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On Communication

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ON COMMUNICATION

John Greenman*

Everybody knows that communication is important, but nobody knows how to define it. The best scholars refer to it. Free-speech law protects it. But no one—no scholar or judge—has successfully captured it. Few have even tried.

This is the first article to define communication under the law. In it, I explain why some activities—music, abstract painting, and parading—are considered communicative under the First Amendment, while others—sex, drugs, and subliminal advertising—are not. I argue that the existing theories of communication, which hold that communicative behaviors are expressive or convey ideas, fail to explain what is going on in free-speech cases. Instead, communication hinges on the free will of the recipient. By this I mean that communication occurs when Person A conveys a thought to Person B, and Person B freely chooses whether to accept that thought. An act is communicative, in other words, if the important change that A wants to make in B's mind occurs only if B wills it to, as happens during an argument.

Reconceptualizing communication in this way—as behaviors meant to change minds through the free will of the listener—would solve deep and persistent First Amendment problems. It would explain which behaviors are communicative and therefore potentially covered by the First Amendment. Adopting the free-will theory would clarify the analysis in historically muddled areas such as the First Amendment treatment of nude dancing. But it would also shed light on the law governing new forms of behavior, such as publication of computer-programming code.

More broadly, the free-will theory of communication can point us in new directions. We are used to thinking of communication in ways that don't describe it, and these errors may keep us from recognizing new forms of communication as they develop. Applying the free-will theory of communication, I argue, will prepare us for technological changes that will make our old metaphors for communication obsolete.

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INTRODUCTION

Everybody knows that communication is important, but nobody knows how to define it. The best scholars refer to it.¹ Free-speech law protects it.²

1. Robert Post, *Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence*, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000) ("It seems that what is amiss with First Amendment doctrine is not so much the absence of common ground about how *communication* within our society ought constitutionally to be ordered, as it is our inability to formulate clear explanations and coherent rules capable of elucidating and charting the contours of this ground."); Frederick Schauer, *The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience*, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004) ("[E]ven the briefest glimpse at the vast universe of widely accepted content-based restrictions on *communication* reveals that the speech with which the First Amendment deals is the exception and the speech that may routinely be regulated is the rule." (emphasis added)); Kathleen M. Sullivan, *Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech*, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 450 (1995) ("[T]he Court has held that cheap and convenient modes of *communication* may not be eliminated wholesale." (emphasis added)); Eugene Volokh, *Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones*, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1304 (2005) ("Under nearly every theory of free speech, the right to free speech is at its core the right to *communicate*—to persuade and to inform people through the content of one's message." (emphasis added)).

2. See *United States v. O'Brien*, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (holding that a law punishing the destruction of draft cards was constitutional because it condemned the act's "noncommunicative" impact).

Smart people tell us that the Internet should be structured to promote it.³ But no one—no scholar or judge—has successfully captured it. Few have even tried.

The following acts are communicative enough to be covered by the First Amendment⁴: playing music,⁵ painting abstract figures,⁶ marching in a Hibernian pride parade,⁷ watching and showing movies,⁸ dancing in the nude and watching nude dancing (barely),⁹ picketing (sometimes),¹⁰ posting computer source code,¹¹ and burning a flag or draft card.¹²

Compare these communicative acts to a list of *noncommunicative* acts: violence,¹³ drug use,¹⁴ subliminal advertising,¹⁵ refusing to allow military recruiters on campus in protest of a government policy,¹⁶ and sex.¹⁷

What's the difference between the first list and the second? Nobody knows. There are a few *proposed* distinctions, but none bear any scrutiny, and few have been seriously championed. The law nominally protects acts that are "expressive," but rarely defines that word. When a definition is provided, it does not capture what it seeks to—any reasonable definition of "expressive" would include sex and violence, which can be deeply

3. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, PROPERTY, COMMONS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: TOWARDS A CORE COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE (2001), available at <http://www.benkler.org/WhitePaper.pdf>.

4. For ease of reference, I will use the term First Amendment throughout this Article to refer only to the Amendment's Free Speech Clause.

5. *Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.").

6. See *Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.*, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).

7. *Id.* at 570.

8. *Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495, 501–03 (1952).

9. *City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.*, 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000).

10. *Thornhill v. Alabama*, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940). *But see Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB*, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951).

11. *Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley*, 273 F.3d 429, 448 (2d Cir. 2001).

12. *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1989); *United States v. O'Brien*, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).

13. *NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.*, 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) ("The First Amendment does not protect violence.").

14. *Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith*, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (holding that the religious-ceremonial use of peyote was "unconnected with any communicative activity").

15. *Vance v. Judas Priest*, Nos. 86-5844 & 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920, at *4 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990) ("[S]ubliminal stimuli do not constitute speech."). *But cf. Zamora v. Columbia Broad. Sys.*, 480 F. Supp. 199, 206–07 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (holding that the First Amendment barred plaintiff's claim that viewing violent television caused him to commit violence).

16. *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.*, 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).

17. James Allon Garland, *Breaking the Enigma Code: Why the Law Has Failed to Recognize Sex as Expressive Conduct Under the First Amendment, and Why Sex Between Men Proves That It Should*, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 159, 196 (2003) ("[N]o court has ever recognized sex as a form of expressive conduct . . ."). *But cf. Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (describing sex as "expression" that is protected under the Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty).

expressive but are not seen as expression covered by the First Amendment. The same is true of other phrases used to describe First Amendment coverage, such as “the First Amendment protects the communication of ideas.”¹⁸ We aren’t really sure what “ideas” are, but whatever they are, music and nude dancing don’t convey them.

Some scholars argue that communicative acts are those directed at the mind and not the body,¹⁹ but activities like psychotropic-drug use and subliminal advertising are directed at the mind and still not protected from regulation. Other scholars argue that philosophers like Ludwig Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin, who argued against a formalist understanding of language, can show us which acts are communicative.²⁰ But no scholar has explained how this work can be used to identify activities that are *not* communicative. And while other scholars assert that communicative acts are those that serve First Amendment values, there is no agreement as to which First Amendment value is paramount.²¹ Nor has anybody explained how any *one* value could be used to distinguish between communication and noncommunication, as any value would also be furthered by some noncommunicative acts.

In short, we got nothing.

This Article fills the gap, providing the first viable legal definition of communication. Instead of worrying about “expression,” or “ideas,” or “mind,” or “values,” I will argue, we should be asking about free will. In determining what communication is, we are engaging our intuitions about free will. More specifically, we are engaging our intuitions about freely willed mental responses. By this I mean that communication occurs when Person A tries to convey a thought—some idea or feeling—to Person B, and Person B can freely *choose* whether to accept that thought. An act is communicative, in other words, if the important change that A wants to make in B’s mind occurs only when B wills it to.

In this Article, I will develop and defend this theory—the free-will theory of communication. In Part I, I will articulate a coarse definition of communication, one that weeds out all the easy cases, and then argue that the coarse definition is overinclusive. I will then argue that the free-will theory defines communication more accurately than any of the four existing theories: (1) that communication is behavior that conveys ideas, (2) that communication is behavior that primarily impacts the mind, (3) that communication can be understood in reference to linguistic philosophy, and (4) that communication is behavior that conveys thoughts and causes limited harm.

18. *One World One Family Now v. City of Miami Beach*, 175 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.) 1999.

19. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, *Resurrecting Free Speech*, 63 *FORDHAM L. REV.* 971, 983 (1995) (noting that a traditional understanding of the First Amendment is that it protects speech, which involves the mind, rather than conduct, which involves the body).

20. See *infra* notes 50–55 and accompanying text.

21. See C. Edwin Baker, *Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech*, 25 *UCLA L. REV.* 964, 990–91 (1978).

In Part II, I will discuss the free-will theory of communication in the context of First Amendment law and theory. I will argue that theorists who attempt to derive a theory of communication by looking only at First Amendment values—meaning justifications for free speech—will inevitably fail, but that the free-will theory is nonetheless consistent with a multiple-value approach. I will go on to argue that current speech-conduct law is incoherent and that the free-will theory could clarify it: in particular, it could solve problems by refining content-neutrality analysis. I will then apply my theory to two sets of free-speech cases: the nude-dancing cases and cases governing the publication of computer-programming code.

In the Conclusion I very briefly explore the broader implications of the free-will theory, arguing that it can help us learn when to treat virtual worlds as real, reimagine the relationship between communication and the body, and prepare us for new technologies that we will not know how to classify under existing free-speech theory.

I. EXPLORATION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO COMMUNICATE?

A. *The Coarse Definition of Communication Is Inadequate*

I argue here that the existing definitions of communication don't work, by which I mean that they don't predict what either doctrine or intuition say communication is. But first, I will suss out a coarse definition of communication, one that will weed out behavior that is undisputedly not communicative, but that will ultimately prove overinclusive.

Communication is made up of things like talking and writing and painting and making movies. We can note, as a start, that all these things are meant to convey a state of mind—an idea or feeling or emotion—from one person to another. To this we can add that the act must be reasonably recognizable as intended to convey thoughts. If, for instance, Fred drops a bowling ball off his roof to protest a treaty, he has not communicated disapproval even if he really meant to. Communication, in other words, requires use of conventional means to convey a state of mind.

We can say, then, that communicative acts are those intended to convey mental states and performed in ways that are reasonably understood to be for that purpose. I'll call this definition—acts meant to convey thoughts done through means reasonably recognizable as serving that end—the “coarse” definition of communication, because it is useful but overinclusive. Let me also note that some scholars define communication (or its equivalent) in almost exactly this way,²² presumably reasoning that this is as precise a definition as we can get.

To test out the coarse definition, let's apply it to the following cases:

1. A doctor prescribes Prozac for a patient.

22. See, e.g., David McGowan, *From Social Friction to Social Meaning: What Expressive Uses of Code Tell Us About Free Speech*, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515, 1524–25 (2003).

2. Person A takes a hit of ecstasy. A tries to explain to B what taking the drug feels like. Finding that words are insufficient, A gives B some of the drug.
3. A nude erotic dancer dances onstage in front of a customer.
4. An erotic dancer gives a customer a lap dance without touching him.
5. An erotic dancer gives a customer a lap dance and rubs the customer while dancing.
6. A movie theater splices a single frame advertising popcorn into a film, which raises popcorn sales even though viewers don't realize they have seen the frame.
7. A sadist uses torture techniques that cause no lasting physical harm on a willing masochist as part of a role-playing fantasy.

These examples, I will argue, show the limits of the coarse definition because under that definition they all should be considered communication—even though they are not, in fact, generally considered communicative.²³

Consider the first example: a doctor prescribes Prozac for a patient. Intuitively, that doesn't *seem* like communication. Indeed, no one has argued that the right to make, prescribe, or take drugs is protected by the First Amendment. Still, the coarse definition of communication includes any act that is primarily intended to convey a state of mind and does so in a way that is conventionally for that purpose. And the very point of Prozac is to alter thoughts; it made Eli Lilly a lot of money doing that. Put another way, Prozac is like a novel: it wants to change your mind. So the acts of making and taking Prozac would be considered communication under the coarse definition. The problem is that they're not communicative.

Of course, one might say that making or taking Prozac isn't speech because it can cause harm. But speech can cause harm—consider those famous Skokie Nazis, whose right to march was covered by the First Amendment.²⁴ They could have caused a lot of harm: fear and anger and so forth. So harm by itself can't be the answer. Still, it might be that Prozac potentially causes more harm. But saying this misses the fact that Prozac seems *categorically* different from Nazi parades—not subject to the same speech-harm balancing test. It is extremely unlikely, for example, that psychotropic drug use would be deemed speech even if the drug undisputedly caused *no* harm. Taking drugs is noncommunicative, in other words, regardless of the harm it causes.²⁵

Another possible objection to the Prozac example is that communication occurs when a person has a thought and tries to pass the *same* thought to another person. Even though the folks at Eli Lilly *intended* Prozac to change people's minds—and to do so in a way that is recognized for that purpose—

23. Nude dancing is an exception.

24. *Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie*, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977).

25. Still, this is one possible definition of communication that we should consider going forward: acts are communicative when they convey thoughts and don't cause too much harm.

it is not conveying a mental state that they themselves are experiencing. In other words, you might say that someone communicates when she has a thought and tries to pass the *same* thought to another person. But people convey states of mind they don't experience all the time—when they lie, for instance. And although lying may not be protected communication, it does seem like a *kind* of communication. One can also imagine situations in which a person conveys a thought without knowing what it is. If, for instance, a poet creates a computer program that randomly writes poetry, and it happens to produce a poem that is critical of the government, nothing in First Amendment law suggests that the government could suppress the poem because the poet wasn't really thinking about its content.

Here let me add that this requirement—of equivalence between the mental state of the speaker and the thought potentially conveyed to a listener—seems to be what the word “expression” is getting at. Literally, “expression” denotes getting something out,²⁶ and in the First Amendment context, the thing expressed must be the mental state of the communicator. But to be communicative, an act doesn't need to express a state of mind that the actor is truly experiencing. Consider a nude dancer. Her free-speech rights don't disappear if she is thinking about the drive home while dancing. This means, then, that the word “expression” is inappropriate, because it implies that the speaker must think or feel what she is communicating—a requirement that doesn't really exist.²⁷

The second example addresses this problem directly: a drug user gives ecstasy to her friend so her friend can experience the same state of mind. This use of drugs, then, is expressive. But few would call it communicative, and no judge would classify it as speech.

Examples three, four, and five all involve erotic dancing: one from a distance, one up close without touching, and one up close with touching. All these acts are meant to change minds by causing arousal, which is a mental phenomenon. But only the first act—nude dancing—is covered by the First Amendment, and then only barely.²⁸ But the purpose and content of erotic dancing and erotic rubbing are the same: to arouse. It therefore seems that all three acts should be treated the same way. Of course, erotic rubbing might be more likely to lead to actual prostitution or other undesirable

26. The first definition of expression is the “[a]ct or product of pressing out.” WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 899 (2d ed. 1934).

27. And while there probably is a requirement that the speaker *intend* to invoke a mental state in others, intending to make someone feel a certain way and feeling that way yourself are two different things. Certainly one can imagine a pole dancer who intends to arouse her customers without herself feeling aroused.

28. See *City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.*, 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (noting that nude dancing is “expressive conduct” but that regulations “unrelated to the suppression” thereof are weighed against a “less stringent” standard (quoting *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989))); see also *supra* note 17 and accompanying text.

outcomes, but that is because it is a very *effective* form of communication, not because it isn't meant to convey a mental state.²⁹

The sixth example involves subliminal advertising in a movie theater. Assume that subliminal advertising works.³⁰ Under the coarse definition, this ad must be speech. "I want popcorn," is, after all, a state of mind. Subliminal advertising conveys "I want popcorn"—an idea—through language, and conveying an idea through language is the *paradigmatic* instance of communication in typical First Amendment discourse.³¹ Subliminal advertising therefore seems like it should be communication. But subliminal advertising is generally not covered by the First Amendment.³²

The final example, a sadomasochistic mock torture session, should also be communicative under the coarse definition. Pain, after all, is a mental state. The torturer in this hypothetical is therefore conveying a mental state—pain—without causing physical harm or using physical coercion. And yet it would seem a category mistake to call this act "communicative." One doesn't "communicate" physical pain in the ordinary sense of the word. Nor is there any reason to think that this act would be covered by the First Amendment.

All seven examples, then, should be communicative acts under the coarse definition of communication. But none except nude dancing are covered by the First Amendment, and none except nude dancing intuitively seem like communication.

The free-will theory of communication explains why. These acts are not communicative because they are intended to convey mental states regardless of the recipient's will. When someone takes Prozac or ecstasy, her ability to experience the mental state the drug is supposed to produce does not turn on an act of will. We would not say to a friend, "This drug will get you high if you really think about it." Similarly, subliminal advertising is thought to persuade a person whether they want it to or not. And erotic rubbing is treated differently than erotic viewing because, of the two, rubbing is harder to experience without becoming aroused.

To the coarse definition, then, I am adding a new piece—one that has never been articulated before. The coarse definition says that communicative

29. One could also distinguish rubbing by saying it is a bodily act. But rubbing doesn't change or damage the body the way that sex might (for example, through HIV transmission). So when we say that rubbing is a bodily act, what we mean is not that it changes the body but that it conveys thoughts through touch, which is a different sense than sight. But it would make no sense to distinguish communication by the particular *sense* that receives the communication. *See infra* Conclusion. Certainly we wouldn't say that reading Braille is not communicative because it involves touch and not sight.

30. It may not. Nicole Grattan Pearson, Note, *Subliminal Speech: Is It Worthy of First Amendment Protection?*, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 775, 788-93 (1995).

31. By this I mean that there is no question whether the act that the government seeks to regulate is communicative when the act uses language. *See, e.g.*, *N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (noting that advertisements depicting the behavior of public officials are speech under the First Amendment).

32. *See, e.g.*, *Vance v. Judas Priest*, Nos. 86-5844 & 86-3939, 1990 WL 130920, at *4 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990).

acts are primarily intended to convey a state of mind and are reasonably recognizable as serving that purpose. But this is not enough. The important and desired change of mind must be effectuated through the listener's will.

B. *The Free-Will Theory Elaborated*

In the previous Section, we saw that the coarse definition of communication and the concept of expression failed to explain why some acts—those that changed minds in ways the listener couldn't reject—weren't communicative. This suggested an additional requirement: that the thought conveyed can only be effectuated through the will of the listener.

We are now in a position to elaborate a bit on this proposal. First, although the concept of freely willed responses may seem obscure, it isn't. This appeal to freely willed mental responses is most evident in argument, which is core First Amendment activity. When someone is arguing, her goal is not just to have her voice heard. Her goal, instead, is to *convince* someone—to change the listener's mind. But the listener can only be convinced through her own free will. My thesis is that we should treat *this* quality, of working through the free will of the listener, to be the *sine qua non* of communication, whether linguistic or not.

Second, let me clarify that I use the phrase “freely willed mental response” to limit the scope of my proposed definition (as the use of the word “mental” indicates) to acts that the listener can control her response to solely through mental effort. In other words, these are acts whose most important effects can be resisted even when they are physically completed. For instance, one can hear an argument and choose whether to agree with it, or watch a play and choose whether to be moved by it. Psychotropic drugs, on the other hand, are *not* communicative, because people who take drugs can't choose whether to be affected by them (although one could freely choose not to take drugs).³³

Third, I have described communicative acts as those whose most “important” effects are effectuated only through the freely willed mental responses of others. Every act has multiple effects, both physical and mental, and the communication analysis focuses on the most significant one. Persuading someone, for instance, has many physical effects, such as moving some air molecules around, and many mental effects, such as putting the

33. My justification for this distinction is primarily descriptive. Communication doesn't encompass acts (consider drug use and sex) whose most important effects cannot be willfully avoided by those who engage in them. But the distinction holds up normatively as well. The First Amendment does not create a simple right to individual communicative autonomy—a right to say only what you want to say and hear only what you want to hear. In some cases, it enables others to impinge on communicative autonomy by granting them the right to make people hear things they do not want to, as when unpopular speakers are granted the right to hold forth in a public place. *See Nat'l Socialist Party v. Vill. of Skokie*, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977). Obviously such a grant could never be extended to acts whose most important effects, when completed, overran the listener's will. There is no First Amendment right to touch someone sexually against her will, even when such touching is in the public sphere (for example, on a street corner). Nor should there be a right to broadcast subliminal messages at someone to make them join a certain political party, even though such an act would involve no *physical* coercion.

sound of one's words in the listener's head and invoking comprehension. The first mental effect, hearing a speaker's words, is unwilled. The second, comprehension, is probably also unwilled in that the normal listener experiences it whether she wants to or not. But the next effect, agreement, is only brought about through the will of the listener. This effect is the focus of the analysis, and the one that I call "important."

It follows that a lot turns on the term "important,"³⁴ a term which is so far undefined and perhaps indefinable. This term denotes a pragmatic analysis that cannot be reduced to a simple formula. That fact notwithstanding, in most cases the most important effect—the one that is the subject of the analysis—is easily identified. The aim of argument is to persuade; the aim of music is to make the listener feel a certain way; the aim of erotic dancing is to arouse.

One can imagine more complicated scenarios, but few that would cause problems in practice. If I decided to convince a friend to support gun-safety laws by shooting him in the neck with a BB gun, I would be inducing pain—an unwilled mental state—with the aim of producing agreement, a willed mental state. But if I were to argue that my act was protected by the First Amendment because inducing pain was only a means to convince my (by now former) friend, I would lose, and no one would find my argument plausible. Pain is an important effect, one that we care about a great deal. The pain itself is therefore the focus of the analysis even when it is used to convince somebody. In most cases, then, the importance requirement will be uncontroverted.

C. Analysis of Existing Theories

So far, I have articulated the coarse definition of communication, argued that the coarse definition is broadly correct but overinclusive and therefore inadequate, and proposed a new element to the coarse definition—namely, that communicative behaviors are those whose most important effects are reasonably intended to be brought about through freely willed responses of others. In this Section, I will test the free-will theory against existing theories of communication and show that the free-will theory more accurately describes communication—that is, that it better aligns with First Amendment cases and common intuition. Although I will refer to First Amendment doctrine as I proceed, I will hold off on fully reconciling my theory with the First Amendment until I have finished making my case in the abstract, because I fear that prematurely descending into free-speech law will only lead us down dark paths from whence we will be unable to retrace our steps.

There are, I will argue, four theories of communication, although this number is somewhat arbitrary. Indeed, the jurisprudence presents an enormous amount of language about communication—and its fellow travelers

34. The word "important" is, I think, the right one, not because it perfectly predicts precisely which thought is at issue, but because it is expansive enough to encompass all the relevant factors. Indeed, any more technical term would suggest a precision that the analysis itself lacks.

“expression” and “protected speech”—but few coherent theories.³⁵ Surveying the literature, one is likely to find phrases like “the First Amendment protects the communication of ideas” or “the First Amendment protects expression” without any examination of what “ideas” and “expression” are.³⁶ To some degree, then, I am only identifying strains of rhetoric, but these strains do cohere into arguments that are worth considering.

The first such argument is that communication is the conveyance of “ideas.” The second is that communication is behavior that goes to the mind and not the body. The third is that communication can be understood in reference to linguistic philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of J.L. Austin. The fourth, as I noted earlier, is that communication is behavior that conveys states of mind and doesn’t cause too much harm.

All these theories, I will argue, are terribly wrong.

1. *Communication Is Not Just the Conveyance of Ideas*

Frequently, behavior is said to be covered by the First Amendment if it conveys “ideas” or “information.” This theory, which I will call “ideaism,” does not withstand much scrutiny. It is, perhaps, sufficient refutation of this theory to note that nobody who uses it will define “ideas” or “information.” But it is worth thinking about these terms; doing so will focus the inquiry and provide a vocabulary for the debate.³⁷ This effort is limited to roughly mapping out how the ideas are used in those First Amendment cases in which courts have tried to operationalize them.³⁸

35. There are, of course, some exceptions to this. *See, e.g.*, *Miller v. Civil City of South Bend*, 904 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring), *rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (articulating Posner’s theory of “expressive” behavior).

36. *See, e.g.*, *First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti*, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he First Amendment was meant to guarantee freedom to express and communicate ideas . . .”).

37. Before considering ideaism, let me note that I will not look at the word “symbolic,” which, although it shows up often in the First Amendment context, is far too squirrely to use productively. Think about two uses for the word. The first is the sense in which words and letters could be called “symbols,” in the way that the written phrase “Stop the war” is communication effectuated through symbols. The second is the way that a physical item serves as a representative for something else, as when O’Brien’s draft card was “symbolic” of the war. *See United States v. O’Brien*, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Without thinking too much about the tougher questions (for example, what is a symbol? or what is the relationship between language and the world?), it should be clear that the word “symbol” means different things in these two cases. But no one who uses the word “symbol” in First Amendment cases will explain in what meaningful sense these two uses are alike. *See id.* Using “symbol” is thus not a way to explain how covered acts are alike, but instead a way of avoiding explaining how they are alike.

38. When I use the word “idea,” I am not using it as it is used in copyright law, for two reasons. First, even in copyright cases, the term, which is distinguished from “expression,” is notoriously poorly defined: the prevailing consensus is that the best definition was provided by Judge Learned Hand, and he noted only that ideas are more abstract than expression. *See Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel”*, 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 405 (1989) (“Presently, the consensus view is that Hand’s attempt to solve the idea/expression dichotomy is the best effort to date.” (citing *Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.*, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930))). Second, the term is not used in the same way across the two fields. In the First Amendment context, courts commonly use the term “expression” not *in contrast* to the term “ideas,” but as a broader category that *encompasses* “ideas.” *See*

Turning to “information” and “ideas,” then, we can say that “information” is used to refer to things like sentences, mathematical formulas, musical scores, computer code, and DNA strings. But it is not used to refer to things like the sound of music or the way a picture looks. “Idea,” on the other hand, refers to mostly the same things—sentences, formulas, scores, and so forth—with the added requirement that “idea” usually connotes a mental phenomenon. Thus in the the ordinary sense of the phrase “he had a good idea,” “idea” denotes a mental state.³⁹

The simple argument against ideaism is that it fails to predict what the First Amendment actually covers. An ideaist view of the First Amendment would exclude covered activities like music and nonsymbolic art. Dance performances,⁴⁰ abstract art,⁴¹ instrumental music,⁴² and narrative⁴³ are covered by the First Amendment, but don’t convey ideas.⁴⁴ And if “idea” is read to denote these things, the term just means “mental state,” and ideaism merely recapitulates the coarse definition of communication. If instrumental music conveys ideas, then more or less everything must. It is true that music has a formal vocabulary (song form, for instance). But so do most human activities, like manufacturing automobiles. If one can talk about the debt

e.g., *Buckley v. Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates [is] . . . political expression . . .”). Instead, I am trying to get at how the terms are used in First Amendment cases in which their meaning might affect the outcome, as happens for example in the code cases. See *infra* Section II.E.2.

39. I offer definitions of these terms, noting first that while these definitions are probably generally inadequate (they fail to capture every usage and are not informed by extralegal literature), they will at least let you know what I’m talking about. We can think of “information,” then, as a series of elements drawn from a limited set of elements that is useful because it is arranged in a particular way. A sentence is a sequence of marks drawn from a limited set of elements (the alphabet). These elements are useful when arranged in the proper sequence, but not otherwise. If I were to rearrange the letters in a sentence, I might have nonsense. The same is true of any of the examples in our list of things “information” refers to: programming code, DNA, mathematical formulas, and so on.

An “idea,” in contrast, is a thought expressed in an information system. In other words, ideas are arrangements of elements that people *can think in* and that have meaning in a particular information system. Most ideas are in language, but people can think in other information systems as well (mathematical formulas, musical notation, and so forth). Notice, then, that not all information systems are idea systems. DNA, for instance, is an information system—limited elements usefully arranged—but not an idea system. (Very few folks walk down the street thinking “AGCT GCAT,” although one can encode language as DNA and vice versa.) But because language is the paradigm example of communication and because information systems tend to resemble each other, there may be a tendency to think of all uses of information as communicative. In fact, this confusion is influencing the programming-code cases. See *infra* Section II.E.2.

40. *City of Eric v. Pap’s A.M.*, 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000).

41. *Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.*, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).

42. *Id.*

43. These need not necessarily be linguistic.

44. Judge Posner has made this point eloquently. See *Miller v. Civil City of South Bend*, 904 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if ‘thought,’ ‘concept,’ ‘idea,’ and ‘opinion’ are broadly defined, these are not what most music conveys; and even if music is regarded as a language, it is not a language for encoding ideas and opinions.”), *rev’d sub nom.* *Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).

Schoenberg owes Beethoven, one can also talk about the debt the 2005 Mustang owes the Mach 1. Building a car still isn't speech.

Ideaists might argue that the First Amendment's protection of music, paintings, art, and dance is either a mistake or a *de minimis* exception. Most don't, however, and as a doctrinal matter, it seems unthinkable that these protections could be rolled back and silly to argue that so broad and meaningful a swath of human behavior is *de minimis*. "A rule cannot be laid down that would excommunicate the paintings of Degas."⁴⁵

Ideaism thus improperly excludes large areas of nonlinguistic behavior from communication. But even if the First Amendment protected only language, ideaism would still be wrong. Language itself obviously conveys more than ideas. Consider how much of language does not survive translation, how much is conveyed through timing or tone of voice (as when one is flirting or telling a joke). Imagine a law providing that the text of rousing political speeches could be reproduced but that video and audio tapes of the speeches were illegal. Transcripts of Martin Luther King Jr.'s speeches would be in legal circulation, but the recordings would not. Wouldn't such a law offend the First Amendment, even if it were idea neutral?⁴⁶ How, then, can we say that the First Amendment covers only "ideas" or "information"?

2. *Communication Is Not Just Behavior that Goes to the Mind*

Some First Amendment scholars have argued that speech is behavior that goes to the mind while conduct is behavior that changes the physical realm—that goes to the "body."⁴⁷ "Mind" here means everything a person experiences in his or her head: pain, for instance, or love, or thoughts about the quadratic formula. The physical realm—the "body" in the literature—is everything that is physically out there: cheese, Yugos, the Indian Ocean, and so on. I will call this view "mentalism." Although mentalism misses the mark, it does so in ways that are more interesting than ideaism.

A trivial objection to mentalism is that every communicative act uses the body. Books are made of paper, conversation of breath, and so forth. Indeed, any communication causes physical responses in the recipient—reading a book causes eyeballs to move and synapses to fire. So when the mentalist says communication "goes to the mind," what she means is that the physical consequences of communication are *incidental* to the mental changes. What matters first about a book is that it can change your mind, not that it causes paper cuts. A sword is primarily important for its value in causing cuts, so using a sword isn't a speech act.

45. *Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.*, 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).

46. *See City of Ladue v. Gilleo*, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994) (noting that a law that "completely foreclose[s] a venerable means of communication" may be unconstitutional even if content neutral).

47. *See Sullivan*, *supra* note 1, at 442 ("The distinction between mind and body, speech and conduct, expression and action, holds that speech is privileged above conduct; government may regulate the clash of bodies but not the stirring of hearts and minds.").

But not all behaviors intended to change people's minds are communicative. As per our previous examples, erotic rubbing, drugs, and subliminal advertising are all both mind altering and noncommunicative. And here you might say that in these acts, the mental change is incidental to the physical change. But the physical change caused by erotic rubbing or swallowing a pill is no more incidental than that caused by reading. And subliminal advertising causes exactly the same physical changes as normal advertising, but is not communicative.

These examples get to the problem with the mentalist view. There are many behaviors that people undertake intending to create a mental phenomenon in others, but that are not speech because the response they provoke is beyond the recipient's control. Prozac changes the mind without the participation of the person who takes it; the same is true of subliminal advertising. To be communicative, an act must effectuate not just any mental changes, but *freely willed* mental changes. This explains why language is the paradigm of communication. Mental responses to language are rarely involuntary. If Person A tries to persuade Person B—or comfort her, or woo her, or what have you—B need not feel as A wants. B will be persuaded or comforted or wooed as she pleases. Her mental response will thus be freely willed. But linguistic activity is only *correlated* with this quality of producing free responses, not synonymous with it.

Language that does not produce free mental responses is therefore not communicative. We can test this hypothesis with a simple thought experiment. Imagine a man who, using spells, could always convince listeners of what he wanted to. Let's call him the Sorcerer. Through television appearances, the Sorcerer forces the American people to appoint him king, scrap our constitutional democracy, and cancel all the good TV shows. He obviously threatens all of the classical First Amendment values: deliberative democracy, individual autonomy, the marketplace of ideas, and so forth. Eventually some soldiers with earplugs detain him and gag him. He then argues (via text messaging, I guess) that preventing him from using his spells violates his First Amendment rights.

So would you, dear reader, go to court to defend his right to cast spells? If you were an ideaist or mentalist, you would have to, because he has done nothing but change people's *minds* by conveying *ideas*. If you think he should stay gagged, then you must reject these theories.

The point of this silly hypothetical⁴⁸ is that it is people's capacity to respond freely that is the sine qua non of communication. This quality of free response is not epiphenomenal; it is the thing itself. In truth, it is the other qualities usually thought to mark communication—the use of ideas, reason, information, or appeals to the mind—that are epiphenomenal. If we remove

48. But it's not *that* silly. Subliminal speech is a minor, real-life instantiation of the Sorcerer hypothetical. So is (language-based) brainwashing.

the reliance on the listener's will, then the act is not communicative, no matter what else is true about it.⁴⁹

3. *Communication Does Not Consist Only of Illocutionary Acts*

Beyond mentalism, a significant strain in First Amendment scholarship tries to solve speech-conduct problems by referencing nonlegal theory, most often linguistic philosophy. The most invoked names are Austin and Wittgenstein.

Reading these two philosophers, one can see why free-speech scholars like them so much. Legal scholars are generally (and rightly) dissatisfied with the existing theories of First Amendment coverage. They therefore tend to argue that courts are overly formalistic in making speech-conduct decisions, meaning that they look too heavily at the form of the activity and not enough at its purpose or the context in which it is used.⁵⁰ These scholars push two related themes: antiformalism and contextualism. Antiformalism proposes that in identifying communication, current doctrine unduly emphasizes form over function; contextualism proposes that the law should focus on the circumstances surrounding the putatively protected behavior to see if it is communicative.

Austin and Wittgenstein fit in perfectly with the agenda of antiformalist scholars. Both philosophers showed that language didn't work in just one way—that it could work in different ways and have different effects in different contexts.⁵¹ And here the problem shows itself already. Taking it as true that language *does* do different things depending on the context in which it is used, how can one use this datum to fashion a rule that defines communication? Knowing that there is no unitary theory of language—that it does different things in different contexts—can only tell us how *not* to define communication. Of course it is true that we can only tell whether an act is communicative by looking at its use in context. But in that context, what the hell are we looking for?

Legal scholars who cite linguistic philosophers, therefore, inevitably end up doing little more than restating the coarse definition of communication.⁵²

49. My sense is that this is what people are getting at when they refer to the mind-body distinction. But if so, they are using the word "mind" in a way it has never been used before.

50. See McGowan, *supra* note 22, at 1525–26; Lee Tien, *Publishing Software as a Speech Act*, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629, 633–34 (2000).

51. Of course this summary is grossly reductionist. I am speaking of Wittgenstein's later writing, which the legal scholars I am arguing against rely on. In *Philosophical Investigations*, for instance, Wittgenstein's rejection of a unitary theory of language is clear. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, *PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS* §§ 1, 11–15, 23–27, 107, 108, 308 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958); see also ROBERT J. FOGELIN, *WITTGENSTEIN* 107–43 (2d ed. 1987). Austin's work focuses on the effect that context can have on the nature of the speech act performed. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, *HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS* (2d ed. 1975).

52. McGowan, for example, in a passage in which he cites, among others, Austin, Post, Wittgenstein, and Searle, states:

Expression is produced through social understandings speakers and listeners bring to bear on conduct they recognize as expressive. . . .

Granted, there is some utility to this, insofar as it beats back more formal conceptions, like idealism. But as we have already seen, the coarse definition is inadequate.

To make this point, let me demonstrate how using Austin's work to define communication produces the wrong result. I choose Austin both because he is a wonderful writer and because he is a favorite of First Amendment scholars.⁵³ Making this demonstration requires using Austin's vocabulary, one that is alien to legal discourse. But it is worth learning these terms, if only to see how little they add to the communication debate.

Austin articulated three kinds of speech acts: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary.⁵⁴ These categories capture different ways in which a single speech act can work. Locutionary acts convey "sense and reference."⁵⁵ Illocutionary acts are "utterances which have a certain (conventional) force."⁵⁶ Perlocutionary acts are speech acts that achieve something.⁵⁷

To illustrate these terms, let me give an example. Imagine that I was considering walking into a bar, but my friend Veronica persuaded me not to. Later, I relate this conversation to a different person, my friend Logan. If I said, "Veronica *said*, 'Don't go into the bar,'" I would be describing the locutionary act, the simple meaning of what was said. If I said, "Veronica *urged* me not to go into the bar," I would be describing the illocutionary act, the type of speech act that was performed taking context into account. If I

For expression to work, both speakers and listeners must understand the practices and conventions they employ as expressive. A person walking to work is not speaking, but a parade marcher is. . . .

The context in which expression occurs is an unspoken element of the dialogue between speakers and listeners.

McGowan, *supra* note 22, at 1524–25 (footnote call numbers omitted). In other words, acts are expressive when, taken in context, people know they are expressive.

53. Austin is famous for arguing that language cannot only describe things, but can actually *do* things. See AUSTIN, *supra* note 51, at 94. For example, when a speaker swings a bottle of champagne at a boat and says, "I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*," she is not describing a christening but performing one. *Id.* at 5. Appropriately enough, Austin calls these verbal acts "performatives." Some First Amendment scholars, most eloquently Kent Greenawalt, have used this distinction to map out First Amendment coverage in ways that, while interesting, won't help us define communication. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, *SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE* 58–59 (1989). Greenawalt argues that a category of linguistic behavior that he calls "situation-altering utterances" is not covered by the First Amendment. *Id.* at 239.

54. See, e.g., Fadi Hanna, *Gay Self-Identification and the Right to Political Legibility*, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 75, 79–84 (arguing that coming out of the closet effectuates all three of Austin's speech acts); B. Jessie Hill, *Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test*, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 512 (2005); Heidi M. Hurd, *Expressing Doubts About Expressivism*, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405, 419. And these are only a few of the many articles that reference Austin's speech-act theory.

55. AUSTIN, *supra* note 51, at 109.

56. *Id.* If this definition seems obtuse to you, don't worry. It seems obtuse to me too, as it did to Austin. See *id.* at 99 ("I am not suggesting that this is a clearly defined class by any means."). And if he has trouble defining illocutionary acts, what hope is there for judges?

57. *Id.* at 109.

said, “Veronica *persuaded* me not to go into the bar,” I would be describing the perlocutionary act, the act that was achieved.⁵⁸

In other words, *saying* is a locutionary act, *urging* is an illocutionary act, and *persuading* is a perlocutionary act. Because these terms describe different ways of looking at a single speech event, the same locutionary act can, depending on the circumstances, have different illocutionary effects. (And this is simply a fancy way of saying that words with the same sense and reference can be used to do different things.) If, for instance, I said, “Don’t shoot me!” to someone who was shooting at me, I would be pleading; if I said “Don’t shoot me!” while rehearsing a play, I would be rehearsing a play. In both cases, the locutionary act—the referential sense of the words—is the same. And if I didn’t get shot, the physical effects would be the same as well. But the illocutionary acts would be different: pleading for one’s life is not the same as rehearsing a play.

Focusing on the illocutionary act thus promotes antiformalism and contextualism, directing the analysis toward speech’s meaning in a particular context. This has led some scholars, including Lee Tien, to argue that the communication analysis should focus on illocutionary impact⁵⁹:

For First Amendment purposes, the relevant intent is the speaker’s intent that the hearer understand the act as a speech act—particularly as an illocutionary act. But the Supreme Court thinks of meaning mainly as propositional content. Without illocutionary force, a speech act is either propositional or perlocutionary, and the speaker can only have propositional or perlocutionary intent.⁶⁰

Tien also suggests that communication should be understood as successful completion of the illocutionary act.⁶¹ But this method will never do to define communication. In practice, it would mean that when faced with a speech-conduct question, a court would ask whether the speaker did something that is conventionally done with words. If Person A brandished a knife at Person B, for instance, the court would ask, “Was A *threatening* B?” Because threatening is an illocutionary act—something that can be done with words—the brandishing would be communicative. But brandishing a knife is normally an assault, which isn’t covered by the First Amendment. But under Tien’s theory, it should be; or at least Tien’s theory does nothing to explain *why* assault wouldn’t be covered.

58. *See id.*

59. Tien focuses more on Searle’s work than he does on Austin’s. *See* Tien, *supra* note 50, at 639–43. Searle’s philosophy, as described by Tien, is amenable to the same criticisms as Austin’s.

60. *Id.* at 651.

61. Tien has proposed the following test:

First, the speaker must intend that the hearer grasp illocutionary intent. Second, the meaning that matters is utterance meaning. Third, the actor must intend that the hearer grasp the illocutionary force through the hearer’s knowledge of the conventions that govern meaning and intent, which requires an internal connection between the two.

Id. at 650.

Nor is Tien's theory merely overinclusive: it is also underinclusive, because it assumes that all nonlinguistic communication has an illocutionary effect—a conventional force—that maps onto language. But not all nonlinguistic communication aspires to work as language does. What is the illocutionary force of a concerto? It has none. A concerto doesn't want to be a play; it's just a different way of conveying feelings. In other words, trying to define communication by focusing on the illocutionary force of nonlinguistic communication doesn't explain why nonlinguistic behavior is communicative when it works *differently* than language, which it sometimes surely does.

4. *Communication Does Not Consist Only of Behaviors that Convey Thoughts and Cause More Good than Harm*

One conceivable definition of communication is that it is made up of behaviors that fit the coarse definition—behaviors that convey thoughts in recognized ways—but is limited by an anti-harm principle or some form of pragmatic cost-benefit analysis. Under this theory, behaviors like assault and sex and drug use are distinguishable from speech only because they are more likely to cause harm; or, in Posner's formulation, they are regulable because the harm prevented by regulation outweighs the value of the speech thereby suppressed.⁶²

I agree with Posner that cost-benefit analysis does influence—and in some ways should influence—analysis of whether a particular speech act is protected by the First Amendment. In the famous example, censoring disclosure of troop movements is permissible during war.⁶³

Taking this as true, one still can't capture the First Amendment by saying that it protects "expressive" behavior that is pragmatically useful.⁶⁴ As I've noted, the category of "expressive" behavior doesn't get at what we want, because it implies an equivalence between the mental state of the actor and the thought conveyed to the listener, which the law doesn't require.⁶⁵ But even substituting the coarse definition of communication—acts that convey thought in ways reasonably meant to do so—the pragmatic view still doesn't fully describe the law. This is because, as I noted earlier, there are many behaviors that both fall under the coarse definition of communication and are pragmatically useful but still aren't protected by the First Amendment. To revisit the earlier list, subliminal speech, drug use, and erotic touching are all coarsely communicative and yet not covered by the First

62. See generally Richard A. Posner, *Free Speech in an Economic Perspective*, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1986). Posner does not like the term cost-benefit balancing and prefers to call his view pragmatic adjudication, although he concedes that his approach involves balancing. Richard A. Posner, *Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis*, 54 STAN. L. REV. 737, 738–40 (2002) [hereinafter Posner, *Pragmatism*].

63. See *Near v. Minnesota*, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).

64. See, e.g., Posner, *Pragmatism*, *supra* note 62, at 745.

65. See *supra* Section I.A.

Amendment.⁶⁶ And here Posner might respond that these acts aren't pragmatically useful—that on balance they cause more harm than good. But this misses the fact that there doesn't seem to be any balancing going on in these cases. Indeed, we can hypothesize facts under which these acts are unquestionably net beneficial, but intuition still balks at the idea of protecting them under the First Amendment. Even if there were a uniformly safe drug that conveyed a wonderful state of mind—a sugar pill that induced visions of cuddly ponies—nothing in our history or law suggests that taking the pill would be deemed a speech act. Nor, I suspect, would a movie theater have a constitutional right to subliminally order people to call their grandmothers if they have a chance, despite the utility of such an order.

This is not to say that a pragmatic approach cannot inform the law; it is only to say that an approach that fails to recognize the difference between giving someone an opportunity to choose a state of mind and forcing her to feel it can not fully capture the First Amendment.

II. APPLICATION: THE FREE-WILL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

I have, so far, argued for a new definition of communication—what I call the “free-will” theory of communication—whose central tenet is that communicative acts are intended to invoke freely willed mental responses. And although I have relied on First Amendment law in this analysis, I have not yet attempted to fully integrate it with the existing doctrine and scholarship. I will do so now.

First, some clarifications. Before continuing, I need to distinguish between “coverage” and “protection” in the First Amendment context.⁶⁷ An act is “covered” by the First Amendment when attempts to regulate it merely invoke constitutional scrutiny; an act is “protected” by the First Amendment when it is unconstitutional to regulate that act. Thus an act may be covered by the First Amendment and still not protected. In this Article, I am primarily interested in coverage—in discovering when the First Amendment is interested in a particular behavior, not whether it ultimately protects that behavior.⁶⁸

I should add that a theory of communication is not by itself sufficient to define First Amendment coverage. As Robert Post and Frederick Schauer

66. *Id.*

67. Frederick Schauer made this distinction first. Frederick Schauer, *Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts*, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 267, 270–73 (1981).

68. There is no hard and fast doctrinal line between protection and coverage, and courts sometimes blur the two. But they are conceptually distinct. The protection determination is a matter of balancing, while the coverage determination is categorical. Under the protection analysis, the government can regulate a behavior if it has a good enough reason, or doesn't incidentally suppress too much speech. This review is taken without the court's usual deference to legislative findings. But the legislature can regulate uncovered activities without needing to survive balancing; it need demonstrate only a rational reason, and its conclusions are reviewed with deference. *See* Schauer, *supra* note 1, at 1769–74.

have noted, many communicative acts aren't covered.⁶⁹ Product warnings, contracts, and professional advice don't invoke the First Amendment, for instance.⁷⁰ Post argues that to be covered, an act must not only facilitate communication but also further First Amendment values.⁷¹ I find this argument convincing, although my larger thesis does not hinge on it. For the purpose of understanding my argument, we need only understand that not all communicative acts are covered.

Nonetheless, as I will argue, all covered acts must at least facilitate communication. I will explore these themes further in the next Section, which addresses First Amendment values.

A. *The Free-Will Theory and First Amendment Values*

There are a lot of First Amendment articles—an awful lot, actually—about values, with “values” meaning, roughly, justifications. Many are looking for the paramount value, the *real* reason for the First Amendment.⁷² But considering the diverse practices covered by the First Amendment—arguing, writing, marching, singing, erotic dancing—and the number of ends they can be put to, identifying a single reason to protect speech seems unlikely.⁷³ Nor is it clear *why* speech should be protected for only one reason. In other contexts, it is not unusual to say that a law has been passed for several reasons; doing so doesn't make the law unenforceably indeterminate. Nonetheless, values-based discourse dominates First Amendment theory, and I need to locate my theory within that discourse.

Let us consider, then, how the free-will theory of communication fits in with the values scholarship. “Values,” as I noted, refers to reasons to have the First Amendment. Accordingly, the values debate describes the ultimate *ends* to which the Amendment should be put. “Communication,” on the other hand, describes a set of means—different ways of doing things. Some scholars have argued that the means must be defined in terms of the ends—in other words, that the First Amendment protects all behaviors that serve First Amendment values.⁷⁴

This approach is incorrect. Let me make an analogy to show why. Let's consider a law that protects another set of practices—say, a law forbidding the legislature to abridge “transportation.” Like speech, transportation is made up of a bunch of practices: driving, flying, train travel, and so on. There could be several reasons for the transportation law. Protecting trans-

69. Robert Post, *Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment*, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 715 (2000); *see also* Schauer, *supra* note 67.

70. Post, *supra* note 69.

71. *Id.* at 715–17.

72. *See, e.g.*, Baker, *supra* note 21, at 990–91; O. Lee Reed, *A Free Speech Metavalue for the Next Millennium: Autonomy of Consciousness in First Amendment Theory and Practice*, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2–4 (1997).

73. Many others have made this point. *See, e.g.*, GREENAWALT, *supra* note 53, at 9–34.

74. *See, e.g.*, Baker, *supra* note 21.

portation promotes individual autonomy, but also economic productivity. It is also necessary for democracy, insofar as people can't get together without it. When applying this law, judges would want to keep these reasons in mind. The law would only cover behaviors that furthered these values; driving friends to work would be protected, but deliberately running over one's enemies would not be. Behaviors would thus be covered when they were *both* considered transportation *and* served the values behind the law.

But focusing on values cannot define transportation. Not only are there many different "transportation values," but even if any single value were used, the definition wouldn't fit, because other means would also serve that end. Cars promote economic production, but so do computers and many other things.

Just as "transportation" cannot be defined solely by looking at values, neither can speech. If the First Amendment covered all behaviors that furthered any particular value—liberty, deliberative democracy, truth seeking—it would be a very different law. Democracy requires free speech, but it also requires a right to assembly, a right to liberty of movement, and so forth. Free speech is good for truth seeking, but so is deep-sea exploration. The latter just isn't speech.

To sum up, acts are covered by the First Amendment when they both facilitate communication and serve First Amendment values. There is no single First Amendment value, however, and hence it is impossible to define communication as all acts that further a particular value. Moreover, even if there were a *single* First Amendment value, defining communication in terms of that value would not produce a descriptive account.

This is not to diminish the work of authors who advocate for a conception of the First Amendment predicated on a single value. These pieces amount to normative arguments in favor of different visions of the Amendment. But whatever the merits of these alternate conceptions, for our purposes it is enough to see that any scholar whose work focuses solely on values will inevitably end up either altering the contours of communication or arguing that the communication requirement should be discarded altogether.

Consider, in this light, the work of C. Edwin Baker. Baker is one of the most insightful advocates of a single-value view of the First Amendment. He champions the liberty-autonomy value, arguing that speech "should receive constitutional protection . . . because and to the extent that it is a manifestation of individual autonomy."⁷⁵ Moreover, because "nothing in the notion of liberty or autonomy distinguishes speech from other meaningful behavior," he concludes that all behavior—communicative or not—should be covered.⁷⁶ Baker further argues that nonlinguistic conduct should be protected if it "furthers key first amendment values" and if it "promote[s] first

75. C. Edwin Baker, *Harm, Liberty and Free Speech*, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997); see also E-mail from C. Edwin Baker to John Greenman (Sept. 24, 2007, 19:35) (on file with author).

76. Baker, *supra* note 21, at 982.

amendment values in a relevantly similar manner” to speech.⁷⁷ This leads him to argue that sex, for instance, should be covered.⁷⁸

Baker’s broader justification of this view turns on his theory of liberty, which is ingenious.⁷⁹ But it does not describe First Amendment caselaw and does not purport to. It is, instead, a normative argument in favor of a libertarian constitutional order.⁸⁰ Baker’s values-only interpretation of the First Amendment cannot account for what is, only what might be.

David Strauss’s work is also relevant here. Strauss has argued for what he calls the “persuasion principle,” the theory that “[t]he government may not suppress speech on the ground that it is too persuasive.”⁸¹ Like me, Strauss argues that protected behavior can be identified by the way it affects the listener.⁸² But he goes on to argue that the persuasion principle is justified by the autonomy value, applying a Kantian definition of autonomy.⁸³ In order to be consistent with his autonomy justification, Strauss limits the application of his principle to behaviors that appeal to “reason.”⁸⁴ But even if we accept “reason” as a meaningful, justiciable category, such a principle necessarily excludes not only most nonlinguistic communication but also much protected speech. (If “Fuck the Draft”⁸⁵ appeals to reason, then that category has very porous boundaries.) Thus, as Strauss admits, his principle cannot explain First Amendment coverage, but can only provide a compelling rationale for protecting behavior in a limited set of cases.⁸⁶

Scholars who focus on values alone thus cannot define communication. But even if communication is not defined by any particular First Amendment value, looking at those values collectively can help describe the requirements for communication, because it has to be true that acts that are deemed communicative serve at least *one* First Amendment value.

Testing the free-will theory of communication against this criterion, we see that under the free-will theory, all communicative acts must serve classical First Amendment values. Described broadly, the classical First

77. *See id.* at 1009.

78. *Id.* at 983 n.12.

79. Baker distinguishes between allocation rules, which allocate a choice to one person or another and therefore do not formally restrict liberty, and general prohibitions, which prevent everyone from making a given choice and therefore restrict aggregate formal liberty. *Id.* at 997–1008. Baker argues that only general prohibitions trigger liberty-based constitutional concerns. *Id.*

80. *Id.* at 1013 (“The strong presumptive principle against violations of formal liberty and the particular categorizations devised here to implement that principle can, I think, only be justified as an intellectual (and potentially political) strategy to get at the best substantive results.”).

81. David Strauss, *Persuasion, Autonomy and Freedom of Expression*, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 334 (1991).

82. *Id.*

83. *Id.* at 354–55.

84. *Id.* at 335.

85. *See Cohen v. California*, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).

86. Strauss, *supra* note 81, at 357 n.64 (“My concern here is not to describe exhaustively what the first amendment protects, but to examine the extent to which the persuasion principle should be accepted as a reason to forbid restrictions on speech.”).

Amendment values are deliberative democracy, truth seeking, and liberty-autonomy maximization.⁸⁷ Looking at these collectively, communicative acts, under the free-will theory, would not *uniquely* serve any single value, but all communicative acts would further at least one value.

Consider, for instance, the deliberative-democracy rationale. There would be no deliberative democracy if people could not disagree with arguments presented to them. The truth-seeking rationale—the marketplace-of-ideas theory—would likewise be frustrated if listeners were constrained to agree with what they heard. Obviously, a true marketplace of ideas requires that consumers of ideas be able to reject them.

Under the free-will theory, communicative acts also increase liberty. This would not be the case under the coarse definition of communication, which would include acts that convey thoughts that the recipient can't resist. In those cases, the speaker has the liberty to do what she wants, but the recipient loses the ability to respond as she wants. But liberty is maximized when the speaker's right to convey consensual thoughts is protected, because the speaker has the freedom to speak, and the listener has the freedom to disagree or not to feel the way the communication is intended to make her feel. Communication, as I define it, thus enhances liberty by definition. The speaker presents the listener with a state of mind, and the listener is free to reject it.⁸⁸

The free-will theory is thus consistent with a multiple-values view of the First Amendment. Each classical value is furthered by communicative behavior, but not all behaviors that further any one value are communicative.⁸⁹

B. Description of Speech-Conduct Law

Here, for the first time, I will discuss speech-conduct law, the set of cases most relevant to communication. As I have noted, knowing what communication is doesn't answer any doctrinal questions by itself. Part of the reason that the simple problem of defining communication has never been undertaken before is that it is woven into difficult doctrinal questions in ways that are hard to untangle. So, before discussing speech-conduct law—the set of cases most relevant to communication—let me tease out a few threads.

I have previously distinguished questions of “coverage” and “protection.” “Covered” acts simply invoke the First Amendment (or should, at

87. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:3 (1996) (describing “[t]hree classic free speech theories—‘marketplace of ideas,’ ‘human dignity and self-fulfillment,’ and ‘democratic self-governance’”).

88. Of course this is only necessarily true proximately—arguing for fascism might reduce aggregate liberty—but the analysis has to be at the proximate level if communication is to be identified.

89. My description of First Amendment values is necessarily abbreviated. In part this is because volumes have been written about each theory, and I simply cannot address them in any way that is responsive to the scholarship. But it is also because the case for the free-will theory stems mostly from its descriptive accuracy, not from any value-based description.

least), while “protected” acts are protected from regulation. The government can regulate protected acts, but only with really good reason, and only after showing that the costs outweigh the benefits—a showing in which it bears the burden of proof.⁹⁰ Doctrinally, this balancing function occurs through the tiered constitutional-scrutiny system.⁹¹ The “interest” and “tailoring” requirements force the government to show that the good the challenged law does outweighs its ancillary costs.⁹² These requirements may vary with the type of speech at issue.⁹³

Coverage is more complicated. The First Amendment is interested in behavior when it facilitates communication and does something else. Post has construed this “something else” as serving First Amendment values.⁹⁴ However this additional requirement is characterized, we can conceive of it as related to the justifications for free speech. It is not enough to speak—one must speak in ways that the First Amendment cares about.

Stepping back, then, it seems that First Amendment analysis should require three different tests: one that describes communication, another that indicates what sort of communication serves First Amendment values, and a third that indicates when the government can regulate covered speech.⁹⁵

Of course, actual free-speech law looks very little like what I’m describing. But it is useful to isolate these questions so we can see how they are incorporated into the various doctrinal tests. Doctrinally, defining communication is most relevant to speech-conduct law. At the heart of this set of cases is a single question—namely, when does nonlinguistic behavior trigger First Amendment scrutiny?

There is no simple answer. The cases variously refer to nonlinguistic communication as “expressive conduct,”⁹⁶ “symbolic expression,”⁹⁷ “symbolic conduct,”⁹⁸ or “combined” speech and conduct.⁹⁹ Optimally, these terms would have distinct meanings, and the Supreme Court, operating under an announced rule, would slot behavior into one of the categories. But

90. Elena Kagan, *Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine*, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 442 (1996).

91. See, e.g., *Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.*, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2007) (“Under strict scrutiny, the *Government* must prove that [the law] furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”).

92. See *id.*

93. As happens with, for example, commercial speech. See, e.g., *Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.*, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (discussing commercial speech).

94. See Post, *supra* note 69, at 715–17.

95. It might also be true that, as Post suggests, the balancing tests for covered speech differ according to the kind of speech protected. See Robert Post, *Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine*, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1275–77 (1995).

96. *City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.*, 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000).

97. *Virginia v. Black*, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).

98. *Id.* at 360 n.2.

99. *United States v. O’Brien*, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).

the terms are used without any particular justification or pattern, and there is no reason to pretend that they collectively form a coherent body of law.

Instead, the Court does one of three things when forced to decide whether nonlinguistic behavior is communicative. It either (1) applies the *O'Brien* mixed-speech-and-conduct test,¹⁰⁰ (2) assesses whether the behavior is covered under the “message” test established in *Spence v. Washington*,¹⁰¹ or (3) fashions an ad hoc test based on conclusory use of the word “expressive.”¹⁰²

The first move—relying on the *O'Brien* test—is quite common. This test combines a content-neutrality test and a scrutiny standard: the content-neutrality prong goes to coverage and the scrutiny prong to protection. But the *O'Brien* analysis contains no test for communication. Rather, an act is deemed communicative by virtue of being slotted in the combined speech and conduct category.

This would be fine if there were some principled reason behind it. But no one has any idea when behavior falls into the combined speech and conduct category, or why. Combined how? In a certain ratio of speech to conduct? But what would that ratio be, and how can courts measure it? Indeed, the idea of combined speech and conduct was picked apart long ago.¹⁰³

If not subjected to *O'Brien* scrutiny, nonlinguistic putative communication can—at the Justices’ unguided discretion—be assessed under the test announced in *Spence v. Washington*, an early flag-desecration case. *Spence* held that nonlinguistic behavior brings the First Amendment into play when “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message [i]s present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [i]s great that the message would be understood by those who view[] it.”¹⁰⁴

The *Spence* test is thus a pure communication test, one that restates the coarse definition of communication while adding the requirement that the mental state conveyed must be a “particularized message.” Problematically, it’s hard to figure out what a particularized message is. My best gloss is that it means that the act must be reducible to language. But if that is what is meant by particularized message, the *Spence* test is subject to the same criticisms that ideaism is.¹⁰⁵

100. *Id.* at 377. The *O'Brien* test is explained as follows:

[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

Id.

101. 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).

102. *See, e.g.*, *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.*, 547 U.S. 47, 65–66 (2006).

103. *See, e.g.*, John Hart Ely, *Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis*, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1494–96 (1975).

104. *Spence*, 418 U.S. at 410–11.

105. *See supra* Section I.C.1.

When not applying *Spence* or *O'Brien*, the Court engages in ad hoc test making. This technique is on display in *Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.* (“FAIR”),¹⁰⁶ the Court’s most recent speech-conduct decision. *FAIR* addressed the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, a law that cut federal funding to law schools that forced the armed forces to recruit off campus in order to protest the military’s policies toward homosexuals.¹⁰⁷ The Court concluded that the schools’ exclusion of military recruiters was not “inherently expressive” and therefore not covered by the First Amendment.¹⁰⁸

In making this determination, the Court did not cite *Spence*.¹⁰⁹ Instead it came up with a new test, holding that nonlinguistic behavior was protected if it was “inherently expressive,”¹¹⁰ like flag burning.¹¹¹ Behavior is inherently expressive, the Court concluded, if people could grasp its message without relying on explanatory language.¹¹² In practice, schools that defied the Solomon Amendment forced military recruiters to work outside the law school but allowed them to recruit on the attached undergraduate campus.¹¹³ The Court concluded that without some accompanying verbal explanation, a viewer wouldn’t know that this exclusion from the law-school campus was in protest of the military’s policies.¹¹⁴ Instead, the viewer might think that the law school was just short on rooms.¹¹⁵ This need for outside explanation contrasts with flag burning, whose communicative force, presumably, is conveyed without accompanying language.¹¹⁶

Although the *FAIR* test is new, the Court made no real attempt to reconcile it with existing doctrine. Nor did it consider the test’s ramifications, or give guidance as to the scope of its application. Even taken on its own terms, the *FAIR* test seems ill conceived. There are many communicative acts, such as modern dance and picketing, whose purpose would be unclear without some linguistic explanation. Indeed, one could make the point about flag burning. One proper method for disposing of a flag is burning,¹¹⁷ so communication outside the burning itself is necessary to help the viewer determine whether a flag is burned for disposal or protest. The *FAIR* test

106. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).

107. *FAIR*, 547 U.S. at 48.

108. *Id.* at 66.

109. *Id.*

110. *Id.*

111. *Id.* (citing *Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (a flag-burning case)).

112. *See id.*

113. *See id.*

114. *Id.*

115. *Id.*

116. The Court, providing an alternative rationale, also concluded that the regulation survived *O'Brien* scrutiny. *See id.* at 67.

117. *See* Am. Legion, Ceremony for the Disposal of Unserviceable Flags, <http://www.legion.org/national/americanflag/unserviceable> (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).

thus fails to define communication on its own terms. But even if the test made sense in context, it is not part of any real effort by the Court to develop a consistent, workable jurisprudence for determining whether nonlinguistic behavior is covered by the First Amendment. The Court seems to have abandoned the effort, if it ever made one. When confronted with the same question, the Court might apply the *FAIR* test, or *O'Brien*, or *Spence*—or it might do something new all over again.

The law, in sum, is a mess.

C. *The Free-Will Theory and Content-Neutrality Analysis*

To review, we are trying to locate the role of a communication standard in actual First Amendment law. I have argued that for an act to invoke the First Amendment, it must at least facilitate communication. This suggests one obvious way that a communication standard is relevant to coverage: the communication standard is necessary to determine whether an act is communicative in the first place. And if communicative acts are those intended to invoke freely willed responses, then the standard will be most relevant when there is dispute over whether observing a behavior changes the viewer in spite of herself. So, for example, the long-running feud over whether nude dancing is expressive reflects disagreement as to whether one can watch nude dancers and choose not to be aroused.¹¹⁸

But there is another way in which a communication standard is relevant to First Amendment law: a communication standard is necessary for a principled application of a content-neutrality test. Content neutrality is the view that First Amendment coverage depends in some way on the government's orientation toward the content of the communication it seeks to suppress—that is, whether the law is in some sense *directed* toward suppressing that content. In truth, this theory has many names and variations (including purposivism),¹¹⁹ but these distinctions—while important—are beyond the scope of this Article.

But if content-neutrality analysis means sniffing out government hostility toward content, we need to know what it means to be hostile to content. And here it must mean hostility to the *communicative effects* of an act. Because, whatever “content” is,¹²⁰ it would not do for the state to avoid First Amendment scrutiny by arguing that it is not hostile to the form of the communication, but to the changes it makes in the world. Imagine, for

118. See *infra* Section II.E.1.

119. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, *The First Amendment's Purpose*, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001) (arguing for an analysis focused on government purpose); see also Kagan, *supra* note 90, at 414 (arguing that the analysis should focus on motive).

120. “Content” is another one of those words that everyone uses but no one wants to think about. As best as I can capture it, “content” is roughly synonymous with “information,” referring to meaningful phrases in information systems. But it is also sometimes used to describe acts in which no ideas are conveyed, including nude dancing. See *Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 560, 581 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Such is the expressive content of the dances described in the record.”). Presumably in these contexts content refers to the sensory experience of the communicative act: the way that an erotic dance looks, or the way that objectionable music sounds.

instance, that the government wants to suppress pro-union speech. Could it then escape constitutional scrutiny by arguing that, while it likes the word “union” (the content) in and of itself, it wants to keep people from joining unions (the effects), and therefore is acting in a content-neutral way? Such a reading runs contrary to modern First Amendment law.

Moreover, if the First Amendment protects communication, then it must protect behaviors that are to be regulated for their communicative impact. Content neutrality, in other words, indicates neutrality toward the communicative effects of speech.¹²¹

If content neutrality means neutrality toward communicative effects, one needs a theory of communication in order to identify those effects. Until now we have lacked such a theory. The result, inevitably, is confusion: courts are unable to articulate what consequences of regulated speech a law may legitimately target. In the Supreme Court, this uncertainty has manifested itself, among other places, in the secondary-effects doctrine, which prohibits regulations aimed at speech’s “primary” effects¹²² but not regulations aimed at its “secondary effects.”¹²³ The Court has never explained which effects are “secondary,” however, and the term itself is ambiguous.¹²⁴

Post has aptly described this problem:

The challenge, then, is to specify the kinds of causal relationships between speech and its impacts that secondary effects doctrine should target. . . . Should a law that prohibits pornographic movies because they allegedly increase the rate of crimes against women be deemed content-based or content-neutral? What of a law that suppresses violence in the media because of an asserted connection to violent crimes? Or a law regulating corporate speech during elections in order to avert voter alienation?¹²⁵

The free-will theory answers these questions. If communication changes people’s minds only when they will it to, communicative effects are those brought about—both remotely and proximately—through freely willed responses. A law that targeted pornography to prevent violence against women, for instance, would be regulable if the average consumer of pornography became more inclined to violence despite himself—if the change was forced rather than willed.¹²⁶ A theory of communication is thus a necessary

121. See Volokh, *supra* note 1, at 1347.

122. See *Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of Willingboro*, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977).

123. See *City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.*, 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000).

124. Secondary could mean “causally remote,” for instance.

125. Post, *supra* note 95, at 1267.

126. The Seventh Circuit faced this issue in *American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut*, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), when it considered a challenge to an antipornography statute drafted by Catharine MacKinnon. *Id.* at 325. The court concluded that although pornography did harm women, it did so in the same way that persuasive speech such as Hitler’s oratory did. *Id.* at 329. The court correctly concluded that not all behavior that effectuates unconscious mental change in the listener is noncommunicative, but failed to explain why some behaviors that cause unconscious changes—changes like pain and fear—are not communicative. See *id.* at 330.

element to a content-neutrality test; the free-will theory supplies that element.¹²⁷

D. Identifying Freely Willed Responses

I have so far argued that communication is a diverse set of practices with no particular form; that other theories misclassify communication by identifying it with characteristics that are only correlated with it; that the free-will theory best describes the outcomes of First Amendment cases; that it is normatively consistent with the multiple-values view of the First Amendment; that it can determine which acts are communicative and therefore help articulate First Amendment coverage; and that it identifies communicative effects and is therefore necessary for a principled application of a content-neutrality test.

Before applying the free-will theory, then, I need only argue that it will work in practice—that asking whether behaviors invoke freely willed responses would be a good way of settling doctrinal controversies in the real world.

The practical benefit of the theory, then, is not that it will provide determinate answers to every question, but that it will make us argue about the right things. This can help by getting us out of the trap of talking about “ideas” and “symbols” and so forth. Trashing bad theory, in other words, is useful in its own right.¹²⁸ Even if the free-will theory of communication became a fig leaf for the exercise of bare intuition, relying on bare intuition would be preferable to referencing misguided rhetoric—rhetoric that someone might actually take seriously.

Beyond clearing out the cobwebs, applying the free-will standard could also helpfully guide us toward relevant factual evidence. Identifying freely willed states of mind—states of mind for which a person can rightfully be held accountable¹²⁹—is central to criminal and tort law and finds expression

127. Posner has effectively argued that instead of focusing on government purpose or motive, the analysis should be consequentialist, weighing the speech suppressed by a regulation against the harm prevented. See Posner, *Pragmatism*, *supra* note 62, at 738–39. I cannot fully address Posner’s argument here, but it is worth thinking about. In any event, even under Posner’s consequentialist view a theory of communication is necessary. If the effects of speech are to be weighed, speech must be identified, and it cannot be identified without some theory delineating what distinguishes it from all other behavior.

128. See generally Mark G. Kelman, *Trashing*, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).

129. Here let me explain what I mean by free will. I write as a pragmatist. The pragmatist views the task of finding the foundation of human knowledge to be either “impossible or uninteresting, and in either case not worth doing.” Posner, *Pragmatism*, *supra* note 62, at 738. Pragmatists thus believe that a proposition should be tested “not by its correspondence with ‘reality’ but by the consequences of believing or disbelieving it.” *Id.*

From this perspective, one can both be a determinist—that is, think that the laws of nature leave no room for human agency—and believe that people can be held morally accountable for their choices. We are better off judging others than not judging others: therefore we should judge. If we are to judge, we must identify those acts for which people are morally accountable. We call those acts on which people can be judged “freely willed.” My incorporation of the phrase “free will” thus does not reflect a studied evaluation of the term in light of its philosophical usage, an evaluation I am neither equipped nor inclined to make. It only recognizes that we have developed a law that

in the insanity defense, compulsion, entrapment, and volition.¹³⁰ There is thus a working body of law centered around the same question I am proposing we ask. Determining whether a strip-club patron could resist arousal, for instance, is no different from asking if an allegedly insane criminal defendant could have resisted the compulsion to commit a crime.¹³¹ Indeed, it's the *same* question, only moved to a new context.

Criminal and tort law thus provide a working template for application of the free-will theory of communication.¹³² In criminal and tort cases, psychological and neurological evidence is relevant to the question of whether an act, and the state of mind that accompanied it, were voluntary. The same evidence can guide factual inquiry about whether an act is communicative. Indeed, the outcomes are congruous. Music is communication—and drugs are not—for the same reason that it is easier to prove a lack of culpable mens rea from a defendant's use of a legal psychotropic drug than it is to prove that a heavy-metal song compelled someone to commit suicide.¹³³

Of course, aligning the communication analysis with the free-will–determinism debate in criminal law doesn't solve all our problems. It only leads to a new set of problems. The role of determinism in the law is highly controverted, as it must be.¹³⁴ The role of psychological, sociological, and neurological evidence to show that a person couldn't have avoided a certain mental state is similarly controverted.¹³⁵ The free-will theory of communication thus transports a familiar set of unanswerable questions—what it means to choose, and what science can tell us about whether a choice was free—into the First Amendment context. But if, as I have argued, we call acts “communicative” when they invoke freely willed responses, then these are precisely the unanswerable questions we should be debating.

gives special protection to behaviors intended to convey thoughts to others when—and only when—we decide that the recipient could be judged for her response. I call these responses “freely willed.”

130. See Mark Kelman, *Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law*, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 643–49 (1981) (arguing that these doctrines embed deterministic reasoning in our criminal-law discourse, which is nominally predicated on the presumption of the actor's free will).

131. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (2001) (providing that a defendant cannot be criminally liable when he lacks the “substantial capacity . . . to conform his conduct to the requirements of law”). Some version of this rule is in effect in roughly one-third of U.S. states. See Richard E. Redding, *The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century*, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2006).

132. To be sure, there is an ongoing debate as to whether these doctrines should be understood as expressions of determinism. See Kelman, *supra* note 130, at 643–49. See generally Michele Cotton, *A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism out of the Criminal Law*, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2005).

133. See *Waller v. Osbourne*, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1151 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (finding a failure to state a claim when the plaintiff's theory was that Ozzy Osbourne's music made the plaintiff's son kill himself); see also McGowan, *supra* note 22, at 1599 n.86 (collecting cases in which courts rejected the argument that music or other performances were incitement unprotected by the First Amendment).

134. See Redding, *supra* note 131.

135. See generally *id.*; Christopher Slobogin, *Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk?*, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing propriety of psychiatric testimony in criminal trials).

Here one might object that the introduction of scientific evidence would disfigure the law by proving that acts now deemed communicative do not invoke freely willed responses. But this is to misread the nature of the free-will standard. Like some of the most enduring legal standards—such as the reasonableness standard—the free-will standard combines both a factual and a normative question. It has to be that way. Whatever evidence comes from neuroscience, there is no part of the brain labeled “free will.” The role of scientific evidence in the free-will determination is thus not to overwhelm the normative question but merely to articulate its contours. If, for instance, psychological data showed that instrumental music affected the brain like drugs do, we might just as well deem drug use communicative as exclude music from First Amendment protection.¹³⁶

More broadly, the free-will theory can reveal the communication analysis as a site where freedom is negotiated—to show that the debate over whether an act is speech or conduct is not one about the *form* of an activity, or even communicative *convention*, but rather about how much freedom we grant ourselves. To call an act communicative, in other words, is to acknowledge the listener as a moral agent; to say otherwise is to deny her that agency.

Consider, for example, the famous Meese Commission. In the 1980s, President Reagan appointed the Meese Commission to examine the impact of pornography on American culture and suggest new laws for the treatment of obscenity. While doing its research, the Commission watched a lot of pornography.¹³⁷ The fact that the Commission watched so much pornography, one might argue, proves that pornography doesn’t turn people into criminals—after all, no one on the Commission was later arrested.

If the rationale for limiting pornography were harm prevention, this criticism would fall short¹³⁸: pornography might affect different people in different ways. But the real issue is one of free will. If the Commission members were to suggest treating pornography as conduct—as something that changed people in spite of themselves, so that pornographers were in some part responsible for the harm viewers caused—they would be granting others less moral agency than they granted themselves. “We can see this

136. One might say that music is protected because it usually complements language, that rulemaking tends to be categorical, and that instrumental music is only protected by dint of its association with vocal music. This is undoubtedly true to some degree. But even so, there must be *some* principle determining what is communicative other than “association with language.” People talk during violence, but violence is never communication.

137. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM’N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 222 (1986) (“We could not have responsibly conducted our inquiry without spending a considerable period of time examining the materials that constitute the subject of this entire endeavor.”).

138. This implicates the argument famously made by Catharine MacKinnon that pornography is punishable because it harms women. *See generally* Catharine A. MacKinnon, *Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech*, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985). I am not arguing that MacKinnon is incorrect. Under my theory, pornography could be punishable either if it were communicative and caused sufficient harm or if it were not communicative—that is, if it changed viewers against their will.

stuff and choose not to be changed; normal viewers cannot.” That this premise is offensive to a rights-based system of law seems obvious.

E. Application: Nude Dancing and Publishing Code

Having argued that the free-will theory can improve doctrine, I am going to give two examples: the nude-dancing cases and cases that govern whether publication of computer source code is protected speech. In both sets of cases, the law or scholarship is confused because authors have been writing without a theory of communication.

1. Nude Dancing

The two most recent cases governing the power of a state to directly regulate erotic dancing are *Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.*¹³⁹ and *City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.*¹⁴⁰ In *Barnes*, the owners of a nightclub wanted to present totally nude dancing, but Indiana law required dancers to wear G-strings and pasties.¹⁴¹ The challenged law did not just prohibit nude dancing, but rather all public nudity.¹⁴² The Court held that the law was constitutional, with Chief Justice Rehnquist announcing the judgment as part of a three-Justice plurality.¹⁴³ The plurality wrote that nude dancing is expressive conduct within “the outer perimeters” of the First Amendment, although “only marginally so.”¹⁴⁴ But the opinion did not explain why. It also applied the *O'Brien* test without any justification, except a brief comment explaining that the *O'Brien* test resembles the time, place, or manner test—a test that is itself inapplicable to Indiana’s general prohibition on nudity.

The plurality held that the law was constitutional under the *O'Brien* test because it was unrelated to the suppression of free expression and instead furthered a “substantial government interest in protecting order and morality.”¹⁴⁵ Justice Souter concurred, writing separately to indicate that he thought the government interest in this case was in curtailing the “secondary effects” of nude dancing, such as prostitution and sexual assault.¹⁴⁶ Justice Scalia also concurred separately, concluding that the statute was not directed at the expressive content of nude dancing but at the immorality of nudity and therefore did not invoke the First Amendment.¹⁴⁷ In dissent, Justice

139. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).

140. 529 U.S. 277 (2000).

141. *Barnes*, 501 U.S. at 563.

142. *Id.* at 566.

143. *Id.* at 562–63.

144. *Id.* at 566.

145. *Id.* at 569.

146. *Id.* at 582 (Souter, J., concurring).

147. *Id.* at 575–80 (Scalia, J., concurring).

White argued that nude dancing was pure expressive conduct and could not be regulated without a compelling interest.¹⁴⁸

Pap's A.M. was decided nine years later and addressed a statute that also imposed a general ban on nudity.¹⁴⁹ A majority of the Court again concluded that nude dancing was only barely covered, holding "that it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection."¹⁵⁰ A five-Justice plurality again concluded that the ban should be analyzed under the *O'Brien* test.¹⁵¹ Justice O'Connor, joined by three other Justices, announced the judgment in an opinion holding that the law was constitutional as applied.¹⁵² Here, instead of finding that the ban passed the *O'Brien* test because the government had a substantial interest in promoting morality, the plurality concluded that the government had a substantial interest in regulating secondary effects.¹⁵³ Justice Stevens's dissent argued that nude dancing was expressive conduct¹⁵⁴ and that the law itself was directed at the expressive content of nude dancing.¹⁵⁵

We can take two points from these cases. First, while most Justices conclude that nude dancing is just barely covered by the First Amendment, some Justices think that it is not covered at all. Second, a ruling plurality agrees that the legality of the statute depends on what the government's interest is, but there is disagreement as to what constitutes a legitimate interest.

The debate thus turns first on whether nude dancing is communication and second on whether the alleged secondary effects the government seeks to regulate are communicative. The first question is controverted, I think, because it reflects disagreement as to whether a patron could watch an erotic dance and *choose* not to be aroused. Consider a spectrum of hypotheticals covering the same sex act: (1) a dispassionate written description using clinical language, (2) a written description that is meant to arouse, (3) a film of the act, (4) a simulation of the act performed by a nude dancer on stage, and (5) the act itself. Now consider the law. Doctrinally, doing it in the flesh is conduct,¹⁵⁶ while seeing it in a movie or reading a book about it is speech (so long as the book or movie isn't obscene). Live dancing is the liminal case. But all these behaviors have the same *content*. The law is not distinguishing between them because of the value of the messages they send. The difference is the degree to which the recipient can resist arousal.

148. *Id.* at 596 (White, J., dissenting).

149. *City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.*, 529 U.S. 277, 283 (2000).

150. *Id.* at 289.

151. *Id.* at 296.

152. *Id.*

153. *Id.*

154. *Id.* at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

155. *Id.* at 331.

156. *See* Garland, *supra* note 17, at 196.

As to whether arousal is a freely willed mental response to nude dancing, I believe that it is. Erotic nudity is simply too pervasive in society—from classical painting to high-art films¹⁵⁷—to permit the conclusion that the harmful mental changes it wreaks can't be resisted. This permissiveness toward eroticism in other contexts demonstrates a belief in the moral agency of its viewers that would be abridged if erotic dancing in strip clubs were forbidden solely because it lacked the trappings of art.

If nude dancing's exile to the First Amendment's hinterlands is explained by uncertainty over whether arousal is freely willed, the state's right to regulate nude dancing turns on application of the secondary-effects doctrine. The alleged secondary effects are violence, public intoxication, and prostitution.¹⁵⁸ Under the free-will theory, the analysis is properly construed as identifying communicative effects. If nude dancing invokes arousal, does arousal lead to increased violence, public intoxication, and prostitution?

Scholars like Amy Adler have argued that it does not. Adler points out that the relevant law forbids nude dancing but not *near-nude* dancing: wearing a G-string and pasties is acceptable.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, she argues, the state must prove that nude dancing causes prostitution, violence, and drug use while near-nude dancing would not—in other words, that two stars and a strip of cloth can stop crime.¹⁶⁰

In Adler's characterization, the state's position is not just wrong, but pathological, demonstrating a fear of female genitalia.¹⁶¹ But the state's case isn't crazy, and it doesn't turn on proving that looking at genitals makes people go bad. Instead, it turns on proving that there is more crime in all-nude clubs than near-nude clubs. This might be true for reasons other than the corrosive effects of genitals. The two types of clubs might attract different patrons and employees and therefore have different cultures, or the visual reminder of the law and the accompanying threat of inspection might alter behavior in larger ways.

But even if the state's position can be construed as a matter of influencing "culture," and not a matter of an uninterrupted causal connection between seeing genitals and crime, that does not mean the state has proved that secondary effects are noncommunicative. It is hard—perhaps conceptually impossible—to disassociate a culture from the communication it fosters. If the government could censor communication because it contributed to a culture that was more amenable to crime, then a fair amount of

157. See *Miller v. Civil City of South Bend*, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089–94 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring), *rev'd sub nom.* *Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).

158. *Pap's A.M.*, 529 U.S. at 297.

159. See Amy Adler, *Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String*, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1129 (2005).

160. See *id.*

161. In part this is just an instance of the sorites paradox. All distinctions look silly at the limit. If it is absurd to say that G-strings will stop crime, it is equally absurd to say that evidence in a crime is fresh the day before the statute of limitations runs out but stale the day after. The limitations period just represents society's best attempt to balance the contravening interests at stake, as does the G-string requirement to those who defend it.

protected speech—curse words¹⁶² and general statements of disrespect to authority¹⁶³—would fall outside the First Amendment’s reach. However tenuous the link, the secondary-effects argument turns on the way nude dancing changes people’s minds. This makes the secondary effects communicative. Under this standard, *Pap’s A.M.* was wrongly decided.

2. Code Cases

In the last decade, a series of cases have analyzed whether computer-programming code is covered by the First Amendment. These cases arise in two contexts. The first line of cases stems from the government’s attempts to regulate, for national-security reasons, the export of encryption technology that could be used to communicate secret messages. The second arises from movie studios’ attempts to use intellectual-property laws to enjoin publication of a program that enables digital copying of DVDs. Both situations show how the lack of any real definition of communication has led the law astray.¹⁶⁴

a. Encryption-Export Cases

The lead case in the national-security line is *Bernstein v. United States Department of Justice*.¹⁶⁵ Bernstein, a Ph.D. candidate, wrote a program called Snuffle using C, a source-code programming language.¹⁶⁶ Snuffle was an encryption program that could convert a comprehensible written message—like a sonnet or a football score—into an incomprehensible cipher text. The program could also be used by someone with a “key”—a large number—to decrypt the cipher text back into comprehensible text.¹⁶⁷

The Ninth Circuit explained source code as follows:

“Source code” . . . refers to the text of a program written in a “high-level” programming language, such as “PASCAL” or “C.” The distinguishing feature of source code is that it is meant to be read and understood by humans and that it can be used to express an idea or a method. A computer . . . can make no direct use of source code until it has been translated (“compiled”) into a “low-level” or “machine” language, resulting in

162. See *Cohen v. California*, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).

163. See *id.*

164. Before getting to the cases, let me point out a complication that is particular to code: code facilitates communication both as a tool and a medium of contact. By medium of contact I mean the thing that the reader experiences through the senses. Code is a medium of contact when a computer programmer (or someone else) reads or hears it, but it is a tool when it is used to make something—an image or song or so forth—that is seen or heard. In discussing these cases, I am analyzing code as a medium of contact; the importance of code as a tool will have to wait for another time.

165. (*Bernstein IV*), 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), *reh’g en banc granted & opinion withdrawn*, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).

166. *Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State (Bernstein I)*, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

167. *Bernstein IV*, 176 F.3d at 1137.

computer-executable “object code.” . . . Because source code is destined for the maw of an automated, ruthlessly literal translator—the compiler—a programmer must follow stringent grammatical, syntactical, formatting, and punctuation conventions. As a result, only those trained in programming can easily understand source code.¹⁶⁸

In addition to the Snuffle encryption program, Bernstein also wrote a paper explaining his encryption method.¹⁶⁹ Later he wrote a set of instructions in English explaining how to program a computer to encrypt and decrypt data using the techniques in Snuffle, “essentially translating verbatim his Source Code into prose form.”¹⁷⁰ Bernstein wanted to publish these materials—the paper, the source-code program, and the prose instructions—for academic discussion. The government requires that some encryption technologies must be licensed before disclosure to a foreign person, and Bernstein was worried that his materials would require a license.¹⁷¹

Bernstein applied for a license.¹⁷² After some back and forth, the State Department concluded that Snuffle was a munition under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations Act, and that Bernstein would need a license to “export” the source code and the instructions, but not the paper.¹⁷³ Bernstein sued, arguing that the export restrictions violated the First Amendment. The district court found that the restrictions were unconstitutional, reasoning that the posting of source code was pure speech.¹⁷⁴ The district court’s influential explanation is worth quoting at length:

Bernstein’s encryption system is written, albeit in computer language rather than in English. . . . It would be convoluted indeed to characterize Snuffle as conduct in order to determine how expressive it is when, at least formally, it appears to be speech. . . . [“]Language is by definition speech, and the regulation of any language is the regulation of speech.” . . .

Whether source code and object code are functional is immaterial to the analysis at this stage. . . . Thus, even if Snuffle source code, which is

168. *Id.* at 1140. Here is an excerpt from Snuffle 5.0:

```
for (;)
(
  uch = gtchr();
  if (!(n & 31))
    (
      for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
        l[ctr[i]] = k[i] + h[n - 64 + i]
        Hash512 (wm, wl, level, 8);
    )
)
```

Id. at 1140 n.11.

169. *Id.* at 1136.

170. *Id.*

171. *Bernstein I*, 922 F. Supp. at 1430.

172. *See Bernstein IV*, 176 F.3d at 1136.

173. *Id.* at 1136 n.2.

174. *Bernstein I*, 922 F. Supp. at 1437. Because the parties had argued for the less restrictive *O’Brien* standard, the court applied that test without considering other options. *Id.*

easily compiled into object code for the computer to read and easily used for encryption, is essentially functional, that does not remove it from the realm of speech. Instructions, do-it-yourself manuals, recipes, even technical information about hydrogen bomb construction . . . are often purely functional; they are also speech.¹⁷⁵

b. DeCSS Cases

The DeCSS cases stem from what was, in retrospect, a sad attempt by a consortium of businesses to prevent unlicensed copying of commercial DVDs. This consortium, which included movie studios and DVD-player manufacturers,¹⁷⁶ developed an encryption algorithm called CSS.¹⁷⁷ As part of a comprehensive licensing scheme, the consortium encrypted all DVDs and installed CSS on licensed DVD players, so that only licensed players could play encrypted DVDs. Jon Johansen, a fifteen-year-old Norwegian boy, and two of his anonymous Internet buddies then broke CSS by reverse engineering it.¹⁷⁸ They then created DeCSS, a program that decrypted CSS-protected DVDs, enabling users to copy and play them.¹⁷⁹ Johansen posted an executable version of DeCSS in object-code¹⁸⁰ form on his website for anyone to download and use.

DeCSS was soon all over the Web.¹⁸¹ Movie studios began writing cease-and-desist letters to the operators of websites that made DeCSS available for download.¹⁸² One such operator was Eric Corley, who published a magazine for computer hackers and oversaw an online version of the magazine.¹⁸³ Corley posted both source- and object-code versions of DeCSS on his website.¹⁸⁴ Universal Studios sued to enjoin Corley (and the corporation he ran) from making DeCSS available for download from his website and from linking to other websites that did.¹⁸⁵

The law that Universal relied on—the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)—is controversial in its own right.¹⁸⁶ The DMCA forbids, among

175. *Id.* at 1435 (citations omitted) (quoting *Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English*, 69 F.3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), *vacated*, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)).

176. *Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes*, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

177. *Id.*

178. *Id.* at 311.

179. *Id.*

180. Object code is the pure binary code read by a computer. *See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley*, 273 F.3d 429, 438–39 (2d Cir. 2001).

181. *Id.* at 439.

182. *Id.*

183. *Id.*

184. *Id.*

185. *Id.* at 441.

186. The DMCA has been broadly attacked by intellectual-property scholars. *See, e.g.*, Jacqueline D. Lipton, *Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA's Anti-Device Provisions*, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111 (2005); Thomas A. Mitchell, *Copyright*,

other things, trafficking in any technology “primarily designed . . . for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access” to digital copyrighted material.¹⁸⁷ In response, Corley argued that DeCSS was pure expression and that the injunction therefore violated the First Amendment.¹⁸⁸

The Second Circuit concluded that “computer code conveying information is ‘speech’ within the meaning of the First Amendment”¹⁸⁹:

Instructions such as computer code, which are intended to be executable by a computer, will often convey information capable of comprehension and assessment by a human being. . . . Moreover, programmers communicating ideas to one another almost inevitably communicate in code, much as musicians use notes. Limiting First Amendment protection of programmers to descriptions of computer code (but not the code itself) would impede discourse among computer scholars, just as limiting protection for musicians to descriptions of musical scores (but not sequences of notes) would impede their exchange of ideas and expression.¹⁹⁰

c. How to Determine Whether Code Is Communicative

The code cases demonstrate the problems that arise when First Amendment analysis proceeds without a definition of communication. The existence of misleading theories—ideaism and symbolism in particular—leads courts to think that noncommunicative acts are communicative merely because they resemble speech: “Language is by definition speech, and the regulation of any language is the regulation of speech. . . . Instructions, do-it-yourself manuals, recipes, even technical information about hydrogen bomb construction . . . are often purely functional; they are also speech.”¹⁹¹

Using symbols is not speech, however—only using symbols to convey thoughts that people *could freely resist* is speech. But computers have no free will; they can’t disagree with code. The analogy with instructions is thus dead wrong. Instructions are orders that the reader could choose to resist. Code, on the other hand, is a way of making a machine run.

If code is not communicative in the first instance, it still might be protected if it is used in a communicative way. And here again, the lack of a definition of communication has led the analysis astray. Consider the pre-

Congress and Constitutionality: How the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Goes Too Far, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115 (2004); David Nimmer, *Back From the Future: A Proleptic Review of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act*, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855, 867 (2001); YiJun Tian, *Problems of Anti-Circumvention Rules in the DMCA and More Heterogeneous Solutions*, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 749 (2005). I find these attacks convincing, although I’m not knowledgeable in the field.

187. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).

188. *Corley*, 273 F.3d at 451.

189. *Id.* at 449–50.

190. *Id.* at 448.

191. *Id.* at 437 (citation omitted).

vailing¹⁹² scholarly consensus that the DeCSS cases were wrongly decided. This argument—made most eloquently by David McGowan—holds that courts have been slow to recognize new conventions of expression and have unduly emphasized code's "functional" nature.¹⁹³ McGowan argues that courts tend to miss the expressive intent of posting code among communities interested in programming.¹⁹⁴ He also argues that, to the extent expressive publication of source code is regulated because it can facilitate unlawful behavior, it should be covered under incitement law, which requires the State to show a likelihood that an act will cause harm if it is to be regulated.¹⁹⁵

This story is wrong. Posting code is not like incitement, even though both acts require an intervening act to cause harm. This is because code can cause noncommunicative harm, while incitement cannot. To be more precise, harm can ensue from posting code even if the mental change the publisher of code hopes to bring about does not occur. Taking Johansen at his word, he meant to initiate a conversation on decryption technique by posting DeCSS. But the most important effect of DeCSS—video copying—would occur even if no one understood the techniques it demonstrated.

Indeed, harm could happen even if *nobody's* mind was changed by the posting of DeCSS. DeCSS enabled people who already wanted to copy DVDs to do so. In this respect, posting code is like leaving a loaded gun out on a windowsill: if someone picks up the gun and shoots a puppy, the liability of the gun owner is not assessed under incitement law. This is true even if the gun owner left the gun out for communicative purposes—to show off the stock, or protest antigun laws. That code has *some* communicative effects does not make it communicative when its most important effect is noncommunicative.

This does not mean that code should *never* be covered. It just means that less code should be covered than the common story proposes. Here we can contrast *Bernstein* and *Corley*. Bernstein was a mathematician who wanted to make a point about encryption theory.¹⁹⁶ To make this point, he used code, a medium that was uniquely suited to his project.¹⁹⁷ His program never functioned, because creating a functioning program was incidental to his goal.¹⁹⁸ It was therefore primarily important because of what it communicated, not what it did. Johansen, on the other hand, wrote a working program. Other

192. *But see, e.g.*, Dan L. Burk, *Patenting Speech*, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000).

193. *See* McGowan, *supra* note 22, at 1572–74; Lora Saltarelli, Note, *The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Functionality Fallacy*, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1647 (2002).

194. McGowan, *supra* note 22, at 1573.

195. *Id.* at 1588–94; *see also* *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that advocacy can be regulated when it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).

196. *Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Bernstein IV)*, 176 F.3d 1132, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 1999), *reh’g en banc granted & opinion withdrawn*, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999).

197. *Id.* at 1140–41.

198. *Id.* at 1141 n.14.

people reposted it, both to make it available for other users and to protest the law forbidding it.¹⁹⁹ When Corley reposted DeCSS, he argued that he did so to communicate the ideas it contained. But DeCSS was not *primarily* important to anyone—to Corley, Johansen, or the government—for the mental responses people had after reading it. It was important because it enabled copying of protected DVDs.²⁰⁰

CONCLUSION

I have argued that communicative behaviors are those that are primarily important because they invoke freely willed mental responses. In this section, I will briefly consider a few broad implications of my theory.

Let me start by revisiting an earlier point. We saw earlier that while proponents of mentalism argue that communication goes to the mind and not the body, the real operative distinction is between behaviors that convey thoughts that are forced on a person and behaviors that convey thoughts a person can refuse.²⁰¹ This suggests a new way of ordering the world. Instead of splitting the world between mind and body—between what we *experience* and what *is*—we might split the world between acts that force experiences on us, and acts that allow us to choose experiences. Applying this distinction will allow us to understand new ways of being. We tend, for instance, to think of virtual worlds as incorporeal—that is, of being more mind than body. But worlds are virtual in light of the meaning attached to them, not by dint of their physical presence. If an online world became so important that its inhabitants were moved by occurrences there to the same degree that real-world inhabitants are—if they could not choose whether to be moved by changes there—then we should not think of it as a virtual space but as a real one. Indeed, the world is full of information technologies that are important for their mental effects, not their physical ones. Nonetheless, we would never describe these technologies as “communicative” or “virtual.” Paper money, after all, is an information technology: a way of keeping track of people’s beliefs. But money is still real.

Thinking about communication, in other words, can allow us to see the world in new ways. Purely symbolic acts—like taking someone’s money

199. Committing an unlawful act in order to protest the law making it unlawful cannot, as a matter of course, be a speech act, or every law would be fairly easily circumvented. O’Brien wasn’t protesting the law against destroying draft cards; he was protesting the war. *United States v. O’Brien*, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

200. At the trial court, Corley argued that he posted DeCSS because he was covering an important story and testified that writing the story without posting DeCSS would be like “printing a story about a picture and not printing the picture,” an argument that McGowan finds persuasive. McGowan, *supra* note 22, at 1572 (citing Transcript of Record at 824–25, *Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes*, 111 F. Supp. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 1036), *aff’d*, *Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley*, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)). But this assumes away the argument, because a picture is communicative and code generally is not. If an unusual gun were used in a famous murder, many people would surely like to own a copy. But if a manufacturer sold working replicas (or gave them away, as Corley did), the government should not have to survive strict—or even *O’Brien*-level—scrutiny to apply ordinary gun laws to the sale.

201. See *supra* Part II.B.

through cybertheft—are more like violence because of the coercion they effect. And nonsymbolic acts—like consensual sex—are in some sense more like language because of the lack of coercion. The free-will theory of communication allows us to see past these categories (mind and body; signifier and signified) that are thought to define communication and consider whether we want to live in the kind of libertarian world that Baker proposes.²⁰²

The free-will theory can also help us rethink the way our bodies relate to the world. Our sense of the normal body deeply informs the scope of communication. The law, for instance, treats communication as a visual and aural phenomenon. Of the five senses, vision and hearing are the only ones that are normally thought of as conduits for communication—the sense through which the communicant receives the communication.²⁰³ All of the communicative phenomena we have been discussing—reading, talking, nude dancing, and music—are experienced visually, aurally, or both. (They can be experienced through other senses as well, but those other inputs are not considered communicative.) The line between speech and conduct tracks the difference between sensory inputs.²⁰⁴ Eroticism conveyed through touch is considered conduct; when conveyed through sight it is expression. No activity that is primarily experienced through taste or smell is considered speech. The only tactile experience that qualifies is Braille.²⁰⁵ Even this fact is telling; presumably, Braille is speech because it is linguistic and thus a close analogue of written communication.

But language is not only the only way to communicate. If Braille is covered because it is an analogue of aural and visual language, then other analogues of visual and aural forms of communication should be covered as well. For those who can hear, music is an aural experience. But for the deaf, it is touch based, experienced through vibrations.²⁰⁶ If aurally experienced music is communication, then tactilely experienced music could be communication as well. The freedom granted the hearing should run also to the deaf.

If, in other words, we believe that communication is seen or heard, we may miss that it can be felt. Indeed, even framing the question this way—“What is the deaf version of music?”—is discriminatory; it might just as well be reversed. There may be forms of communication in the deaf

202. See *supra* Section II.B.

203. A particular communicative act can engage different senses on the part of the speaker and the listener. Someone marching in a protest experiences tactile (as well as visual and aural) input, but a spectator experiences only visual and aural input. Of course the spectator has tactile input (she feels the ground beneath her feet), but this sense is not a medium for communication.

204. This distinction might be another usage for the terms mind and body. My sense is that activities that cause tactile, olfactory, and taste-based input are labeled bodily phenomena.

205. See *Am. Council of the Blind v. Boorstin*, 644 F. Supp. 811, 815 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that the Braille editions of *Playboy* magazine are covered under the First Amendment).

206. See Corey Kilgannon, *Hip-Hop Reverberates In a Silent World*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007, at B1.

community that could alert the law to unrecognized communication in hearing life—new freedoms, if we could see them.

We will also, I think, soon need a theory of communication because technology will change so much that we won't be able to rely on the old categories even by way of analogy. It is now possible to interact in immersive simulated environments, to touch each other (and have "sex"!)²⁰⁷ remotely, to bypass sensory input by stimulating the brain directly, and to transmit brain impulses directly to bionic limbs.²⁰⁸ How long, then, before technology enables one person to convey brain impulses directly to another without mediation of the senses? And what would we say of this—that it went to the "mind" and not the "body"? That it conveyed "ideas"? But saying those things would prove nothing at all.

The old metaphors break down. The world will change rapidly, and we will change too, in ways that we will never recognize, ways that will recreate us and make us recreate what it means to read and write and speak and think. Against all this we can only hope to see truly—that is, to never mistake the name for its bearer, the blueprint for its architecture, or the map for its dark territory.

207. See Xeni Jardin, *High-Speed Love Connection*, WIRED, June 24, 2004, <http://www.wired.com/gaming/gamingreviews/news/2004/06/63963> (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).

208. See, e.g., Charlotte Hunt-Grubbe, *The blade runner generation*, TIMES ONLINE, July 22, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article2079637.ece (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).