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FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS GRANTS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPACTS
TO LOCAL AND STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS


By

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
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Date

6-9-2017

FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS GRANTS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE IMPACTS
TO LOCAL AND STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS

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Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
Eastern Kentucky University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
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DEDICATION

I can do all things through him who gives me strength.
Philippians 4:13

This thesis is dedicated to my wife
Callie Barnes
for her fervent support;

to my parents
William and Mary Barnes
for always believing in and supporting me;

and

to all of the professionals
across the nation and around the globe
who sacrifice daily in service of others.

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I would like to thank my major professor, Dr. Chad Foster, for his guidance and patience. I would also like to thank the other committee members, Dr. Matthew Howell and Dr. Bill Sullivan, for their comments and assistance over the past year. I would like to express my thanks to my wife, Callie, for her understanding and patience as we both complete graduate school. She encouraged me and made me stick with it. Finally, I would like to thank North Carolina Emergency Management, the North Carolina Office of Emergency Medical Services, as well as all of the emergency managers from across North Carolina who participated in this research for their support.

ABSTRACT

Disasters begin and end locally, but anecdotal evidence suggests that national disaster policies significantly influence state and local approaches. The federal government influences local and state emergency management through national emergency management doctrine as well as providing considerable grant programs to local and state governments who adopt the federal policies. The study attempts to explore some effects of this policy dichotomy.

A survey along with selective interviews were conducted of local and state emergency management officials in North Carolina to examine the impacts of select federal preparedness grants. From 70 surveys and 6 interviews, the following findings were identified. There is limited secondary data on the grant programs, but overwhelmingly respondents felt the grants were critical. There is evidence to suggest that state and local response agencies have become reliant on federal grant programs to support operations, especially the state agencies. The grant programs may also contribute to the creation of programmatic “silos” that are not well integrated at all levels of government, and provide little support for the accepted principles of progressive and flexibility. Several key concerns were raised that require additional study to improve the federal preparedness grant programs and by doing so improve the national emergency management system.

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Emergency management has evolved into a core function of public safety disciplines in the United States. Emergency management focuses on mitigating threats to life, property, and the environment through leveraging resources to ensure even complex incidents are mitigated as quickly and safely as possible through a coordinated effort of all appropriate stakeholders. Emergency management is most commonly executed through a bottom up, tiered approach. With very few exceptions, state and federal governments may only intervene after the local governments have exhausted their own ability to respond to and mitigate the event. However, a large portion of emergency management preparedness funding comes from federal grant programs (Sylves, 2015, pp. 16-17). As a condition of these grant programs, state and local governments must adopt federal emergency management policy. While the response to disasters is the constitutional responsibility of state governments, the federal government's disaster policies impact intergovernmental relations. This relationship provides the federal policies significant influence over local emergency management programs (Sylves, 2015, p. 82). The impact of this relationship is one that has yet to be examined in significant detail.

This research explores the impacts of the federal grant programs to the state and local emergency management system. The federal policy process and its interaction with the federal bureaucracy may hinder the emergency management process at the state and local level due to unintended consequences of grant requirements. There is very limited

research specific to this question but the importance of this question is clear. State and local emergency management programs rely significantly on federal grants. There are numerous federal preparedness grants each with their own requirements and limitations. Understanding the impact of these grants as well as any unintended consequences is vital in further improvement of the national emergency management system, especially considering that all disasters begin and ends locally. If federal preparedness grants are a contributing factor to local emergency management failures or inhibiting local success, than the foundation of the nation's preparedness efforts have a significant structural flaw that could contribute to limited improvements in the system or complete system failures. The focus of this research was on federal preparedness grant programs and their impact on local and state emergency management programs.

A better understanding of federal policy implications, as it relates to preparedness grants, would significantly contribute to the ongoing national discussion of the future of the federal preparedness grant programs. It could be argued that block grants would increase state and local flexibility in lieu of the current fragmented federal preparedness grant programs. Academic studies on federal preparedness grants have been extremely limited. Theory surrounding intergovernmental relations can be applied to better understand the context of the problem from a theoretical prospective. Even with some theoretical grounding in public administration theory, specific dynamics of emergency management must be considered, including national integration into a larger emergency management system.

CHAPTER II RESEARCH QUESTION

Federal preparedness grant programs make up a significant amount of state and local emergency management funding. This is especially true since the 9/11 terror attacks. One condition of this funding is agencies must adopt federal policy as well as stay within strict grant guidance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the nature of the federal preparedness grant programs make their requirements a significant burden on local and state emergency management programs through their limited scope that only addresses small “silos” of whole community preparedness. The goal of this research is to examine the impact after the 9/11 terrorist attacks of the federal preparedness grant programs’ requirements on state and local emergency management programs in North Carolina.

For the purpose of this study, the following question was addressed:

Do the federal preparedness grant programs have a significant negative impact on state and local emergency management programs in North Carolina?

As part of this study, investigation of the following hypotheses was included:

H₁ Emergency management officials collectively believe that federal grant requirements contribute to state and local compartmentalization due to the limited scope of each federal preparedness grant program along with the limited interaction between programs.

H₂ Federal preparedness grant funds make up a majority of state and local emergency management funding.

H₃ In the post-9/11 terrorist attack environment, federal preparedness grants became very focused on a specific threat / hazard at the cost of whole community preparedness for other hazards and threats.

H₄ State and local emergency management programs use liberal policy interpretation as a tool to mitigate some consequences of highly specific federal grant requirements.

This study examines four hypotheses to explore how the federal preparedness grant guidance may negatively affect state and local emergency management programs.

If H₁ is true than emergency management programs could be challenged to support an all-hazard approach as the grant programs may focus programmatic activities on a small aspect of the broader program, unintentionally leaving out key aspects of a holistic approach championed by federal emergency management doctrine.

H₂ explores not only the reliance of emergency management programs on federal preparedness grants, but also could predict the local and state programmatic focus. If funding is focused on actual or perceived priorities, than aspects of emergency management that are not as well funded may be inadvertently ignored. The federal government maybe intentionally focusing these programs with the use of grant dollars or any perceived focus maybe an unintentional outcome of the numerous preparedness grant programs.

H₃ specifically explores the potential focus on terrorism in the grant programs. This hypothesis seeks to probe one specific hazard to further explore the findings of H₂. If the federal preparedness grant programs primarily focus on terrorism as well as serve as the primary source of funding, then the federal grant programs could be inadvertently steering programs away from all-hazard preparedness in contrast to federal doctrine.

Finally, H₄ explores one possible reason emergency management programs might be able to address all-hazard preparedness notwithstanding any implied or perceived focus within the grant programs. Such an explanation is supported by some of the relevant literature on the discretion of the public servant, it is just unclear what role discretion plays in applying federal grant guidance in local and state emergency management programs.

CHAPTER III LITERATURE REVIEW

Emergency Management and Public Administration Theory

Emergency management at the state and local level in its simplest form is the part of the bureaucracy that is tasked with ensuring government can protect its citizens and their interest in any type of emergency or disaster. These agents work, like most civil servants, at the direction of elected and appointed officials. Discretion of these civil servants is especially important as they often work with delegated emergency powers that give them significant influence on policy and the government's interaction with business and citizens. They also work with all other emergency services, volunteer organizations active in disaster, public works, and a host of other private and public partners. All of these stakeholders, in a coordinated effort led by emergency management officials, work to prevent and mitigate the impact of disaster to the general population. They do so from a role of coordination and speaking from the delegated authority of the senior government officials they represent. Few if any of their resources are normally under their direction and control, but they are still able to influence a diverse set of resources to help prepare for, mitigate, and respond to all types of disasters. They do so as practitioners of both public administration and emergency management. The first key area of practice that one must understand is their role as public administrators and their role in the broader bureaucracy.

Emergency management as a government function is most often executed by civil servants in what is commonly referred to as the fourth branch of government, the

bureaucracy. This is true at the local, state, and federal level. Bureaucracies are maybe best described in Max Weber's *Essays in Sociology*. Weber describes how bureaucracies are monocratically organized. There is a firm chain of command and decisions can be appealed up a hierarchy to a higher authority. This higher authority is traditionally politically appointed and theoretically isolated from the flux of politics. The organization remains accountable to elected officials so isolation may not be more than theoretical. Additionally, there is a firm structure that demands execution of policy and following of all rules and guidelines (Shafritz, Ott, & Jang, 2005, pp. 74-75). This removes some flexibility in favor of ensuring due process and trying to eliminate political favoritism. On the other hand, it is common for the public as well as politicians to perceive the bureaucracy as oppressively complex and the issue of government. Different divisions of the federal bureaucracy have been known to lobby for opposing views on the same issue due to their specific focus on singular issues without significant regard to the larger picture. This reveals the issue of large bureaucracies and their inability to coordinate and reconcile their message while also staying true to their respective constituencies (Kettl & Fesler, 2005, p. 6).

The true power of bureaucracies is found in the discretion at the street level. Michael Lipsky clearly outlines this in *Street-Level Bureaucracy*. Lipsky contends that the poorer the citizen the more they can be influenced by the street-level bureaucrat (Lipsky, 1980, p. 6). This should extend well beyond financial status, as a citizen in any life altering crisis is going to be significantly influenced through there interactions with government working to mitigate that crisis. Additional power is found in how the civil

servant interprets and applies policy. The discretion afforded at the street-level is partially due to their complex work of the environment. Flexibility is a simple remedy to provide them a better capability to meet the organizational goals in a highly complex and dynamic environment effectively improving outcomes. Flexibility may however, come at a cost of equity since it is inherently decentralized. Just as a police officer has to be selective in how they enforce the law, emergency management professionals may use their discretion to adapt the same program to solve different problems. The key to the success of such a model is sensitive observation and judgement. Rules may impede delivery of programmatic intent due to the situational complexity (Lipsky, 1980, pp. 14-15). The evolution of these rules is only natural as disasters themselves evolve, but doing so may spark additional debate. Especially considering how the grants may reduce the discretion of the experts found in the bureaucracy. Additionally, this debate may raise questions in other circles as to what the role of the various levels of government and the economics of disaster management. Economics of the rational decision-making process can play a crucial role politically when debating the extent of government intervention in disaster recovery and mitigation. Such a dichotomy of flexibility and accountability make the role of the professional public servant a delicate balance of judgement. The evolution of disaster management programs and policies may be best understood in the context of federalism or from an intergovernmental perspective.

The 10th Amendment to the United States Constitution notes, “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States” (U. S. Const., ammend. X). Traditionally, disaster response has

been a function of the lowest level of government that can adequately respond to the emergency. State or federal governments only intervene in emergencies at the request of the next lower level of government and only after the more local government entity has exceeded its capability. One result from such a system is each local government is free to innovate as they learn and grow their own response system. Each independent local government experimenting on how to improve the system is commonly referred to as laboratories of democracy. This use of laboratories of democracy is not a new concept. Laboratories of democracy was best explained by United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis when he stated in the court opinion of *New State Ice v. Liebmann*, 1932, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country (*New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann*, 1932).” Laboratories of democracy are a key advantage of federalism and are exponentially more powerful when the state and local governments can share their individual innovations. This is, however, contingent on two factors. The street-level civil servant must be given the flexibility to adapt policy and practice to the local problems they face. The civil servant must also have a means to share best practices to ensure that the lessons from decentralized government policy experimentation can be more broadly applied and lessons extrapolated to improve outcomes in the broader context. The civil servant most commonly meets the requirement to share best practices through networking and professional meetings of any specific profession.

Additionally, decentralizing government institutions bring additional benefits. The flexibility that allows quick adjustments and decision making to dynamic environments is a key to success in government. Local governments and their civil servants can be more agile in public policy because they do not suffer the issues caused by central government being so far removed from the problem that needs resolution. This furthers the potential for innovation by ensuring the government has a better understanding of the systems at work. Decentralization also provides accountability because they are local problems and do not get lost in the broader national context (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, pp. 252-253). This movement was part of the reinventing government movement of the early 1990s. “We (Bureaucracies) embrace our rules and red tape to prevent bad things from happening of course. But those same rules prevent good things from happening. They slow government to a snail’s pace” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 111). Such an effect can be extremely detrimental in disasters and contribute to complete system failures caused by the slow pace of the federal bureaucracy.

Understanding how systems fails helps to explain some aspects of emergency management policy and the role of the tiered response doctrine. Resilience of systems is critical to the success in any highly dynamic environment. Complexity can aid in resilience due to redundancy and the distribution of power within a given system (Dekker, 2011, p. 153). Redundant systems within a response framework is a great example of this given how the next higher layer of government responds when a crisis

goes beyond the capability of the next lower unit. This builds resiliency within the national response system through layered capability.

Resiliency of the government disaster response mechanism is a key aspect of emergency management. Resiliency is often accomplished through rapid reconstitution of services by moving resources from unaffected areas to affected areas. To do so requires some level of standardization that ensures regardless of how far the resource is moved it understands how to operate in a common response framework. This has been a key development after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. These attacks served as a major catalyst to revise the emergency management system in the United States. The dynamics of the modern emergency management system and its interaction with all aspects of government and non-governmental agencies drive the new status quo for modern emergency management professionals (Sylves, 2015, pp. 83-84).

Federalism, Fiscal Process, and Politics

Disasters by the very nature have many political features. Perception of the public as well as elected officials becomes critical during and immediately following any major disaster. Perception of inaction, ineptness, or over reaction has serious political consequences for appointed and elected officials. The disaster itself commonly becomes a focusing event for the public (Sylves, 2015, pp. 18-19). Emergency management by its very nature is highly decentralized in its operation with the lowest unit of government being the first line of response. This makes for a bottom up system, but due to the need of sharing limited resources, jurisdictions must learn to work together under some common

response framework. Such a need drives the coercive isomorphic policy behind the federal preparedness grants. In such a model, the national government uses its influence through grant dollars to compel standardization across local and state emergency response organizations. This strategy helps to address the daunting task of implementing a standardized national response system across a diverse population of response agencies throughout a very diverse nation. This is a daunting task when considering the number of potential jurisdictions in one county, one state, and especially the nation for large scale incidents. This has pushed federal policy makers to advocate for a standard national response framework to try and address fragmentation (Sylves, 2015, p. 13).

The isomorphic model of national emergency management doctrine is not a new one, but one that the literature suggest has key limitations that must be considered. First of all, isomorphism is reactive in nature and may suffer from a hyper focus of the last failure. In an attempt to prevent the past failure from repeating itself, decision makers may become so focused on the issues related to the past failure that they ignore other shortcomings that will result in future failures. Using case studies to steer future decision making can also introduce sample bias. The sample must look to be representative of the entire population of potential disasters. Finally, one must understand potential conflict between solutions to different problems (Kirkwood, 1999, pp. 35-36). One example of such a conflict is that heavy vegetation may decrease your chance for landslides, but could increase your risk of catastrophic outcomes from wildfires. Potential solutions to problems must be evaluated as systems to understand fully what issues may be introduced from solutions to other problems.

Federal preparedness grant programs have been how the federal government gains compliance with these initiatives for all jurisdictions to adopt the federal response framework. The grant programs have their critics as some aspects of grant requirements are very vague, while other aspects of the grant programs are extremely specific and limit the scope of eligible activities to support a specific preparedness silo. The various federal preparedness grants have served as a major funding source to state and local emergency management programs nationwide since 9/11. The grant funding contributes to what some argue as an era of inclusive authority. The inclusive authority model is in contrast to the tiered response doctrine as described in the National Response Framework. In the inclusive model, each level of government has a diminished level of authority from national to state and state to local. Some would argue under this model state and local authorities have become a “service delivery arm” with the federal government underwriting their activities through disaster funding sources as well as preparedness activities through the various federal grant programs (Sylves, 2015, p. 43).

Fluctuation in the grant guidance and structure of these programs can have significant unintended consequences due to reliance on these grant programs and the number of jurisdictions nationwide that receive funding. A recent trend has been to quantify spending justifications based on a threat and hazard identification and risk assessment (THIRA). THIRA was created to help communities better understand their risk across a diverse set of potential hazards. The THIRA process includes four steps that are: identification of threats and hazards of concern, define the threats and hazards identified and how they may affect the community, establish capability targets to define

success for a particular target capability, and finally apply the results for each core capability and estimate the resources required to meet the capability target. The four-step process was built to help local and state jurisdictions to identify unmet needs that can help prioritize and justify grant investments (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013, pp. 1-2).

While THIRA does quantify threats, the methodology for this process varies by jurisdiction as well as by grant program, and may not always include all the relevant stakeholders. Additionally, some gaps are more difficult to quantify and questions remain on how comprehensive these assessments become as some fields are fairly subjective or focused on specific hazards and threats (Sylves, 2015, pp. 210-217). Since the 2001 attacks, the influx of federal funding has helped strengthen emergency management programs; however, the focus of spending remains mostly limited to “silos” such as counter-terrorism and law enforcement not directly supporting comprehensive all-hazard emergency management requirements. As Sylves so succinctly states:

The world of state and local homeland security is dramatically influenced by federal laws, rules, funding conditions, and administrative actions. U.S. public policy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks called for the nation to recruit, hire, and oversee state and local government homeland security and emergency management officials so they could better prevent and respond to acts of terrorism. One major result of this policy change was a profusion of federal homeland security programs and a dizzying array of grant programs with far-ranging and sometimes bizarre requirements (Sylves, 2015, p. 219).

Considering that response remains a local function, these federal policies may have unintended consequences to the flexibility of state and local agencies and their ability to address local needs. Flexibility of one of eight core principles of emergency management as championed in federal emergency management doctrine as outlined in appendix C. The doctrine states that flexibility is key for emergency managers to use creative and innovative approaches to solve complex problems. The other principles state that emergency management should be: comprehensive, progressive, risk-driven, integrated, collaborative, coordinated, and professional. Only through the interaction of these eight principles does federal doctrine suggest emergency management can be successful in executing its mission (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, p. 1). Federal policies being used to shape state and local behavior is not unique to emergency management programs but has also been studied in other contexts of public management.

Central governments influencing state and local behavior through grants is not a new concept and best understood through the literature on fiscal federalism. Fiscal federalism has been defined in many ways, but generally has the following elements. Sub-central governments have autonomy to set policy, they have autonomous funding stream through levy of taxes or other receipts but do not have unlimited credit, the governments live within a common market so the sub-central governments cannot enact barriers that restrict commerce, and the system is institutionalized in such a way inhibiting the direct influence of central government at will (Sorens, 2011, p. 208).

The emergency management institution follows more closely the coordinated federalism model. In this model, there is a high programmatic autonomy but with low

fiscal autonomy. Sub-central governments can execute emergency management policy as they see fit, but because a significant portion of the funding comes through grants from the central government they also give up some programmatic autonomy. However, the trade does allow the central government to inject some level of standardization across the thousands of political subdivisions across the United States. Such an arrangement could be counterproductive if innovation is a direct function of policy experimentation at the local level. One challenge with fiscal federalism theories is they tend to marginalize the role of politics (Krane, Ebdon, & Bartle, 2004, p. 521). While the political influence at all levels of government is a difficult variable to capture, it could explain the significant expansion of federal grant programs as they relate to emergency management in a time of fiscal austerity.

The post-9/11 era experienced a vast increase in federal preparedness grants as well as vast shifts in public policy (Boyd, Hokanson, Johnson, Schwab, & Topping, 2014, pp. 66-67). Scholars make clear that this is a reversal of the trend seen throughout the post-Reagan era of government where federal grant dollars to sub-central governments were reduced while unfunded mandates and policy restrictions were increased on funds passed down to lower levels of government (Krane, Ebdon, & Bartle, 2004, p. 515). It is reasonable to draw the conclusions that such a drastic reversal in trends as it relates to vast expansion of grant programs has to do with politics and the sharp focus post-9/11 in addressing real or perceived issues in the national response system, a system almost controlled in its entirety at the state and local level. This leaves injecting federal grant funds as one of the simplest means to alter behavior at all levels

and gaining more influence on state and local policy as it relates to disaster preparedness and response.

Federal Emergency Management Policy and Grant Programs

National preparedness policy in the United States began as a direct result of the Cold War. With the Civil Defense Act of 1950, the nation was suddenly focused on the potential for catastrophic disasters as a result of the Cold War. Around this time is also when government realized that empowering citizens to be more resilient, would also result in a resilient nation. In 1950 was also the Federal Disaster Relief Act. This act was pushed because of flooding in the Midwest, but began the conversation around preparedness from natural disasters. Then additional natural disasters in the 1960s would push further action eventually leading towards a national emergency management program to address both natural and man-made disasters. Only in the 1970s did national preparedness and mitigation strategies become a broader talking point eventually leading to the birth of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1978 (Sylves, 2015, pp. 60-61). While FEMA was well on its way to a more coordinated all-hazards approach to disaster preparedness and response, the 9/11 terror attacks served as a major catalyst for change.

President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) in early 2003 to improve on existing systems to make a comprehensive and coordinated all-hazards approach across all disciplines in a unified manner (Sylves, 2015, pp. 60-85). This also resulted in a sudden surge of federal grant funding. The federal

government used grants to induce local and state participation to strengthen national prevention, preparedness, and response capability. This action did not come without consequences as the buildup in counter-terrorism capability came at the claimed cost of other hazards. With failures associated with the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005, the federal government began to look at a more holistic approach. With the influx of money comes additional influence on local jurisdictions through the various grant programs and the conditions of each program. Some contend that this has built significant dependence in local and state emergency management on federal funds. Such dependence could undercut local priorities as they may not be tied directly to funding. Most would agree that these grant programs have significantly increased national capability through increased local capacity; however, the longevity of the capability may be directly tied to the longevity of the federal grant programs (Sylves, 2015, pp. 205-218).

As part of HSPD-5, several national guidelines would also be adopted to improve the national response system. These response plans would in part work to address some of the lessons learned from the response to the 9/11 terror attacks. Challenges existed in managing large complex incidents that span across multiple jurisdictions or disciplines. Challenges were identified in how response agencies organize the response and maintain command and control over all resources. The overall lack of experience is a chronic issue surrounding catastrophic events as they are fortunately very low frequency events (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2005). A national system was developed based on best practices from around the country to help standardize response practices from small to large incidents. This system would be

further integrated into a larger response plan that would logically organize responses from small single jurisdictions to catastrophic incidents that require a complex national response. The federal government would compel local and state jurisdictions to adopt this new system with the use of federal grant dollars.

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) was originally published in 2004 and provides a standardized national response template. This template works to reduce issues in managing incidents by ensuring the use of common terminology across the entire response system from local, state, and federal. This was as a direct result of HSPD-5 as a means to improve national preparedness. The initial local response actions are key for long term success in responding to large scale, complex, and expanding incidents. Through the standard response practices of NIMS, local jurisdictions can facilitate integration of state and federal resources smoothly into any incident. This system was designed to work from the smallest to the largest incidents on the basis of interoperability and compatibility across all jurisdictions. HSPD-5 required all federal agencies to adopt NIMS, while local and state agencies were required to adopt NIMS as a condition of receiving federal grant dollars. The NIMS includes six core principles that defined the goals for this new national system for response:

1. A systematic approach to incident management including the incident command system, multiagency coordination, and public information
2. NIMS was designed as a set of concepts and principles for all-hazards response

3. NIMS provides essential principles for a common operating picture with interoperability of communications and information management
4. Standardized resource management procedures that enable coordination among different jurisdictions or organizations
5. A scalable response so it can be used for all incidents
6. A dynamic system that provides for flexibility and promotes ongoing management and maintenance

By enacting such a system nationwide ensured that resources would be able to integrate into the larger response plan and aid in improving responses through a systematic approach to organizing and managing each response (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, pp. 5-8).

The National Response Plan (NRP) would evolve into the National Response Framework (NRF) as a result of issues with the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 along with several other smaller incidents. While NIMS provides the incident management foundations, the NRF provides the framework for local, state, and federal agencies to implement the requirements of the National Preparedness System. The NRF is intended to be used by the whole community as it recognizes 15 coordinating functions that are critical to response and establishes coordinating structures to allow jurisdictions to better organize response and preparedness activities to improve operations. The NRF does this through a core doctrine common to all mission areas as well as providing a specific structure surrounding each mission area called the Emergency Support Function (ESF). Each of the 15 ESFs outline specific areas of responsibility and focus each area on

a specific set of core capabilities. Additionally, the NRF outlines roles and responsibilities of various local, state, and federal officials as well as outlines some of the key partnerships for response including traditional and non-traditional response partners. A key to the NRF is the inclusion of the whole community from traditional government based response agencies to the private sector, non-governmental organizations, as well as the individual citizen (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2016, pp. 1-48). While the NRF is clear in outlining best practices of how to craft policy with input from the whole community, the federal system cannot do this without restraint.

The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) of 1972, places restrictions on how individuals and groups from outside of the federal government can provide input into the federal policy system. FACA requires all federal committees to follow a complex process to ensure oversight and transparency of federal committees. FACA does allow for blanket exemptions from the Central Intelligence Agency as well as the Federal Reserve System, however all other executive branch offices are required to comply (Federal Advisory Committee Act, 1972). This legislation could complicate whole community emergency management planning, a key principle of the federal emergency management doctrine, due to the significant limitations of feedback loops into the federal policy process. These limitations place additional restrictions on FEMA that may inhibit the creation of specific policy focus groups that could help FEMA gain a better understanding of the impacts of federal emergency management policy on the greater community as well as evolve specific programs such as the federal preparedness grants.

Across the nation emergency management and homeland security programs rely heavily on federal preparedness grant programs. The federal government has provided billions of dollars since 9/11 in a wide array of programs. Some of these programs encompass broad topical areas such as disaster planning, while others target specific sectors. Each grant has its own specific focus but collectively they are designed to increase the preparedness of local and state governments to make for a more resilient nation. Since the national response relies on very few resources that are organic to the federal system, a strong national preparedness system requires strong local and state programs. Over time several of these grant programs have been consolidated as overall grant reductions have occurred as well as in an attempt to better synchronize spending to better address identified gaps in funding (Sylves, 2015, p. 215).

In 2012 the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), an association of state emergency management directors, conducted a comprehensive review of the federal preparedness grants, and they noted specific issues with the lack of comprehensive planning. NEMA made recommendations to restructure the grant programs into a single comprehensive preparedness grant program that would increase local and state flexibility as a direct trade for increased transparency and accountability (National Emergency Management Association, 2016, p. 2). NEMA along with the Governors Homeland Security Advisors Council (GHSAC) of the National Governors Association have also provided testimony to this end directly to the United States Congress. NEMA and GHSAC provided testimony on June 25, 2013 to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Emergency

Management, Intergovernmental Relations, and the District of Columbia. In this testimony Mr. John W. Madden, the then president of NEMA and member of GHSAC, cited several key issues with these grants.

First, he noted the lack of a reliable method to measure effectiveness and performance. Madden cited that after spending more than \$40 billion in federal preparedness grants, there was little other than anecdotal evidence relating to the measurement of grant impacts. Additionally, in the evolution of these grant programs, there has been up to 18 different grant programs each with their own overlapping guidance and eligibilities focused on some particular goal. Madden notes significant administrative burdens on grantees as well as three key potential challenges exist because of a lack of a singular comprehensive grant program. These are: duplicative investments, inhibiting coordination across stakeholders, and limited prioritization in federal funding. Madden states even with these challenges how these grants have been vital to various specific disasters across the spectrum of natural to man-made. It is also noted that the primary focus of these grant funds was terrorism until after Hurricane Katrina when grant programs have seen at least some expansion allowing for some support of an all-hazards approach. Four key recommendations are advocated for in the testimony. First, place more of a focus on data driven assessments to support local decision making through a clear and thoughtful national assessment process. Also, ensure a clear systematic approach to foster collaboration. Tight deadlines have restricted broad participation in the assessment process due to short deadlines within grant guidance. Next, integrate local and state lessons learned into the National Preparedness System. The federal agencies should

focus on being a resource on best practices by learning from the local and state innovation. Finally, provide for consistent long-term planning. One key issue noted is the constantly changing guidance that makes long term planning difficult. Collectively NEMA and GHSAC believe by taking these actions the entire family of preparedness grants can be improved (Madden, 2013, pp. 2-6).

Federal Preparedness Grants

Focused on homeland security improvements are the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). HSGP and UASI work to improve capabilities relating to the prevention and responses to terrorism activities. The UASI grant program is focused on urban areas where the HSGP focuses on state and local programs. Both of these grant programs are administered by a State Administrative Agency (SAA) that is responsible for distribution and management of funds in line with risks and gaps that have been identified by the jurisdictions (Boyd, Hokanson, Johnson, Schwab, & Topping, 2014, pp. 47-49). The HSGP must pass through 80% of the grant to local jurisdictions and limits the amount the state can retain for its own projects. Planning, training, exercise, and equipment purchases are authorized for these grants but any equipment purchase must be explicitly authorized on a consolidated Authorized Equipment List (AEL) (Sylves, 2015, p. 208).

The Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) is another grant program provided through FEMA to support local and state emergency management programs. The grant program does not have a mandatory pass through for state

governments and the rate of pass through varies by state. EMPG was designed to help build capability within emergency management programs by fostering relationships through training, exercises, and other activities between response partners across the emergency management profession. Planning, training, exercises, and equipment is authorized, however just like the HSGP equipment must be listed on the AEL specifically for EMPG purchases (Sylvester, 2015, pp. 213-214). During the 2015 Federal Fiscal Year, states allocated 45 percent of EMPG funding to local jurisdictions nationwide; however, the exact allocation of this funding varies greatly state to state. Nationwide, 2,540 full-time equivalent state emergency management staff are funded at least partially through EMPG with another 4,565 full-time equivalent staff at the local level. Additionally, in 2015, states reported their using EMPG funding to support: 6,122 training classes, 2,400 plan reviews / updates, 1,600 public awareness campaigns, 1,540 exercises, 641 emergency response systems, 255 emergency operations centers, and 218 community warning systems. Specific to North Carolina, 50 percent of the 2015 grant was passed through to local jurisdictions, one percent was passed through to tribal jurisdictions, and 49 percent was retained at the state level. In North Carolina, all EMPG funds are distributed based on meeting a performance criteria (National Emergency Management Association, 2016, pp. 13-28). NEMA also points out that EMPG is the only federal grant program directed to state and local emergency management for all-hazards preparedness. Flexibility of the grant program, while maintaining accountability of spending, is a key point that NEMA advocates for as it relates to EMPG (National Emergency Management Association, 2016, p. 1).

The Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) is based out of the United States Department of Health and Human Services as a function of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR). The HPP is the only source of federal preparedness funds focused on regional hospital preparedness and is focused specifically on ESF 8 Disaster Medical Support from the NRF. The focus of this program is the creation of hospital preparedness coalitions to improve patient outcomes and minimize the need for additional resources during emergencies and therefore enable a rapid recovery and reconstitution of hospital capacity during disasters. There are currently 486 health care coalitions nationwide that were allocated funding (Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, 2017).

Summary

As the field of emergency management continues to evolve, emergency management remains heavily rooted in the lessons of public administration theory. The field of emergency management has continually been event driven. The result of tragic events in the nation's history is almost always a direct shift in policy. After the 9/11 terror attacks, one of those shifts was a new process for how the entire nation would respond to disasters. This new series of federal policies would be shaped around the national goal of improving preparedness. This would also serve as a major catalyst for emergency management to become a better recognized and robust profession. The way the federal government would compel participation in the new system was through various federal grant programs that were made available to state and local jurisdictions

who adopted the new federal policies. While significant volumes of literature exist in the realm of public administration, very little exists on the impacts of these new policy and grant programs specific to national preparedness initiatives and the profession of emergency management.

The role of discretion in executing policy by the street level public servant is well documented public administration theory. The federal government has established national policies that recognize the responsibility of state and local governments as it relates to emergency management. Emergency management policies, clearly rely on the discretion of the street-level public servant to execute the vision laid out in the National Response Framework. Federal emergency management doctrine champions inclusion of the whole community in the policy process; however, this is not without challenges or limitations due to the broad scope of the emergency management community as well as regulation of federal rule making. Public administration theory further discusses some dynamics of federal grant programs through other direct examples of what is commonly referred to as fiscal federalism.

NEMA as well as Congress has only been able to capture anecdotal evidence as to the impacts of these federal policies and programs. The extent of which behaviors are influenced and positive outcomes are reinforced, especially as it relates directly to the federal preparedness grant programs, needs additional study to fill this gap in the literature. The current national discussion of shifting federal spending priorities should make this topic of significant importance as these decisions could have significant implications to preparedness at all levels.

CHAPTER IV RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA COLLECTION

Research Design and Methodology

The focus of this research is to evaluate the impact of federal preparedness grant programs on local and state emergency management programs in North Carolina. For the purpose of this research, the following federal preparedness grant programs were included: Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG), Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) Grant. This research uses a multimodal approach to collect quantitative and qualitative data. Then a survey was conducted to collect quantitative and qualitative data. Finally, qualitative interview data was collected through a selective interview process. Data was collected using a survey instrument of local and state emergency management officials in North Carolina along with selective interviews. The data that was collected focused on the impact of federal grant programs and did not collect personally identifiable information. There is some limited available data on federal preparedness grant programs from the National Emergency Management Association and North Carolina Emergency Management that can provide some summary statistics of the grant programs impact in North Carolina. These secondary sources was used in addition to the data collected to test the hypotheses and work towards addressing the research question.

Ideally through use of the scientific method, the variables would be isolated and tested in a sterile research environment through the use of a control group that does not

receive federal funds as well as a study group that does receive federal grant funds. Such a methodology is not feasible in this research for two primary reasons. First, all local, regional, and state emergency management programs in North Carolina receive federal funds to aid in their operations. As a result, one could not establish a control group made up of programs in North Carolina. Additionally, the variation in programs across the state as well as nation result in an additional variable that adds significant complexity. Each emergency management program in North Carolina as well as programs across the country are tailored to the needs of that local jurisdictions. They may have a similar framework of how they function due to the standardization required as a condition of the federal grant funding; but, emergency management programs' individual challenges, successes, and specific needs are independent from one another and based on the local response system and ultimately their local community needs.

As a result of the limited research on the topic, the goal of this research is to explore the basic relationship between federal preparedness grants and their impact on local as well as state emergency management programs. The target audience for this research is any emergency manager who receives federal grant funding in North Carolina from at least one of the federal preparedness grants being included in this research. In the course of this research, emergency managers are viewed as key informants with specialized knowledge specific to the grant programs. Prior to distribution of surveys and scheduling of interviews this research was submitted for approval through Eastern Kentucky University's Institutional Review Board (IRB). This research was approved as an exempt project under the IRB rules for research involving human subjects and

followed all procedures as outlined by the IRB guidelines for graduate research involving human subjects.

In North Carolina, each county must designate an emergency management coordinator. There are 100 counties in North Carolina each with a local emergency management coordinator. Two counties have a joint emergency management program so both counties share a single emergency management coordinator. This results in 99 county emergency management coordinators in North Carolina. Additionally, there is one federally recognized tribe, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (EBCI), which has a designated emergency management coordinator. The counties and EBCI work closely with North Carolina Emergency Management (NCEM). Each of these emergency management programs receive annual grant funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG).

There are nine Domestic Preparedness Regions (DPR) that work closely with NCEM to coordinate multidiscipline regional and state homeland security projects for the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). Each DPR has an executive director along with a chairperson and multidiscipline committee that coordinate regional projects and recommends funding levels to the NCEM Homeland Security Branch. State emergency management officials from one of the regional branch offices serve as the executive director and county emergency management coordinators are also heavily involved coordinating regional activities in the DPR. These projects are all funded through FEMA's HSGP. There is one approved UASI in the Charlotte metropolitan area. The

Charlotte UASI funding is also coordinated through the NCEM Homeland Security Branch.

There are nine healthcare preparedness coalitions (HPC) in North Carolina and they coordinate disaster medical operations. Each HPC has a lead hospital system that coordinates one region of the state and works closely with the North Carolina Office of Emergency Medical Services (NC OEMS) Healthcare Preparedness Program. Each of these HPCs as well as NC OEMS receives funding from the US Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) Grant to support disaster preparedness activities. This grant program was included in this research because it serves as a significant funding source to increase local preparedness in communities. HPP grant funding does not go to counties directly. The funding goes through regional HPCs and they coordinate activities with counties in their coalition area. The HPCs were included in the survey population as well as county emergency management programs. While the county programs are not responsible for the HPP grant, it is directly effecting preparedness in their county.

The survey was disseminated through electronic mail using Qualtrics Online Survey Software to local, tribal, healthcare, and state emergency management officials. The survey was distributed to 295 local and state emergency management officials with the support of NCEM and NC OEMS. A meeting with their respective leadership was conducted to gain their support to distribute the survey information using their existing electronic mail groups to ensure the most up to date distribution list as well as ensure the

email was received without interference from the various agency firewalls and automatic email filters. The surveys collected both information about their organizations as well as their personal views, but did not collect any personally identifiable information.

In addition to the survey instrument, in-person interviews were conducted with select local and state emergency management officials to gain a better understanding of their perspective on the federal preparedness grant programs on state and local emergency management programs. Interviews were conducted to explore responses with key informants and to probe deeper into the impacts of federal preparedness grants to achieve a rich description. Interviews were included to aid in validating survey responses and provide a better context to make future inferences and drive future research. Questions were designed to facilitate additional information that may be missed in the questionnaire as well as provide an opportunity for participants to provide their thoughts and individual experiences as it relates to their perception of the federal preparedness grants. Participants were selected for interviews using purposeful sampling for emergency managers who met the following criteria:

1. Local or state emergency management official with direct interaction with one or more of the selected federal preparedness grant programs.
2. Active leader in preparedness and response activities regularly at the local, regional, and/or state level.
3. Diversity in terms of geography, population and population density served, and agency budget and staffing.

Key officials that were interviewed represented one the following groups: county emergency management coordinator from each of the three main regions of the state with a diverse population between the three regions; a representative with responsibility for statewide disaster medical preparedness activities; a representative from state emergency management with responsibility for coordinating emergency management operations; as well as a senior appointed state official with responsibility for the coordination of preparedness and response activities. Of the six interviews that were conducted, three represented the local perspective and three represented the state perspective to provide balance to the interview sample. Since local emergency management is also responsible for their local hospitals in their jurisdictions, individual healthcare emergency management was not interviewed directly.

Upon the completion of data collection, the data was analyzed using complex mixed methodology consistent with Russell K. Schutt's eighth edition of *Investigating the Social World – The Process and Practice of Research* (Schutt, 2015, pp. 548-557). Primary data was first cleaned and sorted in Microsoft Excel. Then the data set was analyzed in Excel using summary statistics to establish patterns in the data. Simple comparison methods were used to examine any potential correlation that supports or does not support each of the hypotheses. The eight core principles of emergency management were used as the standard for comparison of data against best practices established by the emergency management community. These principles state that emergency management should be comprehensive, progressive, risk-driven, integrated, collaborative, coordinated, flexible, and professional (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008). Evidence

was compared using simple trend analysis to explore the data and how it supports or inhibits the core emergency management principles as defined above. Data was analyzed through descriptive statistical analysis and by generating frequency distributions along with the use of graphs to support the analysis.

For the purposes of this research, a research finding of a negative policy impact would be supported if patterns of behaviors are identified through primary data collection that could inhibit the core emergency management principles as outlined in the guiding principles of emergency management. The purpose of this research was to examine the relationships suggested by the data to aid in future research and analysis in support of the policy process. Qualitative analysis of secondary sources in addition to observations from intensive interviews provides additional context aiding in strengthening the accuracy and reliability of the research. Personally identifiable information is not presented in this document and all interview subjects are referred to by either the population they represented or by pseudonym.

Data Collection

Three different data sources were collected in the course of this research. First, summary funding statistics was collected from secondary sources. The primary source of this data was the North Carolina Emergency Management 2016 Annual Report. This provided historical and summary statistical information surrounding federal preparedness grant programs as it relates to North Carolina for calendar year 2016.

A survey was then conducted of emergency management coordinators across local, regional, and state agencies in North Carolina that receive one of the targeted federal preparedness grant programs. The total population surveyed was 295 and they were given 17 days to respond to the survey. The survey population received a reminder halfway through the survey period. The online survey returned 71 responses in the course of this research. This represents a 24% return rate of the survey from those who received the email. The data collected from the 71 respondents does not constitute a representative sample size for the population; however, it does provide interesting findings and a significant indication of attitudes and trends to support future studies in other states as well as additional research utilizing higher scales of research. Additionally, one of the respondents identified as a federal emergency manager; that response was excluded from this research since federal emergency managers were not in the target population for this research. A full list of survey questions can be found in Appendix A.

In addition to collection of survey data, select voluntary interviews were conducted separately with six emergency managers representing key local and state leaders in emergency management. The interviews provided additional rich data to expand on survey data. The interviews were scheduled at a time and place of choice by the interviewees. The interviews lasted between approximately one hour and participation was voluntary. Each interview was documented by taking hand written notes of the responses to each of the ten questions. After the notes were typed, they were sent to the interview subjects to confirm accuracy of recorded information. Interviews were then

reduced with key results isolated to allow for simple pattern analysis to be conducted. A full list of interview questions can be found in Appendix B.

Subjectivity

The importance of identifying individual bias and personal experience cannot be over stated. The primary researcher's experience as it relates to the federal preparedness grants comes from working for North Carolina Emergency Management (NCEM) for the past six years in several different roles. A majority of that time has been coordinating the State Search and Rescue Program and eventually managing the Emergency Services Branch of NCEM. In the course of this work, funding for salary as well as programs coordinated were primarily funded through federal preparedness grants. The primary researcher has worked closely with local, regional, and state partners from across the country as well as several international groups in building capability to support identified gaps from exercises as well as real-world events. The scope of these events have ranged from focused small scale disasters to multiple federally declared Stafford Act responses. This time has given the researcher an intimate knowledge of several of the federal preparedness grant programs as well as some perceptions of their strengths and weaknesses. The specific research question came out of some of the researcher's own challenges that has been observed but the interest in this topic was just as much due to the lack of academic study in this area of emergency management policy.

This research was conducted with the hope to add to the national discussion on the future of the various grant programs as emergency managers everywhere work to be

more efficient with the grant funds as well as effective in addressing identified gaps in our various communities, states, and across the nation. In the researcher's various roles at NCEM, the researcher did not control funding levels for counties, regional planning groups, or the state as the researcher's role is focused on executing response programs; therefore, survey and interview subjects should not have felt any pressure to respond or to tailor their response as the researcher has no influence on their individual grant awards through my professional work. Additionally, the researcher represented himself as a graduate student from Eastern Kentucky University to further mitigate any possible influence with the respondents.

CHAPTER V FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Research Findings

The research findings section provides an overview of the results of this research. Due to the exploratory nature and scope of this research, not enough evidence exists to support or reject any hypothesis. However, the research presented below should provide a foundation for future research to further explore and refine the findings presented.

The demographics of the emergency management community in North Carolina who responded to the survey are as follows. The survey data provided 70 responses from the state and local emergency management community in North Carolina. Table 1 displays data on the type of emergency management agencies that responded to the survey.

Table 1. Survey Responses by Agency Type

Emergency Management Agency Type	Total Responses (n=70)
County	41
State	20
Healthcare	7
Municipal	2

Note(s): Responses when respondents were asked, "What of the following best describes the agency you work for (County, State, Healthcare, or Municipal)?"

Of the 41 county agencies that responded to the survey, table 2 displays data on the type of jurisdiction represented.

Table 2. County Survey Responses by Jurisdiction Type

Type of County Jurisdiction	Total Responses (n=41)
Rural	23
Urban	10
Suburban	7
Regional	1

Note(s): County responses when respondents were asked, “What of the following best describes your jurisdiction (Rural, Urban, Suburban, or Regional)?”

This represents a considerable sample of various key partners to the emergency management community in North Carolina. Counties averaged approximately 3 full-time emergency management employees; however, a single full-time emergency management employee was the most common across all of the counties who are represented in the survey. The average experience was approximately 13 years in emergency management with the median being 11 years of experience for county emergency management. Healthcare emergency management averaged 4 full-time employees with 11 years of experience. The median amount of experience for healthcare emergency management was 8 years. State emergency management has 188 full-time employees (North Carolina Emergency Management, 2016, p. 2). The state emergency management employees who responded to the survey averaged 13 years of experience. The median experience for state emergency management officials was approximately 12 years.

The following presents the hypotheses of this research and relevant survey and interview results.

H₁ Emergency management officials collectively believe that federal grant requirements contribute to state and local compartmentalization due to the limited scope of each federal preparedness grant program along with the limited interaction between programs.

In the survey, three questions are most relevant to H₁. The first relevant question, which is number nine of the survey, asks the level the respondent agrees that federal grant guidance is overall consistent with the principles of emergency management. The distribution of the answers to this question are displayed in figure 1. As shown in the figure below, 67% out of a total of 55 respondents agree or strongly agree that federal grant guidance is consistent with the principles of emergency management.




Figure 1. Consistency of Grant Guidance with Emergency Management Principles

Note(s): Graph of responses when respondents were asked, “How much do you agree with the following statement? Federal preparedness grant program guidance is consistent with the principles of federal emergency management doctrine (comprehensive, progressive, risk-driven, integrated, collaborative, coordinated, flexible, and professional)?”

Second, question eight of the survey, asks how much the respondent agrees that federal preparedness grants can contribute to silos because of narrow grant guidance.

The distribution of the answers to this question are displayed in figure 2. More

respondents strongly agreed or agreed with this statement than disagreed or strongly disagreed. However, when considering the substantial number of neutral responses the data does not support that emergency management coordinators feel that the grants guidance contributes to silos.




Figure 2. Grant Guidance and Creation of Silos

Note(s): Graph of responses when respondents were asked, “How much do you agree with the following statement? Federal preparedness grants can contribute to creation of silos because of the narrow grant guidance of each program.”

Table 3 displays data on respondents’ perceptions of the core principles of emergency management as they relate to the federal preparedness grants. Note that 50% or more of respondents indicated that the federal preparedness grants strongly supported three of the eight core principles of emergency management—collaborative, coordinated, and risk-driven. Conversely, fewer than 50% of respondents indicated that grants strongly supported the principles of comprehensive, professional, integrated, progressive, and flexible.

Table 3. Federal Grants and Principles of Emergency Management

Core Principle of EM	Total Responses (n=57)	Percent Selected
Collaborative	38	67%
Coordinated	34	60%
Risk-driven	33	58%
Comprehensive	28	49%
Professional	23	40%
Integrated	20	35%
Progressive	18	32%
Flexible	15	26%

Note(s): Chart of responses when respondents were asked, “Which of the following principles of emergency management does the Federal Preparedness Grant Programs strongly support at the local and regional level (comprehensive, progressive, risk-driven, integrated, collaborative, coordinated, flexible, and professional)?”

The interviews provided additional data on the perception of local and state emergency management officials as it relates to how the federal preparedness grants coordinate with each other. This data is inconsistent with the survey results as five of the six interview subjects categorized the federal preparedness grants as at least somewhat uncoordinated, with one of those responses categorized as uncoordinated. The sixth interview subject categorized the federal preparedness grant programs as somewhat coordinated. This contrasts with table 3 where 40% of respondents did not select coordinated as a principle of emergency management that the federal preparedness grants supported. There was additional anecdotal evidence found in comments from survey and interview responses that noted specific cases where the respondents felt grant programs could contribute to compartmentalization, especially between programs that are coordinated by different federal departments such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

The evidence collected in the course of this research found mixed results as it relates to H₁.

H₂ Federal preparedness grant funds make up a majority of state and local emergency management funding.

In the survey, data two questions are most relevant to H₂. Question 18 of the survey sought information on the percentage of total funding from federal preparedness grants. The distribution of the answers to this question are displayed in figure 3. While a majority of agencies responded that less than 60% of their total funding received is from federal preparedness grants, of the 9 respondents with a statewide jurisdiction it was more likely that those agencies had greater than 40% of their funding from federal grants. The study population included two state agencies NCEM and NC OEMS. Conversely, it was more likely that local jurisdictions received less than 40% of their funding from federal grants.




Figure 3. Percent of Emergency Management Funding from Grants

Note(s): Graph of responses when respondents were asked, “What percentage of your total annual funding comes from Federal Preparedness Grant Funding?” by jurisdiction type.

Next, question 17 asks how much emergency management programs rely on federal preparedness grants in their operations. The distribution of the answers to this question are displayed in figure 4. The data shows that an overwhelming majority across all jurisdiction types feel that their program is dependent on federal grants.




Figure 4. Emergency Management Programs Dependence on Federal Grants

Note(s): Graph of responses when respondents were asked, “How much would you agree with the following statement? My emergency management program is dependent on federal preparedness grant funding to perform daily operations or activities.” by jurisdiction type.

The interviews provided additional rich descriptions on the perception of local and state emergency management officials. All six interview subjects categorized their agency as dependent on federal preparedness grants. In the interviews in response to

question two, subjects identified the following key impacts of federal preparedness grants: funding salaries, equipment, training, and sustainment of their emergency management program. Additionally, in question seven, five of the six interview subjects noted that the grant programs were very critical to their emergency management program with one respondent identifying the grant programs as marginally critical.

Additional evidence specific to this hypothesis can be found in the secondary sources that were reviewed as part of this research. Based on the North Carolina Emergency Management Annual Report 2016, NCEM received 46% of its funding from state receipts, 36% from federal grants, and 18% from state appropriations (North Carolina Emergency Management, 2016, p. 3).

The evidence collected through this research does not support that a majority of emergency management programs get a majority of their funding from federal grants. However, the evidence shows 21% of respondents get more than 60% of their funding from federal grants. While this does not constitute a majority of all programs across the state, it is a significant finding. Additionally, it would appear that state emergency management programs are more likely to receive a majority of their funding from federal grants than local jurisdictions. While this relationship requires additional research, the data suggests that grant programs are critical to emergency management operations even if they do not appear to make up a majority of funding for a majority of respondents.

H₃ In the post-9/11 environment, federal preparedness grants became very focused on a specific threat / hazard at the cost of whole community preparedness for other hazards and threats.

In the survey, two questions are most relevant to H₃. Question six asks how much the respondents agree that federal preparedness grants are focused on meeting the unmet needs identified in the threat and hazard identification and risk assessment (THIRA) process. The distribution of the answers to this question are displayed in figure 5. The data shows 61% of the 59 respondents agree or strongly agree with that statement.




Figure 5. Grants and THIRA

Note(s): Graph of responses when respondents were asked, “How much would you agree with the following statement? The federal preparedness grants are focused on addressing any unmet needs identified in the threat and hazard identification and risk assessment (THIRA) process.”

Next, question seven asks how much the respondent agrees that federal grants work together for all-hazard, whole community preparedness. The distribution of the answers to this question are displayed in figure 6. The data shows that 72% of the 58 respondents agree or strongly agree that the federal grants do in fact work together for all-hazard, whole community preparedness.




Figure 6. Grants and the Whole Community

Note(s): Graph of responses when respondents were asked, “How much do you agree with the following statement? Federal preparedness grant programs (HSGP, EMPG, UASI, HPP) work together to address all-hazards, whole community preparedness.”

Relating to the interviews, five of the six interview subjects agreed that the federal preparedness grants focused too much on terrorism. The last interview subject disagreed with the condition that discretion of the emergency manager mitigated the effects of the focus on terrorism. This data is distinctly different than the survey responses. Some potential explanations of the variation could be the effects are mitigated through discretion as one interview subject identified. In the interviews, subjects identified concerns related to the perceived focus on terrorism. These include a focus on terrorism through the use of a specific authorized equipment list for grant purchases. They noted that contrary to the literature there has been very little change in focus since Hurricane Katrina. Additionally, two interview subjects identified that the grant programs, especially on the healthcare side, tend to always focus on the emerging threat and are very reactionary in nature. Several respondents stated that this “pendulum effect” has a negative impact on overall preparedness activities. This was identified in question ten of the interviews. Additionally, in question five, five out of six interviewees stated that there

was a sudden surge in funding in response to the emerging threat of terrorism after the 9/11 terror attacks. Several respondents argued that the sudden surge of funding after 9/11 without time to develop funding strategies and processes resulted in increased waste as well as initially a lot of redundancy in grant projects.

The evidence collected in the course of this research found mixed results as it relates to H₃. The data collected in the survey was not consistent with the interview results. This would suggest additional complexity to this question.

H₄ State and local emergency management programs use liberal policy interpretation as a tool to mitigate some consequences of highly specific federal grant requirements.

In the survey data, two questions address H₄. The first of these questions can be found above in figure 6. The data presented in figure 6 shows in the distribution responses that 72% of respondents agree or strongly agree that the federal grants do in fact work together for all-hazard, whole community preparedness. The second survey question is displayed above in figure 2. The question asked respondents how much they agree that federal grants contribute to silos because of narrow grant guidance. More respondents strongly agreed or agreed with this statement than disagreed or strongly disagreed.

Among the interviews, five of the six interview subjects stated that discretion was the only means for emergency management officials to fill unmet gaps across all of their

needs. The last interview subject did not provide a specific answer as to the role of discretion.

The evidence collected in the course of this research found mixed results as it relates to H₄. While the data collected in the surveys does not entirely support or refute the hypothesis, there is a strong commonality in the interview data collected that suggest the discretion of the emergency management official is a key tool to improve the effectiveness of the grant programs. This was also supported in the literature review in the work of Lipsky who contended that discretion is one of the most powerful tools of the bureaucracy.

Discussion and Analysis

The primary question of this research explores if the federal preparedness grants had a significant negative impact on local and state emergency management programs due to the top down funding from the grant programs, but the bottom up approach of emergency management. Though results relating to each hypothesis were mixed, the importance of the various federal preparedness grants was clear after reviewing the survey and interview data. The literature as well as individual responses from this research point to the significant impacts the grant programs have on the emergency management system nationally; unfortunately, quantifiable evidence is difficult to come by and the literature on this subject is absent. The need to understand the impact of these grant programs with the goal of increasing their programmatic stability as well as effectiveness cannot be understated. The findings presented in this research should serve

as a starting point as some patterns in the data suggested challenges with the current grant programs. The data collected is just the start as the scope and complexity of the issue is just as dynamic as the national emergency management system. The additional questions raised in this research hopefully drives future research, critical thinking, and key discussions as to how these grant programs can be further enhanced.

Evidence exists that potential negative effects are being mitigated by emergency managers at all levels through the use of discretion. Such an outcome could be expected as explained through Lipsky's work, *Street-Level Bureaucracy – The Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service*. This is especially true when examining the first and third hypothesis. The evidence collected specific to H₁ and H₃ did not provide a clear trend in the data. There was some evidence collected in both cases that supported the hypothesis in the interviews; however, the survey data was not as clear and was not consistent with the interview data. Some potential explanations in the variation of the data would be the emergency management community mitigating the impacts of compartmentalization through the use of discretion and therefore not seeing specific issues in policy because the effects had been mitigated. Additionally, the use of discretion would inject variation based on how the grant guidance was interpreted. This could explain why some felt it was an issue, but others did not see a policy concern. Other explanations also exist, such as survey questions may have been misinterpreted by respondents. If this is the case the research methodology and structure of survey questions may need to be further refined.

The theory surrounding the roles of discretion in emergency management as it relates to federal grant guidance is also supported through the data supporting the fourth

hypothesis. The interview data most directly explored the role of interpreting grant guidance and, again, while there was not decisive survey data, the interview data did support this hypothesis. It is not unreasonable to see how the fourth hypothesis could tie into the first and third hypothesis, but additional research is needed to explore this potential relationship. If a relationship does exist, then discretion could be a key tool used by emergency managers to mitigate negative consequences of grant guidance. This then introduces a new challenge nationally as programs will deal with significant variation on how the grants can be applied based on individual interpretation. This is in addition to the near constant changes in grant guidance identified by the interview sample. Impacts of the grant programs might be handicapped in places where emergency managers are not willing to take as much liberty in interpreting grant guidance. Also, if there is a constant state of change in these programs, the grant programs themselves could inhibit long-term planning. This injects additional variation in understanding the success of the grant programs as well as additional complexity in studying the impacts of the grant programs.

While some variation exists explicitly with flexibility, standardization to some extent is required as a condition of interoperability. The balancing of this dichotomy is key to the success of the emergency management system. The extent that policymakers understand these concepts as well as the core principles of emergency management should be the topic of future studies to gain additional national context on their perceptions of the successes and challenges of these grant programs, especially considering this research focused on the local and state perspective in North Carolina.

Specific to the second hypothesis, data showed that the grant programs did not make up a majority of emergency management funding. However, the evidence collected showed 21% of respondents get more than 60% of their funding from federal grants. While this is not a majority in the state of North Carolina, this finding might be significant if the same levels exist at the national level. The data suggests that local jurisdictions are less reliant on federal grant dollars than state agencies. Such a finding is intriguing as local and state agencies may diverge on some aspects of the grants. If this holds true in the broader population, than it may indicate a need to juxtapose grant impacts between local and state jurisdictions in future research. The data shows the state entities were more likely to receive a majority of their funding from federal grants than the local governments. The data suggests that the grant programs are extremely important to emergency management programs while not making up a majority of funding for a majority of programs in North Carolina.

Even with the importance of the programs, the evidence suggests many issues still remain in their execution as federal policy. Most alarming of the research findings was that less than 50% of survey respondents believed that five of the eight core emergency management principles were strongly supported by the grant programs. Such a finding identifies a need for policy makers as well as grant managers to understand the principles of emergency management as well as the potential shortcoming in this area. Additionally, some of the low numbers could potentially be explained by some principles not focusing on preparedness; the specific principles that were identified as not being strongly supported raise many additional questions. Such a finding also suggests a disconnect

within the policy process as those principles come directly from national emergency management doctrine.

Twenty six percent of respondents indicated they believed the programs strongly supported the principle of flexibility. This number is interesting since these grant programs need to support local needs across a very diverse and complex national emergency management system. The concerns about flexibility of the grant programs was also found throughout the primary and secondary data that was collected. Some suggested new means of accountability being added if such an action would result in additional flexibility in the grant guidance. A mechanism to increase flexibility may already exist in the THIRA process, but anecdotal evidence suggests the THIRA process needs refinement as that was a common complaint from local emergency management entities. A quality risk assessment process could increase flexibility by allowing each community to invest in its own unique needs. Additional flexibility could also be found, as several interview subjects suggested, in making a list specific to non-allowable expenses in lieu of the authorized equipment list (AEL). It would be difficult for federal grant managers to keep up with changes in technology as well as programmatic needs to maintain the relevance of the AEL. Grant staff could more easily articulate what the grant should not support. Such a small shift in policy could have significant impacts to the perceived flexibility of the grant programs. Finally, additional flexibility may already be built in to some extent in allowing purchases under the auspices of homeland security activities such as radio system upgrades that support all-hazard response.

Thirty two percent of respondents believed the grant programs were strongly supporting the core emergency management principle of being progressive. Interview subjects as well as survey respondents consistently commented on the perception of the reactive nature of grant programs. Programs tend to focus on the cause and location of the last big disaster. This speaks directly to the third hypothesis, with the focus on terrorism after 9/11 terror attacks. Again, there was some limited evidence of these issues in the survey data, but the interview sample was almost unanimous about the issues concerning a focus on terrorism. Several subjects stated that even with some significant failures in responses to natural hazards, terrorism remained a key focus of the grant programs. The literature suggested that the focus on terrorism was adjusted to support all-hazards after Hurricane Katrina, but when the interview subjects were asked, few noticed many if any changes to support what the literature suggests was a change in national policy. The contradiction between the literature and the interview data is an important study finding, which should justify additional future research specific to grant changes after Hurricane Katrina. One explanation would be the intent of policymakers was to refine grant eligibilities to address shortcomings, but some other barrier existed for change to be realized by the end user of the grant programs.

Only 35% of respondents perceived that the grants supported the key principle of being integrated. Anecdotal evidence from the interviews suggested this could be from a perceived lack of communication between Department of Homeland Security and Department of Health and Human Services. Two interviews specifically talked about a

lack of coordination between healthcare emergency management grant programs and other emergency management grant programs administered through FEMA.

There was anecdotal evidence presented in the interview of the appointed emergency management official that the peak of federal preparedness funding was around the 2005/2006 grant cycle. If the surge of grant funding also resulted in a surge of staffing across the broader population of emergency management programs, the average experience of emergency management staff may be significantly influenced by program expansion after the 9/11 terror attacks. Such a conclusion is not currently supported by enough data to suggest a relationship; however, the co-occurrence was an interesting intersection of the survey and interview data. Additional study is warranted to explore any trends of full-time staffing in emergency management in relation to the funding trends of federal preparedness grants.

Finally, the survey data as a whole did not always strongly correlate with the interview findings. One possible explanation was emergency managers were more candid and detailed in their explanations during in person interviews where that level of granularity may have been missed using a Likert scale in the survey. This was especially true concerning the first and third hypothesis. When subjects were asked in more detail questions related to the first hypothesis they would state they may not strongly agree with the concepts presented in first hypothesis, but mainly due to mitigating factors such as discretion limiting the impact of a particular challenge with a specific grant. Specific to the third hypothesis, respondents may have felt discretion mitigated the issues caused by being too focused on a single threat. The third hypothesis needs additional study to try

and explain the variation in the data. Finally concerning the concepts of the fourth hypothesis, subjects may not have felt comfortable stating that they interpret grant guidance as broadly as possible due to perceived ramifications from such an answer. During the interviews, the interview subjects were much more candid with their responses with only one interview subject avoiding the question directly.

Research Limitations

This research was conducted with several limitations. Academics have only begun to study the impacts of the federal preparedness grant programs on state and local emergency management. There is a limited amount of data currently available on this subject. Many secondary sources currently available result from the closely related field of public administration and intergovernmental relations. This creates a research methodology constraint caused by the limited previous data sets and proven methods that could be replicated in this study.

The scope of this project was limited to exploring the impact of federal preparedness grant programs in the state of North Carolina. Without additional research, any trends identified may not be applicable across the nation as each state and local emergency management program is expected to adapt to their local conditions and has their own individual nuances. Adaptation to state and local governments' individual legal and political environment introduces variation among these programs nationwide. Each local and state emergency management program has its own needs and challenges. Broadly applying this research to those cases without first understanding the impacts of

the variation between programs would be a significant error in academic rigor. The variation of emergency management programs will limit application of preliminary findings to the state being studied until future research can expand on any suppositions.

The scope of this research is also limited to the study of the effects of a select group of federal preparedness grant programs in North Carolina since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Federal preparedness programs would see a significant overhaul in response to the 2001 terrorist attacks. The foundation of this change was reorganization of federal domestic preparedness activities as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Research that pre-dates this monumental shift in the foundation of federal preparedness strategy would only have limited applicability to today's preparedness programs and serves more to provide historical context. Additionally, since 2001, the federal preparedness grants have expanded and contracted multiple times. Through the evolutions of the different programs, the selected grant programs have survived but remain in a constant state of change. An example are those metropolitan areas considered for the UASI program. During the first few years of this program, this list was in significant flux. An additional limitation to this research is the focus on these specific preparedness grant programs. There are other federal preparedness programs that have existed or still exist that are not included in this research. The hope is that trends identified through this exploratory research can be more broadly studied as resources allow to study the entire population of preparedness grants.

Another limitation of this research is that it focuses on one phase of emergency management, preparedness. Each phase of emergency management interacts to a degree

with the others as to make up the complete emergency management system. Some policies, grant programs, laws, and others environmental factors that affect the preparedness grants may be required to support another phase of emergency management. Emergency management does not occur in a vacuum, but this project attempts to focus on one phase of emergency management. This may not present the entire picture, nor the broader context as it relates to the broader emergency management system.

This research relies heavily on survey and interview data of local and state emergency management officials. The very nature of this data is based on the individual perceptions of the population. The impacts both positive and negative on their individual program may be perceived due to some type of bias of the respondent. There always remains a chance that the population may not fully understand the motivations and long-range goals of the federal policy that shape the federal preparedness grant programs. Just as federal policy makers may not fully understand their impacts to local and state programs, the local and state programs may not fully understand context of federal policy and the various considerations required in the policy process to ensure applicability across a very diverse nation. Additionally, respondents may not have fully understood the definition of each of the national emergency management principles and how they each interact as it relates to federal preparedness grants. This could be an additional shortcoming in the research methodology.

The survey sample results used in the research may include a biased sample where the urban jurisdictions are over represented as a proportion to the population.

According to the 2014 census numbers there are 80 rural counties, 14 regional / suburban counties, and 6 urban counties (The Rural Center, 2017). The survey sample collected 41 county responses with 23 from rural counties, 8 from suburban or regional counties, and 10 from urban counties. This sample may overstate the opinions of urban and suburban counties as rural counties were under represented in the sample.

Finally, due to the broad nature of these programs a limited scope was required to ensure the project could be completed with the time and resources that were available. Additional time to complete surveys with several reminders would have most likely increased the return rate of survey responses. Ideally, additional interviews would have also been conducted to better sample the target population. This would have resulted in additional data that could result in increasing the validity and reliability of this research. This constraint was mitigated as much as possible using a multimodal approach to allow for trends to be isolated across various sets of data to increase validity and reliability even with a small sample size.

CHAPTER VI POLICY IMPLICATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND CONCLUSIONS

This research has several significant potential implications. There has been considerable discussion as to the future of the federal preparedness grant programs as the federal budget is under significantly increased scrutiny. This research contributes to the discussion on how federal grant funding can best be applied to local and state jurisdictions to ensure a more resilient nation. As emergency management has grown into a well-recognized profession, future policy decisions must be made with the assistance of data. A data-driven emergency management system is one that can be both responsible to constituents as well as adaptable to the challenges of tomorrow.

This research has identified a significant lack of previous research on the impact of the federal preparedness grant programs. Additionally, the federal preparedness grants would benefit from improved feedback systems that could better support a long term, sustained national strategy to build capability as well as local and state resiliency. In the case of North Carolina, many respondents complained about the constant changes in funding levels, grant guidance, as well as the reactive nature of the programs in response to the last national-level disaster. Potential challenges exist with program guidance never anticipating or preparing for the next major event through building a comprehensive, all-hazards system.

The federal bureaucracy has a significant challenge in administering these grant programs as they are meant to support an extremely diverse national emergency management system, but diversity brings some of its own advantages. By having such a

large and diverse system, concepts such as laboratories of democracy are key to ensuring an emergency management system that is constantly learning and evolving. Laws such as the Federal Advisory Committee Act may inhibit that feedback loop, but policy makers must have systems in place to listen to and learn from the street-level practitioners. If the federal government wants local and state jurisdictions to have organic resiliency, they must enable local and state emergency managers to leverage the grant programs in a flexible way while maintaining accountability to long-term goals. A long-term vision is key to that, but that vision should come from the whole community of emergency managers that focus on an all-hazards, whole community approach, just as federal preparedness policy suggests. The federal emergency management system should focus on the states as their customer, while states focus on local emergency management as their customer. Under such a model the entire national system could better leverage innovation throughout the entire system. One tool to do so is an improved risk assessment process that more clearly articulates hazards and risks effectively justifying investments. While grant funding will probably remain a top down approach, the focus of the grant programs must remain bottom up just as the emergency management system functions.

Unification of effort nationwide is key to the success of the national response infrastructure. Ongoing debate as to the roles, functions, and structures of homeland security and emergency management adds significant complexity. Each state divides these functions differently. Some states see them as synonyms for the same functions of government, while others see homeland security as a sub-specialty targeting terrorism. Some will argue that these grants are meant to address these issues as two separate

functions as some states are structured. Others see such as effort as the very silos that contributed to the various shortcomings in responding to various national tragedies with both natural and man-made causes. Maturing this field of practice and synchronizing its activities is key to success in future responses.

While this research only began to explore impacts of the federal preparedness grants on local and state emergency management programs in one state in a very large and diverse nation, future research should focus on examining the impacts of these grant programs nationwide and fill the current gap in the literature. Even with the potential challenges that may exist with these grant programs, the importance of the programs was clearly shown in the data collected as part of this research. By expanding research on grant impacts nationwide, key trends can be isolated to further aid in the discussion of how to improve the impact and sustainability of these grants. Notwithstanding the complexity of the emergency management programs, key performance indicators must be established to provide measurable outcomes and aid in creating a balanced all-hazards approach nationwide. The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is the closest to meeting this need, but EMAP is not intended to be performance measures or indicators.

Some alternatives exist to the current structure of the federal preparedness grants. Some contend that block grants would help increase coordination between programs by bringing them together under one common framework. Others contend that this will just lead to further cuts in programs that would significantly impact capability across all local and state jurisdictions. Alternative strategies however must be considered to increase

coordination and communication across all of the grant programs. While this research only examines a few federal preparedness grants, others exist focusing on various areas such as transportation of hazardous materials as well as pre-disaster mitigation grants. Future research should include a holistic evaluation of grants across all phases of emergency management as well as competing methodologies for their distribution. Such a holistic approach may result in different or additional findings. Success can only be measured by incremental programmatic improvements that result in better use of funds and a more resilient nation.

The federal preparedness grant programs work to build a robust national capability, but regardless of their structure the focus must remain on local and state capability. The federal preparedness grant programs must maintain accountability, but must also be flexible enough to positively impact programs across a very diverse system. This is no small feat, but one of utmost importance. The goal of this research is to provide a small building block to this end. The key to meeting this goal is for us all to never lose sight of the goals of preparedness nor yield to a short term, politically driven vision that almost always fall short of long term critical thinking and planning to solve our nation's most complex issues.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A
SURVEY INSTRUMENT

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Demographics:

1. What of the following best describes the agency you work for?
 - a. Private Municipal County Healthcare Higher Education State
Federal Other:_____
2. What of the following best describes your jurisdiction?
 - a. Rural, Urban, Suburban, Regional, Statewide
3. How many years have you worked in Emergency Management?
4. How many full-time employees work for your agency and have emergency management responsibilities?

Perspective:

Please provide comments for any scaled questions.

5. How would you rate the effectiveness of the Federal Preparedness Grant Programs collectively (HSGP, EMGP, UASI, HPP)?
 - a. Very Effective, Effective, Neutral, Ineffective, Very Ineffective
6. How much would you agree with the following statement? The federal preparedness grants are focused on addressing any unmet needs identified in the threat hazard identification risk assessment (THIRA) process.
 - a. Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree
7. How much do you agree with the following statement? Federal preparedness grant programs (HSGP, EMPG, UASI, HPP) work together to address all-hazards, whole community preparedness.
 - a. Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree
8. How much do you agree with the following statement? Federal preparedness grants can contribute to creation of silos because of the narrow grant guidance of each program.
 - a. Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree
9. How much do you agree with the following statement? Federal preparedness grant program guidance is consistent with the principles of federal emergency management doctrine (comprehensive, progressive, risk-driven, integrated, collaborative, coordinated, flexible, and professional)?
 - a. Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree

10. Which of the following principles of emergency management does the Federal Preparedness Grant Programs strongly support at the local and regional level?
(Click all that apply)
 - a. Comprehensive, Progressive, Risk-driven, Integrated, Collaborative, Coordinated, Flexible, and Professional
11. How would you improve the effectiveness of the Federal Preparedness Grants?
12. Do you feel that important aspects of preparedness are not eligible expenses in the Federal Preparedness Grants? Please explain your answer.
13. Do you feel like the Authorized Equipment List is an effective means to focus grant funding? Please explain your answer.
14. What is your biggest concern about federal preparedness grants and emergency management funding?
15. In your emergency management program what has been the most successful outcome of the federal preparedness grants?
16. If you could make any changes to the federal preparedness grant programs to improve effectiveness what would you change?

Grant Impacts:

17. How much would you agree with the following statement? My emergency management program is dependent on federal preparedness grant funding to perform daily operations or activities.
 - a. Strongly Agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree
18. What percentage of your total annual funding comes from Federal Preparedness Grant Funding?
 - a. 0-20 b. 21-40 c. 41-60 d. 61-80 e. 81-100
19. If you would like a copy of the finished research, please provide an email address where the information can be sent (optional)?

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What impact does federal preparedness grants (EMPG, UASI, HSGP, HPP) have on your emergency management program?
2. What are the biggest successes of the federal preparedness grants?
3. What are the biggest challenges of the federal preparedness grants?
4. How would you improve the federal preparedness grant programs?
5. How did the federal preparedness grants change after the September 11th Terrorists Attacks?
6. What role does discretion play in interpreting grant guidance and applying grant funds to your identified needs? Do you believe enough flexibility exists in the federal grant guidance?
7. How critical are federal preparedness grants to funding your emergency management operations? What would the impact be if they were no longer available?
8. What do you believe drives the federal preparedness grant programs?
9. Do you believe the federal preparedness grants are well coordinated between the programs to ensure they address and reinforce whole community, all hazard preparedness?
10. Do you believe the federal preparedness grants are too focused on a single hazard/threat such as terrorism at the cost of whole community, all hazard preparedness?

APPENDIX C
LIST OF NATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

LIST OF NATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

1. Comprehensive – emergency managers consider and take into account all hazards, all phases, all stakeholders and all impacts relevant to disasters.
2. Progressive – emergency managers anticipate future disasters and take preventive and preparatory measures to build disaster-resistant and disaster-resilient communities.
3. Risk-Driven – emergency managers use sound risk management principles (hazard identification, risk analysis, and impact analysis) in assigning priorities and resources.
4. Integrated – emergency managers ensure unity of effort among all levels of government and all elements of a community.
5. Collaborative – emergency managers create and sustain broad and sincere relationships among individuals and organizations to encourage trust, advocate a team atmosphere, build consensus, and facilitate communication.
6. Coordinated – emergency managers synchronize the activities of all relevant stakeholders to achieve a common purpose.
7. Flexible – emergency managers use creative and innovative approaches in solving disaster challenges.
8. Professional – emergency managers value a science and knowledge-based approach based on education, training, experience, ethical practice, public stewardship and continuous improvement.

(Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2008, p. 1)