## Research Report UKTRP-82-14

## SNOW-MELTING SYSTEM, 9th STREET AND I 64, LOUISVILLE

### by

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## in cooperation With Department of Transportation Commonwealth of Kentucky

#### and

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### September 1982

Technical Report Documentation Page

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#### **INTRODUCTION**

The 9th -Street interchange was originally conceived as a major link in the transportation plan for Jefferson County. The interchange was to provide the primary access to the downtown area via I 264/64 and the proposed Southwest Radial (Figure 1). A combination of grades and superelevations (over 6.5 percent) and exposure conditions compelled planners and designers to analyze hazards that would confront the travelling public during bad weather conditions (more specifically during periods of frost glazing, snow, and/ or ice conditions). Conventional snow and ice removal techniques were thought to be inadequate. Therefore, an automated snow and ice removal system was deem**ed necessary. The specifications, design, construc**tion, and initial operation of the heating system have been documented in earlier research reports  $(1, 2, 3, 3)$ 4). This report summarizes the operation, performance, and the factors that influenced operation and perforrnance since the interchange initially opened in the winter of 1976-1977.

To the time of its construction, the 9th Street interchange was the largest application of an electrical resistance system to the heating of a highway pavement for the control of ice and snow. The project was experimental and was implemented to evaluate the viability of developing technology.

ous modes since its completion. Administrative deci-<br>operations. Proposals ranging from total abandonment sions in response to public pressure has been largely of the heating system to maintaining the pavement responsible for the method of operation. Initially, to temperature above freezing at all times were proposed<br>instify the high construction costs of the heating and discussed. A summary of the proposals is conjustify the high construction costs of the heating system, high assurance of performance was deemed tained in Appendix A. Some officials argued that essentiat--For-tlre-fust-two--years-fiCJTtr.WT-7-and-----G~nti<lnal-snnw-remQ¥31--t~ues-ooold-b<>--------------- 1977-1978) of operation, the bridge decks and ramps employed at a fraction of the cost of heating; others<br>were at all times kent warm enough to melt any argued that providing a safe passageway for the were at all times kept warm enough to melt any snow or ice as it formed. A set-point temperature (a motoring public under extreme design and climatic predetermined slab temperature used by the Master conditions required extra-ordinary measures. A predetermined slab temperature used by the Master conditions required extra-ordinary measures. A<br>Controller to adjust the heat input to the slab) of 38°F decision was made to employ "Method D" as outlined Controller to adjust the heat input to the slab) of  $38^{\circ}F$  decision was made to employ "Method D" as outlined  $(3^{\circ}C)$  was used for normal operation. In other words in Appendix A. "Method D" is virtually a continuati  $(3^{\circ}C)$  was used for normal operation. In other words, in Appendix A. "Method D" is virtually a continuation was to maintain a minimum slab tem-<br>normal operation was to maintain a minimum slab tem-<br>of operating procedu normal operation was to maintain a minimum slab temperature of  $38^{\circ}$ F ( $3^{\circ}$ C) at all times. Figures 2, 3, and 4 of 1978-1979 and 1979-1980. A paradoxical situation illustrate the results of that approach during 1976-<br>illustrate the results of that approach during 19 illustrate the results of that approach during 1976-1977 and 1977-1978. Tables **1** and 2 list monthly heating system was never operated in the most efficient weather summaries for the same period. In periods of mode. They maintained that the original design strate**severe** weather, heat input was increased to the slab; however, during periods of cold but clear weather, not yet tested at the interchange. Operation in that adjustments were not made accordingly. Operation was mode would allow the slab temperature to go very low basically in the automatic mode but manual override  $(20^{\circ}F (1^{\circ}C))$  when cold but clear weather conditions

persisted during severe weather conditions. The snowand ice-melting capabilities of the heating system performed beyond expectations. Operating expenses were high but seemed justified as the public grew **accustomed to a "clear roads policy" at the inter**change. The winter of 1977-1978 was the harshest on record for the Louisville area. Yet, during periods with as much as 10+ inches (280+ mm) of snow cover, the interchange remained clear and safe (Figure 5 and 6).

With increasing demands for governmental frugality and a national effort toward energy conserva**tion, more conservative means were sought for operat**ing the system during the 1978-1979 heating season. The slab set-point was lowered, the pavement was not kept warm enough to melt snow at all times, and more manual override was employed when threatening conditions existed. The prevailing opinion was that there was no need to keep a pavement or bridge deck warm during periods of extreme cold-but-clear weather. When threatening weather conditions were forecast, manual override was employed to raise the level of heat input to ensure a snow-melting condition. Contingency plans for snow removal with chemical abrasives were suggested but were not implemented because of possible corrosive damage to the heating elements. Plots of air and slab temperatures and monthly weather summaries are shown in Figures 7 and 8 and Tables 3 and 4 for the 1978-1979 and 1979-1980 seasons. Again, the heating system was able to keep the interchange free of ice and snow. Indeed, some economy **OPERATION** was achieved by modification of operating procedures

In the summer of 1980, officials again ques-The heating system has been operated in vari-<br>tioned the benefits to the public and urged economy in gies called for "total automatic operation" -- a method





Figure 2. Aerial View of 9th-Street Interchange, January 11, 1977, Showing Distinctive Contrast between Heated and Unheated Sections (Courier-Journal; reprinted with permission).





Average Temperatures; January, February, March, and April 1977. Figure 3.





Figure 5. Snow Melting; March 14,1978.

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Figure 6. Snow Melting; March 14, 1978.

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## TABLE 1. WEATHER SUMMARES, 1976, 1977

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## TABLE 2. WEATHER SUMMARIES, 1977 - 1978



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#### TABLE 4. WEATHER SUMMARIES, 1979 - 1980

existed. The Master Controller, in response to various weather signals, would automatically increase the level of heat to the slab as necessary. Automatic operation, had it performed properly, would have utilized the vast array of logic circuitry designed specifically for this heating system. Other engineers felt that the system would not operate in a fully automatic mode, as installed, because of the early malfunction of various detecting instrumentation. However, it was felt that might operate efficiently in a the system semi-automatic mode. The equipment and strategy were described previously  $(2)$  as follows:

> "The Master Controller is provided to obtain as full an automatic control as possible. The basic concept is to operate the heating system at a low level of heat when the slab temperature goes above a certain set point. As the temperature drops, slab temperature sensors cause the voltage regulator to increase the voltage into the system. As the temperature increases, the voltage level is reduced. However, various weather parameters, such as barometric pressure, rain, snow, humidity, and others, are programmed into the system so that the system actually operates on the probability of snow and ice rather than the detection of snow or ice. An illustration is given in Figure A (Figure 9. here). The slab temperature establishes a base-line condition. As the temperature drops, more heat input goes into the slab. The basic straight-line situation is then changed by the weather factor signal modifiers, represented by the cross-hatched areas between the curves. If weather conditions remain ideal, even though the temperature goes very low, a minimum of heating would be required, as shown by the lower portion of the cross-hatched area. If weather conditions are unfavorable, more heat would be required as shown by the upper portion of the cross-hatched area."

Others argued that the system was not capable of total automatic operation as previously described. They maintained that the system was capable of modulation of slab set point by only  $2^{\circ}$  to  $3^{\circ}F$  (4° to  $5^{\circ}C$ ) and that the Master Controller would always maintain a slab temperature, within that range, plus or minus, of the set-point. The issue remained unsettled. The design engineering consultant and the electrical subcontractor were questioned, but the issue remained unresolved. Efforts to validate the theory by practical application in both the 1980-1981 and 1981-1982 heating seasons proved fruitless. Mild winters in each year did not provide a period in which "total automatic operation" could be tested.

Some engineers argue that the system will not provide for modulation of the slab temperature outside a range of  $2^{\circ}$  to  $3^{\circ}F$  (4° to  $5^{\circ}C$ ) plus or minus of the slab set-point. Rather than the complex logic circuitry employed as the "mechanical brain" of the heating system, a simple thermostat, similar in theory to that emploved in a residential home, would have sufficed. Implementation of a thermostat combined with forecasts by the National Weather Service would provide a service virtually identical to that of the Master Controller.

Figures 10 and 11 compare air and slab temperatures and Tables 5 and 6 document weather conditions for the 1980-1981 and 1981-1982 heating seasons.

#### EQUIPMENT AND INVENTORY

Evaluation of equipment and instrumentation utilized at the interchange tends to be very subjective. The subjective viewpoint stems from the operating engineer's confidence in an individual piece of equipment to perform as an integral part of the total system and if that piece of equipment was of benefit to the operating engineer in optimizing the performance of the heating system at the interchange. An equipment inventory indicating the general condition and an estimated cost of repair is listed in Appendix B. The electrical heating system was maintained from construction through Fiscal Year 1981 by Marine Electric Company of Louisville, the electrical subcontractor during construction. Walter Diecks Electric Company of Louisville was retained for FY 1982. Maintenance costs for the system are listed in Table 7. Of the \$114,000 total maintenance cost, approximately \$38,000 was for routine maintenance; the remainder was for repair work.

A remote television monitoring system has performed poorly. Repeated efforts to repair and maintain the closed-circuit monitor system have yielded minimal results. According to those charged with the task of providing an operable system, Marine Electric's engineering staff, the system was overdesigned; i.e., the design engineers specified that the monitoring system be a combination of the best parts of several manufacturers. However, some claimed the specified equipment was incompatible and thus vielded poor performance. A total system supplied by one manufacturer might have been preferred and would, perhaps, have given better performance. At the time of writing this report, only three remote TV cameras and four TV monitors are operable. The operating engineer and assistants expressed the need







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TABLE 5. WEATHER SUMMARIES, 1980-1981

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for a color TV monitoring system in order to deter-<br>mine the difference between ice and water on the The cost of operating such a system is a major mine the difference between ice and water on the

and snow indicators, did not perform as expected. operating, and maintenance costs for both heating and<br>The problem with the rain and snow indicators is ap-<br>conventional snow-removal-techniques-are-definable **The problem with the rain and snow indicators is ap-<br>
<b>Conventional snow removal-techniques-are-definable**<br> **problem** with the rain and is not correctable.<br> **problem** to the design and is not correctable. parently inherent to the design and is not correctable. road-user benefits to the travelling public and safety of<br>Simply stated, the indicators fail to correctly identify a salt-application crew are rather abstract. Theref Simply stated, the indicators fail to correctly identify a salt-application crew are rather abstract. Therefore,<br>snow or rain at all times. Repeated vibration of both assigning a value for accident liability, driver safety snow or rain at all times. Repeated vibration of both TV cameras and weather stations. mounted on masts travel delays and congestion, salt-crew safety, and rising from bridge ramps is partially accountable for service life are subjective. Actual operating costs rising from bridge ramps is partially accountable for

Of the 201 separate heating circuits, 16 are in-<br>his due to low resistance. Three circuits have **One method for cost comparison** is to consider operable due to low resistance. Three circuits have **One method for cost comparison is to consider**<br>heen rewired with two-pole breakers to utilize two of an average annual cost amortized over a 25-year been rewired with two-pole breakers to utilize two of the three circuits which are of sufficient resistance. expected service life: Five of the 16 inoperable circuits are on on-grade ramps; the remainder are on bridge ramps. Moisture intrusion in or around the heating cables lowers their resistance to ground and renders them inoperable. Figures 12, 13, and 14 show sections where cables have been turned off. Periodic energizing of the system is **necessary to minimize intrusion of moisture. A circuit**  that has become inoperable due to low resistance (moisture intrusion) may be rejuvenated with repeated **energizing to "dry out" the circuit.** 

If a circuit does "blow," repair would be difficult and expensive. Since the heating system is buried in the concrete deck or pavement, it would have to be **sawed and removed so as to replace a circuit. However,**  failures should be minimal if moisture intusion is minimized by use and repeated energizing of the system and if salts that would cause the electrical system to corrode are not applied to the pavement.

#### DISCUSSION

The heating system at the 9th-Street interchange has been fraught with problems since its inceplion. It has been both praised and criticized. No one can deny the ability of the system to maintain both a clear and safe passageway.

Problems have been all-pervasive since the system became operational. The design engineering consultant failed to provide operation and maintenance manuals as originally promised and specified. Operating costs have been determined in part by a negotiated contract between Louisville Gas and Electric and the Kentucky Department of Highways (requiring a minimum charge of \$5,900 per month regardless of usage). Attempts to operate the heating system in an optimum mode were not successful. However, a degree of efficiency and full effectiveness in melting ice and snow were achieved by operating a semi-auto-

pavement.<br>Weather stations, more specifically the rain across of intangibles to be considered. Installation, Weather stations, more specifically the rain cause of intangibles to be considered. Installation,<br>we indicators, did not perform as expected. operating and maintenance costs for both heating and their poor performance.<br>
Of the 201 separate heating circuits, 16 are in-<br>
of the 201 separate heating circuits, 16 are in-<br>
age and costs are listed in Table 9.

 $Cost/ft^2$ 

#### HEATING SYSTEM



Average Annual Cost =  $[$10.79 + $0.00 + 25 x$  $$1.29] \div 25 = $1.72/\text{yr}/\text{ft}^2$ 



Average Annual Cost= [\$0.00 + \$5.56 + 25 <sup>x</sup>  $$0,20] \div 25 = $0.42/\text{yr/ft}^2$ 



Figure 12. Inoperative Heating Cable (at curb); December 21, 1981.



Figure 13. Inoperative Heating Cable (left curb); January 13, 1982.



Figure 14. Inoperative Heating Cables; January 13. 1982.



# TABLE 9. POWER U§AGE AND COSTS

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Considering the alternatives using a present-worth basis with a 10-percent interest rate and a 25-year service life:

#### HEATING SYSTEM





\*Present Worth Factor (Uniform Series) \*\*Present Worth Factor (Single Amount)

This economic evaluation is based on as-<br>October 16-19, 1974. sumed zero salvage values. Repair and replacement 2. W. V. Azevedo, A. S. Rahal, and J. H. Havens, costs were for chemical (salt) damage only. Operating, *Heating the 9th-Street Interchange: Construe·*  maintenance, repair, and replacement costs were sup· *tion and Initial Operation,* Research Report plied by the engineering staff of the Department of 486, Kentucky Department of Transportation, Highways. No values were assigned to intan- January 1978. gibles as described above; however, when a fmal 3. J. H. Havens, W. V. Azevedo, A. S. Rahal, and evaluation is made, consideration must be given to R. C. Deen, *Heating Bridge Decks by Electrical*  those and to the following: *Resistance,* Research Report 494, Kentucky

38,000 vehicles per day. On days of inclement weather, also Proceedings, Second International Symposfewer vehicles may use the facility. The same of the same ium on Snow Removal and Ice Control Re-

2. The p>tblie-has-gmwn--aeellStemed-te-a------------soal'Gil,-May-~~.-1-9-1&------------------ "clear roads policy" at the interchange. 4. W. V. Azevedo, R. C. Deen, and J. H. Havens,

interchange, if required, thus forcing traffic to use other arterials. partment of Transportation, October 1980.

4. A dangerous pavement condition may exist between the time snow accumulates and the time salt crews arrive at the interchange.

5. The societal cost associated with one fatal accident could exceed the annual cost for oper· ating the heating system.

6. Abandonment of the system in a "storage mode" will probably render the system inoperable if needed at a later date.

7. Use of chemical abrasives will create a **corrosive atmosphere, causing irreversible damage to**  the heating system should the system be used on an "on-call" basis for intense snowfalls.

8. Initial costs have not been a moratized to a salvage value of zero where the economic analysis would not be clouded with residuals.

#### REFERENCES

I. J. H. Havens, *Heating the 9th-Street Interchange, Louisville, Kentucky,* Research Report 400, Kentucky Department of Transportation, September 1974; also Proceeding, 23rd An· nual Meeting of Southeastern Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials,

1. This interchange carries, on the average, Department of Transportation, February 1978;

3. Provision must be made to close the *The Operation of an Electrical Heating System* ange, if required, thus forcing traffic to use *for Bridge*, Research Report 564, Kentucky De-

# APPENDIX A

# ALTERNATIVES FOR OPERATION OF HEATING SYSTEM

## METHOD A TURN OFF TOTALLY

If this had been done before November 15, 1980, the Department was obligated to pay Louisville Gas and Electric \$25,000. After November 15, 1980, there would be no other obligation other than actual use or the minimum monthly charge (\$5,920).

Ramps may have to be closed at times.

An estimate of the cost of salt or abrasives and clean up is \$15,000 per year. (Note: An estimate by J. W. Spurrier, Assistant State Highway Engineer for Maintenance and Operations in 1969, gave this cost to be in excess of \$60,000 per winter season.)

## **METHOD B** OFF EXCEPT WHEN SNOW **GREATER THAN 1 INCH OCCURS**

Begin applying cinders, turn on transformers and circuits *oniy* after snow begins. Ramps could become hazardous in a heavy snow before heat could catch up. Because of moisture build up on electrical devices, the chances for major breakdowns would be great. An estimated cost breakdown for this method is as follows:



## METHOD<sub>C</sub> IDLE STEP UNTIL SNOW REACHES 1 INCH DEPTH

A staff of 24 would be needed. A cir would be parked at the interchange, and a driv be called in at the first sign of snow. Start heat at 1 inch snow depth. Using this method would have problems in about 30 percent of the snows, and only for a few hours. Estimated costs are as follows:



#### **METHOD D**

## IDLE STEP, iNCREASE HEAT WHEN SNOW IS ANTICIPATED; MANUAL WITH PARTIAL AUTOMATIC OPERATION

This is the method that had been used in the past. The deck would not be warm enough to melt snow all the time, but traffic would have problems in *oniy* about 10 percent of the snows, depending upon the accuracy of predictions. Estimated costs are as follows:



## METHOD<sub>E</sub> MOSTLY AUTOMATIC, WARM ENOUGH TO MELT SNOW AT ALL TIMES

This is the optimum method in all respects except energy consumption. Estimated costs are as follows:



# **APPENDIX B**

# **EQUIPMENT INVENTORY**

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# EQUIPMENT INVENTORY



