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History and Memory in Late Twentieth Century Civil War Literature: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

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*History and Memory in
Late Twentieth Century Civil War Literature:
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.*

Marion B. Lucas

At the conclusion of the Civil War Centennial, 1960-1965, rumor was that as many books had been published during the Centennial as between 1865 and 1960. If a fairly reliable source informed me that an equal number of books on the Civil War had been published since 1965, I would have no trouble accepting the statement as fact. A recent popular work puts the total number of Civil War books at more than 60,000.¹ Now add to that the manuscripts, documents, and writings, scholarly and non-scholarly, on the World Wide Web!

The Good: For the past two decades the study of the Civil War has experienced a writing renaissance. Much of this renaissance consists of new examinations of old problems; a process critics sometimes call "re-packaging" Civil War History. The success of these new works stems from approaching older Civil War problems creatively, from new directions, and presenting findings in superior prose. I intend, first, to present an impressionistic analysis of some of the seminal works and newer ideas of the last twenty years.

Older historical interpretations told us that the North and the South after about 1830 were essentially two separate nations. This line of thinking led to stereotypes. Historians of the older school spoke glibly in terms of "A North" and "A South." Slavery was the reason for the evolution of these two distinct civilizations.²

James Ford Rhodes's works are a good example of this approach. More than a hundred years ago Rhodes described two societies divided over the slavery issue. For Rhodes, slavery was the major cause of the Civil War. Rhodes, however, went to great lengths to be fair in his presentation. In describing the "war years," Rhodes seemed almost to give points: One point for "The North"; One point for "The South"; another point for "The North"; another point for "The South," and so on. Neo-Confederates shouldn't get their hopes up, however. "The South" still lost!³

Recently scholarship has tended to level the barriers between the sections. Indeed, current studies tend to emphasize similarities rather than differences between the South and North. Today, most scholars see the sections as more alike than different. Kenneth Stampp's comments in his 1990 book, *Imperiled Union*, are typical: "Fundamen-

tally [the South] was not the product of genuine Southern nationalism; indeed, except for the institution of slavery, the South had little to give it a clear national identity. . . . The notion of a distinct Southern culture was largely a figment of the romantic imaginations of a handful of intellectuals and proslavery propagandists. . . ."⁴

The sometimes enigmatic Grady McWhiney adds his voice in *Southerners and Other Americans*. "Writers . . . have tended to magnify the differences between the Northerners and Southerners out of all proportion. In 1861 the United States did not contain . . . two civilizations." "One of the great myths of American history is that when the Civil War began Southerners were fundamentally different from Northerners."⁵

David M. Potter's condemnation of the "two separate nations" theory was even more emphatic. "Efforts of historians to buttress their claim that the South had a wholly separate culture self-consciously asserting itself as a cultural counterpart of political nationalism, have led, on the whole to paltry results."⁶

Recent scholars make additional points. Both the North and the South were agrarian societies. "State Rights" was the political philosophy of virtually all Americans, regardless of their section. The charge that romantic literature created a medieval society in the South is dashed to pieces by the fact that northerners were equally taken with escapist writings. And when it came to rising interest in industry, a class of southerners, though small, expressed desires similar to their northern counterparts to build railroads and erect factories.⁷

The facts are currently piling up. The North and the South were not two separate nations, but they were different. And it was a major difference. Northern and southern differences boil down to one word: SLAVERY.

Thus, historians have come full circle. By eliminating differences in other fields, current historical scholarship was forced back to a position that older historians knew almost by instinct. Frontier Alabama, for example, was only slightly less different from Massachusetts than frontier Iowa, except for one vital difference: the presence of large numbers of slaves in Alabama. The real gulf between the North and the South was slavery.

During the last two decades, professional historians began speaking in unison: Slavery was the single most important cause of the Civil War. Eric Foner led the pack. In his seminal work, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men*, Foner named slavery as the major cause of the Civil War. Slavery, northern laborers believed, was "backward," and its expansion a threat to workingmen's dignity. Free men felt they must stop the expansion of slavery, and thus, as Lincoln said, "the rub."⁸ Fear of losing their slaves took the South down the slippery slope

toward secession.⁹

One group of historians challenges this view. The “new political historians” emphasize the “ethnocultural” approach, highlighting social, ethnic, and religious differences. Michael Holt, clearly the leader of the “new political historians,” argues in his provocative book, *The Political Crisis of the 1850s*, that the real cause of the Civil War was a cultural clash. New England reformers, especially, wanted to impose their cultural views on the nation. They believed their goals were being thwarted by the Democratic Party that was dominated by slaveholders committed to local autonomy. For Holt, then, slavery served only as a “concrete” issue to inflame northerners and southerners.¹⁰

One other idea necessary for understanding pre-Civil War America finally reached fruition among historians—if not the public—during the 1990s. For most of our national history, a white-dominated America has been unable to come to grips with slavery’s existence. White America presented our history in this fashion: We proudly nailed to our national masthead our belief that all men are created equal. The United States is an inviting beacon offering freedom and democracy to the world. Through education and hard work anyone can rise to the top. Such was the right of all Americans.

What role did slavery play in this land of opportunity? History, presented by the dominant white culture, answered: Slavery existed, that’s true, but somehow slavery wasn’t really part of America. Americans didn’t really *want* slavery, but it existed anyway. Americans truly wanted to end slavery but somehow couldn’t. How, then, do you explain slavery? You don’t have to explain slavery, these historians seemed to say, because, you see, slavery was an aberration, not really part of America!

But the truth is, slavery was a part of America, and no aberration, as a host of new studies show. Two insightful new works on slavery, Ira Berlin’s *Many Thousands Gone* and Philip D. Morgan’s *Slave Counterpoint*, have as their central idea the nationality of colonial slavery; the centrality of the institution to nineteenth century American history. This point has to be accepted before solutions arise to America’s race problem!¹¹

One reason for the explosion of good literature on Civil War military history results from the growth of university presses. All the older, well-established publishers of Civil War series are, of course, publishing more than ever—Louisiana State University Press, University of North Carolina Press, and the University of Illinois Press. But the older presses are being challenged by aggressive, upstart university presses which publish impressive “Civil War History Series.” The University of Nebraska Press has an outstanding series, “Great Campaigns of the Civil War.” The University Press of Kansas has its

"Modern War Studies" series with a stable of excellent writers. Fordham University Press publishes two series: "The North's Civil War Series" and "The Irish in the Civil War." And don't forget that Greenwood Press has the "Daily Life Through History Series" which features books like *Daily Life in Civil War America*.¹²

Steven Woodworth's *Six Armies in Tennessee* is a good example of the new literature from these presses. At first glance, one might wonder what Woodworth hoped to accomplish by another look at the admittedly critical series of events in Tennessee during the second half of 1863. Did Woodworth really have more to say about the western theater after his well-received *Jefferson Davis and His Generals*?¹³ The answer is emphatically, yes. A master of the secondary sources, Woodworth's fast-paced, lively narrative combines description, analysis, and provocative interpretation to achieve a brilliant synthesis.¹⁴

Another "old" question currently being reexamined by Civil War historians is: Did the South every have a chance at winning the Civil War? Mid-twentieth century southern-born, non-professional writers often taught Americans their Civil War history. Their strength lay in their ability to "turn a phrase." In books written from the 1940s through the 1960s, readers could almost hear the Confederate death rattle.¹⁵ The spirit of these works came through: If the South had just had more grits, and a few more pairs of shoes, the Confederacy would have won that war! Amazingly, they never found a way to *make* the South win until publication of Harry Turtledove's *Guns of the South*, which placed AK-47s in the hands of Lee's troops.¹⁶

Shelby Foote's approach is a good example. In *Shiloh*, Foote's "grits and shoes" approach came through on every page. Ultimately, Foote's love for the South led him to write a narrative history of the Civil War. Once Foote looked at the big picture, his views on southern prospects changed. Readers can almost see Foote's mind shift and rethink in his beautifully written trilogy. Mississippi born, Foote's southern sympathies seeped onto every page as Lee's brilliant generalship carried the Confederacy to its High Noon, only to falter. Slowly, however, Foote became convinced, as he told us in Ken Burns's documentary, the South never really "had a chance to win that war."¹⁷

So it was with most scholarly interpreters. Perhaps this conclusion was a reaction to northern economic power, to the machine age, or the militarism of the Cold War. But whatever the cause, by the mid-1960s all but a few unreconstructed southerners concluded that the South had no chance of winning the Civil War, taking the position R.E. Lee articulated at Appomattox, and the catechism of the "Children of the Confederacy" explains today: "the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources."¹⁸

This writer, as a graduate student, reached the same conclusion almost

by instinct in the 1960s.

Did the South have a chance? In 1986 a group of historians led by Richard Beringer published *Why the South Lost the Civil War*. This work boldly challenged the "no chance" view. Whether influenced by the Vietnam War or simply reacting to rare historical consensus, these writers insisted that when Lee surrendered at Appomattox the South still had a chance for victory. The South was not defeated by overwhelming manpower, by excessive devotion to "State Rights," or by the failed leadership of Jefferson Davis. What doomed the Confederacy? A failure of nationalism, a recognition that slavery was dying, and a loss of will.¹⁹

Here the explanation of Beringer and friends turns novel, though not unique. Social psychology and religion, they believe, played a major role. Southern nationalism, it seems, was only skin deep. Southerners quit; they gave up; they lost because they believed God had turned against them; that God was punishing them for the sin of slavery!²⁰

In recent years, discussion of "turning points" in the Civil War—typically Antietam, Gettysburg, and Vicksburg, where the Northern army appeared to stop losing—has changed. In 1986 James McPherson, the dean of Civil War historians, reappraised Civil War "turning points" in his best-selling *Battle Cry of Freedom*. McPherson argues persuasively that on four occasions victory hung in the balance and might have gone to either side. The first came during the summer of 1862, as Lee and Jackson eased into Maryland and Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith dashed for the Ohio River in the West at Louisville and Cincinnati. This reversal of what seemed like "imminent Union victory" precipitated what many have called "the Crisis of the Union," raising the specter of Confederate independence. The second turning point occurred during the fall 1862. Antietam, and the deadly, but until recently neglected, Battle of Perryville,²¹ thwarted European recognition of the Confederacy, ameliorated the influences of earlier losses in northern elections, and influenced Lincoln's decision for emancipation. The third turning point came with the cumulative effect of three critical battles during the summer and fall of 1863: Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, which pointed toward "ultimate northern victory." The fourth turning point happened during the summer of 1864 as Grant hammered away at Lee's forces and enormous casualties sapped northern will. But William Tecumseh Sherman's victory at Atlanta and the destruction of southern forces in the Shenandoah Valley miraculously regenerated northern will, as Confederate determination crumbled.²²

One new idea only recently and rightly slipped into historical consensus as a turning point: the Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln,

as James McPherson reminds us,²³ freed the slaves, and that must be neither forgotten nor minimized. But an enormous amount of research published during the past two decades reveals a previously unappreciated story. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation merely "confirmed," as Eric Foner says, "what was already happening."²⁴ A small controversy currently rages over these two points: Did Lincoln free the slaves, or was it "self-emancipation"? Ira Berlin and Vincent Harding are leaders of the "self-emancipation" group.²⁵ They, along with other historians,²⁶ make a point too often ignored by historians: The Civil War was the first viable opportunity most slaves had to seek freedom, and they fled in droves wherever the Union army appeared. Largely because of their own actions, Berlin and Harding accurately maintain, blacks inaugurated a social revolution by fleeing into Federal lines, entering the Union army as soldiers, and facing slaveholders on the battlefield.²⁷ Eric Foner, who begins his book on *Reconstruction* in 1863, believes that the Emancipation Proclamation marked the war's turning point as much as Gettysburg and Vicksburg.²⁸

The issue of the destructiveness of Union armies marching through the South began during the Civil War. The southern view, that devastation encouraged by Union generals such as William Tecumseh Sherman exceeded that of the Thirty Years' War,²⁹ became dominant, reaching its culmination in a 1948 John Walters article and dissertation that labeled the Civil War a "total war."³⁰ Historians thereafter applied the term routinely. Over the past two decades, however, historians have begun questioning older interpretations that emphasized the Civil War's destructiveness. Charles Royster's, *The Destructive War*, a 1991 joint-study of Sherman and Jackson, is one of the few recent scholarly books that emphasizes the wanton destructiveness of Civil War soldiers. Royster seems to believe soldiers, North and South, literally wanted to obliterate each other.³¹ Today, most scholarship views the Civil War as an evolving conflict which descended gradually from a conciliatory policy toward increasing harshness, but never reaching the magnitude of "total war."³² Mark Grimsley's 1995 book, *The Hard Hand of War*, is an outstanding study of the evolution of Union military policy. Grimsley's study describes changing Union attitudes and policies toward the South.³³

One of the new fields of Civil War research, a natural outgrowth of studies of Civil War devastation and which is sometimes labeled the "New Social History," seeks to expand historical knowledge by analyzing and evaluating the roles of women—black and white—as well as the economic and social impact of war and devastation on families of both races. Stephen Ash's excellent study, *When the Yankees Came*, looks at the way the Federal policy of "hard war" described by Grimsley reached fruition for southern civilians. The harshest aspect of

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the northern invasion, Ash believes, occurred in "no-man's land," the area between Federal and guerilla forces, and was "deeply rooted in their community." Lee Kennett's *Marching Through Georgia* approaches Sherman's famous campaign from a similar point of view, from the bottom up. In Kennett's account, readers travel through Georgia with common soldiers, experiencing the daily events of their lives, as well as those of local citizenry and refugees, both black and white.³⁴

Another group of historians, following the approach of the "New Social Historians," are endeavoring to inform the public about long-neglected topics, such as the role of African Americans in the Civil War. Joseph T. Glatthaar's *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers* analyzes the daily lives of African American troops during the Civil War, as well as their relationships with their white officers. Glatthaar describes "U.S. Colored" troops as concluding that soldiering offered them upwardly mobility. African Americans, Glatthaar argued, learned quickly, often surprising their white counterparts who sometimes saw service as a chore, and that they supported most vigorously those officers who shared their goal of eradicating slavery. Glatthaar, laments, however, that racial alliances solidified during the Civil War typically faded once the war ended.³⁵

George C. Rable's *Civil Wars: Women and the Crisis of Southern Nationalism* explores the role of southern white women in the Civil War, another slighted minority. In general, southern women were enthusiastic supporters of the Confederacy, Rable argues, but invasion, the death of loved ones, and destruction of property reduced many to poverty, resulting in disillusionment and despair. Though forced to assume many new roles because of war's necessities, those who hoped for new post-war opportunities were bitterly disappointed. When the war ended, most southern white women, with few options, essentially picked up where they left off, assuming pre-war roles.³⁶

The Civil War in Appalachia is another military front where the "New Social History" thrives. In 1997 Kenneth Noe and Shannon Wilson edited an important book of essays, *The Civil War in Appalachia*, which challenged historians to place the region in proper perspective in Civil War history. Collectively, these essays explode once and for all the myth of a monolithic mountain Unionism and will, hopefully, drive that idea from text books.³⁷

Noel C. Fisher's excellent book, *War at Every Door*, quickly answered their challenge. East Tennesseans, in a bloody partisan conflict, struggled to control the region for much of the Civil War. Like similar borderlands during the Civil War, where regular troops and bands of partisans clashed, reprisals became commonplace. Participants were, for the most part, hard-working farmers and merchants who hoped to expel their political opponents, thereby establishing a

government loyal to their side. This work, better than any other, places the conflict in East Tennessee in its proper context.³⁸

The Bad: But are students and the public listening? As a young professor from the Deep South teaching my first course on "Civil War and Reconstruction" in Kentucky, I admit initial surprise at hearing a high school band playing "Dixie" at my first fall football game.

Today, many years later, I am never surprised by my students. Attitudes formed at grandfather's knee appear seldom changed by reading recent histories, and certainly not by what I say in class. For too many students, the latest scholarly interpretations of the Civil War are like a vaccination that doesn't take.

Early in my class, I summarize current scholarship when discussing the causes of the Civil War. Inevitably I get two questions: "I thought the Civil War was about economics" was a popular query in the 1980s. The other, "I thought the Civil War was over State's Rights," forged to center stage in the 1990s. Recently, a bright young woman who had asked the second question dropped by my office at term's end and handed me a packet of Xeroxed pages taken from her "father's personal library."

Several sheets came from Alexander H. Stephens' *A Constitutional View of the Late War*—not exactly new material—and were heavy on the "compact theory" of government. The northern assault on State Rights gave the South no other choice but to secede, Stephens informed his readers.³⁹ The second xerox cache, from a 1927 article by Paul S. Whitcomb in *Tyler's Quarterly Magazine*, consisted of an unrelenting attack on Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln, Whitcomb argued, did to the South what he said southerners did to slaves: took away their freedom, presumably OK in the second instance but not in the first. He and his abolitionist friends attempted to force southerners to accept the equality of "a race of people . . . totally unprepared for self-government." Lincoln's treachery left South Carolinians no alternative but to fire on Ft. Sumter.⁴⁰

During a recent night class of mostly high school teachers, I again bumped into unabashed defenders of the "Lost Cause." In a state where everybody bleeds University of Kentucky blue, two bright, dedicated teachers informed me during discussions that they bled Confederate gray. Both students loved the Civil War, and the classroom repartee was fun, but their oral reports once again reminded me of the sluggish progress historians make. One student reported on James Ramage's *Rebel Raider: The Life of General John Hunt Morgan*; the other read John Marszalek's *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order*.⁴¹

Morgan, the first student reported, was dedicated, responsible, and loyal to the ideals of the Old South. A bold Confederate hero, he bravely fought and honorably died for the cause in which he believed.

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"Wait a minute." I interrupted. "Did we read the same book?"
The discussion began!

"Morgan represented the ideals of the Old South?" I asked.

"Wasn't he a slave dealer and didn't southerners in general and Kentuckians in particular say they hated slave dealers?"

"Well, yes, but Morgan was a brilliant, innovative military leader, wasn't he," the student replied, "and this is a course on the Civil War, not slavery. I think he was a great general."

The question, of course, was what Ramage, an outstanding historian, thought of the "man" and the "general" after years of research and deliberation. The following points came out in the discussion:

Never a team player, Morgan could not be counted on to carry out the Richmond government's orders or even those of his commanding officer, and his advice regarding support for the Confederacy in Kentucky was, in a word, bad. Ramage starkly lays out Morgan's violations of duty: he was AWOL at the Battle of Shiloh; he disobeyed a direct order when he invaded Kentucky in 1862 and Indiana and Ohio in 1863; and he embarked upon the campaign that took his life while suspended from his own command and under investigation by a court of inquiry.

Equally abhorrent was the increasingly lax discipline of Morgan's command, sometimes starting at the top. In at least two instances Morgan either murdered prisoners or allowed his men to shoot them. On other occasions he looked the other way when his men brutalized prisoners, robbed banks and civilians, and plundered private property.

The discussion ended. "I still think he was a great general," the student mumbled.

The second student gave his report; he did not like Sherman. Sherman violated the accepted rules of war, bombarded unarmed cities, campaigned against women, children, and elderly men, yada, yada, yada! Marszalek's outstanding biography had changed nothing.

Few Union commanders have been studied more than William Tecumseh Sherman who, seemingly, never had an unspoken thought—all of which have since been published! Three new, detailed biographies of Sherman appeared in the 1990s *alone!*

Again I asked: "Did we read the same book?" Reappraisals of Sherman today, I said, largely revolve around the issue of whether or not Sherman was a military innovator, not the old charges of barbarity. So it is with Marszalek's *Sherman*. I had expected more from my student.

The Ugly: I originally blamed CNN; I've since added Fox News, a dozen or so cable and satellite channels, and the World Wide

Web. Beginning in the 1980s, CNN put almost any nut who appeared in their station on your TV screen. The World Wide Web now places all nuts on your computer screen. Experts say we are in the "information age"; if so, it's the bad information age!

The League of the South would be one of the more alarming internet websites if it weren't so laughable. Dr. Michael Hill, who holds a Ph.D. from the University of Alabama—that's Forrest Gump's school—is the head of the League of the South. The League hopes to reestablish the religious, social, cultural, economic, and political values of the Old South.

In June 1994 Hill called together about forty "Lost Cause" fellow travelers to form the League of the South.⁴² Their position papers, with titles like "Paleo-Federalist/Southern Nationalists," proclaim that the South possesses an "Anglo-Celtic" civilization dating "back to Runnymede." They believe God is on their side, and in the words of a Lost Cause prophet: The League hateth a "Godless unitary state."⁴³

How much of this is tongue-in-cheek is hard to say. At their 1998 convention at a hotel with an adjacent shopping mall, one observer commented that participants seemed more interested in "khaki and seersucker" than "butternut twill," a stark contrast to the "crass commercialism" they denounce. But in his keynote speech, Hill told his Nashville audience that "there can be no peace until we are a separate and free people again. The day of apologizing for the conduct of our Confederate ancestors is over."⁴⁴

Ironically, in 1998 Hill was a professor of history at Stillman College,⁴⁵ a largely African-American school, where he tooted around campus in a pick-up truck with a "Free the South" bumper sticker. Stillman's president, who used "pathetic and sad" to describe Hill's ideas, is understandably reluctant to restore Old South values. Are paleo-federalists and southern nationalists racists? They answer simply, "No," in one of their position statements. On the race question Hill says, "If blacks and whites in the south had been allowed to work it out for themselves, . . . [things] would have been better," the mantra of white southerners since colonial times. The Southern Poverty Law Center, which in 1998 cautiously described the League as adding a "veneer of legitimacy to bigoted views," has since labeled the League of the South a racist organization.⁴⁶

These people may be serious. They post names of those guilty of "Southern Heritage" violations. The list includes Tony Horwitz, Jimmy Breslin, Edward Sebesta (alias "Crawfish" on the web), Dharma and Greg, and Cracker Barrel Restaurants.⁴⁷ Merely questioning R.E. Lee's generalship violates their First Commandment.⁴⁸ Who can guess the fate of Edward Bonekemper, author of *How Robert E. Lee Lost the*

Civil War?⁴⁹

Groups like the League of the South provide links to publishers who sell books that support their point of view. James Ronald and Walter Donald Kennedy's *The South Was Right!* is a typical example. The brothers Kennedy would have you toss out every scholarly account you have read about the Civil War. The history of the Civil War, they proclaim, was written by Northerners! The war was about State Rights, not slavery. The North invaded when the South exercised its constitutional right of declaring independence. Southerners had no alternative but to defend themselves. In the process the North destroyed State Rights, and since 1865 has exploited the South economically, politically, and culturally.⁵⁰

Books such as these have a mischievous effect. Though scholarly research put such ideas to rest years ago, they won't die. They inevitably turn up in classrooms and the press. Recently, at a North Carolina community college, amateur historians teaching a Civil War class assured students that slavery had nothing to do with causing the Civil War. The war, they taught, was fought for the right of self-determination. Slaves, they maintained, were contented, were well-fed and well-housed, and supported the Confederacy. When local blacks complained about such propaganda in a North Carolina classroom, the lead instructor retorted: "We cannot allow political correctness to rewrite history or wipe out our heritage."⁵¹

Similar views arose recently in Kentucky. When a Clark County group sought a grant to purchase a 28-acre black troop Civil War encampment, a resident of Madison County objected. Describing himself as a veteran of the "special forces" and "a former history and anthropology professor," he denounced the use of "taxpayers' money" for purchasing the site as a "ripoff." Kentucky's black recruits never "engaged Confederate forces in armed combat," he stated flatly, and he scoffed at reports that black families suffered because of enlistments. The real persecuted, he maintained, were whites "who protested [Lincoln's] unconstitutional and illegal 'emancipation.'"⁵²

Such views prompt the question, "Who won the Civil War?" Immediately, the South lost, but that result seems less apparent in the early 2000s. Today, Conservatives, North and South, espouse ideas sacred to Jefferson Davis. Northerners accept flying the Confederate flag as "southern" heritage, not resistance to desegregation, the original motivation. Ohio and California regularly vote down school taxes, an Old and New South tradition. Racist organizations have found homes in Rocky Mountain states as well as the hills of western North Carolina. Many congressional leadership positions are dominated by State Rights southerners who sound more like Jefferson Davis than Thomas Jefferson. Supreme Court justices, seemingly intent upon weakening

the federal government by handing over power to the states, regularly roll back progressive legislation, reminiscent of nineteenth century Social Darwinists. For them, the 1964-1965 Civil Rights legislation went too far, and Title IX is OK only if it doesn't include women's sports.

John Egerton exactly captured America at the beginning of the twenty-first century in a book title: *The Americanization of Dixie: The Southernization of America*.

NOTES

1. Tony Horwitz, *Confederates in the Attic* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998), 5.
2. Fletcher M. Green, "Democracy in Old South," *Journal of Southern History* 12 (1946): 3-24; James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877* (7 vols.; New York: Macmillan and Co., 1910).
3. Rhodes, *History of the United States*, passim, vols. III, IV, and V.
4. Kenneth Stampp, *Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 255-56.
5. Grady McWhiney, *Southerners and Other Americans* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 3-4.
6. David M. Potter, *The South and the Sectional Conflict* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 68-69.
7. Edward Pessen, "How Different from Each Other Were the Antebellum North and South," *American Historical Review* 85 (1980): 1119-49. South Carolina had one of the earliest large railroad projects, the Charleston to Hamburg, S.C. railroad, chartered in 1827. See Walter Edgar, *South Carolina: A History* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 283.
8. Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995; orig. pub. 1970) 43-48, 59-61, 63-64, 266-67. Numerous modern scholars believe slavery was the major cause of the Civil War, including David Potter, William Freehling, William L. Barney, Roger L. Ransom, Steven Channing, and Michael Johnson.
9. Steven Channing, *Crisis of Fear: Secession in Carolina* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 286, 293.
10. Michael Holt, *The Political Crisis of the 1850s* (New York: Wiley and Co., 1978), 3, 138, 258-59. Writers who agree with Holt's approach include Lee Benson, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961) and Joel Silbey, *The Shrine of Party: Congressional Voting Behavior, 1841-1852* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967).
11. Ira Berlin's *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1998), and Philip D. Morgan, *Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry* (Chapel

- Hill, N.C. & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
12. Dorothy Denneen Volo and James M. Volo, *Daily Life in Civil War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998).
 13. Steven E. Woodworth, *Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West* (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1990).
 14. Steven E. Woodworth, *Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns* (Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press, 1998). Over the past fifteen years, a series of thorough, well-researched books have detailed seemingly every aspect of Tennessee Civil War history, capped in the 1990s by Peter Cozzens's bullet-by-bullet studies, *No better Place to Die: the Battle of Stones River* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1990), *Shipwreck of their Hopes: The Battle of Chattanooga* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1994), and *This Terrible Sound: The Battle of Chickamauga* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1992).
 15. Clifford Dowdey, *Lee's Last Campaign: The Story of Lee and His Men Against Grant-1864* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960); *Ibid.*, *The Seven Days: The Emergence of Lee* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964); James Street, *Tap Roots* (New York: The Dial Press, 1942); Shelby Foote, *Shiloh: A Novel* (New York: The Dial Press, 1952).
 16. Harry Turtledove, *The Guns of the South: A Novel of the Civil War* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992). In an Amazon.com comment, James M. McPherson aptly labeled this book as "absolutely unique."
 17. Shelby Foote, *The Civil War: A Narrative*, 3 vols. (New York: Random House, 1958-74). For appraisals of Foote, see Tony Horwitz, *Confederates in the Attic*, a very different picture of Foote from the one seen on Ken Burns' *The Civil War* Public Television documentary, and Robert L. Phillips, Jr., *Shelby Foote: Novelist and Historian* (Jackson, Miss., and London: University of Mississippi Press, 1992). See also Geoffrey C. Ward, Ric Burns and Ken Burns, *The Civil War: An Illustrated History* (New York: Knopf, 1990), 272.
 18. Stanley F. Horn, ed., *The Robert E. Lee Reader* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, Inc., 1949), 447; Horwitz, *Confederates in the Attic*, 37.
 19. Richard Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr., *Why the South Lost the Civil War* (Athens, Ga., and London: University of Georgia Press, 1986), 13, 20, 107, 234, 439.
 20. *Ibid.*
 21. Kenneth W. Noe, *Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle* (Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001).
 22. James M. McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 858. McPherson admits, however, in an essay in *Why the Confederacy Lost*, edited by Gabor S. Boritt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 18, that consensus on why the South lost still eludes the historical profession.
 23. James McPherson, "Who Freed The Slaves?" *Reconstruction* 2 (1994): 35-40.
 24. Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 3, 7, 35, chapters 1-3.
 25. Ira Berlin, et al., eds., *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation* (New York: The New Press, 1982-), passim; Ira Berlin, "Who Freed the

- Slaves? Emancipation and Its Meaning," in *Major Problems in the Civil War and Reconstruction*, edited by Michael Perman (2nd ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), 288-89; Ira Berlin, "Emancipation and Its Meaning in American Life," *Reconstruction* 2 (1994): 41-44; and Vincent Harding, *There is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993; orig. pub. 1981), 233, 236.
26. Foner, *Reconstruction*, 3-4; Marion B. Lucas, *A History of Blacks in Kentucky. Vol. I: From Slavery to Segregation, 1760-1891* (Frankfort, Ky.: Kentucky Historical Society, 1992), 177; Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 138.
27. Berlin, "Who Freed the Slaves? Emancipation and Its Meaning," in *Major Problems in the Civil War and Reconstruction*, 294-95; Harding, *There is a River*, 243-57.
28. Foner, *Reconstruction*, chapters 1-3.
29. Marion B. Lucas, *Sherman and the Burning of Columbia* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2000; orig. pub. 1976), 129-62.
30. John Bennett Walters, "General William T. Sherman and Total War," *Journal of Southern History* 14 (1948): 447-80; *ibid.*, *Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill and Co., 1973), xii, xiii.
31. Charles Royster, *The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans* (New York: Knopf, 1991), xii, 358. Eschewing Walters's pro-South emotionalism, Royster presents the burning of Columbia, South Carolina, and the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain as examples of soldiers' increasingly destructive mood.
32. Mark E. Neely, Jr., "Was the Civil War a Total War?" *Civil War History* 37 (1991): 27-28.
33. Grimsley, *Hard Hand of War*, 67, 92, 209, 210. Numerous contemporaries believed the conciliatory policy had a chance of working. The Emancipation Proclamation signified the triumph of the "hard war" philosophy in northern councils.
34. Stephen Ash, *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), ix, 125, 149, 150, 153; Lee Kennett, *Marching Through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians During Sherman's Campaign* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), xi, 277-78.
35. Joseph T. Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 98, 108, 264.
36. George C. Rable's *Civil Wars: Women and the Crisis of Southern Nationalism* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989). Other important new books dealing with women in wartime are: Victoria E. Bynum, *Unruly Women: The Politics of Social and Sexual Control in the Old South* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Catherine Clinton, *The Other Civil War: American Women in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984); Jacqueline Jones, *Labor of Love, Labor of Sorrow: Black Women, Work, and the Family from Slavery to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).
37. Kenneth W. Noe and Shannon H. Wilson, eds., *The Civil War in Appalachia*
- 54 *The Kentucky Review*

- (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1997), xvi, 161-62.
38. Noel C. Fisher, *War at Every Door: Partisan Politics and Guerrilla Violence in East Tennessee, 1860-1869* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 3-5, 62-95. Much more research needs to be done in these fields before scholars will be able to synthesize the "new insights" into a definitive account of the Civil War. Two other significant areas of research unmentioned here are the role of southern yeoman farmers and the economic transformation of northern society during the Civil War. Important new books touching on these fields are: Philip S. Paludan, *A People's Contest: The Union and the Civil War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988); Emory M. Thomas, *The Confederate Nation, 1861-1865* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979); David Montgomery, *Beyond Equality: Labor and the Radical Republicans, 1862-1872* (New York: Knopf, 1967).
39. Alexander H. Stephens, *A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States: Its Causes, Character, Conduct and Results Presented in a Series of Colloquies at Liberty Hall* (2 vols.; Philadelphia, Pa., 1868-70), 1:255, 270.
40. Tyler's *Quarterly Magazine*, 253, 256, 259, 260. Whitcomb echoed the position taken by Jefferson Davis when he addressed the Confederate Congress just after firing on Ft. Sumter.
41. James A. Ramage, *Rebel Raider: The Life of General John Hunt Morgan* (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1986); John F. Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order* (New York: Free Press, 1993).
42. The group included: Thomas Fleming, editor of *Chronicles* magazine; Dr. Clyde Wilson, editor of the John C. Calhoun Papers; and Gary Mills, a University of Alabama professor of British history.
43. *Louisville Courier-Journal*, August 23, 1998; www.dixienet.org/dnframeset.html; www.palmetto.org/
44. *Courier-Journal*, August 23, 1998.
45. Hill has since left his position at Stillman College. <http://www.splcenter.org/>
46. *Courier-Journal*, August 23, 1998. The "code words" of League of the South statements such as "peoples of different cultures should pursue their own interests without interference from bureaucrats and social engineers," seem to this writer to reveal a latent racism. The League, however, deflects such charges by describing their position as little different from conservative black thinkers such as "Dr. Walter Williams, a black classical liberal economist and op-ed writer who frequently discusses issues like states' rights and secession in his weekly column." See <http://www.palmetto.org/>. For the Southern Poverty Law Center statement on the League of the South, see <http://www.splcenter.org/>.
47. www.dixienet.org/dnframeset.html; www.palmetto.org/.
48. www.palmetto.org/. A newspaper article in the *Charlotte News-Observer*, July 5, 18, 1999, by Thomas B. Buell, author of *The Warrior Generals*, merely suggested that George H. Thomas was a better general, causing an outcry among readers.
49. Edward H. Bonekemper, III, *How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War?* (Fredericksburg, Va.: Sergeant Kirkland's Press, 1998).

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50. James Ronald and Walter Donald Kennedy, *The South Was Right!* (Gretna, La.: Pelican Press, 1994). The Kennedys are well-known reenactors and members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans. Source: Amazon.com and Pelican Publishing Company web pages. Also typical are the articles of varying quality in J.H. Segars, ed., *Andersonville: The Southern Perspective* (Gretna, La.: Pelican Press, 1995). This work features a string of articles written between 1865 and the present. An article by an Andersonville prison surgeon, Randolph Stevenson, is typical of the book's hard sell approach. The site of the Andersonville prison was well-chosen, he wrote, and Confederate officials made every effort to ensure the health and comfort of prisoners. The real culprits, another writer proclaims, were Lincoln and his abolitionist friends who ended the prisoner exchange cartel. And in a modern twist, another article derides Lincoln's policy toward the South as "ethnic cleansing," an increasingly popular charge in Neo-Confederate web pages. See 134, 141, and the web site of the South Carolina League of the South, <http://www.palmetto.org/>.
51. "Perspectives, the American Historical Association Newsletter," 37, (1999): 4; Bowling Green, Ky., *Daily News*, Nov. 16, 1998; *Civil War Book Review* 4 (2002): 15. Peter Novick's *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession* (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), is a grim reminder of the frequent absence of objectivity, even among trained historians.
52. Lexington, Ky., *Herald-Leader*, February 27, 1999. Enlightened citizens responded in adjacent articles. In two separate columns, utilizing the latest scholarship, they proceeded to destroy the "distortions and misinformation" written by the retired professor. *Ibid.*, February 27, 1999.