

3-1978

National Integration and Disintegration: The Southern Sudan

Richard A. Lobban

Rhode Island College, rlobban@ric.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.ric.edu/facultypublications>



Part of the [African History Commons](#), and the [Anthropology Commons](#)

Citation

Lobban, Richard. "National Integration and Disintegration: the southern Sudan," in, "Three Studies on National Integration in the Arab World," Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Information papers, No. 12, March, 14-27 pps.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ RIC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ RIC. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@ric.edu.

NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION: THE SOUTHERN SUDAN

THE SOUTHERN SUDAN has been torn by internal and external struggles for most of its long history. The area has seldom been unified by its own leaders or by those seeking to impose their rule upon the southerners. One of the greatest experiments in national integration is now underway in that region. Certain progress has been made, but much remains to be done. The struggle for national integration in the huge and underdeveloped Sudan is very difficult, with ethnic and geographical factors weighing heavily. The problem has been complicated by the deep roots of national division planted by British colonialism and nourished by changing governments in Khartoum and by global powers which have used the southern Sudan for their own ends. Here we will review the past in order to judge the future prospects for national integration.

Early History

Two themes have dominated the history of the southern Sudan as long as that history has been recorded. The first is isolation: the region has never maintained easy contact with the areas around it. The second theme is exploitation and pillage: foreign powers have been interested in ivory and slaves from the time of the high civilizations of ancient Egypt and Meroe until comparatively recent times. The exploitation increased the isolation, and the isolation made the southern Sudanese prime candidates for more savage treatment by outsiders.

Internal divisions did not help. Some of the cultures, such as the

Shilluk, were organized with centralized political authority, while others, such as the important Nuer, were characterized by a decentralized political system. The Shilluk sought to expand their political dominance by subjugating peoples with a less complex sociopolitical organization. The Nuer and other cattle-rearing people always wanted more land for grazing. Thus, interethnic skirmishes and, sometimes, full scale wars also mark the history of the region. Such strife persists, on occasion, to the present.

Some scholars go to these early days and conditions to seek the roots of the recent conflict in the southern Sudan. Although this background is important, the nature of the conflict has more relevant, recent sources. Many of the causes are to be found in the period of foreign occupation and colonization. In fact, the civil war in the South was qualitatively different from the struggles of earlier centuries because it represented the first major attempt by southerners to unite across ethnic lines in fighting their perceived enemy. Since I view the present situation as different from that of ancient history, I start this review in 1820, when the era of Turko-Egyptian rule began.

The Turkiyah, 1820-1885

Early in the nineteenth century, Mohammed Ali Pasha, viceroy of Egypt, was consolidating his hold on the northeast corner of the African continent. To aid in his conquests, he needed men and money — that is, slaves to serve as soldiers, and slaves to sell. Agricultural, mineral, and animal resources were also in high demand. So that these needs might be supplied, he decided to conquer the Sudan.

Ali Pasha's two sons were delegated with the military conquest and with the procurement of slaves. Ibrahim went south, up the White Nile, to raid Dinka country, and Ismail pillaged the Blue Nile, past Sennar. The flow of slaves, cattle, camels, and hides began slowly but then picked up. The raids for slaves went south of Malakal on the Sobat River, and deep inside the Dinka country on the White Nile, presumably Nuer and Shilluk alike were captured.

Except for certain short periods, the rule during the Turkiyah was brutal and corrupt. The opportunity to become rich through the slave trade was not overlooked, and the Turko-Egyptians would give contracts to those interested in going south for such activities. Such contracts could be acquired more easily in Khartoum, by bribery.

In the 1830s the European antislavery movement was growing as European mercantilists wanted to drive from competition those rival economies based on the slave system. Some European travelers visited

the Sudan, and many of them sent messages of protest to the Turko-Egyptian rulers, demanding an end to slavery. Although the administration later made a show of ending the trade, little was actually done. The military and economic need for slaves was still great, and captured "rebels" and "confiscated slaves" were sent to Egypt to shore up the Turkiyah. If anything, the volume and devastation of the slave raids increased. At one point, Zubayr Wad Rahma, one of the biggest slave-traders operating in the Bahr el Ghazal region, organized a successful resistance to a military force of Turko-Egyptians. Zubayr's strength was subsequently acknowledged when his actions were forgiven and he was made governor of the region, but his personal interests in slaving continued to make him a constant rival to the authority in Khartoum.

During the much heralded reign of Gordon Pasha, the slave traffic was partly disrupted but by no means stopped. When Gordon left Khartoum, in 1879, the slave trade was booming once again. When he returned, in 1884, one of his first acts was to abolish the law which he had written to stop the slave trade. This was done to appease the Mahdist movement, which was then in full swing.

The Mahdiya, 1885-1898

After Khartoum fell, in January, 1885, the armies of the Mahdi were busy consolidating their victories and making efforts to expand their territory — in particular, to the east and the north. Slavery was tolerated by the Mahdi as long as the slaves were nonbelievers in Islam. Slaves were also important, both economically and militarily, to the Mahdi and his caliph. Mahdist authority was extended to Rajaf (near Juba, in Equatoria), but the control was not deep or lasting. The trade in ivory and slaves from the South continued. Under the Turkiyah there had been brutal exploitation; under the Mahdiya the theme in the South was basically a return to isolation.

It is important to distinguish the domestic slavery under the Mahdiya from the "gang" slavery of the European or Turko-Egyptian slavers, who saw slaves simply as a commodity. Indeed, the Khalifa prohibited commercial slaving.

Anglo-Egyptian Period, 1898-1930

In the early years of the Anglo-Egyptian period, the English (who were, after all, the real rulers) employed a two-phase operation in dealing with the South. The first phase was military "pacification." Subsequent to the pathetic confrontation of French and British troops at

Fashoda, it was determined, by Europeans, that the British would rule the South. The vast spaces in the South and the decentralized political systems of most of the southern cultures made for many difficulties in the imposition of the British "pacification" program. In the first three decades of British rule, no fewer than ten punitive military expeditions were sent out against the Nuer. Other revolts are recorded for the Dinka, Beir, Anuak, Latuka, Toposa, and Didinga in the same period.¹

The British, recognizing that armed repression would not be sufficient, arranged to employ Evans-Pritchard, the well-known anthropologist, to study the social and political life of southern peoples (particularly the "troublesome" Nuer) so that they could be "better" administered. The civil secretary, H. S. MacMichael (later to become governor general), in a little-known memorandum about the use of anthropological material and methods in colonial administration, said that anthropological techniques "will be conceded to be an essential equipment of the administrator responsible for the tutelage of primitive races whose mental processes are not as ours." MacMichael arranged for Evans-Pritchard to study the Nuer, who were in sporadic armed revolt. MacMichael provided the anthropologist with a questionnaire which included questions on political organization, weapons used, and names of chiefs. These techniques played a significant, yet little-recognized, role in the British "pacification" of the southern peoples.

Once the area was brought under firmer control, the second phase of British colonialism was introduced — the age-old technique of subjugation; divide and rule. The colonial authorities drew a map of the southern Sudan and partitioned it into eight spheres of missionary activity, much as modern engineers divide maps into tracts for petroleum prospecting. Until that time most southerners practiced their traditional religions, and relatively few were Islamicized or Christianized. In addition to proselytizing the population the missions sought to teach obedience to government authority.²

Not only was the southern Sudan internally divided by the missionaries and by efforts to encourage "tribalism" and ethnic differentiation; the region was also fragmented from the northern Sudan by an official policy designed to discourage any sense of national unity. A deliberate effort was made to create division within the Sudan. Serious thought was given to having the Southern Sudan join with Uganda in the distant

1. Mohammed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (Khartoum: Al Ayam Press, 1968), p. 19.

2. Muddathir Abdel-Rahim, *The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan, 1899-1947* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1968), p. 5.

future. The missionaries spoke of the evil Arab slavers, omitting any reference to the European and Turkish financiers who stood behind the slave trade when it was at its peak. The Missionaries also spoke zealously of the dangers of communism.

The 1920 Milner Report stressed that the Southern Sudan should be kept free from northern Sudanese and Muslim influences, and that Christian holidays should be recognized. The Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922, in keeping with the Milner recommendations, strictly controlled access to the Southern Sudan. Not only did the ordinance control travel into the region; it was also highly restrictive in allowing southerners to go north. This portion, known as the "closed districts ordinance," was applied to other areas in the Sudan which proved troublesome to the colonialists.

Another objective of the British was to eliminate Arabic in the South and to train southern civil servants in English. A British district commissioner cynically observed that the southerners were not allowed to have "foreign" Arabic names, but that it was fine if the missionaries gave them "foreign" English or Italian names when they were baptized. By 1935 the colonialist policy had become even more absurd. Arabic titles such as sheikh and sultan were prohibited. The Greek merchants operating in the South were forbidden from selling Arab clothing. And *tagia* and *emma* — standard northern Sudanese dress — were to be eliminated.

As a result of these deliberate policies, the South continued to be isolated from the North. And those who were not mission-trained were isolated from each other by the conscious reinforcement of traditional ethnicity. Also, there could be seen already a tiny English-speaking missionized class of civil servants who implemented British colonial policies.

Other differences began to appear between the North and the South. A railway was built to the north of Khartoum, to the east, and to the west. (Only very recently did the railway reach the South, when one provincial capital was connected to the network. The other southern capitals are served by seasonal roads and by an inadequate river-steamer service.) Industrialization — to the limited degree that a colonial power would grant — occurred entirely in the North and was basically for processing raw materials and for light manufacturing. The already backward South had no means of changing this situation.

The Revolution of 1924 in Khartoum, led by an Islamicized southerner, Ali Abdel Latif, came close to succeeding. The failure of nationalist Egyptian troops to join the movement was all that kept the mutiny from driving the British out. The British were much shaken by this event

and realized that if they failed to involve southerners in the administration, other such revolts might follow. By 1930, a number of primary schools and several intermediate schools had been opened to provide training to southerners.

Nevertheless, in January, 1930, the office of the civil secretary in Khartoum circulated a memorandum in which the southern policy of the previous decades was reviewed and restated. It was to "build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units" in order to effect the implementation of the proven colonial method of the British of indirect rule.³ The conscious goals of isolating the South from the North, isolating southern cultures from each other, and isolating southern civil servants and the educated elite from the people were effectively approved and maintained.

Anglo-Egyptian Period, 1930-1956

Some time after the memorandum of 1930, the British began to see that their policy, although fine from the point of view of colonial administration, had certain disadvantages. While it was best, during the early period of colonialism, to keep people divided, the British saw that larger national entities would have to be devised. As late as 1946 the Khartoum authorities were trying to decide whether the southern region should be linked with the northern Sudan or with East Africa, or perhaps be divided to go with both. It should be clear from the 1946 revision of southern policy that the British had been so successful in dividing the region that even they did not know what to do with the pieces!⁴

At this time the British, at war with other European imperialist powers, were seeking to economize in every possible way. The end of colonialism began when Europeans became weak from fighting each other for global spheres of influence. But the sophisticated colonial thinkers were already formulating a neocolonial policy that would allow them to maintain their economic hold on the Sudan but have Sudanese do the "dirty work" of keeping the people "in line." The policy-makers went into reverse gear and suddenly sought to integrate the South with the North and to break down the isolation of the South that they had been building up for the previous four decades. This is not to say that the British were planning to grant the Sudan independence in the 1940s, but that they were starting to see the collapse of their whole

3. Beshir, *Southern Sudan*, p. 115.

4. See Abdel-Rahim, *Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan*, p. 43.

empire. The essence of the "new" 1946 policy was that since geographical and economic factors rendered the southerners to be

inextricably bound for future development to the middle-eastern and Arabicised Northern Sudan, . . . they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future.⁵

With a sweep of the magic wand the colonial administrators hoped to rectify the immense damage they had done with their earlier reckless policies. There is some indication that they thought that they might have enough time to rework the administration of the South. J. H. T. Wilson, the district commissioner of the Jur River District, said:

I regard it as of importance that our target in the South should be federation with the North as partners on an equal footing in the self-governing Sudan of the future in the same way as we regard our target in the North as a self-governing Northern Sudan within 20 years.⁶

Contrary to British plans, the Egyptian government was overthrown in 1952 by the Free Officers Society, and the British puppet, King Farouk, was sent into exile. The impact of the Egyptian coup was crucial to the Sudan, and by 1955 plans were being made for full independence in January, 1956 — from the British point of view, a decade ahead of schedule.

On the eve of independence, the southern regions broke into armed and bloody revolt. Although the revolt needs much careful study and comment, it was fundamentally the product of the long-standing and well-cultivated suspicions between the North and the South. The southerners saw northerners as merchants, or sometimes, after the early southern policy had been reversed, as administrators. The decades of colonial and missionary contact had spawned and encouraged animosities between the regions. When independence was imminent, many southern leaders feared that they would be dominated by the North, and that their present underdevelopment would only continue. The revolt spread, and many northerners were killed. Equally brutal repression finally quelled the incipient movement for regional separation. Burning emotions were left to smolder.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

6. Quoted in Beshir, *Southern Sudan*, p. 124.

Independence, 1956-1969

Self-determination, coming on the first day of 1956, had lasted only two years when the parliamentary government was toppled by a strong pro-Western Sudanese army officer, General Abboud. (From 1958 to 1967 the United States pumped about \$130 million into the country.) Meanwhile many southern leaders and intellectuals were convinced that a protracted guerrilla struggle was the only way to gain autonomy and true self-determination for the South. The Sudan African National Union (SANU) was organized in the early 1960s to achieve this goal. During Abboud's rule there was regular military activity in the South to control the ambushes and attacks by guerrilla units of SANU. Little effort was made to check the excesses of the northern troops; their brutality only made the situation worse.

At the University of Khartoum steps were taken to address the issue that was tearing the infant nation apart. In October, 1964, students and teachers met to discuss the situation in the South. The military government, frightened by the gathering of students and political leaders, refused them permission to meet. This refusal stimulated a sharp reaction from the students, then from the workers, and finally from the population as a whole, against the unpopular government. Violent demonstrations culminated in the overthrow of the junta and the return to parliamentary procedure.

A few weeks later the Sudanese prime minister received a letter from SANU stating that it would like to return to "our motherland" on the condition that the war effort be halted, SANU be recognized, a general amnesty be granted, southern refugees be protected, and certain specified and sincere efforts be made to reduce the inequalities existing between the two regions. SANU also called for all political parties in the Sudan to come together at a round-table conference, to stop the fighting, and to get on with nation-building. The spirit of the 1964 October revolution was still strong, and by December an agreement had been reached about the major elements in the SANU appeal. In January, 1965, SANU laid down a short list of further preconditions, stressing an open forum and the imperative task of ending the warfare. From March 16 to March 25, 1965, the round-table conference was held in Khartoum, and the eight delegated political parties reached an agreement. The resolutions that were passed expressed a feeling of cautious optimism, even though some of the central issues had not been fully confronted.⁷ After the round-table conference, much maneuvering, splitting, and merging took

7. For the specifics of the resolutions, see *ibid.*, pp. 183-85.

place among the southern political parties as some southern leaders sought to establish themselves in the most advantageous positions vis-a-vis the northern political organizations.

Some northern elements were fearful of strong autonomy for the South, and they generated a spirit of conservative regionalism and distrust of southerners. This motivation was at a peak when soldiers in the Sudanese army in the South killed a great number of the educated elite in Juba in a notorious massacre. An assault at a wedding party of elites in Wau had the same purpose and effect. The work of months of negotiation and careful optimism was totally undone, and the war flared again. Both sides could think only of military victory and revenge, and interpreted talk of political negotiation as a sign of weakness. Now the southern rebel forces, having acquired automatic weapons from the deteriorating Simba movement in Zaire, were better armed.

By this time two main trends were emerging within the southern movement. One, represented by the Southern Front, held that a final resolution must come from negotiation between equals, not from separation. The other trend was represented by SANU, the Anzania Front, and the African National Union. Distinctions among these groupings are hard to draw since their leadership and platforms have been subject to considerable change. Nonetheless, their general outlook was that complete separation through armed struggle was the only solution. Beyond these fundamental differences in political goals among the elites of the South, there were also ethnic divisions and divisions based upon territory under the control of, or contested by, factions in the guerrilla army.

After the resolutions of the round-table conference had failed, the political parties of the North struggled for influence under the restored system of parliamentary democracy. Swinging from the political center to the right wing, the government in Khartoum was weak and could barely keep itself together much less solve the newly inflamed problems in the South. Elections were held in the spring of 1968 to attempt to create a viable government in Khartoum. William Deng, who had been president of SANU since its formation, won a seat but was murdered by government troops just after the elections.

Independence, 1969 to the present

And so it went until May 25, 1969, when Gaafar Nimeri took over with a military coup. The Sudanese Communist party and progressive elements in the army were instrumental in the planning which led to the successful coup. On June 9, 1969, the new junta issued a declaration in which it promised to solve the southern problem once and for

all. In the first sentence of the declaration, the basic problem in the South was defined as imperialism and the manipulation of the South in order to divide the Sudan. This analysis had long been made by progressive elements in the South.⁸ The policy of separation was seen as fundamentally racist and ultranationalist. The central theme of the solution was the concept of regional autonomy, which was quite similar to the proposal made at the round-table conference.⁹ In actuality the Sudanese Communist party had made a similar proposal in the late 1950s, after the first revolt had taken place; but at that time most people only wanted revenge, and few paid attention to the idea of regional autonomy. The declaration of June 9 "was welcomed with jubilation by the masses of the southern people. Huge demonstrations of support were organized by them in all major southern towns as well as by southern communities in the North," reported the minister of southern affairs, Joseph Garang, appointed to one of the highest positions ever held by a southerner in Khartoum.¹⁰

Many in the guerrilla movement supported the position of separation, and sometimes their support reached astonishing levels. A previously unpublished letter written to the South African ambassador by the Nile Provisional Government (Any-Nya) was captured by Sudanese army forces who overran an Any-Nya base area (Owing Kibol and Moroto) in the southern forests. This letter, dated August 27, 1970, mentioned the Provisional Government's "whole hearted support for your policy of apartheid" since "we are for the separation of races." The letter also indicated that the writers felt that both they and the South African government were fighting "Arab communism." The letter asked for financial support, travel papers, clothes, food, and medicine, and advised that such support should be sent through the Malawi diplomatic mailbag or the American embassy in Uganda. The Nile provisional government also asked for mercenaries from South Africa and suggested that they come to Uganda as tourists on British, American, or French passports. The letter indicated, in strong terms, that the provisional government would never accept negotiation for federation, and that it looked forward to a continuing Middle East war so that it could join the Israelis in their fight against the Arabs.

8. As distinguished from the two other elements in southern politics outlined in Joseph U. Garang, "The Dilemma of the Southern Intellectual: Is It Justified?", mimeographed (Khartoum: Ministry for Southern Affairs, 1971).

9. Ministry of National Guidance, *Policy Statement on the Southern Question (The June 9 Declaration)*, 1969.

10. Garang, "On Imperialist Conspiracies against the Sudan," mimeographed (Khartoum: Ministry for Southern Affairs, 1971).

Another letter from the Nile Provisional Government, confiscated in the same Sudanese army assault, and dated similarly, was addressed to the Malawi high commission in Nairobi. The purpose of this letter was to explain a number of divisions between the Nile Provisional Government and the so-called Anyidi Provisional Government, a split-off from one of the numerous factions within the South. The letter also asked for money, for more ammunition, clothes, and travel documents. The Nile Provisional Government asked the Malawi government to permit South African aid to come through their country, and to raise the issue of the southern Sudan at the Organization of African Unity. The provisional government stated that Malawi's prime minister, Hastings Banda, "is the first who wanted to raise an army to fight the Arabs in the Sudan," and that "Arabs are not Africans." These statements point out the racist ideology espoused by this significant faction within the southern Sudanese movement. Such blatant racism and division are the logical results of both missionary and colonial enterprises which had "divide and rule" as the keystone of their policies. Even when they sought to reverse the policy, it was a case of too little and too late.

As time wore on, the declaration of June 9 became ineffectual. By 1971 many southerners thought that it was just another empty promise from the North. Joseph Garang gave public addresses and sought to have refugees return as if the war were over — but it wasn't. Units of Sudanese army were still operating in the South, and little real change had occurred. Divisions appeared between the President and Garang's Ministry for southern affairs, which sometimes lacked sufficient funds to do all that it was supposed to do. The five-year development plan for the South was fine, but it was not fully implemented. The Amnesty Law was extended, but few returned. The English-language *Nile Mirror* was published so that there would be a medium in which to discuss the many dimensions of the southern Sudan, and so that there would be a newspaper especially for southerners. A series of pamphlets on the southern Sudan was also published by the Public Relations Bureau of the Ministry for Southern Affairs. But the war went on. A broad infrastructure of clubs, unions, and social organizations was initiated. Although one side of the government was making peace, one side was still at war, so the mass organizations never took a deep hold, despite the great effort and expense.

At the time of the 1969 coup, the Middle East was just cooling off from the 1967 war of expansion by Israeli Zionists, who wanted to keep the Arab nations off-balance and in disarray. The Nimeri regime was, at first, strongly anti-Zionist and anti-American, as were most Arab countries at the time. Diplomatic relations with the United States were

broken. Major private commercial firms and monopolistic capitalist concerns were nationalized, further angering the Western powers. The situation in the southern Sudan was just what the imperialist and Zionist powers were looking for. With the conservative, pro-Western Abboud regime in power, the West barely uttered a word against the military atrocities in the South; but with the Nimeri regime in place in Khartoum, Western propagandists (like *Time* magazine) fell over backwards pointing to a "Soviet Viet Nam," and they mobilized their "humanitarian" organizations to align world opinion against Nimeri.

A major propaganda offensive was carried out by West German and American "charitable" associations. The Israelis pumped in arms by way of their ally in the Horn of Africa, Haile Selassie, and a number of southern rebel leaders received military training in Israel. American aid was routed to the rebels through Saudi Arabia, then to Ethiopia and Uganda. The notorious West German mercenary, Rolf Steiner, who had fought in Algeria, Viet Nam, and Biafra, found his way to the southern Sudan, where he gave military training to improve the over-all fighting effectiveness of the southern guerrillas. During Steiner's trial in Khartoum, after his capture in Uganda, it became quite clear that he was the very epitome of an imperialist tool (even though his own anti-Semitism made him blanch at working with the Zionists). His death sentence was later commuted by the Nimeri government.

By aggravating the southern problems, the Western powers tried to discredit Nimeri's rule in Khartoum and to bring him down. Many northerners were already upset about Nimeri's plan to federate with Egypt and Libya. On July 19, 1971, certain politicians and military men toppled Nimeri in a bloodless coup. What surprised the imperialists was that the coup-makers were even further to the left than Nimeri. Panic struck Washington, London, Cairo, and Tripoli. The leader of the coup, Hashim al-Atta, had little chance to survive. The regime was recognized by Iraq (but a plane that they sent to Khartoum was shot down over Saudi Arabia). In three days a countercoup was mounted, and, after very heavy fighting in Khartoum, Atta was brought down and Nimeri, miraculously, was returned to the "People's Palace." Garang was implicated by a fast-acting military tribunal and, with dozens of others, was secretly executed.

Nimeri then made an astounding about-face on the political continuum. Much that he had favored became forbidden, and much that he had opposed became favored. Commercial interests were denationalized and returned to former owners. The Middle East situation became much less important to the new government (one reason for the Black September incident in Khartoum). Diplomatic relations with the United

States were resumed. The Western powers were favored in Khartoum, at the expense of the Soviet Union. The huge English financial conglomerate Lonrho (London-Rhodesia) found good possibilities for business, and was made exclusive buyer for English products in the Sudan. Imperialist support for the rebellion in the South fell off. The Anya-Nya forces could barely go on with their war. (Incidentally, the imperialist military aid was evaluated as insufficient to have ever achieved the goal of separation.) But Nimeri knew that he had to act on the southern problem since it was partly his failures on this issue which had led to the problems of July 19, 1971.

Haile Selassie offered to have the World Council of Churches act as mediator between representatives of the Sudan government and the southerners (there is still argument about who represented whom). The crucial difference between these meetings and the 1965 round-table conference is that this time the imperialist powers desperately wanted a solution. Suddenly, in early 1972, the Khartoum offices of the Eritrean Liberation Front were closed down. This guerrilla movement had been fighting Haile Selassie's annexation of Eritrea for eleven years. Similarly the Selassie government closed down the offices of the southern Sudanese guerrillas in Ethiopia. Elsewhere, Idi Amin, in Uganda, abruptly ended relations with the Israelis (who, it is rumored, helped him to power in the first place!). Everything was ready.

At last, on March 27, 1972, the Addis Ababa Agreement was reached, and the shooting stopped. All peace-loving people rejoiced that the killing was over, and that the South might begin to develop. But the compromises which left the imperialists as big winners must not be forgotten. Moreover, the class structure in the Sudan is essentially unchanged except that there are more people of southern origin in the Khartoum and southern governments — which, of course, is of great significance. The workers of the North must yet struggle for a decent wage and better living; the workers and peasants of the South must yet try to gain better training and opportunities.

Basically the petty bourgeois sectors of the North and the South have come to terms with each other. The alliance of elites in the North and the South will yield some stability, but political factions in both regions are not going to stop seeking power for themselves. If the alliance serves the interests of the masses, there will be greater stability. If the alliance serves its own interests, the Addis Ababa Agreement may go the way of earlier agreements. There have already been some reports of abuses of power and position.

In one of the most recent publications on the situation in the southern Sudan, the ministry of foreign affairs has mentioned that "diversity"

and "discrepancy" remain the most conspicuous aspects of the problem.¹¹ That this problem has been alleviated cannot be questioned; the South has come a long way from the earlier fighting in the protracted war. But there is still a very long way to go.

11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Peace and Unity in the Sudan: An African Achievement* (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1973).