

1-1-2012

George W. Bush, the American Press, and the Initial Framing of the War on Terror after 9/11

Stephen D. Cooper

Marshall University, coopers@marshall.edu

Jim A. Kuypers

Matthew T. Althouse

Follow this and additional works at: http://mds.marshall.edu/communications_faculty



Part of the [Communication Technology and New Media Commons](#), [Critical and Cultural Studies Commons](#), and the [Mass Communication Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Kuypers, J. A., Cooper, S. D., & Althouse, M. T. (2012). George W. Bush, the American press, and the initial framing of the War on Terror after 9/11. In R. E. Denton, Jr. (Ed.), *The George W. Bush Presidency: A Rhetorical Perspective*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Communications at Marshall Digital Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Communications Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Marshall Digital Scholar. For more information, please contact zhangj@marshall.edu.

Chapter Five

George W. Bush, the American Press, and the Initial Framing of the War on Terror after 9/11

Jim A. Kuypers, Stephen D. Cooper, and
Matthew T. Althouse

President George W. Bush's speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 10, 2001, marks an important moment in the history of the War on Terror.¹ It followed closely upon the joint U.S.-Northern Alliance military capture of Mazari Sarif, Afghanistan, which significantly disrupted the Taliban's operations and arguably marked the official beginning of America's War on Terror. As President Bush stated, "The time for sympathy has now passed; the time for action has now arrived."² In some ways, the speech offered nothing new. It reiterated words and ideas that the president frequently used to label elements of the situation following the 9/11 attacks. Certainly the speech was important in that it offered the American public and the world a refinement of the meaning of the war and of the actions the White House would next take. This speech marks another important moment in the War on Terror, however, the moment when the American press moved from a neutral reportorial posture to a posture hostile to the Bush administration.

We are aware that the assertion above is somewhat controversial since it contradicts numerous studies that argue the news media *inadequately criticized* the president's framing of the War on Terror following 9/11. Examples of such findings, academic and journalistic, are plentiful.³ For example, Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman suggested the news media simply echoed the Bush Administration. Further, they argued that, prior to 9/11, the news media framed President Bush as "unqualified," "inexperienced," and "not too bright." Following 9/11, media switched to framing him as a "strong

leader” and as a “unifier.”⁴ In a separate work, Waldman asserted that President Bush “lies” and that the mainstream media was unquestioning in its treatment of Bush following 9/11, essentially failing to criticize his policies at all.⁵ And, Stephen D. Reese and Seth C. Lewis bluntly asserted that the media “abrogate[d] their responsibility to critically examine policy assumptions embedded in frames”⁶ in their coverage of the administration’s policy statements.

Using a rhetorical version of framing analysis,⁷ however, we discovered quite a different story, one that strongly suggests that far from supporting the president, that eight weeks after 9/11, the mainstream American news moved beyond *reporting about* political opposition to the president’s initiatives and instead began to *generate* its own opposition. Moreover, we discovered that, by the end of formal military operations in Afghanistan, the mainstream American news media was framing its reports in such a way that President Bush’s public statements were inaccurately transmitted to the America public. We believe that one possible explanation for our disagreement with what seems to have become conventional wisdom on this matter is that we do not consider the press’s use of terms, short phrases, or labels found in administration statements to constitute endorsement or even uncritical echoing of the administration’s viewpoint. Quite simply, journalists routinely use parsimonious labels to refer to a common theme in their continuing coverage, and these labels may well be those used by advocates for a policy position. Nonetheless, it is not the case that the press’s use of the label constitutes approval or disapproval of the policy, in and of itself. Thus, if a news source simply adopts a term used by the Bush administration for its counter-terrorism policy, it may be hasty for a scholar to point to this as evidence of uncritical reporting.⁸ Given that so much of the scholarly framing literature does just this—simply counts instances of terms and then imputes press support or opposition—we instead offer a different approach, one that looks for the way in which the terms are infused with meaning. We discuss this in more detail in the conclusion of our chapter.

Taking the above into account in our analysis, we chose to identify major *themes* in both the president’s statements and press reports, and then to contrast the respective *framing* of those themes in administration statements and in press reports. Our chapter proceeds in four sections: first, we provide a brief overview of how frames work; second, we discuss the relationship of frames to the news media; third, we compare the frames of President Bush and the news media; fourth, we present a discussion of our findings.

We wish to stress at the outset several points about our study. First, it is not a defense or critique of any policy position or political actor. Rather, this study critically compares news reporting about a major presidential address to the actual text of the speech itself. Second, although the findings have theoretical implications, this is not a theory-building effort. It is instead a

case study through which we gain insights into the fidelity of media coverage concerning some of Bush's justifications for the War on Terror. Third, this study emphasizes the value of fidelity between an event and reporting about an event. As stated in the ethics code of the Society of Professional Journalists, *accuracy* is a cardinal tenet of the profession.⁹ News accuracy can be studied from a variety of perspectives, including opposition to or for an ideology, for instance.¹⁰ Unimpeachable fidelity may be a practical and theoretical impossibility; nonetheless, we maintain that it is a socially desirable ideal, just as it is an ethical aspiration for working journalists. Put in more direct terms, the greater the degree of fidelity of the reportage to the events, the higher the benefit to the public. Thus, the design of this study compares a presidential address to media coverage of it, with the intent of highlighting interpretive commentaries introduced in the news reporting process. Finally, this study acts to demonstrate the benefits of a rhetorical version of framing analysis by comparing our results to results generated using social scientific versions of framing analysis. To this last point we now turn.

FRAMES AND RHETORICAL FRAMING ANALYSIS

The rhetorical power of a frame comes from its functions to make sense of relevant events and to suggest what is at issue.¹¹ Jim A. Kuypers stressed that facts "take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organizes them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others."¹² Framing, then, is the process whereby communicators act—consciously or not—to construct a particular point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be viewed in a particular manner, with some facts made more noticeable than others.¹³

The influence of frames is demonstrated in numerous studies. For instance, in an examination of reporting concerning mandatory HIV testing, Paul Sniderman, Richard Brody, and Philip Tetlock¹⁴ found that a majority of an audience supported rights of persons with AIDS when this question was framed as a matter of civil liberties. However, they supported mandatory testing when framed as a matter of public health. In another study about reactions to a Ku Klux Klan march, Thomas Nelson, Rosalee Clawson, and Zoe Oxley reported similar effects of news reporting. Participants watched two different videotapes, one framing the matter as a free speech issue, the other as a disruption of public order. Viewers exposed to video framing the Klan march as a "free speech story expressed more tolerance for the Klan" than viewers of the story framing the event as an issue of public order.¹⁵

When highlighting some aspect of reality over others, frames act to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies to problems. Located in the communicator, text, receiver, and culture at large, frames provide the interpretive cues for otherwise neutral facts. They are composed of, yet not necessarily reducible to, key words, metaphors, concepts, images, and symbols; these elements will consistently appear within a narrative and “convey thematically consonant meanings across . . . time.”¹⁶ Framing is, however, a normal part of the communication process; we need ways to negotiate the massive amounts of information that comes to us every day. Large and complex ideas and events demand framing since they have so many elements demanding our attention. Because of this, framing analysis is a particularly useful way to understand the potential impact of rhetoric.

Framing and the News Media

Certainly framing analysis can be used to examine a wide array of communication artifacts, yet we feel that it is particularly suited to examine the mainstream news media. We follow here what Paul D’Angelo identifies as one of the conjectures of “hard core” framing research: “that frames are elements of news stories that amalgamate textual items (words and images) with the contextual treatment that they receive from framing devices. Frames are therefore considered to be ontologically distinct from the topic of news stories.”¹⁷ In short, the “facts” of news story can be distinct from their frame; the same “facts” can be framed in different ways. Obviously, reporters cannot cover every matter that comes to their attention, and not every important article can be placed on the front page of a paper. As Jian-Hua Zhu notes, as one issue rises to prominence in news coverage, others invariably drift toward obscurity.¹⁸ For instance, agenda-setting literature demonstrates how news reporting focuses public attention on particular matters and away from others.¹⁹ Some variables at work in this focusing may include the length of a news story, its placement in a newspaper or during a broadcast, or its extended coverage over time; yet, while topics are placed in view of the public’s eye, they command attention. What is more, these variables affect what audiences consider to be significant. Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder note that those in their study “who were shown network broadcasts edited to draw attention to a particular problem assigned greater importance to that problem—greater importance than they themselves did before the experiment began, and greater importance than did people assigned to control conditions that emphasized different problems.”²⁰

While the concept of agenda-setting explains how the news can focus public attention on certain issues, studies moving beyond agenda-setting examine how the news influences how the public makes sense of issues. Two such study areas involve “second-level effects of agenda setting” and “agen-

da extension.” The first deals with how particular attributes in a story are stressed, subsequently influencing the way the public views those particular attributes.²¹ Conclusions flowing from second-level agenda-setting studies suggest that the news media can focus public attention on particular attributes within an issue or an event. Examining news reports from a second-level perspective allows us to explore how the media can elevate one attribute of an issue/event over another in the mind of the news-consuming public. Such stressing of attributes can carry over into public evaluations of those covered in the story. For example, if there is a local school crisis, and the press covers it, school officials would be judged by how well they manage the crisis. However, the news-consuming public’s assessment of how well the crisis was managed would be made in relation to the content of media coverage. Thus, if media coverage of the crisis stressed attribute “Q” over attribute “J,” the public would more likely use attribute “Q” when making judgments about how well the school officials responded to the crisis.

The second area of consideration, agenda-extension,²² deals with how media provides an *interpretive lens* through which to view the issue or event. That is, how the news media constructs its stories invites or induces its audience to understand the issue or event from one specific point of view. Further, the notion of agenda-extension suggests that the way a news story is shaped invites or induces readers and viewers to understand the story from a particular perspective. An agenda-extension orientation recognizes that the media can elevate an issue or attribute’s saliency. However, an agenda-extension orientation asks not only how the issues or attributes are made salient, but also how they simultaneously induce the audience to think about them in a particular manner. It is at this point that the notion of agenda-extension moves beyond second-level agenda-setting in that it posits that the news media not only focus attention on particular attributes of an issue, making some portions more salient than others, *it does so in such a manner that a particular point of view is advanced*. More to the point, second-level agenda-setting examines *what* attributes are stressed, an agenda-extension perspective encourages us to see *how* those attributes are stressed to influence audience reaction.²³

Framing Analysis

There are many ways that researchers can look for how various parts of a news story are stressed. One of these is to look for framing, a process through which alternative interpretations of issues, events, and political actors may be effectively muted. Moreover, the press does not merely supply facts about issues and events to the audience, from which the audience then independently constructs stories; the press supplies facts *within* a story line, combining both factual content and suggested interpretations of the factual content. It is

here that the theoretical connection of framing and agenda-extension becomes apparent: news products provide the audience with a combination of cues as to the relative salience of various facts, and already-constructed interpretations of those facts.

Noteworthy examples of agenda-extension in progress can be seen in work by Anne Johnston,²⁴ who demonstrated that news stories not only provide their audiences with the important topics to think about, they also provide “contextual cues or frames in which to evaluate those subjects.”²⁵ In their study of the Watergate hearings, Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang found that agenda-setting begins when media gatekeepers—station managers, producers, or editors—decide to publish a particular story, and then decide how much attention to give the story. Agenda-extension began when they decided *how to tell a particular story*.²⁶ As pointed out by Doris Graber, it is at this “point where ordinary agenda-setting activities can most readily turn into deliberate [agenda-extension].”²⁷ In short, whereas research in agenda-setting seeks to identify *what* attributes are stressed, research from an agenda-extension orientation seeks to discover *how* particular attributes are stressed.²⁸

Comparative Framing Analysis

We feel that a fruitful way to look for how frames can shift the meaning of events is through comparative framing analysis. In brief, this involves comparing two items that could be framed similarly and then looking for differences in frames or comparing the coverage by different news outlets on the same issues. For example, Robert M. Entman comparatively analyzed the narratives within news stories about the KAL 007 and Iran Air 655 shoot-downs.²⁹ Because the two events could have been reported on in a similar fashion, he speculated that any differences in frames would be readily apparent. Entman found that during the two-week period following each shoot-down, the destruction of KAL 007 was framed as a moral outrage, whereas the destruction Iran Air 655 was framed as a technical problem. About this matter, he noted that, while frames impose a specific interpretation onto events, they also obscure contrary information that may be presented in a particular case: “for those stories in which a single frame thoroughly pervades the text, stray contrary opinions . . . are likely to possess such low salience as to be of little practical use.”³⁰ Thus, although it was acceptable for political elites to describe the KAL shoot-down as a brutal attack, it was less likely for them to describe it as a tragedy. The frames had been set. The Soviets were evil and at fault for KAL 007. However, to call the Iran Air 655 shoot-down something other than an accident or tragedy would run counter to

the established frame. Once in place, frames encourage journalists to “perceive, process, and report all further information about the event in ways supporting the basic interpretation encoded” in that frame.³¹

Comparing international news coverage of the same event, Zizi Apacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira examined the frames used by several newspapers based in the United States and the United Kingdom concerning their reporting of terrorism. The authors found that the “U.S. papers engaged in more episodic coverage and the U.K. papers in more thematic coverage of terrorism and terrorism-related events.” Because they were able to compare the national level frames of the different side-by-side, the authors were able to conclude that, relative to each other, the U.S. papers presented “news associated with the military approach, whereas the U.K. papers were oriented toward diplomatic evaluations of terrorist events.”³² In a similar vein, Jim A. Kuypers and Stephen D. Cooper compared news reports made by embedded and behind-the-lines reporters during the second Gulf War.³³ They argued that “when journalists frame, they construct a particular point of view that encourage the facts of a given situation to be interpreted in a specific way. Thus journalists can, knowingly or unknowingly, guide the interpretation of readers toward a particular point of view.”³⁴ The authors matched stories run by embedded reporters and behind-the-lines reporters by date of publication and discovered that the reporting varied greatly between the two groups of reporters. Journalists embedded with combat troops “often described the war in terms of the weakness of Iraqi army resistance; the frequency with which regular Iraqi forces deserted or surrendered; and the joy of Iraqi civilians at the demise of the Hussein regime.”³⁵ In contradistinction, stories filed by “behind-the-lines journalists described the war in terms of the potential of Iraqi forces to mount significant unconventional counterattacks; the ferocity of the Iraqi irregular forces; the inadequacy of Allied war planning; and the vulnerability of the Allies’ long supply lines.”³⁶

With such examples of comparative framing analysis in mind, we turn our attention to President Bush’s speech and its subsequent news media coverage. We proceed in three steps. First, we look for themes and the framing of those themes in the president’s speech. For the purposes of this study, the theme is the subject of discussion, or that which is the subject of the thought expressed. The frame, as will be described later, consists of the elements of the expression which suggest, or predispose, an interpretation of the meaning of the theme. We did not begin with pre-existing themes or frames. As in much qualitative work, we sought to have data emerge inductively. Thus, we studied the president’s speech as a “snapshot” (i.e., a single, complete text), with the intentions of identifying major themes and of identifying Bush’s own frames for those themes. Second, we examined themes and the framing of those themes found in the press coverage of the speech. Our readings of news reports were longitudinal to find how coverage developed during two

weeks after the speech was delivered. Within any single news story or broadcast there is at least one theme, the subject of the report. When looking at news reports over a period of time, numerous themes may arise, each being framed in a particular manner. As David Levin wrote, “The reason themes [are] taken as a measure of the presence of frames [is] the difficulty of finding a completely developed frame in a single press release. [Frames] are built across a series of news media articles, and not all elements are present in any single article.”³⁷ Finally, we conclude this article with a comparison of the themes and frames of the speech to the themes and frames of the news coverage.

To find news texts for analysis, we considered major mainstream news media outlets. The networks included are ABC, CBS, and NBC. The newspapers included are the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and *USA Today*.³⁸ Since the mainstream news media provide framing of events in both straight news and op/ed content, and it is plausible to expect both to have influence on public understanding of controversial issues, both genres were included in this analysis, although considered separately.³⁹

THE PRESIDENT SPEAKS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

As defined by the president in his speech, the War on Terror would be an international effort spanning the globe. Infused into this idea of international cooperation was the theme of civilization versus barbarism—America would work with the civilized portions of the world to eradicate terrorists and the barbarism they exemplify. According to President Bush, this idea is linked with the theme of good versus evil: “The United Nations was founded in this cause. In a second world war, we learned there is no isolation from evil. We affirmed that some crimes are so terrible they offend humanity, itself. And we resolved that the aggressions and ambitions of the wicked must be opposed early, decisively, and collectively, before they threaten us all. That evil has returned, and that cause is renewed.”

Beyond the United States, civilization itself was enjoined to fight this war: “We’re asking for a comprehensive commitment to this fight. We must unite in opposing all terrorists, not just some of them. In this world there are good causes and bad causes, and we may disagree on where the line is drawn. Yet, there is no such thing as a good terrorist. No national aspiration, no remembered wrong can ever justify the deliberate murder of the innocent. Any government that rejects this principle, trying to pick and choose its terrorist friends, will know the consequences.”

The president also expanded the meaning of the War on Terror: "Every civilized nation here today is resolved to keep the most basic commitment of civilization: We will defend ourselves and our future against terror and lawless violence." In addition, the "civilized world" was already responding, working to deliver its "children from a future of fear." By acting against terrorism, nations were actively choosing "the dignity of life over a culture of death." Moreover, civilized nations "choose lawful change and civil disagreement over coercion, subversion, and chaos. These commitments—hope and order, law and life—unite people across cultures and continents. Upon these commitments depend all peace and progress. For these commitments, we are determined to fight."

The nature of the new enemy was a challenging theme for the president to convey. Bush had to strengthen America's conception of her terrorist enemy, but he also had to present a more official version, one that would allow the world to know how America conceived this enemy. The enemies were "hateful groups that exploit poverty and despair. . . . [They] hate not our policies, but our existence; the tolerance of openness and creative culture that defines us."

Although Americans knew of the existence of terrorists and their methods, and had experienced foreign sponsored terrorism with the 1993 explosion at the World Trade Center, they had never truly experienced it so intimately as with 9/11. Although the Oklahoma City bombing had an effect, it involved Americans acting against their own government; moreover, the response to that attack was framed not as a war, but as a police action. 9/11, in dramatic form, took the terrorists from the shadows and thrust them into the light. President Bush defined the nature of this enemy: "The terrorists call their cause holy, yet, they fund it with drug dealing; they encourage murder and suicide in the name of a great faith that forbids both. They dare to ask God's blessing as they set out to kill innocent men, women and children. But the God of Isaac and Ishmael would never answer such a prayer. And a murderer is not a martyr; he is just a murderer." At eight weeks, America was only beginning to understand the nature of its new enemy and the nature of the new war. To both of these concerns President Bush stated: "And the people of my country will remember those who have plotted against us. We are learning their names. We are coming to know their faces. There is no corner of the Earth distant or dark enough to protect them. However long it takes, their hour of justice will come." Importantly, Bush spoke beyond the needs of Americans, and invited the civilized world to join with him in his characterizations of the terrorists: "Every nation has a stake in this cause. As we meet, the terrorists are planning more murder—perhaps in my country, or perhaps in yours. They kill because they aspire to dominate."

The danger posed by the terrorists was repeatedly stressed: “They seek to overthrow governments and destabilize entire regions. Every other country is a potential target. And all the world faces the most horrifying prospect of all: These same terrorists are searching for weapons of mass destruction, the tools to turn their hatred into holocaust. They can be expected to use chemical, biological and nuclear weapons the moment they are capable of doing so. No hint of conscience would prevent it.” These are serious charges, and responding to such demands a new approach. Here we see Bush’s first hint of a policy of pre-emption: “For every regime that sponsors terror, there is a price to be paid. And it will be paid. The allies of terror are equally guilty of murder and equally accountable to justice. The Taliban are now learning this lesson—that regime and the terrorists who support it are now virtually indistinguishable.”

By way of summary, the president framed five distinct themes in his speech: world wide the struggle of (1) civilization versus barbarism; (2) good versus evil; (3) the nature of the enemy as evil, implacable, and murderous; (4) the nature of the war as both domestic and global, and enduring; and (5) the war as being dissimilar to prior wars.

PRESS REPORTING OF THE SPEECH

Although the news media relayed some elements of the president’s efforts, it also contested or ignored the framing of certain of his themes, and introduced new themes. The majority of press reports touched upon four major themes. The themes are the nature of the War on Terror, World War II or Vietnam, the issue of patience, and the nature of the enemy.

Nature of the War on Terror

CBS Morning News described a “nation swept by both patriotism and fear.”⁴⁰ The *Washington Post* stressed that “the war on terrorism touches all of our lives in one way or another, whether it be something simple like the inconvenience of dealing with increased security checks at work or the fear of the unknown facing armed forces personnel in Afghanistan.”⁴¹ Echoing the administration, the *Washington Post* editorially stated that, “even after the Taliban is gone, the war against terrorism will continue. The challenge is for people to continue ordinary life in the face of this threat. But how will the world cope with a terrorism problem that may get worse rather than better for the next few years? Part of the answer . . . will lie in aggressive military actions that make the terrorists pay a severe price for their assaults. And they should be coupled with new diplomatic and economic initiatives that offer a better life for ordinary people in the Muslim world.”⁴²

Expanding upon the global reach of the war, *This Week* relayed that President Bush was “talking tough to the world community . . . [with] a very solemn, very direct speech . . . in which he ratcheted up the pressure on world leaders to crack down on terrorists. . . .”⁴³ Others shared Bush’s assertion concerning the unique nature of this War on Terror. For instance, *CBS Sunday Morning News* stated that “the front lines seem to . . . coil around the world.”⁴⁴ The president’s claim that the war would be unconventional and lengthy was editorially acknowledged by the *Washington Post* which wrote that, the White House “has said all along that the war on terrorism must be conducted on a number of fronts simultaneously. [Defeating] terrorism will require a . . . bold and creative commitment to long-term political change [in the Middle East].”⁴⁵ The *New York Times* reported Americans feeling that the Administration “had effectively prepared them for a lengthy and unconventional conflict and had stirred enough patriotic fervor to build substantial support for its efforts.”⁴⁶ In a different editorial, the *Washington Post* stated that the “real lesson is that the United States has embarked on a long, complex struggle against terrorists operating under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism who are determined to do this country grave harm.”⁴⁷

The Nature of the War: World War II and Vietnam

Humans often use analogy for understanding new and complex phenomena, and the War on Terror proves no different. The news media we analyze asked, was the War on Terror more similar to World War II or Vietnam? In so doing, though, understanding of the War on Terror was being guided in a specific direction. For example, Cokie Roberts on *This Week* announced recent Gallup poll results: “The current war on terrorism: 89 percent say they have a clear idea of what this war is about. That compares with only 49 percent in Vietnam.”⁴⁸ Following this she asked, is the War on Terror “Vietnam or is it WWII?”⁴⁹ Conservative writer George Will was her guest, and he offered a broad and historical American understanding of those wars. Roberts continued: “Let’s [come] back to more modern times because George raised this question of the goals becoming unclear in Vietnam. Are the goals clear here? Do you think that people know what we’re after in this war, and does that make a difference?”⁵⁰

The White House had recently reached out to Hollywood executives in an effort to explore possibilities for entertainment media to become involved with characterizing the War on Terror. The press noted these overtures, and reported that the purpose was to find out “how the entertainment industry can contribute to the war effort, replicating in spirit if not in scope the partnership formed between filmmakers and war planners in the 1940s.”⁵¹ With its understanding of World War II, the press actively considered American citizens’ contributions on the home front. The *New York Times* noted that,

during the 1940s, “food rationing, tin foil drives, victory gardens” served the nation. However, “Now debate has been rising over exactly how much sacrifice is really needed and how those at home should respond to what Mr. Bush calls ‘a different kind of conflict.’”⁵² The *Times* also stated that it was “less clear how people can respond at home to the conflict that may be more akin to the cold war [than to World War II].”⁵³ During World War II the defining term was sacrifice. However, sacrifice then involved the rationing of gas, food, and appliances. Today’s war needed a new sacrifice, and that was to come through volunteerism. The *New York Times* relayed Bush’s conception here: “Americans willing to volunteer now were . . . making a sacrifice. ‘They are taking time away from their family and their profession.’”⁵⁴ On the other hand, *Washington Post* columnist Richard Cohen wrote in opposition to the World War II analogy: the “impetus to make the present situation the rough equivalent of World War II has already led the Bush administration to embark on a clutch of programs lacking only the Andrews Sisters for chirpy accompaniment.”⁵⁵

For Cohen, Vietnam would be the analogy of choice: the “declaration of war against all terrorism anywhere is becoming a liability. It’s a laudable aim but one that’s clearly beyond us. It may well involve us in a quagmire not unlike the one in Vietnam and obfuscate our war aims—once again, as happened in Vietnam.”⁵⁶ Published before Cohen’s remarks, the *New York Times* editorially stated that “we assure ourselves that this conflict is . . . different from the one we carried out [in Vietnam]. Yet Vietnam’s ghosts are still here [and] they steal away the old certainty that the end will inevitably be triumphant.” Implying that President Bush might lie about the war, the paper made a lengthy analogy with President Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam War. This included a “reminder of what can happen when a president lies to the people for what he believes is their own good.” The paper continued, “Johnson wanted to teach the Vietcong a lesson, but in the end it was the American people who were forced, to their sorrow, to learn a new way of looking at the world. We can’t shake those memories.”⁵⁷

Patience

Although Bush only implied the theme of patience in his speech, it was a theme generally touched upon throughout his administration’s responses to 9/11. Following Bush’s speech, reporters did mention this theme. However, they defined patience as a shrinking quality: “but in a sign of potential trouble for the administration, many of those interviewed made it clear that their patience was not endless, and that they had become somewhat more questioning of the government line in recent weeks.”⁵⁸ Patience was also linked directly to body counts: “‘I think it’s easy to be patient . . . when there aren’t casualties of war.’” The government’s need for secrecy was one other

aspect of a dwindling supply of American patience: “Americans would tolerate a degree of secrecy about the war if they sensed it was being waged competently. ‘But the government has not effectively gotten across that they are competently handling it on every front.’”⁵⁹

At the time of his speech, 9/11 was a livid, aching memory at eight weeks old, and the campaign in Afghanistan was seeing marked military success; on the ground, for instance, the stronghold of Mazari Sharif in northern Afghanistan had just been captured. True, Bush had implied patience in his speech, yet the press raised this theme’s prominence through its reporting. For example, during the introduction to *This Week*, co-host Cokie Roberts asked: “Bush wants patience, but are the American People willing to wait?” The shared interviews reinforced the framing of the other reports: It was a shrinking supply. Roberts followed up with this question: “But how long will that last with no signs of a swift victory?”⁶⁰

The news media reports stressed that no swift victory was to be had in either the War on Terror or the war in Afghanistan. Coupled to this was a framing of the patience theme stressing a dwindling supply of American patience. The *New York Times*, for instance, editorially wrote, “much hard fighting remains before the Taliban can be ousted from power nationwide.”⁶¹ A *New York Times* news story line read: “Patience, for Now, With Flow of Information.” The *Times* did report that the American public believed the White House “had effectively prepared them for a lengthy and unconventional conflict. . . .” The *Times* also highlighted, however, that in “a sign of potential trouble for the administration, many of those interviewed made it clear that their patience was not endless, and that they had become somewhat more questioning of the government line in recent weeks.” By way of conclusion, the story quoted a political scientist: the Bush administration and Congress was “being given a great deal of leeway because people are so stunned by this confrontation . . . they feel that we have to somehow suspend our questioning and our critical eye. But that honeymoon . . . is not going to last.”⁶²

Nature of the Enemy

Americans knew of terroristic acts before 9/11; however, the destruction of the twin towers and the attack on the Pentagon raised the stakes considerably. The 9/11 terrorists were different. They were not angry citizens (Oklahoma City) and they weren’t enemy soldiers (Nazis, Japanese, or North Koreans). Because of this, following 9/11 the Bush administration made a consistent effort to shape American perceptions of their new enemy. Bush repeatedly stressed the meaning of the theme of the nature of the enemy in his speech, and the press picked up on this theme. The *New York Times*, for example,

quoted a criminologist: “we know there’s an enemy but we’re not exactly sure who they are, we don’t exactly know how to find them, and we don’t exactly know how to defeat them.”⁶³

However, other news outlets provided definitive assessments. *NBC Nightly News*, with the effect of better defining the nature of the enemy, relayed Bush’s words, “the suffering of September 11th was inflicted on people of many faiths and many nations. All of the victims, including Muslims, were killed with equal indifference and equal satisfaction by the terrorist leaders.” The news report later stressed that the president “warned if bin Laden and al-Qaeda acquire weapons of mass destruction, they will use them, arguing the future of civilization itself is threatened.”⁶⁴ *The Saturday Early Show* raised the issue of terroristic use of nuclear devices, relaying that the president had “made it clear . . . that bin Laden has made absolutely no attempt to hide the fact that he has been trying to acquire such weapons.”⁶⁵ On *Face the Nation*, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in response to a question, answered: “There is no doubt in my mind but that [terrorists] would use chemical, biological, radiation . . . or nuclear weapons if they have them. . . . [They] don’t worry about the loss of life.”⁶⁶ The *Washington Post* picked up on Bush’s stress of the nature of the terrorists. It wrote that the president had touched “repeatedly” on that “theme” since 9/11: “Bush said that bin Laden and . . . al Qaeda . . . are ‘violating the tenets of every religion,’ including Islam. ‘A murderer is not a martyr,’ Bush said, ‘he is just a murderer.’”⁶⁷

Importantly, beyond relaying Bush’s themes about the nature of terrorists, some news outlets broadened the application of the term “enemy.” Specifically, the press began to portray the Bush administration itself as antagonistic. One area of press complaint involved the amount of information flowing from the government to the public. In particular, the *New York Times* reported on the press demand for more information from the Administration. It wrote that the United States was having strained relations with its European allies due to a “post Vietnam patriotic syndrome.” It charged that public information was being “co-opted by the government, or at least swept up by patriotism.”⁶⁸ According to the *Times*, this caused a “public relations problem” with the Europeans, who as a result feel “they have precious little information they can trust.”⁶⁹ The *Times* used an analogy to pass judgment and to justify its point of view: because of the situation, Europeans “rely on conflicting and equally unverifiable claims from Pentagon briefings and Taliban news conferences, and are increasingly unwilling to believe either side.”

This article forcefully criticized the Bush administration for its “tight lid on sensitive military news, particularly about special operations.” Asserted was that “veteran communicators” with wartime experience were “amazed at the limited” access to information and to the battlefields. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld was described as a hypocrite who “officially” endorsed the “Persian Gulf war guidelines for new media coverage of com-

bat” but then “enforced policies ensuring that journalists have little or no access to independent information about military strategies, successes and failures.”⁷⁰ Skipping over the unprecedented news media access granted during the first Gulf War, the paper raised the specter of Vietnam: “The desire to keep information and expectations at a minimum stems directly from the experience of the Vietnam war.”⁷¹

The *New York Times* editorially predicted that, “much hard fighting remains before the Taliban can be ousted from power nationwide.” This same editorial downplayed the major accomplishment the capture of Mazari Sharif represented; instead it stressed that with “winter approaching . . . it may be some time before a victory in Mazar-I-Sharif can be translated into the goals the White House has set for Afghanistan, including the capture of Osama bin Laden.”⁷² According to a different *New York Times* editorial, Afghanistan and Vietnam were synonymous: “Vietnam’s ghosts are still here. [They] steal away our certainty that the end will be triumphant. [The] current fight will be long and frustrating.”⁷³

Thus, eight weeks following 9/11, we begin to see the press reframing the theme of the nature of the enemy. There is still the Bush administration’s frame: (1) The terrorists kill “with equal indifference and equal satisfaction”; (2) The terrorists violate “the tenets of every religion, including the one they invoke”; (3) The terrorists have “exacting standards of brutality and oppression”; and (4) The terrorists are the “authors of mass murder.” However, while the press was sharing the Bush administration’s framing of the nature of the enemy theme, it was also beginning to *reframe* that theme. No longer limited to terrorists, the enemy list of America was being enlarged to include the Bush administration. Editorially, the *New York Times* wrote that American civil “liberties are eroding, and there is not evidence that the reason is anything more profound than fear and frustration.”⁷⁴ No evidence was provided, although the editors continue and state that “Attorney General John Ashcroft has been careless with the Constitution when it comes to the treatment of people arrested in the wake of Sept. 11.”⁷⁵ According the *Times*, there is only a “limited need for secrecy while investigating domestic terrorism” and detention of suspected terrorists was considered “extreme measures.”⁷⁶

Introducing a new topic, a hard news article in the *New York Times* also relayed that paper’s editorial position concerning the Bush administration’s position on military tribunals for non-American terrorists: “The Bush administration has moved swiftly in the last few weeks to expand its national security authority and law enforcement powers in ways that are intended to bypass Congress and the courts, officials and outside analysts say.”⁷⁷ In similar vein the *Washington Post* editorially wrote: “Few predicted that the

government would come down so decisively on the anti-liberty side. . . . [This is a] potentially irreversible injury at home if Mr. Bush proceeds . . . to undermine the rule of law.”⁷⁸

By way of summary, the news media framed four distinct themes in its coverage of president Bush’s speech: (1) the nature of the enemy as murderous terrorists and the administration’s assault on civil liberties; (2) the nature of the war as both domestic and global, enduring, but questioning whether a war or a police action; (3) the war as being similar to either WWII or Vietnam; and (4) the American public’s patience running out.

DISCUSSION

With this important speech, the Bush administration announced to the world that the War on Terror was now composed of four semi-distinct, yet inter-animated themes: good versus evil; civilization versus barbarism; the nature of the new enemy; and the nature of the war. Each complements the other; each acts to better flesh out the meaning of the larger frame, the War on Terror. By *the larger frame*, we mean that the War on Terror is a complex frame composed of the individual themes mentioned above, and each of those themes, during this time period, is in the process of being framed in a particular way by the Bush administration. However, the understanding of news-consuming Americans is directly influenced by the mainstream news reports about what the president says.⁷⁹ There is, of course, no one-to-one correlation between what the mainstream news reports and what the news audience believes. We do know from agenda-setting studies, though, that the news audience names as important that which the news media focuses upon. Framing analysis allows us to ask how the news media invites—consciously or not—its audience to talk about and understand issues and events. Looking at Bush speak about the War on Terror through the interpretive lens of the mainstream news, we see that the framing of the nature of the war and the nature of the new enemy themes was being actively contested, not by critics of the president, but by the nature of the news reporting itself.

Not brought into play were the moral dimensions advanced by the president; the theme of good/evil rarely made it into press accounts of the president’s speech or actions. Although the president *repeatedly* stressed this and other morally charged elements, the press *chose* to focus on other themes: the nature of the war, the nature of the enemy, analogies between World War II and Vietnam, patience, and the international aspect of the War on Terror (namely to assert that the administration was acting unilaterally). In this sense, the news media was attempting to introduce new themes, with their own frames in place, into the larger frame of the War on Terror. Certainly

Table 5.1. Comparison of President and News Media Themes and Frames

Themes	President's Frame	Press Frame
Good vs. Evil	Struggle of good and evil	Not mentioned
Civilization vs. Barbarism	Struggle of civilization vs. barbarism	Not mentioned
Nature of Enemy	Evil, implacable, murderers	Deadly, indiscriminant Bush administration, acting contrary to country's best interest
Nature of War	Domestic/global/enduring War	Domestic/global/longstanding War or police action
Similarity to Prior Wars	Different Kind of War	WWII or Vietnam
Patience	Not mentioned	Some, but running out
International Effort	Stated	Minimally reported

introducing new considerations into the public consciousness is part of the press function. Yet, by not reporting accurately on how the president characterized the War on Terror—morally—the press failed to allow the American public the opportunity to accept or reject that claim. Instead of allowing the public to think for itself, the press was doing the public's thinking for them.

Although no one frame within the larger War on Terror frame dominated news stories during the two weeks following the president's speech, we do see the development of media opposition to the administration's framing of the nature of the war theme. For example, whereas immediately following 9/11 the press generally relayed the frames advanced both by the Bush administration and by political opponents with little oppositional framing,⁸⁰ here we see this neutral reportorial practice breakdown in favor of the development of a strong current of news media opposition against the Bush administration. In particular, we see within the theme of the nature of the war the news media framing a negative point of view about the actions of the administration. These news media-generated interpretations pushed beyond what was being said by proponents and opponents of the War on Terror; in short, the press itself was beginning to assert an oppositional frame to that advanced by the Bush administration.

Several other important items emerged from this study. First, there was a strong correlation between the frames of editorials/opinion essays and the content of regular news stories. There seems to be increasing evidence⁸¹ suggesting that the framing of news stories echoes the frames used by both editorial and opinion pages. This is not, however, an obvious process. News stories are subtle in their support of editorial positions, usually quoting out-

side sources whose assertions match well the opinions of editors and columnists. For example, the *New York Times* editorially stated that the administration “has been careless with the Constitution when it comes to the treatment of people arrested in the wake of Sept. 11.” Actions by the administration were called “extreme measures” and the paper suggested a “limited need for secrecy.”⁸² A hard news *New York Times* article later led with this sentence: “The Bush administration has moved swiftly . . . to expand its national security authority and law enforcement power in ways that are intended to bypass Congress and the courts, officials and outside analysts say.”⁸³ Another quoted “Civil liberties groups on both sides of the Atlantic” that opposed the Bush administration’s handling of the new War on Terror.⁸⁴ Civil liberties groups supporting the administration’s efforts remained unreported.⁸⁵

Second, we believe the War on Terror frame can best be described as a *master frame*, one that is comprised of numerous themes. Some have defined master frames as similar to paradigms in science.⁸⁶ Others have said that master frames structure “the way in which its adherents process information coming from the environment and the manner in which they disseminate information to others.”⁸⁷ As a master frame, the War on Terror is composed of numerous themes; in turn, each of those themes is framed in a particular manner by both the president and the news media. Much research in framing suggests a single, pervasive frame that dominates a news story. The case study here contraindicates this, in part because the response of the news media was examined over a period of time, thereby allowing for a more nuanced look at the total response. Although the strength of frames has been examined in other studies, the idea of a frame being composed of themes—each of which is individually framed—has yet to be examined fully.

Third, this project demonstrates that the press actively contested the framing of the War on Terror as early as eight weeks following 9/11. This finding stands apart from communication and other literature suggesting the press supported the president or was insufficiently critical of the president’s efforts after 9/11. These studies often rely primarily on tallying a priori textual units, essentially assuming that when the press used phrases or labels which appeared in the administration’s statements (most notably, the label “War on Terror”) this constituted a supportive story context for the administration’s rationale for its Iraq policy. Counting only finds *content*; it does not allow for nuanced analysis of how that content is framed. In short, the presence of *themes* is often taken as evidence of a particular *frame*.

We speculate that some researchers may have mistaken the press’s initial accurate relaying of presidential themes and theme framing as uncritical “echoing” without noticing instances of the press’s subsequent construction of its own oppositional themes and frames. For example, a study by Kevin Coe, David Domke, Erika S. Graham, Sue Lockett John, and Victor W.

Pickard examined fifteen national addresses given by President Bush between January 2001 to the commencement of the Iraq war, and then examined editorials published in twenty U.S. newspapers within two days from each address. They looked for binary opposites: good/evil and security/peril. They suggested that because the editorials contained references to these binaries that were used by the president, that the press “echoed” the words of the president, showing him unprecedented support; they go so far as to report that “it seems highly likely that the press, through consistent amplification of the president’s communications, contributed to the president’s remarkable successes with Congress between September 11 and the Iraq War and to the Republican Party’s 2002 election triumph.”⁸⁸ This study adroitly finds *content*; as designed, however, it is unable to analyze how that content was framed. In short, the presence of *themes* was taken as evidence of a particular *frame*.

Our findings strongly suggest a very different treatment of the Bush administration than that suggested by Coe et al. and other such studies. When taking into consideration how themes are framed, we found that the news media conveyed stories in a way that supported the idea of some kind of action against terrorism, while concomitantly opposing the president’s initiatives. Put another way, the press echoed some of Bush’s themes but not his frames. As we demonstrate in this chapter, in some cases, the news media relayed Bush’s broad ideas about the nature of the enemy and the nature of the war against terrorism. However, the media did not always neutrally convey the president’s point of view. Rather, it inserted its own orientations, thereby altering frames offered to audiences. In other cases, the press failed to mention the president’s themes and frames (e.g., good versus evil) or reported them minimally (e.g., international effort). For that reason it seems clear to us that the press by no means provided uncritical support for the administration’s Iraq policy, but, instead, actively took a critical or even oppositional stance shortly after the president’s speech to the United Nations.

In sum, eight weeks after 9/11, the news media was moving beyond reporting political opposition to the president—a very necessary and valuable press function—and was instead actively choosing themes, and framing those themes, in such a way that the president’s focus was opposed, misrepresented, or ignored. As Karen Callaghan and Frauke Schnell write, “the media are not simply intermediaries between political actors and the mass public. Journalists can actively limit the public’s right to access and evaluate different policy platforms and thus diminish the quality of political dialogue. Such actions have the potential to inhibit pluralism by blocking out the preferred themes of interest groups and politicians.”⁸⁹ Put more critically, the press may sometimes act as a *de facto* arbiter of contentious issues, rather than as a neutral conveyor of crucial information to the public who then decides the issues. As mentioned earlier, we believe the essential role of the

press is to provide information for Americans to use; in the case of the aftermath of Bush's speech to the United Nations, the mainstream news media covered in this study collectively failed to neutrally convey presidential statements to the public.⁹⁰ In doing so, they denied tens-of-millions of Americans who relied upon them the information they needed to make informed decisions on the policies that would affect their lives. Although it was beyond the scope of this work, careful study of the effects of the reportage on public opinion of the War on Terror would be of great interest, as well. In short, further empirical work will be helpful in assessing the fidelity of news products to the events they convey to the public, across space and time, with an eye toward the consequences of press infidelity for the public sphere.

NOTES

1. This chapter represents a reworked version of Jim A. Kuypers, Stephen D. Cooper, and Matthew T. Althouse, "The President and The Press: A Rhetorical Framing Analysis of George W. Bush's Speech to the United Nations on November 10, 2001," *American Communication Journal* 10, no. 3 (2008).

2. George W. Bush, "President Bush Speaks to United Nations," Office of the Press Secretary, November 10, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/2001/11/print/20011110-3.html>. Unless otherwise stated, all quotes from President Bush come from this speech.

3. For instance, see W. Lance Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston, *When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina* (University of Chicago Press, 2007); Kevin Coe, David Domke, Erika S. Graham, Sue Lockett John, and Victor W. Pickard, "No Shades of Gray: The Binary Discourse of George W. Bush and An Echoing Press," *Journal of Communication* 54, no. 2 (2004): 234–52; Robert M. Entman, "Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame after 9/11," *Political Communication* 20 (2003), 415–32; Daniela V. Dimitrova and Jesper Strömbäck, "Mission Accomplished: Framing of the Iraq War in the Elite Newspapers in Sweden and the United States," *Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies* 67, no. 5 (2005): 399–417; Greg Mitchell, *So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, the Pundits—and the President—Failed on Iraq* (New York: Union Square Press, 2008).

4. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman, *The Press Effect: Politicians, Journalists, and the Stories That Shape the Political World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

5. Paul Waldman, *Fraud: The Strategy Behind the Bush Lies and Why the Media Didn't Tell You* (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2004).

6. Stephen D. Reese and Seth C. Lewis, "Framing the War on Terror: The Internalization of Policy in the US Press," *Journalism* 67, no. 5 (2009): 793.

7. For a detailed explanation of the differences between rhetorical and social scientific framing studies see Jim A. Kuypers, "Framing Analysis as a Rhetorical Process," in Paul D'Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers, eds., *Doing News Framing Analysis* (New York; Routledge, 2010).

8. The same logic would apply to coverage of the Obama administration. That the press would refer to the "2011 Jobs Bill" does not, in itself, establish that the press is carrying water for the administration.

9. See the Society of Professional Journalists' Ethics Code (http://www.spj.org/ethics_code.asp) on this point. Many of the subpoints in the "Seek Truth and Report It" section are relevant to the issue of the fidelity of the reporting to the events.

10. Stephen D. Cooper, "Media Bias" in James Ciment (Ed.), *Social Issues in America* (Sharpe Reference, 2006), 1064–71.

11. William A. Gamson, "News as Framing: Comments on Graber," *American Behavioral Scientist* 33 (1989): 157.
12. Gamson, 157.
13. Jim A. Kuypers, *Bush's War: Media Bias and Justifications for War in a Terrorist Age* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 8.
14. Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock, *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 52.
15. Thomas E. Nelson, Rosalee A. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley, "Media Framing of Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effects on Tolerance," *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 3 (1997): 567.
16. Robert M. Entman, "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents," *Journal of Communication* 41, no. 4 (1991): 7.
17. Paul D'Angelo, "News Framing as a Multiparadigmatic Research Program: A Response to Entman," *Journal of Communication* 52, no. 4 (2002): 873.
18. Jian-Hua Zhu, "Issue Compensation and Attention Distraction: A Zero-Sum Theory of Agenda Setting," *Journalism Quarterly* 69 (1992): 825–36.
19. For a solid summary of such literature see Judith S. Trent and Robert V. Friedenberg, *Political Campaign Communication: Principles and Practices*, 5th ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
20. Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
21. See the following studies for examples: Joe Bob Hester and Rhonda Gibson, "The Economy and Second Level Agenda Setting: A Time-Series Analysis of Economic News and Public Opinion about the Economy," *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 80, no. 1 (2003): 73–90; Guy J. Golan, Spiro K. Kioussis, and Misti L. McDaniel, "Second-Level Agenda Setting and Political Advertising," *Journalism Studies* 8, no. 3 (2007): 432–44; Gunho Lee, "Who Let Priming Out? Analysis of First- and Second-Level Agenda Setting Effects on Priming," *International Communication Gazette* 7, no. 8 (2010): 759–76.
22. See Jim A. Kuypers, *Presidential Crisis Rhetoric and the Press in the Post-Cold War World*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). See also Kuypers, *Bush's War*, 1-15.
23. See Kuypers, *Bush's War*. Agenda-setting generally allows for the examination of the type of issues reported on and their frequency of occurrence in articles. Agenda-extension allows for the examination of any differences in the framing of the same issue; using an agenda-extension perspective allows the researcher to comparatively analyze news content for bias. For example, in the 2004 elections, were President Bush's themes positively or negatively framed when compared to the themes expressed by Senator John Kerry? For a good example of using agenda-setting to determine coverage of candidates' issues see Russell J. Dalton, Paul Allen Beck, Robert Huckfeldt, and William Koetzle, "A Test of Media-Centered Agenda Setting: Newspaper Content and Public Interests in a Presidential Election," *Political Communication* 15 (1998): 463–81. Of note is that these researchers found that no bias was seen in the papers covered simply because the papers covered the issues brought up by the candidates. This otherwise well-constructed study shows a limitation of agenda-setting research. Using an agenda-extension perspective, one moves beyond *frequency of reporting* to examine *the manner* in which the papers reported the issues—thus one may look for bias.
24. Anne Johnston, "Trends in Political Communication: A Selective Review of Research in the 1980s," *New Directions in Political Communication: A Resource Book*, ed. David L. Swanson and Dan Nimmo (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990): 329–62.
25. Johnston, 337.
26. Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang, "The Media and Watergate," *Media Power in Politics*, ed. Doris A. Graber (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984) 202–9.
27. Doris A. Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics*, 7th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2005), 165. Graber called this process, agenda-building.
28. Agenda-setting generally allows for the examination of the type of issues reported on and their frequency of occurrence in articles. Agenda-extension allows for the examination of any differences in the framing of the same issue; using an agenda-extension perspective allows the researcher to comparatively analyze news content for bias. For example, in the 2004

elections, were President Bush's themes positively or negatively framed when compared to the themes expressed by Senator John Kerry? For a good example of using agenda-setting to determine coverage of candidates' issues see Russell J. Dalton, Paul Allen Beck, Robert Huckfeldt, and William Koetzle, "A Test of Media-Centered Agenda Setting: Newspaper Content and Public Interests in a Presidential Election," *Political Communication* 15 (1998): 463–81. Of note is that these researchers found that no bias was seen in the papers covered simply because the papers covered the issues brought up by the candidates. This otherwise well-constructed study shows a limitation of agenda-setting research. Using an agenda-extension perspective, one moves beyond *frequency of reporting* to examine *the manner* in which the papers reported the issues—thus one may look for bias.

29. Entman, "Framing U.S. Coverage of International News," 6–27. In 1983 Soviet Migs shot down a Korean Airlines flight 007, which had briefly flown into Soviet airspace; while on station in the Persian Gulf in 1988, the USS *Vincennes* shot down an Iran Air flight 655.

30. Entman, 21.

31. Entman, 7.

32. Zizi Apacharissi and Maria de Fatima Oliveira, "News Frames Terrorism: A Comparative Analysis of Frames Employed in Terrorism Coverage in U.S. and U.K. Newspapers," *International Journal of Press/Politics*, 13, no. (2008): 52–74. Quote on page 52.

33. Jim A. Kuypers and Stephen D. Cooper, "A Comparative Framing Analysis of Embedded and Behind-the-Lines Reporting on the 2003 Iraq War," *Qualitative Research Reports in Communication* 6, no. 1 (2005): 1–10.

34. Kuypers and Cooper, 2.

35. Kuypers and Cooper, 6.

36. Kuypers and Cooper, 6.

37. "Framing Peace Policies: The Competition for Resonate Themes," *Political Communication* 22 (2005): 89. This argument is also made by Kuypers in *Bush's War*.

38. There were 72 news articles and broadcast transcripts examined for this essay: 28 broadcast news transcripts, 26 news articles, 11 editorials, and 12 opinion essays. We examined all news documents published during the two weeks following Bush's speech that contained reference to the speech. All news media documents were obtained using Lexis-Nexis. The remarks in this essay apply to the three major news networks and the three major newspapers covered in this study. They were selected as representatives of the mainstream news media in America. Although we limit our concluding remarks to the news media covered here, we are strongly inclined to believe that they apply equally to the whole of the mainstream news media in America. Opinion essays are cited in text using the name of the writer (e.g., "Sue Smith stated"). Editorials are listed as such (e.g., "the *New York Times* editorially stated that"). All regular news stories and news broadcasts cited in text use the name of the newspaper or news show (e.g., "*CBS News* stated" or "the *Washington Post* wrote").

39. During analysis editorials, hard news, and opinion essays were separated from each other to determine any differences in themes conveyed or the framing of those themes. There were no substantial content differences, only differences in style. These are discussed in the conclusion.

40. "How the War on Terrorism Is Affecting the Legal System in the US," *CBS Morning News* CBS News Transcripts, CBS Worldwide, Inc., November 12, 2001.

41. Kenneth Bredemeier, "Call-Up Law Protects Firms, Military Reservists," *Washington Post*, 12 November 2001: E1.

42. Editorial, "Netting Bin Laden," *Washington Post*, November 11, 2001: B7.

43. "President Bush Visits Ground Zero. . . ." This Week, *ABC News*, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., November 11, 2001.

44. "Front Lines; Some Things Are Getting Back to Normal," *Sunday Morning*, CBS News Transcripts, CBS Worldwide, November 11, 2001.

45. Editorial, "Reconsidering Saudi Arabia," *Washington Post*, November 11, 2001: B6.

46. Kevin Sack, "A Nation Challenged: The Public; Patience, for Now, With Flow of Information," *New York Times*, November 11, 2001: B6.

47. Editorial, "Are We There Yet?" *Washington Post*, November 14, 2001: A32.

48. "President Bush Visits Ground Zero. . . ." The portion of this show concerning the comparison with WWII or Vietnam was again aired on November 12, 2001: "Excerpt from 'This Week' with Historian Alan Brinkley Discussing American Attitudes in Past and Current Wars," *World News Now*, ABC News, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.
49. "President Bush Visits Ground Zero. . . ." *This Week*, ABC News, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., November 11, 2001.
50. "President Bush Visits Ground Zero. . . ."
51. Rick Lyman, "A Nation Challenged: The Film Industry; White House Takes Steps to Renew Tie to Hollywood," *New York Times*, November 11, 2001: B6.
52. Alison Mitchell, "A Nation Challenged: The Home Front; After Asking for Volunteers, Government Tries to Determine What They Will Do" *New York Times*, November 10, 2001: B7.
53. Mitchell, "A Nation Challenged," A7.
54. Mitchell, "A Nation Challenged," A7.
55. Richard Cohen, "We Can't Fight Terror Everywhere," *Washington Post*, November 13, 2001: A31.
56. Cohen, "We Can't Fight Terror Everywhere," A31.
57. Editorial, "Vietnam Ghosts," *New York Times*, November 11, 2001, section 4: 12.
58. Sack, "A Nation Challenged: The Public," B6.
59. Sack, "A Nation Challenged: The Public," B6.
60. "President Bush Visits Ground Zero. . . ." *This Week*, ABC News, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., November 11, 2001.
61. Editorial, "The Battle for Mazur-I-Sharif," *New York Times*, November 10, 2001: A22.
62. Sack, "A Nation Challenged: The Public," B6. For a lone exception to the press framing of this theme see, Editorial, "Are We There Yet?" *Washington Post*, November 14, 2001: A32.
63. Sack, "A Nation Challenged: The Public," B6.
64. "Pres. Bush Addresses UN General Assembly, Says More Than Sympathy Is Needed from all Countries," *NBC Nightly News*, NBC Transcripts, National Broadcasting Co. Inc., November 10, 2001.
65. "Security Tightens around UN in New York," *The Saturday Early Show*, CBS News Transcripts, CBS Worldwide Inc., November 10, 2001.
66. "Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Discusses the War on Terrorism," *Face the Nation*, CBS News Transcripts, CBS Worldwide, Inc., November 10, 2001.
67. Karen DeYoung, "Bush Urges Coalition to Fulfill Its 'Duties,'; \$1 Billion Aid for Pakistan Announced," *Washington Post*, November 11, 2001: A1.
68. Elizabeth Becker, "A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds—A Special Report; In the War on Terrorism, A Battle to Shape Opinion," *New York Times*, November 11, 2001: A1.
69. Becker, "A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds," A1.
70. Becker, "A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds," A1.
71. Becker, "A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds," A1.
72. Editorial, "The Battle for Mazur-I-Sharif," A22.
73. Editorial, "Vietnam Ghosts," Section 4, p.12.
74. Editorial, "Disappearing in America," *New York Times*, November 10, 2001: A22.
75. Editorial, "Disappearing in America," A22.
76. Editorial, "Disappearing in America," A22.
77. Robin Toner and Neil A. Lewis, "A Nation Challenged: Civil Liberties; White House Push on Security Steps Bypasses Congress," *New York Times*, November 15, 2001: A1.
78. Editorial, "End-Running the Bill of Rights," *Washington Post*, November 16, 2001: A46.
79. We realize that alternate sources of information are available given the widespread use of the Internet. However, the hegemony of the mainstream news is not eliminated by online news sources. If we look closely to the time period of 2001, we see that in most cases the online news sources visited are mainstream news websites (e.g., www.abcnews.com, www.washingtonpost.com, and so on). According to the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "41% of those who go online say they turn to the Internet to get more information on stories first seen in the traditional media. Relatively few (21%) say they read stories online

instead of getting them in newspapers or on TV” (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “The Internet News Audience Goes Ordinary,” January 14, 1999, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=72>).

In 1997, 77 percent of Americans read their daily local papers (Smith, Ted J. III, S. Robert Lichter, and Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. *What the People Want from the Press*. [Washington, DC: Center for Media and Public Affairs, 1997], 16). According to Smith and colleagues, “Major national newspapers . . . are read by . . . about one-third of all adult Americans. People with high levels of education and income are . . . approximately twice as likely as those with low levels to read a major national news paper. Less than one-fourth (24%) of those Americans whose education is limited to high school read a national paper, while more than one-half (55%) of those with a college degree do the same” (Smith, Lichter, and Harris and Associates, Inc., 20). According to Roderick Hart, what makes this large readership all the more worthy of study “is that newspaper reading is strongly associated with political involvement. . . . Studies using N.E.S. data found this to be true . . . as have studies using The Civic Culture data . . . Times-Mirror Center data . . . and a Wisconsin-based dataset . . .” (Roderick Hart, “Citizen Discourse and Political Participation: A Survey,” *Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy*, W. Lance Bennet and Robert M. Entman, eds. [Cambridge University Press, 2001], 407–32).

Thus, Americans who are looking for news to make informed political decisions, those who rely on the mainstream news media covered in this study, are the one’s most affected by the press’s lack of neutral reporting: “Despite the growth of the Internet news audience, going online for the news has yet to become part of the daily routine for most Americans, in the same way as watching TV news, reading the newspaper or listening to radio news. Asked about their news use on a typical day (‘yesterday’), just under a quarter of Americans (24%) say they went online for the news. That compares with 60% who watched TV news on the previous day; 42% who say they read a newspaper; and 40% who listened to news on the radio.” (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “News Audiences Increasingly Politicized Online News Audience Larger, More Diverse,” June 8, 2004, <http://peoplepress.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=833>)

80. See, for instance, Kuypers, *Bush’s War*, 17–34.

81. Brigitte Lebens Nacos, *The Press, Presidents, and Crises* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). Also see Kuypers, *Press Bias and Politics: How the Media Frame Controversial Issues* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); Kuypers, *Bush’s War*.

82. Editorial, “Disappearing in America,” A22.

83. Toner and Lewis, “A Nation Challenged: Civil Liberties; White House Push,” A1.

84. Paul Meller, “Technology; European Union Set to Vote on Data Law,” *New York Times*, November 13, 2001: C7.

85. For instance, the Aleph Institute, the Alliance Defense Fund, and Concerned Women for America.

86. See David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Master Frames and Cycle of Protest,” *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, Aldon D. Morris and Carol M. Mueller, Eds. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 133–55. Also see, D.S. Myers, “Framing National Security: Elite Public Discourse on Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War,” *Political Communication* 12 (1995): 173–92.

87. David Levin, “Framing Peace Policies: The Competition for Resonate Themes,” *Political Communication* 22 (2005): 84.

88. Coe, Domke, Graham, John, and Pickard, 248–49.

89. Karen Callaghan and Frauke Schnell, “Assessing the Democratic Debate: How the News Media Frame Elite Policy Discourse,” *Political Communication* 18 (2001): 203.

90. For an example of press bias conceived as a failure in neutrally conveying reality over time see Cooper, “Media Bias,” 1064–71.