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# Effects of Leadership and Trauma on Grassroots Community Development in Post-Conflict/Genocide Societies: A Rwandan Case Study

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**EFFECTS OF LEADERSHIP AND TRAUMA  
ON GRASSROOTS COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT  
IN POST-CONFLICT/GENOCIDE SOCIETIES:**

**A Rwandan Case Study**

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PIM 67

A Capstone Paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a  
Master of Sustainable Development at the SIT Graduate Institute in Brattleboro, Vermont, USA.

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Advisor: Jim Levinson

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## **DEDICATION**

This Capstone is dedicated to my wonderful husband, Dieudonné, for the love he shows me each day, for never giving up on me, and for all his tremendous help from beginning to finish. Ndagukunda iteka!

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APB	Adult Project Beneficiary	MINALOC	Ministry of Local Governance
BS	Bwishyura Sector		
CPB	Child Project Beneficiary	MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
CI	Constraints Interview	NGOs	Nongovernmental Organizations
CPTSD	Complex Post-traumatic Stress Disorder	PB	Project Beneficiary
CQ1	Constraints Questionnaire 1	PCOM	Parent Committee
CQ2	Constraints Questionnaire 2	PS	Project Stakeholder
DESNOS	Disorder of Extreme Stress Not Otherwise Specified	PTG	Post-traumatic Growth
DS	Dependency Syndrome	PTSD	Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
G1 PB	Group One Project Beneficiary	PTSS	Post-traumatic Stress Symptoms
G2 PB	Group Two Project Beneficiary	RP	Research Participant
GPS	Gitarama Primary School	RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
GOR	Government of Rwanda	SS	Stockholm Syndrome
HV	Hard-version	TAC	Twizere Agriculture Club
IC	Identification Criteria	TACP	Twizere Agriculture Club Project
KD	Karongi District	TES	Traumatic Entrapment Situation
LL	Local Leader	U.S.	United States
LL A	Local Leader A	WII	Wealth Index Interview
LL B	Local Leader B	WIS	Wealth Index Survey
LL C	Local Leader C		

## ABSTRACT

This research paper is an analysis of a grassroots, agricultural project carried out from 2010 to 2011 in Gitarama Cell, a rural community in Rwanda, East Africa, during my United States Peace Corps Volunteer service (2009-2011). The project began as the Twizere Agriculture Club at Gitarama Primary School. The goal of the club was to increase food security among community members through rabbit and chicken husbandry, and the study of such agriculture techniques as composting, double digging, and the establishment of microgardens.

Despite the acknowledged need for this club, the Twizere Agriculture Club project met multiple constraints that affected its outcomes. Discussing them with community members, club participants, and local leaders, and analyzing the constraints provided valuable insight on the psychological and social effects of trauma emanating from domestic conflict and genocide.

The primary findings of the analysis manifest the totalitarian, hard-version Theory X leadership style the current ruling party uses to control the public, as well as corruption and Stockholm syndrome conceivably among the local leader project stakeholders. Evidence revealed appeasement and post-traumatic stress likely within many of the project stakeholders, in addition to divided relationships, showing fear, anger, and mistrust among the project beneficiaries—being probable effects of the 1994 Genocide. The data also illustrated possible dependency syndrome in the project stakeholders.

The analysis led way to the formation of a hypothesis called *The Post-Conflict/Genocide Development Hypothesis*. This hypothesis and the analysis' primary findings may be useful to development workers implementing projects at the grassroots level in post-conflict/genocide societies by preventing some or all of the same constraints that transpired in the Twizere Agriculture Club Project.

## PREFACE

The Republic of Rwanda, “the land of a thousand hills”, is a tiny, land-locked country (Government of Rwanda, 2012) located in East Africa that is nestled among four countries: Uganda to the north, Burundi to the south, Tanzania to the east, and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the west (the Great Lakes region).<sup>1</sup> The land area of Rwanda is 26,338 square kilometers (16,366 square miles)—about the same size as the state of Maryland in the United States (U.S.)—and lies on a volcanic mountain chain (Government of Rwanda, 2012). The country is primarily known for its famous mountain gorillas, the equatorial forest pygmies, and unfortunately, one of the most horrific massacres of history, the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.

The population of Rwanda is estimated to presently be almost 12 million people (Government of Rwanda, 2012) with a ratio of 395 people per square kilometer (and approximately 760 people per square kilometer of arable land), making it the most densely populated country in Africa (International Youth Foundation, 2011)<sup>2</sup>. Three tribes of Bantu origin make up the Rwandan people: The Bahutu (Hutu), the Batutsi (Tutsi), and the Batwa (Twa).<sup>3</sup> People of the Twa have more unique physical features and customs than of the Hutu and Tutsi,<sup>4</sup> but overall they share similar cultural characteristics. For example, all three tribes speak the same Bantu language, *Kinyarwanda*, have the same diet, and historically prayed to the same god, *imana* (Des Forges, 1999). Additionally, Des Forges (1999) states that historically, polygamy and intermarriage between people of the Hutu and Tutsi were common before, but

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A, Figures 1-3 (pp. 92 & 93).

<sup>2</sup> Rwanda has an estimated 3% annual growth rate. The population of almost 12 million people has increased from 8 million in 2000. It is typical in rural Rwanda that the majority of people rent or own a very small plot (less than one hectare), and often cannot grow enough to feed themselves (Government of Rwanda, 2000).

<sup>3</sup> According to the U.S. State Department Bureau of African Affairs (2011), the Hutu people made up the majority of the population (90%), while 9% were Tutsi, and the remaining 1% consisted of the Twa before the genocide.

<sup>4</sup> The Twa in Rwanda are the indigenous forest pygmies who historically dwelt in neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo. The Twa are a marginalized group and most live in extreme poverty.

atypical after conflicts between these two tribes. Likewise, people of the Twa intermarried occasionally with people of the Hutu and Tutsi tribes, but this practice was, and still is, shunned by the general public.

Rwanda's conflicted history between the Hutu and Tutsi tribes is long and complex. Rwanda was one of the last countries in Africa to be colonized by Europe and it gained independence following a revolt in 1959 (U.S. State Department Bureau of African Affairs, 2011). Several substantial events layered upon each other—including a civil war—and ultimately led to the boiling point of the 1994 Genocide.<sup>5</sup> The underlying causes behind these conflicts concerned problems with the sharing of power between authorities, misconceptions of each other, and fear (passed down from one generation to the next).

There is no doubt that the terrible event of the genocide left a devastating impact on Rwandans everywhere. Sixteen years later, institutions, infrastructure, and the economy have been rebuilt and restored, but the nation's individuals have not. They are still in the slow and painful process of trying to heal from the past. The Government of Rwanda (GOR), along with many other actors, including international governments, global and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and universities worldwide have invested in the post-conflict reconstruction and development of Rwanda since 1994.

In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, post-conflict development focused on meeting the basic needs of refugees (healthcare, water and sanitation facilities, food, shelter, and protection), and the rebuilding of the destroyed infrastructure in the country (Government of Rwanda, 2000). The majority of development programs today revolve around expanding and improving the core areas for sustainable development in Rwanda—its economy<sup>6</sup> and

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<sup>5</sup> See Appendix B, *Significant Events in Rwandan History*, Figure 5, for a more detailed account (p. 94).

<sup>6</sup> According to the GOR (2000), 90% of the labor force in Rwanda is subsistent agriculture.

infrastructure. The education, health, and information technology sectors, as well as an increased focus on gender equality policies are also recipients of development programs (Government of Rwanda, 2000). Development programs are administered under major frameworks such as, the GOR's Vision 2020 Development Plan,<sup>7</sup> the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) initiative.<sup>8,9</sup>

The U.S. Peace Corps is one of the many development partners that are working with the GOR and other organizations to achieve Vision 2020 and the MDGs.<sup>10</sup> Peace Corps returned to Rwanda in July of 2008 under funding from PEPFAR and as a partner of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) after a 15-year absence following the genocide. In January 2009, the first group of 34 Peace Corps Volunteers (of which I was a part) arrived in Rwanda to begin work in the health sector.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Vision 2020 is a comprehensive plan written by GOR in 2000 that strategically maps Rwanda's post-genocide road to development in all public and private sectors. For more information about Vision 2020, go to the GOR's Ministry of Economics and Finance's (MINECOFIN) website at <http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/ministry/key/vision2020>.

<sup>8</sup> See [www.pepfar.gov/frameworks/index.htm](http://www.pepfar.gov/frameworks/index.htm) for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief's (PEPFAR) framework for development in Rwanda.

<sup>9</sup> President Paul Kagame states in the introduction of the GOR's (2000) Vision 2020 Development Plan, "Today, Rwanda finds itself at a crossroads, moving from the humanitarian assistance phase associated with the 1994 genocide into one of sustainable development" (p. 4).

<sup>10</sup> The GOR is striving to establish and promote Vision 2020 and the MDGs following the genocide in the effort to develop the local public. (See Rwanda's National Institute of Statistics at [www.statistics.gov.rw](http://www.statistics.gov.rw) for more information on the MDGs in Rwanda). The GOR requires any guests doing development work in the country to collaborate on projects that support the GOR's development goals to reduce project duplication. See the GOR's website at [www.gov.rw](http://www.gov.rw) for more information about this policy.

<sup>11</sup> The role of Health PCVs in Rwanda is to collaborate with community members and NGOs to assist the Rwanda's Ministry of Health (MINISANTE) in designing and conducting activities that focus on community development in the areas of healthcare, health education, and capacity building. For more information about Peace Corps/Rwanda, visit [www.peacecorps.gov](http://www.peacecorps.gov).

# INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. Background of the Project Area

The administrative divisions of Rwanda are similar to those of the U.S. The five provinces—North Province, South Province, East Province, West Province, and Kigali City Province—are the equivalent of U.S. states. Each province is partitioned into districts, equivalent to U.S. counties, and each district is made up of sectors, similar to townships in U.S. counties. The sectors consist of cells, which are the same as U.S. towns (or cities). Small villages, making up a cell are comparable to neighborhoods in the U.S. Gitarama Cell is located in West Province, in the district of Karongi, in Bwishyura Sector (BS).<sup>12</sup> This rural area of BS is approximately 16 kilometers (10 miles) from Karongi District’s (KD) main town, Karongi (formerly known as Kibuye).<sup>13</sup> Lake Kivu separates Kibuye from the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Gitarama Cell<sup>14</sup> has nine institutions, consisting of two primary schools, one local administrative office, and six churches.<sup>15</sup> Infrastructure includes one main narrow dirt road that leads from Kibuye to the Gitarama administrative office, and several dirt walking paths (including one that goes from Gitarama to the main Kibuye-Kigali road). The only transportation to Gitarama Primary School (GPS) at present is by foot or motorcycle.<sup>16</sup> Gitarama has no general stores, electricity, paved roads, or market. Clean water, however, is abundant because of the natural, free-flowing spring water that runs through the hills from a source down to a river that

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<sup>12</sup> See Appendix A, Figure 4 (p. 93).

<sup>13</sup> Before the genocide, the town of Karongi was called Kibuye. To prevent confusion, Karongi will be referred to as Kibuye for the duration of this paper because the majority of the Rwandan population and the international community knew and still refer to the town as Kibuye.

<sup>14</sup> For the duration of this paper, Gitarama Cell will be written Gitarama, as it is locally called.

<sup>15</sup> At the time of this research, the GOR was in the process of measuring and remapping all the land throughout the country in efforts to complete part of Vision 2020. After many attempts of inquiring about the exact size of Gitarama at its administrative office, the BS and KD administrative offices, and the National Statistics Institute and Ministry of Local Governance (MINALOC) in Kigali, no specific information was found.

<sup>16</sup> The community is presently constructing a dirt road wide enough for a car to pass that leads from the main Kibuye-Kigali paved road as part of cell-level umuganda. Imiganda is the plural of umuganda, which translating from Kinyarwanda means “community volunteer work days”. For more information on umuganda, visit <http://www.rgb.rw/main-menu/innovation/umuganda.html>.



flows into Lake Kivu. This water is not privatized as it is in Kibuye, and the GOR recently installed several hillside water pipes and reservoirs to control and maintain this water for public use. The majority of the houses are small simple structures built of mud (some have old, cracked cement on the walls) and have either tin or clay-tile roofs. Most are divided into a few small rooms and up to 10 people may live in a household (as told by locals).

According to the 2002 census,<sup>17</sup> about 677 families in eight different villages occupy Gitarama; 1,448 are men, 1,605 are women, and the number of children is unknown (National Institute of Statistics, 2003). Local authorities at the Gitarama administrative office approximate that 99.9% of people living in Gitarama are subsistent farmers, while the other 0.1% teach at the two local primary schools or hold other jobs as alternative sources of income. Some other “wealthier” families have member(s) with steady employment in Kibuye, but the main source of income outside agriculture for most of Gitarama’s families, is irregular hire as manual labor.

Kibuye locals remark that Gitarama is the poorest area in KD and academic performance is the lowest in the region. The National Institute of Statistics (2005) reports that an estimated 85% of the local population in Gitarama lives in extreme poverty, and the other 15% lives in moderate poverty. According to local authorities, few Gitarama children attend school because of poverty, and a substantial number of these usually end up quitting in the early grades to tend to household chores, younger siblings, or outside employment. Others leave to live elsewhere with relatives. An estimated 20% of children have severe malnutrition and 60% are estimated to have moderate malnutrition.

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<sup>17</sup> The Population and Housing Census in Rwanda takes place every ten years. The 2012 census is in process. See Rwanda’s National Institute of Statistics at [www.statistics.gov.rw](http://www.statistics.gov.rw) for more information.

## 1.2. The Twizere Agriculture Club Project

During my two-and-a-half year Peace Corps service in Rwanda, I discovered the hardships of poor crop production and malnutrition with which most Rwandans cope on a daily basis. While working with community members in Kibuye, I learned of a rural area in BS, having an enormous need for assistance. With the help of fellow Rwandan community members, I co-designed and co-implemented an agricultural project that focused on animal husbandry of rabbits and chickens, and bio-intensive agricultural techniques (alternative methods to traditional farming in Rwanda) for the community in Gitarama. The pilot project began as an agriculture club, called The Twizere (*let's have hope*) Agriculture Club (TAC), for students at GPS and their parents/guardians, and was a secondary project of my Peace Corps service.

Recognizing the widespread prevalence of food insecurity<sup>18</sup> in Gitarama, I was interested in addressing the problem through the Twizere Agriculture Club Project (TACP). Furthermore, I was particularly curious to see how microgardens<sup>19</sup> (bio-intensive home gardens), commonly established in urban areas, might play a role in increasing food security in an overpopulated, rural area, such as Gitarama. The project's goal was to increase food security among an impoverished, rural population, as one way of helping Rwandans meet the objectives of Vision 2020.<sup>20</sup> Initial plans included trainings with club members on rabbit and chicken husbandry, bio-intensive cultivating techniques (including microgardens), and home implementation by club members. Individual interviews and focus groups would examine the effects of club activities on food security levels and the personal growth of club members.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> The soil in West Province, particularly in KD, is poor despite the sufficient rainfall and groundwater supply because of the depleted nutrients and high acid content. This results in low quantity and quality of crop production.

<sup>19</sup> See Appendix C, *Microgardens* (p. 96), for more information.

<sup>20</sup> Under the six pillars, and the short and long-term objectives of Vision 2020: Promotion of macroeconomic stability and wealth creation to reduce aid dependency (short-term) and create a productive middle class and fostering entrepreneurship (long-term). See Appendix C (p. 104).

<sup>21</sup> See Appendix D, *Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design* (p. 101) for a complete description.

Many community members and I anticipated the TACP to spread throughout Gitarama starting with students at GPS and their families and spreading beyond this community.

Unfortunately, the project ran into serious constraints before club activities could be executed, beginning when efforts were made to conduct baseline surveys of TACP beneficiaries chosen by GPS personnel (school leaders and teachers) using pre-determined identification criteria (IC).<sup>22</sup>

### **1.3. Statement of the Research Question**

Article II of Resolution 260 (III) A of the United Nations General Assembly (United Nations General Assembly, 1948) defines genocide as:

“...any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (p. 174).

Upon examination, the constraints of the TACP appeared to be associated with the widespread trauma experienced in Rwanda during and after the 1994 Genocide. This initial review made it clear that a systematic analysis, in light of the genocide trauma, would be particularly useful in understanding why these constraints occurred. The conducted qualitative research takes the form of a phenomenological case study based on the experience of the TAC project with the single community of Gitarama. The purpose of this study is to lend insight into the challenges other development workers may encounter undertaking projects in comparable post-conflict/genocide contexts such as that of Rwanda. This paper assesses the case study’s constraints and their likely association with the traumatic effects of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. It is my intent that the lessons learned will aid the successful implementation of future projects.

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<sup>22</sup> See Appendix D, *Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design* for the IC (p. 101).

Some of the conceptual frameworks I used to analyze and comprehend the constraints were theories on post-trauma psychopathology and sociology, behavioral characteristics of individualist and collectivist cultures, styles of leadership and political systems, and corruption at the local level and within leadership. Societal hierarchies and the effects of a post-conflict culture—particularly trust, fear, and motivation—were other conceptual frameworks explored. The particular culture emerging from the conflict and genocide, the inability to progress through innovation and self-reliance due to the psychological development of helplessness and dependency on outside assistance, are a few examples of what likely influenced the constraints faced in this project. Rwanda’s economy, and the structure of the government and its existing developmental initiatives, as well as hierarchical and leadership dynamics in Rwanda, are other examples. The analysis of these theories will determine the extent of influence to which they are consistent with the constraints faced in the TACP. Throughout this analysis, I will attempt to answer the following primary question and sub-questions:

Primary Question:

In what ways can the lessons learned from a grassroots, community development project assist future project designs for post-conflict/genocide societies?

Sub-questions:

- (a) How did the dynamics of leadership in Rwanda relate to the constraints identified in the Twizere Agriculture Club Project?
- (b) How did the *post-conflict culture* of Gitarama affect the implementation of Twizere Agriculture Club activities?

## LITERATURE REVIEW

A traumatic experience can permanently damages one's psyche and/or rip apart a society's social fabric, rendering it forever changed. Rwanda's civil war and genocide, and the resulting aftermath of these two conflicts are complex traumatic events that continue to affect millions of lives including the nation's current leaders. Uvin (2001) states:

...[genocide] and the enduring consequences of genocide...permeates, affects, and influences human behavior so totally that it is remarkable that the survivors and the government have been able to exercise the degree of restraint they have been exhibiting (p. 179).

This review will present the existing literature on trauma along with leadership, dependency syndrome, and corruption in post-conflict societies.

### 2.1. Trauma

Aït Sidhoum, Arar, Bouatta, Khaled, & Elmasri (2002) define trauma as:

The conjunction of two types of facts: on one side, there are events that strike the individual and the situation he finds himself in from the outside, temporarily or long-term. On the other side, there are internal means by which the individual has to face these events and to cope with these situations (p. 381).<sup>23</sup>

Overall, eight generic dimensions of trauma exist. One can observe them to be common stressors worldwide, although the ways in which they are recognized vary among different cultures (de Jong, 2002). De Jong (2002) states the eight dimensions of trauma as:

(a) threat to life and limb (b) severe physical harm or injury (c) receipt of intentional injury or harm (d) exposure to the grotesque (e) violent/sudden loss of a loved one (f) witnessing or learning of violence to a loved one (g) learning of exposure to a noxious agent (h) causing death or severe harm to another (p. 35).

Traumatic events often create confusion in individuals—who perceive their lives as threatened—and destroy their sense of control and trust in the world (Hamber & Wilson, 2002).

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<sup>23</sup> Aït Sidhoum et al. (2002) further explain that trauma occurs when these events threaten an individual's homeostatic balance and he or she must cope with them, but his or her coping mechanisms are not sufficient; or, he or she cannot restore this balance in the short-term without professional help.

There is no doubt that people who experience extremely horrific circumstances respond in different ways depending on how they perceive the situation. One's society, culture, and the political system usually influence a victim's reaction to the event (Summerfield, 1995). Victims may develop trauma, which could result in chronic post-traumatic stress, and a range of other psychopathological disorders.

An intense lack of control over one's surroundings affects people of all ages—particularly children—and leaves them vulnerable to developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD is one of the most prominent psychopathological disorders a victim can develop after experiencing a traumatic event, particularly when a victim encounters intense physical harm (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). The definition of PTSD is not the same in all cultures,<sup>24</sup> nor does exposure to trauma always mean automatic development of PTSD (de Jong, 2002). There is a parallel between a negative event and PTSD: the more unpredictable and uncontrollable the event with its associated stress, the more likely PTSD symptoms<sup>25</sup> will manifest, and the more probable pre-existing PTSD symptoms will intensify. (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). Moreover, re-experiencing symptoms are more apt to develop or be prolonged if the individual is confronted by another related traumatic event. *Active avoidance* (learned helplessness)—giving a designated response to avoid punishments—or *passive avoidance*—avoiding situations that may give reminders of the traumatic event—may also be elicited (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006).

According to Siegmund & Wotjak (2006), symptoms of PTSD usually last for at least

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<sup>24</sup> Cultures around the world have diverse definitions of illnesses. Studies of how local cultures perceive mental health should be studied before applying Westernized clinical definitions and indicators to cases in non-Westernized countries (Favila, 2009).

<sup>25</sup> Symptoms of PTSD fall under the three categories: re-experiencing, avoidance, and increased arousal, as stated by the DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition) (Mineka & Zinbarg, 1996 and Cantor & Price, 2007). According to Cantor & Price (2007), Mineka & Zinbarg (1996), and Siegmund & Wotjak (2006), symptoms in the re-experiencing category include a heightened memory and victims have vivid recollections of the trauma, including nightmares, flashbacks, and emotional distress when exposed to reminders of the event. Symptoms in the avoidance category include avoiding situations or thoughts related to the traumatic event (physical and emotional numbness) and gaps in memory recall (dissociative amnesia). The increased arousal category shows symptoms of disturbed functioning (difficulty sleeping or concentrating), generalized anxiety (exaggerated startle, hypervigilance and a fear beyond the individual's control), and hyporesponding (emotional blunting, social withdrawal, irritability, anger, having an aggressive behavior, and/or always being in a defensive state) (Cantor & Price, 2007; Mineka & Zinbarg, 1996; Siegmund & Wotjak, 2006).

several weeks or may increase as time passes. In response to trauma-related cues, profound conditioned fear and anxiety, including feelings of mental and physical numbness, as well as mental intrusions about the traumatic event are magnified and are key features of PTSD (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006; Frewen & Lanius, 2006). Studies on PTSD show that age, sex, and ethnicity differ in response to trauma. Two-thirds of victims with PTSD symptoms are women (Aït Sidhoum et al., 2002; Cavin, 2006; Pham, Weinstein, & Longman, 2004). This statement was found to be true in Rwanda among the post-genocide female population according to post-genocide PTSD studies (Pham et al., 2004). Favila (2009) references a study where 80% of women surveyed displayed signs of trauma. These circumstances influence the development of PTSD in females because they can be a bigger target for abuse<sup>26</sup> (Aït Sidhoum et al., 2002; Pham et al., 2004), and/or women and men may respond differently to trauma (Cavin, 2006). Women also may have the responsibility of running a household alone because their husbands are missing, dead, or in jail (Qouta & el-Sarraj, 2002).

Oftentimes after extreme cases of trauma, PTSD turns into complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) (Cantor & Price, 2007). A field trial of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV) of PTSD elucidated CPTSD as a “Disorder of Extreme Stress Not Otherwise Specified” (DESNOS)<sup>27</sup> with more intricate, dispersed, and persistent symptoms than ordinary PTSD (e.g. distinctive changes in personality) (Cantor & Price, 2007). Luxenburg, Spinazzola, & van der Kolk (2001) give three noteworthy symptoms of DESNOS as frequent forgetfulness or spacing out, an “everybody is out just for themselves” attitude, and the belief that it is impossible to make positive changes in life (chronic learned

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<sup>26</sup> Many women of post-trauma households take the brunt of their husbands’ frustration, anger, and trauma symptoms, and may become the victims of domestic abuse (Qouta & el-Sarraj, 2002).

<sup>27</sup> Research suggests that DESNOS does not occur in relation to specific traumatic experiences; however, DESNOS can appear in someone with a history of interpersonal victimization, multiple traumatic events, and/or an extended duration of traumatic exposure (Luxenburg, Spinazzola, & van der Kolk, 2001).

helplessness affecting the ability to generate options, make choices and changes, and act on one's own behalf).

When a victim is in a traumatic entrapment situation (TES) (entrapped and unable to flee), and at the mercy of a perpetrator, the victim then can experience repeated trauma, and therefore is more susceptible to developing CPTSD<sup>28</sup> (Cantor & Price, 2007). Mental health specialists have strong evidence that when a person is traumatically entrapped, appeasing becomes the basis of CPTSD and may lead to *Stockholm syndrome* (SS)<sup>29</sup> (Cantor & Price, 2007). Cantor & Price (2007) also claim that victims in a TES, particularly severe abusive relationships, may subject themselves to dominant hierarchies, reverted escape, de-escalation, and conditional reconciliation in order to physically and mentally survive the trauma.

SS is a result of PTSD or CPTSD. It is a condition in which victims of abuse (children or adults)—especially ones who have been held hostage, or experience daily domestic abuse—evolve positive feelings towards their perpetrators. These positive feelings not only allow the victim to obey the perpetrator's demands, but also may create a situation where the victim idealizes and even defends the perpetrator after his or her release (Cantor & Price, 2007). Perpetrators generate hostile environments to create a dominant hierarchy with which they can manipulate and control the victim. Threats may produce a sense of unpredictability that leads to heightened stress in the individual, thus more or less guaranteeing total compliance and positive attachment to the oppressor. To terminate verbal death threats or other physical and/or verbal threats of torture, the victim submits himself or herself (Cantor & Price, 2007).

Cantor & Price (2007) identify four conditions that form the base of SS evolution:

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<sup>28</sup> CPTSD is especially common in victims of torture in TESs. Military and civilian, concentration camps, wartime and post-war time prisons, torture, kidnapping, abusive cults, and domestic abuse are examples of TES (Cantor & Price, 2007) as well as civil wars and genocides where physical and psychological torturing is likely to occur.

<sup>29</sup> In TES, the relationship of power between perpetrators and victims is extremely imbalanced. Biologists and researchers have found that the natural defense mechanism for mammals in surviving a TES is to appease the offender or attacker (Cantor & Price, 2007).



(a) perceived threat to one's physical or psychological survival by being at the mercy of a perpetrator (b) perceived small acts of kindness towards the victim from the perpetrator (c) isolation from any opinions or thoughts other than those of the perpetrator (d) an inability to escape the situation. Brainwashing is another cause of SS (Cantor & Price, 2007). Researchers claim that victims unconsciously develop SS as a way of psychologically helping him or her manage the traumatic experience, which may assist the victim in surviving a severe TES (Cantor & Price, 2007). Twisting reality and making excuses for the perpetrator's behavior helps the victim reduce anxiety and stress, but causes the victim to identify and connect emotionally with the perpetrator. Researchers also claim that the longer the victim experiences the TES, the more likely SS will develop (Cantor & Price, 2007).

Trauma influences change in one's ability to control the following five emotions: *fear*, *panic*, *anger*, *trust*, and *motivation*. Bar-Tal (2001) affirms that emotions are a reflection of any given society and its individuals. Fear can be evoked by non-threatening, conditioned stimuli that result from societal cues or a specific internal trigger that teaches to fear certain objects, events, people, or situations, sometimes based on a past traumatic experience (Bar-Tal, 2001). The sense of uncontrollability of life events—especially early life experiences—can oftentimes lead to anger, particularly if there is a later threat or danger to the individual. According to Barlow, Chorpita, & Turovsky (1996), anger is “characterized by a sense of control and mastery...angry individuals are directing their attention outward toward the source of threat and actively attempting to cope with the situation” (p. 302). This is in opposition to people experiencing fear. Fearful people tend not to cope actively with an imposing threat, opting instead to flee the situation (Barlow et al., 1996). Trust is a key component for the healthy functioning of groups and the development of societies, as it is essential in building solid relationships (Lewis and

Weigert, 2001). Lewis & Weigert (1985) claim that trust is not an isolated phenomenon within an individual; it is dynamic across collective groups, and sociologists determine it is one of the few, if not the only, alternative to chaos and paralyzing fear between these groups.

Another key aspect important to the development of societies is motivation. Motivation pushes individuals to improve performance or advance by intrinsic or extrinsic gratification (autonomous or controlled motivation) (Deci & Ryan, 2008). The innate desire to succeed may increase or decrease when an outside reward is offered, depending on how it must be earned. Sometimes, amotivation occurs when people lose any motivation to work at all (Deci & Ryan, 2008). Amotivation—also known as dependency syndrome (DS) or “brain drain”, according to de Jong (2002)—usually happens when others make decisions and carry out activities for someone and he or she gets no satisfaction from producing the outcome (Deci & Ryan, 2008). Long-standing refugees are one example of a social group who usually develop learned helplessness and/or dependency syndrome (Baron, 2002) because of trauma and/or handouts.

Self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2008) claims that autonomous motivation meets the psychological needs for achievement, intimacy, and control, leading to greater psychological health and improved healthy behaviors. Controlled motivation, on the other hand, is external regulation of one’s actions and is based on a reward/punishment system (Deci & Ryan, 2008). The will to develop or improve performance is enhanced by external motivators, such as fear, outside approval, an avoidance of shame, and a desire to boast. Moreover, controlled motivation tends to drain energy (Deci & Ryan, 2008) and leaves the individual in a psychological state of inferiority, hopelessness, and despair.

Not every person who undergoes trauma suffers severe consequences, such as extreme mistrust or psychopathological disorder. Many things determine an individual’s mastery or

resiliency (resistance and recovery) to a negative or traumatic event (Yehuda, Flory, Southwick, & Charney, 2006). Some determinants for resiliency and post-traumatic growth (PTG) include a feeling of control over early-life stressors (Yehuda et al., 2006), proximity to the disaster and if an individual's circle of personal resources was affected directly (Schaefer & Moos, 1998). For example, Schaefer & Moos (1998) explain that PTG occurs less commonly in populations where large-scale disasters (natural or man-made) and epidemics were rampant, and whole families and societies were involved. This involuntary involvement destroys social and emotional ties and the capacity of families and communities to supply support or resources to victims. Dyregrov, Gupta, Gjestad, & Mukanoheli (2000) add that the destruction of community ties, in addition to collective coping mechanisms and support, induce children's emotional disturbances and grief resulting from traumatic events.

Pham et al. (2004) studied PTSD in Rwanda and found that the more an individual was exposed to an abundance of traumatic events, the more likely he or she was to develop PTSD symptoms;<sup>30</sup> likewise, he or she would also be less likely to support reconciliation efforts and believe in community interdependence. Schaefer & Moos (1998) add that it may take months or years for an individual to develop PTG, if at all. It is common and necessary for someone to experience a period of distress and grief beforehand. However, people need to resolve their depression and anger (even if partially) before any growth can occur (Schaefer & Moos, 1998).

Adults and children receive their stress through their environments (de Jong, 2002). The most common post-traumatic stress symptoms (PTSS) in adults immediately following trauma are emotional distress and negativity, vulnerability, helplessness, hopelessness or powerlessness, despair, intense panic, acute stress, and dissociation (de Jong, 2002 and et al., 1995). Poverty

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<sup>30</sup> Favila (2009) emphasizes that biological, cultural, and situational elements may influence the experiencing, and reporting of trauma symptoms by survivors in Rwanda.

aggravates the unbalance of emotional well-being and misery of traumatized adults (Favila, 2009), and the effects of trauma sustain poverty. Children may also endure one or all of the PTSS adults suffer, depending on their age, and the severity and duration of the trauma (de Jong, 2002). PTSS in children influence improper emotional, behavioral, cognitive, and social functioning and lead to secondary depression and personality disorders<sup>31</sup> (Aldwin & Sutton, 1998; Demaria, Barrett, Kerasiotis, Rohlih, & Chemtob, 2006; de Jong, 2002).

A 1995 study by Neugebauer, Fisher, Turner, Yamabe, Sarsfield, & Stehling-Ariza (2009), done throughout Rwanda with about 3,000 children ages 8-19 years old, found that over 90% of these children had witnessed the eight dimensions of trauma during the genocide. Fifty-four to sixty-two percent met the norms for 'probable PTSD'. Among the children most highly exposed to trauma, the rates of probable 'PTSD' were found to be 100%. The study concluded that large scale, man-made violence eliminates psychological resilience (Neugebauer et al. 2009), supporting Schaefer & Moos's (1998) claims on PTG.

The effect trauma plays on an individual does not necessarily dissipate in a month, a year, or even several years after the horrific event. Without appropriate counseling, complex trauma can seep into the subconscious of the victim and wreck havoc on his or her psyche. As Dyregrov et al. (2000) and de Jong (2002) explain, time does not heal psychological wounds for many people, and children can be affected when their caretakers are greatly distressed. Traumatic neuroses invade the mind of survivors through a process of forgetting and remembering (Leed, 2000) and may be signs or contributors of post-traumatic stress.

Forty-five years after World War II and several years after the Gulf War, studies proved

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<sup>31</sup> According to case studies conducted in Cambodia, Mozambique, Algeria, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Northern Uganda and Iraq, both school-aged children and adolescents who witnessed traumatic events developed severe behavioral abnormalities, inadequate memory performance, and a block in their cognitive thinking from poor concentration (de Jong, 2002). The research suggests that these inhibitions may interfere with future school performance of other traumatized children and adolescents in similar contexts (Dyregrov et al., 2000 and Somasundaram & Jamunanatha, 2002) and cause them to have detrimental effects in family and social life, and later in the work force.

victims were still suffering from many mental disorders and physical diseases due to the conditions they had witnessed (Dyregrov et al., 2000 and Leed, 2000). PTSS in survivors is often suppressed, denied, or forgotten (Kellerman, 2001) and can be passed to other members of the family (*secondary traumatic stress*), especially from mother to child (Aït Sidhoum et al., 2002; de Jong, 2002; Figley & Kleber, 1995) one, two, or possibly many generations later (*transgenerational trauma*) (Kellerman, 2001 and Scharf, 2007). Reuben Hill created the ABC-X Model of Family Stress to study the effects of stress on a family and coping mechanisms used in order to understand a family's resilience to a traumatic event (Goddard & Allen, 1991).<sup>32</sup>

Psychosocial services in Rwanda for survivors are limited, according to Rogoff (2009)<sup>33</sup>, which means that many Rwandans may still be suffering from trauma, as well as their children. Favila's (2009) investigation on the treatment of PTSD in Rwanda revealed that in 2008 only three psychiatrists were working throughout the country. The investigation also showed that where programs for diagnosis and treatment (counseling) of trauma and PTSD existed through NGO and GOR partnerships, they have largely disappeared to make room for HIV prevention and treatment programs. Many of these programs following the genocide were insensitive to Rwandan culture and the context of genocide. Favila (2009) explains that any available counseling treatment given today in Rwanda typically is stationed in Kigali, leaving the majority of the rural population unable to receive help because of a lack of resources for locals to come to Kigali and for organizations to go to the rural areas. Furthermore, mental health programs today tend to categorize survivors under the labeled roles of "victims" or "perpetrators".

The studies done in Sudan, Algeria, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Northern Uganda, and

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<sup>32</sup> In the ABC-X Model, A = the traumatic event or stressor, B = what resources or family strengths are available, C = meaning attached to the event, X = (the level of) crisis and stress. The A, B, and C components combined determine the X component.

<sup>33</sup> Association Rwandaise des Conseillers de Trauma (ARCT-Ruhuka) is one local NGO that offers psychosocial counseling through trained Rwandan counselors (Rogoff, 2009).

Mozambique prove that psychosocial reactions<sup>34</sup> are part of the cultural coping strategies used by survivors and have become an inescapable part of daily life. These coping strategies can lead to a lack of motivation, helplessness, hopelessness, and fear among victims, which may change family, community, and cultural structures (Aït Sidhoum et al., 2002 and Somasundaram & Jamunanantha, 2002). Modifications in cultural norms may make a society whose culture is predominately collectivist into one that is primarily individualist, and vice versa.

When one looks at sociological studies in different contexts, one generally finds that in collectivist cultures, conformity is common, relationships are intense, deep, and stable, and interdependence is practiced. On the other hand, in individualist cultures, relationships are usually detached and not as intimate, and self-reliance is accentuated (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). In collectivist cultures, the focus is on the in-group (the intimate group of social relations and interactions) rather than the individual. However, individuals have few obligations to the group and are free to do one's business, compete, and achieve as one wishes without needing to regard the in-group in individualist cultures. (Asai et al., 1988). Naturally, as time progresses, they change, but, an event as devastating as war or disaster has a huge impact on the culture. The conflict or catastrophe can influence a society's cultural norms so much so, that certain elements of a society's individualist or collectivist culture change as people adapt to the situation and their circumstances.

Individuals in a predominately collectivist-characterized culture begin to behave in ways of predominately individualist-characterized cultures and vice versa. One example of this is the collective coping strategies of a collectivist culture. Collectivist cultures emphasize in-group

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<sup>34</sup> These psychosocial reactions include PTSS; anxiety and panic disorders (e.g. separation and general anxiety, social and agoraphobia from living with insecurity, threats, and possible revenge); deep suspicion and mistrust; profound fear of leaders, community groups; and individual community members; self-reservation; avoidance; denial; anger outburst and cruelty; and silence (Aït Sidhoum et al., 2002; Kumar, 2002; Somasundaram & Jamunanantha, 2002). Another probable psychosocial reaction is telling lies to protect oneself in a society of post-conflict (protracted and internal) and/or one with an authoritarian/totalitarian regime.

(subgroup) harmony and collective coping, which usually makes dealing with unpleasant life events easier (Asai et al., 1988). When an entire country has been affected by a protracted conflict, people become scared, angry, or indifferent to fellow community members. Coming together as a group with deep relationships to help each other cope with the trauma is difficult and almost non-existent. Therefore, that feature of the culture changes and starts to reflect the attribute of less intimate relationships of the in-group, typically found in individualistic cultures.

Oftentimes after large-scale traumatic events such as a war, genocide, or conflict, the social fabric of the community is shredded, and collective trauma seizes the population. Baron (2002) reports from interviews with Sudanese refugees, “the overall personality of the family and community changes...As an overall group they were now less trusting and more fearful of each other and less motivated to help each other” (pg. 167). A conflict implicates much more than the opposing sides; whole societies become involved and pay the consequences of such chaos, “not only when it takes the form of explicit violence, but even when the violence is muted” Kelman states (2007, p. 69). Brahim (2007) summarizes the reality of the atmosphere in post-conflict countries well when he says, “there is an absence of war, but not necessarily real peace” (p. 3)—real peace internally within an individual and externally among community members. Van de Put & Eisenbruch (2002) describes trauma to be “pervasive, massive, chronic, complex, and multilayered” (p. 106). Victims of complex trauma view and accept the effects of trauma as a normal part of life (de Jong, 2002; Van de Put and Eisenbruch, 2002).

The steadfast change in the fundamental character of a community due to internal, protracted conflict dictates and controls individual PTG and societal development, including collective reconciliation. Thereby, a new social fabric of the afflicted society is established with new cultural norms creating a special culture that is defined by the traumatic event. These

changes in a community's personality can be phrased as a *post-conflict culture*. What existed before the conflict either changes so radically due to trauma, or is nearly destroyed during the struggle of the conflict. Demaria and Wright (2006) describe two dominant processes of a post-conflict culture as:

The ways in which a cultural system successfully reproduces and even consolidates itself by inscribing conflict into its dominant practices and...the ways in which a conflict constitutes a symbolic encounter that threatens to deeply affect, even to transform, the meanings that make up the fabric of any culture (p. 6).

Aït Sidhoum et. al (2002) and Somasundaram and Jamunanantha (2002) put the conflict and post-conflict setting as, "a complete disruption of normal life patterns...a continuing atmosphere of fear and terror...a decline in social cohesion and support ...They have lost their way of life and culture" (pp. 227, 228, 402). De Jong (2002) remarks, "the 'culture of fear' may interact with the chronic sequential war traumas and with the daily difficulties of living in a devastated area, a refugee camp, or a repressive environment" (p. 15). Counter-violence, leaders (e.g. police forces or community leaders), and gangs or individuals seeking revenge (de Jong, 2002) can be the reason for the culture of fear because of their life-threatening dangers, as well as physical and economic insecurity, and suspicion of fellow community members (in a protracted, internal conflict) (Bar-Tal, 2001 and Fischer, 2006). "The dominance of a collective fear orientation is not the exception, but the rule," says Bar-Tal (2001, p.619).

A study in post-conflict Bosnia reported that a common survival tactic for citizens is to use ethnic and political relationships (a psychosocial reaction to their trauma) (Fischer, 2006). In the post-conflict setting, especially under another oppressing ruler, this could mean that people may exploit each other and the issue of ethnicity or politics to advance or protect themselves against revenge. Agger & Jensen (1996) point out that the use of psychological weapons of self-defense is one mechanism of protection against state terrorism. Stein (1997) highlights that



weakened institutions and insecurity from internal conflict fabricate a dangerous environment for civil society. Innocent communal programs end in violent disputes and social disintegration. Furthermore, Aït Sidhoum et al. (2002) say that insecure living situations are “high traumatic potentials” that induce severe stress, possibly exceeding an individual’s coping capacity.

Changes in power dynamics along with uncertainty result in recriminations, accusations, and revenge among populations (Somasundaram & Jamunanantha, 2002). Victims who are robbed of an individual identity, whose well-being is subjected, and whose freedom is oppressed are apt to conform to the identity of the group in control (Staub, 2001) for survival. Moreover, forcing post-conflict reconciliation before people (victims or perpetrators) are psychologically ready adds to the hate and anger already felt by the population. Favila (2009) states (of post-conflict/genocide Rwanda), “Reconciliation is often attempted only within these roles [of victims or perpetrators]. Instead of promoting unity and reconciliation, a basic philosophy of healing continues to divide the country” (p. 3). Hamber & Wilson (2002) remark that dissatisfied survivors see reparations with the truth buried and inadequate justice as “buying silence” and being at the mercy of state political leaders.

As a result, the unjustified and traumatized survivor continues to harbor rage, seeking personal justice and revenge. Until proper reintegration and trauma counseling occur, these perpetual feelings and desires will never dissolve (Hamber & Wilson, 2002). Van de Put & Eisenbruch (2002) and Somasundaram & Jamunanantha (2002) conclude with accounts of post-conflict Cambodia and Sri Lanka: “People learned to simply attend to their immediate needs and to survive to the next day...A certain gloominess covers everything and has become normal life” (pp.106 and 229).

According to Favila (2009) who references Neugebauer et al. (2009), only four studies on

the prevalence of PTSD in Rwanda have been conducted since the genocide—as to date. Studies of PTSD in other post-conflict countries in sub-Saharan Africa are also scarce (Favila, 2009).

Fifteen years after the genocide, the need still exists for expanding the capacity of existing mental health treatment programs and investing in new programs to address the underlying trauma and its impact on the capacity of individuals and communities to rebuild effectively after war (Favila, 2009, p. 5).

## 2.2. Leadership

Bolman & Deal (2003), and Vroom & Jago (2007) explain that leadership is the ability to inspire and influence others. The behaviors of leaders do not necessarily come from their personality or characteristics, but arise from situations they encounter, thereby determining if the leadership is effective or ineffective. Under the political leadership frame of Bolman & Deal (2003), an effective political leader advocates, negotiates, and uses a process of advocacy and coalition building to lead. In contrast, a dictator is an example of an ineffective political leader (Bolman & Deal, 2003 and Karekezi, 2004) who uses manipulation and fraud to lead and keep power (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Vroom & Jago (2007) assert, “leader behavior can therefore be an effect of subordinate behavior as well as a cause of it” (p.19).

As said by Karekezi (2004), leaders fall under one of the following five leadership styles: democratic/team, authoritarian/command and control, laissez-faire, country club, and organizational.<sup>35</sup> Tolbert & Hall (2009) insert that there are four styles of decision-making leaders use: authoritarian (centralized bureaucratic/top-down), consultative/popular support (decentralized bureaucratic/down-top), delegative, and group-based (participative).

Two theories—*Theory X* and *Theory Y*—describe how a style of leadership can cause a leader’s assumptions of his or her followers to come true, a “self-fulfilling prophecy” people live

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<sup>35</sup> Democratic/team leadership: leader is concerned about productivity and people. Authoritarian/command and control leadership: leader is concerned about productivity but not about people. Laissez-faire leadership: leader is not concerned about productivity or people. Country-club: leader is concerned about people but not productivity. Organizational leadership: leader works well when people identify the problem.

up to the expectations you give them and in the ways you treat them (Bolman & Deal 2003, pp. 118-119). According to Bolman & Deal (2003), there are two types of Theory X leadership: *soft* and *hard*. The leaders who use the soft-version of Theory X leadership try to avoid conflict and satisfy everyone's needs. This style creates superficial harmony and relationships, apathy, and indifference. People voluntarily obey authority if they believe the authority to be legitimate and working for them (Bolman & Deal, 2003).

Hard-version (HV) Theory X-type leaders use intimidation, tight controls, threats, and punishments to keep control and power through authoritarian rule. They believe their subordinates are lazy, passive, and indifferent, but also fear losing control and authority (Bolman & Deal, 2003). According to Bolman & Deal (2003), the HV Theory X leadership style leads to low productivity, antagonism, militant unions, and subtle sabotage after some time. Theory X leadership, hard or soft versions, may lead to angry, unmotivated, or indifferent subordinates.

The most effective leaders use Theory Y, creating conditions in which people can satisfy and meet their own needs and goals by facilitating their efforts towards fulfilling, organizational rewards (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, is, in many people's opinion, a Theory Y leader, because of the speed in which Rwanda's demolished infrastructure was rebuilt. Kagame promotes *Imiganda*<sup>36</sup> (community volunteer work days) as a means of development through community cooperation and partnership. Nationwide umuganda is held monthly, and local imiganda are held as often as each individual district, sector, cell, or village decides—usually weekly; attendance to umuganda is mandatory. The GOR cites activities carried out at umuganda include building schools, digging roads, and cleaning up trash (Government of Rwanda, 2012).

People respond in various ways to overcontrolling leadership. Bolman & Deal

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<sup>36</sup> *Umuganda* is the singular for imiganda.

(2003) name six examples: (a) withdraw from the job by being chronically absent or quitting altogether (b) stay on the job, but withdraw psychologically, becoming passive and apathetic (c) resist by restricting output and/or conducting revenge (d) try climbing the hierarchy to better jobs (e) form alliances to redress the power imbalance (f) teach their children that work is unrewarding and advancement opportunities are slim. Karekezi (2004) adds that these responses often are seen in rural communities led by local leaders with authoritarian-style leadership, using a centralized bureaucratic approach to decision-making.

Rwandans communicate within the set administrative hierarchical structure of the society. Information is commonly passed through a social network of peers from the bottom (the village-level) and traveling to the top (the government and institutions) of the hierarchy. Direct communication is rarely given without passing through the necessary hierarchical levels. Traditionally, it is socially unacceptable to jump these levels, whether there is a problem to be addressed or a visitor to be introduced. Kajyambere (2009) states, “The hierarchy in Rwanda was a vertical system of management and absolute subordination... This obedience to structure is the foundation upon which the culture of the Rwanda citizen was built” (talesfromrwanda.blogspot.com). Kajyambere (2009) explains that Rwandans are taught early on to respect and obey the hierarchy; therefore, a “yes” answer does not always indicate agreement with a received proposition, order, or question.

Poor leadership has a tendency to be corrupt, with leaders prospering at the cost of the population. In post-conflict countries, leaders may either persuade/coerce the population to take revenge, or accept and follow their politics. Good leadership, however, is the cornerstone of positive post-conflict/disaster development, particularly at the local level. Diamond (2006) emphasizes that when a conflict or civil war in which a rebel force has come to power, control is

established quickly over the state. Historically, this action does not bring much-needed democracy to the state, but usually replaces one dictator with another (Diamond, 2006), causing more protracted conflict and continuing the cycle of violence. Kelman (2007) explains that newly conquered dictator leaders (or parties) may continue to have fears of being dominated, and so are frequently on the lookout for potential opposition attacks. They establish strict laws and punishments, on those who are seen as potential enemies. Somasundaram & Jamunanantha (2002) illustrate:

At these shifts in power, recriminations, accusations, and revenge were very common. Those with leadership qualities...and those with social motivation...have either been [sic] intimidated into leaving, killed, or made to fall silent. Gradually, people have been made to be very passive and submissive (p. 229).

Authorities and the elite have the opportunity in conflict situations to unite people to improve current life conditions, but instead strive to keep people fearful of each other and divided (Staub, 1999). Customary threats by new national leaders aid in the establishment of dominance by stirring up additional social fears already within the collective fear orientation of unquestioning, authority-respecting, blindly patriotic, obedient subordinates found in monolithic and authority-oriented cultures (Staub, 2001). As said by Agger & Jensen (1996), “silent and invisible people are easier to manipulate and dominate” (p. 228). Dictator leaders also manipulate traumatic memories or old fears and feelings of vulnerability (Kelman, 2007). Staub (2000) affirms:

Accustomed to being led...people...are unlikely to oppose leaders...Related to this is a monolithic (versus pluralistic) culture. The less varied are the values in a society, the less freedom to express them, the less likely that people will oppose the evolution of hostility...These tendencies are intensified in an authoritarian political system...(p. 3).

Staub (1999) references Gourevich who says, “Reports from Rwanda indicate that orders by authorities to kill had a powerful influence” (p. 184).

The current ruling military party of Rwanda is the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] (Uvin, 2001). Many observers believe the party dominates Rwandan politics, and observations reveal the rise of human rights abuses by the RPF; whoever negatively judges and defies the government and its decisions meet violent consequences (Uvin, 2001).<sup>37</sup> The manipulation and installation of collective needs and fears through the promotion of nationalism and patriotism are seen as necessary for the sake of maintaining power. It is also a green light for policies and actions the government deems crucial (Kelman, 2007). In other words, “the very manipulation of uncertainties is one of the principal characteristics of power” (Demaria & Wright, 2006, p. 8).

Political leaders (of conflict and post-conflict states) strive to make sure they do not appear weak or gullible to their public through carefully planned decisions demonstrated through their negotiations, public announcements, and style of educating the public. Shaping public opinion about the conflict—displaying the issues and setting limits of acceptable action—are important in ensuring compliance from their subordinates (Kelman, 2007). Changing historical facts after the conflict by controlling discourse about it is also a sure way of showing strength and attaining obedience. As Agger & Jensen (1996) explain: “Psychological warfare is an integral part of state terrorism” (p. 3).

Nationalism preaches unconditional support of the state. Never opposing political agendas produces statewide ignorance, increasing blind acceptance. People who counter the dominant policy quickly become a minority and are hesitant to speak out against the accepting majority (Kelman, 2007). The public’s enforced acceptance to the new norms shows group loyalty. Those who go against these norms or the decisions and discourse of the authorities are seen as traitors. Consequently, antagonistic acts (threatening, jailing, and killing) are justified as

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<sup>37</sup> See Keith Harmon Snow’s (2009) article, *The Rwanda Genocide Fabrications: Human Rights Watch, Alison Des Forges & Disinformation on Central Africa* at [www.allthingspass.com](http://www.allthingspass.com) for more information.

self-defense and patriotic duty (Kelman, 2007). Meanwhile, internal bystanders find it hard to dissent, so they remain passive and even devalue the “traitors” as the enemy, justifying their indifference and reducing their guilt. These means may cause the bystanders to become perpetrators in conflict situations (Staub, 2001), as well as post-conflict societies with new fearful and revengeful leaders.

The post-conflict society is a breeding ground for “brain drain” (DS) and corruption. After a war or disaster, large quantities of aid money from the international community provide opportunities for corruption and greed (Ware & Noone, 2008)—sometimes at the exploitation of victims’ grief (de Jong, 2002). Le Billon (2008) describes the corruption in post-conflict societies as criminal and informal (economic) activities, poor transparency, lack of accountability and checks and balances, and mafia-type bullying by war veterans and exiles who are now local and national authorities. They use corruption for payback by increasing their personal wealth, and later, their social status (Le Billon, 2008). The mismanagement and stealing of aid funds in the post-conflict scene by leaders can make local governments untrustworthy. To mask the corruption, leaders force division, hate, and fear propaganda onto subordinate citizens, who then consequently also engage in corruption as a way of surviving in a national-led corrupted state (Le Billon, 2008).

For their own personal gain, leaders tactically assign jobs, contracts, loans, and grants to certain local elite groups. Even those in non post-conflict states may give in to corruption when an opportunity with a NGO development project arises and “temptation often overcomes duty” (Noone & Ware, 2008, p. 195). Kumar & Corbridge (2002) give an example of local corruption in their case study of a grass-roots development agriculture project in rural India. When attempting participatory planning, development agents ran into the problem of locals identifying

elite villagers as the project's beneficiaries over the targeted, more vulnerable ones. The elite villagers misrepresented their economic income to profit from the benefits of the project and as a result, the targeted poorest of the poor were falling farther into impoverishment while the people who did not need the project were increasing their social capital and income.

As described earlier with self-determination theory, people need to have motivated goals to accomplish a sense of psychological well-being and betterment of themselves. Somasundaram & Jamunanantha (2002) give several examples from post-conflict Sudan, Algeria, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Northern Uganda, and Mozambique of how the constant flow of aid and "free extrinsic rewards" initiate "brain drain" (DS), especially in the immediate aftermath of a war or disaster:

...once the work ethic had dominated this hard working society. Most are now inclined not to work, merely sign their names in the work register, and take the day off at a [sic] slightest excuse...There is a complete lack of quality in all aspects of society, partly due to crippling brain drain (p. 229).

Musoni (2003) attests to this when he studied the role of foreign aid in Rwanda. He claims that the mere labeling of a project with certain names, such as World Bank, USAID, UNICEF, etc. can cause an immediate image of receiving free material goods in the minds of the local citizens and government leaders. "Until the genocide, Rwanda was one of the most aided countries in the world...The immediate post-conflict years were characterised [sic] by high levels of relief oriented assistance" (Musoni, 2003, pp. 8 & 6). The associated DS thus reduces project ownership and motivating energies towards self-sufficiency (Musoni, 2003), encouraging locals to appease development agents in exchange for goods. From experiences with a project in post-conflict Liberia, Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009) caution that "individuals in treatment communities may have learned how to respond in ways that would please outside funders" (pp. 288 and 289).



### **2.3. Weaknesses in the Literature**

The empirical literature is replete with studies on the effects of individual trauma—especially PTSD—and accounts of collective trauma in post-conflict societies. The topics of dependency syndrome, post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction, peace and reconciliation—with the cycles of hatred and violence—and organizational leadership—including corruption in organizations—also are profuse.

Perhaps the most lacking in studies pertaining to post-conflict development is the effect of trauma and authoritarian (especially totalitarian) leadership on implementing community development projects at the grassroots level of post-conflict/genocide societies. There are many examples/theories of why development projects often do not accomplish their goals. There are also many theories about the causes of protracted conflicts. However, few studies exist showing the effects of protracted conflicts on the *real sustainability* of community development projects in the post-conflict scene. The research on the TACP examined the following three issues: (a) how trauma psychologically affects a post-conflict/post-genocide society and creates a special culture with unique needs (b) post-conflict leadership (c) corruption in a post-conflict society. The research will contribute to the existing literature how these issues influence the execution and sustainability of community development projects.

## RESEARCH DESIGN

### 3.1. Culture of the Chosen Inquiry

As previously stated, the culture of the conducted qualitative research is both a phenomenological study as well as a descriptive case study based on my experience with the TACP at GPS in the individual rural community of Gitarama.

### 3.2. Detail of the Data Collection Methods Used

#### 3.2.1. The Research Participants

Forty-one individuals participated in three separate research groups. Twenty-six of the 41 research participants (RPs) were TAC project stakeholders (PSs)—nine children and 14 parents/guardians TAC club members—and three local leaders (LLs) from GPS and the Gitarama Cell administrative office. These individuals made up the first and second groups of RPs. The third group of 15 RPs consisted of community members from 15 additional families in Gitarama who were identified using the project IC<sup>38</sup> in a second selection of project beneficiaries (PBs). Ten other community members, targeted to engage in the research, were not available,<sup>39</sup> leaving 41 participants (80%) of the original 51 selected who participated.<sup>40</sup> Table 5 gives age

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<sup>38</sup> Identification of the first group of PBs was based on criteria written by GPS leaders and myself at a project design meeting. See Appendix D, under *Twizere Agriculture Club Project Description*, for the IC (p. 102).

<sup>39</sup> Thirty was number of club members targeted to participate in the research because the original number of club members in TAC was 15 parents/guardians and 15 children. However, it was confirmed that one whole family (one adult and one child club member) had moved to another town, and five other children left GPS to attend school in other cells (although their families continued to live in Gitarama). Furthermore, one child had graduated primary school and left GPS to attend secondary school in Kibuye. This reduced the original number of PB interviewees' from 15 adults to 14 and from 15 children to nine. The six LLs the most directly involved with the TACP originally were chosen to participate in the research. These LLs gave advance verbal permission to be interviewed, but three out of the six were consistently absent due to numerous obligatory government-directed meetings.

<sup>40</sup> The 23 club members and the three LLs (26 PSs) who participated in the research were targeted because they were directly involved in the TACP. The last 15 RPs were selected to participate in the research as a way to investigate the suspicion that GPS personnel inappropriately selected the initial group of TAC PBs when given control over identification. There were indeed others who fit the criteria better than those who were originally chosen. Before a government meeting, a group of villagers assisted me in creating a list of some of the poorest families from all eight villages of Gitarama using the IC. As with so many other development projects, the inapt identification of the first group of PBs might indeed have contributed heavily to the constraints faced in the project, preventing the poorest of the poor in getting the help they needed.

Table 5 Gender and Age Demographics of Twizere Agriculture Club Project Stakeholder Research Participants

PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED (N = 26)	GENDER	AGE (Years)						TOTAL (T = Total number of persons per gender)
		10-13	14-17	18-24	25-34	35-44	45+	
APBs	M			1		1		2
	F				1	4	7	12
CPBs	M	2	3					5
	F	2	2					4
LLs	M							0
	F			1		1	1	3
<u>Table 5 Key:</u>								
M = Male F = Female			APBs = Adult Project Beneficiaries CPBs = Child Project Beneficiaries			LLs = Local Leaders		

and gender demographics of the 26 TAC PS RPs.<sup>41</sup>

To reduce confusion, clarification of the different names for the groups of people involved in the TACP and in this research, is necessary. The PBs were the initial chosen club members of TAC; the PSs included these PBs and LLs directly involved in the TACP. More specifically, the adult project beneficiaries (APBs) were the parent/guardian club members, and the child project beneficiaries (CPBs) were the child club members. Group 1 project beneficiaries (Gr1 PBs) is used to distinguish the first group of PBs selected by GPS personnel from the second group of PBs (Gr2 PBs) identified as part of this research. For the duration of this paper, the club members are referred to as PBs; the parent/guardian club members as APBs; the child club members as CPBs; and the three LL RPs as LL A, LL B, and LL C.

<sup>41</sup> There was no age or gender data collected on the second identified group of 15 PB families.

### 3.2.2. The Research Questionnaires and Survey

The primary data collection method was two questionnaires and a survey used during interviews with each RP group created by myself, the researcher.<sup>42</sup> The two questionnaires were designed for TAC PSs. These questionnaires centered on obtaining information about the TACP—its strengths and limitations—through the experiences, observations, and opinions of the PSs, as well as RPs' suggestions on project design and implementation improvement strategies. They are labeled *constraints questionnaire 1* (CQ1) used with the PBs and *constraints questionnaire 2* (CQ2) used with the LLs. CQ 1 and CQ2 consisted of mostly open-ended questions allowing the recipients to express themselves freely. Different questions were used for the two groups of PSs based on the roles they held in the project.

The survey administered was a wealth index survey (WIS). It was given to Gr1 PBs and to Gr2 PBs.<sup>43</sup> As previously stated, Gr2 PBs were identified to verify the suspicion that Gr1 PBs were inaccurately chosen. The second group was selected from throughout Gitarama using the project baseline IC. The WIS was used with a family member from each of the second group of 15 families identified, as well as with each parent/guardian club member from the first group of PBs (total of 29 persons). It contained both open and close-ended questions to gather basic information about the wealth status of each chosen beneficiary household.<sup>44</sup> The purpose of the WIS was to compare the standard of living of the first group of possibly poorly identified PBs

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<sup>42</sup> See Appendix E, *The Research Questionnaires and Survey* (p. 110).

<sup>43</sup> Only adults in Gr1 PBs and GR PBs participated in the WIS.

<sup>44</sup> In a typical WIS, participants are not asked what they typically eat or the number of times a day they eat. Instead, the WIS focuses more on evaluating the assets of each household. However, because of the nature of the Rwandan culture, some of the typical questions had to be adapted to fit the context. For example, asking a local if they have a toilet, clothes, food stocks, and domestic tools is considered offensive. Therefore, the information of the availability of these assets and the wealth of each household was collected by observation at the Gr2 PB's house, personal judgment from conversations with interviewees' neighbors (if not at home), and with other locals about rural life in Rwanda. Information was also obtained by giving interviewees the option of sharing what wealth they have through the questions *what other assets do you own? how many times a day do you eat?* and *what do you typically eat a day?* In a 2008 district baseline survey, BS had a population of 20,381 habitants (National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda, 2008); this number likely has increased over the last few years. In 2008, BS was one of three most densely populated sectors in KD with between 438 to 562 people per square kilometer (National Institute of Rwanda, 2008). Wealthier locals who reside elsewhere own most of the land in Gitarama, leaving the majority of Gitarama locals owning no land or just the small plot on which their house is built (which is why the microgarden methods were appropriate to teach). Therefore, the question *how many times a year do you cultivate?* was a suitable question to discover if they cultivate on their own land, sharecrop, or do neither.

with a second selected group to confirm if the first group of selected PBs was the closest fit to the IC, or if there were other families who could indeed meet them all.

### 3.2.3. The Interviews

Each RP took part in a private, one-on-one interview where only the interviewee, my counterpart (serving as translator), and I were present.<sup>45</sup> These interviews were conducted in a location of the interviewee's choice (e.g. his or her home, GPS, the fields, Kibuye town, places of work, etc.). Since the CQ 1 and CQ 2 focused primarily on understanding the project's constraints, the interview in which these questionnaires were used with TAC PSs, was labeled the *constraints interview* (CI). Furthermore, the WIS was given to Gr1 PBs during their CI, while Gr2 PBs partook only in the WIS during a separate interview labeled, the *wealth index interview* (WII). Before the CIs, each TACP RP was given a set of instructions that explained the purpose of the interview and their rights as RPs, as well as a consent form. APBs were given an additional consent form for their participating minor children.

Observation in the field (at Gitarama and other places in Rwanda during different experiences) served as the secondary data collection method. Observation included formal and informal conversations with LLs, PBs, GPS teachers, and other community members during the project design and implementation phases, as well as direct and indirect observation and note-taking during various project activities<sup>46</sup> and visits to Gitarama.

### 3.2.4. The Variables

The independent variables are the age, gender, socio-economic status, hierarchical position in society, degrees of past traumatic experiences, and the proximity to the conflict of

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<sup>45</sup> Private, one-on-one interviews were chosen over focus groups because of the civil society context of Rwanda. Because of the genocide, civil war, and ethnic division and hatred among the civilians, people probably would have felt very vulnerable, scared, and reluctant to speak out about the problems in the project, and voice their opinions and suggestions if interviewed in a focus group. I wanted to give them a safe and secure atmosphere where they could feel free to speak without fear of revenge and further disputation.

<sup>46</sup> Executed project activities included construction of the chicken coop, purchasing of the animals, the elections of TAC's parent committee (PCOM) members, and a few TAC meetings.

each individual community member, as well as the extent to which the community was affected. The dependent variable is the planning and implementation effectiveness of local development projects in post-conflict societies. In an ideal empirical analysis, multiple local development projects in the post-conflict society would be studied, and the dependent variable measured, through various means, in each of these projects. Then, the importance of each independent variable affecting the dependent variable would be examined, and the findings recorded in a regression analysis.

### **3.3. How the Data Collected was Analyzed in Light of the Conceptual Frameworks**

The data analysis methods included not only examining the constraints of the project, but also the strengths as well. The CI responses were examined and the questions 1, 13, and 14 were found to be similar and relevant in finding the strengths. The responses of the PS interviewees to questions 1, 13, and 14 were then studied to determine three factors: whether the interviewee (a) expressed he or she liked the project (b) showed recognition that he or she (the chosen beneficiaries) needed the project (c) he or she showed recognition that he or she understood the project's goals. The number of PSs that showed evidence of supporting the above three factors was tallied and percentages for each were found. Observations in the field were added to the analysis of the strengths (See Figure 13 in the analysis—p. 36).

Each constraint mentioned by interviewees in the CIs was tallied and grouped into one of four categories (depending on who had the most influence on the constraint)—*leaders (Rwandan leadership)*, *the parent committee (PCOM)*, *project beneficiaries (adult and child club members)*, and *a combination of leaders, the PCOM, and PBs*. The frequency of each disclosed constraint was calculated (see Table 7 in the analysis—p. 38). The other questions on both the

CQ1 and CQ2 were combined based on the similarity of their content and the PS RPs responses to these questions were analyzed. The PS RPs responses to the CQ1 were analyzed separately from those of the CQ2 because the two questionnaires held audience-specific questions.

The analysis consisted of comparing and contrasting the field data with theoretical frameworks in the existing literature to determine the possible causes of the documented constraints. A distinct correlation between the data and Rwandan leadership, post-conflict trauma, and dependency on outside assistance led to using theoretical frameworks of authoritarian leadership style, particularly HV Theory X leadership, post-conflict corruption, the Rwandan administrative and political hierarchies, dependency syndrome, and individualist and collectivist societies. Theories on post-traumatic trauma, including PTSD, CPTSD, DESNOS, PTSS, SS, secondary traumatic stress, transgenerational trauma (including the ABC-X Model), and case studies on the dynamics of post-conflict societies also were explored and applied during data analysis.

The wealth of Gr1 PBs and Gr2 PBs were measured by comparing the two groups' responses to the WIS. Because the WIS was adapted to fit Rwandan culture, the analysis was also adapted. The responses of the first four questions of each WIS were charted, and while the last two questions were not, they aided in determining to which category of wealth the family belonged. Assets were given a grade of A-F (excluding E).<sup>47</sup> Based on information from the interviewees and field observations, each family was classified under a wealth category of *well-to-do*, *better*, *poor*, and *destitute*. The positions in society that the PBs hold and their relationships with specific community members also were examined. Where personal

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<sup>47</sup> The scoring of the WIS did not include only the assets of each family interviewed. The number of meals eaten daily by the family, the status employment of the family, and other assets, such as owning land were also used to score wealth. Additional observations were not utilized in the scoring; instead, they supplied extra evidence comparing the families' wealth in both groups. Some adults of the Gr2 PBs were not home at the time of the visit so conversations with neighbors were used instead.

observations were utilized in this research, I have attempted to identify them as such and distinguish them clearly from the interview data collected.

### **3.4. Important Limitations to the Research Design**

There were two important limitations to the research design. The first limitation was the difficulties encountered when attempting to obtain permission from Gitarama and Bwishyura Sector leaders to conduct the interviews with Gr1 PBs and Gr2 PBs. The LL's tight controls caused significant delays to implement each step of the project, as well as the research.<sup>48</sup> The issue was finally resolved after a Peace Corps Staff member came to Gitarama and held additional meetings with crucial leaders and myself to explain the intent and benefit of having Peace Corps Volunteers in Rwandan communities in addition to the objective of the research interviews. The second limitation was that three out of the six targeted LLs were not available to be interviewed. They were consistently absent when the interviews were conducted due to numerous required governmental meetings.

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<sup>48</sup> These steps involved signing essential papers for the project, carrying out club activities, and conducting the CI and WII.



## PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

### 4.1. Analysis of the Project's Strengths

The focus of this analysis is on the constraints of the TACP; however, recognizing the strengths voiced by PSs in the CIs determines if the project was indeed relevant to the PBs and leaves room for scrutinizing the constraints that occurred. Besides what was specified in these interviews, four other major strengths of the project were observed:

(a) The TACP supports the United Nations' MDGs<sup>49</sup> and aligns with two initiatives of Vision 2020—every home throughout Rwanda has a microgarden<sup>50</sup> and every child owns a small animal. As a result of the TAC being compatible with the GOR, full permission and support was received from LLs, GPS personnel, and parents of GPS who showed their utmost interest, excitement, and acceptance in the beginning, demonstrating that collaboration with LLs within the local administrative hierarchy was achieved.

(b) A partnership between TAC and Peace Health Club at Ruganda Secondary School in Kibuye was created, resulting in a teaching and learning experience for all.

(c) The design and initial execution of the project involved participation by the GPS community, which established a role of ownership. Based upon their claim that they best knew which targeted families in Gitarama had the direst need for the TACP, GPS personnel were given full charge over the choice of the first group of PBs. Sharing information and deciding together on the selection of animals to purchase demonstrated the project's strength of participatory decision making and ownership among the PSs. They themselves were shaping the project for their needs instead of passively following the decisions and orders of a foreigner.

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<sup>49</sup> The TACP supports MDG #1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger.

<sup>50</sup> Microgardens are new to Gitarama. Possession of at least one microgarden is a requirement by the GOR. See GOR's Ministry of Health (MINISANTE) at [www.moh.gov.rw](http://www.moh.gov.rw) and Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) at [www.mineduc.gov.rw](http://www.mineduc.gov.rw) for more information about these initiatives.

(d) The preliminary implementation of the TACP occurred.<sup>51</sup>

When interviewed, 10 APBs (71%), seven CPBs (78%), and all three LLs (100%) commented, “The project...has good goals. It can help me to have chickens and rabbits” (CPB); “The project...can help the whole family” (APB); “The project is a didactic tool that helps concretely teach things to students and teachers. They are learning practical things through the project” (LL). This means that more than three-quarters (77%) of PS RPs communicated that they favored the project, suggesting that it was desired in their community (see Figure 13).





The initial acceptance and support, demonstrated through attendance, enthusiasm, encouragement, and participation, that the majority of the PSs understood the goal and objective of the project. More than 50% of all the PSs, specifically, nine APBs (64%), five CPBs (56%), and two LLs (67%) (62% in total) communicated their understanding by sharing ideas how it would significantly benefit them. They gave comments demonstrating that the goal and objective were clear, and reasonable: “The project started well. I was realizing that the project would give us eggs...the eggs can give us more chickens. We can...sell them...and buy a goat or a cow” (APB). “Through the project, the children can learn how to properly take care of animals, know what food to give them, how to treat diseases, among other things” (LL). “...we can sell and eat eggs...and buy a pen... have good nutrition and solve some of our problems of poverty” (two CPBs). “The gardening techniques will help us grow a lot of food and reduce malnutrition. We...need new techniques to improve our crop yield. It is poor and traditional techniques are hard labor” (APB).

The results of the CIs showed a small percentage of PBs who learned concepts about

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<sup>51</sup> The preliminary implementation included acceptance and support from LLs, the identification of the PBs, the construction of the animal pens, the purchase of the animals, and the execution of a few TAC meetings, which included PCOM elections and a few independent meetings with APBs organized by the PCOM.

Figure 13 Strengths of the Twizere Agriculture Club Project Told by Project Stakeholder Research Participants in the Constraints Interviews



animal husbandry, microgardens, and cultivating techniques during the first few meetings.<sup>52</sup> A couple of CPBs reported, “I learned how to test to see if a rabbit is pregnant” and “I learned how to build animal pens.” However, the research showed that percentages could have been higher if fewer constraints had existed, preventing further implementation of the project. These results may be viewed as a weakness of the project; however, a few people did respond positively, giving further evidence it had some strength despite the many constraints.

Seven APBs (50%), three CPBs (33%), and no LLs (0%) (38% of PSs in total) displayed recognition that they (the chosen PBs) needed the TACP. Many gave statements in the CIs that implied that the majority of PSs had not accepted it enough to work willingly for its success. Three APBs said, “We cannot refuse the project if it is progressing;” “I haven’t noticed any problems [with the chickens]. But it has been a long time without seeing the animals;” and “People [were] neglecting the club so much. They did not give it value.” One LL stated, “[The project] is important, but not enough so someone can progress” (LL). Even if the PSs expressed that they wanted it, ambiguous statements such as these do not show total acceptance of the project and willingness to work for its success.

## **4.2. Analysis of the Constraints in the Project**

### 4.2.1. Presentation of the Constraints in the Project

Table 7 shows the constraints of the TACP as shared privately by the PSs in the CIs. Nearly all of these voiced constraints also were observed personally throughout several months of project installation, inspiring this analysis in an effort to understand why they occurred. The alleged constraints were classified by the researcher and are presented in the middle column of Table 7, under one of four categories of PSs who produced or affected them in some way.

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<sup>52</sup> See Appendix F, *Supplemental Figures and Table of Data*, Figures 14 and 15 (pp. 115 & 116).

Table 7 Presentation of the Constraints in the Twizere Agriculture Club Project Told by Project Stakeholder Interviewees in the Constraints Interviews

<p><u>CATEGORIES</u></p> <p>(Group primarily responsible for constraints in adjacent column as classified by researcher)</p>	<p><u>CONSTRAINTS</u></p> <p>(Given by project stakeholders in private interviews)</p>	<p><u>FREQUENCY</u></p> <p>(N = times stated in the constraints interviews)</p>
<p>LEADERS (leadership)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ PBs are hesitant about approaching GPS and PCOM leaders with problems in the club</li> <li>▪ Broken benches (children cannot reach into rabbit hutch to feed rabbits)</li> <li>▪ Seventh Day Adventists (religious denomination) cannot raise or eat rabbits</li> <li>▪ Imiganda and government-directed meetings are excessive</li> <li>▪ The night guard of GPS was given charge of taking care of TAC's animals and no decision about this was made by PBs</li> <li>▪ GPS's night guard is not competent to take care of the animals</li> <li>▪ Bad/corrupt leadership and management</li> <li>▪ The rabbit hutch poorly built</li> <li>▪ No medication for the animals</li> <li>▪ No competent veterinarian available</li> <li>▪ Lack of club trainings</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Total: 11</b></p>	<p>1</p> <p>4</p> <p>1</p> <p>8</p> <p>1</p> <p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>16</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>9</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Total: 48</b></p>
<p>PARENT COMMITTEE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Members of PCOM are disputing with each other</li> <li>▪ Members of PCOM are accusing each other of stealing</li> <li>▪ Lack of responsibility-taking among PCOM</li> <li>▪ Bad organization of the PCOM</li> <li>▪ Very poor communication between PCOM members and other PBs</li> <li>▪ No meetings of the club were organized by the PCOM</li> <li>▪ The PCOM's president does not organize meetings for the APBs and uses the excuse that no one is available for meetings</li> <li>▪ Poor cooperation among members of the PCOM</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Total: 8</b></p>	<p>3</p> <p>1</p> <p>1</p> <p>3</p> <p>1</p> <p>1</p> <p>1</p> <p>1</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Total: 12</b></p>
<p>PROJECT BENEFICIARIES (parent/guardian and child club members)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ PBs abandoned club activities</li> <li>▪ PBs did not take care of animals properly</li> <li>▪ PBs lost courage because of lack of others' support, help, responsibility, and fighting among each other</li> <li>▪ PBs project their responsibility in TAC onto others</li> <li>▪ Poor collaboration between PBs</li> <li>▪ PBs have personal problems at home</li> <li>▪ PBs have division among themselves</li> <li>▪ PBs in different church denominations are divided</li> <li>▪ Gitarama is a bad location for the TACP because it is far from Kibuye and it is hard to transport chicken food (from Kibuye to GPS)</li> <li>▪ Some PBs are unable to leave the house to go to TAC meetings</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Total: 10</b></p>	<p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>1</p> <p>2</p> <p>3</p> <p>1</p> <p>1</p> <p>1</p> <p>1</p> <p>1</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Total: 14</b></p>



<u>CATEGORIES</u> (Group primarily responsible for constraints in adjacent column as classified by researcher)	<u>CONSTRAINTS</u> (Given by project stakeholders in private interviews)	<u>FREQUENCY</u> (N = times stated in the constraints interviews)
COMBINATION of LEADERS, PARENT COMMITTEE, and PROJECT BENEFICIARIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The rabbits and chickens are hungry</li> <li>▪ The rabbits and chickens are dying</li> <li>▪ Domestic jobs (besides imiganda and government meetings) are numerous</li> <li>▪ PSs are indifferent and do not value the TACP</li> <li>▪ Chickens are eating their eggs</li> <li>▪ Rabbits are eating their babies</li> <li>▪ The animal pens lack sanitation</li> <li>▪ The screen and the door on the outside of the chicken coop are being destroyed</li> <li>▪ Chickens are crowded in the coop and not let free to scavenge</li> <li>▪ PSs do not have knowledge about raising chickens and rabbits</li> <li>▪ The TAC animals are not productive</li> <li>▪ PBs were not informed by the PCOM of club meetings</li> <li>▪ PBs only come to meetings or feed the animals when they see me present</li> <li>▪ The chicken coop is too small for all the chickens</li> <li>▪ The chickens and rabbits are sick</li> <li>▪ There is not enough chicken or rabbit food</li> <li>▪ Poor organization of PBs to attend TAC activities (e.g. caring for the animals)</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Total: 17</b></p>	<p style="text-align: right;">19</p> <p style="text-align: right;">30</p> <p style="text-align: right;">4</p> <p style="text-align: right;">2</p> <p style="text-align: right;">1</p> <p style="text-align: right;">1</p> <p style="text-align: right;">10</p> <p style="text-align: right;">9</p> <p style="text-align: right;">8</p> <p style="text-align: right;">2</p> <p style="text-align: right;">7</p> <p style="text-align: right;">3</p> <p style="text-align: right;">1</p> <p style="text-align: right;">2</p> <p style="text-align: right;">11</p> <p style="text-align: right;">3</p> <p style="text-align: right;">4</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><b>Total: 117</b></p>
<p><u>Table 7 Key:</u></p> <p>APBs = Adult Project Beneficiaries      PBs = Project Beneficiaries      TAC = Twizere Agriculture Club            GPS = Gitarama Primary School      PCOM = Parent Committee      TACP = Twizere Agriculture Club Project</p>		

The four categories of PSs are found in the left-side column of Table 7 (see p. 38 & 39). The PCOM was placed in a category all its own because, even though members of the PCOM are PBs, they were elected into leadership roles as catalysts of communication, assistance, and inspiration of project activities to the other PBs and to the community at-large. The fourth category is a combination of the leaders (leadership), the PCOM, and the PBs because there were constraints that all three groups influenced. Under each category, the tallied number of times each particular constraint was articulated in the CIs, and also the total, are found on the right-side column of Table 7 labeled *Frequency*.

The results of the CIs revealed that a majority of the interviewees had observed constraints that limited the project's productivity and progression. Specifically, 17 PBs and all three LLs observed at least one constraint, leaving 19% of the total PS interviewees claiming that they had not observed any constraints and 4% stating they did not know (see Figure 16, p. 41). In the CIs, eleven constraints that were instigated by leaders (leadership) were affirmed a total of 48 times. Eight constraints produced by the PCOM were enumerated 12 times, while ten constraints generated by the PBs were referred to a total of 14 times. Additionally, 17 constraints influenced by all three groups of PSs were mentioned 117 times.

In Table 7, it is noticed that the *combination of stakeholders* category classified the *largest* number of constraints with the *highest* frequency (see Figure 17, p. 41). This implies that all the PSs contributed to the stated constraints in this category because the three groups negatively influenced each other when joining in partnership. The constraint most reiterated in this category is “the rabbits and chickens are dying” (30 times). The category that classified the *second largest* number of constraints with the *second highest* frequency is the leaders (leadership) category. The frequency of the affirmed constraints that pertained exclusively to leaders almost doubled that of the frequencies in the PBs and PCOM categories combined. This connotes that as a singular group, Rwandan leaders were the biggest factor in promoting these constraints. Their powerful capability to influence negative behavior in the TACP suggests their potentiality also to inspire its success. “The rabbit hutch” is poorly built is the most repeated constraint (16 times) in this category.

The project beneficiaries category has the *third largest* number of constraints with the *third highest* frequency. The PBs played a role in the constraints as well, because their teamwork, interest, and motivation for the project came to a halt. The recurring constraint in this



category is “poor collaboration between the project beneficiaries” (three times). *The parent committee* category has the *fewest* number of constraints declared in the CIs with the *lowest* frequency. While issues in the PCOM involving LLs and the other PBs generated some constraints, members of the PCOM alone induced others. The restated constraints in this category were “members of the PCOM are disputing with each other” and “bad organization of the PCOM” (three times each).



## 4.2.2. Leadership in Rwanda

Referring back to Table 7 (p. 38 & 39), one can see that out of all three individual groups of PSs, the leaders were the cause of the majority of the constraints. This observation can be explained by how authorities and those in leadership positions are viewed by Rwandans and by the role they play in the governing of their communities. The relationship between the categories and the constraints framed in Table 7 will be discussed in the remainder of this analysis.

### 4.2.2.1 The Administrative Hierarchy versus the RPF Hierarchy

As depicted in the literature review, Rwanda developed into a monolithic society where authority within its complex system of hierarchies was highly respected and followed with unquestioning subordination by the citizenry. Individuals who hold positions of power titles (e.g. head master, doctor, pastor) were, and still are, extremely revered—especially by those of lower socio-economic status. The modern political hierarchy heightened at the time of independence and influenced the administrative hierarchy at all levels of society,<sup>53</sup> which continues today. Like the administrative hierarchy leadership that played an historic role in the genocide, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) leadership today is a prime determiner in the sustainability of development projects in Rwanda.

Rwandans show the hierarchy within the political RPF system to be more important than Rwandan society's administrative hierarchy. For example, LL A made it known that she is the vice-president of the RPF chapter in KD. Compared to village chiefs and executive secretaries of the administrative divisions, she is a figure of lower-status in the cultural administrative hierarchy because of her occupation at a rural primary school. However, in the RPF hierarchy,

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<sup>53</sup> See the timeline under Appendix B, *Significant Events in Rwandan History* (p. 94).

she is a figure of high stature in the local community.<sup>54</sup> This position gave her the sanction to go directly to leaders at the district and sector levels to introduce me and get their approval for the project, rather than go first to leaders at the village or cell levels. Much of the time, the leaders at the district and sector levels, as well as the head parishioner of the Catholic Church of Kibuye, were consulted when addressing the needs of the project. These leaders all hold similar administrative titles of prestige, not only in KD, but in the RPF as well. For this reason, LL A considered them more important with whom to confer than the leaders of Kivomo Village<sup>55</sup> and Gitarama; they were sought foremost and more often than the latter.<sup>56</sup>

One explanation of this higher respect for the RPF hierarchy, over the administrative hierarchy, is the extreme fear Rwandans have of the government ruling party. This fear affects their attitudes and actions of day-to-day living. This paper cannot discuss the behaviors of the LLs who were connected to the TACP without first examining the leadership at the national level (the top of the administrative and RPF hierarchies), which influences other officials at the lower levels of the country.

#### 4.2.2.2. Hard-Version Theory X Leadership Style

The RPF is represented in all aspects and dominates all functions of Rwandan society from the national to the village level. This is apparent when observing how often RPF meetings and activities are held for the people in Gitarama. Their ruling style reflects the evidence found in the literature of dominant leaders in conflict and post-conflict societies. The RPF regulates with an extreme authoritarian/command and control method of leadership with a top-down approach of decision-making. The HV of Theory X leadership best describes Rwandan leaders'

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<sup>54</sup> As vice-president, LL A is the second most influential RPF representative in KD. Under the RPF hierarchy, she has more decision-making power than administrative leaders in the offices of the cells and sectors in KD, as well as in the offices at the (Karongi) district level.

<sup>55</sup> GPS is located in Kivomo Village.

<sup>56</sup> This kind of interaction among other people was observed often during different occasions.

approach of addressing everyday affairs. The party's top leaders fear retaliation,<sup>57</sup> and so impose policies that fortify the RPF to keep power and prevent being dominated.

Their strategy is to reinforce the collective fear orientation of the civic society through tight controls, manipulation, threats, intimidation, and punishments via RPF members at all levels of the public and private sectors of the country. This reinforcement begins with the high officials and ends with the villagers via a domino effect down the administrative and RPF hierarchies. The PB RPs shed light on this strategy through their explanations of required government-directed activities (meetings and imiganda) for the locals. It is palpable, then, that to some, the head leader of the RPF is thought to be a dictator, and the government, totalitarian. The threatening nature of a dictator and conceivable post-conflict trauma explain why many locals and other leaders work hard to support the RPF, and why others who do not, fear those who do. Moreover, several locals on separate occasions expressed that as long as they work hard for the RPF, they will progress and face no problems.

#### 4.2.2.2.1. Tight Controls by Leaders

Four major examples of tight controls by LLs, challenged putting the TACP into practice: (a) scrutiny when signing papers or granting permission (b) refusal to conduct trainings (c) GPS's night guard given duty of TAC animals (d) excessive, mandatory government-directed activities.

##### 4.2.2.2.1.1. Granting Permission

It was evident that the LLs put tight controls on every action towards implementing TAC. Written permission with signatures from the appropriate leaders of Gitarama and BS<sup>58</sup> was needed to apply every new change in the execution of the project. Obtaining this permission

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<sup>57</sup> See the timeline under Appendix B, *Significant Events in Rwandan History* (p. 94).

often took days since the LLs would take the pending document for further review by higher authorities, and usually this was not enough. Written permission was followed with further questions about the intent of the new change. Approval to conduct both the CIs and the WIs also followed this procedure and eventually, permission was given.

LLs are reluctant to sign their permission for any papers even when they have the authority to do so, especially if they are farther down the RPF hierarchy. A LL will wait to get authorization from those leaders in higher positions before giving their approval. Working under a totalitarian regime heightens the stress and fear of punishment for one's personal actions. One example is the hesitation by a powerful LL in Gitarama who would not give written permission to conduct the interviews until he first consulted with a more powerful LL of BS as well as a Peace Corps local staff member, for fear of the consequences given by higher RPF leaders.<sup>59</sup>

#### 4.2.2.2.1.2. Refusal to Conduct Trainings

A second example is the refusal by LL A to conduct trainings with the PBs or visit them at their homes<sup>60</sup> unless she controlled the logistics. This non-negotiable request was examined further during the CIs with the LLs. The question *what are your suggestions for the amount of time spent on the project's activities?* was asked to understand each one's idea of appropriate time frames for the TAC's formal activities,<sup>61</sup> as well as to see if the other LLs interviewed had

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<sup>58</sup> LLs also sometimes requested additional permission from the LL A, the head parishioner of the Catholic Church of Kibuye, and Peace Corps. Further investigation of small changes during project implementation were not necessary because I already had explained my presence and intent of the project to LL A and the necessary LLs at KD, BS, and Gitarama, whereupon I received their verbal and written approval after they reviewed the project's grant application documents and the permission letter given to each relevant LL.

<sup>59</sup> His position on the administrative hierarchy required him to consult only with the chief of Kivomo Village first before giving his permission, but he had to follow the RPF hierarchy since it is more respected than the administrative hierarchy. Furthermore, he had already signed earlier papers after other leaders did giving his permission to implement the project. When approached again to get permission to conduct the interviews, the former procedures of document review and interrogation were done again.

<sup>60</sup> One of the objectives of the club was to have the project beneficiaries transfer learned knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSA) from TAC by replicating the microgardens and animal husbandry at their homes. The majority of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities would have taken place at the PBs' homes via visits and interviews. M&E activities would have evaluated the success and any problems they might have had setting up their own animal husbandries and microgardens. See Appendix D, *Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design* (p. 101) for more information.

<sup>61</sup> The formal activities of the TAC included trainings, meetings, home visits, and interviews with the PBs. Informal activities included daily care for the animals and microgardens built by PBs during the trainings.

the same desire for control as LL A had. Tables 8, 9, and 10 (p. 47) show the suggestions of the LL RPs for the length of time and frequency that should be devoted to trainings, club meetings, interviews, and home visits with the PBs.

One notices by comparing and evaluating Tables 8, 9, and 10 that LL A gave the least practical times for TAC's formal activities and demanded that they be held only at GPS and only during times when she could attend.<sup>62</sup> The ability to execute trainings during the project implementation was affected then because LL A was often not available usually due to RPF district meetings, school administration meetings, and continuing education classes. It is believed she used her position in the RPF to try to manipulate the organization of trainings in an attempt to control TAC. She claimed in her CI that the Rwanda's Ministry of Local Governance (MINALOC) has a regulation that applies to everyone, everywhere in Rwanda, which states that community meetings may only take place after the day's domestic and professional jobs are finished and each meeting may not go beyond one hour.<sup>63</sup>

The other two LL RPs, notably LL C, stated that they did not know if any such regulation existed. In fact, LL C said that the duration and frequency of the TAC's formal activities depended on the material to be taught and the organization of the PBs. Additionally, the other three LLs not interviewed knew that these formal activities would take place and they also did not state during prior consultations that such a rule existed. The MINALOC regulation may have been another attempt by LL A to try to govern the logistics of TAC's formal activities. LL B was more practical in her responses because she resides in Gitarama and is at GPS more often than either LL A or LL C; therefore, she knew what were realistic time frames to follow with the PBs. Yet, because her position at GPS was the lowest on both the administrative and RPF hierarchies

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<sup>62</sup> TAC was designed to support each group only for six months, so the impracticability of the LL A's suggestions hindered the ability to cover all the needed material with each group before the current club members graduated and a new group started.

<sup>63</sup> When searched for, this regulation could not be confirmed to exist.

Table 8 Local Leader Research Participant A's Suggestions for Length of Time and Frequency of Club Activities			
	Length of Time	Frequency	Total
<b>Trainings</b>	3 hours per day (may be extended to 5 or 6 hours if food or drink is provided)	1 day every 3 months for the adult project beneficiaries  1 day monthly for the child project beneficiaries	3 hours every 3 months for the adult project beneficiaries  3 hours monthly for the child project beneficiaries
<b>Club Meetings</b>	<1 hour (after domestic and professional jobs are finished for the day)	1 day monthly for all project beneficiaries	<1 hour each month for all project beneficiaries
<b>Interviews</b>	30 minutes	Once per every 3 months for all project beneficiaries	30 minutes every 3 months for all project beneficiaries
<b>Home Visits</b>	< 30 minutes	Once per every 6 months for all project beneficiaries	<30 minutes every 6 months for all project beneficiaries

Table 9 Local Leader Research Participant B's Suggestions for Length of Time and Frequency of Club Activities			
	Length of Time	Frequency	Total
<b>Trainings</b>	6 hours per day	Up to 6 days every 6 months for all project beneficiaries	36 hours every 6 months for all project beneficiaries
<b>Club Meetings</b>	2 hours	1 day monthly for all project beneficiaries	2 hours each month for all project beneficiaries
<b>Interviews</b>	30 minutes each	During each home visit	30 minutes during each home visit for all project beneficiaries
<b>Home Visits</b>	Depends on questions or topics discussed and how receptive each project beneficiary is to receive a visit at home	1 time per every 3 months for all project beneficiaries	1 home visit every six months for all project beneficiaries  The length of time depends
“If you give the families a per diem, then you can make the trainings longer” (LL B).			

Table 10 Local Leader Research Participant C's Suggestions for Length of Time and Frequency of Club Activities			
	Length of Time	Frequency	Total
<b>Trainings</b>	Depends on the organization of the club and subject matter being taught	Depends on the organization of the club and subject matter being taught	Depends on the organization of the club and subject matter being taught
<b>Club Meetings</b>	↓	↓	↓
<b>Interviews</b>	↓	↓	↓
<b>Home Visits</b>	↓	↓	↓

than those of the other two LL RPs, she was not in a position to make decisions or have her suggestions honored by LL A (whose position is more powerful than LL B and LL C). LL C's responses were also realistic; however, her inability to give recommendations of time frames during her CI hints that she wanted to avoid punishments that come from offering concrete ideas without first consulting higher RPF authority. This fear also was reflected in her hesitation to be interviewed alone without the presence of her immediate superior.

The HV Theory X leadership style of the RPF uses intimidation and manipulation to augment the already-existing collective fear of the nation, allowing tight control to be exercised over everyone and every function in the country. The RPF head leader, who possibly fears dominance, uses this tactic on people in high RPF and administrative positions, who then inflict it onto those of lesser status. Therefore, in general, everyone in Rwanda harbors various degrees of fear for different reasons. Many people use some form of Theory X leadership (soft or hard-version) to gain or maintain power, as a survival mechanism, or both, regardless of their hierarchical status. This social interaction causes most Rwandans to hesitate in their decision-making, and creates additional negative feelings as the literature review depicts.

This explanation is well illustrated when studying the reactions of the three LL RPs when being interviewed. They displayed very mixed behaviors, which related to their positions on the RPF hierarchy.<sup>64</sup> LL A displayed confidence, whereas LL B agreed to the interview, but appeared to panic when answering questions. LL C was reluctant when asked to be interviewed, insisting on waiting until her boss could be present. She eventually agreed when he continued to be unavailable for participation.

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<sup>64</sup> All three LL RPs were well instructed in the purpose of the research and reassured of confidentiality prior to being interviewed; no one declined.

#### 4.2.2.2.1.3. Giving the Night Guard Control Over the Project Animals

On more than one occasion, LL A and LL B showed that they, not the PBs, had control over the TACP. LL A manipulated the APBs in meetings she attended by dominating the conversation and intimidating them when they tried stating problems and giving opinions, ideas, and suggestions. LL A and LL B also made the decision to give full control of the animals' care, especially during school holidays, to GPS's night guard, with the reason being, the PBs neglected them. This decision was made without first consulting the APBs, PCOM, or myself. In her interview, LL B disclosed, "The PCOM has problems among themselves. There is no cooperation, so as a solution, the decision was made to hire the guard to take care of the animals." An APB (GPS teacher) added, "The club did not organize themselves to care for the animals, so that is why the guard now has the responsibility. His salary was increased." By giving control to the guard, they further kept the PBs from participating in TAC instead of encouraging the PCOM to collaborate with the other PSs and myself to find a positive solution. This is a clear example written in the literature review of the opportunity leaders and the elite have to promote unity, but choose instead to keep people divided.

Seven out of the 23 PBs interviewed (30%) did not agree with LL A and LL B's decision to hire the night guard; in fact, many were angry that they were not consulted beforehand. They believed that he was not a solution to TAC's problems because of his incompetency and unreliability to perform this duty properly. "I do not agree with [LL A's] decision to give responsibility to the guard. He is taking care of them and they are continuing to die" (APB). "The guard is not supposed to take care of the animals. He does not know how. On some rabbits, he used gasoline to cure the infections on their legs and ears because LL A told him. He is not even competent in his own job as a guard" (two APBs). "The guard does not remove the [soiled]



grass [from the rabbit hutch]. He is not conscious about sanitation” (CPB). “The guard is busy with other things. He has no time to do a good job, or maybe he does not care” (APB).

These statements reveal the PBs’ observations of the incapability of the night guard to care appropriately for the animals. It is not logical that LL A and LL B would hire an incompetent person to have sole responsibility for the animals when they already were in need of proper care. Perhaps, though, he was not incompetent, but indifferent to his job because he was not involved in the TACP. It is also feasible that these LLs chose the night guard because he already was employed at GPS, and since his salary was under the school’s control, so was he. This fact made it easier for LL A to control the project’s activities by manipulating him. One villager is easier to manipulate and command than 15 [beneficiary] families.

#### 4.2.2.2.1.4. Imiganda and Government-Initiated Meetings

In addition to tight controls by LL A, an abundance of government-directed, community activities caused serious scheduling difficulties in arranging and holding trainings and meetings with the TAC PBs, despite that 39% of the PBs had conveyed interest and expressed need for them. Imiganda and other government-directed meetings were a significant constraint that prevented the PBs from attending the organized TAC meetings.<sup>65</sup> On average, 12 out of the 15 APBs (80%) were absent from these organized TAC meetings, and usually their children, as well. Eight out of the 14 APB RPs interviewed (57%) stated that their absence was frequently because of mandatory imiganda and government-directed meetings. “I did not attend some club meetings because there were usually government activities, like umuganda, happening. I had to prioritize these activities” (APB). “The biggest challenge to the TACP is that there are a lot of village and grass-root programs [government-directed, mandatory community programs], so we could not come to club meetings because we did not have enough time.” (APB).

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<sup>65</sup> A weekly one-hour TAC meeting typically was organized; the duration of each meeting depended on the available time of the PBs.

These obligatory imiganda and other government-directed meetings, which control the subordinates' free time, are another way the government dominates the population, instead of creating cooperation and partnership by encouraging volunteerism in the community. Spontaneously planned, they leave little extra time to independently progress outside government or NGO-controlled assistance. Instead, precious time is spent attending to immediate needs. "There are a lot of last-minute government meetings. Every Tuesday we have our local [cell-level] umuganda, plus the countrywide umuganda the last Saturday of every month. There are consequences if you miss a government meeting. Everyone must attend, regardless, so time is short for other programs, like the club" (APB).

The PBs hinted in their responses to the CQ 1 that they are intimidated into attending the government-directed activities. Paying a fine is the typical consequence if absent; however, some locals have commented that jail time or beatings are also punishments. Some locals who want to avoid punishment are forced to prioritize these activities, consistently giving government leaders opportunities to manage their subordinates. Furthermore, oftentimes the locals are required to pay fees at these meetings. This is detrimental to the poorest people, since money is precious and hard to obtain. One PB reported, "We were supposed to give money [to buy chicken food], but we cannot because we need to give money for other things during imiganda and government meetings" (APB). A site visit to GPS showed an old man, who had been undoubtedly intimidated by LLs, calling fellow villagers to attend a government meeting. He railed against his peers, insulting them, and forewarning of consequences if they did not come. He said (roughly translated), "It is wonderful to have leaders like ours. They need us present at the meeting. You will be seriously punished if you do not come, no matter what your reasons are."

The PBs emphasized that their free time to complete jobs and other activities, such as

coming to TAC meetings or taking care of the project animals, is difficult if not impossible, due to the overload of these mandatory events. “Teamwork is a problem because... we cannot find time to be together... everyone is busy... It is hard to manage our time around [government meetings]...to organize ourselves to let [the chickens] be free...[so]...everyone ignores their responsibilities” (two APBs who are teachers at GPS).

The locals are intimidated and manipulated by fearful and lengthy day-long meetings, which steal what little personal free time the recipients could enjoy. One observation in Gitarama supports this description of a typical government meeting. LLs had organized groups of villagers to sit on the ground and listen as an apparent LL stood above and bullied them with authority. The LL used threatening words and gestures that indicated punishment. Another observation took place at the Gitarama Cell administrative office while discussing the TACP with a LL of high power in Gitarama. A RPF soldier from the military camp in Kibuye arrived and examined me about my presence and intentions in Gitarama. This same soldier later led a government meeting with the villagers, using the same threatening words and bullying gestures observed during the previous visit. This tactic of intimidation and manipulation leaves the citizenry dependent on the government and guarantees unconditional compliance, acceptance, and (superficial) devotion to their totalitarian leader, which in return, gives them easier control over the locals’ lives. These examples are almost certainly an indication of SS in locals in a TES (living under a totalitarian regime) and reflect well the studies in the literature review of totalitarian leaders and their dependents’ behaviors in conflict and post-conflict states.

#### 4.2.2.3. Corruption of the Local Leader Project Stakeholders

Based on the corruption theories in the literature, one can hypothesize that at the national and local levels, there are some authorities/leaders engaging in corruptive acts because of the

availability of large amounts of foreign aid money being invested in Rwanda's post-genocide reconstruction and development. Two notable corruptive acts by LL PSs occurred in the TACP and contributed to the significant constraint of the animals' poor health and deaths. These acts were the inferior construction of the rabbit hutch and the improper identification of the PBs.

#### 4.2.2.3.1. The Construction of the Rabbit Hutch

The budgeted money for the rabbit hutch construction was given to LL A to obtain the necessary materials, which included wooden planks, tin sheets for the sides and roof, poles to hold up the hutch, and strong, small-holed, wire mesh screen for the floor of the hutch. LL A acquired the materials, and built the rabbit hutch without involving the PBs. It was obvious her actions were deceptive upon seeing the constructed rabbit hutch. The roof and sides were old clay tiles and pieces of discarded tin that had lain around the school grounds. Sticks that had been the walls of the kindergarten classroom had been torn down and re-used as the poles to hold the hutch off the ground. The floor of the hutch was weak, wide-holed, wire mesh screen. The insides of the individual rooms were not well-sealed and nails protruded from the wood. The benches in front of the hutch that served as a step for the children to access the hutch were not well-secured, and soon broke after their construction.<sup>66</sup> The receipts for the materials returned by LL A did not reflect the actual materials used, showing she neglected to purchase the budgeted supplies.

Sixteen out of the 26 PSs (62%) reported in their CIs that they had observed problems with the construction of the rabbit hutch. LL A, who oversaw the construction, was among these sixteen people. More specifically, 10 out of the 16 people remarked that the rabbit hutch was not sealed well inside and six out of these 16 commented that the mesh screen on the bottom of the

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<sup>66</sup> The benches were added so that children could access the rabbits without having to put the rabbit hutch so low to the ground that other animals could harm them. The PCOM and LL A neglected to have the benches and the protruding nails inside the hutch repaired, after being approached by me many times about these problems.

hutch was not strong and the size was too big. They said that the bunnies were falling through the mesh screen and the rabbits, especially the males, were easily passing between the rooms and injuring each other (the pregnant females were especially harmed).

Nine out of the 16 interviewees referred to poor construction as the cause of death of some adult rabbits and most of the bunnies. “The screen on the bottom is not strong. The holes are too big and in many areas the screen broke. The bunnies fall onto the ground and die. The screen should be replaced with strong, smaller-holed screen” (APB). “Short people and children cannot see inside because the benches were not fixed well and they broke” (CPB). Others contributed the rabbits’ deaths to wind exposure, malnutrition, and poor sanitation caused by improper care by both the PBs and the night guard. “The inside of the rabbit hutch is not well protected from the wind and the bunnies are getting cold and dying” (APB). “The children stopped giving grass to the rabbits because they could not reach into the hutch” (APB). “The workers were supposed to put cement on the ground so bugs and other animals could not get inside and disturb the rabbits” (APB).<sup>67</sup>

The construction of the chicken coop was monitored more closely after the poor job on the rabbit hutch. As mentioned earlier, building the chicken coop became a community project when TAC PBs joined with another youth club and other Gitarama community members to lay the foundation and build the skeleton structure. Hired, trained local workers demonstrated and led the construction.<sup>68</sup> The chicken coop served as a model for how a suitable animal pen should look<sup>69</sup> and as a result, no chickens died due to inferior construction. In fact, 19 out of the 26 PS

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<sup>67</sup> GPS was supposed to provide cement as part of the community’s contribution to the TACP’s budget. See Table 3 under Appendix D, *Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design* for the budget (p. 108).

<sup>68</sup> The chicken coop took three days to build. The hired workers finished the construction alone after government meetings prevented the PBs and community members from returning after the first day.

<sup>69</sup> There is no fixed way to build a rabbit hutch or chicken coop. Locating enough good quality materials may pose a challenge since the people in Gitarama are poor and the Rwandan government has a law that forbids cutting trees without prior permission. The TACP budgeted for

RPs (73%) responded that the chicken coop was built well and that the only problems were its constant unsanitary conditions and destruction by locals of the lock, door, and outside fence. Two CPB interviewees remarked, “There are no problems with the chicken coop but children are destroying the lock, door, and fence. We are supposed to clean the coop because it is dirty.” “[It] is well built. The sides are ventilated and cool the chickens when it is hot; they are well protected” (APB). The remaining seven people (27%) suggested that it should have been built bigger to house the large number of chickens and give more space for laying.<sup>70</sup>

Participatory planning of the chicken coop with the PBs involved determining the local prices of materials and who would obtain local items (e.g. logs) for reimbursement while I oversaw the purchase of the rest things in Kibuye.<sup>71</sup> A minor attempt at corruption by the PBs did occur during such a meeting. It was discovered that the quoted prices of the materials were inflated, being much higher than those in Kibuye town. One leader in the PCOM said during this particular meeting (thinking I could not understand her), “Let’s devour this foreigner’s money” (roughly translated). This example shows how even locals with a little authority may attempt exploitation for money when given the chance, instead of honest work. It also supports Le Billon’s argument that ordinary citizens will do corruption to survive in a highly corrupt state.

#### 4.2.2.3.2. Identification of the Project Beneficiaries

The second corruptive act by LLs had the most significant impact on the project as a whole, besides the exorbitant number of mandatory government-directed activities. This act was the faulty identification of the PBs and it helped generate, along with the other factors already

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enough solid materials to build safe animal housing to use as a demonstration for the community. Alternative building methods the PBs could use at their homes were supposed to be discussed during the trainings (ibid).

<sup>70</sup> The chicken coop was built 4m<sup>2</sup>x2m<sup>2</sup>, making it 3x bigger than what is theoretically needed to house 15 egg-laying chickens, under the assumption that they would be closed up only at night and during bad weather. More space was given to accommodate extra future chickens.

<sup>71</sup> The purpose of collectively gathering the materials was to promote partnership, collaboration, and a sense of ownership over the project, while at the same time, monitor the purchase of materials to prevent possible stealing of the project’s money.

discussed, many of the TACP's constraints. GPS personnel chose the first group of PBs supposedly using the IC;<sup>72</sup> however, observations and casual conversations with the chosen PBs, LLs, and Gitarama community members sparked suspicion that the project's IC had not been followed. Four noteworthy observations led to the assumption that the identification was corrupted. These were: (a) The chosen PBs had at least one animal and many owned a cow or several goats (b) one CPB was in sixth grade at the time of identification (c) the majority of the chosen PBs lived next to the school (d) the chosen PBs had personal and/or professional relationships with the those in charge of the identification and/or were influential in Gitarama.

Which animals the TACP should buy was discussed during an initial meeting; it was agreed that chickens and rabbits be purchased over cows or goats.<sup>73</sup> One leader of the PCOM showed extreme dissatisfaction with this decision and insisted that either cows or goats be purchased instead,<sup>74</sup> as did a few other APBs in the CI: "The project gave me only a chicken... You need to give us something more, like a goat or something that has four legs." "They [the other beneficiaries] were saying that rabbits and chickens were nothing significant."<sup>75</sup> These reactions exhibited that some of the PBs already owned animals,<sup>76</sup> as well as DS, from their insistence that the TACP supply expensive animals and display of annoyance when explained to that it would not be feasible to do so.

The CIs revealed that one CB had left GPS to attend secondary school; thus, she was already in grade six when the identification had taken place. Choosing her went against another

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<sup>72</sup> See Table 1 under Appendix D, *Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design*, Twizere Agriculture Club Project Description for the IC (p. 102).

<sup>73</sup> Chickens and rabbits are more advantageous than goats or cows for a poor community like Gitarama because they are cheaper to buy, easier to raise (especially for children), reproduce often, and provide a surplus of products to eat or sell.

<sup>74</sup> His request was overruled because there lacked sufficient money and time to purchase and raise enough cows or goats for each six-month cycle of the project to make the TACP sustainable.

<sup>75</sup> Cows play an important role in Rwandan culture and are perhaps the only animal really valued by most Rwandans. A cow is a sign of wealth because of its historic symbol and because it is expensive to buy and keep.

<sup>76</sup> It was observed later that one leader of the PCOM lives next to GPS and owns four cows, three goats, and several chickens. Possessing one or more animals went against the first identification criterion.

identification criterion.<sup>77</sup> Additionally, the results of the WIs, verified that all 15 children (out of 487 GPS students) in the first group had been chosen only from the village closest to GPS rather than amongst all eight villages in Gitarama. This act neglected seven whole villages and narrowed the diversity from which to select. The skepticism that the first group of PBs had either a familial or professional relationship with those who identified them was confirmed while interviewing the PSs and through my own observations and analysis. Fourteen APBs (43%) were either the child or sibling of a teacher at GPS and eight child beneficiaries (57%) had parents/guardians who were influential in the society. Likewise, one child from the eight had another resource of financial help outside the TACP from a project called COMPASSION.<sup>78</sup> These observations supported the findings.

The conjecture that the first group was improperly identified was proven through the CIs and WIs and my observations before and during these interviews. Corruption in the identification was verified: the PBs of the first group were not the poorest and most vulnerable in the region and thus, should not have been targeted first. Two statements support this confirmation. LL C said in her CI, “Locals who already have a lot of animals should not have been given more because they already have a lot of responsibilities.” One APB shared that another declared she did not need the project. “She said she was going to leave the project because she was able to buy chickens and rabbits herself.”

The results of the WIs revealed that the Gr1 PB’s wealth category consisted of seven well-to-do (50%), six better off (43%), and one poor (7%).<sup>79</sup> All of the families, with the

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<sup>77</sup> Secondary schools in Rwanda are boarding schools; children attend them upon completing grade five of primary school and passing the national examinations. The reason the project was not supposed to choose current sixth graders was because they would have left for secondary school soon after TAC started and would not have been present to participate in the club activities or to assist their peers in future TAC groups.

<sup>78</sup> See Appendix F, Figures 18 and 19 (pp. 117 & 118).

<sup>79</sup> It is assumed that the PB family who moved from Gitarama had a wealth category of well-to-do or better off as they had resources to move.



exception of a GPS teacher, owned at least one goat, cow, or sheep, averaging three animals per family. At least one person was employed in six out of the 14 families (43%), and nine of the 14 families (65%) ate two or three meals per day; the average being 1.8 meals a day per family. Nine out of 12 families whose assets were revealed received a grade of A or B. On the contrary, the findings of Gr2 PB's wealth category consisted of all destitute. Not one family interviewed (0%) possessed an animal, nor did any family (0%) have steady employment. Furthermore, all 15 families reported typically eating no meals a day.<sup>80</sup> Thirteen out of the 15 families whose assets were made known received a grade of F (see Tables 11 and 12, pp. 59 & 60).<sup>81</sup> Based on the conversations, many families were at-risk in this group.<sup>82</sup>

The analysis behind this dishonest identification stems from corruption by GPS personnel who were in charge of PB selection. They chose people with whom they had either familial, friend, or professional relationships, possibly hoping they could profit later from those who were chosen. This analysis is supported by two examples from the literature review: Ware and Noone's explanation that political leaders in higher positions on the hierarchy tactically assign jobs, contracts, loans, and grants to certain elite groups who are then manipulated for the leaders' personal gain, and Kumar and Corbridge's analysis of their community development agriculture project in India. The findings of the CIs and WIs, as well as the supporting observations, concluded that every PB family chosen for Gr1 had more stable means of living than presumably the majority of Gitarama's population who are more at-risk for food insecurity, malnutrition, and overall poor quality of livelihood. Therefore, the families in this group they should not have been

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<sup>80</sup> Conversations and observations revealed that the average Gitarama local eats a diet of plantains, sweet potatoes, white potatoes, beans, and wild spinach-like leaves as staple foods.

<sup>81</sup> Key for Tables 11 & 12 is on p. 61.

<sup>82</sup> The Gr2 PB families suffered from extreme poverty, severe malnutrition, and HIV/AIDS. Some were from the Twa tribe, who are more marginalized in Rwanda than the poorest of the poor. Others were women whose husbands left to search for new wives or whose children were sent away to live elsewhere because of poverty.

Table 11 Wealth Index Survey Results for Group 1 Beneficiary Families

Group 1 Beneficiary Families	Livestock	Employment in the Family	Number of Meals per Day	Other Assets	Exceptional Observations (seen or told)	Wealth Category
A	1 Goat	No	1	OL SBH AA ("C")	N/A	Better off
B	2 Cows 2 Chickens	Yes	3	OL SBH SU AA ("A")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sometimes the family can afford to eat meat</li> </ul>	Well-to-do
C	1 Goat	No	1-2	OL SBH SU AA ("B")	N/A	Better off
D	2 Goats 2 Cows	No	2	OL SBH SU AA ("A")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviewee's husband used to work at Gitarama Cell office before falling ill</li> <li>RPF pays secondary school fees for their two oldest children</li> </ul>	Well-to-do
E	1 Cow	No	1	OL SBH SU AA ("A")	N/A	Better off
F	1 Cow	No	1	OL AA ("D")	N/A	Poor
G	3 Sheep	No	2	OL SBH SU AA ("C")	N/A	Better off
H	1 Goat	Yes	2	OL SBH SU AA ("A")	N/A	Well-to-do
I	4 Cows 3 Goats 3 Chickens	Yes	2	OL SBH SU AA ("A")	N/A	Well-to-do
J	2 Cows	Yes	3	OL SBH SU AA ("A")	N/A	Well-to-do
K	1 Cow 2 Goats 2 Chickens	No	2	OL SBH SU AA ("A")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviewee is the president of teachers at GPS and the president of the PCOM</li> </ul>	Well-to-do
L	1 Goat 1 Chicken	Yes	1	OL SU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Beneficiary was interviewed at GPS; therefore it is unknown what her house looks like and what her additional assets are</li> <li>Interviewee is a teacher at GPS</li> </ul>	Better off
M	No	Yes	2	OL SU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Beneficiary was interviewed at GPS; therefore it is unknown what his house looks like and what his additional assets are</li> <li>Interviewee is a teacher at GPS</li> </ul>	Better off
N	2 Cows 3 Chickens	No	1	OL SBH SU AA ("B")	N/A	Well-to-do

Table 12 Wealth Index Survey Results for Group 2 Beneficiary Families

Group 2 Beneficiary Families	Livestock	Employment in the Family	Number of Meals per Day	Other Assets	Exceptional Observations (seen or told)	Wealth Category
A	No	No	0-1	OL AA ("F")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviewee's child appeared malnourished and stunted</li> </ul>	Destitute
B	No	No	0-1	AA ("F")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Family does not have basic health insurance (&lt;\$2 USD/person/year)</li> </ul>	Destitute
C	No	No	0-1	AA ("F")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviewee (widowed woman) takes care of seven children in the family</li> </ul>	Destitute
D	No	No	0-1	OL AA ("F")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The children in this family appear to be severely malnourished</li> </ul>	Destitute
E	No	No	0-1	AA ("F")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>10 people live in the house built for possibly 5 people at the most</li> <li>House is literally in ruins</li> </ul>	Destitute
F	No	No	0-1	OL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Family was not home at the time of visit; therefore, it is unknown what kind of assets they have</li> <li>Neighbor gave us the information; she told us one child left school because of no money and hunger</li> </ul>	Destitute
G	No	No	0-1	AA ("F")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>House is rented</li> <li>Children appear severely malnourished</li> </ul>	Destitute
H	No	No	0-1	OL AA ("F")	N/A	Destitute
I	No	No	0-1	OL GSFH AA ("C")	N/A	Destitute
J	No	No	0-1	OL AA ("F")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviewee is HIV+ and her husband is in jail</li> </ul>	Destitute
K	No	No	0-1	AA ("F")	N/A	Destitute
L	No	No	0-1	AA ("F")	N/A	Destitute
M	No	No	0-1	OL AA ("F")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Children appear severely malnourished</li> </ul>	Destitute
N	No	No	0-1	AA ("F")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Children appear severely malnourished</li> <li>Interviewee's husband kicked her and the children out of the house because of poverty; she was living with her mother at the time of the interview</li> </ul>	Destitute
O	No	No	0-1	AA ("F")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Children appear severely malnourished</li> <li>Interviewee stated his wife is mentally sick</li> </ul>	Destitute

### Key for Tables 11 & 12<sup>83</sup>

*Other Assets:* OL (own land), SBH (solidly built house), SU (child owns a school uniform), AA (additional assets)

*Note:* AA includes possessing the following four groups of assets: (a) *kitchen/cultivating tools* (b) *furniture* (c) *at least one bed* (d) *at least one mattress*. AA for each family is graded based on the following scale: “A” = owns assets from *all four* groups, “B” = owns assets from *three* out of the four groups, “C” = owns assets from *two* out of the four groups, “D” = owns assets from *one* of out the four groups, “F” = owns *no* additional assets

*Note:* GPS = Gitarama Primary School, PCOM = Parent Committee, RPF = Rwandan Patriotic Front

<b>Well-to-do</b>	<b>Better off</b>	<b>Poor</b>	<b>Destitute</b>
➤ Owns > 1 cow or > 2 animals other than a cow	➤ Has > 1 animal other than a cow	➤ May have > 1 chicken	➤ Possesses no animals
➤ At least one person is employed in the home	➤ No employment in the home	➤ No employment in the home	➤ No employment in the home
➤ Eats > 2 meals a day	➤ Eats > 1 meals a day	➤ Eats 1 meal a day	➤ Eats 0-1 meal a day
➤ Possesses all 3 groups of assets: OL, SBH, SU	➤ Possesses > 2 out of the 3 groups of assets: OL, SBH, SU	➤ Owns land, possesses no other groups of assets	➤ Owns no groups of assets
➤ AA are graded > B	➤ AA are graded > C	➤ AA are graded > D	➤ AA are graded “F”

chosen as the PBs for the TACP’s first six-month cycle.<sup>84 85</sup>

#### **4.2.3 Trauma and Rwanda’s Post-conflict Culture**

It is likely that totalitarian-HV Theory X leadership and corruption were largely responsible for about half of the identified TACP constraints, while the other half related

<sup>83</sup> Tables 11 and 12 were adapted from Project Design Handbook. Copyright 2002. *Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.* Used by permission.

<sup>84</sup> Research to look at the wealth index of every family in Gitarama was not done.

<sup>85</sup> The aim of identification was to target the poorest families first in Gitarama and then the “wealthier” families who had less need for immediate help. Furthermore, the poorest families may have had more time to devote to the project because they had no regular employment or farm work. The TACP could have been their one stable livelihood. The PBs chosen first did indeed deserve a place in TAC; however, Gr1 PBs were not the poorest of the poor in Gitarama, as shown by the results of the WIS. Since they did not meet the IC, they would have been chosen later because the TACP was designed to “graduate” and rotate club members every six months. Eventually all the children at GPS would have had the opportunity to participate in TAC through this rotation.

significantly to chronic trauma experienced by so many citizens—the result of conflict in Rwanda. The civil war with the genocide<sup>86</sup> escalated the historical tension between the Tutsi and Hutu, and the present-day regime is destroying what little peace was left in the already fragile relationships among the people. The research indicated six specific consequences of trauma in TAC that affected the PSs and the club’s functioning: (a) PTSS in the APBs (b) division among TAC members (c) behavioral change from a collectivist culture to an individualist culture (d) appeasement (e) Stockholm syndrome (f) dependency syndrome.

#### 4.2.3.1. Post-traumatic Stress Symptoms in the Adult Project Beneficiaries

The very nature of genocide attests that people who experienced and survived it presumably have some degree of trauma, in the form of PTSS or other psychopathological disorders, including CPTSD. Being a nation-wide holocaust, it is credible that everyone in Rwanda during the genocide was exposed to at least one of the eight dimensions of trauma, including TAC’s PSs, as well as other Gitarama community members.<sup>87</sup> It is also plausible that the negative effects of trauma are contributing to the poverty from which Rwandans already suffer. For example, one boy whose father was interviewed in the Gr2 PBs said his mother had been mentally ill “for a long time” and could not work. Based on the results of their WIS, this family eats 0-1 times a day, has no animals or other means of livelihood, and lives in a precariously built house.

The literature review alludes to studies that proved victims of traumatic events during World War II continued to show signs of trauma 45 years later, and several years after the Gulf War. These studies support the fact that people can indeed still be severely traumatized only 16 years after the genocide—and especially as another dictator is in power. Rwandans suffering

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<sup>86</sup> See the timeline under Appendix B, *Significant Events in Rwandan History* (p. 94).

<sup>87</sup> It is assumed that the people living in Gitarama today experienced the genocide since their economic state would have prevented them from escaping it by fleeing abroad.

from PTSS are caught in a vicious cycle where PTSS affect and are affected by other PTSS. The seven most common PTSS noticed in Gr1 APBs and Gr2 APBs were (a) emotional distress (b) intense panic (c) hopelessness (d) helplessness (e) negativity (f) powerlessness (g) vulnerability. In total, seven out of the 23 PBs (30%) distinctly showed these PTSS by their statements in the CIs. However, all the PTSS in adults and those in children found in the literature review can be recognized in other Rwandans when sufficient time is spent with them.

The most common PTSS in Rwanda upon observing locals may be emotional distress. Numerous times, I witnessed locals cringing or flinching when approached suddenly, or pointing and laughing even when someone was in serious trouble. This lack of empathy shown by most Rwandans illustrates the emotional distress and probable complex trauma (CPTSD), which also is exhibited in their lack of ability to concentrate. One APB confirmed this by saying, “To work with Rwandans, you have to repeat yourself several times for them to comprehend.” These examples are common symptoms of CPTSD, as described in the literature review. Similarly, statements of “Do not record me,” and, “Do not tell the others what I am going to tell you,” emphasized by the APBs, even after reassuring confidentiality and establishing an atmosphere of ease, displayed acute emotional stress, intense panic, fear, and mistrust.

It appeared that bouts of hopelessness associated with trauma might have brought on the PTSS of helplessness in Gr1 and Gr2 APBs. Helplessness probably led to negativity and feelings of powerlessness due to their circumstances. Evidence of these PTSS came out in statements during the interviews with both groups: “We have nothing. Nothing to eat, nothing” (hopelessness); “When they [PBs] do not see you [myself] coming [to Gitarama], they stop to do anything and neglect the club”(helplessness); “People are stubborn and fighting among themselves” (negativity); and “I’m discouraged because people [in the club] are divided...There

are parents who really need this project, but our [local] leaders discouraged us instead of helping us improve” (powerlessness).

Combined with other stressful life situations such as poverty, the PTSS of vulnerability can occur in post-traumatic victims. Widows and women with absentee husbands are one example of a social group in Gitarama who may be suffering from this PTSS, as well as PTSD. Twelve out of the 14 APBs interviewed (86%) were women; eight out of these 12 (67%) were either widowed or their husbands were in jail.<sup>88</sup> One PB widow explained, “Most women in Gitarama do not have husbands at home. If he did not die, he is in jail.” Additionally, three women from Gr2 PBs shared that their husbands had left home because of poverty to look for other wives in Kibuye. Trauma and poverty may have increased already unbearable feelings of hopelessness and may have guided their (husbands’) decision to leave.

The study by Pham et al., described in the literature review, proved that two-thirds of post-traumatic victims with PTSD symptoms in Rwanda are women, and that they are more subject to abuse and poverty, especially in a traditional society where they do not have equality with men. It is conceivable that the majority of the women in the TACP may be suffering from PTSD or PTSS since 67% of them lost their husbands and are running their households alone, oftentimes caring for orphans in addition to their own children. “I take care of three children. One child is an orphan. Their [sic] father is gone,” one APB explained. Another woman PB clarified in her CI that most families have personal problems and domestic tasks are abundant and overwhelming. Her remark suggests that their problems make them feel hopeless. She advised, “People are discouraged. They do not meet often because of personal problems at their homes...The problems in people’s families need to be solved first to fix problems in the club.” Four other interviewees (19% of the total research the PS RP group) gave similar statements

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<sup>88</sup> See Appendix F, Figure 20 (p. 119).

supporting her claim. Thus, hopelessness most likely was a huge contributor to the common problems of absence and indifference to TAC activities.

PTSS of fear and intense panic also may be embedded in the LLs who are working within the RPF hierarchy under a totalitarian regime. These PTSS may be another explanation of why the LLs displayed hesitation and questioned each action of the TACP implementation process when requesting permission.

#### 4.2.3.2. Division Among the Twizere Agriculture Club Project Beneficiaries

Rwanda's complicated history, lack of mental health counseling services, and HV Theory X, totalitarian leadership make it difficult for PTG and sustainable reconciliation to take place. Everyday interactions with the locals reflect the repercussions of trauma on the Rwandan society. Working on the TACP shed light on the division among people in the community of Gitarama from unaddressed collective trauma.<sup>89</sup> When analyzing the data, 12 out of 26 PS interviewed (46%) showed fear, anger, mistrust, or combinations of the three in their responses to the CIQs. The APBs' great concerns for their CQ 1 responses to be kept secret from the other PSs manifests the probable fright and suspicion Rwandans have of each other possibly due to post-conflict trauma. "The best way to fix the [club's] problems...bring everyone together so we can feel comfortable among ourselves. But be careful how you discuss the club's problems with everyone...so it does not cause further anger and division," prompted one APB.

Thirty-five per cent of PSs interviewed stated that the PBs are divided, which resulted in no cooperation or communication among themselves, apathy to the TACP, and poor health of

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<sup>89</sup> Possible trauma from genocide survivors may be affecting their outlook on community cohesiveness. The change in their outlook, along with the transfer of PTSS to their children, could be influencing their children's perception of their community, as shown in transgenerational trauma studies, post-conflict collective trauma studies, and the ABC-X Model of Family Stress.



TAC's animals. Their fear and mistrust caused fighting and anger<sup>90</sup> with each other, and induced their divided relationships as fellow club members. "The club members are divided. We do not work together and some do not value the club...If we had worked together, the club would not have any problems" (APB).

Besides division, 38% of PSs interviewed mentioned indifference and diffuse of responsibility (the by-stander effect) as two additional causes behind the PBs' abandonment of TAC. More specifically, 23% of PSs expressed there was division among PCOM members, and 35% of PSs said the PCOM lacked organization and communication with other PBs, who also contributed to their resignation from TAC. "The PCOM was fighting with each other and having problems. "People are pointing fingers at each other and do not want to take responsibility to work for the club;" Organization by the PCOM was bad...it ceased to exist...so the rest of the PBs stopped caring [about TAC];" "The club members were not too motivated to give the animals food or release them to scavenge" (three APBs). The indifference shown by the PBs reflects collective trauma and the ways by which subordinates respond to overcontrolling leaders as presented by Bolman and Deal in the literature review. Furthermore, it displays probable discouragement of some PBs from receiving no help from the others.

Some comments by PCOM members insinuated that LL A and LL B were not supportive of the PBs as school leaders and future supervisors of the TACP. Instead, when PCOM members approached them for help with the problems of division between PBs, the leaders ignored their pleas. "All of the problems [in TAC] were told to the school leaders and teachers and they did not do anything to help us" (PCOM member). Again, this shows the likely desire of leaders to keep their subordinates divided and fearful or angry with each other in order to retain control, as

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<sup>90</sup> It is also important to mention that anger and resentment were also shown when some of the PBs spoke about the many imiganda and government meetings. Their anger communicated that their constant, required attendance at these affairs was not something with which they agreed, but something of which they had no choice but comply.

mentioned by Staub in the literature review.

#### 4.2.3.3. Behavioral Change from a Collectivist Culture to an Individualist Culture

It was noticeable in TAC that the PSs' desire to work individually rather than collectively encouraged their efforts to care for the TAC animals. The circumstances under which they live—post-conflict trauma, fear and mistrust of other Rwandans, and a ruling totalitarian regime—have caused huge changes to a country that traditionally lived as a unified society.<sup>91</sup> Rwanda's tremulous past and resulting post-conflict dynamics have turned the culture that was once-collectivist into one that is distinctly individualist. Trauma and the deterrent of HV Theory X leadership are preventing consolidation of Rwandan communities.

The indifference of the PBs to collaborate in properly caring for TAC's animals shows their inability to work together for the common good, instead, working to meet their immediate needs.<sup>92</sup> Thirteen PBs (57%) mentioned the animals' health suffered at GPS because of dissention, feuds, indifference, time limitations, and the incompetence and/or indifference of GPS's night guard. "Keeping them at the school is hard. The animals are sick because not everyone is taking responsibility to care for them" (CPB). As a result, the main problems of the project chickens were 0% egg production and 21% mortality rate. Issues considered unsolvable to the PSs were a contagious disease (sleeping sickness),<sup>93</sup> unsanitary conditions, malnutrition from insufficient food, and no funds to purchase feed. The majority of the PSs contributed these issues to the problems with the chickens.

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<sup>91</sup> Even though the Hutu and Tutsi tribes fought and were divided since the arrival of the Belgians, people of the same ethnic tribe worked together. Other Rwandans outside the TACP and Gitarama have verbalized that the genocide has caused mistrust among themselves, even those from the same tribe.

<sup>92</sup> The literature review explains some differences between collectivist and individualist societies. One characteristic of collectivist cultures is concern for the collective group. However, Rwandans have learned to work individually to meet basic needs (as depicted in studies of post-conflict Cambodia and Sri Lanka) because of their collective trauma (as described in the study of post-genocide Bosnia).

<sup>93</sup> "The school leaders said the chickens died of sleeping sickness, but if that were the cause, all of the chickens would have been contaminated and died quickly. But they did not; only three died" (APB).

A leader in the PCOM, LL A, and LL B insisted that the PBs take the chickens home.<sup>94</sup> This eventually was done after everyone stopped coming to GPS to care for them. “The school leaders gave us each a project chicken to take home and feed well so they would not have more problems. We were not able to care for them together at the school” (CPB). The leaders of GPS and the PCOM were in powerful positions, according to Rwandans’ view of societal hierarchy, to support cohesiveness and cooperation between the PBs. The leaders of GPS’ outlook on the ability of the PBs (their subordinates) to cooperate in caring for the animals can be compared to the “self-fulfilling prophecy” of HV Theory X leadership used by most Rwandans in power. Ineffective leadership and DS may have also added to their indifference in encouraging teamwork among the PBs.

The rumor of a contagious disease was refuted when all the chickens’ health dramatically improved and they began laying eggs soon after the PBs began caring for them at home.<sup>95</sup> Sixty two percent of the PSs interviewed realized that the chicken’s illness and lack of laying eggs was because they were hungry, not having been released to scavenge. “The chickens were not laying eggs because they were hungry. Now we have many eggs because they are free to scavenge for food” (APB). However, a few people emphasized that they knew chickens would lay eggs with enough food.

The improvement of the chickens’ health proved the competence and capability of the PBs to care for the chickens<sup>96</sup> (and most likely the rabbits), as well as their unwillingness to cooperate in doing so. “The president [of the PCOM] suggested the idea to take the chickens

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<sup>94</sup> The request was previously denied by myself and other PBs. The chickens were supposed to serve as a model for the Gitarama community and if they were taken home before reproducing sufficiently, there would have been no more replacements for the next groups. Moreover, once the chickens were taken, it would have been very unlikely that the PBs would have returned them or any chicks because of the divided and individualistic nature of present-day Rwandan relationships. The concern was that if no chickens were returned, there would have been no more to keep TAC sustainable.

<sup>95</sup> Observations during the CIs showed all TACP chickens given to the PB families were released to scavenge and appeared to be much healthier.

<sup>96</sup> Observations and informal conversations revealed that most rural Rwandans already raise the local breed of chickens bought for TAC.

home. He had already built his chicken coop at his house. He became angry when the other club members refused his idea” (APB). “Those chickens can stay at our homes instead of at the school. When they have babies, we can give them to other club groups” (CPB). PSs expressed statements 19 times in the CIs that refer to the PBs’ desire to work individually instead of as a team. Their insistence to take the project animals before enough had been produced to keep the project sustainable, shows a change in the collectivist characteristics of the culture, and may be a sign of possible collective trauma.

#### 4.2.3.4. Appeasement

Appeasement typically is used under extreme authoritarian/totalitarian environments as a survival mechanism, and has become a living style for Rwandans because of intense fear and trauma. Locals appease RPF by prioritizing imiganda and government-directed meetings to avoid punishment (active avoidance). The consequence of this appeasement is that Rwandans stay divided and do not live in real peace. Anyone perceived as having any kind of authority, including foreigners and development workers, are shown this appeasement. This results in fear and mistrust that prevent locals from seeking these individuals’ assistance with problems.

Six APBs shared statements, such as “There are no problems in the project. There is no fighting or gossiping,” “The problems with the rabbits and chickens are no one’s fault,” and “There were problems, but now they are fixed,” in their interviews that signal their reluctance to say anything else except, “all is well”. Fourteen out of 23 PBs interviewed (61%) had noticed problems with the rabbit hutch, but not one person approached a LL, GPS leader, or myself (passive avoidance). Instead, they tried in vain to improve it by periodically placing grass and banana leaves over the holes in the hutch. They finally communicated their concerns with its condition privately during their CIs.

Other articulated expressions of pacification toward the TACP appeared 14 times in the CIs. The PSs displayed apparent appeasement to me during beginning TAC meetings, notably the first one. Every PB attended and agreed on which animals to purchase for TAC during this meeting. The PSs (except for one leader of the PCOM)<sup>97</sup> all concurred that rabbits and chickens were the best choice. The issue that Seventh Day Adventists do not raise or eat rabbits came up later in only one CI when an APB confirmed the religious denomination has this rule, but that it is not strictly followed in very poor areas where the availability of food is limited.

The Seventh Day Adventist denomination is popular in BS and still no LL or other community member explained the restriction before or during the TACP design phase. The fact that no one mentioned this rule until the CIs (and by only one APB) is an example of pacification by both the PBs and LLs. Perhaps this appeasement was displayed from fear of the LLs (passive avoidance) who endorsed the TACP, and/or from fear of being removed from the TACP by me (active avoidance).<sup>98</sup> The LLs probably were appeasing me at first because I was foreign by convincing me of their support towards the TACP while profiting from it simultaneously by any possible means. They also most likely wanted to demonstrate their loyalty to the RPF by promoting a project from one of the GOR's development partners.

#### 4.2.3.5. Stockholm Syndrome

Pertaining to the experiences with the TACP, the behavior of LL A is the clearest example of someone who appears to display SS, resulting from the traumatic experiences associated with Rwanda's genocide and civil war. It is assumed that in Rwanda, innocent civilians were abused and killed during the civil war and genocide by all involved. LL A made it

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<sup>97</sup> Refer back to the poor identification of the PBs—section 4.2.2.3.2. *Identification of the Project Beneficiaries*.

<sup>98</sup> This appeasement may be a result of intimidation from leaders, plus dependency syndrome, as illustrated by Fearon et al. in the literature review regarding pleasing outside funders in a project in post-conflict Liberia.

known that she was in Rwanda during these events, and so, most certainly suffered one or more of the eight dimensions of trauma. The RPF was part of the horrific events that still affect millions of people. It is now in power and governs with a totalitarian-HV Theory X leadership style, putting most of the citizenry in a TES. Hence, the party is an “attacker” in the SS theory. The role the party played in the two conflicts and their ruling methods explain why many survivors may have developed SS and go to extremes to appease government leaders<sup>99</sup> even if it means giving contradicting thoughts, orders, and actions.

The political and administrative positions of the LL A ratified her control over the logistics of TAC trainings. As discussed earlier, she used an unconfirmed, national law as an excuse to schedule TAC meetings infrequently and short in duration. She emphasized that this law must be respected, yet she said in her CI, “I wish for the strengths of the club to continue...because...the project has the same vision and goals as the government to develop the local population. These goals are important and your project follows them!” She wanted the TACP to continue because it had the same initiatives as the government; nonetheless, she would not allow us to carry out activities, such as the trainings. Less time for TAC meetings with the PBs ensured more time for their presence at imiganda and government-directed meetings.<sup>100</sup>

Therefore, it can be concluded that by her contradictions she either (a) did not support the TACP, but wanted to appease the government because it supposedly supports similar community development projects, or (b) wanted to appease the government with her tight controls of the TACP by ensuring that the PBs would not miss any last-minute government meetings because of planned project activities. Appeasing top government officials was more important and urgent to

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<sup>99</sup> Government leaders higher up the RPF hierarchy than themselves.

<sup>100</sup> Through her insistence of the MINALOC regulation, she was hinting that the PBs must have time to go to the imiganda and government meetings, but she would not acknowledge that they needed adequate time to attend the TAC meetings and trainings. However, even if the TACP's 15 APBs were occasionally absent from the government meetings, the number would not have been large enough to have an impact on the attendance at these meetings. The TACP only required one child and one adult per beneficiary family to be present at TAC trainings. Other family members could have gone to the government-directed meetings.

her than supporting the TACP's advancement and the development of Gitarama citizens for whom she was working. One can see this when comparing her proposals of timeframes for the TACP's activities with the other two LLs; they gave rationale ideas whereas hers were not (refer to section, 4.2.2.2.1.2. *Refusal to Conduct Trainings*). Her proposals appeased the government, the "attacker", while at the same time gave the impression that the government cares about community development projects, and the independency and sustainability of communities these projects promote.

#### 4.2.3.6. Dependency Syndrome

Within Gitarama, most of the locals are stimulated to work for their community and themselves by the extrinsic motivators of appeasement and DS. Numerous developmental projects in the country since the genocide have fostered a DS in the public. Many countries, NGOs, and private donors with huge sums of money for post-conflict reconstruction and development have crippled the populations' intrinsic motivation to work hard and ultimately progress to independence from exterior aid. The TACP PSs expected this avalanche of goods, as well. One CPB was already involved in a project called COMPASSION, giving items and money to beneficiaries just for attending meetings. Her guardian commented in her interview, "Most people ask themselves if this project will be strong and help them like COMPASSION project. In COMPASSION...there are no problems. The parents find something [money and personal items] when they go to meetings and trainings." Conversely, dependency on these types of projects is unsustainable, harming Rwandans' self-esteem and belief in their own abilities to be self-sufficient.

DS appeared clearly in the TACP—thirty-one percent of the PSs interviewed overtly expressed they expected free hand-outs. In fact, it very likely assisted in hindering its success by

causing indifference and diffusion of responsibility. Thirty-eight percent of the PSs gave statements in their CIs that revealed an indifferent attitude towards the project, relating to DS. Some statements, such as, “We need to take care of the rabbits, especially the club members who live closest to the school” (APB), demonstrated diffusion of responsibility. Sixty-two percent of PBs recognized free-ranging the chickens at home solved the chickens’ hunger problems, but some believed that imported poultry was of better quality, unlike the local breed. Denying their negligent behavior, they articulated their want for imported chickens: “Local chickens are not productive. We need muzungu (‘white man’) chickens, instead” (APB). LL A also rejected the traditional way of allowing the chickens to scavenge as a sustainable solution to feeding them. She insisted that the TACP provide more money for poultry feed, instead of encouraging the PBs to create a schedule for letting the chickens free-range daily and/or cooperate to raise money for supplemental feed. LL B stated during her CI, “You [myself] need to look for more money to give to the club to buy chicken food.”

DS was mirrored by LLs in their responses to other CQ questions, as well. One LL commented, “People are hard to manage,” which implies that she believes Rwandans are extrinsically motivated and programmed to be dependent on others. The three LLs all suggested giving money to each PB in the form of per diems for each meeting or training attended to encourage participation. This money ranged in value from 500-3,000 RWF (roughly \$1-\$6). In addition, they also urged offering small gifts, like tee-shirts. LL A explained, “Other NGOs give at least 1,500-2,000 RWF (roughly \$3-\$4) per training to each beneficiary so they can buy something afterwards. Small things like tee-shirts can also motivate them.”<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> It is important to reiterate that the grant was only for \$500, which would not have been enough money to provide all the PBs with per diems for each meeting and training. This is why every effort was made to schedule the time, duration, frequency, and location of meetings and trainings around their convenience. As this project was striving to be sustainable from a small budget, giving per diem would have been disadvantageous. One LL recognized the significance of this and contradicted herself in her CI by saying, “These rural people should easily understand why they are not receiving money for coming to the trainings. You are already giving them animals and vegetables through the animal husbandry and gardening activities.”



“There are people who still do not know the benefits of the project...When they [club members] do not see you [myself] coming, they stop to do anything [sic]” (APB). This remark stresses the possible DS among the PBs. Most people expected extrinsic rewards prior to putting forth any effort towards the TACP, despite the fact their work would later benefit them. One common behavioral characteristic of collectivist societies is to look only at the present; the PBs adhere to this characteristic. They want to see immediate, tangible results rather than work for sustainable goods, and even more so because they might have DS. If people are used to receiving things with no effort on their part, they become amotivated to support and better themselves.

The mass exodus of refugees into the Democratic Republic of Congo during the genocide is evidence that most of the PSs were at one time in a refugee camp. According to reports described in the literature review, DS developed in refugees of post-conflict Sudan, Algeria, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Northern Uganda, and Mozambique, and almost certainly so in Rwandan refugees as well, since the chaotic situation of 1994 was similar to those of the other six countries. The plethora of foreign aid coming in after the genocide adds to the DS that most Rwandans could have developed beforehand, from previous foreign assistance. Learned helplessness and the PTSS of hopelessness associated with trauma, and living under a totalitarian regime make them susceptible to controlled motivation to partake in imiganda and government-directed meetings, and amotivation and DS to participate in the TACP, as indicated by the self-determination theory.

Authoritarian/totalitarian-HV Theory X leadership, corruption, and post-conflict trauma have devastating effects on the sustainability of local level development, resulting in disappointing outcomes of community projects. If the PBs of the TACP would have had: a fair democratic voice in the community, sufficient free time to devote to TAC activities, support of

leaders, opportunities for advancement independent from corruption, harmonious relationships among other community members, freedom of speech, and possibilities for mental health healing and PTG, they might have had the intrinsic motivation to make the project successful.

## DISCUSSION

### 5.1. Conclusions

The collected data showed similar patterns in case studies done in other post-conflict societies emerging from violence, as well as supports the research and existing theories on trauma, corruption, and leadership in conflict and post-conflict contexts. Seven major factors were discovered to have directly affected the implementation of the TACP upon analyzing the data: (a) *corruption* among LLs (b) *domestic problems* of PBs (c) (likely) *fear* that LLs and locals harbor (d) (probable) *dependency syndrome* of LLs and locals (e) *indifference* of LLs and locals (f) *division* among the PBs (g) *tight controls* by local leaders. Fifty-two percent of PBs offered solutions in their CIs to fix the problems in the project; however the combination of these major factors heavily affected the collaboration of the PBs to carry out any of their suggestions.

Table 13 (p. 77) shows these seven factors, their key causes, and the overall resulting consequences in the TACP. Figure 21 (p. 78) shows significant supporting evidence of the factors presented in Table 13 that the PBs reported during the CI and observed in the field. The evidence is charted under the seven major factors. The findings of Table 13 indicate that some causes, major factors, and consequences overlap each other. Furthermore, some supporting evidence shown in Figure 21 is classified under more than one factor.


The research was performed in one community of Rwanda. However, the findings might be observed in locals in different regions since this small country has the same culture, experienced the same horrific events, is under the same totalitarian regime, and is participating in similar development projects like the TACP. Through the analysis of my own data and examination of the existing literature, I conclude that three principal issues are might be preventing real sustainable development from taking place in rural communities in Rwanda:

Table 13 Major Factors That Affected the Twizere Agriculture Club Project, Their Key Causes, and the Overall Resulting Consequences

\* Note: The constraints are not presented in any order of significance

CAUSES	FACTORS	CONSEQUENCES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Tight controls by local leaders</li> <li>✚ Corruption by local leaders</li> <li>✚ Indifference</li> </ul>	CORRUPTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ No organization of the club's parent committee</li> <li>✚ Project stakeholders became indifferent</li> <li>✚ Club animals became sick and died</li> <li>✚ Discontinuation of project activities</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Fear and anger</li> <li>✚ Corruption by local leaders</li> <li>✚ Tight controls by local leaders</li> <li>✚ Trauma of locals</li> <li>✚ Indifference</li> <li>✚ Dependency Syndrome</li> </ul>	DOMESTIC PROBLEMS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ No collaboration between project beneficiaries</li> <li>✚ No communication between school leaders, project beneficiaries, and myself</li> <li>✚ No organization of the club's parent committee</li> <li>✚ Project beneficiaries became indifferent</li> <li>✚ Club animals became sick and died</li> <li>✚ Discontinuation of project activities</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Tight controls by local leaders</li> <li>✚ Trauma of locals</li> </ul>	FEAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ No collaboration between project beneficiaries</li> <li>✚ No communication between school leaders, project beneficiaries, and myself</li> <li>✚ No organization of the club's parent committee</li> <li>✚ Project beneficiaries became indifferent</li> <li>✚ Club animals became sick and died</li> <li>✚ Discontinuation of project activities</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Tight controls by local leaders</li> <li>✚ Trauma of locals</li> <li>✚ Profusion of development projects before and after the genocide</li> <li>✚ Locals were refugees</li> </ul>	DEPENDENCY SYNDROME	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ No collaboration between project beneficiaries</li> <li>✚ No communication between school leaders, project beneficiaries, and myself</li> <li>✚ No organization of the club's parent committee</li> <li>✚ Project stakeholders became indifferent</li> <li>✚ Club animals became sick and died</li> <li>✚ Discontinuation of project activities</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Dependency syndrome</li> <li>✚ Fear and anger</li> <li>✚ Tight controls by local leaders</li> <li>✚ Trauma of locals</li> <li>✚ Domestic problems</li> </ul>	INDIFFERENCE of project stakeholders and DIFFUSE OF RESPONSIBILITY by project beneficiaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ No collaboration between project beneficiaries</li> <li>✚ No communication between school leaders, project beneficiaries, and myself</li> <li>✚ No organization of the club's parent committee</li> <li>✚ Club animals became sick and died</li> <li>✚ Discontinuation of project activities</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Fear and anger</li> <li>✚ Tight controls by local leaders</li> <li>✚ Trauma of locals</li> </ul>	DIVISION among project beneficiaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ No collaboration between project beneficiaries</li> <li>✚ No communication between school leaders, project beneficiaries, and myself</li> <li>✚ No organization of the club's parent committee</li> <li>✚ Project beneficiaries became indifferent</li> <li>✚ Club animals became sick and died</li> <li>✚ Discontinuation of project activities</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ Fear</li> <li>✚ Corruption by local leaders</li> </ul>	TIGHT CONTROLS by local leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✚ No organization of the club's parent committee</li> <li>✚ Project beneficiaries became indifferent</li> <li>✚ Club animals became sick and died</li> <li>✚ Discontinuation of project activities</li> </ul>

**Figure 21 Significant Supporting Evidence of the Major Factors That Affected the Twizere Agriculture Club Project Reported by Project Stakeholders and Gathered From Observations**



(a) The PSs of the TACP (and possibly the whole society of Rwanda, including its leaders) may be (still) suffering from individual and collective trauma attributable to horrific past experiences, and present unstable living conditions. The availability of assistance (especially culturally and contextually) for mental health recovery and PTG of survivors is scarce. Collective healing, peace and reconciliation, or nation-wide sustainable, grassroots community development cannot successfully ensue without recovery occurring first, no matter how many theoretical models are devised. A monolithic and strict authority-heeding culture, the many components of traumatism, and an uncertainty of violence and chaos through retribution and punishments from authorities most likely keep the citizenry divided and in a permanent state of internalized active and passive avoidance.

(b) The RPF uses the authoritarian/command and control style of ruling (HV Theory X leadership) and functions as a totalitarian regime to maintain power and prevent retaliation from individual opposition. Living under totalitarian leadership encourages the civilians to succumb to any pre-existing urges of engaging in corruption, which they unquestionably do. To ordinary locals under a totalitarian regime, corruption is a survival tactic, and to (new) leaders and the elite, it is an opportunity to advance as quickly as possible by their newly established power.

(c) The majority of the (rural) population has probable DS. The enormous amounts of foreign aid for post-conflict reconstruction and sustainable development, plus inappropriate project designs and improper monitoring of funds, are assisting (along with trauma and leadership), in the destruction of locals' intrinsic motivation to progress and to be self-reliant.

## **5.2. Recommendations for Development Workers in Post-Conflict/Genocide Societies**


Drawn from the findings of my research, I present a hypothesis that I have created, named *The Post-Conflict/Genocide Development Hypothesis*. It states: *The continual effects of*

*internal, protracted conflict/genocide and the irrevocable change in the essential nature and personality of a nation, govern all levels of societal development, especially when under corrupt and/or authoritarian/totalitarian rule.* Figure 22—The Post-conflict/Genocide Society Model—is a model I created of the dynamics of a post-conflict/genocide society under an authoritarian/totalitarian regime, displaying the continuous interactions among four elements—corruption, trauma, leaders, and locals. It helps to illustrate the Post-Conflict/Genocide Development Hypothesis (See Figure 22, p. 81).

Survivors of protracted, internal conflict and/or genocide have unique needs—the main necessity being individual psychological counseling/mental health support. Therefore, community development projects and programs should not be designed and implemented with the same guidelines and benchmarks as in countries that have not engaged in this sphere of conflict. Development workers should be especially aware of the following hidden obstacles when working with locals in post-conflict (protracted, internal)/genocide societies: Appeasement and falsehood, dysfunctional communal relationships, the presence of PTSS and/or other psychopathological disorders—including active and passive avoidance—transgenerational trauma, corrupt acts, domineering leaders, and possible retaliation. These impediments can unhinge the execution and sustainability of community development projects.

The above three principal issues—trauma, authoritarian/totalitarian-HV Theory X leadership, and DS—will continue to block real sustainable development in Rwanda if they are not properly addressed. Authoritarian/totalitarian leadership with its tight controls is one the biggest challenges facing post-conflict reconstruction, peace and reconciliation, and sustainable development in disaster and conflict-torn countries. Advocating for a change in policies is necessary in order to change the three identified issues. However, if the government and the

Figure 22 The Post-Conflict/Genocide Society Model<sup>102</sup>



traumatized public so skillfully conceal the threats of a dictatorship and the effects of chronic collective trauma, how can the administration of stated democratic policies truly be verified? Another dilemma is meeting the demands of the donor when executing a multi-million (US) dollar development project, while at the same time minimizing corruption and DS, and empowering and uniting traumatized locals.

The challenge is to implement projects that meet the long-term needs of these populations

<sup>102</sup> Model designed by Bryna C. Ramsey



and remain within the approved government guidelines. Unfortunately, most development projects are designed to appease governments and donors, ignoring the real long-term needs of the people. Post-conflict trauma feasibly will have profound effects on individuals and the activities they undertake for years to come. The following recommendations are from experiences with the TACP implementation. These insights may be potentially beneficial and may be applied by development workers engaging in community development projects in similar contexts as that of Rwanda. They may help prevent some or all of the identified constraints in any future project implementations by ameliorating the conditions under which they exist. It is suggested that research be carried out on the effectiveness of each given recommendation.

(a) Make trauma counseling accessible to PBs—invest in intensive training of local Rwandans in counseling techniques. Nevertheless, survivors may have severe trust issues and may not tell their entire experience in front of fellow Rwandans, thus inhibiting real healing. Therefore, investing in foreign professional psychologists<sup>103</sup> who have had training in cross-cultural counseling and a variety of traditional mental health healing methods, as well as the local language, also should be considered.<sup>104</sup> They should have a high level of fluency in the language to communicate with the patients without the need of a translator present.

(b) Invest in local language training of (foreign) development workers so they can do better monitoring of project activities. Again, a high level of fluency in the local language will reduce possibilities of manipulation by local leaders engaging in corruption, and will build trust between community members and the development workers.

(c) Place foreign development workers in the field to be part of the identification team to

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<sup>103</sup> Foreign psychologists do not have to be limited to Western psychologists. Other Africans can be just as, or more, beneficial in counseling survivors since African cultures are more similar in comparison than African and Western cultures. Finding available professional psychologists is a challenge, but necessary, as individual psychological healing needs to occur before the collective trauma can diminish and true reconciliation can take place.

<sup>104</sup> Mental health illnesses are not defined the same in all cultures. Therefore, Western psychologists should use the local culture's definitions of mental health illnesses when diagnosing, being culturally sensitive and aware of the local taboos regarding mental health.

monitor the process of beneficiary selection instead of leaving the task solely up to the community. One honest and reliable foreigner from the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) team (who knows the language well) should always be in the field to reduce corruption opportunities.

(d) Conduct private, one-on-one interviews with the beneficiaries when doing participatory needs analysis to reduce anxiety and fear. This will help the identification team receive truthful information about people's needs.<sup>105</sup>

(e) Once the identification of beneficiaries is finished, allow them to choose from among themselves responsible and able project leaders. The beneficiaries should be encouraged not to overlook marginalized or very poor individuals. Empowering them through opportunities of leadership may increase self-esteem, leading to more interest and enthusiasm for the project, unity among beneficiaries, prevention of corruption, and thus, successful project implementation and sustainability.<sup>106</sup> Discuss with/train the chosen leaders about their responsibilities to the project and create Memorandums of Understandings (MoU).

(f) Establish a support system for widows, women with absentee husbands, and child-headed households so they can better commit to the project. One example is to give per diems to those marginalized or at-risk individuals at the beginning of the project and then reduce the quantity and frequency given after establishing a functioning cooperative. Another example is to hold meetings and trainings in the evenings to work around the beneficiaries' schedules.<sup>107</sup>

(g) Limit the amount of per diems given to beneficiaries and hold them more accountable for the goods and services they receive. To help reduce DS, design the projects so the majority of the money received is a result of their work. Sign a MoU with LLs during the planning phase

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<sup>105</sup> It is important, however, to spend a sufficient amount of time building relationships first with the community before attempting interviews.

<sup>106</sup> The most vulnerable have special needs, but they may take more pride and responsibility in the project since it may be their only consistent means of living. This may help encourage them to unite the other beneficiaries.

<sup>107</sup> The Barefoot College in India is one example of a grassroots developmental program where children, who must work in the family fields during the day, attend school at night. For more information about Barefoot College, visit at [www.barefootcollege.org](http://www.barefootcollege.org).

about when and how much per diem beneficiaries will receive.

(h) Negotiate the duration and frequency of trainings, meetings, and other project activities with LLs. Outline all stipulations of the project and of community activities (e.g. mandatory community meetings). Communicate with LLs the roles and responsibilities each beneficiary will have in the project. Document these things discussed and sign a MoU with LLs.

### **5.3. Recommendations for Further Research**

The 1994 Genocide has created some very complicated issues in the Rwandan society. Research on trauma among Rwandans is greatly lacking since the early aftermath of the genocide. The experiences with the TACP and the findings of the analysis illuminate the necessity for further quantitative research with a larger sampling of Rwandans on the prevalence of psychopathological disorders, particularly PTSD and CPTSD, and collective trauma associated with the event. Follow-up studies on the duration of trauma within the population are essential to understanding the necessities and dynamics of the country. More specifically, research examining transgenerational PTSS in children of the genocide victims may help in understanding the effects of the perpetuation of trauma into future generations.

Further study of behavior changes from Rwanda's collectivist culture to an individualist culture may help to understand how collective trauma has altered the culture, as well as studies on DS among Rwandans may assist in better implementation of community development projects at the grassroots level by governments, NGOs, private investors, and faith-based organizations. Research in these suggested areas also should be carried out in additional related settings to compare post-conflict/genocide Rwanda with other countries and enhance understanding of the effects of collective trauma on community development.

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
# APPENDICES

## Appendix A: Maps of Rwanda

Figure 1 Map of Africa<sup>108</sup>



Figure 2 Map of East Africa (Great Lakes Region)<sup>109</sup>



<sup>108</sup> Source: WorldAtlas © www.worldatlas.com


<sup>109</sup> Source: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) © 2009 www.ipcinfo.org



## Appendix B: Significant Events in Rwandan History

Figure 5 is a timeline of major events in Rwandan history from early immigration and civilization to colonization, the genocide, and post-genocide reconstruction. However, accounts of early periods of civilization up to the beginning events before the genocide in 1992 and 1993 could be somewhat biased because Rwandan culture is historically oral and Europeans and Rwandan elites recorded early written versions.<sup>112</sup>

Figure 5 Timeline of Major Events in Rwandan History<sup>113</sup>  
(~100 B.C. to 1975 A.D.)



<sup>112</sup> For more information on the history of Rwanda, see Des Forges's book, *Defeat is the Only Bad News: Rwanda Under Musinga 1896-1931* (2011).

<sup>113</sup> Timeline by Bryna C. Ramsey; information in timeline from Des Forges (1999), Government of Rwanda (2012), and U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs (2011).

Figure 5 (Continued) Timeline of Major Events in Rwandan History  
(1970s A.D. to 1994 A.D.)





Figure 5 (Continued) Timeline of Major Events in Rwandan History  
(1994 A.D. to Present)



## Appendix C: Microgardens

The use of microgardens throughout the country is an important development initiative of GOR as one way to combat malnutrition.<sup>114</sup> Microgarden techniques and cultivating methods to have been taught in TAC are kitchen (keyhole) garden, sack/container garden, mandala (pothole) garden, square-meter garden, permaculture garden, double-dug (raised bed) garden, sunken bed (trench) garden, organic pest control, double-digging, and composting.

### Kitchen (Keyhole) Garden

The pyramid-shaped kitchen (keyhole) garden is placed conveniently near the kitchen. A compost basket, placed in the center, uses kitchen waste (organic matter) to keep the soil fertile. A mixture of manure and soil is added around the compost basket and inside the barrier.

#### Photos of Kitchen (Keyhole) Garden



← Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)

Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2009) →



← Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)

Source: [www.foragedroots.blogspot.com](http://www.foragedroots.blogspot.com) →



<sup>114</sup> For more information, go to the websites of the GOR's Ministry of Health ([www.moh.gov.rw](http://www.moh.gov.rw)), Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MINAGRI) ([www.minagri.gov.rw](http://www.minagri.gov.rw)), and Agriculture Management Information System (AMIS) ([www.amis.minagri.gov.rw](http://www.amis.minagri.gov.rw)).

### Sack/Container Garden

The sack/container garden takes very little space and its size makes crop maintenance easy. This technique uses materials that are available locally and depending on the size, it can produce a large yield of vegetables. One method used creates a channel of small stones for water filtration in the sack and adds a mixture of sand, soil, and manure around the channel.

Figure 7 Sack/Container Garden Photos



Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2009)



Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2011)



Source: Catholic Relief Services  
<http://crs.org/agriculture/stories>

### Mandala (Pothole) Garden

A mandala garden (also known as pothole garden) is shaped in a half circle and is built using the double-dig technique. It is placed near a water source to recycle gray water, which is poured into the center of the garden. The soil filters the soap, leaving clean water to travel to the roots of the plants. The mandala (pothole) garden is great for arid and semi-arid regions.

Figure 8 Mandala (Pothole) Garden Photos



Source: [www.cowfiles.com](http://www.cowfiles.com) © 2010 →

← Source:  
[www.bedroom-culture.tumblr.com](http://www.bedroom-culture.tumblr.com)





### Square-Meter Garden

The square-meter garden uses one square meter plot of prepared soil measured into nine squares. A different type of vegetable is planted in each of the nine squares, vine vegetables being planted in the outside ones. When each plant is harvested, new seeds are immediately replanted using a rotation method so soil is always being replenished with nutrients and a steady supply of vegetables are always available.

Figure 9 Square-Meter Garden Photos



Source: [www.selfsufficientlife.net](http://www.selfsufficientlife.net) © 2012



Source: [www.partners.net](http://www.partners.net) © 2012

### Permaculture Garden

Permaculture is a technique to grow many different kinds of vegetables and fruit trees on a smaller plot of land; however, more space is used than some of the other microgardens. Trenches on all four sides of the garden and shallow holes at all four corners are dug to help direct the flow of water, which makes it very useful in arid and semi-arid regions. The double-dig technique is used, helping roots penetrate deep into the soil for better and more plant growth.

Figure 10 Permaculture Garden Photos



Source:  
Bryna C. Ramsey (2011)



Source:  
← [www.mayalau.com](http://www.mayalau.com)



## Sunken Bed (Trench) and Double-Dug (Raised Bed) Gardens

The sunken bed garden (also known as trench garden) uses about the same amount of space as the permaculture garden, but the size of the garden can be adapted to the area. Sunken bed (trench) gardens are made in very arid regions because they maintain water and moisture better than other microgardens. It uses the double-digging technique, but the second layer of soil is removed (as opposed to the double-dug garden which leaves the second layer of broken up soil). Removing the soil makes the bed sunken, like an umbrella, so water is collected and held better. The double-dug garden (also known as raised bed garden) uses the double-dig technique, which makes the beds look like raised mounds and helps give better quantity and quality of crop production. Double-dug beds are used in both the mandala and permaculture gardens.

arden Photos



Sunken Bed (Trench) Garden  
*Source: www.azpm.org © 2007-2008*



Sunken Bed (Trench) Garden  
*Source: www.soiladventures.wordpress.com*



Double-Dug (Raised Bed) Garden  
*Source: Bryna C. Ramsey (2011)*




Double-Dug (Raised Bed) Garden  
*Source: www.urbanshare.blogspot.com*


## Double-Digging Method

Double-digging is a very helpful cultivating method to use in gardening because the roots go deeper and do not compete with each other. This allows the plants to grow stronger and healthier, and prevents soil erosion. Double-digging allows more air and water to aerate and irrigate large areas of soil. The concept is simple: dig the first layer of soil in a small area of the bed. Remove the top layer, and dig and break up compacted soil of the second layer. This allows plant roots to push deeper into the ground. Add ash or manure and fill the hole with the top layer of soil. A garden cultivated using the double-dug technique can be used for three years without needing to add more manure or do intense tilling/soil preparation each year.

Figure 12 Double-Digging Technique Photos



Source: [www.elgincommunitygarden.wordpress.com](http://www.elgincommunitygarden.wordpress.com)



Source: [www.katemriley.wordpress.com](http://www.katemriley.wordpress.com)



Source: <http://blog.springmeadoworganics.com>

## **Appendix D: Twizere Agriculture Club Project Design**

### Twizere Agriculture Club Project Description

Several weeks of casual conversations—the start of a baseline survey—with community members in the area, led to the realization of the need for food security. The initial idea of an agriculture club, focusing on small animal husbandry and microgardens, was agreed upon with local leaders (LLs), especially LL A, and myself. I applied for, and received, a \$500 grant through a program called Kids to Kids from the organization, World Connect.

During a preliminary meeting with Gitarama Primary School (GPS) personnel and parents of students, I emphasized the project would begin small due to limited funds; because of this, it should focus on knowledge and skills training with the project beneficiaries (PBs). The idea was embraced with great enthusiasm by all meeting attendees. LL A and I established the guidelines for the project. The club would start with a group of fifteen GPS student club members, who would graduate from the club at the end of six months. A new group of another 15 students would rotate into the project, replacing the previous group. Through these six-month-rotations, eventually all the GPS students would be able to participate in the project.

Each child project beneficiary (CPB) would choose an adult (parent/guardian, etc.) to also participate in the project and assist them in implementing club activities at home. After the six-month period, the PBs would take home at least one pair of rabbits and one pair of chickens, plus vegetables produced from club activities. If there would be a surplus of animals or vegetables during the six months, the PBs could take them home sooner.

The planned exit strategy was to involve and train GPS personnel in all aspects of the project. Additionally, some graduated PBs would serve as peer educators in future club groups, assisting GPS personnel. The initial identification of the first group of PBs was done by

Table 1 Identification Criteria for the Twizere Agriculture Club Project Beneficiaries

*The child beneficiary must:*

- Not possess any animals at home
- Be between the ages of 11-15 or in grades 1-5 (many children started school late)
- Demonstrate a need for food security
- Be “at-risk” in some way (be extremely poor, orphan or vulnerable child (OVC), affected by or infected with HIV, malnourished, etc.)
- Contract *not* to sell or kill their animals (when taken home) *until* they produce a sufficient number to sustain the group of animals
- Be willing to attend all meetings, trainings, and home visits and participate in the activities unless an unforeseeable circumstance arises (send a substitute person—another family member, neighbor, etc.— if absence is necessary)
- Be willing to implement club activities at home

GPS personnel using criteria formulated by them and myself (see Table 1). It was agreed upon by all that each beneficiary family identified would have to meet all the IC, and if there were no families in Gitarama that could meet all the criteria, then exceptions would be made. In order to verify if the IC was followed, I wanted to continue conducting the baseline survey with the identified PBs. However, this was not made possible by LL A.

During the first club meeting, the beneficiaries, LL A, LL B, and I reviewed plans for animal purchase, animal housing construction, other club activities, and the importance of club member participation and responsibility. It was decided that the project would be located at GPS to serve as a school-wide curriculum and as a (positive deviance) model to the local community. The 15 adult beneficiaries (parent/guardian club members) elected among themselves, a small group to serve as a committee to help oversee the functioning of club activities. The parent committee (PCOM) originated an idea of a cooperative for the club that would be supervised by PCOM members. Implementation of the project was planned to begin immediately.

Table 2 Twizere Agriculture Club Project Logframe

<b>Objectives</b>	<b>Measurable Indicators</b>	<b>Means of Verification</b>	<b>Important Assumptions</b>
<p><b><u>ULTIMATE GOAL</u></b></p> <p>Increase food security among all Gitarama Cell community members to assist the Government of Rwanda meet the objectives of Vision 2020 Development Plan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All community members increased each family member's food intake by 1 meal per day</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baseline and endline HH surveys</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Families successfully implement project activities at home</li> <li>• Families practice KSA learned in the project</li> <li>• Support from local leaders continues</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>IMPACT GOAL</u></b></p> <p>Increase food security by 20% among 15 families in the Gitarama Cell community (Karongi District, Rwanda) by July 2011</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Percentage of targeted families increasing each family member's food intake by 1 meal per day</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baseline and endline HH surveys</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Families successfully implement project activities at home</li> <li>• Families practice KSA learned in the project</li> </ul>
<p><b><u>PURPOSE</u></b></p> <p>Establish an ongoing agriculture club by July 2011 at Gitarama Primary School (GPS) with an initial beneficiary group of 15 students (from GPS) and their 15 parents/guardians</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of meeting(s) held with parents of GPS students, GPS leaders, and teachers to introduce project idea and discuss logistics of club</li> <li>• Beneficiary identification criteria established by GPS personnel (leaders and teachers) and program manager</li> <li>• Number of beneficiary families identified by GPS personnel and project manager</li> <li>• Club's elected PCOM established</li> <li>• Number of PCOM members understanding their elected roles</li> <li>• Number of PCOM members fulfilling their elected roles</li> <li>• Percentage of scheduled meetings and trainings being held</li> <li>• Percentage of beneficiaries regularly attending meetings and trainings</li> <li>• Club gardens and compost piles thriving</li> <li>• Steady production rate of purchased animals in first year</li> <li>• Club's cooperative installed</li> <li>• Steady growth rate of club cooperative's savings account</li> <li>• Successful rotation of "graduated" beneficiaries and second group of beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identified project beneficiary lists</li> <li>• Project manager interviews and evaluation with chosen beneficiaries</li> <li>• Attendance records of meetings and trainings</li> <li>• Progress reports from beneficiaries, school personnel, and local leaders</li> <li>• Individual interviews and focus groups with beneficiaries</li> <li>• Individual and focus group discussions with PCOM members</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community has need for the project</li> <li>• Community has desire for the project</li> <li>• GPS personnel and local leaders support the project</li> <li>• Beneficiaries have time to devote to project activities</li> <li>• Beneficiaries collaborate for the good of the club</li> <li>• Beneficiaries fulfill their designated responsibilities to the project</li> </ul>

Objectives	Measurable Indicators	Means of Verification	Important Assumptions
<p><u>OUTCOME</u></p> <p>Better quality of life for the 15 targeted beneficiary families through an increase in availability of food</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of beneficiary families' annual income increased by 20%</li> <li>Percentage of beneficiary families whose buying power increased</li> <li>Percentage of beneficiary families whose nutrition improved</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>HH surveys</li> <li>Observations</li> <li>Nutrition screenings by CHWs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agriculture club is successfully implemented</li> <li>Club activities thrive</li> <li>Successful retail of beneficiaries' products</li> <li>Reliable family member has possession of money</li> <li>Family members at-risk for malnutrition can access a varied diet</li> <li>CHWs are willing to conduct nutrition screenings</li> <li>Beneficiaries are willing to attend nutrition screenings</li> <li>Beneficiaries and CHWs attend nutrition screenings</li> </ul>
<p><u>OUTPUT 1</u></p> <p>Teach the 30 project beneficiaries new rabbit and chicken husbandry concepts and skills</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Percentage of beneficiaries successfully transferring new rabbit and chicken husbandry concepts and skills at home</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evaluations through home visits</li> <li>Individual interviews and focus groups with beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Beneficiaries are motivated to implement at home KSA learned</li> <li>Beneficiaries have time to attend meetings and trainings</li> <li>Beneficiaries have means to replicate the animal housing at home using local materials</li> </ul>
<p><u>ACTIVITIES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Hold oral lecture and hands-on trainings at GPS on rabbit and chicken animal housing construction, healthy animal purchase, proper care (feeding, hydration, and disease prevention and treatment), reproduction, and processing techniques</li> <li>Obtain construction materials</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of beneficiaries trained</li> <li>Percentage of beneficiaries passing oral exams</li> <li>Number of locals coming to animal fair with enough animals to buy 15 healthy rabbits (2 males and 13 females) and 15 healthy chickens (1 rooster and 14 hens)</li> <li>Number of small groups in the club organized by PCOM to care for the animals</li> <li>Percentage of club animals consistently in good to excellent health</li> <li>Animal houses at GPS and beneficiaries' homes properly maintained</li> <li>Number of animals' offspring doubled from initial purchase by July 2011</li> <li>Percentage of beneficiaries having at least 5 healthy chickens and 5 healthy rabbits at home by July 2011</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PCOM organizes meetings to hold with other beneficiaries to delegate responsibilities of club activities</li> <li>Beneficiaries attend 80-100% of meetings and trainings</li> <li>All beneficiaries attend 80% of meetings organized by the PCOM</li> <li>All beneficiaries fulfill their designated responsibilities</li> <li>Host community provides their contribution of materials as agreed</li> </ul>

Objectives	Measurable Indicators	Means of Verification	Important Assumptions
<p align="center"><u>(CONTINUED)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Build model rabbit hutch and chicken coop at GPS with beneficiaries and other community members</li> <li>• Hold local animal fair to purchase animals</li> <li>• Beneficiaries practice skills learned about proper animal care and reproduction at GPS via the guidance of the PCOM</li> <li>• Hold periodic follow-up meetings with beneficiaries for evaluation</li> <li>• Beneficiaries successfully implement animal husbandry skills at home</li> </ul>		<p align="center"><u>(CONTINUED)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inspections of animals and animal housing at beneficiaries' homes</li> <li>• Meeting and training attendance records</li> <li>• Small groups animal care logs</li> <li>• Oral training comprehension exams</li> <li>• Animal purchase records</li> <li>• Observations</li> </ul>	
<p align="center"><u>OUTPUT 2</u></p> <p>Teach the 30 project beneficiaries alternative gardening methods</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Percentage of beneficiaries successfully implementing the alternative gardening concepts and skills at home</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluations through home visits</li> <li>• Individual interviews and focus groups with beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beneficiaries are motivated to implement at home KSA learned</li> <li>• Beneficiaries have time to attend meetings and trainings</li> <li>• Beneficiaries have means to replicate the gardening methods at home using local materials</li> </ul>
<p align="center"><u>ACTIVITIES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Obtain training materials</li> <li>• Hold oral lecture and hands-on/demonstration trainings at GPS on the concepts of 3 cultivating methods: composting, organic pest control, and double-digging; and 7 microgarden techniques:</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of beneficiaries trained</li> <li>• Percentage of beneficiaries passing oral exams</li> <li>• Number of small groups in the club organized by PCOM to care for the gardens and compost pile(s)</li> <li>• Percentage of vegetable plants consistently in good to excellent health</li> <li>• Gardens and compost piles at GPS and beneficiaries' homes properly maintained</li> <li>• Number of functioning gardens and compost pile(s) beneficiaries have at home by July 2011</li> <li>• Percentage of yield gardens at GPS giving by July 2011</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inspections of gardens and compost piles at beneficiaries' homes</li> <li>• Meeting and training attendance records</li> <li>• Logs of garden and compost pile care by small groups</li> <li>• Oral training comprehension exams</li> <li>• Observations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PCOM organizes meetings to hold with other beneficiaries to delegate responsibilities of club activities</li> <li>• Beneficiaries attend 80-100% of meetings and trainings</li> <li>• All beneficiaries attend 80% of meetings organized by the PCOM</li> <li>• All beneficiaries fulfill their designated responsibilities</li> </ul>



Objectives	Measurable Indicators	Means of Verification	Important Assumptions
<p align="center"><u>(CONTINUED)</u></p> <p>kitchen garden, mandala garden, sack/container garden, square-meter garden, permaculture garden, double-dug garden, and sunken bed garden</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beneficiaries practice skills learned about alternative gardening methods at GPS on model gardens via the guidance of the PCOM</li> <li>• Hold periodic follow-up meetings with beneficiaries for evaluation</li> <li>• Beneficiaries implement the alternative gardening methods at their homes</li> </ul>			<p align="center"><u>(CONTINUED)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Host community provides their contribution of materials as agreed</li> </ul>
<p align="center"><u>OUTPUT 3</u></p> <p>Teach the 30 project beneficiaries basic business skills using the microfinance system</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A functional cooperative is set-up</li> <li>• Percentage of beneficiaries contributing to the cooperative by July 2011</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individual interviews and focus groups with beneficiaries</li> <li>• Records of the cooperative's activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beneficiaries are motivated to implement in the cooperative KSA learned</li> <li>• Beneficiaries attend 80-100% of meetings and trainings</li> </ul>
<p align="center"><u>ACTIVITIES</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hold oral-lecture training(s) at GPS on basic business concepts, including cooperatives with all beneficiaries</li> <li>• Beneficiaries visit market in Kibuye town and observe trading activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of beneficiaries trained</li> <li>• Percentage of beneficiaries passing oral exams</li> <li>• Percentage of beneficiaries selling for profit their products taken to the market</li> <li>• Elected cooperative officials demonstrating consistent and accurate record-keeping of all cooperative business</li> <li>• The cooperative buying needed item(s) for the club and retaining enough money to support its continuance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attendance records of meetings and trainings</li> <li>• Minutes from meetings</li> <li>• Oral training comprehension exams</li> <li>• Photos</li> <li>• Evaluations and observations of activities at Kibuye market</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beneficiaries attend 80-100% of meetings and trainings</li> <li>• Beneficiaries have goods to sell</li> <li>• Beneficiaries have buyers</li> <li>• Beneficiaries are honest about cooperative funds</li> <li>• Beneficiaries are willing to contribute funds to the cooperative when able</li> </ul>

Objectives	Measurable Indicators	Means of Verification	Important Assumptions
<p align="center"><u>(CONTINUED)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All beneficiaries visit market in Kibuye town and observe trading activities</li> <li>• All beneficiaries role play buying and selling at a market</li> <li>• All beneficiaries participate in actual market experience by selling their club goods</li> <li>• Hold meeting(s) to organize set-up of club's cooperative</li> </ul>		<p align="center"><u>(CONTINUED)</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oral reports from beneficiaries about market experiences</li> <li>• Records of sale</li> <li>• List of elected cooperative officials</li> <li>• Records of the cooperative's activities</li> </ul>	
<p align="center"><u>INPUTS</u></p> <p>Project budget:</p> <p>Partnership Contribution (grant) and Community Contribution (donations and purchased items)</p>	<p align="center">Project proposal and budget approved by donor and community</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Letter of approval from donor</li> <li>• Signed agreement from the necessary individuals for the community to contribute some materials to the project</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The community is not able to contribute <i>any</i> materials to the project as required by the donor</li> </ul>
<p align="center"><u>Key for Table 2</u></p> <p>CHWs = Community Health Workers                      HH = Household                      PCOM = Parent Committee</p> <p>GPS = Gitarama Primary School                      KSA = Knowledge, Skills, Attitude</p>			

Table 3 Twizere Agriculture Club Project Budget

Exchange Rate: 570 Rwandan Francs (RWF) =  
1 US Dollar (USD)

**Partner Contribution**

Purchased Item	Unit	Quantity Needed	Unit Cost (RWF)	Total Cost (RWF)	Total Cost (USD)
Screen	Meter	15	2,000	30,000	53
Wood	Board	20	1,500	30,000	53
Logs	Log	50	500	25,000	44
Nails	Kilo	1.5	2,500	3,750	7
Hammer	Hammer	1	1,500	1,500	3
Tin	Sheet	7,000	15	105,000	184
Labor workers	Man	2,000	2	4,000	7
Rabbits	Rabbit	2,500	15	37,500	66
Chickens	Chicken	3,000	15	45,000	79
<b>Total Partnership Contribution</b>				<b>281,750</b>	<b>496</b>

**Community Contribution**

Purchased Item	Unit	Quantity Needed	Unit Cost (RWF)	Total Cost (RWF)	Total Cost (USD)
Seeds <sup>115</sup>	Packet	1,000	100	100,000	175
Cement	Sack	1	12,000	12,000	21
Chalk	Box	1	500	500	0.88
Big Notebook	Notebook	1	500	500	0.88
Pens	Pen	2	100	200	0.35
<b>Subtotal</b>					<b>198</b>
Donated Item <sup>116</sup>	Unit	Quantity Needed	Unit Cost (RWF) (estimated value)	Total Cost (RWF) (estimated value)	Total Cost (USD) (estimated value)
Land <sup>117</sup>	Meter (sq.)	600	315	189,000	332
Rent classroom	1 hour (2 hours x 28 weeks)	56	500	28,000	49
Manure <sup>118</sup> (Cow)	Rice sack	42	1,000	42,000	74
<b>Total Community Contribution</b>				<b>372,200</b>	<b>653</b>

<sup>115</sup> The project budgeted enough seeds for planting seven gardens during trainings with three project groups of beneficiaries during the first two years. (The project's first year would have had only one group of club members since it takes time to implement a new project. The club would have begun regular six-month rotations of groups starting in the second year. In total, the first two years of the project would have had three groups of beneficiaries and four in later years). Each beneficiary family was to receive 20 seed packets to use at their homes for the first time they built the gardens. (20 packets x (15 families + 1 training) x 3 groups = 960 packets + 40 extra = 1,000 seed packets in total). After two years, it was estimated that the cooperative of the club would have enough money to continue buying seeds, or the local government of BS would provide seeds again (by either donating money or applying for another grant).

<sup>116</sup> Vaccinations for the chickens were not budgeted for four reasons: (1) they are expensive (2) they are not widely available in KD (3) it was anticipated that the project would continuously be producing many chickens and to vaccinate each one would be financially burdening (4) the local chickens have a strong immunity against many of the common diseases in Rwanda. Furthermore, most Rwandans do not vaccinate their chickens, especially in the rural areas.

<sup>117</sup> The local government of BS already owns the land where GPS is located, as well as the school building where some trainings would be held. The local government of Gitarama Cell was to donate the items of land and renting of one classroom to the project at estimated values of \$332 USD for the land and \$98 USD for the classroom.

<sup>118</sup> It was assessed that for the first two groups (1 year), manure would be donated. Most manure can be found free in Rwanda, with the occasional exception of cow manure, which varies in price. The project budgeted that on average, each rice sack of cow manure would be about \$1.75 USD. After the first year, the project would have been able to provide itself manure from the club's chickens and rabbits.

Table 4 Twizere Agriculture Club Project Gantt Chart<sup>119</sup>

Activity	<u>July</u> 2010		<u>Aug.</u> 2010		<u>Sept.-Oct</u> 2010	<u>Nov.-Dec.</u> 2010	<u>Jan.-Feb.</u> 2011	<u>Mar.-Apr.</u> 2011	<u>May</u> 2011	<u>June</u> 2011
	Month 1		Month 2		Months 3-4	Months 5-6	Months 7-8	Months 9-10	Month 11	Month 12
	Weeks 1-2	Weeks 3-4	Weeks 5-6	Weeks 7-8						
Secure funding										
Community meeting(s) with local and school leaders, teachers, and parents at GPS										
Identify first group of beneficiaries										
Gather & transport animal housing construction materials										
Build rabbit hutch and chicken coop										
Buy animals										
Conduct club meetings										
Conduct club trainings										
Club members implement practices at their homes										
Monitoring and Evaluation activities										
Transition of Group 1 club members to Group 2										

Table 4 Key:

= Scheduled time to complete task

GPS = Gitarama Primary School

<sup>119</sup> It was anticipated that it would take several weeks to implement the activities of TAC and get them going steadily. Therefore, it was assumed that the first group of members would participate in the club a few weeks longer than the planned six months.

## Appendix E: The Research Questionnaires and Survey

### Constraints Interview Questionnaire for Group 1 Project Beneficiary Research Participants

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Gender: \_\_\_\_\_

Age (years): 10-13 \_\_\_\_\_ 14-17 \_\_\_\_\_ 18-24 \_\_\_\_\_ 25-34 \_\_\_\_\_ 35-44 \_\_\_\_\_ 45+ \_\_\_\_\_

- 1.) What are the project's strengths, if any?
- 2.) Have you realized or met with any problems in our project? If yes, what are they? What can be done differently to fix these problems?
- 3.) Were you able to attend all meetings? If not, what were some of the constraints?
- 4.) Did you notice anything about the rabbit hutch that might be improved? If so, what?
- 5.) Did you notice anything about the chicken coop that might be improved? If so, what?
- 6.) Have you noticed any problems with the chickens? (If not, go to question 8).
  - a. Which problems?
  - b. What do you think might have caused these problems?
  - c. What might [you] have done differently to prevent/correct these problems? (Based on what you now know, what could be done differently?)
- 7.) Have you noticed any problems with the rabbits? (If not, go to question 9).
  - a. Which problems?
  - b. What do you think might have caused these problems?
  - c. What might [you] have done differently to prevent/correct these problems? (Based on what you now know, what could be done differently?)
- 8.) What might have prevented you from making any changes to correct/prevent the problems mentioned in questions 7 and 8?

- 9.) What, if anything, have you learned from the meetings you have attended about raising rabbits and chickens? Before? During? After?
- 10.) What, if anything, have you learned from the meetings you have attended about gardening techniques? Before? During? After?
  - a. Doing these at your home, are you satisfied with the results? If yes, in what ways? If not, in what ways?
  - b. What, if any, are some alternatives you might try to improve the techniques?
  - c. What, if any, limitations are you experiencing that are preventing these gardening techniques from being successful?
- 11.) Do you know how to use, build, and/or maintain the following microgarden techniques and cultivating methods?
  - a. Kitchen (Keyhole) Garden
  - b. Sack/Container Garden
  - c. Mandala (Pothole) Garden
  - d. Square-meter Garden
  - e. Permaculture Garden
  - f. Sunken Bed (Trench) Garden
  - g. Double-dug (Raised bed) Garden
  - h. Composting
  - i. Organic pest control
  - j. Double-dig
- 12.) Do you use or have any of the above techniques/methods at your home?
- 13.) In your opinion, how do you see the project has having benefited you?
- 14.) Does this project meet your expectations? If not, how didn't it?
- 15.) What, if anything, could have been done differently in the project (for future groups)?

Constraints Interview Questionnaire for *Local Leaders* Research Participants

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Gender: \_\_\_\_\_

Age (years): 18-24 \_\_\_\_ 25-34 \_\_\_\_ 35-44 \_\_\_\_ 45+ \_\_\_\_

- 1.) What are your observations, impressions, and opinions of the project?
  - a. What strengths did the project have?
  - b. What limitations did the project have?
- 2.) What requirements do you have for implementing a community project at the local level, if there are any?
- 3.) What are your suggestions for time frames of project's activities?

(Please fill out the chart below):

<b>Project Activities</b>	<b>Length of Time</b>	<b>Frequency</b>
Trainings		
Club meetings		
Interviews		
Home visits		

- 4.) What incentives, if any, would you suggest be given to the beneficiaries of the project?
- 5.) Do you have any other comments or suggestions regarding the design and implementation of the project and its activities?
- 6.) Did you notice anything about the rabbit hutch that might be improved? If so, what?

- 7.) Did you notice anything about the chicken coop that might be improved? If so, what?
  
- 8.) Have you noticed any problems with the chickens? (If not, go to question 8).
  - a. Which problems?
  - b. What do you think might have caused these problems?
  - c. What might [you] have done differently to prevent/correct these problems?  
(Based on what you now know, what could be done differently?)
  
- 9.) Have you noticed any problems with the rabbits? (If not, go to question 9).
  - a. Which problems?
  - b. What do you think might have caused these problems?
  - c. What might [you] have done differently to prevent/correct these problems?  
(Based on what you now know, what could be done differently?)



Wealth Index Survey Questions for *Group 1* and *Group 2*  
*Project Beneficiary* Research Participants

- 1.) Do you have animals at home?
  - a. If yes, which kinds?
  - b. How many of each kind?
- 2.) What other assets does your family own? (e.g. radio, jerry can, clay pot, buckets, bed, school uniform, etc).
- 3.) Is there anybody employed in the home?

If yes, what is the job?
- 4.) How many times a day do you eat?
- 5.) What do you typically eat a day?
- 6.) How many times a year do you cultivate?

Observations:

**Appendix F: Supplemental Figures and Table of Data**

Figure 14 Number and Percentage of Project Beneficiaries who Learned Chicken and Rabbit Husbandry, and Microgardening Concepts at the Club Meetings Held




Figure 15 Number and Percentage of Project Beneficiaries who Know How to Use, Build, and/or Maintain Microgarden Techniques and (Alternative) Cultivating Methods, and who Use or Have Them at Home





Table 6 Microgarden Techniques and (Alternative) Cultivating Methods to Have Been Taught in the Twizere Agriculture Club

Microgardens Techniques	→	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Kitchen (Keyhole) Garden (with compost basket)</li> <li>▪ Sack/Container Garden</li> <li>▪ Mandala (Pothole) Garden</li> <li>▪ Square-Meter Garden</li> <li>▪ Permaculture Garden</li> <li>▪ Sunken Bed (Trench) Garden</li> <li>▪ Double-Dug (Raised Bed) Garden</li> </ul>
Cultivating Methods	→	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Composting</li> <li>▪ Organic Pest Control</li> <li>▪ Double-Dig</li> </ul>




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**43%** of APBs interviewed who **teach** at GPS *and* have a child in the TACP.

**57%** of APBs interviewed who have a child in the project, *and* who have a relationship with a teacher at GPS *or* are **influential** in the Gitarama community. This number *also includes* a CPB who has an extra resource of help outside the TACP.

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
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- ❖ Beneficiary is a close friend with the local leader B.
  - ❖ Beneficiary is a friend with local leader B. She is a housekeeper for one of local leader B's two houses when she is not there. She lives next to local leader B.
- 




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
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Figure 20 Gender Proportions in the Twizere Agriculture Club Project



**Appendix G: Photos of the Twizere Agriculture Club Project**



Source: Google Maps © 2012 www.maps.google.com



Source: Google Maps © 2012 www.maps.google.com



Gitarama Primary School

House of a project beneficiary

Source: Google Maps © 2012 www.maps.google.com



GPS's Toilets

The teachers' lounge, headmistress's office, and 6<sup>th</sup> grade classroom

House of project beneficiary

House of Gitarama resident (not a project beneficiary)

Twizere Agriculture Club's chicken coop and rabbit hutch

Gitarama Primary School's classrooms

Source: Google Maps © 2012 www.maps.google.com





Above: View of Lake Kivu from Gitarama. Above: Partial view of Gitarama looking towards Kibuye town and Lake Kivu.  
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)



Above three photos: On the way to Gitarama—Hills of Bwishyura Sector.  
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)



Above: Gitarama children—near Gitarama Primary School. Above: Gitarama children pointing the way to Gitarama Primary School.  
Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)



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Top left: With project beneficiaries at the first meeting of Twizere Agriculture Club.

Top right: Adult project beneficiaries at a meeting for parent committee elections.

Middle left: With child project beneficiaries at a club meeting.

Middle right and bottom right: Child project beneficiaries carrying materials for the chicken coop construction from Kibuye town to Gitarama Primary School.

Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)





All photos on this page: Construction of Twizere Agriculture Club's chicken coop by project beneficiaries and members of Peace Health Club at Ruganda Secondary School in Kibuye.

Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)



Top and middle left: Recording the purchase of club rabbits.

Top right: A project beneficiary and teacher from Peace Health Club (Ruganda Secondary School, Kibuye) inspect a rabbit for purchase.

Bottom left: Children at Gitarama Primary School and Bryna Ramsey holding one of the club's rabbits.

Middle left: Two club rabbits after purchase.

Bottom right: One of Twizere Agriculture Club's first litters of bunnies.

Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010 and 2011)



Top left: The rabbit hutch partially built.

Top right: The wide-holed screen on the bottom of the rabbit hutch.

Second left: The unsealed inside of the rabbit hutch.

Second right: Rabbit hutch roof from old tin from school grounds.

Third right: The completed rabbit hutch.

Third left: The completed chicken coop.

Bottom left: The back of the completed chicken coop.

Bottom right: The completed chicken coop and rabbit hutch.

Photographer: Bryna C. Ramsey (2010)



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