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The operational utility of the Walton-McKersie attitudinal structuring model in collective bargaining

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THE OPERATIONAL UTILITY OF THE
WALTON-McKERSIE ATTITUDINAL
STRUCTURING MODEL IN COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING

by
Donald Warren

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate
School of the New Jersey Institute of Technology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of:
Master of Science in Management Engineering
1983

APPROVAL SHEET

Title of Thesis: THE OPERATIONAL UTILITY OF THE
WALTON-McKERSIE ATTITUDINAL STRUCTURING
MODEL IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

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ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: THE OPERATIONAL UTILITY OF THE
WALTON-McKERSIE ATTITUDINAL STRUCTURING
MODEL IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Thesis directed by: Professor J. Rigassio

This work is an heuristic inquiry into behavioral change theory designed for application to labor/management interaction in collective bargaining. The theory itself was postulated by Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie in their book A Behavioral Theory Of Labor Negotiations. The principles of their theory are highly axiomatic and their importance and validity can only be recognized through applied empirical analyses that demonstrate or refute its concept.

The aspect of the theory which is the focal point of this research pertains to the structuring and restructuring of attitudes and attendant relationships resulting from the collective bargaining process. The objective of this work is two-fold. First, the analytical utility of the theory is examined by applying its tenets to an analysis of the behavioral strategies and tactics used by the respective labor and management operatives in the 1981 Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization strike. Second, the consistency of the theory and model with current knowledge and

research in the field is examined; also how that knowledge and research enhances the Walton-McKersie analysis is discussed.

Case study methodology is used to illustrate the thesis concept because any empirical study that examines the validity and practicality of a theory has added value when it is done within the realm of that given discipline. Also, absolute studies best illustrate the trends by which researchers and practitioners approach problems in their fields and help to possibly clarify those approaches.

From this study it is concluded that the Walton-McKersie attitudinal structuring model offers the most elucidative classification of relationships and behaviors descriptive of the negotiating process of all materials researched. It can be applied in collective bargaining interactions to reduce behavioral uncertainties. However, to improve the model's operational utility as a motivational, predictive, and informational tool, additional research and study is required in the following areas. First, as shown in the case study example, humans do not always use probability information effectively; sometimes they ignore it. The probability of a confrontation and the attendant consequences were made clear to all operatives in the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike, however, shattering consequences for both sides were not avoided. Additional study and research on how collective bargaining processes are affected by varying political, economic,

intra-organizational and inter-organizational policies, and social climates will enhance the operational utility of the Walton-McKersie model. Second, the implication interpretable from the above probability of occurrence example is that people, and the organizations that they comprise, estimate the probability of single occurrences more adequately than aggregate probabilities of occurrence, and that the strategies often adopted as a result, are not optimal. Research on how objective probabilities and payoff values (based on past bargaining profiles and current information) can be applied to the Walton-McKersie concepts will allow for simulation and decision theory type analysis of negotiating processes, thus improving the model's predictive utility. Finally, it is suggested in the thesis that goals rather than attitudes be the focal point of behavioral change models related to negotiations. Additional research on the motivational qualities of goal setting in bargaining activities will help in the understanding of how goals and behaviors are linked.

The developmental implication of all the above is to move towards a more useful and analytical model of collective bargaining processes.

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PREFACE

This research effort is directed at examining an integral part of the collective bargaining experience known as labor negotiations. Two professors, Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, formulated a comprehensive behavioral change model to explore "how" and "why" parties engaged in negotiations tend to behave. Also, a taxonomy to classify the behaviors was developed to add some rationality to the study and communication of research in the area.

The value of their work is evidenced by repeated reference to their theory in materials researched that were published domestically, as well as abroad.

The behavioral change model for negotiations that Walton and McKersie developed was designed to be an aid in the study and practice of collective bargaining. To evaluate rationally the behavioral aspects of collective bargaining can only help to impact positively on key decisions made by those party to the process. Of all the models reviewed, the Walton-McKersie model was the one that explored labor negotiating in the context of a broad range of interactive conditions associated with the process.

Further study to enhance their model as an appropriate informational tool in labor negotiations can be essential to the success of future labor relations. By assisting in identifying and dealing with the uncertainties of labor negotiations, behavioral modeling can become a powerful

tool for both educators and practitioners in the labor relations field. Two of the studies included in the thesis deal with quantifying and measuring behavioral models. In this light, by invoking the power of the computer, there is promise that this complex area of study can become manageable and more representative of the collective bargaining experience. Quantitative applications and computer-aided modeling will also aid in compiling, analyzing, and applying the masses of data required in researching such an area.

Behavioral modeling, whether used for analyzing one-time situations or as an integral part of one's planning system, can be of value for considering the desirability of alternative collective bargaining decisions. In evaluating specific bargaining situations for example, changes in political, economic, and enterprise policies can be assessed in terms of choosing a particular bargaining strategy. More generalized models can be used on a continuing basis relative to long range labor relations planning, desirability between collective bargaining strategies, labor negotiations simulation, etc.

Recognizing the potential for all of the above, and the commitment to behavioral modeling development, can only heighten the capabilities of labor relations and its impact on America's systems of service and manufacture.

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SECTION I.

THE LEGISLATED OBJECTIVE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND EVOLVED BEHAVIORAL RELATIONS

The association between labor and management is symbiotic in nature. There are distinct self interests, as well as common interests for both that make their association necessary. A fundamental precept prescribed by law to govern such relationships is collective bargaining.

In the macro context of the Labor Management Relations Act representatives of labor, management, and government are the primary operatives in collective bargaining. All interact in the process to attempt transformations of differences into compromises that maximize the vested interests of each party. Operatives within a given system of service or manufacture are responsible to reach agreement on matters of discord. Collective bargaining is looked upon as the foundation of dispute settlement in the United States. It is one of the primary forces for resolving discord between various human resource factions within a given enterprise.

The institution of collective bargaining is deeply embedded in America's systems of service and manufacture. It has been, and is, a pre-eminent force shaping the attitudes and actions of labor and management alike. It has evolved into a system organized around the resolution of antithetic interests. The process itself was designed to transform those differences into compromises which set the

tone of labor-management relations.

Collective bargaining permeates many key areas of our systems of service and manufacture. Although many employees in the various segments of the workforce are not covered by collective bargaining agreements, it cannot be denied that the institution greatly influences them. For example, systems of service and manufacture whose employees are not organized generally remain that way by matching the gains achieved through collective bargaining in systems that are organized. This tendency is prevalent even within a given system that have both organized and unorganized sectors in their workforce.¹

The processes of collective bargaining are complex. Its utility can be enhanced only to the extent that the multifaceted dynamics of its operation are understood. Bargaining which consciously takes advantage of every possible opportunity rather than constrain itself to traditional areas of gain can only serve to yield a net improvement in intra-business and inter-business labor relations. If the opportunities go unheeded, bargaining success potential will continue to be impeded and any long term relations improvement will be in jeopardy. This consideration is becoming more significant because of evolving tendencies of both blue-collar and white-collar employees to initiate some form of organization. Also, because foreign competition and

¹ Helfgott, R.B., Labor Economics. New York: Random House, Inc., 1980, pp. 79-268.

world markets demand that assaults on all fronts for productivity improvement be considered.

Historically, the primary focus of operatives (comprised of labor, management, and government) in the collective bargaining process has been on economic issues, work rules, work conditions, and the rights and obligations of each operative when they interact with one another. The need for greater efficiency and productivity brought about by inexorable and stern competition, coupled with keen consumer awareness of and demand for quality, make it imperative that opportunity in related, but not necessarily anti-thetic areas of interest, be recognized. Examples of such areas are organizational development, industrial relations, and industrial psychology, all of which are part of human resource management. One such opportunity exemplified in recent bargaining activity is that of attitude change.² Attitude change or attitudinal structuring as defined by Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie is the designed alteration and/or maintenance of desired behavioral patterns amongst interacting operatives. Walton and McKersie postulate that collective bargaining is an excellent mechanism to facilitate such structuring (this assertion will be addressed later).

It becomes very clear after researching the collective

²This is a reference to recent trends toward concession bargaining in the auto industry. Historically, concession bargaining was non-existent. Recent bargaining strategy represents a major change in attitude.

bargaining experience that there are some conflicts which are beneficial and others that are not; some lead to disintegration and harm; some lead to resolution and cooperation. The spirit of this analysis is consistent with these themes. However, the focal point is on attitude change theory, behavior modification, and coterminous goal setting in labor negotiations. There are several characteristics of collective bargaining which heighten the attitudinal dimension: (1) the issues themselves often involve human values, and how they are handled affects the overall relationship (2) the strategies and tactics chosen often involve sanctions which can exert a strong influence on the tone of the relationship (3) negotiation of the agreement represents only the beginning of the transaction and (4) whether or not the terms of the agreement are fulfilled depends upon the character of the relationship. Moreover, the relationship between the parties to labor negotiations is usually unique, continuing, and long term; the attitudinal dimension providing one means by which the successive negotiations are linked.³

From the above discussion of collective bargaining affectivities, its universality can be sensed. Also, one can begin to appreciate the importance and potential of behavioral theory as it relates to the collective bargaining process as a vehicle for change.

³Walton, R.E. and McKersie, R.B., A Behavioral Theory Of Labor Negotiations. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1965.

SECTION II.

THE THESIS CONCEPT

Collective bargaining, as it has evolved in the United States, involves tactical behavioral processes. In tactical negotiating processes, operatives of labor and management do not necessarily change their attendant stimuli and response behaviors as a function of past bargaining experience and respective organizational goals. Roles of aggressor or respondent, and bargaining leverage relative to each other are critical to their interaction. Recognizing this, the interaction between representatives of employees and employers for wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment is an extensive area of study among behavioral scientists.

The thesis objective was to examine how the Walton-McKersie model of behavioral change in labor negotiations could be enhanced as a working model by integrating its propositions with findings from behavioral science research. Then, by use of a relevant case study, tenets of the integrated product were explored.

Many of the complexities in the systems of relations associated with collective bargaining have been represented in behavioral models and/or experiments. Some of the models and experiments rest heavily on "systems" theory concepts. Others are geared towards individual behavior analysis and group behavior analysis. Generally, the studies and models

found in current literature relevant to the thesis analysis fell into one of the following categories:

- a) those which attempt to encompass the system of relationships between operatives in collective bargaining, as well as the "environment" in which those system of relationships exist.
- b) those which explore cognitive and motivational "dynamics" of individuals in their interpersonal relations.
- c) those which focus on situational factors present in a given "task" assignment and the identification of satisfaction and the performance thereof.

It should be noted that categories b) and c) are sub-sets or sub-processes of category a), as the systems oriented models generally attempt to capture the essential concepts examined in categories b) and c).

The materials researched contained numerous theories and studies that relate well to the concepts presented in the Walton-McKersie model. The theories and studies included for discussion in the thesis were selected primarily because the attendant concepts and propositions for each furnished the needed elements that enhance the understanding and operational utility of the Walton-McKersie model. Each of the theories/studies are discussed in the following pages and summarized below.

The valence-expectancy theory set forth by Victor H. Vroom was included because it examines and integrates concepts of individual goals with the perceived probability that the goals are attainable. The goals, coupled with the perceived probability of attainment of the same, is what Vroom suggests is the motivating force that guide individual

actions. These concepts correlate well with the Walton-McKersie discussion of what motivates attitude and behavioral change in labor negotiations.

The behavioral study by Susan E. Jackson and Sheldon Zedeck concerning how goals, task characteristics, and evaluative contexts effect individual and group behavior variability was found to be important in analyzing the Walton-McKersie model because its findings are relevant to such factors as peer pressure, temporal constraints, and motivation relative to "task characteristics, all of which are important elements in the study of negotiating behaviors.

The empirical analysis by Charles K. Parsons and Charles L. Hulin was referenced because of its quantitative modeling technique for measuring dimensions of job satisfaction. Its relevance to the thesis analysis of the Walton-McKersie model is the concept that attitudes and goal identification are "measurable" through quantitative analyses utilizing the techniques they present.

Finally, the decision theory approach to measuring behavioral propensity towards achievement, power, and affiliation was investigated. This theory helps one understand tenets of the Walton-McKersie model that relate to the thesis concept of coterminous goal setting, even in light of recognized differences between labor, management, and government.

SECTION III.

INTRODUCTION TO THE WALTON-McKERSIE MODEL

The attitudinal structuring model provides a systematic behavioral approach for examining and analyzing the creation and/or maintenance of preferred bargaining relationships. Its foundation is rooted in balance theory. Essentially, balance theory in the context of collective bargaining would purport that operatives prefer consistency or balance among their cognitions of how each are expected to act, with a tendency to hold feelings towards each other and beliefs about each other that are congruent. The point being that each will tend to eliminate cognitive inconsistencies, as there is an apparent psychological cost associated with discrepant cognitions, and hence there will be a strain toward balance. The strain towards balance presents an influence opportunity. This opportunity is taken advantage of by the introduction of a new and/or discrepant cognition(s) into the target operatives' awareness(an act, association or other behavior that is inconsistent to existing cognitions or beliefs held by the target operative), thereby creating forces towards attitude modification to alleviate cognitive imbalance. It is surmised that a change in the target operative's attitude will be followed by an attendant change in behavior.⁴

⁴Walton and McKersie, op. cit., pp. 209-219.

Figure 1. schematically shows interacting factors and activities relating to the Walton-McKersie attitudinal structuring model. The model depicts developing or established relationship patterns as being influenced by structural variables. These include (1) environmental or contextual factors- regulatory, economic, political, technological, etc. (2) operatives characterization- conservatism, militancy, Boulwarism, etc. and (3) mutually convergent and/or divergent mores, beliefs, etc. These factors (arrows 1,2,3) influence the actions of all operatives, which in turn influence and structure an attitude posture for each in the bargaining process. Arrow 4 represents the strategy each operative adopts for the bargaining process to attain a desired effect for achieving their respective goal(s). The adopted strategy is usually predicated on previous historical negotiating encounters and developed according to those outcomes. Arrow 5 represents the resultant attitude posture of each operative effectuated in the bargaining process. Once these emergent attitudes and/or behaviors are established, operatives will attempt to influence (arrow 6) the structural variables shown in (A) according to their implication or functional consequence for each operative. Examples of this are political lobbying, awareness campaigning, public sentiment arousal, and coalition bargaining. Once this reiterative loop is exhausted, the consequence for the operatives manifests itself (arrow 7).




FIGURE 1. - Interacting Factors Depicted In The Walton-McKersie Model

Arrows 1,2,3,5, and 6 represent the reiterative loop of activity that outlines the collective bargaining process. The model transcends any temporal constraints and may represent immediate, interim, or successive structuring activity. Arrows 4,7, and 8 represent the manifestations of bargaining activity and the deliberate attempt to maintain or alter those manifestations. Stated more simply:

If the manifested consequence and attendant employment relationship are not regarded as optimal by respective operatives during and/or after the negotiating process, purposive intervention (arrow 8) will be made to alter the relationship so as to minimize a loss in negotiating leverage and to maximize all potential gains in negotiating leverage.⁵

The model also asserts that operatives of collective bargaining share a relationship pattern. These are classified in the model as (1) conflict, (2) containment-aggression, (3) accommodation, (4) cooperation, (5) collusion. Additionally, the model assumes that operatives have (1) certain motivational orientations and action tendencies toward each other (competitive, individualistic, cooperative) (2) beliefs about the other's commitment (3) feelings of trust or the lack thereof toward one another, and (4) feelings of either friendliness or hostility toward one another.

A conflict relationship pattern is mostly characterized by extremely adamant and competitive postures when operatives interact. Sincerity about one another's ends

⁵Walton and McKersie, op. cit., pp. 208-221.

and means are often challenged. Recognition and dealings with one another are mainly limited to that required by law and mutual interest. Operatives view their relationship as one not of choice but one necessary to satisfy their respective organizational goals. Positive concern and interaction is practically non-existent; in some instances operatives may be inclined to contribute to the demise of the other's representatives and/or their organization as a whole. Animosity and distrust are accepted ways of life in this type of relationship.

A relationship pattern characterized as containment-aggression is moderately competitive. Sincerity about one another's ends and means is accepted to a greater degree than in a conflict relationship pattern. Operatives try to constantly extend their scope of influence and contain the same for the other. In this pattern, operatives would not only be interested in gaining the loyalty of each other's constituents, but also in detracting from the loyalty that exists within the other's realm. Boulwarism and Crawfordism are well known worker-employer relations that fit this category.⁶

In a relationship pattern of accomodation operatives demonstrate an individualistic motivational orientation. They more or less accept the status quo with little or no drive to change the nature of their interaction.

⁶McMurry, R.N., "War And Peace In Labor Relations", Harvard Business Review, vol. 30, December, 1955, pp. 48-60.

In the cooperative relationship pattern operative interaction is characterized by willingness by each to coterminously pursue enterprise goals in such a way that all involved derive benefits from accomplishing those goals. Mutual trust and friendliness is prevalent in this kind of relationship.

A relationship pattern that is defined as one of collusion involves activities by operatives which fall outside of the law. The operatives involved form a coalition to pursue common goals that are not really in the valued interest of the constituents they represent. It is a relationship designed to exploit some third party; sometimes within, and sometimes out of the letter of the law. These five relationship patterns are summarized in Figure 2.

The explicit and implicit propositions Walton and McKersie offer as a result of their treatment of behavioral theory in labor negotiations are: (1) that a link exists between bargaining goals and behavior; and that the behaviors often serve as indices for inferring whether or not goal conflict or perceived goal conflict exists in the relationship and conversely, that the knowledge that basic goals are in conflict becomes the basis for predicting the class of behavior identified in their taxonomy (2) that the behaviors Walton and McKersie designate as tactics for modification in attitudinal structuring double as indicators of the degree of concern about the

PATTERN OF RELATIONSHIP

ATTITUDINAL DIMENSIONS	Conflict	Containment-Aggression	Accomodation	Cooperation	Collusion
Motivational orientation/ action tendencies	Competitive tendencies to destroy or weaken		to Individualistic policy of hands off	Cooperative tendencies to assist or preserve	
Beliefs about legitimacy of other	Denial of legitimacy	Grudging recognition	Acceptance of status quo	Complete legitimacy	N/A
Levels of trust in conducting affairs	Extreme distrust	Distrust	Limited trust	Extended trust	Trust based on mutual blackmail potential
Degree of friendliness	Hate	Antagonism	Neutrality-courteousness	Friendliness	Intimacy-Sweetheart Relations

FIGURE 2. - Attitudinal Components Of The Relationship Patterns

Source: Walton and McKersie
Op. cit., p. 189.

maintenance or the desire to change the existing relationship pattern as well as give an indication of the direction of that change (friendliness/trust, animosity/distrust) (3) that opportunity exists in the bargaining process to influence the relationship between operatives; in particular such attitudes as friendliness-hostility, trust, respect, and the motivational orientation of competitiveness or cooperation.

A. "Systems" Concepts Relevant To The Thesis Analysis Of The Walton-McKersie Model

Collective bargaining is a legislated abstraction which advocates a basic practice and procedure to be used to minimize and/or eliminate "...obstructions to the free flow of commerce..."⁷ The legislation⁸ does not explicitly define what is meant by the practice and procedure of collective bargaining, and any real interpretative working definition comprehensive enough to encompass the multiplicity of factors inherent to it would be awkward and abstruse. Even though there is no attempt to define collective bargaining, and examination of certain characteristics inherent to it can be made without loss, as we all apperceive, to some degree, the nature of collective

⁷Title I - Amendments Of National Labor Relations Act, 1947. Section 101, Findings And Policies - Section 1.

⁸Text of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended by Public Laws 86-257, 1959 and 93-360, 1974, (Public Law 101-80th Congress)

bargaining.

Dunlop's theory of industrial relations systems⁹ provides the framework on which the thesis concept is predicated. In all-encompassing terms, John T. Dunlop states:

An industrial relations system at any one time in its development is regarded as comprised of certain actors, certain contexts, an ideology which binds the industrial relations system together, and a body of rules created to govern the actors at the work place and work community.

The actors are: (1) a hierarchy of managers and their representatives in supervision (2) a hierarchy of workers (non-managerial) and any spokesman and (3) specialized governmental agencies (and specialized private agencies created by the first two actors) concerned with workers, enterprises, and their relationship.

So defined, and accepting its premises, this systems concept can be applied to the institution of collective bargaining. Simply stated the above means that every enterprise (its functioning) has a purpose. All operatives within a system interact, and each operative has an effect on the other and on the system as a whole. A subtle abstraction here is that collective bargaining, in a systems context, serves as a mandated interface for operatives to transform discord affecting the goals of national commerce, into compromises. Figure 3. shows primary factions and goals at work in the collective bargaining sphere.

The assumptions listed in Table 1-1 highlight key premises underlying Dunlop's theory as they pertain to

⁹Dunlop, John T., Industrial Relations Systems. New York Henry Holt and Company, 1958.




FIGURE 3. - Sphere Of Collective Bargaining

TABLE 1-1

ASSUMPTIONS FOR SYSTEMS APPLICATION IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

1. In a systems context, collective bargaining processes form an interactive network amongst operatives - labor, management, and government - which is organized in distinctive ways and ultimately governed by overall system requirements.
2. Operatives of collective bargaining processes necessarily interact with and affect each other as well as composite systems of economy and commerce as a whole.
3. As a legislated entity, collective bargaining has a defined purpose to govern employment relations as they relate to and effect systems of economy and commerce.
4. Collective bargaining processes take place in varying political, economic, and social climates and are affected by changes occurring in these dimensions.

collective bargaining.

The Walton-McKersie model assumes attitudinal change can be either conscious or intuitive and that it is a rational and interactive process. However, behavioral analysis in the systems context introduces certain constraints that must be addressed. As Dunlop suggests, there is a hierarchy of goals, functions, and relationships in any system. Subsystems and subprocesses are ultimately affected by overall system goals. This implies that since operatives and their interaction are subsets of the collective bargaining charter,¹⁰ charter goals will ultimately weigh more importantly than operative goals in a bargaining stalemate. This hierarchy of goals, functions, and relationships is shown in Figure 4. The interaction between different goal levels is of obvious interest because it has consequences for overall system effectiveness. Various elements may be wholly or partly dependent on inputs from a given level or may be independent of inputs from other levels. It can be deduced that dependent goal level systems have greater potential for dysfunction (in this analysis this would mean the propensity for strikes, lockouts, job-actions, etc.).

Collective bargaining can therefore be viewed as

¹⁰Twomey, David P., Labor Law & Legislation., Ohio: South-Western Publishing Company, 1980, pp. 108-109.

<u>SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & LEVEL</u>	<u>PRIMARY OPERATIVE</u>	<u>PRIMARY FUNCTION</u>	<u>PRIMARY RELATIONSHIPS</u>	<u>OPERATIVES' BIAS PROFILE (GOALS)</u>
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING	NLRB	SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES	GOV'T., WORK-FORCE, ENTER-PRISE.	COTERMINOUS WITH SYSTEM GOALS.
ENTERPRISE	MANAGEMENT	PRODUCTION OF GOODS & SERVICES	WORKFORCE, CONSUMERS, GOV'T.	SUB-LEVEL BIASED; GENERALLY COTERMINOUS WITH SYSTEM GOALS.
WORKFORCE	ORGANIZED LABOR	PRODUCTION/SERVICE RESOURCE	UNION, MGT., PROFESSIONAL/TECHNICAL SOCIETIES AND ASSOCIATIONS	SUB-LEVEL BIASED; FREQUENTLY IN-DIFFERENT OR AT ODDS WITH SYSTEM GOALS.

FIGURE 4. - Hierarchy Of Goals, Relationships, And Functions
In The Systems Context Of Collective Bargaining

HIGHER - ORDER ↑

the mechanism for self-regulation of interaction between operatives in an ongoing effort to achieve its goal of minimizing obstructions to the free flow of commerce. Its most useful role, accepting the premise that the goals of national commerce have primacy over enterprise goals, is to provide feedback critical to effective self-regulation. Operative and system history is therefore important in understanding system behaviors as behaviors are the elements that fuel and direct the system in achieving its goals.¹¹ This sets the analytical framework under which this treatment of attitudinal structuring is made.

B. Discussion Of The Implications Of Systems Theory
Relative To The Walton-McKersie Model

The focus of the Walton-McKersie analysis relating to attitude change is singularly directed and the relevancy of operative attitude in the systems context is not addressed. This was a self imposed constraint and simplification by Walton and McKersie. For purposes of giving focus to their analysis, the negotiator of respective operatives was the target of attitude change efforts in the model. Walton and McKersie recognized that for change to occur in the

¹¹ Berelson, B. and Steiner, G.A., Human Behavior: An Inventory Of Scientific Findings., New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964, p. 240.

institutional relationships of collective bargaining, it had to go beyond the negotiators to include their constituents as well. Also, they felt that by changing the attitudes and behaviors of representatives of labor and management the desired chain reaction would result. Another reason stated for the singularly directed analysis was that they felt that the negotiator's attitudes were the more "accessible" attitudes for change in the organization. However, for an operational model, consideration must also be given to the contextual or systems factors noted in the schematic diagram of the Walton-McKersie model in Figure 1.

The enterprise, which is a subset of a national system of commerce, is defined by its charter. A charter or mission is what gives the enterprise its purposive nature. The charter is a precondition that establishes a requisite hierarchy of subordination. Simply stated, a requisite hierarchy of subordination is the acceptance of given enterprise needs or requirements to fulfill the responsibilities of its charter.

Inherent to this pursuit are also responsibilities to various enterprise integrants¹² to the extent that those responsibilities foster interdependency for continuity, effectiveness, and the development of an

¹²Integrant as used here is descriptive of aggregated human resources within the confines of a defined organizational unit(hierarchy of managers and their representatives, hierarchy of organized labor, and specified governmental agencies).

internal climate in which enterprise goals can be met. The enterprise charter often attenuates individuality forcing integrants into a controlled mold. In this context, integrant purpose ranks lower in the hierarchy of requisite subordination than composite purpose. The attitude and behavior of integrants of labor, management, and government are therefore not always coterminous in the bargaining process. When respective operatives are embedded as they are in the aggregate system of commerce, many factors dictate and affect behavior and should not be analyzed individually. To that extent the Walton-McKersie attitudinal structuring model is somewhat misguided on the relative import of operative attitude change. Attitudes are of concern but it is recognized that they reflect inherent personal sensitivities that are difficult to change. Berelson and Steiner have found that given consistent support from historical, federal, group, and social forces, attitudes and beliefs are unlikely to change with any degree of permanence.¹³ Parsons and Hulin have noted in their work¹⁴ that behavioral modeling of indeterminate systems that are multi-dimensional in nature is complex and transcends

¹³Berelson, B. and Steiner, G.A., op. cit. pp. 575-585.

¹⁴Parsons, C.K. and Hulin, C.L., An Empirical Comparison Of Item Response Theory & Hierarchical Factor Analysis In Applications To The Measurement Of Job Satisfaction, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 67, December, 1982, pp. 826-834.

simple cause-and-effect analyses. Also, in highly indeterminate circumstances such as a bargaining session, it has been found that behavioral response action to one's own actions are easily misinterpreted.¹⁵ Indeterminacy, and its uniqueness in any given bargaining circumstance, greatly reduces the ability and accuracy to predict from measures of past histories. The system of relations that exist in the collective bargaining process are dynamic; inputs to the process from operatives vary not only in terms of their own organizational posture and goals but also with respect to each other's organizational posture and goals (inter-organizational/intraorganizational). This dynamic characteristic would prove the attitudinal structuring model unreliable as a prognostic tool. Behavioral studies¹⁶ supporting the thesis position indicate that patterning or structuring improves anticipation¹⁷ of behavior in varying

¹⁵Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 49, 1955, pp. 343-351.

¹⁶Jackson, S.E. and Zedeck, S., Explaining Performance Variability: Contributions Of Goal Setting, Task Characteristics, And Evaluative Contexts, Journal Of Applied Psychology, vol. 67, December, 1982, pp. 343-351.

Frost, P.J. and Mahoney, T.A., Goal Setting And The Task Process: An Interactive Influence On Individual Performance, Organizational Behavior And Human Performance, vol. 17, 1976, pp. 323-350.

¹⁷Anticipation is used here in the sense to look for as proper with a foretaste of attendant pleasantness or distress, whichever the case may be. Whereas predictive is used in the sense of having a considerable degree of confidence to foretell occurrences.

degrees and that patterned tasks, whether cognitive or manual, are conducive to reducing uncertainty. However, more study and research on how to quantify the aforementioned elements of the bargaining process would be required to improve the predictive utility of the Walton-McKersie model. As it exists, the structuring activities tend toward enhancement of perceptual anticipation, and in a like manner, anticipatory responding in the bargaining process. One can also premise that attitude structuring and its effect loses import over time if constituents and goals of respective operatives remain the same because redundancy associated with their interaction will enable them to better deal with attitudinal uncertainty at the bargaining table. So it can be concluded that the predictive utility of the Walton-McKersie model in an operational context would be inhibited by indeterminacy and lack of "reality contact".¹⁸ It would be like extending solutions that were worked out for a zero-sum type game and applying them illegitimately to a non-zero-sum type situation. Also there is a degree of internal inconsistency in the Walton-McKersie theory. A basic assumption stated is that operatives wish to modify attitudes in the direction of more trust, friendliness, and cooperation, or at least maintain the existing level of the same in their current relationship. The mechanism they suggest, cognitive instability,

¹⁸Mahoney, M.J., Cognition And Behavior Modification, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974, p. 54.

to motivate attitude change militates against cooperative behavior in favor of competitive behavior. Bem and Abelson¹⁹ address the idea of cognitive instability as a motivator for attitude change, with Bem stating:

Inconsistency, they seem to be trying to tell us, motivates belief and attitude change. But I don't believe it. At least not very much. In my view, a vision of inconsistency as a temporary turbulence in an otherwise fastidious pool of cognitive clarity is all too misleading. My own suspicion is that inconsistency is probably our most enduring cognitive commonplace. That is, I suspect that for most of the people some of the time inconsistency just sits there... I believe in short, that there is more inconsistency on earth (and probably in heaven) than is dreamt of in our psychological theories.

As such, consistency among beliefs or between attitudes and behavior is an acculturated characteristic, not an inborn circuit that can be switched off and on.²⁰

In general then, the model is extremely informational by setting forth an analytical framework to characterize relationships in the negotiating process. However, the focal point for change should be goals more than attitudes. To capitalize fully on the enterprise's human resource, an understanding and commitment to enterprise goals is required by respective operatives. Refocusing modification effort to goals rather than attitudes for more co-terminally oriented and lasting benefit is the better

¹⁹Ibid., p. 222.

²⁰Ibid., p. 230.

approach. Hackman and Lawler²¹ have suggested that behavior is related to the perceived probability that good performance will lead to valued recognition. In collective bargaining, performance is valued to the extent that it satisfies enterprise requirements. When operatives satisfy their respective needs concomitantly while working towards enterprise goals (total system of commerce or a sub-set thereof), they enhance their standing as an asset to the enterprise. As noted in the recent survey by the Chamber of Commerce of The United States,²² a majority of people will value the opportunity to satisfy higher-order enterprise needs (requisite subordination). This should be qualified by stating these higher-order needs are satisfied to the extent that the involved individuals see that they are personally responsible for accomplishing a worthwhile, meaningful task.

As Vroom has suggested, the strength of motivation for certain behaviors is a multiplicative function of the expectancy that the behavior will lead to certain outcomes and the reward value of the outcomes attain-

²¹ Hackman, J.R. and Lawler, E.E., Employee Reactions To Job Characteristic, Monograph, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 55, 1971, pp. 259 plus.

²² Chamber of Commerce of The United States, Workers' Attitude Toward Productivity: A New Survey, Library Of Congress Catalogue Card No. 80-67758, 1980.

Likelihood Of Workers Adopting Coterminous
Goals Of The Enterprise To Improve Productivity




FIGURE 5. - Workers Propensity For Requisite Subordination

Source: U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, 1980.

ed.²³ As such, bargaining goals that are set recognizing collective human resource sensitivities are more likely to enhance, not change, individual motives like achievement and self-actualization, and to generate among individuals who have those motives aroused, the belief that successful performance will result in improved feelings of achievement and growth.²⁴ As Walton and McKersie have suggested, collective bargaining is an excellent medium for executing and propagating these ideas.

C. Informational And Analytical Utility Of The Walton-McKersie Model In The Systems Context Of Collective Bargaining

The Walton-McKersie attitude structuring model offers the most pervasive taxonomy of relationships and behaviors descriptive of the negotiating process of all materials researched. It is important because it offers a framework and behavioral classification of negotiating strategies and tactics which are fundamental to any comprehensive review of a given subject. This is true because the

²³Vroom, V.H., Work and Motivation., New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1964. Ideas stated are adopted from Vroom's valence-expectancy theory.

Wahba, M.A. and House, R.J., Expectancy Theory In Work And Motivation: Some Logical And Methodological Issues., Human Relations, vol. 27, 1974, pp. 121-147

²⁴Lawler, E.E., Job Design And Employee Motivation., Personnel Psychology, vol. 22, 1969, p. 429.

aforementioned allows practitioners and researchers to communicate findings and experiences within a common frame of reference. Throughout many materials researched, the Walton-McKersie taxonomy and descriptions kept reappearing. This indicates a degree of acceptance and universality of their work in the field and a commonality of thought, to which some extent validates both empirical and theoretical treatments they make of the subject.

Their concepts of negotiating behaviors and operative functioning have helped others to understand, and perhaps apply their theory in the real world. Their work shows (1) behaviors that tend to be present in the negotiating process (2) behaviors, functioning, or processes presumably required to improve relationships that result from collective bargaining (3) perceptions operatives must have to optimize their interaction and (4) characteristics of the collective bargaining process in terms of its stimulus and response properties. Levine²⁵ has demonstrated the utility of classification schemes in behavioral research. In general, the specific taxonomy presented by Walton and McKersie has analytical value that is practical and apparently in use in the field.

Figure 6. depicts a schematic representation of an

²⁵Levine, J.M., Evaluation Of An Abilities Classification System For Integrating And Generalizing Human Performance Research Findings: An Application To Vigilance Tasks, Journal of Applied Psychology, 1973, vol. 58, pp. 149-157.




FIGURE 6. - Schematic Representation Of An Industrial Relations System. (see footnote 26.)

industrial relations system.²⁶ Accepting the thesis premise that attitude structuring should be refocused to goal adjustment in the negotiating process and that the analytical and informational properties of the Walton-McKersie model can be better served as such, the feedback (information) loop in Figure 6. will be discussed.

Collective bargaining is the part of the feedback loop that pertains to labor negotiations and the emergent relations between labor, management, and government. It is the legislated mechanism that allows the system of relations to regulate itself and provides various types of information/intelligence (goals, attitude, consequence of behavior, etc.) indicated in the attitudinal structuring model. This information has utility in guiding, enhancing, and making the sensitivities of respective operatives apparent in negotiating and improves the chances for a fruitful collective agreement that is coterminous with enterprise goals. In regulating interaction (collectively, and on a individual basis as well) an evaluative process takes place by each operative as Walton and McKersie suggests. However, in the systems context, modification of goals, rather than attitudes, is of primacy so as to bring them into accord with system criteria. As Figure 6. depicts, feedback is an ongoing process, and without

it is not possible to evaluate and make changes in the system.

²⁶Stephenson, G.M. and Brotherton, C.J., Industrial Relations: A Social Psychological Approach., New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979, p. 17.

it measurement, evaluation, and modification is imprecise.

When the attitudinal structuring model is viewed as a feedback mechanism its informational utility becomes apparent. Work by Locke and Bryan²⁷ lends support to the thesis statement that the model to a lesser degree has motivational properties and to a greater degree informational value. They suggest that feedback should specifically direct on to the nature of his or her error(s), and show how those errors might be corrected. Otherwise, the feedback will tend to be used imprecisely by those to which it is directed with little or no relation to the intended value. For instance, having knowledge of a total score on a test given over a period of time can tell a student whether or not he or she passed or failed, but it would not tell the student specifically areas of strength or weakness. If the intent was to instruct so that one might improve, the locus of inadequate performance must be clear. As in the attitudinal structuring model, introduction of a cognitive discrepancy into an operative's awareness is a form of imprecise feedback. It is a signal of dissatisfaction and that a change is desired, but it does not indicate the source of dissatisfaction or what behavioral changes are desired. As such, imprecise feedback lacks cue value and it is considered to be less

²⁷ Locke, E.A. and Bryan, J.F., Knowledge Of Score And Goal Level As Determinants Of Work Rate, Journal of Applied Psychology, 1969, vol. 53, pp. 59-65.

adequate than feedback that is specific. A recent laboratory experiment by Jackson and Zedeck²⁸ suggest the operational utility of informational feedback. Results from their experiment indicate that feedback that signifies inadequate or superior performance will result in goal changes. In the inadequate performance condition, goals tended to be adjusted to increase levels of effort. In the superior performance condition, goals tended to be adjusted to maintain or decrease levels of effort. The implications of these findings as they relate to the Walton-McKersie model is that (1) goal adjustment is likely to be a more fruitful target for modification in labor negotiations, and (2) coterminous goal setting is more likely to positively affect emergent relationship patterns resulting from collective bargaining by serving to cue operatives towards cooperative behaviors such as generating, trying, and implementing new strategies.²⁹ Unlike the balance theory foundation which is the cornerstone of the Walton-McKersie model, the more recent study suggests that it is not sufficient to know that feedback was given; one should also understand what the receiving party will decide to do about it- that is, those goals they will set in response to the feedback. The premise that group be-

²⁸Op. cit., p. 761.

²⁹Teborg, J.R. and Miller, H.E., Motivation, Behavior, And Performance, Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 63, 1978, pp. 29-39.

haviors and attitudinal factors influence bargaining effectiveness is reasonable. The premise that imprecise cues (offered as tactics in the attitudinal structuring model) serve to bring about attitude change lacks operational validity based on materials researched. It is clarity of enterprise mission and the relevance of that mission to each operative in the collective bargaining process that determine in part the consequence of behavior patterns derived from negotiation. The effectiveness of interactive feedback is inhibited when singularly directed as in the Walton-McKersie model. It is more to the negotiator's advantage (and their respective organizations) to bargain towards commonalities of purpose and to reduce the influence of competitively oriented tactics that are not saliently related to the enterprise mission.

As the thesis concept suggests, the value of the Walton-McKersie model in an operational context is as an aid to planning processes for the various operatives. By characterizing, classifying, and compiling historical behavioral profiles of their negotiating processes, a number of benefits can be derived. First of all, it results in the identification of trends or changes in the same. It helps to identify sensitivities of respective operatives, examine assumptions about one another, and structure a program for constructive relations improvement. What Walton and McKersie have provided to do all of this is a framework. All the users have to do is customize it

to their needs. Analytically, it is an excellent tool for exploring the intrinsic processes and relationships peculiar to the institution of collective bargaining. The model affords a means to detect opportunities for improvement and to mediate them as well.

All of the above declarations are derived from the fact that the Walton-McKersie taxonomy indicates the variables in the collective bargaining process that have to be investigated for behavioral change analysis. Also, the identification and classification of bargaining behaviors that Walton and McKersie describe determines in part the extent to which data can be generalized from one bargaining situation to another.

By classifying (1) the behaviors that tend to be present during bargaining "tasks" (2) the behaviors, functions, or processes required for what is thought to be successful bargaining performance (3) the perceptions that operatives have of one another in the various relationship pattern categories and (4) the characteristics of the various relationship patterns in terms of their associated stimulus and response qualities, one can begin to appreciate the analytical and informational value of the Walton-McKersie model.

SECTION IV.

CONTEMPORARY CASE STUDY ILLUSTRATING THE TENETS OF THE WALTON-McKERSIE MODEL

The discussion in this chapter is presented to illustrate and explore salient tenets of the Walton-McKersie attitudinal structuring model. The 1981 Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike provides a contemporary case study that lends itself to the behavioral principles of the theory within a systems context, which is the framework in which the thesis concept is founded.

First, a recapitulation of the strike and PATCO

³⁰"Solidarity", The Nation, vol. 233, August 22, 1981, p. 132.

³¹Chaz, W.L. and others, "Air Strike Starts To Wear Down All Sides", U.S. News & World Report, vol. 91, August 17, 1981, pp. 22-23.

³²"Challenge To Government Tactics Used Against PATCO", U.S. News & World Report, vol. 91, August 31, 1981 pp. 17-20,76.

³³Biller, M. and Lewis, D.L., "Should The U.S. Grant Amnesty To Air Controllers?", U.S. News & World Report, vol. 91, August 24, 1981, pp. 18-19.

³⁴Ott, J., "Plans Laid To Counteract Strike", Aviation Week, vol. 114, June 8, 1981, pp. 65-66.

³⁵Kilpatrick, J.J., "They Struck A Blow For Tyranny", National Review, vol. 33, October 2, 1981, pp. 1132+.

bargaining history is in order. The references researched were numerous and often redundant relating the information regarding the strike. For brevity, and to eliminate redundant footnotes, all periodicals referenced are listed on page 37.

The strike began on August 3, 1981. Within a month or so media coverage had waned. It was perceived that the management operative was victorious and that the labor operative had suffered a tremendous loss.³⁶

The PATCO strike exacted national emotion on all fronts and was truly a strike of national dimension that had been looming for several years. When the strike began, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had 26,635 controllers. Approximately 4,600 were assigned to flight service stations and another 4,600 were trainees, specialists, and supervisors. The population of controllers figured to be directly involved in the strike consisted of roughly 8,870 controllers assigned to the nation's airport-terminal control towers and 7,632 controllers assigned to en-route centers.

The system that was the strike target is structured into five levels primarily based on air traffic volume, and to a lesser degree, on the proximity of potentially hazardous geographical obstacles such as mountains. The

³⁶Butler, L., "Reagan Botched The Strike", Newsweek, vol. 93 August 31, 1981, p. 9.

The lowest level include such airports as Charlottesville, Virginia and Joplin, Missouri. Level II includes 158 airports, among which are Omaha, Nebraska, and Huntington, West Virginia. Level III has 108 airports which include Long Beach, California and Erie, Pennsylvania. Thirty-eight airports are in Level IV. Phoenix, Kansas City, and Baltimore are some examples. The highest level, Level V, has sixteen airports which are the busiest ones such as Chicago's O' Hare International, Los Angeles International, and Washington National.

The en-route centers are ten in number in the continental United States. Another five are located in Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and Guam. As a whole the domestic system handled about 14,000 scheduled flights that comprised an average of 800,000 passengers every day. Daily traffic volume included the freighters that fly ten thousand tons of air cargo, mostly by night, and thousands of privately owned planes classified as "general aviation". The scheduled commercial airlines employed well over 300,000 persons; revenues were in the magnitude of \$30 billion per year and the industry approximated about 3% of the gross national product. This was the system in which the confrontation between operatives took place.

Since its inception in 1968, PATCO had a history of job-actions and slowdowns. Within seven months of its beginnings the Union staged a work rules slowdown. In 1969, 477 controllers staged a sickout. In the spring of

1970, three thousand PATCO members went on strike. Then again in 1976, a Union slowdown inhibited air traffic.

Between the years 1968 and 1981, various operatives within the system showed numerous retaliatory actions towards one another. In 1970, a strike, which was triggered by the FAA's transfer of several controllers against their will, resulted in nearly one thousand air traffic controllers being suspended and fifty-two of them fired. The Air Transport Association won an out-of-court settlement of \$50 million damage suit against the Union. The Department of Labor rescinded PATCO's status as an accredited union. However, after PATCO agreed not to engage in illegal job-actions, recognition was restored. In addition, the federal courts directed that the Union be put under a continuing no-strike injunction.

The position and activism of the Union was spurned by charges that the air traffic control system was plagued by inadequate equipment, understaffing, job-related stress, and frequent computer breakdowns. In light of these factors, PATCO leaders and general membership felt they were justly entitled to greater compensation and retirement benefits than those provided other federal employees.

To appease these protests, the FAA attempted, and was successful in acquiring funds to upgrade system equipment and controllers salaries. When the strike broke out, salaries of air traffic controllers had improved to a point where their average compensation was \$33,000 per year.

The range of salaries were \$15,193 for an entering trainee at step 1 of the government grade 7 to a maximum of \$49,229 at the top of grade 14.

Based on materials researched, the increased activism of the Union is attributable to a change in the Union's presidency. In 1980, John Leyden was ousted and was replaced by Robert Poli. Poli was considered less of a pacifist, and appealed to the Union's firebrands. Poli was characterized as a man with a mission. Soon after he came aboard, the Union began to build a strike fund and Poli instituted a massive "awareness campaign". The purpose of the campaign was to educate Union membership on the impending strike.

The campaign was a hefty package of written material sent to each union member. Included was a substantial legal memorandum issued by the Union's executive vice president, Robert E. Meyer, informing in no uncertain terms that "it is illegal for the air traffic controllers to strike." He warned of injunctions, and contempt proceedings if injunctions were disobeyed. He reminded the union membership that federal law sanctions termination of employment as government recourse to striking federal employees. However, the focal point of the awareness campaign was on preparation and rallying the troops for the strike. The awareness campaign's success manifested itself in the amazingly resolute solidarity of the Union once the strike began.

Materials used in the Union's awareness campaign fell into the hands of the FAA, whose response was reciprocal preparedness for the impending strike. In a subsequent edition of the Federal Register, the FAA spelled out a plan of action in the event of a PATCO strike.

In February, 1981 negotiations between PATCO and the FAA began for a new contract. Several salient demands among some ninety-six presented were (1) a \$10,000 a year across the board raise for each member of the PATCO bargaining unit (2) two annual cost of living increases at one and a half times the rate of inflation (3) a four day, thirty-two hour work week with a twenty percent night shift differential (versus ten percent currently in effect) and (4) a retirement package that would pay seventy-five percent of a member's highest salary after twenty years of service regardless of age. The 1978 contract provided opportunity for controllers to retire at age fifty at fifty percent of a certain average salary with at least twenty years of service. It has been estimated that the cost of these and various other demands would have been in the magnitude of \$1.1 billion in the first year alone.

The initial counter offer by the FAA was a \$40 million package that contained an across-the-board raise of \$4,000 per year, a increase in the night differential, and compensation at time and a half for the last four hours of a forty hour work week, among other things.

The collective bargaining process continued inter-

mittently through spring and early summer, resulting in a compromised Union position that modified estimated first year costs of a new contract to the fifty million dollar range. The FAA stood firm on their \$40 million offer, however the agency did agree to let PATCO allocate the offer as it saw fit. On June 22, 1981, Poli and his executive board accepted what was said to be the FAA's final offer. Admittedly Poli said "I feel good about it."

Ten days later the Union's rank-in-file dismissed the proposed agreement as an insult and voted it down by a twenty-to-one margin. Poli, in a news conference on July 31, 1981, informed the FAA that if the Union's principal demands were not met, they would strike on August 3, 1981. The FAA asked for an extension of the Union's deadline. Poli refused. A few weak bargaining sessions ensued with the FAA upgrading its offer to a \$50 million package with certain pre-conditions. The Union operatives rejected those conditions and a strike of some 13,000 controllers began.

A. A Discussion Of Model/Thesis Tenets And Propositions Evidenced In The PATCO Strike

In the systems context, the operatives in the air traffic controllers situation were (1) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which in this case served as both employer and the agent of government that Dunlop refers to (see Section III., page 16.), (2) the Profession-

al Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) which represented organized labor and (3) the Reagan Administration which represented government interest in the strike. If one were to characterize the relationship that existed between PATCO and the FAA since the inception of the Union it would fall into the category of containment-aggression. As noted in the historical profile of the relation, within seven months after its inception PATCO members were involved in a work rules slowdown. A sick-out was staged about a year later. A strike of 3,000 members went into effect in the spring of 1970. Again, in 1976 the Union staged another slowdown, and 1981 another strike and the subsequent confrontation between operatives. PATCO's action tendencies, aside from the strikes, reflect what the model calls moderately competitive behaviors. There was evidence of the Union trying to, and succeeding in extending its scope of influence, and the FAA's retaliatory efforts to contain the Union's scope of influence and action. Both sides generally accepted and honored the limits of the law, and negotiating tended to be confined to substantive items such as pay, hours, and working conditions. As Walton and McKersie suggested, in a containment-aggression relationship pattern operatives will gladly weaken the organization or the position of the other's officials, as well as show interest in not only gaining the allegiance of the workers but also detracting from the loyalty enjoyed

by the other.³⁷ On the part of PATCO, this was evidenced by their attempt to scorn President Reagan's ultimatums against a strike. On the part of the government (in this case, employer as well) an awesome counter attack consisting of court orders, arrests, mass firings, and fines illustrate the action tendencies³⁸ Walton and McKersie describe for the conflict relationship pattern, which was reverted to when no accord could be reached under the containment-aggression pattern that existed prior to the strike. An attempt to sway worker allegiance away from PATCO by the government is evidenced by its offer to accept those air traffic controllers back into the employ of the FAA if they returned within the specified grace period. This can also be construed as an individualistic motivational orientation in that by offering and winning over worker allegiance, the government (and FAA) gave the impression of being accomodating, while also trying to strengthen their image and functional position.

When no agreement could be reached, actions described by Walton and McKersie in a conflict relationship pattern appeared. They were on the Union's part (1) a denial of the legitamacy of the government's ends and means by reneging on an oath not to strike against their employer (2) a refusal to bargain in good faith (3) inclinations

³⁷Walton and McKersie, op. cit., p. 186.

³⁸Op. cit., U.S. News & World Report, August 17, 1981, p. 17.

to discredit officials of the government with comments such as, "Denying federal employees the right to strike becomes a sort of refuge for government bureaucrats. They can ignore problems for years and repress workers who seek to change bad conditions through collective bargaining."³⁹ Emotionalism and animosity is exhibited in an editorial in The Nation that states "The effort to destroy PATCO by means of mass firings is the most serious union-busting attempt in any developed capitalist country in decades."⁴⁰

On the government's part, denial of the Union's legitimacy was evidenced by its irreversible position regarding the strike. Their refusal to bargain was predicated on the fact that the strike was an illegal act, which obviated their responsibility to bargain in good faith. Animosity on the government's part manifested itself by their use of all resources (legal, mind you!) to ultimately destroy PATCO by revoking its license, by the use of court orders, by replacing controllers that struck with new hires, etc.

The key contextual factors contributing to the final confrontation were (1) a change in the political and administrative philosophy of the FAA (2) a change in the

³⁹Op. cit., U.S. News & World Report, August 24, 1981, p. 18.

⁴⁰Op. cit., The Nation, August 22, 1981, p. 132.

Union's leadership (Poli versus Leyden) and (3) growing public sentiment against strikes in general, and the PATCO strike in particular. These are the antecedant factors that characterize this particular circumstance. As stated in the thesis table of assumptions, collective bargaining takes place in varying political, economic, and social climates and are affected by changes occurring in these dimensions. Failure by PATCO to reckon with the consequences of these contextual factors lead to PATCO's demise.

Some of the structuring strategy/tactics and behavioral change attempts present in the PATCO situation that Walton and McKersie allude to in their model are as follows. First of all, they purport to present a systematic model of the negotiating process and then assert the way people tend to behave. The model constraints are: (1) it addresses only attitudes towards a person or organization (2) the target of structuring activities is the operative employed; not the employer (3) employer attitudes are only of interest when they become instrumental in changing inter-organizational attitudes and (4) the employer has certain explicit and implicit assumptions about its workforce's existing attitudes and their structure, i.e., which attitudes are more controlling of their behavior relevant to the employer. Also, which of these are more readily accessible to influence. On the basis of this information the operative (employer)

makes certain judgements about the particular attitudes of the target operative which are promising areas for the initiating operative's change efforts. In brief then the initiating operative wants to modify the target operative's attitude and behavior towards him, assumably in the direction of friendliness, trust, respect, or legitimacy.

Threats and tangible sanctions are addressed as tactics in the model. They are competitively motivated and characteristic of the conflict relationship pattern. As previously stated, the PATCO-FAA-GOVERNMENT relationship was one of containment-aggression. Aggravated by insensitivities by the parties, this was heightened to a relation of conflict. As Walton and McKersie point out, a deviation from an established relationship pattern in a negative direction usually results from an involved operative's violation of some rule governing the relation. The violation of a rule in the PATCO case was the strike in the eyes of the FAA and government. From the Union's standpoint lack of good faith bargaining was the rule violated. The work slowdowns, sick-outs, and strikes prior to 1981 had different contextual components (mentioned above) that were able to avert showdowns like the one in 1981. However, in all cases the object was to enhance bargaining posture and to perhaps modify behavior. As evidenced by some air traffic controllers who returned to work before the Presidential grace period ended, behavior modification was successful. This was achieved by

the FAA/government stance which in of itself was a form of cognitive instability Walton and McKersie speak of. Just as the Union's stance (with so much to lose after the ultimatums were issued) was a form of cognitive instability to the FAA and government.

Now the principal propositions exerted by Walton and McKersie in their theory will be discussed. They exerted that a link exists between bargaining goals and behavior; and that those behaviors serve as indices for inferring goal conflict or perceived goal conflict. Conversely, they feel the knowledge that goal structures are in conflict becomes the basis for predicting those class of behaviors identified in their taxonomy. First, implicit in the idea that a link exists between goals and behavior is that people will be motivated to do things to achieve some goal to the extent that they expect that certain actions on their part will help them achieve the goal. A theory in support of this concept is Victor H. Vroom's valence-expectancy theory. He purported that a person's proclivity toward an action would be determined by his or her anticipated values of all outcomes(both positive and negative) of the action, multiplied by the strength of that person's expectancy, that the outcome would yield the desired goal. In other words, he argued that motivation was a product of the anticipated worth to a person of an action and the perceived probability that that person's goals would be

attained. Using his own terms, Vroom's theory may therefore be stated as follows:

$$\text{FORCE} = \text{VALENCE} \times \text{EXPECTANCY}$$

Here, force is the relative desire or other intrinsic pressures of the person to strive, valence is the person's inclination towards a particular outcome, and expectancy is the person's belief that a given action will probably lead to a desired outcome. Although these principles deal with the motivation of individuals, they can be extended to represent the same forces that motivate operatives in the collective bargaining process. In PATCO's case, "Force" in the equation was typified by the Union's solidarity and its unrelenting drive and preparation for a strike. Although the outcome was a gross miscalculation on the Union's part, "Valence", as expressed in the formula was typified by the Union's persistent reliance on past bargaining strategies and tactics to guide their current actions (i.e., slowdowns, sick-outs, strikes, etc.). "Expectancy" was the Union's apperception that political, economic, and societal forces were the same as in past bargaining histories and relations. It was past tactical successes that lead PATCO to believe that their current actions would lead to the desired outcome of a settlement.

What Vroom's theory illustrates relative to the link

between goals and behavior, and what the empirical study by Jackson and Zedeck indicates, is that goals and behavior are the cognitive mediators for change. The goals that served as cognitive mediators for PATCO were improved compensation, improved work conditions, and improved hours over existing levels of the same. These same goals in turn mediated a change in behavior that is descriptive under the containment-aggression relationship pattern to behaviors characteristic of a conflict relationship pattern. An example of this illustrated by the case study facts is how the aforementioned goals, and the expectancy that they could be attained through job-actions and strikes, motivated the Union's membership. Under the leadership of John Leyden, the motivational orientation was towards what Walton and McKersie classify as a containment-aggression relationship pattern. However, under the leadership of Robert Poli, the Union's increasing militancy was characteristic of the relationship pattern Walton and McKersie designate as conflict.

The PATCO case study therefore supports the Walton-McKersie proposition that bargaining goals and behaviors are linked.

The question of whether or not the behaviors exhibited by respective operatives in the PATCO strike served as indices for behavioral prognostication will now be addressed. Behavioral inference in the PATCO case was amiss because operatives underestimated the effect changes

in political, economic, and social climates had on their relationship. Under the leadership of Robert Poli, the Union assumed a more assertive position and solidarity had been well nurtured in preparation for a strike. The FAA and government failed to heed this change in "valence" on the Union's part. The Union misconstrued the "new policies" of the Reagan Administration as rhetoric, and felt that the bargaining process would be business as usual, with an impending strike that was perceived by Poli and the Union membership to be crippling leverage in the relationship. These miscalculations proved costly for all involved. This suggests the importance of systems considerations in effectively assessing one's bargaining posture. It also supports the thesis statement that the predictive utility of the Walton-McKersie model, as it stands, requires enhancement for use as a prognostic tool. As the PATCO case illustrates, a limiting factor in the model is the disregard for overall contextual (or systems) factors as they relate to behavioral change activities. To increase its predictive power and reliability in reducing the indeterminacy factors in labor negotiations, the model should be less singularly directed, and include contingency premises. This would give users of the model flexibility and better represent the dynamic factors that are peculiar to collective bargaining. The affectivities of contextual

factors not only underscore the systems aspects of collective bargaining but also emphasizes how emergent bargaining relationship patterns depend on and influence operative interaction in the process.

In summary then, bargaining models must be based on contingencies to be effective for operational application. How well a model of a system represents variables and interactions of the real world is the true measure of its applicability.

SECTION V.
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL THEORY IN
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

The following synopsis of research findings relevant to the thesis concept and to the Walton-McKersie model are offered to guide further research in the area. Most of the behavioral research material reviewed directs its attention primarily towards individual motivation and behavior and the effects thereof. Relatively little experimentation or study was found that related to interactive group motivation/behavior and the change thereof. This is where the thesis concept sticks its neck out by extending individual behavioral findings to the systems concept of collective bargaining. The things they address suggest relevance to the tenets and propositions of the Walton-McKersie model.

The key thing that past and future behavioral studies related to relationship and goal modification can do is to help to understand how to motivate bargaining agreements that are coterminously oriented to goals and objectives of the respective operatives.

The experimental finding of Susan E. Jackson and Sheldon Zedeck reported in the December 1982 issue of the Journal of Applied Psychology (op. cit.), was that specific, difficult goals lead to better performance than less specific, easy type goals. The analysis focused on the

relative contributions to performance of situational factors. These are equivalent to what the Walton-Mckersie model designate as antecedent or determinant conditions or the environmental climate in which operatives interact. Second, the experiment examined how the nature of a task affected performance. In collective bargaining the tasks are cognitive in nature, which is an aspect addressed in the Jackson-Zedeck analysis. Third, the effect goals, and their adjustment, have on performance is examined. Finally, the effect circumstantial factors have on performance is explored.

Jackson and Zedeck assert that the impact of situational factors in which given behaviors occur are often not considered in research related to goal-setting, although there have been indications that behavioral performance can reliably be altered by these factors.

The results from the Jackson-Zedeck analysis are as follows:

- Performance was significantly higher among subjects who were given specific goals in both the easy and difficult design setting as compared to subjects given a general do-your-best or no goal condition.
- Performance in the difficult/goal condition was significantly higher than performance in the no goal and do-your-best conditions; however, performance in the difficult/goal condition was not significantly different from performance in the easy/goal condition.
- For the manual task, performance in the difficult/goal condition was significantly higher than performance in the no goal condition.
- In both the manual and cognitive tasks, the sit-

uational setting affected performance.

- In the compliance condition, performance was lowest, rather than high as one might be lead to believe.
- Self-set personal goals were more prevalent in the manual task under the compliance condition, with only marginal differences noted for the cognitive task.
- The impact of goal setting on low task variety assignments versus high variety assignments is nominally the same.

The research implications for the above findings as they apply to the Walton-McKersie model of attitudinal structuring are (1) Are goals, moreso than attitudes, of organizations easier to mediate in collective bargaining interactions? (2) Can paradigms and experiments be designed that elicit the behavioral characteristics associated with collective bargaining processes so that theory propositions might be tested and validated? (3) Can correlates be developed to test how well results from behavioral studies can be "cross-fertilized" and generalized from one given area of study to another.

For reference and guidance as to the methodology used in such study, details of the Jackson-Zedeck study are included in Appendix C.

SECTION VI.
APPRAISAL CRITERIA AND MODEL
ASSESSMENT

In assessing the operational utility of a given model the following criteria are often used.

1. The degree to which the behavioral framework of the model encompassed conceptually and realistically the true architecture of labor negotiations.

2. The degree to which ambiguity exists in model descriptors. Also, is the model readily adaptable for simulation techniques and measurements?

3. The degree to which propositions offered embellish existing knowledge and interpretative treatments of labor negotiations.

4. The degree of internal consistency in the model.

5. The degree to which model logic (rules) adequately link the theoretical concepts of the model to stated principles.

6. The degree to which the model affords its theoretically derived predictions to be empirically or otherwise tested.

The model neither accepts or rejects the institutionalized practice of labor negotiations. What it is is an intellectual model of an ideal of the cognitive and behavioral aspects of the process. To support the

propositions and properties of the model, theory, logic, and empirical data from various fields related to behavioral science was used. The model's validity is experiential in nature, relying on the American experience of collective bargaining to prove out its heuristic propositions and operational utility. In this sense then, the attitudinal structuring model is a blueprint for what can be, not of what is. Conceptually it explores and stimulates such questions as:

- What is the nature of the relationship that is desired to be changed?
- What are the reasons for initiating such a change?
- How will the roles of respective operatives involved in the change be perceived by those affected?
- Is there a way to assess and/or evaluate the bargaining session against specified objectives?

In any given bargaining circumstance, the inter-relation of the answers to these questions can be formulated into a planning model of an overall change program as they are all interdependent with one another. They are also the basis for further research in the area of behavioral science as it relates to relationship and goal modification in collective bargaining. For example, there is a clear opportunity for researching the correlates between the nature of a given relationship pattern with the reasons for wanting to initiate a change, and so on.

Answers to questions such as these will help operatives initiating change support the philosophy of what they are doing, and the more successful they are at developing deliberate and consistent bargaining strategies, the more all involved in the process will see that an overall strategy exists.

It is recognized that little change in the "bargaining" status quo has come about over the years. The implications deduced from the model's propositions are that it is desirable and beneficial to all to strive for coherent bargaining objectives. The model provides theory, logic, and the taxonomy for compiling empirical data regarding bargaining performance. The thesis proposition is that through its analytical and informational qualities, the use of the model has utility for enhancing enthusiasm for change and participation in it, rather than resistance to change. Conceptually, the theory of attitudinal structuring is analogous to the team building concept in Management By Objectives (MBO).⁴¹ Like team-building, the Walton-McKersie attitudinal structuring model is intended to be a facilitative and tactical approach to labor negotiations. By refocusing modification efforts from attitudes to goals as the thesis proposition suggests, the model can serve to make

⁴¹Lasagna, J.B., "Make Your MBO Pragmatic", Harvard Business Review, vol. 49, no. 6, November-December, 1971, pp. 65-69.

labor negotiations more effective in reaching constructive labor agreements as well as achieve commonality of purpose amongst operatives. The heritage of collective bargaining in America has been one where operatives in the process show highly individualistic and competitive behaviors with each contending with the other for greater power, prestige, recognition, and organizational autonomy. As such, unity of purpose has fell by the wayside, and the effectiveness of labor negotiations and emergent relationship patterns have suffered. That is not to say that elimination of disagreements should be a goal, although consensual resolve should be. To paraphrase the words of Douglas McGregor⁴² in summarizing where the conceptual loci of relationship modification should be in labor negotiations- it is only when operatives in the collective bargaining process have a clear realization that commitment to overall objectives(system), and their collaboration in initiating constructive and productive collective agreements toward that end, that a meaningful change will come about in their relationship. Conceptually the tenets discussed here are representative of true behavioral forces at play in labor

⁴²McGregor, D., The Human Side of Enterprise., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960, pp. 227-243.

McGregor, D., The Professional Manager, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967, pp. 106-111, 160-182.

negotiations. The propositions offered are consistent with exhibited labor, management, and government goals and objectives attendant in the negotiating process.

From a more pragmatic perspective, the model's architecture focuses only on one operative's association with and/or action towards some outcome or event and how another operative views that association or action and how they might go about changing the first's cognitions about it. A more realistic architecture for the model would have to include reciprocal perceptions and actions, and the responses thereof for all operatives in the negotiating process.

The strength of the Walton-McKersie attitudinal structuring model is its classification scheme and summary of sub-processes present in labor negotiations. The design of their model is presented clearly with all limitations, assumptions, and propositions identified so as to minimize any misunderstanding of their intent. The major weakness and ambiguity in the model is in the discussion of techniques for executing structuring strategy, and tactics for the same. The theoretical framework discusses ways to alter normative behavior but is (1) too prescriptive because operatives perceive and assess normative behavior in different ways (2) too presumptuous because operatives and their constituents are much more susceptible to normative influence

within their respective organizations rather than from an outside source (PATCO's denial of recognition of Presidential ultimatums in favor of union solidarity) and (3) too preemptive in that the model analyzes and relies on research and theory for rational behavior to support its position, whereas it is a departure from "institutionalized rationality" that they are trying to impart. In addition, the model does not account for the system factors in the macro-context of collective bargaining that surely must be addressed and considered for a successful operational model. Sawyer and Guetzow⁴³ suggest that any social-psychological analysis (which is what negotiations are in the attitudinal structuring model theory) includes not only the process of bargaining itself, but also (1) goals, motivating operatives to interact, (2) consequences for each, all accruing within and influenced by (3) pre-conditions of bargaining heritage and norms between and within the organizations of respective operatives and (4) contextual pre-conditions, which the thesis refers to as the systems context of collective bargaining and requisite hierarchy of subordination.

Materials researched⁴⁴ had both qualitative and

⁴³Sawyer, J. and Guetzow, H., "Bargaining and Negotiation In International Relations", in Kelman, H.C. (ed.), International Behavior and Social Psychological Analysis, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, p. 467

⁴⁴Stephenson and Brotherton, op. cit., chapters 9 and 10.

quantitative simulations of bargaining type processes which indicate that the Walton-McKersie model could be adapted to quantitative techniques of mathematical modeling for enhanced measurability of bargaining performance. It is a decision making type model which lends itself to probability theory, gaming theory, and risk analysis.

Jackson and Zedeck⁴⁵ used multivariate analysis of variances and two-tailed "t" tests to analyze data derived from a questionnaire in their experiment of what contributions goal setting, task characteristics, and contextual factors have on human performance behavior.

A multiple regression model was used by Stahl and Harrell⁴⁶ to analyze subjects' affinity for achievement, autonomy, and affiliation. The implications of the Stahl-Harrell exercise for the Walton-McKersie model is that with techniques and methodology such as theirs, behavioral affinities classified in the attitudinal structuring model can possibly be "measured" in a similar manner.

Most of the model's propositions are needed statements of self-evident truths. What Walton and McKersie

⁴⁵Op. cit.

⁴⁶Stahl, M.J. and Harrell, A.M., "Evaluation and Validation Of A Behavioral Decision Theory Measurement Approach To Achievement, Power, and Affiliation", Journal of Applied Psychology, vol. 67, December, 1982, pp. 744-751.

have accomplished is a summarization of the self-evident truths characteristic of labor negotiations, and integrated them with current behavioral theory knowledge. In that sense, knowledge in the field has been embellished.

The only salient instance noted where principles within the model contradicted one another is the statement that the model assumes that operatives wish to modify attitudes in the direction of more trust, friendliness, and cooperation, or at least maintain the existing level of the same in their current relationship. The thesis position argues that the systems of rewards and punishments and the concept of balance theory offered by Walton and McKersie to motivate behavioral change militates against cooperative relationships and is conceptually inconsistent.

The rules or logic of the model stress identification and manipulation of operatives' attitudes and behaviors to serve the objective of only one of the operatives involved in negotiations. The propositions generated are consistent with, except as noted, and supportive of the model's theoretical construct (see page 13 for statement of theory propositions).

Finally, as mentioned before, the experiential nature of the model itself is amenable to empirical and mathematical testing and measurement. This allows opportunities for research of the model and its application in the field, and also in the study of labor negotiations. The more

congruence and compatibility found to exist between the two, the more validity and acceptance the model will have.

SECTION VII.

SUMMARY OF THESIS STATEMENT AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Observations

Behavior modification and other relationship structuring activities should not be viewed as a natural by-product of labor negotiations. These activities do not just happen as a matter of course and cannot be left to chance. To the contrary, they must be deliberate and well thought out, with recognition of potential consequence whether it be good or bad. The development of awareness of behavioral structuring activities in labor negotiations must be a carefully guided process, in which all parties involved understand their role, and the role of one another, as well as the goals of one another.

Moreover, opportunity awareness for behavior and goal adjustment in labor negotiations can no longer go unheeded. Negotiators must be primed for more than simply "bartering" traditional substantive items, although this aspect of negotiations will continue to be a focal point. However, collective bargaining agreements can be enhanced by operatives continually evaluating outcomes of the process as well as the process of collective bargaining itself. Walton and McKersie provide a taxonomy and set of criteria which is the foundation for development of such evaluative processes.

As the thesis statement suggests, as well as supported

by Drucker⁴⁷, attitudinal structuring as presented in the model cannot succeed and will not succeed to alter traits of personality or attitude. Attempts to remake someone's personality or attitude posture frequently fail because those traits are cognitive rigidities developed from individual experience over long periods of time. However, relationship structuring activities do have utility in modifying operative goals in such a way so as to get them to behave coterminously relative to enterprise goals.

Acceptance of the Walton-McKersie concepts will flourish only if users believe in it enough to try it. Its utility is somewhat analogous to management training, organizational development, etc., where although costs and benefits are not easily measured, users assume that a net gain towards enterprise goals will be attained through its application. If operatives and their agents in the negotiating process begin to coach, guide, and assist others in their respective organizations about this untapped opportunity for change, awareness of its concept and dedication and development towards it use will flourish. Just like any other management function, labor negotiations and its sub-processes must involve analyzation, planning, and re-appraisal if its utility

⁴⁷Drucker, P.F., Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices., New York: Harper & Row, 1974.

is to be enhanced.

As previously stated, collective bargaining in the systems context is a legislated abstract devised so that the enterprise components of our national system of commerce can self-regulate their attendant labor-management relations. On a smaller scale within the context of labor negotiations itself, the concepts presented in the Walton-McKersie attitudinal structuring model serve as the mechanism for operatives to self-regulate and/or develop their interactive relations. Implicit in the term "self-regulate" is the reality that although the means and opportunities may exist for change, operatives must choose to change if enhancement of their relation is to occur. By making all parties aware of commonalities of purpose and bargaining consequences, hopefully the right choices will be made.

Through reiterative evaluations, relationship strengths and weaknesses can be identified. Through an enhanced Walton-McKersie model, patrons of collective bargaining can begin to see where and why failures to their interactive processes exist, pinpoint needs, and learn about various ways by which to improve those interactive processes.

The following is a distillation of ideas from materials researched that seem to be the preconditions necessary in a bargaining circumstance for successful structuring and modification activity:

- CLEARLY DEFINED AND CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD RESPONSIBILITIES
- COMMENSURATE LATITUDE IN ONE'S ASSIGNMENT TO ALLOW CONTINGENCY ACTION GIVEN UNFORSEEN CIRCUMSTANCES
- CONSTRUCTIVE FEEDBACK OF INFORMATION BY WHICH PERFORMANCE CAN BE MEASURED
- FOCUS ON CHANGES TO WORK AND/OR GOALS RATHER THAN PERSONALITY OR ATTITUDES

In the same light, the following behavioral tenets must be recognized and accepted to effectively plan, design, and execute goal adjustment strategy in the bargaining process. First, accepting the thesis proposition of requisite subordination, operatives adjust goals only to the extent that they exercise increasingly refined control over their thought processes, actions, and behavior, bringing them coterminously in line with enterprise and system goals. This in a sense refutes the Walton-McKersie proposition that discrepant cognitions motivate attitudinal change. As one knows from his or her own work experiences, one frequently has beliefs and attitudes that are inconsistent with behavior (you may not like or agree with your boss, however, more times than not you do compromise your beliefs, and conform to hierarchial opinion and act accordingly). Second, goal modification is not a process of intrinsic behavioral change, but one of extrinsic behavioral change. Extrinsic behavioral change is more accessible and more easily acculturated than intrinsic behavioral change. This

behavioral axiom supports the thesis proposition that goals should be the focal point of modification in collective bargaining rather than attitudes. Third, as the recent work by Jackson and Zedeck suggests⁴⁸, in designing and planning implementation of goal modification in collective bargaining one must remember the importance of goal setting. People tend to either change according to the particular demands of their circumstance and in accord to their potential, or they do not change at all. The study findings suggest that in a work environment lacking goal setting in its organization, performance will be less than optimal at any given time; but the more pervasive goal setting is, the more likely effort will approach optimal performance. The implication for negotiating is collective agreements that include productivity clauses, as well as profit sharing or a combination thereof. Last, and this can not be emphasized enough, the most important ingredient of successful bargaining of coterminous operative goals is the sincere interest and commitment by each toward purposive change. Models such as the one presented by Walton and McKersie is only a tool operatives can use to examine and understand their interactive relation. By no means is it purported to be a panacea, shortcut,

⁴⁸Op. cit., pp. 759-768.

or prodigious method for the development of frictionless relationships in collective bargaining, as one can attest no such model exists.

The research and development of behavioral theory in labor negotiations and the concept of relationship patterns is of import because operative relations is a guiding link between successive bargaining sessions. The nurturing of positive relations can only contribute to the long term success of America's systems of service and manufacture. As evidenced by the Japanese, enterprise goal awareness by employees, coupled with the four (4) preconditions previously stated for successful structuring and modification activity, yields a significant competitive edge.

Operatives of collective bargaining must keep abreast of major changes in the systems context of collective bargaining and appraise the effect of those changes as it relates to the negotiating process and the anticipated outcomes thereof. In a like manner, bargaining objectives must be adaptive to those changes.

The more significant changes in America's systems of service and manufacture which are saliently impacting the traditionality of collective bargaining focus and consequent outcomes are:

1. Technological changes, which frequently require changes in strategies, structures, and management styles.

These can impact job security, training, internal organization, job design, productivity requirements, yield requirements, quality requirements, etc., all of which can be negotiable items between labor and management operatives in a given enterprise environment. In terms of collective agreements, technological changes force a strain towards agreements that are tied into not only quantitative output, but also qualitative output; profit sharing versus piecework incentives; less rigid work rules regarding job assignments across functional areas; concession bargaining, etc.

2. Organization (unionizing) activities by managerial and public employees. As the scope of influence of unionism broadens, the more important the concept of commonality of purpose. The human resource is a key element in America's systems of service and manufacture. As negotiating balance of power shifts to any one side unchecked, bargaining outcomes can be catastrophic.

3. International markets and availability of resources. As markets expand overseas, so does investment and dependency on foreign resources. Jobs, technology, capital, human capital are all subject to transfer. Distinctions must be made between domestic free enterprise and international competition. The implication for collective bargaining agreements is increased productivity. Operatives of collective bargaining must never forget that the driving force of the enterprise is efficient

performance and profit. Productivity bargaining, and the goals thereof, must be understood to minimize transfer of the resources mentioned above.

B. Considerations To Ensure Effective Goal And Relation Modification Efforts In Collective Bargaining

From a management perspective, any type of purposive change within an organization must be deliberate and defensible. To implement a structuring or change model such as the one Walton and McKersie set forth, pre-planning is of concern to make sure the climate and timing for change is ripe. This would involve, at various levels between and with respective operative organizations, discussing, setting, and communicating to a greater extent coterminous goals as they relate to enterprise goals. Establishing and adopting applicable strategies for bargaining that will enhance the concept of peaceful industrial coexistence amongst operatives. Devising means to measure bargaining performance against criteria that is consistent with the aforementioned themes, and assurance from respective operative managements that principals will have the resources to achieve these objectives. All this adds up to recognizing that purposive goal adjustment and/or relationship change will not occur through collective bargaining unless commitment by all involved is attained.

As R.M. Beese so aptly put it:

- Change is more acceptable when it does not threaten security than when it does.
- Change is more acceptable when it is understood than when it is not.
- Change is more acceptable when those affected have helped to create it than when it has been externally imposed.
- Change is more acceptable when it results from an application of previously established impersonal principles than it is when it is dictated by personal order.
- Change is more acceptable if it has been planned than when it is not planned.
- Change is more acceptable to those who share in the benefits of change than to those who do not.
- Change is more acceptable if the organization has been trained to accept change.

All of the above axioms⁴⁹ are necessary considerations that must be addressed when implementing a change model such as the Walton-McKersie bargaining model. They all emphasize the importance of awareness and acceptance of change as a way of life for continued enterprise well being. Yet since people are resistant to change to some degree, it is the challenge to operative management to restructure and build their respective organizations adaptable to change.

In utilizing collective bargaining as a mechanism for goal modification and relationship improvement the following principles are offered: (1) In the bargaining

⁴⁹Beese, R.M., "Company Planning Must Be Planned", Dun's Review and Modern Industry, vol. 74, no. 4, April, 1957, pp. 62-63.

process operatives must not lose sight of enterprise objectives, and in pursuing a collective bargaining agreement facilitation of those objectives has primacy and benefit for all. (2) Bargaining performance must begin to be measured by the amount it contributes to enterprise objectives offset by the costs and other unsought outcomes resulting from the process. Measurement should be conducted by all operatives so they can better assess their respective posture in the systems context of their interaction. (3) The primacy of their interaction must be realized by each operative. It is the collective agreement that precedes and binds the execution of the policies it contains. The more operatives understand and agree to utilize rationally those policies, the more coordinated and rewarding will be their relationship. Finally, (4) in a period of technological, political, and worldwide change, the more flexibility that can be built into collective agreements, the more operatives will be able to minimize potential losses incurred during stalemates. As mentioned in (2), the cost of the flexibility should be weighed by each operative to assess advantages and disadvantages.

C. Concluding Comments

From this study and analysis it is concluded that the theory of attitudinal structuring, and behavioral findings in support of its propositions, can be drawn

together to form a body of pertinent knowledge for use as an operational approach and working model for behavior modification and goal adjustment efforts in collective bargaining. This is an eclectic approach to enhancing the Walton-McKersie model. It brings together findings and recommendations from various areas of behavioral experimentation that will help to increase one's understanding of the model's applicability in real-life situations. The eclectic type of an approach has the dual advantages of 1) organizing knowledge and experiences relative to collective bargaining in such a way that research questions are aroused and 2) providing "cross-fertilization" of knowledge between fields which helps move towards an operational model that better typifies the multiplicity of behavioral factors inherent in labor negotiations. However, the thesis concept of integrated analysis of the Walton-McKersie model and the accompanying application to the PATCO strike can only be considered as having tentative value. The reasons for this are as follows. First, most of the behavioral research reviewed was directed at the individual rather than hierarchial organizations comprised of individuals. As such, questions and findings resulting from such research may or may not have applicability to a systems type model such as the one reviewed. Second, the behavioral materials researched helped to explain the "how" and "why" of certain attitudes and perceptions in collective

bargaining situations, however, the ways in which those attitudes and perceptions can be translated into successful and productive bargaining agreements is much less clear. Third, the thesis analysis of bargaining interaction is crude in the sense that constraints and premises inherent to it result in inconclusive information that requires much more rigorous empirical and quantitative research to verify the utility of the Walton-McKersie for actual application in collective bargaining.

D. Developmental Opportunities

As a result of this research, a number of conclusions upon which further research may be directed, as well as cautions about the use of existing collective bargaining models, are outlined. They are as follows:

- a) The Walton-McKersie model may be enhanced as an operational model by future behavioral research that examines specific categories of cognitive tasks associated with the negotiating process.
- b) Research that explores the relationships between the goals and charters of private and public business concerns and the priorities of national commerce will give additional insights to the thesis concept of "requisite

hierarchy of subordination". This breaks down into, first, what systems of service and manufacture (public vs. private, auto industry vs. airline industry, etc.) are more likely to be subject to third party (government and/or its agents) intervention when good faith bargaining ceases in a given circumstance? In researching this question, the system of service or manufacture and its characteristics should be the independent variables and the dependent variable (measurement) is the perceived and/or actual effect conflict can have on composite systems of commerce (intra-state, inter-state, or national). Second, the effect that national commerce priorities have on respective labor and management goals and functioning needs to be researched. In researching this relation, the integral system of commerce and its characteristics (industry, sector, etc.) becomes the independent variables while the labor and management bargaining performance (e.g., quick settlement, prolonged strike, etc.) becomes the dependent (measurement) variable.

- c) Acknowledging that individual behavioral considerations exist in organizational settings and that they may effect organizational goals,

is the effect significant? As referenced in the body of the thesis, there is a school of thought that purports individual behavioral effects may be, and often are minimal in the systems context.

- d) To what degree do data, conclusions, and principles derived from behavioral studies of the individual and the group apply to the same in formal organizational settings and system type models of collective bargaining? Are the principles transferrable between the "systems" context and the "individual" context or vice versa? If not, what are the reasons?
- e) How can behavioral research results relevant to the Walton-McKersie model be translated into sound bargaining guidelines for behavior modification and goal adjustment?

Since the primary goal of the thesis is to assist in the development of an operational Walton-McKersie model, answers to the above research questions will enhance the model's utility in actual practice.

APPENDIX A.

IDENTIFICATION GUIDELINE FOR CHANGE

In light of the previous discussion, the following guideline is presented to assist in the design of a program to identify when relationship or goal modification is needed.

A modification need is described as existing any time a relationship or goal condition differs from a desired relationship or goal condition amongst operatives.

A thorough and accurate assessment of modification needs must precede change attempts so that the initiating operative can best decide on an approach for the desired change. One approach entails the following major steps. Step one should involve examination of relevant interactive factors external to the target operative's domain. These include the dominant characteristics of past bargaining performance, as well as the salient values, practices, and heritage that have been exhibited and propagated by the target operative. In other words, this step is a review of the antecedent and/or determinant forces Walton and McKersie speak of (see Figure 2.). This step entails a review and assessment of the target operative's acculturated posture. This refers to those attitudinal and goal orientations which have been learned, shared within the organization, transmitted between organizational boundaries by members to in-

crease scope of influence. The kinds of information gained from the above will be: (1) an assessment of the target population's strength, solidarity, support by public sentiment, etc. (2) identification of norms within the target operative's population; how receptive constituents will be to change; whether or not openness and cooperation is valued more than hostility and adversarial relations. (3) an estimation of how all of the above are either consistent or inconsistent with the initiating operative's objective(s) (a form of measurement). (4) an indication of whether or not the majority in the target operative's population is comfortable and/or satisfied with the organization's leadership. Indications on this surely lets the initiating operative know whether or not the climate is ripe for modification attempts. (5) an indication to the initiating operative of how to meld countervailing forces in a compromising way to serve their objectives.

Step two involves an assessment of operatives' principals (negotiators, NLRB, mediators, etc.) to labor negotiations. Do they require additional training and skills to execute modification attempts in the bargaining process? As alluded to by George R. Terry⁵⁰ managing of this type may require a greater degree of psychology,

⁵⁰Terry, G.R., Principles of Management, Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1977, p. 9.

conceptual knowledge, and skill than bargainers are traditionally equipped with.

Once the first two steps are accomplished, step three should focus on weighing, developing, and communicating the target of modification in the bargaining session. This would be the decided upon plan for implementation.

APPENDIX B.


SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FINDINGS:

U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE SURVEY OF
WORKERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD PRODUCTIVITY

- Workers In The U.S. Have, Generally Speaking, Positive Outlooks About Contributing To Enterprise Objectives.
- Key Incentives For Good Performance Were Identified As Monetary And Personal Recognition.
- Management Abilities And Attitudes Are Just As Important And Critical To Improved Performance & Productivity As Are Workers' Attitudes And Abilities.
- Workers Find Coterminous Effort And Decision Making Conceptually Attractive.
- Workers In The U.S. Are Optimistic About Future Enterprise Development And Growth.


RESPONDENTS FELT THAT DILIGENCE MADE:

(Source: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 1980)



PERCEIVED IMPACT OF GOOD WORK PERFORMANCE ON ENTERPRISE SUCCESS

WHO WORKERS FEEL WOULD BENEFIT MOST/LEAST FROM PRODUCTIVITY
AND PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT IN U.S. ENTERPRISES.



Source: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 1980.

APPENDIX C.

DETAILS OF THE JACKSON-ZEDECK STUDY

The subjects in the experiment were two hundred and sixty-three students who worked on two tasks (manual and cognitive). For each subject, quantity of performance was assessed for a cognitive and manual task. The experimental factors were: (1) type of goal (no goal, do-your-best, easy, and difficult) (2) evaluative context (control, peer evaluation, and compliance) (3) task variety (low, high) and (4) order of task completion (cognitive task first, or manual task first). Subjects' satisfaction with their performance and their reactions to the tasks were assessed in a questionnaire completed at the end of the experiment.

Most subjects participated in this experiment in groups of three, some subjects in groups of two, and a few worked alone. Tests of the impact of group size showed no significant effect. All subjects in the peer evaluation condition participated in groups of three. Within each session, all subjects worked under the same experimental condition, which was randomly assigned.

Each subject worked at a table which faced away from the other subjects in the room. Upon arrival to the experiment, subjects were told they would be working on several tasks similar to the kinds of tasks people

work on in various jobs. The subjects first task was explained to them and they were given ten minutes to practice the task. After the practice session, subjects were told they would be working on the task for twenty-five minutes and that they would then stop and begin a new task. Subjects who were given goals were told their goals at this point. After working on the first task for twenty-five minutes, subjects were stopped and the second task was explained. As for the first task, subjects were given ten minutes to practice the second task. Goals were then assigned, when applicable, and a twenty-five minute work session followed. Upon completion of the second task, subjects were given post test questionnaires to complete.

The manual task involved an assembly assignment of a three dimensional model(e.g. toy jeep, tractor, etc.). The pieces required to build one model were enclosed in a envelope with an instruction sheet. The instructions consisted of two pictures, one picture showing the model half built and one showing the model completely built. By comparing the model they were building with the pictures, subjects were exposed to a means of feedback about the quality of their performance. Completed models remained on their tables until the end of the twenty-five minute testing session, thereby pro-

viding performance feedback to the subjects about quantity of models they had completed.

The cognitive task used in the experiment involved subjects reviewing a floor plan of a one story, three room building. All rooms were four-sided. Although the dimensions of each were not indicated on the floor plan, sufficient information was provided to enable the subjects to determine the dimension of each room. The task was to evaluate the number of units of carpeting to purchase (a) for each room, assuming a different color would be used in each room and (b) for the entire building, assuming the same color would be used in all rooms. To provide feedback to subjects about the quality of their performance on this task, the solutions for each floor plan were enclosed in the immediately succeeding envelope along with the subsequent floor plan sketch. Feedback was easily determined visually since completed floor plans were stacked on the subjects' tables.

Within the group, task variety was manipulated. For instance in the model assembly task, some subjects had only to assemble a single type of model. This was considered a low variety task. Other subjects had to assemble five different types of vehicles (high variety task). For the cognitive task assignment, subjects in the low variety condition worked on floor plans for buildings that were all the same shape (rectangular),

but with differing dimensions. The carpet to be used in these buildings was always sold in the same sized unit (a 10'x20' roll). In the high variety condition, the three rooms in the building were arranged to form shapes other than rectangles. The units of carpet to be used in the high variety condition also varied from one building to the next.

The four types of goal conditions created and posed to experiment subjects were no goal, do-your-best goal, easy goal, and difficult goal. In the no goal condition subjects simply were told to work on the task. In the do-your-best condition subjects were instructed to do the best they could on the task. In the easy and difficult goal conditions subjects were given specific numbers of models and floor plans to complete. Appropriate goals were established through a pilot study in which subjects worked on the tasks under a no goal instruction set. Easy goals were defined as half a standard deviation above the mean number of models/floor plans completed by the pilot subjects. Difficult goals were defined as one and a half standard deviations above the mean. Goals were established separately for low variety and high variety versions of each task to allow for differences in performance due to characteristics of the task itself.

The evaluative contexts created to heighten con-

cern about the evaluation of performance were: (1) peer evaluation (2) compliance evaluation, where concern about complying to an authority who has the power to withhold tangible rewards was set up and (3) a control condition, where no attempt was made to heighten the subjects concern about evaluation was also set up.

Results were as follows:

Manipulative Checks

Subjects' descriptions of the tasks on the post test questionnaire were examined to check whether subjects perceived the manual and cognitive tasks as differing on dimensions other than the prima facie dimension of manual versus cognitive. Two-tailed, paired "t" tests revealed that the manual task was perceived as somewhat easier, less complex, more enjoyable, and more interesting. Subjects perceived the manual task as giving them less autonomy; the manual and cognitive tasks were perceived as no different on the dimensions of feedback about performance or variety.

Goal Conditions

Subjects' responses to the question on the post test questionnaire that asked, "Did the experimenter set a goal for you when you were doing the task?", were analyzed using a chi-square test, which revealed strong differences in responses across the four goal conditions previously stated. For both tasks, ninety-five percent

of the subjects in the easy and difficult goal conditions perceived that goals were set. In the do-your-best condition, forty-two percent of the subjects perceived that goals were set. Sixteen percent of the subjects in the no goal condition perceived that goals were set. Subjects who perceived a goal was set were asked to describe the goal. Their responses were coded as non-specific quantity and/or quality goal (e.g., do as many as I can correctly or do-your-best) or specific quantity (e.g., complete seven units). Looking at subjects who perceived a goal was set, ninety-one percent of those in the easy and difficult goal conditions correctly described the goal set; of those in the do-your-best condition, fifty-two percent described the goal as "do-your-best" and forty-two percent described the goal as non-specific quantity and/or quality. The few subjects in the no goal condition who indicated a goal had been set described the goal as either non-specific quantity and/or quality or as do-your-best and so they were not dropped from the analyses.

Evaluative Context

Compared to subjects' in the control and peer evaluation conditions, subjects in the compliance condition were more concerned about how the experimenter would evaluate performance of the task. A contrast was noted when comparisons were made between the control and peer

evaluation conditions and the compliance condition which indicated that subjects were more concerned about performance evaluation in the compliance condition.

For both cognitive and manual tasks, the main effect of the evaluative context was elicited through the post test question which asked how important it was whether or not other subjects in the experiment felt one performed well. Findings revealed that subjects in the peer evaluation condition had relatively low concern about their peers' opinion. Moderate amounts of concern were reported by subjects in the control and compliance conditions.

Discussion of Analyses

The major dependent variables in this study were cognitive and manual task settings. The major independent variables were goal, evaluative context, and task variety. A multivariate analysis of variance(MANOVA) was used to test the relationship between independent and dependent variables. The results were stated in the body of the thesis(see page 55).

The foregoing was presented to illustrate the type of methodology that can be used to measure and study behavioral aspects in the Walton-McKersie model.

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