

10-1-2001

Creating Spaces to Build Alternatives: The Growing Movement Against Water Privatization in Ghana

Sasha Wright

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/african_diaspora_isp

Recommended Citation

Wright, Sasha, "Creating Spaces to Build Alternatives: The Growing Movement Against Water Privatization in Ghana" (2001). *African Diaspora ISPs*. Paper 73.
http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/african_diaspora_isp/73

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the African Diaspora Collection at DigitalCollections@SIT. It has been accepted for inclusion in African Diaspora ISPs by an authorized administrator of DigitalCollections@SIT. For more information, please contact digitalcollections@sit.edu.

**Creating Spaces to Build Alternatives:
The Growing Movement Against Water Privatization in Ghana**

By
Sasha Wright
School for International Training
December, 2001

Acknowledgements:

Thanks to all my family for your support in all my journeys and projects around the world.

Gracias a mis compañeros bolivianos particularmente Marcela, Oscar, Lupe, Omar Carmen y mi abuelita por instigar mis intereses en el asunto de los movimientos sobre agua. Su coraje en frente de toda la injusticia que encontramos cada día me da la inspiración de conseguir.

Thanks to Sarah and Alison for your support, friendship, and inspiration. I'm in constant admiration of all you do.

Thank you to Naana, Uncle Ebo and Uncle Eric for your personal and academic support this semester.

Thanks to Sallome and Rashayna for your friendship, encouragement and love during our time here in Ghana together.

Thanks to all the activists who gave me your time and energy to help make this project possible. Special thanks to Barzini Tanoh for the books, introductions and hospitality.

Table of Contents

Abstract

Introduction: The global debate over the privatization of basic resources.

Methodology

A brief political history of Ghana

- Colonialism and Independence
- The First Republic
- Liberalization and Class Conflict
- The Rawlings Period

Water, Commodity or Social good?

- The Context of the Debate
- The Contract and its Implications

The Emerging Movement Against the Privatization of Water

The Coalition

Actors Within the Campaign

- Workers
- Students
- NGOs
- Faith Based Organisations
- Community Organisations

Opportunities and Challenges

Conclusion

Abstract

This paper examines the movement against water privatization. First I trace the development of social struggle in Ghana. I then outline the issues in the debate over water privatization. Finally I describe development in the movement against water privatization, and their significance.

Introduction: The global debate over the privatization of basic resources.

The protests of Seattle Washington 1999 highlighted the growing dissatisfaction with neo-liberal economic policies that have failed to provide sustainable development and have caused a corresponding drop in the quality of life in workers and disenfranchised groups around the world. Global capitalist interests (multinationals and the states that support them) constantly expand into new terrain, most recently into the social services, including water. The infringement of the private sector with their profit-based motives into the social services has sparked concern and protests in both developing and industrialized countries. Water in particular is becoming a charged political issue.

In Cochabamba, Bolivia the attempted privatization of the regions water supply sparked a struggle in which workers, farmers, professionals, environmentalists and students united, fighting intense street battles and blockades, successfully forcing the Bolivian government to rescind its contract with the multinational Bechtel and return water to the public sector.¹

Hence the proposed privatization of the water sector in Ghana has led to speculation on the potential for the mobilization of the diverse contingencies that will be affected by the deal.²

Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African country to win independence in 1957, generating excitement among pan-africanists, nationalists and socialists that the newly independent government led by Kwame Nkrumah would successfully wrest the economic and political life from neo-colonial interests. Nonetheless in the decades since independence Ghana, like the majority of formerly colonized countries has failed to break from its subordinate relationship with international capital.³ Since the early 1980s Ghana has undergone Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), which includes the liberalization of the economy in the interests of foreign investors and the slashing of government expenditure. The privatization of water is a conditionality of SAPs in many developing countries, particularly “Highly Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPC) such as Ghana.⁴

The prominence of the debate over water privatization raises several questions. What affect does the attempt to privatize a basic life-sustaining resource such as water have on the legitimacy of government to represent its citizen’s interests? What types of coalitions form around

¹ Raquel Guiterez, Alvaro Garcia and Luis Tapia. “La Forma Multitud de la Politica de las Necesidades Vitales.” In *El Retorno de la Bolivia Plebeya*. (La Paz: Muela de Diablo, 2000)

² Gumisai Mutume. “Resistance to World Bank privatization (water, etc) in Ghana.” (<http://www.fpcn-global.org/pipermail/africa-news/2000-November/000013.html>, retrieved 9/12/01). P.1.

³ Kwame A. Ninsin. “Introduction: Thirty-Seven Years of development Experience.” In *The State Development and Politics in Ghana*. eds Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CONDESRIA, 1989) p. 1

⁴ Sarah Grusky. “IMF Forces African Countries to Privatize Water”. (<http://afjn.cua.edu/Water%20Privatization>, retrieved 9/12/01), p. 1.

the issue of water privatization and what political potential do they embody? Additionally, what role, if any, can a movement addressing the issue of water privatization have in creating awareness, links and mobilization around related societal issues? The movement against water privatization in Ghana is in its initial phases, however trends are emerging which suggest possible answers to these questions.

Methodology

Secondary Sources:

I utilized several books that covered important aspects in the history of social movements, structural adjustment and water quality and availability in Ghana. I used sources available to me at the University of Legon bookstore, later supplementing these with materials recommended and loaned from an organizer in the water campaign. Though I by no means covered the full available published literature related to the topic of social movements in Ghana I was able to develop an understanding of certain key periods.

Since the privatization of water and the movement against doing so is a recent and current phenomenon I used newspaper articles and editorials that I collected over the semester pertaining to the subject. This was helpful in following developments in the privatization process and the debate, though again as I only arrived in the country in September I was not able to review the complete amount of material available through articles. I was however able to review some back articles in publications that give special attention to the issue of water privatization such as the Public Agenda.

I was also given documents pertaining to the goals and stances of the Coalition and related organizations, which gave some context to understanding the dynamics of the forming movement.

I additionally watched a video of the conference on water privatization held in May of 2001 where the Ghana Coalition Against the Privatization of Water was formed. This was important in giving me a sense of important events that occurred which I was unable to observe firsthand.

Primary Sources:

I relied primarily on interviews, conversations and observations to understand the movement forming around the issue of water privatization. I actually began by visiting several government agencies involved in the restructuring process including the Restructuring Secretariat of the Water Resource Center, the Ghana Water Company and the Accra Metropolitan Authority. This had no bearing on the movement against privatization itself. From one of these visits I was able to obtain the contact information of ISODEC, a Non-Governmental Organisation that is playing a prominent role in the coalition. From 2 members of ISODEC I was given the contact information of another organizer in the campaign against water privatization, with whom I was able to attend a small neighbourhood meeting of concerned residents of Madina on water privatization, where I was introduced to other activists involved in the campaign. This included a student activist, who informed me of a student meeting at Legon on the issue of water

privatization, which I attended. There I had the opportunity of meeting other students involved in the issue, two of whom I later interviewed. I also watched a discussion on campus in which covered the issue of water privatization where I was able to gain a first hand sense of student sentiments on the subject. I additionally interviewed members of the Christian Coalition and the TUC, to get a sense of the positions of certain important potential players in the struggle over water privatization, namely religious groups, labour, and NGOs.

Methodological Issues:

I was severely limited by time. Though I discovered that observation was the best way to understand the positions, potentials and problems of the developing movement I was only able to observe one neighbourhood meeting, which was a new association hence small, and one student meeting which occurred during exams, therefore also small. Though it was helpful to interview a member of the TUC leadership, it would have been more pertinent to attend workers meetings on water privatization (many of which occurred in October) to understand mobilization among the rank and file, however that was not possible this month. Likewise, though I was able to talk to a couple religious leaders I would have gained a more well –rounded view of the role of religious associations if I could have also talked with members and leaders of the smaller churches and mosques. During the period in which I conducted the investigation there was a lull in activity so I was also not able to attend any water rallies that were recently organized in certain communities. To fill in the gaps I relied on the accounts of activists involved in the organisation of these events.

Due to time limitations I decided to focus the study on the Accra area. Although water privatization affects all major urban areas there have only been small developments in other cities to this point. Similarly, though the rural areas are affected by the privatization deal, rural water systems themselves are not up for privatization, so far there has been little political activity in these areas.

I have made no attempt to be objective or politically detached from the issue at stake. My interest in water privatization was formed my association with the Coalition in Defense of Water and Life (La Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y la Vida) in Bolivia, the coalition that formed to defeat water privatization in Cochabamba.

In any case I am not analyzing whether or not water should be privatized but the movement forming in opposition. I explained my position and activities in Bolivia to those I spoke with. I believe this helped clarify that I was gathering this information in hopes of producing something slightly helpful to those concerned with the issue of water, not in portraying the coalition in any way that would be harmful to it.

My questions varied greatly on the context of the interview and altered over the course of the study. However the basic points I sought to discuss were:

- When and how did you/your organisation first get involved in the coalition against water privatization?
- Why did you feel it was important to get involved?
- What is the value of the presence of your sector/organisation in the coalition?
- Are you a member of any other organizations? Or have you been involved in any other campaigns/political activities?
- What discussions or activities concerning water privatization have you/your organisation been involved in?
- What potential do you see for mobilization around this issue among your sector/organisation?
- What other organizations/individuals have you collaborated with in organizing discussions or actions around the issue of water privatization?
- Have you made any attempt to contact people or organizations concerned with the issue or water privatization in other countries?

Additional questions for campaign organisers:

- Which social constituencies do you feel are most critical to incorporate into the campaign?
- What strategies do you use to promote awareness on the issue of water privatization and mobilize different sectors/individuals/organizations?
- How is the coalition structured?
- What fund-raising methods do you use?
- How do you utilize the media?
- How is the political climate conducive or not to the campaign water privatization at this point?
- Has the coalition made any attempts been made to connect water privatization to other issues?

A BRIEF POLITICAL HISTORY OF GHANA

To understand the context of a movement against the privatization of water it is necessary to examine the political and economic evolution of Ghana, giving attention to the following:

1. The tension between the interests of international capital, the interests of Ghanaian citizens, and (after independence) the role of the state in this equation.
2. The battle for political and economic control between the “big men” and “small boys”⁵ and
3. The composition, tactics and alliances of the left wing in Ghana.

Colonialism and Independence Movements

Since the advent of the slave trade and later British colonial rule the economic and political processes of the area that is now Ghana have been defined by the interests of international capitalism.⁶

British colonial powers arranged the Gold Coast economy to serve as a source of raw materials (principally gold and cocoa) to feed growing industries in Europe. Investment into infrastructure and social services was kept to the bare minimum required for the functioning of the economy and the colonial government. Within the colonial framework some traditional authorities, successful business men and cocoa farmers and those with access to higher education arose to form an elite class.⁷

Likewise, the demand for independence surfaced among several distinct social classes. On the one hand were the educated elite and business men who wanted independence so they could rise to the economic and political status they believed was due to them. Members of this intelligentsia formed the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947 to agitate for “the attainment of full self – government in the shortest possible time”.⁸ The UGCC subsequently invited Kwame Nkrumah, a young lawyer educated in the United States and England and involved in pan-African circles, to act as the general secretary.

However the strength of the independence movement lay in the increasing numbers of primary school graduates. Basic education was essential to their political formation for several reasons including the acquisition of the common language English creating a stronger sense of

⁵ *The terms “big men” and “small boys” refer to the social status of the wealthy and working classes, respectively. Paul Nugent. *Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana*. (Accra: Asempa Publishers, 1995).

⁶ Walter Rodney. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972)

⁷ Dennis Austin. *Politics in Ghana: 1946-1960*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1964)

⁸ *Ibid* 7, p.7

national unity. Graduates also formed scholars unions, youth movements and literary and debating societies. Here discussions arose concerning local and national politics, and from these circles a “new a political class” and an “anti-chief, anti-colonial movement”. In this manner a nationalistic independence movement grew far more rapidly than the colonial administration or the educated elite had predicted.⁹

Several economic crises in both rural and urban areas also contributed to the fall of colonial rule. During the 1940s a blight of the cocoa trees caused a crisis in which farmers were forced to cut large portions of their crop, a policy that many desperate farmers viewed suspiciously, leading to their ready acceptance of UGCC demands for independence. At the same time in the cities, a shortage of imports caused prices to rise on a range of goods while the real wages dropped. Many held the United Africa Company and other European trading firms as responsible for these developments, and began to boycott non-essential imports, which after several months developed into riots against foreign owned businesses in 1948.¹⁰

Colonial authorities held UGCC leaders responsible for the riots although at this juncture events were entirely outside their control. Nonetheless the detainment of UGCC leaders increased their popularity farther than their campaigning had succeeded in doing to that point. The riots did exacerbate differences between the UGCC and Nkrumah resulting in the removal of Nkrumah as General Secretary. The UGCC allied with certain chiefs worked for constitutional reform. Nkrumah continued to develop a following among the youth and founded the Convention Peoples Part (CPP) in 1950. After an ensuing conflict during the writing of the constitution and Nkrumah’s imprisonment the CPP won the first national elections of 1951, defeating the opposition again in 1954 and 1956. Full independence was achieved in 1957.¹¹

The First Republic

The CPP period, defined by its nationalist politics and experimentation in state capitalism, set the framework against which future development policy and political movements emerged.¹²

Nkrumah’s development strategy aimed at increasing Ghana’s economic strength and sovereignty through industrialization and the stronger integration of the economy. Beginning in 1960 Nkrumah brought large portions of the commercial and manufacturing systems under state control, in the same period entering into a relationship with the IMF and World Bank to finance the Volta River Project and other projects. The CPP however, refused to cooperate with the

⁹ Ibid 7

¹⁰ Ibid 7

¹¹ Ibid 7

¹² Ibid 3, p.4

conditionalities attached to the loans received as doing as conflicted with their development policy.¹³

After independence government officials used the state as the principal tool of capitalist accumulation. Indeed the subordination of the economy as a whole to foreign capitalists made the development of the capitalist class by any other fashion impossible.¹⁴ This occurred despite the fact that the ruling coalition upon election was drawn from the “verandah boys” who displaced the business elite and intelligencia, and that they had gained popularity on the basis that they held the same interests as common people.¹⁵

After independence Nkrumah altered the constitution to allow for one party rule, hence equating the party with the state.¹⁶ The state was the largest employer and the TUC and other parties were thus incorporated into the party. This allowed for a great deal of control by the state over workers, allowing them to tax and reduce wages. Wages in real terms fell after 1964, however there was little resulting strike activity with real political implications apart from the railway and harbor workers in 1961.¹⁷

Liberalization and Class Conflict

The “big men” had their payback when the NLC overthrow Nkrumah and the CPP in a CIA supported coup in 1966. the NLC consisted of an alliance of chiefs, businessmen, successful cocoa farmers, senior civil servants, judges and foreign business interests, and was carried out by senior army officers.¹⁸ The NLC proclaimed they would reverse Nkrumah’s policies of state development and implement the “Rehabilitation Program” of the IMF. However despite the introduction of certain measures such as the devaluation of the cedi and the liberalization of trade, the reduction of government spending, spending in civil and public services and the privatization of some public enterprises, the NLC failed to significantly alter the role of the state as the principle economic actor and means of accumulation. This discrepancy between policy and practise was due in part to internal divisions of interests, but also to the strong backlash from students and workers to these policies. The NLC was forced to open elections in which the Progress Party (PP) under Buis came to power in 1969.¹⁹

¹³ Kwesi Jonah. “Changing Relation Between the IMF and the Government of Ghana 1960-1987.” In *The State Development and Politics in Ghana*. eds. Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CODESRIA, 1989), p. 97-98.

¹⁴ Kwame A. Ninsin. “State, Capital and Labour Relations, 1961-1987.” In *The State Development and Politics in Ghana*. eds Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CODESRIA, 1989), p. 16.

¹⁵ *Ibid* 5, p.6

¹⁶ *Ibid* 7

¹⁷ *Ibid* 14, p. 23-24.

¹⁸ *Ibid* 5, p.8

¹⁹ *Ibid* 13, p. 102

In order to prevent the same problem with internal political differences interfering the implementation of the IMF stabilization program, the IMF and World Bank reorganized government decision-making bodies. However the PP faced such strong opposition they were unable to implement these policies before their overthrow, even though they attempted to outlaw strikes and later the TUC itself.²⁰

The PP were overthrown in a coup by the National Redemption Council, later known as the Supreme Military Council led by General I.K. Acheampong. The SMC policies such as the devaluation of the cedi. However their indigenization policies led to no real solutions for workers.²¹ The economy worsened, in part from the oil crisis of 1974, workers wages dropped in the face of increasing inflation. Strikes escalated in this period, in number and duration, supported by students nationwide. The professional classes also allied themselves through the Peoples Movement for Freedom and Justice demonstrating the de-legitimacy of government through all sections of society. Labour had been fighting for over a decade and was strong both organisationally and politically. The ruling classes were further weakened by the Armed Forces Liberation Council (AFRC) coup in 1979. The return to civilian rule under Limann of the Progress Party did little to abate the crisis.²²

The extent of de-legitimacy of government, and the heightened class conflict created a situation with the greatest potential for social change in Ghanaian history, yet no social movement with the capacity to harness and channel this energy existed at this juncture.²³

The Rawlings Period

On December 31, 1981 units of the armed forces, led by Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings overthrew the PP, establishing themselves as the People's National Defense Council (PNDC). Rawlings announced the change of government over the radio, explaining that the transition was not to be viewed as a coup but a revolution. In the first unstable days he immediately sought to solidify support among the lower ranks of the armed forces, workers, radicals and the peasantry.²⁴

The PNDC initiated Workers Defense Committees (WDCs) and the Peoples Defense Committees (PDCs) to operate on the workplace and community levels respectively, with the charge of developing the revolution from below. Workers used WDCs as a vehicle to defend their interests in the workplace and attack management for their corrupt and anti-labor practices. WDCs operated alongside the existing trade union structures, sometimes in cooperation or conflict, depending on individual cases. These developments led to the formation of the Association of

²⁰ Zaya Yeebo. Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power; Rawlings: Saviour or Demagogue. (London: New Beacon Books, 1991) p. 14.

²¹ Ibid. 14, p.28

²² Ibid 20, p.22

²³ Ibid 20 p. 24

²⁴ Ibid 5 p. 40-42

Local Unions (ALU) by militant labour leaders who subsequently took over the TUC forcing the resignation of the labour leadership whom they accused of being corrupt, bureaucratic and undemocratic.²⁵ WDCs also successfully took over two factories, the Ghana Textile Printing Company Limited and the Juapong Textiles Limited, in response to the threatened retrenchment of thousands of workers.²⁶

These actions differ in nature and form from previous labour struggles. Through the WDCs works had a tool which facilitated the “independence, autonomy and militancy of labour”. Workers did not rely merely on strikes, but engaged in mass mobilization, direct confrontation, and collective actions of a political, anti-imperialist nature. Initially the PNDC was obliged to support to these struggles.²⁷

Also central to the PNDC program was the campaign against *kalabule*, the corrupt professional and business classes who had capitalized on their positions in previous regimes to accumulate wealth at the expense of the masses. National Investigation Committees (NICs) formed to investigate anyone with over 50,000 cedis in savings, and the Citizens Vetting Committees (CVCs) were charged with probing the actions of those whose lifestyles could not be readily explained. The CVCs had the power to try and sentence, with Rawlings as the only body of appeal. The attack on the *kalabule* served to weaken the strength and confidence of the upper classes, while cementing their antagonistic relationship with the Rawlings regime whom they viewed as usurpant “small boys”.²⁸

The end of 1982 marks the transition in the political stance and policies of the PNDC, which was to drastically alter its relationship to labour. Initial signs of their changing discourse on people’s power occurred when the PNDC renamed the P/WDCs Committees in Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) and incorporated them under their own authority. P/WDCs additionally lost their autonomy in the workplace with regards to management. Interim Management Committee (IMCs) which had sprung up in workplaces to give workers decision making capacity in their corporations were turned into Joint Consultative Committees which embodied no real power.²⁹ The PNDC’s treatment of the Pioneer Food Cannery struggle and the dissolution of the ICC-WDCs at a critical juncture in the dispute exemplifies their increasing reluctance to back the struggles of working people.³⁰ PNDC policy changes facilitated the demobilization of the left and labour and opened the door for the implementation of SAP.

²⁵ Ibid 5, p. 62

²⁶ Yao Graham. “From GTP to Assene: Aspect of Industrial Working Class Struggles in Ghana 1982-1986” in *The State Development and Politics in Ghana*. ed.s Emmauel and Kwame A. Ninsin (London: CODESRIA, 1989), p. 52

²⁷ Ibid 13, p.32.

²⁸ Ibid 5, p. 56-57

²⁹ Ibid 5, p. 34-35

³⁰ Ibid 26, p. 65-66

In 1983 and PNDC implemented a harsh structural adjustment policy while claiming that economic reform was their own idea and in line with the revolution. The PNDC used the food shortages, coup attempts and the influx of Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria to justify the need for new economic policies.³¹

SAP seeks to reduce the role of the state and liberalize economic regulations to make the economy attractive to foreign investors. SAP measures include the devaluation of the cedi, increasing government revenue through retrenchment of workers, phasing out subsidies on social services and introducing fees on these services, privatizing government run services, reducing trade barriers and raising interest rates.³²

Such measures obviously gain little popularity among the working and poor who deal with higher unemployment rates, and rising prices, particularly of imports. However the weakened working class was unable to successfully resist these measures. Workers feared to raise their voices in opposition because during retrenchments militant workers were the first to go. Additionally, the “old guard” regained power over the TUC in the previous elections. While the reinstated leaders had less ties and obligations to the PNDC. Freeing them to be critical of ERP measures, they returned to methods such as collective bargaining to defend traditional workers demands.³³ Additionally, the PNDC increasingly used force against mobilizing workers. The PNDC was forced to step back on the issue of the abolition of leave allowances, when the rank the file was up in arms and the TUC declared a national strike. However this incident demonstrates that workers were back to using the trade unions, and the trade unions used negotiation not confrontation in their relationship with government.³⁴

When Rawlings came into power he began a discourse on the meaning of democracy, advocating that democracy was more than elections but involved people influencing the decision making process. This idea resonated among Ghanaian working people who had seen little change in the material conditions of life, or the reflections of their interests in policy during the series of elected governments and military regimes since the 1966 coup. The claim to direct democracy was legitimized to the population in part through the proliferation of the Defense Committees and other civil society organizations in 1982, despite the fact that the decision making process was based in Accra and the actual PNDC consisted of 7 members, 4 of them military officials.³⁵

Over time Rawlings discourse altered from “you the people” to “we the PNDC” as the catalyst in the revolution.³⁶ The murders of three high court judges and a retired army officer, while they could not be directly linked to the PNDC raised questions on the nature of the regime.

³¹ Ibid 5, p.

³² Akilagpa Sawyerr. *The Political Dimension of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa*. (Accra: Ghana Universities Press. 1990) p. 21-22

³³ Ibid 5, p. 147-150

³⁴ Ibid 5, p. 151.

³⁵ Ibid 5, p. 47-48

³⁶ Ibid 5, p. 49

As time went on the Rawlings period was marked by political prisoners, disappearances, executions, censorship of the press and the restriction of civil liberties, leading to what became known as the “culture of silence”, the fear of oppositional forces to speak or act out against the PNDC government.³⁷ Then, in 1989 developments abroad and nationally inspired a push for a return to democratic rule. The collapse of the Soviet Union and of numerous dictatorships in Africa gave hope to PNDC restrictions on religious institutions and the press. A broad based coalition consisting of elements of the left and right formed the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) in August of 1990.³⁸ The PNDC, taking stock of its electoral potential agreed to open up for elections. The electoral period brought the revival of the two traditional political tendencies, of Nkrumah and Busia to life. However the PNDC was able to use its position both to prevent political activity by the other parties in the initial stages, and to use government resources in the campaign. The PNDC/NDC were also accused of rigging the elections, however their success also hinges on the oppositions failure to offer alternatives to the fundamental PNDC policies, namely SAPs.³⁹

Between the return to electoral politics and the defeat of the NDC in the 2000 elections the greatest challenge to the Rawlings regime were the *Ku me Preko* protests against value added taxes (VAT) in 1995, in which thousands filled the streets of Accra and Kumasi. The VAT protests marked an explosion of anger against the decline in living standards of for working people as a result of neo-liberal economic policies.⁴⁰ The Rawlings government was forced to tread more carefully in the implementation of other programs to hold power through the 1996 elections.

It is worth reiterating certain developments of the Rawlings period that have bearing on the political scene of Ghana today.

1. Left forces suffered serious setbacks due to the suppressive nature of the regime.
2. The believed necessity of removing any vestiges of the PNDC from power has resulted in the focus of political activity on electoral politics.
3. The labour movement was weakened in part from the mass retrenchments, and the labour leadership has focused on gaining rights within the existing framework (i.e. instead of protesting a labour cutback, negotiating for severance pay for affected workers).
4. Despite the compliance of earlier regimes with the IMF and World Bank, the Rawlings regime was most successful in reorganizing the economy through SAP.

³⁷ Ibid 20 p. 240

³⁸ Ibid 5 p. 186-197

³⁹ Ibid 5 p. 216

⁴⁰ Akoto Ampaw. “The State of the Nation: Rumbblings on the Labour Front.” In Ghana: The *Ku me Preko* Demonstrations. ed. by Napoleon Abdulai (London: ARIB, 1995) p. 21

The move to privatize water results from the neo-liberal economy and it is within this political and economic framework that a movement against water privatization must operate.

WATER: COMMODITY OR SOCIAL GOOD?

The Context of the Debate

The move to privatize water emerges as part of a growing trend in neo-liberal economics in which multinational find it most profitable to expand into already existing public markets, including the profitable social services.⁴¹

The IMF and World Bank facilitate this process by making the privatization of water a condition for the ability to access much needed loans. This is the case in many HIPC countries in African including Ghana.⁴²

The pending privatization of water in Ghana has caused the future of water management to develop into a heated national debate, and stakes are high. Currently, water distribution is uneven and inadequate, particularly in low-income and rural communities. Women and children are disproportionately affected by this situation as the collection of water falls on their shoulders. Poor drinking water accounts for 70 percent of diseases in Ghana, and the inadequate treatment of sewage causes a plethora of environmental problems.⁴³

The NPP government asserts that privatization would improve this situation because foreign companies would bring much needed capital for investment into the improvement and expansion of water services, and that transferring management into the private sector would greatly increase efficiency.⁴⁴ The government attempts to reassure skeptics that this is not an outright sale of the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWC) but a temporary lease (Private Sector Participation (PSP) or Public Private Partnership (PPP).)⁴⁵

Opponents of the privatization deal argue that PSP or PPP amount to the same thing as outright privatization, and will only exacerbate existing inequalities in water distribution.⁴⁶ The basis for these arguments will be discussed below.

The Contract and its Implications:

The Ghana Water Restructuring Project (GWRP) entails the division of the urban water sector into Business Units A and B, whose management will fall to 2 of 9 multinational corporations in the bidding.⁴⁷ As part of the restructuring process the rural water sector was placed under the control of the Community Water Supply Agency. Expansion and improvement of services in rural communities will depend on their ability to provide 10-15 percent of initial capital

⁴¹ Barzini Tanoh. "Some Observations on Water Privatization in Ghana (WPSP)." Unpublished.

⁴² Ibid 4, p.2

⁴³ S.B. Akuaffo. *Pollution Control in a Developing Economy: A Study of the Situation in Ghana*. (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1998) p. 2.

⁴⁴ Emmanuel Nkrumah, Water Engineer, Interview by author, 6 November 2001.

⁴⁵ Golda Armah. "Govt won't Privatise Water". Daily Graphic, 13 September 2001.

⁴⁶ "Why Water Privatisation in Ghana Must Be Stopped" Unpublished article, in possession of author, p. 2.

⁴⁷ See Appendix for details

cost and then “normal operating fees.”⁴⁸ The sewage system was also partitioned from the GWC, and transferred to the Metropolitan Assemblies.⁴⁹ This means the incoming companies are only responsible for service provision in the more developed sectors of the water company namely sewage and rural water will remain in government hands, who will which no longer have the benefit of subsidies from the urban sector. Instead all profits made in urban water provision may be used at the discretion of the incoming companies to finance other business operations.⁵⁰

No provisions within the contract require the incoming multinationals to raise funds to invest in the poor and inadequate infrastructure (pipelines, pumping capacity, water treatment, etc). instead, the government of Ghana will raise 500 million dollars from international financial institutions creating an Operating Investment Fund (OIF). The incoming corporations will finance all operations from the OIF and earnings from tariff increases.⁵¹ Tariffs increases for Ghanaians is inevitable due the implementation of tariff increases over a 5-year period to achieve “full cost recovery”. This does not however ensure the expansion of water services considering the contract gives multinationals control over investment decisions, granting them the ability to neglect expansion into areas that will not reap profits. The incoming companies profits are further ensured by an “automatic tariff adjustment formula”, which protects them in cases of inflation or changes in the exchanged rate.⁵²

Viewing the track record of these multinationals international provides a gauge of their likelihood to improved efficiency. In fact, the privatization of water has decreased efficiency in a number of developing and industrialized countries where such restructuring has taken place. This is largely due to the fact that only 5 multinational corporations dominate the private water sector, effectively limiting competition. These corporations also have a record of problems with corruption, lack of transparency and secrecy.⁵³ The implications of this are already apparent in Ghana from the undemocratic and secretive manner in which the privatization process is being carried out.⁵⁴

Hence, the conditions of the GWRP itself, and a review of privatization deals in other countries effectively disproves the governments claim that privatization will result in improved efficiency and financial capability. What is apparent is that the multinationals are guaranteed a profitable, risk free acquisition.⁵⁵ The government of Ghana does stand to benefit from the loans they will access upon the completion of the restructuring process as well as the ability to improve

⁴⁸ Ibid 2, p.1

⁴⁹ Ibid 46, p.8

⁵⁰ Ibid 46, p.6

⁵¹ Ibid 46, p.6

⁵² Ibid 41, p. 1 -2

⁵³ David Hall. “Water in Public Hands: Public Sector Water Management – A Necessary Option.” (Commissioned and published by PSI, 2001, www.psi.org, retrieved 4 November 2001) p.3.

⁵⁴ Ibid 46, p. 2

⁵⁵ Ibid 1, p. 3

budget balances, however these are no long term answers for Ghana's economic crisis. Meanwhile, Ghanaian citizens will pay dearly for any improvements in the existing infrastructure, with no pending expansion of services, and more importantly, the majority of the population will not be able to afford piped water. Moreover, once such a deal is reached citizens have little recourse to rescind the contract without facing costly lawsuits. Though the contracts are intended to last 10 and 30 years, the dismantling of the companying and the lay-off of public utility workers demonstrates the permanency of the arrangement.

The privatization of water for the benefit of multinationals and some government officials at the expense of the citizens of the country is a perfect example neo-liberal economic priorities and it exemplifies the higher accountability of government to international financial institutions than to their own citizens. Resistance to these policies by working and poor people who will suffer the consequences is both crucial and inevitable.

The Emerging Movement Against the Privatization of Water

The Coalition

The GNCAPW was formed upon the initiative of ISODEC, an NGO involved in the provision of water and sanitation services in low income communities since 1984. ISODEC organized a conference in May 2001, inviting the participation of other NGOs concerned with water issues, activists from other African countries, the United States and Europe as well as key players in the water privatization process including the Water Restructuring Secretariat, the Minister of Works and Housing and the World Bank representative of Ghana, all of whom presented their position on the issue. At the end of the conference organizations and individuals in opposition to the privatization of water issued a statement known as the “Accra Declaration”, outlining their fundamental position that water is a right not a commodity and its privatization would only serve to jeopardize the ability of the poor to access safe water. The statement calls upon government agencies, parliament, and international financing institutions to address the problematic nature of water privatization.⁵⁶ The “Accra Declaration” was released over the internet and calls on organizations and individuals to write letters to the above pro-privatization institutions. This marked the beginning of a signature campaign, with approximately 70 organisations initially signing on.⁵⁷

The campaign against water privatization began to expand to the grassroots level in September 2001 when new activists were incorporated into the campaign and subsequently focused their energies on developing awareness, debate and mobilization among workers, students, low income neighbourhood, women’s rights advocates and faith based organizations on the issue of water privatization on the issue of water privatization.⁵⁸ This is significant because not only do the above sections of society stand to suffer most from the problematic nature of water privatization but they also include groups with potential for generating social change.

The GNCAPW is divided geographically with the southern sector representing the Volta, Eastern, GAR, Central and Western regions. A Coordinating Committee (SCC) directs regional activities, however the most active structures organisationally are the Local Action Committee (LACs) based out of communities and workplaces. Campaign activities include a signature campaign through which they outreach and make contracts, community meetings which serve educational organisational functions, water rallies which bring public attention to the issue and lobbying elected representatives.⁵⁹ CAPW utilizes the radio and print media and even take out ads in

⁵⁶ “The Accra Declaration on the Right to Water”. (http://www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Urgent_Action/apic, retrieved 9/12/01).

⁵⁷ Rudolf Amenga-Etego, ISODEC employee and Campaign Coordinator, Interview by author, 8 November 2001.

⁵⁸ Barzini Tanoh, ISO and GNCAPW member, Interview by author, 13 November 2001

⁵⁹ Barzini Tanoh, “Report of the CAPW Southern Sector (CAPW SOUTH): Sept-Nov 2001” unpublished article, in possession of author, p.1

the paper if there is critical information to put out.⁶⁰ CAPW additionally produces their own leaflets. The coalition has also solicited the support of journalists through educational meetings and forums. The coalition utilizes fundraising for additional outreach by combining activities such as t-shirt sales with the signature campaign. CAPW seeks to fund their activities domestically through member subscriptions and donations.⁶¹

Future CAPW activities include the formalization of registration of members and affiliates, the organisation of new LACs and the creation of a central office from which to systematize materials and coordinate activities.⁶²

Actors within the campaign:

Workers:

The strength of the coalition hinges on the support of organized labour, because their control over the means of production gives them bargaining power with government. As demonstrated above, the force of organized labour has been pivotal to the outcome of policy disputes since colonial times.

Most working people face difficulties with the increasing tariffs inherent in the water privatization deal. The Public Utilities workers in particular stand to lose from the pending privatization as only 50 of 3,800 workers are assured of future employment. The government promises the re-employment of 2,000 PUWU workers in other areas however their track record is poor: of 946 workers in the last retrenchment only 87 have been re-employed.⁶³

Members of the coalition and workers in factories in Tema and Accra have met to discuss the issue of water privatization, relating it to other issues such as the casualisation of labour. The reaction from workers has proved fruitful. The discourse within PUWU workers took a strong stance against restructuring of the water sector. This is a departure from the past because although this is not the harshest retrenchment utility workers have faced in recent years it is the first time workers have decisively opposed the retrenchment itself, instead of attempting to negotiate the most beneficial severance package possible.⁶⁴ Workers agreed to come out in opposition to water privatization on October 3rd, and the TUC leadership declared its official position against the privatization of water the following day. The TUC leadership also attributes their interest in the campaign to their concern with related issues such as the WTO and the privatization of other

⁶⁰ Ibid 58

⁶¹ Ibid 59, p.2

⁶² Ibid 59, p.4

⁶³ Rudolf Amenga-Etego, "Message to Accra Region GTUC." Press Release: Ghana National CAP of Water, p.1

⁶⁴ Barzini Tanoh, ISO ad GNCAPW member, Interview by author, 2 December 2001.

utilities namely the telecom and electricity corporations, issues they have discussed with labour organizations around the world.⁶⁵

Hence though young, mobilization among workers is significant because the initiative comes from the rank and file.⁶⁶ As one TUC officer stated “It has the potential of being the issue that mobilizes a cross section of people more than any other issue in recent times”.⁶⁷ This thought has added weight considering the strategic location of workers in Accra and Tema, urban areas that directly face the consequences of water privatization.

Students:

Students have historically played a prominent role in the political process of Ghana. This is apparent from their catalytic role in the independence movement, in their prominence in fighting against undemocratic regimes and their presence in solidarity with workers struggles. Students are an important constituency because of the status of university graduates and the influence they have in their home communities.⁶⁸ It is from the universities that the political class emerges, and universities are the breeding grounds for future activists. “When we speak they listen and they dare not ignore our voice.”⁶⁹

A range of SAP policies that entails large cuts in social services directly impact students, indeed the main issues students have organized around in recent years have been the introduction of fees and loans. If water is privatized that will cause a significant increase in students' RFUF which is already a problematic payment for many. University students already have bad experiences with the privatization of social services and are suspicious of the deals going on concerning water.⁷⁰

CAPW began to work among students in September 2001, organizing several forums on campus, inviting guest speakers such as human rights activists and leaders in CAPW. Students themselves organized a demonstration in September.⁷¹

Students comprise one of the most successful local action committees in the Legon area. Larger meetings involve 15-20 students, including student leaders, affiliates of other political organizations such as the ISO and the Students Worker Solidarity Society, and individuals concerned with the issue.⁷²

However the most noteworthy gauge of student sentiments and potential to organize around the issue of water privatization was demonstrated by a talk organized at Akuafu Hall,

⁶⁵ Ofei Nkansah, GAO general secretary, interview by author, 20 November 2001.

⁶⁶ Ibid 64.

⁶⁷ Ibid 65

⁶⁸ Kofi Antwi, student, Interview by author, 23 November 2001.

⁶⁹ Kwesi Baah, student, interview by author, 26 November 2001

⁷⁰ Ibid 69

⁷¹ Ibid 69

⁷² Ibid 69

Legon campus by proponents of water privatization. Posters advertising the conference claimed the event would discuss the pros and cons of water privatization. Yet when students arrived at the talk the speakers consisted only of the “galaxy of pro-privateers”, everyone from the Restructuring Secretariat to the Minister of Works and Housing.⁷³ Also prominent on the poster was the slogan “Idem 13” which is commonly known to mean free food and drinks on campus, demonstrating the importance to the ministers of convincing students to come listen to their case in support of water privatization.⁷⁴ Activists with the coalition received notice of the meeting and arrived early to speak with students on their position, and when the floor opened to discussion the students ‘wiped the floor’ of the privatization proponents, ending with the STC president mounting the stage and declaring that the student government’s official position was against the privatization of water. The strength of student’s anti-privatization feelings surprised even organizers within the coalition signifying that “The mood against privatization is both broader and deeper than our most optimistic assessment had led us to believe. No doubt, this is attributable in important respects to some of the work we have done. But it also shows that our campaign must hurry up to catch up and connect with this mood by organizing and strengthening it”,⁷⁵

A more recent talk at Commonwealth Hall, Legon campus, which featured the Minister of Parliament for the district among others, reinforced the importance of the issue of water privatization among the student body. Thought it was a Friday night during exam times several hundred students were in attendance. Water privatization was one of the feature topics and the students in attendance met the pro-privatisation remarks of the ministers with loud opposition.⁷⁶

Activists of Left Organisations:

The presence of individual activists of left organizations and the International Socialist Organisation (ISO) that joined in the work of CAPW since September is valuable. Activists that have experience in previous campaigns are useful as educational tools in the movement because of their understanding of issue of water privatization and related globalization concerns. Activists additionally have experience with networking on the grassroots level, working in a coalition and they have distinct contacts with activists in other countries.⁷⁷ Some participants in coalition activities trace their involvement in the anti-privatization movement since 1983 when the current structural adjustment policy came into being.⁷⁸

As well as being some of the main organizers of the campaign certain figures on the left have spoken to newly forming bases in the communities, or at rallies.

⁷³ Ibid 59, p.2

⁷⁴ Ibid 68

⁷⁵ Ibid 59, p.2

⁷⁶ Witnessed by author, 23 November 2001

⁷⁷ Ibid 57.

⁷⁸ Kwesi Pratt, Journalist and activist, Interview by author, 19 November 2001

NGOs:

As mentioned above, NGOs have played and have the potential to play a role within the coalition. ISODEC initiated the coalition and countless NGOs (an updated list is not available) representing women and children's advocates, health and environmental interests have signed on. NGOs representing special interests groups can serve as educational resources and speakers on their area of expertise. NGOs can additionally provide links with affiliate organizations in other countries.⁷⁹

Faith Based Organisations:

The vast majority of Ghanaian citizens participate in organized religion. Thus religious organizations provide a valuable forum to engage in debate, education and mobilization around the issue of water privatization. Faith based organizations have historically taken stances in political campaigns such as the return to civilian rule.⁸⁰

The coalition has dialoged with strategic churches and mosques in Accra and Tema, as well as presenting their position to large faith based organizations.⁸¹

Several religious bodies have come out in support of the campaign based on their concern for the rights of their constituencies and the rights of the poor, one of the most visible being the Christian Coalition, which incorporates over 25 churches. The Christian Coalition came out with a press release indicating their position which understands the right to water being a "God-given right to all people that dwell on this earth", which would be jeopardized by its privatization. The statement also demonstrates awareness of anti-water privatization in other parts of the world such as Bolivia.⁸² The Coalition was given materials such as a video on the May conference from ISODEC but they also attribute awareness on the issue from the participation of their leadership in international conferences on globalisation and literature on the subject in Christian publications.⁸³

Community Organisations:

Community organizations are important in the construction of a strong grassroots network to mobilize around the issue of water privatization. Community groups can draw connections between workers, the informal sector, churches, mosque and representatives of special interest groups such as health and education workers.⁸⁴

Central to the campaign is the organization of Local Action Committees (LACs) based on the assumption that the "people in a particular area, institution or workplace are usually best able

⁷⁹ Ibid 57.

⁸⁰ Rev. Dr. Robert Aboagye-Mensah, Christian Council General Secretary, Interview by author, 20 November 2001

⁸¹ Ibid 64

⁸² Rev. Dr. Sam Prempeh and Rev. Dr. Aboagye-Mensah, "Stop the Privatisation of Water". Press Release Christian Council of Ghana, 29 August 2001, p.1.

⁸³ Ibid 80.

⁸⁴ Ibid 64

to decide what is best for their LAC in any particular situation.” LACs register with the Coordinating Committee and agree on an area of operation. LACs mobilize people in their area and affiliating with religious bodies or other interests types like health workers. The most successful committees have formed in the Maamobi, Legon and Tema areas.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Ibid 59, p.3.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES:

The connection between water to the quality of life and human survival creates immense opportunities to rally widespread support and mobilization against water privatization. The coalition has to date successfully maximized on this phenomena by refusing to engage in sectarian politics, “CAPW aims to involve the maximum number of people...because we believe that everyone has an interest in fighting against water privatization, whatever their views on any other issues.”⁸⁶

The general feeling of dissatisfaction with neo-liberal policies, which have led to a drop in the quality of life for increasing numbers of people, also creates fertile ground for the cultivation of a movement against the privatization of water. Drawing from previous experience with neo-liberal policy has taught Ghanaians that multinationals are no “Father Christmas”, but profit motivated corporations who must not be trusted with the control of Ghana’s water.⁸⁷ However the political climate of the aftermath of the 2000 elections creates difficulties for a campaign against water at this juncture. The focus on electoral politics creates a “vacuum” of other forms of political activity and organization. The left must “start all over...we are back to square one,” in the development of theory and the creation of activists networks.⁸⁸ Additionally, the relatively recent return to “democratic” rule inhibits some people’s willingness to challenge government policy for fear of undermining the perceived fragile state democracy in Ghana.⁸⁹

Organizationally, the coalition’s strength lies the fact that key constituencies such as workers, students religious bodies and communities have begun to mobilize over the water. Even more significant is the highly democratic and interactive manner in which discussion and action groups are operating. The focus of energy to the grassroots facilitates people’s ability to prioritize their most urgent concerns and develop actions accordingly.

Furthermore, even in these early phases the coalition has managed to make connections with activists working on related globalisation issues such as the cyanide spills, the WTO rounds in Doha and the reviving jubilee 2000 movement. Making such connections serves to generate ideas and alliances on water privatization and larger issues.⁹⁰

However the coalition also faces the immense challenge of giving organized outlets for the energies and sentiments against water privatization. The coalition in its youth has yet to network among certain constituencies, and must continue to reaffirm and strengthen the commitment of key groups.

⁸⁶ Ibid 59, p.1

⁸⁷ Ibid 57.

⁸⁸ Ibid 70

⁸⁹ Ibid 64.

⁹⁰ Ibid 64.

Though the rank and file supports the anti-water privatization campaign and the TUC leadership announced its official position against the privatization deal, they have to date made no call to action over the water issue. Their pro-active participation in the future is essential to the success of the campaign.⁹¹

Another issue is the lack of women's participation within the campaign. While the coalition counts on the support of some women at the grassroots level in LACs and churches, there was a decided lack of women's presence in many levels of the campaign: few women attend student meetings or head affiliate organizations.⁹²⁹³ Although the issue of women's political participation is broader than the campaign itself, the coalition must exert constant vigilance in the effort to incorporate the active participation of women into decision-making processes and organizational activities.

The nature of the arena for debate presents challenges and opportunities for the coalition. In contrast to previous regimes, the coalition has all channels of media at their disposal, as well as the freedom of movement and association. This creates the potential of developing alliances with journalists and utilizing the press and radio as educational and organizational tools. Additionally, the government's role in advocating the privatization of water through forums, articles, meetings and advertisements in some ways assists to perpetuate national interest on the issue. Government attacks on the campaign, particularly their slander of ISODEC is a double edged sword. If the coalition utilizes the attacks to assert the unity and prominence of the coalition above any of its individual members, then the government's attacks may only give the coalition greater legitimacy to represent a broad cross-section of the population.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Ibid 63

⁹² Ibid 69 and witness by author

⁹³ Ibid 78

⁹⁴ Ibid 59, p.4

CONCLUSION

Despite its short existence the movement emerging to address the impending privatization of water has begun to create a dynamic and diverse alliance with political potential.

It is too early to deduce what implications this step in neo-liberal economic policy will bode for the governments' ability to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of Ghanaian citizens. However it can be noted that the topic of water privatization has sparked great controversy and resistance, indicating the potential for tense developments.

How the movement will affect the future of water policy in Ghana remains to be seen. Yet the challenge to the water privatization process has already caused the government to tread more carefully as evidenced by the postponement of the next tariff increases. More importantly, the mobilization around the water issue is creating a forum for the development of ideas and a tool for political expression among largely disenfranchised groups. Hence the struggle against water privatization is valuable not only for its ability to defend a valuable social commodity but for developing peoples ability to defend, express and demand their rights. Also, the beginning of the cross-dialogue between activists involved in related struggles show the potential for people to make connections between policies and form a broader political perspective. These developments are crucial in face of the void of spaces to advocate for alternatives to the current neo-liberal model which gives no room for democracy, equity or self determination.

Suggestions for Further Study:

This paper addresses the developments, potentials and significance of a newly forming social movement. Further study into the progression of the developing coalition and its activities could add to a better understanding of the relevance of the anti-water privatization movement in Ghana as well as shedding further light onto the questions I was only able to answer partially.

Bibliography

Sources Cited and Consulted

Books

Austin, Dennis. Politics in Ghana: 1946-1960. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Hansen, Emmanuel and Kwame A. Ninsin ed.s. The State Development and Politics in Ghana.
Dakar: CODESRIA, 1989.

Ninsin, Kwame A. Ghana's Political Transition: 1990-1993 Selected Documents. Accra: Freedom
Publications, 1996

Nugent, Paul. Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana: Power, Ideology and the Burden of
History, 1982-1994. Accra; Asempa Publishers, 1995

Sawyer, Akilagpa. The Political Dimension of Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1990.

Yeebo, Zaya. Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power: Rawlings: Saviour or Demagogue.
London: New Beacon Books, 1991.

Articles

“2000 to lose jobs at Ghana Water Company.” *Public Agenda*, October 15-21, 2001, p.1

“Arm-twisting to Promote Privatization.” *Public Agenda*, October 15-21, 2001, p.4

“CAP of Water Rejoiner to WSRS Advertiser's Announcement: Privatization of Urban Water
Supply: A Threat to Democracy.” *Weekend Agenda*, October 5-11, 2001, p.8

“Govt. Won't Privatise Water.” *Daily Graphic*, September 13, 2001, p. 17.

“Labor Says No to Privatization of Water Sector.” *Daily Graphic*, October 4, 2001. p.1

“The Water Privatisation Saga: Casting a panic into a sober perspective.” *Public Agenda*, October
1-7, 2001, p.10.

“Rural Dwellers Will Not Benefit from PSP.” *Public Agenda*, October 15-21, 2001.

Internet Articles

Hall, David. "Water in Public Hands: Public Sector Water Management – A Necessary Option." www.world-psi.org, 2001.

Henning, Rainer Chr. "IMF Forces African Countries to Privatise Water." www.afrol.com, 2001
"The Accra Declaration on the Right to Water."
www.sas.upenn.edu/African_Studies/Urgen_Action_apic-060401.html, 2001.

Unpublished Material

Amenga-Etego, Rudolf. "Message to Accra Region GTUC." *Press Release*: Ghana National Coalition Against the Privatisation of Water.

Ghana National CAP of Water. "Why Water Privatisation in Ghana Must be Stopped."

Prempeh, Rev. Dr. Sam and Aboagye-Mensah, Rev. Dr. Robert. "Stop the Privatisation of Water." *Press Release*: Christian Council of Ghana, 29 August 2001.

Tanoh, Barzini, "Report of the CAPW Southern Sector (CAPW SOUTH): Sept.-Nov. 2001"

Tanoh, Barzini "Some Observations on Water Privatisation in Ghana (WPSP)"

"Community Water and Sanitation Policy on rehabilitation and capacity expansion of community managed systems." Press Conference on Privatisation of Water. 29 May 2001.

"Who We Are" *Press Release*: Ghana National Coalition Against the Privatization of Water.

Interviews

Aboagye-Mensah, Robert Dr. Christian Coalition, General Secretary. Interview by author 21 November 2001, Accra, notes in possession of author.

Al-Lassain, ISO and GNCAPW member, interview by author, 22 November, 2001 notes in possession of author.

Amenga-Atego, Rudolph. ISODEC employee, National Coordinator GNCAPW. Interview by author. 8 November 2001, Accra notes in possession of author.

Antwi, Kofi Student. Interview by author, 23 November 2001, Accra, notes in possession of author.

Bado, GWC employee. Interview by author, 8 November 2001, Accra, notes in possession of author.

Bah, Kwesi. Student. Interview by author, 26, November 2001, Accra, notes in possession of author.

Kpodo, Samuel, AMA employee, 13 November 2001, Accra, notes in possession of author.

Nkwansah, Ofei. GAO general secretary, 20 November 2001, Accra notes in possession of author.

Nkrumah, Emmanuel. Water Engineer. Interview by author, 6 November 2001, Accra notes in possession of author.

Pratt, Kwesi. Journalist, SWP member. Interview by author, 19 November 2001, Accra notes in possession of author.

Tanoh, Barzini. ISO member, campaign coordinator, interview by author 13 November and 2 December 2001, Accra, notes in possession of author.

ATTACHMENT B

The Metropolitan Assemblies and Municipal Assemblies of the towns and cities listed below are not aware and have not

Water Systems in Business Unit A

Upper East	Upper West	Northern	Greater Accra	Volta
Bawku	Tumu	Gambaga	Accra	Nkwanta
Navrongo Bongo	Lawra	Walewale	Amasaman	Kete Krachi
Zebila	Jirapa	Gashiegu	Tema	Kadjebi
Bolgatanga	Nadawli	Saboba	Ada	Jasikan
Sandema	Wa	Saveluga		Hohoe
		Tolon		Kpandu
		Tamale		Ho
		Yendi		Akasti
		Zabzugu		Adedome
		Bimbilla		Sogakope
		Damongo		Denu
		Bolo		Keta
		Salaga		
5	5	13	4	12

Water Systems in Business Unit B

Western	Central	Eastern	Brong-Ahafo	Ashanti
Juabeso	Dunkwa	Donkorkrom	Kintampo	Ejura
Wiawso	Fosu	Mpraeso	Wenchi	Mampong
Enchi	Twifo Praso	New Aberim	Atebubu	Offinso
Asankragwa	Asikuma	Begro	Kwame Danso	Anona
Tarkwa	Swedru	Kibi	Kete Krachi	Effiduase
Daboase	Ejumako	Kade	Techiman	Mankranso
Half Assini	Abura	Suhum	Nkoranza	Kumasi
Axim	Dunkwa	Akim Oda	Drobo	Ejisu
Nkwanta	Winneba	Nsawam	Domma Ahenkro	Kuntansase
Takoradi	Saltpond	Dodowa	Sunyani	Juaso
	Cape Coast	Akropong	Bechem	Bekwai
	Elmina	Somanya	Kenyasi No. 1	Nkwanta
		Atemposu	Tepa	Manso
			Goaso	Obuasi
				New Edubiase
				On-Offin

WHY MUST PRIVATIZATION IN GHANA MUST BE STOPPED

In the interest of two transnational corporations, vested interests in Ghana, foreign governments and the World Bank conspire to violate our Right to water.

Water is Life.

**BUSINESS
UNIT A**

REGIONS

Greater Accra
Volta
Northern
Upper East
Upper West

BIDDERS

Northumbrian – British
Vivendi – French
SAUR – French

TERM OF LEASE

30 Years

NUMBER OF CITIES

27 Years

POPULATION NOW

3.6 million

**INVESTMENT
REQUIRED**

US\$ 1.351 billion

**BUSINESS
UNIT B**

REGIONS

Central
Eastern
Western
Ashanti
Brong Ahafo

TERM OF LEASE

10 Years

BIDDERS

Bi-Water-British
Nuon- Dutch
Generale Des'Eaux- French
Skanska - Swedish

NUMBER OF CITIES

73 Years

POPULATION NOW

3.9 million

**INVESTMENT
REQUIRED**

US\$ 467 Million