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In the Event of Learning

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In the Event of Learning: Alienation and Participative Thinking in Education

This is an essay in four movements: it begins with Marx's notion on alienation, and then shows a form of alienation specific to education. The third movement examines Mikhail Bakhtin's treatment of alienation in connection with his participative thinking theory, and the final one suggests ways of overcoming educational alienation based on Bakhtin's notion of *eventness of Being*. The purpose of this exercise is not to bring Bakhtin into educational theory for the sake of simply enlarging the discussion. Rather, I worry about directions taken by contemporary critiques of education.

Despite the continuous rhetoric of educational reform, the nation's conservative policy makers seem to agree that public schooling is not broken, that it only requires minor modifications. Squeezing more learning out of schools, the conservative thinking goes, is all we can hope for and should do about education. At the opposite end of political spectrum, the liberal and radical critiques of education also deal with issues peripheral to the schools' modus operandi. They mostly concentrate on achieving equality in the ways schooling is distributed, and eliminating prejudice from educational practices. Indeed, these are laudable and important objectives, yet they are proposed on an assumption that equitable and non-prejudiced schools will be just and benevolent.

I disagree with both critiques. Public schooling has a deeper, potentially more difficult problem than prejudice, inequality, and inefficiency. The first two are, in principle, solvable with sufficient political will, effort, and time. The last one, I am almost convinced, is also solvable with careful systemic improvements along the lines of the Era of Excellence reforms. The name applies to the "generation of educational policies intended to enhance student learning"¹ from the early 1980-s till now. One can imagine schools that are reasonably equitable, free of race/class/gender prejudice, and able to deliver a much better package of academic learning outcomes. Yet such schools will still be challenged by educational alienation, which, in turn, affects any long-term solution to the three problems listed above. Let us think one step ahead, and resurrect the ambition of the educational thinking of the early 20th century, with its focus on questions fundamental to our understanding of schooling: What is education? What is its place in the society? Why do students learn and why they do not? Education, in my opinion, needs or will soon need a different reform. In our competing quests for efficiency and justice, we have overlooked the degree to which school-induced alienation presents a problem on its own right.

Alienation

Exploring the long philosophical history of alienation is not among my objectives.² My focus here is on Marx, because he was first to link alienation explicitly to human productive activity. As Arturo Pacheco noted quarter a century ago, Marx had very little to say about education, but his philosophical views are of great importance to educational theory.³ Pacheco's suggestions on the use of Marx in education boil down to the

abandonment of neutrality claims, an examination of oppressive economic relations, and a historical understanding of the role of knowledge. I would only add to the list one obvious but little-explored possibility: an analysis of learning as a form of productive activity.

According to Marx, humans are what they make; the products we create also re-create us. Productive activity is what connects humans to their existence as members of the human kind, to their species-being (*Gattungswesen*). We literally create ourselves in the process of production: "The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification of the species-life of man: for man produces himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, but actively and actually, and he can therefore contemplate himself in a world he himself has created."⁴ Now, the way in which humans produce their own essential humanity rightfully belongs in educational discourse. The appeal of Marx's insight is obvious: We can put students' activity into the conceptual center of education, instead of the traditional concentration on what is going on between teachers and students. Concentration on teaching tends to steer educational theory toward being prescriptive and away from being descriptive and explanatory. In other words, prescriptive side of educational theory must be firmly planted in understanding of limits and nature of learning as it exists in the context of schooling.

Marx believed that the ways in which humans create have significant effects on them, so the economic system based on private ownership of means of production produces alienated labor. The nature of alienation lies in the deformed relationship between a worker and products of his work, the productive activity itself, and ultimately, his species-being. It is easier to explain alienation by pointing at what Marx believes to be its opposite, the non-alienated labor:

Let us suppose that we had carried out production as human beings. Each of us would have in two ways affirmed himself and the other person. 1) In my production I would have objectified my individuality, its specific character, and therefore enjoyed not only an individual manifestation of my life during the activity, but also when looking at the object I would have the individual pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt. 2) In your enjoyment or use of my product I would have the direct enjoyment both of being conscious of having satisfied a human need by my work, that is, of having objectified man's essential nature, and of having thus created an object corresponding to the need of another man's essential nature. ... Our products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature.⁵

The central idea here is that a person's relationship with herself, her human essence, and other people is fundamentally mediated by her productive activity. Let us ignore the simplistic assumption that alienation is limited to capitalism, or even to material production. Perhaps, as Derrida insists, alienation is a universal human phenomenon. However, one would think that there are better and worse cases of alienation. Let us

assume Marx is right about linking alienation to the ways we produce. We also would agree that there are various ways of production, and such ways are substantially different from each other with respect to their alienating qualities; this is a reason to understand alienation through production. Where there are options, there is also choice; choice can always use a theory to guide it. In other words, I am trying to understand how does learning fair with respect to alienation, and if we can do anything to make it less alienating.

Alienation in education

Let us consider school learning as a form of production. People commonly assume that students “produce” knowledge, skills and attitudes to be used in adult lives of workers and citizens. Yet the phenomenology of student learning would immediately indicate that students produce almost nothing; and what little they produce can be called useless. The material things students produce are such things as worksheets, coloring books, reports on dissected piglets, clay figurines, and essays about the Mexican-American War. An inventory of the non-material things students produce would reveal the same list of generally useless theories, ideas, poems, and concepts; useless not in a sense that students will not use them sometime in the future, but useless in terms of immediate use, or exchange for something else. Can one really look at one’s final exam with the Marxian “pleasure of knowing my personality to be objective, visible to the senses and hence a power beyond all doubt?” Rather, the opposite is true: the things students produce in schools reflect back serious doubts about their creators’ actual existence. If we create ourselves through producing things, what sort of self can be created by producing useless things?

One of reviewers of an earlier draft of this paper commented that perhaps grades (and eventually, credentials), and the approval students receive for their work make the things they produce not so useless. Yet these goods received for effort do not eliminate the alienating nature of student work. In a very real, physical sense, all they produce ends up being thrown away; these are things created for practice, and therefore, *by definition*, not useful to others. No teacher grades papers for enjoyment, no math teacher expects to find algebraic discoveries on quiz sheets. The fact that useless work is rewarded does not change the more basic fact that the products of student labor serve no utility. Let us remember that Marx’ theory of alienation concentrated on labor under capitalist conditions, the labor that is rewarded with real money. The worker is still alienated, because he does not own the product, in the sense that when the product is consumed by others, that consumption does not serve as an opportunity for human relationship. A student faces an even bigger obstacle: her product, by its very design, cannot even be consumed.

Students are forced to produce useless objects that cannot enter the world of social relationships. This creates a specific educational form of alienation, which maybe even more dangerous than that of hired workers in a capitalist enterprise. In most non-educational spheres, people consume the products of their own creation directly or exchange these products with others through market mechanisms. In some other activities, such as games and other forms of leisure, the process is clearly pleasurable, so

the process itself becomes a pseudo-product and is directly consumed by the producers. The consumption, the use is the ultimate aim of creation, and the exchange of useful or useable objects, ideas, and services is the basis for all social life. In contrast, students neither consume nor exchange the products of their schoolwork; they rarely derive direct pleasure from the process of filling out work sheets or reading textbooks. Even the most constructivist teaching methods fail to make a major part of learning process intrinsically pleasurable.

One can object by saying that this alienation is a superficial and avoidable part of education. Centuries of educational writings are filled with imagery of students deriving pleasure from the satisfaction of their curiosity; or of students fully integrated in the world of social relation by participating in useful, meaningful, much needed projects. Long discredited in political thinking, utopianism is alive and well in the educational world. Not only dreamy academics, but also otherwise skeptical governments issue pronouncements to the effect that all children will learn if only exposed to the highest expectations. Ironically, the psychologically indisputable assertion that most children indeed can learn at high levels is often converted into an entirely absurd sociological assertion that therefore all children will learn *in schools*. Such a thesis substitution amounts to saying that since all people can exercise and diet, therefore, they will do it; or if all people can obey the speed limit, they will. Schools simply cannot deliver the sufficient amount of pleasure without turning into huge entertainment complexes and losing their educational value. Schools also cannot churn out enough useful community service projects to occupy all kids around the year and still cover any appreciable amount of curriculum. Educational alienation cannot be dismissed as a purely temporary, easily treatable defect. Rather, it is a part of education that defines its essential tension.

Many forms of alienation undoubtedly exist in our schools. However, very few observers believe that bored students in elite private schools and their desperate counterparts in urban ghettos share the same problem. Yet this is exactly what I am trying to show. Despite a host of other socio-economic and cultural problems facing schools today, there is one central mechanism of alienation that has something to do with both what students are doing and how they are doing it. Learning in schools is associated with a fundamentally unproductive activity, and as such, it brings its own unique form of educational alienation.

Although I believe that education in general, and schooling in particular, have always created alienation, it becomes more prominent now. One natural limit to the development of human civilization is in how much we can learn; specifically, how many people can learn what amount of knowledge before fully entering economic, political, and cultural life. If widely distributed knowledge indeed becomes more and more central to economic and cultural production, the practical question all societies will face is this: how can we keep a bigger proportion of the young population for a longer time in schools, with maximum knowledge acquired? When education was based on exclusionary elitist models, such a question was unthinkable, for reproduction of economic and political systems relied on only a few very well educated people. When societies only needed a few educated individuals, schooling was a privilege, and the problem of keeping kids in school did not exist. With economy, politics, mass consumption, and mass culture

demanding more and more people being educated at ever-higher levels, the phenomenon of educational alienation has become more prominent. To their dismay, teachers all over the world realize that long, compulsory schooling does not appeal equally to everyone as a self-evident value. Let us assume that current educational trends will continue: the years of compulsory schooling will increase, the percentage of youth attending school will grow, and expectations of graduates' minimal competencies will rise. The threat of expulsion that still allows us to police most schools will further diminish, so we will have to come up with a system where kids want to stay in school. Here is where the problem of educational alienation will only grow unless we think ahead.

As productive activity becomes more and more a production of knowledge, education takes on a much bigger role. Unlike material things, knowledge completely disappears with the physical death of its bearer; it has to be relearned by each succeeding generation. Of course, various technologies of knowledge selection and recording help, but all books mean nothing if the next generation refuses to read them. If education alienates students from knowledge, this will defeat the entire project of human civilization, the growth of which depends on how much an individual can learn during his or her lifetime, and on the ratio of time spent learning to time actively producing. Perhaps even more importantly, when schooling took a relatively short time, its alienating properties were more or less successfully overruled by the subsequent productive life of individuals. Today, most people need to unlearn the detached, inconsequential ethos of schoolwork acquired during the long years of schooling, and learn real-life relationships and responsibilities. Yet the longer learning takes, the more difficult it is to unlearn its alienating lessons.

Participative thinking

Let me now include Bakhtin in the conversation, because Marx gives us no solution to the problem of educational alienation (and if may I add, to the problem of capitalist alienation of labor). It will be very difficult to include an even brief outline of Bakhtin's entire project here, if there was ever such a thing. Instead, I refer readers to the still definitive volume on Bakhtin by Clark and Holquist.⁶ Here, I will deal with only a relatively narrow area of Bakhtin's thought, the theory of participative thinking. Shortly before his death, Mikhail Bakhtin told his disciples about two manuscripts hidden in the provincial Russian town of Saransk. The manuscripts circa 1919-1921 were found in a lumber room; they were severely damaged, but survived Stalinism, World War II, and their author's long exile and prolonged forced silence. Both were published posthumously, first in Russian, and then in English as *Art and Answerability* and *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*. The latter will help me to consider Bakhtin's notion of participative thinking as a way of de-alienation, and its connection with the notion of the eventness of being. Bakhtin treats alienation differently than Marx, and offers solutions that are more tenable. It is a somewhat dense text, both in its original language and in translation, but I ask the reader bear with me, for Bakhtin is worth it.

Participative thinking⁷ is the thinking of "those who know how not to detach their performed act from its product, but rather how to relate both of them to the unitary and unique context of life and seek to determine them in that context as an indivisible unity."⁸ In other words, Bakhtin seeks to connect philosophy and life in an actual, concrete human

deed, which initially sounds like Marx's 11th thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it."⁹ More broadly, Bakhtin wants to overcome the separation of any product from the act of making it; to surmount the primary form of alienation known by *Homo Faber*. The very act of creation involves the parting of the created from the creator, the price of which is a crack in the unity of human existence. This, of course, goes well beyond Marx's critique of the capitalist mode of production.

Importantly, Bakhtin does not make a distinction between thinking and doing; to the contrary, he considers every thought to be an act. However, he explicitly distinguishes the content of a thought from the act of the thought. The content of a thought has no ethical dimension; it does not exhaust or even represent the act of the thought. His critique of theoretical thinking in general and of philosophy in particular, is based on this distinction. The content of philosophy, once it is separated from the actual acts of life, becomes mechanical, technical, and can serve either good or evil. Bakhtin's suggestion is to consider philosophy as an act in connection with the content of thought. For example, when one thinks of such concepts as dignity, care, or recognition, the act of thinking becomes an ethical endeavor. The concepts themselves, abstracted from the act of thought become lifeless, and ethically neutral.

The problem Bakhtin faces is that the difference between actual being, and theoretical, abstract being is difficult if not impossible to describe within a theoretical language. In other words, the difference that I have tried to explain in the previous paragraph may be difficult to understand not only because of my (or Bakhtin's) ineptness with words, but also because of intrinsic limitations in the theoretical language. In the theoretical world, writes Bakhtin, "I am unnecessary; I am essentially and fundamentally non-existent in it. The theoretical world is obtained through an essential and fundamental abstraction from the fact of my unique being and from the moral sense of that act—as if I did not exist."¹⁰ To the reality of the act though, the individual existence is central, for there is no universal, abstract act; all acts are specific. The reader receives this paper in a form already abstracted from the process of my writing. The only way of resurrecting the paper is the reader's participative thinking about it, that is, by including it into his or her act.

To overcome the limitations of theory, Bakhtin then makes a number of claims about the nature of truth; claims that offer an epistemological apparatus for his ontological construction. He uses two different words to designate truth: *istina* derives from "is", while *pravda* comes from "right," "just" and "true-to."¹¹ *Pravda* is not only context-specific and unique, but also embedded in the actual act of a specific person. *Istina*, to the contrary, is composed of universal moments. *Istina* can be rational, but *pravda* is "more than rational, it is *answerable*. Rationality is but a moment of answerability."¹² Bakhtin wants philosophers to be seekers of *pravda* rather than of *istina*.

A human act (a deed or *postupok*, an intentional act) is the meeting place of the theoretical world with life, of the universal and the individual.

The performed act concentrates, correlates, and resolves within a unitary and unique and, this time, *final context* both the sense and

the fact, the universal and the individual, the real and the ideal, for everything enters into the composition of its answerable motivation. The performed act constitutes a going out *once and for all* from within possibility as such into *what is once-occurrent*.¹³

Here is another example of how Bakhtin wanted theory to address his concerns:

A theory needs to be brought into communion *not* with theoretical constructions and conceived life, but with the actually occurring event of moral being—with practical reason, and this is answerably accomplished by everyone who cognizes, insofar as he accepts answerability for every integral act of his cognition, that is, insofar as the act of cognition as *my* deed is included, along with all its content, into the unity of my answerability, in which and by virtue of which I actually live—perform deeds.¹⁴

This is not an appeal to change the content of philosophy; rather, Bakhtin wants to change the act of writing philosophy. The act of philosophy is therefore much more important than the content of philosophical thought, mainly because the act of philosophy has an ethical dimension, while the product (the content of thought) does not. Moreover, Bakhtin does not establish an absolute primacy of act over product; rather, he is arguing for some sort of holistic connection between them.

Bakhtin's notion of participative thinking applies to philosophy, to thinking, and ultimately, to any other form of human activity. Bakhtin's treats the act as a quasi-transcendental reality, although the act does not transcend the contingencies of mind and language as much as subsumes them. An answerable act must, in fact, embrace the contingencies of mind and language, for answerability does not allow for hiding behind the universals. His is the ontology of action grounded in the ethics of answerability. A human responsible act is the fundamental reality; all else is derivative. For example, a text separated from the act of writing it, is derivative, and cannot be judged by me to be true or untrue as such. Yet it may enter into my act of participative thinking and thus become true or untrue.

One of the most prominent features of Bakhtin's *Philosophy of the Act*, which he revisited throughout his later work, is the persistent emphasis of the "eventness" of Being. His terminology includes "event of Being," "Being-event," "life-event," "Being-as-event," "Being in its eventness," and "Being as event." Bakhtin himself explains the concept thusly: "The *event* of being is a phenomenological concept, for being presents itself into a living consciousness as an [ongoing] event, and a living consciousness actually orients itself and lives in it as in an [ongoing] event."¹⁵ The focus on the act, and not just on its results, is predicated by this ontological claim about the primacy of eventness. To be is to progress through a series of events; to be ethical is to participate in these events through action. "Only the act *as a whole* is truly real; it partakes in the singular Being-event. Only the act is alive; it is fully and completely there, it becomes, happens, it is a truly alive participant of event-Being."¹⁶

What does this add to Marx's concept of alienation? Alienation is not only a function of such social conditions as mode of production; it is also a matter of ethical consideration for the person who is doing the production. A manual worker who has to sell his labor in order to survive, or a philosopher who writes about the worker's plight—both can exercise their productive activities as answerable acts or as alienating behaviors, products of which do not belong ethically to their authors. Yes, Marx was right; what we produce and how we produce makes us who we are. Bakhtin however, changes the same thesis slightly: how we act determines who we are. Alienation is not about relationships between the producer and the products and production; it is a corrosion of the human ability to act, to partake in the eventness of Being. The path from alienation to participatory act leads through the metanoia of answerability; the first step away from alienation is understanding it. Alienation is overcome not by changing the rules of ownership over the products, as Marx believed. Rather, alienation is a result of disconnection from the eventness of Being; thus, de-alienation is the rediscovery of eventness.

The Act of Learning

What of educational alienation? How do we make sure that making useless things for many years will not ingrain student souls with the attitude of alienation? From the notion of participative thinking, one can infer the possibility of participative working, and participative learning, which is something Bakhtin himself has not done. Let us retrace again Bakhtin's reasoning, only applied now to participatory doing rather than thinking. In participatory doing, one does not detach, but relates the performed act and its product (the things produced) to the unity and singularity of one's actual life. Students must confront the act of producing useless things in the context of their existence, as responsible, answerable deeds. Learning to learn involves creating meaning for absurd, useless activities. Such is the fate of our civilization that children spend many years engaged in pseudo-work that is the opposite of the production they will be engaged in as adults. This cannot be helped. Yet the absurd alienates when unrecognized; making sense of the absurd brings it to an end. School children should be able to confront the nature of their alienation and overcome it by participating in school life with all its absurdities. How can this be practically achieved? Simply put, by constructing an eventful school life. My reasoning here is very simple: Making useless things can make sense if it is not the only game in town. It may make sense if there is another, eventful school life that creates the thread of meaningful events in which students can create their identity independently of academic learning.

Can academic learning be eventful? The answer to this question is a "yes" with such extensive caveats, that it really becomes a "no." Only small parts of academic learning, and only some time can be eventful. If one takes into consideration the extent of the contemporary school curriculum, one must give up the hope that all of it can be weaved into the participatory, experiential activities. Human life can only contain so many events, and there is just too much stuff we all need to learn. Much knowledge and skill have to come to us through the absurd production of useless things.

However, school life can and should become eventful. Schools in their present form suffer from what I call “event deficiency,” which is actually a consequence of educational alienation. Schools are organizations set up to manage the useless activity of learning. One fact immediately available to all students is the lack of any worldly impact of their learning activities. The described above form of alienation creates a peculiar uneventfulness in school life. By uneventfulness, I do not mean boredom, or routine, which certainly are not unique to schools, and are as common in workplaces as in any other social institution. Rather, this is a general impossibility of a genuine event. An event in the sense developed by Bakhtin, implies co-being, the becoming, the happening of Being. The event deficiency in turn creates the difficulty for participative thinking and doing, for there is very little in which to participate. Schools are places of suspended answerability, for students lack a possibility of genuine act, and therefore they have a hard time connecting the act with the product of the act.

The next school reform must first address the event deficiency in school organization, because educational alienation is a threat to organizational stability and effectiveness. The vision of school reform compatible with the philosophy of the act begins with the need to create events in school life. Educators are used to thinking in terms of aims, objectives, plans, curricular units, instructional methods, assessment, feedback, professional training, etc. We need to learn to think about school life in terms of the eventness.

One crude, manipulative, but now classic example of the event-rich education is the Robbers Cave Experiment by Sherif et al.¹⁷ The experimental study of factors conducive to conflict and cooperation between groups was first released in 1954. Two groups of boys were brought in a summer camp environment. A number of quite simple treatments first created highly competitive and hostile relationships between the groups, and then lead to significant reduction in friction, and establishing a factor of collaboration between the groups. Creating conflict was easy; it required two groups separated for most of the time, and put in a position of competition over resources. To reduce friction, experimenters created several problems each requiring joint efforts between the groups. The water line was sabotaged, a movie had to be purchased to watch, a truck would not start without a pull, etc.

I am not interested here in intergroup relations, although many schools could benefit from thinking about them. The research objectives of the experiment lie outside of this paper’s concern. However, the experiment proves the principle: it is possible to introduce eventness into an educational setting, even if without the direct connection to the academic mission of the organization. Albeit for entirely different reasons, but the teachers of the Robbers cave were able to construct a story line, and fill the kids’ lives with genuine events. Quite aside from getting along with each other, the unwitting subjects of the experiment had lived their lives as sequences of events, where they could act, and where participative thinking could take root. Even though the students did not really “learn” anything in terms of academic content, they were able to create a community of participative action; a community that would weather the uneventful flow of a school year should they go to the same school.

Yet another example of eventful education comes from Vladimir Karakovsky, a school principle from Moscow whom I had interviewed several years ago on the subject of planning a school year. Karakovsky says that a school year should be like a good novel, and he has to approach planning like a writer: How characters are introduced, situation established, main conflict stated; which sequence of events will comprise the plot, how each event reveals characters and leads toward resolution of the conflict; what will be the climax and the resolution. Of course, every year repeats key elements from the previous year (for example, the climactic spring festival changes little from year to year). Karakovsky's school lives through cycles not unlike a religious liturgical cycle; all main events are designed to relive other events from the past (e.g. Passover, Easter, and Hijrah). However, each year is also a sequel to the previous one; with some story lines continuing, some resolved, and still some others forming. Every year's events also occur in the context of the actual life of the school community.

Only after the big story is planned, can teachers see how some of the required curriculum can be plotted along the story line, and what sort of links the main plot will have with a number of subplots developed in individual classrooms. The major school events take precedent over the strictly academic function of the school. In the end, much of curriculum has no direct relation with the key events of school life: students produce mountains of useless things, like in any other school. Some of the major events (there are about eight of them throughout the year) have limited curricular content, while others, including the main spring festival, do not. The logic to which Karakovsky himself subscribes is roughly this: the life of a school rich in events creates a very strong possibility of developing rich personal relationships among students and teachers. These relationships, in turn, carry over into the everyday, routine class interactions, and create the strongest form of learning motivation attainable in a school. The curriculum itself, Karakovsky believes, is not that important, because in the context of a vibrant communal life, the non-academic side of school subsumes the academic learning.

In the last example, we can see a promising way of dealing with the educational alienation. The alienation is impossible to defeat by a frontal attack, I maintain. No curriculum and no pedagogy, no matter how creative, can undo the tint of uselessness that permeates academic learning. However, an educational institution can and should try to create an event-rich life, even if based on non-educational foundations. Such eventfulness will allow for participative thinking and doing to take hold. Only when academic learning becomes a secondary, unimportant side of school life, will its alienating properties be suppressed, and genuine education will become possible.

Gradual decline of non-academic (extracurricular, social) component of schooling is dangerous and nearsighted. Both conservatives and liberals seem to agree that schools must concentrate on "what they do best," namely teaching and learning the basics. The argument for more funding of extracurricular activities is often framed in terms of "well-rounded" individual or other vague ideals. Yet the need of school community are not frivolous or extraneous to the educational mission of schooling. What I propose is not simply throwing more money into a variety of disconnected extracurricular activities, but a careful, rational construction of the communal life of school. Creation of a good school

is not unlike nation building; it requires paying attention to culture, constructing a story-line of events, and asking participants to take responsibility for the whole enterprise.

NOTES

¹ Joseph Murphy, "Reforming America's schools 1980-2000," *Journal of Educational Administration*, Vol. 36 No. 5, 1998, 426.

² For a comprehensive treatment, see Istvan Meszaros, *Marx's Theory of Alienation* (London : Merlin Press, 1975).

³ Arturo Pacheco, "Marx, Philosophy, and Education" in *Philosophy of Education 1978: Proceedings of the 34th Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society* (Champaign, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 1979), pp. 208-220.

⁴ Karl Marx, *Estranged Labour*, <

<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm>>.

⁵ Karl Marx, "Comments on James Mill, *Éléments D'économie Politique*," *Collected Works*, <<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/james-mill/index.htm#08>>

⁶ Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, *Mikhail Bakhtin* (Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984).

⁷ *Uchastnoe myshlenie* in Russian, *anteilnehmendes Denken* in German.

⁸ Mikhail Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), 19.

⁹ Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*, <<http://eserver.org/marx/1845-feuerbach.theses.txt>>

¹⁰ Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, 9.

¹¹ Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, 94.

¹² Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, 29.

¹³ Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, 29.

¹⁴ Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, 12.

¹⁵ Bakhtin, *Toward a Philosophy of the Act*, 78. Vadim Liapunov, the translator, traces the term to German *Seinsgeschehen*, and specifically to Wilhelm Windelband's comment about the need to replace the traditional distinction between being and becoming with that between the thing and the event.

¹⁶ ? ? .??????, ? ? ?????? ?? ???? ???? , <<http://www.philosophy.ru/library/bahtin/post.html>>.

¹⁷ Muzafer Sherif, O. J. Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood, Carolyn W. Sherif, *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment* (Norman: University Book Exchange, 1961).