

1 A theory of actions and habits in free-operant behavior: The interaction of rate correlation  
2 and contiguity systems.

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Abstract

14 Theories of instrumental actions assume the existence of multiple behavioral systems, one  
15 goal-directed which takes into account the consequences of actions, and one habitual that  
16 depends on previous reward history, both of which are predicated upon the notion of  
17 prediction-error to learn which actions should be performed. We present a model of  
18 free-operant instrumental actions in which goal-directed control is determined by the rate  
19 correlation between actions and outcomes whereas habitual responding is under the control  
20 of contiguous reward probability of an outcome, with these two systems interacting  
21 cooperatively and summing to control actions. The model anticipates the difference in  
22 performance between ratio and interval schedules and accounts for a number of additional  
23 phenomena such as the transition from goal-directed to habitual control with extended  
24 training and the persistence of goal-directed control under choice procedures and extinction.  
25 These results make the model unique in its joint predictions of behavioral control and  
26 performance for free-operant conditions.

27 *Keywords:* actions, habits, dual-system theory, reward schedules, instrumental  
28 conditioning, reinforcement learning

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30 and contiguity systems.

31 **Introduction**

32 Instrumental action instantiates a unique reciprocal relationship between the mind and  
33 the world. Through instrumental learning we bring our representations of the consequences  
34 or outcomes of our actions into correspondence with the causal relationships in the world,  
35 whereas through instrumental action we bring the world into correspondence with the  
36 representations of our desires. However, this reciprocity assumes that instrumental behavior  
37 is goal-directed in the sense that it is based upon an interaction between a belief about the  
38 causal relation between an action and its outcome and a desire for that outcome (Dickinson  
39 and Balleine, 1994; Heyes and Dawson, 1990). Over the last forty years a wealth of evidence  
40 has accumulated that not only are humans capable of goal-directed action in this sense but  
41 so are other animals.

42 The canonical assay for the goal-directed status of instrumental behavior is the  
43 outcome revaluation procedure, which we shall illustrate with an early study by Adams and  
44 Dickinson (1981). They initially trained hungry rats to press a lever to receive either sugar  
45 or grain pellets with the alternative reward or outcome being delivered freely or  
46 non-contingently. The lever was then withdrawn and a flavor aversion was conditioned to  
47 one type of pellet by pairing its consumption with the induction of gastric malaise until the  
48 rat would no longer eat this type of pellet when freely presented. The purpose of this  
49 outcome devaluation was to remove the rat's desire for this type of pellet, while maintaining  
50 the desirability of the other type. If lever-pressing was mediated by knowledge of the causal  
51 relationship with the pellet outcome, devaluing this outcome should have reduced the rat's  
52 propensity to press when the lever was once again presented relative to the level of  
53 responding observed when the non-contingent pellet was devalued. This is exactly the result

54 they observed (Adams and Dickinson, 1981). More recently, the finding has also been  
55 documented in both humans (Valentin *et al.*, 2007) and monkeys (Rhodes and Murray,  
56 2013). It is important to note that this test is conducted under an extinction procedure  
57 where the delivery of the outcome is suspended; any devaluation effect should therefore  
58 reflect knowledge acquired during training rather than during the test itself.

59         Although research on the brain systems supporting goal-directed behavior has  
60 advanced during the last 20 years (for a review, see Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010), the  
61 nature of the psychological processes underlying the acquisition of action- or  
62 response-outcome knowledge remains relatively under-studied. This is in part because the  
63 psychology of learning has focused on the Pavlovian paradigm for the last 50 years or so  
64 given the greater experimental control afforded by such procedures. This research has  
65 generated a rich corpus of associative learning theories, all of which assume that learning is  
66 driven, in one way or another, by prediction errors (for a review, see Vogel *et al.*, 2004). In  
67 the case of Pavlovian learning, these errors reflect the extent to which the conditioned  
68 stimulus fails to predict to the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of the outcome. In the most  
69 straightforward of these theories, the larger the prediction error on a learning episode the  
70 less predicted is the outcome and the greater is the change in associative strength of the  
71 stimulus. As a consequence, the prediction error is reduced appropriately on subsequent,  
72 congruent learning episodes (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). Based on the idea that Pavlovian  
73 associative learning is controlled by prediction errors and the multiple phenomena that  
74 paralleled those found in instrumental learning, Mackintosh and Dickinson (1979) suggested  
75 such errors play an analogous role in both types of learning processes.

76         Over the last decade or so, goal-directed learning has become increasingly couched in  
77 terms of computational reinforcement learning (RL). According to this approach (Daw *et al.*,  
78 2005; Maia, 2009; Sutton and Barto, 1998), goal-directed behavior is controlled by  
79 model-based (MB) computations in which the agent learns a model of the state transitions

80 produced by the instrumental contingencies and the value of each of the experienced states.  
81 At the time of performance, the agent searches the model to estimate the value of each of the  
82 actions available, and chooses the one that maximizes the outcome rate obtained over a  
83 number of episodes acting on the environment. Critically, what determines the value of each  
84 action in each state (or, alternatively, the probability of choosing each of the available  
85 actions in each state) is the probability that a rewarding outcome will be received given that  
86 the action is performed in each one of the states.

87 Whatever the difference between the associative and RL theory accounts of  
88 goal-directed action, both of these approaches share the assumption that the probability of a  
89 rewarding outcome is a primary determinant of instrumental goal-directed action. The  
90 reward probability directly determines the strength of the response-outcome association  
91 according to associative theory (Mackintosh and Dickinson, 1979) and the estimated value of  
92 an action in the case of RL theory. For both approaches, instrumental performance should  
93 be directly related to these variables. However, ever since the initial studies of instrumental  
94 outcome revaluation using free-operant schedules we have known that reward probability is  
95 unlikely to be the primary determinant of goal-directed control.

### 96 **Ratio and interval contingencies**

97 The initial investigations of goal-directed free-operant behavior using outcome  
98 devaluation with rats were uniformly unsuccessful (Adams, 1980; Holman, 1975; Morrison  
99 and Collyer, 1974). In contrast to the successful demonstration of devaluation reported by  
100 Adams and Dickinson (1981), prior studies had all trained rats to press the lever on a  
101 variable interval (VI) contingency between the response and the outcome. This class of  
102 schedule models a resource, such as nectar, that depletes when taken and regenerates with  
103 time. In practice, a VI schedule specifies the average time interval that has to elapse before  
104 the next outcome becomes available. In contrast, Adams and Dickinson (1981) used a

105 variable ratio (VR) schedule, which models foraging in a non-depleting source so that each  
106 action has a fixed probability of yielding an outcome independently of the time elapsed since  
107 the last outcome obtained.

108 In an experimental analysis of the ratio-interval contrast, Dickinson et al. (1983) used  
109 a yoking procedure to match the outcome probability on the two schedules. In one pair of  
110 groups, the master rats were trained in an interval schedule, whereas the yoked animals were  
111 trained on ratio schedules with outcome probabilities that matched those generated by the  
112 master rats. In spite of the fact that the outcome probability per response was matched  
113 between the groups, outcome devaluation reduced performance of the ratio-trained but not  
114 the interval-trained group, suggesting that ratio training more readily establishes  
115 goal-directed control than interval training. This conclusion was reinforced when the  
116 outcome rate was matched by yoking the rates of the interval-trained rats to those generated  
117 by master ratio-trained animals. Again, ratio-, but not interval-trained animals, were  
118 sensitive to outcome devaluation. As the interval-trained rats pressed at a lower rate than  
119 the ratio-trained animals, goal-directed control was observed in the ratio-trained group even  
120 under a lower outcome probability experienced by those rats. The impact of the training  
121 schedule on the outcome devaluation effect has now received extensive replication (see  
122 Gremel and Costa, 2013; Hilario *et al.*, 2012; Wiltgen *et al.*, 2012).

123 The claim that ratio schedules more readily establish goal-directed control than does  
124 interval training finds further support by a study of the acquisition of beliefs about the  
125 effectiveness of an action in causing an outcome. Reed (2001) trained human participants on  
126 a fictional investment task in which pressing the space-bar on the keyboard acted as the  
127 instrumental response. Ratio training uniformly yielded higher judgments of the causal  
128 effectiveness of the key-press in producing the outcome than did interval training both when  
129 the probability and rates of the outcome were matched by within-participant matching.


130 **Two properties of reward schedules**

131 This brief review raises the issue of the critical feature that determines the relative  
132 sensitivity of ratio and interval performance to outcome revaluation. There are two  
133 properties that distinguish the contingencies. The first is that interval contingencies  
134 differentially reward pausing between responses or, in the operant conditioning jargon, long  
135 inter-response times (IRTs). Having performed a response, and collected the outcome if  
136 available, the longer that the agent waits before performing the next response, the more  
137 likely it is that the resources will have regenerated so that the next response will be  
138 rewarded with an outcome. Figure 1a illustrates the relationship between the seconds  
139 elapsed since the last response has been performed and the probability of the next response  
140 being rewarded for different parameters of a random interval (RI) schedule under which  
141 there is fixed probability of an outcome becoming available in each second. As can be  
142 appreciated, the probability of reinforcement increases monotonically with the time between  
143 responses, with faster increases with shorter programmed intervals between rewards. In  
144 contrast, since the ratio between responses and outcomes required under a ratio contingency  
145 establishes a fixed probability of reward which is independent of the time elapsed since the  
146 last response, this probability is independent of the pause to the next response<sup>1</sup>.

147 It is unlikely, however, that this feature of interval contingencies reduces sensitivity to  
148 outcome revaluation because when an animal is trained with a choice between with two  
149 interval sources yielding different outcomes as opposed to a single interval source,  
150 performance is highly sensitive to outcome devaluation. Kosaki and Dickinson trained their  
151 hungry rats with a choice between pressing two levers (*group choice*), one yielding grain  
152 pellets and the other a sugar solution, both on interval schedules (Kosaki and Dickinson,

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<sup>1</sup> Although it can be argued that some patterns of responding under ratio training can differentially reinforce short IRTs—for example because of the development of response bursting—our assumption in this paper will be that responding



*Figure 1.* Different properties of response-outcome reward schedules. (a) Probability of obtaining and outcome after a pause between responses for different programmed inter-reinforcement intervals under an interval schedule. (b) Functional relationship between response rates and outcome rates for ratio schedules with different outcome probabilities ( $1/ratio$ ). (c) Functional relationship between response rate and outcome rates for interval schedules under different interval parameters (or inter-reinforcement intervals).



153 2010). In spite of this interval training, devaluing one of the outcomes reduced performance  
154 of the corresponding response on test even when there was only a single lever present during  
155 the test so that no choice was available at that time. This goal-directed control contrasted  
156 with the insensitivity to outcome devaluation following matched training with a single  
157 response. The second, *non-contingent* group of rats was trained with only a single lever  
158 present so that pressing yielded one of the outcomes on the interval schedule with the other  
159 being delivered at the same rate but independently, or non-contingently of the instrumental  
160 response. In contrast to the goal-directed control observed following choice training, lever  
161 pressing during the test was unaffected by whether the contingent or non-contingent  
162 outcome had been devalued. As the target responses were both trained under identical  
163 interval schedules, both of which should differentially reinforce long IRTs, it not clear why  
164 choice versus single response training should affect the degree of goal-directed control if IRT  
165 reinforcement is the critical factor affecting sensitivity to outcome revaluation under interval  
166 schedules.

167 The second distinction between ratio and interval contingencies relates to their  
168 response-outcome rate feedback functions, which are mathematical descriptions of the  
169 empirical relationship between response rates and outcome rates (Baum, 1973; Baum, 1992;  
170 Soto *et al.*, 2006). Figure 1b presents the feedback functions for typical ratio and interval  
171 schedules. Under a ratio contingency, the outcome rate rises linearly with increasing  
172 response rate, with the slope of the function decreasing systematically as the ratio parameter  
173 increases. The feedback function for ratio schedules can be described by a linear function of  
174 the form  $Y = nB$ , where  $Y$  is the outcome rate and  $B$  the response rate performed by the  
175 agent. The parameter  $n$  represents the inverse of the ratio requirement, or, equivalently, the  
176 outcome probability per response that the particular ratio schedule programs. By contrast,  
177 the feedback function for an interval schedule is nonlinear, with the outcome rate rising  
178 rapidly with increases in response rates when the baseline response rate is low and reaching  
179 an asymptote as soon as the response rate is higher than the rate at which the outcomes

180 become available (Baum, 1992; Prelec, 1982). At this point, variations in response rates do  
181 not have an effect in the outcome rate <sup>2</sup>.

182 In his correlational version of the Law of Effect, Baum (1973) suggested that the  
183 difference between the ratio and interval feedback functions can be captured by the linear  
184 correlation between the response and outcome rates established by the schedules, which in  
185 turn led Dickinson (1985; see also Dickinson and Perez, 2018) to argue that  
186 response-outcome learning is driven by the rate correlation experienced by the agent: the  
187 greater the experienced rate correlation, the stronger is the response-outcome learning.

### 188 Rate Correlation Theory


189 Baum (1973) illustrated the empirical application of his approach to the Law of Effect  
190 by dividing the time-line in an experimental session into a number of successive time samples  
191 and displayed the rate correlation by plotting the number of responses in each sample  
192 against the number of outcomes in that sample. In the present approach, however, we  
193 develop rate correlation theory in terms of psychological processing and assume that the  
194 agent computes the rate correlation at a given point in time by reference to the contents of a  
195 number of immediately prior samples of responses and outcomes held in memory.

196 Figure 2a illustrates a schematic representation of the time-line divided into different  
197 samples in memory of our model. At the end of each cycle, the number of responses and  
198 outcomes in that sample is registered in memory and the content of the memory is recycled.  
199 Given that the memory has a limited capacity, for simplicity we assume that this recycling

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<sup>2</sup> Although the exact analytic form of the feedback function for interval schedules is still a matter of debate (see Baum, 1992), it is well accepted that this function needs to flatten once response rates attain a sufficiently high level, which depends on the outcome rate programmed by the schedule. A widely-accepted form of this function is  $Y = \frac{B}{tB+a}$ , where  $t$  is the interval parameter and  $a$  is a parameter that depends on the conditions of the experiment, and which affect the animal's pattern of responding independently of the outcome rate generated by the schedule.

200 involves not only the registration of the contents of the next sample but also the erasure of  
 201 the oldest sample in memory. Figure 2a displays a memory of four samples. The initial  
 202 memory cycle involves the first four samples, the second memory cycle involves the second to  
 203 fifth samples, and so on. In general, cycle  $k$  involves the deployment of the contents of  
 204 memory from samples  $S_k, S_{k+1}, \dots, S_{k+(n-1)}$ , where  $n$  is the memory size deployed by the  
 205 agent. In the following simulations, we assume that the memory size is the same for all  
 206 subjects.



*Figure 2.* Memory model for a rate-correlation approach to instrumental actions. (a) In this simplified illustration, each memory cycle is comprised by four time-samples. The romboids represent response events and the outcomes are represented by red stars. (b) Different experienced rate correlations for each of the memory cycles exemplified in (a).

207 Following each mnemonic recycle, we assume that the agent estimates the  
 208 response-outcome rate correlation based upon the current contents of the memory. For

209 simplicity, we assume that the agent computes a standard correlation coefficient which,  
210 psychologically speaking, accounts for the agent's experienced linear relationship between the  
211 action and outcome rates. More formally, if  $b_i$  and  $r_i$  represent, respectively, the number of  
212 responses and outcomes in the  $i$ -th sample in memory, then each sample can be  
213 understood as an ordered-pair  $(b_i, r_i)$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, n$ , from which the agent computes the rate  
214 correlation by the following expression:

$$r_{br} = \sum_{i=1}^m \frac{(b_i - \bar{b})(r_i - \bar{r})}{ms_b s_r} = \frac{cov(b, r)}{s_b s_r} \quad (1)$$

215 where  $cov(b, r)$  is the covariance between  $b$  and  $r$ ,  $\bar{b}$  and  $\bar{r}$  the average responses and  
216 outcomes per sample, and  $s_b$  and  $s_r$  the standard deviations of  $b$  and  $r$ , respectively.

217 Let  $k$  be the current memory cycle and let  $g_k$  the strength of the rate correlation  
218 system in each cycle. The simplest model would assume that response strength during the  
219 following cycle  $k + 1$  is determined in this system by the rate correlation computed on the  
220 basis of the memory contents at the last cycle, that is,  $g_{k+1} = f(r_k) = r_k$ . However, there are  
221 two concerns about this simple algorithm. First, the algorithm is sensitive solely to the  
222 currently experienced rate correlation and so gives no weight to prior experience.

223 Second, and most importantly, if the memory contains no events, either outcomes or  
224 responses at a cycle, the rate correlation is undefined. Under these circumstances, it would  
225 seem reasonable to assume that the agent needs to rely on its prior experience to determine  
226 responding in the current cycle. To determine the rate of responding, we assume that each  
227 cycle in the past has an effect on the current level of responding, with the effect being  
228 discounted with time. A typical function representing the discounting for previous cycles is  
229 given by  $\theta = \lambda e^{-\lambda d}$ , which assigns the importance to the cycles according to how far back  
230 they are in time ( $d$ ). For a given value for  $d$ , different values of  $\lambda$  will yield different weights  
231 to the cycles. We use the discrete version of this function (Killeen, 1994). According to an

232 exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) model, the agents compute the  
233 rate-correlation for each cycle and uses this value to generate responding according to

$$g_{k+1} = \theta r_k + (1 - \theta) \bar{r}_k \quad (2)$$

234 where  $\bar{r}$  is the average experienced rate correlation across the previous  $k - 1$  cycles,  
235 computed in each memory cycle  $k$  as

$$\bar{r}_k = \bar{r}_{k-1} + \beta(r_k - \bar{r}_{k-1}) \quad (k > 3) \quad (3)$$

236 where  $\beta = 1/k$  is the learning rate in each cycle and  $\bar{r}_1 = r_1$ , by definition. The  
237 parameter  $\theta$  is a weighting parameter that represents the importance of the current rate  
238 correlation on responding for the next cycle. If  $\theta = 1$ , all the weight is put on the current  
239 cycle; if  $\theta = 0$ , responding is driven only by the average experienced rate correlation; other  
240 values of  $\theta$  will give different degrees of importance to the history of rate correlation on  
241 current performance.

## 242 Simulations of a rate-correlation theory

243 We first investigated the robustness of a correlation coefficient in this model with  
244 respect to variations in the sample duration parameter. To this end, we probed the effect of  
245 varying the sample duration between 10 and 120 s on the rate correlation generated by  
246 random ratio (RR) 5-to-50 and RI 5-to-90 s schedules with response rates varying between  
247 30 and 150 responses per minute. These two types of schedules assign, respectively, a  
248 probability of an outcome being delivered for each response and a probability of the outcome  
249 becoming available in each second. Once the outcome was available, it remained so until


250 collected by a response. Those simulations showed that, for the range of response rates that  
251 we tested, the experienced rate correlation is not significantly affected by the size of the  
252 sample deployed by subjects. So we choose a value of 20 s for the time samples in a memory  
253 cycle, primarily to limit the total duration of the agents' memory to a few minutes. But it is  
254 important to note that using different sample lengths will not affect the results reported in  
255 this paper. As the simulations were run with a memory size of 20, the total memory  
256 duration was 400 s. For simplicity, we also limited the agent to perform a maximum of 60  
257 responses per min (i.e. a maximum of 1 response per second) by arranging for the  
258 probability of a response in each second to be  $g$ . In what follows, we show the results for the  
259 EWMA model with theta set at .5, but note that the same results hold for the other values  
260 of  $\theta$  tested in our simulations (see Supplemental Material).

### 261 **Ratio-interval effects**

262 We investigated the rate correlation model by running simulations under variations in  
263 outcome probability using RR schedules and variations of outcome rate using RI schedules.  
264 Our initial reason for investigating the role of rate correlation in goal-directed learning arose  
265 from the fact that ratio schedules establish responding that is more sensitive to outcome  
266 devaluation than does interval training even when the outcome probability is matched by  
267 yoking (Dickinson *et al.*, 1983). Within our rate correlation theory,  $g$  is the agent's learned  
268 representation of the strength of the causal relationship between action and outcome.  
269 However, as  $g$  also determines the probability of responding, the theory predicts concordance  
270 between judgments of the strength of the response-outcome relationship and the rate of  
271 responding.

272 The most direct evidence for such concordance comes from a study by Reed (2001),  
273 who reported the performance of human participants on ratio and interval schedules with  
274 matched outcome probabilities. Not only did he find that ratio training yielded higher causal

275 judgments of the effectiveness of the action but also higher response rates, but also that the  
276 performance under ratio training was higher than under interval training. To investigate  
277 whether a rate-correlation model could reproduce these data, we simulated training on a  
278 master RI 20-s schedule, which was the temporal parameter employed by Reed (2001), and  
279 then used the outcome probability generated by each master subject to determine the  
280 parameter for a yoked subject trained under a ratio schedule. The initial response rate during  
281 the first cycle was 10 per min, and we trained the simulations across 3 sessions, each of which  
282 terminated after 13 outcomes, in an attempt to match the training received by participants  
283 in Reed's (2001) experiment. Figure 3 shows the data obtained by Reed (left panel) and the  
284 simulations produced by the rate-correlation model of the response strength,  $g$ , during the  
285 last 50 cycles and averaged across 100 replications of each simulation. As can be appreciated  
286 in the right panel of Figure 3, the model generated lower response-outcome rate correlation  
287 values following interval rather than ratio training with matched outcome probabilities.



*Figure 3.* Simulations of a rate correlation model for ratio and interval schedules with matched reward probabilities. The left panel shows the data obtained by Reed (2001) in a human causal judgment experiment. The right hand panel show the simulations produced by a rate correlation model.

288 **Outcome probability**

289 Having established that rate correlation theory can reproduce the ratio-interval  
290 difference, we investigated whether the theory could simulate the general effects of the major  
291 variables determining free-operant performance. From these simulations we report the  
292 response strength,  $g$ , during the last 50 cycles from the 2000 cycles of each simulation  
293 averaged across 100 replications of each simulation.

294 We have already noted that both associative and model-based RL theories of  
295 goal-directed behavior predict that instrumental performance should be determined—either  
296 because an outcome follows from its execution or because its value is determined by reward  
297 prediction-error—by the outcome probability (Mackintosh and Dickinson, 1979; Sutton and  
298 Barto, 1998). This prediction was confirmed empirically by Mazur (1983), who trained  
299 hungry rats to press a lever on a RR schedule under different ratio requirements. To ensure  
300 that the motivational state was kept relatively constant, Mazur scheduled a limited number  
301 of food outcomes per session in an open economy<sup>3</sup>. To assess performance only during  
302 periods of engagement in the instrumental action, he also removed the outcome handling  
303 time by assessing the rate following the first lever press after an outcome delivery. The left  
304 panel of Figure 4 shows a relevant selection of the response rates obtain by Mazur.

305 To investigate the response rates generated by a rate correlation model when the  
306 outcome probability was varied, we replicated a similar design by simulating performance on  
307 RR schedules with ratio requirements varying between 10 and 30. Figure 4 shows that the  
308 likelihood of responding decreased systematically when outcome probability was reduced by  
309 increasing the ratio parameter, correctly predicting the pattern of results obtained by Mazur  
310 in his parametric investigation of ratio performance in rats.

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<sup>3</sup> In an open economy, the animal is also fed in the home cage with a different food to the one earned by the instrumental response during training, so that its weight remains constant throughout the experiment.






Figure 4. Simulations of rate correlation models for ratio training with different outcome probabilities (the inverse of the ratio requirement). The left panel shows the results obtained by Mazur (1983) in a within-subject study in rats. The right panel shows the simulations of a rate correlation model.

### 311 Outcome rate

312 Herrnstein and his colleagues have argued that instrumental performance on interval  
313 schedules is systematically related to the outcome rate, such that longer intervals between  
314 reinforcers should bring about lower performance than shorter ones (Herrnstein, 1969;  
315 Herrnstein, 1970). This prediction has been confirmed multiple times in different species.  
316 One example, shown in the left panel of Figure 5, was provided by Bradshaw et al. (1981),  
317 who trained hungry rats to lever press for milk and reported that there was a systematic  
318 decrease in the response rates as the interval was increased except at high rates of rewards  
319 when outcome handling time may well have interfered with lever pressing. A selection of  
320 their results for intermediate intervals are shown in the left panel of Figure 5. To match the  
321 conditions of this experiment, we repeated the simulation procedure used for outcome  
322 probability but with RI schedules and interval parameters varying between 30 and 90 s. As





Figure 5. Simulations of a rate correlation model for interval schedules with different interval parameters. The left panel shows the results obtained by Bradshaw et al. (1981) in rats. The right panel shows simulations of a rate correlation model using parameters similar to the ones used by these authors.

323 the right panel of Figure 5 shows, all values produced a systematic decrease in responding as  
324 the outcome rate was reduced by increasing the temporal parameter of the interval schedule,  
325 replicating the pattern of results obtained by these authors.

### 326 Outcome delay

327 Baum (1973) noted that his correlational Law of Effect anticipated the fact that  
328 delaying the outcome following the response that generated it will have a deleterious impact  
329 on the acquisition of instrumental responding. For example, the left panel of Figure 6  
330 illustrates the terminal rates of lever pressing by hungry rats obtained by Dickinson et al.  
331 when each lever press produced a food outcome after a delay of 16, 32, or 64 s (Dickinson  
332 *et al.*, 1992). With the 16-s delay and a 20-s memory sample used in our model, only  
333 outcomes generated by responses during the first 4 s of a sample occur in the same sample as

334 their responses, whereas with the 32-s and 64-s delays all the outcomes occur in a different  
335 sample, thereby reducing the experienced rate correlation. The simulations displayed in the  
336 right panel of Figure 6 confirm this intuitive prediction. Following a similar reasoning to that  
337 of causal judgments for ratio- and interval-trained responses, these simulations anticipate a  
338 similar result for the acquisition of a causal belief when outcomes are delayed. This  
339 prediction has been confirmed by Shanks and Dickinson (1991) using fictitious credits as the  
340 outcome and key presses as the instrumental response in human participants. Moreover, the  
341 impact of outcome delay on goal-directed behavior has been more recently confirmed by  
342 Urcelay and Jonkman (2019), who reported that delaying the food outcome by 20 s  
343 abolished sensitivity to outcome devaluation compared to a group that underwent training  
344 with no delay between the response and the outcome.



*Figure 6.* Simulations of rate correlation models for delayed rewards. The left panel shows the data obtained by Dickinson et al. (1992) in rats. The right panel shows simulations of a rate correlation model for the same delay parameters used in the original paper.

345 **Contingency degradation**

346 At first sight, the most direct evidence for a rate correlation approach to instrumental  
347 learning is the sensitivity of free-operant performance to the action-outcome contingency, in  
348 that a correlation provides a measure of this contingency. However, the strength of the causal  
349 relationship between action and outcome can be varied not only by changing the probability  
350 of a contiguous outcome as in Mazur's (1983) experiment, but also by varying the likelihood  
351 that the outcome will occur in the absence of the action or, in other words, the probability of  
352 non-contiguous outcomes. When the contiguous and non-contiguous probabilities are the  
353 same, the agent has no control over the number of outcomes received in any given time  
354 period. Hammond (1980) was the first to study the effect of such manipulation in a  
355 free-operant procedure. Using rats, Hammond fixed the probability of a contiguous outcome  
356 for the first lever press in each second while varying the probability of delivering a  
357 non-contiguous outcome at the end of any second without a lever press. Non-contingent  
358 schedules, in which the contiguous and non-contiguous outcomes probabilities were the same,  
359 failed to sustain lever pressing initially established without the non-contiguous outcomes.

360 We cannot be certain, however, that the low rate of lever pressing under the  
361 non-contingent schedules was due to the absence of a causal relationship between this action  
362 and the outcome. Inevitably, the non-contingent schedule greatly increases the frequency of  
363 the outcome and therefore the time required to handle and process the outcome with the  
364 result that the depression of responding under a non-contingent outcome may have been due  
365 to interference with lever pressing by the enhanced outcome handling and processing. One  
366 way of addressing this issue is to use a non-contingent schedule while varying the identity of  
367 the contiguous and non-contiguous outcome. When the contiguous and non-contiguous  
368 outcomes are the same, the agent has control over neither the outcome frequency nor its  
369 identity. However, when the outcomes are different, the agent can control the type of  
370 outcomes they received. By responding, the agent can increase the relative frequency of the

371 contiguous outcome.

372 To illustrate the simulation of contingency degradation by the rate correlation model,  
373 we followed an experiment reported by Balleine and Dickinson (1998). Hungry rats were  
374 initially trained to lever-press for one of two different food outcomes on an RR 20 schedule  
375 so that the probability of the contiguous outcome was .05. The instrumental contingency  
376 was then degraded by delivering a non-contiguous outcome with a probability of .05 in each  
377 second without a lever press. As the left panel of Figure 7 shows, the rats pressed at a higher  
378 rate if the non-contiguous and contiguous outcomes were different rather than the same. The  
379 right panel illustrates that the rate correlation model can replicate this effect on the  
380 assumption that different outcomes receive distinct representations in memory with separate  
381 response strengths being calculated for each outcome type. Numerous studies have shown  
382 that human causal judgments of the response-outcome association and the rate of responding  
383 are lower when the contingency between the response and the outcome is degraded by  
384 increasing the probability of non-contiguous outcomes (Shanks, 1991).

### 385 **Interim summary**

386 In summary, this set of simulations demonstrate that a rate-correlation model can in  
387 principle provide an account of primary determinants of instrumental performance: the  
388 impact of outcome probability, rate and delay on instrumental performance. In addition, the  
389 model correctly anticipates the ratio-interval schedule effect when the outcome probabilities  
390 are matched, and the effect of degrading the causal contingency between the response and  
391 the outcome, both of which are prerequisites for any theory of goal-directed control.

392 It is equally clear, however, that a further learning system is required for a complete  
393 account of instrumental behavior. To the extent that goal-direct learning is assigned to a  
394 rate correlation system, we are left with no account of sustained responding on an interval




Figure 7. Simulations of a contingency degradation experiment. Left panel. Data obtained by Balleine and Dickinson (1998) in rats. Group *diff* was given freely an alternative outcome with the same probability as the outcome produced by the target action. Group *same* was given freely the same outcome as that produced by the target action. Right panel. Simulations of a rate-correlation model for a similar procedure.

395 schedule, given the low rate correlation experienced under this schedule. Furthermore,  
396 rate-correlation theory on its own provides no principled explanation of why responding  
397 extinguishes when outcomes are withheld. As we have noted, the rate correlation cannot be  
398 calculated at a recycle if no outcomes are represented in memory (as would be the case  
399 during extinction), and under this circumstance the response strength remains at the value  
400 computed at the last recycle in which the memory contained at least one outcome  
401 representation. A comprehensive account of instrumental action therefore requires an  
402 additional learning system.

403

### Dual-System Theories

404

405

When Dickinson (1985) first argued that a rate correlation account of instrumental  
action could explain goal-directed learning, he embedded it within a dual-system theory to

406 explain instrumental responding that is autonomous of the current value of the outcome, as  
407 assessed by the outcome revaluation paradigm. He envisaged this second system as a form of  
408 habit learning that involved the acquisition of an association between the stimuli present  
409 during training and the instrumental response. This is, of course, the form of  
410 stimulus-response (S-R) learning envisaged by Thorndike in his original Law of Effect  
411 (Thorndike, 1911) more than a century ago. According to Thorndike, the occurrence of a  
412 contiguous attractive outcome following a response simply serves to strengthen or reinforce  
413 the S-R association so that the re-presentation of the training stimuli are more likely to elicit  
414 the response. However, because all information about the outcome is discarded once it has  
415 served its reinforcing function, any subsequent change in the value of the outcome cannot  
416 impact on instrumental performance without re-presenting the revalued outcome contingent  
417 upon responding. For this reason, to test whether an outcome representation exerts  
418 goal-directed control over responding, the outcome devaluation paradigm tests responding in  
419 the same training context but in the absence of the now-devalued outcome. Any decrease in  
420 responding under these conditions indicates that a representation of the outcome controls an  
421 action in accord with the current value of the outcome, thereby demonstrating its  
422 goal-directed status (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Dickinson and Balleine, 1993; Dickinson  
423 and Perez, 2018).

424 To date, only RL theory has attempted to offer a computational account using a  
425 similar dual-system view of instrumental control. RL theory recognizes two types of systems  
426 that closely resemble the two psychological processes described by Dickinson (1985) in his  
427 original dual-system framework. Both RL systems aim to maximize the number of rewards  
428 obtained by the agent during a task (Daw *et al.*, 2005; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Keramati  
429 *et al.*, 2011). Model-based (MB) computations learn a model of the environment by  
430 estimating the probability that an action in the current state will lead to each following  
431 state, and the probability of each action leading to a reward in each state. This  
432 "forward-looking" control is based on the online estimation of different state trajectories and

433 is therefore highly sensitive to abrupt changes in either the response-outcome contingencies  
434 or the motivational value of the outcome, and therefore resembles a goal-directed system as  
435 proposed by Dickinson and his colleagues.

436 RL theory also recognizes another system that is relatively impervious to outcome  
437 reevaluation. Model-free (MF) computations estimate the value of each action in each state  
438 ( $Q(action|state)$ ) by simply caching the running average rate of rewards obtained by each  
439 action in a given state adjusting their value by reward-prediction error. Because all the  
440 history of rewards is collapsed in  $Q(action|state)$ , the agent maximizes the outcome rate by  
441 simply selecting the actions with a higher  $Q$ -value. For this reason, MF computations are  
442 less computationally expensive and faster than MB computations. When an outcome is  
443 revalued, however, the MF computations can only adjust to outcome reevaluation by  
444 re-experiencing the outcome as a contingent consequence of an action so that, in this  
445 important respect, the behavioral control exerted by a MF RL system is similar to habitual  
446 behavior.

447 Because the estimations in MB and MF computations are updated by state and reward  
448 prediction-errors, respectively, the value of actions, and hence the probability of performing  
449 an action are ultimately determined by outcome probability. To capture the distinction  
450 between different reward schedules, RL needs significant modifications.

451 To our knowledge, only a model proposed by Niv et al. (Niv *et al.*, 2006) explicitly  
452 addresses free-operant performance within a RL framework. The normative approach  
453 proposed by Niv and colleagues (2005; 2007) distinguishes between the ratio and interval  
454 contingencies by deploying an economic argument that determines the rate of responding on  
455 the basis of the trade-off between the utility of obtaining more outcomes by responding  
456 faster and the cost of emitting those responses. This aim is achieved by choosing a  
457 behavioral strategy that obtains the most outcomes with the least effort. Such a point is  
458 reached when the marginal utility of increasing responding equals the marginal cost of such



459 increase (i.e., waiting, or performing other behavior), a point that is reached at a lower  
460 response rate on an interval as opposed to a ratio schedule. Critically, however, this account  
461 is a form of MF RL and therefore provides no explanation of the differential sensitivity of  
462 ratio and interval responding to outcome revaluation, which is the focus of our analysis<sup>4</sup>.

463 In the following sections we formalize a dual-system model in which a goal-directed  
464 system based on the response-outcome rate-correlation interacts with a habit MF algorithm  
465 based on reward prediction-error. We show how this model can explain all the phenomena  
466 we have already noted, along with additional phenomena from the literature that are not  
467 currently fully captured by RL or associative models of instrumental learning.

### 468 The Dual-System Model

469 Having demonstrated that a goal-directed system based on rate correlation can capture  
470 the primary determinants of free-operant behavior, we now specify a habit algorithm that  
471 will integrate with the goal-directed system to explain both behavioral performance and  
472 control in free-operant training. To this end, we employ an algorithm similar to those  
473 employed in the RL literature to account for MF strategies, but modified so that it can  
474 account for free-operant data (Bush and Mosteller, 1951). The algorithm deploys a reward  
475 prediction-error to increase or decrease the likelihood of performing the response in a similar  
476 situation or context. Let  $h_t$  denote habit strength at each time-step  $t$ . In our habit system,  
477 the acquisition and extinction of habit strength in cycle  $k$  follows the following equation:

$$h_{t+1} = \begin{cases} h_t + \alpha^+ PE_t & \text{if } PE_t > 0 \\ h_t - \alpha^- PE_t & \text{if } PE_t < 0 \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

---

<sup>4</sup> An exception to this is a recent model by Miller et al. (2019). Although their model can predict different sensitivities to devaluation for ratio and interval training, this is only achieved by importing arbitrary assumptions rather than providing an account embedded within an integrated model.

478 where  $\alpha^+$  and  $\alpha^-$  are parameters between 0 and 1 and represent the learning rates for  
479 excitation and inhibition of the S-R connection, respectively <sup>5</sup> and  $PE_t$  is the reward  
480 prediction-error at time-step  $t$ , defined as:

$$PE_t = \begin{cases} 1 - (h_t + g_k) & \text{if response is reinforced} \\ (h_t + g_k) & \text{if response is not reinforced} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

481 Following on evidence showing that learning rates for rewarded and non-rewarded  
482 episodes are asymmetric (Behrens *et al.*, 2007; Gershman, 2015; Lefebvre *et al.*, 2017;  
483 Palminteri *et al.*, 2017), we assume that the learning rate of a reinforced response is higher  
484 than the learning rate for a non-reinforced response ( $\alpha^+ > \alpha^-$ ). This assumption is also  
485 necessary from a practical perspective: in a partial reinforcement schedule as the ones we  
486 have been simulating, the reinforced connection must be counteracting the effect of a much  
487 greater proportion of non-reinforced responses to sustain positive levels of responding. Under  
488 this algorithm, every reinforced episode strengthens the connection between the context and  
489 the instrumental response when the reward prediction-error, given by  
490  $PE_t = \alpha^+[1 - (h_t + g_k)]$  is positive. Likewise, every non-reinforced episode weakens the  
491 strength by  $PE_t = \alpha^-(h_t + g_k)$  <sup>6</sup>.

492 Similar to MF algorithms which assign the value  $Q(\text{action}|\text{state})$  to a specific action in  
493 a given state, Equation 4 explains the change of response strength according to the value of

---

<sup>5</sup> Previous versions of this algorithm deployed only one connection for increasing and decreasing the probability of responding. The original RL algorithm postulated by Bush & Mosteller had the form  $h_{t+1} = h_t + \alpha^+[1 - (h_t)] - \alpha^-(h_t)$  and assumed that  $\alpha = 0$  when a response was not reinforced. The term  $-\alpha^-(h_t)$  can thus be regarded as reflecting an inhibitory potential present both in reinforced and non-reinforced responses.

<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that the PEs employ a summed prediction term by combining the current response strengths generated by the goal-directed ( $g_k$ ) and habit systems. The rationale for this summed prediction term lies with the fact that a PE is intended to capture the extent to which an outcome (or its omission) is surprising or unexpected with respect to the predictions from both systems. In this respect, the rationale for the summed PE is the same as that in the Rescorla-Wagner rule (1972) for determining associative strength in Pavlovian Learning.

494  $h_t$ , which completely summarizes the history of reinforcement in that particular state or  
495 context. Given that this algorithm is only driven by  $PE_t$ , it does not explicitly model the  
496 information regarding the relationship between the response and the outcome or its current  
497 motivational value, making it insensitive to both outcome revaluation and manipulations of  
498 the causal relationship between and response and outcome. Such behavioral autonomy is the  
499 cardinal feature of habitual behavior (Dickinson, 1985; Heyes and Dawson, 1990).

500         Given the above specifications for the habit and goal-directed systems, the next step is  
501 to specify the type of interaction between these systems that would explain total  
502 performance and behavioral control for different experimental conditions. To this end, we  
503 define a response function that jointly deploys both processes to explain total response  
504 strength for each memory cycle  $k$ . We denote this total response strength by  $p_k$ .

505         Our assumption regarding the interaction between the systems will be based on the  
506 data reported by Dickinson et al. (1983). As noted above, after having trained two groups of  
507 rats under interval and ratio schedules with matched outcome probabilities, Dickinson and  
508 colleagues devalued the outcome in half of the rats of each group by pairing it with toxicosis.  
509 After this devaluation manipulation, only the ratio-trained rats decreased responding (i.e.,  
510 were under goal-directed control); the performance of the interval-trained rats at test was  
511 unaffected by outcome devaluation. An interesting feature of these data is that the level of  
512 responding after devaluation in the ratio-trained group did not differ from that of the  
513 interval-trained group. Because the outcome probability was matched between the groups,  
514 the habit system's contribution to responding should have been equal in both groups.  
515 Likewise, because by definition responding that is sensitive to devaluation must be  
516 attributed to the goal-directed component, the residual responding that was not affected by  
517 devaluation in the ratio-trained group must, by necessity, be attributed to the habitual  
518 component. Therefore, this study suggests that both systems were summing their relative  
519 strengths to determine the response probability  $p$ .

520 To transform response strengths into probabilities of responding, we assume that  
521 response probability in cycle  $k + 1$ ,  $p_{k+1}$ , is governed by a sigmoid function:

$$p_{k+1} = s(Ig_k + h_k) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\tau(Ig_k + h_k - C)}} \quad (6)$$

522 where  $g_k$  is the goal-directed strength in cycle  $k$  as defined above,  $h_k$  is the habit  
523 strength accumulated by Equation 4 during the experiment, up to cycle  $k$ , and  $I$  is a  
524 variable representing the current incentive value of the outcome by taking the value 1 if the  
525 outcome is valued and 0 if the outcome is devalued (that is, we assume that the devaluation  
526 procedure successfully decreases the value of the outcome to zero). The parameter  $\tau$  is an  
527 inverse temperature parameter that reflects how sensitive the agent is to increases in total  
528 response strength ( $Ig_k + h_k$ ) and  $C$  is a parameter that determines the midpoint value of  
529 the function. Under this response function, the two systems sum to determine total  
530 responding, so that the response probability in the next cycle  $p_{k+1}$  reflects the relative  
531 contribution of each system (see Figure 8). In the following sections, we will discuss the  
532 implications of such an assumption for the type of behavioral control that should be  
533 expected after we present simulations for different experimental procedures.

### 534 **Ratio and interval training**

535 Initially we simulated goal-directed and habitual learning under interval and ratio  
536 contingencies using a RI 15-s master schedule. The outcome probability generated by each  
537 master interval simulation was then used to generate a yoked simulation on a ratio schedule  
538 with a parameter that yielded to same outcome probability. The initial response probability  
539 for the first session of training reflected one session of pretraining under RR-5 and each  
540 session terminated after 30 outcomes had been received. Panels a and b of Figure 9 display  
541 the mean values generated by 200 simulations under the master interval and yoked ratio





Figure 8. Schematic representation of the dual-system model. For each cycle, the agents concurrently computes the response-outcome rate correlation and habit strength is accumulated. The strength of both systems is then summed and a response function produces the probability of responding for the following cycle. The rate correlation on the goal-directed system is only computed when both responses and outcomes are held in memory. (Illustrations courtesy of Loreto Contreras.)

542 schedules, respectively. Shown separately are the response strengths generated by  
 543 goal-directed and habit systems,  $g$  and  $h$  respectively, and the resultant probability of  
 544 responding per 1-s time sample,  $p$ , produced by the interaction of these response strengths.

545 The first point to note is that the model reproduces the differential sensitivity of ratio  
 546 and interval performance to outcome devaluation early in training. For example, ratio  
 547 training generates a goal-directed response strength,  $g$ , of about 0.4 by the third session,  
 548 whereas the interval response strength is close to zero for equivalent training. As the model

549 assumes that outcome devaluation, if complete, abolishes the contribution of  $g$  to overall  
 550 responding, the model naturally explains why devaluation has a greater impact on ratio than  
 551 on interval responding early in training (Dickinson *et al.*, 1983). This finding is summarized  
 552 in Figure 9c in terms of a devaluation ratio,  $DR$ , defined as  $DR = \frac{s(Ig)}{s(Ig+h)}$ , where  $s$  is the  
 553 sigmoid function defined in Equation 6.



*Figure 9.* Simulations of the dual-system model for the experiment reported by Dickinson *et al.* (1983). (a) Strength from each system and response probability across 10 sessions of interval training. (b) Strength from each system and response probability across 10 sessions of training under yoked ratio training, matching outcome probabilities with the interval-trained subjects. (c) Sensitivity to outcome devaluation for ratio and interval training as assessed by a devaluation ratio early in training (Session 2); at mid-training (Session 5) and at the end of training (Session 10). (d) Response probability per second for ratio and interval training across different extensions of training.

554 **Development of behavioral autonomy**

555         Perhaps, however, the most notable feature of these simulations is the decline in the  
556 goal-directed response strength as the habit strength grows with training. This reduction in  
557  $g$  reflects, at least in part, the reduction in the variance of the rate of responding across the  
558 time samples in memory as the overall response rate increases with the consequence that the  
559 experienced rate correlation, and therefore  $g$ , declines. Thus, according to our model,  
560 behavioral autonomy should develop as responding becomes stereotyped with more extended  
561 training. The reduction in sensitivity to outcome devaluation with training predicted by the  
562 simulations is documented in Figure 9c in terms of devaluation ratio.

563         Adams (1982) was the first to report that behavioral autonomy developed with  
564 training on a variety of ratio schedules. Although the development of autonomy with  
565 training has been independently replicated multiple times (e.g., Dickinson *et al.*, 1995;  
566 Holland, 2004; Killcross and Coutureau, 2003), a number of studies have reported  
567 goal-directed control after extended training. For example, de Wit *et al.* (2018) have  
568 documented two failures to replicate the development of behavioral autonomy observed by  
569 Tricomi *et al.* (2009) after training humans under an interval schedule (see Corbit *et al.*,  
570 2014; Nelson and Killcross, 2006). Similarly, Jonkman *et al.* (2010) found that rats remained  
571 sensitive to outcome devaluation throughout 20 sessions of training on an interval schedule.

572         In interpreting these divergent results it is important to emphasize that it is not the  
573 type schedule (ratio versus interval) nor the amount of training per se that determines  
574 whether responding becomes behaviorally autonomous of the current outcome value, but  
575 rather whether the mechanism of memory recycling yields a low local rate correlation. For  
576 example, consider the case of extend training on fixed interval schedules (FI) in which an  
577 outcome becomes available after a fixed interval between each obtained outcome. FI  
578 schedules have a similar overall functional relationship between response and outcome rates

579 as variable interval schedules (see Figure 1c). However, two types of schedule generate very  
580 different local rate correlations as represented in a memory cycle of our model. The RI  
581 interval schedule establishes a steady rate of responding that, in conjunction with the  
582 temporal constraint on the outcome rate, ensures the rate correlation encoded in memory  
583 cycle is low. By contrast, a fixed schedule produces a sustained variation in the local rate of  
584 responding in the form of a "scaloped" pattern in which responding is low immediately after  
585 the receipt of an outcome before increasing as the availability of the next outcome  
586 approaches in time. As a consequent, the contrasting response rates within the interval  
587 ensures that the agent continues to experience a local rate correlation however much training  
588 is given. Importantly, this prediction accords with the report by DeRusso et al. (2010) who  
589 reported that extended training on a RI schedule established behavioral autonomy, whereas  
590 FI responding remained sensitive to outcome devaluation after equivalent training.

### 591 **Choice training.**

592 The analysis of extended makes clear that, according to rate correlational theory, the  
593 conditions for developing behavioral autonomy are not directly determined by the operant  
594 schedule or the amount of training but rather by whether or not the agent experiences a  
595 correlation between the rates of responding and outcomes as represented within the memory  
596 cycle. To recap, embedding rate correlational theory within a dual-system model predicts a  
597 reduction in the experienced rate correlation through the development of invariant  
598 stereotyped responding with the growth of habit strength, an effect enhanced in the case of  
599 interval schedules by the temporal control of outcome availability.

600 The cardinal importance of the experienced rate correlation is reinforced by the  
601 contrast between the single-response training, which has been our focus so far, and  
602 free-operant choice or concurrent training. It has long been known that responding remains  
603 sensitive to outcome devaluation when the training involves interleaved experience with two



604 different response-outcome contingencies (Colwill and Rescorla, 1985; Colwill and Rescorla,  
605 1988). However, of more directly relevance to the present analysis is the study by Kosaki and  
606 Dickinson (2010), which we have already discussed briefly with respect to the differential  
607 reinforcement of long IRTs, in that they directly compared behavioral autonomy after  
608 concurrent and single-response training.

609 To recap, Kosaki and Dickinson (2010) trained rats on two RI schedules that were  
610 concurrently active during each session of training. In one group, the *choice* group,  
611 responding on different levers produced different outcomes. Another group of rats, the  
612 *single-response* group, received the same two outcomes, only that in this group one of the  
613 outcomes was earned by responding on one lever, whereas the other outcome was delivered  
614 non-contingently after the same average period of time as the contingent outcome but  
615 independently of responding. After 20 sessions, a contingent reward was devalued in both  
616 groups by aversion conditioning and responding tested in a subsequent extinction session .  
617 Kosaki and Dickinson observed that responding in the single-response group was insensitive  
618 to devaluation, whereas the choice group markedly reduced the rate of the response whose  
619 outcome was devalued. There are two points to note about this finding. First, the  
620 devaluation effect was assessed against control conditions in which the other outcome was  
621 devalued. As a consequence, any effects of contextual conditioning on general performance  
622 was equated across conditions. Second, the same devaluation effects was found whether or  
623 not the choice was tested with both levers present or just a single lever. Thus, the  
624 devaluation effect exhibited by the choice group arose from the training rather testing  
625 conditions. In conclusion, these results demonstrated that responding in the choice group  
626 was still under goal-directed control even when similar training extension rendered  
627 responding habitual in the single-response group.

628 Recall that, according to the rate correlation component of our dual-system model,  
629 behavioral autonomy develops through extended training because responding becomes

630 stereotyped with little variation across time-samples, thereby yielding a low rate correlation  
631 within a memory cycle, an effect compounded by the intrinsic low correlation engendered by  
632 an interval contingency. However, response rate variation across time-samples is an inevitable  
633 consequence when the agent is engaged with two interval sources of reward. When engaged  
634 in one of the sources, the memory samples will register neither responses nor outcomes from  
635 the non-engaged source. Consequently, any memory cycle containing a switch will have  
636 some samples with no response nor outcomes representations of the switched-to-source and  
637 other samples containing these representations. And, of course, the same will be true of the  
638 switched-from-source. As a consequence, the agent will experience a sustained rate  
639 correlation for both responses, each of which will therefore sustained goal directed control.

640 To substantiate this intuitive analysis, we simulated a concurrent choice procedure  
641 similar to that employed by Kosaki and Dickinson (2010) using our dual-system model. The  
642 simulations were run under the same conditions as the previous ones for interval training. It  
643 is well established that the probability of switching away from a source remains constant  
644 during responding to that source (Heyman, 1979) and so we programmed a fixed probability  
645 per 1-s time sample,  $p_{switch}$ , for a change-over between levers in the case of the *choice* group.  
646 Inspection of the authors' original data-set revealed that their rats switched between levers  
647 on average every 10 s; we therefore set  $p_{switch} = .1$  for the following simulations.

648 Figure 10 shows the results of the simulation by the dual-system model for this choice  
649 experiment. As can be seen, similar amounts of training under a choice procedure yield  
650 significant contributions of the goal-directed system compared to single training. The result  
651 holds even when the amount of training is sufficient to drive the habit strength to asymptote,  
652 a factor that should reduced the experienced rate correlation, and hence goal directed control  
653 if only a single response was available. In summary, the model predicts that both systems  
654 should contribute to the control of responding under choice training, and therefore outcome  
655 devaluation should be effective in modulating responding under choice procedures, in line

656 with the results reported by Kosaki and Dickinson (2010).




Figure 10. Simulations Kosaki and Dickinson (2010), investigating sensitivity to reward devaluation in a choice procedure. The choice group was trained with two responses concurrently available under an RI schedule.

657 One thing to note with regard to Kosaki & Dickinson's (2010) study is that the  
658 outcomes produced by each response differed in their sensory properties, which is critical if  
659 the dual-system model is to predict devaluation sensitivity after overtraining. Using the  
660 same outcome for each of the responses effectively changes the schedule into a  
661 non-contingent one for both responses because the outcome rate when the agent is  
662 responding to one source would be the same as that when response are not directed at that  
663 source. Hence, the rate correlation for this response should be close to zero with the  
664 consequence that responding under such a schedule should be purely habitual. Holland  
665 (2004, Experiment 2) conducted an experiment where the same training regime was given to  
666 two different groups of rats under interval schedules, with two different responses and  
667 outcomes available in one group, and with two responses producing the same outcome in  
668 another group. After extended training, only the rats in the group trained with multiple  
669 outcome was sensitive to devaluation; using a single outcome even when two responses were

670 available made responding habitual, in line with the predictions of our model.

671 **Extinction.**

672 As it stands, the rate correlation system in our model makes what at first sight appears  
673 to be a highly problematic prediction: goal-direct control should never extinguish. Recall  
674 that the goal-directed system only computes the response-outcome rate correlation for  
675 memory cycles in which at least one response and one outcome are registered in memory.  
676 The consequence of this assumption is that goal-directed strength remains frozen throughout  
677 extinction at the the level attained during acquisition following the last memory cycle that  
678 contained an outcome representation.

679 Although not generally acknowledged by RL theory, this prediction accords with a  
680 series of studies conducted by Rescorla (1993), who reported that the impact of the outcome  
681 devaluation is not reduced by extinction. In one of his experiments, Rescorla trained two  
682 responses each with a different outcome, and then one of the responses was extinguished  
683 before a final devaluation test. Rescorla found that devaluation one of the original training  
684 rewards produced a comparable reduction in performance of the associated response in  
685 extinguished and non-extinguished conditions, thereby demonstrating that goal-directed  
686 learning survived the extinction phase. The left panel of Figure 11 presents the comparable  
687 outcome devaluation effect observed by Rescorla (1993) in the extinguished and  
688 non-extinguished conditions. It should be noted that the relatively high response rates in the  
689 extinguished condition reflects the fact that responding was reacquired with a third outcome  
690 prior to the devaluation test to ensure comparable response rates at test. If the goal-directed  
691 system remains relatively unaffected by extinction procedures, what would then explain the  
692 systematic decrease in responding observed across extinction sessions? One possibility,  
693 originally suggested by Colwill (1991), is that the habit system inhibits the goal-directed  
694 system during the extinction phase, masking the contribution that would otherwise be

695 present during contingent response-outcome training.


696 Our dual-system model anticipates the acquisition of this inhibitory habit strength  
697 during extinction. In our model, the prediction error term in the habit algorithm includes  
698 the total prediction determined by the habit and goal-directed strengths  $g$  and  $h$ ,  
699 respectively. Assume that cycle  $k$  is the last one containing response and outcome events in  
700 memory (the last cycle in training, in this example). If  $g$  retains a positive value during  
701 extinction, because the response-outcome rate correlation is not computed in a memory cycle  
702 that does not contain any outcomes, then  $g_{k'} = g_k = g_0$  for all cycles  $k'$  in extinction. Then  
703 it follows that the prediction-error for  $h$  will be negative at each time step  
704 ( $PE_t = -(h_t + g_0)$ ) and hence there will be a systematic decrease of  $h$  during extinction.  
705 The reductions in  $h$  will in turn decrease  $p$  with training, and responding will eventually  
706 extinguish. Indeed, for complete extinction to occur, the habit strength,  $h$ , will have to  
707 become negative or inhibitory because  $g$  remains constant and positive throughout the  
708 extinction phase. To simulate extinction, we initially trained our virtual rats as in previous  
709 simulations and then suspended outcome delivery for 2000 memory cycles. As can be  
710 appreciated in the right panel of Figure 11, the model correctly predicts a systematic  
711 decrease in total responding while maintaining a positive goal-directed strength, thereby  
712 providing an account of the retention of goal-directed control reported by Rescorla <sup>7</sup>.

713 A different prediction in this regard can be made with respect to contingency  
714 degradation manipulations. Indeed, to reduce the goal-directed strength in our rate  
715 correlation system the agent would have to be transferred from a contingent to a  
716 non-contingent schedule in which outcomes occur independently of responding, and

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<sup>7</sup> The decrease in  $p$  under the value of  $\alpha^-$  chosen for previous simulations made  $p$  decrease at a low rate and remained at a positive and low value after 2000 memory cycles. Therefore, for illustrative purposes, in the simulations shown in Figure 11 we employed a higher value for  $\alpha^-$  and kept everything else identical to previous simulations (see Supplemental Material for the parameters used in each of the simulations shown in the paper).

717 responding should become insensitive to devaluation under these conditions. As far as we  
718 know, the impact of non-contingent training on outcome devaluation has not been reported <sup>8</sup>.



*Figure 11.* Simulations of a devaluation manipulation after extinction. The left panel shows the results reported by Rescorla (1993), which involved devaluation of one outcome for one response after an extinction phase compared with a response for which the outcome was not devalued. A control group had similar training but without undergoing an extinction phase. The right panel shows the final values after 2000 cycles of extinction for the dual-system model.

719

### Additional phenomena and some outstanding issues

720

In spite of the wide range of phenomena that we have shown can be captured by this

721

dual-system model, there still remain a number of outstanding issues that will need to be

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addressed in future refinements of the theory, and other phenomena that follow directly from

723

the simulations presented in this paper. We discuss some of these below.

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<sup>8</sup> Exposure to non-contingent outcomes does not reduce outcome-specific Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (Colwill, 2001; Rescorla, 1994), which is thought to be unaffected by outcome devaluation. However, transfer learning differs from that mediating goal-directed behavior (1994).

724 **Performance after extended training**

725 As Figure 9d clearly illustrates, the dual-system model predicts that a ratio schedule  
726 maintains a higher response rate than a comparable interval schedule early in training, as  
727 was originally observed by Dickinson et al. (1983). With more extended training, however,  
728 the difference in performance disappears as responding comes under habitual control. This  
729 prediction is clearly at variance with the sustained schedule effect on performance widely  
730 documented in the literature (e.g. Catania *et al.*, 1977). We have already noted that interval  
731 schedules differentially reinforce long IRTs—the longer an agent waits before responding  
732 again, the more likely it is that a further outcome has become available with the resultant  
733 increase the probability of reinforcement (see Figure 1a). To the extent that habit learning is  
734 conceived of as a form of stimulus-response learning, we should expect this form of learning  
735 to be sensitive to the temporal cues registering the time since the last response and to come  
736 under the control of these cues with the resulting impact on the rate of responding. By  
737 contrast, on a ratio schedule the probability of reinforcement is independent of the IRT and  
738 responding should be independent of the size of the emitted IRTs (for a discussion, see  
739 Chapter 4 in Mackintosh, 1974).

740 As the habit system does not incorporate a mechanism for the differential stimulus  
741 control of responding, we cannot use our model to assess impact of IRT reinforcement on  
742 responding. However, if this differential reinforcement could be removed while implementing  
743 the low rate correlation characteristic of interval contingencies, the model predicts that there  
744 should be no sustained ratio-interval performance effect. Kuch and Platt (1976) specified  
745 such a schedule, now referred to as a regulated-probability interval schedule (RPI). Without  
746 going into the implementation details, the RPI schedule sets the probability of reinforcement  
747 for the next response so that if the agent continues responding at the current rate, the rate  
748 of the outcome will match that specified by the scheduled interval parameter. As a  
749 consequence, variations in the rate of responding will have little impact on the obtained

750 outcome rate so that the schedule maintains the low rate correlation characteristic of a  
751 standard interval schedule. However, as the outcome probability for the next response is  
752 fixed at the time of the preceding response, the RPI schedule, like a standard RR schedule,  
753 does not differentially reinforce any particular IRT. Consequently, our dual system model  
754 predicts that there should be no difference in the sustained responding on ratio and RPI  
755 schedules with matched outcome rates or probability.

756 The limited empirical evidence on this contrast is mixed. Neither Tanno and Sakagami  
757 (2008) nor Perez et al. (2018), who both trained hungry rats to lever-press for a food  
758 outcome, reported a sustained difference between responding on ratio and matched RPI  
759 schedules, while observing the reduced response on a standard matched interval schedule. In  
760 contrast, Dawson and Dickinson (1990) observed a higher response rate of chain pulling on a  
761 ratio schedule than on a yoked RPI schedule and, more recently, Perez and Soto (2019) have  
762 reported a similar result in humans. This remains an anomaly for our dual-system model.

### 763 **Discriminative control**

764 As it stands, our dual-system model offers no mechanism by which goal-directed  
765 responding can come under stimulus control as the goal-directed strength,  $g$ , is solely a  
766 product of the correlation between responses and outcomes. There is, however, extensive  
767 evidence such responding can come under discriminative control. The most compelling  
768 comes from an elegant biconditional discrimination studied by Colwill and Rescorla (1991).  
769 They trained rats with two different responses (R) and outcomes (O) and arranged for the  
770 different stimuli (S) to signal which outcome would be produced by each response. When S1  
771 was present, R1 led to O1 and R2 to O2 whereas the opposite relation held when S2 was  
772 present (R1 led to O2 and R2 led to O1). When one of the outcomes was then devalued, rats  
773 responded more in the extinction test during the stimulus that during training signalled the  
774 non-devalued outcome for the target response. As this design equates the S-O associations



775 across stimuli and the R-O association across responses, this devaluation effect requires the  
776 encoding of the triadic relationship between S, R and O, a representation that is not  
777 incorporated into our current formulation of rate correlation theory.

778       There is evidence, however, that goal-directed responding does not spontaneously come  
779 under the control of the stimulus context in which the response-outcome contingency is  
780 experienced. Thraillkill and Bouton (2015) found that after limited instrumental training the  
781 magnitude of the devaluation effect shown by their rats was unaffected by a shift from the  
782 training context to another familiar context between the end of instrumental training and  
783 testing. It is unlikely that their rats did not discriminate between the contexts because with  
784 more extended training, when responding had become autonomous of outcome value, this  
785 context shift reduced overall responding. This pattern of results accords with the idea that  
786 with limited training responding is predominantly under goal-directed control that encodes  
787 only the response-outcome relationship and, consequently, this control transfers  
788 spontaneously across contexts as anticipated by our current formulation of rate correlation  
789 theory. However, when responding has become under habitual control with more extended  
790 training, a context shift automatically produces a response decrement because such control  
791 reflects the development of context (stimulus)-response strength.

## 792 **Motivational processes**

793       Different processes are involved in the motivation of habits and goal-directed action  
794 and so we shall consider each in turn.

795       **Motivating habits.** Discriminative control, whereby a stimulus or context signals  
796 or "sets the occasion" for a response-outcome contingency, is not the only function by which  
797 stimuli and contexts impact upon free-operant responding. In accord with classic two-process  
798 theory (Rescorla and Solomon, 1967), it is well established that Pavlovian stimuli associated

799 with appetitive reinforcers motivate the performance of free-operant behavior reinforced with  
800 an appetitive outcome. Estes (1948) was the first to demonstrate this effect using what has  
801 come to be called the Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) effect. He initially established a  
802 Pavlovian stimulus as a signal for food before training his hungry rats to press a lever for the  
803 food. When he then presented the stimulus for the first time while the rats were  
804 lever-pressing, he observed an increase in response rate during the stimulus. Given this  
805 transfer, two-process theory assumes that the Pavlovian conditioning to contextual cues  
806 occurs concurrently with instrumental learning during standard operant training so that the  
807 context comes to exert a motivational influence on free-operant performance.

808         The concordance between the impact of outcome rate on operant performance and  
809 Pavlovian responding accords with this two-process theory of instrumental motivation. It  
810 has long been recognized that an important variable in determining the rate of responding  
811 on interval schedules is the outcome rate rather than the outcome probability per response,  
812 and Killeen (1982; 1978) proposed that outcome rate has a direct motivational impact, so  
813 that higher outcome rates will have a general and sustained energizing effect on behavior.  
814 Indeed, this effect has been formalized by Herrnstein and colleagues (Villiers and Herrnstein,  
815 1976) in terms of a hyperbolic function between response and reinforcement rates and, more  
816 recently, Harris and Carpenter (2011) have reported that the same function applies to  
817 Pavlovian conditioning of magazine approach in rats, consistent with the idea that the  
818 sensitivity of instrumental responding outcome rate reflects the motivational influence of  
819 Pavlovian contextual conditioning.

820         This Pavlovian motivation modulates habitual rather than goal-directed behaviour.  
821 Holland (2004) reported that a larger PIT effect when behavioral autonomy had been  
822 induced by extended training, whereas Wiltgen et al. (2012) reported a similar association  
823 between the habitual status of responding and general PIT in mice by contrasting ratio and  
824 interval training. They observed greater PIT following interval training when performance

825 was impervious to outcome devaluation than following ratio training when responding was  
826 sensitive to the current outcome value. Further evidence that the target of Pavlovian  
827 motivation is habitual comes from the fact that the magnitude of PIT was unaffected by  
828 whether the outcome associated with the Pavlovian stimulus was the same as or different  
829 from the instrumental outcome <sup>9</sup>.

830 The most compelling demonstration of the generality of Pavlovian motivation comes  
831 from an irrelevant incentive study of PIT. Dickinson and Dawson (1987) trained hungry rats  
832 to lever-press for food pellet while also pairing one stimulus with the pellets and another  
833 with sugar water in the absence of the lever. When for the first time the rats were given the  
834 opportunity to press the lever during the stimuli while thirsty and in the absence of any  
835 outcomes, they did so more during the sugar-water stimulus than during the pellet signal.  
836 This finding establishes two important points. The first is the generality of the motivational  
837 influence which augments any prepotent habitual response even if that response was trained  
838 with a reinforcer that differs from that associated with the stimulus. Second, the Pavlovian  
839 motivational process can endow habitual responding with a veneer of goal-directedness. The  
840 shift of motivational state from training under hunger to PIT testing under thirst is an  
841 apparent outcome revaluation procedure in that the sugar-water reinforcer remained relevant  
842 to the test motivational state whereas the pellet reinforcer did not. However, this apparent  
843 outcome revaluation effect did not indicate goal-directed control because the revaluation did  
844 not operate through a representation of the action-outcome contingency in that lever  
845 pressing was trained with the food pellets (Corbit *et al.*, 2007), not the sugar water. In  
846 conclusion, the sensitivity of this Pavlovian motivation to an outcome revaluation procedure

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<sup>9</sup> This motivational effect of Pavlovian stimuli on instrumental responding is called *general* PIT, as it increases the probability of responding for all the available responses and is thought to be mediated by a general energizing effect of a stimulus that is associated with the motivational properties of the outcome. This is in contrast with *specific* PIT, where responding is enhanced only to the response that predicts the same outcome as in training and is thought to be mediated by the association between the stimulus and the sensory properties of the outcome (see Cartoni *et al.*, 2016 for a review).

847 can easily lead to the erroneous attribution of goal-directed status. For example, Jonkman et  
848 al. (2010) reported that rate lever pressing remained sensitive to outcome revaluation even  
849 after extensive training on an interval schedule. It is very likely, however, that the apparent  
850 devaluation effect was mediated by Pavlovian contextual motivation of habitual responding.  
851 Extinguishing context conditioning prior to devaluation test significantly reduced the  
852 magnitude of the effect (see also Killcross and Coutureau, 2003).

853 Recall that the performance function, Equation 6, which transforms response strengths  
854 into response probability, includes a term  $I$  that represented the current incentive value of  
855 the outcome and in product with  $g$  determines the contribution of the goal-directed system  
856 to performance. By analogy, we also include an additional parameter that reflects the  
857 motivational effects of appetitive Pavlovian stimuli on habitual performance. Following  
858 Hull's (1943) classic nomenclature, we denote this parameter as  $D$  for drive, which multiplies  
859 the habit strength  $h$  to represent the contribution of the habit system to overall performance.  
860 Like the Hullian drive concept,  $D$  appears to exert a general motivational effect, at least  
861 within the appetitive domain, so that the complete response function has the form  
862  $p_{k+1} = s(Ig_k + Dh_k)$ , where  $s$  is the sigmoid function as shown in Equation 6.

863 **Incentive learning.** In contrast to the Pavlovian motivational control of habits,  
864 animals have to learn about the incentives value  $I$  of outcomes, such as foods and fluids,  
865 through consummatory experience with these commodities if they are to function as goals of  
866 an instrumental action, a process that Dickinson and Balleine (1994; 2002) refer to as  
867 incentive learning. Moreover, they also have to learn how these incentive value vary  
868 with motivational state. Dickinson and Dawson (1988; 1989) first reported the role of  
869 incentive learning in the motivational control of goal-directed action using an irrelevant  
870 incentive procedure similar to the one they had employed to investigate the Pavlovian  
871 motivation of habits, namely a shift from training under hunger to testing under thirst.  
872 Their rats were initially trained to lever-press and chain-pull, one for food pellets and the

873 other for sugar water, while hungry. Note that this training ensured that the contextual  
874 stimuli were equally associated with both outcomes whatever the action-outcome assignment,  
875 thereby equating any contextual motivation. During a subsequent extinction test, thirsty  
876 rats only preferentially performed the action trained with the sugar water if they had  
877 previously had the opportunity to drink the sugar water while thirsty, indicating that they  
878 had to learn about the incentive value of the sugar water when thirsty. Such incentive  
879 learning is required not only for shifts between motivational states but also variations with a  
880 motivational state, such as that between satiety and hunger (Balleine, 1992). Dickinson and  
881 Balleine (2019; 2009) have subsequently argued that the assignment of incentive value to an  
882 outcome is based on the experienced hedonic reactions to, and evaluation of that outcome.

883 In summary, the motivation of habits and goal-directed actions is varied and complex,  
884 even in the case of basic biological commodities, such food and fluids. Habits are motivated  
885 by a general appetitive drive conditioned to contextual and eliciting stimuli, whereas the  
886 incentive value of the outcome, which is learned, motivates goal-directed action. Habitual  
887 motivation is directly sensitive to shifts in motivation state, whereas the agent has to learn  
888 about incentive values of outcomes in different motivational states before they can control  
889 goal-directed action.

## 890 **Avoidance**

891 So far we have developed rate correlation theory within a dual-system framework by  
892 reference to positive reinforcement of free-operant behavior using appetitive or attractive  
893 outcomes. However, Baum (1973) also analyzed free-operant avoidance in terms of his  
894 correlational law of effect. Under a typical free-operant avoidance contingency, a response  
895 causes the omission or postponement of a future scheduled outcome with the consequence that  
896 our recycling memory model yields a negative goal-directed strength ( $g < 0$ ), at response  
897 rates that do not avoid all the schedule outcomes in a memory cycle. On the assumption

898 that experience with the aversive outcome through incentive learning produce a negative  
899 incentive value, ( $I < 0$ ), the product of the negative goal-directed strength and incentive  
900 value,  $Ig$ , will be positive and thereby contribute to the probability of a response being  
901 performed,  $p$ . Moreover, once the response rate is sufficient to avoid all schedule outcomes  
902 within a memory cycle, the goal-direct strength will remain frozen at the established  $g$  value  
903 and thereby produce sustained avoidance in the absence of the aversive outcomes. This  
904 simple mechanism would explain the persistence of avoidance actions in the absence of an  
905 explicit reinforcing event, which has been the subject of multiple discussions in the literature  
906 (for a recent review, see Gillan *et al.*, 2016).

907 The most radical aspect of this account is its assumption of goal-directed control of  
908 avoidance responding. Although there are precedents for a goal-directed account of  
909 avoidance (e.g. Seligman and Johnson, 1973), contemporary RL theory follows traditional  
910 two-process theory in assuming that avoidance responding is purely habitual or MF (see  
911 Maia, 2009). Although human discrete-trial procedures have demonstrated a reduction in  
912 avoidance following revaluation of the aversive outcome (Gillan *et al.*, 2011), more critical for  
913 a rate correlation account of goal-directed avoidance is a demonstration by Fernando *et al.*  
914 (Fernando *et al.*, 2014a) of an outcome revaluation effect using a a free-operant schedule.  
915 They trained rats to lever-press to avoid foot-shocks that were programmed to be delivered  
916 at fixed intervals. Their revaluation procedure consisted of non-contingent presentations of  
917 the shock under morphine, so that pain would be reduced and the aversive status of the  
918 shock devalued. During an extinction test, their rats decreased responding compared to a  
919 non-revalued control group, demonstrating that the their rats were performing the avoidance  
920 action to reduce the rate of an unpleasant outcome.

921 In accord with our dual-system model, Fernando and colleagues (2014) also  
922 investigated the role habit learning in free-operant avoidance. An enduring problem for  
923 reinforcement theory is the absence of any event following an avoidance response that could

924 act as a reinforcer. However, Konorski and Miller discovered that avoidance training  
925 established performance of the response itself, or more strictly speaking the feedback stimuli  
926 generated by responding, as a conditioned aversive inhibitor and, subsequently, Weisman and  
927 Litner (1969) reported that an explicit aversive inhibitor can function as a conditioned  
928 reinforcer of free-operant avoidance responding by rats. Taken together, these results suggest  
929 that habitual responding may be reinforced by the feedback stimuli generated by responding  
930 itself. In accord with this analysis, Fernando et al. (2014) found that avoidance responding  
931 by their rats was enhanced by the presence of an explicit feedback stimulus and, moreover,  
932 this enhancement appeared to be habitual. Although exposure to the feedback stimulus  
933 under morphine enhanced its reinforcing property, the enhancement was not evident in an  
934 outcome revaluation test. This finding led Fernando and colleagues to conclude that the  
935 responding generated by the presence of the explicit feedback stimulus was habitual.

936 In summary, free-operant avoidance, like its appetitive counterpart, is under joint  
937 control by goal-directed and habitual systems with the former reflecting rate correlation  
938 learning between the response and aversive outcome and the latter reinforcement by the  
939 aversive inhibitory property of response-generated feedback stimuli.

## 940 **Conclusions**

941 In this paper we have formalized a theory of instrumental actions and habits in  
942 free-operant conditions based on two different systems that concurrently control behavior.  
943 After discussing the multiple difficulties of theories based solely on outcome probability and  
944 reward prediction-error to explain instrumental control and performance, we presented an  
945 alternative theory of goal-directed control where agents compute a correlation between rates  
946 of responding and rate of outcomes in a fixed working memory to establish the casual  
947 association between their actions the outcomes and jointly determine the amount of  
948 responding and sensitivity to outcome revaluation under different reward schedules. We

949 showed how such a theory can capture instrumental performance under ratio and interval  
950 schedules when reward probabilities or rates are matched, how goal-directed control  
951 transitions to habits with extended training and a faster development of habits under  
952 interval than under ratio schedules. The model also explains why responding under choice  
953 procedures tends to remain goal-directed control in spite of the amount of training when  
954 different outcomes are employed. These results make our model unique in its joint  
955 predictions with respect to instrumental control and performance in free-operant training.

956 Another aspect which is unique to the present model is that it provides a mechanism  
957 to explain the survival of goal-directed control across extinction. In our model, the reward  
958 prediction-error for the habit system includes the total prediction of both behavioral systems.  
959 This, together with the additional assumption that the goal-directed system can only  
960 compute a rate correlation when there are events in memory which can be processed, make it  
961 so that the habit system effectively inhibits the goal-directed system when the outcome is  
962 suspended in an extinction phase. The implication is that responding extinguishes because  
963 the sum of the strengths of the systems approaches zero, even though the goal-directed  
964 system remains active with the value of the last rate correlation experienced during  
965 instrumental training.

966 In summary, the main contribution of our theory is extending the widely-held view  
967 that outcome probability and reward-prediction error are the cardinal determinants of  
968 instrumental behavior, to one in which agents' computations are made simultaneously in  
969 correlational and contiguity systems to determine the decision to perform an instrumental  
970 action. Although there is some evidence suggesting that humans can compute a  
971 response-outcome rate correlation to inform their causal beliefs of a response-outcome  
972 association (Tanaka *et al.*, 2008), the exact neural processes underlying this computation,  
973 and the way in which these computations are transferred to performance remain unknown  
974 (Perez and Soto, 2019). This is an under-studied area for which the predictions of the



975 present model might help our understanding of goal-directed and habitual processes, as clear  
976 evidence for arbitration between the systems in humans is still sparse.

977

### **Author contributions**

978 OP and AD formalized the model. OP performed the simulations. OP and AD wrote  
979 the manuscript.

980

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987

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