

## HIGHWAYS IN CIVIL DEFENSE

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In discussing highways in Civil Defense, it might be well to first look at the whole picture of Civil Defense, including necessity, and, if there is necessity, just what should be done.

During the past month it seems that the dissemination of information on Civil Defense has been stepped up through the newspapers, radio and television. Many of you no doubt have heard the broadcast sponsored by CBS and given by Arthur Godfrey in which a simulated atom bomb attack was made on certain cities of the United States. We were told then that only 30% of the planes carrying bombs would be shot down. Also, some of you saw, on television, the blast at Yucca Flats. You have read, too, in the newspapers, of a plan to ring certain cities with air craft defense. There is no doubt that at this time emphasis is being placed nationally on the need for stepping up our civil defense programming. Still the answer as to whether we expect atomic bombing is everybody's guess. Our opinions as to the necessity for civil defense measures are no doubt governed considerably by where we live. In the industrialized east and in large cities the answer to whether we need a strong civil defense is yes, and reports received seem to bear out that in some of these states planning is very far advanced and considerable. State as well as federal money has been spent.

In December, 1951, the survey research center at the University of Michigan made a study of public attitudes on civil defense. People were interviewed in the following cities—*New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Detroit, Boston, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, St. Louis, Cleveland and San Francisco*. These interviews were conducted in September and October of 1950 and again in the same cities in August and September of 1951.

Here are some general conclusions from the study which indicate the content and scope of the report:

1. "People generally expect that America may well be in for another world war. Many look for war within a year or two. There is a preponderant belief that such a war will be of the all-out kind, with atomic weapons being used against U. S. cities. Germ and gas warfare are not considered as much of a threat as atomic weapons, but this appraisal may result from lack of public knowledge about these weapons.
2. People are coming to realize that civil defense is an increasingly urgent necessity. They understand its purpose and meaning. Even if we should have peace in Korea, they say we should build a strong civil defense.
3. The recognition of this need for strong civil defense has resulted in general willingness to work in civil defense. *However*, this willingness has not reached the point of conviction that people as individuals should join civil defense now. Nearly half the people in these 11 major cities have not heard or read that volunteers are needed. This may partly explain why only *one* out of three adults has thought seriously about volunteering.
4. Considerable progress has been made in public understanding of the nature of atomic warfare and especially in knowledge of personal protection. The total amount of knowledge is still small but nearly 90% of people know a few simple things they should do to protect themselves. This is an increase of 25% in less than one year.

5. Almost without exception, people need much more information about the dangers of total war; about the importance of their personal participation in the civil defense of their community.
6. Some of the people who need information most are not being reached by general media. Special ways must be found to increase their knowledge and enlist their support."

More than 60% in both the 1950 and 51 survey thought that in case the United States was attacked our cities likely would be hit by atomic bombs. Ninety per cent thought that children should be taught in school what to do in case of an atomic bomb attack.

The whole problem of civil defense then seems to hinge on war, as no doubt a majority of the people believe that all out war would mean atomic attacks, and it appears from the best information now that we have no defense that would stop atomic attacks 100%. Of course, we must not forget that civil defense would be of assistance in any disaster, such as floods, fires, earthquakes, etc. NATURAL BARRIERS like rivers, mountains, Maginot and Siegfried lines, the English Channel and oceans are still helpful in ground defense, but small hindrance in the case of bombs or guided missiles.

We can then assume that if there is war there will be atomic bombing and some of our cities will be hit. This, then, brings up the same old question—will there be war, when, and how much warning will we have. Your answer is as good as any columnists, and may be as good as the experts. The army, of which we would really be a part, cannot give the answer. The army in an aggressor country is only a tool and military conquest is for gaining certain political aims. An army in a democratic country such as ours is primarily a defensive organization and can plan only such steps as are necessary to stop the enemy. They cannot foresee all of the political maneuvering of other countries.

Right now we do not know whether Stalin's death will cause a change for better or worse. We do not know whether peace talks will result in any solution. No one seems to know, so our thinking must be—prepare for the worst but hope for the best.

At any rate none of us are willing to rule out the possibility of war, and since war would mean all out mobilization, there should be, and there is, civil defense planning. Naturally, the tempo of planning and your interest is going to be governed by your location, the tenseness in the country and the leadership shown at National and State levels.

Bernard Baruch, before a Congressional Committee, said: "An enemy contemplating an attack against this country could have only one plan—to overwhelm the United States before the nation's vast productive strength could be converted from peace to war. The next war—and all of us pray it will be avoided—is likely to explode in a big smash. Cities may be all but obliterated."

In your own state, Section 16 of Senate Bill 153 authorizes and directs each county and city of the Commonwealth to establish local civil defense in accordance with the State Civil Defense Plan and Program. Each county judge and chief executive of each city is authorized to appoint a director who shall have direct responsibility for the organization, administration and operation for local civil defense. As a result of this bill, the Governor has appointed a Director of Civil Defense (General Lindsey), a deputy Director (Judge White) and a coordinator for mobile groups (Col. Quinn). The Director in turn has divided the state into five areas for mobile support, with an area director, who has on his staff assistants who are organizing the different services, such as medical, police, civil air patrol, rescue transportation, engineering, fire, communication, food and welfare, and supply. Considerable work has been done toward organizing the mobile support group here in Lexington and the cooperation from various organizations has been good. Of course, the organization is still a paper one, but as a columnist in the

Louisville Times pointed out, our big war with Communists is still in the paper stage, too.

Before going too far with an organization and recruiting personnel, we should explain something of what we are organizing for. To quote from the Federal Civil Defense Manual: "To meet the problems of organizing for civil defense operations it is essential (1) to have a clear picture of the objectives, (2) know what means are available, and (3) know how to mobilize them. Under objectives would be (1) to minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused by an attack on the United States, (2) to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by such an attack and (3) to effect emergency repairs or restore vital utilities and facilities destroyed by any such attack."

In other words, we must first take care of the immediate needs of our people, and then see that, in turn, the people are aided in going back to the pursuit of their occupations so that our fighting forces will be provided with equipment and supplies. If we are bombed it is all out war, and every able bodied man and woman will be in it some way or another. Fortunately, we have never had any practical experience in civil defense, but can use the experiences of others to make our plans. Civil defense was put to the test in Great Britain. In Germany no doubt civil defense was able to help them prolong the fall of their armies. We do know that the atomic bomb is more destructive than any that were dropped on European cities, but with the number of bombs that were dropped on them we do know the results of almost complete destruction. From the experiences of others then we are trying to make our plans for civil defense. First in our plans will come organization and inventory of our resources, both in manpower and material. Then will come training to such an extent as is deemed necessary.

In organizing for civil defense the basic principles are self help and mutual aid. It is expected that each city or urban area will have its organization and that the surrounding area will have pooled its resources so that mutual aid may be rendered. As mentioned, our state will have 5 mobile support areas surrounding the cities of Louisville, Lexington, Paducah, Bowling Green and Ashland. Covington and Newport are in the same area as Lexington. Each of these areas will have mobile support groups, comprised of the various services. These groups will be so organized that they can go to the aid of any cities in their area and in addition could be moved to any city in the state or to other states, if not needed at home.

We will not go into the complete organization of a mobile unit, but will concentrate on engineering services as the Department of Highways, County and City Road Departments, and contractors will be concerned mostly with keeping streets and highways open. The principle of getting there "fustest" with the "mostest" applies in Civil Defense as well as far, and we must depend on highways. Remember that all Civil Defense services are dependent on our highways and streets. Fire trucks, ambulances, supply, rescue, doctors—just any aid we may mention will use our road and street system.

Everybody knows that our streets and highways do not now have the capacity to properly take care of peak traffic. You can imagine the conditions if some of our highways were lost and there were curtailed rail deliveries and the added emergency traffic. Add to that panic conditions and we do have a problem. The first consideration is keeping every possible artery open and to have a plan whereby we can enforce regulations that will insure necessary travel. As an example, we may think that cities are self-sufficient for some time in the way of food, but statistics show that it would only be a short time until necessary supplies for the living would have to be moved in. If we have factories making critical war material they must be kept open and products moved out. When Hamburg, Germany was bombed long distance trains were able to reach only the outskirts of the city.

The importance of highways is stressed as evidenced by the Federal Civil Defense Administration having schools in different sections of the country to which police and engineers are sent for instruction in traffic control. At this school it was emphasized that during ordinary times there is divided authority over highway travel as far as state and city police are concerned, but that any driver can go anywhere and at any time he pleases as long as no laws are violated. In case of bombing, civil defense authorities would take over regulation of the highways and there must be much advance planning for this step. No one can predict just where bombs will strike, so all plans must be comprehensive enough to cover most eventualities and fluid enough to be changed as circumstances dictate. Naturally, the first problem of traffic will be in the city itself. Our first concern would be to get fire-trucks, ambulances, food and medical supplies to the stricken part. That may mean clearing streets of rubbish and moving parked cars off the streets, and for longer travel could be repairing roads and bridges. But perhaps of equal or more importance keep other non-essential vehicles from driving on the streets. The local problem is of first importance, but at the same time, we have aid coming from other towns and cities and their help might be of as much importance as local aid. The highways must be kept open for them and unauthorized drivers kept off the essential roads. Remember that with unauthorized cars we have two problems. They certainly would add to our traffic congestion, and if gas stations are closed to the public or under regulation we might have to deal with stalled cars.

We probably need to think more seriously about civil defense in relation to highways than to any other service. We certainly would give up more readily other things than our right to travel as we please; and restrictions on that travel will be drastic. The highways near any critical area must be regulated the same as railroad travel, with schedules, reservations, etc. Necessary travel may even have to be scheduled. Not only must any traffic plan we have be carefully worked out but the public must be educated as to the reasons for it and how the plan will affect them.

Let us first assume at the state level that we have designated our highways as has New York with primary and secondary civil defense routes. Of course, we would not need as an elaborate plan as they have for we haven't so many large cities linked by a highway network. Some states, though, in addition to designating civil defense highways have civil defense markers on these routes. The State Highway would be responsible for the designating and marking of our routes and the State Police would carry out enforcement. Now, further assume that the Louisville area has a traffic plan which would include St. Matthews, Shively, Albany and Jeffersonville. In making their plans they do have the benefit of experience of European cities in estimating needs of a bombed area. They have designated streets which would be of importance in civil defense. They have a traffic plan which is fluid enough so that with some amendments it will work under any conditions except total destruction. They have block workers and auxiliary police and are prepared to enforce their plan of keeping every key street open. They have set up a highway traffic control center (we hope it is outside the bombed area).

Now, a bomb strikes the city — the control center (of which the highway traffic control center is a part) immediately takes over, and through communications, aerial observers or other reconnaissance determines where help is needed. All information is immediately plotted and corrections made in traffic plans. Now the fire trucks, ambulances, reserve, etc. can move in, and where necessary bulldozers, graders, etc. move in to clear necessary streets. As soon as possible, an estimate is made of further needs for engineering equipment, ambulances, etc. and a call goes to state headquarters for mobile support groups. All of this time traffic control must know what hospitals are being used and keep routes open to

them. Then come calls from state headquarters saying that so many trucks, ambulances and other equipment will arrive via U. S. 60 and where must they go. Control must tell traffic where they are needed and then traffic must give the route. It can be imagined in a major bombing that the dispatcher on a busy railroad would consider his work child's play as compared to scheduling traffic on streets. To add to his confusion, possibly the army will want to schedule a convoy through his area.

Now, while Louisville is having its traffic problems someone is having traffic troubles outside of the Louisville area. Traffic is going west out of Lexington and wants to go through Louisville and on to Indianapolis or Chicago. Maybe the traffic problem from Lexington to Frankfort isn't serious, but it is from Frankfort on. Traffic then must be by-passed by way of Madison, Indiana. It is recommended in cases such as this that there be established a voluntary by-pass well out of the critical area and then a compulsory by-pass as we reach the critical traffic area.

The same thing would apply to 31 W as to US 60. Possibly there would be established an alternate route near Elizabethtown. Now perhaps some of our key highways are damaged. That disrupts our plans. But there is only one answer. Send in repair crews, but in meantime use an alternate traffic plan.

You can appreciate the fact that plans cannot be made when the emergency arises and that there must be much thought given to a plan (of course, the plan may have to be changed, but it is easier to change a good plan than to make one up on the spur of the moment.) We must know what traffic ordinarily uses our roads and for what purposes, what the army plans, and any other information that would help. Planning on personnel, signs, barricades is just one example of the planning. A good traffic control center would have a traffic planning division and under that an intelligence and plans section, a message center, operations division to supervise and regulate traffic, a personnel division and facilities division; also scheduling and dispatching branches.

Our highways and streets in war, as in peace, are our life-line and since we can't build more in an emergency our job is to keep them open and used to the best advantage of the country.

I might end this by asking you to see your nearest civil defense recruiting officer and sign up, but that appears unnecessary, as those of you in the highways have been drafted, and to judge from the recruiting Harry Wyse has done in the Lexington area among the contractors, they are in, too. I also understand that quite a few of the counties and cities are part of this organization.