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Creed vs. Deed: Secession, Legitimacy, and the Use of Child Soldiers

Trace C. Lasley
University of Kentucky, trace.lasley@gmail.com

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Trace C. Lasley, Student

Dr. Karen Mingst, Major Professor

Dr. Clayton Thyne, Director of Graduate Studies

CREED VS. DEED:
SECESSION, LEGITIMACY AND THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Kentucky

By
Trace Cody Lasley

Lexington, Kentucky

Co-Directors: Dr. Karen Mingst, Lockwood Professor of International Relations
and Dr. Clayton Thyne, Associate Professor of Political Science

Lexington, Kentucky

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

CREED VS. DEED: SECESSION, LEGITIMACY AND THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS

The use of child soldiers has troubled human rights activists, policy-makers, and local communities for decades. Although rebellions around the world routinely use children in their activities, many do not. Despite its overwhelming importance for conflict resolution, the topic of child soldiers remains understudied. My research blends classic rational choice and constructivist themes to develop an explanation for when child soldiers will be used, and when they will be avoided.

The likelihood of child recruitment is influenced by the value of international opinion; this is determined by the groups' long-term goals. Secessionist rebellions desire to have their own state. However, statehood is jealously guarded by the international community and is only granted under extreme circumstances. The use of child soldiers has been condemned around the world as a crime against humanity, and it can curtail international support. Thus, secessionists should be the least likely rebel type to use child soldiers out of a concern to appear legitimate.

Opportunistic rebellions face few constraints in their recruitment efforts. They do not desire international support because their long-term goal is the same as their short term goal: profit. Instead of refraining from using children in order to curry favor with external parties, they will abduct, adopt, and abuse children because they are cheaper to employ than adults. Opportunists are unconcerned with losing legitimacy or reducing the chances of victory. Therefore, they should be the most likely to use child soldiers.

Concern for costs can affect all rebels. As duration grows, constraints over long-term legitimacy diminish. Therefore, all rebellions should be more likely to use child soldiers as duration increases.

I test my theory quantitatively by looking at 103 rebel groups active between 1998-2008. I explore rebellions in Somalia, Colombia, Afghanistan and Sudan to further elucidate the causal mechanisms. There is considerable empirical support for the theory.

These results offer policy-relevant conclusions in the areas of rehabilitation and conflict resolution. More importantly, they offer a workable strategy to curb the use of child soldiers in civil war.

KEYWORDS: Civil War, International Norms,
Child Soldiers, Secession,
Rebel Behavior

Trace C. Lasley
Student's Signature

August 13, 2012
Date

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By
Trace Cody Lasley

Dr. Karen Mingst

Co-Director of Dissertation

Dr. Clayton Thyne

Co-Director of Dissertation

Dr. Clayton Thyne

Director of Graduate Studies

August 13, 2012

Date

To Danielle

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ACRONYMS

- ACRWC: African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
- ANPPCAN: African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child Abuse and Neglect
- APRCT: Alliance for Peace, Reconciliation, and Counter-Terrorism
- AU: African Union
- CAAC: Children Affected by Armed Conflict
- CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
- Coalition: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
- CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
- CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child
- CWW: *Civil Wars of the World*
- DEA: Drug Enforcement Agency
- EACD: Expanded Armed Conflict Data
- ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
- EU: European Union
- FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
- FGM: Female Genital Mutilation
- FRETILIN: Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
- ICC: International Criminal Court
- ICU: Islamic Courts Union
- IDP: Internally Displace Persons
- IDP: Internally Displaced Persons
- IO: International Organization
- ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence

LRA: Lord's Resistance Army

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NFD: Northern Frontier District

NGO: Nongovernmental Organization

NPA: New Peoples Army

OLF: Oromo Liberation Front

OLS: Operation Lifeline Sudan

ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front

OPCAC: The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict

PDPA: Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan

PKK: Kurdish Workers Party

PLA: Peoples Liberation Army

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization

ROC: Receiver Operator Curve

RUF: Revolutionary United Front

SFRY: Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

SNA: Somali National Alliance

SNL: Somali National League

SNM: Somali National Movement

SPLM: Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement

SRRC: Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council

SSDF: Somali Salvation Democratic Front

START: Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

TFG: Transitional Federal Government
TNG: Transitional National Government
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNODC: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
UNPO: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
USC: United Somali Congress
WDI: World Development Indicators

PART ONE

THEORY

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Three years after braving the horrors of war, William Johnston was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Abraham Lincoln. He won this by showing bravery during a seven day retreat from a battle in Southeastern Virginia during the Civil War. At his rank, he was the only soldier to complete his duties as assigned. He was a drummer boy; he was 11 years old (Wisler 1997).¹ On the opposing side, the Confederacy deployed 247 underage cadets in 1864 (Singer 2010:93). These stories are not unique. Child soldiers have been used in many conflicts throughout history. They marched at the head of Napoleon's armies when he moved across Europe, and saw extensive action as the Hitler Youth in the final days of World War II. During the Boer Wars, lieutenant-general Robert Baden Powell was impressed with the youths of the Mafeking Cadet Corps and their ability to stand guard, carry messages, and complete other auxiliary duties. Based on this experience, he launched the modern scouting movement, from which the Boy Scouts emerged (Jeal 1989). While child soldier use is not uncommon in the history of conflict, their use in previous large-scale conflagrations was restricted to roles as aides-de-camp, transporters, and spies. Today, children are routinely armed and ordered to engage fully trained and fully equipped soldiers against whom they have little chance of success. Their

¹ He was 13 when he received the Medal of Honor, 11 when performing the duties that earned him that award.

stories are widely discussed in NGO, aid, and development communities, and increasingly gain attention from ordinary citizens.

In March 2012, the charity Invisible Children released a video known simply as “Kony 2012.” It was viewed by more than 80 million people within two weeks, and evoked outrage across the Western world. The half-hour production recounts the various crimes of Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda.² The kidnapping, mutilation, and forced recruitment of children in Central Africa left millions of American Facebook users shocked and calling for action. In modern times, despite the ease with which so many groups like the LRA abruptly end childhoods, such stories still bring out the inner humanitarian in all of us. In a unified voice, rare for the denizens of the internet, Kony's crimes are appropriately labeled as horrendous. Yet, he and so many like him, ignore this sentiment altogether. Between 200,000 and 400,000 child soldiers are used around the world. They fight with national armies in Bahrain (15 years old), Great Britain (16 years old), and the United States (17 years old). Most commonly, paramilitary and armed opposition groups use children in combat, and there appears to be no lower-bound age threshold. The usage of child soldiers has been observed in at least 45 conflict zones in the past decade alone. They are known as moryaan (maggots) on the streets of Mogadishu and abejitas (little bees) in Colombia. Units of kadogos (little ones) no older than 15, routinely see combat in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, despite the disregard that so many groups show to the rights of children, there are a number of rebel commanders that do not. For example, while the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was notorious for employing thousands of children in combat, the Ogaden National

² The LRA was largely out of Uganda by 2008, mostly operating out of bases in the north of DRC and South Sudan.

Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia provides no evidence of similar behavior. Even insurgencies that are condemned for acts of terror show variation in their recruitment practices. The Taliban regularly employs children as suicide bombers and in other roles, while Al-Gamaa al Islamiya in Egypt does not. Though it is not unheard of for them to use underage fighters, the Palestinian liberation forces often shy away from egregiously young suicide bombers in favor of more effective and less morally troublesome adults. As seen in Figure 1, the 45 conflict zones show variation in groups that use and refrain from using child soldiers. Still, others are driven to stop using child soldiers even though they once used them with disregard. In 2010, the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army made headlines when they announced that they were abruptly demobilizing all of their child soldiers. Thus, instead of asking why child soldiers are being used, the better question might be why some rebel groups refrain.

--Figure 1 here--

This research considers long-term costs facing rebel leaders, and explores their rationality with respect to international norms. Supply explanations of child soldier use offer theories of opportunity, while demand explanations primarily explore short-term costs and benefits of using underage troops. Rebel leaders have been shown to consider the long-term consequences of their actions as well (Mason and Fett 1996). I build on the demand-side theories and consider how these factors influence the decision to recruit children. We know that rebels are aware of international opinion (e.g., Bob 2005), and that some desire external support more than others (e.g., Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011). The use of child soldiers is condemned worldwide. Therefore, understanding when rebel groups use them allows insight into the strategy of rebel

commanders. By exploring the use of child soldiers through the rationalist-normative framework, we will better understand the motivations of rebel leaders. Thus, my research question is to determine when rational rebel leaders will consider the long-term costs associated with child soldiering compared to the short-term benefits. I consider how the desires of the group and the beliefs about their behavior lead to their decision on whether or not to use child soldiers. In short, when do rebel leaders forgo international opinion and the limitations in capabilities and use child soldiers?

Any list of atrocities associated with civil war inevitably includes heartbreaking descriptions of child involvement. There are three states of being for children affected by armed conflict: those vulnerable to being drawn in (at risk), those in the post-conflict period (demobilized), and those active in the conflict (child soldiers) (Pederson and Sommerfelt 2007). Anthropologists and health-care professionals have primarily focused on at-risk children (e.g., Honwana 2006). Conflict scholars in political science also consider vulnerable populations in intrastate conflict (e.g., Lai and Thyne 2007). Demobilization remains a top concern for social-psychologists. The third category receives considerable attention worldwide in both the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) communities, and even Hollywood has explored the issue. Social scientists are only beginning to explore the causes and consequences of child soldiering with systematic, empirical research.

Scholarly research on the causes of child soldiering generally falls into two categories: systemic influences and recruitment decisions. Systemic influences are described as supply-side theories and propose that an excess in available children leads to high rates of recruitment. These explanations can be broken into two sub-categories:

volunteers and abductees. Poor family conditions and child unemployment can push children to seek active involvement in an armed group (Høiskar 2001; Brett and Specht 2004). Others suggest pools of vulnerable youths represent ripe targets for ambitious recruiters. Child soldier use will be more common in areas with large populations of at-risk children, such as refugee or internally displaced persons (IDP) camps that lack adequate protection (Achvarina and Reich 2006). The second category explores the motivations of the recruiters themselves, and focuses on the costs and benefits of using underage troops based on their strengths and weaknesses. Groups that value effectiveness will use fewer children. If the scale of fighting is small, the child to adult ratio will be higher. This approach suggests that features of the organization offer better explanations than structural features of the conflict alone (Andvig and Gates 2010). My argument builds on the demand-side literature by extending the time-horizon and considers the long-term consequences of using child soldiers. Before this, I next briefly consider why this research is important both in terms of theory, empirics, and moral imperative.

This project is an ambitious attempt to build on the substantive conclusions of past work on child soldiers, and to improve upon the empirical limitations of prior studies. I extend the literature theoretically by further exploring the motivations of rebel leaders, by considering the full range of consequences for using child soldiers. Based on multiple accounts of child soldiering, we know that their abilities on the battlefield are limited. In the academic literature, the role of the international community has been relegated to background discussions of the legal framework designed to curb child soldier use. Thus far, overlooked is the signal this sends for rebel leaders and would-be recruiters of children. In the tradition of Fearon and Wendt (2002), my work will take a rationalist

perspective and offer a recipe for how to explain rebel actions. They are calculating individuals and recruitment decisions are a product of desires and beliefs. From the constructivist school, I conclude that international norms or "principled ideas" provide the belief system to the commanders. They believe rightly or wrongly that there are consequences for recruiting child soldiers. Rebel leaders that desire an independent state will value the legitimacy constraint may bring. Rebel leaders that do not desire to have their own independent state will value international opinion less. For some, the desire to maintain conflict will devalue the constraining power of principled ideas. They will be the least constrained in their recruitment decisions by international norms. In this sense, my work represents the compatibility between rationalist and constructivist conceptions of conflict.

Methodologically, my project addresses specific limitations encountered by past researchers. Four general methods have been used to study child soldiers. First, reports of ex-combatants offer personal accounts of a child soldiers' conscription. From these stories, scholars have identified sets of factors that lead to higher instances of child soldiering. Stories from former combatants inevitably appear at the forefront of almost any UN report about child soldiers, and are only just beginning to be less commonplace in mainstream political science research. These anecdotes are important, but often represent only a starting point in the research process. They provide individual, on-the-ground insight, but their generalizability is in doubt, and the concern over selection effects cannot be ignored. Second, qualitative, single-country studies offer a treasure-trove of information about experiences and motivations. These studies produce valuable theories that are, however, limited in applicability outside of the specific case. A third

approach explores a single-country, but uses quantitative, survey-based data. This approach offers considerable depth, but with the added benefit of being able to rule out alternative causal factors. However, the question of external validity remains. Are the factors that make children in Afghanistan volunteer to be suicide bombers the same as those that induce forced recruitment by a rebellion in Eastern DRC? Finally, large-n, cross-national analysis has seen limited use in recent years (Høiskar 2001, Achvarina and Reich 2006, Beber and Blattman 2010). This represents the current apex of child soldier research, but it is unfortunately fraught with difficulties given the nature of the phenomenon (Ames 2010, Pederson and Sommerfelt 2007). Still, methods that identify factors influencing child recruitment rates worldwide that are both generalizable and guard against spuriousness are very important. Statistical analysis is a much needed addition to the methodological repertoire for social scientists. At the same time, considering the complexity of the phenomenon, one cannot rely on statistics alone. Detailed case studies that go beyond snapshot summaries of complex characteristics are a necessary part of the process. In conclusion, a thorough exploration of child soldiers must consider a variety sources to uncover the empirical record.

1.2 Understanding Rebel Motivations

In classic studies of rebel behavior, three considerations are often identified as important for leaders. Tse-Tung (1956) offers a succinct summary. "The fundamental problems are: first, spiritual unification of officers and men within the army; second, spiritual unification of the army and the people; and, last, destruction of the unity of the enemy" (90). Leading counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen (2010) identifies a

fourth "unity" in the growing importance of the "influential spectators' gallery of the international community" (103). I extend this point in two ways. First, far from being a new development, international audiences have been important to various groups for centuries. Throughout history, separatist rebellions sought to win over reticent international actors with displays of camaraderie. Revolutions largely adhered to the international policy of government recognition, whereby demonstrated strength resulted in diplomatic ties. For newly created states, however, they had to convince the audience through means other than force alone that they deserved to be seen as equals. Modern separatists, like their independence-movement forbearers in Brazil and the United States, need international support for statehood. Without it, they might never achieve their ultimate goal: independence.

As a second extension, I argue that the value of this fourth unity varies depending on the type of rebellion. Rebellions aimed at creating their own state are absolutely dependent on the audience because, without their support, the rebellion will never achieve their ultimate goal (e.g., East Timor, Kosovo vis-à-vis Somaliland, Kurdistan). Rebellions that are largely greed-based are not dependent on the international community because their goal, profit, is gained independently of external forces. Instead, they rely on conflict perpetuation to maintain a steady flow of resources. External intervention would be bad for business, but oftentimes overtures for peace will bring a series of failed negotiations (e.g., RUF). Rebellions aimed at overthrow are aware of the international audience and should seek their support to some degree. However, due to the difficulty of reinstating an ousted leader, revolutionary rebellions can succeed (change of government)

and after demonstrating their ability to rule they garner support from a reticent global community (e.g., Egypt, Libya).

Most rebellions seek military victory, but for some this alone is not enough to achieve their goal. Secessionist rebellions aim to have their own state. Unfortunately for them, new state formation through unilateral secession is rare. Even if they are victorious in their struggle, without legitimacy recognition will remain forever elusive. It is true however, that behavior itself may not be as influential to veto-players in the global community as geopolitical and domestic security concerns. At the same time, evidence supports the notion that separatist claims that are seen as legitimate benefit from international support and suffer from international condemnation. Therefore, rebels whose ultimate goal is to join the international community should be least willing to break the norm against the use of child soldiers because they have the most to lose if they are seen as illegitimate.

Sources of funding can alter or obscure the professed goals of the rebellion. Recent work on the link between natural resources and conflict identifies a number of mechanisms that influence civil war onset, duration, and intensity. The most compelling of these findings is that the type of resource can affect conflict differently. Resource endowments can alter the motivational structure of the organization, flooding self-styled ideological movements with opportunists (Weinstein 2005). A high proportion of these fighters within a rebel army reduces the utility of victory (Collier 2000, Cornell 2005). Where ideologues are replaced by loot-seekers, rebellions will be more likely to use child soldiers because they are cheaper and can keep costs low. In addition to the reduced concern for long-term goals, illicit funding may put a premium on conflict perpetuation,

such that the capability of one's troops is undervalued. Thus, cheaper child soldiers are preferable.

Additional factors influence how difficult or easy it is to abide by international norms. The longer the rebellion, the more costs will accrue. Rebel leaders are then faced with a tradeoff between lowering expenditures or risk losing the war. To avoid the worst-case scenario of total defeat, they will adopt cost-cutting strategies. One way to reduce expenses is to lower recruitment costs by supplementing the forces with children because they command lower wages and are cheaper to outfit. Thus, as conflict continues, rebellions should be more likely to break the norm against child soldier use. This should be less evident for those groups that have strong incentives to avoid under-age troops in the first place. Therefore, I maintain that duration has independent effects on the likelihood of child soldier use, but is itself conditioned by rebel goals.

Scholars are only just beginning to disaggregate the concept of civil conflict and recognize that rebel behavior is not constant (e.g., Cederman and Gleditsch 2009, Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). For example, Cederman, Buhaug and Rød (2009), and Weidmann (2009) explore ethnic actors within a country in an effort to better understand contentious relationships with the state. Likewise, subnational processes are worth exploring to reveal the spatial distribution of rebellions within a state (e.g., Hegre, Østby and Raleigh 2009; Beardsley and McQuinn 2009). Finally, recent breakthroughs have been made by using geographic data to explore the role of natural resources and instances of conflict (Lujala 2010) and duration (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009). One motivation for the current project is to add to this body of literature by developing theoretical expectations about disaggregated recruitment behavior. The dyadic nature of civil war is

just as important to consider as it is in interstate conflict (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). Ames (2010) reminds us that in the study of child soldiers, the unit of analysis is of great importance. In past research the nation-state has been used most often, but this is "almost always a mistake" (16). Here, I will use the group as the level of analysis and the individual rebellion as the unit of analysis (45 conflict zones, 103 rebellions). Using the nation-state would risk losing a set of cases where some rebels refrained from using child soldiers while others did not. Thus, using the state, or conflict as the unit of analysis would conflate the use of child soldiers and lose the crucial variation that allows for comparison among groups.

It is also valuable to consider the international element in the study of rebel behavior. Past research on international norms and treaty compliance have only considered the behavior of states as signatories. However, Simmons (2010) leaves open the possibility that non-ratifiers may also be subject to the same overarching human rights regime and its accompanying norms and signals (274). Furthermore, there is growing evidence that rebels are responding to signals of condemnation and threat for using child soldiers (Chikukwa 2010). By bringing in the international element to the study of rebel behavior, I build on the work of many scholars in the field that consider the role of external actors in intrastate conflict (e.g., Moore 1995; Carment, James and Taydas 2006; Salehyan 2009; Thyne 2009; Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham, 2011). I also build on the strong constructivist tradition of international relations research as well (e.g., Wendt 1992; 1994; Tannenwald 1999).

1.3 Child Soldier Definitions and Trends

This definition of a child soldier is debated in the international advocacy and research communities. Here, I will use the most recent, and currently the most widely accepted definition proposed. There are many definitions from which to choose and there is considerable overlap. The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups are sponsored by UNICEF and the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC). They define a child soldier as, "any person below 18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking, or has taken, a direct part in hostilities" (UNICEF 2007). This definition is the culmination of a debate that has been ongoing at least since international organizations began recognizing children's rights. It is theoretically exhausting by considering a wide range of components. It is also consistent with other definitions used by international advocates for child protection.

The definition of a child soldier contains at least three debatable points. First, CAAC includes children used in any capacity by an armed group. This includes the obvious category of active combatants, but also includes porters and cooks, which is questionable. For example, if a child works for the group but does not actively take part in the conflict is it fair to equate their actions with those that do? However, it is not safe to dismiss liability for adult military cooks, chaplains, or medics just because they are not active. Therefore, not limiting the role of the child is necessary to capture participation in

general. The inclusion of "sex slaves" or "army wives" is another debatable issue. Again, if these were adults that were captured by an armed group or military and forced into this role, would they have earned the same label of "soldier?" It is doubtful. This question would be important if the philosophy of child protection condemned child volunteers, and only spared sympathy for forced recruits. Fortunately, it does not. Instead, the recruiters are the violators and the target of condemnation, not the child soldiers. Therefore, children observed in the ranks are evidence of abrogating child rights, regardless of the role they serve. This position is consistent with the current project and leads to the second questionable aspect of the proposed definition.

The second aspect of the definition that is questionable is the failure to delineate between volunteers and forcibly recruited child soldiers. While Pederson and Sommerfelt (2007) and almost every other researcher on the topic recognizes the difference between volunteers and forcible recruits, this distinction is not always necessary or useful. Here, I take the approach that armed group leaders operate in conflict environments of relatively fixed (and high) supply of children (Andvig and Gates 2010). In these situations, their own decision to use children is the more important issue. Regardless of the individual soldier's motivations, it is almost always possible to find some children willing to volunteer. I do not consider the direct motivations of children, because, like the ideological foundation of age of consent laws, children are unable to make such large decisions by themselves. All cultures identify distinct adult and child decisions. In the United States, different ages bestowing adult decision making vary for a driver's license (avg. 16), to buy tobacco (18) and alcohol (21).³ Thus, even where 8, 9, or 10 year olds

³ The actual age of consent in the US varies considerably by state from 16 to 18 years old.

are able to volunteer to fight for the liberation of their country, or fight to help provide food for their family, this decision cannot rightfully be made by the child and it takes a rebel leader who is willing to make the conscious decision to accept. Thus, it is more important to look at the motivations of the recruiter rather than those of the individual child.

The third and perhaps most contentious issue regarding the definition of a child soldier is the age threshold. The most common cutoff is anyone under the age of 18. Using this definition, however, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom employ child soldiers in violation of international law. The age-threshold was less than 15 years old in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), but the definition of a *child* in the same document was less than 18. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict OPCAC (2001) and subsequent documents using the higher threshold simply extend the definition of a child to the concept of a child soldier. Furthermore, there is a trend towards this cutoff whereby most states are now refusing to use those less than 18 (Simmons 2009). At the same time, it is valuable to consider the lower age threshold as something with wide support. It offers two advantages. Younger than 15 years old matches what is commonly envisioned when thinking of child soldiers (Andvig 2006) and it clears some of the error in documentation associated with the measure at the higher age threshold (Andvig 2006). People in conflict zones often lack comprehensive birth records and estimates on age are often calculated visually by NGO observers. Furthermore, international norms are subject to ambiguity in compliance. Even in legally-binding treaties, some level of deviation is often overlooked (Chayes and Chayes 1993). A rebel

leader, wanting to comply with international norms and still facing attractive low-cost soldiers, may do the best they can. This results in older children being used who are young, but not obviously so. Using the lower age threshold prevents reliance on strict compliance for gauging the effect of international norms. For this project I will consider both cutoffs, while regarding the higher threshold as most appropriate, but questionable.

Other definitions for identifying children have been offered in the literature (Andvig 2006). These include mental capacity, psychological maturity, and cultural considerations. The first two can be dismissed as wholly impractical for large-n research, or even any empirical research beyond individual psychological profiles. Such distinctions undermine the very nature of child rights. Some persons at very low ages are more mature than older compatriots. This does not excuse those that wish to take advantage of them. Others may be immature at older ages, but should not be protected under the same international laws used to provide protection for a distinct group of vulnerable persons. Cultural considerations can be important. However, I do not take this approach for several reasons. First, it would again limit any ability to engage in cross-national analysis. Second, not only would conclusions across states be impossible, but "cultural" traditions within states also vary. Such an exercise would inevitably involve infinite reductionism where I would chase ever smaller groups down to individual families (at best) or even individual perceptions of when a person reaches adulthood and is ready for military service. Third, it is largely unnecessary to consider cultural distinctions. With the exception of six countries,⁴ 18 years old is by far the modal category for voting age. Several countries have even higher age thresholds. Finally, once

⁴ This group includes North Korea and Cuba.

again, this approach defies the very idea of international child protection laws. By setting an age threshold, the international community is offering protection to a distinct group. Cultural considerations, like psychological approaches rob them of this protected status.

1.4 Why We Should Care

There are a number of reasons why this study is worth pursuing. Children are often among the most vulnerable groups during war because, by definition, they lack peer-advocates (Simmons 2009). This is true for children rights in general and is perhaps more problematic during conflict conditions. Conflict adds to the situation of helplessness or lack of options. Rehabilitation efforts are noble, but the lasting psychological, social, and physical scars of exposure and participation often last a lifetime. In addition to individual suffering, child soldiering can impede development following cessation of hostilities. This can come about by a destruction of the human capital in terms of education or professional development. It can also increase the likelihood of future conflict because of the high number of uneducated youths that have only known combat. Below I underscore the consequences of child soldiering by further exploring a number of factors including the high rates of child soldiering in recent years, the threat of conflict recurrence, the connection to other rebel behavior and finally, as a general human rights issue.

Child soldier use is an unfortunate and undeniable fact of modern warfare. Civil wars represent the modal category of conflict in the 21st century, and academics and policy makers cannot ignore the presence of underage recruits. Since the end of the Cold War through 2007, there have been at least 124 conflicts in 80 locations (Harbom,

Melander and Wallensteen 2008). Of these, 91 were civil wars involving the government and at least one domestic opposition group. Child soldiering is most common in the context of civil war. Of the 50 civil wars ongoing from 1994-1998, child soldiers under the age of 15 were used in at least 31 of these conflicts. More recently, of the 103 rebellions active from 1998-2008 that met traditional thresholds for civil war, evidence exists that 31 of these used children under the age of 15, while 75% used children under 18. The current number of child soldiers worldwide is estimated to be between 200,000 to 400,000. However, this number itself is difficult to verify. Regardless of exact figures, child soldiering is represented on every continent⁵ and in a majority of intrastate conflicts worldwide.

A second reason this research is valuable is for concerns over conflict recurrence. Demobilization represents an important step in the network of human rights advocating for child protection. However, a large pool of unemployed former-combatants raises serious concerns about instability and the renewal of violence (Mehlum, Moene and Torvik 2002). Due to atrocities witnessed and committed, child soldiers are often difficult to rehabilitate. For example, in an initiation strategy used by the RUF in Sierra Leone, children were forced to perform public violence in their home communities in order to sever communal bonds (Honwana 2006, Singer 2005). In fact, one appealing feature of child soldiers is how easy it is to remove those bonds to instill loyalty with the group. After a conflict, the children are often more connected to their military unit than they were with their families. While (Pugel 2010) notes that a majority of child soldiers that participated in Liberia's civil wars were able to return to their home territories, there was

⁵ Except Antarctica.

considerable variation among the factions. Further, in all cases, adults were more easily reintegrated into their pre-war networks than children. Such displacement can lead to a growing presence of landless, disaffected youth, and increase the risk for new or renewed conflict (Heinsohn 2007). Former child combatants who have few other skills are perhaps more at risk because they also lack the social networks to provide basic necessities, leading to an especially large pool of desperate fighters.

Child soldiering is just one of many possible international norms governing behavior. Women's rights, protection of refugees, and other concerns could be explored in a similar way as this project on child soldiers. The norm against child recruitment stands out as particularly important because of its near universal acceptance (Simmons 2009). Unlike individual crimes that are sporadic by nature, such as rape and torture, child recruitment is a characteristic of the group and is therefore more systematic and widespread.⁶ Furthermore, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) find that crimes of this nature reflect an absence of discipline rather than a well-executed method of plunder. Furthermore, the clear signal against using children in combat emphasizes its potential impact on rebel behavior. While bans on practices such as torture exist, there are inevitably qualifications for times of crisis -rationalizations for when it would be appropriate. Considerable definitional debates are seen as well.⁷ The condemnation on using child soldiers, on the other hand, recognizes when the phenomena occurs (during

⁶ Genocide, or mass killing, is also a group-level characteristic to which my theory would apply. Secessionists should be less likely to commit such undeniable atrocities than non-secessionists for the same reason that they are less likely to use child soldiers. At the same time, opportunistic rebellions would not necessarily commit such crimes because it might bring on more international attention, perhaps leading to some kind of intervention. This is beyond the focus of my project, though it still falls under the rubric of goal driven behavior.

⁷ It is true that, like torture, child soldiering also has ambiguity in terms of definitions. It is also difficult to know if and when children are being used. However, these are empirical coding issues that I address in Chapter 4.

war) and explicitly says that such behavior is unjustifiable. Compared to nuclear non-proliferation and even a ban on torture, child soldiering is something that few countries could credibly argue to the UN General Assembly that should be allowed in times of war. Instead, those prominent countries that fail to follow the letter of the law as it is written (e.g., Britain, France, and the United States), argue that the soldiers they use are merely trained and not deployed. Finally, in some cases, the rebel groups are adhering to other international norms, not just refraining from child soldier use. However, while I would argue that my theory could extend to some of these issues as well, child soldiering has a direct link to security concerns and is thus the one that is most relevant to rebel behavior.

Drawing mostly from case studies and anecdotal evidence, social work and education policy researchers identify a fourth reason that child soldiering is a valuable topic of research. At its core, the child protection is a human rights issue. Children recruited into armed forces are denied the right to life, education, development, and protection recognized by the international community. Child soldiers have high rates of physical and mental abuse, the effects of which last into adulthood (Pearn 2003, Somsundaram 2002). Furthermore, coupled with those lost to disability and death, countries with prolific child soldiering are likely to suffer economic impediments as a result of the removal of an entire generation of workers. This suggests that child soldiering can hinder both individual and state development.

For these reasons and more, I aim to bring the tools of modern social science and contribute to a more thorough understanding of one of the worst tragedies of contemporary intrastate conflict. It goes without saying that eradication of the practice remains on the agenda of many NGOs around the world. However, it has suffered from

an excess of normative concerns, paucity of theoretical work, and a deficiency of empirically-grounded policy recommendations. My work will add to a general body of knowledge on one of the worst contemporary forms of human rights abuses and show that child soldiers are not invisible to conflict scholars.

1.5 Outline of the Project

Child soldier use is common in rebellions throughout the world. At the same time, international norms protecting children's rights exist, and are shown to exert influence on state and non-state actors alike. Therefore, it is valuable to explore the role of international norms in rebel decisions to use child soldiers. In the next chapter, I offer a survey of the relevant literature on child soldiers and related abuses. I go on to explain the importance of international norms and review a brief history of international state-recognition policies.

In Chapter 3, I outline the argument of the project. I propose a theory of calculated decisions regarding when to use child soldiers. I build my argument within the norm-compliance literature and the existing scholarly work on rebel behavior, funding, and war duration. I offer a rationalist characterization of rebel behavior and the power of international influence on military behavior, and propose that separatist rebellions should be less likely to use child soldiers in their efforts. By considering funding profiles of rebel groups, I argue that opportunistic rebellions are more likely to use child soldiers. Finally, considering the costs of war, and the low-costs of child labor, duration should increase the use of child soldiers, but should be conditioned by separatist group goals.

Part two of the project presents a cross-national, large-n analysis of child soldiering. Chapter 4 walks through the data collection and coding rubric used to gather the empirical evidence necessary to test the research question. The dataset includes the use of child soldiers, rebel goals, funding profiles, duration estimates, as well as relevant control variables. In this chapter, I review the specific coding rules I followed and provide a detailed description of the source material. In Chapter 5, I engage in quantitative analysis. I use logistic regression and ordinary least squares regression clustered by country to specify models of rebel action.

In part three, I begin with a brief justification for the case selection used as qualitative, empirical tests of my theory. Here, I outline the goals I intend to accomplish, and review the findings uncovered thus far. In Chapter 6, I adopt a most-similar systems design to explore how international norms influence actors in the ongoing civil war in Somalia. I explore the causal mechanisms at work by consulting official statements and published secondary material on the groups involved, as well as original interviews conducted with representatives of the Somaliland government. In this case, I find that a theory of legitimacy constraints helps explain the behavior of the Somali National Movement (Somaliland) when compared to other active armed groups like the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (Puntland), Al-Shabaab insurgents, and other parties to the conflict.


Chapter 7 outlines my use of a most-different systems design, comparing the limitations of international norms to change the behavior of FARC in Colombia and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both rebellions, while near opposites in most aspects, enjoy strong incentives to maintain the conflict status quo. Both groups have poor track records

regarding child protection, while at the same time enjoy the gains of active involvement in the illicit economies of their respective regions. This chapter explores how concerns about international legitimacy are minimal in these cases, and, therefore, legitimacy constraints are ineffectual in altering motivations and action.

The final case study is a thorough exploration of why one high profile separatist group, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, failed to adhere to international norms. In this deviant case analysis, I uncover the motivations of the SPLM leadership and more accurately characterize their goals and tactics for victory. Here, too, I rely on first-hand interviews with the South Sudanese Ambassador to the EU and Belgium. The case research is supplemented with secondary source material.

In the final chapter, I provide a summary of the conclusions implied by my research. Concerns for international legitimacy can constrain behavior. Child soldier use is near-universally condemned throughout the world. Therefore, those actors that wish to become part of the global community will be more likely to show restraint. Consequently, IOs and major powers can justify a carrot-based approach to conflict resolution and target certain groups with incentives. This is dependent on the group's characteristics and their ultimate goals.

Figure 1: Rebel Use of Child Soldiers 1998-2008



Map generated using Stata: Statistical Analysis Software version 11.

Chapter Two

Historical and Scholarly Background

2.1 Introduction

The topic of child soldiers is explored in many fields, but the empirical literature with the goal of proposing a causal relationship is still in its infancy. Drawing mostly from case studies and anecdotal evidence, social work and education policy researchers have explored the developmental problems that come about as a result of participation (Kimmel and Roby, 2007) Somasundaram 2002; Volker 2002). This work examines the problem as a human rights issue. Children recruited into armed forces are denied the right to life, education, economic development, and protection recognized by the international community (McMahan 2010). Child soldiers also prove very difficult to rehabilitate, making renewed conflict more likely (Odeh and Sullivan 2004). Having unemployed former-combatants raises serious concerns about instability and the renewal of violence (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2002). Former child combatants who have few other skills are perhaps more at risk because they also lack the social networks to provide basic necessities, leading to an especially large pool of desperate fighters. Beyond these fundamentals, causal stories represent a new and very important step in the study of child soldiers.

In this chapter, I present the building blocks of my theory by reviewing the literature in four main categories. First, I discuss the evolution of child protection throughout history. This section establishes children's rights as one important influential norm governing combatant behavior. This is followed by a thorough exploration of the recent research on child soldier use. I go on to ground the current study within the wider

area of civilian abuse. This is followed by a discussion of the importance of international norms as an influence on political behavior. Finally, I offer a brief history of international state-recognition beginning with the American Revolution and the diplomatic efforts that accompanied recognition. With these building blocks, I lead into the next chapter where I propose a theory of constrained behavior.

2.2 Establishing Children's Rights as an International Norm

In the absence of global governance international norms help shape expectations of state behavior. For example, military intervention is increasingly used in dealing with humanitarian disasters even where there is no evident political interest other than a stated commitment to humanitarian norms (Finnemore 1996). Further, the non-use of nuclear weapons after World War II regardless of the military value is indicative of a view of appropriate actions not grounded in military victory (Tannenwald 1999). Norms are established through a three-stage process. First, they emerge after the principles are championed by norm entrepreneurs who hold strong views about desirable behavior in their community (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Second, a cascading process takes place whereby these ideas are institutionalized through international rules and adopted by important states. Finally, internalization occurs where norm come to represent the environment, the social reality in which state actors operate. They signal to states how they are supposed to act and states use compliant behavior to signal they are doing so (Hyde 2011). The norm against child soldier use has gone through these stages and now represents an established principle of appropriate behavior. The process of establishing children's rights took nearly 70 years, but as the millennium approached, child protection

norms, including proclamations against child recruitment, were established and entered the cascading process as many legal agreements entrenched expectations and provided strong social incentives for compliance. Since the turn of the century, child protection is accepted by nearly all states. Nested within the larger notion of child protection, the norm against child soldier use is an established, accepted, and internalized norm.

Stage 1: Norm Emergence

The process by which child protection became an international norm was slow at first with large gaps between events. The notion of children's rights is an altogether recent phenomenon. Child abuse laws did not even exist in the US until after 1874. When such cases were tried in court the crime was cruelty to animals (Simmons 2009). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, legislation began to appear in national constitutions, but it tended to be more ideological rather than practical. The first major international effort was the foundation of Save the Children in England in 1919. It began as an attempt to ease the suffering of children caught in the Blockade of Berlin in World War I and, in general, the war orphans that might otherwise have been neglected. The second major development was the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1924). This document was rhetorically substantial, especially for the time, but it still did not offer clear obligations or guidelines on how states needed to act. In 1946, the United Nations founded the International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) as an inter-governmental institution devoted to child welfare. It was the most important global institution for children's issues up to that point. The UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child in 1959 defined children rights to protection, education, healthcare, shelter, and nutrition. However, it did not explicitly define what a child was. While this seems like a

simple fix, the definition of a child still poses a problem when determining international obligations -a topic to which I will return in Chapter 4. The important point is that establishing children's rights was a gradual process (Simmons 2009).

In the mid-1980s, the norm reached a tipping point with the concentrated effort of norm entrepreneurs within UNICEF. 1979 marked the International Year of the Child. The Polish delegation to the UN proposed a new, more substantial agreement that would offer clear support to children's rights. Throughout the early 1980s, their effort met with typical Cold War resistance wherein the US worried about the document being too specific, and the Eastern Powers worried that it was too vague in terms of state obligations (Oestreich 2007). The proposal languished until a concentrated effort by norm entrepreneurs. Individual agents within the NGO community strongly believed in the need for child protection to be recognized in specific UN provisions. They tapped into their professional relationship with UNICEF to take their goals to the international arena. Marjorie Newman-Black was a mid-level staffer with UNICEF and was an early "true believer" in the push for child rights. She succeeded in convincing the Executive Director, James Grant, to support the rights-based approach to child advocacy. Prior to this, UNICEF had been responsible for child development through provisions of healthcare and education. By the mid-1980s, Grant was thoroughly convinced that the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which was a proposed expansion to the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, was worth fighting for. The organization had been reluctant to politicize their operations, and risk tarnishing their image as one of the most highly visible and trusted UN organization (Oestreich 2007). However, Grant was convinced that the CRC conformed to the mission and values of UNICEF and began a

strong public relations push. His initial drive included printing handbooks on child rights to be distributed to all UNICEF field offices around the world (Smyke 1990). He also met with senior government officials for a number of states throughout 1987-1988. Grant was an individual norm entrepreneur that used the organizational resources of UNICEF to bring the norm of child rights to the center stage. He pushed for universal ratification of the CRC and in 1989, he largely succeeded.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) offered a substantial break with past efforts. As a superficial comparison, The Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1954) consisted of 10 principles and contained about 800 words. The CRC outlines 54 principles and is approximately 8000 words in length. The main ideas include protection from punishment based on parent's beliefs, maintaining the best interests of the child, recognizing civil rights and obligating states to maintain a standard of living. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) recognize that after norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to become norm leaders, the norm reaches a tipping point from which it becomes part of the international cultural-institutionalist context. The CRC is the most widely adopted HR convention with 192 parties and 140 signatories (Simmons 2009: 312).⁸ After 1989, a cascade of child protection agreements and reports were completed. As a result, it is fair to characterize 1989 as the tipping point, after which, child protection entered stage 2 in the life cycle, *acceptance*.

Stage 2: Norm Acceptance

⁸ All UN members except South Sudan, Somalia and the United States have ratified the CRC.

After the passage of the UN CRC, international child protection entered a phase where support was strong enough that countries began adopting a rapid succession of new mechanisms by which children's rights were secured. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) was passed by the Organization of African Unity in 1990, and later readopted by the African Union (AU) in 1999. This document was designed to address issues not covered in the CRC that are particularly problematic for children in Africa. For example, the document prohibited child marriages, and offered protection to children in IDP and refugee camps. The ACRWC fixed the age of a child as any person under 18 years old. This is important because while the CRC defines children as less than 18, child soldiers are persons under the age of 15. Thus, Africa was more consistent with its definition of a child than was the UN. The World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children, passed in September 1990 as part of the World Summit for Children. This NGO agreement included 10-point program for improving the lives of children around the world. The year 1996 saw the release of Graça Machel's landmark report on the plight of children in armed conflict. The UN General Assembly unanimously welcomed the report and consistently uses its recommendations on new provisions addressing children's rights. At this time, the UN also established the position of "Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict" (UNGA A/62/228 2007: 15). In 1998, the International Criminal Court (ICC) adopted the Rome Statute. This document reiterated the CRC's proscription against child recruitment under the age of 15. Convention 182 of the International Labor Organization targeted the "worst forms of child labor" which included prostitution, drug trafficking and

slavery. Among these practices, child soldiering was also expressly forbidden. In this document, anyone under the age of 18 was considered a child.

At the close of the century, legal provisions against child soldiering entered into force. A series of UN Security Council Resolutions, beginning with 1261 in 1999, promoted a strong monitoring, reporting and compliance framework to enforce provisions against child soldiering. Resolution 1314 (2000) proposed including child protection staff in field operations and allocated specific resources for the benefit of children. Resolution 1379 empowered the Secretary General to list violators and 1612 (2000) enhanced his monitoring powers. Children's issues began to be reflected in peace negotiations, including the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the Lome Peace Agreement (1999). The next major milestone took place in 2001 and represents the height of the norm against child recruitment.

The Optional Protocol on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPCAC) was a concentrated effort to narrow the CRC to the specific problem of child soldiers. This was the second major UN-wide child rights treaty since the CRC in 1989. While the CRC addressed the issue of child recruitment, OPCAC was more focused on the issues involving children in conflict conditions. Importantly, this agreement raised the age limit of child recruitment from 15, in the CRC, to 18. This change is not surprising because in the CRC, a *child* is defined as anyone less than 18 years old. Thus, OPCAC simply adjusts the age of child soldiers to conform to the general definition of a child. The optional protocol was more slowly ratified, but it has increased its signatories considerably in recent years. By 2012, 142 parties had signed and 119 of these had fully ratified the agreement.

At this point in the discussion, three things should be clear. Child soldiering was increasingly becoming identified as problematic and worthy of targeted action. Second, debate on the definition of a child soldier centered on the 15/18 age-threshold but this did not inhibit widespread eradication efforts for child recruitment. Third and perhaps most importantly, child protection was, at this time, widely accepted and embodied in numerous IO conventions, declarations, and provisions. Thus, these documents represent norm acceptance in the international community. While some issues remained, child rights, and the norm against child soldiering was the very widely accepted. Therefore, the norm of child protection has been internalized, the final stage in the norm life cycle.

Stage 3: Norm Internalization

Empirical evidence suggests states have internalized the norms respecting the rights of children. Simmons (2009) tests the impact of ratification of the CRC and OPCAC on behavior towards children. First, she finds that child protection efforts tend to be stronger than obligations towards children. Thus, she finds statistically significant reduction in child labor rates, but fails to find robust improvement in the proportion of children immunized against measles and diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus. However, national recruitment laws, nested within child protection norms, improved noticeably. Controlling for a several factors that might explain changes towards child soldiering, Simmons finds statistically significant improvement. The legal minimum age for joining the military, for conscription, and for combat all improve after ratification of the OPCAC. This suggests that not only do ratifiers take their signatures seriously, but in the realm of child

recruitment states are internalizing the norms contained in the multitude of child protection documents.

Rules, codified into law, make this internalization possible. They clarify the norm by outlining ever more precise definitions and identify not only what constitutes violation, but what the consequences are. In March 2006, former President Charles Taylor was indicted for war crimes. The charges included the use of child soldiers under the age of 15. One month later, the Secretary General's monitoring group in Sudan recommended further investigation into state support for the recruitment of children (Chikukwa 2010: 49). As will be argued in the next chapter, such high-profile incidents also send signals of appropriateness to non-state actors.

Summary

The norm against child soldier use has been clearly established. Through a slow process beginning with child-targeted development and culminating in the most universally accepted human rights treaty, states accept that children have rights as a specific group. Child soldiering is included within this framework. The debate is settled; states should not use them. This suggests clear signals of appropriateness are being sent. States know how they are supposed to act. In the next chapter, I argue that non-state actors are also receiving these signals. A particular subset, those driving to establish their own independent state, is particularly receptive to these signals.

2.3 Explanations for child soldier use

Systemic Influences (Opportunity/Supply)

Recent empirical literature generally falls into one of two categories: supply-side theories and demand-side theories. Supply-side theories emphasize the number of children vulnerable to conscription and volunteerism. Goodwin-Gill and Cohn (1994), for example, propose that poverty levels account for the number of children able to be employed by hostile parties. Høiskar (2001) contends that a pool of unemployed children leads to high levels of volunteerism among youths. The same economic conditions that drive child “volunteers” may perpetuate their use by destroying the productive capacities of a state, further reducing alternative employment opportunities. Conflict itself can drive the use of child soldiers in other ways. War-orphans, lacking parental guidance or seeking a sense of belonging, are susceptible to the enticing rewards of life as a rebel (Brett and McCallin 1998). Likewise, Achvarina and Reich (2006) propose that the concentration of vulnerable children in unsecured refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps make attractive and easy targets for recruiters. Instead of raiding a village to take a small number of recruits, rebels will target the large pool of potential fighters available at vulnerable locations. They find evidence that the number of refugees in a country is linked to a higher ratio of children to adults engaged in combat. This research identifies the structural factors driving child soldier rates. While fundamentally important for the phenomenon generally, the current project is more concerned with children in conflict conditions where systemic factors like poverty and vulnerability are largely invariant. I set aside this conception and control for structural influences empirically. It is therefore important to consider the other side of the equation.

Recruitment Decisions (Demand)

Demand-side theories revolve around the decisions of leaders and how they evaluate troop capabilities. Singer (2005) explains the recent proliferation of children in combat by looking at the post-Cold War boom in availability of child friendly weapons as well as the nature of guerrilla warfare. Children are valuable because of a narrowing capabilities-gap with adults. The proliferation in recent years of light, child-friendly weapons, like the AK-47, can partially account for the rise in child soldier occurrence worldwide. Unlike past conflicts, children now possess many of the same combat capabilities as their adult counterparts, but are cheaper to feed and house, are easier to manipulate, and their loyalty is less-costly to maintain.⁹ One counter-argument is that child soldiers are often not armed with conventional weapons of war. Instead, knives and machetes are used in combat. Child-friendly arms, then, may not explain proliferation in all areas. For example, the Arrow Boys in South Sudan and Uganda are locally-organized militias of youths armed with bows, arrows, and spears that allow them to defend themselves against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Thus, child soldiering must reflect more than just child capabilities, such as how this factor is internally processed by the commanders.

By most accounts, children are cheaper to use than adult soldiers. They are easier to recruit because they often have fewer social ties and familial responsibilities than adults. Not only does this make them easier to recruit in the first place, but it also facilitates cheaper maintenance costs over adult soldiers. They require fewer resources to keep happy than adults who are likely sending the money back to their families. Orphans

⁹ The idea that “new civil wars” are somehow different than “old civil wars” is questioned by Kalyvas (2001). He maintains that the distinction does not withstand empirical scrutiny. The use of child soldiers in many conflicts from the American Civil War through World War II leads to doubt about a fundamental change in child capabilities.

are attractive recruits for the same reason. Without an active kinship network maintaining protection, orphaned children become easy prey. This reduced expenditure is valuable when an organizer needs to amass a number of troops quickly and cost-effectively. The social network necessary to build a committed and disciplined fighting force takes time. Collier (2000) introduces the concept of an entrance threshold that many would-be rebellions fail to meet. Using children allows recruiters to quickly field enough troops to meet this threshold, or to at least be taken seriously as a credible threat to the government.

Paradoxically, one reason children are often targeted in the first place is because they are easier to subdue and less likely to fight back. Thus, while they can swell the ranks, their quality in the line of fire is often in doubt. The overall cost to use child soldiers is low, however, so are their capabilities. Beber and Blattman (2010) maintain that especially young children, though targeted, are often released shortly thereafter. Only after a trial period are youngsters armed, and even then it appears that adolescents are often the real prize. The aims of the group, therefore, determine how many are needed and to what task they will be put. Child soldiers are efficient when rebel leaders are concerned with bolstering the numbers of guns they can put in the field (Andvig and Gates 2010). Children are cheaper to recruit than adults and easier to exclude from the spoils of war. They are also less costly to maintain because they quickly build group bonds and are less likely to defect. But their skills in combat are somewhat limited. Commanders will weigh the costs and benefits of recruiting adults versus children. In some contexts, adult recruits may prove too costly to use and children too cheap to ignore. Where the cost of using children is low, due to poverty, dislocation, insecurity,

etc., armies will augment their forces with children, especially in the face of financial limitations. Such explanations focus primarily on the short-term costs associated with using child soldiers.

Both theoretical perspectives, supply and demand, likely determine the number of child soldiers used. In situations of excess demand, supply determines the ratio (Andvig and Gates 2010). For example, in the final days of the Nazi-regime, military leaders recruited children en masse because there were so few adults available for military service. The same was true with the Confederacy in the American Civil War. If children are forcibly recruited, this indicates a situation of constraints resulting from capital shortages, duration, or high intensity. Alternatively, where high numbers of children are available, however, characteristics within the group determine the ratio. In these excess-supply conditions the leadership determines how many children will be used and the manner of their service. If children are compelled to volunteer, the leadership determines some expected benefit. However, if there are a high number of adult volunteers, recruitment will be highly selective, forced recruitment is not needed, and child soldiers will not be used in large numbers (90).

As an extension of the demand-side explanations of child soldiering, my theory takes into account international norms as an additional factor governing rebel decisions. Separatists, non-separatists, and opportunistic rebellions represent three types of groups that evaluate the usefulness of child soldiering differently. For separatists, the costs far outweigh the benefits. For opportunists, the reduced capability is of little concern. In the next section, I continue to explore the literature governing behavior during armed conflict

by looking at civilian abuse more generally. This discussion will allow us to better nest child recruitment in the larger literature of human rights violations during times of war.

2.4 Explanations for Civilian Abuse

Using child soldiers is a form of civilian abuse. While academic coverage of the issue of child soldiers is relatively new, scholars have explored the general issue of civilian abuse quite expansively. This literature focuses on elite decisions about when to abuse and when to refrain. It suggests that while in some cases decisions to defy international (and local) norms are made by the individual, generalizable theory should focus on the leaders. One set of explanatory factors of civilian abuse focuses on group characteristics, with unit discipline identified as the strongest factor (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). This position reinforces the idea that many rebel leaders do not want their troops to abuse civilians because it is costly in the long run. A second line of inquiry suggests that international institutions, both formal and informal, can influence when civilians will be abused by offering incentives and disincentives for combatants. These trends in the literature, internal and system-level explanations, serve as a guide to the study of child soldiers.

Internal Explanations

One consensus in this literature is the power of internal group characteristics to influence behavior. Within an organization, decisions must be made that reconcile or coordinate the group's objectives with those of the individual fighter. These are not always the same. For example, Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) explore the level of civilian abuse by combatants in Sierra Leone's civil war. They find that many rebel

leaders, even those within the infamous RUF, did not always want to pillage and plunder. In purely pragmatic terms, it may cost them supply bases and future support (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004). Where discipline can be maintained, violence will be less common than where violations go unpunished (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). Rebels may also avoid civilian abuse for fear of damaging the productive capacity of their areas of operation (Bates, Greif and Singh 2002). Some groups will even go as far as providing local public goods to enhance their areas (Lichbach 1994; Wickham-Crowley 1992).

The environment may also affect levels of civilian abuse. There are two conflicting approaches to this view. Particularly wealthy areas may be seen as valuable and therefore witness high contestation and thus greater collateral damage among civilian populations (Ross 2004b). At the same time, Gates (2002) argues that rebels may avoid recruiting in contested areas because those troops are more likely to defect, with conscription and other violence more likely to occur outside of these places. Competing interests between leadership and the rank and file may also result from these environmental features. Groups can become inundated with opportunists that are unlikely to consider the overall aims and motivations of the rebellion. These elements feel they can benefit financially from the continued conflict (Dishman 2001). This situation most likely occurs when short-term rewards are offered for joining the rebellion (Weinstein 2005; Cornell 2005).

Taken together, internal explanations of civilian abuse can be extended to the study of child soldier at least three ways. First, child soldiering should be more (or less) common when either the rebel leadership or the rank-and-file have strong incentives to

do so. Second, wealth can also play a role in leadership decisions and decisions from the lower ranks. Finally, it is also valuable to consider monitoring and discipline problem when trying to explain child soldiering.

Systemic Explanations

Treaties that aim to curb civilian abuse may be effective for a number of reasons. First, treaty signing is a deliberative process. States often go to great lengths to carefully consider the consequences of signing international agreements. Therefore, they will likely adhere to civilian protection because it is *legitimate* long before the agreement is signed (Franck 1990). Second, international social pressure can also be conducive to protection (Lipson 1991). Targeting civilians may be militarily prudent, but will bear long-term consequences. Action today may make it difficult to maintain the prohibition in the future. Reputation is linked to action in conflict. Being seen as an abuser of civilians may allow other state actors to doubt your commitment to international law. Finally, agreements can clarify what cooperation means by explicitly spelling out appropriate behavior. Treaties can coordinate action and identify punishment for abrogation (Chayes and Chayes 1993).

These external factors influencing civilian abuse might also affect child soldiering among non-state actors as well. Rebel groups cannot sign treaties, but this does not stop them from considering their implications. For example, one Italian NGO advised the leadership in Iraqi Kurdistan to sign a plethora of human rights treaties. The signature was not binding, but the act of offering support would, following careful consideration of the implications would signal commitment to international standards. Second, as argued in the next chapter, if international signals are felt by non-state actors, and human rights

commitments instill pressure for action or restraint, some non-state actors might also be constrained. Third, that reputation is influential even in matters of security, suggests that even where giving weapons to children can inflict damage, it may not be worth the social costs. Finally, when child soldiering was codified in agreements such as the CRC, OPCAC and various other agreements, this offered clear proscriptions on appropriate behavior.

Both internal and systemic-level explanations of civilian abuse can be used to identify the areas of study to consider for the current project investigating child soldiers. Incentives and discipline should be explored to determine when and how child soldiering is valuable. At the same time, international treaties and social pressure should be considered as additional costs associated with rebel behavior.

2.5 Changes in Recognition Policy

Secession is a different kind of rebellion. Fundamentally, the goals of secessionists are long-term. They cannot win without receiving recognition by the international community. Unfortunately, the process of state recognition is inconsistent and is constantly evolving. Stated criteria for statehood are often cited, but seldom used as explicit rules governing independence. Further, stated principles are often at odds with one another with little clarification or determinacy from major powers. Thus, those seeking recognition can look to the past for inspiration that independence can be achieved, but must be thoroughly grounded in the international sentiment of the present for the clues about what will help their claims win support.

Before the mid-18th century, recognition was not really an international relations concept. Statehood was largely a domestic issue. To the extent that international actors recognized states, this act was either illegal (partition or annexation) or unnecessary (dominant de facto principle) (Crawford 2006). This conforms to the declaratory theory of state recognition, whereby new states are formed regardless of the position adopted by existing states. Conversely, the constitutive theory posits that statehood depends on the acceptance of contemporary states. Here, existing states determine who will enjoy the rights and duties of equal international actors. Despite some debate to the contrary (e.g., Crawford 2006), state recognition since around the American Revolution has been constitutive in practice. That is, states must have the political support, through recognition, of their would-be peers before they can enjoy the legal status of statehood. This position did not occur quickly. Instead, it evolved; it ebbed and flowed through decades of international relations. In this section, I will recount the recognition policies practiced by the international community beginning with the American Revolution. Generally speaking, five distinct periods exist. They are summarized in Figure 2.

--Figure 2 here--

US Revolution and Napoleonic Wars (Dynastic Principle)

Up to the early 1800s, international state recognition followed a dynastic tradition. The creation of states was resisted if it represented a threat to the established order of the divine right of kings. Around the time of the American Revolution, liberal philosophical traditions began to challenge such received wisdom. US independence was achieved through force and diplomatic wherewithal. However, it was ultimately the

relinquishment of power by the British that led to wider European recognition. Non-monarchies had existed in the past and acceptance of American claims did not threaten dynastic rule in Europe. Conversely, the new states created in the wake of Napoleonic expansion had been carved out of existing monarchies and were thus deemed illegitimate. At the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), organized to determine the post-war political arrangement, the Napoleonic satellites states were absorbed by larger states. Recognition of the United States was slow, but not collectively resisted by the international community. The French Revolution, on the other hand, was seen as a threat to dynastic order. Thus, before and after American independence, the international community maintained a policy of dynastic legitimacy regarding state recognition. At this point, however, a new policy built on demonstration of control was gaining ground and would lead to a shift in international behavior towards new states.

Central American and Latin American Decolonization (De Facto Recognition)

The transition from dynastic legitimacy to the principle of de facto recognition was swift. After 1815, colonies in Central and Latin American began calling for independence. While dynasticism remained a concern and major powers were at first reluctant to recognize these new states, they did so because of the facts on the ground. This move was led by the US and Great Britain. Both maintained a non-interventionist policy, but the British felt duty-bound to mediate. The US maintained rhetorical support until the British led the way. Also, at this time the concept of *uti posseditis juris* (“as you possess, so you may possess”) was established. This would later become very important as a justification for maintaining the arbitrary colonial boundaries in Africa. In Latin

America, new states that demonstrated their ability to obtain and maintain control over previously recognized colonial holdings were entitled to recognition.

Cases from this period also reveal that recognition policies as practiced by the global community as a whole can change quickly. The policy of dynastic legitimacy was maintained in 1814-1815, but even during this reiteration of policy, twelve new states were formed against established European monarchs between 1810 and 1830. Thus, while the international system currently seems closed to unilateral secession, this policy may give way abruptly in favor of a return to a de facto recognition policy or one of more significant conditionality.

While not always consistent, the new status quo of de facto statehood established by the US and Britain in Latin America represented the established norm before World War I. Both Belgian independence and the reunification of Italy and Germany took place amid both reticence and fractured support throughout Europe. In the case of Italian unification, Russia and France were opposed, as were the German states. However, Britain led the drive for recognition because, even though they too opposed unification, it was preferable to constant war. Sardinia, Central, and Southern Italy joined together after Great Britain (1861), Russia (1862), and later Austria (1866) formally recognized the state of Italy. German unification was an even better example of de facto recognition. There was considerable disagreement as to the character of the union. The major states of Prussia and Austria forced the shrinkage of Denmark and annexed Alsace Lorraine from France. Britain, Russia, and, of course, France resisted these acquisitions, but lamented because the unified Germany maintained effective control of the occupied territories. A

major power response failed to materialize, and they begrudgingly conferred independence.

The breakup of the Ottoman Empire proceeded similarly to central and southern European unification. When Greece, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro declared independence from the Ottoman Empire, the first response was to maintain the status quo. However, a weakened empire unable to hold onto its territory would destabilize the region. Therefore, recognition proceeded with a mix of demonstrated control and conditionality whereby recognition was granted only after the applicant met additional overt and covert requirements. The Treaty of San Stefano recognized Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania. In 1822, Greece declared independence and the major powers initially failed to support it. However, after promises to establish a monarchy and a concerted diplomatic effort to individual states, Greece was recognized in 1827 with the Treaty of London. After the events in Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe, recognition in the 19th century maintained a unifying theme: the system determines new states; the new states do not determine the system (Fabry 2010: 84).

State recognition in 19th Century Europe provides a solid foundation for the argument presented in the next chapter. First, claimants made appeals for recognition on various grounds. However, their reassurances were made in terms that the major powers would find appealing. For example, Belgium appealed for support by reminding the European powers that it had an established monarchy. Greece did the same by promising to establish a monarchy. This is not unlike earlier efforts by Brazil where the election of the king of Portugal's son to the "Emperor of Brazil" indicated their efforts to show commitment to the international order of the day, which was dynastic legitimacy. Thus,

while the new states were breaking with the status quo of territorial integrity and the recognition system was one of de facto statehood, the behavior of those desiring independence were made in the language of legitimacy at that time. This reiterates the notion that the international system governs new state formation.

World War I - Post-World War II (Conditionality)

The end of World War I witnessed the introduction of the ground-breaking concept of self-determination and immediately exposed the inherent problems contained in it. A mere claim of self-determination does not determine who qualifies for the right, how to verify it, or what obligations are owed once the right is established. After World War I, the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires collapsed, and German territorial acquisitions dispersed. A number of new states declared independence under Wilsonian self-determination. At the Paris Peace Conference (1919), the principle was largely upheld, but pragmatism was firmly in place. Full control in an ethnically heterogeneous conflict zone is practically impossible. This was evident in the boundary delimitation talks, which ultimately acknowledged previous boundaries, leaving many minority groups in states to which they did not want to be joined. The lasting legacy of the conference was a respect for territorial integrity (*uti posseditis juris*). The new rhetoric of self-determination was vague and served to morally ground secessionist movements, while arresting international political will.

The right to self-determination has repeatedly come into conflict with the idea of territorial integrity. With 141 new states being recognized since 1945, both policies can easily be characterized as inconsistent. Hannum (2005) makes it clear that while the

official policy that independence should be denied has not wavered, the nature of state formation is such that mixed signals have been sent time and again. Namely, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, especially the case of Yugoslavia, when coupled with rhetoric concerning human, minority, and indigenous rights and representations, can be seen as support for statehood if under legitimate claims. Furthermore, as Fabry (2010) points out, separatists are more likely persuaded by paragraph 2 of UNGA Resolution 1514 proclaiming the right of all peoples to self-determination than by paragraph 6, which establishes the right of territorial integrity (224). Biafra, in 1966, was not dissuaded by the UN-backed defeat of Katanga in 1963. Bangladesh was not dissuaded by Biafra's failure to achieve statehood. Cabinda, Abkhazia, Chechnya, etc., are no more likely to be restrained by the post-decolonization norm of territorial integrity than were their predecessors fighting for independence.¹⁰

The Stimson Doctrine practiced by the US and followed by the League of Nations, reinforced non-recognition of independence or acquisition by conquest. It was used in condemning the Japanese-led formation of Manchukuo (Manchuria). It also reinforced international rule of law (an illegality cannot become a source of legal right). However, when combined with a right of self-determination, it often only served to drag out hostility, uncertainty, and strife. During this transition phase from de facto recognition to one based on international legitimacy, many unrealized aspirations were born. Non-recognition was the legal norm, but self-determination was the growing

¹⁰ Interestingly, in my personal interviews with representatives of Somaliland, they routinely assured me that their claims were rooted in the principle of territorial integrity and decolonization rather than purely self-determination. Somaliland existed as a separate colony from Somalia and achieved independence for five days before joining the new Somali Republic. The idea that their claims are in line with all international principles including respecting colonial borders is also found in the official "Case for Somaliland's International Recognition as an Independence State" published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

rhetorical shield behind which new claims to statehood hid. Depending on which side of the struggle one was on, they could find a legal backing as a source of their legitimacy.

This period is characterized by the introduction of conditionality. Prospective states had to demonstrate that not only could they acquire territory, but the claimants had to convince specific international institutions that it was administratively competent. The Middle East and former Ottoman Empire territories were marked for phased independence. However, the League of Nations, through the Permanent Mandates Commission, established the rules and procedures to which new states were subjected before they would be recognized. Even when Britain, in its role as host country, suggested Iraq be recognized, the League said they were not ready, and denied independence. This condition of capability continued through Israeli independence. Only after demonstrating its ability to maintain security against aggressive Arab neighbors did it receive widespread recognition in 1958 despite having declared it in 1948.

During this time, recognition was a mix of practical realities on the ground and a balance of power among the major states. Thus, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia gained recognition based on the "norms of international society," while independence claims by the Caucasian Republics were ignored and reoccupied by Soviet Russia (Fabry 2010: 123). Immediately after World War II, recognition policy followed a conditional interpretation of self-determination. By this time, however, colonialism had been completely discredited. Falling back on self-determination, drives for independence sprang up around the world. This marked the beginning of normative international recognition policy.

Decolonization (Legitimist Principle)

This era of conditionality was brief. By the 1960s, with colonialism thoroughly discredited, independence claims were legitimized by the mere status of being colonies. With the principle of self-determination as a backdrop, states were quickly recognized without meeting any viability or capability benchmarks. The only states deemed legitimate were those marked as non-self-governing entities or trust territories at the foundation of the UN. Thus, ethno-nationalist groups championing independence on the grounds of self-determination were said to be illegitimate and the international community denied their claims. Only current colonies had a legitimate right of self-determination. Though, once again, the practice of *uti posseditis juris* meant that the colonial boundaries would become the new state boundaries regardless of ethnic composition of the country.

Fabry (2010) calls this the new "dynastic legitimacy." In other words, prior to US independence and remaining a concern up to WWI, monarchism was the order of the day, and claims to independence were filtered through this informal test of legitimacy. Under decolonization, claims were legitimate if they were former colonies. They were illegitimate even if they maintained de facto statehood, met conditionalities, or had compelling claims of self-determination. In the end, a right of self-determination was the large print. The fine print was that only previously identified dependencies had a legitimate claim to self-determination. In reality, it was harder for people to gain self-determination than before the phrase was coined (169).

This provides evidence for the legitimacy argument presented in the next chapter. Although the terms of legitimacy changed, the idea that only legitimate claims will be

honored is evident throughout 1960-1991. Katanga and Biafra were denied recognition because they were not former colonies. Rhodesia was not recognized because the minority-led government did not meet the spirit of decolonization. It went against international opinion as espoused by the UN General Assembly (now swelled by former colonies). In the mid 1970s and early 80s several states within South Africa declared independence. These Bantustans are illustrative because even though South Africa recognized their independence claims, they were isolated internationally because the global consensus believed this to be a ploy to maintain apartheid. Lest arguments about puppetry win the day, it is worth pointing out that one of the Bantustans, the Republic of Transkei, broke diplomatic ties with South Africa after a row over labor conditions in the Rand mines.

Post-Cold War Period

In the post Cold War period that saw the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia (SFRY), state recognition continued with the established principles of *uti posseditis juris* and legitimization, but included a mix of conditionality and pragmatism by the international community. While some commentators thought the recognition process after the Cold War was the birth of a new qualified right to unilateral secession, Fabry (2010) contends that it merely solidified the norms of international legitimacy settled in the 60s and 70s. New states needed the host sovereign's consent, and *uti posseditis juris* was maintained. The USSR fits this contention, but the non-consent of SFRY was justified by saying that government ceased to function. There was no one with which to negotiate. The continued decline of the de facto principle was coupled with a return to conditionality. The Guidelines On Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and

Soviet Union (1991) were the first written conditions since the short-lived Permanent Mandate Commission (1931). In principle, they upheld democratic governance, human and minority rights, nuclear non-proliferation, and other concerns championed by the international community.¹¹ In practice, these conditions were inconsistently applied, though not altogether unimportant.

Once again, a legitimist principle built largely around *uti posseditis juris* was maintained. Juridical and administrative borders were sacrosanct. Republics' claims were heard, while sub-republics, like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Chechnya, Kosovo, and the various Serbian Republics, were not. This reinforced the claim that self-determination is not a universal positive right. Fearing the setting of precedent and the creation of new ethnic minorities with their own claims, the international community refused to hear the claims of self-determination by illegitimate parties (i.e. sub-republics). However, targeted application of "legitimacy" resulted in the conflict that the major powers tried to avoid. Minority groups in the new states fought for independence despite *uti posseditis juris*. This reached such a zenith that Kosovo, an unrecognized sub-republic, turned into a humanitarian disaster for over 8 years that ultimately required NATO intervention to resolve. After everything, Kosovo was recognized after the European Community and the US conferred legitimacy based on humanitarian concerns. The major powers made it clear this was not a change in the official policy against secession. Of course, Russia quickly said the same thing about its prior recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.¹²

¹¹ Non-proliferation is one very clear international norm that applied to former Soviet Satellites seeking statehood. Like child soldier use, this norm is accepted and internalized. Unlike child soldiers however, most groups seeking independence do not have nuclear capabilities.

¹² South Ossetia has since been recognized by Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Tuvalu. Abkhazia adds Vanuatu to their list of recognizing states.

Summary

The recognition of new states since at least 1776 has been inconsistent and shifts in policy are difficult to predict. From the mid 18th century through around 1815, dynastic legitimacy was the established order. Statehood was controlled by the existing family of nations. New states were resisted if the European powers perceived their claims as a threat to their own monarchic control. From 1815 to World War I, de facto rule was often all that was needed to convince world powers that recognition should be granted. This corresponds to previous customs of statehood under the declaratory principle where recognition was merely a formality. After World War I and through the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, conditionality was exercised such that diplomatic interaction depended on the policies and practice of prospective states. This again put the impetus on claimants to make their case to the international community or fail to enjoy the legal status of statehood.

Self-determination was introduced by Woodrow Wilson, but was so untenable that it succeeded only in bringing about new claims for independence that had little hope of being realized. In the 1960s, state recognition generally saw a revival of the legitimist principle. At this point, however, legitimate meant current colonies or protectorates. Self-determination was used to justify new states, but territorial integrity under colonial borders was maintained. Therefore, only colonies, and not their sub-state populations, were granted statehood. This changed in the neo-legitimist period following the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and the recognition of Eritrea and South Sudan harkens back to the dynastic legitimacy of the early 1800s. The international

community supported those claims for independence if the host country agreed (Eritrea and South Sudan) or if the host country ceased to exist (Yugoslavia). Of course, the Republic of Kosovo was also recognized at this time despite failing many conditions in place for new states. This was explained away as an exception. In truth, though, other than the general trends identified above, almost all new states were, in one way or another, exceptions to the largely closed international community.


There are two main points from this subsection. First, the power of recognition has evolved into a fundamentally political act. Contemporary states weigh the outcomes of independence for entities that claim it. They either decide to recognize new states or fail to do so. This is fundamentally a political decision. Existing states may refuse to accept the de facto existence of entities because they do not find them politically acceptable (Biafra, Katanga). Importantly, this political act has legal consequences in international law. Recognition serves to treat states as an actor in international affairs. The recognizer enters into relations with the recognized who then enjoys all the rights of equals indefinitely. Non-recognition, however, maintains the status quo. The entities have no international legal recourse because they are non-persons.

The second major point is that because it is a political act, an individual decision for states to make, the international community operates from a set of informal criteria for recognition. Currently, these informal criteria form a legitimist principle. If the claim appears legitimate, that is, if they are politically acceptable to the contemporary family of nations, the state will be recognized; if it is not, the claim is rejected. As will be made clear in the next chapter, non-recognition is a curse that ensures de facto states will at some point be reintegrated into their mother country, unless and until recognition occurs.

2.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided the building blocks for the theory presented in Chapter 3. The evolution of child protection shows how the issue of children's rights went from non-existence in 1900 to one of the most widely respected human rights concerns in 2000. From here, I recount the different explanations modern social scientists use to explain child soldier use. Even though the norms against the practice exist, child soldiering is still prevalent in much of the world. The discussion on civilian abuse was an attempt to ground the study of child soldiers in a wider area of study that includes abrogation of norms in the name of conflict. Finally, the argument presented in the next chapter largely centers around the goals and motivations of separatist groups. As shown here, independence movements have been successful in the past with over 150 new states added to the global community since 1776. However, the criteria for recognition have been largely inconsistent. With the argument firmly rooted in the work of previous scholars, I now turn to using these pieces to extend the discussion regarding child soldiers and show how motivations of rebels and their perception of the world system can influence their behavior.

Figure 2: Timeline of International Recognition Policies (1776-2012)



Chapter Three

A Theory of Constrained Behavior

3.1 Introduction

My theory follows a straightforward logic. Rebels are assumed to be rational. The use of child soldiers has been unanimously condemned around the world. Secessionist rebels' ultimate goal is state recognition. This depends on states in the international community. Therefore, separatists are more likely constrained in their recruitment practices because of the pursuit of legitimacy. Financing is also an important consideration for rebel groups. Some groups, after tapping into a lucrative, illegal commodity, may come to see the conflict status quo as profitable. These opportunistic rebellions become less concerned with winning. In the pursuit of profits, they will be more likely to see greater benefit in using child soldiers. They are cheap and, because opportunist rebellions are less concerned with victory, reduced capabilities will not be an issue. Nor will any considerations about an external audience. Finally, duration increases costs and makes cheaper soldiers more appealing. This makes restraint more difficult for all conflict types.

This chapter begins by explaining the assumption of rationality and why this is a valuable and useful starting point for the current project. The second part identifies the influence that treaties have in establishing norms and how those norms influence state behavior and non-state behavior alike. After reviewing recognition policy from a normative framework, I proceed to model the decision structure for separatists and how this influences their behavior towards child recruitment. The final three sections provide an extension to the argument by addressing the economic issues associated with conflict

and the influence this can have over recruitment decisions. The models presented are then tested in Chapters 5-8 with both quantitative and qualitative empirical tests.

3.2 Rational Rebels

Historically, the study of political violence is built around assumptions concerning participants. Reports about collective action written about one's political or ideological enemy tend to portray the other as irrational. In the past, governments typically commission such reports. Therefore, they often have unintended biases in their conclusions. More recently, social science research has adopted a more objective approach. Far from being the product of "criminals, madmen, the offspring of madmen, alcoholics, the slime of society, deprived of all moral sense," collective action, even when violent, appears to follow calculated decisions about the environment (Rule 1988: 95). This proposition is important because it allows for the systematic study of political violence, the evaluation of causal arguments, and the extension of other forms of deviant behavior.

The evolution of the concept of the rational-rebel was slow to develop. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, riots were frequent occurrences in the United States, Ireland, England, India, and elsewhere. Breaking free from the prosecutorial mindset that preceded it, reports at this time recognized the entrepreneurial spirit of the organizers of such action (Wilkinson 2009). Symbolic issues that could rally a substantial number of participants were used by individuals with a vested interest in challenging the state. For example, during World War II, structural factors, such as mass recruitment and labor market changes, placed stress on the wartime population and provided the uneasy

environment in which rumors could incite crowds to action (Weckler and Hall 1944). Structural factors and the logic of stimulus-response violence are also accepted as the best explanation for the race riots of the 1960s (Graham and Gurr 1969). Such approaches better explain the character of mass political violence where ordinary citizens can mobilize to redress grievances. Further, it recognizes the generalizable patterns found in collective behavior. Even in decisions to instigate or join violent activities, people are rational.

The concept of the rational-rebel, at present, appears to be the dominant paradigm in civil war literature. Rational-choice theories are used to explain behavior at various stages of a rebellion: from the very beginnings of political violence (Muller and Weede 1990), to initial acts by elites (Weede and Muller 1998; DeNardo 1984; Leites and Wolf 1970), responses by the masses (Mason 1996), and in the end when faced with continuation or cessation of hostilities (Mason and Fett 1996; Walter 2002). In addition, Moore (1995) suggests that third-party involvement in intrastate conflict also relies on a rational calculation of costs, benefits, and a keen eye towards the future.

In the current project, I argue that rebel behavior is bound by strategic concerns and that commanders will refrain from using child soldiers when it helps them reach long-term goals. Rebel goals will determine how much they care about international opinion and how likely it is that norms will influence their recruitment decisions. Further, funding choices and duration can influence the extent to which rebellions value victory and, thus, how willing they are to trade capabilities for lower costs. In the next section, I discuss how international norms provide the conceptual framework in which state and non-state actors operate. If the environment for rebels is in many ways the same

environment for states, and rebels are rational, they will act the way they think they are supposed to.

3.3 How International Norms Influence Behavior

International treaties can influence state behavior even in an anarchic world system. The classic realist position argues that states will comply with international treaties only insofar as it is in their interest (Mearsheimer 1994). Chayes and Chayes (1993) counter the realist position with the observation that in the realm of security, economic, and environmental treaties, noncompliance is the aberration. States often go to extreme measures to appear compliant even if it would be in their best interests to abrogate. Treaties, they argue, are the result of timely and well-considered negotiations that reflect how seriously states consider the terms. Compliance itself may also be in the best interest of the state. Noncompliance can threaten other agreements by making an administration appear untrustworthy. Even where states have no intention of following through with obligations, merely the act of signing can invigorate local and global civil society, putting pressure on leaders to improve human rights practices (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). International norms derive from these treaties and other widely-accepted international agreements.

The power of international norms to shape state behavior is well-documented. Social pressures of inclusion and the desire to avoid being seen as a deviant member can be very strong. Japan originally resisted the international ban on ivory sales, for example, but relented “to avoid isolation in the international community” (Chayes and Chayes 1993: 201). Actors who fail to comply with such widely accepted norms and openly

flaunt abrogation risk near universal scorn and will be viewed with suspicion and treated as pariahs. Norms often become entrenched because they serve as external signals of good behavior (Hyde 2011). Election monitoring is now a prerequisite for democracy. Even the pseudo democrats feel pressured to allow observers in order to avoid the stigma that comes with being an autocrat.

Finnemore (1996) suggests that norms represent a change in the international system whereby IOs and NGOs provide states with direction concerning appropriateness of action. The case of global opinion against apartheid South Africa illustrates how norms can redefine national interests (Klotz 1995). Here, global sentiments about racial equality superseded strategic interests. Tannenwald (1999) demonstrates how the opposition to nuclear weapons is so high that since Hiroshima and Nagasaki no states have used them in aggression. This norm is so strong that deterrence often fails even against nonnuclear states because they know such weapons will not be used in retaliation. In effect, the options available to international actors have changed due to accepted norms. Thus, norms can constrain state behavior. Such effects should not be limited to state actors alone. In the next two sections, I demonstrate how non-state actors are also aware of many of the same signals that state actors are, and that these signals can alter behavior.

International relations can affect the behavior of groups in the run up to, and during, civil war (Thyne 2009). Governments and rebels alike are subject to international signals of support or disapproval. During the 1970s, presidential succession in the White House dramatically altered the likelihood of civil war in Nicaragua by changing the expectations of the actors. Under the Nixon administration, the rhetoric from the White House was that the US was firmly anti-communist. This had the effect of giving a free

pass to the Somoza regime to crack down on the Sandanista insurgents. United States foreign policy shifted under the Carter administration. The new rhetoric championed human and civil rights, and this sent hostile signals to the Somoza regime. Managua changed course and made moderate concessions. However, the Sandanistas used the signals from Washington to rally support against the repression of Somoza. Events unfolded rapidly and by 1979, Somoza succumbed to the rebellion and resigned his post.

Non-state actors are aware of international mood and change their behavior based on rational expectations about the international community. Such was the case in evidence with Hutu extremists during the Rwandan Genocide. After the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia 1994, the international community pulled out of the country virtually cutting off all aid to the region and letting the warlords have free reign over the civilian populations. This was tragic for Somalis, but it also sent a signal that the global conglomerate of would-be interveners did not have the appetite for sustained humanitarian missions. This specific event was later cited by many Rwandan Interhamwe as a reason they did not fear international intervention to stop the Genocide. The Interhamwe believed their actions would be ignored by world leaders reluctant to get involved in a local African conflict (Dallaire 2003: 240). Conversely, in another example, Kuperman (2008) finds evidence that Bosnian Muslims and Kosovars acted as a result of beliefs about the international community. In the dissolution of Yugoslavia, vulnerable groups attacked much stronger state institutions because they believed that it would provoke a harsh backlash by the government, but, more importantly, this response would promote international intervention on the side of the weaker party.

Non-state actors can be influenced by accepted norms in the similar ways as state actors. Bob (2005) finds that rebels are willing to alter their message, goals, and tactics to attract support from transnational NGOs. For example, the Zapatista separatists framed theirs as a movement against globalization rather than the initial fight for indigenous rights. Further, at least since September 11, terrorist tactics have severely hindered secessionists' ability to rally international support for their cause (Hannum 2005: 69). Recent CIA accounts of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) members struggling to balance the attention-grabbing acts of terror with the negative publicity that follows are, therefore, unsurprising (Coll 2005). Ultimately, the PLO reduced the intensity of their attacks because of the public-relations value of adopting less coercive tactics. If non-state actors are aware of the international environment and subject to the same signals of appropriateness, they are, in many ways, under the same social pressures as states.

Treaties can also serve as signals to non-state actors. The Conventions on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Optional Protocol (OPAC) are just two of the most prominent documents of which non-state actors may be aware. Equally important are the monitoring programs of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and the various UN Security Council Resolutions addressing child soldiers. These include high profile indictments, such as Charles Taylor in 2006. Perhaps more telling, a number of rebel groups have indicated their commitments to these treaties. In 2007, the Karen National Liberation Army in Myanmar instituted recruitment ages in its "Deeds of Commitment." Both the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and the SPLA in South Sudan made strong pledges of demobilizing their child soldiers throughout the 2000s. Further,

rebellions have even expressed explicit support for OPCAC, including the ONLF in Ethiopia and Hezbollah in Lebanon. They likely think this is important because child soldiering is condemned by numerous treaties and NGO forums.

Rebels operate in the same world system as state actors. The audience for treaty relations is not always those intended. Simmons (2010) suggests that even non-ratifiers may be internalized and practice norms contained in treaties (274). Just as rebellions change their message and behavior in seeking approval from NGOs, they can become both informed and emboldened by legitimizing effect of compliance with the international human rights regime. However, this depends on the value they place on that external environment. Rebel leaders most concerned with social pressures are the ones likely to comply. As non-state actors, they are limited in their actions to appear compliant to international norms. There is no treaty to sign or convention to attend. Instead, they must actually demonstrate they are willing to act as the community acts. Therefore, child soldiers will be avoided by rebels wishing to signal a legitimate claim for statehood.

3.4 Recognition Revisited

Kilcullen (2010) identifies an ever-growing concern of insurgents. In addition to the political unity within the group, with the civilian population, and trying to thwart the political unity of the government, insurgents are also increasingly aware of the political message consumed by the international community. In particular, the global audience was influential in the East Timor liberation struggle where previously successful counterinsurgency strategies employed by Indonesia failed to overcome FRETILIN. In the late 1990s, globalization increased the value of international propaganda. For

example, in 2004 Osama bin Laden made a video where he ranted about typical al Qaeda grievances. However, this time he included global warming as another evil committed by America. CIA analysts concluded that the goal was to link international terrorism to the Democratic Party in order to ensure reelection of George W. Bush (Suskind 2006). While US voters are not the same thing as the international community, this example shows how individual non-state actors often try to reach wider audiences by speaking their language. While international propaganda is prominently used by rebellions around the world, this is not a new development. Groups trying to get their own state have been aware of international audiences for centuries.

Independence movements have sought support from the wider audience of the international community at least since 1776. The US fought for its independence, but it did not succeed until they had the support of major European powers. Despite any reason for assuming a universal right to self-determination, or even a reasonable expectation of material support, the US still sent diplomats and emissaries to France, the Dutch Republic, Spain and Russia. Support from France became so integral to the success of the revolution that some commentators go as far as to suggest Louis XVI should be considered one of the founding fathers (Fabry 2010: 35-36).

Modern separatists adopt a range of strategies to achieve their goal of recognition, but publicity is an area where many concentrate their energy (Wood 1981). In the comparison of Algerian and Moroccan Berbers, Slymovics (2005) claims that both groups made their case for cultural rights to their domestic audiences. However, Algerian Berbers changed the basis for their movement on fundamental rights of self-determination when they switched their target audience to the international community.

Behavior changes when the audience changes. In a personal interview in 2011, a high level representative of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) representative told me in an interview that there were several occasions where the domestic constituency wanted action, but the leadership followed external wishes. Even agreeing to work with the governing party in 1991 was solely the result of the signals from the international community. Thus, rebel groups that care about international contexts will speak, and act, in accordance with that audience

International Legitimacy

The burden of proof lies with the secessionist to convince the international community that they are worthy of joining as equals (Hannum 2005). Wight (1972) defines international legitimacy as the “collective judgment of international society about rightful membership of the family of nations; how sovereignty may be transferred; how state succession should be regulated, when large states break up into smaller, or several states combine into one” (1). The problem for separatists is that legitimacy is “an elusive and nebulous notion on the frontiers of morality and law” (1). Even prior to the American Civil War, secessionists have felt the need to justify their claims in terms that other nations (a community of which they wish to be a part of) understand. In other words, they sought and seek legitimacy in the eyes of their potential peers (Meadwell 1999). The principle of self-determination, and claims of a right to it, indicate how rebel groups look to the international community for cues on what makes their movement legitimate. During interviews with the staff of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), I was routinely told that members of the European Parliament are specifically

targeted because they care about a particular issue. Taiwanese representatives, for example, began touting their record on cultural rights and democracy because it would bring the support of the influential Green Party. UNPO also targets specific members of the European Parliament by tapping into goals they care about. One parliamentarian was known as a champion of maritime security. A meeting was arranged between him and the Somaliland delegate to emphasize their anti-piracy efforts. Such examples illustrate the importance that secessionist groups place on international concerns. They go to great lengths to put their struggle in terms the international community supports.

Most governments want to stay neutral because foreign meddling is often unpopular and risky if they back the wrong side (Wood 1981). To ease the burden on international actors, hopeful states often go to great lengths to assure the global community that they are legitimate. During the era of Dynastic Legitimacy, new states tried to convince Europe that they had nothing to fear and that they were not a challenge to established monarchism. As previously noted Brazil elected the King of Portugal's son and proclaimed him the "Emperor of Brazil." When Belgium sought independence in 1830, it made a concerted effort to remind the world that it too had an established monarchy in the guise of newly elected King Leopold I. Lacking such credentials of its own, Greece promised to establish a monarchy if it were recognized. Furthermore, prospective states offered assurances of human rights provisions when they thought it would help their case. Once again, Brazil was in tune with the rhetoric of its future global partners when it offered to ban the still active slave trade in 1825 (Fabry 2010: 66). In another example, before it was independent, Romania offered greater religious tolerance

to its minorities in exchange for recognition. Avoiding child soldiers might make support less politically risky.

Conditionality

The international community, to its credit, facilitates such quid-pro-quo behavior by placing conditional recognition in many cases. After World War I, the victorious Allied Powers sought to lay the foundation of peace. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were recognized, but only after agreeing to accept the minority rights provisions outlined in the Paris Peace Conference (Fabry 2010: 131). In 1931, the League of Nations created the short-lived Permanent Mandate Commission, which set the guidelines territories had to follow in order to be recognized. Prominent among these was the “capability principle” whereby would-be states had to demonstrate they could be effective. This was not a mere continuation of the *de facto* statehood principle. Control alone was not enough to bring recognition. Would-be states had to show their administration was capable and sustainable. In one example, Great Britain sought to recognize its mandate of Mesopotamia as the Kingdom of Iraq. Despite inheriting full control from the British, Iraq did not meet the capability condition and the League of Nations refused to recognize its sovereignty. Later, in an effort to get ahead of the massive changes in the world system, the European Community established “The Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union” in 1991. This ambitious plan upheld democratic governance, human and minority rights, nuclear non-proliferation, and other concerns championed by the international community. These conditions highlight an explicit link between internal rule and the

conduct of international relations. In practice, as should be unsurprising, these conditions were inconsistently applied. In the end, both the US and the European Community favored non-proliferation above all other concerns. However, hopeful states sought to fulfill each requirement. At the same time, even this shows the power of the international community over the policies of potential new states.

For nearly 250 years, new states have followed a similar pattern towards statehood. First, they seek support for their claims internationally. This was seen with US independence and throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. Second, they go to great lengths to tap into the general sentiment of the international community at the time, such as when Greece and others promised to establish a monarchy. Finally, the international community, knowing the position would-be states are in, capitalizes and draft conditionalities that must be met before conferring statehood. While professed goals differ from back-room deals and a severe information gap exists, the general process appears relatively consistent. From dynastic legitimacy through the Permanent Mandates Commission and, finally, with efforts to control the Soviet dissolution, ample evidence exists that not only is the international community more than just a bystander or reluctant acceptor of conflict outcomes, claimants to independence know this and act accordingly.

3.5 Legitimacy Constraints

It is clear that secessionists are aware of the consequences of losing international support. This should not be surprising. As the previous section shows, secessionists have long felt the need to justify their claims by framing their struggles in the language of legitimacy. Contemporary independence movements inevitably call for decolonization

regardless of the circumstances of the union. International recognition is sufficiently rare that prospective states engage in diplomatic efforts to secure recognition and, with it, legal protection. Furthermore, they know that some behaviors likely limit support. Child protection exists as one such norm of behavior that is widely accepted, clearly expressed and applicable to all rebel groups. Thus, in an effort to avoid defeat, secure support, and fully achieve their goals, rebellions with the goal of independence should be less likely to use child soldiers. In this effort they try to avoid the fate of many unrecognized states that, upon failure, have ceased to exist.

Quasi-states, if sufficiently strong, can exist without recognition. However, they are living on borrowed time. The best case scenario in the short term is some form of autonomy within the federal structure. For example, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka controlled a large territory in Sri Lanka. They enjoyed some support from India until the 1991 assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The LTTE wallowed in quasi-statehood, accepting and rescinding various peace initiatives. Independence was never reached, and, in 2009, following a swift military defeat, the LTTE and the likelihood of an independent state of Eelam died. Therefore, the most likely outcome for quasi-states is eventual reabsorption into the host state. Organizations that can garner support, however, are less likely to suffer this fate. As Kolstø explains, “A quasi-state may increase chances of achieving political recognition if it manages to build strong state structures and eliminate the most blatant criminal activities in its territories” (2006: 735). Child soldiering is an overtly criminal activity that is near-unanimously condemned. As a result, using underage fighters would risk costing crucial support.

Even though there is little generalizability in decisions over recognition, it is reasonable for rebels to anticipate loss of support for illegitimate actions and behavior. For example, the September 11, 2001 terrorist tactics have severely hindered secessionists' ability to rally international support for their cause (Hannum 2005: 69). Further, in 1995, Operation Storm by Croatia was a harsh but effective means of crushing the separatist Serbian Republic of Krajina. Commentators claim that the international community was mute because the Srebrenica massacre just two months earlier cost the Serbs sympathy (Kolstø 2006: 737).

While some actions are condemned without denigrating the claims (e.g., terrorism in the Occupied Territories), other actions are not as easily overlooked. For example, kidnappings, cruel and unusual punishment, and beheadings in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria effectively evaporated global support for the state. Chechen leaders had achieved victories in their drive towards independence, even winning nominal autonomy from Russia with international support. However, failure to live up to the principles and norms of international law resulted in international condemnation (Ware 2005). The lesson of Chechen misbehavior and its consequences were not lost on its fellow separatists in neighboring Dagestan. In 1999, a Senior Researcher at the Dagestan Scientific Center, Mahomedkhan Magomedovich Magomedhanov, evaluated where the Chechens went wrong:

Those "fathers of the nation," including those of the Chechen nation, who resort to violence while pursuing the supreme goal of self-determination, might benefit from paying attention to the ideological priorities of the global community... It is well known that the internationally recognized principle of self-determination contradicts the equally widely recognized principle of the inviolability of state borders. ... The use of inadequate and inappropriate methods in the struggle for national and state self-determination, and for independence—such as terrorism or attacks on the borders of neighbors—only increases the risks of suffering and loss

for one's own nation...Otherwise, the fruits of independence that are so ardently desired may not even be attained.

Though the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is just one of 16 active UN treaties acknowledging the protection of human rights, it is "the most widely and rapidly ratified human rights treaty in history" (UNICEF 2005). Given its near complete support by the international community, the norms regarding the rights of a child offer very clear signals of appropriate behavior. Even the Taliban, who have deservedly earned condemnation by the world, have an official policy that states "Mujahedeen are not allowed to take young boys with no facial hair onto the battlefield" (Coalition 2008: 41). Of course, this belies the fact that they routinely use young children in combat. Use of child soldiers is often vehemently denied, and revelations are followed by hasty justifications. For example, the New Peoples' Army (NPA) in the Philippines claims to reject recruits that are under 18. When child soldiers were observed in their ranks, NPA officials defended the organization by claiming difficulty in verifying age (Coalition 2008: 277). Under conflict conditions, rebel leaders are faced with the opportunity to hire underage recruits. Commanders could recruit them and arm them, abruptly ending their innocence and often their lives. But such action, while economical, would risk international scorn, and prove detrimental to their overall success.

All rebellions can benefit from international support. However, secessionists face unique concerns. Secessionists cannot "win" without legitimacy. As Wood (1981) notes, "no successful secession is complete until it has become institutionalized in a new government, legitimate at home and recognized abroad" (133). Quasi-states, if strong and autonomous, may exist without recognition. However, without statehood, it is only a matter of time before reabsorption or hostilities will resume (Islam 1985). It is extremely

difficult to get recognized as an independent state, though there are exceptions (Bangladesh, Eritrea, and South Sudan). It is arguable that victory is the one common goal of every rebellion, but victory alone cannot achieve the ends sought by secessionist movements.

Non-separatist rebels have inertia on their side. Continuity of the international system is important (Brown 1950). While it may not always be politically palatable to recognize a government born of revolutionary, military, or otherwise unconstitutional means, it is often a practical necessity. Governments born through illegitimate means may be tolerated and in some circumstances welcome (e.g., Libya), but secession is a different issue altogether. Rebellions aimed at the center and rebellions aimed at exit might both want international support, states are more willing to begrudgingly accept new governments than new states. Considerable resistance over welcoming a new country remains (e.g., Biafra, Katanga, South Ossetia, Abkhazia).

Secessionist groups are the most concerned with the international norms. Thus, they are the rebel groups most subject to the constraining power of international legitimacy. Groups seeking independence cannot win without the backing of the international community. They have little hope of achieving the status of legitimate equal in the eyes of the world if they engage in egregious violations of accepted norms. Operating under such social pressure, secessionists are more likely to comply with the norms against child soldiers than those not concerned about legitimacy. In the decision to use child soldiers, legitimacy serves to constrain rebel behavior and pushes the likelihood to use child soldiers downward.

3.6 Finances and Civil War

Long-term considerations are also manifest in decisions related to economics. Fiscal approaches to civil war have a strong tradition in conflict studies. While the notion that rebellions are quasi-criminal organizations is evident by the fact that they are, in fact, breaking the laws of their country, the idea that they exist solely for the pursuit of profit is more dubious. What is clear, however, is that motive alone is not sufficient to spark rebellion. Independent sources of funding can provide start-up costs and an economic motivation to rebel. At the same time, certain resources can alter the structure of the conflict and provide new means and new incentives to participants. There are three primary ways in which natural resources can influence civil war: onset, duration, and intensity.

Natural resources can encourage conflict onset by weakening states' and their ability to eliminate extralegal challenges. States can be weakened by a lack of economic diversity, and the economy may become beholden to fluctuations in commodity pricing (Klare 2001). Economic instability is part of the structural factors that can promote civil war. Focusing on a single resource can also weaken the economy and lead widespread grievance. Single-commodity economies run the risk of overvaluing the currency which can hinder domestic industries outside of the extraction sector. Finally, if a government is able to procure its expenditures on a single-resource such as oil and natural gas there is little need to engage in taxation. Therefore, they are left without the bureaucratic infrastructure needed to respond to unrest (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Alternatively, the importance of maintaining a particular sector may encourage heavy-handed government responses which could promote instability further.

Would-be insurgents can also be enticed into open rebellion by natural resources. They can serve as an attractive “pot of gold” that offers a big reward if the capital can be taken. States flush with oil wealth; for example, can be open to challenge because the payoff is big enough to overcome the risks of a failed attempt. Likewise, resource concentration can promote separatist rebellions. If the valuable resource is located in a particular area a new identity may form around the promise of economic gain (Le Billon 2001). Old identities can also reemerge as resource wealth is uncovered. For example, the Scottish National Party that argues in favor of Scottish independence enjoyed a huge boost in support after oil was discovered in the North Sea (Collier 2005). Collectively, these onset mechanisms can be thought of as a "resource curse" whereby natural resource wealth, typically thought of as a positive, promotes instability and conflict in many ways.

The nature of the conflict can also be influenced by the presence of significant resource wealth. The effect is varied depending on the strategies of the commanders. Fighting over resource-rich territory may encourage civilian violence as dominance over the area is more valuable than winning public support. At the same time, an attempt to attract supporters in contentious areas may constrain behavior (Keen 1998). Too much extraction would risk turning the populace against the rebels (Bates, Greif, and Singh 2002). Civilian abuse may be curtailed in an effort to “win the hearts and minds” of valuable constituents. This may even go as far as providing public goods such as education centers and health facilities (Lichbach 1995; Wickham-Crowley 1992). Wood (2010) adds that civilian targeting may be a function of rebel capacity. Where rebels are strong, they will opt out of violence in favor of selective benefits. If natural resources

make rebels more capable, then those rebels should be less likely to abuse civilians.

Intensity can also increase if the conflict is lengthened by the types of resources present.

Once civil war begins, duration can also be influenced by natural resources. First, if the conflict is secessionist, the presence of natural resources can make both sides less likely to accept a negotiated settlement. For both sides, an agreement on resource distribution remains uncertain (Fearon 2004). Abrogation is a constant threat. If natural resources provide high profits to insurgents, they can preclude an end to conflict (Sherman 2000). Peace deals will be less likely because rebel leaders will need large fiduciary promises to give up their lucrative trade in the illicit economy. At the same time, if a deal is concluded, mid-level officers, and the rank and file rebels, may be encouraged to disobey ceasefires and/or splinter into new insurgent factions. Lootable resources such as diamonds¹³ and drugs offer one high-value commodity that can alter the utility of victory for rebel forces.

Natural resource wealth can induce conflict, and make civil wars more intense. Also, profitability can make cessation less likely. In the next section I argue that it is this mechanism that makes child soldier use more likely. The type of natural resource can influence how likely it is that incentives will change from victory to perpetuation. Lootable resources offer profits, but successfully taking over the state can threaten to end this revenue stream. Therefore, child soldiers will be used as a way to maintain the insurgency, but not risk ending the business by actually defeating government forces.

¹³ There are two ways to mine diamonds. Primary or "shaft" mining involves deep excavation pits and high-tech equipment. Secondary, or "alluvial" mining uses open pits and relatively simple dredging processes. For diamonds to be "lootable" they need to be of the secondary type.

3.7 Rebel Resource Curse

Throughout the Cold War, patron-states held great influence over their client-rebellions. The superpowers and their allies engaged in large-scale, yet discrete, financing of rival rebels operating in a rivals' sphere of influence. Well-known examples of this include Soviet support for the EPLF in Ethiopia and American support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.¹⁴ Non-superpower sponsors are another important source of funds. Co-ethnics across borders can be seen as potential extensions of one state's territory. The neighbor may then offer to exploit domestic tensions (Carment, James, and Taydas 2006). The side-effects of this support meant that in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, rebels have turned to local resources and looting to replace the lost patron funds (Keen 1998; Labrousse 2004). One quick and easy source of funds are lootables. Easily accessed and mobile, lootable resources can provide a boost in strength a rebellion needs to maintain its struggle. However, they can also pollute the group's goals and obscure its nature such that perpetuation is more economical than victory. Under such circumstances, child soldiers become much more valuable.

One consistent feature of the influence of lootable resources is their impact on duration. The presence of gemstones and narcotics tend to make wars last longer and generate conflict-inducing support from external actors (Fearon 2004; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). Addison, LeBillon, and Murshed (2002) suggest that lootables lengthen conflict because there is more profit in perpetuation than cessation. They can operate as a rebel version of the "resource curse," changing the recruiting policies of the rebellion (Weinstein 2005). Instead of attracting genuine adherents to a cause, opportunistic

¹⁴ Currently, state sponsors of insurgents is relegated largely to state sponsors of terrorism (e.g., Iran support for Hezbollah) and cross-border rivalries (e.g., Rwanda, DRC, Zimbabwe, etc.) (Salehyan 2009).

behavior may corrupt any long-term goals the rebel leaders may have held and proceeds to “shape the character” of the rebellion itself (598).

Opportunism in the Ranks

While it is conceivable to think a greed-based rebellion can turn into one of grievance (through government crackdown, popular backlash, etc.), it is more realistic to imagine noble causes being tarnished. Opportunistic rebellions are not a distinct category of rebellions. Instead, opportunism plagues rebellions and pollutes whatever goals they say they hold. Secessionist and non-secessionists alike can have opportunistic elements. If they do, I argue the behavior will be similar even if the stated goals are different. Cornell (2005) and Dishman (2001) discuss how insurgent and terrorist groups are increasingly involved in criminal activities, such as drug trafficking. Instead of doing what they can to achieve military success, rebel leaders will put a premium on profit over triumph.

Peters (2009) find this same phenomenon evident in the Taliban, which most commentators would label an archetypal ideological insurgency. Through first-hand interviews with government officials, opium farmers, and rebel confidants, she finds that the Taliban have become more concerned with the opium market than actually fighting coalition forces.¹⁵ I explore this case in more detail in Chapter 7. Along with the FARC in Colombia (also Chapter 7), the RUF in Sierra Leone, and numerous Burmese rebels, all

¹⁵ During their brief control of Kabul from 1996-2001, the Taliban occasionally issued prohibitions against growing opium. However, such proclamations were inconsistent and were not widespread. By most accounts these were used to artificially inflate opium prices for the sellers at the expense of the growers (Peters 2009).

of these cases illustrate that strife can be good for business. For them, victory is less desirable than the status quo.

Utility of Victory

The use of child soldiers itself suggests the rebel commander is less serious about winning. Children are not as capable as adults. Even if psychologically scarred from knowing only war, they are less likely to show courage under fire (Singer 2005; Somasundaram 2002; Kimmel and Roby 2007). Children can be drugged and ‘convinced’ to carry out simple tasks, but a drugged child is less capable than a fit and well-trained adult who knows why they are fighting. Underage fighters are particularly susceptible to non-lethal deterrence, psychological operations, and disjuncting tactics that exploit the characteristic fear of children. In fact, the official tactic when confronting child soldiers for the U.S. military is, “[d]emonstrative artillery and mortar fires (including the use of smoke), rolling barrages (which give a sense of flow to the impending danger) and helicopter gunship passes” (Singer 2005: 6). This suggests rebel commanders using children may have a low utility of victory.

Oil, natural gas, and other natural resources can provide startup costs or represent future payoffs for would-be insurgents (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Humphreys 2005). Furthermore, insurgent groups can tap a number of funding sources throughout its duration. However, only illicit sources of funds, those that are lootable, accessible, and mobile seem to have the effect of changing the behavior and goals of the organization. Such resources alter the recruitment strategies whereby even in the event that rebel leaders maintain goals, the soldiers act as spoilers to any peace

negotiation because continuation of conflict is more profitable (Weinstein 2007).

Opportunism serves to increase the likelihood that child soldiers will be used.

3.8 Legitimacy Constraints and Duration

For some rebellions, adherence to the norm against child soldiers is easier. For others it is much more difficult. Rebellions that are confronted with increasing costs will be more likely to opt into the child labor market. Using children reduces expenses through reduced operational and outfitting costs. Food, clothing, housing, and other costs are lower for children. They are smaller and require fewer amenities to stay satisfied. Also, whether recruited or conscripted, child soldiers often lack the familial bonds that tie adult soldiers to “home” or “family” (Gates 2004: 2). Wages are also generally lower for children (Andivg and Gates 2010).

Modification of rebel behavior is common as conflict proceeds and circumstances change. This change may take years or even decades. Rarely are scholars able to see the transition in abrogation of norms as clearly as in the case of the Abu Sayyeff Group in the Philippines. Active since 1991, they have committed a number of high-profile kidnappings and murders since their founding. Despite these actions and amidst global outcry, they were not known to use child soldiers in the early years of their insurgency. However, in 2000, a 15 year old was captured during a military operation against the group (Coalition 2001: 352). They were soon known to routinely employ youths (Coalition 2004). By 2008, independent observations revealed that a majority of its forces were in their mid- to late teens (Coalition 2008: 278). This case illustrates how duration can influence the likelihood that child soldiers will be used.

Legitimacy constraints should weaken vis-a-vis concerns over maintaining the struggle in the face of defeat. While secessionist rebellions are more aware of and respectful of international norms, they are not immune to the mounting costs of war. However, they are most dependent on the international community for reaching their goals and will therefore be the most resistant to duration costs. As conflict persists, rebellions will be more likely to abrogate the norm against child soldier use, but this effect will be conditioned on whether or not that rebellion is aimed at secession. For example, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) began their separatist efforts in 1978. For the first few years of its existence, the PKK was primarily concerned with strengthening its base of support in the Kurdish regions of Turkey and Iraq. Though not afraid to use violence, the PKK pushed for international recognition of an independent Kurdistan. This pursuit of legitimacy resulted in official overtures “[to respect] the Geneva Conventions on treatment of POWs and of civilian noncombatants” (Nigogosian 1996: 43). Further, “a diplomatic offensive to secure recognition, acceptance and eventually legitimacy from NGOs, the United Nations, the European Union and the European Parliament as well as from the European Human Rights Commission... is specified” (43). In 1990, a compulsory service law stipulated the recruitment age of 18-25 (Coalition 2001: 228). They were able to maintain such adherence for 22 years from its founding. Only in 1994 did the PKK begin to recruit children (228). This example illustrates how concern over legitimacy wanes over time, but secessionist rebellions will attempt to respect the norm against child soldier use. Legitimacy constraints may be powerful enough to alter behavior, but they are not eternal. If the goal of the rebellion is secession, this will condition the effect of duration on the likelihood of using child soldiers.

Regardless of motives, all rebel leaders are subject to duration costs and excessively long conflicts force commanders to cut expenses. One sure way to do this is to reduce costs by augmenting their forces with cheaper child soldiers. As conflict continues, costs mount. Child soldiers are less costly than adults. Therefore, as duration increases, child soldiers are more likely to be used. Legitimacy constraints should still operate, but their effect will lessen as time wears on.

3.9 Conclusion

The decision to use child soldier is a cost-benefit calculation. The use of children is more costly for some rebel groups than others because some are more dependent on support from the international community. It represents a violation of international norms. Adherence is valuable for state actors because of social pressures from their peers (Avdeyeva 2007; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). Non-state actors are also aware of and are influenced by international signals (Dallaire 2003; Thyne 2009; Kuperman 2008; Bob 2005). Therefore, norms can affect non-state actor behavior. A secessionist rebellion is not complete until independence is achieved, which takes international recognition (Wood 1981: 133). Thus, separatist rebellions will be less likely than non-separatists to break the international norm against child soldier use (H1). Rebellions whose goals are profit maximization, or are otherwise inundated with opportunists, will be more likely to use child soldiers than those that are not (H2). This is due to the combination of a lack of concern for international opinion and a lower premium on soldier quality/capabilities (the utility of victory is low). This can affect secessionists and non-secessionists alike. Cost is one additional factor that can influence how easy or difficult it is to abide by norms.

Costs can take their toll on any rebellion. Longer wars are more likely to involve child soldiers because they are cheaper and, therefore, may help keep the insurgency solvent (H3). However, the power of legitimacy constraints should hold even as desires to cut costs increase. Therefore, secessionist rebellions should be less likely than non-secessionists to use child soldiers, even as duration mounts (H4).

I frame my argument as a long term vs. short term, cost-benefit analysis. Rebel commanders face constraints like any leader. While many concerns are short term, like fielding troops, procuring weapons and supplies, etc., any competent leader must also consider long-term costs associated with their actions (Mason and Fett 1996). For separatist rebellions, behavior that is out of step with the norms of the international community may pose serious long-term costs. It is very difficult to get recognized as an independent state (e.g., The Basque Republic, Somaliland, Casamance), though there are exceptions (e.g., Bangladesh, Eritrea, South Sudan). It is arguable that victory is the one common goal of every rebellion, but victory alone is not enough to achieve the desired aims for separatists. If international support is the goal, rebel leaders will mimic their desired peer group and not flaunt international norms by recruiting children during the conflict.

PART TWO
DATA AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Chapter Four
Concepts and Operationalization

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explores how Hypotheses 1-3 are operationalized for testing. The goal is to be as open and honest about the difficult task of linking conceptual definitions with empirical measures. I try to be transparent about the sources used and the limitations. I also identify the strengths of my approach and explain why this represents progress when compared to previous studies.

I accomplish these tasks first by fully explaining the dataset. Data collection methods are discussed along with the problems I encountered along the way and what I did to resolve them. Second, I explicitly define the dependent variable, child soldiers, and how it is measured. In section three, I define the independent variables of interest as discussed in Chapter 3. The final section of this chapter briefly reviews the operationalization process of the control variables and the reason for their inclusion.

4.2 Empirical Implications of the Theory

This section recounts the argument presented in Chapter 3, broken into distinct predicted hypotheses. First, rebels aimed at creating their own internationally recognized state put a premium on international support. As a result, rebels that maintain separatist intentions should be less likely to recruit child soldiers because this behavior represents

abrogation of the norms of the community of which they wish to join. Thus, concerns of legitimacy constrain their behavior so that young children will not be used in their military efforts. The hypothesis derived from this argument is:

H1: Separatist rebellions should be less likely to use child soldiers than non-separatist rebellions.

Second, opportunism represents both a type of rebellion, concerned primarily with profit, and also the possibility of a contaminating effect, such that the goals of the rebellion change from victory to maintaining the status quo. Such rebellions do not have an incentive to adhere to international norms, and they are less concerned with the overall capabilities of their troops because they want to maintain the conflict status quo. Instead, preoccupation with loot and profit will drive them to use the cheapest soldiers that can maintain their forces without increasing the chances of winning (and risk ending the business) or spur the government into a more active counterinsurgency (also a risk to ending the business). Illicit funds indicate rebellions that decided profit is more important than victory and that they are not concerned with international norms. The hypothesis derived from this argument is:

H2: Opportunistic rebellions should be more likely to use child soldiers than non-opportunistic rebellions.

It may be possible that rebellions wish to avoid international condemnation and avoid the child labor market. However, as conflict continues and costs mount, the risk of defeat rises. I assume that sustaining the movement is preferable to assured defeat, so rebellions should be more likely to break international norms and use child soldiers when

their struggle is long.¹⁶ At the same time, as conflict continues, concerns over legitimacy, while weakened, should maintain some effect on secessionist. The hypotheses derived from this argument are:

H3a: As duration increases the likelihood child soldiers will be used increases.

H3b: As duration increases the likelihood child soldiers will be used increases, but this effect should be weaker for secessionists.

4.3 Case Selection

The theory is tested on all rebel groups active from 1998-2008. Previous work often uses the conflict or the state as the unit of analysis, but this is "almost always a mistake" (Ames 2010: 16). Using individual rebellions is preferable because a single civil war-state can have many rebellions. Using the nation-state would risk failing to include a set of cases where some rebels refrained from using child soldiers but others do not. Thus, using the state or conflict as the unit of analysis would conflate the use of child soldiers and lose the crucial variation that permits addressing the goals of this project. In the data explored here, there are 45 countries that have civil conflicts.¹⁷ Of these, 25 have at least two active rebel groups. Thirteen countries have three, and in 20 cases of civil war, there are four or more active rebellions. Looking only at the conflict-state, I would miss considerable behavioral variation exhibited by unique organizations (see Figure 3).

--Figure 3 here--

¹⁶ Even for opportunistic rebellions. I argue that these rebellions do not want to win, but they also do not want to lose. Both victory and defeat represent the end of business.

¹⁷ In the empirical models explored in Chapter 5, I control for the possibility of non-constant variance by clustering by country.

To select the cases, I began with the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers Global Reports (Coalition) from 2001, 2004, and 2008. These contain detailed descriptions of child involvement by the government and armed groups in the country for the years 1998-2008.¹⁸ I compiled a list of all armed groups presented in each report. The combined total was 526 non-unique armed groups for which some information was available.¹⁹ I then cross-referenced this list with the Expanded Armed Conflict Data (EACD) on non-state actors (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). The entries were referenced with secondary source material to verify rebel name spelling variation and categorize splinter groups (e.g., Globalsecurity.org, DeRouen and Heo 2007, World Bank Violent Conflict Dataset, and the START terrorist database). I removed duplicate entries where the rebellion "ended" in the EACD data, but began anew in the 1998-2008 time period. I further removed non-civil war dyads, such as the US vs. Al Qaeda, 2001-2008, and the ECOMOG vs. RUF-controlled Sierra Leone, 1998. This process left 103 unique rebellions in the dataset.

Data Collection

Ideally, research on child soldiers would estimate the size of the youth force. However, this is not the best approach for a variety of reasons. First, as Brett and McCallin (1998) point out, "[t]he total number of child soldiers in each country, let alone the global figure, is not only unknown but unknowable" (27). For example, a global estimate of 300,000 is the number consistently offered since at least 1996 (Machel 1996).

¹⁸ The Coalition Reports only cover the years 1998-2007. However, there were no rebellions whose activities began in 2008 or were otherwise not mentioned in the reports past the year 2008.

¹⁹ The initial step to identify armed groups, I went through all the reports making a new entry for each group mentioned. Several groups were in more than one report and were therefore coding more than once. The final step removed these duplicate entries.

In my own attempt to estimate the total global number, I recorded any mention of numbers. The data are too incomplete to use in a model, but they are suggestive. My best estimate is approximately 400,000-450,000 child soldiers being used by armed groups suggesting that the numbers are probably much higher than previously thought. This figure excludes national militaries and government-aligned paramilitaries. Also, these estimates are from just 84 of the 526 armed groups mentioned in the Coalition reports. Not every entry for individual groups reported a count at all.

Relying on counts of demobilized youth does not help because there are surely countless others that have not been demobilized. Further, many have likely been informally demobilized through desertion or simply failing to return. Still others may have only been abducted in order to give NGOs something when they ask for it (Pederson and Sommerfelt 2007: 261). For example, some West African armed groups, including the RUF were known to abduct groups of children just so they would have someone to demobilize at the request of foreign NGOs. Even Achvarina and Reich's (2006) influential work, which developed child to adult soldier ratios for some conflicts in Africa, relies on estimates that vary considerably (Andvig 2006: 17). In my dataset, I opt for a less informative, but more reliable dummy variable to indicate if child soldiers are being used.²⁰ Also, while total numbers are valuable, what is important is whether or not a group is willing to use children or not, whether or not they are breaking the norm.

My approach guards against some of the issues of validity. While I rely on secondary accounts that fail to reveal the extent to which child soldiers are being used,

²⁰ I initially set out to create an ordinal variable to measure the magnitude of use, but this too was problematic. Researchers report on child soldier use in dramatic and descriptive terms. I had hoped to use systematic adjective or adverb use, but this proved fruitless. Instead, NGO researchers do like to identify the youngest child observed. I used these terms in an attempt to capture some degree of the magnitude of norm violation.

the process I used takes into account rebel profiles as a whole. That is, I take very weak, or the absence of, evidence against some groups and ultimately compare it to overwhelming evidence against other groups. For example, while a child soldier (17 years old) was said to be involved in an attack for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. However, since this was the “only attack known to have involved a minor” (Coalition 2004: 314), this group was not equated to groups that are seen to “regularly” or “systematically” use child soldiers. Although it would be ideal to have more precise information, the nature of the phenomenon limits such an approach. The dataset in this project, though failing to capture all of the variation, offers a way around the problem of information quality. Put simply, it is the best given both the nature of the phenomenon and the research question.

Sources

I used many sources to collect data. First, as mentioned, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, now known as Child Soldiers International, is a London-based NGO that collects and produces many documents relating to child soldiers around the world. Their primary product is a global report produced every three to four years since 2001. Their work attempts to document violations of the rights of children by governments, government-backed militias, criminal gangs, and armed opposition groups within every country over the course of three time periods.²¹ Second, I consulted the para-military profiles available on the website GlobalSecurity.org. Based outside of Washington DC, this subscription service provides extensive information on matters of

²¹ The reports cover the following time periods: 2001 Report June 98- April 2001; 2004 Report April 2001- March 2004; and 2008 Report April 2004 – October 2007.

defense, military, and security. Most valuable for my research is an encyclopedia of rebel groups that includes history, goals, tactics and strategies, and funding for armed actors. Similarly, I consulted the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Terrorist Organization Profiles. This think-tank is funded by the Department of Homeland Security and produces hundreds of peer-reviewed academic publications and conference presentations. Taken together, all three sources provide comprehensive information about individual armed groups.

Potential Problems

One potential problem confronted with my coding rubric is reporting bias. It could be argued that because child soldiering is a globally popular problem, rebellions that avoid them will be underreported. Conversely, child soldiering is an elusive phenomenon that may be difficult to observe. As a result, it may be the case that some groups avoid detection. If this is random, it is tolerable. However, if it systematically fails to capture child soldier use for secessionists groups or over represents greed-based or lengthy rebellions, it is unacceptable.

I address the potential of reporting bias in a number of ways. First, the number of “armed opposition groups” included in the Coalition reports is substantial. The combined 2001, 2004, and 2008 reports contain detailed information on well over 500 groups because the organization is an advocacy group aimed solely at bringing attention to the plight of children affected by armed conflict. It is unlikely they missed anyone. Of course, it is still possible because the volume of information varies by report. To avoid systematic error, I use information gathered from all three reports. Therefore, if there is

less information in any one report, it is likely captured in another. Second, I use the concept of evidence, rather than proof. Using three reports that often contain three independent accounts of a group's recruitment policies, there are three chances for researchers to report on the use of underage troops. I conclude, on the basis of these three reports, whether or not there is enough evidence to suggest the organization uses child soldiers.

Third, the depth of information is high. Using the reports of an NGO dedicated to researching child soldiers allows me to consult not one, but, effectively, hundreds of researchers' accounts of the rebels. Based on the Coalition's access, this often includes direct conversations with the rebels, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration centers, or other NGOs that work in the area. While it is possible that some underreporting is present, it is unlikely that this will systematically bias my results.

Finally, secessionists have a global presence and are, therefore, more likely to be the subject of greater scrutiny. Thus, if there is systematic reporting bias, it would work against finding support for my theory. Separatists have higher global profiles, and their behavior is more likely to be reported on. If my coding scheme misses child soldier use among groups, these groups are more likely to be non-separatists. Likewise small, greed-based rebellions are more likely to be underreported in the reports. Also, such groups may be more dangerous and thus more difficult to access. Since I expect them to have high rates of violation, any systematic reporting bias would work against me finding support.

Temporal Variation

Many researchers wrongly assume that variables are stable over time (Ames 2010). With the study of child soldiers, static analysis yields potential problems. Rebellions do not always start off recruiting children, and there are numerous high-profile promises of demobilization. Unfortunately, at this point, I am unable to satisfactorily gather enough temporal data on the groups to adequately analyze data over time. One reason is that the coalition reports neglect to include when child recruitment began. Another reason is because the EACD is also temporally invariant. If the active period of rebel activity ended and another began, both observations have the same value for the variable of interest. Thus, were I to include a temporal child soldier measure, many of the independent variables in the dataset would not reflect the same variation. I attempt to address the issue of temporal variation modestly by considering the length of the rebellion. I recognize that this is not ideal. It fails to capture change in group behavior and group goals. When better data are available, future scholars should proceed with time-series analysis.

Still, I am confident in my coding scheme. The time period covered (10 years) is sufficiently brief that total changes to recruitment policies should be rare. Those entries for which I have temporal data adopted changes farther in the past than when Coalition began collecting data. Second, demobilization is rarely complete. In fact, unfortunately, I have not encountered a rebellion that has ever completely ceased using children even when they made official proclamations to do so. Thus, while the ideal would be a temporal analysis on recruitment, data availability does not permit such a study. Regardless, I am still confident that my approach is sufficient to address for the research

question. If not, I expect the bias to nullify my findings and I will be more likely to commit Type I error.

Geographic Variation

Child soldier data are almost always spatially distributed (Ames 2010). While I partially alleviate the concern of geographic variation by looking at individual groups, I cannot do so fully. I address the issue indirectly by looking at the funding profiles of the rebels, rather than looking at resource allocation by state. However, I do use state-level geographic variables for some of the controls. For example, I use the number of refugees by country of asylum to proxy for a pool of vulnerable recruits. This is less than ideal. One preferred method would look at where the rebels are active and look for specific instances of camp militarization. However, I do not have the resources required to code these data.

Forced vs. Voluntary Recruitment

As mentioned in Chapter 1, most researchers recognize the difference between volunteers and forcible recruits. I do not. Instead, I take the approach that armed group leaders operate in an environment of fixed (and high) supply of children (Andvig and Gates 2010). In these situations, their own decision to use children is the more important issue. Furthermore, regardless of the motivation, children are able to be used, and they offer certain strengths and weaknesses. I assume, as do age of consent laws, that adults are liable even when the choice is made by the child. Thus, there is no distinction in this project between forced and voluntary service. Were the unit of analysis the individual,

this discussion would be absolutely crucial. Since the level of analysis is the group, such considerations are better left to future research.

4.4 Measuring the Dependent Variable

In order to see if the factors identified in Chapter 3 have the predicted effect, I created four measures of child soldier use. This approach proxies the level of norm violation in regards to recruitment. Using any child soldiers is normatively bad, but using a small number of 17 year olds is qualitatively different than routinely recruiting thousands of pre-teens. This multi-faceted approach makes possible a more nuanced evaluation of norm violation.

Definition of a Child Soldier

The definition of a child soldier is surrounded by debate and fraught with difficulty. In order to capture the strongest signal of appropriate behavior, I use the most widely agreed upon concept in the IO/NGO framework. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (OPCAC) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000, and entered into force in 2002. The protocol sets the minimum age for recruitment at 18, but offers some leniency (such as time and resource considerations) for states that recruit over the age of 15. More recently, the Paris Commitments and Principles was a major international conference sponsored by UNICEF and the Secretary General's Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict. The resulting agreement, "Paris Principles," offers a comprehensive definition that recognizes standard age thresholds and the a wide variety of roles for youths. I adopt this definition as most

appropriate. It is the definition used in the Coalition reports, although they readily admit that "there is no precise definition" (Coalition 2008: 411). As precise conceptual definitions are crucial for systematic analysis of a phenomenon, I use the words contained in the most recent report:

Any person below the age of 18 who is a member of or attached to government armed forces or any other regular or irregular armed force or armed political group, whether or not an armed conflict exists. Child soldiers perform a range of tasks including: participation in combat, laying mines and explosives; scouting, spying, acting as decoys, couriers or guards; training, drill or other preparations; logistics and support functions, portering, cooking and domestic labour. Child soldiers may also be subjected to sexual slavery or other forms of sexual abuse (411).

Operationalization

Child soldier use is difficult to capture objectively (Pederson and Sommerfelt 2007; Ames 2010). Therefore, I do not claim to rule out child soldier use, only that there either is or is not enough evidence to conclude a group is violating a critical international norm. The primary dependent variable explored here is child soldiers, which is a dichotomous measure that indicates whether or not there is evidence (0=not used/mentioned, 1=used/mentioned). This process revealed 8 rebellions that were not mentioned in the Coalition Reports at all. After careful secondary source research on each rebellion, and in light of the thoroughness of the Coalition reports to identify all documented cases of child soldier use by armed groups, these 8 rebellions were coded 0.

An additional process produces the three remaining variables that capture norm violation. If child soldier use was documented, I record the youngest reported age of the

children. *Age* is a continuous variable ranging from 5-17 years. If there was no mention of a youngest age whatsoever, the datum is coded as missing.²²

Going beyond the Coalition's definition, the third measure records if children were used at a lower age threshold: younger than 15. This cutoff is consistent with the original text of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (UN 1991) and the 2008 Child Soldier Accountability Act (US Congress 2008), which define child soldiers as persons fourteen years old or younger. Based on this information, I estimated the typical age at which children were being recruited. Child soldiers-15 is coded as "1" if the typical age was less than 15, or "0" if either child soldiers were not used or if the age appeared to be 15 or above. For example, concerning the RUF, the Coalition reports, "[o]ver 50 percent of people who suffered forced recruitment were abducted at the age of 15 or younger, and over 28 per cent at the age of 12 or younger" (2008: 299). I coded this as "1." Afghanistan's Northern alliance was coded at the higher age threshold. While they used soldiers younger than 15, this does not appear to be the norm given the information reviewed. "Boys between the ages of 14 and 18 were used as spies, messengers, porters, security guards and cooks" (Coalition 2004: 162). This is an imperfect system, as I was only able to estimate the typical age if at least some age was given (51.5%). Thus, if there was no information on ages and child soldier use occurred, I can only say that evidence existed for soldiers under the age of 18. Table 1 offers a summary of the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables.

--Table 1 here--

²² One consistent concern with using age as a threshold for determining child soldier use is the notion age is culturally subjective. In some cultures, children are considered adults much sooner (Pederson and Sommerfelt 2007). While this concern is valid, a quick look at the within-country variation reveals that many instances of rebels using child soldiers occur in the same country where other groups do not recruit children, where voting ages are high (18 years) or age of consent matches global standards (16-18 years).

I include an ordinal variable child soldiers-ord to measure the extent of the violation. This variable was coded as "0" if there was no documented evidence that the group used child soldiers. If there was evidence of child soldier use but no reported age, this variable was coded as 1 to indicate that the entry at least met the Coalition's definition of a child soldier as a person under the age of 18. Reported usage of under 15 was recorded as 2, which represents the more extreme cutoff. If the youngest reported age seemed like an aberration and did not represent the typical age category of the children being used, I made the decision to recode this as "1." For example, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in Nepal were reported to use child soldiers, "the youngest being 12 years old." However, I felt it necessary to consider "[t]he general practice of the PLA was to enroll children above the age of 16" (Coalition 2008: 274). In total, 14 similar decisions were made. This should not be problematic because the average discrepancy was 2.5 years away from the 15-year objective cutoff. The mode was just one year. Also, this alteration works against finding significance for my hypotheses as groups using low children at lower ages will more likely be counted at the higher threshold if there is a problem. The PLA example was the most extreme subjective recoding. Figure 4 provides a general summary of the evidence uncovered.

As a final measure of child soldier use and norm compliance, I include a measure that records the lowest reported age if child soldiering is observed. This variable, *age*, ranges from 5 to 17 years with a mean of 11 and standard deviation of 2.9. There are 53 observations. From this measure I can determine, beyond dichotomy, the extent to which the norm against child soldier use is being violated.

--Figure 4 here--

4.5 Independent Variables

In Chapter 3, the main hypotheses were derived from the theory. The models predict when rebels are likely to use child soldiers or when they will refrain. I now describe how the explanatory variables identified earlier are measured.

Secession

Hypothesis 1 predicts that where the rebel goal is secession, child soldiers are less likely to be used. The variable *secession* is used to capture the primary goal of the rebellion. To operationalize this concept, I code the type of rebellion using the START Terrorist Organization Profiles (Terror Knowledge Database 2010), para-military profiles from GlobalSecurity.org (2010b), and additional secondary sources.²³ I recoded the data from the EACD in order to operationalize goals, rather than tactics. This was coded based on the stated goals of the rebellion or an analysis of their objectives. I used the values coded directly from the START database where researchers identified the goals explicitly. In the GlobalSecurity profiles, I coded the rebellions based on the relevant descriptions. *Secession* is a dichotomous variable that is recorded as "1" if the rebellions evaluated goals were either "Nationalist/Separatist" or "Secessionist," and "0" otherwise. Even if other goals were included (e.g., religious, communist/socialist, leftist), rebellions were recorded as secessionist. Nearly half, 41.75% of the rebellions in my sample are coded as secessionist. The expected direction of the relationship is negative: Secessionist

²³ I did not use the type of conflict recorded in the original EACD data. Here, there were several categories that would have captured the type of rebellion. However, the inclusion of terrorists as a type indicates that in some cases, tactics were used instead of goals and would be an inappropriate proxy for the concept of group goals.

rebellions should be less likely to break the norm against child soldiers. Table 2 offers a summary of the primary independent variables included in the dataset. Figure 5 summarizes the number of groups coded as separatist.

--Table 2 here--

--Figure 5 here--

Rebel goals may change. Some may call for a change in policy and later a change in government. Frustrated, they might then call for independence. While conceivable, goals are unlikely to have changed in the 10 year period that I have data on child soldier use. In fact, they do not for any of the 103 rebellions in the dataset according to the secondary source material. My sample does capture change in behavior, but I treated this as imprecision in the source material. In other words, for the sake of thoroughness, I attributed holes in the recruitment record not as evidence of child protection, rather as limited information in the period. This was only the case if there was no evidence in a single report but child soldiering evident in one or both of the other reports. Thus, rebel goals are treated as invariant for the large-n analysis. I confront the issue of changing goals in Part Three of the project where I look at case studies of individual rebellions in detail.

Opportunism

Hypothesis 2 predicts that rebellions that are opportunistic will be more likely to use child soldiers. To determine if *illicit* funds were used, I used four sources of information. First, I consulted the data on illicit funds collected by Fearon (2004). Unfortunately, this only covered rebellions up to 1999. I also used funding information

from Civil Wars of the World (CWW) (DeRouen and Heo 2007). With both sources, a significant problem was that the information contained therein referred to the civil war state rather than individual rebellions. Once again, I consulted the START database and GlobalSecurity.org. Between these four sources, I was able to rule out contraband financing for approximately 65% of rebellions in the dataset. I let START and GlobalSecurity.org take precedence in the coding. That is, if Fearon (2004) or CWW recorded illicit financing, but both START and GlobalSecurity.org failed to provide evidence, I changed the coding to "0". This strategy is used because while each source is valuable, only the GlobalSecurity and START profiles contain individual rebel information. Both CWW and Fearon (2004) often include two or more rebellions active during the conflict. The only time I can specify which rebellion is using contraband financing using these sources is if there is only one active rebellion. In the absence of alternative information, however, Fearon (2004) and CWW is preferred.

Scholars have met considerable difficulty in arriving at a consensus regarding funding and civil conflict in previous literature. Many estimates involve the ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) or some variation of this measure. The type of resource is important, though, and may account for the mixed results in the literature. For example, Ross (2004a) suggests that for resources to be influential, they must be both portable and profitable. In other words, lootable resources should matter, whereas non-lootables may serve as an incentive, but are not likely to substantively influence the current funding profile of the rebellion. Another approach is to examine the geographic distribution of resources and the location of rebels (Lujala 2010). This too is useful at explaining motivations, but it does not help fully understand

the impact of funding on behavior. For example, while active in the heart of a region known for drug-trafficking, the Shan State Army in Burma is not known to be involved in the illicit trade. In fact, they are even known to cooperate with Thai anti-drug taskforces to combat the cross-border trade in heroin (GlobalSecurity.org 2010). The same cannot be said of its contemporaries like the United Wa State Army and the Mong Tai Army. Likewise, though the Khmer Rouge was known to use illegal logging of forests in its controlled territory to fund its rebellion, the NDFB in India is said to erect signs to combat smuggling of trees in the Manas forest reserve (GlobalSecurity.org 2010). Therefore, state-level measures and geographic data were not precise enough to determine which rebellions were actually using loatable contraband financing to fund their rebellions. My approach offers such information.

I consider rebel financing specifically. It is not enough to be in an area that happens to have the potential for illicit economic activity, and it is certainly not sufficient to be in a country with high value lootables. Instead, by recording the evidence for or against contraband financing of the operation, I am able to include reliable measures on economic activity. The conceptual definition, illicit economic activity, and the empirical definition I employ are more closely aligned than other approaches. Descriptive statistics are presented in Figure 6.

--Figure 6 here--

Duration

Hypothesis 3 predicts that longer rebellions will be more likely to use child soldiers. I use the natural log of *duration* to capture the number of years the rebellion has

lasted *from its foundation*.²⁴ To measure the length of the rebellion, it was necessary to consider when the rebellion began, beyond the 1998 beginning date of the sample. I used activity dates from the START terrorist database and GlobalSecurity.org. I also used the World Bank Violent Conflict Database (World Bank 2010a) and the Upsala Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch et al. 2002) as a cross reference for active dates. This combined approach allowed me to avoid intermittent lulls in hostility. To estimate the conditional effects of secession on duration, I use an interactive term *duration*secession* which is log duration times the dichotomous variable secession.

General Drawbacks

There are some shortcomings with my general data gathering approach. First, it may be the case that reporting bias limits information on non-Western or otherwise smaller rebellions. While this may be the case, because my temporal period is recent guards against this major concern. My initial rebel list comes from a dataset already widely used and contains detailed information. Rebellions explored here already have detailed information that was used to compile the initial list. Likewise, the secondary sources consulted appear to have little regional bias. That is, they report as much information on the Middle East and Africa as they do with South American rebellions. I suspect there could be bias due to the size of the rebellions or where there are many active rebels in one country. In GlobalSecurity.org's profiles, in at least two cases, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Burmese conflicts, the website does not have specific profiles for the rebellions involved. However, in both of these cases,

²⁴ The natural log was used because of considerable skewness in the data.

GlobalSecurity maintains a detailed report about the overall conflict, including discussion of the behavior and funding characteristics of parties involved. Therefore, while the individual profiles are not there, the relevant information is still available. Likewise, that I use two or more primary sources for explanatory variables, I am able to rule out substantial systematic reporting bias.

4.6 Control Variables

One valuable asset of statistical analysis is the ability to hold potentially spurious factors constant. The purpose of including control variables is to rule out competing explanations for the dependent variable. In this case, simply looking at the relationship between the primary independent variables and the child soldier use would leave open the possibility that another factor or factors are driving the relationship between both. That is some uncontrolled Z is causing the observed relationship between X and Y. Thus, it is important to consider additional factors in the proposed models.

Unfortunately, the quantitative literature on child soldiers is limited. However, there are a number of concepts that are thought to influence the use of child soldiers. I primarily use the World Bank's World Development Indicators for these controls (WDI) (World Bank 2010b). There are two distinct ways in which the supply of children able to be pressed into service can be conceptualized. First, Høiskar (2001) suggests that youth unemployment increases the likelihood of child soldier usage because they have few alternatives for livelihood and may volunteer. To proxy for the potential supply of underage volunteers, *unemployed youth*, is operationalized using the employment to population ratio of youths aged 15-24. The mean is 48.2 with a standard deviation of

15.32. The expected relationship for *unemployed youth* is positive. The more children are unemployed, the more underage volunteers will be available.

The second form of supply is the number of potential conscripts. Achvarina and Reich (2006) find that large pools of vulnerable recruits contribute to child soldiering in a conflict. I proxy this with two variables: refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Both variables use estimates from the WDI²⁵. *Log-refugees* is the number of refugees by country of asylum.²⁶ This is averaged over the period 1998-2008. The mean is 9.26 with a standard deviation of 3.5. I also include a measure that records the average highest estimate of IDPs in a country, *log-IDPs*. Data availability limits the temporal coverage to 2001-2008. The average for *log-IDPs* is 11.1 with a standard deviation of 4.4. This proxy varies from the Achvarina and Reich's original concept in two ways. First, they do not argue that the number of potential recruits is influential. Rather, it is vulnerability that matters. They use qualitative accounts of 16 civil wars where reports of camp attacks were available. In order to engage in the large-n analysis, I was unable to do the same. Instead, noting that all camps are inherently insecure and very few enjoy peacekeeper protection (Lischer 2010: 148-149). Therefore, I cautiously accept my chosen measures. Second, and less consequential, their theory predicts that the vulnerability of refugees IDPs will influence the child to adult soldier ratio, not just the occurrence of child soldiering. However, the same relationship should hold for use/non-use as well. The more refugees and IDPs in a country, the larger the pool of vulnerable

²⁵ Where the data were missing, I linearly interpolated to estimate the values.

²⁶ The natural log of refugees was used because of severe skew in the data (3.64).

youths and the more likely rebels can find potential recruits.²⁷ The expected direction for *log-refugees* and *log-IDPs* is positive. Rebellions in areas with high numbers vulnerable recruits should be more likely to use child soldiers.

One of the most consistent features within a rebellion that explains when civilians will be abused is the level of internal discipline (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). Child soldiering is a form of civilian abuse. Therefore, I include a control for the strength of the central command of the rebellion in my models. This is necessary to avoid the possibility that secessionist rebellions are somehow more in control of their forces and would therefore be less able to control for abuses. *Strength central* is evaluated based on the original EACD coding. I used a dichotomous variable to capture if the group has strong central command, coded as 1; the observation is coded 0 otherwise. There are four categories included in the original data; unclear, low, moderate and strong. To avoid losing 17 “unclear” cases, I opted for a dummy variable.²⁸ Approximately 11.6% of the cases exhibited moderate or strong central control. The expected direction of *strength central* is negative. Rebellions with higher levels of central control should be less likely to use child soldiers. In the original study, Humphreys and Weinstein use individual-level surveys to determine how often punishment would follow transgressions. This process would be very difficult to replicate for my project.

I also control for the level of *democracy* in the state at the start of the rebellion. Andvig and Gates (2010) point out that government action can lead to grievances, prompting many children to volunteer or parents to send their children to fight with the

²⁷ Ideally, I would have sub-national data for this measure and consider location of refugee-access and rebel use of child soldiers. Unfortunately, I do not. Also, methodological tools to appropriately consider geographic disaggregation are beyond the scope of this project.

²⁸ Variations in coding of the “unclear category” failed to result in statistically or substantively significant changes to the variables of interest.

rebel forces. Alternatively, government repression may lead many adults to join the insurgency. This would lead to a glut in the labor market where children would be easier to turn away. One example of this is in the Burmese civil war. There, the government conscripts children because adults are not volunteering (Becker 2010). These arguments justify inclusion of a democracy control variable. I use the average Polity IV value to for the country during the 1998-2008 time period. (Marshall and Jaggers 2000). The mean for democracy is 2.1. The expected direction for *democracy* is not known because either mechanism could be at work.

4.7 Conclusion

In Chapter 3 I argued that concerns over international legitimacy serve as a constraint on the recruitment behavior of rebel groups. If a group seeks recognition, they will refrain because international support is crucial to reach their goal. Opportunistic rebellions are not subject to legitimacy constraints. Also, incentives exist that lead one to question whether they even care about winning. The reduced employment cost of using children will be more important to them compared to lower global reputation and a reduction in capabilities associated with child soldiers. The length of the rebellion will have a similar effect, whereby concerns to keep expenses low will drive rebels to use low-cost children, but this effect will be tempered by legitimacy constraints.

This chapter laid the basis for the quantitative analysis that follows. I offered justification for the inclusion and measurement of each variable along with a brief account of how this project improves on past limitations. In the next chapter, I subject

each variable to statistical tests to determine when rebellions will refrain from breaking the international norm against child soldier use and when they will not.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables

Source Theory	Variable	Descriptive Statistics	Source
Norm Violation	<i>child soldier</i>	76.7%	Coalition Reports 2001, 2004, 2008
Extreme Norm Violation	<i>child soldier-15</i>	30%	Coalition Reports 2001, 2004, 2008
Categorical Norm Violation	<i>child soldier-ord</i>	Non-use 24.3%; cs_18 45.6%; cs_15 30%	Coalition Reports 2001, 2004, 2008
Degree of Compliance	<i>age</i>	11.1 years	Coalition Reports 2001, 2004, 2008

Note: Descriptive Statistics refer to the proportions for dichotomous variables, and mean scores for continuous variable. Statistics for ordinal variable presented by category: non-use, cs_18, cs_15.

Table 2: Key Variables, Indicators, and the Expected Direction of Relationship

Source Theory	Variable	Descriptive Stats	Expected Direction	Source
Legitimacy Constraints	Secession	41.75%	Negative	GlobalSecurity.org; START
Opportunism	Illicit	35%	Positive	GlobalSecurity.org; START; <i>Civil Wars of the World</i> ; Fearon 2004
Length of Rebellion	(log) Duration	14.4 years	Positive	GlobalSecurity.org; START
Conditional Effect	Secession*Duration	.	Negative	
Supply of Volunteers	Youth Employment	48.2	Positive	World Bank WDI
Supply of Conscripts 1	(log) Refugees	9.26	Positive	World Bank WDI
Supply of Conscripts 2	(log) IDPs	11.04	Positive	World Bank WDI
Internal Discipline	Strong Central Control	11.65%	Negative	EACD
Motivation to Volunteer	Democracy	29%	Mixed	Polity IV

Note: Descriptive statistics refer to the proportions for dichotomous variables and mean scores for continuous variables.

Figure 3: Number of Rebellions per Country




Figure 4: Evidence of Child Soldier Use by Rebellions




Figure 5: Number of Secessionist Rebellions





Figure 6: Evidence of Illicit Funding by Rebellions



Chapter Five

Legitimacy Constraints and the Use of Child Soldiers

5.1 Introduction

This project argues that rebels' long-term goals make them more or less likely to use child soldiers. This chapter tests this theory against every rebellion active between 1998-2008. Here, I will answer four questions. Do secessionist rebellions use child soldiers less often than non-secessionists? Are rebellions that use illicit funds more likely to use child soldiers than those that do not? Are longer rebellions more likely to involve child recruitment? If so, is duration less influential for separatists?

This chapter proceeds through six sections. First, I review the empirical implications of the theory presented in Chapter 3. This is followed by a brief discussion of the methods employed and a quick summary of the main findings. The next part focuses on the evidence for Hypotheses 1-3a on three different dependent variables. The fourth section explores the conditional effects of legitimacy constraints on duration and presents graphs to support Hypothesis 3b. The fifth section briefly discusses the effects of the control variables considered independently and then along with the variables of interest included in the models. Finally, I discuss the goodness of fit of the model and why this suggests my methods are a valuable improvement in the study.

5.2 Analytical Methods

I use logistic regression clustered by country to specify two types of empirical models: one where the age threshold of child soldiers is set at less than 18 years and another at under 15. A third model is tested using ordered logit to explore the effect of

secessionist goals on the ordinal form of the dependent variable. Finally, I explore the interaction of duration and rebel type with three empirical models: one for each of the child soldier age thresholds and a third for the youngest reported age of the children that are used. For the youngest reported age, I use OLS regression.

These methods are suitable for a number of reasons. First, child soldier use is a violation of international norms. Logistic regression allows me to gauge the effects of the specified predictor variables on the log-odds that violation will occur. From this, I can predict probabilities about the likelihood the phenomenon will occur for the different groups and estimate the magnitude of the factors identified. Finally, due to structure of the dependent variables, (dichotomous, ordinal, continuous) logistic regression, ordered logit, and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models are the most appropriate estimation techniques, respectively.

Summary of the Evidence

The quantitative tests performed here confirm that rebels engage in long-term decision making about their recruitment patterns. As Table 3 shows, the impact of secession is consistently negative and statistically significant in all models of child soldier use. Separatist rebellions are not only less likely to use child soldiers; they are also less likely to use them at either age-threshold. Further, when rebel groups are using child soldiers, secessionists are statistically more likely to use older children. Illicit funds are associated with a higher likelihood that child soldiers will be used. This is true for the higher age threshold and the ordinal version. Similarly, as predicted, we see a positive

relationship between rebellion duration and child recruitment as well as a conditional relationship with secession.

--Table 3 here--

5.3 Quantitative Results

The decision to recruit child soldiers is the result of long-term calculations regarding the benefits and consequences of having underage troops. For some, the loss of legitimacy is not worth it. For others, neither loss of legitimacy nor a reduction in capabilities acts as a deterrent. For others, still, the low-costs of recruiting children appear valuable. Table 4 presents the results of the analysis with different forms of the as the dependent variable. The first hypothesis predicts that separatist rebellions should be less likely to violate the norm against the use of child soldiers. Model 1 tests the variables on the dichotomous child soldiers variable, while Model 2 use the lower age threshold *child soldiers-15*. I specified an ordered logit with *child soldiers-ordinal* as the dependent variable in Model 3. Finally, Model 4 tests the variables on the lowest reported age of soldiers used in the rebellion. The hypotheses perform remarkably well. Regardless of specification, the coefficients are in the expected direction and are statistically significant with at least 90% confidence (two-tail).

--Table 4 here--

Hypothesis 1: Legitimacy Constraints

First, I estimate the relationship of separatism on child soldier use. As shown in Model 1 (Table 4), secessionist rebellions are less likely than non-secessionists to use

child soldiers. The coefficient is negative and statistically significant (p-value .002). Separatists are also more likely to avoid especially young child soldiers (Model 2, p-value .014). In Model 4 of Table 4, the coefficient for *secession* again has the expected sign and is statistically significant (p-value .003). The results are supportive of the theory, but the coefficients of logistic regression are notoriously difficult to interpret substantively. Therefore, I use *Clarify* to estimate the predicted probability child recruitment will take place (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). Results are presented graphically in Figure 7. The substantive impact of the key variables of interest is revealing. First, the likelihood of child soldiers being used is approximately .79, when continuous variables are set at the mean and dichotomous variables are all set to 0. However, setting *secession* to "1" reduces the predicted probability to .46. This represents a 42% decrease in the likelihood child soldiers will be used holding all else equal. In Model 2 (Table 4), for the lower age-threshold, the difference between separatists and non-separatists is stark. The predicted probability that child soldiers under 15 years old will be used is .36. This falls by over 67% to .12 for secessionist rebellions. Exploring the ordinal measure (Model 3), separatist rebellions are more likely to be in category 0 (no child soldiers) than the other two categories. The predicted probability increases from .18 to .45, suggesting a higher degree restraint. Secessionist goals reduce the likelihood child soldiers will be used by 14.5% compared to the baseline. The effect on category 2 (child soldiers less than 15) is more impressive at 65.5% reduced likelihood. Taken together, these results reveal strong support for Hypothesis 1. Separatist rebellions use child soldiers less often than non-separatists.

--Figure 7 here--

Using the lowest recorded age as the dependent variable uncovered the expected relationship as seen in Table 4 Model 4. *Secession* is positive and statistically significant (p-value .05). Even separatist rebellions that use child soldiers (violating international norms) are likely to employ older children, indicating some degree of restraint. When considering the lowest reported age, on average, separatists will use children 1.6 years older than non-separatist rebellions, holding all else constant. This offers further evidence that rebellions aimed at independence engage in a form of compliance to the norm.

Hypothesis 2: Opportunism

In the second set of model specifications, I estimate the relationship between illicit funds and child soldier use. Rebellions that use contraband financing are more likely to use child soldiers than those that refrain. In Model 1 of Table 4, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant (p-value .01). For the lower age threshold presented in Model 2, the relationship is also positive and statistically significant at standard levels (p-value .1). Using the ordinal dependent variable, *illicit* also performs as expected. Rebellions that use illicit funds are more likely to be in category 2 (less than 15), than they are in category 1 (less than 18) and category 0 (no evidence).

Once again, it is useful to explore the results by estimating predicted probabilities. The likelihood that child soldiers will be used increases substantially for those rebellions that have drugs or conflict gemstones in their financial portfolios. For rebellions that refrain from using illicit funds, the likelihood child soldiers will be used is estimated at .79. This increases by nearly 23% (.97) for those that do use illicit funds. For children under 15, the likelihood that rebel groups will use them increases by 47% from .36 to .53.

With the ordinal measure of child soldier use, the changes are similar. Rebellions that do not use illicit funds are 62.8% more likely to be in the non-use category, while contraband financing make rebellions nearly twice as likely to use excessively young children compared to the other two categories. Hypothesis 2 finds strong empirical support in these data. Rebellions that use illicit funds are more likely to use child soldiers.

Hypothesis 3a: Duration

Quantitative tests reveal the length of the rebellion is influential just as Chapter 3 predicted. The coefficient for *duration* in Model 1 (Table 4) and Model 3 are positive and statistically significant. Longer rebellions are associated with a higher log-odds ratio when the dependent variable is *child soldiers* (p-value .075). Using the ordinal variable, longer rebellions are more likely to be in a higher category away from the non-use baseline (p-value .066). Substantively, at one standard deviation below the mean of *log_duration* (2 years), the likelihood that child soldiers will be used is .7. This rises to .86 (23%) at one standard deviation above the mean (28 years). Finally, going from one standard deviation below to one above the mean reduces the likelihood that child soldiers will be *avoided* by 55% (.12 compared to .267). Interestingly, child soldiers at the higher age threshold are around 11% less likely to be used. However, the reason appears to be a result of their decision to use very young children. Rebellions of around 2 years are not likely to use children less than 15 years old (predicted probability = .2). This increases by over 55% for wars lasting around 28 years (predicted probability = .4).

Hypothesis 3b: Conditional Effects

Hypothesis 3b predicted a conditional effect of secession on duration. Table 5 reports the empirical evidence. The interactive term, explored graphically in Figure 8, reveals that the effect of secession remains negative even at exceptionally high duration. That is, throughout the length of the war, secessionist rebellions show restraint. This effect weakens over time, but remains consequential. A similar relationship is observed at the lower age threshold as well, Figure 8. While negative, the effect of secession weakens over time. The effect weakens only after (log) duration exceeds one standard deviation above the mean, or about 28 years. Collectively, these graphs reveal strong, though qualified, support for Hypothesis 3b. As a final test on the marginal effects, I again explore the role of secession and duration on the lowest reported age of child soldiers (Figure 9). Again, secessionist rebellions that do employ children appear to generally use older kids. However, this only holds for conflicts of about 28 years. The effects of secession decrease over time up to this point. From the evidence uncovered here, Hypothesis 3b is supported. While duration does increase the likelihood child soldiers will be used, this effect is conditioned by groups goals aimed at independence.

--Table 5 here--

--Figure 8 here--

--Figure 9 here--

5.4 Control Variables

The only control variable to consistently find empirical support is the estimate of IDPs within the country. A higher number of IDPs increases the likelihood child soldiers will be used by rebel groups in that state (p-value .000). This is also true for the lower age

threshold (p-value .09) and the ordinal measure (p-value .008). Substantively, the effect is quite large. Going from one standard deviation below the mean to one above, changes the estimated likelihood from .6 to .9 for the higher age threshold (50%) and almost 100% (.25 to .48) for those under 15 years old. While not an exact test of Achvarina and Reich (2006), it does offer more support for their theory about camp security and its positive effect on the use of child soldiers. Interestingly, the strength of the central control measure was not statistically significant in any of the models. Likewise, employed youth and state-level of democracy fail to reach standard levels of significance.

5.5 Model Fit

The overall goodness of fit of the fully-specified model is strong (Table 4, Model 1). First, the pseudo- R^2 is .34 indicating a strong fit. Additionally, I compare the area under the Receiver Operator Curve (ROC) (Fawcett 2006). With just the control variables, the area beneath the ROC is .74 indicating that the model produces a fair model fit. By adding the primary independent variables to the model, the area under the curve improves substantially to .86. With a chi-square test comparing the baseline model with the models including rebel type, illicit funds, and duration, Model 6 significantly improved upon the predictive power ($\text{Prob} > \chi^2 = .04$). Taken together, including rebel type, funding and duration are necessary components of models predicting the use of child soldiers.

5.6 Conclusions

Based on the empirical evidence uncovered in this chapter, the theory presented in Chapter 3 has strong support. All hypotheses are supported. Hypothesis 1 predicted that secessionist rebellions should be less likely to use child soldiers. This is supported in each model and holds for both age thresholds. The impact of secession is consistently negative and both statistically and substantively significant. This is true regardless of age threshold, and even where child soldiers are used by secessionists, they tend to use older children. This identifies a strong constraint imposed by the pursuit of legitimacy.

The second hypothesis predicted that rebellions that rely on illicit funding should be more likely to use child soldiers. Second, the impact of illicit funds is consistently positive and has a remarkable substantive impact. At the higher age threshold (<18 years old) and using the ordinal variable, the effects of illicit funds are positive and statistically significant. This suggests the impact of opportunism on long-term decision making is strong.

Hypothesis 3a predicted the effects of duration on child soldier use to be positive. The impact of duration was also positive and substantively important. This was found to be the case at both the higher age threshold and for the ordinal measure. Finally, the theory also led to Hypothesis 3b, which expected a conditional effect of secession on duration. Evidence for this was found at most levels of duration. The impact is no longer statistically significant only at excessively high levels of duration (>2 standard deviations above the mean, about 52 years). Coupled with the conditional effect of secession, the evidence presented here suggests rebels update their preferences with regards to recruitment decisions and, by extension, their willingness to abrogate international

norms. All of the results when taken together suggest that rebel type, funding, and duration are highly influential on the decision to use child soldiers.

Table 3: Summary of Results from Quantitative Analysis

	Secession	Illicit	Duration	Refugees	IDPs	Strong Central Control	Employed Youth	Democracy
Child Soldiers	-	+	+	.	+	.	.	.
Child Soldiers-15	-	+	.	.	+	.	.	.
Child Soldiers-ord	-	+	+	.	+	.	.	.
Age	+

Note: "+"= positive and significant relationship, "-" = negative and significant relationship, "." = insignificant results. Conditional models are presented graphically in Figures 8 and 9.

Table 4: Impact of Primary Variables on Child Soldier Use (1998-2008)

	(1) (CS)	(2) (CS_15)	(3) (CS_ord)	(4) (Age)
Secessionist	-1.649*** (0.533)	-1.551** (0.634)	-1.368*** (0.455)	1.648* (0.825)
Illicit Funds	3.351** (1.340)	0.685* (0.421)	1.151** (0.460)	-0.560 (0.855)
(log) Duration	0.414* (0.232)	0.354 (0.272)	0.400* (0.217)	-0.529 (0.446)
(log) Refugees	0.0649 (0.0929)	0.0645 (0.0532)	0.0781 (0.0542)	-0.00582 (0.135)
(log) IDPs	0.231*** (0.0662)	0.135* (0.0817)	0.183*** (0.0687)	-0.169 (0.133)
Strength Central Control	0.492 (1.215)	-0.799 (0.739)	-0.365 (0.500)	0.0199 (1.059)
Employed Youth	-0.00344 (0.0244)	0.0100 (0.0160)	0.00538 (0.0163)	-0.0510 (0.0361)
Democracy	0.00436 (0.0710)	0.000472 (0.0363)	-0.00618 (0.0382)	0.00364 (0.0966)
Constant	-2.412 (1.594)	-3.874** (1.556)		16.42*** (2.524)
Cut 1			2.252* (1.204)	
Cut 2			4.771*** (1.374)	
Observations	103	103	103	53
Wald chi-squared	24.83***	15.21**	26.34	
Pseudo R-squared	0.344	0.130	0.151	0.215


Robust standard errors clustered by country presented in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "CS" = child soldiers, "CS_15" = child soldiers_15, "CS_ord" = *child soldiers_ord*

Table 5: Conditioning Effects of Secession on Duration (1998-2008)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(CS)	(CS_15)	(Age)
Secessionist	-1.593 (1.140)	-6.151** (2.428)	9.438* (5.057)
Illicit Funds	3.347** (1.354)	0.947** (0.464)	-1.089 (1.034)
(log) Duration	0.425 (0.312)	0.224 (0.298)	-0.306 (0.482)
Secession*Duration	-0.0280 (0.447)	1.557** (0.699)	-2.683 (1.685)
Employed Youth	-0.00347 (0.0243)	0.00797 (0.0152)	-0.0421 (0.0363)
(log) Refugees	0.0652 (0.0938)	0.0855* (0.0501)	-0.0474 (0.136)
(log) IDPs	0.231*** (0.0652)	0.116 (0.0806)	-0.0942 (0.161)
Strong Central Control	0.502 (1.195)	-1.018 (0.768)	0.297 (1.104)
Democracy	0.00496 (0.0696)	0.000642 (0.0376)	0.0106 (0.0934)
Constant	-2.438 (1.692)	-3.546** (1.470)	15.18*** (2.844)
Observations	103	103	53
Wald chi-squared	26.53	18.38	
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.344	0.155	0.259


Robust standard errors clustered by country presented in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. "CS" = child soldiers, "CS_15" = child soldiers_15, "Age" = lowest recorded age of the child soldier.

Figure 7: Impact of Independent Variables on Child Soldier Use (1998-2008)




Note: Circles reveal the predicted change in child soldier use as the row variable ranges from 1 standard deviation below the mean to 1 standard deviation above the mean for continuous variables and 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables while holding all other variables constant. Whiskers reveal the 95% confidence interval. "X"s reveal the predicted change in child soldier use at the 15 year age threshold.

Figure 8: Conditional Effects of Secession on Duration for Child Soldier Use




(a)



(b)

Figure 9: Conditional Effects of Secession on Duration for Lowest Age



PART THREE

CASE STUDIES

A. Review of Theory

The main arguments in this project revolve around the type of rebellion and their long-term decision-making. I argued in Chapter 3 that secessionist leaders are more influenced by international norms because they aim to join the international community and hope to demonstrate their legitimacy by maintaining child protection and refusing to use child soldiers. Therefore, separatists groups should show a strong inclination towards international opinion, even to the point where it is favored over domestic demands. Conversely, rebellions relying on illicit funds should be more likely to use child soldiers because of an alteration of goals among the leadership and rank and file which reduces the utility of victory. Rebellions that are active in a profitable illicit economy should exhibit features consistent with those that put a premium on the status quo. Detailed inquiry into their actions should reveal instances where victory was clearly not the aim.

In this brief section, I walk through the main rationale for adopting a qualitative approach to the theory of legitimacy constraints. Next, I discuss the different aspects of the case studies used and why they are valuable as tests of the hypotheses.

B. Justification for Qualitative Approach

The previous chapter revealed strong statistical relationships between the use of child soldiers and rebel type, funding, and duration. These results, while consistent with my theory, tell only part of the story. It is necessary to explore the mechanisms identified in Chapter 3 in a way that can better illustrate the fluid and dynamic aspects of the causal

story. Therefore, I use case studies to further illustrate the determinants of child soldier use. With systematic small-n research, I am able to rule out some alternative explanations of recruitment decisions that cannot be adequately controlled with quantitative analyses. The quantitative tests are valuable, but qualitative research can help assess aspects of the theory that statistics cannot uncover.

One of the most important reasons for using small-n research for the study of child soldiers is to more effectively rule out alternative explanations. This project is focused on a phenomenon that remains understudied. Therefore, it is difficult to compile an exhaustive list of control variables for the large-n models. For example, one of the most common suggestions for differences in child protection is the ubiquitous "culture." This is a fuzzy concept that is notoriously difficult to measure (Zadeh 1965). It can mean one thing to a researcher (e.g., religion) and something different altogether with another (e.g., farming practices). Treatment of children is easily susceptible to cultural arguments. The cases discussed here explore local norms where rebel groups operate and compare these to international norms and those of the rebel groups themselves. The small-n research conducted here serves to rule out such competing explanations.

A second major strength of qualitative research is the depth of analysis that is possible. Quantitative research explores many cases, but ultimately researchers are limited in the depth of their knowledge. Qualitative research is the reverse of this; "knowing more about less" rather than "less about more" (Ragin 2000:22). In this project, I aim to remedy both by engaging in an in-depth analysis of multiple cases.

This rectifies the conceptual stretching employed for the large-n study. For example, the concept of child soldiers is reduced to an indicator variable. The cases allow

me to better explore the child soldier variable of the large-n analysis. In all but the Somaliland case, I explore the volume or numbers of child soldiers used by each group, as well as the age, under 15 years. That is, exploring the child soldier variable beyond a "2." It is not the case that the other groups in the large-n data do not offer any child protection. Rather, such behavior is captured by the less-than-ideal "0" in the child soldier use measure. Of the four cases, only Somaliland and the SPLM offer substantive child protection. For them, I "unpack" the "0" on their child soldier measure. Another way to think about following the norm against child soldier use is as a continuous variable. With my 2,1,0 indicator, I am only getting part of the picture. The cases let me extend the measure above 2 (extremely young ages) and below 0 (more than just not letting them be soldiers).

Even using the more nuanced age-related variables does not solve the problem of loss of information. The extent of use and the number of children used by each group is valuable information that is, at this point, almost impossible to find for the full sample of cases. The task is more manageable for groups involved in the four civil wars explored in this section. Another benefit offered by the richness of detail is to extend the concept of non-use of child soldiers into the realm of child protection. Thus, if groups fail to use child soldiers (like Somaliland, Chapter 6) or stop using them (like the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, Chapter 8) qualitative research allows greater exploration into the policies of the group that help children. This broadens the measurement of child soldier use from positive (child soldiers present) to negative (higher levels of child protection). This would be difficult to do with large-n analysis.

Third, I am better able to explore causal mechanisms behind my theory with qualitative research. I provide a causal story in Chapter 3. In Chapter 5, I offer empirical support for this story, what should be seen if the story is true. With qualitative case studies, the decision-making processes that lie at the heart of the theory can be explicated. Certainty will remain elusive; individuals retain private information. However, with detailed examination of records, policies, secondary source analysis, and personal interviews, these data lead to strong inferences about the private information of decision-makers. Such exploration reveal better how the goals of the rebellion and funding sources influence the behavior and characteristics of the rebellion itself (George and Bennett 2005).

Finally, small-n research will help identify other important variables whose relationship was dismissed in the statistical analysis. Statistical insignificance is not the same thing as having no relationship. Case studies have an advantage in exploratory research (Gerring 2004). Therefore, the analysis that follows will be able to identify where additional variables play a role even if those variables did not have statistical significance in the large-n analysis.

C. Qualitative Methods Employed

In this project, case studies are used to explore the causal mechanisms of my theory of legitimacy-constrained rebel behavior. I utilize three qualitative methods to test my theory. First, I use a most-similar systems design to explore rebellions in the ongoing Somali civil war. I chose this case because selecting rebellions in a single country largely holds constant a number of potentially influential variables in order to identify the effects

of a key causal variable (Lijphart 1971). However, it is impossible to control for all possible variables, (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Therefore, a second case study uses a most-different systems design to explore the second empirical statement regarding contraband financing. Here, I compare the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) with the Taliban in Afghanistan. On as many variables as possible, FARC and the Taliban are different, except on the primary variables of interest. Finally, I utilize deviant-case analysis to explore the role of legitimacy constraints on the behavior of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM offers insight into a rare successful secessionist movement. South Sudan gained independence in January 2011. However, they also used child soldiers. I will explore this case to find out why my theory failed to predict this behavior.

With all approaches, I am adopting both explanatory and descriptive designs (Berg 2009: 327). I attempt to test the causality I propose is at work in the large-n analysis. At the same time, I am providing a link between the theory and the ability to interpret the findings in both the large-n and small-n analysis. This approach adopts both comparative and longitudinal case studies.

D. Somaliland

The most obvious form of selection bias, according to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), is selecting cases we know support our conclusion. This is certainly suspected in my selection of cases. However, random selection in cases studies is not always feasible or desirable (125). Certainly in the selection of Somalia, I anticipate my results based on a preliminary review of the literature concerning child soldiers. However, Somalia is such

an important case that it would be more problematic if left out. Somalia provides a natural experiment where a number of rebellions are ongoing in the same country. More than this, the cultural, historical, and societal similarities allow an opportunity to explore why some rebellions behave differently than others. Also, King, Keohane and Verba (1994) emphasize the importance of variation on the dependent variable. Selecting Somalia accomplishes this. Finally, they point out that a case can, but does not always mean a single observation. Here, I will explore at least three observations within the case, thereby allowing for variation in both my explanatory and dependent variables.

I explore the role of rebellion type in the case of Somalia. I selected this case using a most-similar systems comparative design.²⁹ Rebellions ongoing in Somalia share a number of characteristics. First, they are opposed to the same actor: the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. They also had the same exposure to recent historical events, such as the calamitous Ogaden War 1977-78. They have similarities in terms of language and religion, and share various population-related demographics, such as the number of refugees and internally displaced persons. However, there is variation in outcome and in goals of the rebellion. I will primarily explore the Somali National Movement, which became the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. I then use the most-similar systems design to rule out alternative explanations for Somaliland's high levels of child protection by comparing the group with the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. I will also explore the Islamic Courts Union and its militant wing, the Al-Shabaab insurgency. Together, along with various militia groups in the country, I explore the goals of rebellion and how it influences the

²⁹ That the unit of analysis is sub-regional this case study is essentially an area study with all of the benefits therein (Coppedge 2002).

recruitment of child soldiers. Thus, while the cases were selected having some idea of the value of the variables of interest, they reflect the full variation in the dependent variable. Therefore, the selection criteria should not be correlated with the error term (Collier and Mahoney 1996).

Further justification for the case selection is that Somalia is a least-likely case. That is, any superficial reading of the history of the conflict leads to the conclusion that “all parties to the hostilities” use child soldiers (Coalition 2008: 306). Therefore, to uncover variation in the use of child soldiers by one group would be informative. Also, Somalia is of paramount importance in world affairs as one of the highest profile civil conflicts ongoing. Uncovering rich information about parties involved in the conflict would be very valuable. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), producing unbiased information is one of the criteria that should guide case selection. Reliable sources need to be consulted. Information for Somalia is relatively easily accessible because of the amount of NGO attention the conflict has received. Likewise, a history of vocal political actors with well-documented statements and beliefs is likely to allow for research into thoughts and motivations of decision-makers within the movements. While the latter source of information will not be unbiased, having the actors’ own words to serve as a guide for their motivation will perhaps be more valuable than a third party interpretation of their motives.

What I Expect to See

In this case, a cursory reading of the evidence reveals that Somaliland, unlike every other group in Somalia's long civil war, refrains from using child soldiers. If my

theory is correct, I also expect to see a clear payoff to the government for restraint. In addition, there should be a record of statements by officials that indicate strong appreciation for international standards. Finally, if the empirical record reveals knowledge by senior officials of the political power of human rights in general and child protection specifically, this would support my theory. Absence of these crucial elements would cast doubt over the theory's accuracy.

How I Will Know if I Am Wrong

Conceptual stretching is inevitable with large-n research. I have only explored a brief report about child soldier use by some of these rebellions. I do not have information about the nuances of their use. If child recruitment turns out to be minimal and somehow only extreme cases were reported, my hypotheses will lose support. Furthermore, I only assume that secessionists and non-secessionists differ in their concern with international opinion. It could be the case that other groups are equally concerned. If that turns out to be the case, then my theory of norm-constrained behavior will lose support, and I will need to reevaluate my argument. Finally, if alternative explanations are discovered to be highly influential, then I will need to reformulate my hypotheses, or consider additional control variables in my quantitative models. By exploring the case of Somalia, I may uncover a number of competing explanations that may challenge my theory of legitimacy-constraints.

E. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the Taliban

I will use a most-different systems design to explore the issue of rebel financing. Here, I selected cases that have similar child recruitment strategies but are otherwise

wholly different. FARC is a Latin American armed opposition group that has been fighting a leftist struggle against the relatively stable Colombian government. The Taliban emerged from the relentless tribal conflict that occurred in the wake of the withdrawing Soviet-backed Najibullah government. They were the de facto ruler of Afghanistan from 1996-2001. They are currently fighting in opposition to the US-backed NATO Coalition Forces as well as the internationally recognized government of Hamid Karzai. I chose these cases because both groups represent important cases. They are also important for international security and, like Somalia, are equally high-profile insurgencies. Also, ample evidence exists about both funding sources and the behavior of the groups needed for a thorough analysis.

What I Expect to See

The Taliban and FARC are known users of child soldiers. However, it must be clear that they know these children are poor soldiers and this deficiency does not deter their use. Further, considerable evidence must be present to suggest these groups have a vested interest in conflict continuation. It will be difficult to establish that these groups do not want to win. Instead, I need only show that elements within the group profit from fighting, this is preferred to any kind of closure, and using children accomplishes both. Most importantly, in order to support the hypothesis that illicit financing will promote child soldier use, this comparison must sufficiently eliminate alternative explanations that could also drive the empirical relationship revealed in the large-n analysis.

How I Will Know if I Am Wrong

It is not clear to what extent leaders of these groups have a lowered utility of victory or have allowed opportunists to infiltrate their ranks. My theory proposes both,

but it is true that both groups have stated political goals. If it turns out that illicit funds are truly just a means to an end, then my hypotheses will lose empirical support. Also, the use of child soldiers may be more of a tactical move than an economic decision. If it is the case, as some have argued, that children are intended to actually achieve victory and they do not represent a reduction in capabilities, I will have to reevaluate my theoretical conclusions in light of the new evidence.

F. Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army led the people of South Sudan to independence after nearly 30 years of armed conflict. It should, according to my theory of legitimacy constraints, offer a case of high child protection in an effort to garner international support. However, throughout the conflict, child soldiering was common in all parties to the conflict. In the third and final case study, I adopt a deviant-case analysis in an attempt to find out what went wrong. In my research, I attempt to reconcile the apparently contradictory findings. I rely on secondary source material and a personal interview with the Ambassador of South Sudan to the Kingdom of Belgium and 20-year veteran of the SPLM diplomatic corps. This mix of evidence reveals that far from being an aberration, many of the causal mechanisms were at work in the case of South Sudan.

What I Expect to See

If my theory is to retain support even from this deviant-case's challenge, I need to find other areas of agreement. A link between secessionist policies and concern with international norms should be uncovered, even if these were not dominant. Further, I should be able to identify ways in which the theory is intervened by another factor that

prevents the causal mechanism from operating. Finally, I expect to see positive changes in child protection should coincide with changes regarding independence. Major pushes toward secession should accompany advances in child protection, and vice versa.

How I Will Know if I Am Wrong

On the surface, in the case of the SPLM the theory has failed. However, the causal mechanisms may still be present. If, on the other hand, regardless of separatist goals, the SPLM made no effort whatsoever to court the international community through their actions, then my theory will need to be reevaluated. At the same time, if child soldiering was not a consideration, but the group followed other international norms, then using the subject of child soldiers to demonstrate the normative framework for rebel leaders will be flawed.

G. Summary

In the three chapters that follow, I illustrate how the long-term decision making of rebel leaders plays into their decision to break international norms and recruit child soldiers. Combatants in all of these cases engage in manners consistent with a rational understanding of the international and domestic political environments in which they operate. To put it succinctly, a causal process linking group goals to their recruitment behavior does appear to be at work. Secessionists care about the international community and need it to win; opportunistic rebellions value the status quo and use underage troops to maintain it.

Chapter Six

International Norms in the Civil War of Somalia

6.1 Introduction

In the middle of 2011, a nationwide children's radio contest was held in Somalia. During the holy month of Ramadan, children were quizzed on such questions as "which war was Sheik Timajilic...killed in?" The contest was for children ages 10-17. The top two exceptional youths who answered the most correct questions were awarded AK-47s, while the third place winner received two hand grenades (Gettleman 2011). The contest was conducted by Al-Shabaab, one of the latest iterations in a string of anti-government insurgencies operating in the war-ravaged country.

Meanwhile, 900 miles away in Northern Somalia, radios announced that a new building was to be erected in the center of town near the main airport. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) had just laid the cornerstone for what it plans to be the largest headquarters for children's issues in the Horn of Africa. The land was granted as a gift by the administration of the Republic of Somaliland, indicating its adherence to children's rights, education and protection (Somaliland Press 2011).

Somaliland declared independence in 1991 and has been fighting for state recognition ever since. Two rebellions -both in Somalia- highlight the variation in rebel behavior even among those fighting the same government in the same state in the same region. One shows complete disregard for using children for violence while the other shares the common global opinion that children deserve protection and the right to develop into adulthood.

In Chapter 2, I proposed that rebellions that have the goal of independence are less likely to use child soldiers because they cannot win without the support of the international community for their cause of independence. Using child soldiers can be rational based on resource constraints, but whatever gain in troop size risks losing crucial backing by the global community. Somaliland, in the north is an armed separatist group. Their goal is independence. Other groups maintain a variety of goals from limited autonomy to control of the capital. Below, I argue that this factor can explain the differences in rates of recruitment of child soldiers.

Examining the case of armed groups in Somalia allows for a laboratory-like comparison. United in 1960, the Somali state collapsed in 1991 into factional fighting that has yet to produce a stable government in Mogadishu. Instead, various groups have risen and fallen over the past 21 years. All of the groups share cultural, religious and historical similarities. However, they vary according to their overall goals. In this chapter I present a thorough exploration of the case of the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Republic of Somaliland that it begat. By examining the recruitment practices and group goals, I outline a causal argument whereby adherence to international norms of child protection is a product of the leadership's pursuit of international support. They want to show they can be a global partner, and act accordingly. I use a most-similar systems design to rule out alternative explanations that may account for Somaliland's unusually high levels of child protections. Finally, I offer a brief review of the goals maintained by the various clan-based militias, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the State of Puntland. These goals help explain the variation in child protection.

6.2 Background to Somaliland and the Somali Civil War

The SNM was just one of many clan-based militias in Somalia during the 1980s that formed to challenge the government. After the Ogadan War in 1978, groups throughout Somalia rose to challenge the government. In this section, I trace the background events to the conflict that continues to envelope the southern regions. This introduces the rebel groups that are contemporaries of Somaliland, in that they are operating in the same country at the same time. I go on to explain the rise of the SNM, and the establishment of a de facto independent Republic of Somaliland. This section serves to identify the actors in Somalia from the 1980s to the present. Later in this chapter, these actors, and their behavior towards child recruitment will be compared.

The Somali Civil War in the South (1978-2009)

The decline of Mohammed Siad Barre's regime began in the wake of a devastating defeat by Soviet-backed Ethiopia in the Ogaden War in 1978. On July 13, 1977, Barre, seeking to capitalize on the weakness of an historic rival, invaded Ethiopia in an attempt to wrest control of the Ogaden territory and achieve the long-sought dream of uniting all Somali speakers into a unified "Greater Somalia." The Soviet Union had been the official superpower backer of Somalia since the 1969 coup headed by Siad Barre. However, after a communist coup in Ethiopia in 1974, they opted to support the politically and historically more prominent power. Somali forces were repulsed after a huge influx of Soviet weapons, personnel, and trainers came to aid the beleaguered Ethiopian troops (Marcus 2002). By late 1977, Cuba, North Korea, South Yemen and

East Germany had all supplemented the Ethiopian forces forcing the Somalis to retreat in defeat. After the Ogaden war in March 1978, Somalis were disheartened, the military was humiliated and bitter, and the clan demographics were rocked by the ensuing refugee crisis. Support for the regime plummeted. A group of Majerteen Military officers attempted a coup against Barre, but failed. Those that escaped arrest fled Somalia and formed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) with the support of Ethiopia.

Over time, rebellious forces formed in the north, south, east, and west. The SNM in the north formed around the Isaaq clan-identity. They, too, received support from Ethiopia. When this was removed and their foreign bases denied, they went on the offensive, quickly taking the towns of Burao and Hargeissa. In the south, the United Somali Congress (USC) successfully drove Barre's forces out of Mogadishu. The victors quickly collapsed into competing factions, all vying for control of Mogadishu. Intense fighting gripped the capital -fighting that continues unabated through 2012. When the government succumbed to the concerted force of these rebellions, retreating military factions formed insurgent factions. In 1991, Somalia descent into clan-based civil war officially commenced. The origins of the SNM and Somaliland are similar to other groups in the country, but the unique goals of the group help explain its behavior and recruitment patterns.

Siad Barre fled Mogadishu on January 26, 1991. After his ouster, many groups fought for control of the state. USC leader Mohamed Farah Aideed chased Barre's forces out of the capital. In Aideed's absence, another USC leader, Ali Mahdi, declared himself president. Aideed's faction, now called the Somali National Alliance, returned to Mogadishu. At the first Somali peace conference in Djibouti in 1991, Mahdi's claim to

the executive was supported by the international community and he remained the internationally recognized head of state for the next nine years. Aideed rejected this and these groups, along with a number of local militia forces, engaged in an all-out civil war. Responding to the growing humanitarian disaster, the United Nations offered food aid to the troubled region. Finding it increasingly difficult to maneuver and facing more resistance from Aideed's forces, the UN Security Council approved a US-led peacekeeping mission in December 1992 (Lewis 2002). During an attempt to capture Aideed's top lieutenants; two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by militia RPGs. In the ensuing firefight, 18 US Rangers were killed and 73 were wounded (Bowden 2010). The crisis prompted a US pullout, followed by UN personnel by May 1993.

Clan fighting continued in the Southern regions. Fourteen peace conferences produced "governments" of Somalia, but few made it to Mogadishu. Some were never actually established in Somalia, instead operating from neighboring countries, usually Kenya. Control of Mogadishu bounced from clan to clan, each using its presence in the capital as a key to influence in the rest of the country. In 2000, a near-successful attempt to establish a government took place in Djibouti. The Transitional National Government (TNG) managed to exercise some control of Mogadishu, but resistance by the newly formed Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (headed by Aideed's son) and an inability to unify the country resulted in failure.

Amid all the chaos bloomed yet another organization that proved capable of taking, though not holding, Mogadishu. Sometime in the year 2000, responding to the absence of state authority, a small group of religious judges operating in their respective territories attempted to unify and lay claim to the country. They adopted the name Islamic

Courts Union, and many of their leaders had ties to Al Qaeda, Al-Ittihad al Islamiya and other known terrorist groups. The ICU's strength rose quickly and they largely succeeded in pushing out the warlords from in and around Mogadishu. With the support of the CIA, a new clan-militia made up of previous "warlords" formed a counterweight: The Alliance for Peace, Reconciliation and Counter-Terrorism (APRCT). They failed, and the ICU held Mogadishu for 6 months in 2006.

Meanwhile, another international attempt to form a government had already taken place and was operating in Baidoa, an important city 200km northwest of the capital. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was led by Abdullahi Yusuf, former leader of the SSDF. After the failure of the APRCT, the Ethiopian military was sent in to help the TFG and their former rebel client oust the ICU and take Mogadishu. They succeeded. The ICU fled and quickly devolved into the Al Shabaa and Xizbul Islam insurgencies. Both continued to have ties with terrorist networks and welcomed foreign fighters into their ranks. Since then, Ethiopian troops have withdrawn and returned, the African Union sent nearly 10,000 peacekeepers, and the Kenyan Defense Forces have engaged al-Shabaab from the south. Interestingly, one of the moderate leaders of the ICU was elected President of the TFG in 2009. This did not stop the fighting, and al-Shabaab continues to plague the southern regions. Since 1991, an estimated 500,000-1,000,000 people have died in the civil war. Somalia remains one of the world leaders in refugees. While the TFG and their international backers have achieved considerable success in recent months, control remains tenuous, and the future is anything but certain.

Brief History of the Northern Somalia

Somaliland began as a protectorate of Great Britain in 1888. Operating largely as a source of food for the more valuable British possession of the Port of Aden, Somaliland gained independence from Britain in 1960. Five days before the Italian Trust Territory of Somalia became an independent state Somaliland was briefly internationally recognized as an independent state. Wealthy independence leader Mohammed Ibrahim Hajji Egal became Prime Minister. Decolonization across Africa, and the south's impending statehood, fanned Somali nationalism (Touval 1963). When Italian Somaliland gained independence, the north voluntarily joined with them to form the Somali Republic. Almost from the beginning, the new relationship was rocky. The union proved economically unfair to the north. International livestock sales accounted for 80% of the national income, and 90% of the trade passed through Berbera. However, most of this revenue was spent on infrastructure and public works in and around Mogadishu (Bradbury 2008). Further, political representation was difficult because of the distance between Hargeissa and the Somali capital. Tensions came to a head when Somaliland officer Hassan Keyd staged an unsuccessful coup against the regime of Aden Abdullah Osman Daar in 1961. This failed, but demonstrated the tension that existed between the regions. Somaliland fared no better when Egal became the 3rd prime minister of Somalia. His rule was brief when, in 1969, General Barre took power in a bloodless coup to rule for 22 years.

--Figure 10--

The goals of the SNM evolved quickly from its foundation. During the rebellion, Barre committed mass atrocities in the north. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed when the regime shelled Hargeissa to remove the SNM. "We were left with nothing. No

schools, No buildings were left standing" a Somaliland Representative told me in an interview. As recently as 1997, mass graves were being uncovered in the north, evidence of the brutality of the regime. These tactics failed to eliminate the SNM, and only succeeded in galvanizing the northern clans, especially the Isaaq against the regime. Support for the rebels rose considerably, with additional non-Isaaq clans joining the fight. The SNM did not originally set out to become independent, but support within the movement was always there. At the Grand Conference of Northern Peoples that took place in 1991, prominent elders, businessmen, academics and SNM commanders could not contain the multitudes congregating outside demanding independence.

During the 2000s, Somaliland continued to develop and consolidate. A series of clan conferences produced a unique system of government that blended Somali traditional institutions and western liberal democracy. Local elections occurred in 2002, which determined the number of viable political parties that could compete at the national level. To ensure cross-clan representation, the parties had to reach at least 20% of the vote in at least four of the six regions. The top three parties would go on to compete in the national parliamentary elections in 2003. The Presidential elections occurred in 2005 and the incumbent won by a narrow 80 vote margin. Kulmiye, the opposition party, challenged this through the Supreme Court, which reaffirmed the victory. The ruling was accepted by all parties (Kaplan 2008). Somaliland has achieved marginal economic development facilitated by Isaaq businessmen, investment by the diaspora, and returning refugees. The economy remains weak and both poverty and unemployment are high. Improvements in infrastructure, including the port of Berbera and Hargeissa airport, have contributed to the state budget, but foreign investment is needed. Despite growing trade

relationships with Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Gulf States, one reason, among many, that Somaliland seeks independence is to tap in to development funds that are unavailable due to the state-centric international system. Demobilization of the SNM and other northern militias was largely successful, but not complete. Influential clan leaders were called upon to convince weary soldiers to lay down their arms. Further, wealthy businessmen offered aid to feed encamped militias and supported a limited degree of job training (Bradbury 2008). The gains of Somaliland are more remarkable because of events occurring simultaneously in the south.

--Figure 6.1 here--

Meanwhile, in the South

Over the past 20 years, clan-fighting has gripped Somalia. When the state collapsed, each piece formed their own mini-regimes complete with leadership, followers, and apparatuses for war-fighting. Groups maintained a variety of goals and espoused a range of doctrines. Like the others, the SNM was built around clan-identity (Isaaq) and was geographically situated in the north. Unlike the others, however, it adopted a separatist platform. Calling itself the Republic of Somaliland, they sought to build their region as a state. To do so, they needed international help. To achieve independence, they needed international support. They had militarily won their fight, but diplomatically much remained to be accomplished. Exploring the recruitment patterns of Somaliland, it is evident that much of their behavior can be attributed to the importance of global opinion. International recognition was the goal, and legitimacy was the way to get there.

6.3 Child Protection in Somaliland

Somalia remains one of the worst environments for children. The likelihood to reach adulthood is "among the lowest of children anywhere in the world" (UNICEF 2012). The high rates of destitution are difficult to gauge because access for UN and NGO personnel remains highly restricted. According to international law, Somaliland is part of Somalia. However, UN and NGOs concerned with child rights recognize its distinctiveness. At least three formal reports have been drafted and all identify the remarkable improvements the government has made. Following a public commitment to the CRC in 2001, "[the government] has done much to honour the inherited signature to this treaty by working to align laws and policies to the international standards" (Save the Children 2010: 5). Responding to recommendations in these reports, Somaliland recognizes not just the implicit value of children, but also the importance with which the international community regards children's rights. The government maintains effective policies guaranteeing children's rights and engages in efforts to highlight these facts abroad.

The policies governing child rights is split between the official, the cultural, and the religious, which are, at times, competing. The age at which a person is considered an adult varies. In traditional Somali culture, children begin to take on responsibilities at around 6-7 years old (Mohamed 2003). Under Islamic Law, the typical age of majority is 15, as prescribed in the Haditha. "The Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) inspected me on the battlefield on the Day of Uhud, and I was fourteen years old. He did not allow me [to take part in the fight]. He inspected me on the Day of Khandaq - and I

was fifteen years old, and he permitted me [to fight]" (MSA 2012).³⁰ This is also the age of maturity at which custom bestows adulthood. Constitutionally, there is not a specified age of adulthood. However, the penal code places liability for crime only at 14 years old, and with reduced liability/punishment for those ages 14-17. This is open to interpretation, and a proclamation by the House of Elders suggests remanding children accused of crimes to traditional forms of justice rather than, or before, turning the child over to formal punishment (Save the Children 2010: 66). Further, the voting age in Somaliland is 16. All of this would suggest an attitude toward child recruitment below international standards of 18.

However, this is not the case, and there are no reports of under-18s being employed in the armed forces (Coalition 2001, 2008). In one interview with a Somaliland representative, I was told that the age when someone should be allowed to volunteer was context-dependent, but in his opinion, "maybe 25, 26, or above." Internationally, the age of adulthood is 18 years, and the Somaliland Constitution upholds these standards. Article 10 states, "the Republic of Somaliland recognizes and shall act in conformity with the United Nations Charter and with international law, and shall respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Going beyond this assumed signatory status, in November 2001, the government ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. This effectively raises the age of majority to 18. Perhaps more importantly, these gestures reiterate a commitment to international standards even when they are different than local or religious customs.

³⁰ Translation of Sahih Muslim, Kitab Al-Imara: Book 020, Number 4605 (Muslim Student Association 2012).

Official policy for the government of Somaliland regarding children's rights is far reaching, encompassing, and in keeping with international standards. In 2003 and 2010, the World Health Organization, UNICEF and other NGOs were invited to Somaliland to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the status of children. While many areas of concern remained, remarkable achievements were noted. Regarding specific recommendations made in the 2003 report, the "trend [in child rights] has been positive" (Save the Children 2010: 5). One major concern expressed by UNICEF in 2003 was the lack of a separate system for children accused of crime. In 2007, the government passed a new Juvenile Justice Law that superseded the penal code mentioned above. Under this act, the age of criminal liability was raised from 14 to 15. Further, "minors aged 15 to 18" are only liable "if they have the capacity of 'understanding and volition.'" It is telling that the UNCRC is explicitly mentioned in the text as the reason for the changes to the original code (Juvenile Justice Law 2007). The law was announced in August 2008 at a conference organized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and UNICEF.

Throughout the reports, numerous recommendations were made to widen access to education. This was cited as a reason for high-dropout rates and also increasing the destitution of street children. A note was added to the 2010 report saying that the government ended school fees, making education free to all children. In an interview with the Somaliland Representative to the European Union, I was told that the plan was to extend free education through secondary schools. The representative also emphasized that this was for "boy *and* girls, both, equally." In a 2008 report on child protection in Somaliland by the African Network for the Prevention and Protection against Child

Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN), corporal punishment was cited as a major concern. It was troubling to the researchers that even though this was one of the main reasons for a high dropout rate among children between 12-15 years old, "the government of Somaliland has not outlawed corporal punishment in schools" (5). By 2010, "the Ministry of Education [had] made policy commitments to abolish [the practice]" (Save the Children 2010: 28). This was so, even though both teachers and parents support harsh classroom discipline and are in many ways resistant to abolition. Other developments in the policy areas of education, gender, disability, and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), "are all good examples of the application of human rights/child rights principles into policy documents" (58). In 2005, a "Children's desk" was created as a permanent part of the Somaliland Human Rights Commission by presidential decree, and with support of the both houses of legislature. In addition to official policies and follow-through on them, Somaliland has turned to the international arena for assistance and to highlight its efforts at ensuring children's rights.

Protecting child rights, though not a guarantor of international recognition, has ensured support for the long-term goals of Somaliland from at least one UN agency. Throughout the Children's rights reports, frequent reference is made to a severe lack of capacity that continues to limit Somaliland's progress in the area of child rights. A "capacity gap" or efforts to "build capacity" is mentioned over 50 times in the 2010 report alone. At the same time, NGO observers call on the international community to support such efforts, because it is the international community's obligation under the UNCRC to assist the government. Somaliland's unrecognized status "makes analysis problematic and

serves to obscure issues by conflating Somaliland's data with that of Somalia" (Save the Children 2010: 62).

The government itself claims it would be better able to act if it had international recognition. During my 2011 interview with the representative to Ethiopia, I was told of the progress in ensuring education to Somaliland children. "In Somaliland, the child has to go to school, they have to play; they have to work. In Somalia, some children support their families with what they can get from the gun. Or in Puntland, the child supports the family from the ransom they get from kidnappings or hostages."

Despite these efforts, one of the biggest concerns is unemployment after graduation. "We have thousands of young people but a limited number of jobs. We have succeeded to educate the children, but we have failed to create jobs for them." If these graduates fail to just get employment they'll say, look, over the past 15 years, I was going to school, with my books and now I have nothing to show for it, while a child next door is becoming a millionaire." This "threat to peace and security" is "why we make an appeal to the international community." This appeal is echoed even more explicitly in the 2010 Save the Children report; "Somaliland must be one of the most obvious cases for assistance from the international community" (62). "The best thing that could happen for the children of Somaliland is that they live in a country that has international recognition and engages with the community of nations as fully functioning partner" (69). Ultimately, the influence of such NGOs in matters of state recognition may be minimal, but these statements amount to a clear relationship between support for child rights and endorsement for recognition.

Throughout its two decades as a de facto state, Somaliland has promoted children's rights. Not only has the government made efforts to enshrine these rights into law, but they have proved that their policies are not mere window-dressing by actively trying to live up to their commitments. At the international level, the government promotes their efforts. This fits into a larger strategy of highlighting its efforts at living up to global norms regarding democracy, women's rights, and international security concerns including anti-piracy and anti-terrorism campaigns. All of these efforts are in keeping with the overall goal of state recognition.

6.4 Goals of the SNM and the Republic of Somaliland

For over two decades Somaliland has sought independence from Somalia. Also, for over two decades they have maintained de facto control over a specified territory. They have formed a government through peaceful, democratic elections. They issue currency and passports, police their borders and patrol international waters. Finally, they engage in economic dialogue with their neighbors and are actively trying to enter the global economy. Somaliland has achieved *de facto* independence, but the goal is to be *de jure* independent. The ultimate victory, statehood, remains elusive. This cannot be achieved without the support and blessing of the international community. Somaliland knows this, and has made considerable effort to achieve its goals.

Independence was not the initial goal of the rebel movement that turned into the self-declared Republic of Somaliland.³¹ However, strong secessionist sentiments had existed in the north since the creation of Somalia in 1960. Shortly after unifying, signs of

³¹ Until at least 1999 NGOs referred to the Government of Somaliland as the SNM (US Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 1999).

separatist tendencies immediately emerged. The constitutional referendum that created the unified Somali Republic was campaigned against by the Somali National League (SNL) because it was viewed as detrimental to northern interests. The SNL enjoyed a strong majority in pre-independence Somaliland (20 of 33 legislative seats in 1960). In opposition, they called for a boycott that was largely adhered to, and only 100,000 Somalilanders voted. Even those that participated voted against the referendum overwhelmingly. When the votes were counted the principal northern cities of Hargeissa (72%), Berbera (69%), Burao (66%) and Erigavo (69%) voted against ratification (Drysedale 1991). Despite this rejection, the constitution passed because the vote was a national referendum and was widely supported in central and southern Somalia. In December 1961, a Somaliland contingency in the military launched a failed coup in an effort to reclaim autonomy for the North (Lewis 2002: 173-178). Secessionist feelings remained, but lessened through the 1960s. In 1967, a northern Isaaq, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, became the Prime Minister before the assassination of the President in 1969. During the dictatorship of Siad Barre, there were some Isaaq in high office, but these were largely rejected by their northern compatriots.

Discontent with the union grew steadily throughout the 1970s. The Isaaq had enjoyed dominance in the clan-system in the north. Now they were in the minority. Also, the distance between Hargeissa (the northern capital) and Mogadishu (the federal capital) was nearly 1500 km (932 miles). This limited the national attention paid to northern concerns. Administratively, the English language was discarded for Italian, which favored the south. Professors were expelled and English-speakers were treated as

"second-class citizens."³² In the 1970s, several events fractured Somali nationalism and buried the dream of greater Somalia forever. First, a drought in 1974-74 was especially hard on the north, and forced many to flee to Europe and the Gulf States. On June 27, 1977, French Somaliland opted for independence instead of union, a second rebuttal of Somali irredentism after a defeated 1958 vote to stay affiliated with France. When Somalia tried to annex the Ogaden (Somali) region of Ethiopia in 1978, they were dealt a crushing defeat. Kenya continued to exercise strict control of its Somali population in the Northern Frontier District (NFD). These events limited Somali nationalism and coupled with the mounting grievances against union, left northerners "bitter" about their experience under federalism. Thus, the separatist sentiments were felt very early.

The precursor to Somaliland was the SNM. It began as a culmination of Isaaq frustration and alienation with the regime in Mogadishu. At inception, it was "a typically reactive Somali clan-based organization" no different than the earlier rebellion (SSDF) or later rebellions (USC, etc) that arose against Siad Barre (Lewis 1994: 180). The movement began unofficially in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1979-80. The influx of Somali immigrants left a small and cohesive group of Somali-northerners in the gulf state. They organized community events, started a newspaper, and held political meetings where they discussed events in Somalia in general and their northern home region in particular. At the same time, a group of Isaaq and other Somali migrants were establishing similar community groups in London. Here, they were more active politically, owing to British democratic institutions. The most significant event involved a protest of a hike in fees by the Somali embassy. By 1981, collaboration between the Saudi and London-based groups

³² My interview with Representative of Somaliland in Brussels, Belgium, Mohammed Daar, December 2011.

was strong. Using Saudi-Somali money and London-Somali action, the SNM emerged in opposition to the increasingly repressive dictator at home. They relocated to Ethiopia and began planning a military response to events in the North. Military desertions to the SNM and civilian support in favor of the group grew as the government increased arbitrary arrests and indiscriminate shooting of northerners.

Though the goal was not independence, the SNM's actions belied ulterior motives for the group. First, to the frustration of their Somali allies, the focus was always on liberating the northern territories. The SNM was "only secondarily interested in the south" (Lewis 1994: 208).

This pushed one top non-Isaaq SNM official, 'Ali Mohamed Ossobleh, to abandon the SNM and begin the USC. Second, the SNM went out of their way to deny irredentist plans, which, while crumbling after the 1970s, was still a powerful ideology for many Somalis. Before Ethiopia agreed to host SNM bases, the leadership assured Addis Ababa that the crisis with the Ogaden Somalis was an internal matter. This agreement reversed over 20 years of Somali foreign policy. By rejecting the idea of greater Somalia, the SNM showed they were open to the idea that the five Somalilands could, and perhaps should be, considered separately.

More explicitly, after overthrowing Siad Barre, the SNM aimed to secure robust autonomy for the north. At the time, this could be seen as further rejection of Somali nationalism. During personal interviews with Somaliland representatives, I was told that separatism was always the will of the North, and all but a few of the SNM commanders kept independence as the goal. Because many leaders were defectors from the Southern military, they were "moderate" and "somehow wanted to have change of government,"

but, "not all of them." When I asked the representative about how strong the sentiment was before 1991, he replied, "very strong." Only Tuure, then chairman, and "maybe two others were not [inclined towards independence]." In a revealing quote, a Libyan leader, with connections to Ethiopia was reticent about their support of the SNM because he was convinced they held secessionist goals. One SNM leader Sheikh Yusuf was quoted as responding to the dictator, "You are also labeled by Western media as backing world terrorism, so if that is true then we are also separatists" (Somaliland Times 2002d).

Following the collapse of the regime, the SNM convened a "grand conference" in the north. It was attended by important clan elders, religious leaders, business people, and influential intellectuals, along with members of the diaspora. As talks progressed, the clamor for independence rose. On May 14, 1991, a public demonstration was held in Burao and Hargeissa, which included many SNM fighters. When the conference closed, the Republic of Somaliland formally declared independence, and the SNM chairman was selected as the first President. Thus, while it was not there explicitly in the early stages of the SNM, separatism was a goal that flowed as an undercurrent throughout the struggle.

Since 1991, Somaliland has made considerable efforts to achieve statehood. The first president, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuure led the rebellion which resulted in independence. However, many doubted his commitment to the cause, and within two years he was replaced by another meeting of clan elders. As president, Tuure sought recognition abroad, but did little to encourage a sense of independent nationalism at home. He later accepted a position in Aideed's self-proclaimed government in the south, and continues to bear stigma by Somalilanders for his "betrayal." The second president was selected for his impressive independence credentials. Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal

was the brief Prime Minister of independent Somaliland in 1960. He was also the last Premier of Somalia before Siad took power in 1969. His backers hoped that such credentials would make him an "international figure" that might help bring recognition. Externally, Egal established bilateral trade ties with Ethiopia and other influential countries. On March 9, 2002, Egal welcomed an official Ethiopian trade office that "aimed to strengthen relations and the development of commercial ties between the two countries" (Somaliland Times 2002b). Ties with Ethiopia, including high level diplomatic missions, led the Ethiopian Premier to remark, "there is a legitimate government in Somaliland" (Somaliland Times 2002h). A low-profile US delegation was hosted in Hargeisa, which saw US government officials in official meetings with Egal (Somaliland Times 2002f). Domestically, he sought the trappings of independence by issuing Somaliland passports and a new currency, the Somaliland Shilling. While this failed to result in independence, the peace and security established during his 10-year reign ensured that Somaliland would be considered unique in international discourse by advocates of peace and democracy.

During the third president's tenure, a number of important steps towards recognition were taken. Egal died in 2002, and his vice president, Dahir Rayale Kahin, succeeded him as outlined in the constitution. During his administration, there was an aggressive campaign for international recognition. In 2004, Somaliland hosted two British MPs, allowing them to address both houses of the parliament. Upon their return, they addressed the British parliament and remarked, "I met ministers there, and I was far more impressed with their plans than those of several other African countries that I have

visited -countries that we recognize and support. Somaliland is doing nearly everything right, but it is being ignored" (Worthington 2004).

Later that year, Somaliland joined the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, a NGO based at The Hague. This organization represents a variety of political and cultural groups that do not have diplomatic access enjoyed by states. Through the UNPO, Somaliland engages a wider network of IOs, including the European Union. In 2005, President Rayale formally submitted Somaliland's application to the African Union. This came on the heels of an aggressive diplomatic drive for support in Zimbabwe and Mozambique among other African nations (Somaliland Times 2003). Throughout Rayale's term, he fought criticism and aggressively sought to improve ties with Djibouti. Djibouti remains an opponent of Somaliland's independence. If recognized, the Port of Berbera would command a substantial portion of the Ethiopian export market away from the Port of Djibouti (Gulaid 2003). Overcoming this resistance, Rayale early and often embarked on high profile visits to the neighbor in hopes of ameliorating its opposition. Building on Egal's relationship with Ethiopia, economic ties solidified political ties. Ethiopia accepts Somaliland passports and its currency. On June 3, 2007, President Rayale formally met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. He was met "with full honours" (AFROL News 2007). Rayale was no more successful than was Egal at achieving recognition. At the same time, his efforts promoted goodwill with the international community and varying degrees of support in principle, if not in practice.

The next president, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, elected as an opposition candidate, continued the drive for support begun by his three predecessors. Somaliland electoral

contests reveal the unity of position regarding international recognition. Before the 2003 parliamentary, opposition to President Rayale contended that they would "work harder for international recognition." Silanyo pressed, "we need to make more friends. We will put much more effort towards publicizing our cause, and put our case to the international community much more effectively" (IRIN 2003). His party came up 80 votes short in the 2005 presidential election, but was successful in the 2010 contest where he and his Kulmiye party once again promised that it would "use effective diplomatic tools...to achieve international recognition" (Somaliland Times 2010b). During the campaign, he went to the US and met with the diaspora and US congressmen. With this move, he showed that "even though it is not in government, [Kulmiye] could mount a diplomatic initiative to engage the most developed country in the world" (Somaliland Times 2010a). Rhetoric aside, these priorities were little different than what the previous administration promised and engaged in regularly.

After securing victory, Silanyo followed up with his promise to push for recognition. The Somaliland representative to Ethiopia told me that since the new government has come to power, they have "knocked on every door" in their diplomacy push. The government has stepped up efforts at the African Union and the European Union. This was the highest priority identified by Dr. Mohamed Abdillahi Omar, Silanyo's new minister of Foreign Affairs. He called for a regional approach and working with UN and foreign aid agencies. This involved providing drought relief to help the troubled southern regions. The active approach taken by the Silanyo administration is commendable, but overlooks the consistent attention paid to the international community by previous Somaliland regimes and even the SNM before it.

In addition to following norms regarding the rights of children, Somaliland has made efforts to highlight the other ways in which it lives up to international expectations. One of the earliest decisions they made was in tune with international norms and expectations. When choosing the name Somali National Movement in 1981, the influential Saudi group wanted to include the adjective "Islamic" (Lewis 1994: 198). This proposal was ultimately dropped for fear it would scare-off Western support, whose outlook was damaged by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. A consistent demonstration of its adherence to international standards has been Somaliland's rich democratic tradition. Overt praise for this tradition belies the extreme tests faced along the way. In 2002, the unelected House of Elders voted to extend the government's mandate for an additional year because of incomplete voter registration. Opposition parties argued that to them the government would be seen as "illegal" on February 24, the date at which the extension officially commenced. Silanyo, politically unaffiliated at the time having just returned from a year abroad in London, narrowly averted an institutional crises by mediating between the disputants. Additional challenges were faced throughout Rayale's term, and the closely contested elections in 2003. Throughout, all parties maintained an eye towards the international community in largely abiding by constitutional rules.

The constitutional succession of Rayale when Egal unexpectedly died in 2002 was itself remarkable. In a published eulogy the week following Egal's death, one Somaliland organization called on the international community to "take notice of Somaliland's thriving democratic ideals, its rule of law, and its durable peace." The best response, the press release went on, is "to bestow on the state of Somaliland the recognition that it so richly deserves, as a result of its already deepened democracy"

(Somaliland Forum Press Release May, 2002). After the disputed 2003 elections, the fear that failure to adhere to the constitutional process would derail its recognition was widespread. The non-partisan Somaliland Times, fearing the government would not allow for a genuine contest reiterated the associated risks of "loosing [sic] credibility." In a quick turnaround, they accepted the incumbent's razor-thin victory and charged that the opposition Kulmiye was holding Somaliland's democratic credibility "hostage," urging the chairman to accept the results. He did, and went on to win in the next, largely free and fair election. In my personal correspondence, the role of democracy in showing Somaliland's legitimacy was routinely brought up. One interviewee said that Somaliland should be "rewarded" for its having done the right thing by holding free electoral contests. Further, when asked where Somaliland looks for inspiration, he pointed to the four democratic elections as reason other nations should instead look to Somaliland for inspiration. Somaliland's democratic-ness is not just a method of changing government; rather, it is also another way to highlight its international legitimacy.

In order to establish its role as an equal in the global community, many other areas of international concern have taken prominence in all government policies. Somaliland aims to be a regional security partner in the War on Terror and recent anti-piracy operations. It maintains bilateral security cooperation with Ethiopia, Yemen, and Kenya (Wikileaks 2007). During a private meeting with the US Ambassador to Ethiopia, President Rayale pointed out that "Somaliland and the US had the same enemies" (Wikileaks 2008). In April 2011, President Silanyo supported a UN-backed plan to imprison convicted pirates in Somaliland. At the same press conference, the president linked the action with calls for independence (Somaliland Times 2011b). New legislation

officially labels piracy a crime and paves the way for pirate prisoner transfers to Somaliland. Once again, reference was made to the effort proving that Somaliland is "willing to cooperate with the international community" (Somaliland Times 2012c). In a united front against reunification with the south, Somaliland representatives have, since 1991, refused to participate in International peace-talks with the South. It feared doing so would undermine its position. In a bold move President Silanyo appeared at the International Peace Conference held in London in 2012. He did so in order to advance the cause for independence at a wider venue than had taken place in the past. Participation occurred despite considerable domestic political backlash, particularly from high-profile opponents. Former President Rayale said the visit was not in the best interests of Somaliland, and that President Silanyo should not have participated (Somaliland Times 2012b). Ultimately, the diplomatic value of appearing won. Along with millions of dollars in drought relief pledged to the south, such a move can only be interpreted as an effort to highlight Somaliland's shared interest in international efforts and concerns.

Secessionist sentiments have always been present in the north. They provided an undercurrent to the SNM and in 1991 Somaliland formally declared their independence. Since then, the importance of recognition has figured prominently in domestic political affairs. Internationally, each leader from Tuure to Silanyo has made efforts to draw attention to Somaliland's successes. Furthermore, these efforts indicate the extent to which Somaliland cares about international opinion, as it is crucial to their long-term goal.

6.5 Causal Mechanisms

Somaliland's respect for children's rights, including its refusal to use child soldiers, is a product of their efforts at international recognition. Since at least 1991, Somaliland has embarked on a charm offensive (Wikileaks 2006). While not denying their sincere valuation of children, the decision to protect them is in accordance with an overarching desire to gain independence. They know that recognition is difficult, but believe it is possible if the case meets the right conditions. Somaliland officials know what is important to the international community and make every effort to highlight their normative accomplishments. While recognition remains unachieved, Somaliland continues to receive very positive feedback from important actors for their efforts. This highlights the causal process whereby perception leads to changes in behavior.

Somaliland representatives show considerable adeptness in what is important to the international community. First, they know the vocabulary of international recognition. In my interviews, representatives repeatedly referred to the "reassertion" of independence. According to one, "[Somaliland is] not seceding, it's not secession, but it is abrogation of a union with Somalia." This was in keeping with past traditions in the interaction of states including Senegambia, and the United Arab Republic. I was often reminded that Somaliland adheres to the AU charter in that it exists within its colonial borders. One representative told me that unlike other independence movements "such as Rhodesia," Somaliland is democratic representing the exercise of self-determination enshrined in the UN charter.

Second, representatives see value in highlighting accomplishments in areas important to the global NGO community. The Foreign Minister during the Rayale

administration, Edna Ismail, believed Somaliland could serve as "a model country" for the region. "It has a controlled army, the diaspora is returning in large numbers, there are no arrears in salaries, no hunger and no malnutrition. In addition, Somaliland has worked feverishly in the Global War on Terrorism (Wikileaks 2004). When asked about women's rights, one representative told me of the growing involvement of women in society and politics. "[We] have women doctors, women professors, the University of Somaliland, Hargeissa was founded by a women, minister of foreign affairs, Edna Ismail." When pressed, he believed this was important for the international community to see. The protection of child rights, too, was seen as influential for international legitimacy, and that it would help their cause. "It shows that Somaliland is a country that has values, it wants to develop the skills of the young people, give them employment, give them a permanent place in society." Finally, they believe the role that these efforts of adherence to international norms can play a strong role in recognition efforts. In terms of supporting independence, child protection and other norms are likely to help because "[recognition] has to be justified, you know? We have to show how responsible we are." I asked if one representative thought Somaliland should be rewarded for its good behavior, he simply replied, "Why not?" Another representative remarked, "I would say that the societies that keep values should be supported by the international community." Conversely, "[groups] that use child soldiers would stand in bad light in the international system." They are expected to receive less support from the international community because this "inflicts[s] so much pain and these are some of the things the international community should pay attention to." In the end, the importance of international norms to the Somaliland government is clear. One representative offered a good summary of the

government's position, "we are showing the international community that we are behaving as a government behaves and we want just to have a government that behaves and respects what the international community wants."

Looking at the inconsistency with which international norms have played in decisions of recognition, it is perhaps puzzling that the government of Somaliland holds such beliefs. However, they do so because so far, even though outright recognition has eluded them, they have received numerous supportive overtures because of their efforts. Active diplomacy has led to measured support from important local actors. Ethiopia has tried to "sensitiz[e] the international community about the situation in Somaliland" (Somaliland Times 2002a). Early in the administration of President Rayale, the US and EU recognized the government of Somaliland as "the sole legitimate representative of the Somaliland people" (Somaliland Times 2002c). This had the effect of denying delegates claiming to represent the north at the numerous peace and reconciliation conferences organized by the UN and others. The European Union slowly but steadily increased its involvement in Somaliland by giving direct support to the government. South Sudan was expected to grant full diplomatic recognition to Somaliland when it became independent³³ (Somaliland Times 2011a). Wales, though not independent itself, has officially recognized Somaliland's independence (AFROL News 2006). In their efforts to promote democracy, they have received near-universal acclaim. Prime Minister David Cameron said "Somaliland has taken an important step forward in showing that better governance and better economic progress are possible. In many ways, it is an example that others can follow" (Somaliland Times 2012a). Such sentiments are just a small part

³³ As of this writing it has yet to do so.

of the larger support for recognition in the British Parliament. Godfrey Bloom of the UK Independence Party adamantly supports full recognition.

"For 21 years the country has grown, unrecognized and unheralded. It is a multi-party democracy. It is free trading. We even use its prisons to lock up pirates. But if we fail to support it we will be missing a trick. Currently our Government is using the stick it must learn to use the carrot. We must reinforce success rather than failure. To do that we must accept reality on the ground. We must recognize Somaliland" (Somaliland Times 2012d).

Somaliland's role in international security has also received powerful praise. The World Peace Foundation, a forum of scholars at the Harvard Kennedy School called for recognizing the independence of Somaliland because doing so would strengthen the incentives for neighboring Puntland to get serious about piracy. "Recognition of Somaliland will thus assist in strengthening accountability and governance in regions that are now pirate infected" (Rotberg 2010). In 2007, the Washington Post reported that the US Department of Defense supported an independent Somaliland: "[It] is an entity that works. The Pentagon's view is that 'Somaliland should be independent.'" The head of strategic communication for the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa eagerly spoke of engaging Somaliland and was only "waiting for [the] State [Dept.] to give us the okay" (Tyson 2007).

Protecting child rights is directly responsible for support as well. In its second report, Save the Children called on the global community to reward Somaliland's efforts by conferring independence: "The best thing that could happen for the children of Somaliland is that they live in a country that has international recognition and engages with the community of nations as a fully functioning partner" (2010: 69). Of course, despite considerable support from many circles, full independence has not been achieved. To summarize the exasperation that my interviews, and the numerous political

commentators have expressed, the former Foreign Minister Edna Ismail Aden proposed that Somaliland was like a "beautiful woman that no one wanted to marry" (Wikileaks 2004).

The government of Somaliland's primary goal is international recognition. To achieve this goal, they have to engage the international community directly. They have trained their diplomats to speak the language of recognition and to cultivate relationships with the global community. Perhaps most importantly, they have demonstrated in deed, not just creed, that they deserve de jure independence. In many areas from democracy, anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, women's rights, and child protection, Somaliland has tried to cultivate the image of an equal partner in the eyes of the world. They have strong incentives to do so. Without support, they would otherwise never achieve their primary goal.

6.6 Competing Factors

Somaliland's accomplishments are remarkable, and the citizens and government have much to be proud of. It is all the more remarkable considering the many similarities they share with their southern and eastern neighbors. To explain Somaliland's recruitment practices, I looked to the incentives based on their overall goals. In comparison, I will look to other groups active in the region, and show that faction aims can influence the degree to which they care about international norms and thus their likelihood to use child soldiers. But first, I will rule out alternative explanations through a controlled comparison using a most-similar systems design. In terms of culture, perceptions of childhood, and

history, Somaliland is very similar to Somalis in other regions. Therefore, these factors fail to account for the variation in recruitment strategies.

Cultural explanations for Somaliland's respect for children's rights are not sufficient. Such differences are often cited as one explanation for Somaliland's success in light of the South's failure. The Somaliland representative to Ethiopia offered this as an explanation in my interview. "We are culturally different, our systems are different." In an outspoken op-ed in the Somaliland Times, a commentator spoke of a unitary culture as "nonsense!" (Hassan 2002). The author proceeds to claim that "[liberty] was a Northern creation" and that "if there are verifiable Southern virtues, I am open to hear them." Such ethnocentrism reflects pride of present accomplishments, rather than an anthropological reality. The Somalis share near-identical traditions of language and religion. Somalia, including Somaliland, is often referred to as the only ethnically homogenous country in Africa. Nearly all Somalis are practicing Muslims. Further, regardless of geographic location, Sunni-Islam is dominant. The arguably more tolerant, more pacific Sufism is popular in Hargeissa. However, it is also widespread in Mogadishu, and southern cities, and is the dominant religious order of the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a, an active government-aligned militia that is known to use child soldiers (UNSC 2010 2010: 6). Degree of religiosity is also not a sufficient explanation. The Somaliland constitution is based on Sharia law, and is said to be the foundation of the government.

Even more than other forms of agricultural work, nomadic pastoralism increases the demands placed on children at young ages. Children as young as 6 begin to take on familial responsibilities (Save the Children 2010: 26). However, this livelihood is as dominant in the north as it is in the south. Even in Somaliland, around 19% of children

between 5-14 years old engage in some form paid labor (ANPPCAN 2008: 4).³⁴ Views of children as maintaining economic potential and/or family responsibilities is not differentiable based on northern and southern "values." Cultural variation regarding child soldiers in particular fails to explain variation in use. Though one representative assured me it was "not the Somali way to use children in combat," actions by nearly all groups currently fighting in the south suggests otherwise. The 2010 UN Secretary General's Special Report on children affected by conflict in Somalia identifies child soldiering by nearly every group in the region *except* for Somaliland. All other armed groups flagrantly violate international norms. Surprisingly, reports also indicate the TFG government forces use children around the age of 15. Even the relatively peaceful and stable region of Puntland has 15 year-olds in their official police forces. Cited cultural differences of Somaliland fail to explain variation in recruitment rates. Perhaps it is even more telling that at least two prominent leaders of Al-Shabaab were from Somaliland and of the Isaaq clan (Horadam 2011).

Some cultural variation does exist among the Somalis. The Rahanweyn and Digil clans are sedentary farmers that settled in the areas between the Jubba and Shabelle rivers. Also, there are ethnic minorities that exist in the south that include the Bantu and Arab settlers (Lewis 2002). However, these differences have not resulted in any meaningful variation in the child protection or the recruitment of child soldiers. The highest instances of child soldiering occur in the Southern regions where the Rahanweyn,

³⁴ While child labor and child soldiering are often used as collective norms, the distinction is important. Child labor is a growing concern for many NGOs. In the language of norm establishment, it is most likely in stage 1, emergence. While language against child labor is often used in conjunction with proscriptions against child soldiering, it has yet to reach the critical mass to move into the second stage, acceptance. Also, it is important to keep in mind that the Somaliland government making strong efforts to ensure that all children go to school.

Digil, and numerous other clans reside, including the Hawiye and Darood. It is not possible to rule out that the northern clans of the Isaaq are somehow different.³⁵ Isaaq lands, including much of Somaliland, have no instances of child soldiering. However, there are other clans including the Dir, and Dulbahante also present in Somaliland. Further, President Rayale, who ruled for 8 years, was a Dulbahante. The Dulbahante are a sub-clan of the Darood that not only occupy the south (high levels of child recruitment), but also dominate the eastern, semi-autonomous region of Puntland. Puntland, unlike the Darood in the south, offer some degree of child protection. This, I argue in the next section, has more to do with the goals of the group rather than the clan-identity of the territory. Thus, cultural differences are an insufficient explanation for variation in rates of child recruitment of child soldiers.

Another potential explanation for the non-use of child soldiers is the number and level of protection for refugees and internally displaced persons. The sizes of the vulnerable population in Somaliland and Somalia are difficult to compare due to nearly 30 years of perpetual conflict and routine droughts and famines. During the 1980-1991 civil war, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled Somalia. Conflicts in neighboring Djibouti and Ethiopia made respite difficult for all but the most financially able, or the lucky ones that could go abroad, to the Gulf States, Europe and the US. Since 1991, persistent conflict has maintained a steady flow of refuge and asylum seekers from the troubled region. By 2011, an estimated 770,000 Somali refugees remain resident in another country (UNHCR 2011). This puts the total at a distant third behind Iraq (1.7 million) and Afghanistan (3 million). Internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Somalia

³⁵ Notwithstanding the Isaaq members of al-Shabaab.

reached a staggering 1.5 million by January 2011 (UNHCR 2011). To complicate the issue, IDPs in the north are referred to as refugees because Somalia is seen as another country. Therefore, the potential for vulnerability exists throughout the region but does not help explain rates of variation in youths being targeted.

Vulnerable-youth *security* however, might explain some variation in child recruitment. Children in IDP camps in Somaliland tend to enjoy much greater protections than their counterparts in the south. The UNHCR maintains near total access to the northern regions, dissipating precipitously as one moves along the coast towards Kenya. However, this is likely a product of administrative priorities rather than capacity alone. In 2002, the British government began a campaign of systematic repatriation of Somali refugees to Somaliland. The program was resisted by the Somaliland government because they did not have the resources to protect them (Somaliland Times 2002g). The situation has changed little with high numbers of refugees from Ethiopia and Djibouti and relocation of Somali IDPs further burdening the limited resources of the state (UNHCR 2011). In the past, the UNHCR and UNDP faced a shortage of funds and could not provide for the vulnerable populations. At present the government assists the UN organizations and other NGOs in an official capacity. Furthermore, the UNHCR maintains a substantial presence in the NFD with support from the much more capable Kenyan government, yet this area exhibits high rates of child recruitment.

Globally, schools are favorite targets by recruiters of child soldiers due to the concentration of vulnerable youths. This is true in the southern Somalia as well. Schools throughout the south, but especially in Mogadishu have even become parties to the conflict. Many had to be shut down due to insecurity (UNSC 2010 2010). Some are even

attacked by government troops because it is feared they will provide pools of recruits for al-Shabaab (UNSC 2010 2010: 12). By contrast, in Somaliland schools are given priority by the government and enjoy the highest portion of the state budget behind spending on defense and police (Save the Children 2010). Such funds contribute to the perception of schools as safe zones for children that keep recruiters out.

Children in both the north and the south remain vulnerable due to conditions of high-levels of poverty. Despite considerable progress, Somaliland ranks high on global poverty rankings. The GDP per capita is estimated to be \$250 per year, compared to \$277 for Somalia. Further, poverty remains a primary reason for other forms of child labor including domestic workers, shoe shiners and khat dealers³⁶ (ANPPCAN 2008: 6). Child poverty in particular remains a concern of the government. One representative told me that the appeal of armed militias and pirate groups is an ever present concern for the government. Schooling is mandatory and expanding, but with limited prosperity awaiting graduates, the appeal of income through violence is a growing problem. Thus, while the availability of large pools of vulnerable children is one potential explanation, the protection children enjoy in the north is more likely a product of the government's position regarding children. Thus, level of protection alone is an insufficient explanation for Somaliland's non-use of child soldiers

One argument for the considerable variation in outcomes from the north and the south is the colonial history. Somaliland was a former British colony, while the south was ruled by Italy. The British practiced indirect colonialism that left traditional rulers with more power than they had in the south. When I proposed this explanation to one of the

³⁶ Khat is a local stimulant, similar to coffee but with strong importance for politics and society (Bradbury 2008: 170-172).

representatives, he agreed that variation in colonialism could account for the strength of traditional institutions of conflict resolution and democracy.

However, there are two issues that preclude colonial explanations for child recruitment. First, traditional Somali rule, even in the North, maintains lower standards of child protection than does international law. Somaliland's traditional code (xeer) finds it acceptable for children to work at less than 10 years old and to be punished for crimes at 12. This mindset could easily be extended to service in the armed forces. Further, traditional practices justify female genital mutilation, a practice widely condemned by the international community. On these issues, government practices are much more in line with international concerns and laws than powerful local customs. Workshops and advocacy campaigns have been supported and hosted by the government. Thus, strength of traditional rule fails to explain high levels of child protection.

Second, Somaliland was not the only Somali territory colonized by the British. The NFD in Kenya was also a British colony and was one of the five Somalilands that make up the ideological "Greater Somalia." Child protection in the NFD remains weak. Groups aligned with southern militias routinely recruit forcefully and solicit volunteers from the former British subjects.

An additional historical argument could be made regarding experience under the Siad Barre administration. Due to the atrocities committed against the North, they may have been especially sensitized to the importance of human rights protections. Several thousand Somalilanders were killed from 1981-91 and entire cities were bombed into ruin. Systematic punishment was meted out by the notorious General Morgan, which affected every northerner and was one reason often cited as to why the differences

between the north and south are irreconcilable. However, Siad Barre was brutal throughout Somalia. During his reign of terror, hundreds of thousands were systematically killed, starved, or displaced by regime troops. Further, after 1978 his oppression was clan-based with particular harshness reserved for the Darood clans and the southern agriculturalists. While particularly harsh in the North, the atrocities committed by the regime were so widespread, that, were this line of reasoning sufficient, there would be rampant human rights protections throughout the region. This is not the case, and thus does not explain the exceptionally high rates of recognized international rights in the north.

Using the similarities of the armed groups throughout Somalia, it is possible to tentatively rule out competing explanations for Somaliland's child protection standards. Contrary to popular conception, Somaliland largely shares the same culture as their brothers to the south. Religion is an insufficient explanation because Somaliland is little different than the south in terms of type and intensity. Further, security is an important consideration, but while children are generally more secured in the north, this is likely a product of government priorities. Finally, historical explanations offer partial explanations, but by comparison do not account for similar experience in the NFD and the south during Siad Barre's reign. From a research perspective, it is fortunate that Somalia has many similar armed groups with which to compare behavioral outcomes. By comparison, Somaliland is very similar to groups in the south, but maintains remarkably different recruitment strategies towards children. Group goals appear the most likely source for this variation.

6.7 Goals and Recruitment Patterns of Other Somali Armed Groups

Somaliland exists alongside groups that show low, but varied levels of child protection. Despite many similarities including culture, refugee protection, and poverty, Somaliland stands out as unique. As outlined in the previous section, in comparison to other groups active in the past two decades, Somaliland shares many similarities. However, the disparate goals of the group result in remarkably different behavior.

Since the 1980s, various groups have challenged the governments in Mogadishu. The USC was one group rose to prominence as the force that ultimately toppled Siad Barre's regime. Just after Barre's exit, Mohamed Farah Aideed led a breakaway faction known as the Somali National Alliance (SNA). His son, a former US Marine, later formed the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) in 2001. The SRRC reconciled the differences between the leaders of the former USC factions and openly fought the UN-backed government from 2001-2004. Factions within the SRRC also broke and supported the government. Still others evolved from the initial rebel forces that fought against Siad Barre. Iterations of these factions have continued under different names and different leaders through the present.

In the absence of a central government, local Somali customs and religious traditions re-emerged. Local Islamic courts unified to become the ICU, which briefly held Mogadishu in 2006. The ICU fought against the CIA-backed ARPCT to win control of the capital, but was subsequently ousted by the Ethiopian-backed TFG. They then splintered into the factions of Al-Shabaab and Xizbul Islam, and continue to fight the internationally recognized government. One overarching shared trait of all these groups has been their desire to control Mogadishu or enough of it to exercise a monopoly of state

resources. Control of the capital did not require international recognition. These groups, clan-based militias and Islamic insurgents, were largely driven by short-term considerations of military and economic gain. These groups had few links to a wider global community. Those that did, including APRCT (US) and the ICU (Eritrea), did not risk losing their support by their actions.

The APRCT represented the remnants of the clans that fought against US forces in the first Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, but were seen as the only force capable of challenging the ICU with and, by association, Al Qaeda. If historical enemies of the US could become temporary allies, the APRCT had no reason to think their actions jeopardized US support. This was a marriage of convenience and both sides knew it. The ICU did not care about international opinion because their support derived largely from Eritrea, itself a pariah of the global community. Further, the core leadership of the ICU had been part of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, a known terrorist group in the Horn of Africa. Thus, through extreme interpretation of Islam and antagonism to the UN-backed government, the ICU showed they and their offshoots cared little about global opinion.

As each of these factions had little reason to fear a loss of international support, they are the groups most likely to use child soldiers. As made clear in numerous reports on child soldiering in Somalia, they all do. The SRRC was identified by name in the 2004 Coalition report, but was just one of the many factions control that contributed to the approximately 200,000 Somali children that are involved in combat activities (99). The ICU's military wing and the current dominant opposition force was al-Shabaab (Arabic for "the youth"). Both the ICU and al-Shabaab have made public statements about their intentions to recruit children (Coalition 2008: 306). The Secretary General's Special

Representative reported in 2010 that "al-Shabaab has undertaken the most systematic and widespread recruitment and use of children in the conflict" (7). This included forced recruitment from Puntland and Somaliland, but also training in southern regions. Estimates are as high as between 30-45% of al-Shabaab's forces are children. Reports indicate children as young as 9 years old have been abducted and trained for combat (UNSC 2010 2010: 8).

The Transitional Federal Government wants to maintain and expand their authority over the country. It was first led by Abdullahi Yusuf and later under the helm of former ICU chairman Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Arguably, it has the most to lose if they flaunted international opinion. According to my theory, we can expect their adherence to international norms to be high, and they should refrain from child recruitment. However, evidence exists that current and previous administrations have used and may still use children. Under the administration of President Yusuf, children as young as 11 were reportedly seen at checkpoints, and many 14-18 year olds were acknowledged by the government as being used (US State Dept. 2006).

However, the relationship the TFG has with the international community is mutually dependent. The UN, AU, and regional organizations want peace in Somalia, and have backed the government long before its arrival in Mogadishu. Nearly 10,000 AU troops are currently serving alongside the TFG to bring al-Shabaab to heel and restore peace to the country. Like the US/CIA supported APRCT, the TFG is seen as the best hope for stability. The international organizations have put all of their support behind the TFG. This does not mean that they should openly violate international norms, but that the consequences of doing so are more akin to those of an existing state government rather

than a would-be state. When the *New York Times* reported of child soldier use by the TFG in 2010, President Sharif issued a public statement vowing to crack down on any youth recruitment (UNSC 2010 2010: 9). Therefore, even though the TFG is reliant on the international community for support, they already have the legitimacy. Reports of child soldiering need to be acted upon, but are not damning for their overall goal of expanding control.

The semi-autonomous region of Puntland began as a base for the SSDF. Throughout the 1990s, it existed as an enclave of the Majerteen sub-clan of the Darood. They engaged in conflict with neighboring Somaliland over the disputed Sanaag and Sool regions that both entities claim. The north east clans of Somalia engaged in similar meetings as the northern clans in Somalia. Unlike Somaliland, however, Puntland declared autonomy within the Federal State of Somalia in 1998. Their goal is to resist domination, but have appeared in the past fully willing to work with the TFG and the international community. Independence sentiments existed, but cooperation was largely the rule (International Crisis Group 2006, 2009). The relatively strong relationship with Mogadishu is not surprising. The second president of the TFG was Abdullahi Yusuf, who vacated his position as Puntland President to serve the national government. At the same time, they remain resistant to centrist rule. In 2011, they formally broke ties with the TFG because their interests are allegedly not being served by Sheikh Sharif (Weinstein 2011). Because they do not seek international recognition, they are less dependent on the international community. At the same time, because they seek international goodwill to ensure a high degree of autonomy, they should care about international norms to a certain degree. The government has cooperated with anti-piracy operations and has enjoyed

increased development funds as a result. Because they need to maintain a particular image, in the past they have publicly supported child protection and maintain they will not use child soldiers. However, older children around 16 years old were reportedly in the ranks of the Puntland police forces (Coalition 2004: 99). In an extension of the argument presented here, the Puntland government's position bears a degree of international outlook, but success is not dependent on it. Therefore, they offer some child protection in accordance with international norms, but still exploit the usefulness of underage troops to a limited degree.

The goals of the various groups in Somalia differ considerably. These goals coincide with the degree to which the group cares about the international community and, thus, the level of child protection offered. Al-Shabaab and the ICU before it do not care about the international community and ultimately show complete disregard for children as combatants. Likewise, the earlier iterations of warlords were only interested in taking Mogadishu and regularly scorned international opinion. Both the TFG and the semi-autonomous Puntland administration should generally look abroad for support, but in practice are less dependent on global opinion than is Somaliland. The Puntland administration can sustain its goals without external partners, but would be better off without complete rejection by outsiders. Thus, they tend to respect children's rights, but are inconsistent in delivery. The TFG is dependent on Western governments, but the relationship works both ways. Thus, while giving lip-service to human rights, they are not committed to follow through. Issues other than child protection take priority. In comparison, Somaliland is dependent on the international community in order to achieve its ultimate goal: statehood. Without this support, Somaliland will never succeed, and

independence will forever be stalled. Thus, of all the groups active in Somalia today, they are the most likely to refrain from using child soldiers. As was noted in the previous section, all of these groups share similarities in history, culture, and a number of structural factors. However, they do vary in goals. This difference helps explain the variation in their behavior towards children.

6.8 Conclusion

The SNM and from it, the Republic of Somaliland, began as nearly every other clan-based militia had in Somalia. Born of the repression of Siad Barre in the 1980s it emerged, and consolidated its rule throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Now, in addition to acclaimed stability, democracy, and modest economic development, it acts as a beacon of child rights not seen anywhere else in the region. Not only do the armed forces refrain from using child soldiers, but additional protections for children are present. Above, I examined the group goals of Somaliland and by comparison the goals of its contemporaries. These alone sufficiently explain the high rates of variation between the groups.

Somaliland cares about the international community; this is the key to their ultimate success. While they emerged from the repressive state in 1991, they avoided the factional fighting that plagued the south and maintaining a focused strategy on gaining international support. Even though independence has thus far eluded them, support has come in many shapes and sizes. Some NGOs, like UNICEF, recognize the gains Somaliland has made in human rights, openly support independence claims, and call for the world community to reward their behavior. The treatment of children is consistent

with the goals of the group. Employing an army of child soldiers might allow the government to finally bring an end the simmering fight over the Sanaag and Sool regions. Conceivably, the armed forces might more successfully strike the TFG in the south if its forces were enlarged with a cadre of underage troops. However, though this might further entrench military victory, it would effectively eliminate any chance of gaining the necessary support of the international community. Thus, given its goals, Somaliland's best strategy is to continue its charm offensive, strengthen its democratic institutions, and above all, maintain the standards set forth in the UN and AU charters and widely touted by the international NGO network. Without the support of these actors, no matter how many military victories it achieves, Somaliland will never truly win.

Figure 10: Map of Somalia Showing Republic of Somaliland



Source: National Public Radio 2010.

Chapter Seven

Opportunism in the Colombia and Afghanistan Civil Wars

7.1 Introduction

In Pueblo Rico, Colombia, six children between ages 6 and 10 years old were killed on August 15, 2000. Thinking they were a group of guerillas, the National Army attacked and killed them before realizing their mistake (Coalition 2001: 13). In Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the American military had to create an entire compound to house the growing number of children detained in the War on Terror. Camp Iguana, as it was called, housed children less than 18 years old, including one Afghan boy, Mohammed Jawad, who was imprisoned at age 12 (Salahuddin 2009). This reflects the reality of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Colombia, and highlights just how far the recruitment strategies of the primary insurgents are from international standards.

These stories are not surprising given the frequency with which insurgents in the theatres of Colombia and Afghanistan use underage combatants. Other than the RUF in Africa, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Taliban represent two of the worst perpetrators of child soldiering in my dataset. But apart from this similarity, they have little in common. They are from entirely different regions. One is religious, the other is secular. One is from an area once occupied by Britain, but was largely free from colonial control, and the other is a former Spanish colony. Afghanistan has seen almost no democracy in its long history and remains impoverished, while Colombia has been a democracy since the 1960s and while poor, by international standards, it has avoided many of the economic crises that befell its neighbors. Why then,

would these groups, with so many differences, share a trait as important as recruitment decisions?

In the previous chapters, I argued that opportunistic rebellions are more likely to use child soldiers because they care less about winning and more about maintaining the conflict. The limited capabilities of children are more than enough to accomplish this task. Children cost less to employ than adults, can be manipulated, and can be more easily kept from the revenue of the group. Examining these cases as most-different-systems, the hypothesis is supported. While different in almost every way, the Taliban and FARC are notorious violators of child rights. They also profit considerably from the status quo and adopt tactics that are aimed at continuity rather than victory. Limiting costs is more valuable than combat capabilities. Their recruitment profiles reflect these priorities.

7.2 The Cases

FARC

When the Spanish relinquished control over the colony of Colombia in 1810, many people desperately hoped that the new state would shrug the socio-economic institutions that divided the colonists. Unfortunately, tensions between landed elites and peasants, routine throughout Spanish rule, remained long after independence. Impasse over land-rights led to a large-scale civil war known as *La Violencia* that engulfed the country for 10 years (1948-1958). It was a partisan fight, liberals against conservatives, that was mainly fought in the countryside and pitted rural peasants against peasants backed by elites. The outcome of this struggle was inconclusive. The same dominant

classes ruled, a polarized electoral system emerged, and institutionalized violence was legitimized as a political reality (Richani 2002). From this emerged the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). With others, FARC grew out of the peasant-defense organizations in the 1960s. It was both peasant-based and driven by concern for the safety and well-being of the poor peasants. However, FARC evolved in both tactics and motivations, such that its humble origins and goals of social justice have largely been discarded. Through the routine and severe recruitment of children, along with gluttonous involvement in the global drug trade, FARC demonstrates its goals of peasant-ownership of the land and redistribution were corrupted.

Colombia has a history of conflict over land. The current crisis began as just another iteration of this struggle. The *Hacienda* system, inherited from the colonial system, was relatively productive, but was dependent on servile labor. At first, Spanish elites used Indian labor known as *resguardos*. Mixed-Native and European populations (Mestizo) were also unable to own land and perpetuated the aristocratic system. This unequal labor system, coupled with the existence of large tracts of land (*latifundios*) that were difficult to patrol and monitor, resulted in a class of squatters known as *colonos*. *Colonos* worked and developed small plots of fallow land (*minifundios*) that were not their legal property. A growing number began to call for some measure of redistribution that would see their efforts rewarded with acquisition of land. Landowners resisted these calls and political parties emerged to represent these competing interests.

However, this does not reveal the full picture of self-interestedness on the part of Colombian political parties. The Conservative Party did speak on behalf of the landed elites, but many supporters of the Liberal Party championed peasant interests only as a

way to protect themselves from massive redistribution from an inevitable populist revolution if such demands were ignored. When the Liberal Party dominated the executive branch from 1930-1945, they passed a series of land reforms. However, they were ultimately unsuccessful at quelling the tension between the land-owners and peasants. The land laws that made up the Liberal Party reforms of the 1930s included community-based expropriation procedures. They also sought to establish a land-title system. They pushed for land-judges to be assigned in disputed areas (virtually all of the countryside) in order to hear claimants' cases. The Conservative Party, along with conservative elements of the Liberal Party, succeeded in challenging and undermining these reforms. A new land law passed in 1944 scaled back the provisions in the prior set of reforms (Vertinsky, Geffner and Fox 1972). This had the effect of rendering the first reform package ineffective and exacerbated the tumult throughout the country.

The first Colombian civil war was a product of the partisan divide and legislative gridlock in Bogotá. Facilitated by a plurality electoral system, fractionalization within the Liberal Party paved the way for the Conservative Party candidate Mariano Ospina Perez to win the 1946 election. Election-related violence gripped the countryside and only subsided when the Liberal Party united around the populist champion of non-violence, Jorge Gaitain. Almost guaranteed electoral victory, his campaign was cut short when an assassin's bullet sparked the civil war that would engulf the country for over a decade. La Violencia was largely fought in the countryside and pitted Liberal peasants against Conservative-backed peasants. Two days of large-scale "looting, killing, [and] raping" led the Conservative government to reorganize the urban police forces that circumscribed city-violence (Bailey 1967: 567). In rural areas, land-owners hired *Los Pajoros* (the

birds) as private militias to challenge the armed peasant groups and communist party locals (Kreutz 2007). Local interests heightened the scale of the fight and personalized the violence (Richani 2002).

The war ended through a rapid succession of events. A military coup in 1953 ended the civilian administration. Gustavo Rojas began negotiations with the warring factions but was himself deposed in a coup in 1964. This transition led to a one-year military junta the emergence of a bipartisan coalition, the National Front, made up of moderate elements of both the Liberal and Conservative Parties. In the end, between 200,000 and 300,000 people died, over 500,000 were injured, and over 1 million were displaced (Bailey 1967). The formation of the National Front ended the violence, but tensions remained alongside feelings of vulnerability on all sides. In the late stages of La Violencia, peasants formed defense organizations to protect themselves from elite domination, encroachment, and to express their collective interests.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia were a direct extension of these peasant defense organizations. Towards the end of the conflict, peasant self-defense groups organized themselves into administrative blocs and operated nominally independent of Bogotá. With assistance from the United States, the Colombian military violently retook these regions alienating the local population and emboldening the peasant organizations. In July 1964, remnants of these groups formed the "Southern Block," united in armed opposition to the government. At a second meeting, they adopted the name Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) (Garcia-Duran 2004). FARC shared many attributes with other guerillas emerging at the time. First and foremost, they offered defense to the colonos. FARC prevented landowners, and later

cartels and cattle-ranchers, from expanding onto peasant land. Acting as an alternative administration, they also offered a range of public services from financial and market assistance to local conflict resolution, including settling marital disagreements (Richani 2002: 70). In addition, the guerillas coordinated school-funding through progressive and luxury-goods taxation.

FARC's structural evolution began in the late 1970s when, eager for funds, they decided to tap into the transnational marijuana trade. Creeping authoritarianism in Bogotá coincided with a growth in the marijuana industry. FARC served as the middle-men between Colombian growers and Mexican and American distributors. Proceeds provided the group with the means to entrench their interests, but most of the profit went to the distributors. At this time, the allure of cocaine profits pushed Latin American drug cartels into FARC's and other guerillas' territories, creating an additional dimension to the conflict. At first, FARC was content with merely taxing these new elites, as they had the traditional landowners, but the narco-bourgeoisie began to assert their power and hired private militias as a counter to the guerilla forces. Using the by-now, well established networks of growers, transporters, and distributors, FARC had established itself as a major player in the international drug trade.

--Figure 11 here--

FARC began with humble, arguably noble goals, that gave hope to the powerless peasants that numerically dominated the countryside. The voiceless masses, not represented in Bogotá, were at least able to avoid repression thanks to their guerilla defenders. However, the increasing production of illicit goods, first marijuana and then cocaine, polluted the goals of FARC. The effects of this contamination became apparent

quickly. After the 1970s, FARC grew ever more powerful, but victory and institutional changes in favor of the peasants seemed to lessen in importance. Along with the strength of the guerillas, the appeal of the status quo grew exponentially. This is evident in the recruitment decisions of the group. In comparison with potential competing explanations, funding and motivational shifts can best account for the recruitment and use of children as soldiers.

Taliban

The Taliban emerged from the ashes of the final proxy battle in the Cold War. When it came on the scene, it was little different than other radical Islamic organizations jockeying for position in Afghanistan in the early 1990s. After a series of victories (and many defeats), it came to control a majority of the country. To many commentators, the Taliban remains a perfect example of an insurgency that is based on radical ideology and will stop at nothing to achieve total control. This perception is wrong. Were it not for the Taliban's indirect role in the September 11th terror attacks, their true motivations would not be questioned. It is without question that the Taliban is/was a terrorist-harboring organization. However, its ignoble goals are more traditional and mundane than that espoused by the transnational network of Jihadist groups. From the beginning, the top-Taliban commanders have demonstrated their desire to capitalize on the Central Asia opium trade. Their history, recruitment practices, and strategy reflect the centrality of profit in the organization.

Contemporary chief executives of Afghanistan have been ephemeral. On July 17, 1973, the 39-year reign of King Zahir Shah ended in a bloodless coup while he was in

Italy for eye surgery. The former Prime Minister and cousin of the king, Mohammad Daoud Khan, became president and abolished the monarchy. Shortly thereafter, his brief but brutal dictatorship was overthrown in another coup in 1978. Even though Daoud was an avowed socialist, his foreign policy emphasized non-alignment and Afghanistan grew closer to other Middle-East countries, especially Egypt, during his reign. This estranged the Soviet Union that previously supported Daoud in hopes to expand its sphere of influence in Central Asia (Tanner 2002). Fractionalization within the communist Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) amid increasingly high levels of dissent resulted in the arrest of several leaders of two military factions. In response, PDPA military officers assassinated Daoud and Nur Mohammad Taraki (one of those arrested by the government) became president. Factionalism remained, and Taraki was himself arrested in yet another coup and executed. One of his chief-PDPA rivals, Hafizullah Amin, assumed the office next.

In late 1979 Amin alienated his Soviet patrons. In December, they secretly deposed his government and proclaimed Babrak Karmal the new president. These events coincided with a massive increase in Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. It was there ostensibly to fight the insurgency that began under Daoud's rule that has continued in some degree to the present. In 1987, Karmal was quietly dropped in favor of Mohammad Najibullah, head of the KGB-inspired KHAD (Afghan secret police). Najibullah would remain president until 1992 when a temporary alliance of rebels brought an end to communist rule in Afghanistan. Of all the executives since King Zahir's ouster, Babrak Karmal's brief tenure (6 years) would be the longest for any sitting executive in Afghanistan until Hamid Karzai in 2004.

During the jostle for power in Kabul, a wide-scale insurgency challenged each government. Known collectively as the Mujahedeen (those engaged in Jihad), they tapped into a network of regional and international allies, each with their own designs on Afghanistan. Collectively, from 1980-1992, the Mujahedeen received and estimate \$10 billion from its international backers. Spurred by a fear of Pashtun nationalism espoused by Daoud, Pakistan housed the various opposition forces. Additional support for the Mujahedeen came from the United States determined to make Afghanistan "The Soviet Vietnam" (Yousaf and Adkin 1992: 159). They channeled supplies through the Pakistani intelligence services, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This process allowed the ISI to determine which groups received support and which were neglected, contributing to the confusion and instability in the region. The ISI favored the Islamic groups over others. Chief among these was Hizb-i-Islami, the party of Gulbaddin Hikmatyar (Rashid 2010). The Soviet Union, facing a seemingly never-ending war and mounting domestic problems, withdrew in 1989. After the Cold War, the US stopped funding the Mujahedeen. The support was carried on by wealthy elites from the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and especially Saudi Arabia. These funds were largely channeled to the more radical Wahhabi-based groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The insurgency maintained ideological unity against the atheist Soviet forces, but showed remarkably little operational cohesion.

Surprisingly, the Najibullah government was able to rule for a further three years without Soviet support. This was due in large part to fractionalization within the Mujahedeen (Tanner 2002). There were 7 major groups, all Sunni, operating from bases in Pakistan. Of these, four were Islamists and were both anti-communist and anti-

monarchy. The remaining 3 groups were also anti-communist, but promoted customary law and were open to a return to the monarchy. These groups were more tolerant to ethnic minorities as well. Additional parties represented the Shi'a minorities in Hazarat. Like the governments in Kabul, the opposition had their own shifting roster of leaders and parties. After the coup against King Zahir, Karmal, at the behest of the new Daoud regime, attempted to crush a budding Islamic movement.

The leaders of which fled to Peshawar in Pakistan. From among these refugees would emerge three high-profile figures in Afghanistan's history: Ahmed Shah Massud, Gulbuddin Hikmetyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani. In truth, many individuals comprised the resistance, including army deserters, religious leaders, students, opportunists, and countless others alienated by the communist regime. In fact, from 1978 to the time of Soviet withdrawal, the National army of Afghanistan shrank from a height of 108,000 to approximately 30,000 by the end of the 1980s (Sathasivam 2007). In addition, fighters from all over the Muslim world came to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. The period 1982-1992 witnessed an estimated 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 countries join the resistance (Rahsid 2010). From this theatre emerged the Taliban.

Immediately before the rise of the Taliban, Afghanistan was in a period of "virtual disintegration" with factional fighting and warlord rule throughout the country (Rashid 2010:22). Najibullah's rule came to an end on April 26, 1992. The government succumbed to a lack of funds and pressure from the United Nations. Najibullah agreed to a UN brokered peace deal (the Peshewar Accords) and stepped down; he sought refuge at the UN compound in Kabul until his death in 1996. The agreement called for the formation of an interim government. The powerful Gulbuddin Hikmatyar took advantage

of his position near Kabul to seize the capital for himself. As the recipient of a large amount of Pakistani military equipment, he was in a position to challenge the other groups. The interim government appointed Ahmed Shah Massoud (of the Jamiat-i-Islami) as defense minister. He was tasked with ousting Hikmatyar from Kabul, to which he obliged. Fierce urban warfare continued in Kabul as forces aligned to the different parties jockeyed for power. Ultimately, Hikmatyar received the position of prime minister in 1993 under President Burhanuddin Rabbani. One year later, opportunist as he was, Hikmatyar allied with former Pro-Soviet Abdul Rashid Dostum and again tried to seize Kabul. This time, Massoud's forces succeeded in repelling the temporary alliance. In addition to these primary groups, regional players further contributed to the disunity. Saudi Arabia backed the Wahhabi Ittihad-i Islami faction, which was at odds with the Iran-backed Hizb-Wahdat. Displeased with the total disintegration of the brief Mujahedeen alliance and angered by Hikmatyar's personal role in its failure, Pakistan, still anxious to extend its influence, saw the southern Taliban movement as another potential client organization.

The Taliban began as a small religious movement in the anarchic southern regions in 1994. The Mujahedeen quickly demonstrated that they were not up to the task of maintaining control of Afghanistan, something for which many Afghans were desperate. Believed to be outside the interest of the major factions, the south, including the second largest city in Afghanistan, Kandahar, was ravaged by looters and clashing warlords. Disturbed by this lawlessness, many Afghans either fled to or remained in Pakistan, studying in the numerous madrassas that previously helped feed the ranks of the Mujahedeen. Among them was a small cohort of extremists under the leadership of

Mullah Mohammed Omar, a seasoned veteran in the war against the Soviet Union. During the war he fought with the splinter Hizb-i-Islami under Maulvi Younis Khalis. Two years after the fall of Najibullah he returned to Afghanistan and founded a madrassa in a small village near Kandahar. There, with around 40 students ("Taliban" in Pashtun), he claimed to be able to offer an end to the corruption, violence, and suffering of Afghanistan through a strict form of Sharia law.

Mullah Omar and his Taliban developed a "Robin Hood" reputation by confronting petty thugs in Kandahar. One story holds that the Taliban stopped two rival commanders from raping a young boy. Another tells that they rescued two girls from being raped by soldiers. Contributing to the allure, Omar reportedly asked for no reward (Rashid 2010: 24). By the end of 1994, with a supportive following, the Taliban largely controlled the city of Kandahar and began their northward expansion.

Like the Mujahedeen before them, the Taliban received considerable support from Pakistan. The group served three purposes for Islamabad. Supporting the Taliban would prevent a strong nationalist government in Kabul in favor of a relatively weak, compliant regime.

Pakistan initially saw this possibility in the Mujahedeen, however, the leaders proved more consumed with their own individual designs on the country. Hikmatyar's actions, and his close ties to Pakistan, made it more likely that if a rival came to power they would be antagonistic towards Islamabad. The Taliban proved willing servants at first when, on October 1994, a Pakistani convoy had been hijacked by warlords. The Taliban were tasked with freeing it, and they did. Second, the Taliban unofficially served the interests of the powerful Pakistani transportation mafia, who were eager to dredge the

roads of superfluous Mujahedeen checkpoints. They also wanted to open a route from Quetta to Kandahar, now under Taliban control. These transporters would be key early financial backers of the Taliban (Rashid 2010: 25). Finally, Pakistan was committed to "[recreate] a Sunni Muslim space between infidel 'Hindustan,' 'heretic' (because Shi'a) Iran and 'Christian' Russia" (Roy 1999: 8). Supporting the Sunni Taliban offered a way to continue Islamabad's neo-imperialist adventure. This was a natural extension of their decades-long support of the Mujahedeen in general, and of Hikmatyar in particular. Despite considerable backing by Pakistan, the Taliban asserted their independence. In November 1994, a Taliban spokesman demanded that Pakistan not make deals with individual warlords. Also, to the ire of the transport mafia, the Taliban proclaimed that Pakistani trucks could not carry goods through Afghanistan.

The Taliban spread quickly throughout the mid 1990s, capturing many southern posts from powerful warlords. After seizing Kandahar, the Taliban accessed a huge stockpile of weapons, including Mig-21 fighters (Rashid 2010: 29). Flush with resources, they expanded from Kandahar and slowly took important cities and strongholds from rival factions. Their victories were not militarily impressive. Taliban tactics remained poor with little effective chain of command and weak formations (Rashid 2010: 40). Using a tactic they would rely on throughout their existence, they routinely bribed commanders into joining their forces. This they practiced during their initial march northward, only attacking forces that refused their financial enticements. For most, including many of Hikmatyar's top commanders, money was enough incentive to switch sides suggesting that during its initial drive to Kabul, the Taliban were allying with opportunists whose goal was money rather than control. In early 1996, Massoud halted

their drive outside Kabul. A concerted effort by the Taliban and a series of promised bribes failed to overcome Massoud's superior military prowess. The commander at Jalalabad accepted the Taliban's bribe, opening up an eastern front to Kabul (Peters 2009).³⁷ On September 26, 1996, Massoud abandoned the city and retreated north. Far from consolidating their control, the Taliban commanders remained relatively entrenched in the capital, and proceeded to press their efforts to resistant factional commanders around the country. This situation existed until September 11, 2001.

The Taliban emerged similarly as the other armed groups in Afghanistan before it. It was not even the only radical Jihadist organization active at the time. Benefiting from connections with powerful external backers and bribery-over-combat tactics, it largely succeeded where others had failed. It took the capital and declared victory well before it had consolidated its rule. Even on September 11th, Kabul was being shelled by groups resistant to Taliban rule. After the US-led liberation of Afghanistan, the Taliban did not change course. Rather, it fell back to its base in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces. As with most rebel groups, its actions fail to live up to their rhetoric. One of the earliest actions involved rescuing children from abusers. They then became the abusers. They pledged to combat the plague of poppy ravaging the region. Before, during and after its height, the Taliban was heavily involved in the drug-trade. Analyzing the tactics and strategy of the group, its soldiers, and commanders, reveals the extent to which the former is a product of the latter.

³⁷ Some suggest Osama bin Laden put up the \$3 million needed to pay off the remaining warlords (Peters 2009: 79).

7.3 Child Soldier Use

FARC

It is not uncommon for the stated goals and policies of an armed group to differ from its practice. However, with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the rhetoric is so far removed from reality that it difficult to understand why the pretense is maintained. In addition to being infamous for their involvement in the cocaine-industry, FARC is also notorious for its indiscriminate use of child soldiers. They are known as "little bees" for their ability to "sting" the enemy or "little carts" because they often ferry drugs and ammunition (Coalition 2001: 119). By volume, approximately 40% of FARC's forces were recruited under the age of 17 (Gutierrez-Sanin 2010). By severity, children as young as 6 are used as porters, spies, and as direct combatants (Human Rights Watch 2003). FARC routinely violates international norms by recruiting children in high numbers and disturbingly low ages.

FARC claims to respect international norms regarding children and child soldiers, but in practice it routinely violate these policies. In 1999, FARC publicly stated it would not allow recruits under age 15 to join their forces. This pledge was made to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. Questions about under-15s evoke denial and assurances that such volunteers are returned to their families (Coalition 2001: 121). Despite these hollow assurances, monitoring groups report a near unanimous position identifying egregious use of underage soldiers. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers regularly notes the widespread use of child combatants in Colombia and routinely identifies FARC by name in their annual reports. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary General also highlights the widespread

use of under 18s. In 2003, Human Rights Watch compiled a 150-page report outlining the abuses in Colombia, of which FARC figures prominently. When confronted by reporters about such allegations and calls to stop using children, FARC leader at the time, Manuel Marulanda, responded succinctly, "They're going to stay in the ranks" (Reuters 2000).

Child soldiers comprise a substantial portion of FARC's troop strength reflecting the routine violation of international norms. Exact numbers of children employed cannot be known, but estimates reveal a very high ratio of children to adults. Human Rights Watch (2003) estimates that between 20 and 30 percent of the regular forces are underage at any given point in time. A conservative estimate yields at least 3,600 children, and as many as 5,400 in the regular forces. However, the urban militias allied to FARC provide another large number of combatants and recruit heavily among youths (Human Rights Watch 2003). Assuming an additional 10,000 supplementary forces from these areas and further assuming a higher proportion (35%) of these are children, FARC's total estimate of children is between 7000-9000. These numbers make up a substantial portion of the estimated 14,000 child soldiers recruited by all armed groups, including paramilitaries in Colombia (Coalition 2004: 125).

Beyond basic counts and ratios, FARC is notorious for recruiting very young children. As of the late 2000s, FARC operated in over 60 active combat zones throughout Colombia. A sizeable minority of children under fifteen years old are used on nearly all of these (Human Rights Watch 2003: 24). Conscription of all males between 13 and 15 was mandated in the Putumayo Department near the Peru-Ecuador border (Coalition 2001: 121). In the municipality of Cunday (Tolima), FARC demanded that all children over the age of 12 would be forced to join the group (Coalition 2004: 126). In the

demilitarized zone, FARC conscripted "all persons between the ages of 13 and 60." In truth, though, there is no lower-bound age to FARC's recruitment efforts. Children are often "born into armed groups because their parents are members" (Coalition 2001: 119). A FARC training video shows children around the age of 11 contributing to the war effort (Coalition 2001: 122). On April 17, 2003, a boy was killed trying to deliver a bomb to a military checkpoint. He was 10 years old (Coalition 2004: 125). Of the 112 former child combatants in Colombia interviewed by Human Rights Watch in 2003, 71.25% were recruited by FARC. Over 70% were recruited before their 15th birthday. Finally, 32.5% of these children were recruited when they were under the age of 13 (Human Rights Watch 2003: 144-149).

Despite a pledge to follow international commitments towards children, FARC does not. Not only do they routinely violate the rights of children, but they do so on a massive scale. Some of the most vulnerable members of society, the very young, are indiscriminately recruited by the guerillas to be serve a variety of roles. The use of child soldiers by FARC, both in both number and severity, coupled with the realization that children make weak soldiers, offers a clear indication that their recruitment practices are not driven by pursuit of victory on the battlefield.

Taliban

The first US casualty in Afghanistan was at the hands of a 15-year old Afghan sniper. Taliban's history of child soldier use is consistent and extends to their early days when they would empty madrassas in Pakistan of students to fill their ranks against the warlords in the south. During their brief reign in Kabul, they denied the regular NGO

reports that said they recruited children. Following the US intervention, the Taliban largely ended this charade and their abuse of children was widespread and visible. Showing complete disregard to both international norms and children's rights, the Taliban not only regularly use child soldiers but do so at very-young ages and in extreme ways.

The Taliban consistently bolsters its forces with children, but surprisingly makes some effort to hide this fact. When the UN Secretary General reported that between 2000 and 5000 children served on the frontlines for the Taliban in their struggle against the Mujahedeen, the leaders denied the report and invited monitors onto the frontlines to verify (Coalition 2001). In the Taliban Rule Book, Rule 19 states " Mujahideen are not allowed to take young boys with no facial hair onto the battlefield..." (Schuster 2006). As far back as 1998, Mullah Omar warned of "severe punishment," for those that recruited (effectively) under-18s (BBC 1999). However, in practice these proclamations are routinely broken. In 1994, the interim government ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. The Taliban annulled this when they took Kabul two years later (Coalition 2001: 29).

The Taliban made use of child soldiers from the start. They used the network of madrassas in Pakistan and called on local mullahs to meet troop quotas, often filled with child conscripts (Coalition 2001: 32). During their occupation of Kabul, the Taliban regularly called on Madrassa students to fight against the Northern Alliance (as Massoud's forces were then known). An estimated 5000 students, some as young as 14, were called to action, forcing many schools to close entirely (Galpin 1999). Child soldiering remains problematic throughout Afghanistan, but is especially bad in the areas where the Taliban is active and maintains their strongholds. Allegations of child

recruitment is highest in the South, Southeast and eastern regions of the country, particularly in the Helmand and Kandahar provinces (UNSC report 2008: 7). Other noted offenders include the Haqqani network, closely aligned to the Taliban, and sometimes-ally/sometimes-enemy, Hikmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami. These groups and these regions are also in areas most heavily involved in the poppy-trade.

With increased attention following the US occupation, the Taliban's crimes against children have become more apparent. Young children are used as spies, messengers, and human shields. In 2009, the *Washington Times* reported that children as young as 7 were being "purchased" by Taliban leaders to serve as suicide bombers. Another report documented a 6-year old caught wearing an explosive vest at a Coalition checkpoint. Thankfully, the vest was defused and no one was injured (Guardian 2007). A 12-year old boy beheaded a man accused of being a spy in a video released by the Taliban. "We want to tell the non-Muslims that our youngsters are also Mujahideens [holy warriors] and fight with us against you... These youngsters will be our Holy War commanders in the future and continue the jihad for freedom," said Taliban commander Mullah Hayatullah Khan (Reuters 2007).

Unlike many other armed groups, the Taliban has access to tens of thousands of battle-hardened veterans proficient in guerilla fighting. They even have experience fighting a better trained, better-armed superpower. Despite this access, they use children. What is more, they put a premium on recruiting children, and use them at very young ages. Child soldiers serve little tactical advantage and their combat effectiveness, even as suicide bombers is limited. Taken together, these facts suggest that military victory is less valuable than maintaining the fight.

7.4 Importance of Funding

FARC

FARC began with 44 members vowing to protect the peasant from state and elite encroachment. Four decades later, the group stands at 18,000, the largest guerilla movement in Latin America, with an annual income of around \$300 million (Kreutz 2007). If it were a country its economy would rank approximately 43rd in the world putting it ahead of Saudi Arabia, Brazil and Mexico. Founded on principles of protection and delivery of public services, the local peasants supported FARC with donations, supplementing additional income gathered through taxation, extortion, bank robbery, and ransom. The contemporary stated goals of the rebellion are indicative of these roots, but motivations have evolved as conditions have changed. Beginning first as a rural/peasant protection organization, the rise of the narcotics industry has polluted FARC's original foundation and the pursuit of profits has altered the political calculus of the organization.

In the early years of the insurgency, FARC relied on contributions from locals and a progressive taxation system that targeted the landowners, but turned to the illicit economy following economic and demographic shifts in the 1970s. Throughout the decade they had relied on the standard portfolio that most Latin American guerillas enjoyed. The rural peasants (*campesinos*) supported FARC with donations in return for protection. At this time, the organization engaged in small-scale predatory actions such as kidnapping and bank robbery (Cook 2011). Though not under their direct control, FARC also received donations from Russia and Cuban communist groups. The guerillas first began their foray into the illicit economy by taxing the marijuana trade in the 1970s.

Cartels settled in guerilla-held areas by agreeing to pay protection taxes. This was estimated to be approximately 10% of all transactions (Joyce and Malamud 1998:69). The funds allowed FARC to expand its operation and increase the number of fronts in the civil war. However, it also resulted in more autonomous commanders with some actively involved in the narcotics trade (McDermott 2004:29). The profitability of the trade in marijuana was limited compared to cocaine. First, the profits were primarily enjoyed by the Mexican and American distributors rather than the growers in Colombia. This limited the tax revenue claimed by FARC. Second, a combined US and Colombian anti-Marijuana policy in the 1980s aimed to curtail the trade. Unlike the coca plant, marijuana is distinguishable from other native flora and was thus more easily targeted by anti-drug forces. Third, cocaine is agriculturally efficient. It grows well in inclement conditions and poor soil. Unlike other crops, including marijuana, it does not need large-scale irrigation or fertilization (Cook 2011). Finally, cocaine-paste can be derived, extending the storage life of the final product indefinitely. All of these features, coupled with growing North American and European demand, altered FARC's funding profile and offered the resources to expand their operations considerably.

Moving into the cocaine industry proved highly lucrative for the group. FARC initially resisted entry into the market. In 1982 at the Seventh Guerrilla Conference, leaders weighed the decision against their ideological position. By this point, FARC leaders on the Caqueta front had already tapped into the cocaine industry. Ultimately, they determined that the benefits (expanded operations) outweighed the costs (reduced ideological purity) and a Financial Commission emerged to direct the proceeds (Marcy 2010). At first the profits were limited, as FARC instituted a 10% tax on growers

(*gramaje*). Involvement grew quickly. Using new international narco-trafficking networks, FARC moved into sales and market manipulation (Ribetti 2007). In the early 90s, the group was bringing in \$60-100 million per year from the drug trade. By early 2000's the organization is estimated to have made around \$300 million per year, with 60% of the total coming exclusively from the drug trade (Richani 2002). This profitability changed the FARC's strategy and allowed it to expand its operational reach considerably. In the 1980s, insurgents maintained a presence in just 17% of the country. By 1995, this had grown to 58% (DeShazo, Primiani, and McLean 2007). FARC maintained just 27 military fronts in 1983. After adopting pro-cocaine policies, this more than doubled with the group operating on over 60 fronts by 1995 and over 70 by 2000 (Kreutz 2007: 273).

The financial prospects of FARC continued to rise as the US War on Drugs took its toll on the more vulnerable narco-traffickers in the late 1980s. The death of Pablo Escobar in 1993 and combined US-Colombian financial warfare on the Medellin and Cali Cartels strengthened FARC's position as a powerhouse in the global narcotics industry. Using profits from the cocaine-trade, it grew to considerable proportions and pushed the weak Colombian military out of important agricultural sectors. This in turn offered more drug-related profits. In fact, by July 1999, 65% of Colombians thought that the state was apt to fall to the insurgency (DeShazo, Primiani, and McLean 2007). Despite this surge in resources and strength, FARC never successfully challenged state hegemony or made a drive for Bogotá or other major cities. Instead of capitalizing on their

newfound prosperity, FARC maintained the conflict-status quo. It was good for business.

Taliban

Like their contemporaries, the Taliban reaped reward from Afghanistan's principle crop, the poppy. Many actors, both individuals and groups, not only got rich from the global heroin trade, but were also intertwined with the Taliban. From the beginning, it was an organization centered on the poppy plant. This has not changed, and the industry has only gotten more lucrative under the heightened conflict conditions following the Taliban's ouster from Kabul.

The Taliban's key financial allies depend on the drug trade. An early financier of the Taliban's operations was the Pakistani transportation mafia, which made big profits smuggling opium from Afghanistan to distributors around the world. Before 1996, the Quetta-Kandahar trucking mafia provided and estimated \$450,000 over two days for the organization to open up trade routes to Iran (Peters 2009: 76). Some suggest they deserve more credit than the ISI in getting the Taliban started. The World Bank estimates that the profit from the narcotics trade approaches \$1.25 billion annually.

The trucking mafia is not the only beneficiary conflict perpetuation. Hikmatyar, as mentioned earlier, was an early dominant party in the narcotics industry. When his Hizb-i-Islami party was allied with the Taliban, he paid up to 25% of his profit to the Taliban for security. His organization was a "full-fledged narco-terror organization," trading in heroin, gemstones and timber (Peters 2009). Another Taliban ally, the Haqqani group, was also tied into the smuggling trade. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

fought alongside the Taliban against the Northern alliance in the mid-90s. They are a key heroin distributor in Central Asia. Haji Bashir Noorzai was an huge profiteer from the drug trade with tens of thousands of acres of poppy farmland. He was arrested in 2008 on heroin charges in the US. He was also one of Omar's original sponsors, working with the trucking mafia and sponsoring Madrassas in Quetta, Pakistan (Peters 2009: 75).

There is overwhelming evidence that the Taliban profits considerably from narcotics trafficking and by extension, the conflict situation in which it thrives. The heroin-opium-poppy capital of the world is located in the Taliban-held areas. In 1999, 75% global poppy-crop came from Afghanistan. Given the level of Taliban occupation, it is not surprising then that 97% of this was grown in areas under Taliban influence or direct control (Peters 2009: 81). Even after Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power and scattered their troops, in 2007 80% of the opium produced in Afghanistan was from Taliban regions (see Figure 13). In 2008, drought reduced the poppy crop by 19%. However, at this point 98% was cultivated in insurgent-areas of the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Hikmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami. The Executive Director of the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in 2009 that Afghanistan does not have an opium problem, rather "a southern opium problem," Furthermore, approximately 60 functioning heroin labs are believed to be in the Taliban-strongholds of Helmand and Nangarhar provinces alone.

From this control comes considerable wealth. According to the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), 70% of the Taliban's financing comes from drugs (Peters 2009: 14). In 2001, the estimate for Taliban and al-Qaeda profits from the drug trade reached \$1 billion. The figure for all traffickers in 2007 was \$4 billion. Approximately \$1

billion moves through the hawala dealers in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar alone. Taliban-collected drug taxes garnered approximately \$56 million at the farm level in 2007 (UNODC 2008). From heroin refineries they garnered an additional \$133 million per year. They collected a further \$250 million in protecting drug shipments.

--Figure 13 here--

In its earliest stage, the Taliban was dependent upon and intertwined with the international narcotics trade. Early financiers were archetypal drug warlords and drug smugglers. It was they who profited from the Taliban's takeover, and maintained strong incentives in the chaotic situation that has reigned in Afghanistan since the 1970s. Drugs fueled the Taliban's rise to power in other ways by allowing their militarily inept forces and leadership to co-opt rivals, thereby supplementing their forces and expanding their territory. The massive profits reaped to the Taliban and its allies by their involvement did not change after September 11th.

7.5 Causal Mechanisms

FARC

FARC and other actors in Colombia's civil war have adapted to the political economy of the insurgency. Richani (2002) argues that the primary actors, guerillas, military and paramilitaries, benefit from the stalemate presently reached. Analysis of the profits available to the FARC supports this notion. FARC's recruitment practices reflect a rational change from an overt political strategy to one of profit.

Tactical decisions indicate a priority towards financial-security rather than military success. A surge in strength and capability coincided with an incredible

expansion of territory, although these acquisitions focused on protecting valuable drug-producing areas. In addition, FARC went on the offensive and challenged military positions more directly than they had in the 1970s. However, despite these gains, decisions reflected the increasing importance of income over military victory. The troop strength increased exponentially from 1990-2002 (see Figure 12). However, the estimated battle-deaths at this same time suggest that, rather than using increased forces to engage the military, the conflict status quo was maintained. Were FARC interested in using their new wealth to further the revolutionary cause, not just engagements, but high-intensity maneuvers would be evident. This has not been the case.

--Figure 12 here--

Recruitment and indoctrination patterns indicate a pollution of FARC's original goals.

Low level soldiers in the group are often admittedly driven by economic or selfish motivations. Former FARC guerillas interviewed in 2000-2001 revealed that they were not even aware of the group's ideological goals (Ribetti 2007: 716). This lack of commitment did not change as many members left the group when the promised economic resources were not given. Increasingly autonomous commanders are active in the drug trade, making economic rather than military decisions. Middle Rank (Mandos medios) are known to pocket the *gramajes* tax money defying the leadership which lays claim to all resources. At least \$2 million has been lost through embezzlement at the middle-ranks in 2000 alone (Ribetti 2007). FARC leadership appears increasingly removed from the ideological underpinnings of the rebellion's origins. FARC commanders often do not explain to members what would be different if it actually won.

Interviewed former guerrillas indicated that they "did not perceive leaders as caring, committed or just" (Ribetti 2007: 71). Further, internal disagreement remains about whether winning is a desirable strategy (Kreutz 2007:287). This fractionalization has routinely led to breakdown in peace negotiations. On November 4, 2011 the leader of FARC, Alfonso Cano, was killed by targeted air strikes. The timing of the offensive was somewhat surprising because Cano had begun to engage the government in peace talks. It was perhaps less surprising when it was revealed that Cano's own inner security circle had provided the necessary intelligence for the operation (Hinchliffe 2011).

Using child soldiers supports this changing set of priorities. Beber and Blattman (2010) suggest that 15 represents the age of higher combat effectiveness for children. However, FARC withholds these troops for other duties and instead uses the very inefficient younger children for combat. Using data from Human Rights Watch, younger child soldiers are statistically more likely to have seen combat than their older comrades. Contrary to what one might expect, children over 15 are less likely to be involved in higher levels of combat. This is true even when controlling for the number of months served.³⁸ Also, those involved with this group are less likely to see high levels of conflict compared to their non-FARC peers. Children under the age of 15 have a .118 likelihood of avoiding combat, compared to .3 for those 15 years or older. They are also 21.7% likely to have been in combat between 10 and 20 times. This is only 11% for those 15 or over. Finally, children over 15, those Blattman expects to be more capable, only see

³⁸ I estimated an ordered logistic regression where the dependent variable is categorical and records combat involvement (Table 7.1). Here, "0" means the child did not see combat; "1" means they saw it less than 10 times or "a few times;" "2" means between 10 and 20 times or "several times;" and "3" means they saw combat more than 20 times or "many times." The independent variables include a dichotomous age variable, 15 years or older, months served in the organization, voluntary recruitment, and a dichotomous variable for having at some point been a member of FARC.

combat "over 20 times" or "many times" at a rate of .06. For children under 15, this increases 140% (.15).³⁹ These data are only suggestive at this point, but they do point to routine decisions to send ineffective, very young children into combat over older, more capable (though still not as capable as adults) child soldiers.⁴⁰

--Table 6 here--

FARC's decisions reflect an organization that is more concerned with economic gain than social justice. Exploring the tactical decisions, FARC failed to capitalize on its growing strength, and the weak position of the government, opting instead to maintain its hegemony in the lucrative coca-producing regions. Furthermore, the individual motivations of low, middle, and high-ranking members reveal the level of distortion that drug-profits has brought. The decision to use child soldiers and the way in which they are used illustrates just how far FARC has come from its humble origins. Despite strong ideological, popular and populist beginnings, it is now the quintessential opportunistic rebellion. Under these circumstances, using child soldiers is a rational decision by FARC leaders and commanders. This is consistent with the theory.

Taliban

The Taliban benefits financially from the conflict situation in Afghanistan. Group tactics denote a strategy that is aimed more at profit than outright victory. Even when

³⁹ Predicted probabilities were estimated at the 95% confidence level using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).

⁴⁰ Looking at the bivariate relationship, compared with how well we can predict a child's combat experience, knowledge of their entry age improves this by a substantial 28% (somer's d = -.28; p-value .012). In comparison, a similar model considering the months served only improves our prediction by 54% (p-value .000).

they held control of the capital, running a functioning state was not important. Rather, they maintained and expanded involvement in the most profitable sector of their internal economy: the opium-trade. Consistent with the theory, Taliban behavior before, during and after their occupation of Kabul is rational based on the political economy of the war system.

Having largely achieved control of the country by 2001, it could be argued that the Taliban did, in fact, care a lot about winning. This is not the case. Despite overtures to gain international recognition for their government, they routinely flaunted international public opinion, enraged the United Nations, and alienated other Muslim countries. The Taliban routinely illustrated their disdain for world opinion with several high profile acts. When they entered Kabul, their earliest acts showed how little they cared about international opinion. On September 27, 1996 at 1:00 am, they entered the UN compound in Kabul, severely beat, castrated, and then drug the former President Najibullah to his death (BBC 2001). This immediately signaled that diplomatic territory would not be respected. Even Islamic countries that had been less hostile to the Taliban's strict interpretation of Islam denounced their actions. After formal condemnation by the UN, the Taliban responded by issuing *additional* death sentences for Dostum, Rabbani and Massoud (Rashid 2010: 50). In a further display of a lack of respect for diplomatic protection, the UN staff pulled out of Kandahar in 1998 after staffers were beaten and threaten by senior Taliban officials (Rashid 2010: 70). The Governor of the city threw a table and chair at one UN official. The bodies of Afghan UN aid staff were found, with no explanation for their deaths, followed shortly after with the secret execution of 11 Iranian diplomats in the town of Hazarajat. Poor treatment of women took on diplomatic

importance when female aid agency staff were first forbidden to be in public without a related, male escort, which was almost impossible for many staffers. They even forced a female UNHCR lawyer to speak from behind a curtain when meeting with low-level Taliban officials (Rashid 2010: 65). Taliban treatment of women received high profile critics. For example, US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright said, "We are opposed to the Taliban because of their opposition to human rights and their despicable treatment of women and children " (Rashid 2010: 65). International Women's Day 1998 was devoted to the plight of Afghan women. Further acts scorned world opinion. In 2001, Mullah Omar ordered the ancient Buddha status at Bamiyan dynamited. Of course, after the US embassy bombings in Africa, the Taliban rebuffed all diplomatic efforts to turn over Osama bin Laden. In the end, only Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia ever recognized the Taliban government. By 2001, the Saudis had already rescinded this recognition.

The Taliban depends on the poor security that conflict conditions create. The Taliban has proven especially hostile to global humanitarian efforts to alleviate poverty in the areas they control. In addition to the above anecdotes, the head of UN humanitarian aid operations was refused entry to visit Kabul in 1998. Further, the Taliban closed all NGO offices in Kabul and forced them to move to an old college on the outskirts of the city, one that had been all but destroyed in the fighting for the capital (Rashid 2010: 72). Two Afghans that were working for the UNHCR and World Food Program were kidnapped and executed in Jalalabad. The harsh tactics and human rights violations prompted the EU to suspend all aid to areas under Taliban control. The presence of Western aid agencies would have jeopardized the Taliban's primary source of income.

Poor farmers grow poppy because it is one of the only things they can do. If aid agencies and national stability were present, they would be able to offer the citizens alternatives. The Taliban did not want humanitarian assistance threatening their economic system. The restrictions and poor treatment appeared to be working. The Assistant to the Secretary General Brahimi, who was tasked with brokering peace negotiations with the groups in Afghanistan, went public about his frustrations: "This is an organization that hands out edicts to us that prevents us from doing our job. The Taliban must know that not only is there a limit to what you can stand but that there are growing pressures on us - in particular from the donor community to say that there's a limit" (Rashid 2010: 72). UN accommodations, including bringing in female Muslims to work at UN healthcare facilities, proved too patient and compromising for the Taliban. Clearly not taking the hint, on July 20, 1998, the Taliban ordered all NGO offices closed and removed the staff by force. This effectively ended humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Lasting peace and the presence of aid agencies is bad for business. Ashraf Ghani, the former finance minister of Afghanistan put it succinctly; "Drug smugglers do not want to see this country become stable" (Peters 2009:5).

In practice the Taliban indicate a preference for profits over military or political victory. They use tactics that favor the narcotics industry rather than retaking Kabul. For example, Deh Rawood fell to the Taliban in February 2009. The target did not have military value. However, it is one of the most important smuggling routes in the Uruzgan province (Moore 2008). Taliban tactics changed from trying to gain tactical advantage to protection and diversion (Peters 2009: 116). Major offensives on security checkpoints take place during covert drug transportation. Even September 11th can be seen not as a

political blunder, but an investor's careful, calculated action. Before September 11th, the regional price of a kg of opium hovered around \$35. In 2001, this soared to over \$300/kg before settling to around \$100/kg in 2004 (UNODC 2008). In 2009, diplomatic cables revealed that the Taliban use opium stocks as a sort of illicit stock exchanged. Stockpiles for commanders, including Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, reached considerable heights during their five year reign. Figure 14 shows how high their stock prices got in 2001. With such considerable profits at stake, there is little distinction between the commanders and the drug traffickers. Said one UN official, "What is the Taliban? They are gone now. What we have now is people working together just to make money." According to a survey of 350 people working in the drug trade along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, 81% said the Taliban commanders' first priority was to make money (Peters 2009: 13). Thus, the Taliban bears little resemblance to the organization that resides in popular perception.

--Figure 14 here--

Using child soldiers, particularly in the way that they are deployed by the Taliban, is not a tactic for victory. It can, however, maintain instability, insecurity, and prove nurturing to conditions most enjoyed by narco-traffickers. It is a tragedy that children are used as suicide bombers and a blessing when they are intervened, defused, and reintegrated into peaceful society. However, it is telling that so many of them are unsuccessful. Contrasting this with other suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories reveals that if the Taliban was serious about winning, it would use older, more capable bombers.⁴¹ The Israeli Security Services (Shin Bet) collected data on all Palestinian

⁴¹ Palestinian goals are different and this likely determines their tactics of avoiding underage suicide bombers. Of course the theory presented in this project would predict this outcome for two reasons. First,

suicide bombings since 2000. The average age for bombers was 22, and a plurality (38%) had completed more than 12 years of education (Yom and Saleh 2009). Further, of the 159 suicide bombings between 2000-2005, 151 were committed by individuals aged 17 or over.

While similar to the other Islamic groups active in Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Taliban shared one impressive difference: they managed to achieve a degree of success by taking Kabul in 1996. Even though they largely succeeded, government control was never the goal. The Taliban made overtures in a half-hearted effort to achieve international recognition. For example, they officially banned opium in 1999. However, this only succeeded in driving prices higher, benefiting the leadership financially. Instead, tactics, strategy, and recruitment practices from 1996 to the present provide evidence that, rather than an organization that truly believes in establishing a particular ideology across Central Asia, the Taliban is, and has always been, a greed-based rebellion.

Summary

In Chapter 3, I argued that rebellions that use illicit funds are more likely to use child soldiers. Opportunism creeps into the organization and regardless of stated motives, there is value in maintaining the conflict status quo. Insurgents will use child soldiers because they can artificially inflate the size of the organization, encouraging conflict conditions and keeping the rebellion active, and they are less expensive than adults and easier to keep from sharing the spoils of war. At the same time, children are less capable

many Palestinian groups aim to have their own state. Therefore, they need international support and should refrain from using youths. Second, absent evidence to the contrary, most Palestinian groups are free from the opportunism that is present in other groups. Therefore, a political victory is desired over the conflict status quo. They want to win.

and having child soldiers risk international scorn. Neither of these drawbacks should discourage opportunistic rebellions because they do not care about the international community, and they put a low premium on winning.

This process was seen in both FARC and the Taliban. FARC appeared to desire victory when it began as a peasant-based organization. However, when it became involved in the international drug industry, the link to the people was distorted by illicit-market incentives. They now command a small fortune and ending the conflict either through victory or defeat is being avoided at all costs. The use of child soldiers by FARC is expected. They keep expenditures low, and they allow the army to operate over a wide territory. At the same time, they also do not risk "accidentally" winning.

Similarly, the Taliban maintained links with the illicit economy from the beginning of their movement. Calling itself a religious organization, their actions portray a group more in-tune with the underground economy. The economic activities of commanders alone would be enough to suggest ulterior motives. Their motivations are betrayed even further by looking at the powerful financial backers of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Most Taliban decisions reflect a preference for conflict. Using child soldiers is rational because they make they reduce overhead, distract coalition forces from targeting their financial installations and keep the world's attention on the region. All of which produce high profits for the Taliban.

7.6 Competing Factors

Beyond the opportunism/demand argument presented here, additional factors may explain flagrant child soldier use in these cases. Ever-present in the discussion is the

possibility that culture regarding child rights is lower in some cases than others.

Additionally, Achvarina and Reich (2006) argue that refugee and IDP camp protection limits how many child soldiers can be used. Finally, state-level features of economic development and poverty might explain some instances of child abuse by rebellions.

However, none of these can adequately explain the similar recruitment patterns of FARC and the Taliban.

The two groups are from very different cultural environments. Both are from a culture that maintain respect for child rights and condemns child soldier use. Colombia has adopted many child rights provisions. Due to public backlash, other child rights abusers like the AUC, have released many child soldiers. Stories of FARC's child rights violations are believed to alienate the population to the point that their political goals are threatened (Gutierrez-Sanin 2010). In 1998, in the largest voter turnout in Colombia's history, citizens voted in favor of the "Citizens' Mandate for Peace, Life and Liberty." This referendum called on armed groups to stop involving children in the war (Bellamy 2000). In Afghanistan, 89% of respondents to a Red Cross survey believed that "no one should take up arms for combat before the age of 18" (Greenberg 1999). A further 76% said the minimum age should be 20 years, and fully 19% favored a 21-year limit for combat. Further, UN efforts to demobilize and rehabilitate child soldiers have been met with support by local tribal leaders (Coalition 2004:163). In addition, the groups themselves hold very different religious and ideological positions. The Taliban is a radical religious organization. Ostensibly Islamic, for many Muslims, the group's strict interpretation is in truth a perversion of the religion. Conversely, FARC is a secular organization active in a largely Catholic country.

Also, public expression of faith are suppressed and "there is little tolerance of religion or spiritual needs" (Human Rights Watch 2003: 51).

Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) protection is at first a plausible explanation for the high levels of rights-violations by these groups. While the number of refugees is low in both countries, Afghanistan and Colombia have a high number of IDPs due to the ongoing conflict. In 2000, UNHCR estimates that over 750,000 Afghans, 3% of the population, were displaced. By 2005, this had dropped to around .5%, but remained close to 1% displacement in 2009. Colombia too has had a high number of IDPs. Nearly 5% of the population was reported displaced in 2000 (950,000). This soared to over 3 million in 2009 (7.2% of the population). However, despite such similarly high figures, there is variation in the degree of both international and national protection. All 297,000 IDPs were assisted by UNHCR in Afghanistan in 2009 compared to just 17% in Colombia. In addition, considerable funds are available thanks to the presence of Coalition forces in Afghanistan. The budget (largely based on donations) in 2009 was nearly \$5.7 million for Afghanistan. Nearly \$1.3 million was devoted exclusively to protection. In Colombia, less than half the Afghan total is allotted (\$2.3 million). This equates to about \$7 of assistance per person compared to nearly \$200 in Afghanistan. Of course, available assistance does not equate with IDP protection. UNHCR is only able to reach about 51% of Afghanistan's population, while in Colombia most IDPs (~82%) are settled in large urban centers where they are largely protected from abduction by government forces (UNHCR 2009: 317-318). High concentrations of vulnerable youths still play a role in the levels of child soldiers observed in the FARC and Taliban. The Taliban and other groups are known to recruit heavily from youths studying at madrassas

in Pakistan. Further, FARC will target schools during their recruitment drives. However, the level of protection for these concentrated youths varies to a considerable degree. Teachers in Colombia have increasingly been victim to armed attacks due to resistance to guerilla recruitment drives (US State Dept. 2000). This suggests that while far from secure, there is a degree of resistance from administrators in Colombia's schools. In Pakistan, it is often the heads of the schools themselves that recruit on behalf of armed groups in Afghanistan. In 1997, after his father brought the incident to the High Court in Karachi, a boy returned from Afghanistan. "I was persuaded to go to Afghanistan by the nazim of the school," he said. He was one of 600 recruited that day (Amnesty International 1998). Thus, while both the Taliban and FARC have a large number of potentially vulnerable youths housed in both IDP camps and education centers, variation in levels of protection limit this as an appropriate causal explanation for the high rates of abuse observed in these groups. While very plausible, few conclusions can be reached in these cases regarding the relationship between child protection and likelihood of recruitment.

At the state-level, the rebellions face very different antagonists. Both countries are very different economically. Colombia represents one of the regional economic powerhouses in Latin America. One of the few countries to withstand the debt crisis of the 1980s, Colombia averaged 1.75% growth rate. Since 1990, GDP per capita has nearly doubled from 4370 in 1990, to 8379 in 2007. Conversely, growth in Afghanistan remained stagnant coming from decades of instability and strife. From 1990-2001, the economy consistently retracted, reaching a trough of -26.78% growth in 1994. Since 2003, growth has been positive and averaging a healthy 6.9%. However, the average

GDP per capita was only \$535 in 1990. In 2003 it had only reached \$548. After positive growth since the Taliban's ouster, GDP per capita remains a worrisome \$797. Further, Colombia maintains a relatively diverse economy with only 18% of the labor force employed in the agricultural sector. Fully 68% of the labor force is employed in the service-sector. Unemployment was 11.2% in 2011. In comparison, Afghanistan is reliant on agriculture (78.6%) and unemployment reached 35% in 2008. The differences are equally stark when exploring political indicators. Using the Polity IV scores, when FARC began in 1968 Colombia was already establishing its democracy (+7) and was improving. The regime officially crossed into the "democracy zone" in 1957 and has never dropped below a +7 in Polity. Subsequent Afghan regimes have never reached above a -7 since 1973. The current administration does not receive a value from Polity researchers because of the conflict situation, though subjective accounts tell of corruption and nepotism that challenges new democratic institutions. Exploring these state level features reveal very different political and economic indicators. Thus, these features cannot adequately explain the variation in recruitment profiles by the Taliban and FARC.

The FARC and the Taliban represent two insurgencies with varied features. They vary considerably on nearly every factor. They differ in terms of stated goals, religion, culture, geography, history, and even the targeted governments are very different. However, they share funding profiles that, contrary to what one would expect has not resulted in an increase in capabilities and troop quality. Instead, they are both engaged heavily in the recruitment of low quality, but inexpensive child soldiers. Commentators on both groups suggest ulterior motives based on the profit of the illicit economy. In short, they have an incentive for conflict, but not to win the conflict. Recruiting children

can accomplish this feat. Maintaining a set level of violence and insecurity is good for business. Children are easily recruited, easily manipulated, and cheap. They may not fight well, but that is not what the recruiters are after.

7.7 Conclusion

Systematic comparison of the FARC and the Taliban supports the secondary hypothesis presented in chapter 3. The funding profiles of rebel organizations can influence their decision to use child soldiers. The pursuit of profit and the level of opportunism in an organization influences how the decision is weighed. The trade-off of using children comes down to a question of costs and capabilities. Children are cheaper but less capable soldiers. The evidence presented here suggests that where costs are more of a concern, children are more likely to be used. Profit-seeking rebellions-those financed by illicit funds-benefit from the status quo. More than motivating takeover, the conflict scenario is necessary to take advantage of a climate that is conducive to illegal trade. Comparing two rebel organizations reveals that while different in almost every way, the Taliban and FARC insurgencies share a disregard for children's rights. They also appear to be highly influenced by involvement in the drug-trade of their regions. Such involvement appears to pollute their motivations and tactical decisions. While it cannot be attributed to any single factor, the evidence presented here supports the idea that the decision to use child soldiers is strongly influenced by the value of victory. When winning means an end to lucrative drug profits, cheap soldiers will be used.

Table 7.1 Impact of Age and Affiliation on Level of Combat Experience

Table 6: Impact of Age and Affiliation on Level of Combat Experience

	Combat
Over 14 years old	-1.128* (0.619)
FARC	-1.169** (0.521)
Months Served	0.0795*** (0.0222)
Voluntary	0.815 (0.794)
Cut1	-0.446 (0.770)
Cut2	2.200*** (0.827)
Cut3	3.421*** (0.792)
Observations	84
Wald chi-squared	25.85***
Pseudo R-squared	0.263


Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 11: Map of Colombia Indicating FARC Areas




Source: BBC 2002

Figure 12: FARC Troop Strength and Estimated Battle Deaths (1990-2002)




Source: Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas 2004; Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch et al. 2002).

Figure 13: Regional Opium Cultivation and Production in Afghanistan, 2009



Source: Government of Afghanistan - National Monitoring System Implemented by UNODC (2009).

Figure 14: Opium Prices at Harvest Time (1994-2008)



Sources: UNODC (2008) Opium Surveys, 1994-2008 (Annual Village Survey)

Chapter Eight

Legitimacy Constraints and the SPLM/A

8.1 Introduction

John Garang died in an accidental helicopter crash on July 30, 2005. He had successfully led the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) through 22 years of conflict against the government of Sudan. Before taking the reins of leadership, he served as the head of the Army Staff College for Sudan. He arrived here after earning progressively higher rank in the Army. Eleven years earlier, Captain Garang began his career with the Sudanese army after the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement that brought to a close the first Sudanese Civil War by reintegrating the southern rebels into the Khartoum government. Ten years before that, he enlisted with the rebels. He was 17 years old.

That the leader of the group had been an underage fighter makes it unsurprising that SPLM were known for routinely recruiting child soldiers. What is surprising is that this same group led South Sudan to independence in 2011. The theory presented in Chapter 3 argues that separatists should be less likely to use child soldiers because of the weight of legitimacy in the international community. However, this is a case where a seemingly secessionist group both achieved independence with international support, and used child soldiers. On its surface, my theory fails. A closer look at the case, however, reveals that the SPLM and the independence of South Sudan is much more nuanced than can be captured with quantitative data.

--Figure 15 here--

In this chapter I offer an explanation for how my theory accurately captures the behavior of the SPLM. First, the low- and mid-ranking SPLM commanders maintained a strong degree of autonomy. They lacked the awareness of international standards regarding recruitment (UNSC 2007:5). This alone would not account for child soldiering if it had not been coupled with undetermined goals. In the second section, I discuss the evolution of group goals within the SPLM. Secession remained an undercurrent throughout the various southern rebel movements since the end of the first civil war in 1972. However, the SPLM, specifically the leadership of John Garang presented inconsistent goals. This rift even led to fractionalization that plagued the group throughout the 90s. The third section presents evidence that, far from being out of touch with the international community, the SPLM had strong awareness of the importance of international opinion. Consistent with predictions of the theory, this was weighed most heavily by those pushing for independence. Finally, when both the norm against recruitment of child soldiers solidified in the 1990s and the group coalesced around the idea of independence for the South in the 2000s, it was then that the strong forms of child protection become routine.

8.2 Child Recruitment by the SPLM

One defining feature of the second Sudanese civil war was the severe humanitarian crisis. The civilian populations were targeted and were treated as resources. This is true of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), government-aligned militias, various southern rebels and even the SPLM. One particular problem was the routine abduction and conscription of children. The famed "Lost-Boys of Sudan" are depicted in various

media. Over 20,000 children displaced from the fighting ended up in refugee camps in Ethiopia, asylum in Western countries, or, as child soldiers in southern Sudan. Even though it is justified on the grounds that they are recruited for their own protection, it cannot be denied that the SPLM used child soldiers at high volumes and at disturbingly young ages.

Like the FARC and the Taliban, the SPLM is another high-profile recruiter of child soldiers. In southern Sudan, the policy of boy soldiers is historic but before the second civil war (1983-2005), it was limited. Children were used as military slaves before Sudanese independence in 1956. These "gun-boys" were active in the 19th century (Johnson 1992). Even during the first civil war (1955-1972), boy soldiers were not uncommon, but role was largely limited to ferrying weapons and they rarely saw actual combat (Johnson 1989). In the 1980s, the SPLM recruited children in droves. This policy was institutionalized in 1987 (Human Rights Watch 1994). In the SPLM-administered refugee camps in Ethiopia they maintained a separate camp for boys. An estimated 17,000 boys were housed and trained in such camps. Unlike other groups in the south during the 1980s and 90s, the SPLM never cooperated with reunification efforts by relief agencies (Rone 1995). When the camps were closed in 1991 after the collapse of the Ethiopian Derg regime, many refugees relocated to Kenya. The SPLM took several thousand of the boys back into the South Sudan. More recently, the number of underage recruits remained high. In 2001 there were an estimated 7000 children still enlisted (Coalition 2001). This number was cut nearly in half by 2004, but remained between 2,500 and 5,000 children (Coalition 2004). Even in 2006, there were still reports of student conscription in southern Sudan (Coalition 2008).

Not only were child recruits maintained at high volumes, but the age of the children was very low, even by local standards. Adulthood in southern Sudan had been around 15-16 years old. This is the age at which ritual scarification occurred. Since the 1980s, the age for the ritual dropped to around 13-14 years out of fear that the practice would soon be banned in a wave of modernization (Human Rights Watch 1994). The SPLM was known to recruit children as young as 9 (UNSC 2007). Since its foundation, there have been consistent reports of children under 15 being used. Many of these serve in menial roles rather than in direct combat. They were often used as bodyguards for officers or as prison guards. They were also kept off the front line and served as defense forces for liberated areas (Human Rights Watch 1994). However, active duty was always a possibility. In the first few years, battalions of children known as the Jesh Amer (Red Army) were used on the front line, but were "always massacred" (Human Rights Watch 1994: 15). In the final days of the Ethiopian Derg regime they demanded additional troops from the SPLM to fight the advancing Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front, in exchange for years of support. The SPLM sent many of their untested child recruits some as young as 11. In 1991, the SPLM split into (at least) two factions. Since the fighting took place within previously "liberated" areas, many of the combatants were underage boys.

The response to allegations of child soldiering by the SPLM included both denial and justification. Several high profile members of the SPLM denied using child soldiers. One commander told Human Rights Watch that even though they sometimes trained youths aged 15-18, they did not serve in combat (Rone 1995). If such recruits made it into the ranks because of poor birth records, they were removed and sent back to live

with their families. John Garang himself was quoted as saying, "Our cutoff age is eighteen and above" (Sharp 1991). Some officials were more candid and instead of denying the policy, they offered rationalizations for breaking international standards. Some suggest that joining the SPLM offered education opportunities that were not available elsewhere (Human Rights Watch 1994). During an interview with one South Sudanese representative, I was told that the children were recruited for their own good. You have these people from eleven years old to eighteen that were sometimes left in the village. If you left them in the village they would be captured by Khartoum. The only way to keep them away from the enemy is to keep them near to you." These competing responses indicate that even though the SPLM recruited young children by the tens of thousands, some commanders knew this was a risky move.

Many armed groups in Sudan during the 1980s were recruiting children. Everyone was doing it and the SPLM was not the worst. Still, such behavior went against international norms and many within the movement believed it would threaten international support for the group. But, as the theory points out in Chapter 3, the degree to which international support is crucial to reaching goals varies depending on the ultimate goal. It is also important that everyone for all commanders to know the official group position regarding recruitment.

8.3 Local Commander Autonomy

I discussed the internal-discipline explanation of civilian abuse in Chapter 2. Where internal discipline is low, civilian abuse should be high (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006). In Chapter 5, child soldiering, as an extension of civilian abuse, did not

appear to have empirical support. In the case of the SPLM, a dual process is likely at work. Opportunism surely drove some child recruitment, but many local commanders also were so isolated from the political center they might not have known their behavior was inappropriate. Decentralization of the SPLM command, along with a lack of understanding of world opinion present in the low- and middle-ranking officers, can partially explain the recruitment behavior

The leadership of Garang and his closest advisers coordinated policy, but the SPLM remained a decentralized rebel force. The geography of southern Sudan made coordination difficult and isolation of divisions likely. The equatorial climate promoted dense forest cover and swamps are a regular ecological feature. The Imatong Mountains and related hills limit the road network throughout the region. Finally, the White Nile River effectively cuts the territory in half. Factionalism limited the effectiveness of the southern rebellion in the first civil war (1955-1972), the Anyanya. Garang and his commanders were determined not to let the same thing happen to them (Johnson 2003). Offering limited policy direction through radio broadcasts from Ethiopia, Garang left issues such as administration, taxation and, notably, recruitment in the hands of local commanders (81). Rampant factionalism, especially after 1991 shows that this strategy was not altogether successful. Such decentralization left Garang open to criticism about the behavior of the rank and file and several middle-level commanders.

Some commanders used the tumult in the south to pursue self-interested ends. Begun in 1986 with the government-backed Murahalin raiders, many groups, including those aligned with the SPLM engaged in cattle raids. Thousands participated. Murder, rape and slavery by these bands became routine (Johnson 2003). Child abduction often

took place during such raids (UNSC 2007). In response, many new groups sprung up as self-defense organizations. Groups such as the Mundari Forces, the Didinga and Boyya militias and the Murle all organized to defend against looting and raids by SPLM-aligned forces (Institute for Security Studies 2004). These opportunistic individuals are likely to engage in child soldiering even if it went against the overall best interests of the SPLM.

While it was not always clear that the SPLM leadership thought that child soldiering was an issue that needed to be addressed, many of the low level troops did not even seem to be aware that there were standards. Some senior commanders appear knowledgeable about child rights. This was certainly true of those that were most in-touch with the international community including Riek Macher and Lam Akol. These two commanders later launched a move to oust Garang in 1991. Riek Macher was married to an NGO worker, Emma McCune that worked with children in the refugee camps and met with him personally to discuss their plight (Scroggins 2002). Lam Akol was the Director of External Relations for the SPLM and negotiated with UN personnel including the Executive Director of UNICEF (Akol 2005). Low ranking officials on the other hand seemed less aware of international norms regarding children. As recently as 2007, during a UN mission to report on the progress of the SPLM, many junior officers did not know what was expected (UNSC 2007: 5). The rift between international standards and local customs is great. As previously mentioned, many local tribes conferred adulthood at 13 years old. Given the high level of autonomy granted to low-ranking officers, it is unsurprising that they would not follow international norms. The disconnection between high-ranking officers in-tune with global opinion and local commanders following their

own customs is a partial explanation why child soldiers were so often observed in the SPLM ranks.

Geographic and political features forced the SPLM into a decentralized structure where many local leaders enjoyed considerable autonomy. Like Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) suggest, this led to opportunistic behavior at the lower ranks. However, the local commanders also failed to understand what was expected. This is true in two respects. First, they did not appear to be aware of international standards. Second, they did not always know the exact goal they were fighting for.

8.4 Explanation 2: Undetermined Goals

From the inception of the SPLM in 1983, to his death in 2005, John Garang maintained a policy known as "New Sudan." His goal was unity, not separation. This alone might explain why the theory superficially fails. However, the story is more complex. Some within the leadership wanted secession, while Garang and others did not. The compromise was self-determination. As discussed in Chapter 2, this is a nebulous concept that can be very subjective. Thus, the SPLM suffered an identity crisis with respect to group goals. Despite ending with an independent South Sudan, throughout most of its history the SPLM held only underlying sentiments of separatism. Officially, it was a national liberation movement seeking regime change in Khartoum and unity within a federal state. Therefore, they had less of a reason to show the world community they could follow standards. Instead, they just had to project enough force to pressure Khartoum into changing policies.

Separatist sentiments were strong in southern Sudan even before independence. The southern Sudan rebellion began in 1955. It emerged from a separate identity that began in the early 19th century. Sudan was first ruled by the Ottoman Empire through an Egyptian administration. The British later set up an administrative arrangement with Egypt and ruled Sudan jointly until 1956. At this time, Islamic nationalism grew in the north and a greater connection with Arab culture emerged (Thyne 2007). The southerners felt alienated. When the agreement for Sudanese independence was made in 1953, it was clear the British would make no effort to adjudicate between north/south divisions. The southerners rebelled. Through 17 years of fighting, many groups emerged in the south but coalesced around the policy of separatism. In 1963, a prominent Sudanese officer, Joseph Lagu, defected to the south. Through political maneuvering against exiled politicians he became the unified commander of the guerilla movement that would be known as the Anyanya (Johnson 2003). The position of Anyanya improved in the late 1960s. Sudan was publicly in support of the Arab forces against Israel in 1967. In response, the Israelis sent money through Ugandan connections, and offered training to Anyanya officers. Sudan was supporting Eritrean separatists in Ethiopia. In response, Haile Selassie began supporting the southern Sudanese rebels. Facing a strengthened rebel army and dwindling diplomatic support, Khartoum made peace in 1972. Under the Addis Ababa Agreement, South Sudan would become an autonomous region of Sudan. Also, the guerilla forces were to be integrated with the northern army.

This arrangement brought a semblance of peace and security to Sudan, but the underlying grievances remained. The autonomous arrangement was not acceptable for some of the Anyanya rebels that wanted political separation. Many in the guerilla army

did not accept integration and moved across the border into Ethiopia. There they would continue low-intensity actions in the name of an independent South Sudan. Nor did it quell the Islamic nationalism that was the source of southern grievances in the first place. The Sudanese President Nimeiri faced opposition by those that felt the Addis Ababa Agreement gave up too much. The autonomous arrangement allowed a non-Muslim minority equal status in an Islamic state. Nimeiri dealt with this sentiment the old-fashioned way, he arrested Hassan Al Turabi of the Muslim Brotherhood party and compelled Umma Party leader Sadiq Al-Mahdi into exile. However, economic crises in the early 1970s, and two Muslim coup attempts in 1975, and 1976, forced the president to bring his opponents into a governing coalition as a move to quell instability. Their demands were not satiated and they felt as though they were not bound to the Agreement because it was made by a dictator. They continued to push Nimeiri to the religious right. Succumbing to political pressure, poor health, isolation and paranoia, Nimeiri passed the September Laws which made Sharia law applicable to the whole of Sudan (Johnson 2003: 56). This move flared the smoldering grievances in the south.

A second civil war launched in 1983 but had a new leader and new demands. When a group of integrated southern soldiers refused transfer to the north and mutinied, the government sent John Garang to negotiate. Unbeknownst to them, Garang was one of many southern sympathizers within the SAF and police forces. Instead of quelling the mutiny, he took over their command and led them to Ethiopia to rendezvous with the remnants of the Anyanya forces to form the Sudan People's Liberation Movement. Garang maintained a policy of unity with the North. He called for a "New Sudan" that would end the dictatorship of Khartoum and establish a secular state. This clashed with

the old Anyanya leadership and exiled politicians that maintained a call for independence. Garang enjoyed many strengths that would lead to his dominance of this new rebel force. But they were all of secondary importance because he had the backing of Ethiopia. The southern rebels depended on Ethiopia as a host for their bases and a regular supplier of arms and other resources. Since Addis Ababa faced their own separatist rebellions, they were anathema to such a position and supported a policy of national liberation. In July, the SPLM issued a Manifesto listing their grievances and policy platform. They rebelled against a policy that kept peripheral regions underdeveloped. They also rallied in opposition to Arabization and Islamicization practiced by Khartoum. They wanted change, but did not call for independence. This platform won Garang and the SPLM supporters throughout the country; however, the disavowal of independence was not shared by all of the SPLM leaders.

Garang's goals often put him at odds with other southern rebels. Many early leaders in the SPLM wanted independence. The resistance to Garang's leadership by the Anyanya rebels was a direct result of his policy of unity. Throughout the 1980s, the SPLM splintered over this policy. In particular, groups in eastern Equatoria were in immediate opposition to Garang's "New Sudan" platform. Disagreements reached a pinnacle when, in August 1991, the SPLM split in two. Three commanders, including one former Anyanya Major declared an end to Garang's leadership. Among other things, they declared South Sudan should be independent. One leader, Riek Macher, hoped that by pushing for independence they could encourage mass desertions from Garang's forces.

This did not work, but not because the sentiment was not shared by the southerners or the rank and file. Instead, many southerners felt that Garang was their only

hope to exercise self determination. They doubted his policy commitments and hoped that if the SPLM got to the negotiating table, then the issue of independence could be raised again. Even those southerners that stayed in Garang's SPLM began to feel that independence was the only way forward. Within the leadership there were those that supported independence but did not raise the issue for fear of dismissal. Notably, Salva Kiir was a known separatist that enjoyed the position of deputy, and would later go on to lead the organization after Garang's death.

There are even doubts over whether Garang was really for unity at all. The "New Sudan" policy won Garang support throughout Sudan. Northern opposition groups supported the SPLM because they would have enjoyed being free from Islamist rule in Khartoum. Secession of the south would not have improved their standing in the North and would have cost crucial support throughout Sudan. Along with Ethiopia, the African Union, as a rule, did not support separation for sub-colonial units. On the other hand, throughout the continent there was support for *National Liberation*. In addition, I was told by a 20-year veteran of the SPLM that Garang's actions all along showed his true separatist tendencies, but they were hidden. Garang wanted to secure the south. His call for autonomy of security forces and administration would set up the institutions that the south needed to rule itself. Garang was personally instrumental in establishing foreign liaison offices that would become the South Sudanese embassies around the world. Even after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that would bring a close to hostilities, Garang refused the offer to use Sudanese embassies as diplomatic offices for the autonomous south. In fact, early in the SPLM, diplomatic chapters were established and officers were sent to South Africa to train as future diplomats. While the civil

administrative capacity of the SPLM remains in doubt (e.g. Young 2003), much of this account is corroborated by the secondary source material. Frequent radio broadcasts focused on Jallaba (Arabs) which situated the southerners as distinct from the rest of the country. Johnson (2003) maintains that independence was an unspoken/uncoded option (65). Through the 2002 peace talks in Garang officially supported unity. However, he began to publically admit that without real secularism, independence remained on the table. Islam dominated much of the political situation in Khartoum. Garang likely expected secularism was unlikely and thus would have sooner or later declared independence.

The preceding section reveals that the path that led to South Sudanese independence was contested. While the undercurrent of independence was present from the beginning, and there were many in the movement that wanted it, Garang exercised considerable control over official the public agenda, and he stressed unity. Divisions within the leadership over this policy continued to plague the SPLM through the 1990s. This inconsistency in goals is another partial explanation that recruitment practices did not match global standards. At the same time, the underlying causal process outlined in Chapter 3 is still observed in this case.

8.5 Legitimacy Constraints and the SPLM

The second Sudanese Civil War took place at the last peak of Cold War rivalry. The combatants could not help but be aware of the ever-shifting global allegiances and their role in the wider struggle. Many SPLM actions and decisions can be interpreted as a pursuit of global support. Interestingly, the moves that seemed to make it most likely to

win wide international acclaim were taken by avowed separatists. The SPLM knew its place as a minor actor in the global stage, but still valued international support, knew it was important, and was wielded most strategically by those that wanted a separate state.

The SPLM's diplomatic efforts must be interpreted within the world system at the time. The 1980s was the last gasp of the Cold War. Far from fading gently, the superpowers stepped up their efforts and engaged in continued to fund proxy wars around the world. The Sudanese civil war, and the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa, took center stage. During the 1980s, Khartoum remained firmly in the Western camp. When Nimeiri came to power through a socialist coup, he was courted by the Soviet Union. However, a communist coup attempt in 1971 along with a growing relationship with the Chevron oil company succeeded in bringing the regime into the US sphere of influence. Khartoum also backed Ethiopian rebels to the ire of the socialist Derg regime in Addis Ababa. Washington loved this and reciprocated by channeling money, weapons, and perhaps most importantly, diplomatic support to the dictatorship of Nimeiri. In 1984, Ronald Reagan used continued support of the anti-communist Sudan regime as a point on which to campaign. This began to change in the mid-1980s, and the US relationship soured by the close of the century.

After Nimeiri, the new regime turned increasingly towards Islamic nations. Budding relationships with Iran and Libya resulted in reducing US aid. Support for Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War cut ties completely and the growing human rights abuses by the Sudanese government were no longer overlooked. By 2001, expansionary Islam was the new target in the Global War on Terror, and the Bush administration successfully labeled Sudan as a state sponsor of terror. Even though the SPLM was a non-state actor it also

traversed Cold War diplomacy with considerable aplomb. The Manifesto released at the outset maintained Marxist overtures. It railed against colonialism and neocolonialism and called for a "United New Socialist Sudan" (Deng 2009). At the same time, Garang and other top SPLM leaders were quietly hedging their bets.

Sensing accurately that the US was committed to Khartoum, the SPLM bypassed the US and went straight to the UN. They used a variety of strategies. The UN had followed the US and refused any relief efforts outside government-held towns. UN General Secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar ordered both the UNHCR and the World Food Program not to cooperate with the SPLM. The guerillas knew they were under greater scrutiny as a rebel organization than the internationally backed Nimeiri regime (Johnson 2003: 147). The abuses by northern-backed militias continued as the SPLM began to systematically curtail similar abuses by their forces in 1988. This inspired NGOs to circumvent the UN and set up their own relief operations in SPLM areas. This in turn inspired UNICEF to set up an NGO-coordinating office in Nairobi to facilitate health projects for southern towns. In 1989, Lam Akol, then External Relations Director of the SPLM negotiated with UN representatives to open the Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). The humanitarian crisis could not be ignored, so the UN offered to send food and medical supplies to the stricken southern populations. While the UN maintained that it still did not recognize the SPLM, the establishment of OLS was accomplished because of a successful overture to Western agencies. Akol later recalled that these negotiations set the stage for future peace negotiations. "[F]or the first time in SPLM's history, journalists were milling around in previously out of bounds SPLM/A administered areas" (Akol 2005: 54). The talks that led to relief provided "sustained direct access to the SPLM/A

leadership for the international community and the press" (54). Thus, the SPLM was not only aware of the international system in which it operated, but it cultivated relationships beyond its operational theatre.

This is in keeping with a general policy of "informal diplomacy." One representative told me that this policy began at the organization's founding. "We recognized ourselves in such a way that we were not isolated, that we were in contact with the whole world." As previously mentioned, this belief led to the establishment of diplomatic training missions in South Africa. Unofficial diplomats were sent around the world including to the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany, to try and highlight humanitarian issues in order to bring support. John Garang himself traveled extensively as chairman and visits were organized through NGO networks. After 2001, there was a shift from soliciting humanitarian assistance to highlighting the north's position in the GWOT. The SPLM drew attention to the terrorist training camps being set up in the south by Osama bin Laden under the auspices of Khartoum. John Garang was invited to Washington to discuss anti-terror campaigns with US officials.

Showing the value placed on international support, this focus on external relations was sometimes at odds with the SPLM domestic constituency. One issue, as discussed, was the call for a united Sudan. Of course, it is possible that John Garang believed in revolutionary change rather than secession, but it is plausible that this was a ploy to maintain support from Ethiopia and as a way to avoid further isolation by the African Union. Many leaders clearly supported separation and moved to oust Garang believing they had the backing of the regular citizens. Further, I was told that "99% of the [SPLM] army was for independence."

A second issue involved the negotiations themselves. The SPLM received strong signals that "the people wanted us to fight until the end, but whenever there was an offer by the international community to come and sit, we go and put our ideas on the table." "This readiness was to show the whole world our good will." In another example, many in the south called for "houses of nationality" which would create a parallel assembly of at least 66 southern tribes. The SPLM believed that such a move would create confusion abroad. Again, a fractionalized rebel organization was a constant fear of the SPLM, and they wanted to cultivate the image of a united front for the global community to see. Therefore, even when it conflicted with domestic wishes, the SPLM leadership opted for diplomacy, indicating they were under some degree of legitimacy constraints. However, at this point, such constraints were not aimed at changing their recruitment policies.

In 1991, three prominent members of the SPLM moved to oust John Garang. They were the individuals most in-tune with the international community, wanted independence, and specifically drew attention to issue of child soldiers. The leaders of the movement were Lam Akol, Riek Macher and Gordon Kong. Kong was a former Anyanya commander and while not instrumental in the drafting of the declaration, was a high-ranking supporter. He was later considered more of a short-sighted opportunist and made several attempts to dominate the southern Sudan oil fields. Akol and Macher, however, maintained long-term goals. By 1991, the SPLM was still tarnished in the eyes of the US as being an extension of the communist Derg regime in Ethiopia. The US hindered UN relief operations and drew attention to the plight of child soldiers in the SPLM ranks.

In a move specifically designed to curry favor with the US, Riek and Lam used this issue as an opportunity to push for Garang's ouster (Johnson 2003: 95). Responding to

back channel chatter by US organizations, the two commanders interpreted covert US support for their human rights platform as a green light for the move (96). On August 28, 1991, they used the two-way radio network to denounce Garang as a dictator and called for greater democracy within the leadership and pledged themselves to human rights "especially in regard to the release of political prisoners and a halt to the recruitment of child soldiers" (97). They also officially changed the policy of SPLM to independence rather than unity. Nasir Declaration's ultimate byproduct was a fractionalized SPLM under two factions. Garang maintained leadership of what came to be known as SPLM-Torit or SPLM-Mainstream, and Akol and Machar's SPLM-Nasir, splintered into many groups over the course of the 1990s. Regardless, the Nasir Declaration and the behavior of Akol and Machar illustrate precisely the causal mechanisms of the constraining power of legitimacy as presented in Chapter 3.

Lam Akol was an avowed separatist and was very much aware of the shift in global opinion towards human rights in the late 1980s. As External Relations Director of the SPLM, he was instrumental in projecting the movement beyond their regional ally in Addis Ababa. He worked with the UN to organize OLS. Coincidentally, the first major meeting between the SPLM and the international community was with Lam Akol, and the Executive Director of UNICEF, James Grant (Akol 2005). As a leading figure in UNICEF during the drafting of the CRC, Grant himself was convinced of the political power of a rights-based approach that focused on child protection. At least as early as 1987, Grant believed that adherence to the CRC could bring legitimacy and support to UNICEF's operations (Oestricht 2007: 31-33). Akol's focus on the particular issue of

child soldiering in his call for independence is telling. In the Nasir Declaration, drafted by Akol himself, he noted:

The People in liberated areas send their children to refugee centres in order to get proper basic education that Garang had failed to provide at or near home. While undergoing education this heartless dictator takes them out of schools and recruits them into the army. Such an odious act is contrary to all accepted norms and is an abuse to the confidence the parents put in the Movement. Juvenile soldiers, traumatized by the experience, become a constant menace to themselves and to the society. This is a gross and serious violation of human rights. (Akol 2003: 311)

Specific references to "accepted norms" along with a call for independence by the chief diplomat of the organization suggest that Akol knew that this was an issue that mattered.⁴²

The second leading figure in the Nasir faction was Riek Machar. After OLS opened, NGO's flocked to the town of Nasir where Machar was the commander. This put him in a new, diplomatic position (Johnson 2003: 95). But his indoctrination to the value of international norms was much more personal. In January 1990, Machar met a British NGO worker named Emma McCune. She was part of the OLS and was opening schools in refugee camps. McCune confronted Machar about child recruitment by the SPLM at a hotel in Nairobi. He listened, responded candidly about the recruitment practices, and ultimately gave her a signed permission slip to work with children in the areas he commanded. McCune fell in love. The two would go on to marry and work together to draft many of the documents Machar would tout as the constitution for an independent South Sudan (Scroggins 2002). This account coincides with Machar's early push for children's rights within the SPLM. In 1988, he had been pushing for education in the camps (Human Rights Watch 1994: 10). He confronted Garang about training and recruitment of boys and felt that this brought bad publicity to the group. Later, as leader

⁴² Akol would later serve as Foreign Minister of Sudan until 2007. He now leads the opposition party SPLM-Democratic Change in the new Republic of South Sudan.

of the South Sudan Defense Forces he continued to highlight the connection between separatist goals and adherence to international protection norms. While the SSDF were known to use child soldiers, this is likely a product of the same decentralization that plagued the SPLM. Forces under Machar's direct command participated in UNICEF reunification efforts that saw thousands of boy soldiers repatriated to their families. In one incident, one of the SSDF commanders went through a line of 500 boys set to be airlifted back to their families. He was selecting those he thought fit enough to serve. UNICEF personnel protested directly to Machar. The commander was dismissed, and quickly defected to another faction (Rone 1995). Like Akol, Machar was a separatist and was made quickly and personally aware of the value of child rights to the international community. His position regarding child rights and his efforts to combat child recruitment illustrate the process by which such long-term considerations can change short-term behavior.⁴³

Two major shifts in the international system took place during the life of the SPLM. The Cold War first put the rebellion at odds with the West. They were able to maneuver this position to draw in a degree of international support. In the 1990s, the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of new international standards regarding child recruitment pushed the SPLM to again show its diplomatic skill. The Nasir coup against Garang failed, but it shows how those within the movement that sought secession were the first to see the changes in the system as potentially valuable and necessary for support of their desire for independence. Later, when both the norms against child soldiering

⁴³ Machar later became Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan.

solidified and the SPLM coalesced around the idea of independence, the Theory presented in Chapter 3 functions as expected.

8.6 When Norms and Goals Come Together

The norm against child soldiers grew well before the UN CRC came into effect in 1989. However, as with nearly all norms, it took time to solidify. In the SPLM, as was seen with the Nasir Faction, there were some early responders, but it was not until the late 1990s that Garang was affected. In pursuit of international support, the SPLM released some child soldiers and made overtures of support to the CRC. By 2005, the idea of separatism was the new goal of the SPLM. With it came a host of child protection measures in preparation for a drive for independence. The change in behavior moved slowly even as the norm against child recruitment solidified; when combined with a SPLM goal of secession, this trickle became a flood.

Before 1989, child recruitment was not on the main stage of global discourse. The idea of international child protection standards began largely in 1979 during the International Year of the Child. However, many delegates to the UN did not expect a change in accepted standards (Cohen 1993: 11). Quibbles over definitions, expectations, and the extent of governmental responsibility limited the unity of signals regarding child protection throughout the 1980s. Thus, many rebellions opted to focus on their role in the Cold War ideological struggle rather than to highlight their individual actions towards policies championed by the international community. At this time, the SPLM's diplomatic efforts centered on rhetoric rather than demonstrated respect for international standards. As mentioned, they espoused ideology that they thought had cache in the global

community. They adopted a policy of national liberation at a time when many governments in Africa had come to power under just such a banner. Playing into the Cold War dichotomy, the SPLM officially announced Marxism, but quickly and continuously downplayed such a position when Khartoum successfully used it to garner additional support from the US. This tactic would slowly change as the world shifted to rights-based approaches to diplomatic support after the Cold War.

After 1989 and the passage of the CRC, child recruitment began to figure prominently in discussions on conflict resolution. As a result, some within the SPLM aware of this and felt as though international support was valuable, began to reevaluate the groups' recruitment practices. The Nasir faction was a direct challenge this policy. Others made quieter attempts. In 1992, a sign proclaiming a boys camp as the "Jesh Amer"⁴⁴ was removed after bad publicity (Human Rights Watch 1994: 22). By this time, what had long been an open practice, became underground. There were some mid-level commanders that did not follow suit and openly admitted using child soldiers (Singer 2005: 25). Many others especially those in contact with the international community were more careful. "Diplomatically, we have been denying it," said one veteran, "saying 'we don't recruit children,' we have been saying it, knowing all along that we had." Such denials were made after direct questioning by the NGOs.

The stigma of child recruitment continued to plague the SPLM as the group pivoted towards a policy of independence. At the close of the 20th century, the group made halfhearted and uninspired commitments to stop using child soldiers. By this time, they admitted using child soldiers and promised to demobilize them. At one high-profile

⁴⁴ Red Army. This was the name given to the all-child battalions used early in the conflict.

event in 2001, the SPLM "demobilized" 3,500 child soldiers to an audience of UN observers and international media. However, those demobilized turned out not to have been soldiers at all (Singer 2005: 145). Such duplicitous demobilization schemes continued and delays and unmet goals were commonplace. The first phase of demobilization ended with less than 1000 confirmed children (Coalition 2004). By 2004, the end of the second phase of demobilization, approximately 12,000 child soldiers had been demobilized. Still, several thousand remained. In addition, under Garang's leadership, the SPLM concluded a series of peace negotiations by signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which effectively ended hostilities with the north. Among many other points, the agreement called for "the demobilization of all child soldiers within six months of the signature of the CPA (CPA 2005 Part III, 24.9: 32). Noble efforts to comply were made, but underage recruiting still being reported. Thus, during the first 5 years of the new century, the SPLM shifted its child protection policies to those more in line with international standards, but efforts remained limited.

Real change took place under Garang's successor, both in terms of child soldiering and with regards to unification. Upon Garang's death in 2005, the known separatist Salva Kiir took over leadership of the SPLM. With this change also came renewed and demonstrable commitments to stop the recruiting child soldiers. Under his leadership demobilization efforts expanded. In 2006, the Juba Declaration brought in several thousand SSDF fighters into the SPLM forces. Many tried to inflate their strength by quickly abducting children pressing them into their ranks. Under Kiir's leadership, these children were demobilized, and nearly every year, credible commitments to demobilize child soldiers were made. Ever smaller numbers were reported as hostilities

drew to a close. Notably, these efforts coincided with fears of renewed conflict as the referendum on independence, promised under the CPA, approached; precisely when having a reserve of inexpensive soldiers would have been most valuable. Like Somaliland, the nascent South Sudan state drafted official documents affirming child protection. A Child Protection Bill easily passed in the South Sudan National Assembly in 2006 (UNSC 2007). The subsequent Child Protection Act passed in 2008 offered very specific provisions. It limited recruitment to persons over the age of 18, in line with the highest accepted international standards (Child Act 2008: section 31 part 1). The new Republic of South Sudan's Constitution passed in 2011 reiterated this standard by defining children as persons under age 18 (Republic of South Sudan Constitution 2011: section 17: part 4). Furthermore, new laws make child recruitment a crime punishable by 10 years in prison and a fine. The first decade of the 21st century saw a dramatic change in the recruitment practices and child protection efforts of the SPLM. These happened at the same time as the group changed from a policy of revolution to secession; one that depended on international support for their claims.

In the previous section I demonstrated that the SPLM was aware of the external environment. In this section, I showed that they responded according to the degree they cared about this support. Garang wanted support, and made rhetorical overtures to Western humanitarian standards. As pursuit of independence rose, however, child protection became a serious publicity problem that the SPLM had to address. They did so. Through mass demobilization efforts, and child protection standards that rival any developed country, the SPLM and the new South Sudanese administration demonstrated

their outlook towards global opinion. They were forward-looking and when the future showed child protection as a crucial asset, they acted accordingly.

8.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I explored the role of international legitimacy on the SPLM. Even though it ended as an independent state, it was not always a separatist movement. This alone might explain the superficial failure of my theory. However, as shown, there is much more to the story. Just as group goals were not static, neither were the low levels of child protection. The only constant was the awareness of international opinion. Commanders knew it was important, but how it mattered changed depending on the individual's outlook. Garang wanted support, but since he was not a secessionist, his pursuit of support was short-term and strategic. Separatists within the SPLM recognized the long-term importance of international legitimacy, and sought to curb egregious human rights violations. However, by the mid-1990s, the changing world system coupled with an entrenchment of norms of child protection and a stronger sense among the southern Sudanese civilians that independence was the best option promoted recruitment behavior designed for an external audience.

This reminds us that while cross-national comparisons are useful, there is still something to be gained from a closer look at individual cases. This qualitative analysis reveals that far from being a deviant case, the SPLM and their recruitment patterns largely follow that which is predicted by my theory. Child Soldiering is a long-term decision related to group goals. Secessionists within the SPLM and those that were aware of international norms sought restraint. Diverse elements within the group either did not

want independence, or were not aware of the norm. What is clear, when the norm had solidified in the 1990s, and separatism was the goal in the mid-2000, the SPLM faced the same legitimacy constraints as do Somaliland. Their behavior towards child recruitment changed accordingly.

Figure 15: Map of South Sudan



Source: Ogle Earth 2011.

Chapter Nine

Conclusions

9.1 Introduction

Throughout this project, I have argued that rebels will consider the effects of their actions in the long-term. Using the issue of child soldiers, I argued that rebel commanders will evaluate the impact this will have on their prospects for achieving victory. In the short-term, child soldiers are less expensive and can enhance the total size of one's forces. In the long term children are not only less effective, but they risk tarnishing international reputation.

I also argued that the value placed on these short-term and long-term features determine when children will be used. Separatists depend on international support and will therefore be constrained in a pursuit of international legitimacy. Opportunistic rebellions on the other hand will not be constrained and will discount the reduced effectiveness because conflict perpetuation is more important than military victory. This cost-benefit analysis continues as the war progresses. Rising costs can undercut concerns over legitimacy, but because the rebellions that want independence cannot succeed without recognition, they will resist the appeal of inexpensive children.

In this chapter, I will review the findings uncovered by the systematic comparison of 103 rebellions active from 1998-2008. I will also briefly review the value-added by the qualitative exploration of the four rebel groups active in Somalia, Colombia, Afghanistan and Sudan. In the second section, I will discuss how these finding contribute to the broader field of international relations and comparative politics. I conclude the project by

discussing how the results and unique insights revealed in this project can be used by policymakers.

9.2 Findings

Quantitative Analysis

Statistical tests in Chapter 5 revealed empirical evidence for legitimacy constraints. When rebels have long-term goals of independence, they are less likely to break international norms by using child soldiers. These rebel leaders are aware of the community of states to which they want to be a part. They evaluate the long-term costs and modify their recruitment practices as a result. Conversely, rebels whose funding profiles include conflict diamonds and involvement in the drug trade are also aware of the long-term implications of their actions, but are not driven by the same motivations as insurgents without opportunistic insurgents. Using children is less costly, and the reduced operating costs in an asset to them. Furthermore, using children ensures the conflict will continue providing another gain for greed-based rebellions.

The quantitative results also revealed that the short-term cost savings can be valuable for rebellions that have been fighting for decades. Longer rebellions were shown to be much more likely to use child soldiers than shorter rebellions. At the same time, these effects were conditioned by rebel goals. The groups most resistant to the increase in costs are the same ones that most value international opinion.

The empirical results findings in Chapter 5 were not without limitations. Taking a 10-year snapshot of rebel behavior failed to capture temporal variation in regards to both recruitment and goals. Also, in order to maintain objective, unbiased coding, I was forced

to rely on brief accounts of child soldier use (or non-use) which did not capture the variation in recruitment rates or level of child protection. These weaknesses large-n analysis is a strong reason to examine cases in more detail. To address some of the empirical limitations of quantitative research, I designed three qualitative case studies.

Qualitative Analysis

The Statistical analysis revealed which variables were statistically correlated with child soldier use. However, from such an analysis, it is impossible to show *why* they are correlated. I still was not sure the extent to which rebel leaders were forward-thinking. I could not determine if alternatives might better explain the relationship between child recruitment and both secessionist goals and opportunism. In order to show legitimacy constraints in action, I explore the case of the Somali National Movement which became the Republic of Somaliland. Using a most-similar systems design, I was able to rule out alternative explanations, most notably, that of culture. In this case, the best explanation for Somaliland's unusually high rates of child protection is the value they place on global opinion related to the goal of recognition.

In the second case, I explored the impact of illicit funding on two rebel groups in very different circumstances. On the surface FARC in Colombia and the Taliban in Afghanistan represent two near-diametrically opposed groups that happen to demonstrate the same recruitment behavior. I thoroughly explored their sources of funding and the imputed nefarious motivations this imparts. In so doing, I revealed that these groups are not concerned with the international community; they are also more interested in

continuing the conflict. Through a most-different systems comparison I was able to rule out competing explanations for extreme norm abrogation for these two groups.

Finally, the case of the SPLM in Sudan offered an initial challenge to my proposed theory. This group gained independence but also had a reputation of severe norm-violation with respect to child recruitment. A more nuanced look at the SPLM revealed that separatism was not the original goal and only emerged late in the rebellion. At the same time, some elements within the SPLM *did* want independence and they were revealed to offer some child protection and be the most concerned with garnering international support. In this deviant-case analysis, I showed that with a more thorough look the case of the SPLM supports the theory.

These cases revealed the nuances in the relationship between goals and recruitment behavior. First, goals can change. The Somali National Movement was not an avowed separatist group. However, by most accounts, including those derived from personal interviews, this was their goal all along. Conversely, the SPLM also changed goals, but the policy of unification was dominant throughout the duration of their movement. When the goal changed, so did their commitment to international norms. Also, disputants to the party line, at both low-levels and high-ranking officers were important in this case.

Opportunism was revealed to infiltrate organizations and alter their goals. The FARC began as a peasant-rights organization but devolved rather quickly into a large-scale insurgency built around the cocaine-industry. At which point, the recruitment of children became commonplace and sending very young soldiers to their deaths against

fully-trained Colombian soldiers was routine. The Taliban was an opportunistic rebellion from the beginning, and its use of child soldiers was likewise immediate.

The qualitative analysis suggests further refinements for future research. The importance of temporal variation is extremely important and, in light of the evolving nature of group goals and recruitment behavior, it deserves closer attention. Similarly, these results reveal the importance of exploring splinter groups. Internal disputes can reveal a greater degree of variation than group profiles provide.

9.3 Implications for International Relations Theory

The conclusions reached by the theoretical and empirical contributions of this project speak to a variety of areas in conflict studies. First, by exploring individual preferences and beliefs about the international community, this project contributes to the bridging of the rationalist-constructivist divide. Adopting the rationalist formula reveals beliefs held by a certain class of non-state actors, separatist rebellions. Second, allowing for variation in desired outcomes challenges assumptions about universal goals of rebellion. Finally, the theoretical argument reveals a new interpretation of the life cycle of international norms. Going beyond the 'norms matter' paradigm, I show how norms matter for non-state actors as well, and this takes on a similar, but unique pattern compared to that of states.

The results uncovered here contribute to recent efforts to bridge the theoretical schools of rational choice and constructivism (Fearon and Wendt 2002; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1999). Rebel leaders engage in rational behavior in a norm-constrained world. I employed the standard rationalist formula where preferences plus

beliefs equal actions. The preference for secessionists is to win statehood, so their actions will be to try to win. Simple enough, but when their beliefs are taken into account, they do what they think is necessary to achieve their definition of victory. Empirical evidence presented here suggests actions can be explained in reference to beliefs about the international system. From the interviews and a thorough review of the secondary literature, I found that separatists are aware of many international norms. In this project, I focused on one such norm, children's rights. The statistical analysis goes beyond the anecdotal support to provide further empirical evidence that such norms matter in determining behavior. Separatists are willing to do what it takes to be welcomed into the community to which they want to belong.

This project contributes to conflict studies in a number of ways. First, it challenges the notion that military victory is the universal goal of rebellions. Secessionist rebellions cannot truly succeed unless they end up with their own state. Greed-based rebellions may not even care to win at all if winning means ending the conflict (and the business). Part Two and Three of this project reveal that far from being universally short-sighted and of a single mind, rebel groups exhibit remarkable variation in their short and long-term calculations. Perhaps most importantly, that they maintain both short- and long-term goals at all is a step forward in better understanding rebel behavior. This project reveals that there are different goals with short- and long-term goals varying by group type.

A second way in which my work contributes to conflict studies is by adding to the collective understanding of how natural resources can influence rebel behavior. Opportunism in the ranks can shape recruitment patterns. It might also influence

deployment and engagement tactics. Building on the finding that lootable resources increase conflict duration (Fearon 2004), the evidence uncovered in this project extends the argument that some rebels learn to value conflict in and of itself. Finally, my work is able to test the assumption that children make poorer soldiers. Rebels with the most incentive to keep fighting but not necessarily *win* are more likely to use less effective younger children. This is supported empirically. In other words, those groups who are least likely to need effective troops are the ones statistically more likely to use less effective, and less expensive, child soldiers.

A final conclusion reached by the project is to add a new understanding of how international norms develop and change. In a classic approach to the life cycle of norms, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest that norms evolve through a three-stage process. This begins with norm emergence through the work of entrepreneurs who hold strong beliefs about certain actions or behavior. Second, norms are institutionalized through a cascading process where important states adopt the precepts of the norm. Finally, they become the social reality when they are internalized by a majority of the state actors in the system. This project suggests a similar life cycle of international norms for separatists eager to join the international system. For them, however, norm entrepreneurs do not begin the process; rather, the norm emerges in the second and third stages of the state-centric process. That is, would-be state actors receive their cues when state-actors react to the new environment, thus leading to the perception by non-state actors that this is what must be done to belong to the community of nations. Thus, they use behavior as a signal that they know how to act and should therefore be looked upon as equals.

My research shows that the stronger support for international standards regarding conflict behavior can be influential to conflicting parties, even when those parties are not states. Typical debates about the role of human rights norms focus on state compliance and abrogation of treaties and are replete with examples from the realist and constructivist camps. Non-state actors are traditionally believed to operate outside the jurisdiction of international norms. Evidence uncovered here suggests otherwise. Building on the constructivist school of thought, this project supports the idea that it can be in the best interest of actors to abide by the perceived norms of the system. In a novel contribution, I show that international norms and opinions can shape non-state actor behavior as well. Signaling norms come about once state leaders have internalized and become acclimated to their new environment. Like state leaders, rebel leaders react to changes in the environment. They make decisions that weigh the external costs associated with violating perceived international norms. Some rebels can see the benefits of abiding by systemic norms and this can be an effective motivator. For separatists, this often leads them to avoid using children as combatants.

9.4 Implications for Policymakers

In a more practical sense, my work offers comfort to the advocacy community in their drive to improve the conditions of children around the world. Condemnation works. Rebel leaders operate in the same social sphere as states and some, though by no means all, value being seen as legitimate administrators. Thus naming and shaming should extend to non-ratifiers to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and other human rights agreements on which there is consensus.

Moreover, rewards for compliance need to be offered. Of course, all separatists cannot be recognized. However, a willingness to observe the rules of war and accepted international standards should be met with stronger negotiating positions. In effect, this would offer rebels incentives for restraint. Condemnation and high profile convictions are important sticks, but to be most effective, diplomatic carrots should be offered as well.

Third, counterinsurgency strategists should more effectively consider the role of funding and rationality in their efforts to understand their adversaries. The findings presented here offer greater support to the idea that illicit activity is unlikely to be a means to an end, rather it becomes an end in itself. Strategists should use this information to avoid overlooking financial centers in favor of military targets.⁴⁵ It would also put military personnel on higher alert for distractions. When a guerilla force strikes, it is important to remember what else they might be doing. Finally, the variation within an organization opens the door for effective targeting of dissidents. Instead of trying to weaken an organization militarily, careful appeals and negotiations can promote new leaders that will offer greater protections for human rights even in the middle of conflict.

The rebellions analyzed here offer one final conclusion. Some rebel leaders are open to playing by the rules. Far from being an irrational act of malevolence, child soldier use can be systematically explained. If it can be explained it can be targeted; if it can be targeted, it can be curtailed and hundreds of thousands of the world's most vulnerable populations can be better protected. I hope this project makes some effort towards this end.

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⁴⁵ This was a big complaint lobbied at US forces in Afghanistan (e.g. Peters 2009).

Appendix: Child Soldier Use by Rebel Group

Country	Rebel Name	Child Soldiers	Lowest Age	Child Soldiers 15	Child Soldiers Ordinal
Afghanistan	Taliban	1	6	1	2
Afghanistan	UIFSA	1	14	0	1
Algeria	FIS	1	15	0	1
Algeria	GIA	1	12	1	2
Angola	UNITA	1	8	1	2
Angola	FLEC	1	8	1	2
Burma	KNPP	1	14	1	2
Burma	MTA	1	.	0	1
Burma	KNU	1	.	0	1
Burma	SSA	1	.	0	1
Burma	UWSA	1	12	0	1
Burma	BMA	0	.	0	0
Burundi	Palipehutu-FNL	1	.	0	1
Burundi	CNDD	1	13	0	1
Burundi	Frolina	1	10	1	2
Burundi	CNDD-FDD	1	15	0	1
	Khmer				
Cambodia	Rouge/PDK	1	5	1	2
Central African Republic	Faction of Francois Bozize*	0	.	0	0
Central African Republic	Military Faction*	0	.	0	0
Chad	MDJT	1	.	0	1
Chad	MDD [-FANT]	1	.	0	1
Chad	FARF	1	.	0	1
Colombia	FARC	1	10	1	2
Colombia	ELN	1	9	1	2
Comoros	MPA	0	.	0	0
Congo-Brazzaville	Ntsiloulous	1	.	0	1
Congo-Brazzaville	Ninjas	1	14	1	2
Congo-Brazzaville	Cocoyes	1	.	0	1
Congo/Zaire	RCD	1	9	1	2
Congo/Zaire	MLC	1	13	0	1
Congo/Zaire	AFDL*	0	.	0	0
Congo/Zaire	RCD Faction	1	12	1	2
Egypt	Tala i al-Fath	0	.	0	0

* Not mentioned in Coalition Reports directly, but unnamed armed groups known to use them.

	al-Gamaa al-				
Egypt	Islamiyya	0	.	0	0
Eritrea	EIJM	0	.	0	0
Ethiopia	ARDUF	0	.	0	0
Ethiopia	OLF	1	11	1	2
Ethiopia	al-Itahad al-Islami	0	.	0	0
Ethiopia	ONLF	0	.	0	0
Guinea	RFDG	0	.	0	0
Guinea-Bissau	Military Faction	1	14	0	1
India	PLA	1	.	0	1
India	BLTF	1	.	0	1
India	Naxalites/PWG	1	8	1	2
India	NSCN	1	13	0	1
India	UNLF	1	.	0	1
	Kashmir				
India	Insurgents	1	10	1	2
India	ATTF	1	.	0	1
India	MCC	1	8	1	2
India	UFLA Faction	1	13	1	2
India	NLFT	1	.	0	1
India	KNF	1	.	0	1
India	BDSF/NDFB	1	.	0	1
Indonesia	Fretilin	1	10	0	1
Indonesia	GAM	1	14	0	1
	Mujahideen e				
Iran	Khalq	1	17	0	1
Iraq	SAIRI	0	.	0	0
Israel	PNA	0	.	0	0
Israel	Hezbollah	1	16	0	1
Israel	PFLP	0	.	0	0
Israel	Hamas	1	15	0	1
Israel	AMB	0	.	0	0
Israel	Fatah	0	.	0	0
Israel	PFLP-GC	0	.	0	0
Ivory Coast	MPCI	1	10	1	2
Ivory Coast	MPIGO	1	10	1	2
Ivory Coast	MJP	1	10	1	2
Lesotho	Military Faction	0	.	0	0
Liberia	LURD	1	10	1	2
Liberia	Ulimo-J	1	.	0	1
	Ushtria Clirimtare				
Macedonia	Kombetare	1	14	0	1
Nepal	CPN-M/UPF	1	8	1	2
Niger	FDR	0	.	0	0
Niger	FARS	0	.	0	0

Niger	UFRA	0	.	0	0
Pakistan	MQM	1	15	0	1
Papua New Guinea	BRA	1	13	0	1
Peru	Sendero Rojo	1	.	0	1
Philippines	Abu Sayyaf	1	15	0	1
Philippines	MNLF (Faction)	1	.	0	1
Philippines	MILF	1	10	1	2
Philippines	NPA	1	11	0	1
Russia	Republic of Dagestan	1	.	0	1
Russia	Republic of Chechnya	1	12	0	1
Rwanda	Opposition alliance	1	8	1	2
Senegal	MFDC	0	.	0	0
Sierra Leone	AFRC	1	.	0	1
Sierra Leone	Kamajors [†]	1	7	1	2
Sierra Leone	RUF	1	10	1	2
Somalia	SRRC	1	10	1	2
Somalia	USC Faction	1	.	0	1
Sri Lanka	LTTE	1	9	0	1
Sudan	SPLM	1	9	0	1
Sudan	Faction of SPLM Mvmnt. Peace in	1	10	1	2
Tajikistan	Tajikistan	0	.	0	0
Tajikistan	UTO	1	12	1	2
Turkey	PKK/Kadek	1	7	1	2
Uganda	WNBF	1	.	0	1
Uganda	ADF	1	.	0	1
Uganda	LRA	1	5	1	2
United Kingdom	Real IRA	0	.	0	0
Uzbekistan	MIU	1	.	0	1
Yugoslavia	UCK	1	14	0	1

[†] Technically a rebellion, but only because RUF rebels controlled government for a brief time. The Kamajors were a former government-allied militia, known to use child soldiers.

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Vita

Author's Name

Trace Cody Lasley

Date and Place of Birth

January 18, 1983; Bowling Green, Kentucky.

Education

Master of Arts, Political Science, University of Kentucky, 2010

Bachelor of Arts, Cum Laude, Economics, University of Kentucky, 2006

Bachelor of Arts, Magna Cum Laude, History, University of Kentucky, 2005

Bachelor of Arts, Magna Cum Laude, Philosophy, University of Kentucky, 2005

Additional Training

Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), University of Michigan, 2008 (Game Theory & OLS Regression)

Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 2006-2007. (Politics of the Horn of Africa, Amharic Language, Afan-Oromo Language)

Research Interests

International Relations (Civil Conflict, International Organizations, Interstate Conflict,) Comparative Politics (Civil Society, Democratization, Political Behavior, African Politics)

Publications

"Constitutional Norms and the Decline of the Coup d'état: An Empirical Assessment of the African Union's first Decade" with Jonathan M. Powell. *The AU: The First Ten Years*, to be published by the Institute for Security Studies (Peer-Reviewed). Forthcoming 2012.

"Book Review of *Child Soldiers: From Violence to Protection*, by Michael Wessells, and *Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States*, by Scott Gates and Simon Reich, eds." with Clayton L. Thyne. *International Studies Review* 2011, 13(1): 155-158.

"We Saw Not Clearly nor Understood: The Economic Background of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War." *Kaleidoscope* 2006, 5: 66-75.

Conference Papers

"Funding, Capabilities, and the Use of Child Soldiers." Paper to be presented at the *Southern Political Science Association 83rd Annual Meeting*. New Orleans, LA. January 12-14, 2012.

"An Assessment of Coup Activity in the AU's First Ten Years" (with Jonathan M. Powell). Invited to speak at an Expert Roundtable organized by the Institute for Security Studies (South Africa), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, October 2011

"Associational Life and Attitudes about Democracy in Africa." *Southern Political Science Association 82nd Annual Meeting*, New Orleans, LA, January 2011.

"Media-ting Africa's Civil Society: Hierarchical Linear Modeling of Individual and State-Level Effects on Support for Democracy." *American Political Science Association 106th Annual Meeting*, Washington, D.C. September 2010.

"Beyond Window Dressing: Secession, Legitimacy, and the Use of Child Soldiers." *Annual Conference of the International Studies Association*, New Orleans, LA, February 2010.

"Weak Ties, Strong Soldiers: Civil Society and Battlefield Effectiveness." *Annual Conference of the International Studies Association – Southern Region*, Nashville, TN, October 2009.

"Weak Ties, Strong Soldiers: Civil Society and Battlefield Effectiveness." *American Political Science Association 105th Annual Meeting*, Toronto, Canada, September 2009.

Awards

- 2012 Travel Grant, University of Kentucky, Dept. of Political Science (\$500)
- 2011 Anne-Marie Yanarella Scholarship-field research Brussels, Belgium (\$1000)
- 2011 Travel Grant, University of Kentucky Graduate School (\$800)
- 2011 Travel Grant, University of Kentucky, Dept. of Political Science (\$250)
- 2011 Arts & Sciences Certificate for Outstanding Teaching (\$500)
- 2011 Prestage Cook Award (\$250)
- 2010 Travel Grant, University of Kentucky Graduate School (\$400)
- 2010 Sidney Ulmer Graduate Student Research Paper Award (\$500)
- 2009 Travel Grant, International Studies Association – South (\$150)
- 2009 Travel Grant, University of Kentucky Graduate School (\$800)
- 2006 Scholarship, National Security Education Program (\$20,000) (Ethiopia)
- 2006 Travel Grant, University of Kentucky (\$1,000) (Ethiopia)

Teaching

- Primary Instructor, University of Kentucky, Fall 2008 to present
 - Political Science 212 – Culture and Politics of the Third World
 - Political Science 212 (online) – Culture and Politics of the Third World
 - Political Science 410 – Topics in Regional Politics: African Politics
 - Political Science 471 – Race and Ethnicity in Politics
 - Political Science 372 – Introduction to Political Analysis (research methods)
- Instructor, Somali Education Center (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), Oct. 2006 to March 2007
 - American History, History of World War I & II

Professional Experience

2008-2010 Research Assistant for Dr. Emily Beaulieu, project: Election Events
2010 Research Assistant for Dr. Wonbin Cho, project: African Elections, Third
 Wave Democracies

Invited Talks and Lectures

November 27, 2011 Introduction to Contemporary Political Problems in Somalia,
 Pisgah Presbyterian Church, Lexington, Kentucky.
February 4, 2011 Information on Somalia and Somali Refugees, Hospital In-service,
 Jackson Purchase Medical Center, Mayfield, Kentucky.
October 1, 2010 Guest Appearance to Discuss Events in Somalia, "Berry Craig's
 Notebook," Paducah-Channel 2, WKCTC Television Department.
August 29, 2008 Guest Appearance to Discuss Education Abroad in Ethiopia,
 "Berry Craig's Notebook," Paducah-Channel 2, WKCTC
 Television Department.

Other Service

October, 2011 Selection Committee for New Faculty Hire, Graduate Student
 Representative.

Association Memberships

2008-present Southern Political Science Association (SPSA)
2008-present Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA)
2008-present Peace Science Society International (PSS)
2007-present American Political Science Association (APSA)
2007-present International Studies Association (ISA)