

Selected Bibliography for:

Penn Law Review Antitrust Symposium

The Post-Chicago Antitrust Revolution

October 11-12, 2019

Panel 1: The History & Framing of the Chicago School

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Panel 3: Merger Underenforcement

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Panel 4: Antitrust & Patent Holdup

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