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# Born of Freedom and Dissent: A comparative analysis of American antiwar protest in the first 1,418 days of the Vietnam and Iraq wars

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Born of Freedom and Dissent: A comparative analysis of American antiwar
protest in the first 1,418 days of the Vietnam and Iraq wars

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by

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*For my country*

# ABSTRACT

Born of Freedom and Dissent: A comparative analysis of American antiwar
protest in the first 1,418 days of the Vietnam and Iraq wars

By Thomas N. Ratliff

Cultural aesthetics are the latent effects of human relations informing cognitive schemas as cultural variations of social forms in specific time-space contexts. To understand what conditions produce intra-national conflict during wartime, engagement reactivity between social control mechanisms and antiwar protesters was measured. Hypothesis-1 showed high numbers of arrests were influenced by the type and duration of protest and military presence at protest events during Vietnam, whereas place and size of protest were influential during Iraq. Hypothesis-2 showed that where and how antiwar protests occur has changed. Hypothesis-3 showed that, compared to Vietnam, Iraq antiwar protest has increased initial reactivity-intensity, has more arrests and fewer injuries, and is 541.6% larger per event, with a 248.8% greater total number of protesters. This study concludes that structural flexibility and preparedness prevent intra-national conflict, the antiwar movement has become an institution, and the cultural schema for Vietnam antiwar protest has affected its present form.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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**CHAPTER ONE:**
**Introduction**

Terror - the fear of losing the quality of life that is consistent with the values of one's culture - stands as the ultimate nemesis to the beacon of freedom. During the short presidency of John F. Kennedy, the categorization of the actions of North Vietnam and the Viet Cong as 'terrorist' (Transcript of Rusk's news conference, 1961) draws an important parallel with the Bush administration's confrontation of global terrorism that began with the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Emerging from these conditions were two very unpopular wars – Vietnam and Iraq. Although the social context of the sixties and the turn of the 21$^{st}$ century are very different, comparisons between the two wars can be made. One difference between these wars are the conditions 'on the ground' in America. This study will examine the difference in the expression of dissent towards war during the first 1,418 days of each conflict. Specifically, it will use anti-war protest and hegemonic response to antiwar protest to begin answering an important question – under what conditions does a nation at war turn against itself?

Crucial to understanding the framing of this question is that it does not attempt to place fault or judge either group. Rather, the engagement between American anti-war protesters and the normative forms of social control will be gauged as a necessary function of reactivity. The intensity of these expressions of reactivity, how both sides engage one another, is what is under scrutiny here. Reactivity is more than just interaction, action, or reaction – it is the synthesis of all these behavioral constructs. Weick (1979) contended that "the behaviors of one person are contingent on the behaviors of another person(s), and these contingencies are called *interacts*. The unit of analysis…is contingent on response patterns, patterns which an action by actor A evokes

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a specific response in actor B…which is then responded to by actor A" (pg. 89, *emphasis original*). Weick terms this complete sequence of engagement a 'double-interact' - and it is crucial to understanding reactivity. For example, the interaction between antiwar protesters and police is both actual and symbolic, but the reactive intensity is ultimately determined through the mutual responses from both agents. Hence, reactivity measures the patterns of response between both sets of agents under the specific influence of contextual variables.

Durkheim's social facts, the relatively stable patterns of behavior that persist in a society, provide the substance of contextual variation. However, the greatest flaw in Durkheim and perhaps functional theories in general, comes in the negated context of meaning. Reciprocally, and fundamentally, such a flaw emerges in social constructionist theories as they remove emphasis from the 'actuality' of social facts. Paradoxically, the focus of each of these paradigms emerges *in* a Habermasian life-world through the process of structuration. Just as face-to-face interaction may be seen as the prototype of human interaction, so too is the life-world the prototypical 'place' where psychological and systemic constructs find their origin. It is here in the realm of 'flesh and blood' people where this study will be focused.

Resource mobilization, social constructionist, 'new' social movement, and breakdown theories provide an extensive literature for studying protest. However, in light of an increasing emphasis on culture, this study will offer a new approach – cultural aesthetics. The contemporary concepts of a cultural aesthetics perspective come from the work of Arnold Berleant. Berleant (2005) contended that a cultural aesthetic is "an analog of the cultural landscape" and that a cultural aesthetics perspective studies not only "the

perceptual features of the environmental medium, features that reciprocate with the people who inhabit it" but also "the influences of social institutions, belief systems, and patterns of association and action that shapes the life of the human social animal and give that life meaning and significance" (pg. 107). This study provides an operationalization of this theory from a sociological perspective. Divergences from Berleant's conception will be explained.

The comparisons and contrasts of the Vietnam and Iraq wars are many. This study is not so much concerned with the systemic likeness of the wars as it is the conditions in America while they were occurring. In the context of this study, the point of engagement for the Vietnam War is August 4, 1964 - the direct military engagement of North Vietnam and the Tonkin Resolution approved by Congress three days later. However, this also outlines one difference between Vietnam and Iraq. The Iraq War, though arguably as equally ideologically based, can in hindsight be seen as a break with the Afghanistan front. Bush's ultimatum on March 15, 2003, was met hours later with a storm of antiwar protest (Lichtblau, 2003). It is for this reason that March 15 will be used as the point of reference for the comparison on the ground in America. Therefore, the shift in the War on Terror from Afghanistan to Iraq, and the bombing of North Vietnam to the Tonkin Resolution, become the study's reference points. Hence, engagement in Vietnam was initiated with action leading to proposition, where engagement in Iraq was initiated with proposition leading to action.

Data was collected from the *New York Times* and analyzed using four linear regression models. Reactivity is measured from August 5, 1964 – June 20, 1968 and March 16, 2003 – January 31, 2007. The beginning dates exhibit the one day lag of the

previous day's news. Expression of antiwar sentiment will be compared between the early Vietnam and Iraq wars. The situational emergence of antiwar protest intensity will be used as a measure to show societal shifts in the actualization of values. It provides preliminary evidence that cultural aesthetics' are the latent effects and expressions of prototypical human behaviors in specific social environments – the cultural variation of social forms. As a guide, this study **does not** intend to say that America has turned against itself. Rather, it seeks an understanding of what conditions initiate such a turn. At what point do the beneficiaries of freedom protest the defense of that supposed freedom? At what point does freedom lose its way?

## CHAPTER TWO:
## The historical contexts

Defining points in history for the origin of nations is simultaneously simple and complex. Extracting the moment in time where one nation divides and another emerges ultimately falls upon ideological conflict and the war, large or small, for independence. The complexity increases when one examines the conflict within the emerging nation, the division in a culture, the hopes of multiple futures, and the constraint placed upon it by external forces. The origin of the United States of America as an independent nation may, simply, be cited as July 4, 1776. Yet America was, and still is, politically divided.

The origin of American political division comes from Jeffersonian cultural nationalism and Jacksonian federalism. Though the intricacies of this division is beyond the scope of interest here, the split of Jackson's Democratic Republicans and the "era of the common man" from the Jeffersonian "economic aristocracy" and individual state power (Brinkley, 1997) is a cultural cleavage still resonating in the politics and rhetoric of contemporary America. The importance of this conceptual divide, however, is that no one side of the debate exists. Rather, both sides are engaging one another; the actuality of life 'on the ground' in America is an expression of this reactivity.

The concept of freedom and how it is to be attained and defended still remains a dilemma in the real world. Freedom, then, is only a symbolic representation, a cultural schema whose details are filled in by the specific context where 'freedom' is played out (*see* Lipset, 1993; Sewell, 1992). This expression in a social context, varied as it may be, is an example of a cultural aesthetic. Hence, as the American nation has marched on throughout the centuries, the form of this freedom has changed, the expression of its actualization ever refining, ever the more curious. For freedom, placed upon the

continuum between anarchy and oppression, is a perplexing paradox – a paradox resolved and unresolved.

*The specter of Communism*

In the years after World War II, in the emergence of the Cold War, the ghost of Karl Marx hovered above Eurasia. Though it goes without saying that no self-proclaimed "communist" country has ever actualized Marx's vision, the expression of this ideology in Southeast Asia became crucial to the shaping of America and the world. Pinpointing the start-date for the Vietnam War is difficult, for the cliché 'rules of engagement' become bogged down in the global and national quagmire of the Indochina War. How and when does one define America's 'engagement' in Vietnam? Ideologically, and as it concerns 'national interests', American involvement in the Vietnam War could have said to have begun in 1950 (Herring, 1996). However, for the purposes of this study, a distinction between 'involvement' and 'engagement' must be made.

It could be said that the Vietnam War was an extension of the Cold War where American and allied forces combated the rise of Communism. It could also be said that Vietnam became the temporal place to fight an ideological battle. If it were the focus of this study to analyze the ideological beginnings of the Cold War, the slippery slope would lead back to Marx himself. This is not the case here. True involvement, then, begins in the Kennedy administration, as American troops entered Vietnam as 'military advisors'. On February 14, 1962, John F. Kennedy stated that no combat troops in the "generally understood sense of the term have been sent to Vietnam" (Frankel, 1962). However, within a month, both China and Russia charged the United States with fighting

an "undeclared war" in Southeast Asia (Calls action undeclared war, 1962; Topping, 1962). Thus began the shadowy escalation into America's longest war.

Kennedy was hesitant to begin major combat operations, though he did ascribe to the domino theory – the idea that if Vietnam fell to the 'communists' that the surrounding countries in Southeast Asia would also hitch their wagons. The shaky relations with the Diem regime in Vietnam were outlined by the sharp division in the Kennedy Administration. Many in Kennedy's administration felt that Diem should go. "Vice President Johnson, top CIA and other Pentagon officials…[among others]…continued to insist that there was no real alternative and that Diem's removal would bring chaos to South Vietnam" (Herring, 1996, p. 115). Kennedy responded to this division with a liaise-faire attitude - not overtly supporting or preventing any attempted coup. On November 1, 1963, however, the coup occurred, resulting in the execution of Diem and Nhu, the head of the South Vietnam's Special Forces. Then, in a tragedy that still haunts and perplexes America today, just three weeks after the fall of the Diem regime, Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas (Herring, 1996). This was to be the beginning and end of an era.

On August 4, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson was presented a conundrum – a conundrum that this study places as the differentiation between involvement and engagement in Vietnam. The captain of the U.S.S. Maddox reported that it had been fired upon and that an attack from the North Vietnamese was immanent. Six hours after the initial report, President Johnson ordered retaliation against the North. American jets bombed two naval bases, destroyed a major oil facility, and two U.S. planes were downed in the attack. The captain of the U.S.S. Maddox later reported that no attack took place

(pbs.org, retrieved 2-9-07). Of course, it could be argued that the attack did not occur because of the bombing of the North, and that Johnson's retaliation was just that - retaliation. However, as will be soon described, this pre-emptive strike set an eerie precedent.

*The War on Terror*

It was 8:45 a.m. eastern time, September 11, 2001, in New York; a bright, crisp morning to a greater or lesser degree like all others. But as the clock ticked a tock to 8:46, the history of America, and of the world, changed forever. In a single instant, two wars began – the War on Terror and the Spirit War. Whether it is termed Jihad or 'the struggle to please God' or 'the struggle against one's soul' (not necessarily 'holy war'), the War on Terror represents simultaneously a Spirit War. It is not by necessity 'spiritual', but a war of hearts and minds with a burden brought to bear on the families of innocents who died in the tragedy and to the American people and soldiers who now must supplant fear with resolve. This war, just as the war with the specter of Communism, begins and ends in the various cultural schemas of freedom.

In the weeks that followed that fateful day, flags unfurled in an undeniable show of patriotism from homes in the city and in the country, from the rich and the poor, and the retribution, the retaliation for 9-11 was swift. President George W. Bush took action and sought out the leader of the perpetrators – Osama Bin Laden. The invasion of Afghanistan was met with little resistance in America. It seemed the obvious course of action for an event so grievous. However, the most severe criticisms of the Bush administration, and the contrast to the point of engagement in Vietnam, originate from the shift in the War on Terror.

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The longstanding grudge between America and Iraq most clearly emerged during the presidency of George H.W. Bush. In the early 1990's, Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, decided to use Kuwait as a bargaining chip to remove the heavy debt-load Iraq carried. The war with Iran ravaged the Iraqi economy, and Hussein sought a quick solution. In August and September of 1990, Hussein made demands for the unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the Occupied Territories, as well as governance of the Bubiyan and Warbah islands, and a small stretch of land along the Kuwait border that would have allowed deep-draft shipping. What would ensue from that point was a countering of increasing troop presence between Hussein and the Iraqis in Kuwait and George H.W. Bush and the Americans in the Persian Gulf. Many in America debated the necessity of defending Kuwait, a country of primarily oil sheiks (Pelletiere, 2004). Nevertheless, the war began and ended quickly.

On March 15, 2003, President George W. Bush made it clear while addressing the nation that Iraq's 'resistance to disarm' could not be overcome without force (Lichtblau, 2003). The shift in focus from Afghanistan to Iraq began a firestorm of controversy. Linking Iraq with Al-Qaeda, and defining the danger of a nuclear Iraq in the context North Korea's nuclear interest and still simmering Iran, prompted the Bush administration's labeling of these three countries as "the axis of evil". One must also consider the relativistic implications of Tannenbaum's (1938) concept of the "dramatization of evil" in the face of the 'faceless cowards' who existed, and exist, in 'terror cells' across the Middle East and the world. But it is this temporalization, this defining of "place" and "enemy" which harkens back to the aberration that was Vietnam. For just as Vietnam and Southeast Asia became a real-world place to combat the specter

of Communism, so too did Iraq become the place to combat terrorism. Just as the fear of

countries falling as dominoes in an ideological battle during the Vietnam Era, so too have

these chips fallen in the Iraq Era. In both cases, it is safe to say, the selection and

definition of place and enemy can be debated.

**CHAPTER THREE:**
**Theoretical Framework – Sociological cultural aesthetics (SCA)**

The ability to predict and understand human behavior has perplexed humankind since the time before Plato. He is mentioned here only because even in his time there was recognition of how human habits chained us as prisoners to the world of illusion. Hence, the ability to predict and understand comes from preconceptions of reality. Plato's illumination that breaking free from habit led only to future discoveries parallels the concept of constant discovery upon further inspection that is at the cornerstone of science. For sociology, the evolution from habit to institutionalization is crucial, for those institutions become an integral part of social structure. Yet 'structure' is as illusive as 'freedom', for its conception and actuality is constantly in flux.

The origin for a sociological cultural aesthetics comes from a model for a causal aesthetic[1]. Though the details of this causal model are beyond the scope of this study, it bears mentioning due to its influence here. A causal aesthetic deals with the direction, manifestation, and rearrangement of matter and energy over time and space. The term 'causal' derives from Hegel's Absolute[2] and the 'aesthetic' serves as a balance to causality in that it is the temporal reality (creation) from which experience is engaged. Hence, the multiple causes for any situation are, obviously, manifest in the present. The past, then, is what scientists observe in order to 'predict' the future. However, for changes in the present or future, the causes must come from somewhere, they must lie dormant, or latent, in reality.

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[1] Ratliff, T. (2003, *unpublished*) *The Causal Aesthetic*. Presented to the Department of Philosophy and Religion, Western Kentucky University, October 2003; Ratliff, T. (2001, *unpublished*) *A Thief in the Night*. Presented to Dr. Michael Seidler, Western Kentucky University, December, 2001.
[2] This refers to "the development of the self-consciousness and self-actualization of God" or "Absolute Spirit" (Redding, 2006) which represents an all-embracing unity.

Berleant (2005) contended that "theatre…embodies a social aesthetic…it is in theatre's embodied depiction of social situations and, in particular, of particular human relations, that theatre's special contribution emerges most vividly" (p.153). The distinction between a 'cultural' and 'social' aesthetics is at the heart of this study, and is fundamental to understanding SCA. Berleant focused on how the theatre itself is aesthetic, in that it depicts the social situations in an artistic form. The important factor in distinguishing social aesthetics from cultural aesthetics in his conception is that it is the act of theatre, the human production of what we categorize as 'theatre', that is social. It stands to reason that there are forms of theatre all around the world (obviously varying linguistically), but the particular artistic *form* of theatre varies from place to place. Hence, theatre, just as 'school', 'art', 'war', and 'protest' are all social forms brought to life through behavioral and/or contextual traits - much like a status indicates a role, set of roles, or sets constraints for role performance. For example, if I were talking about 'school', one may ask, 'where are you going to school?' or 'what are you going to school for?' This distinguishes the *kind* and particular details of my 'school' situation. So the cultural aspect is how social forms are brought to fruition in specific human environments.

Berleant's formulation is crucial. However, it does make the distinction between aesthetics that are social and cultural. This dichotomizing is also problematic, as will be discussed later, in agency-constraint conceptions of sociological theory. For the 'social' cannot be separated from the 'cultural' - at least in real life. Berleant (2005) contended that a "social aesthetics is…an aesthetics of the situation" (p. 154). The distinction is useful analytically, for distinguishing form (category) from kind (expression of form).

However, the terminological differentiation of social aesthetics from cultural aesthetics is at the same time clarifying and confusing[3]. What is a social situation apart from the culture which composes it? In other words, what is aesthetic about culture in the first place is its aesthetic social form in a particular context or situation. Hence, how that form is performed exhibits its aesthetic qualities.

Goffman's (1959) contention that life itself is like a staged play and that humans are the actors of that play is also crucial. If Berleant's conception of 'theatre' can be accepted as a social aesthetic (a form of behavior that varies aesthetically by situation), and Goffman's (1959) conception of everyday life as being *like* 'theatre' can be accepted, one can see the obvious parallel between human relations in the world and the aesthetic qualities of Berleant's formulation. Yet inserting Goffman into the equation extends the understanding of the aesthetic, for there are not distinctions made of what *is* or *is not* aesthetic. Rather, there is a unified conception of the aesthetic that upholds the sociological qualities of studying culture[4]. Therefore, a sociological cultural aesthetics would, from the lens of sociology, study the form and the expression of human behaviors within the sociocultural matrix. In other words, cultural aesthetics'[5] are how social forms are played out in specific social contexts – they are the cultural variation of social forms. But what *is* 'aesthetic'?

Berleant (2005) stated that "the word 'aesthetics' comes from the Greek *aisthēsis,* literally 'perception by the senses'... [identified by Baumgarten in 1750] as...the science

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[3] I explored these possibilities after consultation with Dr. Berleant.
[4] Cultural relativism is a perspective that views cultural variation (i.e. taste, morality, norms) in objective terms sensitive to the terms of the culture being studied.
[5] The term cultural aesthetics' differs from cultural aesthetics, in that the plural ownership denoted by the apostrophe demarcates between multiple forms (cultural aesthetics') and the perspective (cultural aesthetics). For example, there are many cultural aesthetics' of racial construction (i.e., Brazil vs. United States), but the method for studying these variations would be a cultural aesthetics of racial construction.

of sensory knowledge directed toward beauty, and art entails the perfection of sensory awareness" (pp. 77-78). The difficulty with this definition, from a sociological perspective, is the preoccupation with 'beauty' and 'art'. It is here where SCA must diverge with the *connotation* embedded in previous theories of aesthetics. Though art is no less a sociocultural product, its connotation is confusing. A sociological cultural aesthetics would, in a similar fashion of Robert Merton's shedding of the organic analogy for functionalism, shed the constricting art connotation for aesthetics. Sociological cultural aesthetics would retain the 'science of sense knowledge' described by Baumgarten and replace 'art' with 'creation'. So a cultural aesthetics perspective becomes the science of human sense knowledge studying social creation through human interaction in and/or across specific time-space contexts. In other words, cultural aesthetics' are the latent effects of structural constraint and meaning construction expressed into reality as created 'things' *interpreted* by the individual mind in relation to their perception of that reality.

Although the term 'aesthetics' has primarily been used in the context of art, replacing art with 'the processes of social creation' does not negate the artist. At the same time, taking the connotation of art away from aesthetics allows for the operational definitions necessary for sociological inquiry. For clarity's sake then, the 'aesthetic' as used in this work derives from the process of human creation. SCA studies both categories of behavior and the way those categories become manifest by focusing on the context of the interaction process and the resultant reactivity. So that, as defined here, 'the aesthetic' becomes the qualities of the world we inhabit and engage, and the term is used to emphasize the modes of appreciation (not necessarily aesthetic appreciation) for

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certain types of environments. It focuses on how the 'sense' or feeling people get from those environments influence affiliation with others, how that affiliation produces the organization of the social world, the latent qualities of everyday life and the opportunities for social change.

A sociological cultural aesthetics is the study of how social facts and meaning worlds merge and produce the conditions of specific time-space contexts or social environments. A cultural aesthetic (singular) is one example of a particular cultural form of human social behavior (material or schematic) in the environment under study. Four major principles of cultural aesthetics are:

> 1) Social facts are how forms of social behavior, framed by cultural meanings, are expressed in a time-space context.
> 2) Social structure is formed by culture and the conditions of the context in question are based on the degree of integration of a cultural expression *into* the social facts of that context.
> 3) Human behavior is not a duality, rather a synergistic (or co-created) field of engagement and disengagement where divisions are only conceptual tools for analysis.
> 4) Cultural aesthetics' influence schema formation from the sense individuals get from their social environment, producing appreciation, affiliation, and levels of integration – cultural aesthetics' inform schemas.

These principles are illustrated in the following text, and serve as the basis for an understanding of how antiwar protest in America in two time-space contexts represents the evolution of this social form. From an analysis of this form, a deduction of the intensity and significance of dissent can be made.

*The space of flows and social facts*

> The social matrix expresses itself into the spatial pattern through a dialectical interaction that opposes social contradictions and conflicts as trends fighting each other in an endless supersession. The result is not the coherent spatial form of an overwhelming social logic…but the tortured and disorderly, yet beautiful patchwork of human creation and suffering…Sociological analysis of urban evolution must start from the theoretical standpoint of considering the complexity of these interacting trends in a given time-space context (Castells, 1993, *as cited in* LeGates and Stout, 2003, pg. 476).

Castells (2000) contended that social structure is "the organizational arrangements of humans in relationships of production/consumption, experience, and power, as expressed in meaningful interaction framed by culture" (p. 695). This 'cultural framing' provides clues to Durkheim's curiosity expressed in his studies of suicide. Essentially, these studies focused on how different regions have relatively stable suicide rates year after year, and how different societies produce different types of suicide. Durkheim's work in this area focused on the persistent patterns of behavior in and over social contexts as well as how those contexts condition social behavior – social facts. Although Durkheim stressed the necessity to observe these 'facts' as *things* as opposed to *idea*s, he focused more on nonmaterial social facts (i.e. morality) rather than material social facts (i.e. structure). A good example of nonmaterial social facts would be norms or values, and more generally, culture (Ritzer, 1996). However, this 'generality' of culture is problematic.

Part of the difficulty in specifying culture in Durkheim's framework is that he often got stuck in the macro-level analysis of societies (Ritzer, 1996). Yet it seems, with such an emphasis on culture, the idea of the *thingness* of social facts would have given way to the reflexive actuality of human life. The earlier references to Castells, then, cite the contemporary emphasis on culture, the importance of time, space, and context, but also *expression*. How social facts are expressed in a time-space context is one of the fundamental concerns of a sociological cultural aesthetics. Hence, the first principle of SCA: **social facts are how forms of social behavior, framed by cultural meanings, are expressed in a time-space context.**

Blauner (1964) discussed alienation and freedom in modern industrial society by studying the context (or social atmosphere) of four different industries. He defined the idea of *thingness* as the worker in these environments being reduced to a "mechanical device." No pun intended, but the propensity of Durkheim, as well as functionalists and structuralists alike, to reduce human behavior to functional parts of the whole or making structural constraints the determinants of action, seems a little mechanical. However, to the structuralist's credit, they do explain how specific environments shape behavior.

> Freedom is the state which allows the person to remove himself from those dominating situations that make him simply a reacting object…Control is more positive than freedom, suggesting the assertion of the self-directing subject over such potentially dominating forces as employers or machine systems (Blauner, 1964, p.16).

Blauner's conception of freedom begs the question – how can the system still function if the individual has the potential to control their degree of integration into the system? The answer begins with the flexibility of the 'machine', the responsiveness of the structure within which an individual can exert control. Sewell (1992) contended that "a social science trapped in an unexamined metaphor of structure tends to reduce actors to cleverly programmed automatons…it makes dealing with change awkward…[it] lends itself readily to…how social life is shaped into consistent patterns, but not to…how these patterns change over time" (pp. 2-3). Keeping Blauner's idea of freedom in mind, the *thingness* of an individual influences their sense of alienation. If a structure imposes this constraint upon the individual, and the individual feels alienated from its imposition, such alienation can obviously influence the social personality as well as the self-image of individuals.

This poses a fundamental flaw to structural functionalism – the more thing-like the individual becomes in a "dominating" system, and the more thing-like an individual is

treated (either in science or life), the less potential control the system has and the less realistic the portrait of the situation. From Durkheim's vantage point, the rather rigid determinism that comes from structure ignores a very important variable – meaning. It also speaks volumes of the social context in which he was writing and the perspectives about the world and humans at that time. Without acknowledging the internalization of these social forces or facts by the individual, and their ability to reject those patterns and forces, the crucial factor of social change is ignored and human will negated. This underscores the second principle of SCA: **social structure is formed by culture and changes in the conditions of a context are based on the degree of integration sensed by individuals, afforded by meaning attachment and shown through the cultural expression by individuals *into* the social facts of that context.**

The automaton-like reaction Blauner (1964) described appears to happen at the individual level (i.e. blind faith, false consciousness). It also appears this way at the macro-levels of society, as economies fluctuate, fashion trends come and go, belief systems endure, and people conform to the mainstream. But where and how these 'things' happen, and why they change, does not originate at the macro-level. Nor is one individual or individual mind responsible for the reflexive nature of human life. The how, why, and where of occurrence and change become real in the interactions of everyday life. Reality *becomes* real through engaging existence in the flows of everyday life and through the perception of that engagement. However, the *reality* of reality is only as real as one may define it. Challenges to other's perceptions require a different view of life. But overcoming the extant order or withstanding challengers requires a perpetual process of legitimation.

*Anomie, order, and enactment*

The idea that different social groups give different meaning to social behavior is explicated well by the concept of a "meaning world". These meaning worlds become the locus of control, the legitimated sets of behavior and purpose for individuals in reality. From these behavioral sets, through the dialectic process of society, reality is constructed and framed within a meaningful order, a nomos that represents what is 'right' in a symbolic totality of existence (Berger, 1967; Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Berger and Luckmann (1967) borrow for their symbolic interactionist framework a term from Durkheim's functional theory (ironic as it may seem). This "anomie" or normlessness becomes the terror that disrupts the "symbolic totality", the meaningful order of a given set of legitimated perceptions of reality.

It is without doubt that Berger and Luckmann's framework for a social construction of reality is crucial to understanding SCA. However, their framework is not without flaws. Weick (1979) contended:

> The notion that reality is a product of social construction does have some connotation of action conveyed by the word *construction*. But this construction is usually thought to involve activities of negotiation between people as to what is out there. Less prominent in these analyses is the idea that people, often alone, actively *put* things out there that they then perceive and negotiate about perceiving. It is that initial implanting of reality that is preserved by the word *enactment* (p. 165, *emphasis original*).

Weick (1979) countered the idea of social construction with the concept of enactment and 'enacted environment' to differentiate between the perceptual meaning world and the *actual* reality of life. He contended that the 'negotiated environment' as described by constructionist theories makes an object-subject distinction that negates the reciprocal influence between subjects and objects (pp. 164-5). So, in much the same way that positivist theorizing automates behavior and objectifies individuals, constructionist

theories make individuals separate from actual reality; though to some subscribers of an ideology, opponents may seem detached from it. Yet 'detached' or not, **both** meaning worlds exist – **in** reality.

Human enactment is the role that individuals play in co-creating an environment which then affects them. Enactment changes a given human environment and the cognitive maps of past experience, influencing the raw materials of sense making (Weick, 1979, pp. 130-131). It is in this real world of the senses where life takes place, including thoughts, international trade, and osmosis. Though it goes without saying that dividing the 'subject' and 'object' of experience is a necessary component of analysis in social science, the question of the reference frame for that analysis is crucial. This outlines the third principle of SCA and its reference frame for analysis: **human behavior is not a duality, rather a synergistic (or co-created) field of engagement and disengagement where divisions are only conceptual tools for analysis and understanding.**

The tendency to divide is seen in positivist theories, constructionist theories, as well as the plethora of philosophical treatises before them. However, placed upon a continuum from social structure to individual psychology, such theories also present another paradox – although division (postmodern or otherwise) is useful and necessary for analyzing social life, the actuality of life and the point of study takes place in the real world, in the space of flows, the space of places and social facts. Even when one is thinking, they are in the real world. Even though a war may be raging across the ocean it may still be in one's thoughts. Hence, the study of any dialectic process, any study of

reality, is really the study of synthesis and the points of reactivity (mutual antithesis) where individuals engage the world.

*Structuration in the lifeworld*

> Communicative actors are always moving *within* the horizon of their lifeworld; they cannot step outside of it…the lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjective), and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements (Habermas, 1987, p.126, *emphasis original*).

The transcendental nature of the Habermasian lifeworld characterizes the unity between the structural (or systemic) and the subjective. It is a simultaneous existence of the objective, subjective, and social. It evokes Husserl's concept of 'horizon', in that the thematic context of the lifeworld shifts depending upon spatiotemporal placement (Habermas, 1987). Habermas (1987) contended that "from the participant perspective of members of a lifeworld it looks as if sociology with a systems-theoretical orientation considers only one of the three components of the lifeworld, namely, the institutional system, for which culture and personality merely constitute complementary environments" (p. 153). Habermas contended that this was problematic, and sought to uncouple systemic and lifeworld *perspectives* – but not the system from the lifeworld. Rather, he saw the lifeworld as "the subsystem that defines the pattern of the social system as a whole" (Habermas, 1987, p. 154).

From the Habermasian perspective, the lifeworld becomes the 'location' of reality. This perspective also reemphasizes the paradox of structure and culture and the 'thematic' nature of specific and shifting social contexts. This 'shift' that occurs from one context to another is largely dependent upon the social facts of that location. A theme, then, could also be something emerging in opposition to the regular patterns of behavior in a single context. Hence, the structure that exists in the environment is constantly under

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pressure from these emerging forms of thematic behavior and/or ideas. The nature of this

process is described by Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration.

Sewell Jr. (1992) contended:

> [Giddens'] conception of human agents as "knowledgeable" and "enabled" implies that those agents are capable of putting their structurally formed capacities to work in creative or innovative ways. And, if enough people…act in innovative ways, their action may… [transform] the very structures that gave them the capacity to act" (p. 4).

Sewell (1992) continued, stating that Giddens' formulation of social systems "have no

existence apart from the practices that constitute them, and these practices are reproduced

by the "recursive" (i.e. repeated) *enactments* of structures; so structures aren't the pattern

of social practice, but the principles that pattern those practices (i.e. schemas)" (p. 6,

*emphasis mine*). These schemas "can be applied in or extended to a variety of contexts of

interaction…they can be generalized…to new situations" (Sewell, 1992, p. 8). Giddens'

theory of structuration does not retreat back to social constructionist conceptions of

meaning worlds, though the emphasis on schemas may create that illusion. Rather,

Giddens' structuration "is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence

of any form of societal totality, but practices ordered across space and time" (Giddens,

1984, p.2).

Giddens' structuration theory, however, suffers several criticisms. First, Giddens'

conceives of agency and structure as 'dual' or "both medium and outcome" (Sewell,

1992, p. 4) of social practices, rather than a dualism, which separates processes or social

facts in the conceptual dichotomy. The necessity of dualisms is supported by Archer, who

contended that there was utility in using these dualisms for social analysis. Archer's main

contention was that structure, culture, and agency are analytically distinct but clearly

intertwined in social life, and the loss of this distinction will decrease the understanding of their influences upon one another (Ritzer, 1996).

Second, Giddens' "structuration theory does not seem to have any end result. There is just an endless cycle of agency and structure without any direction" (Ritzer, 1996, p. 534). The agency-structure theory of Archer, however, places central focus on culture rather than structure. Archer contended that "structure and culture must be dealt with as relatively autonomous" conceptually speaking, because culture and structure are substantially different - "structure is the realm of material phenomena and interests" where "culture involves nonmaterial phenomena and ideas" (Ritzer, 1996, p. 534). So how can one accept Giddens' view without ignoring the analytical power of conceptual distinction? How can one accept Archer's proposition of the importance of culture without spiraling head-long back into the meaning world? How can one retain the empiricism of Durkheim's social facts without treating a human as an object?

*Cultural schemas in context*

Social change results from situations in which individuals no longer tolerate social injustice. An individual's engagement of specific social contexts has important implications for the role of situational factors in their schema formation and motivations to organize in pursuit of social change. The sense of normlessness emerging from social contradictions and conflicts can increase or decrease solidarity, depending on: 1) the level of organization (i.e., societal vs. group); or 2) affiliation with groups (i.e., in-group vs. out-group). However, previous theories have not been specific enough in distinguishing an appropriate frame of reference from which to study how social facts are actualized from the meaning worlds of the mind.

The development of schemas in human consciousness provides a survival mechanism and automatic template that impacts behavior. The basis for everyday, automatic cognition relies upon, "culturally available schemata – knowledge structures that represent objects or events and provide default assumptions about their characteristics, relationships, and entailments under conditions of incomplete information" (DiMaggio, 1997, p. 269). Such automatic processing is obviously useful in such instances as instinctive reaction to duck if one hears the sound of a gun shot, or knowing not to take a shortcut through a crime-ridden area after dark. Yet schematic organization becomes problematic if one relies solely on automatic cognitions in social interaction. In other words, the aforementioned automaton-like constraint (Blauner, 1964; Weick, 1979) and the structural determinism of Durkheim and others all hinge upon this fulcrum.

Schemas tell us a great deal about how culture works. Schemata are "cognitive shortcuts that promote efficiency at the expense of synoptic accuracy" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Bourdieu, 1990; Kahneman et al, 1982, *as cited in* DiMaggio, 1997, p. 269). The "expense" recorded by DiMaggio is that schematic organization necessarily reinforces the status-quo. As schemas are automatic and necessarily unconscious components of human consciousness, they may simultaneously reinforce social order as well as social injustice. Schemas, therefore, have a dual-function of cultural reality-maintenance (securing a culture's existence) and context-dependent reinforcement of social injustice (creating the assumption of things-as-they-are is the way things 'ought' to be).

The dual-function of schemas raises some important questions about how human environments evolve. Schematic organization is focused, above all, on efficiency, which a prime requisite for rationality. Schemas, then, become the path of reasoned action by which subjective norms and attitudes form intentions to act in one's best interest (Sabini, 1995). Auburn (1999) noted that "cultural schemas…tend to grow more simple and usable in the process of repeated transmission, are quickly and easily learned, activated and communicated to others" (p. 213). For example, an American cultural schema is that all individuals are created equal. The automatic reaction is that 'since we are all Americans, we are all equal'. Yet it does not take much deliberation to recognize that, in fact, all Americans are not *equal*. But for social change to occur, individuals must recognize a disparity between the 'ought' of ideas and the 'is' of reality. The question of the impact of cultural schemas, then, becomes not about *if* one can rationally understand inequality, but *how* one comes to such a conclusion. The answer, in part, comes from aesthetic perception.

Auburn (1999) described aesthetic perception as being designed to discriminate between similar objects, affording individuals the ability for recognition and judgment, and is said to induce self-transcendence, which provides the ability for an individual to have feelings for or to appreciate an event, idea, individual, way of life, etc. Aesthetic perception, then, is the means by which individuals comprehend sense-impressions in everyday reality and how one attains motivations to maintain preferred aspects of that reality and/or nomos. This has implications for the Habermasian lifeworld, for if the lifeworld is the 'transcendental' site for interaction, the means for this transcendence is aesthetically based. Therefore, although schemas serve important rational functions,

aesthetic perception is how individuals create (through appreciation and preference) the hierarchy of schemas within a particular culture and how schemas are maintained or changed. This differential hierarchy then becomes transmitted among individuals and through generations in a society; it is the basis for the structure of a society which reciprocally imposes back upon the individual. This provides the fourth principle of SCA: **cultural aesthetics' influence schema formation through sense experiences individuals engage in a social environment, producing appreciation, affiliation, and levels of integration – cultural aesthetics' inform schemas.**

The ecological and evolutionary advantage of schematic organization is found in how it simplifies aspects of environmental engagement in the form of interpreting sense-impressions. One must acknowledge that the closer to the situation one is the more specific schemas become. The further removed an individual is from an event or idea, the more general the schema becomes (*see* Habermas, 1987). The cognitive ascription to certain schemata produces motivation for action to reify or reject certain contextual events, ideas, etc. (*see* Lipset, 1993). The magnitude of preference for one schema or another influences the individual's actions regarding situation-specific events. Therefore, quite literally, self-perceived rational affiliation toward a certain schema determines how one "feels" about those events.

Decision-making becomes difficult when two schemas are conflicting. Festinger (1962) contended that cognitive dissonance occurs "if a person knows various things that are not psychologically consistent with one another" (p.10). After one senses the dissonance, they attempt to reconcile this feeling by taking action to reduce the dissonance. This 'sense' of dissonance may also be related to both Durkheim's and

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Berger and Luckmann's concept of anomie. Returning to the previous example, if one ascribes to the cultural schema that 'all Americans are created equal', and that person recognizes this is not true, then they would necessarily have to do something to decrease this opposing perception. The tipping point, however, is the magnitude of affiliation toward a certain schema and the opportunities for expressing those feelings.

*Cultural Hegemony*

Appreciation for social facts, both material and nonmaterial, comes in the form of personal preferences that are reified through interaction in human environments. As individuals interpret and are interpreted by others, and as various personalities interact, the meanings held in private belief are expressed based on the interpretation of situational constraints. As preferences of individuals come into balance, the balanced set of cognitions and feelings create cohesion among members of a group. This solidarity increases the salience of cultural schemas for members of a certain group, and these group preferences create distancing or even polarization from other groups with dissonant preferences. The issue of control among groups arises in the form of cultural hegemony, the "domination by ideas and *cultural forms* which induce consent to the rule of the leading groups in a society" (Durham et al., 2001, p. 33, *emphasis mine*). However, the 'consent' to govern is challenged, just as the existing social structure. The hegemonic order may represent a dominant side, but the cultural aesthetics of the situation include not only government, but the latent potentials for dominance and order.

The groups *leading* society are, in a hopeful democracy, the ones who have the interests of the masses in mind when making decisions about a particular human environment. These political forces create the basic structure of the environment, both

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political and social, as they set legal parameters for behavior. Cast (2003) invoked Goffman, stating that "one of the first things that individuals do in interaction is to establish a definition of the situation" (p.186). Hence the dominant groups are able to define the terms of behavior and the situation at hand. Cast (2003) continued, stating that to verify identities, "individuals work to control the definition of the situation (situational meanings) so as to support their own conception of self and other in the situation" (p.186).

Sewell Jr. (1992) contended that rules for social behavior are really schemas that "can be applied in or extended to a variety of contexts of interaction" (p.8). However, when the hegemonic force defines a schema that becomes dissonant, their relative power to define the situation decreases. For example, President George W. Bush contended in 2003 that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq was a central front in the War on Terror. At the time, Bush had the power to define the situation as threatening to American interests. As time bore on, however, the clarity of Bush's threat-schema gave way to evidence that caused dissonant beliefs in both the public and government. Hence, the rules for behavior in that context became dissonant, and increasing anomie emerged as more information was added to the definition of the situation (i.e. there were no weapons of mass destruction).

The influence of cultural hegemony on schemas only goes as far as those schemas can be reified by the public. If conflicting information arises the legitimacy of a schema can be questioned. Such was the case with the Iraq war. For example, the evidence for a cognitive shift concerning American hegemonic control was the 2006 mid-term elections. The cultural schema of threat broadened, and the political climate shifted as the

Democrats took control of the House of Representatives and the Senate. This creates a distinctly different context and feeling in America due to the different people (and personas) in positions of power. However, though the schema of terrorism-threat remains intact, there has been a shift in preference for the method of maintaining schemas of freedom.

The process of schema-maintenance involves the legitimation of a particular worldview. The existing social structure of a particular population provides the feeling of normalcy. However, different individuals will interpret and act on the opportunities of this structure in different ways. Structural manifestations (particular forms of structure) influence individuals to associate based on the degree of similarity, proximity, and familiarity. As groups diverge from one another the clarity of differentiation between groups and the opportunity for cohesion within the group increases. The appreciation for certain structural manifestations differs depending on a group's ideology. The different ways that structural constraints influence individuals to reject or reify the idea of structure they have in their mind exhibits a particular cultural aesthetic. In other words, a worldview is legitimated when a cultural schema appears to have meaning and purpose.

The feeling one gets from engaging particular structural constraints will diverge from the taken-for-granted assumptions of everyday life based on the magnitude of feeling for preferred aspects of potential realities constrained by the opportunities presented by structure. The degree to which one worldview diverges from another is based on how individuals interpret the structural manifestations of reality. A particular group will have a particular worldview. Yet many differing worldviews can exist within a particular population. However, for the legitimacy of a hegemonic worldview to be

challenged, the cognitive schemas ascribed to that ideology must be changed. This becomes problematic due to the difficult nature of schema-change.

Social divergence is based on the particular qualities of schemas. The degree of schematic divergence is equal to the degree of conflict, competition, or cooperation between groups. Cultural aesthetics exhibit how different social groups are shaped by one another. This mutual-molding creates social structure and cognitive structure simultaneously. The information from particular co-created environments is often incomplete. However, an individual can only make inferences based on what they think they know. It is this history of consciousness that takes the form of cognitive schemas. Schemas are literally the structural templates for behavior that are influenced by environmental engagement. However, for a schema to change there must be a shift from automatic to deliberative cognition.

The legitimation of ideology is based on the maintenance of schema appreciation. This appreciation, preference, meaning, or purpose in the social world also influences the stability of cognition. In other words, a true 'change of mind' means that someone has considered the implications of social impressions. However, there are many acknowledged problems in the world that have yet to change. As implied earlier, schemas developed in response to fear conditioning. It would stand to reason that the terror of anomie is related to the disruption of the schema. Further, fear itself is the impression of a potential hope destroyed or current happiness removed. It would seem, then, that the mechanics of schematic response is to maintain certain forms or modes of life. In other words, things as they are become legitimated through the security of their existence – safety and security alleviate fear.

The hierarchy of schemas held by a nation, state, or community may change as information regarding the accuracy of the schema is introduced. Not only on an international level can the hierarchy change, as the Iraq war, but on a grassroots level as well. For example, a particular political environment will favor certain group preferences over others. However, the individuals interacting under those constraints are affected when the salience of inconsistencies increases in the cultural schemas. So while the individuals are feeling dissonance, the group senses injustice. It is the interaction of individuals feeling dissonance that reify such feelings. This reification produces the motivation for affiliation and identity formation, the conditions of anomie or societal breakdown, and the reasons (grievances) for organization to enact change.

**CHAPTER FOUR:**
**Literature review – Perspectives on collective action**

> The different theoretical approaches in social movement literature can be defined as putting an emphasis on one of four factors: grievances, resources, political opportunities or processes of meaning construction (Klandermans, 1997, p. 200).

*Theoretical perspectives*

Classical theories of collective behavior – symbolic-interaction, structural-functionalism, and relative deprivation – rest on several assumptions: 1) collective behavior is a unitary concept where different forms are seen as nearly interchangeable; 2) collective behavior is non-institutional; 3) collective behavior is seen as a reaction to societal stress, strain, or breakdown; 4) direct causes for collective behavior come from various forms of individual discontent or anxiety; 5) collective behavior is essentially psychological rather than political; and 6) the legitimacy of collective behaviors is denied and labeled dangerous or irrational (Buechler, 2000, pp. 20-21). Jenkins (1983) contended that these theories "pointed to the sudden increases in individual grievances generated by the "structural strains" of rapid social change" as the cause for collective behavior, however, the social movements taking place during the 1960s "dramatically challenged these assumptions" (p. 528).

A primary challenger of these assumptions was Doug McAdam. Buechler (2000) described McAdam's (1982) contention that the classical model "ignores the larger political context in which movements arise…assume[ing] away the central social process of translating individual mental states into genuinely collective phenomena…[in a] convenient justification" (p. 31). This critique is the essential break of the resource mobilization paradigm from classical breakdown theories. It also serves as a caveat – there is a distinction necessary between collective behavior, per se, and a social

movement. To wit, a fad or riot is different than a strategically organized movement. Additionally, a particular form of collective behavior (i.e. antiwar protest) may at one time be a spontaneous group (or individual) reaction and at another time a social movement; this progression may or may not be linear.

The emergence of the resource mobilization paradigm also emphasizes how the study of collective behavior changed along with the movement environment in America. Klandermans (1997) contended that "resource mobilization and political process theories start from the assumption that insurgency constitutes a set of rational collective actions by excluded groups to advance their interests" (p. 203). Buechler (2000) explicated the resource mobilization paradigm contending that "social movements are an extension of politics by other means…analyzed in terms of conflicts of interest just like other forms of political struggle…[that are] structured and patterned…like other forms of institutionalized action" (pp. 34-35, see Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1977, 1973; Tilly, 1978). However, some have criticized the paradigm for ignoring the "cultural and symbolic life world that necessarily underpins such strategic action" (Habermas 1987, 1984 *as cited in* Buechler, 2000, p. 38).

In the defense of breakdown theories, relative deprivation does provide a framework that is "fairly straightforward and hard to dismiss, people rebel in response to perceived injustice" (Klandermans, 1997, p. 202). As individuals begin to form groups that reflect similar motives, members of the group then perceive themselves in relation to other groups. Brewer and Miller (1996) contended that:

> Just as abilities and attributes are evaluated by comparison with others, the value attached to outcomes such as economic or social rewards may also be determined by social comparison…Feelings of resentment and the sense of injustice that arises from perceiving that one has less than is deserved (compared to others) is called *relative deprivation* (p. 15, *emphasis original*).

The idea of social comparison evokes Festinger, whose social comparison theory contended "that people need a sense of subjective validity for their beliefs about themselves and the world around them…[so] people engage in "social reality testing"" (Brewer & Miller, 1996, p. 39). This reality testing is intimately linked with reality-maintenance, which is the job of the schema. Schemas serve as the template for action in a social setting. This reaction is twofold: 1) an individual tests the cognitive (individual) schemas in interactions varying in constraint based on the situation; and 2) at the group level, the sense of affiliation and appreciation for certain objectives provide motivations for enactment to test cultural (group) schemas.

Gaskill (1990) contended "that relative deprivation should be understood as a sense of deprivation that can vary for a person on two dimensions: magnitude, the discrepancy between the desired and present position, and degree, the emotional intensity with which the deprivation is felt" (p. 261). Gaskill's use of "sense" connects individual dissonance to the social comparisons making individuals aware of a disparity between groups. More importantly, it leads to the importance of context in shaping dissonance, balance, and behavior. However, Klandermans (1997) stated an obvious dilemma in relative deprivation – "it is hard to understand how a subjective state such as relative deprivation can be deduced from objective or structural conditions…[more often] objective conditions do *not* translate into the feelings of relative deprivation and injustice" (p. 202, *emphasis original*).

In response to both politics by other means and the inherently negative connotation of *breakdown* theories, a "new" theory of social movements has emerged. Labeled "new social movements" theory, here social movements are seen as "people in

search of a new collective identity" (Klandermans, 1987, p. 204). Identity is a concept

that has been broadly formulated in the field of social psychology from both a

psychological and sociological perspective. In both cases, each presents the identity as a

'prototype', or definitional representation of a category, though the sociological concept

is related to role-salience and the psychological concept to self-categorization to the in-

group. It bears mentioning that the process of identity formation, whether psychological

or sociological, has obvious links the group comparisons of relative deprivation.

New social movements theory involves a plethora of themes, of which several

important to our interests here will be mentioned: 1) a societal totality provides the

context for collective action; 2) the societal totality is a causal factor in movement

emergence; 3) movements are no longer based in class structure; 4) collective identity is

central to social protest; 5) everyday life has been politicized; and 6) the role of cultural

and symbolic forms of resistance are crucial (Buechler, 2000, pp.46-47). The importance

of context and the politicization of everyday life are crucial to understanding the post-

materialist values which strive for quality rather than quantity of life. This helps to

explain the foundational role of identity, and the struggle for identity, in a postmodern

capitalist world. Hence, from this perspective, social movement activism occurs in

response to the societal context in which the agent is located and how that activism

provides purpose or 'quality' to the life of the agent.

The need to increase the quality of life bears stark resemblance to dissonance-

induced deprivation. Hence, the agent experiencing the dissonant feelings of late

modernity identifies with a group providing an identity of change. An exemplar of new

social movement theorizing and the process of agent activism-decision is found in

Klandermans' *Social Psychology of Protest*. Klandermans (1997) contended that

"collective action frames…are sets of collective beliefs that serve to create a state of

mind in which participation in collective action appears meaningful" (p. 17). Gamson

(1992 *as cited in* Klandermans, 1997) distinguished three components of these 'frames':

"(1) a sense of injustice, (2) an element of identity and (3) the factor of agency" (p.17).

Klandermans described the problematic nature of the objectivity of *injustice*, which bears

relevance to our interests here as it reinforces the problematic nature of relative

deprivation.

Klandermans evolves the deprivation hypothesis by conceiving of grievance and

sensed injustice as a process forming identity. This grievance-based identity formation is

obviously objective (one can see groups people actively identify with), yet they must both

be coupled with agency for movement participation to occur. The key question for

Klandermans is how and when people 'engage' in social movement activism, and at what

point they 'disengage' from it. The necessity of the politicization of an issue and public

discourse about it are fundamental to engagement. Discourse and politicization, however,

originate in structural and cultural cleavages (latent potentials for grievances) stemming

from the different sides to the issues of the day (i.e. gender, peace, war, environment,

homosexuality). The crucial point is the social context and "multiorganizational field" of

different organizations with to which the movement organization may link itself

(Klandermans, 1997).

The primary differentiation between classical theories of collective behavior and

contemporary theories of collective action is that in the latter the specificity of the

emerging form of dissent is established. Though classical theories still linger, they are

being evolved as social scientists come to a greater understanding of our social world.

Interestingly, the contemporary theories have more in common than it may seem. For

both resource mobilization (i.e. McAdams) and new social movements (i.e.

Klandermans) each recognize the importance of political environments and social

context. Although their emphasis, or reference frame, is focused on different aspects of

protest behavior, they too, like other dualisms, present the opportunity for a useful

synthesis.

*Empirical studies*

The timing, place and pace of social movements may be viewed as equally

important as the factors that influence them. For when one knows the details of the

contextualized protest event, the influential factors can be discovered. Minkoff (1997)

contended that "in the 1960s and 1970s…groups historically shut out of the political

arena gained access to an extent previously unknown" (p. 779). This evolution of action

must also be linked to the evolution of ideas – of which freedom and equality must have

been central to this shift. Emerging from the facts of this time is a precarious question:

how does one explain social protest? Even as discussed briefly above, the theoretical

perspectives on protest are diverse. However, the commonalities among these theoretical

standpoints offer the beginnings of a solution.

Minkoff (1997) contended that organizational density (the number of protest

organizations) in a particular context was an essential component of protest cycles. In the

article, Minkoff focused on the cyclic or sequential nature of social movements and the

dependency of protest diffusion upon an "organizational niche" – the support network or

resource parameters for an organizational environment. The "organizational niche" is

offered as an alternative to the demonstration effect – the idea that if other organizations are successful that it will inspire others to join. McAdam (1995 *as cited in* Minkoff, 1997) argued that "cultural diffusion and adaptation drive protest cycles" and that initiator movements ('early risers') "are the source of new cultural forms – of insurgent consciousness, cognitive liberation, injustice frames – and spin-off movements" adopt similar strategies and use the avenues of success from these initiator movements for a wider diffusion of protest (p. 781). However, it is the 'carrying capacity' of a political environment where these new organizations emerge or old organizations endure that largely determines the viability for success.

Minkoff (1997) showed how the number of extant protest organizations "promotes and shapes new organizational activity" (p. 782). Established groups in a socio-political environment have the obvious advantage, where new groups have to carve out a 'niche' for themselves. Using civil rights protest and its organizational growth from 1955 to 1985, Minkoff showed the niche-affect on feminist organizational foundings during the same time period.  Minkoff's organizational dynamic model showed that an increase in the density of feminist protest organizations was inversely related to feminist protest events, and an increase in "Black" protest events "dampened" (decreased) the number of feminist events (Minkoff, 1997, pp. 788-91). This seemingly interconnected 'niche' provides a useful tool for looking at how protest organizations come into existence and bring to fruition a protest event. However, if fails to answer a crucial question about the context where this niche is built.

It stands to reason that protest organizations that have existed in a particular social context will have more freedom of resources and action than up-and-coming

organizations. The parameters described by Minkoff's organizational dynamic model expressed the relation between different types of organizations and protest activity. This model is supported by the inverse relation of feminist and 'black' activism. More curious than that, however, is that more feminist protest organizations led to a decreased number of feminist protest events. The role of solidarity among the feminist protest groups should be addressed. Such fragmented organizational structures in a particular context imply a varied and fragmented purpose or goal-set, which may also be linked to a diversity of grievances. Although the organizational dynamic model explains how one type of organization affects another, it may not be sufficient to address the nature of a particular group in the same context. However, the strength of Minkoff (1997) comes in the purview of the influence of behavior parameters and coalition formation in a specific political environment. Minkoff (1997) contended, "the growth of a national organizational infrastructure may encourage multimovement coalitions that can position supporters inside the political system…maintaining readiness for future protest" (p. 796).

McAdam (1983) contended that the pace of insurgency is related to the process of tactical innovation. The idea behind McAdam's claim is similar to Minkoff's. In Minkoff's conception, the sequence of movement activity is related to the receptiveness of an organizational niche to upcoming movements. McAdam's contended that challengers to hegemonic domination must "devise techniques that offset their powerlessness" (McAdam, 1983, p. 735). These two are similar in that there is competition for a position in the political opportunity structure. Of course, the fundamental difference is that Minkoff was focusing on inter-movement relations and the

creation of a niche that supported movement activity, where McAdam focused on the

insurgency of challengers against institutionalized (formal) social control.

McAdam's (1983) re-emphasizes Minkoff, contending that "tactical

innovation…derives much of its significance from the larger political/organizational

context in which it occurs" (p. 736). Further, McAdam contended that peaks in black

insurgency against segregationist domination from 1955 to 1970 were linked to the

introduction and diffusion of new protest techniques. Interestingly, McAdam focuses on

the type of protest occurring, though he links it to 'techniques' rather than the expression

of a cultural form. In other words, these forms become primarily tactical or functional

rather than expressive or symbolic. One can readily see the resource mobilization

perspective in McAdam's analysis and some variant of it as well in Minkoff. Each is

looking at the way a particular political/organizational opportunity structure constrains

the abilities of organizations to engage in collective protest. But again, where each

described tactics and the parameters for coalition, they each seemingly ignore the cultural

components which give meaning to the reasons to act collectively in the first place.

Klandermans (1985) contended that "if social context were sufficient as an

explanation…I would not expect to find variance among people in the same social

context" (p. 860). Hence, such variance in movement participation among individuals in

the same social context seems problematic. In other words, how can a particular social

context be the determinant for social movement activism if not everyone is acting? In his

studies of union action, Klandermans (1984 *as cited in* Oegema and Klandermans, 1994)

contended that union member willingness to participate depended on the action proposed

and that participation levels varied over different industrial settings (p. 703). Oegema and

Klandermans (1984) concluded that participants in the Dutch Peace Movement had "increasingly divergent perceptions of the social environment" (p.714). Each of these conclusions reinforce Klandermans' contention that social context is not the sufficient condition for engagement in collective action. However, upon further inspection, one can also discern a carefully placed phrase – divergent perceptions.

To say that qualities of a social context, *a priori*, would force individuals to engage in collective action would revert the understanding of social context, or social structure for that matter, to the determinism of positivist theorization. In all fairness, this is not what Klandermans meant. Rather, he was focusing on the agency of individuals in that context and how social movements take "place in the context of the formation of mobilization potentials, the formation of recruitment networks, and the arousal of the motivation to participate" (Klandermans, 1985, p. 860). The concept of mobilization potentials, for Klandermans, is focused more on consensus mobilization than resources, and these potentials, along with recruitment networks which can actualize them, give a hint of agency to Minkoff's organizational niche. The variable of divergence for Klandermans from both Minkoff and McAdam comes in the form of motivation.

Measuring motivation is tricky. However, it stands to reason that differing degrees in magnitude of feeling (which would influence motivation to act) will produce different types of behaviors. For example, if a nation went to war to pursue its attacker, people may not like the idea of war, they may talk about their dislike of it, but they may not do anything. However, if a nation fought a war that enough individuals felt was unnecessary, unjust, or unlawful, hundreds of thousands may march on the capitol. A central concern of Klandermans is what causes individuals to engage and disengage in

protest. A central concern for Minkoff is how specific opportunity structures and organizational density influences collective action. For McAdam, the pace of insurgency is a concern, where tactical innovation determines the lull in the protest cycle. Yet in each of these perspectives, a central theme is dominant – engagement in collective action is dependent upon a social context that is characterized by divergences in perception and adaptation to the characteristics of those contextual divergences.

McAdam and Su (2002) contended that forms of antiwar protest activity were related to congressional voting during the Vietnam era. He concluded that: 1) extreme forms of antiwar protest (i.e. violent) simultaneously increased pro-peace voting while slowing down congressional action; and 2) persuasive forms of protest (i.e. large number of protesters) simultaneously increased the pace of congressional action while decreasing the chance of pro-peace outcomes (p. 696). These paradoxical results provide an important distinction when considering Klandermans – is the motivation to stop the war at all costs greater than the way it is done? In other words, does the end of a war justify the means - even if its violence in the streets against one another? For if congressional action is not taken quickly, does McAdam and Su (2002) suggest that violence begets more violence? Or if an undeniable show of dissent is laid upon the altar of freedom, does congressional action in collaboration with that expression not produce results? This seems problematic, yet it also seems as reflexive as the diffusion of protest in Minkoff's organizational niche, as reflexive as structure and culture, as reflexive as freedom and terror. Many have asked 'why do we fight?', but should one not also ask what are *we* – soldiers, politicians, and citizens – fighting for?  It is with this in mind that the original

question of this study must be brought to bear – under what conditions does a nation at

war turn against itself?

# CHAPTER FIVE:
## Methods and data

To determine conditions that create a nation's turn against itself, a variety of methods were used. Three hypotheses were generated based on the principles of SCA. The conditions for each era were analyzed separately and compared to discern the affects of a cultural aesthetic of dissent on reactivity. The form of antiwar protest, not only type and place, but potential change in American antiwar protest intensity, was used to gauge the societal context in general.

*Hypothesis 1: Time-space contextual variables affect the intensity of antiwar protest reactivity.*

It stands to reason that individuals engaging in antiwar protest activity are relatively affected by the larger societal context in question. The time period in question has distinct organizational constructs (i.e. organizational density), ideological and generational conflicts, and different social and political environments. However, by looking at a particular geographic region (America) in two different time-periods and wars, the evolution of a cultural aesthetic aids in understanding what produces the dynamics of contention and division. In this case, antiwar protest is used as an indicator of American beliefs about the defense of freedom. As freedom is a fundamental cultural schema, and the level of integration among citizens concerning the means of maintaining and achieving such freedom in the real world (i.e. quality of life) a large determinant in influencing social personality and behavior, the conflicts arising from differing impressions of that schema come to fruition in the reactivity of antiwar protest.

*Hypothesis 2: Cultural variation is exhibited by changes in the social form of protest.*

The way dissent is expressed speaks volumes of the social structure in which it is located. The absence or presence of certain forms of behavior in the same region at different times indicates a thematic and structural shift in the political environment, the meaning worlds of the mind, and the material and nonmaterial social facts of a particular context. Additionally, an increase or decrease of intensity or frequency of certain forms of behavior indicates an evolution of old forms of behavior or new outlets for dissent. Intra-national conflicts, in the form of social and political cleavages, stem from the culture that frames the quality of an environment. The more intense the reactivity between these cleavages, the more divergent and potentially unstable is the environment in question.

*Hypothesis 3: Cultural variation of social forms is exhibited by a change in reactivity within the same geographic parameters where surges in protest activity are related to the larger societal context.*

The reaction time or pace at which dissenters engage hegemonic control depicts the magnitude of preference for certain schemas. Reciprocally, the way hegemonic control mechanisms (law enforcement) handles a protest situation reflects the schematic norms of that hegemony. This engagement shows the organizational links extant in an environment through the time it takes to mobilize consensus and resources. As mentioned earlier, there is a difference between a social movement and collective behavior. The reaction time of dissenters also shows the characteristics of a particular cultural aesthetic. In other words, the timing of reaction shows the readiness and degree of integration of a particular social form into the institutionalized order. The 'order' that is maintained in the

engagement of emergent and traditional forms indicates the level of organization and preparedness of both.

Surges in antiwar protest activity are obviously related to the fact that a war is occurring. However, the particular reaction to different types of historical events at the national and international levels indicates a cultural shift in dissenter impressions and hierarchies of importance. For example, the organization of a protest event around an anniversary versus a troop increase shows a difference in the focus and significance of dissent. Additionally, similar dissenter reactions to historical events would indicate a similarity in schema importance over time.

*Data*

The data were collected on American antiwar protest events from August 5, 1964 to June 20, 1968 and March 16, 2003 to January 31, 2007. The start dates for the search accounted for the one-day lag in reporting time. A list of articles was compiled using *The New York Times* online archive in each time-frame using the archive search engine. Seven searches in each time-frame were conducted using the terms: (campus, demonstrations, "War name"), (antiwar demonstrations), (antiwar), (campus unrest), (peace, demonstrations, "War name"), (protest, "War name", dissent), (protest, "War name"). In each search, the appropriate war (Iraq or Vietnam) was inserted for "War name". Only articles pertaining to U.S. continental antiwar protest were compiled in each list. Articles were cross-referenced to exclude duplicate listings[6]. The total number of articles suitable for analysis in the Vietnam era was 452. From these articles, information

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[6] Articles were not excluded until actual content analysis was done to maximize the coverage of antiwar protest. In other words, although the search terms may pull up an article, the article may only be scarcely related to the study in question. For example, many articles compiled to the original list were reporting on the war in question and may have mentioned protest but did not cite actual protest events.

on 112 protest events was suitable for further analysis. The total number of articles suitable for analysis in the Iraq era was 234. From these articles, information on 58 protest events was suitable for further analysis.

The method of SCA is to explain human behavior by looking at the contextual variables surrounding a social form. In this case, the data retrieved from analysis was focused to analyze the conditions directly engaged by individuals at protest events. Data was coded for arrest, injury, death, date, week, city, state, duration, protest volume, thematic projection, place, protest type, military presence, and counter-protester presence.

*Dependent Variables*

To measure reactivity, the number of deaths, injuries, and arrests were tallied. However, the only deaths (2) were by self-immolation and were excluded from the analysis. Arrests and injuries, then, are the variables that exhibit reactivity. As mentioned earlier, reactivity is not just action or reaction, but the interactive residue of engagement. Hence, arrest totals include both antiwar protesters and counter-protesters, while injury totals include antiwar protesters, counter-protesters, and police. For clarity, the purpose is not to pit protester against police, but to look at the number of Americans hurt or arrested.

*Independent Variables*

The importance of time-space context was elaborated when determining the predictors of protest reactivity and the level of intensity thereof. Each protest event was coded by date (month/day/year) and by week (1-203) for each era. The city and state where each protest occurred was defined. The duration of protest was coded in hours, with times less than an hour being represented mathematically (i.e. 30 minutes = 0.5).

Duration was the most frequently missing data. The predictors just mentioned are straightforward, while the other predictors require more examination.

*Place*

The concept of "place" is different than "location", in that place describes the perceptual features of the immediate sensory environment. Place describes the contextual features of both the built environment and the natural environment. For example, if I said 'where are you located?' you might reply 'I am at home'. However, to understand what 'type' of home it is, much more description and, optimally, direct engagement of that place is needed. In other words, you would get a very different feeling from being in a cabin in the hills than a penthouse in New York. As pertains here, place represents the contextual demarcation of where the protest occurred (took 'place'). For both eras, place was coded as government building, street, public square, national monument, military recruitment center, military installation, college campus, and public building. Government building was used as the reference variable for this category.

*a) Government building*

The qualifications for coding place as government building begins with at least minimal restrictions of entry for the public and certain rules or regulations for entrance. The most frequent examples of places coded as 'government buildings' were: the White House, U.N. Mission, the Pentagon, Federal or Supreme Courts, and residences of government officials. Though there is a precarious nature to defining a private residence as a government building, this coding was justified by the rationale that: 1) in all likelihood, an antiwar protest wouldn't have taken place near the residence of a non-government official; and 2) an antiwar protest wouldn't have been directed at a private

residence unless there was a government official living there that was related in some way with the war. A prime example is the protest at the Bush ranch in Texas by Cindy Sheehan and others. In other words, there is at least a symbolic extension of the relation of government which takes form in the residence of a government official.

*b) Street*

The coding for street was sometimes difficult. It stands to reason that many protest marches begin at one site and end at another. However, when coding this variable, certain qualifications had to be met. First, a place was considered 'street' if it was the primary place of occupancy during the protest. Secondly, most articles demarcated this place with phrases like: 'marched through the streets', 'took to the streets', 'parade route', 'street barricades', 'antiwar march', etc. In a few cases, protesters met at a college campus or at "ground-zero" in New York, but the site itself was only a point of origin.

*c) Public Square*

The coding for public square was determined by the stationary congregation of antiwar protesters in a center of a city or principle intersection. Data for public squares were usually straight forward, with articles citing 'Times Square', 'Union Square', etc.

*d) National Monument*

The coding for national monument was almost exclusively the Washington Monument in Washington, D.C. However, places like memorial bridges or natural environments given state or national recognition and/or funding (i.e. national park) were also coded as national monument.

*e) Military Recruitment Center*

The coding for military recruitment center was inclusive of both recruiting stations and selective service stations. At the time of the composition of this study there was no draft in Iraq. Yet this convergence of place presents symmetry for both eras. Further, though a volunteer army and a draft army are much different, both the recruiting stations and draft boards were/are the respective means to induct soldiers into war.

*f) Military Installation*

Military installations (i.e. army bases) were distinguished from recruitment centers for a pretty obvious reason. Although military personnel are at both locations, there is a grand contrast between protesting in front of a recruiting station and a military base. Articles made clear distinctions between the two.

*g) College Campus*

Protest events considered to have taken place on a college campus were coded directly from the citation of the college in the article in reference to the event.

*h) Public buildings*

Public buildings are considered places that most anyone could enter under normal conditions or with easily attainable reservations (i.e. working hours). Examples include hotels, convention centers, and arenas.

*Protest type*

The emphasis of SCA is on the cultural variation of social forms and how that variation can be used to deduce behavioral and/or ideological shifts as well as the conditions of the larger societal context. In this study, the form of 'protest' is specified as 'antiwar protest'. The protest type further specifies the form antiwar protest takes in

certain contexts. This was done to examine the affects of dissent-form on reactive intensity. The protest forms were coded as sit-in, rally, march, vigil, teach-in, and picket. Sit-in was used as the reference variable for this category.

*a) Sit-in*

Sit-ins are characterized by the determination to resist being moved by law enforcement (whether police or military), or the infiltration of a particular social space. Hence 'stand-ins' or 'walk-ins' were also coded in this category.

*b, c, d) Rally, march, and picket*

Rallies were coded under the specifications than an event was primarily stationary. Usually, rally-types included guest speakers, but sometimes they included individuals with pickets. Again, as with certain place-types, the primary focus of the event determined categorization. The prime determinant for a picket was characterized by protesters with signs or placards blocking public spaces, walking back and forth on the sidewalk, etc. However, if no distinction could be made between a rally and a picket, or no distinction was made in the article, the case was listed as missing. A similar dilemma comes between the march-type and picket-type. Marches were characterized by parade routes and the mobility of the protesters. Linguistically, marches were more clearly distinguished from pickets than pickets from rallies. Obviously, there is a difference between twenty people 'marching back and forth' on the sidewalk with placards and 200,000 people marching down 5th Avenue in New York.

*e) Teach-in*

A teach-in is a distinct protest type and was defined as the organized means to disseminate views (one-sided or objective) about the war being protested. Generally,

these took place on college campuses in school rooms or reserved spaces in convention halls or hotels. Teach-ins are characterized by the rotation of speakers and/or debates from respective sides.

*f) Vigil*

The most distinct protest type was the vigil. It is characterized by silent or peaceful protest, they are stationary, and are of longer duration or ritualized (i.e. every Saturday). In addition, vigils are characterized by the homage to or mourning of those engaged or formally engaged in the war effort.

*Thematic projection*

The theme of protest was divided into antiwar and anti-draft. The lack of a draft in the early Iraq era did not prevent this coding. Originally, specifications were made (i.e. antigovernment, anti-soldier, etc.) that would have been more evaluative of the Iraq era. However, no such distinctions could be made. Event themes were coded for Vietnam in this fashion to discern the effects of the anti-draft sentiment on antiwar reactivity. An event coded as anti-draft met the qualifications of being visibly or symbolically represented through signs, directed speech, or organized and disseminated as particularly an "anti-draft protest" by protest organizers.

*Protest Volume*

Protest volume was coded as the number of protesters at a protest event. Obviously there is a dilemma of estimation in the cases of larger events, although smaller events were most often exact (i.e. 48). In cases where an exact number was not reported, estimates were made if sufficient evidence was listed. These are the cases: "a couple of thousand" was coded as 2,000; "several thousand" was coded as 3,000; "tens of

thousands" was coded as 20,000. In cases where a range was given (i.e. 2,000-3,000), the mean was used (i.e. 2,500). In cases where there were conflicting reports of the volume (i.e. protest organizers v. police estimates) police estimates were used. In cases where government officials could not comment (Iraq war era in D.C.), "unofficial" police estimates were given precedence. In some cases no source was listed. When that occurred, only Associated Press releases were coded. Other cases were listed as missing.

*Military and counter-protester presence*

The presence of 'military' was only considered in cases where military police were used as a means of social control or secret service members directly engaged protesters. Obviously, military installments or military recruitment centers were **not** considered military presence. Counter-protester presence was considered in cases where there was a critical mass of individuals in contention with the views of the antiwar protesters.

**CHAPTER SIX:**
**Findings**

*Hypothesis 1: Time-space contextual variables affect the intensity of antiwar protest*
*reactivity.*

An OLS regression was run to determine the influence of contextual variables on
arrests and injuries in both periods of the Iraq and Vietnam wars under study. Cases were
excluded pairwise to maximize data. The Vietnam Models had a total of 112 cases (n =
112) and the Iraq Models had a total of 58 cases (n = 58). For both Model 1 (dependent
variable – number of arrests) and Model 2 (dependent variable – number of injuries) the
variables teach-in, thematic projection, military presence, and duration were excluded
from analysis in the Iraq era due to missing correlations. Model 1 for both eras was
significant: Vietnam (Sig. = .034), (F = 2.093), ($R^2$ = .519); Iraq (Sig. = .000), (F =
6.762), ($R^2$ = .702). Model 2 was not significant in the Vietnam era. Model 2 was only
marginally significant in the Iraq era: (Sig. = .402), ($R^2$ = .287), (F = 1.085). The lone
variable of significance for Model 2 was "military installation" in the Iraq era (.004)[7].

For Model 1 in the Vietnam era, Table 1 shows that military presence (.028),
duration (.008), and vigil (.049) were significant. The presence of military police and
protests of longer duration were positively influential on increasing numbers of arrest.
Protests of the vigil-type were inversely related to number of arrests. For Model 1 in the
Iraq era, Table 1 shows that protest volume (.000) and street (.005) were significant. In
the Iraq era, larger protests and protests taking place in the street were positively
influential on increasing numbers of arrest. For Model 2 in the Iraq era, protests occurring
at a military installation were more likely to produce injury.

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[7] A table of Model 2 was not included due to its marginal influence and prediction power.

**Table 1: OLS regression indicating affects of contextual variables on arrest**

| Model 1 | Vietnam Era | | | Iraq Era | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | b | Std. Error | β | b | Std. error | β |
| (Constant) | 5.139 | 42.610 | | 42.048 | 92.953 | |
| Protest Volume | .001 | .001 | .236 | .003*** | .000 | .774 |
| Rally | -31.424 | 32.912 | -.170 | -49.979 | 116.948 | -.057 |
| Vigil | -119.141*[a] | 58.318 | -.360 | -63.468 | 114.383 | -.066 |
| Picket | -25.995 | 30.246 | -.130 | -173.597 | 114.724 | -.202 |
| March | -25.010 | 34.559 | -.133 | -180.153 | 108.613 | -.257 |
| Teach-in | -30.726 | 49.442 | -.085 | -[b] | -[b] | -[b] |
| College Campus | -27.042 | 36.741 | -.152 | 129.688 | 184.137 | .074 |
| Military installation | -36.739 | 54.172 | -.101 | 37.259 | 152.977 | .026 |
| Military recruitment center | 31.606 | 46.393 | .144 | 43.633 | 134.824 | .035 |
| Public square | 16.398 | 37.610 | .080 | 21.782 | 105.968 | .023 |
| Public building | -27.088 | 41.269 | -.103 | 48.081 | 148.302 | .033 |
| National monument | -2.523 | 56.843 | -.006 | -126.940 | 109.979 | -.129 |
| Street | -7.777 | 38.497 | -.037 | 288.668** | 96.425 | .408 |
| Thematic projection | 14.172 | 27.282 | .088 | -[b] | -[b] | -[b] |
| Duration | 2.123** | .749 | .529 | -[b] | -[b] | -[b] |
| Military presence | 111.853* | 48.734 | .336 | -[b] | -[b] | -[b] |
| Counter-protester presence | -3.157 | 24.581 | -.018 | -25.035 | 130.677 | -.020 |
| $R^2$ | .519 | | | .709 | | |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | .271 | | | .605 | | |
| Number of Cases (N) | 112 | | | 58 | | |
| Degrees of Freedom (d.f.) | 17 | | | 13 | | |
| Standard Error of the Estimate | 64.26459 | | | 206.25456 | | |

(a) * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$;  (b) Variables excluded from analysis due to missing correlations

*Hypothesis 2: Cultural variation is exhibited by changes in the social form of protest.*

The aesthetic expression of antiwar protest can be seen through observing the place in which the protest occurred (Model 3) and the type of protest occurring (Model 4). Table 2 shows the variation in place (Model 3) between the Vietnam and Iraq war eras. The top three places (% of total) in the Vietnam era were: 1) College campus (23.2%); 2) Public square (16.1%); and 3) Government building and street (tied at 15.2%). The top three places (% of total) in the Iraq era were: 1) street (29.3%); 2) government building (20.7%); and 3) public square (13.8%).

**Table 2: Frequency of the place of protest in the Vietnam and Iraq eras**

| Place | Vietnam era | | Iraq era | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| Government building | 17 | 15.2 | 12 | 20.7 |
| Street | 17 | 15.2 | 17 | 29.3 |
| Public square | 18 | 16.1 | 8 | 13.8 |
| National monument | 4 | 3.6 | 7 | 12.1 |
| Military recruitment center | 15 | 13.4 | 4 | 6.9 |
| Military installation | 5 | 4.5 | 3 | 5.2 |
| College campus | 26 | 23.2 | 2 | 3.4 |
| Public building | 10 | 8.9 | 3 | 5.2 |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0 | 2 | 3.4 |
| Total | 112 | 100.0 | 58 | 100.0 |

Table 3 shows the variation in protest type (Model 4) between the Vietnam and Iraq war eras. The top three types of antiwar protest events in the Vietnam era were: 1) sit-in (32.1%); 2) rally (20.5%); and 3) march (19.6%). The top three types of antiwar protest events in the Iraq era were: 1) march (29.3%); 2) sit-in (19%); and 3) picket (17.2%).

**Table 3: Frequency of type of protest in the Vietnam and Iraq eras**

| | Vietnam era | | Iraq era | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Protest type | Frequency | Percent | Frequency | Percent |
| Sit-in | 36 | 32.1 | 11 | 19.0 |
| Rally | 23 | 20.5 | 9 | 15.5 |
| March | 22 | 19.6 | 17 | 29.3 |
| Vigil | 6 | 5.4 | 7 | 12.1 |
| Teach-in | 5 | 4.5 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Picket | 19 | 17.0 | 10 | 17.2 |
| Missing | 1 | 0.9 | 4 | 6.9 |
| Total | 112 | 100.0 | 58 | 100.00 |

**Table 4: Total arrest and injury by protest type (Vietnam era)**



Table 4 and Table 5 show the variation in reactivity by protest type (Model 5) in the Vietnam and Iraq war eras. Table 4 shows the variation in reactivity by protest type in the Vietnam era. The types of antiwar protest in the Vietnam era with the highest number of arrests were sit-ins (sum=921, mean=25.583), marches (sum=712, mean=32.363) and pickets (sum=446, mean=23.474). Hence, sit-ins had a higher total number of arrests, while marches had a higher average number of arrests per event. The types of antiwar protest in the Vietnam era with the highest number of injuries were the sit-in (sum=150,

mean=4.167) and picket (sum=1, mean=0.053). No other protest type in the Vietnam era

incurred injuries. Table 5 shows the variation in reactivity by protest type in the Iraq era.

**Table 5: Total arrest and injury by protest type (Iraq era)**



The types of antiwar protest in the Iraq era with the highest number of arrests were

marches (sum=3,557, mean=209.235), sit-ins (sum=904, mean=82.182) and pickets

(sum=22, mean=2.2). Hence, marches had the highest total number of arrests and the

highest average number of arrests per event. The types of antiwar protest in the Iraq era

with the highest number of injuries were sit-ins (sum=20, mean=1.818) and marches

(sum=10, mean=0.588). The injuries incurred at the sit-ins and marches were the only injuries reported during the Iraq era.

**Table 6: Arrest and injury by place (Vietnam era)**



Table 6 and Table 7 show the variation in reactivity by the place in which the protest occurred (Model 6) in the Vietnam and Iraq war eras. Table 6 shows the variation in reactivity by place in the Vietnam era. The places where arrests were highest in the Vietnam era were government buildings (sum=1,039; mean=61.118), military recruitment centers (sum=635; mean=42.333), public squares (sum=192; mean=10.667),

and streets (sum=184; mean=10.824). The places where injuries were highest in the

Vietnam era were college campuses (sum=97; mean=3.731), military recruitment centers

(sum=24; mean=1.6), and streets (sum=20; mean=1.176).

**Table 7: Arrest and injury by place (Iraq era)**



**indicates the environmental type for protest**

Table 7 shows the variation in reactivity by place in the Iraq era. The places where arrests

were highest in the Iraq era were streets (sum=5,103; mean=300.177), military

installations (sum=198; mean=66), government buildings (sum=75; mean=6.25), and

public squares (sum=74; mean=9.25). The places where injuries were highest in the Iraq

era were military installations (sum=20; mean=6.667), and streets (sum=10;

mean=0.588). These two places accounted for all the reported injuries incurred in the Iraq era.

***Hypothesis 3: Cultural variation of social forms is exhibited by a change in reactivity within the same geographic parameters where surges in protest activity are related to the larger societal context.***

The magnitude of feeling, combined with the organizational framework of a particular context, can be observed through the reaction time of protest. Table 8 and Table 9 show the variation in reactivity over time (Model 7) in the Vietnam and Iraq war eras. Table 8 shows the levels of reactivity over the first 203 weeks in the Vietnam era.

**Table 8: Vietnam arrest and injury data by week**

The three weeks with the highest number of arrests in the Vietnam era were Week 168 (sum=974), Week 53 (sum=350), and Week 175 (sum=329). The total number of arrests made during the Vietnam time frame was 2,261, with a mean score of 11.18 per week, and a mean score of 20.37 per antiwar protest event. The two weeks with the highest number of injuries were Week 168 (sum=130) and Week 190 (sum=9). The total number of injuries during the Vietnam time frame was 151, with a mean score of 0.744 per week, and a mean score of 1.36 per antiwar protest event.

**Table 9: Iraq era arrest and injury data per week**

Table 9 shows levels of reactivity over the first 203 weeks of the Iraq era. The three weeks with the highest number of arrests in the Iraq era were Week 1 (sum=3,394), Week 77 (sum=1,800), and Week 168 (sum=168). The total number of arrests made during the Iraq time frame was 5,608, with a mean score of 27.63 per week, and a mean score of 96.7 per protest event. The two weeks with the highest number of injuries were Week 4 (sum=20) and Week 1 (sum=8). The total number of injuries during the Iraq time frame was 30, with a mean score of 0.148 per week, and a mean score of 0.517 per antiwar protest event.

Table 10 and Table 11 show the variation in protest volume over time (Model 8) in the Vietnam and Iraq war eras. Table 10 shows the number of protesters per week over the first 203 weeks in the Vietnam era.

**Table 10: Variation in protest volume by week (Vietnam era)**

Table 10 depicts the three weeks with the largest number of antiwar protesters as Week 141 (sum=150,200; n=3), Week 195 (sum=87,425; n=3), and Week 168 (sum=68,915; n=14). The total number of protesters present at all events in the 203 weeks of the Vietnam era was 540,578, with a mean score of 2,663 per week, and a mean score of 4,870 protesters per event (n=111).

**Table 11. Variation in protest volume by week (Iraq era)**



Dot/Lines show Sums

Table 11 shows the number of protesters per week over the first 203 weeks in the Iraq era. Table 11 depicts the three weeks with the largest number of antiwar protesters as Week 77 (sum=500,000; n=1), Week 203 (sum=400,000; n=1), and Week 1 (sum=213,915; n=10). The total number of protesters present at all events in the 203 weeks of the Iraq era was 1,345,127, with a mean score of 6,626 per week, and a mean score of 26,375 protesters per event (n=51). Overall, Iraq antiwar protest is 541.6% larger

per event than those in the Vietnam era, with a 248.8% greater number of total protesters over the same length of time.

Table 12 and Table 13 show the total number of arrests and injuries by month (Model 9) in the Vietnam and Iraq eras. Table 12 shows that arrests are highest during the fall months in the Vietnam era. The three months with the highest number of arrests during the Vietnam era were October (sum=1,053; n=28), August (sum=422; n=9), and December (sum=329; n=6). The two months with the highest number of injuries during the Vietnam era were October (sum=135; n=27) and March (sum=9; n=16).

**Table 12: Arrest and injury by month (Vietnam era)**

Table 13 shows that arrests are highest in March (sum=3,577; n=36), September (sum=1,812; n=7), and June (sum=168; n=1) in the Iraq era. The two months with the highest number of injuries in the Iraq era were April (sum=20; n=4) and March (sum=9; n=32).

**Table 13: Arrest and injury by month (Iraq era)**

Table 14, Table 15, and Table 16 show the total number of protest events by month (Model 10) in the Vietnam and Iraq eras. Table 14 indicates that the number of antiwar protest events in the Vietnam era was highest during the spring, with March and May having 16 events each and April having 14 events (spring total = 46). However, the largest surge in antiwar protest activity was in October, which alone had 28 events.

**Table 14: Number of protest events per month (Vietnam era)**



Table 15 indicates that the number of antiwar protest events in the Iraq era was overwhelmingly highest in the spring, particularly March (n=37). In the Iraq era, September (n=7) and April (n=4) were the next closest in event activity. Table 16 shows the clear pattern of spring and fall antiwar protest surge, with March (n=53) and October

(n=31) being the prime months for antiwar protest events. Taking into account the

seasonal factors, the spring (March, April, and May) is the prime season for antiwar

protest events (n=89; 52.3% of total). The second surge in protest activity occurs during

the fall (August, September, and October) (n=47; 27.6% of total).In all, the spring and

fall account for approximately 80% of all antiwar protest events in both eras under study

combined.

**Table 15: Number of protest events per month (Iraq era)**



Mean =4.26
Std. Dev. =2.489
N =58

**Table 16: Protest events by month in first 1,418 days of Iraq and Vietnam (combined)**



Mean =5.75
Std. Dev. =3.335
N =170

**CHAPTER SEVEN:**
**Discussion and conclusions**

The intensity of antiwar protest during the first 1,418 days of the Vietnam and Iraq wars greatly differ. Undoubtedly, the antiwar protest extending beyond the Vietnam time-frame under study, and the Vietnam War itself, has greatly affected the reactivity of the current conflict over Iraq. Yet one can also see a curious link between the evolution of the study of social movements in the sixties and classical theories of collective behavior. The larger number of events of smaller volume during the first years of the Vietnam era, and the slower emergence of forms of dissent toward war than in the Iraq era, may indicate that what was actually occurring during the first years of the antiwar 'movement' in the Vietnam era was mostly collective behavior – it was itself the birth of the movement. In other words, a contrast can be made about the existence of the antiwar movement itself.

When the antiwar movement began, like many other aspects of the cultural revolution of the sixties, antiwar protesters were seen as misfits or vagabonds. Yet this study provides ample evidence that not only has the movement itself grown, but that the antiwar protest movement may itself be an American institution. This crucial link could be seen from a resource and/or consensus mobilization perspective, for the resources and mobilization potentials of antiwar dissenters would explain the differences in response time between the two eras. The integration of Vietnam era protesters into mainstream society and the government is also influential. Additionally, the development of communication technology no doubt aids in this development, taking the form of websites like Moveon.org. However, more than the resources and consensus seen in the differences between eras, there is a significant shift in the qualities of the protests.

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This study provides preliminary evidence that reactivity increased more because of how one was protesting and how long one protested in the early Vietnam era. The vigil was the only deterrent of arrest, where duration increased the chances of arrest. Additionally, the presence of military police/national guard or secret service also added to chances of arrest. In the case of military presence, such engagement must be considered carefully. The impact of the military identity, and its significance, has obvious implications for emotional invocation during a time of war. More importantly, however, is that military presence wasn't a factor in the Iraq era. In fact, no military police have thus far been used as a means of social control during the Iraq era. In the Iraq era, it is pretty simple – if a large number of people are protesting the war in the streets, there will be arrests.

A comparison can be made when one considers that protest volume was not significant in the Vietnam era and that vigils did not deter arrest in the Iraq era. The relation between size of protest and type of protest may be the key. If protest events are smaller, it would matter more 'what' was being done. This develops further with the unpredictability of injuries. The convergence on a military base in the Iraq era was significant, though Model 2 for Iraq had marginal significance at best. Again, the salience of the military identity, and confronting this identity, inevitably influences injury. Additionally, sit-ins had the overwhelmingly largest number of injuries for both eras combined. The sit-in, and its various forms, represents most clearly a shift from dissent to resistance. Obviously, resistance would induce physical contact. However, the sit-in was not consistently arrest-inducing in both eras. In Vietnam the sit-in was overwhelmingly arrest-inducing, where the march produced the most arrests in the Iraq era. The frequency

of sit-ins in Vietnam and the frequency of marches in Iraq exhibit a distinct change in protester attitude. The sit-in, which is more 'resistant', is simultaneously more stubborn. However, the march is mobile, active, and visible. Quite literally then, the antiwar protest of Vietnam was more resistant and the antiwar protest of the Iraq era is more pro-active.

The astronomically large difference in protest size over fewer events during Iraq as compared to Vietnam also implies that, besides a higher degree of organization, the common misperception of contemporary citizens and dissenters as apathetic must be reconsidered. The significantly lower number of injuries during the Iraq protests says something for the means of social control, although some more critical of the handling of protest events by the government in the Iraq era may say the significantly larger number of arrests indicates a type of fascism. However, when looking at the number of people protesting, and the fewer number of people getting hurt, a positive perspective can be taken. In the Vietnam era, the largest spike in injuries was closely timed with the largest spike in arrests. However, this occurred late in the time frame (Week 168; arrests=974; injuries=130) for Vietnam, while the highest number of arrests in Iraq came in Week 1 (3,394) and all the injuries (28) except two for the whole era (30) occurred within the first four weeks. This speaks volumes, not only of the preparedness of the antiwar movement, but as well for the police officers who controlled the situation.

The timing of the protests in Iraq was most frequently centered on the beginning and anniversary of the Iraq invasion. However, the largest protest occurred days before the third anniversary of 9-11 and the second largest after the Democrats took control of the House and the Senate in January of 2007. The timing of protest in Vietnam was a little more precarious. The largest protest during the Vietnam era under study occurred

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days after Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. spoke out against the war, and advocated a merger of the civil rights and antiwar movements, while the second largest occurred about a month after the Mai Lay Massacre.

Although many other things were occurring during these surges in activity, one thing is clear. The Vietnam era antiwar protest seemed less organized – until Dr. King. Yet there are no main figureheads (arguably Cindy Sheehan) in the Iraq era. Rather, it seems as if the antiwar protesters are directly responding to the moments of meaning upon which the internal conflict about Iraq is raging - September 11th and Iraq. In other words, the focus for Iraq antiwar protest is clear – 'bring the troops home'- and the leaders are many. But the words of Bobby Kennedy ring true for antiwar protesters in the Iraq era. One can see what they are against – but what are they *for*? The answer may be a simple comparison in this recent movement – how many people protested the invasion of Afghanistan?

Freedom is a gift that often seems vacant of meaning. What is freedom? Freedom to do, not to do, freedom from this, freedom from that – but freedom is not anarchy. A true measure of freedom may be how well individuals with opposing views can speak or express those views without confrontation, how well the enforcers of the law obey it, and how well dissenters control themselves. So when does a nation turn against itself? If one concedes that arrests and injuries, with protest size taken into account, are accurate representations of the intensity of engagement, there is still the problem of reconciling which, arrest or injury, carries more weight. Though correlation does not necessitate causation, the fact that more arrests during the Iraq era has translated into fewer injuries must be taken into account.

The idea that the human environment is co-created exemplifies the reactivity shown in both eras. In Vietnam, the antiwar movement was just being born, non-participants and hegemonic controls were not ready for the emergence of such norms, and the movement itself was more spontaneous. Hence it was less controllable and more violent. In Iraq, one can see a change in the cultural form of dissent. Undoubtedly, the tragedy of Kent State on May 4, 1970, where both antiwar protesters and bystanders were killed or injured by the National Guard, must be put into perspective. In other words, much as American reactions to Iraq evoke the ghosts of Vietnam, the lack of military presence at antiwar protests and violence in the Iraq era must be influenced to some degree by the Kent State tragedy. It stands to reason that peaceful protest cannot occur without a degree of cooperation from the sides of an issue. This study shows that both sides have adapted.

The residue of engagement between hegemony and dissent becomes a process of mutual creation. A now highly organized antiwar movement shows event turnouts that far exceed those over the same amount of time in Vietnam. However, this also shows the structuralization of antiwar sentiment and values into the institutions of America. Nearly forty years after the end of the Vietnam time-frame under study, the antiwar movement is quick to mobilize, and the police handle larger crowds in a less violent fashion. It stands to reason that a larger crowd would produce more arrests. However, it would also seem that a larger crowd would produce more injuries as well. This has been shown not to be the case. So that the turn inward, the spiraling down into the core of American sentiment on war, comes to the point of engagement – how do dissenters and enforcers of law treat their fellow citizens?

This study provides preliminary evidence that time-space contextual variables affect the intensity of protest reactivity. It shows how time has changed the American antiwar movement and the social facts of its country. The defense of freedom, and the means to protect that freedom, has become more than just an idea. It has become a reflexive set of institutions to protect the emergence of competing cultural views on war and peace. This cultural variation is shown through the evolution of the antiwar movement in America and the direction and form of intensity of its enactment. Although there are more arrests during the Iraq era, the protests are more orderly, more organized, and less violent. This bodes well for both protester and policeperson. Additionally, this change in the quality of antiwar protest shows a shift in the American societal context. It shows preparedness for action and control, as well as the development of the cultural schema of freedom. This development is not just mental, but can be seen in the handling of antiwar protest events by both protesters and enforcement agencies.

Limitations to this study include: 1) the 'turn' is only considered in the context of dissent towards war; 2) reactivity is only the initial point of engagement, so this study only focuses on the cultural changes in mutual response regarding sentiment towards war; 3) individual's perceptions were not included, and can only be inferred from the reactive engagement of antiwar protest; and 4) organizational density was not accounted for, but rather the focus was placed directly on what actually happened as reported by *The New York Times*.

Future research should investigate the perceptions of individuals engaging in the antiwar protest environment. By addressing the meanings attached to the environment by both those who express dissent and those who maintain order, one can come to a fuller

understanding of how this cultural aesthetic evolves human consciousness. It is with all hopes that the Iraq war, or any war, would not continue. However, the reliability and validity of this type of research could be increased by extending the length of the time-frames for particular wars. For example, one could study the entire Vietnam War and contrast it from September 12, 2001 to the potential present. Additionally, other media sources, be it other newspapers (local and regional) or television news coverage, would add to the understanding of this topic. These expansions, in addition to individual perceptions, would also benefit from studying the organizational density and development of communications which help link the antiwar protest movement. Hand in hand with the organizational framework comes the legal framework which reflexively governs its qualities. Hence, a study of congressional voting and content analysis of congressional hearings would provide insight into the political context under study.

*Conclusion*

The defense of freedom from the terror of its loss is not a new topic, nor a topic exclusive to America. The quality of life one desires is the most real and basic tenant of human existence. However, the variation of preferences for the way of life one lives is exponential. It is the management of these interactions, and the qualities of the engagement of dissenting positions that determines the outcome and actuality of that reality. The cultural aesthetic of American antiwar protest could most simply be cited as resulting from being born of freedom and dissent. The purest democratic ideals, as far off and distant as they may seem at different times in American history, are constantly attempting actualization. This study shows that at least one form of this freedom is being expressed more democratically than it was forty years ago. American antiwar protest 'on

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the ground' is different than the partisan politics of government. Despite the varying views on the war in Iraq, the engagement of enforcement and dissent in the Iraq era shows preparedness – a preparedness and readiness to defend freedom from itself. This shows a positive aspect of a trying time in history – that the American people in everyday life are ready to defend it. It expresses a paradoxical truth, a concept that strikes to the heart of meaning.

When Thomas Jefferson penned the Declaration of Independence, the ideas that became creed have become larger than his intentions. The foundation of America, and the evolution of its sometimes bloody history, can be criticized. However, what America 'stands for' is both a cultural and structural reality. Many great ideas come along, many bright ideas fade, but the concept of freedom has endured. The greatest paradox, in fact, is at what point does that freedom give way to anarchy and where in protecting against anarchy does a government become oppressive – when does a nation turn against itself? The conclusion derived from this study is that a nation at war turns against itself when it is rigid and ill-prepared. What this study shows is that preparedness and flexibility for an American cultural aesthetic of dissent has increased.

APPENDIX ONE

Figure 1: Schema failure and the persona shift



The personality is the relatively *consistent* self as located in a context. I contend that the persona, however, is the mechanism which shifts between identities acclimating itself to the context. The persona is a negotiator and a defense mechanism that aids in impression management. Persona shifting, then, is what fills in the gaps of information in each context. This may sound familiar, because the schema is what provides individuals with the ability to shift impressions between identities and contexts. Between identities schemas still exist. Between contexts schemas still exist. But it is the individual-as-agent who adapts the schema in context by shifting their 'mask' to acclimate to specific circumstances. Although the persona is an in-context reflection of private beliefs (the self), it is important to notice that individuals may maintain inconsistent identities due to incomplete information or out of necessity.

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