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SAMAR BASI – “WE GO THERE TOGETHER”
**THE LOCAL PEACE COMMITTEES AND THEIR EFFECT ON
BUILDING PEACE IN NEPAL**

Jessica Faye Babcock

PIM 71

A Capstone Paper submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for a Master of Conflict Transformation at
SIT Graduate Institute in Brattleboro, Vermont, USA

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Advisor: Paula Green

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List of Acronyms Used

CA – Constitutional Assembly
CAP – Conflict-Affected Peoples
CDO – Chief District Officer
CLPC – Community Level Peace Committee
CPA – Comprehensive Peace Accord
CPRP – Center for Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Program
CT – Conflict Transformation
DAO – District Administration Office
IDP – Internally Displaced Peoples
LPC – Local Peace Committee
LPF – Local Peace-building Forums
MOPR – Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
NCP – Nepali Congress Party
NMCC – National Monitoring Committee on the Code of Conduct for the Ceasefire
NPTF – Nepal Peace Trust Fund
PB – Peacebuilding
PLA – People’s Liberation Army
SPA – Seven Party Alliance
TOR – Terms of Reference
TRC – Truth and Reconciliation Commission
VDC – Village Development Committee
VLPC – Village Level Peace Committee (sometimes interchangeable with CLPC)
UCPN-M – United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist
UNMIN – United Nations Mission in Nepal

List of Nepali/Sanskrit Terms

Bandhs – political demonstrations or strike often involving transportation which causes road and business closures, sometimes enforced by barricades, due to the threat of violence. A tactic often used by the Maoists frequently.

Dalits- still considered untouchables and face huge social discrimination within the country. To mitigate this they demand proportional representation within all bodies of the state.

Janajatis – Indigenous peoples of Nepal

Jana Andolan I, II – People’s Movement in 1990 (establishing a constitutional monarchy/parliamentary democracy) and in 2006 (establishing the renunciation of King Gyanendra and the starting a new constitutional process towards a federal republic).

Kamaiya – system of bonded labor found in the western regions in Nepal, often using children as slave laborers to pay off the debt of their parents.

Palali – a term used to describe the hill people of Nepal.

Terai – Nepal’s lowlands located on the Gangetic Plains bordering India.

Samar Basi – literally translating to ‘we go together’ it has been used to describe inclusivity in the country and the need to represent all groups that make up the diversity in Nepal.

ABSTRACT

“We have ears but no hearing. We have eyes but no sight. But I hope our children do not have to go through a similar fate of ignorance.” – Kattike Nepali (Jumla)

From 1996 to 2006 Nepal experienced a horrible, civil conflict taking over 13,000 of its citizens, displaced another 25,000 with many more unaccounted for. With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006, between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists insurgents, the violence ceased but the long road to recovery and peace began. Nepal is currently transitioning towards a democratic government. The establishment of a Constitutional Assembly (CA) in 2008 allowed many marginalized voices to be heard and began the process of creating a near complete product of what could have become the new constitution for the country. Unfortunately, the CA was dissolved in May 2011 before the constitution was drafted due to lack of political consensus on the issue of federalism. *Bandhs* (political demonstrations), poverty, ethnic discrimination, lack of access to resources, and oppression of marginalized groups are some of the challenges Nepalis are still working to transform and heal their country after the conflict.

One mechanism aiding the peace process is the creation of the Local Peace Committees (LPC) that seek to promote inclusivity, peace, and restoration of the country through grassroots leadership, dialogical processes and the mediation of local conflicts. Nepal is in a state of political transition as they continue to create a constitution representative of its diverse peoples. The following paper is a case study of the LPCs in one district, noting the challenges and effectiveness of the LPCs pertaining to the wider peace process in Nepal. While the LPCs have experienced several challenges due to political instability, they have been able to create a structure by which to use conflict resolution processes and other strategies to works toward creating sustainable peace in Nepal.

Introduction

From 1996 to 2006, Nepal experienced civil conflict that claimed the lives of more than 13,000 of its people. Even during the destruction and bloodshed there was hope that peace will be restored to the country. With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2006 between the Nepali government and the Maoists insurgents, the violence ceased. While peace is a process that takes decades to be fully realized, it is important to have hope. This paper is about hope for Nepalis to come together and transform their country after extreme armed-conflict into a republic representative of its diverse population. It is about inclusion and *Samar Basi* – going there together, going towards peace together. The establishment of a Constitutional Assembly (CA) in 2008 allowed many marginalized voices to be heard. Unfortunately, due to a lack of political consensus on the issues of federalism, the CA was dissolved in May 2011 before a constitution could be drafted. Today, Nepalis are still working to transform and heal their country after the conflict. One such mechanism that has aided the peace process is the creation of the Local Peace Committees (LPC) seeking to promote inclusivity of all groups through grassroots leadership, dialogical processes and mediation of local conflicts.

Contextual Information

This paper is structured in a Course Linked Capstone (CLC) format bridging the theories of coursework in Initiatives in Peacebuilding to experiences and research conducted in Nepal. The focus is on the Local Peace Committees as one mechanism to build peace. The Local Peace Committees were created as part of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA):

To create an environment conducive for a just system in a transitional period through restoration of sustainable peace by resolving the remnants of conflict at the local level and systematically promoting the processes of peace and reconstruction through mutual goodwill and unity; To address the concerns and complaints of local stakeholders for democratic values and beliefs and a sustainable peace. (Terms of Reference, Local Peace Committees, 2009 (2065), p. 1)

The Center for Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Program (CPRP)¹ in Nepal works in collaboration with international organizations to provide trainings in mediation and dialogue processes for peace committee members. CPRP allowed me to work directly in the field of Peacebuilding (PB) and Conflict Transformation (CT)² assisting with trainings of the LPCs and village level committees. During these trainings, I facilitated activities and put theoretical knowledge of CT and PB into practice. I also evaluated the effectiveness of the trainings on increasing capacities of the LPCs. From my experiences at CPRP, I examined the role of the LPCs in building peace at the local level and pertaining to the wider peace process in Nepal.

Background of Conflict

The people of Nepal are currently fighting for political representation and democracy. Two historical events have led to change in Nepal. The first was India gaining its independence in 1947 allowing Nepal to open its borders to the outside world in 1950. The second event was when the people revolted against the Rana Dynasty giving way to democracy in 1951. The general elections held in 1959 established a democratically-elected government. However, within two years the monarchy dissolved parliament and abolished all political parties. In 1980, there was a referendum that weakened the no-party system, but didn't eradicate it completely. It wasn't until *Jana Andolan (I)*, the first people's movement, in 1990, that the no-party system was abolished and a multi-party constitution was restored. Within a year, the democratic constitution gave the Nepalese people sovereignty for the first time. Even after this restoration, the next six

¹ SODARC-Centre for Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Promotion (CPRP), (earlier known as SODARC) is a non-governmental, non-profit organization registered under the Associations Registration Act, 1977. It was registered with the District Administration Office, Kathmandu in February 1996 (Regd No 544/052/53) and affiliated with the Social Welfare Council (Affiliation No 3852) in the same year. (<http://cprpnepal.org/about-us>)

² See APPENDIX A: *Glossary of Terms*

years would be marked by political instability in the new parliament. In 1996 the “People’s War” started with the armed-insurgency of the Maoist Communist Party burning a physical copy of the 1990 Constitution.

Because of these upheavals the people lost momentum from the first people’s movement and had to deal with the violent struggle from the Maoists that were taking thousands of lives and displacing thousands more. In February 2005, the country was pushed into further turmoil by King Gyanendra who imposed martial law and reinstated absolute monarchy. The people were not happy and resisted publically. In November 2005, a 12-point agreement was signed by the Seven Parties Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists.³ This halted the armed movement and allowed for everyone to participate in *Jana Andolan II*, the second people’s movement in April 2006. Thousands of Nepalese protested the monarchy in the streets and ultimately forced the abdication of the king and reinstatement of parliament. The Maoists joined the government and signed the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) on November 21st, 2006. The CPA ensures the end of violence with the promise of social, economic, and political transformation by adhering to humanitarian law and peaceful settlement of disputes. Subsequently, there have been six commissions established to implement and monitor these promises: Disappeared Persons, Truth and Reconciliation, State Restructuring, Scientific Land Reform, Monitoring Committee for the Effective Implementation of the CPA and other Agreements, and the High-Level Peace Commission (Bhatta, 2012). The Peace Secretariat and the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction with the Nepal Peace Trust Fund work to institutionalize the peace process with the national government in the hopes that peace will be more sustainable.

³ See APPENDIX B: 12 Pt. Agreement between SPA and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists)

In 2008, the people elected their assembly to establish a new constitution for a Federal Republic. The Constitutional Assembly (CA) allowed these groups to have their voices heard, as it was the first body of its kind to have all the ethnic and religious groups represented. There was an overwhelming desire to break from the centralized government in Kathmandu and to have autonomous regions within the rest of the country. “State restructuring, autonomy, the right to self-determination, and federalism” were the terms given to define the demands by the people (Pathak, 2007). Unfortunately, defining federalism manifested itself in two dominant ways. The first revolved around finding definitions acceptable to all groups. The second was how to divide these ethnic groups into various autonomous regions based on their geographic vastness.

The Maoists have 32% of seats and must assent to any significant decisions within the CA, a factor greatly contributing to the difficulties of establishing consensus within the various parties. However, all political parties have splintered and increased their numbers in the CA, but “the lines of difference are not over ideologies but over individual personality which subsequently works as a catalyst to form intra-party wings representing opposite approaches to political issues” (Bhatta, 2012, p. 2). It has been said that “the biggest problem lies with the fact that Nepalese leaders come up with various agreements and programmes but they only remain on the paper and never implemented in the real sense” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 28). This is evident by the nearly 50 agreements that have been written between political parties, government officials and ministries since the end of the conflict in 2006. This is also similar to what is currently hindering the LPCs.

The CA was initially given two years to write the new constitution. Yet, after a two-year extension, they were still unable to reach consensus on the language of the new constitution. The 2011 deadline came and went. The CA was effectively dissolved on May 28th, 2011. An election

date was set for November 22nd 2012 to elect a new CA, but this date came and went as well. The election was set for June 21st, 2013 but have once again been postponed until November 2013. However, people are skeptical that an election will take place. “The domination of discourse by power politics has made both peace-building and the constitution-drafting process an uphill task, widened the trust gap, and reinforced the political culture of negation across the political spectrum” (Bhatta, 2012, p. 2). This tension between political parties over power-sharing and the language of the constitution, whether democratic, People’s Republic or ethnic-federalism, is hindering the peace process and no one knows for how long.

Purpose of Research

Nepal is in a state of political transition as they continue to create a constitution representative of its diverse peoples. While the LPCs have experienced several challenges due to the political instability, they have been able to create a structure by which to use conflict resolution processes in an attempt to sustain peace. Whether the conflicts are being resolved or mitigated at the local level by committee members is yet to be determined. Since LPCs formed in 2007, only a handful of districts had working committees. By 2009, there were 55 districts that had established peace committees but this was still short of the 75 total districts, and thus 75 desired peace committees, in Nepal. There has been little research done as to the effectiveness of the committees in bringing about peace and reconstruction in the country. The LPCs are experiencing several challenges, both internal and external, making it difficult to function and work with other institutions striving for peace and justice within the country.

One such institution the LPCs need to cooperate with is the Chief District Office (CDO). Previously, local disputes would be sent to the CDO, representing the structure and source of the local government. Because the disputes are too numerous to handle the peace committees have

supplemented the efforts to resolve these conflicts. However, with corruption affecting many areas, especially among the police and sometimes even within the LPCs, this gridlock is creating serious barriers towards reconciliation and reconstruction. Also, since Nepal has not established a new constitution within the time frame mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the central government is deadlocked with disorganization at all levels. Despite the LPCs working under this dysfunction, they provide structure within the community as they are made up of members from different political parties, ethnic groups and genders. Unfortunately, if or when a constitution is ratified, the LPCs will, as stated by the Terms of Reference (TOR), “be dissolved after the enforcement of the new constitution to be framed by the Constituent Assembly” (2009 (2065), p. 1). Considering the instability of the country and the infrequency of national consensus, it may not be beneficial to dismantle the only body arriving at consensus and promoting peace.

Theoretical Frameworks

Literature Review

When conflict occurs it needs to be *transformed* rather than resolved or managed. Because conflict is complex one theory cannot explain every aspect. Theories within CT “assume(s) that conflict is caused by real problems of inequality and injustice expressed by competing social, cultural and economic frameworks” (Fisher, et al., 2000, p. 8). The overarching goals of these theories are based on the need to change structures that are causing inequalities and injustices. Some of these goals include economic redistribution to improve longer-term relationships and understandings between the conflicted parties, and to develop processes promoting empowerment, justice, peace, forgiveness, reconciliation, and recognition⁴

⁴ See *Appendix A: Glossary of Terms*

(Fisher, et al., 2000). In Nepal, there are several theories relevant to reach respective goals towards peace.

Lederach's integrated approach to building peace is useful. He outlines peacebuilding as requiring both top-down and bottom-up leadership through three levels in his conflict transformation triangle or pyramid (Lederach, 1997, p. 39). Track I refers to diplomacy, includes military, political or religious leaders of high importance. Approaches at this level focus on high-level negotiations, cease-fire agreements and peace talks. Track II refers to middle-range leadership including academics, intellectuals and members from civil society. Approaches at this level include problem-solving workshops, trainings or peace commissions. Track III includes local leaders, community developers and leaders within the indigenous community. The Local Peace Committees are considered part of Track III approach to peacebuilding but crossover to Track II because committees are at both the district and village levels in Nepal.

When looking specifically at the local level peacebuilding mechanisms, Human Needs and Social Identity Theories are used in analyzing the effects of conflict alongside theories of Conflict Transformation (CT). Human Needs Theory states conflict arises because basic human needs are frustrated or are otherwise not being met (Fisher, et al., 2000). Basic human needs can be physical, psychological, or societal describing the need for security, recognition, identity, participation, and autonomy (Burton, 1990). The latter three pertain directly to Nepal in that identity, participation and autonomy are the most pertinent needs within the current context. Social Identity Theory postulates that conflict is caused when one's identity is threatened often rooted in unresolved past loss or sufferings (Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, 2005). When part of one's identity is targeted that part becomes overwhelmingly powerful. One is therefore

incapable of being able to fully develop their other (whole) identity. As such, it is hard to see people in the fullness of all their identities (Karuna Center for Peacebuilding, 2005).

Human Needs and Social Identity theories are important in understanding the connection to CT. The assumptions of these theories directly relate to the specific goals and responsibilities of the LPCs. The goals are as follows:

Human Needs Theory:

- To assist conflicting parties to identify and share their unmet needs, and generate options for meeting those needs
- For the parties to reach agreements that meet the basic human needs of all the sides

Social Identity Theory:

- Through facilitated workshops and dialogue; for conflicting parties to identify threats and fears they each feel and to build empathy and reconciliation between themselves.
- To jointly reach agreements that recognize the core identity needs of all parties.

(Fisher, et al., 2000)

Human Needs and Social Identity Theories help us to understand how to transform violent conflict by assisting the conflicting parties to come together, dialogue about unmet needs, threats and fears, and to build understanding and empathy towards agreements that recognize basic human and identity needs. LPCs assist conflicting parties to identify their needs, threats and fears, and to reach mutual agreements through dialogues.

Similar to the goals within the Human Needs and Social Identity theories, Lederach's Strategic Peacebuilding model examines three major pathways of strategic peacebuilding: Violence Prevention, Conflict Response and Transformation; Justice and Healing; and Structural and Institutional Change and Development (Lederach & Mansfield, 2012). Dialogue and conflict resolution strategies are located within the violence prevention pathway. The formation of Local Peace Committees in Nepal is one approach falling within the Violence Prevention, Conflict Response and Transformation pathway providing dialogue/conflict resolution strategies

and non-violent social change via government and multi-lateral efforts. The LPCs use these strategies to facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political or social conflict, working on reconciliation, healing and trust-building at the local level. If goals are met, then relationships are built increasing communication and trust between conflicting parties. Conflict is essentially *transformed* hopefully preventing future conflicts.

Peace committees are not new. Many post-conflict societies have implemented similar strategies at the local level to build peace after violent conflicts. In Kenya, Adan and Pkalya (2006) analyzed peace committees establishing the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) in 1995. They noted many challenges the committees faced in Kenya including legitimacy, funding, volunteerism, ethnic and political interferences. Despite these challenges, the peace committees were successful in filling the void of traditional mediation practices. Two Nepali scholars who have done extensive research on their country's own traditional conflict resolution practices are Dev Raj Dahal and Chandra Dev Bhatta. In their article, *The Relevance of Local Conflict Resolution Mechanisms for Systemic Conflict Transformation in Nepal* (2008) they outline several responses to conflict at the local level including formal institutions, traditional and religious approaches, as well as community mediation and civil society negotiation. One example is the "indigenous institutions such as Gram Parishad (Village Council) used to organize a discussion to mediate conflict. They used to take the perspective of all conflicting sides, find identity of interests, construct a solution and legitimize this by sacred dharma (institutional duties) interlinked with custom and morality" (2008, pp. 15-16).

However, many believe that LPCs have no value or are not legitimate bodies for establishing peace because they are too modern and deviate from traditional practices. Aside from traditional mediation practices that Dahal discusses there are Track I approaches to

peacebuilding that include more diplomatic interventions. These however are limited in scope and often fail if not implemented correctly as many peace accords signed do not hold up years later and there is a *re-escalation* of violence. If peace is not grounded within the communities engaging in the violence and affected by its consequences, then sustainable peace will not be achieved. This is the essence of what locally-based peacebuilding practices are trying to achieve.

Many scholars and practitioners within the PB and CT⁵ fields have explored issues around the use of local peace structures as part of the overall peace process needed in post-conflict societies. Local peacebuilding has more recently been advocated but only after a select few have argued for their legitimacy. Paul Risley and Timothy Sisk (2005) wrote *Democracy and United Nations Peace-building at the Local Level: Lessons Learned* trying to call to attention the effectiveness of local, bottom-up, peacebuilding strategies. Yet connecting the resources of the international community to the local needs of those affected by war has been largely the challenge. Local peacebuilding structures can aid in bridging the gap often found in post-conflict societies by supporting the local communities implementing transitional government processes (Odendaal, 2008).

Odendaal examined processes of other countries that established peace committees to mitigate conflicts and create more sustainable peace within society. He describes these processes as Local Peace-building Forums (LPFs), arguing that “local peacebuilding strategies, if done well, have the potential to anchor the peace process locally. They enable local communities to engage with those problems or issues uppermost in their minds and to inform the national process” (Odendaal, 2008, p. 3). Local ownership counters the exclusive nature of elite pacts, reduces violence, and creates a democratic process from within joint-problem solving processes.

⁵ See *Appendix A: Glossary of Terms* for more comprehensive definitions of terms used in this section.

The LPFs consist of all local political stakeholders, government officials, civil society and “have a mandate to secure peace locally and prevent further violence” (Odendaal, 2008, p. 3). While they have proven to enhance tolerance and reduce violence “their potential is not fully realized because of a lack of scrutiny and rigorous assessment of appropriate methodology. Their contribution to peace-building is not being considered sufficiently in serious literature, with the result that little collective learning is taking place” (Odendaal, 2008, p. 3).

Odendaal envisions a specific methodology for effective LPF implementation:

1. National mandate needed but not necessary depending on the context. National mandates should confer legitimacy and credibility to LPFs and formalize lines of communication with the national leadership.
2. The LPF needs to be composed of all stakeholders in the conflict including local political leaders as well as people committed to peace and those from civil society.
3. LPFs should not have the power of arbitration, but rely exclusively on the ‘soft’ approaches to dispute resolution such as dialogue, confidence-building, facilitation or mediation to provide inclusive dialogue in a non-threatening space.
4. LPFs should receive sustained, professional support in the following areas: facilitation, orientation regarding roles expected of them and skills in performing those roles, and logistical support structure from the national level that is established as part of the national peace infrastructure.

Odendaal warns, however, that LPFs cannot enforce peace through forcible means because this would negate their *soft* approaches to peacemaking. The LPFs also will find it extremely difficult to implement peace agreements if there is lack of political will to do so at the national level. Ball states (as cited in Odendaal A. , 2008, p. 7), who worked with peace committees in South Africa, that if any stakeholders lack commitment to a national peace agreement, the LPFs cannot be expected to be successful. Similarly, LPFs cannot address the root causes of a conflict if those causes are located in the national constitution, laws and policies. Odendaal continues to say that LPFs have been accused of facilitating *negative peace* by addressing only the symptoms and not causes of the conflict. This is real life fear for Nepalis in their current state.

In an interview with the founder of peace studies, Johan Galtung said Nepalis have a capacity for negative peace. “The 10-year-long conflict was a testament to their potential for excessive violence, while during the 18 days of Jana Andolan II in 2006, they toppled a 240-year-old monarchy without resorting to violence.” He continues to say that “Nepalis are specifically good at *negative* forms of non-violence like civil disobedience, demonstrations, and non-cooperation, but they struggle when it comes to positive non-violence, like nation building and constructive actions towards peace” (Galtung, 2012). And while the LPCs cannot directly control the national debate on the nature of peace, they can and are, mandated to recommend and pressure local leaders to change policy at the national level (Terms of Reference, Local Peace Committees, 2009 (2065)). The peace process should balance the national level issues of constitution-making, state restructuring, and power-sharing with the local level issues that ground the peace processes and provide access to resources and compensation to conflict-affected peoples.

While the effectiveness of LPCs is unclear, the impact of the peace committees and their use of dialogue/conflict resolution strategies on the greater national peace process in Nepal are significant. However, one main critique of the overall peace process is that Conflict Transformation has not been able to grow from the micro level because there is no system in place linking it to the macro level. “The peace process has been strained by the irresolution of the old problems such as weak governance, absence of state security in the peripheral areas, economic volatility, poverty, high unemployment, poor education, discrimination, distributional struggle of social forces and inaction of the state to cope with political violence generated by non-state actors” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 7). The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) outlines the need to eliminate old problems and mandates the establishment of institutions to

implement new programs, the peace committees being one such program. However, without the central government upholding the CPA, these changes cannot occur. If the CPA cannot effectively bring about sustainable peace in Nepal by creating national initiatives then the success of LPCs should not be expected to succeed either. Since the government has yet to establish any national initiatives, “It could be said that the CPA itself is not sufficiently comprehensive, as it did not address the grievances of those political parties and societal groups who are outside the SPA [Seven Party Alliance] framework” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 27). The inconsistent lack of decisions being made by the government about the future of the LPCs and other peace strategies within the CPA is inhibiting the collaboration of macro level processes with the local level processes.

Another critique is that the peace process has been too politicized on a national level, especially when it comes to LPCs. Immediately after signing the peace accord and while integrating the Maoists into the government allowed violence to cease, their involvement in the political process is now hindering forward progress in the CA towards the writing of a constitution. Political deadlock and monopoly make the LPCs incapable of functioning to fulfill their mandates. This is largely due to the CPA being ineffective due to the political deadlock at the center of other political processes. “This is the reason peace movement of Track II and Track III civil society actors have become essential to unfreeze the peace accord” (Dahal R. D., 2010, p. 10). One aspect of this deadlock is political nepotism when disbursing monetary funds to the committees. When funds were first given to victims, the lists favored those with ties to political party members, who often times were family members. Additionally, compensation forms are difficult to complete; as many victims are illiterate. Ultimately, the people affected do not get the compensation because they have no political affiliation, are working, or illiterate.

Conflict Analysis

The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) institutionalized the peace process at the national level after the violence ended. Even though there is no direct connection between the CPA and LPCs, both are designed to support and aid building peace, with the CPA being the means by which to solve the problems causing the conflict. Nepal's conflict can be described as ethno-political (Bhatta, 2012). The political instability of the country shows its inability to come to consensus, especially around issues of governance, state restructuring and federalism. "The impact of Nepal's culture of impunity and political patronage is pervasive in public life" (Bhatta, 2012, p. 3). Unfortunately, it seems as though the *ethnic* part of it is being politicized and used to further divide the country and control power. This is not unusual in post-conflict societies and is often seen as a "rational choice approach in which individuals, especially among elites, [can] use ethnicity for political benefit" (Jesse & Williams, 2011, p. 12).

Ethnic-federalism in Nepal is a sticking point to achieving consensus. Some believe that federalism will solve the political and social problems with the writing of a new constitution, but most Nepalis do not know the meaning of federalism or are aware of what is happening in the capital, Kathmandu.⁶ It has also been said that ethnic-federalism, the dividing up of the country into autonomous regions based on ethnic boundaries for proportional rights, can help give rights to those who currently have none due to the current caste system and discrimination. It is unclear how this will look, as it has not yet been decided how the country is going to restructure the state. Caste and class discrimination, especially for *Dalits* and women, is still prevalent.

⁶ Watch *The People's Constitution* for more on Nepali's view of the constitution and Constituent Assembly. There are several quotes from various groups about their views of the government, the constitution-writing process, and overall socio-political climate in Nepal.

Closely connected to the lack of human rights is the overall oppression and marginalization of groups (indigenous, various ethnic groups i.e. Tibetan refugees, Hindu caste, women, youth). Social identity theory explains this oppression as a potential cause for conflict, and as we have seen in Nepal for decades, there are ethnic/caste-based discrimination which is one root-cause of the armed violence. Identity-based groups have currently been created to counter this discrimination, but the lack of consensus on the definition of federalism in the constitution are causing conflicting demands. Conditions are more volatile than they previously were because this type of conflict based on social categories (e.g. ethnic grouping) strikes at the core of a person's self and identity which is difficult for affected individuals to overcome.

There has also been a lack of land rights associated with the feudal land system. For example, in the western region of the *Terai* the *Kamaiya* (long term farm labor) system still uses indentured slavery to work the land (Sharma S. , 1999). When the US sprayed DDT in the lower region to rid the area of Malaria, the hill people (*Palali*) migrated to that region. This created conflict between two ethnic groups because the Madhesi people, 50% of whom have traditionally lived in this area, look more Indian and have historically been marginalized by the hill people. National land rights given in the new constitution would hopefully mitigate this conflict.

A major part of analyzing the complexities of this conflict is reviewing the CPA within the current context of Nepal's events and whether the CPA is being followed by all actors who signed it. The CPA is extensive, but thus far, it has accomplished five main goals, which has implications for the post-conflict society. First, it ended hostilities between the Maoists and the Nepali Government allowing the head of the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-

M)⁷ party to join the government. Following the signing of the CPA, the UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal) was established, to ensure the integration of the two military forces, as well as monitoring preparations for the Constituent Assembly elections in 2008. This integration of the Maoist Rebels into the National Army of Nepal meant it would be less likely that an armed conflict would subsequently occur. The integration of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers with the Nepali Army is seen as a major accomplishment towards peace.

The CPA also established a commitment to follow Human Rights and International Human Law. Unfortunately, the government of Nepal has yet to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) or the Disappeared Inquiry Commission to display this commitment. "Conflict victims had little hope of justice when Constituent Assembly (CA) was functioning. Agendas of the victims were completely over-shadowed following the dissolution of the CA..." (Pokhrel, 2012, para 3) Some view the TRC as a more legitimate way in which to start the reconciliation process of a country recovering from a violent conflict. And with the LPC unable to provide amnesty or reparations to the conflict victims, it seems as though the LPC is unable to contribute to the peace process. One journalist states her dislike for the overall process, "There is Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction and Local Peace Committee (LPC) at the district level for promoting peace and harmony in the country. But in the absence of a clear government policy and a TRC, these two institutions have only been involved in distributing relief packages and are completely silent on a reconciliation process" (Pokhrel, *Is the government promoting impunity?*, 2012, para 5). Yet the peace committees are not completely silent in the peace process. They are trying to hold the country together until the government catches up and can sustain the inclusive system of the local level. Nevertheless, it is necessary that the government

⁷ See *APPENDIX D: Nepal: Key People and Parties*

establish a TRC to work with the LPCs to establish, investigate and seek justice for the victims of prior human rights abuses.

Similarly, the CPA established a commitment to restructuring the Nepali state. This means assessing and adjusting the power dynamics between stakeholders, giving more representation to marginalized groups, and defining the margins of federalism. The CA committees were created with specific tasks and functions to make the process more systematic. *The Committee on State Restructuring and Distribution of State Power* created criteria for developing a new federal state in the Nepali constitution. However, the dissolution of the CA puts the country at another political stalemate. Without a clear definition of how the state is going to be restricted, the constitution will never come to fruition which is necessary for the peace process to continue. More decisively, “The demands for ethnic autonomy have become so strong that if they are not addressed they could lay the seeds for further conflict as happened in Sri Lanka and Aceh” (Sharma, *Ethnic Tension*, 2012, para 7).

It is unknown whether the new CA election will actually occur in November 2013 given that other dates to create a new constitution have come and gone. The Nepali people are disillusioned and seemingly without hope or trust in the government. One editor of the *Nepal Samacharpatra*, a daily newspaper, expressed his worry for the future, “The election will only add to the turmoil because the government did not take major political parties and all of its coalition partners into confidence” (Sharma, 2012, para 6). These failures to meet deadlines have created the current political stagnation on the issues of consensus around the number, names, and boundaries of the ethnic states and between ethnically-formed caucuses that break party lines and create conflict in government. It has also created a lack of hope in the government’s ability to follow-through with their promises.

Primary Research Question

I am interested in whether the LPC members are fulfilling their mandate established by the 2006 CPA and the creation of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MOPR). If not, why? Connecting this to the overall peace process in Nepal I am also interested in the additional questions: Are the LPCs using dialogue/conflict resolution strategies to create sustainable peace for Nepal? More specifically, how does this affect local peacebuilding efforts in Nepal as they continue to be in a state of transition towards a stable government? What are the implications of this transition on the local peacebuilding efforts?

Local Peace Committee – Overview

The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MOPR) was established by the CPA with a mandate to create the LPCs at each district level. The LPCs were created to “overcome the conflict transformation and peace-building vacuum at Track II levels, execute CPA and institutionalize peace-building activities at the local level”⁸ (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 25). The LPCs are able to create Village Level Peace Committees (VLPC) within the Village Development Committee (VDC) if they deem it necessary. There are 75 districts in Nepal and it is desired that each one have a peace committee. As of July 2009, there were 55 peace committees that had been created. Currently, there are 74 peace committees with one remote district in the far-eastern region lacking enough people to create one, which shows that there has

⁸ The official structures of peace rest on Peace Negotiation Coordination and Advisory Committee (PNCAC) comprising 10 political parties representing parliament, Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, National Monitoring Committee on Code of Conduct for Ceasefire (NMCC), National Transition to Peace Initiative (NTTP), Interim Constitution Draft Committee (ICDC), Joint Monitoring and Coordination Committee (JMCC) on Cantonment Management which comprises UNMIN, CPN (Maoist) and Nepal Army and 11-member High Level Monitoring Committee (HLMC) to monitor the implementation of the understandings and agreements reached between SPA. (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008) For the purposes of this research I'll only be focusing on the specific structures and mandate of the LPCs.

been significant improvement in establishing these peace committees but it is unclear whether they are functioning or not.

The LPCs are comprised of 23 members, with one third of the committee members being female. More specifically, (a) only 12 members can be from the district working committees of the political parties having representation in the CA; (b) Four people must be from civil society, local organizations or human rights activists promoting peace; (c) Four must be representing the conflict-affected peoples; (d) One must be a member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industries; (e) and two must be among the indigenous communities, *Dalits*, *Madhesis*, Muslims, etc. who are not also represented in (a), (b), or (c) above (2009 (2065), pp. 2-3).

Many of the LPCs have formed VDC level peace committees. In this case, the VDC Secretary or Executive Office of the Municipality also functions as the Village Level Peace Committee (VLPC) secretary whereas with the district level committee the secretary is assigned by the MOPR. Both peace committees select a coordinator to assist the secretary, a position established by consensus and rotated out every six months. At the VDC level there are only nine members of the committee, including at least two women, and they report every activity to the district level committee. While this formation is designed to provide inclusive participation and local ownership it is problematic because nine members do not represent all groups within Nepal or even a given region. Because of this the government regulates the number of VLPCs whereas the district level simply add more people.

While there are the formal stipulations to create the LPCs, there are many other intricacies and challenges that were not anticipated by TOR making it difficult for them to function as a committee. One of the primary functions of the LPCs is to coordinate with the local district bodies. Some external challenges include a lack of transparency, lack of coordination

with the CDO and MOPR, and a lack of resources. By public opinion, the LPCs are viewed as the only way in which families will receive victim compensation from the war. While this non-descript role has been a positive outcome for the LPCs, it is unclear what happens when the victim compensation money runs out. It is not specifically written in the mandate as to the procedures for the distribution of funds. As such, there is a lot of ambiguity as to how this process should be accomplished within the LPCs.

Internal challenges within the LPCs include political party interference with budget allocations not being based on group size and a lack of budget transparency. Additional challenges are ethnic and gender discrimination, and lack of education and language barriers preventing effective communication. So while the LPCs are mandated by the TOR to be inclusive and proportionally represent everyone, there is no guarantee that their voices are heard. In some cases one's dialect may not be understood by everyone, in other cases individuals do not feel comfortable enough to speak up about their positions on the issues. The latter problem is especially prevalent for women and members of the *Dalit* communities.

Goals and Objectives of LPCs

The goals and objectives of the LPCs are established in the TOR. However, a report from Raja Ram Rijal, the LPC Secretary in Dhading said their five main objectives are:

1. To reconcile the victims from the state and the rebel side
2. To provide employment and income generation activities
3. To provide educational support to conflict victims
4. To run joint program among conflicting parties
5. To expand LPC to the village level and initiate to resolve conflict existed at the local level.

These objectives, while true, currently do not align with the stated objectives in Section (4)

Duties and Responsibilities of the Local Peace Committees of the TOR. The following are the objectives (adapted) of the LPCs as stated in the TOR:

- 4.1 Assist in the implementation of the CPA and promote the peace process
- 4.2 Monitor the implementation of the Ministry's Relief and Reconstruction Program
- 4.3 Support the Task force for the collection of data on conflict affected individuals, families, and structures
- 4.4 Facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political and social conflict
- 4.5 Work on reconciliation, healing and trust-building
- 4.6 Monitor political and social developments at the local level
- 4.7 Disseminate information on issues that affect local peace processes

While some of the objectives stated by the LPC Secretary could in fact lie within the broader objectives mandated by the MOPR and Peace Secretariat, not all the objectives are the same. According to committee members, LPCs are mandated to provide monetary relief to conflict victims and displaced peoples, as well as return properties captured by Maoists insurgents. Further, one scholar found that LPCs aimed to “ensure return of properties captured by CPN (Maoist); look into resettlement and rehabilitation issues and promote the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure....” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 25) Therefore, while providing monetary compensation is in fact part of the duties and responsibilities of the LPCs it should be more clearly stated as such rather than broadly describe as to give specific context to the types of activities needing to be implemented.

Processes

In the TOR the *(5) Working Procedures for the Local Peace Committees* outline the processes that enable the LPC to fulfill its mandate and achieve its objectives. The following is an adapted list of objectives:

- 5.1 Create common agreement to implement strategies of peace process
- 5.2 All decisions shall be made by consensus (if that is not possible then by majority of total members present)
- 5.3 May use services of local or national facilitators
- 5.4 May establish working relations with national or international monitors
- 5.5 LPC and DDC, Municipality, VDC may exchange cooperation
- 5.6 May forward issues to the Peace and Rehabilitation Commission for consultation

Similar to the objectives of the LPC, the specific processes are equally ambiguous and probably vary from district to district. In the Dhading district, there are specific activities implemented to fulfill their mandate. In the same report that Secretary Raja Ram Rijal wrote following the Mediation Training, he stated the following activities the committee produced last year:

1. Establishment of VLPCs in 30 DCs
2. Skill Development program for conflict victim families (computer training for 20 conflict victim persons)
3. Radio Programs to strengthen peace process
4. Interaction program with LPC members, Political parties and concerned civil societies on the 'Role and Challenges for LPC in Peacebuilding Process' (60 representatives, twice)
5. Essay competition on the topic 'Role of Youths in Peace process' among secondary level students
6. Interaction Program with the participation of LPC members, VLPC coordinators, female members and VDC secretary on the topic 'Role of Peace Committees in Peacebuilding Process'
7. Street Drama on the Peace theme (twice)

There have also been additional efforts to mitigate the external challenges that the LPCs face and to create more Village Level Peace Committees (VLPC) to reach a wider group of people within the villages. Rijal said,

“Efforts have also been made to establish an office of VLPCs. To be more transparent on the relief amount allocated by the government for the conflict victims and to ensure that the actual conflict victims are recommended for the packages, more roles and responsibilities are given to VLPCs. Similarly district LPC are also planning for educational visit to observe the activities done by LPCs of other districts.”

While this is a good start, the LPCs have a long way to go to create transparency within the government at the local level. The interaction program which gathers the desired group together to *interact* on the topic given is a good way to *create common agreement* for the implementation of peace strategies. At the national level, decision-making via consensus is a challenge especially in relation to the CA and the terms of federalism in the constitution. “The need for consensus building processes that reinforces trust between government and people cannot be compromised even by the need for political institutions to act as quickly as possible” (Joshi, 2009, p. 101). If consensus is not reached at the national level it will be equally as

difficult for the local level to come to consensus on the same issues, “assuming that local leaders have the ability, knowledge and interest to address these types of conflicts” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 26). This isn’t happening by the leaders of the Local Peace Committees as issues of reaching consensus within the committees is a challenge that is directly related to the national level’s ability to come to consensus.

Members are mandated to recommend cases to the national level that cannot be solved at the local level. This communication is important towards facilitating working relationships with the national and international monitors to prevent any crisis or potential for violence.

Additionally, there is a responsibility to communicate signed agreements between political parties and the central government to the LPCs “which are related to peace and conflict resolution process, to the local level” (Dahal & Bhatta, 2008, p. 26). It is unclear whether information is being communicated to LPCs and if LPCs are aware of the responsibility to turn unresolved cases over to the national government. This is the basis of the research.

Most of the LPC processes relate to peacebuilding and the use of dialogical/conflict resolution strategies. Given my exposure to mediation as dialogical strategy, I was able to see how these processes affected the committees. “The idea of facilitated dialogue as a response to conflicts, often understood in simple terms and provided by wise people whose impartiality and decency were considered central, has been an integral part of Nepali social tradition, and various of these traditional forms can still be found today” (Lederach & Thapa, 2012, p. 3). Since LPCs may play the role of mediator or facilitator, there has been a focus on mediation as a process for peacebuilding at the local level. Trainings in mediation skills have been provided to LPC members through collaborative efforts between CPRP and CSSP. Now we see an interesting mix

of newer forms of mediation (*Integrative*)⁹ with traditional systems of conflict resolution (Arbitration). “Thakalis, Magars and Tharus have traditional institutions that continue to function, such as heads of villages, or (ethnic) community organizations such as mukhiya, mahato or badghar” (Lederach & Thapa, 2012, p. 3). Most of these traditional forms were abolished in the 1960s but some are still used today and some disputes are referred to the VDC which is often the only local body of governance in the remote areas of Nepal.

Mediation is often used within the committees and local agencies as there are several barriers the LPC encounter when working in the community. While the LPCs can work with local bodies (CDO, DDC, and VDC) they cannot make any decisions that conflict with these bodies. During the mediation training, one man said that while the government provides training to LPCs, it is useless because the CDO has all the power to deny requests or refuse to cooperate if they don't agree. The CDO does not always accept the functions mandated of the LPC. The CDO makes the final decision about what programs are implemented, which is problematic for the LPCs who need to coordinate with the CDO to conduct their programs. Members of this LPC cited two instances of allotting Nepalese Rupees for “displaced peoples” but since their documentation did not contain the language “conflict victims” the money went back to MOPR because they could not reach consensus on the appropriate language.

Awareness and acceptance of LPC needs to be realized before they can be an effective mechanism for promoting peace and democracy at the local level. If the CDO does not recognize or respect the work that the LPCs are doing, then the community will not either. People within the Dhading community are not aware of the purpose of the LPCs or its capabilities for assisting in solving their conflicts. Therefore, the LPCs are not being utilized in the way they were

⁹ See CSSP website for more on their approach to Mediation. www.cssp.org

initially designed. Whether this is due to structural challenges, communication issues, lack of resources or lack of advocacy, it needs to change in order for their processes to be effective.

Monitoring/Evaluation

When the CPA was signed it effectively dissolved the National Monitoring Committee on the Code of Conduct for the Ceasefire (NMCC) which was the only body mandated to monitor the ceasefire. It also dissolved the Peace Secretariat which was involved in the all peace negotiations leading to the peace accord.¹⁰ The Peace Secretariat transformed into what is now the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. As such it took over responsibility for many transitional peace processes once the CPA was signed. The MOPR is the core Ministry responsible for the overall operation of the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF). As the overseeing government agency of the LPCs, because of its role in helping create the committees, the MOPR is responsible for monitoring the duties and responsibilities of the LPCs. Part of their mandate is the “Formulation implementation, monitoring and evaluation of immediate and long-term policies, strategies, plans and programs for the establishment of peace, conflict management and reconstruction of physical infrastructures damaged due to conflict” (Reconstruction, 2013), and as the Local Peace Committees is one such program it is the MOPR’s responsibility to monitor and evaluate their progress.

Conversely, the LPCs are supposed to “To monitor the implementation of the Ministry’s relief and reconstruction programs” (Terms of Reference, Local Peace Committees, 2009 (2065), p. 5), though there is no specification as to how this done. I was unable to find specific reports from the MOPR regarding the progress of their monitoring of the LPCs.

¹⁰ See *APPENDIX C: History of Peace Negotiation Talks (prior to CPA)*

I did, however, find adequate information about the NPTF with more information as to the monitoring of programs. The NPTF, which funds the reconstruction and peace efforts under the Ministry of Peace, was created in February of 2007 after the CPA and seems to be the only form of monitoring that exists within the government reporting on the LPCs progress. Their monitoring and evaluation strategy are used to follow the money within the projects that the MOPR implements, including the LPCs and their programs. There are four major projects (*clusters*) the MOPR are currently conducting, and as of January 2013, the NPTF has financed 55 projects within its four clusters (Government of Nepal, 2009):

- Cluster I: Cantonment Management and Rehabilitation of Combatants
- Cluster II: Conflict Affected People (IDP in particular) and Communities
- Cluster III: Security and Transitional Justice
- Cluster IV: Constituent Assembly and Peace Building Initiatives at national and local levels*

The specific project within the fourth cluster that pertains to the LPCs is entitled *Strengthening Local Peace Committees: Peace with the bottom-up approach*. This program's goal is to strengthen the capacities of the LPCs as "effective, autonomous local peace structures" yet there have been limited achievements as of April 2012 including "Training institutes are being selected and training manuals are under preparation" and "Procurement of logistics is completed" (Nepal S. W., 2012, p. 1). The project is funded until July of 2013 but only started in February of 2011 (Nepal S. W., 2012). It has taken almost five years for funding and support to reach the districts and with 75 districts and LPCs, it suggests a challenge of what can be covered in the time remaining. The reports will show that resources are limited and challenges are seemingly boundless. Reports also show that wider awareness of LPCs are providing access to support for conflict-affected peoples (CAP), the LPCs continue to be adversely affected by political interference and the lack of conflict sensitivity skills among the members, which limits their effectiveness and limited resources (Nepal S. W., 2011). As part of the NPTF, an external

monitoring process produced a report discussing the outcomes of all the cluster projects. Some findings include the following:

- The LPC at the district level need to strengthen to improve their quality of services to CAP. For example, many of its staff, including the Secretaries, was not aware on how to deal with complex and sensitive situations such as when there is overwhelming pressure from the CAP seeking assistance. The monitoring team noted that LPC team to behave inappropriately to the CAP approaching LPC for support.
- The complex and lengthy application and verification process for CAP relief support does not match with the staff resources assigned by the implementing agencies, particularly at the DAO, to process the applications.

(Nepal S. W., 2011, pp. 30-31)

These are some of the main challenges the LPCs still face despite years of working with the MOPR more concretely to mitigate these issues. There have been numerous recommendations to strengthen their capacity. Examples of conflict sensitive trainings in order to approach conflict-affected peoples (CAP) in a more supportive way are suggested time and time again. Yet even with these challenges some LPCs have been effective. A peaceful political environment and reduced local conflict has been achieved in areas where LPCs are proactive and have political consensus. However, the opposite is true when these things are lacking in the local environment.

The MOPR is a governmental institution accountable to the people of Nepal and should have its efforts monitored and evaluated regularly. Without this monitoring, peace cannot be sustained. Changes are needed to address the needs and demands of the local peoples in order for these goals and objectives to be achieved. The NPTF seems to working well with the MOPR to monitor its projects greater coordination and communication between the MOPR and the LPCs needs to occur since they are in direct contact with the CAPs and IDPs (Internally Displaced Peoples) needing the access and resources that the funding is supposed flow to. While the MOPR is required to submit biannual reports on the status of its projects, as well as their budgets and accounts, the lack of computers or the internet by everyday citizens hinders their effect,

especially in the VDC rural areas. Budget transparency also needs to be increased among the LPC members within the committees themselves.

Research Methods

Practitioner Inquiry Design

This is a qualitative case study using in-depth surveys framed within my knowledge and experiences working with peace committee members who participated in a training conducted by CPRP. In order to research this population, flexible techniques were needed (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). Flexibility comes from wanting to investigate the overall effectiveness of the peace committees and their effect on the larger phenomenon of peace at the national level, but not being able to survey more than a single district. Cultural differences between Nepal and the US also required greater flexibility in research methods to allow for data to be obtained through impersonal conversations, informal interviews, observations from the trainings as well as the relevant literature. Literature on LPCs come from newspaper articles, books, and online resources to supplement my research and obtain an overall understanding of Nepal's post-conflict reconstruction and current political climate.

Data Collection/Methodology

Data come from a questionnaire created and translated into Sanskrit for the Dhading District LPC members in Nepal. Developed within the theoretical frameworks of Human Needs, Social Identity and Conflict Transformation theories, survey questions asked about committee members' experiences within the LPC and CLPC including how committees resolved conflicts both internally and externally and between their networks such as the MOPR, the CDO, and other peace committees. Questions also surveyed the participant's satisfaction with their ability to mediate conflicts, the communication and relationship levels between these networks and their

overall contribution to peace in Nepal.¹¹ Survey methods were chosen because of my language barrier as I did not speak Nepali and my financial inability to hire a translator for numerous in-depth interviews.

Data were collected after a CPRP-sponsored Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation Training for the CLPCs of the Dhading district. Since the training was for CLPC members this sample was surveyed first (n=26). The CLPC members were administered their survey directly after the second-to-last day of training with instructions to return the completed survey the following day. Twenty-three CLPC members returned the questionnaire on the last day of the training. The second sample includes the district LPC members of the Dhading (n=23). Nine LPC members were administered their survey in an informal meeting later that day with instructions to complete and return to the district secretary. Some additional surveys were left for the remaining district LPC members who were not able to be present at that meeting. Twelve surveys from LPC members were returned to me in Kathmandu two weeks later by the district LPC Secretary.

Data were coded and analyzed using SPSS 21. Open-ended data were categorized and assigned values based upon the themes emerging from respondents' answers. Using both forced-choice and open-ended responses, t-test were conducted to examine differences between gender, ethnicity and political affiliation. However, data failed to yield any significant results.

Findings

Presentation of Data

Because the response rate was low at the district level, data were not sufficient to present each of the two committee levels alone and then compare. As a result, survey data from the

¹¹ See *APPENDIX E: Survey Questionnaire* for the complete questionnaire administered (in English).

village level (n=23) and district level (n=12) are combined; findings are grouped into themes. Where appropriate a distinction is made between village and district level findings.

Understanding and Awareness of Mandate

One of my initial research questions was “Are the LPC members fulfilling their mandate established by the 2006 CPA and the creation of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MOPR)?” I asked the participants some questions around whether or not they read the TOR and the respondent’s knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of the committees. When asked if participants had read the Terms of Reference (TOR) the responses varied. At the district level, the majority of those surveyed, 8 out of 12 (or 66.7%) said they had read the TOR. At the village level, 14 out of 23 (or 60.9%) said they had *not* read the TOR.

Another aspect of understanding their mandate is being able to identify the processes by which they were able to complete the duties and responsibilities given. When I asked members to select the duties and responsibilities their committee had participated in the respondents identified that they had in fact participated in the various duties and responsibilities but they were not able to elaborate as to how they were able to accomplish these duties. The CLPC has participated in “Working towards reconciliation, healing and trust building” the most with 73.9% selecting. 56.5% of members selected “Supporting the task force constituted by the Government of Nepal for the collection of the data on conflict affected individuals, families, and structures” as another duty their committee participated in. The LPC has been able to “Disseminate information on issues that affect local peace processes” and “Work on reconciliation, healing and trust building” with 75% of members saying their committee has participated in these duties. They have also been able to “Facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political and social conflict” with 58.3% selecting this responsibility.

Inclusivity

Part of the overall peace process requires inclusion of the various ethnic groups who have historically been discriminated against and to give them more representation within the government. The LPCs have to adhere to the requirements of the CPA dictating inclusiveness. The main requirements include 33% participation from women, representation of members from conflict-affected peoples, as well as various ethnic groups. When I asked various demographic questions to see if this inclusiveness was occurring, results suggest it was occurring. In terms of gender there is in fact 1/3 female membership within the CLPC with 8 out of the total 23 participants surveyed or 34%. Since I received nearly full participation from the CLPC this is a more accurate measure of the female participation within the committee. Within the LPC, I was unable to obtain more participation but out of the 12 surveyed there were 3 women, representing 25% participation, but my knowledge of the composition of the committee, I know there is 1/3 female membership within the district level as well.

In terms of ethnicity, they are members from several members of different ethnic groups including one Dalit member and two members self-identifying as Janajatis. The majority of members were Chetris or Newars with five members each. Unfortunately, there were several who didn't respond to this question making it impossible to know if any other major ethnic groups are represented. The lack of sufficient numbers at the district level makes estimates of inclusiveness impossible. While these demographic questions were needed to identify if the committees were inclusive based on percentages, it does not allow me to say whether the committee is inclusive, nor does it allow for me to say how well the committee functions. Participants were also asked if they would describe their committee as being inclusive towards

all or a majority of the various ethnic groups, the results were varied. Descriptions of the relationship between ethnic groups are as follows:

“We, not because of caste and religion and culture, but because we are Nepali, we stay together and work together. There is not caste partiality among us.”

“In committee, all political parties, Janajati, Dalit and women need to be included to make it strong.”

“Ethnicity and caste system are all fake. We all are human and we should know that. Empowerment through knowledge and economy should be promoted.”

While the descriptions could be coded as positive responses it is deceiving to the rest of the data which shows a negative satisfaction with the relationship between ethnic groups and consensus reached.

At the district level, there was not enough participation to see whether members thought the committee was inclusive, 25% said no, 33.3% said yes and 41.7% did not answer. At the village level, almost half of those surveyed, 47.8% of members said they did not think their committee was inclusive towards a majority or all the ethnic groups while 21.7% said yes it was inclusive. Three members of the CLPC said they were *not at all* satisfied with the relationship nor the level of consensus reached between the ethnic groups. If a few are not satisfied then things need to be done to have everyone be satisfied with the relationship between ethnic groups. If not, inclusiveness cannot truly be reached within these committees. 26.1% of members were *somewhat* satisfied with ethnic relations and 30.4% were *somewhat* satisfied with the level of consensus reached by ethnic groups but the overall trend among the data suggest that members of the committee were not extremely satisfied with the ethnic inclusion in the committees. Whether this negates the actual inclusive nature of the committee is hard to say but the challenges of inclusivity make it difficult for the committees to function properly and be effective in resolving disputes.

Another aspect of inclusivity is political participation. Having all stakeholders involved in the committee is another mandate of the TOR. All LPC members surveyed said they were politically affiliated. Nineteen out of the twenty-three surveyed CLPC members said they were politically affiliated. When asked which political parties they were affiliated with the participants all identified the current major political parties in the country.¹² Even if members were politically affiliated it is interesting whether they were approached by political parties to be involved in the peace committees. When asked how participants became part of the peace committees, overwhelmingly members were encouraged by a political party to be part of the committee. At the district level, 7 out of the 12 surveyed said they became part of the committee due to political party involvement. Some members at the village level, 9 out of the 23 surveyed, were approached by political parties to become involved with the local peace committees. Explaining this one participant said “There is representation from every party in the committee so since I am the chairperson of the party, I became involved in this committee. The DAO and VDC Duwakot has requested this.”

While the peace committees are designed to include political party members, they are not necessarily designed to include members encouraged by political parties. Even those who were part of the civil society were designated by political parties to be in the local peace committee. One participant said, “Since I am involved in social service I was told by the representative from the Nepali Communist Party UML to be involved in the local peace committee.” Yet there were four responses of those who were not approached by any political party, or a political party member, but wanted to be involved in the peace committees. One participant said, “No one made

¹² See *APPENDIX D: Nepal: Key people and parties*

any suggestions to me about this but because I am in social services and want the best for people, I got involved by my own wish.”

Use of dialogue/conflict resolution strategies

The use of dialogue and conflict resolution skills is one of the main strategies that the peace committees use to create peace within the communities. Another question asked was: *Are LPCs using dialogue/conflict resolution strategies to create sustainable peace for Nepal?* To answer this, questions in the survey were designed to measure if 1) these processes were used and 2) if committee members were satisfied with their use. The data shows the committees do in fact participate in conflict transformation processes in order to achieve the responsibilities outlined by the terms of reference. Both committees stated they participated in the responsibility to “facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political and social conflict.” Therefore, these processes are used yet whether they are effective and if members are satisfied is a different discussion. When asked if participants were satisfied with their committee’s ability to use mediation skills to resolve conflicts, a majority had positive satisfaction ratings. Within the CLPC 26.1% said they were *somewhat* satisfied, 17.4% were *very* satisfied, and 26.1% said they were *extremely* satisfied (69.6% total) with their committee’s ability to use mediation skills. Within the LPC, 41.7% said they were *a little* or *somewhat* satisfied with their ability to use their mediation skills with 25% of those saying they were *very* satisfied.

When asked about the satisfaction of their role in reducing conflict in the district through these processes a majority of responses were positive. At the village level, 39.1% said they were *somewhat* satisfied with their role in reducing conflict in the district. 30.4% said they were *very* satisfied and 13% said they were *extremely* satisfied. They were as satisfied at the district level,

partially due to lack of participation, but 25% of those surveyed said they were *very* satisfied with their role in reducing conflict in the district.

While committee members may feel *somewhat* to *extremely* satisfied about their role in reducing conflict in the district or to use their mediation skills in reducing that conflict, there are still challenges they face, both internal and external, that make this process difficult. One such difficulty is the lack of training in mediation is one of the most important internal challenges both levels of peace committees faced. At both levels large numbers of respondents said that the lack of mediation trainings was an *extremely* important challenge, 43.5% and 33.3% at the village and district levels, respectively.

Another aspect of dialogue as a strategy is not just within the community, but within the peace committees themselves. We can see that a main internal challenge was the lack of training among members in mediation that affected their ability to communicate within the committee and to achieve consensus. When I asked participants how quickly they come to consensus on a given issue, respondents said, on a scale from 1 to 5 with one being never and five being always, 56.5% of village level respondents indicate that they *sometimes* reach consensus. At the district level only 41.7% reported they *sometimes* can quickly reach consensus with another 25% saying they *seldom* can reach consensus quickly.

When internal challenges come up, the majority of the time members' use dialogue/conflict resolution strategies to reach an agreement. Of the participants answering this question, half indicate that they engage in a discussion to resolve internal challenges, "Discussed by sitting with each other and talking about how to tackle the problem and how to go about it." If a discussion was not used, an outside mediator might be used to assist in achieving consensus among members. As one respondent pointed out, "Also, in case of a failure to make an

agreement, an outside mediator can be taken and help from administration department or organization can be used.”

Top-Down Support for the Peace Committees

Part of assessing the effectiveness of the peace committees is to understand the relationship between peace committee and the networks that oversee its functions and work with the committee to achieve the goals established by the CPA. The main governmental organization coordinating with the peace committees is the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. Another body that must be coordinated with is the Chief District Officer (CDO) as it is the governing body within the community. These two relationships are essential to understanding the top down relationship and flow of information and resources being transmitted to the peace committees. Within this network, it is also important to understanding the relationship between the district and village level committees.

The relationship between the CDO and the peace committees is also important as that directly connects the committee members with the community. Specifically, the district officer is the leader of the entire district and requires his approval to be legal. Within the CLPC most members, 17 out of 23, were only *somewhat* satisfied with their relationship with the CDO. Eight of those 17 members were dissatisfied with the communication level between the CDO. Nine out of 23 said they were also *somewhat* satisfied with the communication level. While this data is indicative of a decent relationship that is still probably evolving, as the committees have not worked together for very long within a given community, it is more interesting to hear the words of respondents describing the actual relationship with the CDO as there were no overwhelming responses of a positive or negative relationship necessarily. One member said the following:

“There is not a very good relationship with the DAO [The DAO, or District Administration Officer, is another term for CDO]. Because of political stance, although for peace, little relief has

come and it could not be used in the proper place. No dispute is seen. Because not all work done by the DAO is reported to the peace committee.”

Participants also said that this relationship to the CDO, as well the national government, is challenging and thus relates to why the relationship is not satisfactory. 58.3% of members surveyed at the district level said the lack of ability to coordinate with the government is a *very* important challenge a sentiment mirrored by village level members (52.2%) who believe it is *very* to *extremely* important challenge. The lack of coordination with the CDO is another important challenge. 33.3% of district members surveyed said this challenge was *somewhat* and *very* important with one participant saying it was *extremely* important. At the village level, 69.5% said this was *somewhat* to *extremely* important challenge.

The Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction is the organization that coordination and communication should be the best in order for the committee to function effectively. Unfortunately, this relationship is rocky and is also one of the major external challenges the peace committees face when receiving funding and resources to complete their tasks. Like the CDO, the relationship with the MOPR is only *somewhat* satisfactory to members of both committees. At the district level, 75% of those surveyed said they were *somewhat* satisfied with the overall relationship between the MOPR but two members said they were *not at all* satisfied and one said they were only *a little* satisfied. At the village level, 47.8% said they were *somewhat* satisfied with the overall relationship but 26.1% combined said they were either *not at all* or only *a little* satisfied with the overall relationship. In terms of communication level, 58.3% of district level members said they were *somewhat* satisfied with 33.3% saying they were only *a little* satisfied. At the village level, 43.5% said they were *somewhat* satisfied with the communication level with the MOPR but a combine number of 43.4% were either *not at all* satisfied or *a little* satisfied.

It is telling to hear from members about the nature of this *somewhat* satisfactory relationship. One member within the CLPC is not even aware of the programs implemented by the ministry to support the peace committees. “There should be good relations between the Ministry and the Committee but there have not been any programs conducted by the Ministry. The relationship between these two organizations is limited only to building of the local peace committee.” Yet some were aware of the need to be supported by the ministry as one member said, “The Peace Committee must be assisted by the Ministry of Peace and reconstruction.” This may however be just a disconnect between the furthest points within the structure, the top national level and the bottom village level, which still is concerning in terms of analyzing how effective this committee can be if it’s relationship with the overseeing committee is non-existent or there’s a lack of awareness. It is unclear but based on this data the relationship lacking.

It is also unclear at the district level. While the number of participants was less and thus it was more difficult to find sufficient data as to the exact nature of the relationship between the MOPR and the LPC but the open-ended responses were significant. Four respondents could not remember any conflict between the MOPR and their committee or said there was no conflict when asked. Others critiqued the relationship saying that the “Monitoring aspect is not effective. There has been no monitoring of any activities.” This is concerning given the reports read on how some committees have been monitored by the MOPR. Dhading may not have been monitored as of yet or there is limited information as to how they are being monitored. Either way, it does not seem to be an effective relationship. Another member said the “Ministry has just created the LPC. No power and not appropriate and sufficient guidelines.” Another member shared a similar opinion saying, “...LPC should be more autonomous and should have more financial power.” Justifying these opinions of the MOPR is that the relationship or lack thereof, is among several

external challenges of high importance among both committees. 53.3% of the district level committee members believe this lack of relationship with the MOPR is *very to extremely* important challenge. 73.9 % of the village level members believe this challenge to be *somewhat to extremely* important as well.

It is also interesting to note the number of responses related to funding and resources as challenges the peace committees face in relation to the MOPR because they are governing body allocating those funds. A lack of resources was both an internal and external challenge expressed by both the village and district level committee members. 53.3% of district level members said this was *extremely* important internal challenge and a *very* important external challenge as well. 82.6% of village level members said this was an *extremely* important internal and external challenge. Other challenges include lack of funds for scholarship applicants. 33.3% of district level members believed this to be *somewhat to extremely* important. 65.1% of village level members believing it to be an important challenge. The inability to access these funds or benefits was another important challenge with 50% of district level members rating it as *somewhat* important and 30.4% of village level members rating it as *extremely* important.

Overall Peace Process and the future of the Peace Committees

Part of assessing the overall effectiveness of the peace committee is looking at whether it contributes to the overall peace process within the country. One of the questions I asked in order to figure this out was whether or not a new constitution would eliminate the need for the peace committees. It is written in the TOR that once the constitution is signed the peace committees are effectively dissolved. Concerned about whether this would actually occur, given the unstable nature of the political climate and the inability to draft the constitution written by the first

Constitutional Assembly in time, I asked participants to see what they thought about the relationship between the new constitution and their role in the committee.

Most didn't think the government would hold elections in April for a new constitutional assembly. Of those who answered negatively within the CLPC, they attributed it to government weakness as well as a lack of resources. One member said "Because the politics of Nepal are very weak, all must stand on their own so I don't have hope." Another agreed saying "Because of own political selfishness" the government would not be able to hold elections in April for a new CA. One member said this was because "Members of the Constitution Assembly won't understand the importance of time and money." The results weren't as optimistic in the LPC either. One flat out said the "election is not possible by the end of April." Another noted the political stalemate thus far saying, "No work has been done 'Til now so I don't believe on it." Unfortunately, we know by now that this election for the new assembly is pushed back, like many other dates within national politics, to November 2013. Yet the views of the members are still relevant and there's a very apparent awareness of the political stagnation affecting all areas including the peace committees.

Members of both committees said they did not agree that the role of the peace committees would no longer be needed if the constitution was ratified in the future. Eleven out of 23 surveyed in the CLPC said no. Five respondents in the LPC said no as well. One member said, "It won't happen, need peace committee." Another said "Peace is not a cetamol (which is short for paracetamol/Tylenol) that can be taken when there is a fever. That's why peace is the flowing river. Instead of destroying, it should be strengthened continuously."

Also relating to my research question was whether the peace committee's role in bringing about sustainable peace in Nepal. When asked how members would rate their satisfaction with

their role in bringing about sustaining peace in Nepal the results were all positive. At the village level, 78.2% said they were *somewhat* to *extremely* satisfied with their role in bringing about sustaining peace in Nepal. At the district level, 50 % said they were satisfied with one member reporting they were *extremely* satisfied with their role in bringing about sustaining peace in Nepal.

Limitations

Literacy and language, cultural norms, and sample size are among the limitations of this research. While surveying committee members allowed for a substantial amount of quantitative and qualitative data, not all participants were literate in writing Sanskrit. This concern was confirmed by the lack of answers to the open-ended questions as pointed out by my colleagues at CPRP. Nepalis are not used to taking surveys, culturally, and I was advised to limit my open-ended questions because while they can read Sanskrit they are not used to writing in Sanskrit. Further, while the survey was translated in Sanskrit by a Nepali colleague, there were no guarantees that it was universally understood by the various ethnic groups. Some of the words and phrases in English used to create the survey may not have been easily translatable or understood by various ethnic groups or in Sanskrit. Given sufficient time and access to the peace committees, focus groups and interviews conducted by a researcher who, at the very least, speaks the language would yield better data.

Culturally, there were limitations with implementing the survey. Participants understood the survey was voluntary as the informed consent was translated and attached to the front each survey. My Nepali colleague and I were there to answer any questions for the CLPC participants. Yet there were differences in how the survey was administered for both the LPC and CLPC. In Nepal it is normal to take a survey home and return it the next day. Since there

was limited time after the CPRP training it was advised that this method was more appropriate and necessary. However, confidentiality could not be ensured completely as the survey was anonymous. Further, participants could have received help at home in completing the survey.

Consequently, data collection was more quasi-experimental than originally intended. For example, since survey administration processes yielded low response rates at the district level the sample size needed to be combined to incorporate both district and village level committees with the village level containing two committees rather than one due to the fact that both committees are small. As a result, a comparison between the two levels could not occur as originally intended and only distinctions were made. Culturally, our plans are not always the best way and we need to respect the cultural norms of the people we are trying to understand. I had to understand and abide by the cultural practices of Nepalis. As I was told when I got there *respect local knowledge and to go with Nepali's advice.*

Conclusions

There are several conclusions to be drawn from the given themes within the presented findings above. Odendaal hypothesized that Local Peace Committees need four basic methods in order to implement an effective committee that contributes to peace in a post-conflict society. These strategies are the themes which were discussed in the data collected; having a national mandate, inclusivity, using dialogue/conflict resolution processes, and receiving support from the top-down as well as training in various skill sets. These themes will provide conclusions for understanding the effectiveness of the LPCs and recommendations for areas of improvement in the future.

In *Understanding and Awareness of Mandate*, data show that the majority of village committee members surveyed have *not* read the Terms of Reference (TOR). It is imperative that

members read this document to understand their role as peace committee members. Currently, LPC members do not receive any formal orientations from the MOPR after the initial formation of the committee. While this may affect their ability to fully complete their mandate most members surveyed are able to identify the duties and responsibilities in which their committee had participated. So while it is effective that the Local Peace Committees in Nepal have a national mandate, the mandate does little to formalize communication with the national leadership that would confer legitimacy and credibility to the local committees. As a result, there are still challenges with communication and understanding of responsibilities.

In terms of *inclusivity* in post-conflict societies, representation from stakeholders on both sides of the conflict is necessary for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Local peace committees are proven effective when members committed to peace come from political parties, civil society, and marginalized groups. The LPCs in Nepal are similarly comprised. These peace committees adhere to mandates to establish inclusivity but they are not always successful or well-functioning bodies. Data show that internal issues with ethnic discrimination and communication problems with the hill (*Palai*) committee members exist, as well as a negative satisfaction with the relationship between ethnic groups and consensus being reached. The Dhading CLPC participants did not feel their committee was inclusive. Challenges of inclusivity make it difficult for the committees to function properly and be effective in resolving disputes. Data show not only high political affiliations within the peace committees but also that a majority of members were approached by political parties to be involved in the peace committees. Some have criticized that committees are too politicized, especially since at the national level they cannot achieve consensus. This affects the LPCs' legitimacy and effectiveness. This inability to reach consensus and resolve disputes, whether due to ethnic or

political issues, creates many more challenges for the Local Peace Committees to achieve their duties and responsibilities towards reducing conflict in their society.

The *use of dialogue/conflict resolution strategies* is visible in the LPCs of Nepal, for example dialogue, mediation or confidence-building facilitation to provide inclusive, trust-building environments towards creating sustainable peace. Research showed these strategies are in the Terms of Reference for the LPCs and they are required to “Facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political and social conflict” and “Work on reconciliation, healing and trust-building.” Data show a lack of mediation trainings which suggests that committee members are not equipped with these skills to properly carry out their duties and resolve conflicts. The LPCs may not be equipped with *hard* approaches to resolving conflicts within the community like the police or CDO, but data show they do employ dialogue and conflict resolutions skills when needed. This suggests that LPCs are effectively trying to resolve disputes nonviolently and potentially reducing the level of conflict which contributes to the overall peace process. While these conflict resolution processes are in place their effectiveness is less apparent. Whether these processes are being used effectively to create peace is a more difficult question to answer. There is a high level of member satisfaction with the work the committees are doing to bring about peace. This demonstrates members who are dedicated and hopeful that sustainable peace is attainable. However, satisfaction does not equate to effectiveness. Therefore evaluating effectiveness of conflict resolution strategies within the LPCs cannot be determined with this research alone. More action research needs to be conducted comprehensively in order to determine the effectiveness of these strategies within the LPCs in Nepal.

In order for local peacebuilding efforts to be effective, *Top-Down Support for the Peace Committees* need to occur. The LPCs in Nepal are not exempt. The local peace committees should receive logistical support as well as capacity support from the national level as part of the national peace process. While the creation of local peace committees started with much confusion as to which overseeing body was in charge of monitoring their efforts, they now seem to be coordinating with the MOPR and NPTF to strengthen their capacity. This relationship only exists in a few districts and the reports show little progress in areas with limited resources, but overall LPCs are receiving support from the national level structure at the MOPR. Unfortunately, communication and coordination is still lacking among the committees. The relationship with the MOPR and the village level committees are non-existent and there are complaints of the committee's inability to access funds/benefits. There is a significant lack of resources that make it difficult for committees to carry out their mandate. This is not necessarily the fault of the MOPR, rather it is due to the social conditions in Nepal. With high levels of poverty, unemployment and dependency of foreign resources, these conditions add to the challenges the committees already face. These challenges impede the effectiveness of the peace committees at the local level and the overall peace process in Nepal.

When looking at the *Overall Peace Process and the future of the Peace Committees* there continues to be political stagnation at the national level which affects the local peace committees' role in the peace process. The CPA contains the future goals of Nepal; the constitution is the language by which it is understood by its people and upheld in the country for the future. Since the national government cannot ratify a new constitution, there is an essential need for the peace committees to continue to facilitate the consensus of all stakeholders within the conflict from the bottom up. The political instability of the country shows its inability to

come to consensus, especially around issues of governance, state restructuring and federalism. Political deadlock and monopoly renders the LPCs incapable of functioning to fulfill their mandates. But if their capacities are strengthened and they receive more support from the national level, communication gaps will be lessened and consensus may be more easily reached at the grassroots level.

Measuring the effectiveness of the LPCs within these four basic strategies may not be enough. While these strategies help LPCs to implement effectively, there needs to be more formal evaluation research of the committees to know for sure. Conducting the same inquiry on all 74 peace committees in Nepal, or at most the areas most affected by the conflict, could be beneficial to understanding the exact nature of their effectiveness and could produce more substantial data. Yet, questions still rose from this research that merit further inquiry as to whether the MOPR is effectively running their programs and overseeing the committees themselves. Further research could be done to identify some of the gaps in communication between the MOPR and the peace committees. Researching the MOPR itself to see if their functions are being followed would be beneficial as well. This would be important to connect the national and local level and serve to legitimate the LPCs as a functioning body towards the peace processes.

For local peace committees members to be more effective there needs to be a more systematic approach that connects local level and national level processes for sustainable peace in Nepal. To be more effective, there needs to be more formal mediation and conflict resolution trainings to increase capacity for committee members. In order to increase the communication between the different levels of society, local peacebuilding efforts need to include the TRC and other programs within the MOPR. The peace process should balance the national level issues of

constitution-making, state restructuring, and power-sharing with the local level issues that ground the peace processes and provide access to resources and compensation to conflict-affected peoples. The LPCs are the essence of locally-based peacebuilding and where hope lies for the Nepali people. They have the potential to unite all levels of the country, but only if processes are strengthened and shown to be effective. The LPCs are where inclusion meets *Samar Basi* as all Nepalis go towards peace together. If peace in Nepal is not grounded within its people, it will not become sustainable or long-lasting.

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APPENDIX A: Glossary of Terms

Conflict Management

...refers to the long-term management of conflicts and the people involved in them to prevent escalation of conflict.

Conflict Resolution

...refers to the process of resolving a dispute or conflict permanently by addressing each side's interests and needs.

Conflict Transformation

...refers to changing the nature of a conflict, a de-escalation or reconciliation between the people or groups involved. Conflict Transformation is *to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships.*-John Paul Lederach, *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*.

Consensus

...is achieved when everyone agrees with a decision, not just a majority. In consensus based processes, people must work together to develop an agreement that is good enough that everyone in the process can agree to it.

Dialogue

...refers to a process of sharing beliefs, feelings, interests and/or needs with another group in a non-adversarial, open way, usually with the help of a third party facilitator.

Facilitation

...refers to a process in which a third party assists in conducting consensus-building meetings. The facilitator leads the process and supports the parties in setting ground rules and an agenda, enforces both, and supports the participants to keep on track and working towards mutual goals.

Mediation

...is a voluntary process in which a third party assists the parties in conflict to achieve a mutually agreeable solution. The mediator leads the process in supporting the parties in communication and restoring their relationships.

Needs

...refer to the basic human needs that according to psychologist Abraham Maslow drive all people in order to attain certain biological and psychological requirements.

Negotiation

...is a basic way of getting what you want from someone else using verbal communication. Roger Fisher and William Ury developed a model in 1981 that has become very popular. It consists of four basic principles: separate people from the problem, focus on interests not

positions, invent options for mutual gain, and insist on using objective or mutually acceptable criteria.

Peacebuilding/Sustainable Peace

...refers to the long-term project of building peace and stable communities. The process needs to restore and strengthen relationships and transform unjust structures and systems. This requires the reconciliation of differences, apology and forgiveness of past harms, and the establishment of a cooperative relation between groups.

Reconciliation

...refers to the normalization of relationships between groups or people. According to John Paul Lederach it involves four simultaneous processes: the search for truth, justice, peace, and mercy.

Reconstruction

... includes physical, political and social reconstruction; physical relates to infrastructure of civilian life including housing, hospitals, schools, offices, transport and communication; political relates to re-establishing civilian authority where it has been destroyed with one properly representative of the population including rule of law, restorative justice, and police force; social relates to the rebuilding of relationships and trust within the community as well as healing.

APPENDIX B: 12-point understanding reached between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal Communist Party (Maoists)

The struggle between absolute monarchy and democracy running for a long time in Nepal has now been reached in a very grave and new turn. It has become the need of today to establish peace by resolving the 10-year old armed conflict through a forward - looking political outlet. Therefore, it has become an inevitable need to implement the concept of full democracy through a forward - looking restructuring of the state to resolve the problems related to class, cast, gender, region and so on of all sectors including the political, economic, social and cultural, by bringing the autocratic monarchy to an end and establishing full democracy. We hereby disclose that in the existence of aforesaid context and reference in the country, the following understanding has been reached between the Seven Political Parties within the parliament and the CPN (Maoists) through holding talks in different manners.

The points reached in understanding

1. The democracy, peace, prosperity, social advancement and an independent, sovereign Nepal is the principal wish of all Nepali people in the country today. We are fully agreed that the autocratic monarchy is the main hurdle for this. We have a clear opinion that the peace, progress and prosperity in the country is not possible until and full democracy is established by bringing the absolute monarchy to an end. Therefore, an understanding has been reached to establish full democracy by bringing the autocratic monarchy to an end through creating a storm of nationwide democratic movement of all the forces against autocratic monarchy by focusing their assault against the autocratic monarchy from their respective positions.
2. The agitating Seven Political Parties are fully committed to the fact that the existing conflict in the country can be resolved and the sovereignty and the state powers can completely be established in people only by establishing full democracy by restoring the parliament through the force of agitation and forming an power full - party Government by its decision, negotiating with the Maoists, and on the basis of agreement, holding the election of constituent assembly. The CPN (Maoists) has the view and commitment that the aforesaid goal can be achieved by holding a national political conference of the agitating democratic forces, and through its decision, forming an Interim Government and holding the election of constituent assembly. On the issue of this procedural agenda, an understanding has been made to continue dialogue and seek for a common agreement between the agitating Seven Political Parties and the CPN (Maoists). It has been agreed that the force of people's movement is the only alternative to achieve this goal.
3. The country, today, demands the establishment of a permanent peace along with a positive resolution of the armed conflict. We are, therefore, firmly committed to establish a permanent peace by bringing the existing armed conflict in the country to an end through a forward-looking political outlet of the establishment of the full democracy by ending the autocratic monarchy and holding an election of the constituent assembly that would come on the basis of aforesaid procedure. The CPN (Maoists) expresses its commitment to move forward in the new peaceful political stream through this process. In this very context, an understanding has been made to keep the Maoists armed force and the Royal Army under the United Nations or a reliable international supervision during the process of the election of constituent assembly after the end of the autocratic monarchy, to accomplish the election in a free and fair manner and to accept the result of the election. We also expect for the involvement of a reliable international community even in the process of negotiation.
4. Making public its commitment, institutional in a clear manner, towards the democratic norms and values like the competitive multiparty system of governance, civil liberties, fundamental rights, human rights, principle of rule of law etc., the CPN (Maoists) has expressed its commitment to move forward its activities accordingly.
5. The CPN (Maoists) has expressed its commitment to create an environment to allow the people and the leaders and workers of the political parties, who are displaced during the course of armed conflict, to return and stay with dignity in their respective places, to return their homes, land and property that was seized in an unjust manner and to allow them to carry out the political activities without any hindrance.

6. Making a self-assessment and a self-criticism of the past mistakes and weaknesses, the CPN (Maoists) has expressed its commitment for not allowing the mistakes and weaknesses to be committed in future.

7. Making a self-assessment towards the mistakes and weaknesses committed while staying in the Government and parliament in the past, the seven political parties have expressed their commitment for not repeating such mistakes and weaknesses now onwards.

8. The commitment has been made to fully respect the norms and values of the human rights and to move forward on the basis of them, and to respect the press freedom in the context of moving the peace process ahead.

9. As the announcement of the election of municipality is pushed forward for an ill-motive of deluding the people and the international community and of giving continuity to the autocratic and illegitimate rule of the King, and the rumour of the election of the parliament are a crafty ploy, announcing to boycott it actively in our own respective way, the general public are appealed to make such elections a failure.

10. The people and their representative political parties are the real guardians of nationality. Therefore, we are firmly committed towards the protection of the independence, sovereignty and the geographical integrity and the national unity of the country. It is our common obligation to maintain friendly relations based on the principle of peaceful co-existence with all countries of the world and a good-neighborhood relationship with neighboring countries, especially with India and China. But we request all the patriotic peoples to remain cautious against the false attempt of the King and the monarchists to create confusion in the patriotic people by projecting the illusory the fake ('Mandale') nationalism to prolong the autocratic and illegitimate rule of the King and to raise question mark over the patriotism of the political parties, and we appeal to the international powers and the communities to support the democratic movement against the autocratic monarchy in Nepal in every possible way.

11. We heartily invite the civil society, professional organizations, various wings of parties, people of all communities and regions, the press community, intellectuals all the Nepali people to make the Movement succeed by actively participating in the peaceful People's Movement launched on the basis of these understandings reached by keeping the democracy, peace, prosperity, forward-looking social transformation and the independence, sovereignty, and dignity of the country in centre.

12. Regarding the inappropriate conducts that took place among the parties in the past, a common commitment has been expressed to investigate the incidents raised objection and asked for the investigation by any party and take action over the guilty one if found and make informed publicly. An understanding has been made to resolve the problems if emerged among the parties now onwards through the dialogue by discussing in the concerned level or in the leadership level.

22 November 2005

APPENDIX C: History of Peace Negotiation Talks (prior to CPA)

27 Oct 2000	Informal contact between then Deputy Prime Minister Ramchandra Paudel and Maoist Leader Rabindra Shrestha for peace process. The process was soon disrupted because of the controversial release of two Maoist Leaders from detention.
25 Jul 2001	Cease-fire announced by the government led by Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba. Maoists also announced cease-fire on the same day, after the government's announcement.
30 Aug 2001	First round of peace talk between the government and the Maoists held in Godawari, Lalitpur.
14 Sep 2001	Second round of peace talk held in Thakurdwara, Bardia district.
13 Nov 2001	Third round of peace talks held in Godawari, Lalitpur again.
21 Nov 2001	Maoists unilaterally broke down the cease-fire.
3 Dec 2002	Maoists announced formation of 'central dialogue team'.
29 Jan 2003	Announcement of cease-fire by both the government and the Maoists.
13 Mar 2003	22-points Code of Conduct was signed by the government and Maoists. Formation of a Monitoring Team led by representative of Nepal Human Rights Commission consisting 13 Members.
27 Apr 2003	First-round of peace talks between the government and the Maoists held in Shankar Hotel, Kathmandu.
9 May 2003	Second-round of the peace talk held in the Shankar Hotel, Kathmandu.
30 May 2003	Lokendra Bahadur Chand resigned from the post of prime Minister.
4 June 2003	Mr. Surya Bahadur Thapa was appointed Prime Minister.
17 Aug 2003	Third-round of peace talks held in Hapure of Purandhara VDC, Dang District.
27 Aug 2003	Maoists broken down the ceasefire unilaterally. The statement issued by Prachanda, Chairman of the Maoists, stated that the significance of the ceasefire, peace talks and code of conduct has been ended.
12 Aug 2004	Formation of High Level Peace Committee and the Peace Secretariat by the Government.
23 Sep 2004	Deuba government formally called on the Maoists to come for dialogue.
24 Sep 2004	Maoists reactions to the government's official call for peace dialogue. Maoists' Chairman Prachanda, issuing a press statement, asked six questions regarding the status and legitimacy of Deuba government for holding peace talks.
25 Nov 2004	The government set January 13, 2005 as the deadline for the Maoists to come to the negotiating table. The government also decided that it will declare parliamentary elections otherwise.
27 Nov 2004	Maoists Chairman Prachanda, in a press statement, told that the declaration of timeline by the government is a conspiracy and threatening. He marked that peace talks could not proceed in the status quo.
16 Mar 2005	High Level Peace Committee was dissolved and the Peace Secretariat remains working with new TOR.
22 Nov 2005	The SPA and Maoist signed a 12-Point Understandings for Peoples movement and restoration of democracy in New Delhi, India.
6 Apr 2006	SPA declared a non-violent joint people's movement and the Maoist support the peaceful movement.
21 Apr 2006	Royal address returned back the executive power to the people and offered SPA to form the government. SPA rejected the royal offer and declared the movement continues.
24 Apr 2006	19-day peaceful and non-violent movement turned successful and restoration of democracy by restoring the sovereignty of Nepal inherent to the people and

	reinstatement of the HOR.
26 Apr 2006	Three months unilateral Ceasefire declared by the Maoist.
28 Apr 2006	Mr. Girija Prasad Koirala was appointed as Prime Minister from NC and as a leader of SPA.
30 Apr 2006	HOR passed the motion of Constituent Assembly unanimously
3 May 2006	Government reciprocated the Ceasefire Announcement and invites the Maoist in peace Talk. The government also withdrew the terrorist tag and red corner notice to the Maoist for confidence building.
10 May 2006	Maoists announced formation of 'Negotiation Talk Team'. Peace Negotiator of the Maoist Side: Mr. Krishna Bahadur Mahara Convenor Mr. Dinanath Sharma Member Mr. Dev Gurung Member
19 May 2006	The Government announced 'Negotiation Talk Team'. Consisting of: Mr. Krishna Prasad Sitaula Convenor Mr. Pradip Gyawali Member Mr. Ramesh Lekhak Member Formation of a ' Peace Negotiation Coordination and Advisory Committee '
26 May 2006	First round of negotiation talk held at Gokarna Forest Golf Resort, Kathmandu and reached an agreement on 25-Points Ceasefire Code of Conduct.
12 Jun 2006	Formation of Peace Committee comprising of the representatives of the 10 Political Parties representing in the HOR by the Government in lieu of the former ' Peace Negotiation Coordination and Advisory Committee '
15 Jun 2006	Second round of negotiation talk at Himalaya Hotel, Kupandol, Lalitpur, and formed a National Monitoring Committee on Ceasefire Code of Conduct (NMCC) and a Peace Talk Observer Team agreeing to request UN OHCHR to facilitate the NMCC on 25-Points Ceasefire Code of Conduct.
16 Jun 2006	First Summit held between Prime Minister G.P.Koirala and Maoist Supremo Prachanda and ended up with an 8-Point Understanding. After following the First Summit, Third round of negotiation talk of both Negotiation Talk Team agreed to form a 6 Member Interim Constitution Draft Committee for drafting the interim constitution.
26 Jun 2006	Fourth round of negotiation talk between the Negotiation Talk Team held at Peace Secretariat and agreed the Terms of Reference and Powers of the NMCC.
15 July 2006	Fifth and Sixth round of negotiation talk of both Negotiation Talk Team held on 15-30 July agreed to re-form a 16 Member Interim Constitution Draft Committee for drafting the interim constitution including Women, Dalit and Indigenous People's representation on the committee. Fifth round of negotiation talk team have decided the date of Summit II on 21 July 2006
17 July 2006	The Peace Committee approved the draft of Working Procedures of Local Peace Councils and sends it to the Government for approval
21 July 2006	Postponement of Summit II to 28 September, 2006.
29 July 2006	Time extension of Ceasefire for Three months by the CPM (Maoist) .
31 July 2006	SPA led Government approved the Working Procedures of Local Peace Councils forwarded by the Peace Committee for approval by the Government
9 Aug 2006	5-Point request Letter to UN by the leader of the Government and the CPN (Maoist) to provide its assistance for the peace process of Nepal.
25 Aug 2006	Interim Constitution Draft Committee submitted its draft constitution to Negotiation Talk Team.
14 Sep 2006	SPA and CPN (M) preparatory meeting held on Godawari for the preparation of

	Thursday Summit II and discussion for the content of draft interim constitution.
23 Sep 2006	A preparatory meeting of the top Leaders of the CPN (M), NC(D) and CPN(UML) for Thursday Summit II and agreed for the future of the monarchy will decided by a referendum during the election of CA.
25 Sep 2006	SPA Leaders Meeting for final discussion on the political agenda that will be discussed with Maoist on 28th September Summit II .
28 Sep 2006	Postponement of Summit II to 8 October, 2006.
8 Oct 2006	First round discussion of Summit II in Prime Minister's Residence. Representatives of 8 Party involved in the process and they discuss all issues but could not decide anything.
10 Oct 2006	Second round discussion of Summit II in Prime Minister's Residence agreed on some issues. The meeting agreed to re-form Election Commission up to 17 October, 2006 and will complete the Election of Constituent Assembly up to Mid-March of 2007. Meeting also decides that the Interim government will decide the date of CA election.
12 Oct 2006	Third and Fourth round discussion of Summit II in Prime Minister's Residence on 12-15 October. 8 Party involved in the process and they discuss all issues but could not conclude anything.
29 Oct 2006	Time extension of Ceasefire for Three months by the CPM (Maoist).
8 Nov 2006	SPA and Maoist historic agreement and timeline on various issues as follows: Arms Management, Monarchy, Interim Parliament, Interim Government, Interim Local bodies, CA Election, Structure of the State Timeline: Peace Accord November 16, 2006 Cantonment of PLA November 21, 2006 Cantonment of NA November 21, 2006 Interim Constitution November 21, 2006 Declaration of Interim Constitution, Interim Parliament, Dissolution of HOR and National Assembly November 26, 2006 Interim Government November 31, 2006
21 Nov 2006	Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala of GON and Chairman Prachanda of CPN (Maoist) have signed Comprehensive Peace Accord in the program on BICC organized by Peace Secretariat.
28 Nov 2006	Negotiation Talk Team of GON and CPN (Maoist) have signed an Agreement on monitoring the management of Arms and Armies.
8 Dec 2006	Negotiation Talk Team of GON, CPN (Maoist) and UN Representative have signed an Agreement on monitoring the management of Arms and Armies.

APPENDIX D: Nepal: Key people and parties

Parties and Institutions

Constituent Assembly (CA):

Formed following elections in 2008, the CA represented the interim legislature in Nepal tasked with writing the new constitution. 601 members took their seats, with the UCPN(M) the largest party, followed by the National Congress and the CPN-UML. Failure to pass the constitution on time led to four extensions to the assembly's tenure. On 27 May 2012 the CA was dissolved, after the final deadline passed with no extension agreed.

Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) UCPN(M), Unified CPN(M) or CPN(M):

The rebel group that fought the government in the 10-year armed conflict. Beginning their uprising in February 1996 – the same year that the pro-democracy movement forced the monarchy to begin restoring some aspects of democratic rule – the UCPN(M) continued their insurgency until 2006, when it joined the Seven Party Alliance for the restoration of democracy. In 2007 the CPN(M) joined the interim government, thus entering the political mainstream. After the general elections of 2008, the CPN(M) became the largest single party in the Constituent Assembly, and formed a coalition government the same year. However in 2009 party leader Prachanda resigned as Prime Minister, following a row with the President over the dismissal of the chief of the army. In 2011 the party returned to power, with the appointment of party vice-chairman Baburam Bhattarai as Prime Minister.

The Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML):

The third largest party in the Constituent Assembly after the 2008 elections, the CPN-UML was created in 1991 through the unification of the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist) and the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist). The party is regarded as moderate left-wing, and supplied the country's Prime Minister for almost two years between 2009 and 2011.

Nepali Congress Party (NC):

Involved in all stages of Nepal's path to democracy – they formed the nation's first government following the end of the autocratic Rana dynasty in 1951. They the nation's first general election in 1959, then saw their government dissolved and many of its leading figures imprisoned when the king re-took control the following year. The NC refused to participate in the panchayat (partyless local assembly) system that followed, and pushed for full democratisation instead. After mass rallies in 1990 supporting the return of democracy, the panchayat system was abolished and the NC won the following year's election,. In 1994 the party stepped down following defeat in a no confidence motion, but returned to lead the government on several more occasions until the king declared direct rule in 2005. Elections in 2008 saw the NC become the second largest party in the newly-formed Constituent Assembly.

Palace and Royal Nepal Army:

Despite allowing democratic elections in 1959, the newly elected government was soon dismissed and replaced with the partyless panchayat system, effectively returning all powers to King. The system continued until a growing popular pro-democracy movement, and a prolonged civil war with Maoist insurgents forced the reinstatement of a legitimate parliament, and the

eventual abolition of the monarchy in 2008. Until 2007, the palace maintained full control over the Nepalese army.

People’s Liberation Army (PLA):

The PLA was formed during the ‘People’s War’ as the armed wing of the (UCPN-M). Following the end of the conflict PLA members were housed in secure cantonments, whilst negotiations regarding reintegration took place between the major political parties. In November 2011 the last part of a deal to reintegrate ex-combatants was agreed. In February 2012 around 7,000 ex-fighters were released from their camps and returned back into society. In April soldiers moved into the camps as the army took over control. Around 6,000 ex-combatants were expected to be integrated into the army, and another 3,000 expected to choose voluntary retirement.

Seven Party Alliance (SPA):

Coalition of seven political parties which grouped together to bring about the end of autocratic rule in Nepal. These were: Nepali Congress, Nepali Congress (Democratic), Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal Goodwill Party, United Left Front, and Peoples Front. Combined the parties had received over 90% of the vote in the 1991 election. In 2006 the SPA joined with the UCPN(M) to spearhead the Loktantra Andolan (democracy movement), which resulted in popular pro-democracy uprisings across Nepal. The outcome was the abolition of the monarchy and the formation of a Nepali republic

Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM):

A splinter group of CPN(M), based in the Terai and fighting for independence for the Madhesh region since 2004. It is still active after breaking a truce with the government in 2007.

Young Communist League (YCL):

Youth wing of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M). The YCL was formed during the ‘People’s War’, and it has since provoked much controversy. Although its leaders state that its members are unarmed, with no military training, this claim has been widely challenged. Furthermore, whilst members are encouraged to participate in socially responsible activities, such as maintaining and improving the environment, they have also been associated with law enforcement activities, such as traffic management and night patrols. This may be seen as presenting a challenge to the authority of the state. However more recently the YCL has been urged to compromise on the party’s revolutionary ideals for the sake of peace and constitution. UCPN-M leader Prachanda was quoted as stating, on 1 April 2012: “Time has come to make sacrifice. We will have to sacrifice our stance for peace and constitution”.

People

Puspa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda):

Charismatic leader of the UCPN (M) since 1994, including the period of the ‘People’s War’. He served as the first Prime Minister in the newly democratic Nepal, following the 2008 elections in which his UCPN-M party won a surprise victory. He had previously spent over 20 years underground, as a militant communist leader opposed to Nepal’s monarchy. A conflict with President Yadav over the sacking of the army’s chief of staff, resulted in Prachanda’s resignation in 2009.

Baburam Bhattarai:

A pivotal figure in Nepali politics, Dr. Bhattarai became the 36th Prime Minister of Nepal in August 2011, and was still in place at the dissolution of the CA on 27 May 2012. He is a senior Standing Committee Member and vice chairperson of the UCPN-M, and is highly regarded for his academic rigour, and personal standards of integrity. In February 1996 Bhattarai presented the government with a list of 40 demands on behalf of the Maoists, threatening civil war if they were not met. Shortly after, the ‘People’s War’ began. Bhattarai then went underground, but slowly emerged as the public face of the Maoists during the conflict. He became one of their lead negotiators in the run-up to the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Relations with Maoist leader Prachanda have sometimes been rocky, featuring various disagreements and reconciliations during the two men’s time at the head of the UCPN-M.

Ram Baran Yadav:

Became the first president of Nepal in July 2008, nearly two months after the monarchy was abolished. As a leading figure in the Nepali Congress, he was at the forefront of the pro-democracy movement. An ethnic Madheshi from Nepal’s southern lowlands, Yadav is strongly opposed to any idea of an independent Madhesh state. The presidency is a largely ceremonial position, although after the collapse of the CA in 2012, the President came into conflict with the UCPN-M over the status of the Prime Minister.

Madhav Kumar Nepal:

MK Nepal is a long-standing member of the CPN-UML, serving as General Secretary of the party for 15 years. He was the Prime Minister between 2009 and 2011, taking up office after the resignation of UCPN-M leader Prachanda. Previously General Secretary of CPN(UML), and Deputy Prime Minister during the early 1990s. Resigned in June 2010.

Jhala Nath Khanal:

Chairman of the CPN-UML since 2009, and Prime Minister of Nepal from February to August 2011. In January 2011 he was famously slapped by a member of his own party, in protest at the lack of political progress in the country.

Excerpted from:

<http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/nepal/conflict-profile/key-people-and-parties/>

APPENDIX E: Survey Questionnaire (LPC)

Please read each question carefully and circle the answer that best fits your response.

Demographics:

1. What is your age?
 20-29
 30-39
 40-49
 50-59
 60+
2. What is your gender?
 Male
 Female
3. What is your ethnicity? _____

Affiliations:

4. Are you affiliated with a political party in Nepal?
 No
 Yes
 - a. Which one? _____
 - b. In what capacity? _____
5. Are you affiliated with any governmental organization in Nepal?
 No
 Yes
 - a. Which one? _____
 - b. In what capacity? _____
6. Are you affiliated with any non-governmental organization in Nepal?
 No
 Yes
 - a. Which one? _____
 - b. In what capacity? _____

Formation of LPC:

7. Describe how you came to be part of the LPC? (Were you asked to be a part of the LPC? If so, who asked you? If not, please explain how you became part of the committee.)

8. Do you have a specific role in the LPC?

- No
 Yes

a. If yes, what is it? _____
b. If no, why? Would you like one?

9. Have sub-committees been formed in your LPC?

- No
 Yes

a. What are the sub-committees?

10. Who is the Secretary of your LPC?

11. Who is the current Coordinator of your LPC?

12. Does your LPC have a Local Peace Secretariat?

- No
 Yes

a. Who are those members?

13. Have you read the Terms of Reference for the LPC?

- No
 Yes

For questions 14-19 please use the following scale from 1-5, 1 being *not at all satisfied* and 5 being *extremely satisfied*:

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

LPC and Chief District Officer:

14. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the relationship between the Chief District Officer and your LPC?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

15. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the communication between your LPC and the CDO?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

16. Please elaborate on the relationship with the CDO. Have there been any conflicts with the CDO in implementing any programs on behalf of the LPC? If so, why and how was it resolved?

LPC and Ministry Of Peace and Reconstruction:

17. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the relationship between the LPC and the Ministry Of Peace and Reconstruction?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

18. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the communication between your LPC and an MOPR officer/representative?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

19. Please elaborate on the relationship with the MOPR. Have there been any conflicts with the MOPR in monitoring their programs? If so, why and how was it resolved?

Duties and responsibilities of LPC:

20. In which of the following duties and responsibilities outlined in the Terms of Reference has your LPC participated: (Please check all that apply)

- Monitor the implementation of the Ministry's relief and reconstruction programs
- Support the Task force constituted by the Government of Nepal for the collection of the data on conflict affected individuals, families, and structures
- Facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of debilitating political or social conflict
- Work on reconciliation, healing and trust-building

- Monitor the political and social developments at the local level and to try best to diffuse the tension by using conflict resolution processes if there is a political deadlock or potentiality of violence
- Disseminate information to members and the public on issues that affect national or local peace processes

21. If any checked above, please elaborate as to what specific programs were implemented or ways in which these duties and responsibilities were accomplished.

22. If there are other mandates your LPC accomplished *not* listed above please list them here:

LPC and Village District Committee level Peace Committees:

23. Has your LPC created a VDC level Peace Committee?

- Yes (Move to question 24)
- No

a. If not, why? _____

24. On a scale from 1-5, 1 being *not at all satisfied* and 5 being *extremely satisfied*, how satisfied are you with the communication level between your LPC and the VDC level committee?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

25. On a scale from 1-5, how satisfied are you with the overall relationship between your LPC and the VDC level committee?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

LPC and Advocacy:

26. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being *not at all aware* and 5 being *extremely aware*, how aware would you say the community is with your role as an LPC member?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

27. On a scale of 1-5, how aware would say the community is with the ability of the LPC to solve local conflicts?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

28. What are some ways your LPC has advocated for the committee itself within the district?

LPC and Challenges:

- Internal:

29. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being *never* and 5 being *always*, how often would you say that your LPC has internal conflicts? (amongst members of the LPC)

1	2	3	4	5
Never	rarely	seldom	sometimes	always

30. On a scale of 1-5, how often would you say that your LPC can quickly reach a consensus on an issue?

1	2	3	4	5
Never	rarely	seldom	sometimes	always

31. Please circle each of the following internal challenges your LPC may face on a scale of 1-5, 1 being *not at all important* and 5 being *very important*.

	<i>Not at all</i>	<i>a little</i>	<i>somewhat</i>	<i>very</i>	<i>extremely</i>
a) Lack of timely management of budget release	1	2	3	4	5
b) Transparency issues	1	2	3	4	5
a) LPC not mandated to reconstruct infrastructure	1	2	3	4	5
b) Lack of transportation facility	1	2	3	4	5
c) Lack of communication with hill committee members	1	2	3	4	5
d) Lack of attendance with hill committee members	1	2	3	4	5
e) Lack of training of LPC members (i.e. mediation)	1	2	3	4	5
f) Insufficient coordination with NGO's and other org.	1	2	3	4	5
g) Lack of publicity/awareness with public	1	2	3	4	5
h) Lack of resources	1	2	3	4	5
i) Lack of coordination with DAO (no records)	1	2	3	4	5
j) Lack of funds for scholarship applicants	1	2	3	4	5
k) Lack of education (illiteracy)	1	2	3	4	5
l) Language barrier (Nepali vs. other dialects)	1	2	3	4	5
m) Ethnic discrimination/minority representation	1	2	3	4	5
n) Gender discrimination (patriarchal society)	1	2	3	4	5
o) Nepotism (favoritism of files being pushed through)	1	2	3	4	5

Of the challenges you ranked above as 3 or higher please answer the following questions with those in mind:

32. Has there been discussion in your LPC on how to overcome these challenges in any way?

- No
 Yes

a. If yes, what has come up? Please elaborate below:

33. On a scale of 1-5, one being *not at all confident* and 5 being *extremely confident*, how confident are you that these challenges will be resolved?

- 1 2 3 4 5
 Not at all a little somewhat very extremely

- External:

34. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being *never* and 5 being *always*, how often would you say that your LPC has external conflicts? (Either with local NGOs, government agencies, the CDO, etc.)

1 2 3 4 5
 Never rarely seldom sometimes always

35. On a scale of 1-5, how often would you say that your LPC can quickly reach a consensus on an issue?

1 2 3 4 5
 Never rarely seldom sometimes always

36. Please circle each of the following external challenges your LPC may face on a scale of 1-5, 1 being *not at all important* and 5 being *very important*.

	<i>Not at all</i>	<i>a little</i>	<i>somewhat</i>	<i>very</i>	<i>extremely</i>
a) Lack of relationship with MOPR	1	2	3	4	5
b) Lack of coordination with CDO	1	2	3	4	5
c) Lack of ability to coordinate with gov't	1	2	3	4	5
d) Political party interference with budget	1	2	3	4	5
e) Lack of transparency of budget	1	2	3	4	5
f) Lack of cooperation with organizations	1	2	3	4	5
g) Inability to access funds/benefits	1	2	3	4	5
h) Corruption/bribery	1	2	3	4	5
i) Lack of women involvement	1	2	3	4	5
j) Inadequate publicity/awareness with public	1	2	3	4	5
k) Lack of resources	1	2	3	4	5

Of the challenges you ranked above as 3 or higher please answer the following questions with those in mind:

37. Has there been discussion in your LPC on how to overcome these challenges in any way?

- No
- Yes

a. If yes, what has come up? Please elaborate below:

LPC and Ethnic Identity:

38. How would you describe the relationships between members of different ethnic groups in your LPC?

39. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being *not at all satisfied* and 5 being *extremely satisfied*, how satisfied are you with the relationship between the members of different ethnic groups?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

40. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the level of consensus reached by different ethnic groups on various issues?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

41. Would you describe your LPC as being *inclusive* towards all or majority of the various ethnic groups?

Yes

No

a. If not, why do you think some groups are more represented than others?

b. Are you part of the ethnic group that is under-represented?

LPC and Peace in Nepal:

42. On a scale from 1-5, 1 being *not at all satisfied* and 5 being *extremely satisfied*, how would you rate your satisfaction with the LPC's ability to use their mediation skills gained in the previous training to resolve conflicts?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

43. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate your satisfaction with the LPC's role in reducing conflict in the district?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

44. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate your satisfaction with the LPC's role in developing effective VDC level LPCs?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

45. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate your satisfaction with the LPC's role in bringing about sustaining peace in Nepal?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

LPC and New Constitution:

46. Do you think the government will call for elections of a new Constitutional Assembly in April?

No

a. If no, why not? _____

Yes

b. If yes, do you think that Assembly will ratify the constitution already drafted by the previous Assembly within the established time frame?

No

Yes

47. If the constitution is ratified do you agree the role of LPC will no longer be needed?

No

Yes

Survey Questionnaire (CLPC):

Please read each question carefully and circle the answer that best fits your response.

Demographics:

1. What is your age?
 20-29
 30-39
 40-49
 50-59
 60+
2. What is your gender?
 Male
 Female
3. What is your ethnicity? _____

Affiliations:

4. Are you affiliated with a political party in Nepal?
 No
 Yes
 - a. Which one? _____
 - b. In what capacity? _____
5. Are you affiliated with any governmental organization in Nepal?
 No
 Yes
 - a. Which one? _____
 - b. In what capacity? _____
6. Are you affiliated with any non-governmental organization in Nepal?
 No
 Yes
 - a. Which one? _____
 - b. In what capacity? _____

Formation of CLPC:

7. Describe how you came to be part of the CLPC? (Were you asked to be a part of the CLPC? If so, who asked you? If not, please explain how you became part of the committee.)

8. Do you have a specific role in the CLPC?
- No
 - Yes
 - a. If yes, what is it? _____
 - b. If no, why? Would you like one?

9. Have sub-committees been formed in your CLPC?
- No
 - Yes
 - a. What are the sub-committees?

10. Who is the Secretary of your CLPC?

11. Who is the current Coordinator of your CLPC?

12. Does your CLPC have a Local Peace Secretariat?
- No
 - Yes
 - a. Who are those members?

13. Have you read the Terms of Reference for the LPC?
- No
 - Yes

For questions 14-19 please use the following scale from 1-5, 1 being *not at all satisfied* and 5 being *extremely satisfied*:

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

CLPC and Chief District Officer:

14. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the relationship between the Chief District Officer and your CLPC?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

15. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the communication between the CDO and your CLPC?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

16. Please elaborate on the relationship with the CDO. Have there been any conflicts with the CDO in implementing any programs on behalf of the CLPC? If so, why and how was it resolved?

CLPC and Ministry Of Peace and Reconstruction:

17. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the relationship between the CLPC and the Ministry Of Peace and Reconstruction?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

18. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the communication between your CLPC and an MOPR officer/representative?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

19. Please elaborate on the relationship with the MOPR. Have there been any conflicts with the MOPR in monitoring their programs? If so, why and how was it resolved?

Duties and responsibilities of CLPC:

20. To your knowledge, does your CLPC have a written Terms of Reference or Mandate that is known by all members of your committee?

- No
- Yes

a.If yes, where can this document be found?

In the Terms of Reference of the District Level Peace Committees it states that the *Village Development Committee (VDC) Secretary or the Executive Officer of the Municipality will function as the Secretary of such Municipality or Village Development Committee level Peace Committee respectively*. Assume that your committee follows the same “Duties and responsibilities” as the District LPC for the following questions.

21. In which of the following duties and responsibilities outlined in the Terms of Reference has your CLPC participated: (Please check all that apply)

- Monitor the implementation of the Ministry’s relief and reconstruction programs
- Support the Task force constituted by the Government of Nepal for the collection of the data on conflict affected individuals, families, and structures
- Facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of debilitating political or social conflict
- Work on reconciliation, healing and trust-building
- Monitor the political and social developments at the local level and to try best to diffuse the tension by using conflict resolution processes if there is a political deadlock or potentiality of violence
- Disseminate information to members and the public on issues that affect national or local peace processes

22. If any checked above, please elaborate as to what specific programs were implemented or ways in which these duties and responsibilities were accomplished.

23. If there are other mandates your CLPC accomplished *not* listed above please list them here:

CLPC and District Level Committee Peace Committees (LPC):

24. On a scale from 1-5, 1 being *not at all satisfied* and 5 being *extremely satisfied*, how satisfied are you with the communication level between your CLPC and the District level committee?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

25. On a scale from 1-5, how satisfied are you with the overall relationship between your CLPC and the District level committee?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

CLPC and Advocacy:

26. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being *not at all aware* and 5 being *extremely aware*, how aware would you say the community is with your role as an LPC member?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

27. On a scale of 1-5, how aware would say the community is with the ability of the LPC to solve local conflicts?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

28. What are some ways your CLPC has advocated for the committee itself within the district?

CLPC and Challenges:

- Internal:

29. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being *never* and 5 being *always*, how often would you say that your CLPC has internal conflicts? (amongst members of the CLPC)

1	2	3	4	5
Never	rarely	seldom	sometimes	always

30. On a scale of 1-5, how often would you say that your CLPC can quickly reach a consensus on an issue?

1 2 3 4 5
 Never rarely seldom sometimes always

31. Please circle each of the following internal challenges your CLPC may face on a scale of 1-5, 1 being *not at all important* and 5 being *very important*.

	<i>Not at all</i>	<i>a little</i>	<i>somewhat</i>	<i>very</i>	<i>extremely</i>
a) Lack of timely management of budget release	1	2	3	4	5
b) Transparency issues	1	2	3	4	5
c) CLPC not mandated to reconstruct infrastructure	1	2	3	4	5
d) Lack of transportation facility	1	2	3	4	5
e) Lack of communication with hill committee members	1	2	3	4	5
f) Lack of attendance with hill committee members	1	2	3	4	5
g) Lack of training of CLPC members (i.e. mediation)	1	2	3	4	5
h) Insufficient coordination with NGO's and other org.	1	2	3	4	5
i) Lack of publicity/awareness with public	1	2	3	4	5
j) Lack of resources	1	2	3	4	5
k) Lack of coordination with DAO (no records)	1	2	3	4	5
l) Lack of funds for scholarship applicants	1	2	3	4	5
m) Lack of education (illiteracy)	1	2	3	4	5
n) Language barrier (Nepali vs. other dialects)	1	2	3	4	5
o) Ethnic discrimination/minority representation	1	2	3	4	5
p) Gender discrimination (patriarchal society)	1	2	3	4	5
q) Nepotism (favoritism of files being pushed through)	1	2	3	4	5

Of the challenges you ranked above as 3 or higher please answer the following questions with those in mind:

32. Has there been discussion in your CLPC on how to overcome these challenges in any way?

- No
 Yes

i. If yes, what has come up? Please elaborate below:

33. On a scale of 1-5, one being *not at all confident* and 5 being *extremely confident*, how confident are you that these challenges will be resolved?

1 2 3 4 5
 Not at all a little somewhat very extremely

- External:

34. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being *never* and 5 being *always*, how often would you say that your CLPC has external conflicts? (Either with local NGOs, government agencies, the CDO, etc.)

1 2 3 4 5
 Never rarely seldom sometimes always

35. On a scale of 1-5, how often would you say that your CLPC can quickly reach a consensus on an issue?

1 2 3 4 5
 Never rarely seldom sometimes always

36. Please circle each of the following external challenges your CLPC may face on a scale of 1-5, 1 being *not at all important* and 5 being *very important*.

	<i>Not at all</i>	<i>a little</i>	<i>somewhat</i>	<i>very</i>	<i>extremely</i>
a) Lack of relationship with MOPR	1	2	3	4	5
b) Lack of coordination with CDO	1	2	3	4	5
c) Lack of ability to coordinate with gov't	1	2	3	4	5
d) Political party interference with budget	1	2	3	4	5
e) Lack of transparency of budget	1	2	3	4	5
f) Lack of cooperation with organizations	1	2	3	4	5
g) Inability to access funds/benefits	1	2	3	4	5
h) Corruption/bribery	1	2	3	4	5
i) Lack of women involvement	1	2	3	4	5
j) Inadequate publicity/awareness with public	1	2	3	4	5
k) Lack of resources	1	2	3	4	5

Of the challenges you ranked above as 3 or higher please answer the following questions with those in mind:

37. Has there been discussion in your CLPC on how to overcome these challenges in any way?

- No
 Yes

c.If yes, what has come up? Please elaborate below:

CLPC and Ethnic Identity:

38. How would you describe the relationships between members of different ethnic groups in your CLPC?

39. On a scale of 1-5, 1 being *not at all satisfied* and 5 being *extremely satisfied*, how satisfied are you with the relationship between the members of different ethnic groups?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

40. On a scale of 1-5, how satisfied are you with the level of consensus reached by different ethnic groups on various issues?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

41. Would you describe your CLPC as being *inclusive* towards all or majority of the various ethnic groups?

Yes

No

c. If not, why do you think some groups are more represented than others?

d. Are you part of the ethnic group that is under-represented?

CLPC and Peace in Nepal:

42. On a scale from 1-5, 1 being *not at all satisfied* and 5 being *extremely satisfied*, how would you rate your satisfaction with the CLPC's ability to use their mediation skills gained in any previous training to resolve conflicts?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

43. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate your satisfaction with the CLPC's role in reducing conflict in the district?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

44. On a scale from 1-5, how would you rate your satisfaction with the CLPC's role in bringing about sustaining peace in Nepal?

1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	a little	somewhat	very	extremely

CLPC and New Constitution:

45. Do you think the government will call for elections of a new Constitutional Assembly in April?

No

d. If no, why not? _____

Yes

e. If yes, do you think that Assembly will ratify the constitution already drafted by the previous Assembly within the established time frame?

No

Yes

46. If the constitution is ratified do you agree the role of CLPC will no longer be needed?

No

Yes