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*History of the war in Affghanistan, from its commencement to its close; including a general sketch of the policy, and the various circumstances which induced the British government to interfere in the affairs of Affghanistan. From the journal and letters of an officer high in rank, and who has served many years in the Indian army. Edited by Charles Nash, esq., with an introductory description of the country, and its political state previous to the war*

Charles Barnes Nash  
*editor*

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# HISTORY

OF THE

## WAR IN AFFGHANISTAN,

FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT TO ITS CLOSE ;

INCLUDING

A GENERAL SKETCH OF THE POLICY, AND THE VARIOUS  
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH INDUCED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO  
INTERFERE IN THE AFFAIRS OF AFFGHANISTAN.

FROM THE

JOURNAL AND LETTERS OF AN OFFICER HIGH IN RANK,

AND WHO HAS SERVED MANY YEARS IN THE INDIAN ARMY.

EDITED BY CHARLES NASH, ESQ.

WITH AN

INTRODUCTORY DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY,

AND ITS POLITICAL STATE PREVIOUS TO THE WAR.

LONDON :

THOMAS BROOKS, PUBLISHER, 8, BAKER STREET,

PORTMAN SQUARE.

1843.

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PRINTED BY SCHULZE AND CO., 13, POLAND STREET.

## P R E F A C E.

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better to correct, in the body of the work, such errors as had crept in from imperfect information, in consequence of a great portion of it, having been written during the progress of events, than to leave them standing and supply the deficiency by a note. To avoid also the necessity of a glossary, which at best is but a tiresome distraction of the reader's attention, the Indian terms used in the MS. have been accompanied by their meanings, or discarded altogether, where it could be done safely, for English phrases of the same import.

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

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SCINDE  
AFFGHANISTAN  
THE PUNJAUB Etc.



Longitude East 70 from Greenwich

Thomas Brooks, London, 8 Baker Street Portman Square.

W. Reid, Sculp.





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

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Futteh Khan, when, as would sometimes happen, an Armenian Christian presented himself, desiring to become a convert to Islamism, that he was wont to inquire, what defect he had discovered in his own religion, that he should wish to change it? And would further remark, that those persons who possessed "*a book,*" or written system of faith, and yet wished to adopt a new creed, were scoundrels, actuated by a love of gain, or some other interested motive. To the Hindoo, however, who might wish to enter the Mahomedan church, he, on the contrary, made no objection, but applauded him, who having, as he considered, no religion, was anxious to embrace one.

The general laxity of morals and religion at Cabool, might lead one to suppose, that this apparent liberality, was the result of indifference, rather than superiority of mind; and this impression would be confirmed, by an acquaintance with some of the sectarians, who, amidst their fanciful and mystical doctrines, really appear to possess no religion at all; but when we find the same toleration extending over the country, and influencing all races, whether Affghans, Tajiks, or others, who could not be chargeable with these doctrines, it is fair to ascribe it to some better reason.

The origin of the Affghan people, like that of most other nations, is involved in considerable obscurity. Their own records and traditions represent them as being descended from the Jews, and according to Sir W. Jones, the best Persian authorities coincide with them in this account. He further says, that many of their families are distinguished by the names of Jewish tribes, although, since their conversion to the Islam faith, they studiously conceal their origin, and that the Pushtoo language has a manifest resemblance to the Chaldaic.

In support of this theory, it is further affirmed by Sir John Malcolm, that this origin is claimed for the Affghans by nearly all the Mahommedan writers, and that he himself possessed a genealogical table, in which it was attempted to prove that all the principal families of Affghanistan, were direct descendants of the Kings of Israel. He, however, does not perceive any affinity between the Pushtoo and the Hebrew, and, therefore, does not lay any stress upon the idea of their language being confirmatory of the theory. Cary and Moshman, however, state distinctly that "the Pushtoo language, into which they have translated nearly the whole of the New Testament, contains a greater number of Hebrew words than is to be found in that of any nation in

India, that the Pushtoo and Beloochee appear to form the connecting link between those of Sanscrit, and those of Hebrew origin." Finally, Mr. Chamberlain, a resident missionary, writes "many of the Affghans are undoubtedly of the race of Abraham."

We may, therefore, conclude, that although there is much that is fabulous and absurd in the Affghan accounts of their descent from the children of Israel, still there are reasonable grounds for the supposition that some portion of Jewish blood flows in their veins.

The Affghan nation originally consisted of four tribes, which bore the names of, and were descended from the four sons of Kyse Abdooresheed, Serrabun, Ghoorghoosht, Betnee and Kurleh. As the population increased, these tribes became further divided into classes, and subdivided into petty chieftainships, each forming a little commonwealth, distinct from the others, and holding itself entirely independent of the common head of the race. By degrees the four great original divisions became lost among the intricacies of the numerous smaller ones, and are now only mentioned in their genealogical records.

Their form of government is patriarchal, each subdivision into which the different tribes have ramified, being ruled by its own chief who is,

however, in some degree subordinate to the head of the tribe or Ooloos, to which his subdivision belongs. Notwithstanding, however, this parcelling out of the population into compartments, as it were, and their independence of each other, which might be supposed to weaken the patriotic sentiment, they indulge a feeling of one common nationality, and of the general interests of the whole being mutual.

The manner in which the different chiefs are chosen, varies. The head of an Ooloos or tribe is termed a Khan, and is sometimes elected by the people; but most commonly by the King, and is removable by him at will. The chiefs of inferior divisions are always chosen by popular suffrage, and in all cases the selection must be made from the oldest family, without, however, any strict attention to primogeniture, fitness for the office being generally deemed the chief requisite. This gives something of a democratic tendency to their feelings and institutions, and their attachment is, accordingly, stronger towards the body corporate, than the person of their chief.

The general law of the kingdom is that of the Koran, but they preserve their own code, called the Pooshtoonwulle, a kind of *lex talionis*, authorising any injured party to exact an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. As among the

Corsicans, quarrels are transmitted from father to son, and if vengeance is unattainable upon an aggressor, it is wreaked upon his family; their feuds thus become hereditary.

These feuds are of the most deadly character, particularly among the Eusofzyes, and as quarrels are matters of daily occurrence, they are very numerous. There are few men of station who are not obliged to be continually on the watch for their lives; and in every village may be seen men whose constant habit it is to wear armour as a protection against the sudden assaults of their private foes, and some go attended by hired retainers. The following account of a particular feud, which Mr. Elphinstone mentions having received from one of the parties involved in it, will sufficiently exemplify the preceding observations. The father of Mozirrib (Mr. Elphinstone's informant) had a dispute with a man named Sirundauz, about the boundaries of their lands. From high words, the parties proceeded to blows, and in the end Mozirrib's father was wounded. Anwur Khan, his brother, was head of all the Ghal-leekhail (one of the divisions of the Eusofzye tribe); but his influential position gave him no means of redress, beyond those possessed by any other person. A Jeerga was held on the occasion, which failed of producing any pacificatory result.

A few days afterwards, when Anwur Khan went to the Hoojra, or public-apartment, accompanied by Mozirrib and ten or twelve of his relations, some well armed, others with merely their swords, they found Sirundauz there, with twenty of his friends in full armour.

Anwur immediately commenced reproaching him with his conduct. This produced a retort, and a desperate conflict took place, in which Mozirrib received a terrible gash on the head, and Anwur Khan himself was covered with wounds; many of his friends also received severe injuries. On the other side, a son of Sirundauz, and another of his followers were killed. As Anwur Khan had killed the first man, he was considered to be in the wrong, and was obliged to fly with all his family. Wearied at length with his exile, he submitted to Sirundauz, giving him his sister and his niece (a sister of Mozirrib's). Sirundauz behaved with courtesy; he said, he regarded Anwur's sister as his own, and restored her to her relations; but he kept the other, without marrying her, (it being their custom never to marry a woman, given as the price of blood) and from that day Mozirrib saw his sister no more. The feud was thus put an end to as far as their seeking each other's life, but no intercourse took place between the families. Sirundauz and Anwur

never meet if they can avoid it, and when they do, they turn their heads away. Mozirrib, in answer to a question what he would do, if he met Sirundauz alone, replied that he would instantly attack him, in order to anticipate the assault Sirundauz would undoubtedly make on him. Such animosity, after a reconciliation had taken place, would be censured even among this turbulent tribe; but says Mozirrib, "A man's heart burns for his relation that was killed."

Criminal offences, among the Affghans, are generally tried before a Jeerga, an assembly of khans, elders and priests. In serious cases, a number of young women are given in marriage from the family of the criminal to the person aggrieved and his relations.

In cases of murder, six of them are given with portions, and six without; six also are the penalty for cutting off a hand, an ear, or a nose; and three for breaking a tooth. In this manner, the wealthy and well-connected offender enjoys an immunity from punishment, but woe to the criminal who has no women, and no dowries with which to buy off the consequences of his offence.

In an article in the Quarterly Review, supposed to have been written by Sir Walter Scott, the following interesting comparison is drawn between



these wild and lawless tribes, and the Scottish Highlanders.

“The government and manners of these Affghans are simple, and purely patriarchal; and we have been very forcibly struck with the curious points of parallelism between the habits of these Oriental mountaineers, and those of the ancient Highland clans.

“They resembled each other in their feuds, in their adoption of auxiliary tribes, in their laws, in their modes of conducting war, in their arms, and in some respects, even, in their dress. An Affghan who makes the *amende honorable* to an enemy, comes to his dwelling, lays his head upon the block, or offers his sword, held by the point; a Highlander did the same. It was deemed unworthy, in either case, to refuse the clemency implored, but it might be legally done. The genealogies of the Affghan tribes may be paralleled with those of the clans; the nature of their favourite sports, their love of their native land, their hospitality, their address, their simplicity of manners, exactly correspond. Their superstitions are the same or nearly so. The Gholée Beabaun, demons of the desert, resemble the Boddach of the Highlanders, who ‘walked the heath at midnight and at noon.’ The Affghan’s most ordinary mode of divination, is by examining the marks in the

blade bone of a sheep held up to the light; and even so, the Rev. Robert Kirk assures us, that in his time, the end of the sixteenth century, the seers prognosticate many future events, only for a month's space, from the shoulder bone of a sheep on which a knife never came. By looking into the bone, they will tell if whoredom be committed in the owner's house; what money the master of the sheep had; if any will die out of that house for a month, and if any cattle there will take a troke (i. e. a disease) as if planet struck."

The Affghan, who, in his weary travels, as related by Elphinstone, had seen no vale equal to his own native vale of Speiger, may find a parallel in many an exile from the braes of Lochaber; and whoever had remonstrated with an ancient Highland chief on the superior advantages of a civilised life, regulated by the authority of equal laws, would have received an answer somewhat similar to the indignant reply of the Affghan: "We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood, but we will never be content with a master."

Mr. Elphinstone also remarks upon the similarity between the customs of the two countries, and observes, that "with the exception of the republican government of the Ooloosses, the si-

tuation of the Affghan country appears to me, to bear a strong resemblance to that of Scotland in ancient times. The direct power of the king, over the towns and the country immediately around; the precarious submission of the nearest clans, and the independence of the remote ones, the inordinate power and faction of the nobility most connected with the court, and the relations borne by all the great lords to the crown, resemble each other so closely in the two states, that it will throw light on the character of the Dooranee government to keep the parallel in view."

In two respects, the manners of the Cabool tribes differ materially from those of the Highlanders; first, in the influence of their Jeergas, or patriarchal senates, which diminishes the power of their chiefs, and gives a democratic turn to each separate tribe; the second point of distinction, respects the consolidation of those detached tribes under one head or king, who with a degree of authority, greater or less, according to his talents, popularity and other circumstances, is the acknowledged head of the associated communities.

## CHAPTER II.

## RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE DOORAUNEE MONARCHY.

IT does not come within the design of this narrative, to give an account of all the different tribes of which the Affghan nation is composed; or to dwell at length, upon the history of the country in remote periods. Its career resembles that of most other nations in a semi-barbarous state. Incessantly at war with its neighbours, as their or its own ambition prompted, it was alternately the conqueror and the conquered, now extending its dominions over distant lands, and anon, shorn of its possessions and fighting for its very existence, according as its people marched to conquest under a Mahmood of Ghuznee, or a Sultan Baber, or fell a prey to the victorious arms of a Genjhis Khan, a Tamerlane, or a Naudir Shah. We can but point out, as we have done in the preceding chapter, the general characteristics of the people *en masse*. For more detailed information, we must refer the reader to

works of greater pretension, more especially to the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone's very valuable book upon the subject.

But it will not, it is supposed, be deemed unacceptable to make an exception in favour of the Dooraunes, and give some account of this powerful and important tribe; "which," says the writer above-mentioned, "still rules the whole of the Affghan nation, whose government has been obeyed from the neighbourhood of the Caspian sea to that of the Ganges, and the effects of whose power have been felt over Persia and Tartary, and even at the remote capital of the Mahrattas." It is the tribe to which the royal family belongs, and in every respect the most interesting division of the Affghan people. It enjoys the distinction of being considered the *best*, as the Eusofzyes and Khyberrees possess the unenviable notoriety of being regarded as the *worst* of the Affghans. Even their rivals the Ghiljies, the tribe next in importance to themselves, who occupy the country about Cabool, Ghuznee and Jellalabad, and who once possessed the sovereign power, though the remembrance of their lost supremacy still rankles in their bosoms, admit the general superiority of the Dooraunes to the rest of their countrymen. They inhabit the western parts of the country,

and are remarkably attached to their native land, seldom emigrating to other countries. Their two most important cities are Candahar and Herat.

Of the early history of the people but little is known; they were formerly called Abdaulees, and are divided into two great classes, named after Zeeruk and Punjpow, the sons of Turen. From Zeeruk are descended the Populzyes, the Alekkozyes, the Baurikzyes and the Atchikzyes, which latter, however, were originally but a branch of the Baurikzyes, whom Ahmed Shah divided to lessen the influence of that numerous and powerful clan. From Punjpow spring the Norzyes, the Alizyes, the Ishaukzyes, the Khougounees and the Mankoos. Of these nine clans, the Populzyes and the Baurikzyes are by far the most important, and the only two that need be particularly mentioned. The Populzyes, inasmuch as the royal family is of their number, must be regarded as the chief. This family springs more immediately from the small division of Suddozye, which has long been the head of the Populzyes, and the members of which enjoyed peculiar privileges. Their persons were sacred, no punishment could be inflicted on them, except by one of their own family; nor could even the head of the Abdaulees himself pass sentence of death upon a Suddozye. To this clan of course our late protégé, Shah Shoojah, belonged.

The Baurikzyes are a high spirited and warlike clan, and far more numerous than the Populzyes. From the talent and influence of some of its chiefs, particularly the celebrated Futteh Khan, it has played a conspicuous part in the recent revolutions of the kingdom. To this division belong Dost Mahomed and his son Akbar Khan. The majority of its people are shepherds, while the Populzyes on the other hand are chiefly engaged in agriculture.

Having now introduced the reader to a knowledge of the two most important and interesting clans of the Dooranees, a rapid survey of the rise and progress of the monarchy founded by that powerful tribe, and of the revolutions which convulsed it of late years, will not be thought irrelevant, and will greatly assist the unprejudiced in arriving at a correct judgment upon the causes which led to, and the policy which dictated, the British invasion of Affghanistan.

When Naudir Shah, the restorer of the Persian monarchy, and the conqueror of Affghanistan, was murdered, which event took place in June 1747, Ahmed Shah, a Suddozye chief, and then a very young man, was in his service, in the command of a body of Affghan troops. Upon the death of his sovereign, Ahmed, who was then in Khorassaun, appears to have conceived the design of freeing his country from the Persian yoke

and placing himself upon the throne. He accordingly directed his course towards Affghanistan, fighting his way through the greater part of the territory he was in, and proceeded to Candahar, where he arrived at the head of two or three thousand cavalry. He immediately set about taking measures to secure submission to his authority, and seized upon a treasure which had been intended for Naudir Shah, and had arrived at Candahar on its way from India. He met with some opposition on the part of several of the Doo-raanee chiefs, but by the exercise of a little timely severity, he succeeded in reducing the refractory to submission, and in October, 1747, four months after the decease of Naudir, was crowned King of Affghanistan. He afterwards changed the name of his tribe from Abdaullee to Doo-raanee, which signifies a high degree of excellence, or literally, pearl of pearls.

During the remainder of the year, and the commencement of the next, Ahmed was occupied in establishing his authority securely over the territory he already possessed, and in organizing his army for future expeditions. In arranging the form of his government, he appears to have taken that of Naudir Shah, in Persia, for a model, modified, however, by the different state of things under which himself and that monarch were



called upon to act; Naudir succeeding, although by usurpation, to a throne long established in the affections or prejudices of the nation, while Ahmed on the other hand, had erected one amongst a people of democratic feelings and habits, who had hitherto been unaccustomed to submit to kingly authority, save under the compulsion of foreign conquest.

His chief care was to attach his own tribe firmly to his person and government. With this view, he bestowed several of the great offices of state upon the leading Dooraanee lords, making them hereditary in their families, besides granting them many other important privileges; while his courage, his general talents for war, and the affability of his manners, rendered him popular amongst all classes. With respect to the more distant tribes, he expected by the moderation of his government, by defending them from their enemies, and leading them to conquest, to create in them feelings of attachment towards a monarch of their own country.

When he considered affairs to be sufficiently settled to permit of his leaving home, Ahmed Shah commenced his career of conquest. He first marched against the Ghiljies, who were disaffected to his rule, and speedily reduced them to submission, appointing Dooraanee governors to direct their affairs. He then turned his arms

towards India, advanced like a torrent through the Punjaub, overthrew the Indian army in sight of their capital Lahore, and triumphantly entered that city. After further successes and one action in which he had the worst of it, he finally added this fine province to his dominions.

He next turned his attention towards the west, and Khorassaun; and early in 1749 advanced upon Herat. He speedily reduced this important place, and proceeded thence to Meshed overcoming every obstacle in his way. He then marched upon Neshapoor, where he suffered a defeat, but was more fortunate in a second attempt, and in 1750 brought this country under subjection.

His attention was now diverted by a rebellion in the Punjaub, which had broken out in his absence. With his usual activity he again invaded that country, and reduced it once more to submission. He also further increased his dominions during this expedition by the addition of Cashmere, which was ceded to him by the Great Mogul.

Ahmed was not, however, destined to enjoy much peace with his Indian acquisitions. After a few years' repose, he was again summoned to quell an insurrection in the Punjaub, which broke out upon the death of its governor

Meer Munnoo, and in consequence of the intrigues and aggressions of the court of Delhi. His genius and energy were crowned with their usual success when upon the spot, and upon this occasion, after driving his enemies out of the Punjaub, he marched on to Delhi which he captured, and treated with considerable severity. But all his efforts were comparatively fruitless. Of all possessions, a distant conquered province is the most uncertain. Scarcely had he turned his back, when fresh disturbances arose, and his son Timour, whom he had left in command of the country, was compelled to flee.

Having concluded a war in which he was about this time engaged with the Beloochees, and in which he succeeded in making them tributary to him, Ahmed once more set out for India. He crossed the Indus, and continued his progress through the Punjaub unchecked, the Mahrattas retreating before him as he advanced till they found themselves in the neighbourhood of Delhi, which city they resolved to cover, and drew up their forces for that purpose at Baudlee. Here they were totally routed, and after more than a year's protracted warfare attended with partial successes on both sides, their power was entirely overthrown in a great battle fought near Panniput on the 7th of January, 1761, and the whole of India was thus placed at the mercy of Ahmed

Shah. He, however, prudently abstained from enlarging his possessions, contenting himself with the provinces which had formerly been ceded to him, and shortly afterwards he returned to Cabool.

It is unnecessary to follow this prince through all the details of his victorious career. The rest of his reign was spent in suppressing the rebellions which broke out from time to time in various parts of his wide spread dominions, the Punjaub still being preeminent among the refractory for the trouble it gave him; and, at length, in June, 1773, he died of a cancer in the face.

The character of Ahmed Shah will bear comparison with that of the most famous Asiatic rulers. His abilities both in peace and in war were of a high order. As in the case of Cæsar, Napoleon, and other great warriors, his soldiers were strongly attached to his person, and felt the utmost confidence in him even when under defeat. His general character is thus summed up by Elphinstone, whose words we cannot do better than quote: ’

“ Ahmed Shah appears to have been admirably suited to the situation in which he was placed. His enterprise and decision enabled him to profit by the confusion that followed the death of Naudir, and the prudence and moderation which he acquired from his dealings with his own nation, were no less necessary to govern a war-

like and independent people, than the bold and commanding turn of his natural genius.

“His military courage and activity are spoken of with admiration, both by his own subjects, and the nations with whom he was engaged either in wars or alliances. He seems to have been naturally disposed to mildness and clemency; and though it is impossible to acquire sovereign power, and perhaps in Asia, to maintain it without crimes, yet the memory of no eastern prince is stained with fewer acts of cruelty and injustice.

“In his personal character he seems to have been cheerful, affable, and good tempered. He maintained considerable dignity on state occasions; but at other times his manners were plain and familiar, and with the Doorâunees he kept up the same equal and popular demeanour which was usual with their khans before they assumed the title of king. He treated Moollahs and holy men with great respect, both from policy and inclination. He was himself a divine and an author, and was always ambitious of the character of a saint.

“His policy towards the different parts of his dominions was to rely principally on conciliation with the Affghans and Beloochees; with this difference between the nations, that he applied himself to the whole people in the first case, and only to the chiefs in the other. His possessions

in Toorkistan he kept under by force; but left the Tartar chiefs of the country unremoved, and used them with moderation. The Indian provinces were kept by force alone; and in Khorassaun he trusted to the attachment of some chiefs, took hostages from others, and was ready to carry his arms against any who disturbed his plans."

On the death of Ahmed Shah, he was succeeded by his son Timour, not without attempts, however, to place one of his brothers upon the throne. The character of this prince unfortunately differed greatly from that of his father. He was weak, and fond of ease, and when he felt himself secure in the possession of the sovereign power, he yielded to his natural disposition, instead of endeavouring to consolidate the large empire his predecessor had founded. This inactivity on his part gave encouragement to the disaffected at home, and inspired the conquered provinces with the hope of regaining their independence. He was consequently occupied great part of his reign in suppressing the conspiracies of his rebellious khans, and quelling the insurrections which broke out in the remoter parts of his dominions. But his successes were attended with no permanent good result, as, when he had affected his object, he sunk back into his former inertness; and although he continued to maintain the kingdom bequeathed him by his father with-

out much apparent loss, he left it, at his death, in such a state, as to be ready to fall to pieces upon the first shock. He reigned twenty years, and died in 1793, at Cabool, whither he had removed the seat of government<sup>e</sup>, that he might be more independent of the Dooraunees.

Timour Shah left behind him a numerous family, the most conspicuous of whom were his sons, Humayoon, Zemaun Mahmood, Shoojah, and Ayoob. He had given no directions about the succession, and as soon as he was dead, an intrigue was set on foot for placing Shah Zemaun upon the vacant throne. Sirafranz Khan, a leading Baurikzye nobleman, was prevailed upon to espouse his cause; by which means, the powerful support of the most influential Dooraunee chiefs was secured. Immediate measures were then taken for the establishment of his authority. The persons of the various princes of the royal blood, resident in Cabool, were seized and placed in confinement; the guards, ever open to the highest bidder, were won over to his interest by the liberal distribution of money, and Shah Zemaun being proclaimed king, was permitted to take peaceable possession of the government.

It was not to be supposed, however, he would be allowed to remain long in undisturbed possession of the throne he had so unjustly acquired; and his first measures were directed towards the for-

mation of an army, that he might be prepared to suppress any attempts at insurrection. He had most reason to be apprehensive of Humayoon, who as his senior, had a better claim to the throne, and held possession of Candahar. But the means of the latter were insufficient to make head against his more fortunate brother; and being forsaken by many of his followers, and defeated, he was obliged to flee for safety into Beloochistan. Shah Zemaun then became master of Candahar; and Mahmood, who was governor of Herat, having submitted to his authority, he returned to Cabool, and the undisputed possession of the sovereign power.

Deeming himself now securely seated on the throne, Shah Zemaun became seized with a desire to emulate the military achievements of his celebrated grandfather, Ahmed Shah, in India, and commenced preparations for the invasion of that country; but after advancing as far as Peshawar, the unsettled state of his own dominions and tributaries, particularly, Cashmere, which had revolted upon the death of Timour, and Sind, which was largely in arrears with the annual tribute, compelled him to forego his schemes of conquest for the present. Having succeeded in subduing his enemies, he returned to Cabool, but was again obliged to take the field to oppose Mahmood,



who was marching against him at the head of a considerable army. The brothers met, and after a hard-fought battle, the result of which was for some time doubtful, the good fortune of Zemaun again prevailed, and Mahmood was forced to flee.

But peace could not be expected to last long, while there were so many claimants to a throne occupied by an usurper; and Humayoon having found means to assemble a force, once more advanced against his brother, in the hope of recovering his inheritance. He was, however, again defeated, and taken prisoner; and to prevent any future attempts of the kind, cruelly deprived of sight.

These insurrections being suppressed, Shah Zemaun felt himself at liberty to resume his plans for the invasion of India. His expeditions into that country were attended with occasional success, but always eventually frustrated, from the necessity he was under of returning home to quell the rebellions his absence had given rise to; especially on the part of the indefatigable Mahmood, who, however, was still unsuccessful, and compelled to relinquish even his own government of Herat, and seek safety in flight. It was this desire for Indian conquest, almost amounting to infatuation, leading him to undertake foreign wars when he ought to have been attending to his domestic affairs, and the consolidation of his

usurped power, together with his devotion to a favourite and worthless minister, which in the end, produced, Shah Zemaun's downfall. This minister was Wuffedar Khan, who had so insinuated himself into his master's confidence, that he wielded, uncontrolled, the powers and influence of government, and perverted them to the advancement of his own selfish interests. The nobility hated him for his meanness, arrogance, and rapacity. So obnoxious had he rendered himself by these qualities, that at length some of the Dooraanee nobles entered into a plot to assassinate him, depose his royal master, and place Shah Shoojah upon the throne in his stead. Their design, however, was discovered before it was ripe for execution, and the chief conspirators were all seized and put to death; amongst whom was Sirafracz Khan, the head of the Baurikzie family. The severity of these measures, though it averted the present danger, only exasperated the adherents of the fallen chiefs, and incited them to further attempts in future of the same nature.

Futteh Khan, the eldest son of Sirafracz Khan, burned to revenge the death of his father, and only waited an opportunity to carry his design into effect. At length, having ascertained the feelings of his party, he repaired to Mahmood, and prevailed upon him to make another attempt to gain the throne. He was speedily

joined by the most influential chiefs who had been alienated from their allegiance to Zemaun by the cruelty and injustice of Wuffedar, and he advanced to the siege of Candahar at the head of a considerable force. After a few weeks' resistance, Futtch Khan by his address, gained over the governor to the cause of Mahmood, and this important place fell into his hands.

The loss of Candahar was a heavy blow to the power of Shah Zemaun. It awakened him from his dream of Indian conquest, and brought him hastily back from Peshawar, where he was engaged in organizing his plans for the invasion of Punjaub at the time the intelligence of its fall reached him. But it was too late. He had neglected to secure his interests among the Doo-raunee chiefs, and he now saw himself forsaken by many of those who had hitherto adhered to him; particularly by Ahmed Khan Norzye, one of his principal generals who deserted with his whole force, to his rival, on the eve of a battle. Unwilling to risk an action with so much disaffection about him, he attempted to seek safety in flight; but in his course, was prevailed upon by his evil genius Wuffedar Khan, to enter the castle of a man to whom he had formerly been a benefactor. The treacherous Affghan basely detained him a prisoner, and delivered him into the hands of Mahmood, who subjected him to the same bar-

barous punishment he had inflicted upon Humayoon, and kept him closely confined in the Bala Hissa, at Cabool. At Mahmood's fall, however, he was set at liberty, and afterwards became a resident in the British possessions, and a pensioner upon British bounty.

Mahmood, now invested with the sovereign power, had every prospect of being able to maintain himself in it undisturbed. Humayoon and Zemaun were incapacitated from ever again wielding the sceptre by their loss of sight, and none of the other princes possessed sufficient influence, at present, to give him much cause of alarm. The nobility and people, too, disgusted by Wufedar's insolence and oppression, looked forward to a better state of things under another reign, and regarded with satisfaction the accession of the new monarch.

But Mahmood was even less qualified for the duties of government than Zemaun. The character of this latter prince, indeed, compared with the average of eastern monarchs, was far from contemptible. He possessed considerable energy and activity; his abilities, particularly in military affairs, were above mediocrity, and if not such as would have enabled him to found an empire, they were sufficient to have maintained him upon the throne, with advantage to the country and honour to himself, had he only listened to the dictates of

prudence, and relied more upon himself. Mahmood, on the other hand, was deficient in courage; and thought only of his personal security and comfort, indifferent as to how his ministers might proceed while these were studied. Of these ministers, the most prominent was the Bau-rikzie chief, Futteh Khan, to whose influence and advice the new king was chiefly indebted for his throne; and who, in fact, may be said to have wielded the chief authority. He was a man of great courage and capacity, and of indefatigable activity, restless and intriguing.

Mahmood was not permitted to retain possession of the crown long unmolested. Scarcely had he felt himself safely established in authority, when Prince Shoojah Ool Moolk, who now for the first time appears prominently on the stage of events, and was then about twenty years of age, conceived the design of striking a blow for the crown, and revenging the wrongs of his brother Zemaun. He had been left at Peshawar, in charge of the crown jewels and other property, and he immediately set about distributing money, and making other preparations for assembling an army to enforce his pretensions. He succeeded in collecting a body of ten thousand men, but they were mostly undisciplined, and but indifferently provided with arms. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, however, he had nearly gained

the victory in an action which ensued, when his troops falling into disorder, Futteh Khan made a desperate charge at the head of his gallant Baurik-zies, and totally defeated them. Their rout was complete, and Prince Shoojah himself was obliged to escape to the Khyber mountains for protection.

Mahmood's apprehensions on this head were thus quieted for the present. But one danger only gave way to be succeeded by another of much more formidable extent. He hardly had time to congratulate himself upon his victory over his rival, when an alarming insurrection broke out amongst the Ghiljies. This important tribe had long brooded with dissatisfaction over their by-gone power, and encouraged by the divisions in the country and the weakness of the Dooraunee government, they resolved to make an attempt to recover their former influence. An army of twenty thousand men was quickly formed, and preparations made for attacking Cabool. The intelligence of these proceedings spread the greatest consternation amongst the Dooraunees, and the government were quite unprepared to meet the exigencies of the occasion. The greatest exertions, however, were made by all classes in preparing to meet the common foe; and a force was assembled, which though much inferior in numbers to the enemy, possessed greatly the advantage in discipline and the completeness of their

arms. They sallied forth from the city to meet the advancing Ghiljies, and in two successive conflicts, defeated them with great slaughter.

Another still more formidable rebellion broke out among the same tribe in the succeeding year, which, however, Mahmood was equally successful in quelling; the Ghiljies, after several severe engagements, settling down into repose, and submitting once more to the Dooraunee government.

After the subsiding of these troubles, Mahmood enjoyed, for a time, comparative repose, but his weakness and inattention to the government, his disregard of the religious prejudices of the people, and above all, the licentious freedom he allowed his Kuzzilbash guards to indulge in, to the detriment of the city, disgusted the inhabitants of Cabool, and soon gave rise to fresh disturbances. At length, an outrage committed by this privileged body of troops brought affairs to a climax. The populace flew to arms, and attacked the soldiers, instigated chiefly by Mookhtaur Oodowlah, a nobleman of distinguished courage and talents, whose popular deportment and reputation for sanctity had rendered him universally beloved. Several conflicts took place, in which the guards were worsted. Mahmood was besieged in the Bala Hissar, and finally expelled from the throne, which was now ascended by Shah Shoojah. The deposed monarch was im-

mediately placed in confinement; but contrary to eastern custom, his sight was spared to him. Of this act of humanity, Shah Zemaun, to his honour be it spoken, is said to have been the chief prompter, generously forgetting the treatment he had himself received at the hands of Mahmood.

Upon Shoojah's assumption of the sovereign power, Mookhtaur Oodowlah, the chief promoter of the late revolution, was made vizier. The abilities of this man were sufficient to have strengthened the influence of the crown, and have rescued the country from the deplorable condition into which it had fallen, had the new king been entirely guided by his advice. But Shah Shoojah was unwilling to resign the reins of government into the hands of another. He also felt himself called upon to reward the other supporters of his cause, whose assistance contributed to gain him the throne. Accordingly, all the chief offices of the court were bestowed upon them, but so numerous were the claimants, that a great portion also of the public revenue was swallowed up in making gifts to those for whom offices could not be found. Amongst them were many who envied the talents and influence of the vizier, and who endeavoured to instil into the mind of the king a jealousy of him, which although not seriously apparent for some time, had the effect of weakening the vizier's attachment to his sovereign, and finally



led to an open rupture between them, and the revolt of Mookhtaur Oodowlah to the opposite party. Another great mistake on the part of Shoojah, was his neglecting to secure the powerful support of Futteh Khan, who upon the defeat of Prince Caumraun, the son of Mahmood, at Candahar, came over to his cause, but soon seceded from it again in disgust at being refused the appointments held by his father. The change of sovereigns, although Shoojah was a better and more capable man than Mahmood, had not therefore strengthened the power of the government. In fact, throughout this reign, the disorganization of the state was upon the increase. The power and insolence of the nobles had grown to such an extent, in consequence of the late troubles and the competition of different candidates for the crown, that the most trivial cause was sufficient to drive them into rebellion, and Shoojah deeming it the wisest policy to conciliate rather than punish, they did so with comparative impunity. All this led to a state of things deplorable to contemplate. The chiefs appeared to dissociate all idea of principle from the causes they supported, and veered about from one side to the other, just as the passion or caprice of the moment directed. No one could depend upon another. Treachery and intrigue were in the ascendant, and a man would go out in the

morning to fight a battle against the enemy, he would, perhaps, see some cause for joining before evening.

The first rebellion which occurred to disturb the repose of Shah Shoojah broke out at Candahar, the government of which, upon the expulsion of Mahmood's son, Caumraun, had been given to Prince Kyser, son of Shah Zemaun. Futteh Khan, however, who had quitted the court of Shoojah with a determination to be revenged for the neglect he had met with, had infused into the mind of the young prince the ambitious desire of striking a blow for the kingdom of which his father had been dispossessed by Mahmood. This attempt, Shoojah succeeded in frustrating, as he also did a second one, and Futteh Khan finding his intrigues with Kyser unavailing, proceeded to Herat, where he contrived by his address to impress Prince Feerooz with the same ambitious feelings as he had previously done Kyser. Both parties assembled troops, but before hostilities took place, their differences were settled by negotiation, upon which Futteh Khan withdrew from the cause of Feerooz in disgust.

After the defeat of these attempts to depose him, Shoojah enjoyed for some time peaceful possession of the sovereign power. Kyser, who

had been continued in the government of Candahar, remained faithful to his interests, and even entertained a design of putting Futteh Khan to death, whom he had contrived to seize. But this wily and intriguing chieftain not only succeeded in turning him from his purpose, but likewise in shaking his allegiance to his uncle, and engaged him in a fresh attempt upon the throne. In accordance with this design, Futteh proceeded to enrol his Baurikzyes in the cause, but during his absence Kyser transferred his confidence to Khojeh Mahommed Khan, another noble of great power and influence, who dissuaded him from his intention. Futteh Khan, upon his return, was so exasperated by this change of plan, that he resolved henceforth to give up all connection with Kyser's cause, and immediately went over to the party of Caumraun, of Herat, whom he offered to put in possession of Candahar. This prince gladly availed himself of the proffered assistance, and advanced to within a short distance of the city. Kyser was alarmed by these proceedings, and prepared for immediate flight, but sent to Futteh Khan to solicit a final interview previous to his departure. The result of this meeting was a total change of the relative positions of each of the contending parties, and an illustration of the character of the times and

of the people. Kyser represented to Futteh Khan the obligations he was under to him for having saved his life, while the other complained of the want of confidence with which he had been treated. At last, a reconciliation took place between them. Kyser promised to be guided by his advice in every thing for the future, and Futteh Khan resolved once more to join his cause. The next morning they marched out together to attack Caumraun, whom Futteh Khan charged with his usual impetuosity, and totally routed.

Notwithstanding, however, the singularity of the circumstances and the apparent sincerity of their reconciliation, the new alliance between Prince Kyser and Futteh Khan was of but short continuance. Khojeh Mahommed recovered his ascendancy over the mind of the young prince, who preferred his more prudent counsels, and the Baurikzye noble once more quitted with indignation and disgust the cause of the vacillating Kyser, and with the ease with which an Affghan changes his party, transferred his services again to Caumraun.

This prince, notwithstanding his former treachery, acceded to the offers of Futteh Khan, and their united forces advancing upon Candahar, compelled Kyser to flee for safety into Beloo-

chistan, where he waited the arrival of reinforcements from Shoojah.

The king, who was at Peshawar when he first had intelligence of this fresh outbreak, hastened in person to quell it. In this he was successful, as the troops which Feerooz had sent to the assistance of Caumraun were recalled to repel a meditated attack by the Persians on Herat. The rebel army, thus weakened, were insufficient to oppose the royal troops. Caumraun took to flight, and Futteh Khan once more submitted to Shah Shoojah.

But this reign is little more than a record of tumults and rebellions. Scarcely had the king succeeded in suppressing that of Caumraun than Kyser was again in the field, incited by the vizier Mookhtaur Oodowlah, whose dissatisfaction with his sovereign was so great that he now threw off all allegiance, and joined the rebel party. He was, however, killed in an engagement with the royal troops. Mahmood, also, who had taken the field again, assisted by the restless Futteh Khan and the Meer Waez, chief priest of the Mahomedans, was defeated, and Shah Shoojah's affairs once more established upon a seemingly firm basis.

## CHAPTER III.

HISTORY OF SHAH SHOOJAH, AND FALL OF THE  
DOORAUNEE MONARCHY.

IT was during the interval of repose which succeeded the events related in the preceding chapter, that the mission of the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, from the government of British India, arrived at Peshawar, where Shah Shoojah at that time held his court. Before much had been done, however, to further the objects of the embassy, the quiet of the country was again disturbed by Mahmood, aided by the restless and indefatigable Futteh Khan, who had once more raised a rebellion, and taken possession of Candahar.

When the intelligence of this disaster reached Peshawar, the greater part of the royal army was

absent under the minister Akram Khan, who had been sent a short time previous, against the son of the late vizier, who still held out in Cashmere. The result of this expedition was most unfortunate. Akram Khan was betrayed by Motawullee, a chief in whom he placed great confidence, and the greater part of his army destroyed among the mountain passes, into which they had been traiterously conducted. The minister and the other chiefs, however, contrived to save themselves by flight. Simultaneously with the arrival of this disastrous news, information was brought of the capture of Cabool by Mahmood, and of his intention to march on Peshawar; but the progress of the victorious party was stayed by dissensions among themselves.

Shoojah was now placed in a perilous situation. Akram Khan had returned, and was endeavouring to re-assemble the scattered remains of his army; but this minister was very unpopular, both amongst the chiefs and the people. He was a man of fair abilities and invincible personal courage, but excessively haughty and avaricious. He was not, therefore, calculated to gain adherents to his master's cause, or conciliate his enemies; but the disagreements of the latter among themselves, gave the King time to retrieve, in some

measure, his late reverses. A considerable body of troops was again collected, and it was resolved to march on Cabool. Unfortunately, the army did not advance with that precaution and attention to order which circumstances rendered necessary; and after a long and fatiguing march through the mountains, they were attacked while yet in confusion, by Futteh Khan, at the head of a small body of his followers. Akram Khan, who was with the king in the rear, directly he heard of the circumstance, dashed forward with a few horsemen to the assistance of the advanced guard; but he was too late, they were already defeated. Nevertheless, the courageous and gigantic chief, carried away by the impetuosity of his disposition, rushed on, and had penetrated almost to the very spot where Futteh Khan was, when he was overpowered by numbers, and slain, after a gallant and desperate resistance, in which numbers fell beneath his sword. Dost Mahomed, the future ruler of Cabool, who was a younger brother of Futteh Khan, is said to have greatly distinguished himself in this action.

This calamity, and particularly the death of Akram, appears to have broken the king's spirits, He despondingly regarded the defeat of his advanced guard as decisive of the contest, and retreated to the Khyber mountains, where he re-



mained inactive for some days, but was subsequently persuaded to advance on Candahar. But misfortune still attended him. Mahmood and Futteh Khan pushed on, at the head of six thousand horse, to intercept his progress, and came up with him at Jakan, near Candahar. A battle ensued, which was sustained with considerable obstinacy on both sides, till the treachery of Saloo Khan Astikzye, who deserted from Shoojah at the head of a large body of horse, decided the fate of the day, and compelled the unfortunate monarch once more to seek safety in flight. He pursued his way towards the Indus, which he crossed near Leia, and took refuge for a time in the territories of Mahomed Khan, a chief of his own tribe, who treated him with much hospitality and respect. Here he heard the satisfactory intelligence of the safety of his family, who, upon the breaking out of the troubles, had been prudently sent to Rawil Pindie, in the Punjaub, to be out of the reach of danger.

At this stage of Shah Shoojah's fortunes, Runjeet Sing, the celebrated Maha Rajah of Lahore, with the design of extending his own power, offered to assist him in the conquest of Mooltan. The Shah, however, appeared to penetrate his intentions, and evaded a direct answer to his overtures by proceeding to join his family at

Rawil Pindée. While there, he resolved once more to attempt the recovery of Peshawar, and crossing the river Attock, advanced at the head of his troops to attack the city. Mahomed Azeem Khan, the brother of Futtèh Khan, to whose charge it had been committed, upon learning the approach of Shoojah, advanced to meet him; but after some days, finding his army greatly thinned by desertions to the Shah, he deemed it most prudent to decline an engagement, and retreated, leaving the Shah to take possession of the city unopposed.

His success, however, was but temporary. Mahomed Azeem, who had proceeded to Cabool for reinforcements, returned at the head of a chosen body of troops, and after an obstinately contested battle, in which Shoojah was defeated, he regained possession of Peshawar, and the Shah betook himself again to Rawil Pindée. Another attempt of the same kind was made by him shortly afterwards, but was equally unsuccessful, and he then relapsed into inactivity.

From this state of tranquillity, Shoojah was roused some time after by the adhesion of a number of the Dooraunee lords who had hitherto sided with Mahmood, but now represented themselves as disgusted with the tyrannical administration of that monarch and his minister, Futtèh Khan,

and resolved to support the claims of Shah Shoojah. With their assistance and advice, he resumed his efforts upon Peshawar. Mahomed Azeem Khan, again thought it advisable to retire to Cabool; and the Shah once more entered the city in triumph.

But the whole proceeding appears to have been a plot on the part of some of the chiefs engaged in it, to get Shoojah into their power, and deprive him of the Kohi-noor, one of the largest diamonds in the world, which had been brought from India by Naudir Shah, passed at his death into the possession of Ahmed Shah, and descended to his successors on the Dooraunee throne. Jehan Dad Khan, Semunder Khan, and Nund Rans, were the agents in this disgraceful transaction, to which they had been instigated by Atta Mahomed Khan, of Cashmere, the son of Mookhtaur Oodowlah, Shoojah's former vizier. After various manœuvres, they gained possession of the person of the unfortunate Shah, and actually had the audacity to imprison him on one of the mountains of Cashmere, whither he was conveyed by Jehan Dad Khan, and where Atta Mahomed visited him immediately in quest of the coveted prize.

This daring outrage appears to have filled even his rival, Mahmood, with indignation. Directly he was made acquainted with it, he sent troops to

devastate the territories of the tribes to which the conspirators belonged, and fitted out an expedition against Cashmere, which he placed under the command of Futteh Khan, to avenge the dishonour done to the Dooraunee name. Upon the receipt of these tidings, Atta Mahomed became terrified at the consequences of his temerity and baseness, although he at first made some show of opposition. But seeing the hopelessness of his being able to withstand the force sent against him, he threw himself upon the mercy of Shoojah, whom he abjectly solicited for forgiveness, which the generous Shah granted him.

Atta Mahomed having thus submitted, Futteh Khan recovered Cashmere, and Shoojah was prevailed upon by him, in conjunction with Runjeet Sing, to retire to Lahore, whither his family had been previously removed by the cunning Maha Rajah. During his progress to that city, he was frequently solicited by various chiefs to erect his standard in Cashmere; but he declined, from a feeling of gratitude to Mahmood, who had sent Futteh Khan to release him from the power of Atta Mahomed.

No sooner had the unfortunate Shoojah arrived at Lahore, than the object of Runjeet Sing in persuading him to come there was made apparent. He was immediately subjected to restraint, and every attempt made by cunning

and cajolery to induce him to give up the Kohinoor diamond. To this he at length acceded, under a written promise from the crafty Indian despot, to furnish him with a regular revenue for his support, and provide him sufficient means for the recovery of his kingdom. But these promises, as may be expected, were only intended to deceive; and the unhappy monarch, when he had parted with his treasure only found himself a closer prisoner than before. His eyes were now fully opened to his situation, and he resolved to escape from the power of Runjeet as soon as he could contrive the means. His first care, however, was for the security of his family, who succeeded at last in effecting their escape to Loodianah, after the failure of four successive attempts. Upon their flight being known, Runjeet Sing was exceedingly exasperated, and ordered increased vigilance to be exercised in guarding the king. But in spite of all his precautions, the Shah, after several months' confinement, having discovered a connexion between his prison-room, of which he had removed some of the flooring, and several rooms beneath, found means of setting himself free. Taking with him four followers, he descended in the night to these rooms, which conducted him to the public drain of the city, and creeping through it till he arrived at the river

side, he jumped into a boat which had been placed in readiness for him, and escaped to Rajour, whose chief treated him with great kindness and hospitality. From this place, he proceeded to Kustwar, whither he was invited by the Rajah of the district who received him with the utmost cordiality, and promised to assist him in the design of recovering Cashmere, which he was then meditating. Preparations for carrying out this plan were now entered into with spirit, and a tolerable force assembled, the friendly Rajah having disposed of his jewels to procure the necessary funds.

These preparations did not pass unobserved by Mahomed Azeem Khan, who was at this time Naib of Cashmere, and he took rigorous measures for his defence. His troops were, however, defeated upon several occasions, but the severity of the season was so great, that the soldiers of Shoojah, who were principally Hindostanees, perished in great numbers. He was consequently compelled to give up the contest and return to Kustwar, where he remained for some months longer, but becoming naturally anxious to see his family; he resolved to take his departure for Loodianah, and safely arrived there after a lengthened journey, during which he suffered greatly from anxiety and fatigue.

Shah Shoojah appeared to have resigned all hope of regaining his lost crown, and had dwelt for some time in peaceful retirement at Loodianah with his family, when circumstances occurred which raised him from inactivity, and brought him again upon the scene of action.

An expedition had been sent against Herat, under Futteh Khan, for the purpose of deposing Hajee Ferooz, the governor, upon the plea of his incapacity for the administration of affairs. This scheme was successful, the governor was imprisoned, and Dost Mahomed Khan, who accompanied his brother, the vizier, forced his way into the Harem Serai, where he found a daughter of Mahmood's, who had been given in marriage to a son of Hajee Ferooz, and violently tore from her person the jewels and ornaments which adorned her dress. Futteh Khan, upon hearing of the outrage, was exceedingly incensed against his brother, and resolved to punish him, but he escaped to Cashmere, where he sought refuge with another of his brothers, Mahomed Azeem Khan, who although he condemned his conduct, afforded him protection.

When the gross insult which had been offered to his family in the person of his daughter was made known to Mahmood, his indignation was extreme, and his son, Caumraun, who envied

and, hated Futteh Khan, persuaded him that it was at the instigation of that chief that the outrage had been committed. Mahmood, glad to have an opportunity of disgracing his vizier, without the appearance of injustice or ingratitude to the man who had raised him to the throne, gave Caumraun permission to adopt whatever course he might deem best, and that prince immediately had the Baurikzye noble placed in confinement and barbarously deprived of his sight.

Such an act of tyranny, it was not likely, would be allowed to pass unavenged by the powerful family to which the injured chief belonged. His brothers accordingly threw off their allegiance to Mahmood, and entered into schemes for deposing him and raising one of his brothers to the throne in his stead. Yar Mahomed Khan, at the head of one party, endeavoured to bring in Prince Ayoob, while Nuwab Sumud Khan, Şultan Ali Shah and Peer Dil Khan, at the head of another, solicited Shah Shoojah once more to resume the sceptre. The latter party do not, however, appear to have had any sincerity in their proceedings, and although Ayoob fled before him, Shoojah, doubtful of the fidelity of the chiefs, and learning that Mahomed Azeem Khan, one of his advisers in his present attempt,



was advancing against him, retired into the mountainous districts, where he was met and defeated by that insidious noble, whose schemes were made apparent by his immediately inviting Ayooob back.

In the meanwhile, Mahmood, enraged by these proceedings on the part of the Baurikzye chiefs, and not content with having robbed the unfortunate Futteh Khan of his sight, resolved to wreak his vengeance still farther upon that hapless nobleman. In pursuance of this resolution, he gave orders for his death. The blind vizier was brought out, his fetters were knocked off, and he was literally cut to pieces, limb by limb, at the command of his savage master. This diabolical deed was performed by the Dooranees of different clans, who each cut some portion from the tortured man, Mahmood hoping by this infamous expedient to shut out all chance of their uniting with the opposite party.

The Baurikzye brothers were, however, too powerful for Mahmood successfully to withstand. His power was limited to Herat and the country immediately surrounding it, and the dissolution of the Dooranee monarchy may be said to date from this period. Sultan Ali Shah was seated on the throne of Cabool, but speedily deposed and strangled by Ayooob, who then assumed the

sovereign power with the assistance of Mahomed Azeem Khan. This chief, in fact, wielded the whole authority of government, Ayoob being but a mere puppet in his hands. He administered the affairs of his sovereign with success for some years, but died, at length, it is said, of a broken heart, in consequence of an unsuccessful expedition against Runjeet Sing, whose dominions his ambition to be a conqueror had led him to covet. He was a man of immense wealth, amounting, it is said, to three millions sterling. Upon his death, his son, Hubeb Oolah Khan, became governor of Cabool and defeated Dost Mahomed in several attempts to overthrow his authority, but was at last expelled by him when that chief became master of Cabool and assumed the sovereign power, which he retained possession of till driven from his kingdom by the British forces in the late war.

The country now enjoyed a state of repose as regarded struggles for the sovereign power for a lengthened period. The once mighty kingdom of Cabool, torn to pieces by its own dissensions, was broken up into so many separate principalities, the heads of which were too much occupied with their own affairs to permit of interference in those of each other. The states which had been tributary to the crown, Balk,

Scinde, Beloochistan, and the Affghan possessions in the Punjaub, had taken advantage of the recent troubles, and the weakened state of the Dooraunee monarchy, to throw off their allegiance and to regain their independence. Mahmood remained undisturbed in possession of the government of Herat, and attempted not to recover the lost sovereignty of Cabool. Dost Mahomed maintained his power in the latter city and its dependancies by dint of his genius and energy of character, while Candahar and Peshawar were held by his brothers, who, however, governed independently of him. There was abundance of materials for combustion, but not sufficient unity amongst them to produce ignition.

Such was the state of the country from the year 1824, when Dost Mahomed's sovereignty commenced, up to the beginning of 1833; but it would seem as if nine years were too long a period for the turbulent and intriguing khans of Affghanistan to remain inactive, or content with even the moderate degree of peace and order, the country had latterly enjoyed. Accordingly some of the leading chiefs of the Dooraunee and Ghiljie tribes, dissatisfied probably with the little influence they possessed under the able and energetic ruler who then swayed the destinies of Cabool, and thinking to increase their power by placing the

sceptre in the hands of one they deemed might be more compliant, sent urgent solicitations to Shah Shoojah to resume offensive operations, and once more attempt to recover his lost kingdom, assuring him of their entire support. The oft-defeated king in spite of repeated failure, still cherished the hope of one day being successful, and listened eagerly, as heretofore, to their proposals. He was also further encouraged by Runjeet Sing, who furnished him with a considerable sum of money towards the expenses of the war; stipulating, however—for the wily Sikh ever had an eye to the increase of his own power—that Peshawar should be ceded to him in return for his good offices. He thus contrived to assemble a very considerable force, but in the onset met with an unexpected obstacle in the opposition of the Ameers of Scinde, upon whom he had calculated for support. He totally defeated them, however, in a sanguinary battle in which great numbers of the enemy were slain.

After this victory, the Shah pushed on towards Candahar, before which he arrived with an army which had swelled in his progress to sixty thousand men. He immediately invested the city, and his first operations were attended with success, but the intelligence of Dost Mahomed's approach at the head of a numerous force, though

far inferior to the Shah's, occasioned the latter to change his position. On the day following that on which he effected this movement, Dost Mahomed arrived to the relief of his brothers in Candahar, and a general action ensued. The battle raged with great fury for some time, and, at first, victory seemed to incline to the side of Shoojah, but the courage and energy of Dost Mahomed retrieved the day. He flew from rank to rank, holding the Koran in one hand, and his sword in the other, exhorting his troops who were giving way before the superior numbers of the enemy, to stand firm and not desert their leader. His gallantry restored their confidence, and re-inspired by his spirited exhortations, the flying troops returned to the charge with redoubled vigour. The troops of Shah Shoojah now in their turn began to give way, and the Hindoostanees being still further dispirited by the loss of Mr. Campbell their leader, who had entered the Affghan King's service, the rout became general. Dost Mahomed was left master of the field, and the unfortunate Shoojah once more became a fugitive and an exile. This was his last attempt to regain his lost kingdom till the British Government in India deemed it necessary for the maintenance and security of our Eastern dominions, to espouse his cause, and put him

forward again in 1838, as a claimant to the throne.

During the decline of the Dooraunee monarchy, while Affghanistan was convulsed by the factions which sprung up on every side in support of this or that competitor for the crown, a power was growing up on its eastern frontier, which, though once a tributary, threatened to become a formidable rival to it, and as it exercised a considerable influence upon our relations with Affghanistan some account of it will be necessary.

This was the Sikh power which from a peaceful sect of religious dissenters founded in the fifteenth century by a Mahommedan priest, named Nanak, had grown into a powerful and warlike people. They had given even the victorious Ahmed Shah much trouble in his expeditions to the Punjaub, and though always defeated by him, they returned in greater numbers upon his withdrawal from the country. Their power had gone on increasing during the succeeding reigns, and they had taken advantage of the distracted state of the kingdom of Cabool in latter years to free themselves entirely from the Affghan yoke. Under their celebrated chieftain Runjeet Sing, they had gradually acquired extent of territory and organization, and had now become a powerful and independent kingdom. This monarch

was a man of extraordinary talent, courage, and ambition, with an activity of disposition which gave these qualities full effect. He was diminutive in person, but of most expressive countenance; his forehead was broad and capacious, his right eye, the only one he possessed, having lost the other by small pox, was large, prominent, and brilliant, glancing continually and restlessly around, and his appearance altogether was singular and compressive. After having subdued the various chiefs in the Punjaub and erected that country into a sovereign state, he turned his attention to the Dooraanee possessions bordering his dominions, and wrested the important province of Cashmere from them. He next formed the design of adding Peshawar to his territories, having, by his address, engaged the government of British India in a treaty by which it was bound not to interfere with his conquests on the west of the river Sutlej, and after the defeat of Shah Shoojah, in 1834, acting upon the agreement which had been entered into between them, he gained possession of that city by an artifice worthy of his cunning and aggressive genius. No, Nehal Sing his grandson, was sent, who asked permission to view the town. This was granted, and he entered it accompanied by a numerous armed escort, who as soon as they were all safely within

the walls, kept forcible possession of the place, and evaded all Dost Mahomed's demands, on the part of his brother, for its restoration. This ruler at length resorted to arms for its recovery, but was equally unsuccessful, although he maintained a conflict for some time with great spirit against the Sikh monarch, under the disadvantage of insufficient means, especially want of funds.

- Dost Mahomed, conscious of the weakness of his position, had long wished to strengthen himself by the formation of some powerful alliance. He had accordingly, at a very early period of his rule, cast his eyes towards the government of Calcutta, but his solicitations had not been favourably regarded in that quarter; non-interference with the affairs of Cabool having been deemed, at that time, the best policy on our part.

Alarmed, therefore, now by the aggressions of Runjeet Sing whom he perceived to be in strict alliance with the British, and apprehensive of continued encroachments from the well-known ambition of the Maha Rajah of Lahore, he bethought him of looking to some other power for assistance.

He was still further influenced to this course by the knowledge that the English had hitherto afforded protection to the exiled monarch of the

- Suddozye family, and were suspected of secretly favouring their cause.



The country which most obviously presented itself to him in this situation of affairs, was Persia, whose connexion with Affghanistan had formerly been so intimate, and the views it put forward about this period respecting that state, and particularly its attempt to subjugate Herat, the last remaining possession of the Sud-dozye family, exercised an important influence upon the future policy of the British government.

Since the foundation of the Dooraunee kingdom, Herat had been under the dominion of the Affghans, and it was not till about 1831-2; that the Persians conceived the design of annexing it to their territory. The governors of Khorassaun had frequently sent expeditions against that city, not, however, for the purpose of conquest, but rather with a view to plunder.

Futteh Ally Shah, the late sovereign, was always opposed to the design of subjugating Herat, and upon one occasion, when one of the Persian princes had introduced a body of troops into the town, he was ordered by that monarch to evacuate it. He foresaw the difficulty, even if he succeeded in conquering it, of preserving his authority over its turbulent and hostile people, and felt convinced that its capture would prove a source of weakness rather than of

strength. He consequently advised his son, Abbas Meerza, to relinquish all thought of subduing the city, and attend to the consolidation and improvement of his own kingdom.

Notwithstanding this counsel, the prince found himself sufficiently powerful to act in opposition to it, and in the year 1833, he fitted out an expedition against Herat, and placed it under the command of Mahomed Meerza, since become the sovereign of Persia. It was unsuccessful in consequence of the death of Abbas, which compelled his son to retreat, but directly Mahomed succeeded his grandfather upon the throne, he resolved to attempt again the conquest of Herat. His designs were strenuously opposed by Mr. Ellis, the British minister, at his court; but on the other hand, as strenuously supported by the agents of Russia, and it was not difficult to pronounce which advice would be adopted by a young and ambitious monarch, when the choice lay between the advocate of a peaceful policy, and those who pandered to his warlike inclinations and love of territorial aggrandizement.

Russia had for some time been secretly intriguing at the court of Persia, and her influence was now paramount. When Mr. Ellis discovered the state of affairs, he lost no time in representing to the British government the danger to our

interests with which the designs of Russia and Persia were fraught, and the necessity of doing something to counteract their machinations. He wrote on the 8th of January, 1836, "that the Russian minister at this court (the Persian), had expressed himself in very strong terms respecting the expediency of the Shah losing no time in undertaking the expedition against Herat, and had assigned, as a reason for the immediate urgency of his doing so, the probability of the British government discouraging the attempt, in pursuance of their known wish to see a restoration of the Affghan monarchy." Soon afterwards, he writes: "I feel quite assured that the British government cannot permit the extension of the Persian monarchy in the direction of Affghanistan, with due regard to the internal tranquillity of India; that extension will, at once, bring Russian influence to the very threshold of our empire; and, as Persia will not, or dare not, place herself in a condition of close alliance with Great Britain, our policy must be to consider her no longer an outwork for the defence of India, but as the first parallel, from whence the attack may be commenced or threatened." And again: "I am convinced that every effort will be made by the Shah to obtain possession of Herat, and to extend his dominions in the direction of Aff-

ghanistan, and that, for this purpose, no opportunity will be lost of forming connexions with the chief of Cabool and his brothers. I cannot refrain from most earnestly calling the attention of his Majesty's government, and of the East India Company, to the danger of the Shah of Persia approaching, either by direct conquest or by the admission of his right of dominion, the frontiers of India; for I can conceive no event more likely to unsettle the public mind in the North Western provinces, and to disturb the general tranquillity of our Eastern empire."

It was with these powers, then, thus inimicably intriguing against the interests of England, that Dost Mahomed and his three brothers who governed Candahar, entered into those negotiations which appeared to threaten the security of our eastern empire, and ultimately induced the British government to send the late ill-fated expedition to Cabool, for the purpose of placing upon the throne a sovereign more friendly to our interests.

## CHAPTER IV.

## REMARKS UPON THE POLICY OF THE WAR.

SUCH was the state of Affghanistan, and of our relations with the rulers of that country, Persia, and the monarch of the Sikhs, when Lord Auckland in 1836, was appointed to the government of British India.

Immediately upon the arrival of the new Governor-General, Dost Mahomed addressed a letter to him, setting forth the danger in which he was placed between the Persians on the one hand, and Runjeet Sing on the other, and soliciting advice and assistance. Lord Auckland replied in a friendly spirit, and the result of the correspondence was the mission of Captain, afterwards Sir Alexander Burnes to Cabool, for the purpose of negotiating a system of commercial intercourse between the countries of Central Asia and Hindoostan ; but whose powers were afterwards enlarged, so as to include questions of a more political nature. In the meantime, an active correspondence had been carried on between the

chiefs of Candahar and the Persian court, who sought to engage them in its designs upon Herat. Into these, Kohun Dil Khan and his brothers entered the more readily, conscious that their power was founded on usurpation, and from the animosity they consequently bore the chief of that principality, who was the head of the only branch of the Suddozye race whom they had not succeeded in expelling from sovereign power. Independently of these considerations, between Prince Caumraun and the Baurikzye brothers a deadly feud existed which had arisen from mutual injuries; the former had been chiefly instrumental in depriving Futteh Khan of his sight and afterwards in his cruel murder; their father Sirafracz Khan had also been put to death by one of his race. On the other side, the Baurikzyes had incurred the hatred of Caumraun by the gross outrage offered to one of the princesses of his family by Dost Mahomed. The governors of Candahar, therefore, notwithstanding the danger that might result to themselves from the ulterior designs of Persia, felt more inclined to listen to the overtures of that power than to look for support from England, and a promise of the possession of Herat was held out to them as the price of their co-operation in its conquest. These negotiations were no secret to the Ameer of

Cabool, and between the appointment of Captain Burnes' mission and its arrival at its destination, he had received communications from the Persian envoy at Candahar, which tended in some measure to cool his ardour for the British connexion. He, however, still professed to desire it in preference to any other alliance, and Captain Burnes was received with much apparent cordiality upon his arrival at Cabool.

In the various interviews which ensued between them, the British envoy represented to the Ameer the advantage of cultivating improved relations with England, both commercial and political, and subsequently tendered the mediation of the Indian government for the settlement of his differences with the Sikhs. To this was annexed the condition that he should renounce all further communication with the courts of Russia and Persia, a preliminary, which was absolutely essential to render the alliance of any value to England, as he had recently made overtures to the latter power, which if embodied in a treaty would have subjected him so entirely to Persian influence, as to compel him to assist in whatever design that government might form, and consequently to aid the views of Russia. Dost Mahomed at first listened attentively, and with apparent good faith to the representations of Captain Burnes. He

had good reason to suspect his brothers at Candahar; of negotiating with Persia for the advancement of their own interest independently of, and even in opposition to his. He had a higher notion of the power and importance of the British government than is usually entertained by the semi-barbarous and inflated monarchs of Asia, and deemed that they might be exerted beneficially for his interest at the court of Lahore. These, and other considerations, induced him to wish the alliance of England in preference to that of any other state, supposing it equally ready to forward his designs; and there appeared good grounds for anticipating a favourable result to the mission.

But it soon became evident that the desire of obtaining possession of Peshawar, for which he was about this period engaged in a contest with Runjeet Sing, was uppermost in the mind of the Ameer of Cabool. In his first interviews with Captain Burnes, he expressed himself anxious to do everything that could promote the interests of commerce, but that he was involved in difficulties most unfavourable to such a course. His hostilities with the Sikhs, he said, narrowed his resources, compelled him to take money from the merchants, and even to increase the duties to support the expenses of the war. It was useless



he further remarked, to think that peace could be established while Peshawar was controlled by the presence of Sikh troops, and that Runjeet Sing's relinquishment of that city could alone secure permanent tranquillity. He also desired the assistance of England, on the condition of furthering her views, in preserving the independence of Candahar, and otherwise defending Affghanistan from the attacks of the Persians.

These demands it was of course impossible for the British government to accede to with any regard to justice or sound policy. Peshawar had never belonged to Dost Mahomed. At the dissolution of the Dooraunee kingdom, it had fallen to the share of one of his brothers and could no more be claimed by him as part of his possessions, than its governor could lay claim to the city of Cabool. Runjeet Sing had taken advantage of the troubles of the country, and a treaty he had entered into with Shah Shoojah to take possession of it. It had, therefore, become his by right of conquest, and to have compelled him to give it up, leaving out of view the injustice of such a step, would have been highly impolitic, as tending to alienate a firm and powerful ally, at a time too, when we needed all the influence we could secure among the native princes of India. Dost Mahomed was nevertheless greatly disappointed at

the refusal of England to comply with his wishes. He closed the correspondence with irritation, and immediately entered into close communication with Captain Vieovich, the Russian agent, who had arrived at Cabool during the progress of the negotiations with Captain Burnes.

The mission having thus failed of its objects, it became necessary for the British envoy to leave Cabool; and having applied for, and received his dismissal, he returned to India, representing to the government the necessity of taking immediate measures for the counteraction of the intrigues carrying on against us.

During these transactions, matters in the west were advancing towards a crisis. The Shah of Persia at the head of a large army, had marched to the siege of Herat, and had publicly announced his determination of adding it to his dominions. In this design he was assisted by Russian advice and with Russian money. His first operations were attended with success. He advanced as far as Ghorian unopposed, and that formidable fortress, regarded as one of the most inaccessible strongholds in the country, capitulated after a siege of only ten days. The victorious Persian army then proceeded to invest Herat, and arrived before that city to the number of forty thousand men.

It is unnecessary to enter into the details of

this memorable siege, interesting as it was upon every account. It was carried on for several months with unflagging spirit, and greater courage and military skill were displayed on both sides, than is usually looked for in the records of Asiatic warfare. The Heratees, notwithstanding the disheartening effect of the fall of Ghorian, defended themselves with invincible bravery under the leadership of their daring and talented minister Yar Mahomed Khan. But it was the brilliant conduct of our heroic countryman, Major Eldred Pottinger, then only a lieutenant, who threw himself into the beleaguered town, while returning to India by that route, which was chiefly instrumental in preserving it from falling. His skilful arrangements foiled the whole power of Persia, and eventually compelled the Shah to retire from before Herat in disgrace.

The designs of Persia were made evident beyond the possibility of doubt by the march of her troops to the siege of Herat, in spite of the remonstrances of England. Every effort had been made to dissuade the Shah from the prosecution of that enterprise, but without avail; it was quite clear he intended to act in opposition to British advice and British interests. The Persian minister explicitly stated to Mr. Ellis, that he considered the dominions of his sovereign

justly extended as far as Ghuznee, while the emissary from the rulers of Candahar, declared that Affghanistan was ready to submit to the authority of Persia. It became, in consequence, imperatively necessary that the government of India should adopt some decided and energetic course, with relation to affairs in that country.

The British empire in the East is founded upon a basis, the very nature of which, renders her naturally averse to the neighbouring influence of any foreign power, which could by any means become her rival. The policy of England has, therefore, always been to form such connexions and alliances with the native states in her vicinity, as might serve for a protection to her interests in that quarter of the globe. Russia was the country from whose position and resources, coupled with her well-known activity and love of territorial acquisition, the most danger was to be apprehended. It was not, therefore, without a feeling of well-grounded alarm, that the Indian government had beheld the approaches of that ambitious and grasping power to our frontier through the influence it exercised over the intervening countries of Persia and Affghanistan.\* That this alarm was, as has been said, well-grounded, and not entertained hastily and without consideration, there is abundant evidence to prove. Mr. Ellis and

Mr. McNeill, ministers successively at the court of Persia, both men of ability and well fitted for coming to a right judgment upon events passing around them, united in representing the peril to our interests, arising from the intrigues being carried on between Russia and the court at which they were resident, and the necessity of erecting Affghanistan into a barrier against their designs upon India. Passages from the letters of the first named gentleman were quoted in the preceding chapter bearing upon this point, and in July, 1836, he thus again refers to the subject. "His Majesty has been encouraged, and I have been recently informed, has been promised positive assistance, in this design (the attack on Herat) by the Russians, who well know that the conquest of Herat and Candahar by the Persians, is in fact an advance for them towards India, if not for the purpose of actual invasion, certainly for that of intrigue and disorganization."

In a previous dispatch, he had said, "Indeed, in the present state of the relations between Persia and Russia, it cannot be denied that the progress of the former in Affghanistan, is tantamount to the advancement of the latter, and ought to receive every opposition from the British government that the obligations of public faith will permit." And again he stated that he was

“ quite convinced that the British government could no longer, with safety to its possessions in India, refrain from intimate connexion with the Affghans, whether they be subject to one chief, or divided into principalities.”

Mr. McNeill confirms the views taken by his predecessor, and on the 8th of August, 1838, wrote as follows : “ At this moment, the united influence of Persia and Russia would seem to be established in all the Affghan dominions, with the single exception of Herat, and the existence of that influence in those countries, viewed in conjunction with the course which those powers have recently been pursuing, and the measures that have resulted from their joint diplomatic exertions, is so obviously incompatible with the tranquillity of India, and even with its security, that no measures can be more unequivocally measures of self-defence than those which the British government is called upon to adopt for the purpose of counteracting the evils with which India is threatened : Persia has no provocation to complain of. The course pursued by the British government towards this government has been one of uniform friendship and forbearance ; and it appears to me that it would be a hazardous and costly line of policy to adopt, were the British government any longer to permit Persia, under

shelter of her treaty with England, to open the way to India for another and far more formidable power."

The aspect of affairs here presented, was sufficiently alarming; the approach of a hostile Mahomedan power towards our Indian frontier, attended with the moral impetus derived from a victorious career through Affghanistan could not be viewed with indifference; on the contrary, it was calculated to diffuse very general apprehension among those who were desirous of maintaining intact our power and influence in Hindostan. The Mahomedan portion of the population, even although they might not be previously disaffected, would not be disposed to regard with very inimical feelings the approach of a nation believing in the same religion as themselves, who would proclaim it as their object to free them from the yoke of the Christian infidels; and the least reverse on our part would probably be the signal for rebellion. It should not be forgotten, that although our government may be popular amongst our Hindoo subjects, there is not a native prince, from the greatest to the meanest, whether professedly friendly, or openly hostile, who would not view with satisfaction, our defeat and expulsion from the country.

The majority of these Asiatic rulers are so ignorant of the powers and resources of other

states, so inflated with notions of their own immeasurable importance, pampered as their vanity is by the grossest flattery, and the bombastic style of address usual in Eastern countries, that nothing but occasionally striking a strong blow and inflicting military chastisement, can bring them to their senses or keep them in check; and the states of Ava and Nepaul, taking advantage of the apparent difficulties which beset us, were already evincing hostile dispositions and endeavouring to stir up disaffection amongst our Indian subjects. Rumours of foreign invasion were artfully spread, and had been so far successful as to have considerably weakened the confidence of the native population in the stability of the British rule. There was an universal impression that some imminent danger was about to assail us on the north-west; that some powerful confederacy, in which Russia invariably held the most prominent place, irresistible in its might, was about to pour down upon our territories, and whose arrival was to be the signal for a general rise amongst the neighbouring states and even in our own provinces. A general feeling of alarm prevailed throughout India, the existence of which was confirmed by the representations made to the Governor-General, from all parts, by the most intelligent and best informed men connected with



the administration of affairs. To such an extent had this feeling become prevalent in some places, that the merchants hesitated to embark in their usual commercial speculations, and many of the inhabitants actually commenced burying their valuables to preserve them from the enemy. The probability of an early and important change was every where the engrossing topic of conversation, and the best mode of defending our Eastern empire from the intrigues and threatened attacks of foreign enemies, instead of being merely a speculative question, had become a practical and deeply important one.

The public writers of the day discussed it earnestly, and as an evidence of the prevalent feeling, it was stated by one, that in case a formidable contest should ensue, the whole of the British force in India would amount to 500,000 souls, with a reinforcement of 60,000 from England, and 72 pieces of artillery. These might be serviceable in a pitched battle, but if enemies are to start from all sides and begin to attack every point, the story of the English will be short, and they must sell their lives as dearly as they can. A cloud has arisen from the west and surrounded the whole of India, and the lightning of the sword flashes in the air.

Under circumstances so urgent, it became ab-

solutely necessary for the Indian government to be prepared to repel aggression, and prudence seemed further to dictate the necessity of forming closer connexions with Affghanistan than had hitherto been considered politic. It would of course have been better to have accomplished this object, with the assistance of the existing rulers of the country and by pacific means, if possible, but these had been tried to the utmost and had failed. Negotiations, as has been seen, had been opened with the chiefs of Cabool and Candahar, but the insincerity manifested on their part, especially in the proceedings of the Candahar brothers, destroyed all hope of dependence upon their good faith, even had they been brought to enter into a treaty.

There were many circumstances in the position of these rulers, which led them naturally to look to Persia for support in preference to England. They had no rightful pretensions to the sovereign power, having expelled the legitimate family from the throne by force of arms, and rather than resign their usurped dominion, they would have been content to hold their possessions as tributaries of Persia. It did not require much, therefore, to induce them to co-operate in the destruction of Caumraun of Herat, that prince being a Suddozye, and by that means remove from the

country the only member of the royal race, who was sufficiently powerful to give them uneasiness, and might well be expected to do so, had he attempted it, from the attachment with which the Affghan people still regarded the family of their late sovereigns. Another circumstance which helped to cement their intimacy with Persia, was their connexion with the Kuzzilbashes, tribes of Persians, who had been for some time settled in Affghanistan, but had preserved their distinctive features and their affection for their original country. Upon these tribes, the Baurikzyes depended chiefly for the maintenance of their authority, they again clung to their present masters from the influence they were allowed to exercise, and the fear that it would be lessened if the legitimate sovereign of the country were restored. These considerations naturally inclined the Baurikzye chiefs towards Persia, although such ties would have had but little effect had England tempted their cupidity with sufficiently dazzling offers, and at the same time, that they were professing an anxious desire for the British alliance, they were secretly intriguing against us with the agents of Russia and Persia. It would seem as if finding these two powers on the one side, and England on the other, each desirous of forming a connexion with them, they became inflated by

the apparent importance of their position, and hovered between the contending parties with the view of obtaining greater advantages, and joining with those who should bid highest for their good offices.

But this was not all. Even had they preserved the most entire good faith in their intercourse with England, what Mr. Masson has termed the "eternal and unholy dissensions and enmities" which prevailed amongst the Baurikzye brothers rendered any engagement, which might be entered into with them, of exceedingly doubtful effect as regarded the object to be attained, which was of course the erection of a permanent and secure barrier in Affghanistan against the encroachments of any western power, upon our possessions in the east. Had the chiefs of Candahar acted in unison with the Ameer of Cabool, and the two governments worked together for the good of their common country, it would have materially altered the course of policy necessary to be pursued by the Indian government. But there was not one of them who would not gladly have availed himself of any means that offered to gain an advantage over his brothers, and they were constantly engaged in intrigues to supplant each other. Dost Mahomed complained bitterly to Captain Burnes of the treacherous designs of

his brothers against him, while he, on the other hand, coolly proposed that England should assist in driving them from Candahar and making himself master of their possessions.

Furthermore, the general unpopularity of the Baurikzye chiefs formed a strong objection against placing dependence upon their power. Their government was maintained by military force, and, as is generally the case under such circumstances, great license was permitted to the troops, who plundered the country and otherwise oppressed the citizens. Trade was ruined by the exactions rendered necessary for the support of these marauders and the other expenses of government, and the people groaned beneath every species of tyranny.

Under such a state of things, what advantage could England expect to derive from an alliance with the then rulers of Affghanistan? Their good faith being dependant upon mercenary considerations, might perhaps have been secured had the British government consented to make sacrifices sufficient for the purpose, but the weakness inherent in their position rendered them incapable of constituting a sufficient check to the designs of Russia and Persia, and, therefore, such sacrifices would have been worse than useless, in as much as they would even, very probably have contri-

buted to strengthen our adversaries. This weakness arising chiefly from their want of union is the main point on which to ground the impolicy of entering into alliance with the Baurikzye chiefs. It has been thought by some, however, that too much stress was laid upon the dissensions, which existed between the Baurikzye brothers, and that they were scarcely more than those which divided the different branches of the Suddozyes. But the supporters of that opinion appear to lose sight of the fact, that those divisions were the cause of the ruin of that family, and the downfall of the Dooranee monarchy, and consequently afford an argument against the wisdom of placing any dependence upon political relations, with rulers so divided against each other; whereas, it appeared probable, the former claimants of the throne having, from death and other causes, relinquished their attempts to gain it, that Shah Shoojah, with the powerful support and countenance of England, would be able to maintain his authority unopposed and secure the union of the country.

But another alternative, admitting the impossibility of forming a satisfactory alliance with these governors, has been advocated by many in preference to making a hostile demonstration in Affghanistan; that alternative was, that we

should have taken our stand on the Indus, which forms the natural boundary of the country, and have watched with careful eye the progress of events. This opinion has derived immense weight from being generally understood to have received the sanction of the first military authority of the age. If such be the case, the writer cannot help thinking, with due deference, that rather too much of the soldier enters into this view of the question. The views of the politician appear to yield to those of the mere military leader, who in a spirit of confident bravery, and intent upon a particular manœuvre, would restrain his men till the enemy approached near enough for his purpose, and then with a gallant "*up, lads, and at them,*" lead them on to the attack.

The advice would have been better, had our dominion extended to the banks of the Indus; but the counsellors of such a policy seem to forget that the territory of Scinde intervenes between that boundary and our own. The Ameers of this country, being in our immediate vicinity, were compelled to remain upon terms of tolerable amity with us; but they hated us in their hearts, and would have been glad to diminish the power, if they could not entirely get rid of their dangerous neighbours. These dispositions on their part were abundantly evident, especially in their

after conduct with regard to the expedition, and they had even gone so far, as secretly to notify to Persia their readiness to enter into the league against England. To occupy the right bank of the Indus, therefore, securely and advantageously, it would have been necessary to have taken possession of Scinde, and those who decry the Affghan war as unjust would scarcely, it is to be presumed, be the advisers of such a course. Had this, however, been done, it will admit of something more than a doubt, whether it would have been politic to have allowed Affghanistan to fall under the dominion of an adverse nation, without any opposition on our part, till we found its outposts ranged over against us on the opposite bank of the Indus. If we had reason to dread the machinations of Russia before, when at a distance, how much greater reason should we have to do so from her proximity. Already had her political missionaries sowed the seeds of disaffection and hostility in our neighbourhood, and her power of working us mischief would have been incalculably increased by the extension of her influence to the banks of the Indus. It is not pretended that this ambitious people, had any intention of immediately invading India, or seriously disturbing our power in that part of the world. What they sought was, to quote the



words of a very intelligent writer, Captain Connolly, "to have it in their power to attack us in India, in case of a quarrel rendering such a measure expedient."

But there are also great advantages in possessing Afghanistan as the seat of war, if necessary, instead of being compelled to defend our own frontier. The natural dispositions of the country are admirably adapted for purposes of defence, and a very moderate force of disciplined troops acting in concert with the natives, would be enabled to obstruct the progress of any invading army. Was England to stand tamely by—behold each favourable position quietly occupied by an enemy, and permit a country, so well fitted to form a defensive barrier to her Eastern empire, to fall under the influence of a power, whose jealousy of that empire and wish to weaken it, is notorious? It is no argument against the original policy of the expedition, that the ill-success which afterwards attended it has nullified these advantages. They were obvious at the time, and but for the miserable mismanagement which eventually covered our arms and our policy with shame, we should have been reaping the benefit of them now, instead of leaving them, as they must be, the subject of future consideration to succeeding governors of India.

But there are people who were, and still are, or pretend to be, sceptical of the part played by Russia in the important drama which was enacting in the east at this period; who pretended and still pretend, that all our Indian statesmen, the ruling powers, as well as the subordinate agents, military men, and civilians, were under a grand hallucination with respect to the designs of that power, and that they alone could see clearly what was going on. This is silly trifling, or it is worse. The intrigues of the Russian agents in Persia and Affghanistan were as notorious in the East as any event of modern history, and are as capable of proof from the public documents of the time. By these, it is made clear that Count Simonich, the Russian minister at the Persian court, used every exertion to prevail on the Shah of Persia to attempt the subjugation of Herat, employing as an argument, that England would be likely to oppose it if delayed, and eventually accompanied him and afforded him assistance in the siege—that he entered in conjunction with Persia into all the intrigues being carried on at Cabool and Candahar, guaranteeing the fulfilment of the treaties contracted between them, and allowing it to be understood that the interests of his own sovereign and the Shah were the same—that a Russian army did actually advance to Khiva, doubtless for the

purpose of co-operation, but was driven back by the severity of the season—that a Russian agent was sent direct from St. Petersburg to negotiate with the chiefs of Affghanistan, whose object, to quote the words of Dost Mahomed's agent at Tehran, was “to have a road to the English (India), and for this they (the Russians) are very anxious,” and part of whose instructions, were according to the same authority to assure Dost Mahomed, “that if the Shah does every thing you want, so much the better, and if not, the Russian government will furnish you (the Ameer) with every thing wanting.”

Notwithstanding, however, these manifestations of the designs of the Muscovite court, it is absurd to talk of its conduct, constituting a *casus belli*, which would have justified England in commencing hostilities against Russia, and risking the probability of plunging Europe once again into all the horrors of warfare. The ministers of that astute power could, as they did, declare solemnly that the intrigues of their agents were carried on without their knowledge or connivance,\* and these are times when, thanks to the improved tone of public

\* It is a significant circumstance that the most active of these agents, Captain Vicovich, was recalled, in consequence of the remonstrances of England, and that he died immediately after an interview with Count Nesselrode, *it is said by his own hand.*

morals, and, perhaps, still more to the pecuniary necessities of the different courts, governments are unwilling to incur the opprobrium of entering without the strongest grounds, into such a war as must inevitably ensue between two powers of such magnitude as England and Russia. All, therefore, that could be done was for the Indian government to keep a watchful eye upon the proceedings of that country in the east, and prevent her intrigues taking effect by every means in its power, even to the ejecting of hostile neighbours from their territories, if necessary for self-preservation.

This necessity having arrived, as is sufficiently proved by the foregoing statements, the Governor General of India resolved upon an armed intervention in the affairs of Affghanistan, and as the best means of doing so, without offending the national prejudices of the people, and their jealous love of independence, the cause of their exiled sovereign, Shah Shoojah-Ool-Moolk, was espoused.

The character of this prince has been grossly misrepresented. He has been described as weak and timid, yet at the same time cruel and tyrannical, and as having disgusted his subjects by his excesses. Nothing can be further from the truth; although much inferior to Dost Mahomed, who is a master-spirit in energy and ability, there are

few Asiatic monarchs with whom he would suffer in comparison. In the course of his eventful and chequered life, now wielding sovereign power; now wandering among the mountains, or an exile and a pensioner in a foreign state, and anon raised again to the throne, he displayed on many occasions courage, perseverance, and humanity. Indeed, it may be questioned whether his forbearance in sparing the eyes of Mahmood, (a most unusual act of lenity in the East,) when he had him in his power, was not the chief cause of his subsequent misfortunes, as that ungrateful prince, as has been seen, afterwards dethroned him. He also wrote a history of his life and adventures which Sir Alexander Burnes described as being written in a simple style, free from extracts from the Koran, metaphors and other extravagances of Oriental authors, and such a work as would be considered in England as an interesting detail of events. A semi-barbarous Mahomedan prince, capable of writing a work of this kind besides possessing other excellencies of character, scarcely deserves to be regarded in a contemptible light. His chief faults appear to have been too great a dependence upon others, and an over-fondness for regal state and ceremony, which grated upon the Affghan love of equality and offended the proud-spirited khans.

There were many circumstances, which warranted the British government in supposing their adoption of the cause of Shah Shoojah would be a popular measure in Affghanistan, and most successfully achieve the object they had in view ; and there were others which made it a matter of comparative necessity, supposing an interference in the affairs of that nation determined upon. In the first place, the country was torn to pieces by internal dissensions, the people groaned beneath the exactions of their governors ; and although Dost Mahomed, by his energy and determination maintained tolerable order in the immediate vicinity of Cabool, the whole country was overrun with bands of armed plunderers for whose depredations it was useless to seek redress. Moreover, the Suddozye tribe possessed a strong hold upon the affections of the Affghans, who regarded the members of that distinguished family with a reverence they conceded to no other clan, and the writers best qualified from position and experience to judge, represented the people as weary of the disorganized state of things under the Baurikzye rule, and anxious for the restoration of the Suddozyes. They also stated that in consequence of this reaction in public opinion, Shah Shoojah had become exceedingly popular, and that all classes would hail with satisfaction the re-establishment

of the royal authority in his person. On the other hand, to reap all the desired advantages of an intervention in Affghanistan, it was necessary to have the assistance of Runjeet Sing, as the position of his dominions will sufficiently demonstrate. This ruler had already entered into a treaty with Shah Shoojah, by which he bound himself to aid in the restoration of that prince to his dominions, and from this engagement it was impossible for him to recede with any regard to honour, especially as he had availed himself of the advantages which it guaranteed to him. This then alone, would have constituted a strong reason for the adoption of the course the Indian government had resolved on, and as it was, it was the only one that was left, unless we had chosen to act in opposition to the monarch of Lahore, and have added him to the list of our enemies. It is unnecessary to put the alternative of bribing that ambitious chief, to depart from his engagements with the Shah, with a promise of an accession of territory, which probably would not have been difficult had we thought proper to follow an opposite course of action, as it is presumed no one would seriously think of advocating such a proceeding.

But it has been said that the attack upon Herat was the ostensible cause, and the only justifica-

tion of the warlike intentions of the Indian government, and that when the siege of that town was raised, all motive for hostilities on our part had ceased. This is absurd: the siege of Herat was neither the real nor the ostensible cause. It was merely such a revelation of the designs of Russia and Persia, as roused England to a sense of immediate danger, and convinced her of the necessity for energetic action. The true reason was, that the intrigues of those powers in Affghanistan had rendered it absolutely necessary for us to interfere in that country, if we wished to prevent it from being converted into a hostile position on our frontier, from which Russia could assail our oriental dominions; and it is idle to pretend that because the attack of Persia, in concert with Russia upon Herat had failed, there was no farther need of warlike proceedings on our part. The designs of those powers were the same, although their first attempt at carrying them out was defeated, and what England had to look to, was security for the future. The warning had been given and was she to relapse into inactivity, till roused again, and perhaps too late, by danger at her very doors, because the enemy had at the outset sustained a temporary and scarcely looked-for repulse.

Such were the motives, which upon a candid



review of all the circumstances appear to have influenced the British government in resolving to support the claims of Shah Shoojah to the throne of Afghanistan, and in resorting to the extreme measure of sending a British army across the Indus.

## CHAPTER V.

THE SIMLA DECLARATION—ADVANCE OF THE BRITISH  
ARMY—OPERATIONS IN SCINDE AND BELOOCHISTAN.  
—ARRIVAL AT CANDAHAR.

WAR having thus been resolved upon, the Governor-General of India, preparatory to commencing operations, issued a manifesto in which he set forth his reasons for proceeding to such an extremity. This document, although it has frequently been made public, being of such importance, that a history of the war could scarcely be considered complete without it, and having besides excited a good deal of animadversion, is inserted here at length.

*Declaration of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India, on the Assembly of the Army of the Indus.*

Simla, October 1, 1838.

“The Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, having with the concurrence of the

Supreme Council, directed the assemblage of a British force, for service across the Indus, his Lordship deems it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons which have led to this important measure.

“ It is a matter of notoriety, that the treaties entered into by the British government, in the year 1832, with the Ameers of Scinde, the Nawab of Bahawalpore, and Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing, had for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facilitate the extension of commerce, and to gain for the British nation in Central Asia that legitimate influence which an interchange of benefits would naturally produce.

“ With a view to invite the aid of the *de facto* rulers of Affghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those treaties, Captain Burnes was deputed towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mahomed Khan, the chief of Cabool. The original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial nature. Whilst Captain Burnes, however, was on his journey to Cabool, information was received by the Governor-General that the troops of Dost Mahomed Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack, on those of our ancient ally, Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing. It was naturally to be apprehended that his Highness the Maha Rajah

would not be slow to avenge this aggression ; and it was to be feared that the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions, into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British government would be altogether frustrated. In order to avert a result so calamitous, the Governor-General resolved on authorizing Captain Burnes to intimate to Dost Mahomed Khan, that if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maha Rajah, his Lordship would exert his good offices with his Highness, for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. The Maha Rajah, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Governor-General to the effect that, in the meantime, hostilities on his part should be suspended.

“ It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor-General that a Persian army was besieging Herat ; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Affghanistan for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond the Indus ; and that the court of Persia, had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of her Majesty’s mission in the Persian territory,

but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs, wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.

“ After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless negotiation at Cabool, it appeared that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Governor-General could not, consistently with justice, and his regard for the friendship of Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of his Highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India; and that he openly threatened, in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid he could command. Ultimately, he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Affghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was well apprized, and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Government, compelled Captain Burnes to leave Cabool, without having effected any part of his mission.

“ It was now evident, that no further interfe-

rence could be exercised by the British government, to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh ruler and Dost Mahomed Khan; and the hostile policy of the latter chief, shewed too plainly that, so long as Cabool remained under his government, we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our Indian empire would be preserved inviolate.

“ The Governor-General deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian army for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British envoy at the court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with gallantry and fortitude, worthy of the justice of their cause; and the Governor-General would yet indulge the hope that their heroism will enable them to maintain a successful defence, until succours shall reach them from British India. In the meantime, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British government, have been, by succession of events, more and more openly manifested. The Governor-General

has recently ascertained by an official despatch from Mr. McNeill, her Majesty's Envoy, that his Excellency has been compelled, by the refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the Persian government, to quit the court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two governments. The necessity under which Great Britain is placed, of regarding the present advance of the Persian arms into Affghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah, under the express order of her Majesty's government.

“ The chiefs of Candahar (brothers of Dost Mahomed, Khan of Cabool) have avowed their adherence to the Persian policy, with the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests of the British nation in India, and have been openly assisting in the operation against Herat.

“ In the crisis of affairs, consequent upon the retirement of our envoy from Cabool, the Governor-General felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression, towards our own territories.

“ His attention was naturally drawn, at this conjuncture, to the position and claims of Shah

Shoojah-ool-Moolk, a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the British government, and who, on his empire being usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in the British dominions.

“ It had been clearly ascertained, from the information furnished by the various officers who had visited Affghanistan, that the Baurikzye chiefs from their disunion and unpopularity, were ill-fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the British government, and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of national defence. Yet so long as they refrained from proceedings injurious to our interest and security, the British government acknowledged and respected their authority. But a different policy appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those chiefs, and to be indispensable to our own safety. The welfare of our possessions in the East, requires that we should have, on our western frontier, an ally who is interested in resisting aggression and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandizement.

“ After a serious and mature deliberation, the



Governor-General was satisfied that a pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, whose popularity throughout Affghanistan had been proved to his Lordship, by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities. Having arrived at this determination, the Governor-General was further of opinion, that it was just and proper, no less from the position of Maha Rajah Runjeet Sing, than from his undeviating friendship towards the British government, that his Highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations ; Mr. MacNaghten was accordingly deputed, in June last, to the court of his Highness, and the result of his mission has been the conclusion of a tri-partite treaty by the British government, the Maha Rajah, and Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, whereby his Highness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his ancestors. The friends and enemies of any one of the contracting parties, have been declared to be the friends and enemies of all. Various points have been adjusted, which had been the subjects of discussion between the British government and his Highness the Maha Rajah, the identity of whose interests with those

of the Honourable Company, has now been made apparent to all the surrounding states. A guaranteed independence will, upon favourable conditions, be tendered to the Ameers of Scinde; and the integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be fully respected; while by the measures completed or in progress, it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted, that the name and just influence of the British government, will gain their proper footing amongst the nations of central Asia, that tranquillity will be established upon the most important frontier of India, and that a lasting barrier will be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment.

“ His Majesty Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk will enter Affghanistan surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by a British army. The Governor-General confidently hopes that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents, and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Affghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn. The Governor-General has been led to these measures by the duty which is imposed upon him of providing for the security of the possessions of the British

crown ; but he rejoices that in the discharge of this duty, he will be enabled to assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the Affghan people. Throughout the approaching operations, British influence will be sedulously employed to further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile differences, to secure oblivion of injuries, and to put an end to the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and happiness of the Affghans have been impaired. Even to the chiefs, whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the British government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable treatment, on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from opposition to that course of measures which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of their country.

“ By order of the Right Hon. the  
Gov. Gen. of India.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

Sec. to the ‘Govt. of India, with  
the Gov. Gen.’”

This important state paper sets forth with the calm dignity of a powerful nation, unwilling to be supposed acting in the mere consciousness of superior might, and not too proud to offer a justification of its design, its reasons for interfering

in the affairs of a weaker neighbour, and shows such a course to be necessary to prevent that neighbour, from being converted into an instrument for the injury of its interests.

One paragraph, however, appears justly open to objection. It is that, in which it is stated that, "His Majesty Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk will enter Affghanistan surrounded by his own troops." One can hardly help the suspicion, although it may be construed differently, that this was intended to convey the impression that the Shah's army would comprise, at least, some portion of his own subjects; whereas it was entirely composed, as will be noticed hereafter, of raw levies from the provinces of India, enrolled at the cost of the British government, and commanded by British officers. This passage, therefore, wears an appearance of deception unworthy the character of such a document, and the effect it was probably intended to produce, viz: to allay the feelings of a people proverbially jealous of their independence, would be entirely frustrated upon their discovering it to be an imposture.

Appended to the Simla declaration, was a notification announcing the following appointments for the purpose of carrying out the objects referred to in it. Mr., afterwards Sir W. H. MacNaghten, principal secretary to government, to assume the

function of Envoy and Minister on the part of the government of India, at the future court of Shah Shoojah, with the following officials as assistants; Captain Alexander Burnes to be employed under Mr. MacNaghten's directions as envoy to Khelat, the capital of Mihrab Khan, the titular chieftain of Beloochistan; the gallant Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, the hero of Herat, was entrusted with diplomatic powers at the court of the sovereign whose domains he had so well-defended; Lieutenants E. D'Arcy Todd, R. Leech, Drs. Percival and B. Lord received other diplomatic appointments, subordinate to the Envoy and Minister; while Lieutenant E. B. Conolly and Mr. J. G. Berwick were appointed, the one to the command, and the other to the medical superintendence of his escort.

During the progress of these political arrangements, the most active preparations had been going on in the military department for the purpose of commencing the campaign with spirit in the spring, and whatever may be the differences of opinion as to the policy of the Governor-General, he appears to have won unanimous approbation by the energy and promptitude he displayed in preparing for the war. The Indian army, which during the preceding ten or eleven years, had dwindled from an effective force of 274,000, to no more than 190,000 had been augmented by

great exertions to 203,000 in the course of a few months. Besides this, directions had been given, for raising a body of troops under the name of the "Shah's Contingent," consisting of a troop of native horse artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and five of infantry. A commandant and adjutant were selected for each of these corps from the officers of the Bengal army, and as fast as the young soldiers destined to form the force, enrolled themselves at the different stations, they were marched off to Loodiana to undergo the necessary training. Major-General Simpson, Colonel of the 19th Regiment Native Infantry, was appointed to the command of this armament, and a commissariat and other necessary concomitants of an army established. This was the body of troops placed at the disposal of Shah Shoojah referred to before.

The formation of this contingent, was one of the great mistakes of the expedition in a military point of view, and was probably one cause of the disgust, which it has been stated Sir Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief, felt for some of the military arrangements of the government. It was a large and inefficient force, got together at an immense expense, and was rather a source of weakness, than of additional strength to the army, inasmuch as it frequently impeded the movements

and contracted the comforts and resources of the other troops, during the scarcity of every requisite which was found to prevail upon their march, and created much discontent amongst both officers and men.

The other military arrangements and appointments were as follow:—The British troops selected by the government to support Shah Shoojah in regaining his lost throne, were to consist of three divisions, two to be contributed by the Presidency of Bengal and one by Bombay. The whole to be denominated the “Army of the Indus.” The first infantry division of the Bengal force was placed under the command of Sir Willoughby Cotton, and consisted of the first, second, and third brigades; the fourth and fifth brigades constituted the second division which was entrusted to the care of Major-General Duncan. Brigadier Sale was placed at the head of the first brigade, in which were H.M.’s 13th Light Infantry, commanded by its junior Lieutenant-Colonel, the gallant and lamented W. H. Dennie, and the 16th and 48th Regiments of Native Infantry. Major-General Nott commanded the second brigade containing the 31st, 42nd and 43rd regiments of Native Infantry, and Brigadier Dennis the third, which was composed of the Buffs, and the 2nd and 27th Regiments of

Native Infantry. The fourth and fifth brigades were placed under the direction of Brigadiers Roberts and Worsley, and consisted, the former of the Bengal European Regiment, and the 35th and 37th Native Infantry Regiments; the latter of the 5th, 28th and 53rd. Brigadier Graham was placed at the head of the Artillery, and Captain George Thompson presided over the Engineer department with two companies of sappers and miners and an efficient siege train.

The troops furnished by Bombay were placed under Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, the Commander-in-Chief of that Presidency, and consisted of two troops of horse, two companies of foot artillery, and a brigade of cavalry consisting of two squadrons of H.M.'s 4th Light Dragoons and the 1st Bombay Light Cavalry. The infantry were H.M.'s 2nd and 17th foot, and the 1st, 5th, 19th and 23rd Regiments of Native Infantry. This force was also accompanied by an engineer department and siege train. The artillery was placed under the superintendence of Brigadier Stevenson; Brigadier Scott commanded the cavalry brigade, and Major-General Willshire the infantry, having under him Brigadier Gordon and at a subsequent period Brigadier Baumgardt. The united forces of the two Presidencies may be estimated at about sixteen thousand, ten thousand



of which were comprised in the Bengal Contingent.

This force was afterwards increased by the addition of another brigade, which consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Regiments of local Cavalry under the direction of Colonel James Skinner. The whole was placed under the command of Sir Henry Fane, Commander-in-Chief of India.

But the Governor-General did not allow these preparations to withdraw his attention from the threatening proceedings of some of the neighbouring courts, who seemed preparing to take advantage of the difficulties, they anticipated would beset us. Various dispositions were made to provide for the security of our dominions and repress any attempts which might be made to disturb their tranquillity. Directions were given for augmenting the number of the troops stationed in Arracan and Terassen, (the provinces ceded by Ava to the English at the close of the last war) in order to convince the Burmese that we were not so fully occupied, but that we were still able to inflict chastisement for any acts of insolence or aggression, on their part. At the same time, the emissary who had been commissioned by the King of Nepal to the court of the Maha Rajah of Lahore for the purpose of undermining his attachment to the English, was arrested, and his

treacherous master given to understand that his perfidious dealings with the princes of India and with our own subjects, had been discovered. This monarch had previously sent some detachments of troops to occupy different posts on the frontier, and made other preparations of a hostile nature. A peremptory demand for the withdrawal of these, was made by the British government, and to enforce it, if necessary, measures were taken for the assembly of a strong corps of observation in the province most exposed to danger. These energetic measures were attended with entire success. The two monarchs against whom they were directed, were effectually intimidated from making any further hostile demonstrations, save a few vain threats and boasts, ebullitions of Asiatic pride and vanity which might safely be permitted.

The route decided upon, by which the "Army of the Indus" were to enter Affghanistan was the Bolan Pass, although there were other lines\* which appear at a first glance to offer equal or even superior advantages. The most direct course for the Bengal force to have, adopted, would undoubtedly, have been through the Punjaub by way of Peshawar and so on to Jellalabad and

\* Vide Captain Havelock's Narrative of the War for an admirable examination of these.

Cabool through the Khyber and Choord-Cabool passes. But at that time, great apprehension was entertained of the difficulties which beset that line of march, especially of the terrible Khyber Pass and the robber tribes which infest it. These apprehensions were much strengthened by the knowledge that they had never been forced, even by the greatest conquerors ; but on the contrary, that they had invariably purchased a peaceable passage through them for their armies with large sums of money. Naudir Shah in 1739, had paid £100,000 to be allowed to occupy them unmolested, and the subsequent sovereigns of Affghanistan, granted these wild mountaineers an allowance of several thousand pounds annually to secure a free passage and protection for the Kafilas trading between the country beyond these passes and Cabool. A stronger reason, however, for not adopting the route in which lay these formidable defiles, was the objection entertained by Runjeet Sing against his territories being traversed by the British army. The wily old lion of the Punjaub was by no means backward in appreciating the honour and advantage of an alliance with the Indian government, but he was not equally desirous of indulging his powerful neighbour with an opportunity of forming so close an acquaintance with his dominions, as might possibly lead

to their future acquisition. We could doubtless have found means to induce or compel him to acquiesce in such an arrangement, had it been absolutely necessary to do so ; but it was probably not deemed of sufficient importance, as to make it worth while to risk the chances of a quarrel with that ruler at that particular moment, or the loss of his assistance in the objects we had in view. There were circumstances also which, in as far as they were connected with the route chosen, made it more advantageous notwithstanding its circuitousness. It was by no means certain, that the affairs of Scinde might not assume such a complexion, as to require the co-operation of both divisions of the army, and failing this, have so occupied the Bombay force as to have prevented its junction with that from Bengal, leaving it to enter Affghanistan unsupported, and thus, perhaps, have defeated or at least injuriously delayed the main design of the expedition. For these reasons, therefore, the Bolan route was resolved on.

Preparatory to carrying out this plan, the various corps composing the Bengal division of the army had received orders to concentrate at Ferozepore, where a grand interview was to take place between the Governor-General of India and the Maha Rajah of Lahore. Their first meeting took

place on the 28th of November, 1838, when Runjeet Sing paid his visit to Lord Auckland at his camp, which was pitched about four miles from the banks of the Gharra. It consisted of a wide street, formed by large tents, in the centre of which was situated one of much loftier and more spacious dimensions where the durbar was to be held. The scene of pageantry which ensued was most imposing. The brilliant uniforms of the different officers composing the united staffs of Lord Auckland and Sir Henry Fane, the display of so large a body of military, the gorgeous habiliments of the Sikhs and above all, the magnificent appearance of the elephants, the presence of which stately creatures is alone sufficient to give grandeur to a scene, added to the desire which existed on the part of the British, to behold the celebrated man, who had raised himself by his abilities, from a simple chief to a powerful monarch and founder of a kingdom constituted a whole, such as the East only can present. The Governor-General afterwards paid the Maha Rajah a visit in return, in which much that was novel and interesting was introduced to the British, but it is unnecessary to dwell upon the details of these festivities.

While the army was preparing to assemble at Ferozepore, the most important intelligence had

arrived from the West. The Shah of Persia intimidated by the energetic proceedings of England, suddenly raised the siege of Herat and retreated, by hasty marches, towards his own capital. This event led to considerable changes in the military plans of the Indian government. In consequence of Persia having retired from the contest, it was deemed unnecessary to have so large a force as had been contemplated. It was, therefore, announced that a diminution of its numbers would immediately take place; that there was no longer any necessity for detaining Sir Henry Fane, who had previously tendered his resignation, in consequence of ill health, and a wish to return to his native land; and that Sir Willoughby Cotton would take charge of the troops, till their junction with the Bombay division, when Sir John Keane would assume the command of the whole army; This arrangement gave Major-General Nott the command of a division, and Lieutenant Colonel-Dennie that of a brigade.

In consequence of these new dispositions, it became necessary to select, from the assembled troops, those regiments who were to be employed on active service. This duty naturally devolved upon Sir Henry Fane and may appear a somewhat invidious one, since those who were destined to remain behind, would probably feel greatly mortified by such a decision. Unwilling,

it would seem, to become the object of these disappointed feelings, the Commander-in-Chief, instead of relying upon his own judgment as to which of the different corps were the fittest for the service, adopted the unwise expedient of allowing the question to be decided by lot. In consequence of this injudicious arrangement, the army was deprived of the services of the Buffs, one of the most efficient corps in India, while the 13th Light Infantry, an invalid regiment was to accompany the expedition.

When the arrangements, consequent upon the change of plan in the destined military operations were concluded, and the pomps and festivities of Ferozepore over, Sir Henry Fane, previously to quitting the command, issued his instructions for the advance of the army; and on the 10th of December, the leading column of the Bengal force debouched as far as the town of Mendote, in the direct line to the territories of the Nuwab of Bhawalpore, whose friendship and assistance were reckoned upon in its passage through his country. By this route it was to enter the Scinde territory and march onwards to the Fort of Bukkur, an important position on the Indus, which Sir Alexander Burnes had in the meantime been sent on a mission to Meer Roostum, the Ameer of Khyrpore, to secure possession of, and also to request an unmolested

passage through his dominions. These demands were acceded to formally, but under such circumstances as made it evident that the troops could expect to meet with nothing but treachery and opposition at every step. These expectations were afterwards fully verified by the difficulties and privations they were compelled to undergo, and a foretaste of which they had even already begān to experience. The camp followers were beginning to desert in great numbers, carrying away with them the camels which had been hired for the service of the army. The example had been set by the Hindoos and Sikhs, and the evil increased in a terrible magnitude during the progress of the troops through the Scindian territories.

The conduct of the Ameers of Scinde was not, however, without good reason. Their country had formerly been a dependency of the Dooraunee Empire, and had paid a large annual tribute to the Affghan kings; but during the troubles which in latter years convulsed that state, they had succeeded in making themselves independent, and discontinued paying the tribute.

Shah Shoojah, however, had never given up his claim to the sovereignty of the country, and had frequently threatened its governors that he would make over his right upon them to the



British government if they refused to grant him the tribute money he demanded. Still they had contrived to maintain their independence, although their system of government was almost as wretched as can be conceived. The British government's adoption of the cause of Shah Shoojah, and its resolution to attempt the re-establishment of the Affghan kingdom, had, therefore, filled them with alarm, as they naturally concluded their own return to a state of dependence would be the consequence of the exiled monarch's success. This fear was soon confirmed by the demand made upon them, a sa part of the Affghan dominions, to contribute twenty-eight lacs of rupees towards the expenses incidental to the restoration of their king, and in lieu of the arrears of tribute which had remained so long unpaid. They accordingly considered it to their interest to throw every obstruction they possibly could in the way of the expedition, and at the same time, by empty promises, to avert from themselves the punishment due to their duplicity.

Great, however, as were the difficulties with which the Bengal force had to contend in their passage through Scinde, from the treachery of the natives, the troops from Bombay, under Sir John Keane, had to endure still greater hardship and

annoyance. This division of the Army of the Indus landed at Vikkur, which is situated on the eastern bank of the Hujamry mouth of the Indus, in the latter end of November, after a voyage up that river, seriously crippled by the want of necessary supplies and the means of conveyance for the armies. These the Scindians had solemnly promised to provide, but upon the arrival of the troops at Kurrachee it was discovered that nothing whatever had been done towards relieving their necessities, and so far from entertaining any intention of doing so, the people manifested towards us strong feelings of jealousy and hostility. Every kind of petty opposition was practised to delay our progress, and the crafty Ameers beheld with satisfaction the results of their policy, when day after day passed by and the head quarters of the British army still remained stationary. Meanwhile, they had commenced a levy *en masse*, calling out the whole of the population able to bear arms, while the Hyderabad rulers assembled a numerous force of mercenary Beloochees on their side of the river to defend the capital. During this state of things, Captain Outram had been despatched to Cutch, the Rao of which was believed to be friendly to our interests, for the purpose of procuring the necessary means for the conveyance of the army. This was a task of no

slight difficulty; but after the most indefatigable exertions, he succeeded in procuring a tolerable supply of camels, which enabled Sir John Keane once more to advance.

In the meantime, intelligence of the critical situation of the Bombay division had reached the Bengal force, and Sir Willoughby Cotton resolved immediately to proceed with a detachment of 5,500 men to the assistance of Sir John Keane. A portion of this force was ordered to take up a position near Roree, to act as a reserve to the rest, and also to the Shah's Contingent, which had been ordered to rendezvous at Shikarpore, and had advanced in a parallel line with the Bengal army, but on the opposite bank of the river.

Another consequence of the proceedings in Scinde, was the detention of Sir Henry Fane, who would be unable to continue his progress down the Indus while Hyderabad remained in possession of the enemy, and whom the government, from the serious complexion of affairs, ordered to remain in India for the present. His Excellency accordingly landed from his flotilla, and announced his intention of accompanying Sir Willoughby Cotton to Lower Scinde, merely, however, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of India, without superseding the last named officer in the command of the troops.

The detachment advanced in high spirits, in the anticipation of capturing Hyderabad, a city celebrated for its wealth and which was supposed to contain treasure to the amount of eight millions sterling; but the golden expectations of the troops were doomed to disappointment, for on the seventh day of their march, despatches were received from Sir John Keane, announcing that all differences with the Scindian government had been amicably arranged, and commanding them to halt and await his further instructions.

While these operations were being carried on, a reserve force of three thousand men, under the command of Brigadier Valiant, which had been ordered up from Bombay to occupy Kurrachee, arrived in the harbour of that place. This is a most important station upon the Indus, both in a military and commercial point of view, and in the opinion of Sir Alexander Burnes, was the first that ought to have been occupied. Sir John Keane was subsequently of the same opinion. A portion of the troops with Colonel Valiant, were embarked on board her Majesty's ship Wellesley of 74 guns, the flag ship of Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland, so well known from his connexion with the fallen fortunes of Napoleon, and upon their arrival in Kurrachee harbour, the insignificant garrison of the fort had the temerity to fire a

feeble shot at them. It was immediately summoned to surrender, but the commandant replied in the true boastful spirit of his country, that he was "a Beloochee, and would die first."

The Admiral and Colonel Valiant had been informed by some fishermen on the coast who had been captured, that the fort was one of the most impregnable in the whole country, and that one of the Ameers had a short time previously arrived at the head of three thousand men to defend it. These representations were, however, disregarded as they deserved, by the gallant Sir Frederick, and preparations were immediately commenced for the attack; the troops and artillery were loaded and the ship brought to, ready for action. Everything being ready, the Wellesley opened her broadside and speedily dismantled the breastwork of the fort; but the garrison being observed attempting to make its escape, the firing ceased and a party of troops were immediately despatched to take possession of the place. Upon entering the fort, they found it quite deserted; upon which, its flying defenders were pursued and all captured, when they were found to amount to the formidable number of twenty!

While the Bengal and Bombay portions of the army were thus occupied, Shah Shoojah's Con-

tingent had reached Shikarpore. From thence, he had dispatched a body of troops to take possession of Larkhanu, a considerable town on the right bank of the Indus, in which it is supposed he obtained a valuable treasure. By this time, Mr. Mac-Naghten having accomplished the objects, for which his visit to Lahore was undertaken, had arrived at the Shah's head-quarters. Upon the deviation of the Bengal force from the original line of advance to support the Bombay division, the Envoy's mind was filled with much inquietude as he was apprehensive the result of the expedition, of which he had been one of the principal advisers, might be seriously compromised by the delay occasioned by the diversion in Scinde. He accordingly wrote urgently to recommend an immediate return to Bukkur, but Sir Willoughby Cotton could only reply that being now under the command of Sir John Keane, he must wait his instructions, before he could comply with the Envoy's wishes. These soon after arrived, and the Bengal troops commenced their countermarch upon Bukkur and proceeded thence to Shikarpore, which they reached on the 20th February, while Sir John Keane prepared to advance up the right bank of the river by Sehwan and the Sukkee pass.

At Sehwan, it had been arranged that Sir

Henry Fane and Sir John Keane should have a meeting; accordingly an interview took place between them at that town of a most gratifying nature. The two Generals embraced each other with much cordiality, while their eminent position and the circumstances under which they met imparted an interest to the scene that was felt by all who witnessed it.

On the 23rd of February, the Bengal division began its march towards Dadur, and great as had been the hardships the soldiers had already met with, their sufferings in reality may be said only now to have commenced. During their march back upon Bukkur, after their advance into Scinde to support Sir John Keane had been counter-ordered, the carriage cattle had begun to suffer severely from the effects of fatigue and insufficient food, and had died in great numbers; while the abandonment of private baggage consequent upon the loss of the means of conveyance, had become a serious evil. This afforded anything but a pleasing prospect in commencing a march across a country of almost unexampled sterility and difficulty. Such necessaries even as were provided them upon their route, were frequently carried off by bands of marauding Beloochees, and they were compelled to traverse many miles together of dry sandy

desert, in which scarcely a bush, a herb, or a blade of grass were to be seen, nor even so much as a puddle of water to quench the burning thirst of man or beast. To add to their other misfortunes, the Beloochees began to evince their plundering propensities with the utmost audacity, hanging about their rear, and attacking and robbing them at every convenient opportunity. To such an extent were the sufferings of the army carried, that a retreat began to be openly talked about; but through the strenuous personal exertions of Sir Alexander Burnes in procuring water and otherwise providing them with supplies, they were still enabled to hold on their course, though but slowly, and at length arrived at Dadur, after having endured great hardship, but without meeting with any very serious calamity.

They now entered upon the passage of the terrible Bolan Pass, a huge chasm, running between precipitous rocks to the length of seventy miles, and rising in that distance to the height of 5,637 feet above the plains below, which are here about 750 feet in height above the level of the sea. The dangerous defiles which abound in these mountains are infested by the poorest and wildest tribes of the country, who live entirely by plunder; but they fortunately refrained from molesting the troops to the extent they



might have done, and it was not till they were about to emerge from the Pass that any opposition was offered to their progress, when a few light skirmishes took place unattended with any serious result. It was an immense relief to the toil-worn troops to find themselves once more upon a plain country after the harassing passage of the Bolan Pass, and they proceeded on their march somewhat revived by the nearer prospect of its termination, but still their difficulties increased at every step. Among the miseries they had to put up with, was the constant loss of despatches, and the consequent suspense and uncertainty they were frequently left in, and while halting at Siriab, a terrible proof was seen of the fate their communications so often met with. A packet was brought which was completely soaked in human blood, and bore the following inscription in the handwriting of one of the deputy postmasters of the army: "The *suwar* who carried this packet was shot dead within two marches of Shah Shoojah's camp, and the envelope is stained with his blood."\*

At length, on the 27th of March, they reached Quettah, the capital of the province of Shawl, at which town they had been ordered to await the arrival of the Commander-in-chief. Here they

\* This incident is related by Captain Havelock.

were doomed to meet with the bitterest disappointment they had yet had to endure. In accordance with the promises and engagements of the Chief of Khelat, they had expected to find, upon their arrival at Quettah, an abundance of food, and it was with feelings of the deepest despondency that the already half-famished troops discovered that literally nothing had been provided for them.

The situation of the army was now most alarming. Major Craigie, Deputy Adjutant-General of the Bengal force, had been despatched by Sir Willoughby Cotton, on the 25th, to the headquarters of Sir John Keane, which it was supposed he would find at Dadur, to represent to him the deplorable state and prospects of the advanced force, and to request his Excellency's specific instructions as to the course to be pursued. But in consequence of the destitution at Quettah, the situation of the troops was growing hourly more and more hopeless, and it became absolutely necessary that their commander should adopt some prompt and decisive measure to meet the exigencies of the occasion. He accordingly issued orders for the reduction of the daily rations of each soldier to one half. The loaf of the Europeans was diminished to that extent, the native troops received only half instead of a full seer of

ottah, and the camp-followers were compelled to rest contented with a quarter of a seer. These measures were severe, and their severity was perceptible in the famished looks and fearful countenances of the suffering troops, but they were absolutely necessary, and Sir Willoughby Cotton deserves high praise for his energetic adoption of the only course by which the army could have been saved from the horrors of actual starvation, or a disastrous and ignominious retreat. But blame must attach somewhere for reducing things to such an extremity. There appears to have been a great want of foresight in planning and providing for the subsistence of the army in its advance, and this was made evident from the very commencement. The expedition ought never to have been left wholly dependent for its supplies upon the will of a set of barbarous and capricious chieftains, but means at least should have been resorted to, to compel *immediate* compliance with the engagements they entered into, instead of leaving their punishment, if they deserved it, to a future opportunity, and the chapter of accidents in their favour.

Of the chiefs on whom we were thus dependent, the one whose opposition affected us most injuriously, was Mihrab Khan, the ruler of Khelat, in whose territory Quettah was situated. He was

a man of courage and ability, but pre-eminently faithless and unscrupulous, even for a Beloochee. His country was formerly tributary to Candahar, but during the sway of the Baurikzye Sirdars, he had successfully set their power at defiance and rendered himself independent.

With this prince an amicable correspondence had been entered into at the commencement of the war; and Sir Alexander Burnes had been sent on a mission to him to procure his acknowledgment of Shah Shoojah and his support in favour of the expedition as far as furnishing it with supplies. The terms guaranteed to him, as the conditions of his acceding to our views, were that he should retain possession of his dominions under the same stipulations as they were held in the time of the Suddozye monarchs, and that he should receive a subsidy of one lac and a half of rupees per annum during the continuance of the war, besides being adequately remunerated for everything he should furnish for the use of our troops. A treaty to this effect was drawn up, and after some shuffling and attempts at evasion, he was induced to sign it; but as it afterwards appeared with no intention of ever fulfilling his engagements, although he made many protestations of his good faith. He appears to have

thought the expedition would ultimately fail, and that if he could escape the immediate occupation of his country he should have nothing to fear. Upon one occasion he said to Sir Alexander Burnes, "Wait! till sickness overtakes your troops, till they are exhausted with fatigue from long and harassing marches, and *from the total want of supplies*; wait till they have drunk of many waters; and wait, too, till they feel the sharpness of Affghan swords." His system accordingly seems to have been that of lulling us by the most abundant promises; and instead of facilitating the advance of the troops, throwing every conceivable obstruction in their way, and leaving it to be supposed his power was not equal to his wishes. It was at his instigation that we were beset by his plundering Beloochee subjects during our route, and it was subsequently made known, that while he was negotiating with the British authorities, he was secretly sending orders to the Governor of Gundavaq to prevent the purchase of stores by our agents. An intercepted letter, also, to one of the mountain chiefs, still further proved the extent of his treachery. It ran thus: "What is the use of your treaties and arrangements? All child's play. There is no relief but in death; no cure but in the destruction

of the English. Their heads, goods, and bodies must be sacrificed. Strengthen the pass! Call on all the tribes to harass and destroy!"

This, then, was the chief, whose dominions the unfortunate Bengal column of advance had been traversing with so much hardship, expecting, at least, to find an alleviation of their difficulties upon reaching Quettah. How those anticipations were realized has been seen. They were now looking forward with the deepest anxiety to the arrival of the Commander-in-chief. Notwithstanding the stringent measures Sir Willoughby Cotton had been compelled to resort to, even at the reduced rate of meting out the rations, they had only sufficient to last for a few days, and the necessity of an immediate advance upon Candahar became hourly more pressing. The villagers, too, daily committed the most atrocious outrages. They would frequently come among the soldiers with articles for sale, and induce men to come out under the pretence of selling them provisions, and then cruelly butcher them. At length, on the morning of the 3rd of April, Major Craigie returned from the Commander-in-chief, whom he had found at Dajdur in company with the Shah and the Envoy, and announced that they would reach Siriab on the following day.

While the Bengal column had been thus pain-

fully pursuing its way, Sir John Keane had arrived at Larkhanu, and assumed the command of the whole army. His first act was to issue a general order, which was dated the 10th of March, announcing to the troops of both presidencies the arrangements consequent upon this alteration in affairs, by which Sir Willoughby Cotton was directed to fall back to the command of his original division, which, of course, led to General Nott's resuming his brigade, and Colonel Dennie his regiment; Major-General Willshire was to command the Bombay division, and General Thackeray the cavalry; while Brigadier Stevenson, as the senior officer, was placed at the head of the artillery of both presidencies. Under these new arrangements, the troops were to be governed as much as possible by the rules of their respective presidencies; and the orders of the Commander-in-chief, intended to apply to both divisions of the army, were to be promulgated through and signed by Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, the Deputy Adjutant-General of Queen's troops at Bombay, who officiated as Military Secretary to Sir John Keane.

About this period, a violent contest was carried on between the two divisions of the army of the Indus, concerning their respective shares of the commissariat supplies, which occasioned a vehe-

ment paper war in the columns of some of the Indian newspapers. The Governor-General had directed Sir Alexander Burnes, Major Leech, and several other officers to collect camels for the use of the army; and had calculated, that when they were all assembled at Shikarpore, they would, in conjunction with those already attached to the Bengal column, amount to about forty-five thousand. These he intended should be fairly divided between the troops of each presidency and the contingent of the Shah; but nothing nearly approaching that number was ever collected, and the consequence of the insufficient supply, was the struggle above noticed for the possession of the largest proportion. The Bengal troops appear to have imagined, somewhat unreasonably, that all the camels were to be appropriated to their use, and were exceedingly discontented with the orders which admitted the Bombay column, and Shah Shoojah's troops to a participation in them. They charged the Bombay column with being a needless auxiliary, as they were themselves sufficient for all that was to be accomplished, and the Commander-in-chief with entertaining a partiality for the troops of his own presidency; while the Bombay partisans retorted that Sir Willoughby Cotton and the Bengal division had, without authority, made a bold start forward, in the hope of dis-



tancing their rivals, and rendering it impossible for them to trench upon their own resources. To make matters worse, it was the policy of the ruling powers to send the Shah's Contingent forward at least in as complete a state of efficiency as possible, and the consequent necessity of diminishing the effectiveness of the Indus army, was one of the chief evils before referred to as the result of the organization of this force.

Colonel Dennie was at this time stationed at Shikarpore, still in command of the brigade which had devolved upon him, and exerted himself greatly in carrying out the orders of the Commander-in-chief, which the officers of the Bengal commissariat contrived every means to evade; but he nevertheless, thought it extremely hard that all his cattle and stores should be taken from him to enrich the army of Shah Shoojah, and he addressed a letter of remonstrance upon the subject to Colonel Macdonald, for the information of Sir John Keane, by which he incurred the severe displeasure of that General, and subsequently suffered much from its effects.\*

\* This has been denied, and, as has been stated, upon the best authority; but when its effects were made so apparent in the wounded feelings, and, for a time, clouded reputation of Colonel Dennie, we may be permitted to doubt unsupported assertions of the non-existence of any adverse feeling on the part of his

As soon as the arrangements attendant upon the assumption of the supreme command by Sir John Keane were completed, his Excellency quitted the Bombay column, and moved forward in advance, accompanied by a squadron and a half of the 1st Bombay Light Cavalry, and a wing of the 19th Native Infantry. Upon arriving at Dadur, he found his Majesty, Shah Shoojah, and Mr. MacNaghten, who had encamped there the day before, to both of whom he was now introduced for the first time, and they all moved on together through the Bolan Pass, the Shah's camp continuing during all the subsequent operations with the Commander-in-chief. On the 4th of April they had arrived at Siriab, where an interview took place between Sir John Keane, and Sir Willoughby Cotton who rode over to meet him; and on the 6th, his Excellency's head-quarters were established at Quettah. The drooping spirit of the soldiers were now raised by the excitement of preparation, as orders were immediately issued for the re-commencement of the march, and on Sunday the 7th of April the Cavalry and the 1st

commander. Sir John Keane might have been—as he probably was—of the same opinion as the man who was by no means one of the least efficient instruments in gaining him his peerage, but he might also have been highly indignant that an inferior officer should *dare* to hint opposition to any proceeding of his.

Bengal Brigade of Infantry proceeded with the Shah, Sir John Keane and Sir Willoughby Cotton, *en route* to Candahar. Still our difficulties continued, nor could we look for much relaxation from them till our arrival at Candahar; and it is wonderful how the troops, and especially the camp followers were enabled to endure the fatigues of each harassing march upon so small a portion of food as they were compelled to subsist on. The mortality among the horses of the cavalry was very great, and yet withal numbers had to be destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy from the utter impossibility of being able to procure food for them, while the camels perished in still larger numbers. We were also perpetually annoyed by the cowardly and murderous Beloochees, who never dared venture to attack us boldly; but seized every opportunity of plundering our baggage, murdering the camp-followers and stragglers, and intercepting our convoys. The rascals were in many instances pursued and overtaken, and invariably hung or shot, as no quarter was given them; but their death never seemed to deter their companions from following their example, and risking their fate.

The severe privations we were thus compelled to undergo, had at one time created a feel-

ing of discontent among the troops, from which some of the officers, also, were unfortunately not entirely free. Despondency was the order of the day. Whisperings of retreat were heard throughout the camp which gradually swelled into murmurs, and the writer of this has occasion to know that Sir Willoughby Cotton himself, foreseeing the difficulties of a further advance and the spirit pervading the troops, was, at one time, seriously apprehensive of the ultimate necessity of such a step. This feeling had been increased by the injudicious advice of Major Leech, one of the political agents, who had written to Sir Willoughby Cotton recommending him to fall back with the army upon Shikārpore. But the energetic demeanour of Sir John Keane upon his arrival, accompanied by the order for an immediate advance, had re-inspired the force with confidence.

As we drew near to Candahar, our sufferings, from want of water, were extreme. It was pitiable to see the poor, jaded, starving horses dragging one leg after the other with obvious effort, and panting with excessive thirst; while even the severe restraints of discipline scarcely sufficed to keep the almost frenzied men in order. At a village named Killah Puttoolah, we at last found water, and nature levelling all distinctions in the

burning desire to cool their parched throats, the well-born officer and the humble private might, in many instances, be seen sharing together such scanty portion of the stream as they had been able to procure. At length, on the 25th of April, after almost unexampled difficulties, borne upon the whole with most praise-worthy fortitude by both Europeans and Natives, the head-quarters of the British army arrived under the walls of Candahar, the metropolis of Western Affghanistan.

We must now glance at the proceedings of the Bombay column of the army of the Indus, which, from the insufficiency of its equipments, was now reduced from five thousand five hundred men to about three thousand six hundred, composed, half of Europeans, and half of natives, Brigadier Gordon with three native regiments being left at Bukkur to cover the advancing column, and keep open the communication of the army with the Indus. It had been arranged that while the Bengal division should advance to Candahar by the route that has just been denoted, the troops of the other Presidency should proceed by the Gundava Pass in order to avoid the impoverished track of the first division of the army; but this intention was departed from, from an apprehension of its impracticability. Captain Sidney Powell had been sent to explore the country, and report upon

its facilities, and upon his return had stated that it was impossible to convey the artillery by that line. This opinion, however, was subsequently found to be erroneous, as General Willshire returned by that route after the fall of Khelat. They were accordingly compelled to pursue the same line of march as the Bengal force, and traverse the Bolan Pass, and on the 12th of March they left Larkhanu, and proceeded to cross the desert at Gundava.

On the 23rd, Sir John Keane, as has been related, proceeded to join the advance of the army; and the command of the Bombay troops consequently devolved upon General Willshire. It is unnecessary to dwell in detail upon the progress of this body. The difficulties it had to contend with were of much the same nature as those which the Bengal force had encountered, but the number of the troops being smaller, they were less severely felt. Their greatest sufferings arose from the intensity of the heat, the thermometer frequently standing at  $110^{\circ}$  and upwards, and this rendered infinitely more offensive, the horrible effluvia arising from the dead bodies of the camels which had been left behind by the Bengal division, and in such numbers as almost to line the whole course of their march, polluting the air all around. The horrible sights which frequently met their

view were also most revolting. Half-decomposed bodies of murdered camp-followers lay constantly in their path, with sometimes a slain Beloochee, whose companions had failed to carry him off. They were much annoyed the whole way by the native robber tribes, and some terrible examples were made of such as were unfortunate enough to be captured without, however, curing the rest of their plundering propensities; but they accomplished the passage of the Bolan Pass in security, not having been attacked, till nearly out of its terrible jaws, when they easily repulsed the assailants.

It is surprising that measures were not taken by the chiefs for defending this and the other passes. With no more knowledge than they may well be supposed to possess, they might have effectually blocked up the narrower parts of this formidable defile, and with a comparatively small body of the mountaineers have annihilated the whole of our troops.

Emerging from the Bolan Pass, the Bombay contingent proceeded on to Quettah, which they reached on the 12th of April. Here a company of foot artillery was directed to remain to reinforce General Nott, who had been left to occupy the town with one of the Bengal brigades; the rest continued their route to Candahar, where

they arrived on the 4th of May, and became once again united to their Bengal brothers in arms.

While the two grand divisions of the army of the Indus were thus making their way to Candabar, Colonel Dennie was performing one of those gallant actions which, while General Sale may be considered as the hero of the retreat, gives the other a claim to be regarded as the hero of the advance. This brave and ill-used man had been left in command of two native regiments of the second Bengal brigade at Shikarpore, where he was detained for want of the means of conveyance, Sir John Keane having deprived him of nearly all his camels and stores to equip his own force. This was, perhaps, to a certain extent, necessary to enable the Bombay division to advance at all; but it fell very hard upon an officer of Colonel Dennie's rank and merit, especially when detention at Shikarpore was looked upon at the time as almost tantamount to destruction, and the very plea put forth for robbing the native troops of their carriage cattle, to push forward the European regiments, was the preservation of the latter from the dangers of the climate.

Even here, however, his active spirit found fitting employment. Captain Stockley, an officer of the Bengal Commissariat, while proceeding on



his way to the depot at Dadur, with a convoy of cattle and various stores, had been attacked by a strong party of Beloochees, and compelled to retire for safety into the fort of Janneedera ; the enemy had captured three hundred and fifty of the camels, and a number of his men were slain in the conflict. Colonel Dennie, directly he had intelligence of the event, aware of the insecure position occupied by Captain Stockley, and of the immense importance of the convoy, hastily equipped two hundred sepoy's of the 42nd regiment, and advanced to his relief. He made a rapid march of one hundred and fifty miles, a great portion of the distance, over the Desert, succeeded in rescuing the Captain and his convoy from their perilous situation, and delivered it over safely to the Commissariat authorities of Dadur.

So uncertain had been the communication between the different stations, that it was here he learned, for the first time, of the Commander-in-chief's general order of the 4th of April, directing him to join his regiment, which it will be remembered was in the first Bengal brigade, and consequently now advancing on Candahar. He, therefore, immediately proceeded with his little escort to brave the dangers of the Bolan Pass. At the same time, Captain Anderson, who was in command of two newly raised troops of horse artillery with

tumbrils, ammunition waggons, and other accompaniments, was about to set out from Dadur to join the army by the same route, and claimed the protection of Colonel Dennie. Their march commenced under a burning sun, and they suffered most severely the whole way from the intensity of the heat, the thermometer frequently rising in their tents alone to 120°. Some of the men went mad, and others died upon the road-side from the fearful severity of the weather, and to add to their trials, they had to fight their way along the whole route. In spite of these obstacles, Colonel Dennie, by his admirable dispositions, succeeded in conveying his charge, without loss, to Quettah. Attached to the artillery under Captain Anderson, were some bullock-carts and baggage, which, from the miserable state of the animals, Colonel Dennie had warned him were unfit to proceed, and that he at any rate could not hold himself responsible for their safety. Nevertheless, they were brought on, and he exerted himself to protect them when he found his assistance could be of service. On the last day of the passage in the Bolan Pass, he ordered that all the baggage should be sent in advance for security, but through some neglect on the part of Captain Anderson, the bullock-carts were left in the rear, and when nearly through the defile, it was reported that they

were unable to come on, the cattle being disabled, and that the Beloochees were manning the surrounding heights, and firing upon them. Some of them were thus inevitably lost, although every thing was done that could possibly be effected to bring them away or destroy them, and the Commander-in-chief thought proper to censure Colonel Dennie for faulty arrangements. Reproof so undeserved could not fail to suggest reminiscences of the Shikarpore remonstrance.

At length, having surmounted the difficulties of the march, Colonel Dennie and his little band, which had been augmented by three companies at Dadur, arrived at Quettah with their charge, and proceeded thence to Candahar, where they arrived at the beginning of June, with treasure to the amount of twenty-two lacs of rupees, which they had escorted from Quettah.

## CHAPTER VI.

STORM AND CAPTURE OF GHUZNEE—PURSUIT OF DOST MAHOMED—ARRIVAL AT CABOOL.

UPON the arrival of the British army near Candahar, the governors of that city, the three Baurikzye brothers, fled with their families and a few followers to Ghirisk, a small fortress on the river Helmund, which formerly belonged to their celebrated brother, Futteh Khan. Shah Shoojah, upon the discovery of their flight, wished to send a detachment of his troops immediately in pursuit of them; but Sir William MacNaghten, apprehensive that the treatment they might meet with, if taken, from the exasperated feelings of the King's adherents, would ill accord with British notions of what was due to a conquered foe under the circumstances, restrained the Shah, and reiterated the offers which had before been made to them by the English government. All terms were, however, rejected by these turbulent chiefs, and Brigadier Sale was dispatched in pursuit of them; but upon arriving at the Helmund,

he found that they had fled on to Meshed in Persia, and he was compelled to return unsuccessful from the chase.

On the approach of Shah Shoojah to the western capital of his dominions, he was received with many demonstrations of affection on the part of the inhabitants, who seemed willing to submit to any rule which relieved them from the tyranny of the Baurikzyes. Sir William MacNaghten in his official letter to government announcing the event, thus describes his reception :

“The spectacle which presented itself on the road was the most interesting one it ever fell to my lot to witness. His Excellency, Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane, with the army of the Indus, was one march in our rear, our advance having been made on an erroneous calculation of the distance, which was too great to be performed by the European troops from the heat of the weather. The Shah’s disciplined troops were behind us, and his Majesty advanced, attended only by the officers of the mission, and his own immediate retainers. At every hundred yards of our progress, we were met by bands of well-mounted and well-armed men, all tendering their allegiance to his Majesty, whilst the peaceable inhabitants of the city assembled in crowds, and manifested their joy at the Shah’s restoration in

the most unbounded terms. Tranquillity is restored; the people flock to our camp with the greatest confidence. There is no longer any apprehension of scarcity; and even the confidential servants of the Sirdars, several of whom have visited me, declare their satisfaction at the change of government, and state that they would sooner have joined the Shah, but for the dread that some evil would have been inflicted on their families, whom they must have left in the city."

On the 25th of April, his Majesty took formal possession of Candahar amidst similar rejoicings, and the 8th of May was fixed for the ceremony of his recognition to take place. On this occasion, the whole of the British army was drawn out before the King, who was seated on a splendid throne, and attended by the Envoy and Minister, and all those who composed the diplomatic body. He was hailed with every mark of homage; royal salutes were fired in honour of him; the troops presented arms as they approached, and then defiled past him, while nuzars, (complimentary gifts implying homage), were presented to him by Sir William MacNaghten, and a certain number of the Affghans who had joined his cause. The scene presented, upon the whole, an imposing appearance; but one could scarcely help a smile of good-natured derision, at

beholding the court paid by the British authorities to the King of their own creating, whose whole power was derived from themselves, and who, in fact, was but an instrument in their hands for the furtherance of their own objects.

The army remained at Candahar two months, to recruit the shattered strength of the men and its exhausted resources. The general health of the native troops was excellent, but the Europeans suffered much from sickness, so severe had been their trials and so excessive was the heat. While here, two events occurred of the most tragical nature; one was the murder of Lieutenant Invararity, which proved that it was still impossible to go any distance away from the camp or the city with safety. This young officer, in company with Lieutenant Wilmer, both of the 16th Lancers, had gone on a fishing excursion some miles from the camp, and had imprudently deferred their return till late in the evening. While proceeding homeward, Lieutenant Invararity being considerably in the advance, was struck down by a heavy stone, and cruelly butchered by band of ruffians. Lieutenant Wilmer, on reaching the scene of his friend's murder, was also set upon by these miscreants, but he was more fortunate. He defended himself for some time with great bravery, parrying their blows with

his walking-stick, the only weapon he had, and at length succeeded in reaching the camp of a detachment of the Shah's infantry in safety. He immediately returned with an armed party to the spot where he had left his friend. He was still alive, and able to recognise Wilmer, but he almost immediately expired.

The other event was of a more public character, and more atrocious in its details. A body of camp-followers, to the number of three hundred, weary of their harassing life, had formed the design of leaving the army without asking permission, and returning to India by Dera Ismael Khan, and through the Punjaub. The arrival of a kafila at Candahar gave them an opportunity of carrying their plan into execution, and it was agreed that they should put themselves under the protection of the kafila-bashee, or chief of the caravan. For some days, all went on satisfactorily, although the suspicions of the camp-followers had been aroused by their being required to give up their arms at night, upon the plea that the inhabitants of the villages through which they passed, might be alarmed by their hostile appearance. These suspicions were, however, allayed by their arms being punctually returned to them each morning. This course was pursued for some days; but at length, in a part of the country no-



torious for the murderous and plundering propensities of the people, they were gathered together in a fort of great strength, called Maroof, under the pretext of securing them from danger, and then led out, one by one, through the gate, and brutally slaughtered. After a time, the shrieks and groans of the wretched victims alarmed those who were still immured in the fort, and in the height of their alarm, they clambered over the walls in the hope of escaping the dreadful fate which awaited them. But very few succeeded in fleeing from the scene of horror; some fell crippled to the earth, and were mercilessly cut to pieces by their pretended protectors, while a very small number contrived to reach Candahar, and relate the horrible catastrophe of which their companions had been the victims. The gallant and indefatigable Captain Outram was afterwards sent to take vengeance on the atrocious assassins, which he accomplished effectually by destroying the fort and executing many of the people concerned in that deed of blood.

During the stay of the troops at Candahar, their prospects of obtaining supplies had not brightened to the extent expected. They still experienced much difficulty in procuring the necessary means of subsistence, both for themselves and the cattle. Grain came in but slowly, and was reported to be scarce, while the treasure-chest

was also at a low ebb, and, notwithstanding we had spent thirty lacs of rupees among the people of the city, it was found impossible to negotiate a loan. The arrival of Surwur Khan the Lohanee chief with a convoy of provisions and stores, had been anxiously looked for, for some time, but upon their reaching Candahar, the Sohanees obstinately refused to proceed further with the army, from a dread, as they asserted, of bringing down the vengeance of Dost Mahomed, whose subjects they were, upon their families. The army was, consequently in no better condition than before, as there was no means of conveying the newly arrived stores; nevertheless, it broke up from before Candahar, on the 17th of June, and we commenced our march *en route* for Ghuznee.

The progress of the now united army of the Indus to this place was attended with no obstacle of importance. The Affghans still refrained from showing themselves in any strength, though we were occasionally annoyed by parties of plundering Ghiljies, and threats of a night attack which obliged the troops to keep prepared, and interfered with their rest; but nothing worthy of particular note occurred till we reached Ghuznee, which we did on the 21st of July.

This celebrated fortress stands on the northern extremity of a range of hills running due east

and west. Three sides of the town are protected by a broad and deep moat, supplied with water from the adjoining river. The citadel is a square of irregular form, and is situated on an eminence commanding the whole city. The garrison was commanded by Gholam Hyder Khan, one of Dost Mahomed's sons, and consisted of between three thousand and four thousand men, a large portion of whom were well-mounted cavalry; they had provisions sufficient to last for eight months, and such was the strength of the place, in the opinion of the Affghans, and, indeed, of the people throughout the East, that they believed it capable of holding out against us for a year. The number of inhabitants in the town was about equal to the garrison.

It was against this town, then, that on the 21st of July the united army directed its march. The British troops now amounted to about eight thousand fighting men fit for duty, and the Shah's Contingent to four thousand, making in all an effective force of about twelve thousand, with forty pieces of artillery. This body the Commander-in-chief divided into three columns, to be prepared to give battle in case of an attack, and moved over the plains to the west of the city, halting after a march of twelve miles, within a mile of the walls of the fort.

The ease with which Shah Shoojah and his British allies had been allowed to take possession of Candahar, and the information they had received from various sources, had induced them to suppose that no opposition would be offered to them at Ghuznee. This, and the scarcity of carriage cattle, had led Sir John Keane to resolve on leaving his siege train and battering artillery behind him at Candahar. The place had been represented as weak and indefensible, and entirely commanded by a range of hills, from which operations could be successfully carried on without the necessity of heavy ordnance; and although certain indications of a hostile nature were observable as we approach'd, the Envoy was still confident of the correctness of the information to the contrary which he had secretly received, and the army moved on in uncertainty, but prepared.

Sir Willoughby Cotton had gone on in advance to reconnoitre the principal approach to the fortress, and a party of Affghan horsemen who had been observed hovering about some walled gardens, hastily disappeared as he drew near. While the General was proceeding on his reconnoissance, however, the advanced guard was fired upon by some skirmishers from the gardens, and the three regiments of the first brigade received

orders to move up towards the walls in separate directions. This movement on our part was answered by a shot from the ramparts, which whistled harmlessly over our heads; and a brisk fire from the gardens around the fort was commenced at the same time, but the party from which it proceeded was speedily dislodged.

Sir John Keane was now anxious to ascertain what strength of artillery the Affghans could bring to bear upon us; and with that view ordered a battery to be formed of eighteen horse artillery guns of the Bombay force, together with the camel battery of nine-pounders, which was got into position seven hundred yards from the walls. These opened a sharp fire, and the enemy, nothing daunted, replied by bringing about half a dozen of their guns to bear upon our columns, which were directed with a precision highly creditable to their skill. The Commander-in-chief having gained the information he desired, ordered the troops and artillery to be withdrawn; and the Affghans, we afterwards learned, taking our retirement for a repulse, were highly delighted at the success, as they imagined, of their operations. During these proceedings, a demonstration was made on the part of the enemy's cavalry with the design of attacking the rear of the army, whereupon Captain Outram was despatched to stop the

advance of the Bombay force ; and the cavalry and infantry brigade of that division were halted within about three miles of the fort, to prevent our flank from being turned.

The result of Sir John Keane's reconnoissance of the fortress was a total change in the position of the army ; and the evil effects of having left the battering train at Candahar were now made fully apparent. Ghuznee, instead of being, as had been represented, almost defenceless, was a place of remarkable strength, and was found by the engineers to possess a high rampart in good repair, built on a scarpèd mound, about thirty-five high, flanked by numerous towers, and surrounded by a *fausse-braye* and wet ditch. The irregular figure of the "enceinte" gave a good flanking fire, whilst the height of the citadel covered the interior from the commanding fire of the hills to the north, rendering it nugatory. In addition to this, the towers at the angles, had been enlarged, screen-walls had been built before the gates, the ditch cleared out, and filled with water, stated to be unfordable, and an outwork built upon the right bank, so as to command the bed of it.\* The gate on the side of Cabool, however, had been left in such a state as to admit of ingress and egress,

\* Memoranda of the Engineers' operations before Ghuznee by Captains Thompson and Peat.

reinforcements being expected to arrive from that city. It was, therefore, arranged that the attack should be made on that, the weakest point of defence, and the troops were accordingly ordered to take up a new position on the opposite or Cabool side of Ghuznee, and occupy the whole frontier space ranging between north and south east. This movement was commenced at four in the afternoon, the garrison firing the whole time, and the rest of the day was taken up in accomplishing it, the cavalry marching round the fortress, out of reach of the enemy's cannon, to the right, and the infantry to the left. This change of situation had the effect also of cutting off all chance of escape on the part of the garrison, who, on the other hand, in their fatuitous ignorance, beheld it with immeasurable satisfaction. Gholam Hyder Khan and the other chiefs, regarded it as an evidence of our intention to abandon Ghuznee and proceed at once to Cabool, which would enable them to harass our rear, while Dost Mahomed, who was supposed to be advancing from Cabool, hemmed us in, in front.

At break of day the following morning, the Commander-in-chief, accompanied by Sir Willoughby Cotton, ascended the heights commanding the eastern front of the works, to make a fresh reconnoissance, and resolve upon the plan

of attack. It was quite evident that the strength of the fortifications was such, that our army could not venture to attack it in a regular manner with any prospect of success, as we had no battering train, and the great command of the parapets from sixty to seventy feet, with the wet ditch, were insurmountable obstacles to an attack, either by mining or escalading. It was, therefore, determined that the brilliant and daring expedient suggested by Captain Thompson in the previous day's reconnoissance, namely, to make "a dash at the Cabool gateway, blowing the gate open by bags of powder," should be adopted. It was further resolved that every thing should be got in readiness during the night, and that the attempt should be made on the following morning. Sir John Keane then issued his instructions as to the manner of carrying the plan into effect. This was to be done by drawing off the attention of the garrison to a false attack on the opposite side, while under cover of this, the engineers were to carry on their operations as secretly as possible.

In forming these plans, the engineers derived much assistance from the information imparted to them by Abdool Rusheed, a nephew of Dost Mahomed, who came into the English camp the night previous to our arrival at Ghuznee. He had been treated with much neglect by his uncle,



and, along with a younger brother, appears to have exhibited signs of attachment towards Shah Shoojah, which roused the suspicions of their cousin, the governor of the fortress. He first sent for, and questioned the younger of the two, and not being satisfied with his answer, ordered him immediately to be put to death, while Abdool Rusheed, taking warning by his brother's fate, secretly quitted the town at the head of a few followers, and joined the cause of the Shah. He made us acquainted with the state of the fortress, informed us in what respects it was most easily assailable, and upon other points which rendered us service in our subsequent operations.

While arrangements connected with the coming night's proceedings were thus occupying the mind of the Commander-in-chief, a spirited little affair was going on in another part of the field. About noon, the enemy was observed mustering in considerable strength upon the heights to the southward of the camp, and displaying several banners. They were a body of fanatical Mussulmen, termed Ghazees, or Defenders of the Faith, whose enthusiasm had been enlisted by Dost Mohamed against the Kafir, or infidel English, and their renegade King, as the Shah was represented to them. Their position commanded his Majesty's camp, and it was evident from their movements

that they were about to pour down in that direction, as if their animosity were chiefly directed against him. The whole of the Shah's horse, supported by the lancers and a regiment of Bengal cavalry, moved out immediately with two guns to oppose them. The enemy had already begun to descend into the plain, when they were met by the Shah's cavalry under Captain Nicolson, and driven back with some loss, leaving one of their standards in our hands.

Captain Outram, one of the bravest and most active officers in the service, who, whenever any out-of-the-way duty was to be performed, seemed always ready in a moment to undertake it, and has since gained so much distinction in connexion with the affairs of Scinde, arrived at the scene of action just previous to the occurrence of this incident. Finding no other European officer on the spot, he prevailed on a body of the Shah's horse to accompany him round the hills in the enemy's rear, where he stationed them so as to prevent the latter retreating. Intimidated by this manœuvre, and the repulse they had met with, the Ghazees ascended the heights beyond the reach of the horse, and Captain Outram meeting at this moment a small detachment of native infantry and matchlock-men under an English officer, proposed to him an immediate attempt to force the

enemy from their new position. They ascended the rocks in gallant style, Captain Outram at their head, advancing steadily under a galling fire, and at length, step by step, attained the topmost peak, over which floated the Ghazee consecrated banner of green and white, which was supposed to confer invincibility upon its followers. At sight of this, the whole party rushed forward, cheering vociferously. The standard-bearer was brought to the ground by a chance shot, the sacred standard itself fell into our hands, and the hopeless Ghazees fled panic-stricken at the loss of their charmed banner, and its inefficacy to protect them. The loss on our part in this affray, was about twenty killed and wounded; the Affghans lost between thirty and forty, and about fifty of them were made prisoners.

A scene now ensued much less pleasant to contemplate. It of course became a question what to do with the captives, and they were brought before the Shah. Some of them were released, upon their declaring that they had been forced into the ranks of the King's opponents against their wish; but the majority, excited by fanaticism, were not restrained even by the Shah's presence from evincing their animosity towards his person, and avowing their determination to have been, to seek his life. One of them, more

violent than the rest, upon the interference of one of his Majesty's attendants, stabbed him with his dagger, and they were then immediately ordered for execution. Two of them, however, were afterwards spared; one upon the plea of his being a Syud, and the other because he pleaded hard for his life.

This transaction has occasioned much animadversion; and how far so extreme a proceeding was justified by necessity, has never been satisfactorily ascertained. But from the fact of some of them having been pardoned, and previous acts of humanity in the course of the Shah's life, one is unwilling to attribute to him wanton cruelty upon this occasion. The share borne by the Commander-in-chief in this tragical event, is not quite so clear. It has been stated, that upon his being informed by the Envoy of the Shah's intentions, he expressed his concurrence in it as a retaliatory measure for the plunder of our baggage, and the murder of our camp-followers. On the other hand it has been said, that the execution took place entirely without his knowledge, and that when it was made known to him, he expressed his strong disapprobation of the deed, and caused it to be represented to the Shah, that no such proceedings would be again permitted while he was connected with the British army.

Although there may be too good grounds for supposing his Excellency to be a man of arbitrary and vindictive temper, we would fain hope the latter account is the true one; at the same time, if it be not, justice compels one to add, that it is not impossible to find some justification of the act. The danger of a number of prisoners, if prisoners were to be taken, in a camp already subsisting on half and quarter rations, must not be underrated, and of the determined ferocity of the men in question, there appears to be no doubt. But after all that can be said, their cold-blooded execution was one of those acts, which however much it may have been required by the stern dictates of necessity, our feelings will never permit us to approve of. (C)

While these events were thus occupying the attention of one portion of the army, preparations were all day actively in progress for storming Ghuznee the next morning. The road which led to the Cabool gate was, as has been already indicated, the line of attack. About midnight, four companies of the 16th Native Infantry were placed in the gardens bordering the town, while shortly afterwards three companies of the 35th under Captain Hay, took up a position towards the north side of the fortress, with instructions to divert the attention of the garrison by keeping up

an incessant fire of musquetry upon the works. The artillery, under the direction of Brigadier Stevenson, was placed in a commanding situation on the heights opposite. Meanwhile Captain Thompson, with the officers and men of the engineer department, crept down to the works with their terrible apparatus, protected by a detachment of H.M's. 13th regiment, who sought what cover they could on either side of the road, and endeavoured to keep down the fire from the ramparts, which became very heavy on the approach of the party.

The tempestuous state of the weather was exceedingly favourable for the concealment of their movements, the wind blowing in such violent gusts from the east, as frequently to drown all sound, among the devoted garrison, of the operations going on for their destruction. The explosion party consisted of Captain Peat, Lieutenants Durand and McLeod, three serjeants, and eighteen men of the Sappers, carrying nine hundred pounds of powder in twelve sand-bags, with a hose seventy-two feet long. Behind these the storming party stood ranged in anxious expectation of the signal for action, and was composed as follows :—“ An advance,” consisting of the Grenadier Companies of H.M's. 2d and 17th regiment, the Bengal European regiment, and a

company of H.M's 13th, under the heroic Colonel Dennie, who had been solicited to take the leadership. A second body was placed under the immediate command of Brigadier Sale, which was made up of the rest of H.M's 2d and Bengal European regiments, with the whole of the 13th, excepting the company attached to Colonel Dennie's forlorn hope. H.M's. 17th regiment, under the guidance of Colonel Croker, was added as a supporting column, and directed to follow the storming party into the fort. Another body, denominated the reserve, was commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton in person, and consisted of the unemployed companies of the 16th, the 35th, and the 48th; while Colonel Stalker, with the 19th Bombay Infantry, to prevent a surprise, took up a position on the Cabool road, in support of a division of Cavalry stationed there for the same purpose, the enemy having threatened an attack from that quarter. None, however, was made. The rest of the Cavalry, under Major-General Thackwell, were distributed in various situations round the fort, to be employed as circumstances might require.

It was now three o'clock in the morning, and every thing was in readiness for the grand attack. So admirable had our various operations been conducted, that no sign of the garrison's being at

all aware of our intentions was manifested, until the commencement of the false attack by Captain Hay, with the three companies of the 35th Native Infantry, roused them to a sense of danger.

At the appointed time these troops opened a brisk fire from the southward, and the batteries began playing vigorously upon the walls. This was answered from the ramparts with a spirited return fire from the juzails, and such artillery as they possessed; and every time that our skirmishers of the 13th, who were ranged along the whole northern face of the works, showed themselves to the enemy, they were saluted with a hail-storm of musquetry. The scene became intensely exciting. It was still dark, and the Affghans exhibited on their walls a succession of blue lights to aid them in getting a clearer view of the efforts of their adversaries. Every where the cannonade and fire of musquetry grew fiercer and fiercer, and the northern rampart especially became one vast sheet of flame. The dusky fortress looked like some huge monster, indignant at the attacks of its enemies, belching forth masses of fire and smoke, as if to consume its audacious foes at once. The scene was unimaginally, though dreadfully beautiful.

But the catastrophe was approaching. The party to whom was entrusted the critical duty of



blowing up the gate, now advanced to their task silently and rapidly, led by Lieutenant Durand. The besieged were conscious of our being in the gate-way, but had no conception of the terrible process going on, or by throwing over a few of their blue lights, they might have prevented the placing of the powder-bags. But this ignorance on their part had been foreseen. The success of the whole scheme depended upon the nicest calculation of chances, and the event proved how skilfully this had been done. On going up to the gate, Lieutenant Durand distinctly saw through the chinks, lights and a guard behind it. The poor fellows were smoking their pipes with all a Mussulman's imperturbability, and quite unconscious that the next moment would hurl them into eternity.

The powder-bags were now piled against the huge portal, the hose laid, and the train fired; the explosion party quickly retiring to such cover as they could find in the short space of time available. The whole was accomplished in less than two minutes. The enemy were still ignorant of the nature of our proceedings, but their attention was attracted at that moment by the commotion about the gate, and a large and brilliant blue light was brought to the spot that they might see what was going on. But it was too late. The powder-bags had ignited,

and now exploded with a tremendous crash, shivering the massive barricade to pieces, and tearing away solid masses of stone and wood-work from the main building. Not one of the party was hurt by the explosion; but Captain Peat, in his anxiety to witness the success of the operations, not keeping sufficiently under cover, was, for a time, stunned by the concussion.

After a short pause the bugle sounded the signal for the advance of the storming party, and the heroic Colonel Dennie, at the head of the forlorn hope, sprung over the black and smoking ruins that impeded the gateway, and rushed into the fortress. The surprised and terrified Affghans, for a moment, lost their self-possession, but speedily recovered themselves, and a fierce hand-to-hand encounter ensued. They contested the entrance with great bravery, but the gallant and impetuous Colonel dashed forward with invincible courage, bearing down all opposition. Although day-light had broken, it was still so dark in the narrow entrance as to be impossible to distinguish any object clearly, and the soldiers as they came up had to grope their way between the yet standing walls, and pour in their deadly volleys when almost close upon the enemy, for there was no time nor space for regular firing. It was at first feared that the gate had been

bricked up behind, a sudden angle in the passage causing that appearance; but as they pressed on, the leading files caught a glimpse of the sky above the heads of their receding foes, and felt assured that the town was before them.

The conflict though severe, was not of long duration. The gallant little band, inspired by their daring leader, whose commanding figure was seen ever in advance, and whose voice cheered them on to the attack, forced their way along, overbearing all resistance, and at length a long, loud, exhilarating cheer announced to the whole army without the triumphant issue of the contest.

Meanwhile that portion of the 13th which had been acting as a skirmishing party, was closing up at the sound of the bugle, and Brigadier Sale was promptly and steadily advancing with the rest of the storming party to the assistance of the forlorn hope. While moving on he was informed by Captain Peat, who seemed bewildered by the explosion, that although the gate was blown down, the passage was choked up, and Colonel Dennie had been unable to effect an entrance. This was disastrous news, and the Brigadier knowing the uselessness of proceeding under such circumstances, was compelled to order a retreat. This backward movement was actually commenced, when Captain Thompson becoming an-

xious at the non-appearance of the main column, hastened himself to ascertain the cause of its detention, and informed General Sale that so far from being repulsed, Colonel Dennie had already won his way into the fortress. The brave Brigadier now pressed hastily forward and entered the gateway; but the delay occasioned by the false intelligence he had at first received, had nearly proved fatal. Instead of the main column following up quickly, as it should have done the advance, too great an interval was left between them, and Colonel Dennie, who had by this time got well within the walls, was driving headlong before him a large body of the Affghans. These were rushing down towards the opening in the hope of making their escape just at the moment that Brigadier's Sale's column was entering. The conflict which ensued was terrific. The Affghans, rendered desperate at finding themselves hemmed in between the two bodies, and their egress thus barred, rushed upon the British with the impetuosity of men, who, seeing death inevitable, were resolved to sell their lives as dearly as they could. Bayonet and sabre clashed together in deadly strife—and so impetuous was their onset, that, for a moment, our troops began to give way. One of the foremost of the enemy, a man of powerful frame, threw himself upon the

Brigadier, and brought him to the ground by a sabre-cut in the face. As the gallant Briton was falling he dealt him a second blow, but missed his footing in the attempt, and both men fell to the ground. A fearful struggle now ensued between them for the mastery. They grappled with all the energy of despair, each conscious that life was the prize contended for. The wary Brigadier endeavoured to gain possession of his adversary's sword, but failed, and wounded his hand in the attempt. His situation was now most perilous, faint as he was from the loss of blood, and the future hero of Jellalabad might have ended his days in the broken portal of Ghuznee, but for the opportune approach of Captain Kershaw of the 13th, who, seeing his leader's danger, plunged his sword into the body of the Affghan. Still the frantic wretch continued to struggle, and it was not till Sir Robert Sale, who for a moment got uppermost, with one blow of his sword cleft his skull from the crown to the eyebrows, that he succeeded in freeing himself from the grasp of his desperate enemy.

Upon regaining his feet, the leader of the column refrained for a short space from personal conflict with the enemy, but remained directing his troops, who had now driven back the Affghans, and established themselves within the

town. In the meantime, Colonel Croker was advancing with the support without encountering any other obstacle to his progress than was afforded by the surgeons, who were conveying away the wounded men of the storming party. The reserve force had also been closing up to the walls as speedily as the progress of the advanced columns would permit it, sustaining every now and then a galling fire from the ramparts, in consequence of their exposed position, and it was not till Colonel Croker's division had made its way into the town that the reserve was enabled to march steadily forward.

Thus far all had proceeded well, but more yet remained to be done before our victory could be said to be complete. The citadel had not yet been assailed, and it was reasonable to suppose that the enemy would now turn their efforts in that direction, and make a determined stand there. In anticipation of this, Sir John Keane ordered every gun of the batteries upon the heights to be aimed at that point; and Brigadier Sale speedily regaining his strength, and disregarding his wound, gallantly hastened on in the same direction.

But Gholam Hyder Khan, the governor, had other thoughts. Astounded by the sudden apparition of the storming party within the walls he had deemed capable of resisting any

attack, he abandoned the contest in despair, and secreted himself in a distant part of the fort; so that when the British, led on by their commander, nothing daunted by his recent danger, reached the citadel, scarcely any resistance was offered, and in a few minutes more, the colours of the 13th and 17th regiments were floating proudly above the ramparts.

By this time the reserve had penetrated into the town, and was driving from their hiding-places on the ramparts, the enemy whose galling fire had so annoyed its men upon their approach. Unable to make head against their disciplined assailants, the desperate Affghans rushed madly down from the works, distributing themselves over the town, and cutting furiously at every thing in their way, while our troops now assembled within the walls in great numbers, blocking up all escape, hunted them down like so many wild beasts. It was now no longer a struggle, but absolute slaughter.

The darkness which had prevailed during the conflict, increased the horror of the scene, and being more favourable to the besiegers than the besieged, the latter suffered most severely. Every street was strewed with the mangled bodies of the dying and the dead. One fortified house had held out with desperate valour, and fifty-eight of

the Affghans perished in its defence alone. Five hundred and fourteen dead bodies were picked up within the walls, and buried by the British; sixteen hundred became prisoners, and the number of the wounded was probably about the same. One hundred more, it is supposed, were cut up by the Cavalry, who scoured the plains in all directions; and, for weeks afterwards, dead bodies were found in various parts of the town, in narrow streets, and the recesses of private buildings, mostly those of men who had since died of their wounds; so that the total loss of the Affghans in slain was probably little short of a thousand. Such are the harrowing details of these scenes of glory.

One fact, however, must be recorded to the honour of the captors of Ghuznee, which places their conduct in the most favourable light, and to which history cannot probably furnish a parallel. It is confirmed by the testimony of all, that their exploit was unstained by even one solitary act of peculiar atrocity. Those scenes of horror which generally follow the capture of a town by storm, and at the bare idea of which the heart sickens, were refrained from here. With the close of the fighting all unnecessary violence ceased, and throughout the city not a single female was exposed to injury or insult. These good dispositions, on the



part of the soldiers, were, doubtless, assisted by their abstinence from liquor, the spirit stores of the army having been exhausted for some time previously. To this cause also was attributed, by the medical men, the rapid recovery of our troops from their wounds, many of which were very severe.

As an instance of the spirit which animated the men, Dr. Kennedy mentions, that on visiting the hospital of her Majesty's 2nd and 17th regiments, he was surprised to find them cleared of sick! The gallant fellows had all but risen in mutiny on their surgeons, and insisted on joining their comrades! None remained in hospital but the hopelessly bed-ridden, who literally could not crawl; and even of these, a portion, who could just stand and walk, were dressed, and made to look like soldiers, to take the hospital guard: no effective man could be kept away. Surely when we reflect upon such instances as this, and witness the daring courage which achieved the conquest of Ghuznee, crowned as it was by the noble conduct which ensued upon success, we may be permitted to doubt the necessity of brutalizing the soldier by priming him with liquor previous to undertaking similar enterprises.

One thing was still necessary to complete the success of the day. All resistance was now over-

borne, with the exception of a few infuriated men who continued throughout the day, after the town had surrendered, to fire upon our soldiers from isolated positions, killing and wounding some, but who were at length secured, and their leader afterwards executed. But Gholam Hyder Khan, the governor, was still at liberty. It was for some time supposed that he was concealed somewhere about the harem, but he was at length discovered in a house near the Candahar gate, attended by a body of Affghans. Captain Taylor, of the Bengal European regiment, was the first to discover his hiding-place, and upon approaching it, he was saluted with earnest cries for quarter. One of the treacherous barbarians, however, fired upon him as he advanced, and slightly grazed his breast; but, with the aid of a small detachment, he penetrated into the room where Gholam Hyder was concealed, and took him prisoner. He was taken before the Shah, but upon being brought into his presence, appears to have exhibited anything but courage. The King, however, behaved towards him with much generosity, and after mildly rebuking him, allowed him to depart.

As soon as all was quiet in the town, the Commander-in-chief conducted Shah Shoojah and Sir William MacNaghten over the citadel and a greater part of the fortress. The King expressed

much admiration of the skill and courage of the British troops, and was astonished at our having made ourselves masters of a place hitherto considered impregnable, in so short a space of time. We had gained possession of the citadel in less than an hour, and in two hours and a quarter the artillery had ceased firing.

The chief merit of the brilliant achievement just recorded, fairly belongs to Captain Thompson, who conceived the daring plan by which the capture of Ghuznee was accomplished; but he, upon whom the most depended in its execution, was undoubtedly Colonel Dennie, who, at the head of his devoted little band, gallantly rushed into "the imminent deadly breach" as soon as it was practicable, and may be said to have been actually in possession of the fort before he received any assistance. Had he faltered at all in his course, or had any misgivings as to his success upon discovering the appearance of the gates being barricaded behind, and given way, the whole scheme would have failed, and the British army have probably met with a similar fate to that which overwhelmed its unhappy remnant at a subsequent period at Cabool. The part borne by Sir John Keane in the action which gained him a peerage and two thousand pounds per annum, was of subordinate consequence; but he has the merit

of perceiving at once the feasibility of the plan proposed to him, and of acting upon it with promptitude and decision. The dispositions for the attack were judiciously made and contributed towards its ultimate success.

But whatever merit this fortunate leader may be entitled to upon the occasion, was tarnished by his subsequent ill-treatment of the chief actor in the scene. In the general order issued from headquarters in the course of the day, Brigadier Sale, whose heroic character needs no support from the stolen glory of another, was represented as having led and directed the *leading* column, while the name of Colonel Dennie is only mentioned, and his brilliant gallantry slurred over, with a list of others, who, however meritorious their services, were in no way particularly distinguished from the numerous other brave men who did their duty upon the occasion. Conscious, without vanity, of the important part he had played, and the responsibility which had devolved upon him in the capture of Ghuznee, Colonel Dennie felt much mortified by this slighting notice of his merits; but unwilling to suppose it proceeded from hostility towards himself personally, he attributed it to mistake. He accordingly waited upon the Commander-in-chief to explain the real circumstances of the case, encouraged thereto by the knowledge

that another officer on the previous day had adopted the same course with success. Upon doing so, however, so far from meeting with redress, he was surprised and confounded by the conduct of the Commander-in-chief, who treated him with the grossest indignity, using such language as even a menial servant would not submit to without resenting.\* The injured officer retired with indignation and disgust from the presence of his general, and so aggrieved did he feel himself to be, that he made a formal complaint to the military authorities in England of Sir John Keane's behaviour towards him. It was not to be expected, however, that the courtly powers of the Horse Guards would think of censuring the conduct of a man holding so distinguished and fortunate a position as Sir John Keane, and no notice was, therefore, taken of Colonel Dennie's complaint; but their silence speaks greatly in his favour, as he would doubtless have drawn upon himself severe marks of their displeasure, had he done any thing to deserve it. But he had not yet expiated the Shikarpore remonstrance, and he had much more to bear with from the same source ere his glorious fall put an end at once to his further exploits and disappointments.

\* Vide Colonel Dennie's letters in the *Bombay Times*, for May, 1842.

The importance of the capture of Ghuznee was soon made apparent by the arrival of Nawab Jubbar Khan in the British camp, on the 28th of July, with terms of submission from his brother, Dost Mahomed. This chief was the personal friend of Sir Alexander Burnes, who has done ample justice to his character. He has been celebrated for his frankness, amiability, and generosity towards Europeans, and for his regard for the English in particular; and our travellers were always sure of meeting with hospitality and kindness from "the good Nawab" as he was called. The purport of the proposals with which he was entrusted was, that Gholam Hyder Khan, the late governor of Ghuznee, should be set at liberty, and that Dost Mahomed should resign the sovereign power into the hands of Shah Shoojah upon condition of his being appointed his vizier, an office he laid claim to by right of descent.

It was of course impossible for the British government, consistently with its views, to consent to these terms; and the Nawab, who, from his character, was treated with much respect throughout the conference, was given to understand that no proposals could be listened to which did not include the absolute resignation of all power on the part of his brother, the Ameer. He would, however, be provided with a safe asylum and a liberal allowance for himself, fa-

mily, and dependents, in the British dominions. This, the Nawab said his brother would never consent to, and nothing satisfactory resulted from the negotiation. He was further offered for himself the continued possession of his own estates, with additional favours at the hands of the Shah, but he honourably declined, and announced his determination of clinging to his brother's fortunes, let his fate be what it would. This conduct on the part of the good Nawab, contrasted favourably with that which would have been pursued by most Affghans under similar circumstances, for the Ameer of Cabool, in the days of his power, had stripped his brother of much of his property, and treated him with great harshness.

Dost Mahomed was now fully aware of the dangerous situation of his affairs, and having refused the conditions held out to him, it behoved him to employ all his energies in preparing to defend himself. His first efforts were directed towards concentrating his means with the view of making one grand attempt to re-establish his declining power. He accordingly sent to his favourite son, Mahomed Akbar Khan, who has since become so notorious, directing him to fall back upon Cabool with his whole force immediately. Akbar had been stationed in the vicinity of Jellalabad, of which place he was governor,

with a body of two thousand five hundred men, and fourteen guns to oppose the passage of Colonel Wade through the Khyber pass. This officer, (now Sir Claude Martin Wade), had been placed in command of the troops, which as part of the original military arrangements of the expedition, were directed to be levied, and to enter Affghanistan, in conjunction with our Sikh allies, by the eastern passes. He had assembled near Peshawar, at the beginning of the year, an army of four thousand eight hundred men of the Shah's Contingent, besides a body of six thousand Sikhs. These troops were to advance on Cabool by the route above mentioned, accompanied by Timour, the eldest son of Shah Shoojah, while another body of Sikh troops was to be stationed at Peshawar as a corps of observation.

Colonel Wade, having from time to time been informed of the progress of the grand army, proceeded into the Khyber Pass on the 22nd of June. Continuing to advance, on the 27th, he obtained possession of Ali Musjid, a stronghold previously occupied by the adherents of Dost Mahomed, upon which Akbar Khan relinquished all opposition and fled precipitately towards Cabool. He left behind him near Gundamuk the whole of his artillery and camp equipage, so that twelve guns, seven hundred rounds of ball cartridges,



camp appointments, horses, draught bullocks; and swivels with ammunition and equipments, fell into our hands. This, at once, opened the way for Colonel Wade through the passes, and on the 2nd of September he arrived at Cabool. General Ventura was to have taken the command of the Sikh Contingent; but in consequence of the death of Runjeet Sing, whose decease took place on the very day the grand army broke up from before Candahar, he remained behind, and Colonel Wade was left in charge of the whole force, amounting to nearly eleven thousand men. The manner in which he conducted his advance, won him general applause, and the special thanks of the Governor-General were given to him, a distinction his judicious leadership well merited.

In the meanwhile, the various arrangements connected with the capture of Ghuznee having been completed, and a garrison left in possession of the place, the Army of the Indus resumed its march on the 30th of July, and proceeded to Cabool, leaving the Bombay brigade with the Shah and his contingent to follow. On the 3rd of August we halted, to permit of his Majesty's overtaking us, and on the same morning received intelligence of Dost Mahomed having been deserted by nearly all his followers, and compelled to flee. It appeared to have been the intention

of the Ameer to advance to Muedan on the Cabool river, and amidst the difficult defiles of that valley, to attack our troops, and endeavour to effect their destruction. His purpose, however, was frustrated by the disaffection apparent in his army. The Kuzzilbashes, in particular, showed evident indications of their intention to desert him. This unstable and faithless people were waiting an opportunity to go and make their peace with the party they deemed most powerful, and all their leader's spirited efforts to retain their allegiance, and his appeals to their national and religious feelings, were vain. He went amongst them with the Koran in his hand, conjuring them not to insult the creed of their forefathers by joining a man who had brought the Christian infidels to desolate their country. He endeavoured to rouse their gratitude by recapitulating the benefits they had received from him. "You have eaten my salt," he said, "these thirteen years. Since you are resolved to seek a new master, grant me but one favour for that long maintenance and kindness—enable me to die with honour. Stand by the brother of Futteh Khan, whilst he executes one charge against the cavalry of those foreign dogs; in that onset he will fall; then go and make your own terms with Shah Shoojah." But all the exhortations of the

Baurikzye chief were lost upon men already treacherously bent upon forsaking his cause; and seeing the hopelessness of being able to secure their allegiance, he gave them their dismissal, and, at the head of about three thousand followers, who still clung to him in his adversity, he fled to Bameean.

This intelligence being fully confirmed, it was resolved to send in immediate pursuit of the Ameer, and the service requiring both talent and daring, Captain Outram seemed, as a matter of course, the officer selected to command the pursuing party. With him were associated nine other British officers, followed by one hundred and fifty chosen horse, fifty of the 2nd Bengal light cavalry, fifty of the Bengal 4th local, and fifty of the Poonah Auxiliary horse. To these one hundred of the Shah's cavalry were afterwards added. Insignificant as this little force would have been alone, they would have stood a better chance of succeeding in their object than they did when backed by the allies that accompanied them. These were a body of two thousand of the Shah's Affghans, under the command of Hadjee Khan Kakur, a man notorious throughout the country for his unparalleled treachery. In early life he had been nothing more than a humble melon vender, but he was a man of enter-

prise and courage, and had raised himself to the highest rank by his crafty talents, invariably changing sides when his interest prompted him to do so. He had intrigued even in favour of the heretic Sikhs during their hostilities with Dost Mahomed, and afterwards quitted the service of that chief to join the rulers of Candahar against him.- Upon the approach of our armies to Candahar, he again changed sides, and deserted with all his followers to the cause of Shah Shoojah, for which piece of well-timed service he received a thousand pounds from us. But nothing could secure the fidelity of this designing chief, who seemed to love treachery for its very sake, and upon our march to Ghuznee, he hung aloof in the most suspicious manner, evidently waiting, as was afterwards proved, to see the result of our operations upon that fortress, in the hope that our defeat would give him another opportunity of changing his party. Our glorious success, however, confirmed his wavering fidelity for the moment, and the day after the fall of Ghuznee, he arrived at the British camp with congratulations, and protestations of his earnest attachment to our cause.

Such was the man who was most injudiciously chosen to accompany Captain Outram in the pursuit of Dost Mahomed. He was appointed to

the duty under the foolish supposition that he was too deeply committed against his former master to join him again ; but such an opinion showed very little acquaintance with human nature, as men of the stamp of the Kakur chief always have it in their power to make their peace again, in times of political convulsion, by a timely return to the party they may have deserted.

His very first operations were calculated to rouse suspicion. The whole pursuing force had been directed to assemble at 4 P.M. at the Envoy's tents, but although the British party waited till dark, not more than three hundred effective men of the Affghans had assembled, the rest consisting of from four to five hundred Affghan rabble, mounted upon half-starved ponies. Hadjee Khan was extremely anxious to take the high road as far as Muedan, in order, as he pretended, to pursue the route of the flying Ameer thence ; nor was it till Captain Outram represented the impossibility of ever overtaking Dost Mahomed by such a course, who had already got twenty-four hours' start of his pursuers, that the Kakur chief would consent to provide guides. These were instructed to lead the party across the hills by the nearest route, so as to intercept that of the Ameer about three marches beyond Muedan.

During the first night the party marched about

thirty miles, and reached Goda, a little village situated in a valley, at seven A.M. on the 4th; but although they had halted several times in the course of their march to enable the stragglers to overtake them, not more than one hundred of the Affghans arrived at Goda at the same time. In the course of the day, however, the remainder made their appearance, and the cause of their delay was sufficiently conspicuous in the plunder with which they came in laden. In the evening, the troops resumed their march, but much against the inclination of the traitorous Hadjee, and after a harassing journey over a difficult country, they encamped again at a village called Kodur-i-Suffeid, scarcely fifty of the Affghans keeping up with them, but straggling in again, as before, in the course of the day. Information was here received that Dost Mahomed was at the village of Yourt, one march in advance of his pursuers; whereupon Hadjee Khan became exceedingly desirous to proceed no further without reinforcements, as he declared the Ameer had upwards of two thousand followers with him. The brave Captain Outram, however, resolved to push on at all risks, in the hope of being able to overtake the fugitive at Hurzar, the next halt beyond Yourt; but it was with extreme difficulty, and not till after much altercation, that he was

able to prevail upon his unwilling allies, not more than three hundred and fifty of whom were suitably mounted, to accompany him.

At length they got upon the road; but before they had proceeded four miles, the guides, who were under the charge of Hadjee Khan, were reported to have deserted. It was then quite dark, and they were surrounded by dangerous precipices and ravines. Captain Outram had, therefore, no alternative but to await the approach of daylight before their journey could be resumed, which prevented them from reaching Yourt until the following morning, the 6th. Here the party was compelled to make another long halt, as nothing would induce the crafty Kakur to advance sixteen miles further to Hurzar, where Dost Mahomed was reported then to be; at last, he promised that he would certainly move on in the evening; and there still appeared a chance of being able to come up with the Ameer in the course of the night. When evening came, however, instead of being ready to fulfil his engagements, Hadjee Khan commenced a long story about the hardships endured by his men, and the impossibility of their being able to face Dost Mahomed, even if they should overtake him, until assistance should arrive. He continued in this strain till night, and ended by pro-

mising that he would make up for the delay by a forced march of double the distance in the morning. To this arrangement Captain Outram was reluctantly compelled to accede, as he was not empowered to act independently of the Affghans. Thus did the arch-traitor Hadjee continue to throw impediments in the way of the Ameer's capture; but Captain Outram being further informed that the progress of the fugitive was delayed by the sickness of one of his sons, resolved, at all events, to proceed on the morrow, and if the Kakur chief would not accompany him, to push forward alone. Of this determination Hadjee Khan was duly informed, and he did all in his power to shake it; representing the extreme rashness of such a proceeding, but in vain. The night set in very inauspiciously for the next day's progress. It rained and hailed violently, and the soldiers had had nothing to eat for two days, except a little parched unripe corn.

At day-break, on the 7th, they again started forward in quest of their flying foe, and on arriving at Hurzar, discovered traces of his encampment on the previous day. Upon observing these, our worthy ally, under the pretence of resting his men, again endeavoured to retard Captain Outram's progress, but without effect, as the gallant leader of the British party now



advanced alone. But upon his learning that Dost Mahomed was only a short distance ahead at Kalloo, and riding back to apprise Hadjee Khan of the intelligence, the Kakur chief actually endeavoured to restrain him by force, protesting that he was madly rushing on to inevitable destruction. The Captain, however, broke from the wily Affghan, and pushed hastily on to Kalloo with his little party, but had the mortification to find that the object of his pursuit had departed so long previously that he must, ere then, have surmounted the Kalloo Pass, the highest of the Hindoo Koosh.

Every one of the Affghans had now fallen off from the pursuit, and the little party of British were left to pursue their route alone; they had been nine hours in the saddle, their horses were quite worn out; they had crossed the Hajee Guk Pass, twelve thousand feet above the level of the ocean, and were gazing down from its bleak summits upon sheets of snow, fifteen hundred feet beneath them. Night too was fast approaching, and the men having had but little food throughout the whole march, were knocked up with hunger and fatigue. It was, therefore, determined to halt here, and during the evening they were fortunate enough to obtain a scanty meal of flour. The next morning, they were reinforced

by Captains Taylor and Trevor, with thirty troopers, and about three hundred Affghans. Hadjee Khan also now again made his appearance, but, as it seemed, only for the purpose of resorting to his old schemes to delay the pursuit. He once more urged upon Captain Outram the necessity of waiting the arrival of fresh troops, averring that it was impossible for the Ameer to escape beyond Bameean, as he had caused all the roads to be blockaded to intercept his progress. The pertinacious chief was, however, after all induced to proceed another march in advance.

After travelling all day, during which they crossed the Pass of the Shutur-i-Gardan, or Camel's Back, three thousand feet higher than the Hajee Guk Pass, which they had traversed the previous day, they arrived after dark, at a deserted village at the foot of the ghout, and halted on the banks of a stream flowing into the river Oxus, to allow the straggling Affghans to rejoin them. They now found it impossible to place any dependence upon Hadjee Khan, who pretended to be afraid of his own followers, and flatly refused to march with them by night. "In broad daylight," he said, to Captain Outram, "I may be able to take them on; but if you do encounter Dost Mahomed Khan, not one of

the Affghans will draw a sword against him, nor will I be responsible that they do not turn against yourself in the *mélée*."

In this state of affairs a council of war was held, when it was agreed, that considering the smallness of the party, their only chance of success lay in being able to effect the destruction of the Ameer, whose death would probably confirm the wavering fidelity of their Affghan allies. It was, therefore, resolved, that in the event of his being overtaken next day, and offering resistance, the thirteen British officers should unite their efforts, and charge in the centre of the little band, every one directing his individual attack against the person of Dost Mahomed, whose fall would thus be rendered almost certain. With this exciting prospect before them on the morrow, they passed the night cheerfully and merrily, although they had little to eat, nothing whatever to drink, and no other bed to lie on than their sheep-skin cloaks.

But all their anticipations of glory were frustrated, for whilst in the act of mounting their horses at break of day on the 9th, intelligence was received that the Ameer, instead of remaining at Bameean, as prognosticated by the treacherous Hadjee Khan, had pushed forward to Akrabad, and that long before he could be overtaken he

would be safe in the territories of the Wallee of Khooloom, an Usbek chieftain, favourable to his interests. Upon arriving at Bameean, this information was confirmed by a party of Affghan horsemen, who had been a short time previously dismissed by their fugitive leader. Under these circumstances it was, of course, useless to proceed any further in the pursuit; and after halting for a few days to obtain supplies, and give time for the arrival of fresh instructions, during which Captain Outram wrote to inform the envoy of the Kakur chief's treasonable conduct, the party returned to Cabool, where they arrived on the 19th of August. The perfidy of Hadjee Khan was now fully established. It was proved that he had entered into a league to fight against the King, in the event of any reverse happening to his cause; and that while employed in the pursuit of Dost Mahomed, he was actually engaged in a correspondence with him during the whole time. He was, therefore, immediately arrested, and has since been detained a state prisoner at Chunar.

The policy which dictated the employment of a man so notoriously bad and faithless as was this Kakur chief, in an object so important as the pursuit of the ex-ruler of Cabool, has already been slightly touched upon; and its ill effects

were made apparent in the Ameer's escape, and the subsequent trouble he gave ; not to mention the immense influence it might have exerted over future events, had he fallen in the struggle, which would have probably followed between his own troops and his pursuers, had he been overtaken. He would unquestionably have been so, had Captain Outram been entrusted with a sufficiently large force, and with authority to act without Hadjee Khan, who, merely as an *attaché* to the party, would have been a valuable auxiliary ; but instead of this, the chief power was vested in the renegade Kakur, and the British leader's instructions were only to act along with the Affghans, and second <sup>or</sup> them if necessary. His subsequent energetic determination to act by himself, when the treachery of his ally was too evident to mislead the blindest, was adopted upon his own responsibility.

Why more efficient means were not resorted to, to accomplish the capture of a man upon whom the whole continuance of the war rested, it is difficult to conceive. It would almost seem done in a similar spirit to that which dictated the formation of the Shah's Contingent, to support the transparent fiction that the Shah was attempting to establish his authority by means of his own troops, and preserve the semblance of his being

able to accomplish his ends by his own instruments, aided by the English merely as allies. This was weak policy, as it sometimes, as in the present instance, induced the civil and military leaders to employ less effective means in the accomplishment of a particular design than they otherwise might have done, without giving substance to the shadow, to strengthen and gain credence to which, the inefficiency was risked. In opposition to this, it is but just to say, that it was frequently asserted in the camp that the Envoy had earnestly entreated Sir John Keane to send a larger British force with Captain Outram, but his advice was ineffectual. Let the reason, however, have been what it would, it is quite clear that one of the most important objects of the campaign was defeated, through the inadequacy of the means resorted to to secure it.

In the meantime, while Captain Outram had been sent in pursuit of Dost Mahomed, another party, under Major Cureton, had been ordered to advance on the road towards Cabool, and take possession of the artillery which the Ameer had left behind him at Urghundee. It consisted of twenty-eight guns, of various calibre, made of brass, and all of the most indifferent construction as to mounting and carriages. The ground they were placed upon, according to Asiatic notions of

warfare, was well adapted for an action, but was ill chosen for an engagement with civilized troops as it afforded great facilities for our attack, had the enemy waited to receive us. A great quantity of ammunition and other military stores were also captured; after securing which, Major Cureton, as he had been directed, pushed forward his reconnoissance to the very walls of Cabool, the rest of the army, in the meanwhile, advancing steadily, without interruption, and arriving before the city on the 6th of August.

## CHAPTER VII.

INSTITUTION OF THE DOORAUNEE ORDER—FALL OF  
KHELAT—RETURN OF SIR JOHN KEANE TO INDIA,  
AND BREAKING UP OF THE ARMY OF THE INDUS.

THE army of the Indus having surmounted all the toils and difficulties of its march through previously untraversed countries, had now arrived at the capital of Affghanistan, and Shah Shoojah was re-instated upon the throne of his ancestors. He had entered the city with much pomp, accompanied by the Envoy and Minister, the Commander-in-chief and the general officers of the army, Sir Alexander Burnes and the other functionaries of the mission, besides the staff, and a vast number of other officers. His reception was not enthusiastic, but the people preserved an orderly decorum, and received their monarch with becoming respect. Upon arriving at the palace, the King led the way into it, hurrying eagerly over the scene of his former state, and weeping as he surveyed the dilapidations time and neglect had wrought in the dwelling-place of his youth.



Among the arrangements entered into to give an imposing aspect to the restoration of the Shah, was the institution of an order of knighthood, to take its name from the great Affghan tribe to which the sovereign belonged. Accordingly on the 17th of September, a grand state Durbar was held at the palace, for the purpose of conferring the badges of the Dooranee order on a certain number of the most distinguished of the British officers.

The ceremony took place in the courtyard, but the decay into which the palace had been allowed to fall by the Baurikzye rulers, destroyed much of the effect of the scene which otherwise presented a novel and brilliant appearance. Nevertheless, looking at all the circumstances, the then insignificance of the once mighty kingdom of Cabool, and such importance as it did possess being entirely derivable from ourselves, there seemed something farcical in the whole proceeding; and one could scarcely help the trite observation occurring, that there is but a step from the sublime to the ridiculous. The order was divided into three classes, to be conferred according to the different degrees of merit of the candidates. Sir John Keane the Commander-in-chief, Sir William MacNaghten the Envoy and Minister, Sir Willoughby Cotton, Sir Alexander Burnes,

and Colonel Wade, were invested with the decorations of the first class, while the second and third classes were bestowed upon several of the subordinate officers who had most distinguished themselves.

Amongst those upon whom it was proposed to confer the third class of the Dooraunee order of knighthood, was a man whose name, if merit had really been the criterion, should have stood high upon the list of those destined to receive the first. This was Colonel Dennie. Mortified by what he could not help regarding as a fresh evidence of the Commander-in-chief's ill-feeling towards him, and manfully, not boastfully conscious of the services he had rendered, and of his station in the army, he declined to accept that as an honour which was less than his due, even according to the rule which regulated the distribution of the others, and which he, therefore, justly considered an unfair depreciation of him. Under these feelings, he wrote to decline the proffered distinction; but he only drew down upon himself the increased animosity of Sir John Keane, who replied in a letter remarkable for its rude and insulting tone, and the coarseness of its insinuations.

The chief object of the expedition into Affghanistan having now been accomplished, and the Suddozyes once more established on their hereditary throne, it became necessary that such por-

tion of the army as was not intended to occupy the country, should return home. Accordingly, on the 18th of September, the Bombay troops commenced their homeward march, intending to retrace their steps to Ghuznee, and crossing the Toba mountains, proceed by way of Quettah to Khelat, whose chief they had instructions to punish for his perfidious conduct during our advance.

Meanwhile, the active services of the gallant Outram had been again called into request. Shortly after the arrival of the Shah at Cabool, certain insurrectionary movements among the Ghiljie tribes attracted his attention, and an expedition was resolved on to attempt their reduction. A cold-blooded murder had also been perpetrated upon the person of a British officer, Colonel Herring, of the 37th Native Infantry, by a party of these desperate marauders. Captain Outram was, therefore, placed in command of a body of troops, British and Affghan, commissioned to depose the refractory Ghiljie chiefs, to punish the people of Maroof for their horrible and wanton destruction of a kafila of Hindoos in the previous May, and to avenge the assassination of Colonel Herring. He started on this expedition on the 7th of September, and after several days of indefatigable exertion, he discovered that the perpetrators of the last-named atrocity belonged to a tribe of free-

booters, called Kanjuks, whose stronghold was situated some distance to the north-east of Ghuznee.

On the 21st, Captain Outram made a night march, in order to surprise these banditti, and arrived, at break of day, at a deep dell occupied by the gang. His dispositions were made so skilfully that he succeeded in completely surrounding them, but they defended themselves with the greatest obstinacy, and maintained their position until all their ammunition was nearly expended, when, upon our men rushing in upon them from every quarter, they were compelled to throw down their arms. Sixteen of their number were left dead upon the spot, and one hundred and twelve were taken prisoners. Not one was permitted to escape; and forty-six of the most ferocious were immediately transmitted to Cabool for execution.

All their camels and property also fell into the hands of Captain Outram's party, the former bearing marks by which they were discovered to have been stolen from our troops. He fulfilled his other instructions with equal celerity and success, blowing up the fort of Maroof, which was found to be a place of remarkable strength, and taking several of the people prisoners, and on the 30th of October, overtook the Bombay column

at Koochlak, one march before it reached Quettah.

It has been already stated that General Willshire had received orders, ere quitting Cabool, to chastise Mihrab Khan of Khelat, whose treacherous conduct it will be remembered, occasioned our troops so much annoyance upon their march into Afghanistan. This was to be accomplished by his deposition from power, and the substitution of his cousin, Newaz Khan, as Chief of Khelat. The insidious Beloochee, finding all his hopes of being able to retard the progress of our armies frustrated, and that victory attended our steps, had latterly been lavish in his professions of devotion and loyalty to the cause of Shah Shoojah, and friendship for his English allies. On the arrival of General Willshire at Quettah, he received a letter written in the same hypocritical strain, and entreating his interference to stay the hostilities with which he was threatened by Captain Bean, political agent for Shawl. The wily chief concluded by stating, that if attacked, he would defend himself to the last extremity. But it was impossible that the flimsy protestations of allegiance he now indulged in, could impose upon any one, or preserve him from the fate his treachery deserved. Immediate preparations were, therefore, made for sending an expedition to de-

pose him; and on the 3rd of November, a brigade consisting of H.M.'s 2nd; and 17th regiment, and the 81st Bengal Native Infantry, with six light field pieces, the sapper corps, and one hundred and fifty irregulars, proceeded under the command of Brigadier Baumgardt to invest Khelat. General Willshire with his staff followed them the ensuing day.

Little opposition was offered to the progress of the troops during their march; but upon their arrival before the fortress on the 13th of November, they discovered the enemy drawn up upon some small hills in front ready to receive them. They had five pieces of artillery which were posted upon the heights, and as the head of the British column came within range of their fire, a general discharge was opened upon it. It was quite evident that the Khelatees far exceeded in numbers the little army of General Willshire, which could not muster a thousand bayonets. In order, therefore, to avail himself of the services of every efficient man in the force, he now commanded a halt to admit of the baggage closing up, which along with the sick he assigned to the charge of the Treal Horse. The determined aspect of the enemy betokened that our troops had a task before them, worthy of their utmost exertions, and the cool and resolute demeanour of the

General, inspired every one with confidence. Captain Outram says, that he never shall forget the obvious feeling of delight with which the deep-toned word of command, "Loosen cartridges," was received by the soldiers, evincing, as it did, that an immediate attack was intended.

General Willshire then arranged the details of as brilliant a little achievement as ever conferred glory upon the British arms in Asia. The three redoubts on the heights were first to be carried by four companies of each regiment. Two companies were to advance through some gardens on the left, and the remaining ten companies were to form the reserve. The heights once in possession of our troops, would serve in a great measure to cover their camp from the artillery of the fort, and would afford a commanding position from which to annoy the garrison.

Everything now being in readiness, the three columns of attack steadily advanced, preceded by the artillery which opened a cannonade upon the enemy with such admirable precision, that they were driven from their position long before the infantry had reached the heights. The Khe-latees were now observ'd endeavouring to draw off their guns, and General Willshire sent Captain Outram, who had bravely volunteered upon the expedition, with orders to the column which was

nearest to the gate to pursue the fugitives, and if possible to enter the fort with them ; but, at all events, to prevent their taking in the guns. The Captain overtook the advancing column, and galloping on, reached the redoubt just at the moment that the enemy were vacating it, and engaged in attempting to carry off one of their pieces of ordnance. He dashed forward, calling upon Captain Rait of the Queen's Royals to accompany him with his party, and succeeded in compelling the enemy to abandon their gun, although they were too late to enter the fort with them. The whole of our troops were now upon the heights, and the guns were in process of being dragged up.

As soon as the latter could be got into position, two of them were directed to play upon the towers commanding the gateway; two others opened fire upon the gate itself, while the remaining two were stationed upon the road leading direct to the gate, for the purpose of blowing it in, which was effected in the course of a few discharges. Upon observing this, General Willshire rode down the hill, and gave the signal for the advance of the storming parties. The troops instantly rose from their cover, and rushed in; those under the command of Major Pennycuick, being the nearest, were the first to gain an



entrance, headed by their gallant leader. They were quickly followed by the rest of the column, who pushed in to their support under a heavy fire from the works, and from the interior, the enemy making a most determined resistance, disputing every inch of ground up to the walls of the inner citadel. Meanwhile, the General dispatched Captain Outram, who had been actively employed the whole time in various parts of the scene, with a company of her Majesty's 17th foot and a portion of the 31st Bengal Native Infantry, to storm the heights, and secure the gate on the opposite side of the fort. This movement was most spiritedly performed. They ascended the rocks, dispersed a party of matchlock-men occupying their summit, then rushed down again to the fort, driving in a party of the enemy with such precipitation, that they had not time to secure the gate behind them, possession of which was thus obtained, and the escape of the garrison entirely cut off. At this moment, they were joined by another party, under Major Deshon, who had been sent by the eastern face of the fort with two guns, to blow open this gate also, if necessary, as well as the gate of the inner citadel. The first having been gained as described, the guns were placed in position for bombarding the latter, and their fire was kept up with destructive effect until

our soldiers forced an entrance into the place. A furious contest now ensued between the besiegers and the besieged. Mihrab Khan himself headed his men, and fought with desperate valour, although he had previously attempted to make his escape, but he was at length slain by a shot in the neck, from an unknown hand. Many of his chiefs fell with him, and about four hundred of the garrison. In a few minutes more, the British flag was waving above the ramparts of the captured fortress of Khelat. The amount of booty discovered was supposed to be very considerable, but the army possessed no means of carrying it away, or of disposing of it. Amongst the spoil was found the sword of the fallen Beloochee chief, which was of the most costly workmanship, and the troops unanimously presented it to their gallant commander, as a testimony of their admiration of his heroic conduct.

Immediately after the fall of Khelat, Captain Outram was commissioned to carry the glorious tidings to Bombay, in doing which he undertook one of those daring adventures, which from their very danger, give so much interest and excitement to Indian warfare. He resolved to disguise himself, and make his way by the most direct route, which lay through the heart of the enemy's country, to Sonmeanee, the sea-port of Sus, and pro-

ceed thence by water to Kurrachee, and so on to his destination.

Having accordingly disguised himself as a holy man, he left the British camp in the dead of the night, accompanied by two Syuds, who had agreed to go with him, together with two armed attendants of their's, and one servant of his own. They overtook in their route many of the fugitives from Khelat, one party of whom, consisting of the families of Mihrab Khan's brother, and his principal minister, Mahomed Hoossain Khan, recognised the two Syuds as old acquaintances. It happened unfortunately that Captain Outram was actually arrayed in a dress taken from Mohamed Hoosain Khan's own wardrobe, but by a skilful preservation of his assumed character, he managed to escape detection. On another occasion, his companions having reason to suspect they should meet with certain persons it would be most prudent to avoid, at Nal, a village in their route, the party refrained from halting there, and rested in a jungle some distance beyond, while one of the Syuds, with the two armed attendants, went into the village to procure grain for their horses. On the return of this party, however, they unfortunately missed Captain Outram's place of concealment, and he waited in anxious expectation till evening, without seeing

them. The other Syud then became so uneasy, that he went to the village to endeavour to learn some tidings of the absent party, leaving the Captain alone with his servant to await his return. Time passed away, and Captain Outram began to be apprehensive that his presence in the neighbourhood had been discovered, and that his companions were detained on purpose to induce him to come in search of them. He had now to consider what was best to be done. The whole of his money and provisions were with the absentees, and destitute as he was, ignorant, too, of the language, and without a guide, he felt his murder was inevitable at the hands of the very first Beloochee who should fall in with him, and detect his disguise. He, therefore, resolved to proceed to the village, and take the chance of his character as a British officer protecting him from injury, or if that should fail, he hoped that the influence of his Syud friends might be of some benefit to him. He sallied forth accordingly from his hiding place, but had not proceeded far when he fortunately fell in with the second Syud, who having also missed their place of concealment, had been a long while hunting for him. He brought the welcome news that the first party was safe, but they having likewise missed the locality, had gone under the impression that their companions had

preceded them. At length, after a two hours' search from village to village, the whole party met again, and Captain Outram, anxious to be the first to communicate to government the news of the brilliant affair of Khelat, they continued their journey throughout the night without once halting. At length, after escaping numerous dangers, and undergoing various fatigues, now urging forward their steeds to escape some impending evil, frequently remaining all day and night in the saddle, now laying down to snatch an hour or two of sleep, with their little property beneath them, and their horse's bridles in their hands, to be prepared for a surprise, the gallant Outram and his little party reached Sonmeanee. \* He then took boat for Kurrachee, whence he proceeded to Bombay, and afterwards learned that he had had a most narrow escape, for he had been discovered and pursued by the son of one of the chiefs slain at Khelat, who only missed him at Sonmeanee by a few hours.

While General Willshire with one division of the Bombay column had been thus employed in effecting the reduction of Khelat, the remaining portion under Brigadier Scott, quitted Quettah and proceeded on their homeward route, threading once more the arduous defiles of the Bolan pass, and so by Dadur on to Sukkur, which they reached on the 29th of November, without having

met with any obstruction. But, although they had passed unmolested by their Beloochee enemies, a more terrible and insidious foe had made its appearance amongst them. On the 17th of November, the day after their arrival at Baug, two servants of the staff lines were attacked by cholera, which had been raging in the village, and almost immediately died. The next morning, Surgeon Forbes of the 1st cavalry caught the infection, and two or three more servants, all of whom speedily shared the same fate. The deadly scourge continued its ravages, and between the time of its breaking out and the 30th of November, the force, mustering in all short of seven hundred men, lost through this terrible infliction, two officers and fifty-six European soldiers.

During the halt of the troops at this fatal place, accounts were received of the fall of Khelat, and of the advance of a Russian force upon Khiva. This power had taken advantage of the depredations and annoyances its merchants were exposed to, in passing through the Khivan territories on their way to and from Bokhara and other Asiatic countries; to advance an army of thirty-two thousand men, besides an enormous park of artillery, into the countries bordering on Affghanistan, under the pretence of maintaining the rights of its own subjects in that part of Asia. Whatever may have been the in-

tentions and destination of this force, it is absurd to suppose that so large an army would have been assembled for the insignificant purpose of repressing the depredations of a few plundering tribes of Toorkistan. But its real designs were never developed, as it was driven back by the natural difficulties of the climate and countries it had to pass through, its men and cattle having perished in great numbers from cold, hunger, and disease.

In consequence of the intelligence of this movement on the part of Russia, the Bombay column had been directed to halt, until the receipt of further orders; but from the critical situation in which the army was placed, with cholera raging among its ranks, Brigadier Scott upon the recommendation of the head of the medical department, had continued his progress to Sukkur which he reached as before stated on the 29th of November. Meanwhile, General Willshire had been returning homeward by the Gundava pass into Cutchee, the route which had been pronounced 'impracticable' when the expedition started, but which was now ascertained to be even better than the one that was adopted. On the 18th of December, he arrived at Larkhanu, whither the officers of the general staff proceeded from Sukkur to meet him, and on the 24th, he received orders from the Governor-General for the breaking up of the

Bombay division of the Army of the Indus which was forthwith carried into effect.

We must now return to the Bengal force, which upon the departure of the troops of the other Presidency, still remained at Cabool. During the latter part of September, and up to the period of the Commander-in-chief's quitting the city, his Excellency and the Envoy and Minister were chiefly occupied in arranging the details for the military occupation of the country, over which we had just acquired such paramount influence; and such was the satisfactory appearance of things, in the view of the authorities, that it was at first confidently hoped a single brigade of British troops in Western, and another in Eastern Affghanistan would, in addition to the Shah's own army, be sufficient to preserve the tranquillity of the kingdom. But in the beginning of October, affairs to the north of the Hindoo Koosh assumed so threatening an aspect, from the power and influence which Dost Mahomed appeared to have acquired among the chieftains of Koondooz, that the Shah began to tremble for his newly established power. It was, therefore, resolved that the whole of the Bengal division of infantry, with the camel battery and the 2nd Light Cavalry, should remain in the country for the present, while the rest of the cavalry and artillery should accompany Sir John



Keane in the middle of October to India. It had also been wished by the civil authorities, that a brigade should be sent across the Hindoo Koosh and established at Syghan to give weight to the diplomatic representations of Dr. Lord, the political agent resident in that part of the country. But the injudiciousness of such a plan was demonstrated by the Commander-in-chief, and it was given up.

It was at first arranged that Sir Willoughby Cotton should remain in command of the troops stationed in Affghanistan, but being the next in seniority to Major-General Ramsay, Provincial Commander-in-chief in Bengal, whose tour of duty was over, he was recalled to exercise the functions of that post, and the troops in Western Affghanistan were ordered to report to General Nott, while those in the East were to look to Brigadier Sale. Of these latter, the reserve of the force, consisting of a brigade of infantry and the 2nd Light Cavalry, with a portion of the Hindoostanee troops of the King, was to be encamped around Jellalabad, at which city the court intended to winter, while the 13th Light Infantry, and a corps of Native Infantry garrisoned the capital, another native regiment holding Ghuznee.

These arrangements being completed, Sir John Keane, on the 15th of October, took his departure from Cabool, with the lancers and horse artillery;

while Sir Willoughby Cotton, with the rest of the cavalry under General Thackwell, left shortly afterwards, carrying with them Hyder Khan, the Governor of Ghuznee, and Hadjee Khan, the detested Kakur chief. Their progress was unattended by any remarkable event and they reached Ferozepore on the 1st of January, 1840. After remaining in that town about a month, Sir John Keane proceeded to Sukkur, where he gave the final orders for the breaking up of the Army of the Indus, and on the 27th of February, he landed at Bombay, amidst the thunder of artillery and other marks of public respect. In five weeks more, he quitted India for England to enjoy the honours which had been conferred upon him, and for which he was more indebted to good fortune and the admirable instruments under him, than most other commanders who have attained to the same height. He is a man of fair average capacity, and much firmness and decision of character. This may fairly be conceded to him, but more he cannot claim; and his own opinion of the exploit which raised him to the distinguished position he occupies, may be gathered from his having described Ghuznee, as "but a rotten hole after all." The other side of his character cannot be regarded without aversion. He is almost universally disliked by the army, both officers and men, for his

proud, irascible and arbitrary character, and one of his favourite modes of revenging himself upon his officers when they offended him, was to suppress in his despatches, as in the case of Colonel Dennie, all mention of the way in which they may have distinguished themselves.

## CHAPTER VIII.

DOST MAHOMED'S IMPRISONMENT AT BOKHARA, AND  
ESCAPE—INSURRECTIONARY STATE OF THE COUNTRY  
—SURRENDER OF DOST MAHOMED TO THE BRITISH  
ENVOY.

WITH the events recorded in the preceding chapter, closed the first campaign in Affghanistan. In it we have seen the indomitable energy and perfect discipline of the British soldier contending bravely with difficulties well nigh insurmountable, and overcoming every obstacle, animate and inanimate, which opposed his progress. We have seen him, after a march of nearly two thousand miles through some of the most inhospitable and inaccessible regions in the world, planting his country's standard in the cities of Central Asia, spreading far and wide the fame of English prowess, and establishing our influence in countries, hitherto scarcely more than acquainted with our name; and we have seen, by the aid of these exertions, a once mighty monarchy re-established, or rather re-erected, for as yet, the state of the country would scarcely permit of our calling Shah Shoojah's power firmly settled. Having effected

thus much, the next consideration was how it should be maintained. Upon the policy of these proceedings, the writer has already fully recorded his opinion ; but when we had brought about the state of things we had desired, in as far as the reinstatement of the Suddozye monarch went, it was equally necessary to provide effectually for the preservation of that which it had cost us so much pains to accomplish. To what extent this was done remains to be seen.

The stupid policy which permitted the escape of so important an enemy as the intelligent and energetic ex-ruler of Cabool, who was completely in our power had an efficient and trustworthy force been sent in pursuit of him, bore its natural fruits in the success of his intrigues amongst the chiefs to whose territories he had fled for protection. When Sir William MacNaghten, alarmed by the hostile appearances on the other side of the Hindoo Koosh, had proposed sending a brigade across that chain of mountains, which was refused by Sir John Keane, upon the plea of the manifest inexpediency of such a step at that season of the year, he still took measures, although less extensive, for opposing the efforts of the enemy in that quarter. At the end of September, the Ghoorka corps, a troop of horse artillery, three mortars, one thousand Affghan

cavalry, and six hundred infantry were sent to Bameean. To these were now added the Fourth Brigade and the Local Horse, a company of sappers and miners, and the 35th and 37th Native Infantry, with supplies for six weeks. On the 31st of October, a detachment from this body fell in with a party of Usbecs to the number of six or seven hundred, and totally routed them, when Syghan was annexed to the Shah's dominions.

Dost Mahomed now turned towards the King of Bokhara, and endeavoured to enlist him in his cause. He wrote to that monarch, stating that Shah Shoojah had become a Kafir, and having leagued himself with the Kafir Feringees, had dispossessed him by fraud and treachery of Affghanistan. He represented his resources to the Tartar prince as still considerable, and offered to divide with him whatever spoil might be obtained. The Bokhara chief appeared to listen favourably to his proposals, and replied by requesting a personal interview; upon which the Ameer, elated by the prospect opening before him, immediately set off for his new ally's dominions, accompanied by his sons, Akbar and Afzul, and Sumunder Khan. This was in the latter end of November.

The King received Dost Mahomed with much apparent cordiality and many protestations of his personal regard and esteem. During the conference

which ensued, he suggested that the Ameer should send his family for protection to Bokhara, intimating that their alliance should be further cemented by intermarriages between their children. He, at the same time, secretly wrote to the Wallee of Khoolum, desiring him to send on to Bokhara immediately the family of the Dost, whom he basely intended to rob of their jewels and property. The Ameer was, however, suspicious of the designs of his new friend; but not wishing to provoke him, he addressed a letter to his brother, Nuwab Jubbar Khan, requesting him to arrange for the immediate departure of his family to Bokhara. This he laid before the King; but sent another privately, telling the Nuwab rather to have every member of his family put to death than trust them in the hands of the treacherous monarch. Judging that his schemes had been detected by the non-arrival of his expected prey, the Bokhara chief was so much exasperated, that he had Dost Mahomed and his sons directly thrown into prison. The safety of his family, however, was provided for by Jubbar Khan, after some hesitation, delivering them over to British protection.

Dost Mahomed was now in a situation of the utmost peril. The barbarous sovereign, into whose power he had fallen, was highly incensed at the defeat of his plans, and would doubtless have

had him put to death, had he not been restrained from the savage act by his minister's representations of its impolicy and injustice. The fallen chief's place of confinement was a small mosque, near to one of the great bazaars; and aware of the danger he was in, his thoughts were anxiously employed upon the best means of escape. This he at length effected in the following manner, as related by an intelligent writer upon these events :\*

He succeeded in bribing a guide to procure him a good horse, to be posted in a suitable situation, a few miles from the city, and to remain himself close by for the purpose of shewing him the way. He then assumed the Usbec dress, and finding an opportunity of joining his conductor, an Usbec who was ready mounted in the thronged Bazaar jumped up behind him. The Dost and Usbec trotted on unnoticed, passed through the city, and reached the spot where the other horse was stationed, without impediment. He then sprung upon his own horse and eagerly pursued his journey; but in a few days he discovered that the animal had become rather lame, and dreading the chances of being detected or chased; and unable, from that circumstance, to accomplish his own delive-

\* Atkinson's Expedition into Affghanistan.



rance, he thought it more safe to have recourse to even an inferior steed, which was sound in wind and limb, than to continue on his own. Upon the urgency of the occasion, he therefore made an exchange with his guide. Proceeding onwards, the Usbec began to repent of his undertaking, and apprehensive of the consequences to himself, considered in what way he might avert the punishment that awaited him, if discovered. He was also anxious to turn the ex-ruler to some account, and was not long in forming the scheme of getting him back to Bokhara, and delivering him up to the king. A favourable moment soon occurred, for next day, he fell in with a few horsemen, with whom he entered into conversation about Dost Mahomed and the Feringees; and finding they were enemies of his charge, his avarice led him to hope for a high reward, not only from them, but from the King of Bokhara. In this spirit, he said to them:

“Perhaps you would like to gain a prize. Do you see that horseman? That’s Dost Mahomed, who has just escaped from prison at Bokhara,” pointing to the Cabool chief, a few hundred yards a-head of them.

“No! no!” they replied, “That is impossible; Dost Mahomed would never ride on such a sorry yaboo as that, and you, his follower,

mounted on this fine horse. No, no! you are yourself Dost Mahomed in disguise. We know you well; so come along with us to Bokhara."

The consternation of the guide, at this blow to his cunning project was strongly depicted in his countenance, which to the horsemen, was an additional proof that he was "the real Simon Pure." He was thus caught in his own trap, and, in spite of his remonstrances, borne away. Dost Mahomed being left, unsuspected, to pursue his own course to Khooloom.

The intelligence of this event, which occurred in the summer of 1840, gave increased impetus to the disaffection prevailing throughout Affghanistan towards the newly established order of things, and the adherents of the Ameer began to entertain fresh hopes of ultimate success. After the defeat of the Usbecs at Syghan, in the preceding October, things remained tolerably quiet for the rest of the year, although it was evident much inflammatory feeling was abroad, which led us to anticipate plenty of work for the ensuing spring and summer. Early in January, however, it became necessary to recommence active operations, in consequence of the insurrectionary state of the mountain country eastward of Jellalabad. Accordingly Colonel Orchard was despatched against the fort of Peshoot, with a body of troops

two thousand strong. The heavy rains, which had prevailed for some time, impeded their operations; but on the 17th, the weather becoming more favourable, the guns were placed in position, and after a cannonade of two hours, practicable breaches were made on both sides of the principal gate. Upon this, Lieutenant Pigou with a party of forty Europeans and Sepoys, rushed up to it, forced it in, and proceeded to examine the inner portal, which was found to be as yet uninjured. Observing this party entering the breach, a bugler by mistake, sounded the advance, and the whole force began to move forward. A heavy fire from the ramparts quickly made them aware of the blunder, and the troops were directed to seek shelter in a neighbouring ravine. Two attempts were then made to blow open the gates by means of gunpowder bags; but both of them were unsuccessful, in consequence of the rain again falling heavily, and it having been found impossible to scale the ramparts, or storm the fort without a further bombardment, the troops were for the present withdrawn. The enemy, however, had had sufficient experience of their inability to resist our overwhelming modes of attack for any length of time, and shortly after the retirement of the besiegers, they retreated, with all their valuables, from the fort, leaving us to take quiet possession

of it. The force then proceeded to the opposite side of the river, and took Khathke, after which, an attempt was made to pursue the insurgent chiefs, but without success, from the impracticable nature of the country at that season of the year.

The winter had been one of great severity, and at Cabool our soldiers endured terrible hardships from the intensity of the cold, especially the Hindostanees. It was no unusual thing to hear of some of them being frozen to death, as well as the camels and horses. The snow fell incessantly, and lay to a great depth upon the ground, the thermometer sometimes standing for many days together below zero.

Upon the approach of spring, increased indications of a rising were observed among the different tribes. The Huzarahs, a people dwelling on the other side of Bameean, were the first to set at naught the authority of the Shah, and offer resistance to our troops. About the middle of March they obstinately refused to sell forage to the Commissariat officers, and not content with this, assembled in considerable numbers and assaulted the troops sent in quest of it. Attempts were made to conciliate them, but without effect, and a small detachment of infantry and cavalry with two guns, under the command of Captain Jurbett, was sent to reduce them to order. The first of their forts ar-

arrived at, was one of considerable strength, and its inmates refusing to capitulate, preparations were made for its immediate attack. The guns commenced playing vigorously upon the walls, and in an hour they were in our possession, the garrison retreating to the inner tower, where they still obstinately refused to yield. Hay and straw were now piled up about the base of the tower, and set on fire to induce them to submit, but without avail; and when the fire burned out, not a man of them was found alive. A few women and children, who had sought refuge in the fort, had scrambled to the top of the tower as the flames ascended, and were with difficulty rescued; but one of the soldiers having contrived to carry up a rope through the burning building, they were all brought down in safety.

The obstinacy of this resistance, on the part of a mere handful of men in a small mud fort, was an alarming evidence of the spirit existing in the country, and such as to arouse the new government to a sense of the difficulties it would have to cope with. It was sufficient to convince those in authority, that unless the people were conciliated by a steady course of justice, and attention to their prejudices, nothing but force could maintain them in their position. It was a difficult task, it must be confessed, amongst a people with such strong feelings

of nationality, and so much addicted to predatory habits. But it was never sufficiently tried, owing partly to the difficulties of our position; and it is to be feared, that from our being associated in the nation's mind with every proceeding of Shah Shoojah, and some of the unwise and oppressive measures which were afterwards resorted to, to replenish the exhausted coffers of the state, a sense of British justice is much less strongly impressed upon the Affghan people, than the conviction of British prowess.

The King and the Envoy, with their escort and suite, returned from their winter quarters at Jellalabad, and arrived at Cabool in the beginning of April, everything seeming to promise an unquiet summer. On the 9th of May, an important convoy arrived from India, much to the satisfaction of the army, which had suffered much during the past winter from the insufficiency of its means. This convoy consisted of the 2nd Native Infantry, six depot companies of native regiments, with drafts of Her Majesty's 13th and 1st European Foot, and the mountain train, amounting in all to two thousand fighting men, two hundred remount horses, with eight hundred camels for the use of the troops commanded by Brigadier Wallace, who had, under his charge, £210,000 in treasure, and an immense quantity

of public and private stores. About four thousand camp followers, and two thousand camels attended it.

It commenced its route from Ferozepore in February, and proceeded through the Punjaub without meeting with annoyance; but upon its approach to Affghanistan, an attack was apprehended from the plundering tribes of the Khyber Pass, and General Sale, with the 37th and 48th Native Infantry, advanced from Jellalabad to escort them through the defiles. By this precaution, it was enabled to reach Cabool in safety.

As spring advanced, the discontents of the country began to be most unequivocally manifested, and the same excited state of feeling existed in western as in eastern Affghanistan. The Ghiljie tribes, ever the most turbulent and averse to the Sudozye race, had been for some time in insurrection, cutting off our communications, and otherwise greatly annoying us; in consequence of which, a small party of cavalry, under Captains Taylor and Walker, were despatched in April, to repress the insurgents. They, however, found the enemy assembled in such force as to compel them to fall back upon Khelat-i-Ghiljie, but being reinforced by a small party of horse and foot, under Captain Codrington, on their route to Cabool, and a stronger detachment from General Nott's force at

Candahar, the enemy were brought to action, defeated, and dispersed.

Meanwhile, preparations were made for sending a body of troops to strengthen General Nott at Candahar, and Colonel Wallace left Cabool on the 22nd of May, with the 2nd Native Infantry, and two troops of the 2nd Light Cavalry under his command, with three nine-pounder guns, and two mortars. At Ghuznee, he was reinforced by two companies of the recruit dépôt, the 1st Light Cavalry, and two more guns of smaller calibre; when, by a rapid movement, he arrived before Mookhah, the stronghold of the principal chief of the rebellious Ghiljies. The attack was so sudden and unexpected, that the fort was quite unprepared for defence, scarcely any one being found in it except the women and families of the chiefs. It was taken possession of without resistance, and afterwards destroyed. Colonel Wallace was then joined by Captain Anderson and the troops under him, and the combined force, now nearly three thousand strong, proceeded to destroy the strongholds of the other rebel chiefs in the neighbourhood. This was done without any further opposition on the part of the Ghiljies, and the country for a time, again appeared to be quieted.

While these operations were carrying on against the refractory Ghiljie tribes, feelings of the most



hostile nature against the government of Shah Shoojah were growing up in the northern districts. The people of Kohistan had hitherto been among the staunchest of the King's supporters, and had flocked in great numbers to welcome him on his entrance into Cabool, but the stringent measures pursued in the collection of the taxes appear to have alienated them, and they had now become inimical to the newly established order of things. When the escape of Dost Mahomed was made known in Affghanistan, a fresh stimulus was given to the exertions of his adherents, and the utmost excitement prevailed throughout the Kohistane and neighbouring districts. To such an extent were these hostile sentiments apparent, that Sir Alexander Burnes warned the envoy that an insurrection might break out any day in that part of the country.

Meanwhile, Dost Mahomed was making vigorous preparations for the renewal of hostilities, in which he was aided by the zealous co-operation of the Wallee of Khooloom and other Usbec chieftains. The Sikhs, also, who since the death of Runjeet Sing had been less faithful in their engagements, and who had been detected giving protection to the Ghiljie rebels a few months before, were now proved, by intercepted letters, to have promised assistance to the Ameer. In addition to these causes of alarm,

a conspiracy was discovered in Cabool by Sir Alexander Burnes, implicating nearly all the most eminent men in the city and surrounding districts; the design of which was to subvert the dominion of Shah Shoojah, and expel the British from the country. Arms and ammunition were bought up in large quantities in Cabool, and sent to Dost Mahomed, while many of the people from the neighbourhood flocked to his standard. At one time, it was thought that we should be compelled to abandon all our out-stations, and fall back upon the capital until reinforcements should arrive. Some skirmishes, of no great importance, took place in the disturbed districts about Bameean; but we having, in two of them, suffered slight reverses, it served to give increased confidence to the enemy; and although the force stationed in that part of the country amounted to two thousand, one half of it was composed of Affghans, who waited but a convenient opportunity to desert. On the march from Syghan, they behaved in the most mutinous and disorderly manner; and on their arrival at Bameean, one company marched out with their arms and accoutrements, and went over to the enemy's camp; the remainder, to the number of five or six hundred, were disarmed, and ordered to return to Cabool.

At length, on the 5th of September, information

was received at the capital, that the whole country between the Hindoo Koosh and the Oxus had risen to support Dost Mahomed, and that he was approaching Bameean with a powerful army. Colonel Dennie was immediately despatched, at the head of a small detachment, to reinforce the troops already stationed there; he arrived on the 14th, when he immediately proceeded to disarm the disaffected Affghan regiment, and the men, although loaded, submitted quietly to the operation.

Finding no enemy in the neighbourhood, he began to make arrangements for an advance upon Syghan; but this turned out to be unnecessary, as on the evening of the 17th, information was received that the Ameer and the Wallee of Khooloom were entering the valley from the great defile, a few miles in front of Bameean. Colonel Dennie wisely sought not to interfere with their progress, as his design was to draw them well into the vale, to secure a favourable position for his own operations. But on the morning of the 18th, the enemy attacked a fortified village, which it was necessary for us to defend. The troops with Dost Mahomed were reported as much under the number they really mustered; and relying upon the correctness of his information, Colonel Dennie had taken only a portion of the force with him to the relief of the village. The enemy had got

possession of the chain of forts in front, reaching to the mouth of the defile, and Colonel Dennie was struck with surprise at finding them so much more numerous than had been represented, numbering, in fact, thousands instead of hundreds. To have sent back for reinforcements, however, would have caused delay, inspired the enemy with confidence, and have checked the forward feeling that animated his little party. He, therefore, pushed forward with spirit, and succeeded in dislodging the foe from the heights which they occupied. After rallying several times, seeing the steadiness and rapidity of our advance, they lost all courage, and fled in a confused mass towards the gorge of the pass, when the whole of the Cavalry were sent in pursuit, and committed great slaughter among the fugitives. Several of the deserters from Captain Hopkin's corps here met with the fate their treachery deserved, and their arms and accoutrements were seen lying in all directions: The pursuit continued for four miles, and when Dost Mahomed was last seen, he was wounded in the thigh, and had not more than two hundred followers with him. The An eer and his son, with the Wallee of Khoolum, were indebted for their escape, which they with difficulty effected, to the fleetness of their horses. The enemy had possessed but one gun;

this with their kettle-drums, tents, standards, and baggage, all fell into our possession, and more than five hundred of their number were left dead and wounded upon the field. Our own loss amounted to no more than fifty, put *hors de combat*, of whom six only were killed.

This brilliant action was attended with the most important results, inasmuch as it entirely broke the Dost's power, although he still continued for a time to struggle on. Congratulations flowed in upon the heroic victor and his little band from all quarters; even the Governor-General himself personally addressed Colonel Dennie, in a letter indicative of his high estimation of the importance of his victory, and the gallantry by which it had been achieved.

For several days after their defeat, no intelligence could be obtained of the Ameer or the Wallee, but under the impression that they were endeavouring to re-assemble their scattered forces at Syghan, Colonel Dennie resolved to move forward in that direction. On the 22nd, he advanced with a mixed force of horse and foot, not exceeding fifteen hundred in all, and a few small guns. He arrived at Akrabad at the end of the first march, and learned that the enemy had passed that place in their flight from Bameean, and continued their progress, without halting, towards Ilyatoo, where

they left a garrison. The next day, he reached Ilyatoo, but discovered that the fugitives had pushed on beyond Syghan, and that the garrison they had left behind had also fled. He destroyed the fort, and then continued his advance to the last-named place, which he immediately occupied. It was found to be a fortress of great strength, and capable of holding out for a length of time. But the enemy, terrified by our approach, had precipitately abandoned it, leaving behind them all the military stores and property, public and private, which our troops had had the misfortune to lose in their hasty retreat before the advancing Dost a few weeks previously.

The Wallee of Khooldoom, was now convinced of the hopelessness of his ally's cause, and on the 28th, he sent an ambassador to Dr. Lord with overtures of peace; Colonel Dennie, in the meantime, resolving to remain where he was, till negotiations were completed. These were speedily arranged, upon the Wallee promising to renounce all further connection with the Ameer, and Colonel Dennie and his gallant little band, arrived again at Cabool on the 18th of October, having accomplished the most brilliant series of operations which had yet distinguished the war. For his success in this expedition, he

was offered the Second Class Dooraunee Order, but the same high-spirited reasons which dictated his refusal of the third class on a former occasion, when he thought the second his due, prompted him again to decline the proffered honour.

Dost Mahomed, forsaken by his Usbec allies, now retired precipitately towards the Ghorebund Pass, by which he meditated a descent into Kohistan. With his son Afzul and a few followers, he at length reached Nijrow, where, by indefatigable exertions and exciting the religious enthusiasm of the people, he again succeeded in collecting a considerable number of adherents.

Meanwhile, General Sale had marched on the 29th of September from his camp at Robat, to attack the fort of Tootundurrah at the entrance of the Ghorebund Pass. His force consisted of Her Majesty's 13th, the 27th and 37th Native Infantry, a party of the Shah's cavalry, who joined us at Charakar, and five pieces of artillery. On reaching Tootundurrah, we discovered the enemy in a position of much strength. The village was surrounded by garden walls, and defended by forts most advantageously disposed, while its rear was protected from assault by a deep canal. A body of the enemy were posted in front of this position, a second party held possession of a hill to the west-

ward, and the forts, one of which was of great strength, were all thickly studded with matchlock men, who kept up a rapid fire upon us as we approached. It first became necessary to clear the hills, and some of our troops with artillery, were despatched to take the enemy in flank, and obtain possession of two detached forts upon the right. These operations were spiritedly and successfully performed, and the main column moved down upon the village. But all was the same as in our former contests with the people of this country. Nothing could withstand our discipline and artillery, the enemy were driven back at all points, and the whole place was in a very short space occupied by our troops, with the loss of only six men killed: We also lost one officer, who was Captain Edward Conolly, the brother of the traveller.

Having, at the suggestion of Sir Alexander Burnes, who accompanied the force, destroyed all the forts we had just taken, we proceeded next to Jugla, where Sir Robert Sale had been informed that a number of the rebel chiefs had sought refuge. The cavalry were sent forward in advance to prevent the escape of the enemy, until the infantry and artillery should have time to arrive. On the morning of the 3rd of October, we arrived before the place, and as soon as every



thing could be got ready, a severe cannonade was opened upon the fortress, which was continued for two hours. It was then considered that a sufficient breach had been effected, and the order was given for the advance of the storming party, but the enemy manned the shattered ramparts in such numbers, and poured in so desperate a fire, that we were compelled to retreat with loss. During the struggle, four of our officers excited the admiration and drew forth the cheers of the whole force, by the determined bravery with which they maintained, for some time, an unequal contest on the summit of the walls; but it was in vain, and our troops were eventually compelled to take refuge in an adjoining ravine. The inmates of the fort, however, unwilling to risk another trial of our strength, speedily effected their retreat, which was done in spite of our precautions to prevent them, and we then took possession of the place. In this affair, we had fifty killed and wounded.

Two other rebellious chiefs still remained to be chastised, Durwesh Khan of Bab-oo-koosh-kar, and Saif-oo-deen, Khan of Kah-derrah. The former chief evacuated his fortress upon the approach of our troops, upon which it was taken and destroyed. The latter place, however, was a fort of remarkable strength, and able to maintain a pro-

tracted defence, each house constituting a separate stronghold of itself, loopholed and garrisoned; while numerous towers of formidable appearance were situated in various parts of the town. Negotiation was therefore tried with a view to avoid hostilities, but without effect. The garrison consisted of about a thousand men, who appeared determined to resist us, as they were observed throwing up breast works and making other preparations for defence. Accordingly, dispositions on our part began to be made for their reduction, and on the 21st, the force, divided into three columns, moved forward to the assault. But all <sup>①</sup> further trouble was spared us, as the enemy quitted the fort at our approach, and fled to the hills. Kah-derrah was then set on fire and burnt to the ground, and on the 22nd the British force advanced and took up a position at Ak-serai, to protect Cabool in case the Ameer, who was now again at the head of a considerable body of men, should attempt a surprise in that quarter.

At this place, our troops remained stationary for about a week, when they proceeded towards Nijrow upon receiving intelligence of Dost Mahomed's arrival in that district; and on the 2nd of November they came up with him at Purwan Durrah, a small valley traversed by a clear rapid stream, and sprinkled over with orchards and numerous forts.

Colonel Salter who commanded the advance, observed the enemy rapidly retreating towards the hills as he approached, and at the suggestion of Dr. Lord, who accompanied him, sent round a party of the 2nd cavalry to intercept them. The infantry followed, but slowly, in consequence of the difficulty experienced in bringing on the artillery, arising from the water courses in their route. The cavalry having got some distance ahead of the infantry were attacked by a body of Affghan horse, headed by Dost Mahomed in person; and Captain Fraser as they approached, ordered his men to draw and charge. The command was not obeyed: the men, as if terrified by the impetuous oncoming of the Affghans, at first wavered, then fell back, and at last fairly took to flight. All the exhortations of their leaders to induce them to stand firm were in vain, and Captains Fraser and Ponsonby, with the rest of the officers, and about fifteen or twenty of the men, were left to bear the whole brunt of the Affghan charge. Dost Mahomed led his men down the hill, calling out to them, in the name of God and the Prophet, to fight, and drive the Feringee Kafirs from the land. Their onset was most furious, and of course the gallant little band were overpowered. Captains Fraser and Ponsonby were severely wounded. Dr. Lord had fallen previously by a shot from a

fort, which had fired upon them during the advance, and Lieutenant Broadfoot, and Adjutant Crispin were killed upon the spot.

The infantry were now formed into line to receive the enemy, and the guns were got into position; but the Affghans now wheeled round and galloped out of reach of the artillery. The enemy were then dislodged from some heights, which they occupied; but evening coming on and the troops having been already nine hours under arms, all further operations were deferred till the next day. When morning dawned, however, the enemy were found to have retreated to Charekar, and Dost Mahomed had disappeared altogether from the scene of action, without the knowledge of any one. The cowardly conduct of the 2nd cavalry, afterwards met with its just reward. The regiment was broken up, and its number erased from the army list, while those who had not misbehaved themselves, were drafted into other corps.

The action at Purwan Durrah, can scarcely be regarded as otherwise than a reverse, although the enemy retreated in the night, and as such, in fact, it was looked upon. Great alarm was felt in consequence, and expectations entertained that the disaffected might be inspired by fresh hopes. Sir Alexander Burnes wrote to the Envoy, stre-

nuously advising that the various detachments of troops should be recalled, and concentrated at Cabool, in readiness to resist the attack which might be expected. But Dost Mahomed was aware that his resources were exhausted, and that a merely temporary advantage could not retrieve his affairs. He felt too, that by obstinately holding out, he could not expect such favourable terms as his timely submission would procure him, and he accordingly took advantage of his recent success to yield with honour.

It was on the 3rd of November that Sir William MacNaghten received the communication just referred to from Sir Alexander Burnes, and he was taking his evening ride, pondering upon the gloomy prospects the intelligence opened up, when a solitary horseman suddenly rode up to him, and abruptly asked if he was the Envoy.

“Yes,” was the reply.

“Then,” rejoined the querist, “here is the Ameer.”

Sir William MacNaghten was astounded at the announcement. His mind had just previously been filled with visions of the adventurous Dost's arrival at Cabool at the head of a numerous force, and he exclaimed somewhat confusedly :

“What Ameer? where is he?”

“Dost Mahomed Khan!” was the reply, and in a moment afterwards that renowned chief himself alighted from his horse and claimed his protection. He then presented his sword, which Sir William,<sup>b</sup> with generous courtesy, requested him to retain, and they proceeded together to the Envoy’s residence in the Bala Hissar.

The Ex-Ameer displayed remarkable self-possession under the circumstances of his captivity, conversing freely and familiarly with those about him, and he was treated with much deference and respect. His old friendship with Sir Alexander Burnes was renewed, and they exchanged swords as a token of reciprocal good feeling. Almost immediately after his arrival at the Bala Hissar, he had requested to be furnished with writing materials and a moonshee, or clerk, upon which he dictated, with much precision, letters to his sons, Mahomed Afzul and two others who had escaped since they had been under British protection, informing them of his having surrendered himself and advising them to do the same.

The personal appearance of Dost Mahomed is imposing; he stands about five feet ten inches in height, and his figure, which was formerly somewhat spare and sinewy, is now robust. His forehead is rather receding, but high and intellectual, and his eyebrows are exceedingly, and, indeed, beautifully

arched ; while his eyes are large, dark, brilliant, and remarkably expressive. His manners are more polished than those of most of his countrymen, and he possesses agreeable powers of conversation. The khans of Affghanistan, like our own barons of old, are very illiterate and disdain the accomplishments of learning ; but it is related as an instance of the Ex-Ameer's mental energy and activity, that he taught himself to write at an advanced period of middle life.

On the 12th of November, Sir Willoughby Cotton, who, before he reached India on his return home the previous year, had, in consequence of the troubled appearance of things, been again placed in command of the forces in Affghanistan, moved from Cabool with a portion of the troops to Jellalabad, to winter there, and Dost Mahomed was escorted by him so far, on his way to Loodianah. At Peshawar the Ex-Ameer waited the arrival of his family, who had resided at Ghuznee since they had been under the protection of the British. Of his numerous sons all now had surrendered except Akbar Khan who continued to hold out to the last, and eventually took terrible vengeance for all that his family had suffered. The residence first appropriated to the use of our distinguished captive, was the same that Shah Shoojah had occupied for so many years

at Loodianah, but he was afterwards removed to Mussoree, on the north-west frontier of our territories, where the climate was better adapted for his health. The pension we allowed him, was three lacs of rupees, or £30,000 a year. He was permitted to visit Calcutta at his own solicitation, where he was received by Lord Auckland with every mark of respect, and was for a time an object of great and general attraction. During the whole of his captivity, he appears to have conducted himself with much circumspection, and although he naturally took a strong interest in the events passing in his own country, there is nothing to prove that he ever entered into any correspondence with the rebels, or took the least advantage of our misfortunes, when they befel us.



## CHAPTER IX.

SHAH SHOOJAH'S GOVERNMENT — BRITISH POLICY—  
GENERAL SALE'S RETREAT TO JELLALABAD—BREAK-  
ING OUT OF THE REBELLION AT CABOOL.

UPON the surrender of Dost Mahomed, no further definite object existed for the continuance of hostilities, and it was hoped that the Affghan tribes would sink into a state of tranquil, if not contented endurance of the new government. It is true, there was abundance of combustible matter in all parts of the country, and the people frequently gave indications of the forced nature of their submission. The fire was allayed, not extinguished; but it might perhaps have been kept under, until it finally died away, by the application of a mild and conciliatory policy. The task was one of great difficulty, doubtless, among the wild and independent tribes into which the nation was divided, and one requiring temper and prudence, conjoined with firmness; but it was not impracticable, and it was our duty to attempt it. The writer's opinions upon the policy of the original entry into Affghanistan, judging from the

information then possessed by the British government, have already been fully set forth, and in consistency with both our interest and duty, we were bound to follow out, in our intercourse with the people, the just consequences the expedition entailed upon us. The fierce and turbulent Affghan, like other men, when he saw around him the evidences of increased prosperity, would in time be able to distinguish between bad and good government, and not rise in insurrection at the call of every recusant chief.

But the British authorities appeared to entertain, from the first, an overweaning apprehension of interfering with the prerogatives of Shah Shoojah. Afraid of being supposed to exercise too great an intervention in the administration of affairs, we rushed into an opposite evil, and one of greater magnitude. In allowing the Shah a comparatively unchecked exercise of authority, the Affghans could only suppose us to be influenced by one of two courses. Either we supported the King in all his proceedings, or our power was insufficient to restrain him. The latter opinion, it was scarcely likely they would hold, after all they had seen; the former must have been, then, the conviction they adopted, and would they not have regarded with more toleration our open and direct control in their government, when they felt its effects in a

wiser and juster order of things, than our standing by and allowing Shah Shoojah to act independently even if they could have appreciated the motives of our abstinence.

But the fact is, we had gone too far to pursue with effect this abstinent course of conduct, or to make the Affghans think we were pursuing it. Even if we could have done so, what satisfaction would it be to them, while suffering from the effects of an oppressive administration, to know that although we had the power to interfere, we did not do so, from a wish not to be suspected of employing too direct an influence in their internal affairs. What mockery would this seem, after we had riveted their new government upon them by force of arms, and were still continuing to support it by the same means?

It was somewhat pertinently observed by the Nwab JubbarKhan, in his negotiations with the British after the fall of Ghuznee, that if Shah Shoojah was to be king, of what use was the British army in Affghanistan? If, on the contrary, the British were to rule, where was the necessity for Shah Shoojah? There was much speciousness in this, but some truth also. The fact is, that neither of these alterations were adopted, but a sort of middle course was steered, which, like all trimming methods, failed of success. Enough was done to make the

Shah wish himself able to act with more independence, but not sufficient to make the people feel we acted from a regard for their feelings and prejudices. We did not "make our giant first, and then kill him;" but we made our giant, and then bowed down to him; without, however, impressing his subjects with a notion that there was anything about him demanding such prostration.

All this militates nothing, viewing all the circumstances under which we acted, at once, against our adoption, in the first instance, of Shah Shoojah's cause. But the great mistake in reasoning upon the Affghan war has been, that a number of distinct causes and effects have been jumbled together in a confused mass, and then drawn out as occasion served, either ignorantly or for party purposes, and placed one after the other, without any regard to their natural sequence. It has never been pretended that the Shah was the perfection of a ruler; and, probably, when he found himself supported by the invincible power of England, he was less studious of preserving the regard of his subjects than he otherwise might have been. Be this as it may, it is undeniable that the popularity of the King did not come up to the expectations we had previously entertained; and as we gained experience, we should have modified our intentions for the future. One great

cause of this, was the pride and reserve, and fondness for etiquette he maintained in his intercourse with his subjects. There is no fault so difficult for a people to forgive in their sovereign, as a haughty and supercilious demeanour; while the assumption of a gracious and popular manner will cover a multitude of bad qualities, and ensure him their affection. The common pride of our nature is gratified by the desire to please, it betokens, and the kind of equality it for a moment raises us to; and the people would frequently submit to acts of injustice and oppression from a prince whose personal deportment was so mild and conciliatory.

But this was not all.<sup>o</sup> Shah Shoojah, although fond of pomp and show, was a man of an easy and grateful disposition, and averse to the cares of government; but, at the same time, exceedingly tenacious of being regarded as a mere puppet in the hands of another. This led him to employ as ministers, men who had<sup>e</sup> won his attachment by their services, and whose force of character did not permit them to take the lead, without much regard to their qualifications for office. The chief of these, Sir Alexander Burnes spoke of as a man who had attended the Shah throughout his exile, and grown grey in his service. His name was Moolah Shikore, and he

was a man of no family; his faculties were impaired by age and disease; and he once incurred his master's displeasure, for which he forfeited his ears, a subject fruitful in criticism to the discontented about the court, and little calculated to elevate the representative of majesty. So completely had he lost his memory, that he never recognised a man he had once seen, and the commonest business required half a dozen letters. In fact, of him it might be said that his whole business was to gather money, and to this one end his remaining faculties were applied.

One of the measures of this man, was to seize all the granaries round Cabool, on which he put his seal, and from which he drew forth the grain, and had it exposed for sale in the bazaar by his own officers, and at a price fixed by himself. When spring arrived, he conceived it would please his Majesty to adorn the royal gardens, which had been long neglected, a measure most laudable to a people so fond of gardens as the Cabooles; but this was to be done *gratis*, and by conscription on all around the district. The poor peasants were dragged in hundreds from their homes, at seed time, when their lands required their care, and compelled to labour without any reward. Discontent rose to such a height, that Sir Alexander Burnes strongly remonstrated with the

minister, and plainly told him that he was disgracing his king and himself; he further added, that he would no longer stand silent, unless the poor wretches were at least given bread; and if this was not done, he would supply them from his own treasury. After this, the workmen received two pice worth of bread a-day, while our engineer officers were paying seven times that in the adjoining garden, where our cantonments were erecting. At another time, this minister reduced the number of butchers' shops, and compelled them to sell at his own price, thereby ensuring a monopoly of meat to a few, and injuring many. For days the loudest complaints were uttered, till free trade was again established.

The manner of raising and collecting the revenue, also gave rise to the greatest discontent. Many old imposts were revived, and new ones created, galling to the people, whose "ignorant impatience of taxation," to use a celebrated expression, was proverbial; and the collection of the revenue was entrusted to the military. These received assignments on certain districts for their pay, and they proceeded there, living at free quarters on the community till the peasants paid the amount of the assignments; causing thus a more fruitful harvest of dispute than any other human invention could have devised.

The position of Shah Shoojah was unquestionably an embarrassing one, restored, as he had been, to the sovereignty of a country, impoverished by the exactions of its recent rulers and a long period of anarchy and disorganization. Nor was the situation of our own officials much more enviable, assailed as they were by reiterated injunctions from the home administration, to economize as much as possible. But such a minister and such proceedings were only calculated to undermine the popularity and render still more embarrassing the position of any government; nor was it likely our apparent countenance of them would help to dissipate the prejudice already strongly existing against us. Although we did not permit these things to go on without remonstrance, still nothing of consequence was done to check them; and when the people exhibited signs of dissatisfaction, our assistance was always forthcoming, if necessary, to repress them. A nation's usual resource against grievances too heavy to be borne, was thus denied them; and in spite of the good intentions towards them we might possess, they looked upon us as the means whereby their rulers were enabled to oppress them.

It is not wonderful, therefore, that we did not succeed in persuading this fiery and independent people to be contented with our



presence in their country; nor is it necessary to probe the darker side of their character in order to discover any possible cause for their continued animosity, and attribute that to a cruel and malignant nature, which may fairly be ascribed to much of our own conduct in our relations with them. It must not be forgotten that the tribes of Affghanistan, unlike in this particular the Highland clans of old, were not bigotedly attached to the persons of their chieftains, but from the democratic nature of many of their customs, felt an interest in the general welfare of the community. When, therefore, they beheld measures undertaken for their benefit, and felt their effects in increased comfort and a better order of things, they would, in time, have settled down into a contented endurance, if not an absolute desire for our rule. The khans, it is probable, would never have been brought over heartily to support our authority, as it would naturally tend to circumscribe their power—a result these proud-spirited chiefs would never view with satisfaction; but by securing hostages, and other energetic measures, tempered with prudence, they might have been kept from seriously disturbing the tranquillity of the state.

Dost Mahomed, who knew his countrymen well, in his conversations with the English during his progress to India, strenuously recommended some

such policy as this. "The Suddozyes," he said, "had never been accustomed to obey, and never would obey, and by their intrigues under the anomalous sovereignty of Shah Shoojah, we should be involved in perpetual embarrassment. The only effectual mode of crushing them, was to govern them in our own way. You will also find," he observed, "the very courtiers about the Shah, who have for years been fattening on your bounty, the most forward in plotting against you." This was doubtless not far from the truth, but the course of policy adopted was different, and every one is aware of its fatal results.

° Notwithstanding, however, these sources of dissatisfaction, the country, after the withdrawal of Dost Mahomed from the scene of action, enjoyed a degree of repose for several months, to which it had long been a stranger. Sir Wilmoughby Cotton, who had applied for leave to resign, was succeeded in the command of the troops, by Major-General Elphinstone, who assumed his new office in April, 1841. In the course of the summer, however, disturbances began to manifest themselves in some portions of the country, and during the months of July and August, a partial rising among the Ghiljies took place; but it was suppressed without much difficulty. To the west of Candahar, also, a predatory

chief, named Akter Khan, had assembled a numerous force of horse and foot ; but he, too, was defeated, and his followers dispersed.

As the season advanced the complexion of affairs grew more serious, and Major Pottinger, who had been appointed political agent in Kohistan, warned the envoy of the deceptive nature of the apparent tranquillity, and represented to him the insufficiency of the military force, stationed in that part of the country. In the Nijrow district especially, which had been the focus of disaffection, ever since our establishment at Cabool, and whose turbulent chiefs had never been entirely subdued, there prevailed much ill-omened activity. In the beginning of September, further evidence of the unquiet state of things was given in the resistance offered by the inhabitants of the valley of Zoormut to Captain Hay, who had been sent, with a party of troops, to collect the revenue in that part of the country ; but it was soon quelled.

In the meantime, still more formidable signs of disaffection were springing up in another quarter. Early in October, some of the leading Ghiljie chiefs suddenly quitted Cabool, and retired to their mountain fastnesses in the Choord-Cabool Pass, where they raised an insurrection, robbed the dawks, and stopped our communications. General Sale's Brigade, which in consequence of

what had been deemed the pacific state of the country had been ordered home, but was waiting the arrival of the troops from Zoormut, was now directed to proceed immediately on its march to force the pass, and punish the rebels. Accordingly on the 9th of October, the 35th Native Infantry, under Colonel Monteath, one hundred of the Shah's sappers, a squadron of cavalry, and two guns were sent on in advance to Bootkhak, at the entrance of the pass, where, on the following night their camp was attacked by a number of the rebels. A severe fire was maintained by them for several hours, and thirty-five of our troops were killed and wounded. On the 11th, General Sale followed up the advance with the 13th, and on the following morning, the whole force proceeded to expel the enemy from the pass. They were found posted most advantageously, behind a strong stone breast-work, thrown up across the narrowest part of the valley, and also crowning the heights in great numbers, whence they poured down upon our troops a well-directed fire. General Sale was wounded in the ankle at the commencement of the affair, and shortly afterwards obliged to resign the command into the hands of Colonel Dennie, who immediately pushed on his advance column, with the view of driving the enemy from the above-named breast-work. He

found, however, that they had deserted that position, and retreated to the heights, whither he sent up a party of skirmishers to dislodge them; these, with desperate bravery ascended the precipitous rocks in the face of the Affghan fire, and at length succeeded in clearing them. The 35th regiment then encamped at Choord-Cabool, while the 13th, in obedience to their previous instructions, returned to Bootkhak, not however without frequently being fired upon by parties concealed amongst the rocks. The force remained in these positions for several days, awaiting the return of the Zoormut expedition to Cabool, during which time occasional night-attacks were made upon both camps, and considerable loss sustained.

On the 20th, of October, General Sale resumed his homeward march, and again advanced as far as Choord-Cabool, having previously been joined by the 37th regiment, Abbott's guns, the mountain train, one hundred of Anderson's horse, and the remainder of the Shah's miners. Here they halted for two days, and then proceeded on to Tezeen, accompanied by Captain Macgregor the political agent, having to fight their way throughout the march. At this place, the force remained till the 26th; the intermediate time being employed by Captain Macgregor in negotiating with the refractory chiefs, and a treaty was en-

tered into, which guaranteed them the forty thousand rupees about which the quarrel had commenced, they in return, promising to restore what property of ours they had taken, and refrain from further hostilities. These promises, however, were utterly valueless, and this treacherous people continued to harass General Sale, and his gallant little force throughout the whole way to Jellalabad. At Jugdulluk especially, they met with the most determined opposition. The nature of the country was such as greatly to favour the mode of warfare adopted by the mountaineers; our troops having to pass through a long winding valley, hedged in between lofty and precipitous mountains, partially covered with bushes and dwarf trees, from behind which the enemy, with their long juzails, could pour down upon us a deadly fire.

On these terrific eminences, the insurgents had collect in great numbers, and fortified their positions with strong breast-works, evincing a determination to dispute with the utmost obstinacy the progress of our flanking parties. Upon observing this, General Sale, whose wound still confined him to a dhooly, detached companies from every corps, and ordered them to scale the lofty heights. This was done in the most gallant style; and the enemy having ne-

glected to guard the main outlet of the pass; the vanguard pushed on, and established itself upon all the most favourable points, to protect the advance of the rear.

The enemy now seemed to decline all further resistance, and the march was resumed; but as the cumbrous train of baggage filed over the mountain, they again appeared from behind the most distant ridges, and renewed the contest with increased numbers and the most savage fury. So fiercely and suddenly was their onset made, that our troops were for a moment thrown into confusion, and some baggage fell into the enemy's hands. The cool and determined conduct of the officers, however, in a little while restored confidence, and the force reached Gundamuck on the 30th of October. Their loss during this march was severe, amounting to one hundred and thirty, killed and wounded. At this station the troops remained till the 11th of November, when they again moved forward, still subject to the harassing attacks of the exasperated Ghiljies, who constantly hung upon their rear, and galled them from their mountain fastnesses. Upon approaching the open country, Colonel Dennie, who commanded the rear-guard, resolved, if possible, to draw them from the rocks into an action on the plains; and with that view, pretended to retreat,

still keeping his men together in good order. The feint succeeded; the enemy boldly pushed on, as they imagined, in pursuit, when Colonel Dennie suddenly wheeled round, impetuously charged the advancing foe, and entirely routed them. They fled precipitately to the hills, leaving in the course of the whole affair, one hundred and fifty dead upon the field, and Jellalabad was reached by our troops on the 12th, without further molestation.

In the meantime, events of the most appalling character were transpiring at Cabool, and the insurrection had broken out, the fatal results of which have excited so mournful and intense an interest throughout Great Britain. Various opinions have been put forth as to the causes that led to this catastrophe; and it is still a subject of dispute whether it was the result of a deep laid plot, or arose from a sudden provocation. It is beyond a question, that independent of the national and religious prejudices with which we were regarded by the people of Affghanistan, much dissatisfaction existed in consequence of the measures of the new government; and the inattention paid to applications for redress, both by the Shah and by the British authorities, increased the exasperation. In spite of all this, up to the very outbreak of the revolution, it was obstinately per-



sisted in that the nation was in a tranquil state, and preparations were even being made for the gradual withdrawal of the British force altogether. It is true, that at one time, the unfortunate Envoy had listened to the warnings of some of the intelligent military officials, Major Pottinger and others, and had solicited from the supreme government an increase of troops, but he was induced, at the instigation and upon the assurances of Sir Alexander Burnes, who seems to have been completely blinded throughout, to give up this wise and necessary measure. Shah Shoojah and his British allies were slumbering upon a volcano, and knew it not, or *would not* know it.

It unfortunately happened that there were many who had a strong and direct interest in representing all around them as pacific. It is not to be supposed that men of the high character and reputation borne by Sir William MacNaghten and Sir Alexander Burnes, would be betrayed into a neglect and desertion of their duty by merely personal considerations; but such views, it is to be feared, must have helped to warp their judgments under the difficult circumstances in which they were placed. The Envoy had just been appointed to the governorship of Bombay, and was exceedingly anxious to proceed thither, to enter upon the performance of his new du-

ties, and the enjoyment of his new honours. It is not, either, unlikely, that he was glad to have the opportunity of escaping from the perplexities which surrounded his position. Póor Burnes, on the other hand, was to have succeeded to the office of Envoy upon Sir William MacNaghten's relinquishment of it, and was by no means disposed to throw any obstacle in the way of his departure. There were many others, also, who, tired of the fatigues and inconveniences of the Affghan campaign, and casting a longing eye to the far-off luxuries of home, were anxious, at all risks, to return to India. The wishes of all these naturally pointed to the pacification of Affghanistan, as in the first place necessary to the furtherance of their views, and their perceptions were then made to bend to them. The measure, which, coming upon the back of other things, at length roused among the tribes a spirit of resistance, was the unwise reduction of the annual stipends bestowed upon the Ghiljies for a safe passage through their passes. Taking advantage of the feeling produced by this most imprudent proceeding, the Cabool chiefs incited the citizens to revolt, making use of the king's name as an authority for their actions. Sir William Macnaghten has left behind him a memorandum, thus setting forth his view of the matter.

“The immediate cause,” he says, “of the outbreak in the capital, was a seditious letter, addressed by Abdoollah. Khan to several chiefs of influence at Cabool, stating that it was the design of the envoy to seize and send them all to London. The principal rebels met on the previous night, and, relying on the inflammable feelings of the people of Cabool, they pretended that the king had issued an order to put all infidels to death; having previously forged an order from him for our destruction, by the common process of washing out the contents of a genuine paper, with the exception of the seal, and substituting their own wicked invention.”

It has, however, been supposed that the document was really a *bonâ fide* one, and that the Shah had treacherously joined the league against us. But there does not appear to be sufficient evidence to warrant such a conclusion. He was a man of weak and vacillating character, and in the difficult situation in which he was placed, some of his acts bore an equivocal appearance; but he must have known that he depended entirely upon our assistance for the preservation of his power, and would scarcely have lent his willing support to any schemes that contemplated the removal of his chief safeguard, especially in the first instance. But to proceed to the catastrophe.

Early on the morning of the 2nd of November, the troops stationed in cantonments without the city, received the astounding intelligence, that the populace of Cabool had risen in insurrection and were plundering and murdering the British, resident within the walls. About eight o'clock, the news was confirmed by a note from Sir Alexander Burnes, who, however, stated—confident, poor man, to the last—that he was in hopes of shortly being able to quell the disturbance; but it was soon known that Sir Alexander himself had fallen a victim to the popular fury, and that the treasury chest of Captain Johnson had been plundered by the rioters. Flames, also, were shortly afterwards observed issuing from the British quarter of the town, and the report of fire arms was incessant.

Sir William MacNaghten now called upon General Elphinstone to act; and Brigadier Shelton, then encamped at Seeah Sung, a short distance from cantonments, was directed to proceed immediately to the Balā Hissār, with one company of the 44th, a wing of the 54th Native Infantry, the 6th Shah's infantry and four horse artillery guns. The remainder of the troops stationed at Seeah Sung were at the same time ordered into cantonments, and consisted of H. M's. 44th foot, two horse artillery guns and Anderson's irregular horse. The 37th Native Infantry, which had accompanied

General Sale to Choord-Cabool were likewise immediately recalled. The troops at this time in cantonments, were the 5th Regiment of Native Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver; a wing of the 54th, five six-pounder field guns, with a detachment of the Shah's artillery, the Envoy's body guard, a troop of Skinner's horse and another of Local horse, three companies of the Shah's sappers and about twenty men of the Company's sappers attached to Captain Paton, Assistant Quarter-Master-General.

At the same time that Brigadier Shelton was ordered to occupy the Bala Hissar, Captain Lawrence, the Envoy's military secretary, was despatched to prepare the Shah for that officer's reception. Taking with him four troopers of the body guard, he was galloping along the main road, when a desperate cut was made at him by an Affghan assassin, which he fortunately avoided; but almost immediately afterwards, a body of men sallied out from the city to intercept his progress and fired upon him. Their bullets whistled harmlessly by him, however, and he reached the citadel in safety, where he found the king in a state of great agitation, he having been a spectator of the whole affair. His Majesty expressed himself willing to act in accordance with the Envoy's advice in every particular.

While the King and Captain Lawrence were yet in conversation, an attempt had been made upon the life of another British officer, Lieutenant Sturt, who rushed into the palace, the blood streaming down from three desperate gashes in his face and neck. The wounds were fortunately not mortal, and he was conveyed back to the encampment in the Shah's own palanquin, under a strong escort to protect him.

Soon after this, Brigadier Shelton arrived with his detachment, but the miserable imbecility, which seemed like a spell to fall upon every one having authority upon this fatal occasion, prevented anything effectual being done, and the insurgents were permitted to revel uncontrolled in the murder and spoliation of our countrymen, in the face of an army strong enough for ten times the exertions as yet demanded of it. In consequence of this want of energy on our part, the rebels were inspired with increased confidence, and those who might have been inclined to support us, received no encouragement to do so and fell into the ranks of the enemy. The insurrection at its commencement, presented by no means the formidable appearance it afterwards assumed, although it is idle to suppose it amounted to nothing more than a mere street riot. The fact is, a general dissatisfaction with the existing

order of things prevailed throughout Cabool; a few of the most ardent and energetic spirits gave expression to this feeling in action, and the rest who cautiously waited to see what would be the result, as in more civilized communities, joined them upon discovering their efforts attended with success.

Still, however universal the feeling in favour of a change, the first outbreak was so insignificant as regarded numbers, that the slightest decision, and exertion of force in repelling the attack, would probably have succeeded in restoring quiet; but so confident was the ill-fated Burnes in the good dispositions of the people, that he actually restrained his guard from resisting the rioters and attempted to pacify them with words. The result was such as might have been anticipated from the infuriated rabble, they rushed in and murdered every living being in the place, not even sparing women and children. Along with Sir Alexander fell his brother, Lieutenant Burnes, and Lieutenant Broadfoot who were breakfasting with him. The latter defended himself with the most desperate valour and slew six of the ruffians with his own hand before he was shot down.

It is difficult to account for the inconceivable fatuity of Sir Alexander Burnes upon this occasion. He was aware of the unpopularity of the government, for he had strenuously urged upon

the attention of the Envoy, many of the grievances of which the people complained, yet he obstinately neglected all the warnings he received of what was about to ensue. On the night preceding his murder, in particular, he was emphatically given to understand by an Affghan of family, named Taj Mahomed, that danger was brewing; but he totally disregarded the information and ridiculed his informant. The next day he paid the penalty of his fatal blindness.

The numbers of the insurgents now rapidly increased, and the king, who was in the Bala Hissar, began to be seriously alarmed. He sent one of his sons with Campbell's Hindostanees, and two guns to quell the tumult, but they were driven back with great slaughter, and their guns with difficulty saved from falling into the hands of the rioters. We, instead of supporting them, were doing literally nothing, or worse than nothing, for we were encouraging the rebels by our inactivity and apparent cowardice. Our leaders seemed completely paralysed by the event, and yet with singular inconsistency pretended to regard the affair as inconsiderable. No one appeared to know what to do or how to give orders. If any were given, the slightest possible check threw their givers into indecision, and they remained unexecuted. Even upon the arrival of the force



from Seeah Sung at the Bala Hissar, the king actually refused them permission to enter the city, and kept them standing inactive under arms. What could be the motive for this? Was the king anxious to quell the disturbance by means of his own forces? Or was he acting upon the advice of the Envoy, still deluding himself, and struggling to keep up the farce of pacification, even amidst the scenes going on around them? This would seem likely, for at ten o'clock A.M., a note was received from Captain Lawrence, the Envoy's military and private secretary to the effect, that the troops were not wanted as all was going on well. Shortly afterwards, however, Sir William MacNaghten himself, thought it necessary to leave his residence in the "Mission compound," and seek protection in cantonments.

Meanwhile, in another part of the city, similar scenes were enacting. Captain Trevor, with his family, occupied a large and strong tower on the banks of the Cabool river, near the Kuzzilbash quarter; while, on the opposite side, was situated the fort appropriated for the stores of the Shah's commissariat, in which resided Brigadier Anquetil, and at that time, Captain Colin Mackenzie, Assistant Political Agent for Peshawar. Close by, stood the fortified house of Captain Troup, Brigade Major of the Shah's contingent. Upon these positions, a large body of the rebels came rushing

down, and commenced a sharp fire. Brigadier Anquetil, and Captain Troup had gone out for their accustomed morning's ride, unconscious of the proximity of danger, and Captain Mackenzie had to take upon himself the defence of the place, with the small party of troops which constituted the guard of each fort.

After maintaining his post, the whole of the 2nd, and up to the night of the 3rd, with the greatest bravery against overwhelming numbers, and under every disadvantage of shortness of ammunition, and mutiny amongst his men, which latter, he quelled by his courage and determination, he was compelled to evacuate his fort, and retreat to cantonments. This was no easy matter, encumbered as his little force was with women and children; and before he had proceeded far, the rear missed the advance, upon which some of the enemy had begun to fire. All the sepoys had crept a-head with the Juzailchees, and Captain Mackenzie found himself alone with a servant and two troopers, in the midst of a helpless and wailing crowd of women and children. As he rode on by himself to try and pick out the way, he was suddenly surrounded by a body of Affghans, whom he at first supposed to be his own men; but was quickly undeceived, by their immediately attacking him with their long sharp knives and swords. Dashing his spurs into his

horse's sides he wheeled round, and cutting desperately right and left, succeeded in parrying most of his assailants' blows, and lopping off the sword-hand of the foremost of them, eventually effecting his escape with only two slight sabre cuts. Proceeding cautiously along, he again perceived to his horror, a dense body of Affghans in his path. Retreat was impossible, so putting his trust in God, as he says in his own account, he charged into the midst of them, in the hope that the superior weight and strength of his horse would carry him through, and reserved his sword-cut for the final struggle. It was fortunate that he did so, for after overthrowing about twenty of them, by the impetuosity of his onset, he discovered them to be his own men, and he then reached cantonments without further adventure.

Thus every defensible post was sacrificed, and the rebels allowed everywhere to gain head for want of sufficient energy and courage in our commanders, to reinforce the one, or stop the other. Captain Trevor, like Captain Mackenzie, held out his fort, until all hope of relief had vanished, and then retreated with his family to cantonments, under the protection of the Hazirbash Horsemen, or King's Body-Guards, who behaved themselves with great bravery and fidelity. Long after the commencement of the attack, Khan Shereen

Khan, the Chief of the Kuzzilbashes, and several other khans of consequence were with him, earnestly expecting that some display of energy would be made on the part of the British, to afford them a fair opportunity of joining us. But they waited in vain. All thought of those shut up within the city, and exposed to the fury of the Affghan populace seemed given up, and the ideas of our commanders centred in securing themselves within their intrenchments.

Accordingly, though no offensive measures were projected, which was the only thing to save us, there was no lack of preparation for defence, which eventually turned out to be useless. But every measure that could be taken with this view was partially neutralized by the injudicious nature of the position they had to defend. The cantonment consisted of a low rampart, and a narrow ditch, in the form of a parallelogram, thrown up along the line of the Kohistan road, one thousand yards long, by six hundred broad, with a tower at each corner. Attached to this, on one front, was a still larger space than that occupied by the fortifications; enclosed by a common wall, and appropriated to the residences of the Envoy, and the politicals, and such as were in attendance upon him. The whole was situated upon ground which, had it been selected for an enemy's

encampment, we could scarcely have desired to see more suitably placed for our designs. It was a low swampy plain, surrounded on all sides by hills and forts, from which a hostile force could annoy us, without being very accessible to annoyance in return ; and every one of the above named corner towers was commanded by some one or other of these positions, whence it could have been advantageously assailed. At a little distance to the eastward ran the Cabool river, which was unfordable in the rainy season, and yet over which no bridge had been built till the arrival of General Elphinstone to take the command, although the camp at Seeah Sung, with which it was, of course, necessary to preserve an easy communication, lay on the other side of the river. But the crowning absurdity, the folly of follies, the oversight from which all our subsequent calamities arose, was that of having the commissariat stores, that is, in plain words, the food, the very means of existence of the army, deposited in an old crazy fort, away from the fortified works, and almost incapable of defence.

The injudiciousness of such an arrangement must be obvious to every reader, military or un-military, and what makes it worse, it was done in spite of remonstrances to the contrary. Captain Skinner, the head of the Commissariat depart-

ment, earnestly requested that a place within the cantonment might be set apart for the stores, and Sir William MacNaghten himself strenuously advised the same course, but without effect. The then Commander-in-chief, dazzled by his good fortune in the capture of Ghuznee, thought he had nothing else to do, upon his arrival at Cabool, but to sit down in quiet occupation of the country. Anxious, as it would seem, to get home, and enjoy the rewards in store for him, his military dispositions were hastily made, and whatever future contingencies might arise were left to be provided for by those who had to meet them.

This should be fairly stated, and every one made to bear their portion of blame in the disastrous events which put an end to our influence in Affghanistan. Next to the incapacity which disgraced our counsels at this calamitous period, the evils we endured are doubtless attributable to the defects of our position; and although, had Lord Keane been at Cabool in November, 1841, or even a man of less energy and ability, affairs would have taken a very different course, it is but right that the man who has alone reaped the laurels and rewards of the Affghan war, should be made to take his share of the burden of its reverses, if he can be fairly proved to deserve it.

Such as the cantonments were, however, every

preparation was now made to secure them against the anticipated attacks of the insurgents. All the available guns were placed in position, round the works, and of these there was a fair supply; but they were very inefficiently manned, as we had but eighty Punjaabee artillerymen to attend to them all, upon whose fidelity very little reliance could be placed.

The night of the 2nd was past in great anxiety throughout cantonments, as a night attack had been threatened, and double sentries were stationed on the walls. But all past off quietly till three o'clock, A.M., on the 3rd, when an alarm was sounded in the eastern quartér, in consequence of a brisk file-firing in the direction of Seeah Sung. This, however, was found to proceed from the 37th Regiment of Native Infantry, which had been recalled from Choord-Cabool, and was now approaching, closely followed up by a large body of Ghiljies, about three thousand in number. These had hung upon their rear the whole way, but from the admirable dispositions of Major Griffiths, their commander, the troops had made good their retreat, in capital order, and without any loss of importance. They formed a most acceptable addition to our beleaguered garrison, and in consequence of their arrival, a reinforcement was sent into the Bala Hissar. The rest of the day was spent in

continual skirmishing, without any particular result on either side, further than that our non-success gave additional advantages, and increased spirit and numbers to the insurgents.

It was now quite evident to the most obtuse, that the insurrection was of a much more extensive and formidable nature than was at first apprehended, and orders were despatched to General Nott to send reinforcements from Candahar, while General Sale's brigade was also recalled from Gundamuck.

The following day, the enemy assembled in great strength in the Shah Bagh, or King's Garden, and threw a garrison into the fort of Mahomed Shereef, one of those formerly alluded to as commanding our defences, thus cutting off the communication between the commissariat fort and cantonments, the faulty position of which, as regarded each other, has been remarked upon.

Ensign Warren, of the 5th Native Infantry, at this time occupied the Commissariat fort, with one hundred men; and having reported the danger he was in of being cut off, General Elphinstone, apparently forgetful of the important nature of the fort's contents, sent Captain Swayne, with a detachment of the 46th, to bring off Ensign Warren in safety to the cantonments. As they issued from the works, so deadly a fire was poured



upon them from Mahomed Shereef's fort and the party in the Shah Bagh, that they were compelled to return. Another attempt was made, for the same purpose, by a party of the 5th Light Cavalry, but with no better success.

In the meanwhile, it was represented to the General that the maintenance of the fort was of the utmost consequence; that, in fact, the very subsistence of the troops depended upon it, and if lost, the Commissariat officers had no prospect whatever, under existing circumstances, of being able to procure fresh supplies. The General, thus reminded of the importance of Ensign Warren's post, sent off orders to him to hold out to the last extremity, with an assurance that he should be reinforced as speedily as possible. In the meantime, a council of war was held as to what was best to be done. The Envoy urged, that unless Mahomed Shereef's fort was taken that night, it would be impossible to save the Commissariat fort from falling into the hands of the enemy. A spy was sent to reconnoitre the place, who represented, from all he could gather, that it was weakly guarded, and unable to resist a sudden and determined onset. The debate was recommenced, but time passed away without the General being able to make up his mind. After much proing and conning, Lieutenant Eyre, a most intelligent and brave young officer, who presided

over the artillery, was sent to Lieutenant Sturt, who was still suffering from his wounds, for his opinion. This was to the effect, that the attack should be deferred till morning, in consequence of the gate being watched by the enemy, who could prevent the placing of gunpowder bags to blow it in, thus rendering it necessary to employ the artillery for the purpose. Accordingly, early on the following day, preparations were made for storming the fort, and the troops were got under arms, and ready to march, when Ensign Warren, with his little party, arrived in cantonments, and the commissariat stores were all lost. He had held out until the gates of the fort were actually set fire to, and the enemy were upon the point of rushing in, when he led his men out through a hole in the wall, ready prepared for the last extremity. The conduct of this officer occasioned some animadversion, and he was called upon to explain his reasons for abandoning his post; but he did not receive Général Elphinstone's order to hold out till he received reinforcements, and none arriving, he was compelled to retreat. No blame is fairly attributable to him, but it lies heavy upon those who sent not to his succour.

The loss of this fort was an irrecoverable blow. The rest of the drama was one continued scene of disaster, relieved occasionally by individual

traits of heroism, but, upon the whole, detracting terribly from the glory which had hitherto attended the British arms in India.

No sooner did it become generally known among the troops that their supplies had fallen into the hands of the enemy, than the most determined wish was evinced to be led out for their recovery. The 37th, especially, burned with the greatest impatience to sally forth against the foe, whom they could see from the ramparts, carrying off their spoil.

Observing this favourable spirit among the troops, Lieutenant Eyre urged upon General Elphinstone a renewal of the attempt to capture Mahomed Shereef's fort, volunteering himself to clear the way for them with two guns. The attack was accordingly resolved on, and every preparation made, the storming party being placed under the direction of Major Swayne. For twenty minutes the artillery played away with spirit and effect; but the stormers failing to take advantage of the best opportunity for advancing, they were recalled by the General, who feared that the gun ammunition was running short. Upon the failure of this attempt, it was resolved to take the fort by regular breach and assault; and on the following day, the guns being got into position commenced a brisk cannonade, and a storming party, under Major Griffiths, rushed into the breach, overthrew

all before them, and speedily gained possession of the place. The enemy had, however, now been taught that we were not invincible, and a fierce and protracted conflict was maintained outside, in the gardens, and the neighbouring hills. In the course of this, a gallant hand-to-hand encounter took place between the Affghan cavalry and our own, headed by Anderson's horse; during which, Captain Anderson slew in single combat the brother-in-law of Abdoolah Khan, and the enemy were driven back with much loss. But any advantage we now gained, was attended by no permanent good result, and serious apprehensions began to take possession of the force respecting their means of procuring supplies. The enemy, too, evidently perceived that it was their best policy to starve us out, and our situation was becoming daily more perilous.

It was now the eighth day of the rebellion, and affairs had assumed a most gloomy aspect. To make matters worse, General Elphinstone's health, previously bad, suffered severely from his late anxieties and fatigues. He had applied some time before to be relieved from his arduous duties, to which he felt himself unequal, and was only waiting the arrival of his successor. He was growing almost hourly more incapacitated for the command, and at the Envoy's earnest wish Bri-

gadier Shelton was summoned from the Bala Hissar, to share his authority and assist him with his advice. It was hoped that this would give more decision and unity of purpose to our military counsels, and restore the sinking spirits of the troops ; but it had quite the contrary effect, for the Brigadier himself was one of the leading *croakers*. This officer was a man of acknowledged bravery, as was evinced upon many occasions ; but he had unfortunately resolved to listen to no plan which did not further a return to India. Personal courage is an attribute belonging to every soldier in the British army, and consequently is not so rare as to call for especial admiration, excepting when exhibited under extraordinary circumstances of peril. Something more was required now. Lamentable as had been the mistakes already committed, there was yet time to arrest our downward progress. What we wanted, was a man with the moral courage to look consequences in the face, and a high sense of duty, devoid of all personal considerations. Such attributes united to General Shelton's personal bravery might have retrieved us from disgrace ; but we looked in vain for such a leader.

The enemy were indefatigable in their attempts to annoy us, and the evil effects of the different forts in our neighbourhood, now became terribly

apparent. A large body of Ghiljies came down the Seeah Sung hills upon the 10th, took possession of all these forts on our eastern quarter, and commenced pouring a deadly fire into cantonments. One of them called the Rika-Bashee fort was especially troublesome, and it was resolved to attempt its capture, at Sir William MacNaghten's earnest solicitation, who took the responsibility of the movement upon himself. Captain Bellew, who was entrusted to blow open the gate, unfortunately missed it, and only blew down a small wicket, scarcely large enough to admit two or three men to enter at a time, and that only in a stooping posture. The signal, however, was sounded, and the storming party advanced, headed by Colonel Mackerell, who notwithstanding the heavy fire opposed to him, and the disadvantageous nature of the breach, forced his way in with Lieutenant Bird, and a few Europeans and Sepoys. The affrighted garrison fled upon their entrance, and escaped out of the opposite gate; but, in the meanwhile, a cry of "cavalry" having been raised outside, a panic seized our troops, and a general flight commenced.

It was now that Brigadier Shelton appeared to advantage. He stood firm and undaunted amidst the thickest of the enemy's fire, and earnestly exhorted the flying troops to return to their duty. At length, he succeeded in re-inspiring them with

confidence, and he led them on himself to the charge. Twice was this disgraceful scene repeated, twice did the Brigadier thus gallantly conduct himself, and at the third charge we became masters of the fort. But all this time the gallant little party inside were sustaining alone the whole brunt of the Affghan attack. The garrison, who had at first fled out at the opposite gate, encouraged by the reverse we had met with in front now returned, forced open the gate which Colonel Mackerell had fastened as securely as he could with a bayonet, and rushed in again. The unfortunate Mackerell was cut down, and almost hacked to pieces by the brutal Ghiljies, who are never satisfied with an 'enemy's fall, but even cut at the dead bodies of their foes with insatiate ferocity. Lieutenant Bird, with two Sepoys, concealed themselves in a stable, whence through a small opening they kept up a most destructive fire upon the Affghans as they appeared. At length they were discovered, and an attack commenced upon the door of their retreat, which, however, they succeeded in barricading, so as to prevent the entrance of their maddened assailants. By this time, one of the Sepoys had fallen, but still the brave Lieutenant and his companion poured in their rapid volleys upon the thronging foe, and when they were relieved by our troops, who had by this time got possession of the place, more

than thirty of the enemy were found to have fallen before this gallant pair. Our loss upon this occasion was severe, amounting to about two hundred killed and wounded; but in consequence of our success, the enemy allowed four of the neighbouring forts to fall into our hands. From these some supplies were procured, but it was found impossible to maintain permanent possession of them, as all the troops were necessary to man the cantonments.

Thus, even if a slight advantage was obtained, it could not be followed up, and the enemy observing this, even when driven back still hung about us, and immediately upon our retirement returned to the attack. The following day, the 13th, they re-appeared in great force upon the hills, and commenced a vigorous fire with two guns, upon the cantonments. But no preparations to resist them were made, till Sir William MacNaghten urgently requested that a detachment might be sent to dislodge them, and attempt the capture of their guns. This was done, and a severe action again ensued, in which the enemy behaved with the most determined bravery, charging on to the very bayonets of our infantry. We were, however, at length successful in capturing one of the guns and spiking the other, which from the cowardly conduct of the



men of the 44th, it was found impossible to bring off.

Whatever may have been the previous mistakes of the Envoy, it is certain that he was now the only person of influence possessing energy or courage at all adequate to the occasion. Nearly every action evincing spirit was undertaken at his suggestion, and even earnest solicitation, and only then, upon his consenting to take the responsibility upon himself. Brigadier Shelton, instead of being, as he had hoped, an assistance, was the chief opponent of his wishes, and their differences frequently ran high. The Envoy was resolved, at all hazards, to maintain his post, and avowed his determination to die there rather than quit it, even if the whole army forsook him, while the Brigadier obstinately shut his eyes to all chances of success, and thought of nothing but retreat. Before these pages will see the light, the inquiry into his conduct will be concluded, and the writer cannot be accused of a wish to prejudice his case. There is, therefore, no reason why the truth should not be told, and in fairness to others, it must not be concealed, that instead of contributing towards rescuing the force from its difficulties, his presence was a drag upon all enterprise. He frequently shrunk altogether from the responsibility of giving advice, and when he did not, his

counsel was of a damping, instead of an encouraging tendency. The consequences of all this upon the troops were fatal. Their spirits were broken, and they lost all confidence in themselves, and in their commander. We have seen that when he did lead them to the attack, he led them gallantly, but personal courage in the field but slightly counterbalanced the evils of despondency in the camp.

What could be expected from such a state of things, but disaster and disgrace?—and we found them.

## CHAPTER X.

LOSS OF CHAREKAR—FLIGHT OF MAJOR POTTINGER—  
INCAPACITY OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES AT  
CABOOL—MURDER OF THE ENVOY—REMARKS.

WHILE these events were transpiring at Cabool, our military station in Kohistan was exposed to even greater dangers. On the 3rd of November, a number of the Nijrow chiefs, under the pretence of aiding in preserving tranquillity, inveigled Major Pottinger, whose residence was at Sughmanee, into an interview, during which Lieutenant Rattray, his assistant, was treacherously murdered by their followers. This gave the signal for hostilities, and Major Pottinger's guard opened fire upon the assassins, and bravely defended themselves, till reinforced by Lieutenant Houghton, and a party of his Ghoorkas, from Charekar, the military station, about three miles distant. A sharp skirmish ensued, at the conclusion of which the enemy were driven back, and Captain Codrington, the commandant of the station, who happened at the time to be at Sughmanee, promised to send a further reinforcement the

next morning. This was accordingly attempted, but the Kohistanees mustered in such numbers, that in spite of the brilliant gallantry of Lieutenant Houghton, who commanded, and with a mere handful of his men, and one gun, protected the rear of the rest of his force from the enemy's cavalry, our troops were compelled to retire back on Charekar. Thither, also, Major Pottinger, unable to hold out longer, now resolved to retreat, which he did in safety, deserted, however, by all his Affghan followers, with the exception of the Heratees, and a few Peshawarees. The deserters had been much disgusted a short time previously, by the sudden reduction of a portion of the Major's escort, which led them to suppose that their dependance upon the British service was uncertain. Thus, at the very moment that we stood most in need of the good feeling of the natives, we were alienating them by ill-timed schemes of economy and retrenchment.

On the morning of the 5th, the enemy surrounded the barracks at Charekar in great numbers, and a desperate contest ensued in which Captain Codrington was killed. Day after day the courageous Pottinger, the same who covered himself with glory at Herat, maintained himself with his little party against the overwhelming

masses of the enemy. During the whole time, they suffered terribly from thirst, and on the 10th the officers drew their last pool of water, serving out half a wine glass to each fighting man. This wretched state of things continued until the 13th, when all hope of relief from Cabool, for which Major Pottinger had repeatedly written, being given up, it was thought best, as the only chance of saving any of the force, to attempt a retreat towards that city. This was a task of great difficulty from the disorganized state into which the men had fallen, encumbered too as they were with their families, and after proceeding with them for some distance, finding few of them willing to proceed, and rendered unfit to command by exhaustion, from a severe wound he had received, the Major with Lieutenant Houghton resolved to push on alone to Cabool. The latter officer had also been desperately wounded in the neck and left arm, and had lost one of his hands in endeavouring to restrain some of the Punjaabee artillerymen from seducing their companions from their duty.

Having no guide, they got into many difficulties, and both men and horses were by this time almost incapable of further endurance, the latter had been ten days without water, previously to starting, and five days without food. Still the

gallant pair struggled forward on their cheerless way, in the day time seeking the protection of some friendly ravine and travelling only by night, suffering all the while from fatigue, hunger, thirst and the smarting of their wounds, so dreadfully, that they scarcely entertained a hope of being able to sustain their strength, till they should reach Cabool. On several occasions, they had almost yielded to despair, but their own internal energies kept them up, and in one instance poor Houghton having fallen off his horse, and being unable from weakness to rise, he declared his resolution of awaiting his fate where he lay. His generous companion refused to desert him, and both laid down to sleep. After an hour's rest, feeling their strength and spirits a little restored, they once more commenced their toilsome journey, and at length, on the 15th of November, arrived safely within cantonments, to the joy and surprise of all. To accomplish this, in consequence of having missed their way, they had actually had to pass the enemy's outposts, and answer their challenges, which they fortunately did without being discovered, and then through the very heart of the city of Cabool. This they also managed to do, relying upon the inhabitants being asleep at that hour, (3 o'clock A.M.); but had almost been taken by the picket between the city.

and cantonments, who discovered and pursued them. Desperation, however, lent them strength to urge their weary horses into a pace sufficient to distance their pursuers, who were on foot, and in a few minutes more they were safe!

After the engagement of the 13th, the force in cantonment passed several days unmolested by the enemy, but so extensive and ill-contrived were the works, that from the constant toil of protecting them, the men enjoyed no repose, although unharassed by opposition from without. Winter too, was now approaching with rapid strides, and threatened to encrease ten-fold the severity of their sufferings. These considerations forced upon the attention of many the feasibility of quitting our entrenched position, and occupying the Bala Hissar. The Envoy himself was greatly in favour of this project, and notwithstanding the many objections which were urged against it, it was, perhaps, the best that could have been adopted; but General Shelton opposed it from the first, and it was given up as impracticable.

We had for some time obtained our supplies from the village of Beymaroo, which commanded part of the works; but the enemy now assembled there daily, preventing the approach of our foraging parties, and continuing to annoy us. It was, therefore, resolved to attempt its capture, and

preparations were accordingly made. This was the most disastrous of all our affairs with the enemy, and may almost be said to have sealed the ruin of the force. A series of lamentable errors was committed, which ended in the total discomfiture of our troops, who, unable to stand against the immense masses of the enemy, were driven back into cantonments with fearful slaughter, the infuriated Ghiljies almost entering with them.

Encouraged by their success into a belief that we should probably be glad now to avail ourselves of any opportunity of escaping from their country, the insurgent chiefs addressed a communication to Sir William MacNaghten, expressing their desire to enter into negotiations for peace. To these overtures the Envoy returned a favourable reply; but upon their terms coming to be made known, they were found to be of so dishonourable a nature, that they were rejected with disdain. A few days afterwards, hostilities were renewed, and a furious attack was made by the enemy on the Bala Hissar, but it was foiled, and they were compelled to retreat with considerable slaughter. They next turned their attention to the fort of Mahomed Shereef, which they endeavoured to take by blowing open the gate with powder bags; but in this they were also unsuccessful. Its garrison was then reinforced by one company of H.M.'s



44th, and one of the 37th Native Infantry; but the former, whose general bad conduct in connexion with these events, has covered the regiment with disgrace, impregnated the rest with their cowardice, and the fort was evacuated upon the first alarm, and allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy.

The situation of the force was now desperate. Provisions were running short, with little prospect of obtaining more, and starvation stared us in the face. Intelligence had been received some time before from General Sale, which totally destroyed all expectation of assistance from that quarter, and the advanced period of the season almost precluded every hope of relief from General Nott. The mind of the unfortunate Envoy was harassed by the reflections the sudden overthrow of all his schemes of policy called up, and still more by the incapacity and irresolution of the military leaders. The troops too, were becoming more and more disorganised every day. All was confusion, uncertainty and dismay.

At length, on the 11th of December, the rebel chiefs having again manifested a disposition to negotiate, Sir William MacNaughten, accompanied by Captains Lawrence, M'Kenzie, and Trevor, went out to meet them on the plain towards Seah Sung. The terms of the treaty were

discussed and acceded to by all the chiefs, after some slight opposition on the part of Akbar Khan, and were to the following effect :

That the English should evacuate Affghanistan, including Candahar, Ghuznee, Cabool, Jellalabad, and all the other stations absolutely within the limits of the country so called ; that they should be permitted to return, not only unmolested to India, but, that supplies of every description should be afforded them on their road thither, certain men of consequence accompanying them as hostages ; that the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, his family, and every Affghan now in exile for every political offence, should be allowed to return to their country ; that Shah Shoojah and his family should be allowed the option of remaining at Cabool, or proceeding with the British troops to Loodiana, in either case receiving from the Affghan government a pension of one lac of rupees per annum ; that means of transport for the conveyance of our baggage, stores, &c., including that required by the royal family, in case of their adopting the latter alternative, should be furnished by the existing Affghan government ; that an amnesty should be granted to all those who had made themselves obnoxious on account of their attachment to Shah Shoojah and his allies, the British ; that all prisoners should be released ;

that no British force should be ever again sent into Affghanistan, unless called for by the Affghan government, between whom and the British nation perpetual friendship should be established, on the sure foundation of mutual good offices.

During the conference, large bodies of Affghans had issued from the city, and were surrounding the scene, and many circumstances occurred to give rise to a suspicion of treachery. All past off quietly, however, except a single shot being sent flying over the heads of some of the gentlemen of the Envoy's escort; but it was afterwards ascertained that Akbar Khan had actually intended upon this occasion to seize Sir William's person, and carry him a prisoner to Cabool, and would have made the attempt had he not been restrained by the other chiefs.

The first step taken in fulfilment of the conditions of the treaty, was the evacuation of the Bala Hissar, and accordingly the troops were withdrawn from that fortress and received into cantonments. This was not accomplished without further evidences of treachery on the part of Akbar Khan, who attempted to gain an entrance into the Bala Hissar, but his object was frustrated by the vigilance of its inmates. Our troops were also assailed in their progress by some of the fanatic Ghazees, who hung about in great

numbers, but Akbar himself assisted in repelling these.

Retreat was now of course fully decided upon ; but the Affghan chiefs appeared by no means ready to perform their part of the agreement. They had made another proposition to the effect that Shah Shoojah should continue King, on condition of his giving his daughters to some of them in marriage. This was at first agreed to by the Shah, but afterwards his consent was withdrawn, and the treaty resumed its original form ; but the chiefs obstinately refused to furnish us with any supplies, until, as a further proof of our sincerity, we should put them in possession of all the forts in the neighbourhood of the cantonment.

At this time the troops were driven to extremities for the want of provisions and forage. The camp followers had no other food than the flesh of the dead animals who perished daily, from cold and starvation, having nothing to subsist on, but the bark of trees, and even their own dung, which was regularly collected, and spread before them. A small portion of grain still remained in store for the fighting men ; but in two days more, this also would be exhausted. Under such circumstances, it was thought best to accede to the demands of the Affghan chiefs, and the forts in question were delivered over to them,

the British leaders not reflecting that every gratified request only increased the disposition of this perfidious people to grasp at more. When this was done, a few supplies were sent in, with promises of more, but, as might have been expected, fresh demands were made, and they now insisted upon our resigning a portion of our arms and ammunition; Brigadier Shelton was also required as an hostage.

Our situation was now indeed humiliating, compelled to listen to, and still worse, to submit to, the disgraceful propositions of these barbarians. One spirited suggestion was however made, but only made to be rejected. The gallant and unfortunate Lieutenant Sturt, who was afterwards killed in the retreat, a worthy son-in-law of the heroic Sale, we might add, of his heroic lady, indignant at the dishonour heaped upon the English name, proposed to break off all further communication with the treacherous foe, and fight our way to Jellalabad; but there was something too startlingly energetic in this proposal for our feeble-minded leaders, and it was accordingly rejected. The Affghan terms were again acceded to, two hostages (Captains Conolly and Airey), out of the four demanded, were given up, and a selection of military stores of their own choosing. Brigadier

Shelton having a very strong, and certainly, not unnatural objection, to put himself in their power, the chiefs did not press that point.

But the darkest and foulest catastrophe of the whole war was now preparing. These insidious people, not yet contented with the terms they had obtained from us, formed a plot for securing the person of the Envoy, to whom, as a prisoner, they hoped to dictate what conditions they pleased. Accordingly, a communication of pretended secrecy was made by Akbar Khan, to Sir William MacNaghten, in which it was proposed to abandon the former treaty, and enter into a new one between themselves, upon the following basis. Amenoolah Khan, the most influential of the rebel chiefs was to be seized on, the following day, and delivered up as a prisoner. Mahomed Khan's fort, and the Bala Hissar were to be immediately occupied by our troops, who were to remain in their present position until the ensuing spring; and Shah Shoojah was to continue King, with Akbar Khan as his minister.

Propositions so favourable might have led the Envoy to suspect an intention of treachery, especially from his correspondent's notorious possession of that quality; but this, perhaps, misled him, as, aware of the faithless character of the men he had to deal with, he knew that they

would betray each other without remorse, if by such means, they could but secure an advantage to themselves. It must be confessed, that in acting upon such views, Sir William MacNaghten himself was not setting an example of good faith, and there is something humiliating in the reflection, that the representative of Great Britain should have perished in an attempt to over-match a half-barbarous nation, with their own weapons of cunning and deceit. Let it not, however, be supposed that nothing can be said in defence of his conduct. The intense anxiety to which his mind had been a prey for several weeks, the consciousness that he was greatly responsible for the welfare of the thousands of his fellow-creatures shut up in the cantonments, and for whom he foresaw scarcely any other prospect than death; perceiving, too, that notwithstanding our readiness in complying with the stipulations of the first treaty, the enemy were treacherously bent on not fulfilling their part of it, and which might, in fact, be said to release us from our engagements; knowing, also, the utter incapacity of the military heads, who had formally announced their inability to do anything more, and who, if they had displayed but one tithe of the energy and disposition to make the best of things, exhibited by him, he would never have been placed in a situation in-

ducing him to act as he did—all these considerations prompted the well-nigh distracted Envoy to catch eagerly at any, even the slightest chance which offered, of extricating himself and the army from their perilous situation, and he fell into the snare thus subtly laid for him by the traitorous Akbar.

It had been arranged that a conference should take place between them, on the plain towards Seeah Sung, and on the fatal 23rd of December, about noon, Sir William MacNaghten, attended by Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie, left cantonments to attend it. Previously to his departure, he had requested the General to have a strong party of troops, and two guns in readiness for secret service, and the walls strongly manned also, as the interview would be of a critical nature. This, however, like every other useful or spirited measure, was left unexecuted; and Sir William, as he quitted the works, expressed his chagrin at this fresh proof of inertness on the part of the military authorities.

The Envoy had, as yet, communicated to no one the important nature of the business he was engaged in; but as he rode towards the place of meeting, he mentioned to his companions the object of the conference. It was remarked to him that the scheme seemed a dangerous one,



and that there was great reason to apprehend treachery.

“Dangerous it is,” he replied, “but, if it succeeds, it is worth all risks; the rebels have not fulfilled even one article of the treaty, and I have no confidence in them. If by it we can only save our honour, all will be well; at any rate, I would rather suffer an hundred deaths, than live the last six weeks over again.”

The British party now approached the scene, attended by a few of Sir William's body-guards, and were soon met by Mahomed Akbar Khan, Mahomed Shah Khan, Dost Mahomed Khan, Ghiljie, Khooda Bux Khan, Azad Khan, and the other chiefs of the party. After the usual interchange of civilities, the Envoy presented Akbar Khan with an Arab horse of great beauty, which had been purchased for him that morning for three thousand rupees. The whole party then sat down upon a small hillock to commence the conference. Meanwhile a number of armed Affghans were observed gradually closing round them, which was not calculated to allay their suspicions, but upon attention being drawn to the circumstance by Captain Lawrence, Mahomed Akbar remarked that, “It was no matter, they were all in the secret.” Scarcely had the traitor uttered the words, when every thing being ready for his

purpose, he again called out "Begeer! Begeer!" (seize! seize!) and Sir William MacNaghten and his three companions were suddenly pinioned from behind and deprived of their arms. Akbar Khan himself and Sultan Jan seized the poor Envoy and dragged him in a stooping position down the hillock, the only words he uttered, being, "Az barac Khooda!" (for God's sake!) while a mingled expression of horror and astonishment was depicted on his countenance. He struggled, however, to free himself from the grasp of his assailants, when the ferocious Akbar losing all patience, discharged his double-barrelled pistol into the body of his victim, who had only presented his murderer with the weapon the previous day, and immediately afterwards he was cut to pieces by a band of inhuman Ghuzees.

Meanwhile Captains Lawrence, Trevor, and Mackenzie were dragged violently along, compelled to mount on horseback, each behind a Ghiljie chief, and hurried away in the direction of Mahomed Khan's fort. In their progress, it was difficult for their captors to preserve them from the fury of the savage populace, who rushed after them, calling loudly for their blood and aiming at them desperate blows with their long sharp knives. Poor Trevor, who by some accident, lost his seat

and fell to the ground, was instantly cut to pieces. Mackenzie narrowly missed a similar fate, just as he reached the fort, a desperate ruffian having made a furious cut at him; but Mahomed Shah Khan behind whom he rode, warded off the blow, receiving it upon his own shoulder. Upon arriving within the fort, they were placed in a small room, but even here they were in great danger, for it was with the greatest difficulty the chiefs, who certainly did all they could to protect their prisoners, were enabled to restrain the fanatical ruffians who longed for their blood, from shooting at them through the window. At midnight they were removed to Cabool, to the house of Mahomed Akbar Khan. Thus ended this day of horrors.

But while these scenes of terror were being enacted without, what were they doing within cantonments? As usual—nothing! The hapless Envoy's escort infected with the cowardice which seemed to have spread throughout the force, tainting both the leaders and their men, had galloped hastily back to cover, upon the first appearance of danger, and announced that their chief had been captured. In spite of appearances to the contrary, it was assumed that this might have been done with a friendly intent. Shortly afterwards, a dead body, plainly an European one, was observed upon the plain where the conference

had taken place, and a party of Affghans gathered round, engaged in plundering it. A few cavalry might easily have been sent to recover it and ascertain who it was, but still nothing was attempted. The troops were got under arms, and the ramparts were manned—that was all; and our leaders sat down, as if a feat of gigantic energy had been performed. It seemed, as if all within the walls had been struck with sudden paralysis. It is impossible to repress the honest indignation one cannot help feeling at this dastardly inactivity, while events were transpiring so imperatively calling for action. Why were not the preparations made which the unfortunate Envoy solicited, and the troops held in readiness for any service that might be required? Had they been so, and some indication made that we were prepared to meet any contemplated treachery, the catastrophe might perhaps have been prevented. But what could be expected from men who shielded themselves behind the vagueness of merely verbal orders, lest by giving them in writing, the responsibility might be traced home to them, should they turn out unsuccessful? This was not imbecility, nor incapacity, it was not alone gross moral cowardice, but it was a culpable neglect of duty, deserving of the severest reprehension, and it bore its natural fruits. One of these, was the cruel death of Sir

William MacNaghten ; and history will have to record that a British general at the head of an army of nearly five thousand disciplined troops, in a barbarous country, suffered a British Envoy to be murdered almost in his presence, without moving a step to save his life, or if that were too late, to avenge his death.

## CHAPTER XI.

RETREAT FROM CABOOL—DESTRUCTION OF THE BRITISH  
ARMY—OBSERVATIONS.

UPON the death of Sir William MacNaghten, Major Pottinger was requested, by General Elphinstone to assume the office of Political Agent; and unenviable as that situation now was, the gallant defender of Herat shrunk not from the duties it imposed. The negotiations entered into by the late Envoy were renewed, and three more clauses proposed by the Affghans. The first, that all the guns should be left behind, except six; secondly, that all our treasure should immediately be given up; thirdly, that the hostages should be exchanged for married men with their wives and families. The latter condition was rejected, Lieutenant Eyre being the only officer who consented, from a sense of public duty, to be one of them. Many of the others declared, that they would rather put their wives to death with their own hands, than commit them to the tender mercies of such treacherous monsters as the Affghans

had proved themselves to be. Captains Drummond, Walsh, Warburton and Webb were eventually accepted, and the treaty was signed.

At length, after many subterfuges and delays on the part of the chiefs, every thing was prepared for the retreat of our hapless army, and on the 6<sup>th</sup> of January, 1842, their fatal progress commenced. The force at this time, amounted to about four thousand five hundred fighting men, and the camp followers to twelve thousand, exclusive of women and children. Scarcely had they moved out of the cantonments, when they were filled by vast numbers of infuriated Ghazees who rent the air with their exulting yells of triumph over the deserted stronghold of the Kafir Feringees. A scene of plunder and savage devastation ensued, as they spread themselves over the works, butchering such of our hapless people as they could lay hold of, and who had not yet moved out. The rear-guard unable to restrain them, was obliged in its own defence, to take up a position on the plains without, but the Affghans, who had hitherto been too much absorbed in the work of plunder, to take much notice of the troops, now began to man the lines we had lately occupied and pour in amongst our men a galling fire of juzails, in many instances with fatal effect.

At length the whole force got upon the road,

but it was impossible to preserve anything like order in their march, as the camp-followers pressed forward among the troops, and the whole became mingled in inextricable confusion. It was now night, but their progress was illuminated by the burning cantonments which the Affghans, having satiated themselves with plunder had afterwards set on fire. Never did an army commence a march with such gloomy prospects as did this devoted force. The weather had been daily increasing in severity for some time, and the snow was lying thickly upon the ground, and the cold was intense. The men had been kept on insufficient diet throughout the siege, which had grown gradually less, and they were worn out and half-starved; the cattle were in a still worse condition. As they toiled laboriously along upon their dreary way, their trail was marked by numbers of the poor, exhausted sepoy, and camp-followers, who sunk numbed and frozen upon the ground, and perished in the snow. Night only added to their horrors, and many laid down to sleep upon the cold earth who never rose again, while their surviving companions set forth upon their day's march, wondering if it would be their turn next.

Upon the second day of their march, a number of Affghans were seen clustering upon the



heights, and an attack was made upon the rear-guard, which consisted of the 44th, and a squadron of irregular horse, with two guns, under Brigadier Anquetil. A short and severe struggle ensued, in which the two guns were unfortunately abandoned, and the Affghan Horse charged down into the very midst of the baggage column, carrying off large quantities of plunder. Numbers of our men fell from wounds, but many more from sheer exhaustion, produced by cold, hunger, and fatigue. Two more of the guns were shortly afterwards abandoned, the horses being found utterly incapable of dragging them further through the snow. The General, who, with the advance had reached Bootkhak, was now informed that the rear was in much danger, and he sent a detachment to their assistance under Brigadier Shelton, who immediately scaled the nearest heights, drove the enemy back, and kept them in check for upwards of an hour. Meanwhile, it had been ascertained that Akbar Khan was in their neighbourhood, and Captain Skinner, upon making his appearance before him, was told that our troops had been attacked in consequence of their having marched contrary to the wishes of the chiefs. He was, however, sent to escort us in safety to Jellalabad; but insisted that the force should halt at Tezeen, until General Sale had

evacuated the first-named place, for which an order had already been sent, in fulfilment of the terms of the treaty.

These conditions were agreed to, and the troops halted at the entrance of the Choord-Cabool Pass, where they passed another night of horror. But all confidence in the promises of the Affghans was now at an end, and it was with no great surprise, although with much disgust at their persevering treachery, that the force beheld them on the following morning drawn up for an attack. They had begun to pour in their fire upon the camp, when Major Thain putting himself at the head of the 44th, and calling on the men to follow him, rushed forward to disperse them, which was speedily accomplished. Captain Skinner again sought an interview with Mahomed Akbar, and remonstrated against this faithlessness on the part of his followers, upon which the wily chief demanded, that Major Pottinger, and Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie should further be delivered up to him as hostages. This was assented to as readily as all his other outrageous requests, and hostilities again ceased for a time.

The toil-worn troops now proceeded to thread the dangerous defiles of the Choord-Cabool Pass. As they advanced towards a part of the valley where it gradually narrowed, they

observed the precipitous heights above them crowned with masses of the enemy, who commenced a hot fire upon them as they came up.

The ladies who rode with the advance-guard were here in great danger; but seeing that their only chance was to keep themselves in rapid motion, they galloped forward at the head of the whole force, while the bullets whistled around them, and stopped not until they had escaped from the jaws of the pass. Lady Sale, alone of the whole, was wounded, and that only slightly in the arm. The troops were less fortunate. The Ghiljie fire took terrible effect amidst their ranks; the deadly effect of the long juzail was apparent in the numbers that fell, and terrified by the slaughter they beheld, the whole mass of soldiers, camp-followers, women and children, scrambled forward regardless of every consideration but their lives. The rear-guard fared no better; and finding that their only safety consisted in speed, they hurried forward in the same manner to the front. Another horse-artillery gun was abandoned here, and all its artillerymen slain. Upwards of three thousand souls perished in this fatal pass, amongst whom, the gallant Sturt received his death-wound. After passing through the thickest of the fire, and reaching a place of comparative security, he saw Major Thain's horse riderless,

and struggling in the agonies of death, the poor animal having received a shot in the loins. Supposing his master wounded, or in danger, Lieutenant Sturt galloped back to render him assistance, if not too late, when his own horse was shot under him, and before he could rise, he himself received a frightful wound in the abdomen, which stretched him beside his dying steed. Here he would have been left to be hacked to pieces by the merciless Ghazees, if Lieutenant Mein, of the 13th, had not run back to his aid, and with generous gallantry, stood over his fallen friend for several minutes, at the imminent risk of his own life, imploring assistance from each passer-by. He, at length, found a coadjutor in his benevolent task, in Serjeant Deane, of the Sappers, with whose help he conveyed the wounded Sturt, in a quilt through the remainder of the pass.

It is such acts as this, of individual heroism and self-denial, which throw a brightness over these scenes of horror, and which, indeed, these scenes alone give rise to. Were it otherwise, the sickening details of war would not bear contemplation. The dying officer was laid upon a bank, between his poor distracted wife, whose delicate situation at the time makes one's heart shudder at the loss she sustained in him, and his wounded mother-in-law, Lady Sale. His wound

was then dressed by Dr. Price, but all medical skill was vain; he lingered only till the following morning, when he died; and it may have been some alleviation to the grief of those he left behind, that they were enabled to give him Christian burial, the only one of the thousands who perished on this fearful march who received it.

On the force reaching Choord-Cabool, the snow began to descend heavily. Only four small tents were saved; of which, one belonged to the General, two were set apart for the ladies and children, and one was devoted to the use of the sick. But this could accommodate but a few, and numbers of poor wounded wretches wandered shelterless about during the night, till they fell down to perish in the snow. Death, indeed, was a release, and many of the wretched survivors as they set out upon their morning's march, gazed upon the stiffened and snow-covered corpses which marked the place of encampment, with feelings of envy for their happier fate. Never was an army exposed to more fearful sufferings. Not that of the celebrated "ten thousand"—no! nor even that which perished in the fearful retreat from Russia. These both appal from their length of endurance, and the latter from its magnitude; but for the time they lasted, the miseries of the Cabool force were equal. They had now ascended

into a still keener climate, and were without shelter, fuel, or food. Such was the intense severity of the cold, that the breath, as it issued from their mouths, congealed, and hung in icicles upon their beards. The earth was enveloped in a thick covering of snow, and save when broken by the rattling thunder of the artillery, and the noise of conflict, a death-like stillness pervaded the atmosphere, as though nature's self was numbed and frozen. Still the miserable soldiers dragged along their enfeebled limbs, till brought to the ground by the enemy's guns, or by the snow collecting round their own, or their horses' feet, in such a manner as to make them stumble and fall. To attempt rising again was hopeless; equally hopeless were their groans and cries of distress. Their companions were struggling for their own preservation. Even their weapons were an almost insupportable weight to some, and many had their fingers frozen on the muskets they still grasped.

Such was a portion of the horrors to which this doomed force was subjected; in estimating which, it should be remembered that the large majority were natives of a hot southern climate; but language is feeble to describe all the sufferings they underwent. Were it not so, the written descriptions could not be borne, and the world would rise *en masse* to check the cruelty

and ambition of man which occasions the enactment of such scenes.

Having passed the night at Choord-Cabool, when morning came the troops once more commenced their hopeless march. It was General Elphinstone's intention that they should commence moving at ten o'clock, but a number of the soldiers, and nearly the whole of the camp-followers set off without orders at eight, and were obliged to be recalled, in consequence of a communication from Akbar Khan, recommending the force to wait until he could make preparations for protecting their march. The order to halt was received with general dissatisfaction. Every one had had sufficient experience of the treacherous dealings of the foe to know that their only chance of escape lay in moving forward as fast as possible; and so disgusted were the native soldiery by the delay, that they now, for the first time, began to think of deserting. This feeling first made its appearance among the Shah's native cavalry, who had hitherto behaved with the utmost fidelity, resisting every attempt made by the enemy to corrupt them; but the love of life at last overcame all other considerations; and it cannot much be wondered at, considering the desperate situation in which the force now was.

Akbar Khan's next proposition was that all the

widowed ladies and married families should be placed under his protection to preserve them from further hardship and danger; and Captain Skinner strenuously advised the General to accede to the proposal. Up to this time, scarcely one of the ladies had tasted food since their departure from Cabool. Some had infants only a few days old at the breast, and others were approaching their confinement. What they had undergone upon this fatal march has been seen, and every hour added to their difficulties and dangers. How, in fact, they were able to bear up as they did so long, is wonderful; and it is more than likely that most of them would have perished before they reached Jellalabad, even if any of the troops succeeded in doing so, which now appeared extremely problematical. Faithless, therefore, as the Affghan chief had proved himself, it seemed the least dangerous alternative of the two for the ladies to put themselves under his care. The General, accordingly, consented to the arrangement, and ordered the married officers and ladies to prepare for their immediate departure, who bidding their friends a long farewell joined the party of Affghan horse deputed to escort them, and were quickly out of sight. It was also intended that all the wounded officers should accompany them; but this not being



generally known, only two had time to do so, Captain Troup, and Lieutenant Mein, who went to protect Lady Sale. Akbar Khan's object was, doubtless, to get a number of prisoners into his hands, that he might hold the threat of taking their lives *in terrorem* over our heads, to prevent our revenging the massacre of our troops, which he was then contemplating; but his motive was not so apparent at the time, and it was thought best to make a display of confidence.

The force now resumed its miserable march, the soldiers and camp-followers mingled confusedly together, and each struggling eagerly forward to the front to escape the dangers of a rearward position. The Europeans were almost the only effective men left, the Hindoostanees having suffered dreadfully from the intolerable severity of the weather. Few of them were even able to carry their arms, and to use them with effect was wholly beyond their power. The whole were sunk in a state of hopeless despondency, and terror and despair were stamped in every line of their haggard countenances.

The advanced guard of this miserable remnant of the Army of the Indus consisted of H.M.'s 44th foot, mustering now about one hundred men, about fifty troopers of the 5th cavalry, and the only remaining gun. After marching some

distance without being molested, they came to a narrow gorge of the pass, upon the rocks commanding which, had assembled a large body of Ghiljies to oppose their progress. As they approached within shot, the enemy with their long, far-reaching juzails, poured in a tremendous fire, every bullet of which seemed to take effect. The men fell like grass beneath the mower's scythe, and the Pass was literally choked up with the bodies of the dying and the dead. The unfortunate Sepoys, unable to defend themselves, flung down their useless muskets, and feeble as they were, attempted, along with the camp-followers, to escape, which the Affghans observing, rushed down the heights, sword in hand, and cut them up most mercilessly. This fatal conflict, if conflict that can be called where the fighting was all on one side, completed the destruction of the Native Infantry regiments; nearly the whole of the main and rear columns were cut off, and all that remained of the force that quitted Cabool, four thousand five hundred strong, were about fifty horse artillerymen, with one gun, seventy files of the 44th, and one hundred and fifty cavalry troopers. The camp-followers, however, in spite of the slaughter that had taken place amongst them, still constituted a considerable body.

They had now reached Kubbur-i-Jubbar, where they halted; but observing a party of Affghan horse approaching, poor General Elphinstone drew up his little force in line, in expectation of an attack; and bitter, indeed, must have been his feelings as he surveyed it, to note the frightful havoc a few short days had sufficed to bring about. It was, however, discovered to be Akbar Khan and his followers; and Captain Skinner was sent to remonstrate with him for the treacherous attack which had been made on our troops, in defiance of the treaty.

In reply, he pretended to regret that we should have been molested, but said that he had found it imposible to restrain the Ghiljies, whom nothing could prevent from indulging their animosity against the Feringees. He then recommended that the remaining troops should resign their arms, and place themselves under his protection, in which case he would guarantee them a safe arrival at Jellalabad, but that the camp-followers must be left to their fate. To these terms the General felt that it would be disgraceful to assent, and the desperate march was resumed.

After journeying a few miles unmolested, they came to the Huft Kotul, a steep and dangerous defile, and a ghastly spectacle here presented

itself. A number of the camp-followers, with whom were several of the wounded officers, had preceded the rest of the force. Upon reaching the foot of the hill, they had been assailed by a party of the enemy, and all massacred. Their bleeding bodies now lay in the path of their companions, and the remorseless foe crowned the heights in readiness for their next victims. As the troops pursued their way down the defile, they poured in a destructive fire upon them, and fresh numbers of dead and wounded were added to those already covering the ground. Here Brigadier Shelton again gave evidence of his unflinching personal courage when in presence of the enemy, and with a few of the Europeans still capable of action, he kept the Ghiljie masses at bay till the whole force had cleared the pass. The miserable remnant reached Tezeen shortly afterwards, where they halted; having lost during the march from Cabool, upwards of twelve thousand men, including camp-followers.

In spite of its proved uselessness, another attempt was now made at negotiation, and Captain Skinner was again despatched to Akbar Khan for the purpose; but that insidious chief merely proffered the same terms as before, which were, of course, as then, rejected. All dependence, therefore, upon him being at an end, it was

resolved to push on at once, under cover of the darkness, to Jugdulluk, a distance of twenty-two miles, word having been previously sent to Mahomed Akbar that it was the General's intention to move only as far as Seh Baba, seven miles in advance of their present position. On moving off, the last gun was abandoned, and poor Dr. Cardew, who had been lashed to it in the hope of saving him, was left to his fate. Dr. Duff, the superintending surgeon, fared no better, having dropped down in a state of utter exhaustion upon the road shortly after the re-commencement of the march. Upon reaching Seh Baba, which they did without resistance, they again encountered the opposition of the mountain-tribes; at Burik-ab, also, a little further on, a heavy fire was poured in upon them from some caves by the road-side; and by the time they arrived at Kutter-Sung, still ten miles from Jugdulluk, which they did at 8 A.M. on the 11th, the enemy had begun to crown the surrounding heights in large numbers.

Everything now seemed to portend the entire destruction of the little force. The neighbouring hills were literally alive with Ghiljies; every peak had its cluster of marksmen, who sent in volley after volley with terrific effect, and the whole route to Jugdulluk was one continued conflict.

Prodigies of valour were performed by our hapless troops and their officers, whom desperation seemed to inspire with renewed energy, worn and faint as they were, but still nothing could avail them against the deadly fire of the foe, and man after man fell, till the road was lined with bleeding carcasses. At length, about 3 P.M. the skeleton of the advance reached Jugdulluk, and took up a position behind some ruined walls, upon the summit of a hill by the road-side. From this eminence they cheered their comrades in the rear, who with Brigadier Shelton at their head, continued obstinately to contest every inch of the ground, although against overwhelming numbers, until they won their way up to the advance.

The pangs of thirst were now added to the other distresses of the force, and their parched tongues clave to their mouths for want of a little water. Many sought to cool their burning throats by swallowing handfuls of snow, which they eagerly clutched from the ground, but this only enhanced instead of alleviating their sufferings. For food, they fared somewhat better, and the raw flesh of three bullocks, which had fortunately been saved, being served out to the soldiers, was ravenously devoured.

Another attempt was now made by Akbar Khan to enveigle the British General into his

power, and this time with success. He sent to him, earnestly desiring his presence at a conference, and demanding Brigadier Shelton and Captain Johnson as hostages for the evacuation of Jellalabad. His insidious purpose was evidently to rob the little force of its chiefs, the more securely to effect its destruction. General Elphinstone, anxious to do anything which offered the least chance of saving his few remaining men, consented to the arrangement, and temporary command was made over to Brigadier Anquetil. But Akbar's scheme was soon apparent; the General, on wishing to return to his troops, was put off with vexatious delays, until it was ascertained that they, impatient of further detention, and alarmed by the deliberate murder of Captain Skinner, who was shot in the face by a Ghiljie, while riding over towards Mahomed Akbar's camp, had actually recommenced their march.

Upon the departure of their leaders, the deepest despondency pervaded the whole force. They felt convinced they should never see their General again, and that his invitation to the conference was but another scheme of their treacherous foes to lull them with fresh hopes of security preparatory to effecting their destruction. The miseries of their situation increased momentarily; many of them were suffering from wounds, and all alike

were enduring the extremes of hunger, thirst, and fatigue. The first day passed, and the second, both in cruel suspense, during the whole of which, the Affghans kept up a galling fire upon them from the neighbouring heights. Still their General came not. Sally after sally was made by the little handful now remaining of the 44th, but as fast as the enemy were driven back, they returned again to the attack. Night came again with its attendant horrors, and deeming all further stay now useless, the despairing troops quitted their position, and resolved, at all risks, to pursue their way to Jellalabad. The sick and wounded were necessarily abandoned to their fate.

As they toiled wearily along the Jugdulluk valley, the remorseless Ghiljies still pursued them with their fire, and masses of them were observed hastening forward to block up the pass. This formidable defile is about two miles long, very narrow, and walled in by lofty and precipitous rocks. The wretched soldiers continued their way, returning the enemy's fire as well as they were able, when suddenly they found their progress obstructed by strong barriers, formed of bushes and branches of trees intertwined, and stretching completely across the defile. This was disheartening enough, and the men set to work to clear themselves a passage ; but in the mean-



while, the Ghiljies were gathering around in great numbers, and now poured in a withering fire upon them from all quarters. The soldiers and camp-followers were crowded thickly together at the barrier; the slaughter amongst them was terrific. The mountaineers, after discharging their juzails, rushed in amongst the bewildered mass, knife in hand, and a complete massacre ensued, Brigadier Anquetil and eleven other officers were slain on this bloody occasion. About forty others pushed their way through with a miserable remnant of the troops, who hurried on as well as they were able towards Gundamuck, their rear still harassed by the enemy. On reaching the Sourkhab river they found their progress again opposed by the foe, who had taken possession of the bridge, and they had to ford the stream under a heavy fire, by which many of them were killed.

The morning of the fatal 13th, had now dawned, and they were approaching Gundamuck, while the enemy beheld with returning day-light the utter insignificance of their numbers. At this time, the whole Cabool force comprised only twenty officers, some fifty men of the 44th, half a dozen artillery-men, and about as many sepoy. Amongst these but twenty muskets could be mustered. The enemy emboldened by their weakness now assailed them with increased fury,

and the hunted little band were obliged to quit the road, and take up a position on an adjoining hill where they resolved to stand firm, and sell their lives as dearly as they could. Here one more attempt was made to put an end to hostilities, and Lieutenant Hay having communicated with a party of Affghan horsemen, Major Griffiths proceeded to a conference with the chief.

A number of the Affghans soon ascended the hill, and entered into friendly communication with the British party; but the truce was of short continuance. Our soldiers, enraged by some attempts of the insidious ruffians to gain possession of their arms, made a vigorous charge, and drove them fiercely down the height. This was the signal for their destruction, and the death struggle commenced. The enemy stationed themselves upon the surrounding hills, and poured in volley after volley with deadly effect, while bands of them below rushed up to complete the work of slaughter. Several times did they attempt this, but were as often driven back by the frantic bravery of our men, who seemed inspired with almost superhuman energy. Officers and privates fought like lions. Captain Hamilton, who was suffering so severely from two wounds received at Jugdulluk as scarcely to be able to sit his horse, behaved with remarkable gallantry, and slew five of the

enemy with his own hand before he was cut down ; while all that the most desperate valour could do, to redeem the lost credit of the 44th, was done by the last sad remnant of that hapless regiment on this fatal day. But nothing could avail against the overpowering numbers of the Affghans, and when the heroic little band was reduced to about thirty, the enemy rushed in upon them, bore them down at the point of the knife, and slaughtered the whole party, except Captain Souter, and a few privates who were made prisoners.

After the conflict at Jugdulluk, about a dozen of the officers, better mounted than their companions, had pushed on in advance of the rest, intending to make the best of their way to Jellalabad. Six of these, Captains Bellew, Collier, Hopkins, Lieutenant Bird, Drs. Harper and Brydon, arrived at Futteabad in safety, the others had fallen off on the road, and been cut up by straggling parties of the enemy. Deceived by the friendly professions of the people, the six officers above mentioned, halted near Futteabad, to allay the cravings of hunger, which gave the inhabitants time to arm and sally forth upon them. Captain Bellew, and Lieutenant Bird, were shot down directly ; Captains Collier and Hopkins, and Drs. Harper and Brydon, rode off at their utmost speed, but worn out as themselves and their

animals were, they could make but little head. They were pursued, and the three former overtaken and slain a few miles from Jellalabad, but Dr. Brydon contrived to evade his pursuers and at length reached that town in safety.

Such was the miserable fate of the British army stationed at Cabool; an event which viewed under all its aspects, and in connexion with the circumstances which led to it, cannot but be regarded as perhaps the most disastrous and disgraceful recorded in our military annals. No wonder that the melancholy catastrophe should have created so profound a sensation in England, and roused the people to an interest in Indian affairs, unparalleled since the commencement of our connexion with Hindoostan. No wonder either that this feeling should have been taken advantage of, both here and in England, to bring into disrepute the original policy of the Affghan war, by representing as its natural result, the calamities which subsequently befel our troops. Such a mode of argument, however, is most inconsequential, and the interests both of truth and sound policy demand that results of such magnitude and importance should be traced up to their real causes in order to avoid, in future, the mistakes that may have been committed, and that praise or censure, may be apportioned according to desert.

Let the policy which dictated the Affghan war have been the most profound, and based upon principles the most undeniable, unless the co-operation of the inferior instruments employed in carrying it out was effectually given, success might of course be doubtful. It is the lot of all human enterprises, unless in that confined sphere, when solely dependent for a successful issue upon the capacity of their designer, to require the assistance of subordinate agents, which, although the best that may offer, may yet be insufficient when an emergency arrives. Such appears to have been the case in the present instance. The force assembled at Cabool at the close of the year 1841, if not sufficient for offensive operations, or to meet all the exigencies which might arise, in case of a general outbreak, was, at least, under able guidance, adequate to the task of defending itself till the season should permit of its being reinforced. All our experience in Affghanistan goes to prove the impossibility of the natives, however strong in numbers, being able successfully to resist a tolerably numerous and compact body of our troops; this was made sufficiently obvious by Colonel Dennie's brilliant action at Bameean, and the subsequent victories of Generals Sale, Pollock, Nott, and others.

The deplorable reverses, therefore, which.

overwhelmed that devoted army can only be justly attributed to the gross incapacity of its directors. There were many officers in the force, not to mention those of superior grade, captains, and others of still inferior rank, who, could they have been suddenly elevated to the command, would have avoided the first errors, commencing with the fatal 2nd of November, or even after they were committed, could have rescued the troops from their false position, and conducted them safely through their difficulties. There was nothing extraordinarily perplexing in the circumstances attending their situation; no danger requiring the genius of a Napoleon, or the judgment of a Wellington to extricate them from. The exigency at first was comparatively clear and simple, although, doubtless, sudden and startling, and only required to be met with decision and promptitude; but these qualities none of our chiefs seemed to possess. If it may be taken as a general rule in life, that it is better in a doubtful case to act wrongly, than not to act at all, the axiom is especially true as regards military affairs, and this was an occasion of the kind. It was emphatically a case for action, not for the indulgence of long discussion; and one would have thought feeling alone would have decided it, without much aid from reflection, when they

beheld their fellow-countrymen murdered in cold blood before their eyes.

But the writer would not be thought in these remarks, to press hardly upon the unhappy General Elphinstone, who fell a victim to his own and others' misconduct, although a man's falling himself is a poor excuse for involving others in his descent. Unmitigated pity is the feeling with which he must be regarded; pity for his bodily ailments which unfitted him, as he well knew, for the command; pity for the anguish of mind which must have embittered his last days.

But men should not be deterred by a morbid fear of injuring the memory of the dead, or wounding the feelings of the living, from stating what they believe to be the truth, and distributing censure where they consider it to be due. One might be content to let a man's faults and follies be buried with him in the tomb, but it is not just that the burden of their responsibility should be transferred to living shoulders.

While however we pity the fate, and excuse the faults of General Elphinstone, it is impossible to regard with equal mildness the conduct of his second in command. Brigadier Shelton is a man of proved courage, was in vigorous health and years, and sufficiently qualified, one would

have thought, for the position he was called upon to occupy. But, unfortunately, he had from the first set his mind upon returning home, and strenuously opposed every plan that tended to retard his favourite object. Was any spirited enterprise proposed, it was coldly received and finally rejected, for the Brigadier knew that success would entail a prolonged stay in the country; and it is frequently asserted, that he was in the habit of sleeping, or pretending to be so, during the discussions of the council of war,\* that, in difficult cases, he might avoid the responsibility of giving his opinion. All the solicitations of Sir William MacNaghten, who alone of those in authority seemed to retain his presence of mind and English spirit, to pursue a more decided course, were treated with neglect, or only sluggishly and half-acted upon; while even the disgraceful treaty he was afterwards compelled to submit to, and in seeking to extricate himself from which he fell, was forced upon him by the imbecility of the military leaders, who urged him to come to terms.

But, independently of the conduct of the British chiefs present at the insurrection, great

\* The council of war consisted of General Elphinstone, Brigadier Shelton, Brigadier Anquetil, and Colonel Chambers, but was frequently enlarged by the admission of others.



blame attaches to those whose duty it was to provide against any outbreaks of the kind. The probability of such an event might easily have been foreseen among a hostile and but partially subdued people, remarkable for their nationality and love of freedom; and whether the supreme government, or its instruments, are chargeable with the neglect, the absence of proper measures of precaution to repress civil commotion, was deeply reprehensible.

Of all the errors, however, of this blundering period, the most fatal in its immediate consequences, was that by which the commissariat stores were left in an insecure position without the cantonments. The injudicious nature of this arrangement has been remarked on before, and is so manifest, that one is astonished that it should have taken place: and even when the miserable mistake might have been redeemed by a little timely exertion of vigour, our leaders were talking instead of acting, until the opportunity of doing so with effect had passed by, and the very means upon which the army depended for subsistence were irrecoverable. When Napoleon abandoned his stores and artillery at Mantua, to the astonishment of his enemies, who divined not his schemes, it mattered not. The French army felt there was that within them, and their unconquerable chief, that could gain them stores,

baggage, artillery, and all that they could require. But it was not so here. Had it been, terrible as had been the mismanagement, there was yet time to retrieve past errors. The troops in cantonments were eager for the contest, and might have been united with those in the Bala Hissar, when, by vigorous sallies upon the town and neighbourhood, they might have still secured themselves plentiful supplies. But there was no one to lead them—no one to direct them. Those who should have done so, were wasting the precious hours in miserable and futile debate upon what was best to be done, while events were accomplishing themselves; and although the officers, on whom devolved the direction of affairs, may not be chargeable with a want of personal bravery, their countrymen have a right to charge them with a gross deficiency of mental daring and resolution; they have a right to charge them with that cowardice as regarded results which led them to remain almost passive spectators of what was going on, lest in action they should commit themselves, and for this public opinion will hold them answerable.

## CHAPTER XII.

DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD—BRIGADIER WILD'S REPULSE  
IN THE KHYBER PASS—DEATH OF COLONEL DENNIE.

THE mind turns with delight from the contemplation of the events recorded in the preceding chapter, to the contrast afforded by the conduct of General Sale at Jellalabad. Placed in a situation of equal, or even greater peril than the Cabool force, this brave and resolute officer demonstrated, by his brilliant successes, what could be effected in circumstances of the utmost difficulty by the exercise of energy, ability, and determination; and was upholding the honour and glory of his country in the midst of the defeat and disgrace which every where else overwhelmed us.

It will be remembered that Sir Robert Sale reached Jellalabad with his brigade on the 12th of November. He found the walls of the city in such a state as might have justified a feeling of despair as to the possibility of defending them. Their extent was so great, embracing a circum

ference of upwards of two thousand three hundred yards, that his force was insufficient to man them effectively, and there was no parapet, excepting for a few hundred yards, and even there, only two feet high. Earth and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts, that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country, affording the greatest facilities to the approach of the enemy. At one part of the works there was a space of four hundred yards together, on which none of the garrison could show themselves, excepting at a particular spot; the population within was disaffected, and the town was surrounded on every side by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened on the defenders, at a distance of only twenty or thirty yards.

The first point to be attended to was the correction of this insecure state of things, and Captain Broadfoot was immediately ordered to make a general survey with a view to putting the town in an efficient state of defence. This, by the most unremitting labour on the part both of officers and men, was at length accomplished, not, however, without great opposition on the part of the enemy. On the very first day of our taking possession of the place, they assembled in great force to the southward and westward, while

masses moved down from the north, crossed the river, and closely invested the city. For twenty-four hours the Ghiljies, under cover of the gardens and old buildings, kept up an incessant fire on the working parties, but indifferently protected behind the rapidly advancing field-works. The range was short, and our men suffered severely. In addition to the galling opposition of the enemy, provisions were getting scarce, and disaffection spreading within the city. To obviate the danger to be apprehended from these sources, the women were first ordered to withdraw themselves; strangers and suspicious persons were next excluded, and finally, the whole male population, save the shopkeepers, were got rid of.

On the morning of Sunday the 14th, it was determined to dislodge the Ghiljies from their vantage-posts in our vicinity. For this purpose three hundred of her Majesty's 13th, three hundred of the 35th Native Infantry, one hundred sappers, three guns, the whole of the Cavalry, with two hundred of the Khyber Corps—about one thousand two hundred in all, were detached under Colonel Monteath. These sallied from the town, and immediately carried the walled garden in front of the southern gate, and the walled enclosure to the westward. The troops appointed for this duty having established themselves, a sortie was made from the southern gate

for the purpose of storming the heights in front, where the insurgents had assembled themselves in masses. Two hundred men from her Majesty's 13th and the 35th Native Infantry having been posted on the heights, the cavalry and artillery, with a nine-pounder gun under Captain Backhouse, stationed themselves in the plain to watch the movements of the enemy, once more collecting on the heights beyond. Colonel Monteath, at the same time, moved the rest of the troops and guns round to the right, for the purpose of driving off the insurgents, still occupying the northern and western faces of the town. A well-directed fire from the guns, under Lieutenant Dawes, dispersed them in every direction. The juzailchees sallying out of one of the gates, cut up great numbers of them. About three hundred janbazees, who had deserted at Gundamuk, seeing the hopeless state of matters, now descended from the hills, and made off in the direction of Cabool, being saluted on their retreat by some well-directed rounds from a gun under Captain Backhouse, within whose range they had imprudently come.

Meanwhile Captain Oldfield had been stationed with a party of cavalry, with directions, that as soon as he saw the infantry debouche upon the plain, he was to move forward as expeditiously

as possible and take the enemy in the rear. This movement was prevented by a change in the enemy's situations, and the cavalry had to maintain themselves against a heavy fire poured in upon their front and right. To check this, Captain Oldfield despatched a party of skirmishers to the front, and ordered the charge to be sounded, which soon dispersed the foe; then advancing himself to the South Mission Gate, where he again encountered a heavy fire, he drove their horse before him, dashed in amongst the foot, and cut them up right and left. In the course of the action he had a narrow escape from two Janbaz horsemen, who charged him simultaneously; but he bravely defended himself till two of his men came to his assistance. The enemy mustered upwards of five thousand, and the slaughter amongst them was considerable; while the number of our own troops employed did not exceed twelve hundred, and our loss in killed and wounded was under ninety.

So much discouraged were the enemy by this defeat, that for the next fortnight nothing serious was attempted against us; and the operations of the assailants were confined to attacks on the working parties. A desire to spare the scanty supplies of ammunition made the General bear these, until they began seriously to interrupt the

progress of the fortifications. On the 1st of December, accordingly, a column of six hundred Europeans and Native Infantry, with two guns, some sappers and juzailchees, and all the cavalry, rushed from the Cabool gate under command of Colonel Dennie, and diverging to the left, swept the space in front of the walls round to the rocky mounds on the main road to Cabool. A series of brilliant movements were now executed with great rapidity, and in uninterrupted succession. The troops were in the highest spirits, and an animating cheer burst from them as they found themselves beyond the walls. They were met by a heavy fire on the part of the insurgents, but nothing could withstand them and their impetuous leader, who broke into the enemy's strongholds, drove them from all their positions, and chased them across the plains. They were then hotly pursued to the river's bank and up the cliffs by the juzailchees and skirmishers of the 13th Light Infantry, Captain Abbot pushing his guns at the gallop to a point which commanded the stream, committing great havoc amongst the flying Affghans with his round shot and shrapnell. Many of them fell under his fire, as well as that of the infantry and irregulars ; many rushing into the river, and missing the ford in their consternation, got into deep water, and were swept away and



drowned. The cavalry, in the meantime, were doing excellent duty in the plains, everywhere vigorously charging the foe, while the sappers, by a sudden onset, surprised and dispersed, with much slaughter, another large body, moving apparently with the intention of attacking the southern front of the works.

The effect of this victory was electrical. The insurgents not only fled from the nearer forts, but retired from those of the whole line of the Char Bagh, and only rallied at Umr Khail, at the cautious distance of twelve miles from the ramparts. At first, the troops had to labour in clearing out the wells and strengthening the fortifications, with the dreary prospect before them that, should they not be speedily relieved, both ammunition and food would quickly fail them. Fortunately the enemy had neglected to destroy the powder in the government stores, and the tribes on the south began to come in with supplies. By some most extraordinary oversight, the brigade had left Cabool three months in arrear of pay; and the severest difficulty which began to be experienced by the second week of December was want of money. In this state, matters continued till the 29th, by which time the wells were cleaned out, and the walls so thoroughly repaired that no grounds of apprehension remained for any attack

the Affghans could attempt against them. Supplies became plentiful, a small additional stock of gunpowder was provided, and the men recovered the high and gallant spirit which the events of the beginning of the month were well-calculated to have shaken.

Meanwhile, as soon as intelligence of the Ghiljie insurrection reached the government, a brigade was ordered to be got immediately ready to move from the banks of the Sutlej on to Jellalabad. Accordingly, on the 18th of November, the 60th and 64th Native Infantry regiments, under Colonel Tullock, left Ferozepore, and passing through the Sikh territories, reached Peshawar on the 24th of September. The 30th and 53rd left the same point on the 24th of November, and arrived on the 27th of December, when Colonel Wild took the command of the whole force, now amounting to about four thousand men, with sappers and miners, and artillery men. General Avitabili, one of the most distinguished of the European officers, under whom the army of Runjeet Sing had been trained, received them at Peshawar with every kindness, and did all that in him lay to forward their objects. A few guns were procured from him, much against the will of his Sikh soldiers; but in such miserable condition as to be almost unserviceable.

The force here remained stationary for about three weeks, when a report having been received that the Khyberees were about to surround Ali Musjid to obstruct its advance, the 53rd and 64th were suddenly ordered up the Pass, on the 15th of January, to take possession of the fort. It was only ten miles off, and having started late at night, the place was occupied next morning without loss, and with little or no opposition. The officers and men had started as lightly accoutred as possible; the rest of the brigade was expected immediately to follow; they had no guns, no baggage-camels, and no provisions or commissariat stores. This was the signal for a general rising of the tribes around. The garrison was cut off, and in immediate danger of being starved. On the 19th, Brigadier Wild, with the 60th and 30th Native Infantry, endeavoured to force the Pass, and relieve the regiments in the fort. He was, however, attacked in the defile, and beaten back with the loss of the greater part of his baggage and treasure. He himself was wounded. On the 23rd, another attempt was made, but without success. Meanwhile the garrison, suffering from cold, and threatened with famine, without the hope of being joined by their companions, or the chance of being of service in any way by themselves, resolved to attempt re-

turning to the mouth of the Pass. On the 24th, accordingly they got under arms, and, after a very severe encounter, succeeded in rejoining their companions at Jumrood, with the loss of two officers and about one hundred and seventy Sepoys. The reunited force now retired on Peshawar to await the arrival of the brigade with Europeans, cavalry, and guns, under General Pollock, which had also been ordered on the same service.

In the meantime, the gallant Sir Robert Sale had been summoned on the 19th of January by the leaders of the Affghan rebellion, to give up Jellalabad, in fulfilment of the convention entered into by the political and military authorities at Cabool; but aware of the treacherous disposition of the enemy, he refused to comply, and on the 13th he received intimation of the disasters which had befallen the troops in their retreat from the capital. On that day, as has been seen, Dr. Brydon arrived at Jellalabad, wounded and way-worn, and at first scarcely able to give a distinct account of what had occurred. A rumour spread rapidly among the garrison that the remains of the Cabool force were in full retreat upon them, and that the enemy were cutting them to pieces. The bugle sounded, and the men were instantly got under arms. Every glass was pointed in the

direction of the Passes ; but nothing could be seen, save some smoke, and a few horsemen in the distance. The cavalry were ordered out to scour the country ; trumpets were sounded ; and for three nights beacon-fires were kept burning. But no army made its appearance. Those fatal Passes had been its grave. The mangled bodies of the three officers who were cut down in their flight with Dr. Brydon, from Futteabad, were found, some days afterwards, a few miles from the gate, and were the sole relics of the Cabool force which presented themselves to the view of the Jellalabad garrison.

Almost at the same time, it became known to the besieged that the brigade of four regiments, marched to their succour from Hindoostan, had been driven back upon Peshawar. Their position was now most critical. The duties of the garrison were exceedingly severe, their labours unceasing, and the most insidious endeavours were constantly made by the enemy to seduce from their allegiance the native portion of them, although without effect, for their fidelity remained unshaken amidst the labours and privations they were exposed to. Still their heroic general thought not of retreat, although this might have probably been effected while the enemy were employed in plundering the hapless Cabool force. But he re-

solved, at all hazards, not to relinquish his hold on the key of Eastern Affghanistan, so long as the honour of England required its retention. With reference, however, to the excited state of feeling prevailing around him, he took the wise precaution to get rid, first of the corps of Khyber rangers, next of the detachment of juzailchees, and a few of the Affghan sappers, and then of a body of Hindoostanee gunners, who had formerly been in the employment of Dost Mahomed. Meanwhile the works had been completed under the able superintendance of Captain Broadfoot, and a ditch, ten feet in depth and twelve feet in width, excavated round the whole of the walls. The place was thus made secure against the attack of any Asiatic enemy unprovided with siege artillery.

But an unforeseen and most terrible foe now suddenly assailed the city, overthrowing all its brave defenders' hopes, and rendering their past labours vain. On the 19th of February, a tremendous earthquake shook down all the newly raised parapets, injured several of the bastions, cast to the ground all our guard-houses, demolished a third of the town, made a considerable breach in the ramparts, and reduced the gate on the Cabool side to a shapeless mass of ruins. "It savours of romance," says the brave General in his despatch, "but it is a sober fact, that the city

was thrown into alarm, within the space of little more than one month, by the repetition of full one hundred shocks of this terrible phenomenon of nature."

Disheartening as was this appalling visitation, the troops turned with alacrity and indefatigable industry, to the reparation of their defences. But, at the moment of the great convulsion, Mahomed Akbar Khan, flushed with the success of his schemes, which were consummated by the tragedy at Gundamuk, having collected a considerable body of troops, advanced to Markhail, within seven miles of Jellalabad. He attacked our foraging parties with a large body of horse on the 21st and 22nd of February; and soon after, fixing his headquarters to the westward, two miles from the place, and a secondary camp to the eastward, about one mile distant, invested the town, and established a vigorous blockade. The enemy now continued incessantly to harass the garrison, by throwing swarms of skirmishers into the ravines and hollows round the walls, and behind the numerous remains of mud forts, which it had been found impossible wholly to destroy. On the 10th of March, the efforts of the Affghans were particularly directed against the northern face of the works, and with greater force than usual; and towards evening, spies brought intelligence,

that they were driving a mine in that direction.

Although Sir Robert Sale saw reason to doubt the accuracy of this information, he resolved on making a sortie to ascertain the fact, and check the boldness of the enemy. On the morning of the 11th, three hundred of her Majesty's 13th under Colonel Dennie, with three hundred of the 35th Native Infantry, and two hundred sappers and miners, at daybreak, sallied out from the Peshawar gate, and swept steadily round the low ground to the spot where the enemy was said to have broken ground. The cavalry, under Captain Oldfield, at the same time appeared upon the plain towards the south, to distract the attention of the Affghans. The post where the enemy were expected to have been met, unexpectedly proved to have just before been abandoned; but a strong picquet in the neighbourhood was gallantly driven in, and pursued to a considerable distance, by Captain Broadfoot, at the head of the sappers and miners. An attempt on the last-named body by a heavy force of the enemy's cavalry was also repelled, and the troops having accomplished the objects of the sortie in examining the ground around the wall, where neither mine nor gallery could be found, retired in perfect order.



into the fort, without serious casualty of any sort.

Such, however, was the vigilance and perseverance of the enemy, who constantly attacked our foraging parties, and impeded their exertions, that provisions once more began to run short; and on the 25th, a strong detachment was sent under Captains Broadfoot and Fenwick, to beat off the enemy, who had assembled in considerable force, upon the northern walls to intercept the foragers. This was speedily accomplished, but Captain Broadfoot was severely wounded in the action. On the 1st of April, however, a brilliant sortie was made by a body of infantry and cavalry, under Captains Pattison and Oldfield, when five hundred sheep were seized in the very face of Akbar Khan and his army, and carried into the fortress.

The beleaguered garrison were now anxiously looking forward to the arrival of General Pollock's force to their relief. From the time that the brigade threw itself into Jellalabad, the native troops had been on half, and the followers on quarter rations; and for many weeks they had been able to obtain little or nothing in the bazaars, to eke out this scanty provision. The Europeans had also been exposed to many and severe priva-

tions; and both officers and men, British and Hindoostanee, of every arm, had been compelled to remain fully accoutred at their alarm-posts, from the 1st of March, to the 7th of April.

Their disappointment may be imagined, therefore, when, after all their sufferings, on the evening of the 5th of the latter month, information was received, in the most positive terms, from spies in the enemy's camp, that General Pollock had been defeated in the Khyber Pass, and forced to fall back upon Peshawar. This disastrous news seemed to receive confirmation on the following day, by the Affghans causing a *feu-de-joie*, and salute of artillery to be fired, as was said, in honour of the event. It was afterwards found, that the assassination of Shah Shoojah had been the cause of this demonstration. It was also announced on the same day, through similar channels, that the Affghans were sending reinforcements to aid in defending the frontier passes, and obstructing the advance of General Pollock's force.

Although these reports could not be fully depended upon, accompanied as they were by counter-reports of another revolution at Cabool, the defeat of the Khyberees, and, by one account, of the intended, and even actual retreat of Akbar

Khan to Lughman, General Sale, on a full consideration of the various circumstances and rumours, resolved to anticipate the last-mentioned event by a general attack on the Affghan camp, in the hope of relieving himself from blockade, and facilitating General Pollock's advance. He accordingly gave directions to form three columns of infantry, the centre consisting of the 13th Light Infantry, five hundred rank and file, under Colonel Dennie; the left, of the 35th Native Infantry, also five hundred strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel Monteith; and the right, of a company of the 13th Light Infantry, another of the 35th Native Infantry, and the detachment of sappers and miners, under Lieutenant Orr, three hundred and sixty strong, commanded by Captain Havelock. These were supported by the fire of the guns of No 6, light field battery, under Captain Abbott, to which Captain Backhouse was also attached, and by the whole of the cavalry force under Captain Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne. The troops issued from the Cabool and Peshawar gate, at break of day, on the morning of the 7th; and so far from Akbar Khan having made dispositions to avoid the encounter, his whole force, not falling short in all of six thousand men, was formed in order of battle for the defence of his camp; the right

resting on a fort, its left on the Cabool river; and even the ruined works within eight hundred yards of the place, were filled with Ghiljie marksmen, evidently prepared for stout resistance.

The attack was led by the skirmishers and column under Captain Havelock, who pierced at once the enemy's line of works, drove them from their intrenchments, and proceeded to advance into the plain. Meanwhile, the heroic Dennie with the central column dashed forward against a strong square fort, which had been repaired by the Affghans, and now maintained an obstinate resistance; but, when within only five yards of it, a ball from one of the enemy's guns, struck him on the hip, lacerating his side fearfully; and before he could witness the success of the attack he was so valiantly leading, his gallant spirit had passed away. The troops, however, continued their progress, and the rear of the fort having been gained by passing to its left, General Sale gave orders for a combined attack on the enemy's camp. It was in every way brilliant and successful. The artillery advanced at the gallop, and directed a heavy fire on the Affghan centre, whilst two of the columns of infantry penetrated their line at the same point, and the third drove their left back from its sup-

port on the river, into the stream of which some of their horse and foot were forced. The Affghans made repeated attempts to check our advance by a smart fire of musketry, and throwing forward heavy bodies of horse, which twice closely threatened the troops under Captain Havelock, and by opening against us three guns from a battery, screened by a garden wall, and said to have been served under the personal superintendence of Akbar Khan himself; but in a short time, they were dislodged from every point of their position, their cannon taken, and their camp involved in a general conflagration. The battle was over, and the enemy in full retreat in the direction of Lughman, by about seven P.M.

Two of their cavalry standards fell into our hands, the whole of their tents were destroyed, and, chief trophy of all, we captured four guns, lost by the unfortunate Cabool army, the recovery of which was the source of especial exultation to the whole force. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded in this brilliant action was severe, while our own was very insignificant, as regarded numbers: but the victory could not be called cheaply purchased, which cost this country the life of Colonel Dennie. He was a man of decided talent and resources, and if the palm of courage can be

given to one where all possess so much, he might, for dashing, daring valour, safely be called the bravest officer in the British army. Under happier auspices he would have risen to the highest rank in his profession; such a man, under Napoleon, would have speedily obtained a Marshal's baton, and one cannot repress the disgust excited by the undeserved neglect with which he was treated. Words, barren words of praise, and not even those always, were nearly all that he received in the course of a long and glorious career, and it is impossible to reconcile oneself to the rules which govern the distribution of military rewards, when such men as Sale or Dennie are passed by, or inadequately rewarded, while some fortunate superior in rank reaps the profit of their brilliant actions, in a pension, and a peerage, and, perhaps, depreciates and insults the man or men, through whose means he obtained them.

Without, however, seeking to undervalue the services of others, it may justly be said, that few generals have obtained the honours above alluded to, who deserved them better than Sir Robert Sale. Compelled, after fighting his way through a series of the most difficult mountain passes in the world, to fall back upon one of the enemy's towns, in a miserably inefficient state of defence,

and all his efforts to strengthen it, after the most indefatigable exertions, overthrown by a fearful and unforeseen convulsion of nature; surrounded by a population infuriated by national and religious antipathies; flushed with their success over a superior force; and shut up in a beleaguered fortress, amidst distresses and privations of no ordinary magnitude, he yet contrived, not only to maintain his position, which alone would have been worthy of admiration, but sallied forth repeatedly and defeated the enemy in the field; and, at length, when his prospects were at the gloomiest, conceiving the daring design of attacking the besiegers in their own camp, he gained, with only fourteen hundred men, the important and decisive victory just recorded, over an army of six thousand.

The defence of Jellalabad will henceforth take its place in history as one of the most brilliant military achievements upon record; and if a peerage is to be regarded as the highest honour which a British officer can aspire to, and Sir Robert Sale's conduct does not deserve one, it is difficult, it might be said impossible, to pronounce what conduct does.

After the glorious victory of the 7th, the "illustrious garrison" entertained no further

apprehensions of the enemy, who were effectually dispirited and dispersed; and nothing further, of importance, occurred from that time, till the 15th, when General Pollock arrived to their relief.



## CHAPTER XIII.

FORCING OF THE KHYBER PASS—DEFENCE OF CANDAHAR — RECAPTURE OF GHUZNEE—ADVANCE OF GENERALS POLLOCK AND NOTT TO CABOOL.

WHILE Sir Robert Sale had been thus heroically maintaining the honour and glory of his country, and laying the foundation of a lasting renown, the Government of India had been making active preparations for his relief, and the rescue of the English captives who had fallen into the hands of the Affghans, since the breaking out of the insurrection. In addition to the troops already mentioned, as having been despatched to Peshawar, further reinforcements were gathering at Ferozepore, for the same destination. The Sikhs were called upon to furnish a contingent, and a considerable force from that country moved forward to the assistance of General Pollock; while on the western side, a brigade under General England was sent to reinforce General Nott, at Candahar. Nor was the home government behind hand in making preparations to meet the emergency, but as soon as intelligence of our

disasters in Affghanistan reached England, several regiments were put in readiness, and despatched to the seat of war. Lord Auckland had in the meantime, in consequence of the change of ministry in England, been superseded as Governor-General of India by Lord Ellenborough, a man of ability, and business-like habits; but vain and pompous, and abrupt in his manner. This change was unfortunate, at the particular period at which it took place, as the latter nobleman was strongly opposed to the Affghan policy of his predecessor; and it led to much hesitation and indecision in the subsequent military operations.

Towards the end of March, the force assembled at Peshawar amounted to nearly eight thousand men, under the command of General Pollock; but their situation was anything but satisfactory. Sickness had prevailed amongst them to an enormous extent, confining upwards of two thousand men at one time to the hospital, and the fears and hardships of the native soldiers were inducing them to desert in great numbers. Desirous as General Pollock was, to proceed to the relief of Jellalabad, he had hitherto found it impossible to do so, and he was anxiously expecting the arrival of fresh European troops, to reinspire the Sepoys with courage. But the

urgency of Sir Robert Sale's situation became so pressing, that, insufficient as was the number of his troops, and doubtful as was the fidelity of some of them, General Pollock resolved, at all hazards, to attempt the dangerous passage of the Khyber mountains.

This defile, one of the most formidable and impenetrable in Asia as a line of military defence, extends from Jumrood upwards in the direction of Jellalabad without interval for the space of twenty-eight miles, throughout twenty-two of which it had hitherto been considered impassable for an army, when the inhabitants had determined to oppose them. From Jumrood, where the pass opens on the Peshawar side, to Ali Musjid, the dell is deep and uninterrupted; and the celebrated fort just named, which stands on an isolated hill in the narrow near the middle of the defile, completely commands it.

At half-past three o'clock on the morning of the 5th of April, the troops were got under arms, the camps struck, the treasure, ammunition and baggage placed on the road leading from Jumrood, and everything was in readiness for the perilous advance. The hills on both sides, were rocky and precipitous, presenting formidable obstacles to the progress of our troops; and the enemy had for some days past, appeared in great numbers upon these heights, and at the mouth of the pass, which

they had fortified with a strong breast-work of stones and bushes. It became of the utmost consequence to dislodge them from their commanding position; and at the same time, that the main column proceeded to assault the entrance, a column was despatched to the right and left, to drive the Khyberes down. Both columns, after considerable opposition, which they overcame in the most gallant style, succeeded in routing the enemy, and gaining possession of the crest of the hills on the other side. While the flanking columns were in progress on the heights, General Pollock ordered Captain Alexander, in command of the artillery, to throw shrapnel among the enemy, which assisted much in their discomfiture. As Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, from the opposition he met with, was some time in reaching the summit of the hill on the right, the General next detached a party under the command of Brigadier Wild, to assault it in front; it was, however, so extremely steep near the top, that notwithstanding the undaunted gallantry of both officers and men, they were unable to gain a footing on the summit; and the enemy were enabled to hurl down stones with fatal effect upon some of the grenadiers. Finding the heights in our possession, General Pollock now advanced the main column to the north of the pass, and commenced destroying the barrier which the enemy had erected on perceiving their

position was turned ; a portion of the right and left columns being left to keep the heights, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Mosely and Major Anderson respectively. Major Huish and Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor continued their advance to crown the hills in front on each side, which were covered with the enemy, who appeared determined to combat every inch of ground ; but nothing could resist the gallantry of our troops, who carried everything before them. A position of considerable strength above the bridge now remained to be carried, and again the juzailchees were conspicuous in forcing the enemy to relinquish their strong-holds.

At length, all opposition on the part of the Affghans was overcome, and the heights being occupied by our troops, and the defile cleared by the guns, the principal columns with the baggage moved along the dell, and reached Ali Musjid the following morning with very trifling loss. The remainder of the march was accomplished with scarcely any opposition from the enemy ; and on the 16th of April, General Pollock and his army, reached Jellalabad to the great joy of the beleaguered garrison, who were drawn up on the ramparts, with streaming banners, and their bands playing, to welcome their approach. The scene of the meeting of the two forces, was most animating, and full of interest ; and for a time,

all was festivity and delight; but General Pollock having marched with the smallest possible amount of stores and baggage, that he might be enabled to force the Passes unencumbered, he was obliged, after a few days, to put the whole force upon half rations.

It is necessary now to take a survey of what had been transpiring in Western Affghanistan, during all this time. At the breaking out of the revolution at Cabool, the affairs of Candahar wore a more tranquil and promising appearance, than they had done since the introduction of our influence into the country. Akram Khan, a powerful rebel chief, had been executed by the Shah's orders, and eight of his colleagues sent to Cabool, under the escort of Lieutenant Crawford. The Hazareh and Beloochee tribes had been effectually conciliated; the Dooraunees of the northern and western districts, had been humbled and overawed.

On the 7th of November, the peaceful aspect of things appeared such as to justify the despatching of Colonel Maclaren's brigade, on its homeward route to India; but upon the same day, news of the disaster which had befallen Captain Woodburn and his detachment between Cabool and Ghuznee, arrived at Candahar, and the brigade was recalled. Upon the 14th, letters from Sir William MacNaghten and General Elphinstone,

announced the breaking out of the Cabool insurrection, and requested General Nott to send the brigade ordered for India, immediately to their assistance. Colonel Maclaren accordingly returned to Candahar, and strengthened with a corps of horse artillery, started for Cabool upon the 17th.

In the meantime, Captain Hart's corps of Janbaz, had been called in from Tireen, and followed in the rear of Colonel Maclaren's brigade. Two of the Shah's corps that had been left in Neesh and Dehrawat, after the return of the regular troops, were likewise summoned to Candahar, and nothing remained out, but the first corps of Janbaz, the first Shah's regiment, and two guns in Jamin Dawar. Shortly after this, it became known that Lieutenant Crawford had been attacked near Ghuznee, and that the Dooraunee prisoners under his charge, had escaped. This intelligence was followed by an account of the Ghiljies' attack upon Guddoo Khan, on his return from Ghuznee, in which that brave Affghan officer, whose services to our cause had been most valuable, was overpowered by numbers and slain, with several of his best men; losing at the same time, forty-five horses, and a quantity of arms and baggage.

The province of Candahar itself, however, still continued tranquil; and it was not until information was received on the 3rd of December, that Colonel Maclaren had been forced, by the in-

clemency of the season, to give up his advance on Cabool that disturbances were anticipated. General Nott then judged it advisable to concentrate all his troops at Candahar, and accordingly ordered in the regiment and guns at Zamin Dawur. Colonel Maclaren reached the city on the 8th of December, and the Zamin Dawur detachment came in the following day. A few days afterwards, reports were rife that Mahomed Atta-Khan had been dispatched from Cabool to spread the rebellion in this province, and the Atchukzye, and other neighbouring tribes, quickly flew to arms. The Affghan troops in our own service also shared the general infection, and the Janbaz horsemen, who were about to be stationed on the river Helmund, for the double purpose of protecting the fort of Ghiriskh, and being kept from communication with Cabool, broke into open mutiny, murdered their commanding officer, Lieutenant Golding, severely wounded Lieutenant Patterson, and took the field, hoping to raise the country.

Two days subsequent to this mutiny, the rebel cause derived increased importance from the accession of one of the sons of Shah Shoojah, resident at Candahar, Prince Sufter Jung, who, disgusted by the non-possession of authority, and won over by the persuasions of an intriguing



chief, the son of the Khan of Laush, fled from the city, and joined the insurgents. From that moment they rapidly increased in numbers, and Atta Mahomed having arrived from Cabool, they fixed their head-quarters at Dehla, about forty miles distant from Candahar. General Nott was deterred, by the unfavourable state of the season, from attacking the rebels at that place, and Atta Mahomed, construing his inactivity into weakness, marched leisurely down the valley of Arghundab, at the head of about three thousand horse and foot. Having been joined by about two thousand more from the surrounding villages, on the 12th of January he took up a strong post on the right bank of the river which runs through the Achukzye country, about five miles west of the city.

Here General Nott resolved to attack them; and having adopted efficient measures for the protection of Candahar, he sallied forth with the rest of his troops to meet the insurgents.

The position of the enemy was formidable, protected in front by canals and a marsh, and both flanks resting on strong gardens. They could not, however, withstand the large force now moving against them. The fire of their matchlock-men posted in the gardens and about the canals was, for a short time, severe; but when our troops had

crossed the river, and our infantry advanced to the charge, the insurgents broke and fled. The enemy's horse attempted to make a stand, but were charged by our cavalry, and dispersed in all directions.

Our loss on this occasion was very trifling, amounting to no more than three killed, and between twenty and thirty wounded, while of the enemy one hundred and fifty three bodies were counted on the field of battle, and their wounded were estimated at about two hundred. This success produced the most beneficial effects. It disheartened and thinned the ranks of the insurgents, decided the wavering, and encouraged the well affected; and the city of Candahar was well supplied with provisions from the neighbouring villages.

Our troops were now left unmolested for a considerable period, and General Nott took advantage of the interim to repair the fortifications of the town, and lay in a five months' stock of provisions. On the 30th of January, they heard of the assassination of the Envoy at Cabool, and the intended evacuation of that city; and on the 21st of February, they received instructions to give up Candahar in compliance with the stipulations of the Cabool convention. General Nott, however, and Major Rawlinson, the political agent, like Sir

Robert Sale at Jellalabad, declined acceding to the injunction, and resolved to maintain possession of the city till definitive instructions should arrive from Calcutta. Immediate preparations were then made for taking the field, and as a preliminary, the extreme but necessary measure was adopted, of expelling all the population supposed be hostile to our interests from the town.

Meanwhile, the enemy had commenced annoying us by attacks upon our foraging parties; and on the 7th of March, General Nott moved out against the insurgents, with a force composed of her Majesty's 40th, with the 10th, 38th, 42nd, and 43rd regiments of Native Infantry, a few cavalry, and Anderson's guns, consisting of four nine-pounders. Considerable skirmishes ensued, and several villages were destroyed by our men, and given up to plunder. When the Affghans had got our troops decoyed a sufficient way out, following at last a detachment of only two thousand strong, the principal body consisting of about five thousand foot and one thousand horse, doubled upon them and returned to Candahar, where they arrived and immediately took possession of the old town, on the evening of the 9th. Next morning they attacked, and nearly got possession of a portion of the city, having effected a lodgment at the Herat

gate, and commenced setting fire to the houses. Had they been successful, the position of General Nott would have been perilous indeed. The bulk of our artillery, with the 2nd Native Infantry, the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Shah's Infantry, and the 1st cavalry with Skinner's Horse, amounting to two thousand seven hundred, had been left behind, and gave them so rough a reception that they were speedily dispersed, leaving from six hundred to a thousand killed or severely wounded. The insurgent army, on this, broke up, and quitted the neighbourhood altogether. General Nott returned in safety to Candahar on the 13th, after a seven days' absence. This defeat for a time appeared to have produced a strong impression throughout the country. The aggressions of the enemy were, for a period, interrupted, and supplies of provisions, previously withheld from us, began once more to be brought into our camp by the natives.

In the meantime, the reinforcement under General England, was advancing to the relief of the Candahar garrison with treasure, ammunition, and other stores in convoy. The first detachment of this force, consisting of about twelve hundred men, headed by General England in person, left Dadur on the 9th of March, and arrived at Quettah on the 16th, after a terrible

passage of the Bolan, during which some hundred camels were lost in the snow, and fifteen of the soldiers frozen to death. The second detachment of about equal strength, under Major Simmons, followed at an interval of nineteen days, and reached Quettah on the 4th of April, while the third portion of the brigade was moving up from Scinde, with a view of arriving at the same point early in May.

A few days after General England reached Quettah, he moved out towards the valley of Pisheen, about twenty miles off, to protect its inhabitants, who were peaceably disposed towards us, from the insurgents, and to gather forage for his camels. On the 27th, the troops passed the village of Hykulzie, and were received by the chiefs with every demonstration of friendship; but on the following day large bodies of men were observed suspiciously clustering upon the hills on either side. These were at first supposed to be scouts or marauders, but further on, two hills, between which lay our line of march, were found hostilely occupied; one being strongly barricaded, and the other crowned with irregulars, evidently determined to oppose our progress. The light companies of the 41st, and of two of the native regiments, amounting in all to one hundred and eighty men, were directed to charge

up the hill in line only, it being supposed that the enemy would flee at their approach. Instead of this, however, they kept steadily behind their intrenchment, and the moment our men crossed the crest of the barricade, a rush so desperate and irresistible was made against them, that they were compelled to fall back, leaving Captain May and seventeen others dead upon the field. On descending the height, hotly pressed by the enemy, who conducted themselves most gallantly, a body of cavalry, which had arrived from Candahar on the previous day, wheeled round the flank of the hill, and fell upon the rear of the foe, while another detachment of the 41st covered the retreat of the storming party, which then threw itself into a square at the foot of the hill to receive the enemy. The Affghan horse finding their efforts against the compact mass of no avail, retreated in good order, leaving many of their dead beneath the bayonets of our men, amongst whom were several chiefs. This was one of the best contested actions, on the part of the Affghans, we had yet been engaged in; and they fought with the greatest intrepidity, charging on to the very bayonets of our soldiers. The utmost gallantry was also displayed by the British troops, although repulsed. The Sepoys earnestly entreated permission to charge up the hill again,

but were refused. The 41st were equally anxious to renew the contest, and wipe out the disgrace of their discomfiture, but the General declined making any further attempt to advance, and resolved to fall back on Quettah, which was reached with but little molestation on the 30th.

General England now gave up all hope of being able to send troops to Candahar at present. He wrote to General Nott, announcing his reverse at Hykulzie, and stating that supplies could only be pushed forward in case of extreme emergency, and with the assistance of a body of troops from Candahar to secure the Passes. He then commenced intrenching himself strongly at Quettah, repairing the old fortifications, and throwing up fresh ones; and was actively employed in these precautionary measures, when, about the middle of April, a peremptory order reached him from General Nott, commanding his instant advance, and disapproving of his proceedings at Quettah.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 20th of April, General England once more set out for Candahar with his force, comprising nearly three thousand men, in charge of two thousand camels, £100,000 of treasure, and various military stores, for the use of the garrison of that city. On the 28th they reached Hykulzie, exactly one month

after their previous mishap at that place, and found the enemy occupying their old position on the hills. The 41st again rushed on to the attack, gallantly led by Major Simmons, determined, at least, not to be beaten back this time, and supported by the 3rd cavalry and three light battalions, the heights to the right and left were speedily carried. As soon as the enemy perceived we had turned their position, they were seized with a panic, and fled in all directions. The infantry scampered off among the hills to avoid our fire, and the horsemen, leaping from their horses, endeavoured to escape on foot, dropping some of them from heights of fifty or sixty feet, and some threw themselves madly on our troops, attacking the cavalry with their swords. A severe personal encounter took place between one of these dismounted Affghans and Lieutenant Ashburner, whose horse refusing to charge, his opponent rushed upon him, gave him a deep cut in the leg, and dragged him from his horse. A fierce struggle ensued between them, and the Lieutenant seizing his opportunity attempted to pistol the Affghan, but received a desperate blow upon the head, and a sword-cut upon his arm, which nearly severed it in two. The rebel thus escaped for the moment, but almost immediately after he was cut down by some of our men.



The loss on our part in this affair was slight, amounting to no more than ten wounded. The enemy had about thirty killed, and a much greater number wounded. After this action, the troops met with but little opposition in their progress, and having passed the Kojuk Pass in safety, where they met with the brigade sent from Candahar to their assistance, they reached that city on the 9th of May.

Shortly after this, Lord Ellenborough's order for the evacuation of Affghanistan, which has occasioned so much discussion, arrived at Candahar, and General Nott was desired to send a force to bring off the garrison of Khelat-i-Ghiljé, and reduce the fortifications of that place to ruin. Colonel Wymer was accordingly despatched with a strong detachment of five thousand men for that purpose. Meanwhile the insurgents had collected in great strength, and surrounded Khelat-i-Ghiljé, and at day-break on the morning of the 21st of May, they commenced an attack upon it in two quarters. The enemy advanced to the assault in the most determined manner, each column consisting of more than two thousand men, provided with thirty scaling ladders; but after an hour's hard fighting, they were repulsed by the brave little garrison, and driven down the hill with the loss of five standards.

On the 26th, Colonel Wymer's force arrived to their relief, and preparations were immediately made for the evacuation of the fortress, and dismantlement of its defences. This being done, the Colonel with the garrison under escort, returned to Candahar, which he reached on the 7th of June.

During the absence of this detachment, Aktar Khan, Chief of Zamin Dawur, having assembled a force of three thousand men, crossed the Helmund, and joined the rebel army under Prince Sufter Jung and Atta Mahomed. Under an impression that the garrison of Candahar was now so weakened as to be unable to stand an attack, and at the same time operate in the field, the enemy on the 29th of May took possession of some steep rocky hills within a mile of the city walls. General Nott instantly moved out with a portion of his troops to the attack, leaving General England with the rest in command of the walls. About one o'clock, the heights on which the enemy were posted, were stormed under a heavy fire of artillery, and our troops dashed up in gallant style, although much inferior to the Affghans in numbers. The latter were quickly driven from all their posts with great slaughter, and pursued and cut up by the cavalry in all directions. It was a brilliant action, the enemy

having mustered eight thousand strong, besides two thousand protecting their camp, while General Nott's gallant little force did not exceed twelve hundred. Its effects were seen in the submission shortly afterwards of Sufter Jung and several of his chiefs.

With the exception of a kind of marauding expedition, upon which Colonel Wymer was next sent, upon his return from Khelat-i-Ghiljie, all remained quiet about Candahar for some weeks. Suddenly, however, a change seemed to have taken place in the pusillanimous intentions of the Indian government, and instead of falling back, as we had latterly expected, upon Quettah, a rumour ran through the city, that we were about to advance upon Ghuznee, and thence, to Cabool. This was in part speedily confirmed, to the great delight of the eager troops, who were in excellent spirits from the conduct of their brave commander, and their late successes, as well as by the active preparations which were commenced as preliminaries to an advance. At length it became fully known that Candahar was to be evacuated, that General England was to return to Scinde with a portion of the troops, about four thousand, and all the women, and the sick and the wounded of the army, that General Nott should advance northward with the remainder of the force,

about seven thousand, as lightly equipped as possible.

Accordingly, on the 8th of August, after the powder magazine had been blown up, the spare commissariat and arsenal stores destroyed, and all the other arrangements completed, the British army quitted Candahar, General England proceeded on his homeward route, and arrived at Quettah on the 20th, after a most successful passage of the Kojuk defiles. Thence the brigade moved on to Dadur, the General, with the last division, leaving Quettah on the 1st of October, and by the middle of the month, the whole of his force had bade farewell to Afghanistan.

\* In the meantime, General Nott was advancing steadily forward without any obstruction of consequence, in the direction of Ghuznee. This important fortress had again fallen into the hands of the Affghans, who had risen in rebellion, in this district, about the same time that the outbreak had taken place at Cabool. It had been left with a garrison of upwards of a thousand men, under the command of Colonel Palmer, and had the authorities acted with promptitude and decision, they might, perhaps, have held their post, till reinforced by General Nott. But they seem to have been paralyzed by the intelligence of the

Cabool events, and neglected to do much that might have bettered their condition. Instead of acting as Generals Sale and Nott had done, in expelling the hostile inhabitants from the town, a foolish wavering feeling prevailed, that it would be an act of unnecessary cruelty to drive them from their homes; and, at length, after holding out for several months, and enduring almost unparalleled hardships, frequently repelling the attacks of the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, with the most undaunted bravery, these townspeople treacherously admitted the enemy within the walls, and Colonel Palmer was obliged to capitulate in the beginning of March. The terms of the treaty guaranteed honourable treatment to the garrison, and safe escort to Cabool, solemnly sworn to by the chiefs, but the same treachery marked the conduct of these men, as their countrymen had exhibited at the capital, and several of the hapless garrison were murdered, and Colonel Palmer with others, made prisoners.

Though occasionally annoyed by small parties of the enemy, General Nott had met with no serious opposition in his progress towards Ghuznee, till he arrived at Gonine, thirty-one miles south-west of the town. Here, on the 30th of August, Shumsoodeen Khan, the Affghan governor of the fortress, marched out against him with an army of twelve

thousand men, and posted himself in the vicinity of the British camp.

General Nott resolved to give him battle, and moved out with one half of his force, the enemy at the same time, advancing in the most bold and gallant manner, each cheering as they came into position. Their left was placed upon a hill of some elevation, their centre and right upon a low ridge, until their flank rested upon a fort filled with men; and they then opened a fire of small arms, supported by two six-pounder guns, directed with admirable precision. Our columns now advanced upon the different points boldly and steadily, pouring in a deadly fire upon the opposing ranks, and after a short but spirited contest, completely routed the enemy, capturing their guns, tents, ammunition, and baggage, and dispersing them in every direction. Shumsoodeen himself fled, with about thirty horsemen towards Ghuznee, and had it not been for the friendly cover of night, which was fast setting in, and aided their escape, the whole Afghan army would have been destroyed.

After this glorious victory, General Nott moved on against Ghuznee, before which he arrived on the 5th of September. He found the city full of men, and the range of mountains running north-east of the fortress, covered by heavy bodies of

the enemy's horse and foot. The gardens and neighbouring ravines were also occupied, and a considerable reinforcement to the garrison had arrived from Cabool, under Sultan Jan.. The General's first measure was to direct Major Sanders, of the Bengal Engineers, to reconnoitre the works, under escort of the 16th regiment of Native Infantry, and a party of irregular cavalry. This brought on some smart skirmishing, in which our Sepoys behaved to admiration. Captain White, of her Majesty's 40th regiment, commanding the light companies of the army, was pushed forward, accompanied by Anderson's troop of horse artillery, to support the reconnoitring party, and General Nott at once determined on carrying the enemy's mountain positions before encamping his force. The troops ascended the heights in gallant style, driving the enemy before them until every point was gained.

The village of Bullal is situated about six hundred yards from the walls of Ghuznee, upon the spur of the mountain to the north-east, and observing it to be a desirable spot for preparing a heavy battery, to be placed three hundred paces in advance, the General ordered it to be occupied by two regiments of infantry, and some light guns, to protect the operations of the engineers, and established the rest of his troops in camp.

It was also resolved that the principal assault by battery should be supported by two other attacks; one an attempt to blow in the water-gate, (both the others having been strongly built up, and the causeways in front of them cut through,) another to escalate a weak point near the Cabool gate, which would have been greatly aided by the fire of the artillery from the hill.

Accordingly, at dusk on the evening of the 5th of September, a working party, composed of the sappers, and a hundred and sixty men from the regiments occupying the hill, commenced work on the battery. By four A.M. on the following morning, cover for the party had been secured across the ridge of the hill, and so much progress made in the execution of the work, as to lead to reasonable expectations that the four eighteen-pounder guns, and two twenty-four-pounder howitzers would be established in position, and ready to open their fire during the day.

Early on the evening of the 5th, a brisk matchlock fire was kept up from the citadel on the hill, but this gradually slackened, and at 4 P.M. had entirely ceased. The enemy's infantry had been observed at dusk, crossing the river near the water-gate, with the intention, it was supposed, of attacking the working party



during the night; but, as the day broke, the fort was discovered to be evacuated, the garrison, alarmed by our preparations, having fled under cover of the darkness. The citadel and all the defences of the once formidable Ghuznee, were then destroyed, and General Nott proceeded to Cabool, which he reached towards the end of the month, after another triumphant conflict with Shumsodeen, and a large army of Affghans.

Meanwhile, General Pollock had advanced upon the same point from Jellalabad, where he had been detained upwards of four months by the indecision of the Indian government, as to its future intentions in Affghanistan, and his inability to move for want of the necessary means. This period had been employed in sending occasional expeditions against the surrounding tribes, and negotiations for the release of the Cabool prisoners, which, however, came to nothing; and an advance upon the capital having at length been decided upon, General Pollock, on the 20th of August, commenced his march. Prior to this, however, General Sale had moved forward to Futteabad, with his gallant garrison, the 3rd dragoons and other cavalry, a party of sappers, and artillery. Immediately upon his arrival, he commenced operations against one of Akbar Khan's

principal forts, which had recently been much strengthened; the party charged with the office of reducing it, was placed under Captain Broadfoot, and so well did he make his dispositions, that the place was taken, and razed to the ground, without any bloodshed.

On the morning of the 23rd, General Pollock's force reached Gundamuk, and having heard that the enemy, under the chiefs Hadji Ali and Khryroollah Khan, occupied the village and fort of Mammoo Khail, two miles from the camp, it was resolved to attack them the following morning. Accordingly, at 4 o'clock A.M. on the 24th, General Pollock marched out at the head of about four thousand men, and dividing them into two columns, with skirmishers in front, advanced to give the enemy battle. The fields were flooded, purposely, to prevent the advance of our force. The village was entered without resistance, and the left column moved on towards the fort of Mammoo Khail, which was gallantly stormed, by the men using each other's shoulders for scaling ladders. The right proceeded on to Koocee Khail, punishing the enemy severely as it advanced. The Affghans defended themselves with great bravery, and the fighting lasted for five hours. At length, they were defeated at all points, and their tents, carriages, cattle, and am-

muniti<sup>o</sup>n, with a quantity of provisions, fell into our hands; a large quantity of plunder, taken from the ill-fated Cabool force, during the retreat, was also discovered, evidently proving that the people of this district had aided to bring about our disasters. Two Hindoostanee women were found there, and the names of three European soldiers, two of the 44th, and one of the 13th, were observed written on some of the buildings, clearly proving the fact of their captivity there. These records of their murdered comrades added greatly to the exasperation of our troops, and the villages were destroyed, the trees cut down, and the plains devastated, with revengeful eagerness. The effects of this victory were made apparent in the immediate submission of the neighbouring tribes, and the camp began to be well supplied with provisions.

Meanwhile rumours prevailed, that the enemy were gathering in great force in the Passes ahead of us, with the determination of resisting our further progress. On the 8th of September, General Pollock moved out of Soorkhab in progress to Jugdulluk, and on approaching the heights which commanded the valley, they were found to be occupied by large bodies of the enemy, apparently under different chieftains; each having a distinguishing standard. On a nearer view, their posi-

tion proved to be one of remarkable strength, and most difficult of access. The hills they occupied formed an amphitheatre, inclining towards the left of the road, on which the troops were halted, while the guns opened, and the enemy were thus enabled on this point to fire down upon the column, a deep ravine preventing any contact with them. Our artillery began to play upon them, but with little effect, while the mountaineers poured in their fire from every point unremittingly. The General observing this, detached Captain Broadfoot, with a party of sappers, to the extreme left of the enemy's position, and his men began ascending a hill on the top of which the enemy were entrenched behind a strong breastwork. The 9th foot, under Colonel Taylor, were at the same time directed to cross a deep ravine, and assault the hill on the opposite side, where the enemy held a ruined fort, and were assembled in great numbers. Captain Wilkinson, with the 13th, and other corps under Lieutenants Boileau and Trench, and Captain Gahan, respectively, were despatched to other points, and the whole, bursting into an animated and enthusiastic cheer, rushed up the heights simultaneously, and drove the scared Ghiljies before them, who fled precipitately down the hills. A large body of their horsemen still remained on the summit of a high mountain, and

on this apparently inaccessible height, they planted their banners in defiance. This was not to be borne, and the gallant 13th, with a few companies of Native Infantry, rushed up the lofty heights with undaunted resolution; but the Ghiljies waited not for the onset, and our troops took quiet possession of their last and least assailable stronghold.

But our difficulties were not yet over. These tremendous defiles offered opportunities but too advantageous for our molestation, to be neglected by the ever ready Ghiljies; and at Tezeen, immense bodies of them, under the leadership of Akbar Khan himself, crowned every disposable height commanding our camp. On the 13th, General Pollock resumed his march towards the mouth of the Pass, and the enemy's horse appeared in the valley, with the intention of falling upon the baggage; but the dragoons and native cavalry made a most brilliant charge, and completely routed the whole body of them.

On entering the Pass, our infantry mounted the heights, to drive off the enemy; but the Affghans encouraged by the presence of their eminent chief, instead of giving way, as in previous instances, advanced to meet us, and a desperate encounter ensued. So obstinate, indeed, was their defence, that the contest, in many cases,

was only decided at the point of the bayonet. Throughout the field of action the same spirit prevailed; all the neighbouring heights were alive with desperate combatants, and the enemy seemed especially eager to prevent our ascending the Huft Kotul. But nothing could withstand the determination to conquer evinced by our troops: one by one, they forced the different positions of the enemy, and, at length, scaled the sides of the Huft Kotul, giving three cheers as they reached the summit. This was one of the best contested actions which had yet taken place between our troops and the Affghans. The fighting continued throughout the day, and the enemy, who mustered the formidable number of sixteen thousand men, left several hundreds dead upon the field.

This brilliant and decisive victory opened the way for General Pollock to Cabool. The troops pursued their march through this series of terrific passes, without further molestation; but at every step, some harrowing spectacle presented itself to their eyes, some dismal relic of the tragedy enacted there, in the preceding January, which goaded them to fury, and urged them to vow vengeance upon their treacherous foes. Before them, and behind them, in huge heaps, the unburied skeletons of their murdered fellow countrymen lay bleaching in the mountain winds, and when we

read of the excesses which, it must be confessed, were committed on some occasions, during the second advance and retreat, it should be remembered how strongly such scenes as the above were calculated to rouse the passions of untutored men, whether Europeans or Hindoostanees.

At length, General Pollock and his victorious army arrived at Cabool, and on the 16th of September, the British colours were once more waving triumphantly over the ramparts of the Bala Hissar.

## CHAPTER XIV.

STATE OF CABOOL—CONDITION OF THE PRISONERS—  
NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THEM—THEIR ESCAPE—  
OPERATIONS IN KOHISTAN—DESTRUCTION OF THE AFF-  
GHAN CITIES—RETURN OF THE ARMIES TO INDIA—  
RECEPTION AT FEROEZEPORE—CONCLUSION.

Since the breaking out of the revolution, the city of Cabool had been a prey to intestine commotion. Mahomed Zeman Khan, brother of Dost Mahomed, at first assumed sovereign authority; but Shah Shoojah, who continued to hold the Bala Hissar against the town, was, after much fighting, acknowledged by the majority of the chiefs, with whose plans he was, in some measure, obliged to fall in. There is no decided proof, however, to convict him of treachery towards us, or of having instigated the insurrection; and it is not to be wondered at, if, when he found himself deserted by our troops, he endeavoured to make the best terms he could with his rebellious subjects. But his reign was of no long continuance, the unfortunate Shah



being murdered at the beginning of April by the son of Mahomed Zeman Khan. His death was the signal for the renewal of civil strife, and the leading chiefs struggled among themselves with the late King's sons for the possession of the supreme authority. Mahomed Zeman and Akbar Khan were the two principal competitors for power, and their parties were alternately in the ascendant. At length, Akbar Khan seated Prince Futteh Jung, the third son of Shah Shoojah, and a most dissolute and abandoned man, upon the throne, making himself, at the same time, vizier, and retaining the whole power in his own hands; but this state of things, again, was soon altered, and just previous to General Pollock's arrival at Cabool, Futteh Jung came as a fugitive to the British camp.

In the meantime, negotiation after negotiation had been entered into, and various propositions made, having for their object the release of the hostages and prisoners in the hands of Akbar Khan; but, from his insincerity, and the extravagant nature of his demands, hitherto without effect, and their rescue seemed as far removed, or even more remote than ever. The fate of these unfortunate individuals excited the intensest interest in every British bosom. Although their treatment was better than could at first have been anticipated, their situation, independent of their

captive state, was one of the greatest hardship, and an universal feeling of indignation ran throughout the length and breadth of their native land, animating equally their fellow countrymen in India, when it was known that Lord Ellenborough had issued his mandate for the withdrawal of our troops from Affghanistan, without having first provided for their safety. How they were enabled, gentle and delicate females, and children as some of them were, to bear up against the sufferings inflicted upon them, is really wonderful, and affords a strong proof of the protecting care of Providence. The noble fortitude of Lady Sale, however, was of immense service in keeping up the spirits and hopes of her fellow captives; and the heroic disregard of self evinced in her celebrated letter to her husband, has stamped that lady's name with honour upon the page of history.

Month after month passed away, during which time the wretched prisoners were dragged about from place to place by their treacherous captor, until all hope of ever seeing their friends and country again began to give way to despair; and on the 11th of September, being at Bameean, they heard, to their horror, that they were to be marched off forthwith to Khooloom, and distributed among the chiefs of that territory. Fearful and hopeless indeed was the prospect now before them; but what the fear of our advancing armies

could not procure from the Affghan chief, was achieved by the love of gold in a subordinate. It was intimated to Saleh Mahomed, who commanded the Affghan regiment, sent to escort the prisoners to Toorkistan, that he would reap a rich reward if he would consent to aid in their escape; and in an interview with Major Pottinger, it was agreed to give him a present of twenty thousand rupees, and to continue to him the command of his regiment on his present salary of one thousand rupees a month; granting him at the same time full pardon for all past offences. Having so far discovered the sentiments of Saleh Mahomed Khan, Major Pottinger with whom were associated Captains Lawrence and Johnston, brought him to General Shelton, and laid the plan before that officer, and Colonel Palmer, who, with the captured officers from Ghuznee, had been added to the Cabool prisoners. Both these officers, however, declined attaching their signature to any agreement of the kind, lest it should implicate them with Mahomed Akbar if discovered; whereupon, the Major and his companions consulted the rest of the captives, and it was unanimously resolved to attempt the plan at all risks, and that if it were found to be a scheme to overreach them, they should try to seize the weapons of the guard, and to hold out in the fort they were stationed in till succour arrived.

Major Pottinger, with his usual energy and promptitude, then assumed the functions of a political agent, and finding the governor of Bameean inclined to be hostile, although he at first proffered his services in their cause, he, backed by Saleh Mahomed, superseded him directly, appointing Deen Mahomed Khan, the former governor, in his place. He then employed men to frighten the Meer Akhom Ahmed Khan, who had the more immediate custody of the captives by telling him, (as if in friendship) that it had been resolved to seize him and bribe the troops. These bold measures had the desired effect; the Governor sent to proffer his good offices in the prisoners' favour, and Ahmed Khan, with his Ghiljie guards, hastily decamped. On the 15th, they received intelligence of General Pollock's advance, and his victory over the Affghans, and giving up their intention of holding out in the fort, the captive officers now animated with fresh hopes, resolved, with Saleh Mahomed, to march out, and force their way to Cabool unassisted.

Accordingly, on the following day, the little party commenced retracing their steps down the Bameean valley, and reaching Tepchy Bala, encamped with the castles in their front, so as to occupy them in case of necessity. Meanwhile, the Kuzzilbashes of the capital, who had always been friendly to our interests, urged on by the

promises and representations of Mohan Lal a most worthy and intelligent Hindoo, formerly attached to Sir Alexander Burnes, had been taking measures to effect the release of the prisoners, and a party of Kuzzilbash horse were advancing to their assistance, with Sir Richmond Shakspeare at their head. This brave and enthusiastic officer, upon the arrival of General Pollock's army at Cabool, hastened to the Kuzzilbash quarter of the town and finding a party ready to proceed, he determined to accompany them in quest of his captive countrymen. His generous efforts were crowned with success, and on the 17th the anxious prisoners had the inexpressible delight to behold, from their encampment, the banners of the liberating party; and in a few minutes Sir Richmond galloped up, and congratulated them upon their restoration to freedom.

But there was yet cause for anxiety. Akbar Khan was still at large, with several of the chiefs at his command, and it was to be apprehended that he might make an attempt to regain possession of his victims. Consequently, Sir R. Shakspeare sent immediately to General Pollock for a reinforcement, the now joyous party continuing at the same time their route to Cabool, and on the 20th, shortly after reaching the town of Kotashroo, they had the happiness to fall in with the hero of Jellalabad, who had been despatched

to their assistance. The scene of their meeting was, as may well be supposed, intensely interesting; but it is needless to dwell in description upon the mutual delight which must have almost overpowered the brave General Sale, and his wife and daughter, upon their reunion, in common with the other captives and their friends. Words are too weak to express the tumultuous feelings of joy which throbbed in many a bosom on that occasion; suffice it, that such moments as those must, one would think, be the nearest approach to perfect happiness that men can know.

The rescued captives and their liberators now moved along towards the Pass of Suffed-Kak, where were stationed the 13th Light Infantry. Loud and animating was the cheer with which the men saluted each lady as she successively ascended the hill, while a perfect storm of delight burst from the gallant fellows to welcome the lady of their Colonel as she came in sight. The same joyous salutations greeted them wherever they met with friends, and on arriving at General Pollock's camp at sunset on the following day, the thunder of artillery once more proclaimed the joy their presence diffused amongst their countrymen.

The only drawback upon these demonstrations of delight was the knowledge that Captain By-

grave still remained in the hands of Mohamed Akbar, but even on this score all apprehension was soon relieved, as that wily chief, seeing the uselessness and impolicy of further detaining him, gave him his freedom unsolicited, and he completed the triumph of our arms and the general joy, by entering the camp, under escort, a few days afterwards.

The number of prisoners thus rescued from a captivity, its hapless victims had begun to regard as only terminable by death, amounted to upwards of a hundred; of whom nine were ladies, some thirty odd officers, a few children, and the rest non-commissioned officers and privates, chiefly of the 44th. The total number of prisoners, however, including natives, which may be said to have been liberated by our success, was nearly two thousand; of whom the immense majority were the sick and wounded left at Cabool previous to the retreat, and such of the soldiers and camp-followers as had found their way back to the city during and since that perilous time. These were now wandering beggars about the streets.

Our honour, however, seems not to have been considered as yet fully vindicated, nor our vengeance sufficiently appeased, and on the 25th of September, an expedition of about four thousand

men, under General McGaskill, was despatched to Kohistan to ravage the country, and endeavour to secure the persons of Akbar Khan, and other leading chiefs of the rebellion. The main feature of the irruption was the assault and capture of the strong fortress of Istalif, at a short distance from which place the detachment encamped on the 28th.

The same evening General McGaskill proceeded to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and found it to be one of immense natural strength. The town, consisting of masses of houses and forts, was built on the slope of a mountain, in the rear of which are yet loftier eminences shutting in a defile which leads to Toorkistan; and in no way could this place of abode of fifteen thousand people be approached but by surmounting ranges of hills, separated by deep ravines, or traversing by narrow roads its gardens, vineyards, and orchards, fenced in with strong enclosure walls. The whole of them, with the mountain side and the tops of the houses, were occupied by juzailchees; and the strongest proof is afforded that the enemy after this disposition considered the place unassailable, by their having retained within the town the wives and children, not only of the inhabitants, but of thousands of refugees from Cabool.



Soon after daylight on the following morning the troops began to move, and traversed the plain from the left to the right of the enemy's position. Our light troops and guns repressed the occasional attacks of their juzailchees from the gardens, who were numerous and most daring; but when the column arrived in front of the village Ismillah, the General resolved to make a combined attack on this point; Brigadier Tulloch's column assailed its left, and Brigadier Stacey, making a long detour, attacked the right. The action commenced with great gallantry on both sides; Hill's 9th Foot, under Colonel Taylor, the 26th Native Infantry, under Major Huish, and Captain Broadfoot's sappers, who so distinguished themselves at Jellalabad, vied with each other in feats of daring courage, dashing at the almost impregnable positions of the enemy, and leaving them no resource but flight. The 41st Queen's Foot, under Major Brown, the 42d Native Infantry, under Major Clarkson, and the 43d, commanded by Major Nash, now moved forward, covered by their light companies, and got into action on their side, storming the village and vineyards with distinguished bravery. The enemy were driven from every point, and pursued with a rapidity which left no time to rally; and a singular spectacle was then presented in the es-

cape up the mountain side of the women and children from the place, to which no interruption was offered; but as detached parties of the beaten Affghans still occupied some very lofty heights, the mountain train ascended them by a dizzy pathway, and dispersed the fugitives by a destructive fire. Our reserve was now established on the lower heights, and the whole of the place, filled with property of every description, much of it plundered from our army in 1841, was in our possession. After taking out various supplies which might be useful to the troops, the town was set on fire in several places, and the country around devastated without mercy. The troops then continued their route towards Charekar, where we suffered so severely the previous year, a regiment of Ghoorkhas having been entirely cut up, and from which place Major Pottinger and Lieutenant Houghton had effected their arduous retreat to the Cabool cantonments. This town farèd no better than Istalif, but was destroyed in such a way as scarcely to leave a vestige remaining, after which General McGaskill, with his division, rejoined the main army.

These were the last offensive operations undertaken against the Affghans; and the object for which the second expedition into Affghanistan was undertaken, being accomplished in the redemption

of our tarnished glory, the repossession of Cabool, and the restoration to freedom of the prisoners, nothing now remained but to withdraw from the country. Previous to doing so, however, it had been determined to leave behind us in the capital, as well as elsewhere, signal marks of our displeasure; and Colonel Richmond, on the 9th of October, was ordered with a detachment to blow up the principal mosque, and the great covered bazaar, one of the chief ornaments of Cabool. On arriving at the city, the necessary dispositions were made to guard against attacks from the citizens, and attempts at plunder upon the part of the camp followers; after which, the work of destruction commenced. By the evening, the mosque at the head of the bazaar on the West, also two out of the four covered arcades, constituting the great choke, were blown up, and effectually destroyed. The great cause of our animosity against the bazaar was, that the mangled remains of the murdered Envoy were exposed in it to insult. On the following day, the two remaining covered bazaars were blown up, along with the Baurikzye's houses, and a splendid mosque just completed, which had been built in honour of our expulsion from the place. It had also been intended, that the Bala Hissar should share the same fate, but Prince Shah-poor having assumed the royal dignity, it was left for

his protection. With this single exception, all the chief places in Cabool, indeed, the whole town, was ravaged, and destroyed; and although great allowances may be made for the exasperated feelings of the soldiery, there seems something unnecessarily savage in the destructive measures ordered by those in authority.

At length, on the 12th of October, the British army turned its back upon the scenes connected with so many recollections of disaster, and of glory, and proceeded on its homeward march as far as Bootkhak, accompanied by the Prince Futteh Jung. Here arrangements were made for dividing the troops into two columns, to facilitate their progress; and General Pollock with his division, moved forward through the Choord-Cabool Pass, the following morning. General Sale had been despatched the previous day to occupy these heights, and protect the advance of the force; but no enemy appeared, and they arrived at Choord-Cabool unmoëstêd.

At the Tezeen valley, however, which they reached on the 16th, as night was setting in, they met with some opposition, the mountaineers taking advantage of the darkness, to fire upon them; but they were easily kept in check. These marauders continued day by day, to follow up the columns through the Passes, and make attempts

upon the baggage, but without success. On the 18th, however, when General Nott's division which moved on one day's march behind the first, was threading the Jugdulluk Pass, the enemy assembled in greater force, and commenced a desperate attack. Parties were detached to repulse them; still they fought with the utmost determination, frequently charging our men sword in hand; but in spite of all their efforts, not the slightest portion of the baggage fell into their hands.

Thus the troops proceeded, destroying every fort and village in their route, until they arrived at Jellalabad, which was reached by the advanced column on the 23rd. Here also the work of demolition was to be continued, and preparations were made forthwith to blow up the fortifications of the town. The bastions of the fort were mined by Captain Broadfoot's sappers; and on the army quitting the place, the principal bulwarks were blown up, and the interior of the fort fired in all quarters.

They were now once more approaching the formidable Khyber Pass, and a deputation of the chiefs waited upon Captain Mackeson, the political agent, to know what was to be given for a safe passage. Nothing! was the purport of the bold reply; the General intends to force the Pass with

out payment. Accordingly, on the 27th, General Pollock's and General McGaskill's divisions started for Ali Boghan; the rear division, under General Nott, followed on the 29th. The opposition they met with was persevering; but General Pollock achieved the passage with the loss of but few men; a considerable quantity of baggage, however, fell into the hands of the Khyberees. The column reached Peshawar on the 3rd of November. General McGaskill suffered more severely, losing two officers and about sixty Sepoys, and he did not arrive at Peshawar till the 5th. General Nott, with the rear, joined the rest of the army on the 6th, and so admirable had been his arrangements that, although hardly pressed the whole of the previous day by the enemy, he did not lose a single camel, and had but two officers wounded.

The route of the army now lay through the territories of a friendly power, and nothing remarkable occurred till their arrival at Ferozepore. They experienced the most friendly treatment on the part of the Sikhs; but the whole force suffered greatly throughout the remainder of their march, from sickness of various kinds, including the small-pox, and a species of plague, under which many sunk.

At length, on the 17th of September, the gal-

lant Sir Robert Sale and the "illustrious garrison," arrived on the bank of the river Sutlej, opposite to Ferozepore, where thousands were on the tip-toe of expectation to receive him. At this town the Governor-General had previously taken up his residence for the occasion, and the Army of Reserve, the formation of which had been one of the measures, consequent upon our disasters in Affghanistan, had been concentrated upon the same point to do honour to the returning force. About half-past 7 o'clock in the morning, the troops took their ground, forming a line upwards of two miles in extent, on the road leading from the camp to the river; and on the right of the artillery, a line of two hundred and fifty elephants formed a street on both sides of the road, connecting the right of the line of troops with the foot of the bridge. The Governor-General proceeded to this point at a very early hour with his suite, and walked about until the arrival of the Commander-in-chief and staff, when the two shook hands with animation, and a signal was passed to the other side of the stream for the troops to move. Sir Robert Sale then advanced, preceded by Lady Sale and her daughter on two of the Governor-General's elephants, each wearing a cross belt, from which was suspended a Jellalabad medal. The Commander-in-chief rode half way over the bridge

to meet them, while Lord Ellenborough and his suite dismounted, and awaited Sir Robert's approach under a semianah, surrounded by his body guard. ° ° Here his Lordship remained until the whole of the troops had passed, returning the greeting of the gallant force as it marched by. The Commander-in-chief and staff accompanied Sir Robert for a short distance, and then took their leave, when the hero of the occasion proceeded on his way, at the head of his gallant 13th, the band playing the "British Grenadiers"; the 35th Native Infantry, Captain Broadfoot's sappers and miners, the mountain train, and Captain Oldfield's squadron of the 5th cavalry, following. They then passed down the line of troops to their encamping ground between the tents of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-chief, and the thunder of eighteen pieces of artillery pealed forth their welcome back to India. It was a glorious and animating scene, and the man and the occasion were worthy of each other; nevertheless, such honours are barren, if unaccompanied by the more substantial rewards often lavished upon others without a tithe of this officer's merit; and the countrymen of the brave Sir Robert Sale, in contributing liberally towards the enrichment of those who have deserved well of the state, have a right to expect that govern-



ment will seize the opportunity of showing how highly they esteem the claims to such a distinction of the valiant defender of Jellalabad.

General Nott arrived, with his division, at Ferozepore, on the 23rd, bringing with him the famous sandal wood gates of Somnauth. These trophies had been carried away from India eight hundred years before, by the celebrated conqueror, Mahmood of Ghaznee, and upon that place being destroyed by General Nott, he brought the gates away with him, along with the famous mace of that barbarous sovereign, which reposed upon his tomb. The General was met by the Commander-in-chief, with a troop from the 16th Lancers, and one from the 3rd Light Cavalry, a salute being fired upon his approach. General Pollock, upon his arrival, received no salute, in consequence of his intention to cross the river at the time he did, not being known. He had intended to enter Ferozepore on the succeeding day, but the Governor-General having sent to give him the option of crossing at once, he accepted it, and came over immediately, without further announcement. No difference was, however, made by the Governor-General in his reception of the three gallant chiefs, and festivity and rejoicing were, for a time, the order of the day.

It is unnecessary to dwell further upon the proceedings which took place upon the return of the Affghanistan troops to India. The circumstances which led to our occupation of that country, and the operations of our armies consequent upon them, have been detailed with sufficient fulness and fidelity, it is hoped, to give the reader an accurate knowledge of the subject, whether he agrees with the writer's deductions, or otherwise. It is probable, that had Lord Auckland known beforehand, all the difficulties which have beset us in the country of the Affghans, his policy might have undergone some modification. People reason now, upon a full knowledge of all that has occurred, and forget that their information has only been derived from the misfortunes they condemn. But sad as these have been, it is impossible to deny that much good has still resulted from our occupation of Affghanistan. We are now acquainted with the impregnable nature of the country on that side of our Eastern dominions, and shall never have the same fear of an enemy's approach from that quarter, as was previously entertained. Our glorious successes have also had infinitely more effect in impressing both friends and enemies with a knowledge of our power, than our disasters had in the contrary direction, and it is not too much to affirm, in

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spite of all that has been said of the recently tottering state of our Indian empire, that our sway in the East never stood upon a more secure basis, than it does at the present moment, through our triumphs in Affghanistan.

THE END.

