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Organized Resistance to an Imposed Environmental Change: A Reservoir in Eastern Kentucky

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ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO AN IMPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE: A RESERVOIR IN EASTERN KENTUCKY

by

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ABSTRACT

This is a case study of a group organized to resist the construction of an Army Corps of Engineers reservoir project located in Eastern Kentucky. More specifically the account describes how a group of land-owners organized themselves and enacted an increasingly complex strategy of resistance. Within this framework perceived costs, leadership and authority and group organization are considered.

The primary method employed in this research was that of repeated interviews with members of the resistance organization who were identified as key informants. These interviews were carried out on both structured and unstructured bases.

The formal analysis of the voluntary association data emphasizes the process of resistance. That is, the report depicts the evolution of persisting resistance organization. The conclusions include recommendations to both project resisters and project planners.

Descriptors: Social Aspects*, Social Impact*, Decision Making,
Leadership*, Resistance, Resistance Networks*

Identifiers: Organized Resistance, Voluntary Association, Social
Costs, Sentiment Systems

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PREFACE

This report, an adapted version of William Schveri's thesis for a Master of Arts degree in Anthropology, is part of a series of studies, funded through the Kentucky Water Resources Research Institute, which have focused on the social effects of reservoir development. This study has addressed the emergent phenomenon of organized resistance to reservoir development and therefore compliments earlier studies which have focused upon those who have been forced to move.

Resistance to development is a familiar theme in the social science literature. Yet there are relatively few studies of resistance in which the perspective of the community is emphasized and resistance is treated as an adoptive activity.

The dearth of such studies belies the importance of the topic in the everyday life of American communities be they rural settlements or urban neighborhoods.

American communities are continually challenged by planned change. In most cases the benefits of such change is perceived as exceeding the cost. In this account we will see one community's response to the high social cost of a proposed development project. It is more complicated than high perceived costs, of course. As planners consider the cost and benefits in their rational decision-making it is clear that many aspects of community life do not yield to cost/benefit accounting. Further this brief case study makes clear something that Eastern Kentuckians have always known that they are often called upon

to pay high social costs for something that benefits other people in other places.

However one views the process and products of water resources development one must respect the persons and communities which engage in resistance to unwelcome change. They invest their energies in defense of a valued "commodity;" a community and its way of life.

We very much hope that this document will assist both communities and planners in better understanding resistance.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of an organized resistance group in Eastern Kentucky which is attempting to stop a reservoir project. More specifically, this report describes why and how this group of landowners organized themselves and how the group's activities were chosen and enacted. The focus of this study was on the perceived costs of the project and the development of leadership and strategies of resistance from the point of view of the members and officers of the group.

The publicly-stated aim of this group is to stop the construction of the Green Creek Reservoir project which is being developed by a district office of the United States Army Corps of Engineers (hereafter referred to as the Corps) which has the responsibility for the planning, development, and construction of reservoirs in the river basin where the proposed dam is to be located. The river basin is an area which includes parts of Kentucky and two other states, and is approximately 100 miles long and seventy miles wide. In this area, four lake/reservoir projects have been completed and four more are being planned or developed.

Kentucky has a long history of federally-sponsored reservoir construction; since 1925 over twenty-five Tennessee Valley Authority and Corps reservoir/lake projects have been completed. In the state there have been twenty-one flood control projects developed by the Corps. In addition, twenty-four projects are authorized but of inactive status, three are under construction, and five are authorized for further study (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Ohio River Division, 1975, p. 12). In

all, eleven multi-purpose lakes have been completed, six are under construction and seven are authorized for further study by the Corps. Clearly water resource development is an important issue in Kentucky.

After a review of the available literature from the University of Kentucky Office of Water Resource Research and numerous conversations with researchers who have been either directly or indirectly involved in these projects, the present writer has found a notable lack of organized resistance to the projects. Certainly there has been some resistance in every case; only recently, however, has the resistance to such projects become organized with the specific intent of stopping the projects. The Citizens Organization to Resist the Dam (CORD) is one of these recently formed groups and is currently part of a state coalition of five such groups.¹

Background

Initially the researcher focused upon the published social science research in water-related development projects in order to identify salient factors which might have been of importance to this study. It quickly became evident that little was known about grass-roots resistance to water resource projects. There had been, however, a few research projects in the area in which this study took place. These projects did not touch upon the activities of the resistance group, so only general information was available about the area and its residents. While this was of value as background information, it did not shed light upon the question of why the local group was resisting the reservoir project.

It seemed logical that the residents perceived the proposed project as a threat and as a result organized to try to stop the dam. The review of available water resource literature did provide some suggestions as

to why the people might perceive the project as a threat. Four studies included such variables as positive and negative attitudes toward various reservoirs (for a more substantial review of these reports see Arnett, 1976). In one early study Pothiadis (1960) noted that older people tended to be less in favor of water development projects and that non-farm residents tended to favor the developments. Although Dasgupta (1967) states, to the contrary, that age and sex did not relate to attitudes about reservoir projects, Smith (1970) concluded that farmers were wary of unwanted changes and Drucker (1972) discussed the high level of anxiety among traditionally oriented people which was produced by the impending development of such a project. Burdge and Johnson (1973) reported that the older, retired people in a project area were most affected by relocation. In addition to such factors as type of rural habitation, traditionalism and age, other studies have pointed to apprehension related to land acquisition (Goebel et. al., 1969-70 and Burdge and Johnson, 1973) and the disruption of social and kinship ties due to forced relocation (Drucker, Smith and Reeves, 1974). None of these factors, however, were described as having fostered the organization of a resistance group.

It was thought possible, therefore, that a combination of these factors might have been responsible for the negative attitude which the resistance group demonstrated. This was supported, in part, by this writer's research experience in another reservoir project area (Johnson, Burdge, and Schweri, 1974). When asked, "How do you feel about possibly having to move?" many informants' replies centered around the affective value of the area. That is, the responses were generally oriented toward the anticipated loss of the land, friends, and family and how these losses would affect the individual respondent. The answers usually involved the

informant's subjective feelings of attachment to these things which would be lost due to relocation. In addition, some informants mentioned their emotional ties to their neighborhood and how these would be negatively affected by relocation.

In support of this line of reasoning was a study reported by Firey (1945), which examined sentimental associations connected with three neighborhoods in Central Boston. Firey suggested that economic explanations were not enough to explain the land use patterns of the neighborhoods. He found that the people thought of the neighborhoods as symbols of their group values (1945, 140). The areas became symbols due to a number of sentimental associations and behind such expressions of sentiment were a number of historical associations connected with the area (141).

These research findings generally suggested that a range of reasons might be responsible for the negative perception or attitude of CORD. Generally it was expected that a specific range of reasons for the formation of the group would include social, cultural, and economic variables which could be identified.

In considering how the group was organized, the researcher turned to a review of literature focusing on voluntary associations. It was known that CORD had formally elected officers, a specific membership, a recognized purpose, and periodic meetings. This indicated the group could be classified as a voluntary association in terms of Freedman's (et. al.: 1952) classic definition: a bounded organization with an identity and recognized purpose. From the large body of literature concerning voluntary associations in Western society, there were a few considerations which proved useful in clarification of the type of group which was studied.

Western society is characterized by the development of many voluntary associations. Analysis has indicated that these can be differentiated by function and size (Wilensky: 1961). These groups have been found to be important institutions that support the normative order of communities (MacCoby: 1958) and aid in the distribution of power at the grass-roots level (Rose: 1962). Most of the studies reviewed by this researcher were concerned primarily with affiliation and membership characteristics, taking into account specific variables such as social class, sex, religion, ethnic group, and place of residence (Foskett: 1955; Freeman, et. al.: 1957; Hausknecht: 1962; Martin: 1952; Scott: 1957; Wright and Hyman: 1958; Zimmer: 1955; Zimmer and Hawley: 1959).

Of particular interest to this research is the typology of voluntary associations developed by Babchuck and Gordon (1962). They suggested that "generically organizations can be classified according to the functions that they perform for their members" (1962, 37). The typology has three general categories of voluntary groups: expressive, instrumental-expressive, and instrumental. The expressive group's orientation "is not to the attainment of a goal anticipated for the future, but to the organization of a flow of gratifications in the present" (37). Examples of this type of association are the Boy Scouts, or the Young Men's Christian Association. The instrumental group, however, is oriented toward the attainment of some anticipated goal in the future. "It seeks to maintain a condition or to bring about change which transcends its immediate membership" (37). Examples of this type of association are the National Organization of Women or the Urban League.

The activities of an instrumental group are aimed at some goal. From the time of a group's organization, decisions relevant to the goal are continually being made. More specifically, substantive ob-

jectives of various types are identified which will aid in the attainment of the group's goal. From various alternatives, short-term strategies are developed which are reasoned to be appropriate to the achievement of the objectives. Together these activities become a process which is directed toward the goal of the group. A strategy, as it is used here, is a rational plan for the deployment of resources to effect the attainment of an objective.

This clearly had implications important for consideration in this study. It was thought, however, that in order to understand this process it would be essential first to understand the organization of the group. This researcher then reviewed the literature which focused upon what constituted the group.

Social scientists have studied groups as a basic unit of analysis for some time. Goldschmidt suggests the logical reason for this interest is that "the universal existence of groups is perhaps the most evident of all the components of a social system" (1959, 66). Further, he explains what constitutes "groupness": "a common sense of identity among those individuals who are members, a focus of interest, and organization" (67). That is, members of a group can identify members and non-members, they hold certain interests in common, and "there is an internal structure, a distinction of statuses and roles, lines of communication, and foci of authority" (67).

Within groups, interpersonal relationships are ordered. Individuals relate to each other in standardized ways, depending upon their positions relative to each other. Social scientists formalized this concept of relative position under the term "status." Status has been defined as "the position of a person vis-à-vis others" (Goldschmidt: 1959, 81). A group may be thought of as a social system, in that it is a network of

ordered or standardized positions that serves to define the relationships of its members.

Given a specific situation, an individual with a particular status will be expected to act in a set of customary ways by other members of the group. This expected behavior has been formalized under the concept of role. Goldschmidt explains that the concept of role "is taken from the theatre, where the role is an actor's particular behavior in a given context" (1959, 82). In the terminology of social scientists, role is not considered as the actions of an individual, "but an indication of what the action should be" (82). As Linton (1963, 114) has suggested, "a role represents the dynamic aspect of status." When an individual "puts the rights and duties which constitute the status into effect, he is performing a role" (114).

Social groups, however simple or complex, formal or informal, do not enact activities without direction. There must necessarily be some form of legitimate decision-making. Group authority is defined by Goldschmidt (1959, 91) as "the right of persons to make binding decisions regarding the life activities of others." Authority is not evenly distributed among the members of a group. As Gibb's comprehensive survey of leadership studies points out, the focus of authority and control is in the leadership and higher status members of any group (1954). The leadership of a group generally refers to those individuals of relatively higher rank within the status hierarchy of the group, identified and supported by the group, who commonly make decisions for the group. Leaders have, therefore, a legitimate right to control the behavior of others; that is, they possess authority. This decision-making authority is allocated by members of the group. The allocation or distribution of the right to

make decisions, may be called the system of authority (Goldschmidt: 1959). As Sanderson (1940) has suggested, the allocation of authority to any particular leader is typically based upon prestige, persuasion, or on some actual or alleged skill that is pertinent to a given problem or situation.

Lang and Lang use the concept of leader to refer to any individual who calls for and controls social action (1961). That is, those key individuals who are supported by the groups as leaders control group action by deciding what actions are to be taken. Not only is the leadership supported by the group, but the expected behavior of those individuals who occupy leadership positions is defined by the group. What leaders should or should not do is understood by all of the members of the group, in that they have learned, as members of their community, what the general roles of leaders are. While leadership roles differ among societies, within a specific society there are general patterns of behavior which are understood as correct for a leader. In this sense, the leadership roles of a group are culturally defined and the cultural criteria for leadership are identifiable in the leader's role performance. It was reasoned, therefore, that if this study was to focus upon the organization of the resistance group, it would be necessary to determine how the leadership and authority system of the group had developed with some specificity.

In describing the organization of the resistance group, the significance (or lack of it) of the local social organization could not be ignored. This study relied heavily upon an earlier study of a comparable area in Eastern Kentucky which very clearly described the social organization of one group of neighborhoods. In "The Conjugal Family and the

Extended Family Group," Brown (1952) notes that the social organization of Beech Creek is based on family units and locality units. Brown found the conjugal family to be the basic social group in the neighborhood. Since the average farm family was also the basic unit of economic production as well, it was difficult to distinguish economic roles from family roles, except analytically. Due to the history of geographic isolation and a tradition of marrying and settling close to home, numerous family units lived together, interacted to a great extent, and considered themselves as members of a family group.

These family groups were identified by Brown as extended family units, which also tended to be locality groups. Over time the original land settled by a family had been bequeathed to succeeding generations and the eventual outcome was a large number of separate farm families living in close geographical proximity, all of whom identified themselves as belonging to a specific family group and a specific geographical location. Brown also found that the family groups had a leadership structure. "Often the old father, or occasionally the old mother, was the accepted leader" (1952, 300). In some cases, sons were accepted as the family group leaders.

This seemed to be comparable to what Hochstrasser (et. al.: 1974) found in his study of the reservoir area under the auspices of the University of Kentucky Center for Developmental Change. Hochstrasser (personal communication) clearly identified (geographically) several neighborhoods in the proposed study area similar to Beech Creek in Brown's study. These neighborhoods have been of major importance in this study and some clarification of "neighborhood" is necessary.

It should be clear that "neighborhood" here refers to a relatively small natural area inhabited by people who generally maintain friendly, if not primary group, relationships with one another (Toby: 1964). The concept of neighborhood can be differentiated from community in that neighborhoods are smaller and do not offer the full range of services which communities are generally considered to have, although the neighborhood might have as its center some service unit such as a general store, gas station, or post office. In Eastern Kentucky, the neighborhood typically consists of a number of locality units; however, a single large locality unit might constitute a neighborhood. It is important to understand that a locality unit is not always composed of one extended family group, although this might sometimes be the case. Two or more extended family groups and/or a few separate conjugal families might make up the locality unit. It was thought that these locality units or family groups were of some significance in this study.

The encompassing concept of this study is the process of resistance. While culture change processes are frequently researched and reported upon, resistance is infrequently researched in the manner of this report. That is, the focus is on how a community resists, not how an agency overcomes community resistance. Implicitly the researcher views community resistance as a positive and creative activity which is carried out as a means of community survival.

Studies with this perspective appear infrequently in the social science literature. In anthropology, the discipline of the researcher, very few such studies have been done. One such study is Dozier's work entitled "Resistance to Acculturation and Assimilation in an Indian Pueblo" (1951), which attempted to analyse in historical terms the maintenance of a distinct TEWA community at Hano in the face of extensive

interaction with Hopi tribal members.

There are at least two anthropologists engaged in resistance studies. These are Richard O. Clemmer and Luther P. Gerlach. Clemmer's research deals with the small Hopi community of Hotevilla and their resistance to various Federal programs (1974). Gerlach's research entails analysis of groups resistance to certain aspects of energy development in terms of the concept of social movements (1979).

In spite of these interesting examples, the following assessment by Clemmer of resistance studies among American Indians seems appropriate.

Resistance, if discussed at all, is usually treated as a phase of acculturation, and in a theoretical framework that may explain the acculturation, but not the resistance to it. Resistance movements are analyzed either as tension-relieving mechanisms whose prime function is to ease the strain of the acculturative process, or as simple unwillingness by a particular group of people to abandon the security of [previously] enculturated behavior patterns. (1969: 214).

It is clear that the CORD experience illustrates a community-based maintenance strategy and should be studied as such rather than as a "tension-relieving mechanism" or a manifestation of some sort of "primordial conservatism" on the part of the resisting segment of the community.

Research Design

This ethnographic case study of a grass-roots resistance group focused on three major research objectives. The first research objective was to determine the specific range of reasons for the formation of the group, including social, cultural, and economic variables as they were perceived by the group. The second objective was to describe how the group was formed and organized, including the significance of existing social organizations. The last objective was to describe the group's

"discovery" of an organized, coherent resistance process in a region where such activities are historically rare.

As the field work continued it became apparent that the people of Hickory (a neighborhood) perceived the Green Creek Reservoir Project as a threat to their sentiment systems associated with their land, churches, cemeteries, families, and neighbors. In response to the perceived threat, these neighbors formed CORD with the purpose of stopping the reservoir project. Within CORD, leadership was contingent upon age, family group affiliation, ability, and prestige. Authority was contingent upon the representation of the interest groups within the neighborhoods and communication was based upon the traditional methods of transmitting information. Strategy development was contingent upon the control of information and the development of specific objectives.

Of great importance to this research were the concepts of leader, authority, communication, strategy, strategy implementation, and reasons for resistance. These concepts were operationally defined as:

- 1) leader - any individual who made decisions which were binding on the group
- 2) authority - reasons for one individual to make decisions rather than another
- 3) communication - the passing of information or knowledge among group members
- 4) strategy - any plan which was aimed at the deployment of resources to effect the attainment of some group objective
- 5) strategy implementation - the deployment of resources in the form of group activities
- 6) reasons for resistance - the members' reasons for joining the resistance group.

In attempting to determine why CORD had been formed, this research focused upon the specific reasons for resisting the project which were given by each member. This was important in the clarification of why various leaders were chosen.

In attempting to understand how decisions were made within CORD, it was necessary first to identify the individuals who were directly involved in the decision-making process and then to determine how the decisions were being made. Further it was necessary to identify and characterize the authority system of the group. The field research was first focused upon the elected officers in an attempt to learn how and why they had been selected. Their activities were investigated from the perspective of the officers and members alike. In addition, the attributes which were important in their selection were addressed. Then, those who were actually observed making decisions were identified in order to ascertain how decisions were being made and why these individuals were allowed to make decisions for the group.

These individuals were used as key informants to determine how the strategies of resistance were developed and subsequently implemented. It was important to identify what the policies and objectives of the group were and to describe how the strategies were identified, developed, and implemented in terms of these objectives. It became evident in the data collection phase of this research that the control of information about the reservoir project was of importance as were the decisions which were made about the use of information.

From this general design the following sections of this report emerged. After the methods section is a detailed history of the project which serves as a background for the subsequent sections describing reasons for resistance, leadership and strategies of resistance. In the conclusions, this researcher has attempted to draw together these various parts into a discussion which emphasizes the process of resistance in the case of CORD.

CHAPTER II

AREA, METHOD, INFORMANTS

Research Setting

It is important that the reader gain some insight into the study area and thus better understand the way of life of the members of CORD, as well as their perception of the reservoir project. The description of the area is included in this chapter to facilitate an understanding of why certain techniques were used and to clarify the research methodology.

The area dealt with in this study includes four neighborhoods located in adjoining parts of two Eastern Kentucky counties (named here Blue and Green Counties). These neighborhoods are located along a narrow stream (named here Green Creek) generally bordered by steep wooded banks. The neighborhoods are separated by high ridges and deep gorges along the creek. Three of the neighborhoods (named here High Point, Dreamin, and Cane Lick) have only a portion of their land (in the bottoms and on ridge tops) suitable for agricultural production and are located in Blue County. The fourth neighborhood (named here Hickory) has considerably more productive agricultural land than the others. This is due to the relatively wide bottoms that border the creek for a few miles. Hickory is located in Green County.

Homes have been built either near the tops or at the bases of the ridges or hills above the primary flood plain. This affords some protection from the elements and allows for the maximum use of arable lands since the dwellings and out-building are not typically in the bottoms but always accessible to them.

The neighborhoods are linked by four asphalt-surfaced state roads which are kept in good repair, considering the great amount of heavy coal-truck traffic. Within the neighborhoods there are county roads which are generally all-weather gravel surfaces, although some ultimately become nothing more than dirt paths. Most of the dwellings in High Point, Dreamin, and Cane Lick are located along the paved state and county roads in Blue County. Half of the dwellings in Hickory, however, are located along gravel-surfaced county roads. The state roads link the neighborhoods with the county seats of the two counties (named here Bluetown and Greenville), but due to the terrain, roads do not pass directly from one neighborhood to another. Typically the roads follow the hollows which are most accessible to road construction and maintenance. This means that while two of the neighborhoods are adjacent to one another, they are separated by a small ridge system and the roads were built around these ridges rather than over them. Instead of a few minutes travel, therefore, a journey of twenty to thirty minutes in an automobile is necessary to go from one neighborhood to another.

Green and Blue counties are similar in many ways; however, there are differences in their demographic characteristics which are reflected in the respective neighborhoods and are important in this study. For example, Blue County has over twice the population density of Green County (66 persons per square mile as opposed to 27 persons per square mile). The majority of the Blue County population resides in rural non-farm areas (71%), some live in the county seat (22%), and very few (7%) occupy rural farms. This contrasts sharply with Green County in that slightly less than half (44%) of its population live in rural farms and the rest (56%) reside in rural non-farm areas. Included in the rural

non-farm population are those who live in Greenville; therefore the latter statistic is somewhat misleading.

The major difference between the counties is underscored by the 1969 agricultural statistics. Green County has twice as many farms as Blue County (1160 as opposed to 563) and over sixty percent of the land in Green County is owned as farm land (Green County = 61%, Blue County = 30%). This is also one of the major differences between Hickory as reported by its residents and the other three neighborhoods. Hickory, with its larger bottoms, has more tillable land than any of the other neighborhoods and a larger portion of the incomes of Hickory families is derived from farming.

In Green County 64% of the employed residents worked in the following occupations: agriculture (16%), construction (12%), manufacturing (17%), mining (3%), and trade (16%). In Blue County 58% of the employed residents worked in these same industry areas; however, 19% worked in agriculture and 12% in mining. Again, as Hochstrasser (1973) found, these statistics are reflected in the neighborhoods, although the difference between those employed in mining and agriculture is not as great.

Method

The primary method employed in this research was the use of repeated interviews with members of the resistance organization. As Paul has suggested, the requisites for obtaining reliable ethnographic data are "repeated interviews, development of trust and mutual understanding, cross checking with other informants, and direct observation" (1953: 447).

Entry to the study area was made possible with the aid of a personal friend of the researcher who is a resident of the area. Prior to the development of the research proposal, this friend made inquiries as to

Whether or not the leaders and members of the resistance organization would be amenable to a research project on the organization. During the subsequent proposal development stage and after the actual field research began, this friend introduced the researcher to various members of the resistance group and generally provided the researcher with accommodations at his home near the study area. A professor of the University of Kentucky, Department of Anthropology, provided additional aid by introducing the researcher to various plaintiffs (members of CORD) at the first court hearing in the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky.

Preliminary contacts with five members of the organization were made by the researcher during short meetings arranged by the researcher's friend. These meetings clearly indicated the role that the interviewer should assume while conducting the research. The researcher was introduced as a cultural anthropologist and the study was explained as research that would be used for a Master's thesis. At the same time, however, it was stressed that the student has many family ties in Eastern Kentucky, and because of these ties has personal interest in the plight of the people in Green County. Thus two major roles were played by the researcher, that of objective anthropologist and that of a personally interested friend.

Repeated interviews were conducted with informants as they were identified by the researcher. An informant, by popular definition, might be anyone who provides information. In this study, however, the researcher used the more customary anthropological understanding of an informant, that is, "an articulate member of the studied culture who enters into a more or less personal relationship with the investigator"

(Paul: 1953, 443). The researcher began his data collection slowly. The first meetings with the members of the resistance group were of a general nature, consumed with explaining the research, assessing the qualities of the prospective informants, appraising their areas of knowledge, identifying their general positions within the association, and accumulating a list of the members of the group. The organization was small enough to allow preliminary open-ended interviews of the entire membership with few exceptions. The exceptions were due either to a person's absence from the area or a relative's request to forego an interview. In all, four members were not contacted.

As Paul maintains (1953, 443), "informants should be so selected as to comprise a panel representative of the major social subdivisions and categories recognized within the community." With this in mind, informants were selected on the basis of preliminary interviews with particular regard for their representation of the three neighborhoods in the area. This reduced the number of informants to eleven. In all, twenty-eight preliminary interviews were conducted with members of the group and subsequent directed interviews were conducted with the eleven selected informants.

The basic format of the preliminary interviews was: 1) introduction of the interviewer; 2) a general explanation of the research; 3) a promise of anonymity for the interviewee and his or her acceptance or rejection of the interview; 4) general questions on the reservoir project and threats associated with it; 5) general questions on the history of the resistance group including its organization and subsequent activities to stop the dam project; 6) the significance of the neighborhoods; and 7) the existence of other voluntary associations in the area. In these interviews a general question was asked or a topic suggested and the re-

spondent was allowed to answer the question or discuss the topic as he or she saw fit. This flexible interviewing method was of particular importance in the early stages of the field research. The open-ended interviews allowed the respondents to discuss and disclose views, important topics, and various interconnections that might have gone unnoticed if a more structured interview had been used. This interview format also allowed for the establishment of rapport between the interviewer and informants, which was essential in later interviews due to the potentially sensitive topics discussed. Six informants were particularly candid and informative; therefore, multiple general open-ended interviews were conducted with these individuals.

At the outset one problem arose as a result of the timing of the research. Since the group had been active for almost three years, informants had difficulty in remembering some activities, dates, and individual involvement. This difficulty was remedied to some extent by a calendar of events developed by the researcher, consisting of a month-by-month list of major events. The list was constructed from newspaper accounts, testimony at the first District Court hearing, and a few of the first interviews, and consisted only of the place or date involved. This calendar of events was referred to by the interviewer to aid the memory of the informant only when necessary; typically it was not needed. However, even with its use, informants remained somewhat uncertain of the ordering of a few of the events and dates. The lapses of memory occurred, generally, when a number of activities had taken place concurrently and had not begun or ended at the same time.

After the initial interviews were completed, eleven individuals were selected for further directed interviews. These interviews

employed open-ended questions, but unlike the initial interviews, the questions were directed to the specific topics of importance to this study. In the latter stages of the directed interviewing fairly specific questions were asked. It was at this time that the rapport between this student and the informants was most important.

The matter of this student's personal involvement in the activities of the resistance group was crucial. It must be understood that the resistance efforts were continuing throughout the data collection period and that this student often felt drawn toward a more active role in the activities of the group. At one point, an advocacy role was considered, although dismissed because considerable objectivity would certainly have been lost to this study. Midway through the data collection this student was asked by the leaders of the resistance group to act as their photographer. They explained that no one within the group was skilled in photography and they needed some photographs to prove their point on various matters involved with the lawsuit and to submit to federal agencies. This student, having been involved with photography for eleven years on an active amateur basis, was asked to do the photography that they felt was necessary. This activity, being considered a rather peripheral involvement, was agreed to and, as it turned out, was an invaluable research opportunity. Acting as a photographer involved travel to various parts of the creek, and these trips to and from different places offered excellent opportunities for casual conversation as well as information gathering. In addition, these trips involved meeting a number of landowners in the area to obtain permission to enter their land. The introductions were valuable for later interviewing visits to these same landowners.

Possibly the most important outcome of assuming the role of photographer, however, was the researcher's opportunity to observe the leaders' activities in decision-making, planning, and implementation. This first-hand direct observation was the one component of the methods used in the study that was generally lacking before the role of photographer was assumed. Acting as the photographer allowed the student easy access to information which had been vaguely mentioned, at best, in earlier interviews. From this point on, this student was able to go step by step with a few knowledgeable informants through their accounts of the group's formation and subsequent activities in candid detail.

Formal appointments for interviews were typically made by telephone. As the study progressed and friendships were established, however, informal appointments or unannounced visits became the rule rather than the exception. This allowed for gaps in the data to be filled with comparative ease and often yielded significant information which had not been discussed in earlier interviews.

In addition to the members of the resistance group, eighteen individuals who were residents of one of the neighborhoods were selected for interviews. These individuals were neither members of the voluntary association opposing the dam project nor participants in the association activities.

Some of these people had sold or were in the process of selling land to the Corps of Engineers. These individuals were interviewed in order to contrast their perceptions of the dam project with those of the resistance group members. Of the eighteen, four refused to be interviewed, stating that it might influence their dealings with the Corps of Engineers. Two others were unavailable for interviews due to

poor health. The remaining twelve individuals were interviewed in the open-ended format that was explained earlier in this section.

At no time did any informant react with belligerence or hostility, although four of the non-members did initially react with some suspicion of possible ulterior motives on the part of the interviewer. One of these people revealed obvious surprise at the completion of the interview and asked if that was, indeed, the end. When the interviewer assured him that it was, he immediately apologized for thinking that the student was "after something else." The best way to characterize the reaction of informants to the interviewer and, more generally, being interviewed, would be with the term "gracious hospitality." On numerous occasions the interviewer was invited to lunch or supper. These invitations were accepted at every possible opportunity. On a few occasions the interviewer was asked to spend the night at an informant's home, rather than return to Lexington late at night.

The study area is located two hours from Lexington by car. This, coupled with the fact that this student is a full-time research associate at the University of Kentucky, Center for Developmental Change, made full-time (from beginning-to-end) interviewing impossible. The usual procedure was for the student to take four days every other week for the visits to the study area. Twice, however, vacation time was used to allow the researcher to be in the field ten days at a time. This logistical situation proved to be valuable in that it allowed for time between interviews to reflect upon what had been discussed, and it gave informants an opportunity to "rest" between interviews. Although the connection may not be immediately clear, this procedure did take considerably more time than a single, long-term visit, but it was advantageous to the development of rapport.

At first two or three interviews were the average per day. When initial interviewing began, this was clearly the most efficient use of time because most interviews did not exceed one or two hours in length. When the directed interviews were begun, this schedule became impossible to follow, since many of the interviews were five hours in length, and additional time was required for the review of the notes and taped comments.

After each interview, the interviewer used a tape cassette recorder to record his reactions, additions, and mental notes for later cross-referencing of information. This method was much faster than writing comments, but proved to be more cumbersome than written comments when the preliminary analysis began.

The possibility of using a tape recorder for interviewing was entertained but dismissed due to the general distrust and commonly negative reaction to the machine that this student has experienced in the past. During the interviews, extensive notes were written. In the first interviews the interviewer was very observant of the informants' reactions to the note-taking. The fear that note-taking might in some way distract the informant was unwarranted. Over time, note-taking came to be expected; in fact, on more than one occasion the interviewer was asked, "Are you going to get this down?" or "Can you keep up with my ramblings?" Some informants sat next to the interviewer so that they could see if the notes were progressing along with the conversation. These informants often stopped and added comments to the notes or retold certain events to make sure that the notes were complete.

The outline for this report was taken directly from the categories of data developed in the preliminary analysis. Obviously, no single informant was expected to have total knowledge of the organization of the resistance

group and its activities, or of the perceived threats to the members of the group. The raw data, therefore, was comprised of numerous accounts, descriptions, and impressions of the various informants. In addition, there were the detailed observations and impressions of this researcher. The compilation of this diverse array of information constituted the preliminary analysis of the data.

In the final analysis and subsequent drafts of this thesis the names of places, titles, and some situational contexts were changed because they might have served to identify informants. Because the topic of the thesis might be considered sensitive to some, names have been selected at random from the telephone directory of a distant Eastern Kentucky county. Also changed were occupation specifics and titles of political positions; some superfluous positions and titles have been added to assure a greater degree of anonymity.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY

A detailed history of the project is included in this section to provide the reader with a general understanding of the resistance organization, its activities, and internal changes that have occurred over time, as well as to provide the reader with a chronology which will be referred to in later chapters. This history was developed from informant responses to questions about the history of the organization and reservoir project. This section is written, therefore, from the point of view of the CORD members, in order to ensure that the reader understands the perspective of the people involved with the resistance effort. With this perspective the content of later sections will be more understandable.

Rumors

The first news of a reservoir project came in the form of rumors. One Blue County resident remembered conversations she had had with two of her neighbors concerning the Green Creek Reservoir as early as 1960. Everyone interviewed remembered these rumors and the one thing they all had in common: the fact that Green Creek would be impounded and a lake would be formed. Otherwise there were few similarities in the rumors as they were remembered by various informants.

From 1960 to 1970 rumors were circulating about the size of the lake, where it would be, what it would be used for, and how much it would cost. Those interviewed seemed vaguely aware that a dam would be built as early as 1960 in Blue County because, as many said, "The Governor owed them one" or "It was promised by a Congressman." Over time, these rumors increased in number as well as diversity until the mid-1960's, when most Green Creek

residents agree that they knew a man-made lake would become a reality. No individual interviewed knew until the late 1960's that the reservoir project would affect them personally.

By 1971 there seem to have been three distinct rumors about the plans for the reservoir project. First there was a rumor which many informants said they heard in Bluetown (Blue County seat) which indicated the location and size of the lake. It was clear that all of the lake would be in Blue County near Bluetown and would not be large enough to be of any consequence to those Green Creek residents further upstream.

The second rumor was like the first, but two neighborhoods near the Blue and Green County boundary were mentioned. These two neighborhoods were to be mildly affected by the lake. Only a small amount of land, however, would be lost to the lake and as recompense, landowners would be allowed to keep lake front property. This rumor also was believed to have originated in Bluetown, although it was circulating almost a year after the first rumor.

The third rumor about the plans for the reservoir project came from surveyors who were working in the Green Creek area. Many informants said that they assumed that these men were working for the State Highway Department since a local road was to be widened and repaved. Two informants specifically asked what these surveyors were doing and found that they were working on a new road cut. Four other informants, however, were told by surveyors that they or their employers were working for the U.S. Army. These surveyors were asked why they were so far up the creek and they responded that the entire valley was being surveyed because that was standard practice. They also said that some of the bottom land would be taken by the lake. One surveyor said that no homes

would be in danger and another said that the project would be executed far in the future.

Generally, there was no alarm over the reservoir project until the early 1970's because the residents of Green Creek believed that the project would hardly affect them. Many residents, relying on the truth of the rumors, thought the project would be developed far in the future and that they might even acquire some scenic lake-front property in the bargain.

This is not to imply that no one was concerned by the rumors. At least two men were worried and one confronted a regional politician about the project. The politician assured the resident that no dam would be built in his lifetime.² This news traveled quickly among Valley residents and seemed to substantiate at least part of the rumors. Two men remembered that at the time they had inferred from this statement that if it was true that the project would be far in the future, then the rest they had heard about the project was probably true as well.

The second man who was worried about the rumors was a local teacher, Jimmy Reines. The Reines family was well known because they had lived in the Green Creek valley since the 1800's and Jimmy was known because he had taught in local schools for over twenty years. Reines was worried about the rumors beginning in the late 1960's. His reasoning was that if they were going to dam Green Creek, it would cause a number of changes in the Creek and the surrounding area. He also was concerned that he might lose some part of his family land to the project. Although Reines expressed his concern to his friends and neighbors, few, if any, shared his concern. There were two reasons for this: first, no one believed that they would be affected and second, Reines was considered an activist

by his neighbors. That is, relative to his neighbors, Reines was a well read individual who was active in the expression of his beliefs as they concerned his neighborhood, county, state, and the nation as a whole.

Reines' neighbors described themselves as conservative people and suggested that while Reines was not a liberal, he was certainly less conservative than most of them and more active than most in public affairs and activities. Most people attributed this to the fact that he was a school teacher and was, therefore, expected to be active in public affairs. Ultimately it was his activities which initiated the first actions toward the organization of CORD.

From the early 1950's to the early 1970's two public hearings had been held which dealt with the Green Creek reservoir project. The first hearing (1954) primarily concerned the major drainage area in which the project is located. The second public hearing (1963) did include a relatively complete discussion of the reservoir project specifically. The project was one of three authorized by Congress in the Flood Control Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-298) followed by the Appropriations Act which provided funds to begin the pre-construction planning. Although funds were appropriated to begin construction in (Fiscal Year) 1971, the monies were allocated for use in the following fiscal year. It was not until the first notices announcing a landowners meeting about the project that any of the Green Creek residents realized that they would be directly affected by the project.

Official Notice

In early 1972 residents of Green Creek received notices sent to their homes which announced a landowners meeting at the Blue County High School in late April. The purpose of the meeting was to inform landowners who

would be affected by the project and other interested people of the Corps' policy and procedures in land acquisition. Included with the meeting notification was a map of the project.

This was the first official notification of the project that the landowners had received, and residents of the four neighborhoods located in the tailwaters of the project experienced mixed emotions. Many realized, after looking carefully at the project maps, that they were going to lose their entire farms to the project. Many, however, said that their first thoughts were that there was some sort of mistake; they felt that they would still only lose their bottom land. These thoughts did not last long after they read newspaper reports that the Corps would acquire land from ridge top to ridge top in order to control private development along the lake.

Most of the residents expressed shock at the meeting notices but a few people were angered. One of these individuals was the teacher Reines, who began to circulate a petition protesting the construction of a dam on Green Creek. Others quickly joined Reines in his efforts. One man, Sammy Dyre, was a retired oil and gas worker who had lived on Green Creek all of his life. His family, like Reines', had lived in the valley since the mid 1800's. A third man, Elbert Smith, was a lay-preacher and a skilled construction worker whose wife was a descendant of early settlers of the area.

These three men, with the help of their friends and relatives, were able to amass 1200 signatures including those of landowners in the Green Creek Valley, their friends and relatives, and various Green County officials and businessmen. The three men also enlisted the aid of the Green County judge, who sent a letter of protest to the U.S. Congressman and two Kentucky Senators.

Before the landowners meeting, Dyre, Reines and Smith met with the county attorney on a number of occasions for legal advice and in the process told him all that they had learned about the project. They told the attorney that they had not been notified about the project and they questioned the need for the project in relation to what would be lost (productive family farms, county tax base, sixty homes in Green County, etc.). They met with the attorney the day of the landowners meeting and asked him to represent them at the meeting. The attorney consented to do so if the three men would compile information about the project for him to review. From 1:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. (the meeting began at 8:00 p.m.) the three landowners and friends gathered all obtainable written information (that is, newspaper accounts, replies to letters, copies of the meeting notice, and copies of the petition) pertaining to the reservoir project.

Landowners Meeting and Growing Concern

The meeting was attended by five to six hundred people who were there to voice their opposition to the project as well as find out what the Corps was intending to do about their land. The meeting was held in two parts. First the Corps representatives explained the project, the reasons for it, and how they envisioned that the development of the project would proceed. After this presentation there was a recess while landowners looked over large maps showing the 450 tracts of land which would be acquired for the project.

The meeting was again called to order and the Green County attorney identified himself as a spokesman for those opposed to the project. He challenged the need for the reservoir project, the legality of the Corps proceedings leading to the authorization of the project, and the lack of

public hearings. He suggested that the land and its coal, oil, and gas were of greater value than the supposed benefits which would be derived from the project.

All accounts of this meeting by CORD members were in agreement on two points. First, the heated exchange between the attorney and the Corps representatives excited the anger of a greater number of valley residents than ever before. This was primarily because they saw how many people were in opposition to the project and because they were able to see how much had "gone on behind their backs." They felt that when their spokesman asked pointed questions (e.g., about previous hearings), the Corps representatives either did not know or said it did not matter.

At this time, the primary points of irritation as explained by CORD leaders were: 1) they had not been contacted prior to the landowners meeting, that is, they had not been given the opportunity to participate in the public hearings; 2) they felt that the project would not afford any flood protection to Bluetown; 3) they would be forced out of their homes and lose all of their family lands; and 4) the Corps had indicated that the landowners would get just compensation for their land, but they also stated that no payments would be made for potential worth of land including oil, gas, coal or other minerals, or sentimental attachments.

These statements as well as personal appeals formed the substance of letters from many Green Valley residents as they took part in a letter-writing campaign. The purpose of the letter-writing was to inform public officials of their opposition to the project. Leaders in each of the neighborhoods urged valley residents to write their congressman, senators, and the Governor. The leaders also suggested that residents talk to their local state representative and senator to ex-

press their opposition. The letter-writing continued for two months, until enthusiasm waned.

During this period, some of the valley residents began boycotting businesses in Bluetown whose owners were proponents of the dam. As one member of the opposition group said, "Why should I spend my money in a man's store when he is only interested in profiting from me losing everything I've worked for all my life to build?"

In the fall of 1972 the enthusiasm shown in the spring and early summer was gone. This was attributed to two things: 1) a conflict between the Kentucky Constitution and a provision of the 1970 federal Flood Control Act involving cost-sharing contracts and 2) a feeling by most people in the valley that the Governor would eventually stop the project. The general opinion was that the Governor would use the conflict between section 22 of the Flood Control Act of 1970 and sections 49 and 50 of the Kentucky Constitution to halt the project. As one man put it, "That was back when I thought that Democrats stuck together. . . since [Blue] County is Republican and [Green] County is democrat, I thought the Governor [a Democrat] would side with us and stop the dam."

In late December of 1972 one of the opposition leaders received a letter from the Governor which was basically noncommittal. The wording of the letter, however, seemed to suggest some support for the opposition. One week later the Green Creek residents received news that the Governor had signed a new cost-sharing contract for the Green Creek Project. Three weeks later there was a joint announcement by the Governor, the Corps District Engineer, and Congressman Perkins that the Secretary of the Army had approved the cost-sharing contract between the Commonwealth and the Federal government.

Organization of CORD

When members of CORD were asked how they reacted to the letter from the Governor and his signing of the cost-sharing contract, responses were mixed. Some people said that they felt clearly the Governor had lied to them. Others said that they were unable to believe that the Governor would lie, and one man stated, "I didn't want to think that a man I'd up and voted for would turn around and pull a stunt like this." Most of the men who had been most active in resisting the project (all were from Hickory) said they were angered by the turn of events and that within one week their neighbors were just as angry as they were.

Dyre, Reines, Smith, and a few others made the decision that it was "time for action" or as Reines put it, "We had to get organized and fight the thing and to do it we all knew we could use some help." They decided to contact the editor and publisher of the county weekly newspaper (located in Greenville) and then they arranged a meeting with the county attorney.

The residents met with the publisher and his son (the editor) of the county newspaper, discussed the situation, and showed them the letter from the Governor. They asked the publisher if the newspaper would help them fight the dam and the publisher agreed. They then met with a prominent businessman in Greenville who also agreed to help in any way he could.

The following month four or five of the most active opponents of the reservoir project were supposed to meet with the county attorney to discuss the possibility of legal action. On the day of the meeting, 40 or 50 Green Creek residents attended. The county attorney made several points, all concerning what the residents might do to stop the dam. He

reiterated a statement he had made after the landowners meeting, that they did seem to have grounds for a suit but that they needed a lawyer who was more acquainted than he with environmental law. Further, he suggested that they organize and advised them that they needed to collect money to retain a lawyer.

One observer of this meeting stated, "Well, they organized on the spot, elected their officers (president, treasurer, and secretary), and collected a few hundred dollars." The editor of the newspaper was asked to look for and find a lawyer specializing in environmental law and the local businessman was asked to help in gaining more support from the county seat.

Renewed Activity

In the Spring of 1973 the newly formed CORD began formally to recruit members, the letter-writing campaign was revived, and there was a concerted effort to document the previous charges against the project and to gather further information. The latter was done by requesting information directly from the Corps, accumulating newspaper stories, and collecting letters from landowners in the valley.

All of these efforts eventually paid some dividends. The recruitment of members led to a larger membership and consequently more letters being sent to public officials. More importantly, larger membership increased the amount of information available to CORD concerning the costs of the dam. Of course such data was very useful in the resistance effort. For example, a retired driller who had worked locally for 40 years mentioned that the site that was selected for the dam was in a syncline and the substrata might be fractured. He told one of the leaders that this could cause seepage and excess stress on the under-

lying fault. This was news to the leader, who asked the driller to write him a letter about the fault and its dangers. This was also done in the cases of abandoned oil wells and asphalt seepage.

From newspaper articles published outside the county the leaders learned of the National Environment Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the requirement that a Draft and a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) be prepared by federal agencies to be reviewed before construction could begin on a project. The leaders of CORD acquired copies of the FEIS for the Green Creek Reservoir Project, as well as copies of the hearing minutes, announcements, and a list of recipients of the announcements. All of this information was published as news in the county paper and was used in the compilation of a statement which outlined the opposition's arguments. As the Corps released further news about the project, the leaders of CORD would reply by using the local newspaper and by writing letters to congressmen, senators, and the Governor.

In May of 1973 CORD sent two representatives to Washington to testify before Congressional Subcommittees (both Senate and House) analyzing 1973-74 budget requests for public works projects. The CORD representatives met first with Senators Huddleston and Cook, who had arranged for them to testify before the subcommittees. The men took with them a statement which outlined the CORD argument against the reservoir project. Included were a memorandum (drafted by the CORD lawyer) outlining the basis for a suit, statements corroborating facts supplied by an accredited geologist about the fault, estimates in dollars of the economic loss from the reservoir project (including crops, tax base, and jobs), a copy of the 1200-signature petition, and a copy of a University of Kentucky Law Journal study of Cave Run Reservoir land-buying practices. In addition,

they presented what they called supplemental data, which included an historical description of the Green Creek Valley, a history of the project and CORD activities from news accounts (including charges of misconduct by the Corps), editorials and letters supporting the opposition of the project, statements about the religious beliefs of the valley residents pertaining to the removal of graves from the area, and statements about the residents' fears of breaking up of family and long-time friends if they were forced to relocate.

The two men told the subcommittees that they hoped that after reviewing all of this evidence the members would not appropriate funds for the Green Creek Reservoir project, or in lieu of not funding the project altogether, they might at least delay funding until the landowners' attorney could prepare and file a suit against the project in U.S. District Court. The CORD representatives also met with representatives of the Sierra Club (arranged by a Kentucky Sierra Club member), the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Office of Management and Budget (these latter meetings were arranged by the Senators).

Expanding Organization and Formal Meetings

Over the summer of 1973 the elected officers of CORD expanded the organization in two ways. First they named an Advisory Committee for Green County made up of businessmen and friends in the county seat who were opposed to the project. These men were asked to aid the CORD officers and lawyer in the preparation of a law suit to halt the reservoir project. Secondly, CORD held its first meeting in Blue County in an attempt to expand the membership of CORD into the neighborhoods of Dreamin, High Hope, and Cane Lick.

The meeting, as did most of the meetings, began with a short prayer. Approximately one hundred valley residents attended, the majority being from the three Blue County neighborhoods. The president of CORD presided over the gathering which heard for the first time a full report of the activities of CORD, which had started its organized effort only three months before. This included explanations by two advisors and our officers of their efforts to persuade public officials and Congress to delay the project on economic and environmental grounds.

One landowner, a descendant of the early settlers of the valley, made a moving statement about his reasons for and commitment to fighting the project to the end if necessary. A CORD member said of this speech, "While he was talking and when he got done, I will never forget how many women and men had tears in their eyes." The assembly heard seven other speakers that evening, all of whom reiterated previously mentioned points of contention about the Project. One speaker aimed his comments at the Blue County residents: "We didn't come down here to sell you anything, but to let you know you can fight the government; you can fight the Corps." Many of the speakers urged those wishing to help stop the dam to write their Congressman and Senators. CORD officers said they were at the time delaying the planned legal action in anticipation of the outcome of Congressional hearings on public work appropriations and now, while they were debating the issues, was the time to write to the people's representatives. The meeting ended with a few words of scripture.

This meeting at High Point, while larger than most, was typical of the meetings held in the spring and summer of 1973. Local meetings were held either in Hickory or High Point at the homes of members or at the local churches spread throughout the valley. Occasionally meetings were

held in Greenville, as was the first meeting between the Corps District Engineer and the opposition group's representatives.

This important meeting was held at the public library and was attended by the CORD lawyer, fifteen officers and advisors of CORD, and the State Representative and Senator. With the District Engineer were one member of the Corps' legal staff and four aides. The meeting was held at the District Engineer's request so that the Corps and the opposition could discuss the project. During the meeting the CORD lawyer outlined the basis for legal action by CORD and then suggested a 12-to 18-month delay in the project while the various environmental problems were studied thoroughly. The Corps representatives admitted that there were environmental problems but added that none of the issues brought up by the CORD lawyer were surprises to the Corps planners; they had been included in the plan for development of the project. The District Engineer explained that he could not, therefore, stop the project. After being convinced that legal action was imminent, the Engineer did agree to a three-day halt of the project to allow the Corps to reassess the various problems raised by the opposition group. After the meeting was adjourned the officers of CORD thanked the Corps representatives for the visit and told the District Engineer that they appreciated his attempt to apprise them of the Corps' position, but they fully intended to stop the project. One of the aides said that the project was an eventuality: "Why prolong the agony? We will win in the end." An officer of CORD responded, "Well, sonny, we'll see about that."

In July a Senator, citing strong local opposition (he was receiving 20 letters a day in opposition to the project) and environmental factors, stated that he was opposed to the Green Creek Project and called upon the

Senate to withhold appropriations. Included in his statement was an attack on the Corps for holding only three public meetings on the project in 30 years. The news of the Senator's stand against the project was considered a victory by the opposition group, but all informants said that they knew that the fight was just beginning.

In an attempt to solicit the aid of the Governor in opposing the project, a group of 44 CORD officers, advisors, and members (from Blue and Green County) met with the Governor for over 90 minutes in mid-July. The spokesman for CORD discussed all of their reasons for opposing the project, one by one; as they did so, various Green County public officials such as the County Judge commented about how the loss of fifty families and their productive farms would hurt the county. Others mentioned that the state Democratic leaders (such as the Governor) should be backing the Democrats of Green County because all of the people of the county opposed the project. They also suggested that while the proponents for the dam were many and vocal, there were many Blue countians opposed to the dam.

The Governor reacted by stating that he was neutral about the project, that he felt that this was a disagreement between the U.S. Congressman and U.S. Senator. His reason for this stand was that there were just as many people for the project as there were people against it. The main question, he said, was whether or not the project could be considered as progress.

The first of August was devoted by CORD officers and advisors to an attempt at persuading the U.S. House and Senate conferees to exclude funds for the Green Creek project from the public works appropriations bill. The House Subcommittee had included the Green Creek project in its version of the bill, while the Senate subcommittee had deleted the project at the urging of Senator Cook. A Conference Committee Meeting was being held

to work out various differences between the two versions of the bill. The efforts to persuade the conferring congressmen to deny funds for the project included the collection and duplication of letters, affidavits, and other documents, including legal memoranda. In addition to preparing documented information outlining the CORD reasons for opposing the project, the opponents made numerous phone calls to Congressmen and Senators, urging their support for the Senate version of the bill. These phone calls continued until minutes before the Conference Committee met. The Green Creek project, despite the opposition group efforts, was included in the final version of the public works bill. That same afternoon the officers of CORD met at the home of one of the officers to assess their position and to prepare a statement for the press.

In November CORD held its first formal meeting of officers, advisors, and members since late summer. The meeting was convened at one of the Baptist churches in Hickory and was attended by approximately thirty people. Blue Countians reported on observed Corps activities in Blue County, advisors who were monitoring the project's status in Washington reported that the U.S. Senator had asked for a review of the cost-benefit ratio for the project, and others reviewed the organization's activities of the past year. A vote was taken and passed on a resolution to begin regular meetings once each month. This schedule of meetings did not last, however, and after January no regular meetings were held until mid-March 1974.

From March until May CORD officers and advisors were busy preparing for a second trip to Washington and gathering documented information to be used in the legal action. In May, two CORD advisors and their legal counsel went to Washington and met with some of the same agencies as in

1973. The most important meeting was with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) representative and a member of the EPA's legal staff. They suggested that CORD had grounds for legal action if they could produce admissible evidence for all of their claims and urged them to take the matter to court as soon as possible. This was especially important because it was learned on this same trip that the Senator had, without giving a reason, reversed his stand on the project.

Legal Action

The next two months were spent in finalizing the initial civil action against the project. The Citizens' Organization to Resist the Dam filed a complaint against the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army in July 1974. The complaint included numerous allegations of improper or inadequate actions by the Corps in the planning and formulation of the project and in the preparation and processing of the environmental impact statement. The plaintiffs' complaint also alleged that specific National Environmental Policy Act (1969) provisions had been violated. The objective of the litigation was to enjoin the Corps from completing the Green Creek Reservoir Project.

Throughout the fall of 1974 the CORD membership was preparing for the actual hearing, scheduled for January 1975. Their major task was to prepare evidence to substantiate their claims that the area would be less useful for recreation if the project were completed and that numerous violations of specific NEPA provisions had occurred. Knowledgeable individuals were sought to give testimony as experts in the areas of geology, mining, archeology, economics, and hydrology. Affidavits from landowners, ore laboratory reports, public hearing notices, and other documents were collected for use as evidence.

The three-day hearing was heavily attended by CORD members and interested friends despite the distance from Green Creek. Each day the court was filled with CORD members intently listening to the evidence and testimony given by both sides. Before and after court sessions and during recesses, some CORD members were visibly worried, others remained silent and smiling, and a number of the CORD officers were observed talking to the Corps District representatives about the project and the claims made in the complaint.

The Federal District Judge refused to grant a temporary injunction to halt the project, but an agreement was reached between the plaintiffs' and defendant's attorneys that no contact would occur between the involved parties. After reviewing and evaluating the transcript of evidence, briefs, and exhibits, the court issued a Memorandum of Opinion and Court Order pursuant to the civil action in July 1975. A judgment was handed down in favor of the plaintiffs for three specific claims. Curative action was ordered in the form of additional information about oil seepage in the project area and the cost-benefit ratio, as well as supplemental data for annual appropriations requests.

While awaiting the court's decision, the members were actively preparing for a third trip to Washington, D.C. in May. This was the largest delegation, including three officers of CORD, two owners of a coal company, and an advisor. The delegation split up in order to meet with as many agency representatives as possible. The important meetings were with the Federal Energy Administration concerning a Corps claim made in the FEIS for the project. It was stated in the FEIS that the coal in the project area was of low-quality. The owners of the coal company disagreed with this appraisal and had purchased mineral leases

throughout one end of the valley, stating that they had found the coal in the area to be of good quality and available in sufficient quantity to warrant recovery.

Throughout the summer of 1975 CORD members were again sending letters to the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), Senators, Congressmen, and the Senate and House Subcommittee on Public Works. These letters mentioned the amounts of coal on each landowner's property and the nation's need for energy. Consultants were hired by CORD to evaluate the economic impact of the project and determine the amount and value of the Green Creek coal, and their reports were sent to various agencies such as the FEA, CEQ, and the Office for Management and Budget.

While the CORD membership was jubilant over the judgment in their favor, they realized that once the Corps filed the requested supplemental data, the injunction would be lifted. The CORD lawyer was instructed to pursue a second suit questioning the constitutionality of the cost-sharing contract between the Commonwealth and the Corps, while the CORD advisors and officers continued to urge the Governor and Kentucky's Senators to oppose the project.

The Corps complied with all aspects of the court order by filing with CEQ and distributing to all interested persons and agencies all of the supplemental data requested by the court. This process was completed by the spring of 1976. Each year the Corps has continued to comply by including supplemental data in its annual project review.

State Coalition

The officers of CORD had continued their efforts at persuading the Governor to take a stand against the project throughout the winter and

spring. They were also active in preliminary meetings (during the spring and summer) and finally the formulation of the Kentucky Rivers Coalition. The coalition is a Lexington-based collection of land-owners and environmental and recreation groups opposing various reservoir projects in Kentucky. This merger of resources represented a change from the strategy of resisting one reservoir at a time to a plan for state-wide resistance.

CHAPTER IV

REASONS FOR RESISTANCE: THE PERCEIVED COSTS OF THE PROJECT

One of the primary interests of this research was the determination of why people were resisting the reservoir project. This section is a summary of responses to open-ended questions directed to the subject of reasons for resistance. Informants were asked, "What is the main (or most important) thing that caused you personally to decide to oppose the project?" Further, informants were asked about secondary reasons, either related or unrelated to their first answer. Only six informants were able to identify clearly a primary reason for their resistance, and all were quick to add that the first reason given was one of a number of related reasons for their opposition to the project. Most informants were unable to choose between two and sometimes three or four related reasons for their active opposition. Often respondents were asked to clarify vague statements and at times they were simply unable to do so. Overall, the information gathered fell into the four logical categories of home and homeplace, churches and cemeteries, family, and neighbors. While these categories of responses are discussed separately here for easier description, it should be understood that they are very closely related to one another and that the loss of all was of major concern to the informants.

The Homeplace

The most frequent answer to questions about why people resisted the project centered around the land on which they lived. At first, many informants seemed unable to explain what their land meant to them; they

used phrases such as, "This is home to us," "I would find it hard to call some other place home," or "This farm means an awful lot to us." After carefully considering the question, however, they were usually able to state why their land was so important to them.

The explanations centered around what many called "the worth of the land." Most informants explained that their families had lived in the Green Creek Valley for many years. Four informants said that they were living on part of the original land homesteaded in the early or mid-1800's, and many others (12 informants in all) stated that their families had lived in the area since the late 1800's. Accompanying the explanations were short histories of the informants' ancestors which included various events connected with the land which their families owned. Nine informants made a clear distinction when discussing their land; they noted that the land that was owned by individuals was distinct from the "family land" or "homeplace." In understanding the worth of land in the Green Creek area, it is necessary to understand the difference between an individual's land and family land.

"Family land" or the "homeplace" was defined by informants as the original place or geographic location where the family ancestors had settled. In most cases this included the original home and land which was either homesteaded, bought, or inherited. Land which was purchased after the original settlement is not included in the family land. In some cases, the land has been inherited by one of the sons or daughters or by the siblings as a group. It has sometimes been the case, in the latter event, that one of the siblings purchased his or her brothers' and sisters' shares in order to consolidate the ownership of the land.

While some informants in Dreamin and in Cane Lick referred to the family land and homeplace interchangeably, informants in Hickory and

High Point did not. These informants stated that the family land was the land which was settled by their ancestors and that the homeplace referred to the ancestral family home. In some instances the family home had long since been destroyed or replaced and the place where it had stood was called the site of the homeplace or simply the homeplace. In four cases, newer dwellings had been built upon or next to the site of the original family home; the new dwelling was called home by the household which occupied it but not the homeplace. The site upon which the newer dwelling sat, however, was called the homeplace or the site of the homeplace.

Land owned by individuals was not considered family land, with the exception of the aforementioned cases, where a sibling had purchased all other shares or had inherited the entire farm. In these cases and in the cases where the land was owned jointly by a number of siblings, the important factor was not who owned it but that it was the place where the family had been born and raised and in some cases had died and been buried. In pointing this out, informants gave as explanations short histories of their ancestors which included various events connected with the land. Rather than attempt to summarize all of the histories, a few have been selected and are included here as examples.

The Reines

Jimmy Reines, a teacher, lives on a ridge overlooking Green Creek. To get to his five-room house, he either uses his four-wheel-drive automobile or parks his car near the road and crosses the creek on a high swinging bridge. Reines' grandfather purchased the land from a man who had homesteaded a large area in the valley and later sold tracts of land to other early immigrants to the valley.

Reines remembers many stories that he heard as a boy concerning the early days of the valley, but he says, laughing, that time was not so long ago. His father helped build the log cabin that makes up part of his home in Hickory. Over the years other rooms, insulation, and a better roof have been added. His most vivid memories concern his childhood, when no all-weather road, electricity, telephones, or other modern conveniences existed. He says it is hard to explain to young people who have been raised with all of the modern conveniences what it was like back in the twenties here in the valley. "We didn't miss all of this modern stuff because we didn't know we were missing it."

Distances were greater when Reines was a child. The main road from one place to another was the creek. "You were either headed up the creek or down the creek." Reines' sister said that she clearly remembers riding the horses down the creek to church on Sunday and walking to the small school a short distance away. Both remember their father's farming, the closeness of the family, and the special feelings they always had about the place where they were reared.

Reines explained, "We are closely tied to this land. My parents are buried over there on the hill." Reines, like many other informants, mentioned that members of his family had lived, died and were buried on their land. "I can only explain it by saying we are very sentimental about our home." Reines said that if he had wanted to move he could have done it many times. He felt that his profession allowed him much greater mobility than most people and he could teach in adjoining Blue County, as well as many other places. "As you can see, I'm still here," he stated, while his sister added, "Every time I think about them flooding the land and making my home a wilderness playground for a bunch of out-

siders, it makes me sick." Reines said that he had heard that the reservoir project would affect his home before he got the notice of the landowners meeting. When he heard about it Reines said he too was hard hit by the news, and the more he thought about their taking his home and the family land, the more determined he became in his decision to fight the dam.

The Smiths

Elbert and Betty Smith also feel closely tied to their land, Betty especially so because her family homesteaded their farm in the early 1800's. Four generations of her family have lived in Hickory. Hers was one of six families which said they had lived in two of the neighborhoods for over 100 years.

Like the Reines, Mrs. Smith remembers her childhood in and around the creek with fond memories. She and her husband built their house next to the site of the original family home. She pointed out of her window and described various events that had occurred, times when she was very young and had gotten into trouble or favorite games she and her brothers, sisters and friends had played. She remembered, "We weren't rich but we had everything we needed." She had always been very close to her father, a factor in her being the heir to the family land. Her parents were buried in the family cemetery above their house.

Mr. Smith feels the same way about their land, although he was not raised in Hickory. He remembers that when he was much younger, he and a friend were forced to leave eastern Kentucky to find work. Through his labor union they were able to locate jobs in the Southwest. After they had worked on one job for over a year, the work was finished, and they were laid off. They then drove to a new construction site looking for

more work and found that the foreman on the job was hiring only those who would give him some kind of kickback. Smith remembers, "Well, I looked at that ol' boy that was with me and we didn't say a word. We loaded up the car and started driving. We slowed down for food and gas but we didn't stop until we hit this driveway. We both knew we had had enough and when we got in that car we were heading home." Smith said he had lived a lot of places in and out of Kentucky, but here was his home.

The Smiths stated that there was another reason they had decided to oppose the reservoir project which was as important to them (if not more so) as their home and the family land. This was their church and their family cemetery.

Churches and Cemeteries

When people were explaining why they were resisting the reservoir project, most mentioned the planned removal of the cemeteries and loss of their churches. In all, seven churches with a combined membership of over 1,000 are within the project area. Approximately seventy-six cemeteries—a few adjoining the churches, but most privately maintained—will be relocated.

One minister explained that there are three denominations of Baptists in the Green Creek Valley and all would be considered conservative (when compared to Southern Baptists, for example), but that two of the denominations were decidedly fundamentalist in their beliefs. This is consistent with Brewer's finding in his study of religion and churches in the Southern Appalachian Region. Brewer states, "Religion in the Southern Appalachians was built upon a dissenting Protestant tradition and it remains dominantly sectarian and fundamentalist today in attitude and beliefs, in church practice, and in general orientation toward society" (1962, 217). The

large number of churches relative to the number of members is also characteristic of the region, as is the evidenced sectarianism (Brewer, 1962).

The minister stated, "Some of these churches are deeply rooted in the culture of the local people because they have been here since the land was settled. Some of these families have attended their churches for generations." He went on to note that "early pioneers and church leaders alike are buried in these cemeteries." To the United and Regular Baptists, the removal of cemeteries is considered a desecration. The reason for this is that these Baptists believe that when Christ returns to the earth on Judgment Day (the Second Coming), the bodies of the dead will rise, restored, from the grave. Disturbing the graves in any way is believed to be a violation of this fundamental belief, in that it denies eternal life to the buried ancestors.

While most informants (30) said they were members of churches in the valley, some (6) said that they did not attend church often or, as one middle-aged man suggested, "I don't go as often as I need it." Others who were interviewed said that while they did not consider themselves as deeply religious as some of their neighbors, they did worry about the cemeteries. Everyone interviewed expressed his respect for the dead and a few pointed to their family cemeteries, noting that there were no weeds and that the grass was mowed. One elderly man said that he was "no saint" but every time he thought about people digging up the dead, he felt a cold chill down his spine. An older woman in High Point said that "if they [the Corps of Engineers or some other outsiders] come and move my husband and parents, I just don't know what will happen."

When discussing the cemeteries, it was common for a few Hickory residents to digress and talk about their church. These people felt that their church was unique and that joining a similar church somewhere else would be impossible. This feeling was explained by a lay preacher who said that the church was a "Primitive Baptist church" whose founder had split away from another Baptist Church many years ago. Since this was the only church of its kind that he was aware of, he assumed that there would be no possibility of continuing his organized worship in another place. He said that he would rely on God to see him and the other church members through if they lost their battle with the government.

Others in High Point, Dreamin, and Cane Lick echoed these thoughts. They said that they supposed that they could join another church of the same denomination but they said it would not be the same. Churches, they said, are made up of "like-minded people," that is, people who hold similar religious beliefs. Eighteen people mentioned that if the project were completed and they were forced to migrate, it would be unlikely that they could all relocate close enough to each other to maintain their congregations.

One lay preacher in the valley said that normally, "when there was some form of personal tragedy in a man's life, he could rely on God, his religion and his church. When these people are moved, their churches will be taken as well and they won't have their churches to fall back on for support."

Family

Before discussing the perceived threat that relocation posed for the families of the CORD membership, it is necessary to discuss the kinship structure of the residents of the four neighborhoods, because it is not altogether like that of American society in general. Important in this discussion is the work of Brown (1950a, 1952b, 1952c) in the Beech Creek neighborhoods of eastern Kentucky.

Brown (1952b, p. 297) stated that "in most ways the kinship structure of Beech Creek is like that of American Society at large." Brown points out that Parsons (1943, 24) has identified American kinship as a conjugal system in that it is made up "exclusively of interlocking conjugal families." Brown found that typically in Beech Creek, as in most of American Society, an individual "is during his life a member not of one but of two conjugal families, the family of orientation and the family of procreation" (1952b, p. 297). Parsons (1943, p. 29), in discussing this pattern in American society, states that "this fact naturally is of central significance in all kinship systems, but in our own it acquires a special importance because of the structural prominence of the conjugal family and its peculiar isolation. In most kinship systems many persons retain throughout the life cycle a fundamental stable - though changing - status in one or more extended kinship units. In our system this is not the case for anyone."

The Beech Creek kinship system was found to be a variant from the American pattern described by Parsons, in that Brown found that there were extended kinship groupings. Brown (1950, 174-215) describes the typical Beech Creek household as consisting of the husband, wife, and children, with the three principal relationships of husband-wife, parent-

child, and inter-sibling. These households made up farm families which Brown describes as autonomous economic and social units (1952a, 1952b). The autonomous nature of the farm family aided in the development of family solidarity. Brown (1950, 235) notes that "solidarity among parents and their mature children and among adult siblings is one of the most significant influences in the lives of Beech Creek people." It was, in part, this solidarity which predicated the extended kinship system in Beech Creek neighborhoods.

In describing the extended family, Brown (1950, 241) states that there were groups of "two, three, and four families in the Beech Creek neighborhoods which were particularly solidary and friendly. These groups were primarily groups of siblings' families or of siblings and their parental families; that is, they were extended families." Brown named these extended families "family groups" and noted that "through their daily intimate contacts the members of a family group built up a strong feeling of group solidarity. They thought of themselves as a group, and the neighborhood thought of them as a solidary group" (Brown 1952b, 300-301).

In general, this same kinship system was found to exist in Hickory, High Point, and Dreamin. Cave Lick is excluded from this list for two reasons. First, only four Cave Lick households were directly involved in the resistance effort. The majority of the households in the neighborhood (18) stated either that they didn't care whether they had to move or they wanted to move. Therefore, there was not enough data to develop a convincing argument. Secondly, the data collected in the neighborhood clearly indicate separate farm families, all of whom stated that they were not "blood relations."

In the first round of interviews, which included 38 individuals and their respective households, many informants in Hickory (9 of 12), High Point (7 of 10), and Dreamin (5 of 8) stated that they were worried about the effect relocation would have on their families. Their first concern was that they would be unable to relocate as close to their relatives as they would like. Three Hickory couples said that they would miss not having their grandchildren and children living nearby. Their children and grandchildren typically visit two, three, or more times each week. Always on the weekend and often during the week after school, the grandchildren visit their grandparents.

One High Point man said that he was "finally retired" (construction worker) and only farmed a few acres (38 acres) to pass the time. He said that he had retired so that he could see more of his two sons, their wives, and his six grandchildren. "If they move us out," he said, "I doubt that we'd all find good land close together and I wouldn't much care for that." In general, the sentiments of the grandparents were repeated by their adult children.

In all three neighborhoods, the parents of younger children mentioned that they thought that it was important that young children visit with their grandparents often. Usually, when asked why this visitation was important, the responses were centered around the belief that the children learned from and enjoyed the experience. Some said that their parents "really enjoyed the children" and one woman said her parents "really like being grandparents," and "if you think they don't like to see their grandchildren, come and watch us visit them without the kids. You'd never see such a fuss."

All respondents talked about the visiting of their parents, siblings, children, or grandchildren respectively. Visits between households occurred

with surprising regularity, especially on the weekends. The greatest amount of visiting reportedly took place on Sunday afternoons after church, although during the week visits occurred with a great degree of regularity and the visiting was observed to follow a distinct pattern. This student, while interviewing key informants, observed numerous residents of Hickory, High Point, and Dreamin visiting on Saturdays and Sundays. Typically, it became customary for the student to call in advance to determine where the informant (or informants) would be.

Russell Stevens, a retired school teacher (a key informant) in High Point, said that the visiting among family members had occurred since he could remember and that often (as this student found by experience) the midday meal would be included in the visiting activities. The teacher said that these visits were important for families because it "helps them to keep together." "Families in this area [High Point and Hickory] are close knit," and he said that when members of a family are not visiting one another, there is usually something wrong. That is, some problem or altercation has arisen within the family. Stevens said that it was important for this student to "understand about families" in order to understand the resistance group.

Stevens went on to discuss various High Point "families" as "the Whites" or "the Smiths." When discussing a family, he would first mention the person whom he said was "sort of the head" of the family. For example, Bud White, his wife, Bud "Junior", his wife, and four children are one "bunch" or "set" of Whites. There is also the "Eb Whites" made up of Eb, his sister, his four sons, and three daughters-in-law, and their six children. Stevens said that "way back when, Eb and Bud's families were probably related but that was too far back [in time], so they don't think

of each other as direct kin or blood relatives." Indeed, when interviewed, Eb White said, "the Bud Whites are a different set of Whites than us." Both he and Bud counted their kin for the student and it was found that the account by Stevens was accurate.

Subsequent interviews revealed that there were family groups present in three of the Green Creek neighborhoods which were similar in structure and organization to those described by Brown. In fact, the use of the terms "counting kin" (the accounting of blood relatives), "sets" (a term to distinguish among contemporary groups who were not thought of as blood relatives), and the descriptions of sets are very similar to what Brown reports in the Beech Creek neighborhoods (1950, 216-225). Each family group member knew who the family leader was and the leaders readily identified each other within their respective neighborhoods. The interviewed residents of the three neighborhoods were all able to identify the various family groups and most could identify which households were members of which family groups.

In all, nine family groups were identified in the three neighborhoods. In Hickory, nine of twelve households who were involved in the resistance effort constituted a majority of the membership of five family groups (including the Ginny Dryse set, Reines set, Smith set and White set). In High Point, six of the ten families were members of two family groups (the Stevens set and James set). In Dreamin, five of the eight households were members of two family groups (the Leadford set and Jamison set). It should be noted that 18 of the 21 respondents who stated that the threat to their families was a major reason for resisting the dam were members of family groups. The most repeated remarks (except discussions of visiting) of these eighteen informants centered around family help and aid during some crisis. One man, Jed Stevens, was particularly adamant about

this point. He said his wife Bess had to have an emergency appendectomy in the mid 1960's and there were some minor problems associated with the surgery. Bess and the children moved into Jed's parents' home and stayed for two weeks while Bess convalesced. Jed asked, "What if we all got run off from here?...What if one of us gets really sick?...Who will help?... We won't be able to get any land close by one another, so I guess we won't be able to help each other." It was the statement of almost all of these informants that the family is expected to help during any crisis such as "illness, fire, accident, death or other trouble." Again, this is consistent with what Brown describes in his study of Beech Creek (1950, 1952 b.).

It cannot be over-emphasized that most informants found it difficult to conceive of their family land, family cemeteries, and family relationships as separate categories. That is, in discussing these three areas of possible loss, informants would continuously move from one topic to the other with constant digressions or stories to explain their points. The treatment here has been, in a sense, an analytical separation for ease of discussion.

The fourth area of concern expressed by informants as a reason for resisting the proposed reservoir involves the loss of their neighbors and more generally, their neighborhoods. This category is not a merely analytical separation, since "neighbors" were differentiated by the informants themselves.

Neighbors

Although neighbors, their qualities, and their worth were usually the last item mentioned by informants attempting to explain why they were resisting the reservoir project, these subjects were often the most talked about. Neighbors, sometimes individuals and sometimes households, were

always said to live "near-by" the informants. All informants referred to the friendships which they shared and most stated their complete trust in those whom they identified as their neighbors. As in the previous areas mentioned, the worth of good neighbors was explained by telling numerous stories of events that had happened in the past (both recent and distant) which involved neighbors. The value of what one man called "a tried and true neighbor" was discussed by most of the informants in all four neighborhoods (26 of 34).

Elbert Smith, in Hickory, was recently hospitalized for a number of days and was confined to bedrest for a few weeks afterward. While he was in the hospital, he had not thought of all of the work which needed to be done back on the farm. On the long drive home, however, as he rode along looking at other farms, he was suddenly aware that his hay needed to be cut, bailed, and stored. The more he thought about it, the more he realized how long he had been in the hospital, and by the time he was within a few miles of home he was imagining that the hay had gone to seed and the tobacco was probably overgrown with weeds. He described his feelings as he turned into his drive, when he first saw that the hay had been cut, bailed, and stored and the tobacco had been cultivated. "I knew right away that my neighbor and his sons had been by to help out," he said. "I called 'em up to say thanks and ol' Otis told me that he and the boys had finished their work early one day so they just headed over here and did a little to help out." Smith went on to say that working with hay was not easy work and he added that this was not an isolated case.

When asked about the incident, Otis White acted as if it were not very important, but when asked about his neighbors he said there were "none better in the world." He said that "neighbors here help each

other when they can. You can't find a thing that a neighbor won't lend you." He laughed and then added, "exceptin' maybe the wife."

In High Point, Russell Stevens said that people who were neighbors trusted each other, and one of his neighbors, Abel Brown, said that the ignition keys had never been out of his tractors. Brown said that sometimes he would come in late in the evening and notice his tractor and some attachments were gone, "but I never ever gave it a thought because I knew that one of my neighbors had borrowed it." He said that High Point was a place where a man didn't have to "tie everything down, because we don't have any stealing around here." He went on to comment that if the government puts in the dam, all of that would be lost. "A man would have to do some pretty mean searchin' to find neighbors like mine," he concluded, "and if you could find a place like this it still wouldn't be the same."

An older woman, Maud Caney, had nothing but praise for her neighbors and became visibly upset at the prospect of losing them if the dam were built. Her two daughters have married and moved north to Ohio with their husbands and "Mr. Caney passed away, God rest his soul, eight years ago." Since his death her neighbors have been dropping by to say hello and pass some time. Often they bring fresh vegetables or some portion of prepared food which they said they had fixed too much of for their own needs. One neighbor boy (he is 37 years old) cuts the lawn that borders the house and separates it from the asphalt road. Beside the house she pointed to a fenced garden where she said her neighbors, seeing her working in the early morning or late evening, would on occasion stop and get an extra hoe and "sort of help out. Boy, I've got the hoein'est neighbors you ever saw."

She went on to say that she simply did not know what she would do if they built the dam and she were forced to move away from her neighbors.

The Comparison Group

As was mentioned in the Methods section of this thesis, 12 individuals were interviewed who were not members of the resistance organization. These people lived in Cane Lick and were selected for interviews to determine whether or not their responses would differ significantly from those of members. Of specific interest were their discussions about why they were leaving or wanted to leave the Green Creek valley.

Of the twelve individuals interviewed, three of the four women and two of the eight males were widows or widowers. One of the other males had never been married. Half of the informants (6 of the 12) therefore lived alone, and three of these people owned their home and less than two adjoining acres. Only one informant said he farmed and the little that he did he said was only to "keep busy." Five of these people were receiving pensions, eight were receiving social security income, and four worked at non-farm-related jobs.

All of these individuals stated that they did not want to live in Cane Lick. One widow said that she thought that this was "as good a chance as any" to "get shed of this ol' house" and move to town nearer her daughter. Her neighbor said she was interested in living in town (Bluetown) because she felt more secure there. She was in her late sixties, she said, and if she needed medical attention she could get it "in short order." Five of the eight retired people said they wanted to live in town and three said they were going to move whether the Government bought their land or not. The other three retirees said they intended to "sell out" and move to Florida or Arizona where it was warmer.

The four households whose head was still working full-time all said that they wanted to move to towns in the area because that was where they worked. One man, a house painter, said he did all of his work in Bluetown and would like to live closer to his work. He emphatically stated that he did not intend to live "in-town where everybody knows your business." Another man said he was tired by his hour-long commute to the strip-mining site where he was working. One woman said she was about to "marry off" her only daughter and as soon as that was accomplished, "I'm going to load up and move to Louisville." She said she could live with her older sister until she found work.

Only two of the comparison informants said that the reservoir project would be beneficial. One cited the recreational benefits of "great fishing" and the other said that Bluetown would never be flooded again. Six individuals said they did not know if the reservoir would be beneficial or harmful, and two of these said they didn't care. The remaining four, all retired, said they thought the project would be harmful. One man, a retired driller, said he thought the lake would be an "oil slick." He stated, "I have drilled all over and this here will be some kind of a mess." The other three informants said they thought that the reservoir was not necessary and that it was not right for the Government to "run good people off their land."

Closeness to blood-relatives was given as an important factor in four people's decision to move away. They said that they wanted to live closer to their children or siblings. Aside from the two brothers who intended to move to a warmer climate together, there was no evidence of extended families of the sort Brown called family groups. Eight of the twelve people said they had lived in the area less than twenty years, and

four said they had lived in Cane Lick less than five years. Only four individuals had been born and raised in Cane Lick. Clearly this is in marked contrast to the responses about kinship and residential history given by members of CORD. In Hickory, for example, within every family there was at least one individual who had been born and raised there or who had lived there for more than thirty years.

Another sharp contrast was revealed by questions related to neighbors. None of the twelve informants reacted with the same enthusiasm or vigor as did CORD members when asked about their neighbors. Most said that they had never had any trouble with their neighbors or that they did not see them often. This difference, like that of kinship relations, can probably be attributed to the difference in residential histories of the two groups.

Four of these informants said they went to church regularly, and six others said they were members of churches. All twelve informants expressed distress at the impending removal of graves from local cemeteries. Six people said they had parents or siblings buried in the valley, but only two had relatives buried in Cane Lick, and they were particularly worried about exhumation.

Overall, it can be stated that for these twelve people, their general attitudes and interests were not the same as those of CORD members. That is, they did not seem as interested in where they were living as in where they intended to go. On the other hand, the members of CORD were entirely interested in where and with whom they were living and had no interest in moving to some new locale. More specifically, the members of CORD were more involved with living in their neighborhoods. The importance of their families and neighbors was clearly illustrated by their

stories, which attempted to explain their attachment to their land, churches, cemeteries, and in general their neighborhoods. When mentioning the time they did something or saw something, there was always a description of who was with them and what their relationship was to each other, be it kinship or friendship. Usually there were numerous digressions in the illustrative descriptions of various events, especially when two family groups were involved. These digressions were for the education of the researcher, who would not have sufficient knowledge of the neighborhood, its families, and their differences to appreciate fully the account being given, because he was not a long-time resident of the community. A second important part of these historical accounts was the place where they had occurred. Often the location was as important as the event, because the place remained as a reminder of what had occurred. This was especially true of the churches and cemeteries, but was also true of the family land and the creek.

Numerous members of CORD, remembering when they were youngsters, told a few tales about where they had done one thing or another. In trying to explain where the event had occurred, they would name one of the large boulders, known to most of their neighbors. Many, after realizing that the student had no idea where the event had happened, would draw a map in the dirt or discuss the place as being a certain distance from a fork, where a church was located, or a man's land. One man said he had "run with a few of the ol' timers" and had "learned most of the rocks" (boulder names) down the creek. He said they each had a story to "help a feller remember their names."

In summary, the members of CORD perceived the loss of their homes, homeplaces, churches, cemeteries, family, and neighbors as the cost they

would have to pay if the project were completed. In general, these individuals felt that the loss of these things was too high a price to pay, and they were left with no alternative but to resist. As everyone identified the specific costs related to them and their family, there were a few who said they saw this "fight against the Government" as a "fight for a way of life." These few individuals were able to identify, very precisely, what their family groups and their neighbors' family groups would lose if they were relocated. These same men were identified by every member of CORD as the officers/leaders of the organization.

CHAPTER V

LEADERSHIP

In attempting to understand how decisions were made within CORD, it was first necessary to identify the individuals who were directly involved in the decision-making process and then to determine how decisions were being made. Further it was necessary to ascertain what the authority system of the group was, that is, how the right to make decisions had been allocated within the organization. From the open-ended interviews concerning the authority system and leadership it was clear that the selection of officers (those individuals who were elected by the members to hold formal offices such as president, vice-president, etc.) was of considerable importance. This was especially true in explaining the significance of the neighborhood social organization in the organization of CORD.

This section will begin with a discussion of the members' accounts of how officers were elected and how the structure of the resistance group developed. Next the section will deal with members' accounts of why the officers were elected and how they were expected to behave, followed by a discussion of the leadership and authority system of the group.

Formation and Development of the Formal Organization

In the early spring of 1973, three men were elected as the "temporary officers" of CORD in the Green County Courthouse. Before this time the resistance activities of "getting up a petition" and "writing letters" had been coordinated by three or four people who at times worked together and at other times worked individually. By all accounts, it was after this meeting that the organization became recognized as a formal group by

members and non-members alike. At that meeting officers were elected to represent the families who were opposed to the reservoir project and money was collected to hire a lawyer.

All of the sixteen informants who said they remembered the meeting basically agreed about what transpired during the sessions. They all agreed that it was the county attorney who convinced them that they needed to "get organized to present a legal case against the dam." The attorney said that he believed that they had grounds for legal action and would need a lawyer who was a specialist in environmental law to argue their case. He stressed the need for a formal organization because the "fight against the project might last a good while." One informant said, "We organized then and there. We elected temporary officers and collected money to hire a lawyer." The temporary officers elected in the Green County Courthouse were re-elected as regular officers at a second meeting held a few weeks later in a member's home in Hickory. Four other Green County men were asked to become advisors to the group and they accepted. Both members and leaders agreed that the second meeting and election were necessary because more families could attend the meeting in Hickory and take part in the election of officers. The leaders felt that this procedure was the proper way to identify formally the officers and advisors for the entire group. This factor was especially important in the case of the advisors from Greenville because they were not well known by some of the Hickory families. The advisors were not officially (publicly) named until later in the year (midsummer); however, both leaders and members agreed that they began to act as advisors after the early spring meeting at the Greenville Courthouse.

The members did not commonly distinguish between elected officers (president, secretary, and treasurer) and advisors, but all of the officers

and advisors themselves, when discussing the positions of authority within the group, did note the distinction. The major difference emphasized was that the officers were the representatives of the group and were responsible for deciding what should be done to stop the dam. The advisors, on the other hand, were chosen for the purpose of advising the officers within their specific areas of expertise and helping them organize various resistance activities. These distinctions were not observed in actual practice by the researcher. After a considerable number of conversations about how decisions were made, it became clear that at least two of the advisors were initially involved with the officers in deciding to organize opposition to the project and in making the first decisions about how to resist. That is, the elected officers and two advisors were responsible for the development and adoption of the policies which the group followed and the long-term strategies which were subsequently developed.

An understanding of these men and their positions within the neighborhood of Hickory and within CORD is crucial in understanding the leadership structure and organization of the resistance group. Here is presented a discussion of each of these individual's positions within the neighborhood and the resistance group. This will be followed by a discussion of the decision-making process and authority system of the group.

The Officers

In an attempt better to understand the selection of officers and the initial organization process, informants in Hickory were asked why leaders were elected in general and why specific men were elected to

their respective positions. Further they were asked what it was that officers did.

Three responses were indicative of answers given to the first question: informants stated that the officers were elected "to represent all of us opposed to the project," "to get a lawyer and file a suit," and "to find out how to stop this thing and let us know so we can get it done." In explaining these responses, most informants would talk about the elected officers individually and describe them as friends and neighbors, as well as officers of CORD.

The president was described as a "young fellow with a nice wife and kids" who owns his home and land. The members all pointed out that he operates his own business and is the son of a well known and respected woman in the neighborhood of Hickory. He was described as "hard-working, smart, and willing to stand up to the Government or anybody." Everyone mentioned that his family had lived in Hickory for over 100 years.

During interviews with this researcher, the president often thought about the questions for a few moments before answering, was articulate, and usually expressed himself with the fewest words necessary to convey his meaning. He said he did not know why he had been elected as president, except that at the time of the election he had more free time to work against the dam than some of the other men opposed to the project. He said that the secretary, treasurer, and two advisors had started the opposition and that at the time he was elected, he was just "one more person who was against the dam." The members, however, said that his young age, family name, and reputation for being a hard worker all contributed to his being elected president of CORD.

The secretary of CORD was always described as a "well-educated man," "an outspoken feisty school teacher," and a member of one of the older

families in the valley. He was considered by his neighbors to be the individual who started the early opposition. Everyone said that he was very knowledgeable and well respected in Hickory, and that he had taught school for over 25 years. The secretary said he was elected secretary because he had been involved "from the first" and because he was already passing petitions and writing letters to congressmen and senators in opposition to the project. The members agreed with this, but quickly added that he was an educated man and represented a family that had lived in the valley for three generations. One neighbor laughingly said that the school teacher was as tenacious as a bulldog: "Once he sets his teeth in something, he won't let go. That's the kind of people you need to fight a dam."

The treasurer of the organization was a grandfather, a highly-skilled laborer, and a lay preacher, who had married into one of the older families in the valley. Many thought that his affection for the neighborhood and his neighbors was important in selecting him as treasurer. Although he was not born and raised in Hickory, he said that he was deeply tied to his home, neighbors, and church. Perhaps no one was more visibly upset at the prospect of losing the church than the treasurer and his wife. Members said he was elected treasurer because he was honest, hard-working, and very religious.

In general, one officer said, these officers were elected because they were like everyone else in the neighborhood of Hickory. The people felt they would, therefore, represent them and their interests against the project. Indeed, all of the members said that the officers were elected for this reason, as well as to find ways to stop the project. The officers said that they needed help to do the latter, and thus the Advisory Committee was named.

The Advisors

The Advisory Committee was made up of one Hickory resident, two Greenville businessmen, a Green County attorney, and the editor of the local newspaper. The members and officers described these men in terms of their personal attributes, considered important for the resistance effort. The two businessmen were well known in the county seat. One was active in county politics and had held office in the local party organization. The other businessman was well acquainted with all of the local politicians, but was better known for what were called "civic involvements;" one informant noted, for example, that he would always go out of his way to help someone. He had had past dealing with the Corps when they were purchasing easements associated with another reservoir and this accumulated knowledge was considered important. Many informants stressed his ability to "reason out" various situations; he was considered a clear thinker. A few informants said that they felt that his ability to remain friendly with all of the various political groups in the county was important in his selection as an advisor.

The major reason for selecting the attorney as an advisor was that he could give legal advice and represent the resistance group until a lawyer specializing in environmental law could be found. He was also considered very knowledgeable in the area of local, county, and regional politics, a factor many informants cited as important in his selection as an advisor.

The selection of the newspaper editor was considered important by every informant, because all saw the need for someone with the ability to write well and speak in public, with numerous "outside contacts." By outside contacts they meant all of the people outside of the region whom the editor counted among his friends. In addition, the editor

had access to the latest press releases, so the resistance group could be quickly notified of any newsworthy development. All of the officers stressed the editor's knowledge and experience in fact-finding, which they thought would be necessary for the legal action they planned.

The fifth member of the Advisory Committee was a retired oil and gas worker who had lived all his life in Hickory. His family had lived in the valley for over 150 years and he, like his late father, was well known and highly respected by his neighbors. In addition, he was "old friends" with the other advisors and was instrumental in enlisting their interest and assistance. Most informants agreed that the reason he was an advisor was that he did not want to be an officer because his health was not good.

In summary, the officers and advisors had a number of qualities in common. They were all considered intelligent, honest, and diligent men with good reputations in the county. Although two were described as being more fundamental in their religious beliefs than others, all were described as "good Christian men" who had dedicated themselves to stopping the reservoir project. The officers and advisors who were residents of Hickory were land owners and the representatives of families who had resided in the valley for at least one hundred years. Only two of the men, the president and newspaper editor, were younger than fifty years of age. Four of the men were described as being good public speakers and all were said to dress well and act properly in public. Members agreed that these qualities in an officer were necessary if the officer were to be effective in carrying out his duties.

Activities of the Officers

The members of the CORD identified four general activities in which

the officers were engaged: they were to determine ways to stop the dam, keep the membership informed about what to do or what was happening, represent all of the families in the valley who were opposed to the project, and collect money to pay bills. When asked to describe specifically what the officers did, some members used past events to explain. Others generally described what had been done, referring for example, to officers' use of formal and informal meetings to inform members about what was happening.

Typically, when describing how officers figured out ways to stop the dam, the members stated that they sought and received advice from various sources, such as the advisors, lawyers, residents, local politicians, and federal agencies. Many types of informal contacts were described in explaining how members were kept up-to-date with events. Specifically mentioned were telephone calls and formal and informal meetings, such as chance encounters between officers and members in Greenville at neighborhood stores, or on one of the roads leading to or passing through the neighborhood. Most of the informants emphasized that when they met and talked with their neighbors, the topic of conversation almost always turned to the proposed project and what was being done to stop it from being built.

When describing how officers collected money, informants identified two men, one in each county, who were responsible for the collection, but they added that all of the officers and advisors helped. The Treasurer was identified as the individual who kept records of how much was collected and how much was payed to whom. At every formal meeting the treasurer gave a progress report about the finances of the organization.

When discussing the officers' representation of their interests, most members identified specific officers with specific interests. The lay preacher, for example, was viewed as representing those who did not want to lose their churches and cemeteries; the school teacher represented those who were primarily concerned about the loss of their family land. The informant summarized by noting that "overall, these fellows represent all of the people who don't want to leave the valley," explaining that everyone's reasons for opposing the dam were being represented by one or more of the officers or advisors.

Answers by informants to questions about how the officers represented them were diverse. Usually they described the trips to Washington, D.C. as an example. Many mentioned the meeting with the Governor and a few described the court action. Each of these activities was an example of one or more of the officers explaining to "outsiders" why the people of Green Valley were upset about the reservoir project. Other informants did not mention specific events but rather described the process of gathering information about the costs and dangers of building the dam - a job performed by the officers and advisors, who then disseminated the information to local, state, and federal officials. All of the members said that the officers were the men who discussed what had to be done, decided what to do, and finally were responsible for the completion of every resistance activity. Often, they said, officers took on various tasks themselves; at other times they delegated duties to other people.

The officers of CORD generally agreed with the members' descriptions of what they were expected to do, as did the advisors. They gave much more detailed accounts of their activities simply because they had taken part in the planning of each activity of the group and were, therefore, more knowledgeable. The officers did stress the importance of their

"representing" the people of the valley specifically in the decision-making process. In general, the officers agreed that their most important function was to identify ways to stop the reservoir project. This, they said, included deciding what to do and then implementing their decisions.

Decision Making

Decisions were generally made by three officers and one or two advisors after they had fully discussed the situation and possible consequences. The officers said that no decision had been made for the group by fewer than three people. Usually, however, all five of these men were involved in the process. These five men were called the "core leaders" by the other advisors and each other, because they were the men responsible for making decisions which were binding upon the group. As one informant stated, "They are the fellows who call the reel." In this discussion they will be referred to as the leaders.

The decision-making process was described identically by each of the leaders. The researcher was able to observe various decisions being made and, with one exception, the leaders' actions were as they had described. This single observed exception will be discussed after a general description of the decision-making process.

The decision-making process was composed of a series of formal and/or informal discussions between two or more of the leaders. The process could be initiated by any of the leaders by mentioning the need to make a decision about a specific activity to another leader. Usually this was done in conjunction with a discussion of some other (related or unrelated) matter regarding CORD activities. Once a need to make a decision about a particular activity was introduced into the process, the decision was dis-

cussed until agreement was reached, sometimes quickly, within a few hours, and at other times only after weeks had passed. The latter situation was typically caused by a lack of information upon which a decision could be based rather than a disagreement among the leaders. For example, when deciding who would make up the delegation to be sent to Washington, D.C. to represent CORD, the leaders first had to decide what the delegation would be expected to accomplish and which agencies would be visited. These decisions were made almost simultaneously. Information about what the proponents of the reservoir project were planning was considered and discussed, as was other information such as when appointments with agency personnel were being made, what needed to be said on behalf of CORD, and how the trip would be financed. Over a period of two or three weeks all of the various possibilities were discussed among the leaders until everyone was in agreement on who should go, what they should do, and how the trip would be financed. At this point the leaders would begin to discuss with their neighbors (members) what would be done. Within a few hours most of the opposition group would not only know who was going, but why they had been selected as well.

The decision-making discussions revealed no observable pattern as to who spoke to whom, when he was spoken to, or where. Often, when a decision needed to be made quickly, leaders called each other on the telephone or visited each other at home. Chance meetings along a neighborhood road were as likely to be used for a decision-making discussion as was a talk between friends after church services. Such meetings occurred frequently, sometimes as often as three times a day. Usually the leaders would meet in groups of two or three a few times each week simply by chance or, if necessary, by design. Usually a number of pending decisions were discussed

as were the consequences of previous decisions and other CORD business. It would be totally incorrect to suggest that these meetings were used only for the transaction of CORD business. In fact, the part of these conversations devoted to discussing CORD affairs was small compared to other, locally institutionalized topics of conversation. Other topics discussed included the respective families' health, the weather, gardening, farming, current neighborhood events, and local news. The conversations were variable in length, lasting from ten minutes to two or three hours depending upon the situation, how much needed to be discussed, or the amount of time that could be devoted by the individuals involved.

Formal meetings were also used for discussions about various decisions. These discussions were aimed primarily at introducing matters for decision, clarifying decisions, and reporting to members. Usually by the time a decision was discussed at a formal meeting, all of the leaders had already reached a consensus as to what should be done; in short, the decision had already been made.

There were some deviations from this pattern, however. At least one decision was made by only two of the leaders, and a dispute among the leaders ensued. The disagreement occurred when two leaders decided to hire a country-and-western band, charge admission to its performance, and use the proceeds to defray some of the expenses of the resistance group. Two of the leaders who were fundamentalist Baptists were not involved in the early discussion of this idea because both were ill. When they learned of the other leaders' intentions a few weeks later, they vocally opposed the idea. They believed that "wild music and dancing is a thing of the devil" and therefore "good Christians should not take part in such goings-on." Their opposition to the money-making scheme created

a considerable amount of tension among the leaders for a month or more. This was caused, one leader said, "because some of the fellows overstepped their bounds." By this he meant that the leaders who started the idea did not have the authority to make the decision without involving all of the leaders. One leader opposed to the plan stated that it was probably because he will ill that he hadn't been "worried with CORD business" by the other leaders, but he still should have been notified because he felt that it was in important decision. A leader who was a proponent of the idea said that since it violated some of the people's beliefs, it would not be implemented. He said that the thought that the plan would be offensive to some of the members never crossed his mind and that if there had not been a problem with communication among the leaders the dispute never would have occurred. He stated that the leaders had been lax in their communication for over three months and something was "bound to happen." After this incident efforts were made to increase the number of conversations and contacts among the leaders, thus averting similar problems in the future.

A more typical decision-making situation occurred when the researcher was asked to be a photographer for the group. During an interview the researcher commented that some documentary black and white photographs showing oil seepage were overexposed and therefore had very little tonal range. The treasurer of CORD asked if the researcher could do a better job. After receiving an affirmative answer, the treasurer called the secretary, president, and two advisors, briefly discussing the possibility of having the researcher photograph the oil seeps. All of the leaders thought that this was a good idea and the treasurer then worked out the details and logistics with the researcher.

The photograph episode is an example of how decisions which had to be made quickly were accomplished. In that case the researcher was visiting only for the week. Other decisions requiring immediate action, including those concerning legal action, hiring consultants, and confirming last-minute details before a trip to Washington, D.C., were made in this manner. When the leaders used the telephone, they typically asked what others had to say and why they decided to do one thing or another. Often leaders said that if the other four men were "of one mind on an issue," they would go along.

Clearly the decision-making process was one of consensus, where once a collective opinion or general agreement was reached, the decision was made. This method of making decisions binding upon the group was essential for the organization and maintenance of the group. One leader suggested that it was the only possible way to operate in light of the authority system of the group.

Authority System

In explaining why decisions were made by consensus, two leaders stressed the reasons why people were resisting the reservoir project. The leaders said that they knew that people were upset about the possible loss of their land, the fragmentation of their family groups, the disruption of the cemeteries, or the loss of the churches. One leader noted that some were more upset at the prospect of losing their land, and others felt that the disruption of the cemeteries was sacrilege and therefore the most upsetting aspect of the reservoir development. In short, people in the valley felt differently about what was the most important loss which they would incur as a result of the proposed project.

The leaders also described these diverse sentiments in terms of the decision-making process. They explained that two leaders represented those who were religious fundamentalists, and were most opposed to the loss of their churches and disruption of the cemeteries. They named two leaders who were equally concerned about the loss of their family groups. They also identified three leaders who represented people who were most concerned about losing their land.

When asked if the member could identify which leaders represented which interests, they stated that they could. The men explained that if all of these interests were not taken into account, there could be no CORD. If, for example, the people who were most threatened by the loss of their churches and cemeteries did not recognize any leader who was a proponent of their beliefs, they would not participate in CORD activities. In general, people who felt unrepresented would have dropped out of the group.

In effect, the authority to make decisions was allocated by various interest groups within the neighborhood to specific leaders who represented their interests in the attempt to stop the dam. The leaders explained that as long as people knew that they were represented by the leaders in the decision-making process, they were steadfast members of the opposition group. The leaders stated that they knew, after a considerable number of discussions among themselves and with their neighbors, that this was the only form of decision-making which would be acceptable to a large number of people in the valley and still be effective in the guidance of the resistance group.

Planning

When discussing decision-making, the leaders of CORD generally used their planning activities as examples. They said that first they identified

some objective. Typically, when objectives were discussed, there was a clear differentiation between "local objectives" and "outside objectives." The local ones focused upon the recruitment of members, education of group members, the education of non-members, and the acquisition of political support from local politicians. Outside objectives focused upon the education of the general public, the acquisition of political support from the Governor and Senators, and the delay of the project through litigation or federal agency intervention.

Most of the leaders stressed the difference between simply planning a specific activity and planning on a contingency basis. The intention of the leaders was to plan for, rather than react to, a negative outcome of their actions. That is, the leaders attempted to anticipate what the range of possible reactions to their activities might be and plan for them before they occurred. This, they felt allowed for a quicker reaction on their part.

Essentially the leaders recognized two general types of planning which they called short and long-term planning. Long-term planning or strategic planning included, for example, the solicitation of political support, continuation of litigation, and informing federal review agencies of the group's objections to the project. All of these bore directly upon the goal of the group. Most of the short-term or tactical planning was directed at small concerns or problems which, while significant, were not of major importance in achieving the goal of "stopping the dam."

An example of tactical planning was the smoothing of relations between those leaders who did not believe in dancing and those who liked country-and-western music. As was mentioned earlier, a small rift occurred between the leaders over the method of fund-raising. One group of leaders decided to sponsor a country-and-western music performance

without knowing that two other leaders' (and the members they represented) religious beliefs precluded dancing. The argument, although heated, did not last long because an advisor and one of the leaders developed the idea of raising a crop of sorghum. The sorghum could be pressed and cooked down to make molasses, which, when canned, could be sold at a fair profit. This alternative was discussed and accepted by all sides and the possibility of a serious split in the leadership was abated.

In discussing planning, the CORD leaders emphasized timing, that is, when a particular activity should be carried out. Early in the organizational stage of the group, timing was not considered. As resistance activities accelerated, however, the leaders became aware of the lack of timing in their efforts. An excellent example of this was the groups' initial efforts at lobbying in Washington. After the two CORD representatives arrived in Washington the first time, they realized that they should have begun much earlier in their letter-writing campaigns and that they should have prepared various federal agencies for their visit by sending statements of their objections to the project along with appropriate documentation. From that point on, timing was always considered when planning strategies and tactics. All of the leaders said that timing was essential to maintaining group morale, instituting litigation, and developing political support.

Clearly, the leaders did not make the decisions about resistance efforts in a simple manner. When the leaders described their activities in considerable detail, it was clear that the members' accounts of what they did was somewhat over-simplified. After making a decision the leaders

often carried out various activities themselves. They acted as information collectors, planners, and educators, as well as lobbyists, politicians, and neighborhood spokesmen. One leader explained that he had learned to wear different hats as a result of being a resistance leader. He said he had been a farmer, construction worker, husband and father. Now, he said, he had become a lay lawyer, local politician, researcher, and "about half hippie." In explaining the latter he said, "If you told me two years ago I would be out marching with signs against anything, I would have laughed in your face."

Overall, the context in which decisions were made was explained by the leaders in terms of strategies, that is, they explained their actions in terms of various objectives and the plans which they developed to meet the objectives. The next chapter will deal with the development of these strategies.

CHAPTER VI

STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE

In discussing how various resistance activities were chosen and enacted, the leaders of CORD always explained what the objective or objectives were for each activity. Initially, the leaders said they only agreed upon a few basic policies which they felt were important in maintaining the integrity of the group. As they learned more about resistance, objectives were identified and plans to meet the objectives were developed. Many of the planned activities were aimed at more than one objective and as resistance efforts accelerated, the leaders' long-term or strategic planning became more important in keeping abreast of events and reacting properly and quickly to some activity initiated by proponents of the reservoir project.

After the first year of formal organization, CORD began to implement many of the plans developed by its leaders. Although some of these activities were direct reactions to something which the proponents had done, much of their efforts were the result of careful planning. As one leader explained, "We kept up the defensive and started our own offensive." By this he said he meant that CORD began to raise issues which had not been considered by the proponents of the project. This meant that the proponents then had to react to the efforts of CORD and were, in effect, put on the defensive.

This chapter will describe the original policies decided upon by CORD as well as the organizational, legal, and political strategies which

were developed over time. There is an attempt to include the major concerns of the leaders and how the leaders explained the importance of the various strategies. In addition, the major activities within each strategy are outlined.

Early Policy

The initial policy decisions were made during the first few meetings between the neighborhood leaders and the county seat advisors. After discussing possible groups which might have helped CORD in their resistance effort, it was decided that CORD would accept aid from any group which offered assistance. This was an important decision because there was a great likelihood of receiving some form of support from coal companies as well as state and national environmentalist groups such as the Audubon Society and Sierra Club. It also was considered quite possible that CORD would cross political party lines in seeking support because Blue and Green Counties were traditionally thought to be Republican and Democratic strongholds respectively. To ally with either exclusively would unnecessarily limit the support of the other. The leaders decided, therefore, to seek bi-partisan political support locally, within the state, and nationally.

The leaders discussed the possibility of losing support from some groups as a result of this policy of accepting aid from whatever source. They concluded that if a group did thus withdraw support, it would be no great loss because any such group probably had no interest in this specific resistance effort and therefore would in any case be of little help. At the same time, the leaders decided to make it clear to all groups which might be potential supporters that no grudge would be

held against any group for failure to support CORD. This policy was changed the following election year when all local politicians were told that there was only one stand on the dam controversy which would get them elected. With this one exception, there was no deviation from the original policy.

A second major policy was that CORD would use only legal methods to resist the reservoir project and that under no circumstances would violence be tolerated. The leaders explained to the members that illegal action would only hurt their chances of stopping the reservoir and that the leaders themselves would not be part of any group which did not act legally and morally.

The leaders were well aware that some of the Green Creek people were prone, as one leader stated, to "swift and direct action," and they felt that this behavior had to be controlled or all of their efforts would be wasted because of one injudicious act. They thought that any violence whatsoever would turn both public and political opinion against them. While threats of violence were directly and indirectly leveled on more than one occasion, no incidents occurred. This record is due primarily to the agreement among the leaders, advisors, and members that no violence would be allowed and that, until it was evident that they were under control, those identified as "hot heads" were to be observed closely. On two occasions leaders and advisors were called upon to calm angry members who said they had "taken all they were going to take." When one man stated publicly that it was "time to stop talking and start doing," a few telephone calls were made and the same afternoon a leader and an advisor visited the resident's home. They dis-

cussed at length how various types of behavior would destroy any hope of stopping the dam and eventually calmed the angry farmer.

It was obvious to all of the leaders that a volatile situation could arise at any time because representatives or employees of the Corps were often seen in the valley, and often they entered people's property without permission. They also conducted surveys to locate cemeteries, which was a point of contention. Under any circumstances the probability of a confrontation between landowners and Corps representatives increased as work on the reservoir project increased. While the leaders could predict the behavior of the landowners all too well, they had no way of knowing how Corps representatives might react to a confrontation. The leaders solved this problem by educating the members of CORD about their rights under the law and again explaining how unacceptable behavior might dash their hopes of stopping the project. Although this will be discussed in the section dealing with organizational strategies, it is important here in that this attempt at controlling a few members was the impetus for contingency planning by the leaders of CORD. That is, the leaders began to anticipate probable actions by the proponents of the reservoir and make plans for appropriate CORD responses. This was a deviation from their earlier pattern of reacting to something that had already occurred and was more effective.

The last policy decided upon by the leaders of CORD involved information dissemination. It was decided that CORD would use only available facts to state their case and thus sway judicial, political, and popular opinion against the reservoir. This, they thought, would be in marked contrast to the Corps and proponents of the dam, because the latter were said to have great trouble in "getting their story straight because they never told the same one twice." This impression of con-

stantly-changing facts about the reservoir project on the part of the Corps was primarily due to two factors. First, their plans changed depending upon how the project progressed. As one Corps planner explained in court, with any large project there are unforeseen problems and as these problems arise, plans must be changed to solve them. The second factor was that many of the surveyors and other contractors who were not Corps employees were willing to say anything in order to get onto people's property. A substantial amount of what these individuals told valley residents was pure falsehood, apparently aimed at insuring no local intervention in their work. The result of this was a belief by the valley residents that the Corps was deliberately spreading false rumors and lies so they could, as one resident described it, "sneak in, build the dam, and flood us out before we knew what hit us."

The leaders of CORD felt that they could take advantage of this situation by trying to document every bit of information that they could collect about the project and its possible consequences. This included all information regardless of whether it was supportive of CORD or of the proponents. The initial idea was that CORD would be seen as a group clearly against the dam but still "open-minded," and willing to consider other viewpoints.

Over time, this policy did pay off, in that the leaders and members alike knew the arguments for and against the project. This made them all very effective in any public encounters with proponents of the project. This policy was applauded by the representatives of various Federal agencies in Washington, notably the EPA and CEQ. At least one leader had mixed emotions, however, when he said, "I'm not so sure telling their [the proponents'] side was a good idea. They seemed to tell it

pretty well without our help." Most leaders agreed that this was an important policy which aided their "good-guy" image and assured that their members were ready to demonstrate that "they knew what they were talking about even if the proponents didn't."

The leaders agreed that these three policies of doing things legally, accepting aid from anyone, and using only facts were the only overall guiding principles which were agreed upon before CORD was organized. They called them policies because under no circumstances were CORD members to deviate from these rules. As one leader explained, "These were the only rules we set at first and they have served us well. Especially when you think about how much has gone on." He went on to explain that there were numerous activities that he and others were involved in, but these policies never changed - "bent some, but not changed."

In addition to these policies, the leaders identified certain objectives which they thought would aid them in reaching their goal of stopping the reservoir project. These objectives were not decided upon at the first meetings of the leaders, but developed over a two-year period of time. The leaders, when discussing their activities, tended to organize their discussions in terms of these various objectives and explained that if an objective was reached or was found to be unattainable, they would rethink their situation and develop new objectives and ways to meet them. Overall, the primary objectives of CORD were to organize and maintain the resistance group, to delay the land buying and construction of the dam, and to gain the political support necessary to stop the dam. At first, only the first objective was clearly defined, simply because the leaders did not know how to go about delaying or stopping a reservoir project. The leaders said: "We didn't know about

the law of it or the politics of it or anything. We had to start from scratch and learn."

Early in 1973 the leaders generated fairly specific legal, political, and organizational strategies as a result of the Governor's decision to sign the federal cost sharing agreement. The leaders were shocked into the realization that they had no political support and needed it badly. Further, they realized that they had been too slow in organizing and collecting information which would support their views.

Organizational Strategies

As was stated in the previous chapter, the formal organization of CORD occurred in the early spring of 1973 when three men were elected as the "temporary officers." This was the beginning of a long series of events which were important in the final organization of the group.

Over a four-or five-week period the officers met with the then unnamed advisors from Greenville and discussed plans for recruiting more members. It was evident that they needed to involve Blue County residents who were opposed to the project. This would allow for a larger group and one that would be bipartisan since the Blue Countians were known to be staunch Republicans. The Blue County families represented more of the people to be relocated by the project and therefore their inclusion would greatly swell the ranks of CORD. One leader explained that this expansion of the membership would give the group a larger population to be used in various resistance activities. Especially important, he said, were the letter writing, information-gathering and collection of money to pay for legal and consultant services.

The leaders of CORD were not prepared to recruit members in Blue

County without the aid of a few Blue County residents who could identify those individuals most willing to oppose the project. While the leaders knew who the people were who said they were against the dam, they were sure that many would not publicly oppose the project because they were afraid of its more powerful proponents. One leader said that CORD would not have the support of their county judge, mayor, sheriff, or banker because they were proponents of the dam. The leaders were aware that anyone who opposed the project in Blue County would not endear himself to these men.

It was decided that first a few men from Blue County would have to be identified publicly as the Blue County leaders. The leaders thought that they could work with these men in recruiting their Blue County neighbors. The leaders knew that there were a substantial number of valley residents opposed to the project in the Blue County neighborhoods of High Point, Dreamin, and Cane Lick. It was decided, therefore, that a few influential men from these neighborhoods should be identified as officers in CORD who could act as the Blue County leaders.

A meeting was called at the home of the CORD president and a number of Blue County residents were invited to attend. The men were known to be active and vocal in their opposition to the reservoir project. The leaders of CORD discussed what they saw as necessary to stop the reservoir project and suggested that these Blue County men aid them by helping to organize the Blue County opposition. Two of the Blue County residents agreed to serve as what would be called the vice-president and secretary/treasurer for Blue County. In addition, four other men agreed to be the advisors for Blue County. These six men agreed to help in any way they could to stop the reservoir project. They were asked to raise money,

gather information about the valley, and disseminate information about CORD's activities. First and foremost, however, they were asked to recruit Blue County members for the opposition group.

Recruitment

The first strategy for resisting the Green Creek Reservoir was to recruit members. The leaders knew from informal conversations with their neighbors and the Blue County officers that practically all of the families in the four affected neighborhoods were opposed to the project. The recruitment of members into the resistance organization was greatly complicated, however, by the fatalistic belief held by most valley residents that "you can't fight the Government." This belief was not part of a general pattern of fatalism, but rather, it developed from a specific situation and subsequent assumptions.

Historically, the valley residents had voted for local, state and federal officials with the understanding that if they put their candidate in office, he would feel indebted and, as one informant said, "watch out for our interests." Traditionally, the Governor and U.S. District Congressman were considered the most powerful politicians to whom the local people had access.

When the reservoir project began to be developed, the U.S. District Congressman was an outspoken proponent of the project during the House Subcommittee hearings on public works appropriations. In fact, since 1972 the Congressman has worked hard to assure the appropriation of federal monies to continue the project. It was clear that the Congressman would not support the efforts of a resistance group.

In 1972 the Governor was still considered the individual who would stop the reservoir project. During the year, six or seven individuals

contacted the Governor in an attempt to persuade him to oppose it. In December one soon-to-be leader of CORD received a letter from the Governor which implied that he would oppose the project. The following month, however, the Governor signed the recreational cost-sharing contract between the state and federal governments which allowed the project development to begin. This occurrence was the catalyst for two events. First, five neighborhood leaders decided to organize a group to stop the dam, and second, most of the would-be members decided that it would be impossible to fight the government project. The residents believed that the two politicians who had the power to stop the project obviously would not change their position. All of the valley residents understood why they were opposed to the project, but many simply felt that it was an eventuality. They saw no chance for success in trying to fight the federal government and therefore felt there was no reason to waste their energies in useless action.

The leaders were faced with the problem of persuading many of their neighbors to join their resistance organization. They knew it would take time to change the belief that they could not fight the government, but they thought that over time they could prove the belief wrong if a few of their initial legal and political strategies proved fruitful. They had a number of ideas about how to begin their efforts to stop the project, but they did not have the people necessary to carry out the various strategies.

The leaders first identified what they themselves would lose if the project were developed, that is, their land, churches and cemeteries. They decided to use the potential loss of these locally cherished items to encourage their neighbors to aid them in their planned resistance

activities. The leaders understood the social organization of the neighborhoods and could identify family group leaders who, if persuaded to join the resistance group, would undoubtedly persuade their family groups to join as well. In addition, the leaders used the knowledge of the Blue County officers to identify other individuals in Blue County who were opposed to the project.

First the leaders concentrated on recruiting all those opposed to the project in Hickory; when this was accomplished they turned their attention toward recruiting more heavily in Blue County. In Hickory, the leaders knew which people had to be recruited in order to insure that almost all of Hickory would oppose the project in turn.

The persuasion of these family group leaders was not difficult in most cases. Generally, after mentioning why everyone should resist the project, the recruiter would say that, if nothing else, they intended to "put up one hell of a fight" or, "If I don't try to stop the dam, I won't be able to live with myself." Often the recruiter would mention that at another reservoir project in a neighboring county the people were poorly paid for their land and they were not paid for their mineral rights. This meant, they surmised, that the Green Valley residents who had coal on their land would not be paid a fair price for it.

In some cases these appeals, based upon the sentiments and economics of the situation, were not enough. In these cases, the persuasion of a potential recruit was more difficult, and employed more graphic, if not brutal, illustrations of the reasons for opposition to the dam.

For example, one CORD member was observed discussing all of the reasons he had for resisting the project with an older neighbor who was concerned about his family cemetery. The Cord member said that "out-

siders will come in here with a truck and a back-hoe and they won't stop until they dig every one of the bodies out of your family cemetery." He went on to say he didn't know what would happen to them then. This type of vivid, graphic description of what would be occurring forced residents to face their own sentiments for their family lands, cemeteries, and churches, and was particularly effective on the older residents of the valley.

The leaders of CORD did not try to build what one leader called "false hope" in the people who believed that CORD could not fight the Government and win. Rather, they overlooked the possibility of winning or losing their struggle and reinforced the idea that they intended to do their best to stop the project regardless of the consequences. During interviews, this researcher often heard the following phrases: "We might lose but they [the proponents] will know they were in a fight"; "If nothing else, we will raise some hell before they run us off"; and "If they run us off, at least we will be able to say we tried our best."

Over the summer of 1973 the leaders implemented their plan for the expansion of CORD by publicly announcing in the Green County newspaper the members of the Blue County Advisory Council. The Advisory Council was made up of "businessmen and friends of the opposition." They were asked to help the leaders of CORD in preparing for the law suit and to aid the Blue County officers in mustering support for CORD in Blue County. In addition, a large public meeting was planned in Blue County, in an attempt to expand the membership of CORD within the neighborhoods of Dreamin, High Hope, and Cane Lick. The leaders thought that if they could show the people of Blue County that they could resist the project, they would join in the resistance effort.

After an opening prayer, a full report of CORD activities was given by three of the leaders. They explained their intention to file a law suit based upon the inadequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement which was filed with the Council on Environmental Quality. To do this they said they needed the support of every family in the valley who was opposed to the project. The leaders urged all of those present to write letters stating their opposition to the project and send them to their state and federal Congressmen and Senators.

One of the leaders made a moving statement about why he was resisting the project. He mentioned the early settlers of the valley and, using his family as an example, told how his family had broken the rough land and tamed it for farming. He ended by saying that he intended to fight to the end if necessary. The meeting was concluded by a few words of scripture.

This meeting was extremely successful. Many of the families who had been opposed to the project but were fatalistic about the probable outcome now became active in their resistance effort. The membership and leaders agreed with one advisor that this meeting turned the fatalistic belief that "you can't fight the government and win" into the idea that "win or lose we'll put up a fight." Until this time it had been almost impossible to motivate those opposed to the project. After this meeting, subsequent meetings were held in three of the neighborhoods and the activity within CORD increased. As one leader stated, "Everybody got into the act. There's no telling how many letters went out of here to congressmen opposing the dam."

After the belief that one could not fight the federal government had been overcome, there were no major problems with the recruitment of those

in Green Valley who were opposed to the project. There was no concerted attempt to recruit those few who wanted the reservoir project to be developed. One leader said that they were not interested in recruiting those people or trying to change their thinking. He said it was enough work recruiting those already opposed to the project. Another leader, the treasurer, agreed that this was true, but noted that there were few proponents of the project who lived in the valley. He added that although they might be on opposite sides of the issue, no one who was a proponent of the dam was ostracized by his neighbors. That, he said, would have broken with CORD policy and, after all, these people were still neighbors. One exception to this was noted, but it involved a serious breach of a social norm.

This exception involved a young man who wanted his father to sell his land and move closer to town. He took two Corps representatives onto his neighbor's (the secretary of CORD) land without permission. When they were noticed, a confrontation ensued between the young man and the ill sister of the CORD secretary. Miss Reines took a rifle with her to encourage her uninvited guests to leave the property as she forcefully asked them to. From this time on, there was a considerable amount of ill will directed toward this young man because, informants said, he had entered his neighbor's land without permission, he had brought Corps people with him, and worst of all, they were "tramping all over the family cemetery." This was the only case where anyone was socially ostracized by his neighbors as a result of the resistance group's efforts.

With the inclusion of those families who were opposed to the project in Blue County, the leaders of CORD continued to direct the group's

activities. It was not only necessary to direct the activities of CORD when something needed to be done, but also as one advisor said, "to keep up morale when nothing was happening." In short, the leaders had to plan for the maintenance of the group.

Maintenance

When discussing how the group was maintained, the leaders explained that when the group was active there was no problem with group solidarity or morale. During the frequent periods of inactivity, however, difficulties arose, especially since the proposed project was a constant source of concern. Some members found it easier to give up, rather than try to cope with what they described as "a heavy weight, always with you," explaining that "not a day goes by that you don't think about losing everything." This almost constant worry was said to be made worse because "every time you look at your home, land, church or family cemetery, you remember the dam and the lake and you feel sick." One leader summarized by saying that "it would have been easy to just give up and leave but people around here aren't like that."

The leaders of CORD worked very hard to see to it that the members of CORD did not give up and leave. They had different ideas about how to maintain interest and keep clear the objectives of the group during those periods when there was no need for any group activity. Most of the leaders wanted to continue bi-weekly or monthly meetings as they had over the summer and early fall. The other leaders felt that continuing to have regular meetings without a specific agenda would not be a good idea because they thought people would stop coming to meetings because nothing was happening and therefore nothing could be reported. After a considerable amount of discussion it was decided to hold monthly meetings of CORD

during the winter. By all accounts the first two meetings went well, although only half as many people as usual were in attendance. At the third meeting almost no members came and as a result the formal monthly meetings were abandoned as a method of maintaining group solidarity and morale. Two of the advisors thought that just the opposite was accomplished, that is, people lost interest and were demoralized by the continuing meetings. The leaders did not allow this to happen; they were able to maintain interest in CORD and its objectives through interpersonal contacts.

The leaders used every opportunity to keep the goal of stopping the reservoir project fresh in all of the valley residents' minds. Typically, they met members informally at their church, post office, neighborhood store, or in Greenville. During these chance meetings the leaders always mentioned that CORD members would have to redouble their efforts in writing to their senators and congressmen before they voted in the appropriations subcommittee. When asked why they stopped going to the regular meetings, informants said it was a waste of time so they saw no reason to go. In the spring of 1974, when CORD met to decide who would be sent to Washington, D.C. to lobby against the reservoir project, the meetings were well attended. Informants said that they were not disgusted with opposing the dam, they simply did not need to attend pointless meetings and when there was reason for meetings to be held, they would be the first to attend.

This same attitude persisted when there was a setback in one of the strategies. That is, the members of CORD saw the setback as just that and nothing more. They were still prepared to continue the opposition and did continue their efforts with other resistance activities. As one leader explained it, "we didn't think we had any chance at all. We

were behind in the first place so a few setbacks had to be expected." Three of the leaders said that no one knew how successful they were going to be with their resistance efforts and therefore no one had any false hopes. Other informants said that they were depressed when the Governor and the Congressman publicly supported the project, and when another senator withdrew his support of the opposition. They said that these events were demoralizing for a while but everyone knew that they had no alternative when they began the resistance effort. One leader explained, "When people have their backs to the wall and they know how bad it will be to lose, they just keep on fighting." This is apparently what was thought by many of the CORD members when there was some setback or when they seemed to be getting no closer to their goal.

When objectives were met, such as the recruitment of support from the Green County Judge, the Greenville businessmen, or a state senator, the members reacted with guarded optimism. That is, they were not overly confident that any single objective, when met, would stop the reservoir project. One leader said that the entire resistance effort had been a series of "ups and downs," explaining that "sometimes you think you are getting somewhere and other times you wonder if you'll ever make any progress." The leaders played down the possible effects of these high and low points. Two leaders agreed that this was the best policy because otherwise when a setback occurred just after some small victory, you might lose half of the members. The reaction of members were controlled, in effect, because rather than tell people CORD would win, the leaders told people CORD would fight to the end, win or lose. This had a marked effect on how people reacted to the outcomes of their various activities. The members did express a considerable amount of joy or sadness regarding events, but they kept their emotions in

the context of continuing to resist. One leader said, "People around here don't take up a cause very often, but we've found out when they do, they do." Another informant stated, "You have to understand that people in this valley who decide to do something are tough to stop." There was a great amount of pride evident in all of the members and leaders who were interviewed. They were proud that they had continued against all odds and did not intend to stop until the reservoir project was de-authorized or they ran out of resistance strategies.

As was mentioned above, there was no problem with morale or interest when CORD was active. Most informants said they were happy to write letters, contribute money or attend meetings when they heard it was needed. Many said they felt good when they were doing something to stop the reservoir and others said it felt good to be involved. One woman said that when she was writing letters or going to court, she felt that she was using pent-up energy and this eased her nerves. She said her nerves were upset because she would lose everything if the dam were constructed. It was not difficult, therefore, to motivate people to donate their time, money and efforts to CORD activities.

Each spring, one month before Congress began hearings on public works projects, the leaders of CORD would organize members to begin writing letters opposing the appropriation of federal dollars for the Green Creek Reservoir Project. The leaders would also begin to collect money to finance the sending of a CORD delegation to Washington to lobby against the project. This was done through telephone calls and other informal contacts among members. The leaders needed only to make telephone calls to people and ask them to "spread the word." "Spreading the word" consisted of numerous telephone calls and visits among family members and friends in which the primary topic of conversation would be

the upcoming events. The informal network was not clearly identifiable by the researcher; however, its effectiveness was demonstrated on more than one occasion. For example, after the researcher's initial contact with one of the leaders of CORD, all of the leaders and many members soon knew what the researcher looked like, what he was doing and why, and had an accurate description of his vehicle.

This same network was used to gather and disseminate information. The leaders all emphasized the importance of controlling information and explained its importance when discussing the education of members.

Information Collection and Dissemination

Early in the field work this researcher asked members of CORD what they thought was wrong with the project. Responses to this question were almost uniform in their content. Typically, the respondent would discuss the issues of a geological fault under the proposed lake, the conduct of Corps representatives, the probability of pollution by uncapped oil wells, the Corps estimates of coal and oil reserves in the project area, and the inaccuracy of the cost-benefit ratio for the project. These issues were not merely mentioned; rather, they were discussed in detail. For example, when discussing the Corps estimates of coal, the members would describe the various seams of coal by name, thickness, grade and ash-residue after burning, amounts in terms of acre-feet and tons, and the difference in pit-prices and tipple-prices. Then the informants explained that they felt the Corps was legally bound to include the coal as a cost of the project because it would not be mined if the reservoir were constructed. Later in the field work, the leaders explained that they thought it important to keep the members informed about the results that various hired consultants were reporting,

as well as factual information from other sources. They thought that this would promote prestige for CORD locally and with state and federal officials contacted by CORD members. The thorough education of CORD members was a result of the overall plan for information collection and dissemination.

In order to pursue their strategies, the leaders needed information which could be used to refute the claims made by the project's proponents. Once collected, the information was assessed for its value to the group's needs and then passed on to whatever was considered an appropriate individual or agency. For example, one CORD leader, during a conversation with a neighbor who was a retired driller, learned that there was a fault under the proposed project area. The news was passed quickly to the other leaders, who questioned those among their neighbors and friends who were geologically knowledgeable about the fault. Affidavits were drawn up, signed, and sent to the Governor, Congressmen, and Senators. One former resident of the valley was contacted in Ohio by CORD leaders and asked about the fault. The man had worked as a geologist for over twenty years and was willing to send information, which he did. Another retired oil driller wrote an article about the syncline which was published in the Green County newspaper. The leaders were especially interested in collecting information about the possible danger of building a dam and reservoir over a fault. In a few months a number of affidavits were sent to various politicians, the Corps, and various government agencies.

This was how information was collected about abandoned oil wells, asphalt seepage, and extant coal reserves. The leaders of CORD believed that the people who lived in the valley knew more about their land than Corps planners. They said that this type of information

collection was started soon after CORD was organized, but the system was changed somewhat after the second trip (1974) by CORD representatives to Washington.

In Washington, during a meeting with a representative of the Environmental Protection Agency, the CORD advisors explained their views concerning the proposed reservoir. They explained what CORD was and what they intended to do to stop the project. They also asked if the representative had any suggestions which might help them in their efforts. After stating that what CORD had begun seemed to be well thought out, the representative stressed two things: First, he said that CORD should, as soon as possible, ask their attorney, who had substantial knowledge of environmental law, to file suit in Federal Court; second, he suggested that they identify one individual as the coordinator of all information which was collected by CORD, including its source and use. He explained that this would help control false information and allow for more unified reports refuting information being disseminated by the proponents of the reservoir.

Upon their return to Green Creek, the CORD representatives relayed these suggestions to the leaders of the group. After some discussion they decided to seek and hire a lawyer and to ask the editor of the county newspaper to become the Executive Director of CORD. He accepted and from then on coordinated press releases, reports sent to various places and, most importantly, became the spokesman for CORD. His duties included the dissemination of information from various sources such as the CORD lawyer or one of the hired consultants to the leaders.

When discussing their decision, the leaders said that the editor was a "natural choice." His background as a journalist and editor was

largely responsible for his selection, combined with the fact that he was already involved. As one advisor stated, "He knew how to manage information and that's what we needed, so we asked him to help us." All of the leaders said that the Executive Director was very important because he organized what was going on at all times. They explained that during any month some of the members and leaders might be trying to set up a meeting with the Governor, others might be planning to meet with the Corps and still others might be collecting samples of asphalt. The leaders said that it was essential that all information go through the editor and thus, when anyone had a question, they knew where they could get an answer.

The leaders stated that the editor could also use the information which was newsworthy in the Green County newspaper. This was very important for the dissemination of information to non-members who lived near the project area and in surrounding counties. All of the leaders said that the newspaper was important in keeping up the morale of the CORD members and in changing the belief that "you can't fight the government." They said that the newspaper often printed stories about the various environmental problems associated with the project in great detail. This aided in the education of the general public, as well as CORD members. The local news coverage grew into state-wide and regional news stories in the major state newspapers and on television. The latter, they said, was thought to be effective in gaining support from environmentalist groups across the state. It was not, however, thought to have been as effective as expected in gaining political support across the state.

When the leaders spoke of information being passed from one person to another, they differentiated between "inside the valley" and "outside the valley." Any information which came from a federal agency or from the proponents of the project was said to come from "outside the valley," and information which came from valley residents was said to come from "inside the valley." The process of passing information was discussed, therefore, in terms of its source and whether it was for use inside and/or outside the valley. In actuality, this is how information was generally handled by the Executive Director, although sometimes he said it seemed impossible to keep up with everything CORD was receiving and sending to people during some of the more active periods. For example, as members and leaders found out more about Corps land-buying policies, including what would be done to help move, they gave information to the Executive Director, including its source. As the information was passed among CORD members, some might ask leaders questions about the Corps policy. They would contact the Executive Director if they did not know the answer. It was also the case that when the consultants had questions or needed some aid, they would contact the Executive Director and he would contact the appropriate leaders. Sometimes it was either inconvenient or impractical to pass information through the Executive Director. On these occasions the leaders would notify the Executive Director after the fact. Under all circumstances the leaders attempted to keep their Executive Director informed in detail of all CORD plans and activities, as well as the proponents' plans and activities. In addition, the Executive Director was expected to keep some record of how state and federal politicians were reacting to CORD activities.

In the case of the latter, the leaders talked about their political and legal plans to stop the dam. They said the control of information

was important to meet their objectives of delaying the project with legal maneuvers while trying to recruit political support to get the project stopped.

Legal Stragegies

The leaders of CORD agreed that their plans for legal action were never expected to stop the reservoir project. Rather their intention was to delay the project until they could muster sufficient support to get the project deauthorized. As one leader explained, "This thing was born of politics and will have to die of politics." This meant that while an injunction might halt the project for some period of time, it would not stop it entirely. Once the conditions of the injunction were met by the Corps, the project would continue. What was wanted was more time to solicit the help of the Governor or Congress.

There was, however, a chance that if the Corps was told to begin anew in developing their Environmental Impact Statement and if they were forced to account for all of the coal reserves that would be lost, then their cost-benefit ratio might be too low to warrant further federal funding of the project. The leaders recognized that there was little chance of this, but they did collect information which might be admissible in court to make the information part of the public record.

One leader explained that CORD "had gotten a lot of mileage out of threatening to file suit." He said that every time the leaders met with Corps representatives, they would threaten to use in court anything said by the Corps. Recalling the meeting with Corps representatives, he said that he personally felt that the Corps had not really cared if CORD brought suit against the project. He was sure, however, that they were more careful about how they proceeded with the project. He said

he was confident that the Corps had "done this one by the book after we started talking about a suit," and therefore had not cut any corners. This, he thought, had probably slowed down the project. This was not part of the original legal strategy but was a result of the legal strategy.

The CORD legal strategy as it was first developed by the CORD leaders was to hire a lawyer and "do whatever the lawyer told them to do." This strategy reflected the admitted lack of legal knowledge held by the CORD leaders. Soon after a lawyer was retained, the strategy became more detailed. The leaders first said they had to collect admissible evidence to support their case; then they intended to file, not one, but two suits. The first was to be based upon environmental grounds and the second on the constitutionality of the cost-sharing agreement between the Corps and the state.

In the Spring of 1973, CORD leaders asked the newspaper editor to find a good environmental lawyer who would take their case. The editor contacted his sister who had left Greenville some years before and was living near one of the state's three law schools. She somehow identified a young law professor who was teaching a class in environmental law. The editor then called the lawyer, explained what was happening in Green Creek, and asked if the law professor would either take the case or suggest someone who might. The attorney responded that he might very well be interested in the case and a meeting in Greenville was arranged.

After the meeting, in which the CORD leaders explained what they were trying to accomplish and why, the attorney said he would like to think about the case before he committed himself. Less than a week later he did accept the case and began to outline what types of information would be necessary to prove their complaint. From this time on, his

input on what should or should not be done became the legal strategy of the CORD leaders.

The Spring of 1974 was spent in preparing the formal complaint against the Corps, which was filed in July. The complaint included numerous allegations of improper or inadequate actions by the Corps in the formulation and planning of the project and in the preparation and processing of the environmental impact statement for the project. In addition, the plaintiffs' complaint contained allegations that specific National Environmental Policy Act (1969) provisions had been violated. The objective of the litigation was to enjoin the Corps from completing the Green Creek Reservoir Project until proper and adequate remedies could be achieved. The major allegations made in the complaint were the lack of prior notice that a project was planned, the absence of proper study and appropriate precaution in the planning of the dam to allow for the underlying fault, the absence of proper studies and precautions concerning the preservation of cultural materials, hundreds of abandoned oil wells and asphalt seepage, and the improper filing of the environmental impact statement.

Throughout the fall of 1974 the leaders of CORD prepared for the hearing, scheduled for January 1975. Their primary concern over those six months was the compilation of evidence to substantiate their claims. Knowledgeable individuals were sought to give testimony as experts in the areas of geology, mining, archaeology, economics, and hydrology. Two geologists who had worked in the valley agreed to testify about the geological aspects of the valley, and the owners of two local mining companies were asked to be witnesses for CORD regarding the extant coal reserves. The State Archaeologist was subpoenaed to testify about the cultural remains of historic residents of the valley. A hydrologist who

had worked under contract for the Corps in the valley was subpoenaed to testify about the various hydrological problems of the project. As in the cases of the hydrology and archaeology of the project, there was no knowledgeable local individual to deal with the economics of the project, so CORD hired a consultant to do an economic study. In addition to the expert witnesses, the leaders collected affidavits from landowners, ore laboratory reports, public hearing notices, and other documents such as various maps, newspaper articles, and letters from the ACE. The final compilation of evidence and the preparation for the hearing was, obviously, left in the hands of the CORD attorney.

The hearing lasted 3 days; each day the courtroom was completely filled with CORD members eager to hear the testimony of both sides. After an initial refusal to grant a temporary injunction to halt the project, the Federal District Judge issued a Memorandum of Opinion and Court Order in July 1975 in favor of the plaintiffs for three specific claims. The court required that the Corps provide more information about oil seepage in the project area and the cost-benefit ratio, as well as supplemental data for annual appropriations request.

The leaders of CORD were elated over the court's decision. To them this meant another delay in the project to give them more time to lobby in Washington and seek support from the Governor. The decision was seen as a victory by all of the members of CORD who had expressed concern that because the Corps had so many highly qualified experts, they did not expect to win the case. One member explained that during the court hearing he did not understand what a couple of the Corps witnesses were talking about, although he was sure it made some sense because, as he put it, "that one fellow had so many degrees of education, he probably needed two pieces of paper to sign his name." The leaders and members were jubilant

over the judgment in their favor, but they realized that once the Corps filed the requested supplemental data, the injunction would be lifted and the project would continue. The CORD attorney, therefore, was asked to pursue the second suit questioning the constitutionality of the cost-sharing contract between the Commonwealth and the Corps, while the leaders continued with their political strategies.

Political Strategies

The political strategies of CORD were to gain support from county and state politicians first and then to seek support at the federal level. In the county the leaders sought and received support from the elected officials, primarily the county judge, magistrates, court clerk, and attorney. At the state level the leaders sought the support of their state senator and representative and the Governor. At the federal level they sought support from Kentucky's Senators and Representatives, as well as various agencies.

The strategies were similar in all cases. First the leaders wanted to make a showing of the numbers of people against the reservoir project. This was accomplished by the letter-writing campaign which was directed toward the Governor and the U.S. Congressmen and Senators from Kentucky. Another method used was the organization of large crowds at public meetings and the court hearing. Overall, this was intended to demonstrate to the politicians that not a few families were against the project, and locally this made it clear that CORD was a sizeable constituency. One leader summarized the effects of their efforts by saying that the local politicians were supportive from the very first and the large number of people against the project insured that they would continue to support CORD's efforts. The effect upon Kentucky's U.S. Senators and Congressmen was that the showing of support, as one leader explained, "got their attention."

The second strategy was to convince the Governor, Congressmen, and Senators that they should oppose the project. One method which was used was the dissemination of factual information which supported CORD's opposition to the project.

Early in the history of the organization it was decided that CORD could not rely only upon the local reasons for resisting. Clearly, the loss of their family land, cemeteries, and churches was important, but such items were lost in the development of all projects. In an early meeting with the Corps, the District Engineer had explained that these losses had already been considered and dismissed because they were common to all projects. The Engineer said that if the residents intended to resist the project, they would need to establish that the project would not be of benefit to the region and the larger drainage basin into which Green Creek flowed. The engineer explained that the Federal Government had gone to great expense to identify the benefits of the project and the Corps intended to develop the project as long as the Congress approved. If the resistance group intended to stop the project, he said they should contact their Congressman and Senators who were appropriating money for the project's development each year. In short, the leaders developed much of their strategy to convince various politicians to support their opposition as a direct result of this meeting. The leaders stated that the District Engineer explained how money was appropriated and when. With this information and their knowledge about the local area, the leaders were able to develop a factual case against the project which was used in litigation and for soliciting the aid of the various politicians who had been identified by the Corps District Engineer.

The factual information sent to the various politicians was primarily concerned with the issues of a geological fault under the proposed lake, the inaccuracy of the Corps coal and oil estimates, the improper conduct of Corps representatives, the probability of pollution by uncapped oil wells, and the inaccuracy of the cost-benefit ratio for the project. In addition, the disruption of the neighborhoods was included as a substantial loss which the Corps had not accounted for in the cost-benefit ratio.

As information was compiled and verified, the leaders made copies and sent them to the U.S. Senators and Congressmen from Kentucky, the Governor, and the District Office of the Corps. For example, when a consultant's report was received from a mining engineer, it was copied and sent to these individuals as well as the Federal Energy Administration. The report indicated that there was substantially more coal extant in the project area than had been reported by the Corps. The leaders thought that they might be able to force the Corps to include the value of the coal in the cost-benefit ratio and therefore stop the project on economic grounds. Copies of the report were sent to the EPA, OMB, FEA, Kentucky's U.S. Senators and Congressmen, and to other Senators and Congressmen who were influential members of the House and Senate Sub-committees on public works appropriations. In addition the information was included in many letters sent by landowners in the valley to their congressmen and senators. In the following spring the information was included in lobbying efforts by the delegation representing CORD. This information was handled in the same way as all other data collected to support CORD's position.

The objective was to demonstrate that the project was unwanted, unnecessary, and would be more of a detriment than a help. If this could be demonstrated, the CORD leaders believed that the project could be delayed

indefinitely, thus allowing time to solicit the aid of the Governor. The Governor was thought to be the most important of all because the leaders had heard in Washington that no project would be continued without the support of the Governor.

The leaders also used political contacts to sway the Governor, Senators, and Congressmen. Local elected officials and political party leaders in the county were asked to contact these officials in an attempt to obtain their support.

Although one Senator did support CORD for a brief period and then reverse his stand, CORD was unable to gain the political support necessary to stop the project. In 1976 the CORD officers were preparing to file their second suit in order to delay the project further. Their intention was to wait until another Governor was elected and seek his aid since the two predecessors had supported the project. They also believe that they needed to seek more support from federal agencies. It was at this time that one of the CORD leaders was asked to help form a state coalition of reservoir resistance groups.

After some discussion the leaders decided to join. They reasoned that they could aid other groups because they had experience, and the larger group should be able to exert more influence on the Senators and Congressmen from Kentucky as well as the Governor. This was not the only change that occurred. As a coalition of groups, CORD members began an active program of public demonstrations at every opportunity. Rather than continuing in their relatively passive efforts to change the mind of the Congressman who had been the staunchest supporter of the project, CORD members were demonstrating their opposition at every public appearance that the Congressman made. They would, in the words of one leader, "load the cars with people and signs protesting the reservoir and drive to every

place he showed to make a speech." They did not stop resisting the proposed reservoir in Green Valley but began to resist reservoir projects on a state-wide basis.

Summary

In summarizing, it must be emphasized that the leaders of CORD planned their activities in terms of the various objectives they had established. Many of the activities were aimed at more than one objective. The newspaper coverage of CORD events was, for example, expected to educate members and non-members alike for different reasons, as was mentioned above.

It should be clear that a considerable amount of time and effort was involved in simply maintaining the group. The collection of money, dissemination of information, and overall control of the group was accomplished through interpersonal contacts. This was time consuming but had the advantage of allowing for more visibility of CORD leaders and direct contact between the leaders and members. This direct contact increased group solidarity in that all of the members felt that they were being informed of all developments quickly and it insured that the members maintained their interest and a clear understanding of the group's objectives. The most important point, however, is that the members felt that through their interpersonal contacts with the leaders, they could, if they chose to, make some input into the planning and decision-making process of the group.

The legal and political strategies of the group were the most important strategies aimed at reaching the goal of the group. The legal strategies were intended to delay the project until it could be stopped politically. While all political activities of the group were aimed at stopping the project, the result was sometimes only a delay in the project's de-

velopment. This was often important because it allowed more time for the leaders of CORD to seek support from the Governor or it allowed the leaders to wait until the next Governor took office.

The strategies of the group changed over time. The strategies became more complex as the leaders gained more experience and sophistication. When the activities of the group were being analyzed it became apparent that more than the strategies changed over time. That is, it seemed that the way the group generally did things changed. The style of the group became more sophisticated as the group gained more experience in resisting the reservoir project. While these changes were most evident in the activities of the group, they represent the changes that occurred in the leadership and decision-making process of CORD. These changes will be discussed in the conclusion of this report.

VII

CONCLUSIONS

In summarizing why and how CORD was organized, as well as how the group went about resisting the reservoir project, it is important to emphasize the process of resistance. Over a five-year period, the Citizen's Organization to Resist the Dam evolved from an unorganized group of angry residents into an effective, well organized resistance group. This was accomplished by the accumulation of experience from actual resistance of the proposed project.

The process of resistance began with the identification of the proposed project as a threat. More specifically, the residents realized that they would lose all of their land to the project. The owners realized that their family lands would be inundated by the proposed lake and that their families would be separated by the forced relocation. While this aggravated many people, only a few were active in speaking out publicly against the project. These few asked why the people had not been informed earlier about the project, what would happen to the churches and cemeteries, and why anyone would want to put a dam on Green Creek. These questions were not answered to the satisfaction of the residents of the valley. These concerns were added to the fact that the landowners were told at the first public meeting that they would receive no compensation for the potential worth of their land, including the value of oil, gas, or coal.

Over a period of six months the residents began to realize more fully what they would lose if the project were completed. This process of clearly identifying what would be lost was accelerated by three or four

landowners who had already decided to oppose the project actively. These men asked their neighbors what they thought about the loss of their land, cemeteries, and churches. They reminded them that they would neither be compensated for their coal nor would they be able to relocate close to their families and friends.

There was no movement toward organization at this time because it was the consensus of opinion in the valley that the Governor would stop the project. Essentially, people acted individually by writing letters to their Congressmen and the Governor and by refusing to do any business with stores whose owners were proponents of the project. It was not until the Governor signed the cost-sharing agreement for the project that a concerted effort was made to organize an opposition group.

Even after the initial organization, the leaders of the group found it difficult to recruit members because many residents believed that they could not fight the federal government and win. All of the residents of the valley had some understanding of what they would lose to the project; they simply did not think their efforts would be fruitful. The leaders of the opposition group knew that the cemeteries and churches in the valley were religiously and socially significant to the residents. They knew that the people had many sentimental associations with these places, as well as with their family land, associations involving family and friends in events that had occurred over two or three generations. The churches were not simply a place for a religious group to meet; rather, they were symbols of the religious values held by their congregations. The land symbolized the family, the history of the family, and the value placed upon the family in the valley. The land also symbolized the independence of the family as an autonomous group in the neighborhoods. The proximity

of various households which made up a family group was not a historical accident. The closeness was planned by the heads of the households because they placed a high value on frequent interaction with their fathers, mothers, and children. Neighbors were discussed as if they were almost as important as relatives. Because many of the residents had lived their lives in Green County, many of the memories which they associated with their churches, cemeteries, and land involved neighbors with whom they had grown up.

The leaders of CORD understood that a resident's church, cemetery, land, and family were very important to his way of life. They clearly understood the significance of these symbols; they could articulate their meaning and were able to use them in recruiting residents who were hesitant in their opposition to the project because they felt they could not oppose the federal government and expect to win. The leaders, therefore, were instrumental in the identification of the project as a threat to the residents' way of life. They were, in part, responsible for the clarification of what was being threatened, specifically in the case of individual residents, and generally in terms of the neighborhoods. They used their understanding of the posed threat to force action by individuals at first and later by the group as a whole.

The clarification of the threat posed by the reservoir occurred rather quickly for the leaders and some members. For others the process was aided by the leaders and the identified threats were used by the leaders in the recruitment of still others. It is important to note that the process was not instantaneous, that is, it occurred over a two-year period. During the latter of these two years CORD was formally organized and later expanded

to include members from four of the neighborhoods that would be directly affected by the proposed reservoir.

The formal organization of CORD was the second important part of the resistance process. This is especially true because there was no precedent for such a group in the four neighborhoods, where there had never before been any voluntary association other than churches. At no time in the past had the churches allied themselves to achieve some common goal.

The only historical evidence of groups which cross-cut families were the interactions of neighbors aimed at some specific mutually beneficial project. This would include the sharing of labor to cut and house tobacco or the raising of a barn. At these times, the heads of various households and the family group leaders would work out an equitable arrangement to accomplish work that required a large group of men due to necessity or expedience. At these times the family group leaders had to reach some decisions as to what would be done by whom and when it would be done. This was generally accomplished by a discussion of the important factors until a consensus of opinion was reached.

These occasions were not frequent, occurring less than once each year. Even so, these events provided the basis for the formal organization of CORD. The leaders knew that all of the families in the neighborhood of Hickory would have to be represented and they knew that all of the families had to be allowed some part in the formal selection of the officers. Indeed, the members and leaders all agreed that the officers were elected to represent the interests of everyone in the neighborhood, to help prepare legal action, and, in general, to find out how to stop the project.

Before their election, the election of officers had been discussed by most, if not all, of the residents of Hickory. Those who had been in-

volved for over a year were identified as the best candidates for the job long before a vote was taken. At the courthouse, they were elected unanimously after very little discussion. At the second election, at which the advisors were formally selected, the officers and advisors were unanimously chosen. It seems that the members had already reached a decision as to who would be the officers and advisors before the meetings actually took place. It is probable that in the many informal meetings between residents of Hickory which occur frequently, the members of CORD had already reached a decision. That is, over the period of a week or two, everyone had agreed, informally, who should be elected. The vote taken at the meeting was simply the formalization of the decision which had already been made.

Whether this analysis is correct or not, it is quite clear, from the leaders' descriptions that this type of consensus decision-making was used by CORD after it was formally organized. The leaders stated that this was necessary due to the diversity of families and interests which were represented by the resistance leaders. In short, this was the only way in which the members would allocate the responsibility of making decisions to a few individuals.

Some changes were observed in the decision-making process by the researcher. At first, members stated that they were concerned about who should be the officers when the group was organized. However, after three years of formal organization the members were noticeably pleased by the actions of the officers. They were not apprehensive that a poor decision would be made. The officers stated that they discussed their decisions less because, for example, they saw no alternative to a decision or they had already discussed the issue. Primarily they said that their three

years of experience were responsible for this change and they did not have to use as much time explaining their decisions to the membership. They also said that the activities of the group had escalated and that decisions had to be made more quickly than before when the group was first organized.

The decision-making process became streamlined as the members became more willing to accept the leaders' decisions. This process was aided somewhat by the expansion and other changes which occurred in the structure of the organization. The members were included in the early strategy development of the group and were able to understand the increase in the number of officers and the second advisory group.

Other changes which occurred were due to the temporary loss of one or more of the leaders because of ill health. When one of the leaders became ill and unable to attend to his duties, a younger member of the group was selected by the leaders to take his place temporarily. This caused no difference in CORD activities; decisions were made and strategies implemented without discord. This change in leaders occurred for short periods of time over the first three years of the organization's history. Over the past two years, these same younger men have assumed most of the duties of the older leaders, due to their prolonged ill health. This transition from the older men of the neighborhood to their younger successors was accomplished smoothly because the members said they expected these men to become more active in the group. After all, they had acted as temporary officers and knew what needed to be done. The members assumed that, as leaders, the younger men would continue the resistance effort; if they assumed the position of a leader, they were expected to act as a leader. Concisely stated, the leadership positions

and the appropriate behavior attributed to the positions had become institutionalized within the group. This process of replacing leaders demonstrated to the members that the leadership of the group was to be trusted in making decisions for the group.

At the end of the research period there were many times when only two or three leaders made decisions after very little discussion. The leaders explained that these decisions were made quickly because the CORD lawyer needed an answer to a question quickly, the leaders had more pressing problems to solve, or because the decision was of minor consequence. Regardless of the reason for the quickly-made decisions, it was clear that the way in which decisions were made by the leaders had changed from the original process which was used when the group was formed. Discussions were shorter and fewer leaders were involved.

Other changes were noted in the strategies of the group and the activities associated with each strategy. Overall, as each strategy developed, more people became involved or the activity became more direct. For example, during the first year in which CORD sent representatives to Washington, D.C. to lobby against the reservoir project, only two representatives went. Three years later thirteen representatives participated and were able to meet with the representatives of a greater number of federal agencies. The first lobbying expedition was primarily a fact-finding mission while later lobbying efforts were aimed at information dissemination. Nowhere was the change in activities more evident than in the area of political strategies.

Over a five-year period, the activities of the group which were aimed at the objective of gaining political support to stop the reservoir changed drastically. These efforts, in chronological order of

commencement, include petitions, letter-writing campaigns, meetings with local politicians and meetings with the Governor, meetings with Senators and Congressmen from Kentucky, lobbying efforts at federal agencies, lobbying efforts with Congressmen and Senators from other states, and the formation of a state coalition of resistance groups. The change was in the direction of greater sophistication in the group and its activities. This was an adaptive and educational process. That is, as the leaders saw their strategies meet with some degree of success or failure, they either continued, modified or abandoned their efforts. In the first two years of CORD's existence the leaders learned, through trial and error, what types of activities were successful. They also learned from other sources, such as their lawyer, representatives of various federal agencies, and hired consultants.

The second thing which seems to have been responsible for the increase in sophisticated activity was the inclusion of younger men in the leadership of the group. While the older men were identified as the only men who could have organized a group like CORD, only the younger men could have sustained the resistance effort for so long a time and with so much vigor. The younger leaders became more active each year. They were responsible for the initiation of the second lawsuit and worked hard in the development of the state coalition. The younger leaders also initiated the practice of demonstrating against public officials who were proponents of the reservoir project. This often meant long trips in automobiles to demonstrate for only an hour or two while the politician spoke at a public meeting or some form of dedication ceremony. These activities were not considered legitimate activities for the group by the older leaders early in the resistance effort. As the younger leaders assumed more and more responsibility, however, these activities

became more acceptable as a legitimate CORD tactic. The younger leaders brought a more direct approach to the activities of the group. In addition to the accumulated experience, therefore, the addition of younger leaders played an important part in the changes which occurred in the group and its activities.

In summary, CORD discovered the process of resistance through experience. In general, this process begins with the identification of a threat. The second part of the process is the collection of economic, legal, political, and social information which is relevant to the situation. The knowledge gained from the collection of information is used to clarify the magnitude of the threat and to identify legitimate ways in which the threat can be abated. Specific economic, legal, political, and social objectives are then formulated. These objectives are ranked in terms of their relative value in delaying the development process or stopping it. Essentially, the objectives are statements of what has to be done to stop the threat and the strategies are clear, concise plans of action which emphasize how the objectives are to be met. Implicit in this process is the continued collection of information, reformulation of objectives, and development of subsequent strategies.

Implicit in this process is the capacity to convert the general long-term goal of "stop-the-dam" to short-term objectives which contribute to the process by 1) delaying the project, 2) establishing political alliances, 3) improving the group's knowledge of the project, related law and the development agency, and 4) increasing the group's view of itself as competent and potent.

Over the five years of CORD's existence, the leaders and members of CORD have learned the lessons of leadership, authority, group solidarity, and communication. In general, their example provides a model for other communities faced with similar plights. This case clearly shows how the successful invocation of symbolic and sentimental attachments can be used to create group cohesiveness. In this case, effective resistance was best developed by local leaders who used both democratic and authoritarian procedures for decision-making and who had the authority and ability to control the actions of the group. The planning of effective resistance strategies and tactics required contingency planning, clearly defined objectives, and politically astute timing. Important to the group's efforts was the control of knowledge, requiring the use of professional consultants, accurate and rapid collection and dissemination of information, and accurate internal communications. Certainly these are important things to be considered by other communities which might wish to resist some unwanted imposed change.

Recommendations

Recent non-research literature on water resources points to several problem dimensions: 1) the need for empirical data about the social impact of water resource development; 2) a subsequent need for greater public involvement in the development process; and 3) the need for research on the interaction between population, environment, and social organization (Davis 1971, Warner 1971, Biswas 1972, Vlachos 1971). Essentially, the literature points to the notable lack of knowledge, which can be painfully documented by planners and political leaders who have become embroiled in public controversy. Rather than anticipating

and planning for the locally perceived impacts of a project, planners and political leaders find themselves reacting to various situations as they arise. Needless to say, this process becomes a costly and time-consuming task.

In Kentucky there have been six organized resistance efforts organized by local residents who have the goals of stopping the respective projects. One of these resistance efforts (in the case of the Red River Reservoir Project) has reached the level of a national issue. Five of these groups have formed a state-wide coalition for the purpose of resisting the projects.

This research has identified the perceived costs associated with one such project. The threat posed to the cemeteries and churches should have been planned for by the planners of the project in conjunction with the local residents. The residents were not, however, involved in the planning process. Previous research in this area indicates that this should be taken into account in the future. In addition to occasional articles in the Journal of the American Institute of Planners (Bower 1971, Galloway and Hvelster 1971), the best empirical studies of public participation in planning come from various basin studies: Felton's (1968) study of the Delaware Basin; Barton, Warner and Werick's study of the Susquehanna (1970); and Connor and Bradley's (1972) study of the St. John River Basin. These researchers discuss the most effective means of obtaining and maintaining public participation in planning, and as Connor and Bradley (1972) point out, the public is more likely to accept projects if they have been involved in the planning of them.

The inclusion of the public in planning has also been discussed by Burdge and Johnson (1973) in their report of social costs and benefits of water resource developments after comparing data collected in the project areas of four reservoir projects. In suggesting ways to minimize the social costs of projects, Burdge and Johnson (1973, p. 30-2) suggest that the Corps reassess its public relations, land purchase, and public hearing policies. They also suggest that some form of public opinion poll be used to determine community receptiveness to development and that an individual approach should be developed for the relocation of residents directly affected by the project.

This study of one resistance group indicates that planners in water resource development should carefully consider the Burdge and Johnson recommendations. This study indicates that the lack of public input into the project planning was a major catalyst in the organization of the resistance group. In this case the public hearings were held in 1954 and 1963, but the first official notice that the residents received pursuant to the project came in 1972. In addition, rumors had been spread by surveyors who were working in the area. This created the impression that the project was being developed regardless of the interests of the residents whom it would displace. Further, it seemed that the proponents of the reservoir were attempting to confuse the issues involved by spreading false information. This amazed landowners in the project area and was considered yet another reason to resist the project.

In addition to spreading rumors about the project, the surveyors also angered property owners by entering their land without the owner's

consent. This violated local norms associated with the ownership of land and the sovereignty attributed to the land. These men also violated norms governing the conduct of people when they are in the family cemeteries. The surveyors, without permission or explanation, drove stakes in and around the grave sites and cut small trees in the cemeteries. These actions outraged residents and were often mentioned as major points of aggravation three years after the events had occurred.

The disposition of the cemeteries was a primary point of concern for all of the CORD members, as were the churches and family lands. The separation of family groups and life-long friends was also of concern to the residents of the valley. In the environmental impact statement filed for the project, these concerns were not specifically identified. The residents of the valley saw these as real costs of the project and felt that the planners of the project and those who had authorized the project did not understand what these costs meant.

It is clear that in this project, project benefits are largely accruing to persons outside the involved counties and that the costs are primarily to be borne by members of the local group. Further, the cost-benefit analysis carried out as an aid to decision-making did not measure the actual potential cost to community members. Certain basic socio-cultural costs were discounted as "constants." The magnitude of these costs in this case is manifested in the community's expenditures of time, money and political "favors" in the resistance process. A further area of analysis might be to determine the monetary equivalence of these opportunity costs incurred through the resistance process.

Based upon the findings of this research the following suggestions might be of use to other planners and community leaders who are involved in the development of a water resource project.

Recommendations to Planners

1) There should be a continual flow of accurate information about the project to the community. This should include factual information about the general process of development and the specific project being planned. This educational process should begin as early as possible during the planning phase of the project.

2) Community responses to this information should be solicited and reviewed to determine the accuracy and completeness of community understanding. These community responses should be used to determine whether alternative community education measures should be developed and incorporated into the planning process.

3) Project personnel should be prepared as part of their professional role to behave respectfully toward local life-ways. They also should be knowledgeable about the project as it is being developed or refer questions from local residents to others who might be better prepared to give correct answers.

4) Project planners should take the lead in identifying specifically the social costs of a proposed project in an attempt to incorporate these costs in the project decision-making process.

5) Project planners should insist on more frequent public meetings held in the project area in order to provide a forum for direct exchange of information between professional project staff and local residents. These meetings should include both formal presentations, informal question and answer sessions and unstructured discussion of the project.

Recommendations to Resisters

1) Any community which intends to resist an unwanted project should form some type of formal group with elected officers and a descriptive name.

2) The group should maintain a continual flow of accurate information about project implications and resistance activities to the community.

3) While intensity of motivation may be the most important positive quality of a successful leader, the leadership of the group should reflect the diverse composition of the area so as to facilitate decision-making and communication.

4) Patterns of communication and leadership should follow as closely as possible the existing "natural" patterns in the community. This will lead to more efficient use of local resources as well as greater familiarity with the community's perceptions of the project on the part of the leaders.

5) The group must develop relationships with individuals and groups outside the area so as to obtain reliable technical information and to establish political alliances.

6) The group should develop and maintain lines of communication with all pertinent federal agencies (including those responsible for the project development) in order to monitor accurately the progress of the project and disseminate resistance propaganda.

7) Effective resistance is based as much on sound technical information as it is intensity of motivation, therefore resistance leaders must continually work to improve their understanding of the factual and legal basis of water resource planning.

8) Effective resistance depends upon the careful planning of resistance strategies which focus on both long-term and short-term objectives. The objectives should be clearly identified as early as possible so that group activities can be organized to obtain the greatest effect.

9) Resistance leaders should work to demonstrate the effectiveness of the group early in the process so as to counteract community fatalism.

FOOTNOTES

- 1) The Citizens Organization to Resist the Dam is a pseudonym as are the names of Bluetown, Blue County, Greenville, Green Creek, Green County, and all named individuals mentioned in this report.
- 2) The dam was not built in his lifetime because he died during the resistance effort as did another older valley resident. In both cases the families said that these mens' deaths were partly attributable to the reservoir project. In addition, a few weeks after he had been forced to move, a CORD leader died. He had been one of the key-informants in this study. During one interview he prophetically stated that if he were forced to move it might prove to be too much for his already poor health.

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ADDENDUM

to

Research Report No. 110

ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO AN
IMPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE:
A RESERVOIR IN EASTERN KENTUCKY

by

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Due to an error in the final review process the following
items were inadvertently omitted from the original bibliography:

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