

EXPLAINING VARIATION IN ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF  
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES

---

A Dissertation

presented to

the Faculty of the Graduate School

at the University of Missouri-Columbia

---

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy in Public Affairs

---

by

Kyoung-sun Min

Dr. Alasdair S. Roberts and Dr. Mary Stegmaier, Dissertation Supervisors

July 2018

© Copyright by Kyoung-sun Min 2018

All Rights Reserved

The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the dissertation entitled

EXPLAINING VARIATION IN ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF  
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES

presented by Kyoung-sun Min,

a candidate for the degree of doctor of philosophy,

and hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance.

---

Professor Mary Stegmaier

---

Professor Alasdair S. Roberts

---

Professor Lael Keiser

---

Professor Judith Stallmann

To Grace

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

While writing this dissertation, I have had the benefit of comments from great teachers. It is difficult to express in words my gratitude to Professor Alasdair S. Roberts. He has taught me how to study research questions in broader contexts. Without his guidance, this dissertation would not have been written. I am particularly grateful to Professor Mary Stegmaier. As my co-advisor, she has helped me in many of my hours of need. I am truly indebted to her. I must also thank Professors Lael Keiser and Judith Stallmann for their support and comments. I wish to thank Professor Colleen Heflin, who has firmly believed in my potential. This essay is a small step toward living up to her expectations.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>LIST OF FIGURES .....</b>	<b>VII</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES .....</b>	<b>VII</b>
<b>ABSTRACT.....</b>	<b>VIII</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW .....</b>	<b>13</b>
CORRUPTION.....	13
<i>Definition of Corruption .....</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Grand Corruption and Petty Corruption.....</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Impacts of Corruption.....</i>	<i>17</i>
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES .....	19
<i>Anti-Corruption Movement.....</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>General Prescriptions for fighting corruption.....</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Assessing Compliance with Anti-Corruption Policies .....</i>	<i>28</i>
<i>Measuring the Level of Corruption.....</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>Measuring Impact of Anti-Corruption Policies .....</i>	<i>33</i>
MAIN CONCEPTS .....	34
<i>Political Will.....</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>Rational Power Maximizer .....</i>	<i>39</i>
<i>Governance Strategy.....</i>	<i>41</i>
<b>CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK.....</b>	<b>44</b>

RESEARCH QUESTION .....	44
MODEL.....	45
COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL METHOD .....	50
CRITERIA FOR CASE SELECTION .....	53
<b>CHAPTER 4: INDIA .....</b>	<b>58</b>
OVERVIEW .....	58
CONDITIONS FACED BY INDIA’S LEADERS .....	62
<i>International Affairs</i> .....	62
<i>Social Affairs</i> .....	65
<i>Economic Affairs</i> .....	67
<i>Political Affairs</i> .....	69
GOVERNANCE STRATEGY .....	71
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES .....	74
<i>Political Leaders and Anti-Corruption Policies</i> .....	74
<i>Types of Anti-Corruption Policies</i> .....	77
CONCLUSION.....	89
<b>CHAPTER 5: RUSSIA .....</b>	<b>90</b>
OVERVIEW .....	90
CONDITIONS FACED BY RUSSIA’S LEADERS.....	95
<i>International Affairs</i> .....	95
<i>Social Affairs</i> .....	98
<i>Economic Affairs</i> .....	101

<i>Political Affairs</i> .....	103
GOVERNANCE STRATEGY .....	106
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES .....	110
<i>Political Leaders and Anti-Corruption Policies</i> .....	110
<i>Types of Anti-Corruption Policies</i> .....	111
CONCLUSION.....	116
<b>CHAPTER 6: CHINA .....</b>	<b>119</b>
OVERVIEW .....	119
CONDITIONS FACED BY CHINA’S LEADERS .....	123
<i>International Affairs</i> .....	123
<i>Social Affairs</i> .....	128
<i>Economic Affairs</i> .....	133
<i>Political Affairs</i> .....	136
GOVERNANCE STRATEGY .....	139
ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES .....	144
<i>Political Leaders and Anti-Corruption Policies</i> .....	144
<i>Types of Anti-Corruption Policies</i> .....	145
CONCLUSION.....	152
<b>CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>160</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	160
DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS .....	161
<i>India</i> .....	161



<i>Russia</i> .....	164
<i>China</i> .....	165
COMPARISONS .....	167
<i>Three Countries</i> .....	167
<i>India and Russia</i> .....	172
<i>Russia and China</i> .....	175
<i>China and India</i> .....	178
CONTRIBUTIONS .....	181
DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.....	183
<b>REFERENCE</b> .....	<b>186</b>
<b>VITA</b> .....	<b>242</b>

## LIST OF FIGURES

<b>FIGURE 1</b> TYPES OF ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES .....	26
<b>FIGURE 2</b> FREQUENCIES OF "LACK OF POLITICAL WILL" .....	35
<b>FIGURE 3</b> BIASED SELECTION AND FAILURE OF ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES .....	45
<b>FIGURE 4</b> POLITICAL LEADERS WITH CIRCUMSTANCES AND GOVERNANCE STRATEGY ....	46
<b>FIGURE 5</b> PROCESS OF POLICY SELECTION .....	49
<b>FIGURE 6</b> EVALUATING ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES IN INDIA.....	88
<b>FIGURE 7</b> EVALUATING ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES IN RUSSIA .....	111
<b>FIGURE 8</b> EVALUATING ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES IN CHINA .....	152

## LIST OF TABLES

<b>TABLE 1</b> INDICES OF COUNTRIES .....	54
<b>TABLE 2</b> CIRCUMSTANCES AND REACTIONS.....	167
<b>TABLE 3</b> GOVERNANCE STRATEGIES AND POLITICAL WILL .....	169
<b>TABLE 4</b> ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES .....	170

## **ABSTRACT**

Since the negative effects of corruption on the quality of government are becoming more apparent, the anti-corruption industry is expanding. Yet while scholars have developed several anti-corruption policies, political leaders have only partially adopted them. This selective adoption causes those anti-corruption policies to be less effective. Why do political leaders adopt different anti-corruption policies? This research question has not yet been fully answered. The extant literature on this topic suggests that a lack of political will can explain incomplete compliance with anti-corruption policies, and yet it stops short of explaining what encourages or discourages political will. This dissertation assumes that political leaders want to maximize power to govern their people effectively. To fortify their power within national affairs and to respond to international, social, economic, and political circumstances, political leaders develop a governance strategy. When an anti-corruption policy is consistent with their governance strategy, the leaders' political will to adopt the policy will increase. If not, their political will might decrease. To evaluate the validity of this assertion, this thesis uses the comparative-historical method in an exploration involving three countries: India, Russia, and China. The Indian leaders refuse to build a strong anti-corruption agency that may impede their ability to protect political allies. The Russian leaders avoid introducing reformatory anti-corruption policies to keep from losing the support of corrupt elites. The Chinese leaders use anti-corruption policies as a punishment against opponents to increase their power in the party and the power of the party. This dissertation concludes that experts should consider the circumstances which political leaders face before suggesting prescriptions for reducing corruption.

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Why do political leaders adopt and implement different anti-corruption policies?<sup>1</sup>

Their ultimate concern is not to fight corruption that can be defined as the intentional misuse or abuse of public power by public officials to increase private interests while doing damage to the people through their actions. They want to maximize their power to govern their people efficiently while responding to international, social, economic, and political circumstances to retain their power.

To react to these circumstances effectively, leaders strengthen their governance strategy, defined as a grand plan to fortify their power within national affairs, by choosing policies that are consistent with that strategy. If a new anti-corruption policy is consistent with their grand strategy, then they have a strong political motive to adopt this policy. If an anti-corruption policy is not consistent with their strategy, they will not choose to adopt it. This dissertation tests the validity of this assumption by using the comparative-historical method in an exploration involving three countries: the Republic of India (hereafter India), the Russian Federation (hereafter Russia), and the People's Republic of China (hereafter China).

The detrimental impact of corruption is extremely high. In 2013, the chief of a public enterprise in South Korea that operated several nuclear power plants was arrested for alleged corruption (Ju-min Park, 2013). It was reported that a private contractor

---

<sup>1</sup> This dissertation construes political leaders as “the people who exercise power within a state” (A. Roberts, 2018a, p. 6).

bribed him into fabricating safety test results (Choe, 2013). He is not the only one. Since 2011, about one hundred employees in the company have been indicted for receiving grafts (Park, 2013). This corruption resulted in some nuclear power plants being constructed with low-quality materials. The result was terrible: Twenty-three reactors came to a halt, and the damage to the nation was estimated at more than eight billion dollars (Choe, 2013). This case is not unique. Corruption scandals continue to be rampant worldwide (Brademas & Heimann, 1998).

Since the 1990s, corruption has sparked burgeoning interest amongst international organizations and countries because people have realized its harmful impact (Savedoff, 2016, p. 4). In its 1991 report, *The Challenge of Development*, the World Bank asserted, “Corruption weakens a government’s ability to carry out its functions efficiently” (The World Bank, 1991, p. 131). To date, 183 countries have ratified the United Convention against Corruption, and more than 100 countries have established anti-corruption agencies to fight corruption (Transparency International, 2016; UNODC, 2018). The anti-corruption industry, a term coined by Sampson (2010), is growing explosively (p. 262). Billions of dollars have been invested in fighting corruption (Hough, 2013, p. 29).

To combat corruption, researchers have developed a general anti-corruption toolkit, which consists of not only investigation and enforcement, but also prevention measures such as institutional reforms, education, and the participation of civil society. Enhancing transparency is highly recommended (Khan, 2006, p. 13). Enlightening citizens is emphasized (Pope, 2008, p. 295). Empowering civil society is also encouraged to detect corruption (Klitgaard & Baser, 1998, p. 77). These recommendations are based

on the belief that if experts could give the right prescriptions to political leaders, then the leaders would accept it. According to the experts, if politicians adopt these recommendations, then the level of corruption would finally decrease.

Despite the considerable investment and development of various anti-corruption policies, empirical results show that corruption in the world has not decreased. Anti-corruption investment in corruption-infested countries has a limited impact on curbing corruption (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013, p. 450). Researchers have determined that the World Bank continues to fail to reduce corruption (Collier, 2017). Johnston (2011) declares that the success of anti-corruption policies “has been elusive at best” (p. 467). Thus, the implementation of anti-corruption policies has not generated a favorable outcome (Heeks & Mathisen, 2012, p. 533). Therefore, despite these numerous initiatives, there is no evident diminishment in the level of corruption in the world.

Corruption persists because there is still a lack of compliance with anti-corruption policies worldwide. First, some countries do not adopt a recommended anti-corruption policy. For instance, in 2008, the Government of Barbados did not want to enact anti-corruption laws that would prohibit public officials from receiving bribes (Barbados Free Press, 2008). Second, other countries only adopt a weak version of anti-corruption policies. The Republic of Uganda (hereafter Uganda) has built various anti-corruption institutions, but these institutions do not have a sufficient capacity to investigate central public officials (Godfrey & Yu, 2014, p. 9). Finally, many countries implement anti-corruption policies incompletely, and numerous anti-corruption agencies are not effective due to a lack of independence (Meagher, 2005, p. 100).

If the approach that is taken by an anti-corruption movement does not appear to work because of incomplete compliance with anti-corruption policies, one might reasonably ask some questions. Why do countries refuse to adopt a recommended anti-corruption policy? Why do they institute a weak version of anti-corruption policies? Why do they implement anti-corruption policies incompletely? These questions, related to the failure of anti-corruption policies, lead this dissertation to pursue the following questions. What causes the variation in adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies? Why do political leaders adopt and implement anti-corruption different policies?

These research questions are related to the failure of anti-corruption policies. To reduce corruption successfully, countries should implement various anti-corruption policies because one specific type of policy is not enough to handle rampant corruption. Political leaders, however, have a preference for a particular policy and refuse to adopt other measures, which consequently causes anti-corruption policies less effective. Thus, to understand the real reason for the failure of anti-corruption policies, we first need to understand the preferences involved in the adoption of anti-corruption policies.

Although these questions are imperative to understanding the causes associated with the failure of anti-corruption policies, researchers have paid little attention to the variation in anti-corruption policies. They focus mainly on the concept of political will to fight corruption as an explanation for the failure of these policies (Rotberg, 2017, p. 223). They construe political will as the demonstrated commitment of a political leader or political actors to achieve political goals. An extensive body of literature suggests that strong political will is necessary for the implementation of anti-corruption policies to

generate favorable results (Healy & Ramanna, 2013). Many researchers would like to emphasize that a lack of political will is the leading cause of the failure of anti-corruption policies. For example, a lack of political will has had an adverse impact on solving various problems including corruption in African countries (Mango, 2015, p. 1). In Asian countries, the absence of political will is the most critical factor leading to the failure of anti-corruption policies (Quah, 2013a, p. 137). Therefore, a broad consensus has emerged that political will is an essential idea in explaining the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies (Zhang, 2015, p. 254).

It is not easy, however, to find various and profound explanations about what generates political will. Hardly any researchers appear interested in determinants encouraging or discouraging political will.<sup>2</sup> If we do not pay attention to the causes of the lack of political will, then the concept of political will *per se* cannot elucidate the variation in adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. Therefore, we need to know what generates the political will of leaders.

This dissertation introduces a more sophisticated model of decision-making by political leaders to explain what encourages or discourages the political will of leaders. This model assumes that political leaders want to maximize their power to govern their people efficiently. Realists in the field of international relations construe the state as a rational power maximizer (Gel'man, 2015, p. 9; Halliday, 1990, p. 508). From the

---

<sup>2</sup> A small body of literature tries to explain some influencing factors on political will such as political systems and international donors (Kpundeh, 1998, p. 92).



viewpoint of realists, this thesis assumes that political leaders are rational power maximizers in national affairs.

Political leaders face and respond to international, social, economic, and political circumstances. Their reactions are partly determined by the assumption that political leaders are power maximizers. Their primary interest in maximizing their power leads them to choose various types of reactions. To make their reactions valid, they look to their governance strategy.

A governance strategy is a grand plan that is selected by political leaders to fortify and then maintain their power within national affairs (Roberts, 2018a, p. 10). Political leaders want to maximize their power to govern their people effectively while operating within their own international, social, economic, and political circumstances. Their governance strategy enables them to maximize their power under these circumstances. Therefore, strengthening their governance strategy is a very high priority.

To strengthen their governance strategies, political leaders carefully select anti-corruption policies. They have little consideration for the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies since reducing corruption is not in their best interest. They are interested in their power. When a new anti-corruption policy is deemed consistent with their governance strategy, they have a strong will to adopt this policy. In contrast, when they believe that a policy is not consistent with their governance strategy, their political will to adopt this policy is weak. Thus, political leaders in different countries adopt and implement different anti-corruption policies because their governance strategies vary.

This novel model will shed light on the complexity of choices surrounding anti-corruption policies in various countries. This study checks some definitions of ideas related to corruption and anti-corruption policies, presents a detailed explanation of the model, and employs case studies to test the validity of this model.

Chapter 2 begins by explaining various concepts and histories that are related to the main argument of this dissertation. This thesis conceptualizes corruption as the intentional misuse or abuse of public power by public officials to increase private interests while doing damage to the people through their action. In the past, corruption was a taboo among social scientists, but after the end of the Cold War, people realized that corruption could hurt economic development (Brademas & Heimann, 1998). Subsequently, to fight corruption, anti-corruption experts have developed holistic strategies including punishment, prevention, and education (Pope, 2000, p. xviii). Since these prescriptions have not been sufficiently introduced and implemented, corruption has not decreased. A more detailed explanation of several concepts such as political will and governance strategy is suggested at the end of the second chapter.

Chapter 3 describes the methodological framework. After explaining the research question, this dissertation applies a model that sheds light on the variation in the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. To evaluate the validity of the model, this dissertation uses the comparative-historical method, which employs case study research to explore complex social phenomena (Yin, 2014, p. 4). By comparing various cases, the comparative-historical method tries to find complex causal relationships to understand general ideas behind the external appearance of the cases (Mahoney & Thelen, 2015, p.

7). This method is appropriate to explain the variation in adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies because the research question in this dissertation is not interested in a simple causal relationship. Instead, this thesis is concerned with the complicated motivation of political leaders and how it influences their choice of anti-corruption policies. The appropriateness of the comparative-historical method is examined in the third chapter.

Chapter 3 ends with an explanation of the criteria for case selection. The criteria for case selection in this dissertation consists of countries which suffer from high levels of corruption, the different reactions of political leaders, geostrategic importance, and data accessibility. This thesis has selected three countries as case studies: India, Russia, and China. These countries suffer from high levels of corruption but face different circumstances. Moreover, they adopt different types of political systems. India is a federalized liberal democratic state, Russia may be construed as a managed democratic state, and China can be called a party-state. This variation in political systems enables this study to generalize the model. Although these three countries do not represent all countries, concentrating on a small number of them enables us to investigate complex causal relationships and to evaluate the validity of the model (Lange, 2013, p. 14).

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 assess the explanatory power of governance strategy by looking at the implementation and adoption of different anti-corruption policies in these three countries. International, social, economic, and political circumstances are explained. These conditions affect the formation of governance strategy. After illustrating the governance strategies of the political leaders of the three countries, each chapter explores

the relationship between the governance strategy and the selection of anti-corruption policies.

Chapter 4 looks at a federalized liberal democratic state: India. India's foreign policy is non-alliance because India does not want to bring international problems to their people. Internally, India faces conflicts between religious and ethnic groups (Varshney, 2014, p. 16). To increase geographic integrity, the Indian government controls insurgents by letting them participate in elections and have autonomy (Varshney, 2014, p. 33). Economically, India suffers from mass poverty (Guha, 2008, p. 589). Indian politicians adopt various policies to fight poverty because they need support from the poor. Politically, democracy has successfully entrenched itself in India (Varshney, 2014, p. 4). Political leaders in India are concerned about the possibility of losing elections, so their political power is not very stable while the political system is stable.

To respond to these international, social, economic, and political circumstances effectively, the Indian political leaders need votes. Therefore, the governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections. To win elections, they need the support of political allies. The anti-corruption policies that they adopt reflect this governance strategy. They try to protect political allies while also trying to avoid the pressure of civil society. Since a robust anti-corruption agency may harm their political allies, they do not want to build this agency. However, since freedom of information acts can curb petty corruption, they tend to enact the acts to assuage civil society. They are willing to fight petty corruption because it is not associated with their political allies.

Chapter 5 looks at a managed democratic state: Russia. Internationally, the Russian political leaders condone military expansion and aggressive diplomacy against EU-US economic sanctions. Internally, when demonstrations have a negative effect on the political regime, they control the media and suppress civil society. Economically, they persuade people to believe that Western powers are liable for current economic crises. Politically, they want to win elections overwhelmingly to verify their popularity.

To respond to these international, social, economic, and political circumstances effectively, the Russian political leaders seek to control the various apparatuses consistently. The governance strategy employed by the Russian political leaders is focused on fortifying vertical of power (Monaghan, 2017, p. 5). To do so, the Russian political leaders seek to form symbiotic relationships with corrupt elites.

Therefore, the Russian political leaders tolerate corruption to help elites accumulate wealth. They have enacted some anti-corruption laws, but a lack of specific provisions makes these laws useless. Anti-corruption activists have asked the Kremlin to adopt institutional reforms, but political leaders in Russia do not want to adopt anti-corruption policies that might have a negative effect on the support of the elites (Krastev, 2016).

Chapter 6 examines a party-state: China. Internationally, China tries to increase influence over other states with military expansion and aggressive diplomacy to inspire patriotism domestically. To maintain internal authority, China does not let Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong become independent. China seeks to pacify people's anger and suppress civil society to increase the sustainability of the political regime. In the corridors

of power, the Chinese political leaders purge their enemies. Economically, China needs foreign investments to maintain the high level of economic growth. Politically, the Chinese leaders are concerned about the fragility of the political system.

To respond to these international, social, economic, and political circumstances effectively, the Chinese political leaders need the power of the party, and so their governance strategy is to maintain that power. They rely heavily on punishment to fight corruption because punishment has a positive effect on increasing both the power of the party and their power in the party. The Chinese political leaders, however, refuse to adopt Western prescriptions such as increased transparency and democratic accountability because these policies might have a negative effect on the power of the party.

In chapter 7, the conclusion of this dissertation highlights and compares the distinguishing characteristics of the three countries. The implications of this dissertation are based on the assertion that without talking about politics, we cannot help political leaders curb corruption. This dissertation asserts that anti-corruption experts should consider the circumstances that political leaders face when they suggest prescriptions for reducing corruption. In other words, they should overcome the politics-administration dichotomy which means the administration is free from politics.

This assertion leads us to consider three implications. First, if we focus only on fixing administrative corruption, then our efforts may fail to reduce the total level of corruption (Johnston, 2011, p. 485). Second, it is too naive to believe that political leaders will adopt anti-corruption policies just because these policies have a positive effect on curbing corruption. Third, if anti-corruption experts want political leaders to

take an anti-corruption policy, they should understand the governance strategy of those political leaders.

## **CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW**

In this chapter, various concepts related to the main argument of this dissertation are explained. The definition of corruption, its detrimental impact, and a brief history of the anti-corruption movement are introduced. After that, this chapter elucidates the general anti-corruption prescriptions and the reactions against these prescriptions. The general impact of anti-corruption policies is also evaluated. The concept of political will, an assumption about political leaders, and the idea of governance strategy are then explicated at the end of this chapter.

### **Corruption**

#### *Definition of Corruption*

While the definition of corruption has generated long-running debates, there is still no single definition which satisfies everyone. The first reason for this dissatisfaction is the number of different purposes of defining corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015, p. 3). Experts in various disciplines such as political science, criminology, sociology, and economics have all studied corruption from their own perspectives. Some authors focus on punishment, for example, while other writers are interested in a culture of corruption. The second reason is that the types of corruption vary (Jain, 1998, p. 3). Corruption can range from bribes and embezzlement to nepotism and clientelism. The final reason is that discussions on corruption are related to context (Johnston, 2005, pp. 10–11). While some countries construe a particular action as corruption, other countries may find the same



behavior acceptable (Klitgaard, 1988, p. 3).<sup>3</sup> Corruption is understood differently depending on the context of the state where the discussion of corruption takes places (Costantini, 2017, p. 175).

Conventionally, the definitions of corruption have three major common elements: action, actor, and gain. Some scholars build a narrow concept of corruption while others adopt a broad concept. First, concerning action, the narrow concept of action focuses on breaking the law (Neild, 2002, p. 6), whereas the broad concept of action includes the abuse of public power (Mundial, 1997, p. 8; Transparency International, 2016). Second, concerning the definition of an actor, the narrow concept of actor focuses on public officials (Huntington, 2002, p. 253; Neild, 2002, p. 6), and the broad concept of actor includes private persons (Evans, 1999, p. 3; Transparency International, 2016). Third, concerning gain, the narrow concept of gain focuses on private financial gains by the actors, while the broad concept of gain includes non-financial gain such as political and status gain (Friedrich, 2002, p. 15; Johnston, 2005, p. 12; Neild, 2002, p. 6; Nye, 2002, p. 284).

These comparisons do not conclude that a narrow concept of corruption may be superior to a broad concept of corruption, or vice versa. The usefulness of the definition should depend on the purpose of the analysis. Thus, the definition of corruption in this thesis is constructed with the specific purpose of the research question in mind. The goal of this dissertation is to elucidate the large variation in types of anti-corruption policies

---

<sup>3</sup> However, this blurred line does not mean that we cannot differentiate a bribe from a gift. Although the definition of bribery can vary amongst many countries, people can tell an illegal bribe from a legal gift (Klitgaard & Baser, 1998, p. 60).

amongst countries. These policies have been developed to abate corruption in the public sector, which has a negative effect on a country's economic growth and the capacity of the government (Lambsdorff, 2005, p. 2; Langseth, 2006, p. 9).

Considering the goal of the study, this dissertation defines corruption as the intentional misuse or abuse of public power by public officials to increase private interests while doing damage to the people through their actions. This definition has five elements: intention, misuse or abuse of public power, public officials as actors, private interests, and damage. First, this dissertation includes the concept of intention in the definition of corruption because the intention of corrupt actors is a necessary component in evaluating corrupt actions (Porter & Warrender, 2009, p. 82). Second, the definition of corruption in this thesis mentions the misuse or abuse of public power. Power is a more informative concept than the law because the law can be manipulated by powerful corrupt actors (Wallace & Latcheva, 2006, p. 82). Third, because this dissertation deals with corruption in the public sector, one of the actors involved in corruption should be a public official (Eiras, 2003, p. 2).<sup>4</sup> Fourth, the concept of private interests is another crucial element of the definition of corruption in this dissertation. Private interests include financial gains, promotion, and convenience (Neild, 2002, p. 6). Finally, the definition of corruption in this dissertation also includes the concept of damage because the detrimental effect of corruption is one of the main concerns in the study of corruption (Uslaner, 2017, p. 302).

---

<sup>4</sup> In many cases, corruption is created by the cooperation of the public sector and the private sector (Klitgaard & Baser, 1998, p. 59). However, the main actors are the public officials because one of the actors should be a public servant.

## *Grand Corruption and Petty Corruption*

This dissertation explores various anti-corruption policies that are effective in controlling petty and grand corruption.<sup>5</sup> While some anti-corruption policies focus on reducing petty corruption, other policies fight grand corruption. For example, increasing the salaries of street-level bureaucrats is a proper prescription to curb petty corruption because a frequent motivation driving their corruptive behaviors is based on their financial needs (Quah, 2013b, p. 248). In contrast, increasing the salaries of senior officials does not effectively combat the greed of high-ranking officials because their corruptive action may stem from a different motivation than the need which motivates the corruptive behavior of street-level bureaucrats (Quah, 2013b, p. 248).

To evaluate anti-corruption policies, we need to distinguish between petty corruption and grand corruption, but there is no concrete definition of either. There are two reasons for this. First, there is no precise point along the continuum that explicitly separates a petty corrupt action from a grand corrupt action (Sindzingre, 2017, p. 442). Second, petty corruption and grand corruption are usually interrelated (Della Porta & Vannucci, 2012, p. 136).

Although the distinction between grand corruption and petty corruption is not always clear, some scholars have sought to explain the difference. Heidenheimer (2002) claims, “Petty corruption refers to bending of official rules in favor of friends, as manifested in the somewhat untruthful reporting of details, the ignoring of cut-off dates,

---

<sup>5</sup> Some anti-corruption experts prefer to use the term of “venal corruption” instead of “grand corruption” (Rotberg, 2017, p. 32; Wallis, 2006, p. 25).

the “fixing” of parking tickets, and so on” (p. 150). Holmes (2015) argues that petty corruption occurs in ordinary people’s daily lives while grand corruption happens only at the elite levels (p. 10). Others define grand corruption as much more sophisticated than petty corruption (Lambsdorff, 2005, p. 5; Poeschl & Ribeiro, 2012, p. 22). In this study, these explanations are sufficient for defining the difference between petty corruption and grand corruption.

### *Impacts of Corruption*

The harmful impacts of corruption are far-reaching. Corruption may have negative effects on economic and social conditions such as health expenditure, public education, tax collection, and human capital (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015, pp. 2–3). One of the reasons for these negative impacts of corruption is that corruption is associated with the low quality of governance (Besley, 2006, p. 10). This dissertation explains the impacts of corruption on economic growth, income equality, social stability, and trust. These malignant consequences of corruption are typical reasons for fighting corruption.

First and foremost, corruption and economic development are related (Savedoff, 2016, p. 1). Corruption hurts foreign investment in countries (Voyer & Beamish, 2004, p. 211) and distorts the distribution of resources and decreases resource efficiency (Besley, 2006, p. 10). It also intensifies political instability, which has a negative effect on economic growth (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2004, p. 429). The negative effect of corruption on economic growth can be intensified in very corrupt countries where people lose their incentives to fight corruption (Mauro, 1995, p. 681).

Second, corruption affects income inequality (Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002, p. 30). This negative effect is especially strong in African countries and countries of the former Soviet Union (Klitgaard & Baser, 1998, p. 61). Developed countries are no exceptions. In the United States of America (hereafter the United States), corruption is associated with income inequality (White, 2016, p. 1663). This relationship between corruption and income inequality can be construed as the inequality trap because corruption is “a tax on the poor” (Uslaner, 2017, pp. 302–303).

Third, corruption hampers national integration and intensifies social instability (Theobald, 1990, p. 130). Corruption affects both income inequality and social inequality. In a corrupt society, people who stay in the inner circle of power elites have more opportunity to succeed while people who have no connection with elites have less opportunity (Holmes, 2015, p. 19). If corruption generates economic inequality, people consider it unfair (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005, p. 1228). Thus, when corruption encourages economic inequality, social inequality also rises.

Finally, corruption impairs trust. A low level of trust is associated with a high level of corruption (Xin & Rudel, 2004, p. 298). Seligson (2002) finds that corruption has a negative effect on interpersonal trust in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia (p. 428). Corruption increases inequality, and corruption and inequality have a negative effect on political trust (Uslaner, 2017, p. 302). Corruption also causes people to mistrust their political regime and decreases regime legitimacy (Clarke & Xu, 2004, p. 2067). In sum, corruption does not “grease the wheels” but rather “sand[s] the wheels” (Habibov, Afandi, & Cheung, 2017, p. 178).

According to these assertions, it is clear that corruption has a negative effect on the state. If so, corruption could be a negative effect on the power of political leaders. It is plausible that people do not want to support their political leaders when they suffer from corruption. For this reason, it seems to be obvious that political leaders want to reduce corruption. In some cases, such as the Republic of Singapore (hereafter Singapore), fighting corruption has a positive effect on the power of political leaders.

However, in many countries, political leaders do not seriously fight corruption. It means that corruption might have no effect on their power. Rather, corruption could have a positive effect on their power. For example, in a democratic country, if people do not care about corruption and they believe that ability is more important than integrity, they might choose corrupt leaders who look like smart. In this case, political leaders know that corruption has no effect on their power although it has a negative effect on the state. In an authoritarian country, political leaders might tolerate corruption because it could be better for them to maintain their power. They need the loyalty of their subordinates, and the loyalty could be fortified by bribes. Therefore, corruption has a negative effect on the state, but it might have a positive effect on the power of political leaders.

## **Anti-Corruption Policies**

### *Anti-Corruption Movement*

In the past, corruption was not an attractive subject amongst social scientists (Caiden, 2001, p. 429). Before globalization, developed countries did not consider corruption to be their problem, and underdeveloped countries affected by corruption tried

to hide it (Collier, 2017). In the 1960s, researchers were not concerned about the rampant corruption in South Asian countries (Myrdal, 2002, p. 266). It was not until the 1970s that social scientists were interested in studying corruption (Quah, 2011, p. 7). Indeed, corruption has not always been a popular topic (Collier, 2017).

This attitude towards the study of corruption, however, has changed since the late 1980s (López Claros, 2014). In a 1988 book, *Controlling Corruption*, Robert Klitgaard explored a way to curb corruption in developing countries (Klitgaard, 1988). In 1989, Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston, and V. T. Le Vine co-edited a book entitled *Political Corruption: A Handbook* (Heidenheimer, Johnston, & Le Vine, 1989). Today corruption is no longer ignored by academia (Hope, 2017, p. 1).

The Western powers have also shifted their stance on corruption. They used to protect corrupt leaders in developing and underdeveloped countries because they needed the support of these leaders in their struggle for power during the Cold War. However, after the end of the Cold War, they no longer protected these corrupt leaders. For example, Mobutu Sese Seko, the former President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1965 to 1997 and a notorious dictator, was not protected by international organizations after the Cold War despite his loyalty to the Western powers (López Claros, 2013, p. 3).

The end of the Cold War forced many authoritarian and communist countries to adopt democratic political systems and market economies. New democratic leaders in developing and underdeveloped countries have revealed the corruption that the former authoritarian leaders were associated with during the Cold War. During these transitions,

corruption was not as easy to hide as it had been (Brademas & Heimann, 1998), and the new democratic leaders had no incentive to hide the corruption of their authoritarian predecessors. They wanted to show that they were different from the old dictators.

International organizations have also given much attention to anti-corruption policies (Olken & Pande, 2012, p. 2). According to the United Nations, from 1990 to 2004, the economic development of 54 underdeveloped countries has decreased despite incredibly generous donations (Pieth, Smith, & Jorge, 2007, p. 1). This disappointing result led international organizations to think about the necessity of fighting corruption; in 1996, James Wolfensohn, the former President of the World Bank, asserted, “We need to deal with the cancer of corruption” (Wolfensohn, 1996, p. 10). Today, international organizations believe that corruption is the single most important determinant in miserable economic situations.

International donors have started to focus on curbing corruption through various techniques (Brademas & Heimann, 1998). In 1996, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund declared that they would persuade aid-recipient countries to adopt anti-corruption policies (Brinkerhoff, 2000, p. 247). In 2011, the International Police Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and other participants founded the International Anti-Corruption Academy to provide a holistic approach to curbing corruption (IACA, 2018).<sup>6</sup> In 2005, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) came into effect, which has been ratified by 183 countries since 2005 (UNODC, 2018). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the

---

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.iaca.int>



Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) also joined in the war to combat corruption (Costantini, 2017, p. 182).

Non-governmental organizations have also joined in the fight against corruption. In 1993, Peter Eigen, a former World Bank manager, initiated Transparency International (Sampson, 2010, p. 274). Since 1995, Transparency International has released the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), a list which has considerable influence over anti-corruption experts and policy-makers (Galtung, 2006, p. 106). While Transparency International has a significant role in increasing awareness of corruption, other non-governmental organizations such as the Integrity Action and the International Budget Partnership have also been established to reduce corruption (Andersson & Heywood, 2009, p. 761).<sup>7</sup>

Since the advent of globalization, multinational companies have also begun to raise their voices against corruption. To compete in the intense global economy, these companies need to cut costs, but corruption usually increases costs (López Claros, 2013, p. 5). Petty corruption is especially harmful to their bottom line (Lambsdorff, 2005, p. 4). Thus, private companies dislike corruption particularly when it is not lucrative for their business.<sup>8</sup>

Ordinary people have also discovered that corruption is not “grease for the wheels of progress” but rather “a major obstacle to democratic transitions, market economies, and development” (Brademas & Heimann, 1998). In the 1990s, corruption scandals were

---

<sup>7</sup> <http://integrityaction.org>; <http://www.internationalbudget.org>

<sup>8</sup> If bribe givers became better off, then they would not want to fight corruption. In contrast, if the givers fail to get advantages through bribery, then they could change their attitude towards corruption.

rampant worldwide. Many political leaders went to jail or lost elections due to their corruption scandals (Brademas & Heimann, 1998). Some examples of corrupt leaders are Suharto in Indonesia, Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela, Felipe Gonzalez in Spain, and Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic (Brademas & Heimann, 1998). A positive effect of these scandals was the increased awareness of corruption worldwide.

In recent years, corruption has received much more attention. In 2012, the USA Today and Gallup Poll conducted a survey that revealed that corruption in the federal government would be the second most important issue in the 2016 American Presidential election (Vogl, 2012). People in the Republic of the Philippines (hereafter the Philippines) expected corruption to be the most critical issue during their 2016 Presidential election (Cruz, 2014). Alpha Condé, the President of Guinea, worries about corruption because Guinea is considered one of the most corrupt countries (Condé, 2014). In 2016, delivering a speech at Ukraine's parliament, Joe Biden, the former Vice President of the United States, asserted that we should seriously fight corruption to ensure a successful democratic system (Mungiu-Pippidi & Kossow, 2016).

Thus, various actors are interested in anti-corruption policies, and massive resources are being invested in the anti-corruption industry (Sampson, 2010, p. 262). Governments, supranational organizations, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and academia have tried to find a way to reduce corruption (Sampson, 2010, p. 272). Michael and Bowser (2009) estimated that five billion dollars had been invested in the anti-corruption industry (p. 1). Marquette and Peiffer (2015) stated that approximately

a hundred million dollars a year might be spent on curbing corruption. Sampson (2010) declared, “Today, anti-corruption has arrived” (p. 271).

### *General Prescriptions for fighting corruption*

Anti-corruption experts have developed various policies, all of which seek to reduce corruption (Altamirano, 2007, p. 462). To begin with, they focused on increasing the probability and severity of punishment to increase the opportunity cost of corrupt actions. The absence of monitoring and the low probability of punishment lead public servants to the favorable choice of committing corruption (Khan, 2006, p. 12), an action which can be explained through microeconomic theory. Rose-Ackerman (1999) wrote, “Economics is a powerful tool for the analysis of corruption” (p. xi). Researchers who believe the validity of microeconomic approaches construe corruption as “a crime of calculation” (Klitgaard & Baser, 1998, p. 69). Economists explain that the optimal level of corruption can be found by adjusting the level of punishment and incentives. Increasing the probability of punishment is still a primary tool for fighting corruption (Sampford, 2014, p. 4).

As anti-corruption policies have developed, policy-makers have agreed that we need a more holistic approach to fighting corruption. A well-known approach is the National Integrity System (NIS),<sup>9</sup> a program founded in 1997 by New Zealand lawyer and co-founder of Transparency International Jeremy Pope (Townsend, 2009). The NIS

---

<sup>9</sup> Integrity means “the use of public power for officially endorsed and publicly justified purposes” (Sampford, 2014, p. 2). Jeremy Pope chose “integrity” instead of “anti-corruption” because the former term sounded like a positive (Sampford, 2014, p. 6). Sampford (2014) believes that “integrity” is a better expression because of the definition. According to him, the definition of integrity is “primary because you cannot know what an abuse is if you do not know what the correct ‘use’ is” (Sampford, 2014, p. 6).

is “the sum total of the institutions and practices within a given country that address aspects of maintaining the honesty and integrity of government and private sector institutions” (Mbaku, 2007, p. 335). Many scholars have mentioned the NIS as a new machine to fight corruption (Sampford, 2014, p. 7).


NIS followers believe that holistic strategies, including prevention and education, are essential (Pope, 2000, p. xviii). The first reason is that the process of law enforcement takes too much time to recover the damage of corruption (Sampford, 2014, p. 4). The second reason is that without ethics, law enforcement cannot be effective (Sampford, 2014, p. 4). The third reason is that corruption is not a problem caused by institutions, not individuals (Klitgaard & Baser, 1998, p. 59). Bad institutions encourage corruption (Sampford, 2014, p. 4). Thus, NIS practitioners pursue a holistic approach because they believe that criminalization is not a strong enough deterrent to corruption.

Anti-corruption policies have evolved into a greater variety of types, which scholars and governments have classified. According to Meagher (2004), there are four types of anti-corruption policies: investigation, prevention, education, and coordination (p. 1). Shim and Eom (2009) argue that law enforcement, administrative reform, and social change are the three main ways to control corruption (p. 101). In the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter Hong Kong), the Independent Commission Against Corruption has developed three approaches: “deterrence, prevention, and education” (Kwok, 2006, p. 198).

This dissertation reclassifies anti-corruption policies. Figure 1 shows a detailed explanation of the four categories of anti-corruption policies proposed. The legislation is

needed to build the basic structure of anti-corruption measures. Independence of agencies and the judiciary is imperative to punish corrupt officials fairly. Education is essential to prevent corruption. Third-party empowerment can help civil society and the media monitor corruption.

**Figure 1** Types of Anti-Corruption Policies



First, legislation is necessary to combat corruption. There are three types of laws for anti-corruption: criminalization, the freedom of information, and the protection of whistleblowers. Criminalization is a fundamental approach to reducing corruption by increasing the probability and severity of punishment (Bowles & Garoupa, 1997, p. 76). Criminalization of corruption prohibits public officials from receiving bribes.<sup>10</sup> The freedom of information act is one measure developed to fight corruption (Lindstedt &

<sup>10</sup> Some anti-corruption laws punish both bribe givers and bribe takers equally: e.g. German Criminal Code, 2013, section 331 and 333 in Chapter Thirty. In other countries, bribe takers are punished more severely: e.g. Penal Code in Japan, 2006, Article 197 and 198 in Chapter Twenty-five, Part II.

Naurin, 2010, p. 302). Encouraging transparency of the government makes corruption easier to detect. Whistleblower laws are commonly needed to protect those who expose corruption (Martin, 2003, p. 119). If whistleblowers have confidence in their protections, then they will report complaints that are related to corruption.

Second, institutional reforms related to the independence of investigative agencies and the judiciary have frequently been mentioned by anti-corruption experts because corruption is not only a problem of bad public officials, but also a malfunction of bad institutions (Hope, 2017, p. 2). The independence of investigation agencies and the judiciary is required to handle corruption cases fairly (Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998, p. 13). Independence from political influence is one of the most important conditions for the success of anti-corruption agencies (Kuris, 2014, p. 3). Without this condition, anti-corruption agencies cannot fairly investigate grand corruption. Without an independent judiciary, corrupt politicians could escape punishment and avoid detection. Thus, anti-corruption institutions can be effective when the independence of institutions is guaranteed (Hope, 2017, p. 3).

Third, researchers have determined education to be a tool for reducing corruption. Holistic strategies include not only punishment and institutions but also education (Pope, 2008, p. xviii). Educational approaches are targeted to both public servants and ordinary citizens. For example, the Independent Commission Against Corruption of Hong Kong educates the police and university students (Klitgaard & Baser, 1998, p. 73). Anti-corruption instruction strengthens the ethics of individuals and promotes strong attitudes against corruption (Amukowa, 2010, p. 140). Proper education and training can increase

“the moral costs of corruption” (Klitgaard & Baser, 1998, p. 70). In sum, anti-corruption education can help people become aware of corruption, change their attitudes towards corruption, and develop new skills to deal with corruption (Keen, 2000, p. 6).

Finally, third-party participation is highly recommended as an anti-corruption strategy. Cooperation between the government and civil society can reduce corruption (Pope, 2000, p. 28). Because investigative journalism can uncover corruption, guaranteeing the freedom of the press within active civil society has a positive effect on detecting and punishing corruption (Halamová, 2017, p. 53). A high level of third-party participation is a compelling way of curbing corruption because civic groups can be anti-corruption watchdogs to monitor corrupt officials (Johnston, 2011, p. 488).

### *Assessing Compliance with Anti-Corruption Policies*

Anti-corruption experts argue that the level of corruption will eventually decrease if political leaders adopt anti-corruption policies thoroughly. For example, NIS practitioners consider the disappointing results of anti-corruption policies to be part of an ongoing learning process (Pope, 2000, p. xx). Although there have only been a few success stories about anti-corruption reforms, this fact does not affect their confidence. They believe that it is just a matter of time before their strategies will succeed (Pope, 2000, p. xx).

However, when we look at many developing and underdeveloped countries, it seems that curbing corruption is not just a matter of time. Some states have reduced corruption successfully within a few decades. In 1974, the Independent Commission

Against Corruption was established in Hong Kong (Klitgaard & Baser, 1998, p. 63). In 1952, Singapore built the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau. At that time, corruption was rampant in these two countries. Today, they both experience only a low level of corruption. Over the past ten years, some developing countries, such as Georgia, the Republic of Liberia, and the Republic of Rwanda, have remarkably reduced corruption (Rotberg, 2017, p. 13). While there have been satisfactory results from anti-corruption policies, many developing and underdeveloped countries fail to control corruption (Hope, 2017, p. 1). Thus, time cannot sufficiently explain the different results amongst these countries and the persistence of corruption in many other countries.

Incomplete compliance with anti-corruption policies is endemic and stems from many reasons. First, some countries do not adopt a recommended anti-corruption policy. In 2008, the government of Barbados did not want to enact anti-corruption laws that would prohibit public officials from receiving bribes (Barbados Free Press, 2008). In 2015, the Bulgarian parliament refused to approve a new anti-corruption law that would permit to investigate corruption cases with anonymous complaints (Zhelev, 2015). The Republic of Estonia (hereafter Estonia) has rejected the anti-corruption advice of the international donors (Mungiu-Pippidi & Kossow, 2016).

Second, other countries have only adopted a weak version of anti-corruption policies. One example is Uganda. Uganda has built various anti-corruption institutions, but these institutions are unable to investigate central public officials (Godfrey & Yu, 2014, p. 9). The Federal Republic of Nigeria (hereafter Nigeria) also adopts weak anti-



corruption policies. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria has been criticized for its politically selective investigations (Alo, 2014, p. 52).

Finally, many countries have implemented anti-corruption policies incompletely. They have established anti-corruption agencies to emulate the success of anti-corruption agencies in Singapore and Hong Kong, but it is hard to replicate the satisfactory performance of the agencies in those countries (Meagher, 2005, p. 69). Other anti-corruption agencies have not been effective due to the lack of independence and cooperation (Meagher, 2005, p. 100). The deficiency of human and fiscal resources are also responsible for the failure of anti-corruption policies (Benton, 2015).

### *Measuring the Level of Corruption*

To evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies, we first measure the level of corruption. The ability to measure corruption has developed remarkably (Olken & Pande, 2012, p. 1). Social scientists, however, cannot reach a unanimous agreement that corruption indices reflect the real level of corruption accurately. Some researchers assert that the results of these indices have significant bias and are therefore unreliable. Other scholars argue that because the corruption indices are consistent, they are trustworthy to some extent.

No corruption indices are impeccable (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007, p. 3). Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, and Schankerman (2000) argue that if the responders of surveys overestimate or underestimate the real level of corruption in their countries, then the surveys are not reliable because of potential bias (p. iii). Similarly, Donchev &

Ujhelyi (2014) find that the perception of corruption does not precisely estimate corruption experience (p. 3). Kenny (2009) agrees that perceptions are “very weak proxies for the actual extent of corruption” (p. 314). Miller (2006) also argues that the perception of corruption is not a precise measure of corrupt actions (p. 183).

Some scholars, however, assert that we can trust the perception of corruption to some degree. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) contend that perception is a reliable source “since corruption usually leaves no paper trail” (pp. 2-3). Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006) find that the CPI and other corruption indices are highly correlated (p. 86). This finding shows that corruption indices based on different perceptions generate consistent results. Therefore, we can trust the results of the indices to some degree even if a bias exists.

There are numerous ways to measure corruption by using perception. This dissertation focuses on two popular indices: the CPI and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The CPI has been released by Transparency International every year since 1995. Its purpose is to raise public awareness of corruption (Transparency International, 2018). It measures the perceptions of different kinds of corruption such as bribes, rebates in government procurement, and embezzlement in the public sector. The minimum value of the CPI is zero, and the maximum value is one hundred.<sup>11</sup>

The methodology of the CPI has improved since its inception. Before 2012, Transparency International summated different datasets without considering the date of

---

<sup>11</sup> While a high score means a low level of corruption, a low score means a high level of corruption (Transparency International, 2018). Before 2012, the maximum value was ten.

the data, but after 2012, the CPI has only used one year's datasets. The CPI is a composite index of twelve datasets that explain perceptions of corruption. The CPI then aggregates these data without weighting (Transparency International, 2018). Some of the datasets are the Bertelsmann Foundation Sustainable Governance Indicators, the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings, and the Freedom House Nations in Transit (Transparency International, 2018). The respondents of the CPI are experts and businesspeople. The ordinary citizen is not included. In 1995, Transparency International investigated 41 countries, but the 2017 index includes 180 countries (Transparency International, 2018).

Another measure is the WGI. The World Bank has released the WGI annually since 1996 (Kaufmann et al., 2007, p. 2). The purpose of the WGI to “to create instruments useful to establish more effective instruments of government” (Malito, 2014, p. 11). It measures corruption and other aspects of governance through six dimensions: “1) voice and accountability, 2) political stability and absence of violence, 3) government effectiveness, 4) regulatory quality, 5) the rule of law, and 6) control of corruption” (World Bank, 2018). The WGI is a governance index that includes a corruption indicator.

Despite their similarities, there are some significant differences between the WGI and the CPI. Like the CPI, the WGI measures the perceptions of corruption, but the definition of corruption in the WGI is not limited to the public sector. The WGI measures corruption in both the public and the private sector. Thus, the WGI investigates a broader range of corruption. The ranges of the two indices also differ: The range of CPI is from

zero to one hundred, and the range of the WGI is from -2.5 to 2.5.<sup>12</sup> For the convenience of comparison between countries, the world average of the WGI is always zero every year (Rohwer, 2009, p. 48). Regarding aggregation, the CPI simply aggregates the datasets, but the WGI uses weighted averages (Malito, 2014, p. 16). The developers of the WGI believe that the more informative data should receive more weight (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010, p. 16).<sup>13</sup> The WGI aggregates 40 datasets including the datasets of the CPI. Unlike the CPI, the respondents of the WGI are not only experts and businesspeople, but also ordinary citizens. While the CPI investigates about 170 countries, the WGI examines more than 200 countries (Rohwer, 2009, p. 47).

### *Measuring Impact of Anti-Corruption Policies*

Some experts have tried to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies with corruption indices. Using the WGI on the Control of Corruption and the data related to anti-corruption regulations, Mungiu-Pippidi & Kossow (2016) find that there is a positive relationship between anti-corruption regulations and corruption.<sup>14</sup> It means that countries which adopt more anti-corruption regulations suffer from more corruption. This empirical result demonstrates that anti-corruption initiatives are unsatisfactory due to incomplete compliance.

---

<sup>12</sup> Like the CPI, a high value means a low level of corruption.

<sup>13</sup> If the sources cover many countries and are highly correlated, then they receive more weight. The WGI calls this method an Unobserved Component Model (UCM) because this model assumes that corruption can be measured as a linear function of unobserved corruption (Malito, 2014, p. 12).

<sup>14</sup> The control variable is the Human Development Index: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>. This outcome may have bias related to endogeneity. For example, the high crime rate increases the number of police officers (Levitt, 1997, p. 270). In the same way, higher corruption is likely to increase anti-corruption regulations.

Therefore, anti-corruption regulations lead to no evident diminishment in the level of corruption over the world. The anti-corruption investment in corruption-infested countries has a limited impact on curbing corruption (Persson et al., 2013, p. 450). The Central Eastern European countries have adopted various anti-corruption policies, but have still suffered from corruption (Batory, 2012, pp. 66–67). The implementation of anti-corruption policies in many African nations has not yielded the desired effect (De Maria, 2010, p. 17). International organizations are no exceptions to this trend. Researchers have determined that the World Bank has still not succeeded in reducing corruption (Collier, 2017). Johnston (2011) declares that the success of anti-corruption policies “has been elusive at best” (p. 467). Thus, the implementation of anti-corruption policies has not generated a favorable outcome (Heeks & Mathisen, 2012, p. 533).

## **Main Concepts**

### *Political Will*

Political will is a relatively new way of explaining policy failures.<sup>15</sup> A JSTOR search shows that it was not until 1966 that “the lack of political will” appeared in a journal article, and Google Books Ngram Viewer supports this result. Figure 2 shows that this term has been used since the middle 1960s. Its frequency in articles has increased as authors have sought to use political will to explain the failure of anti-corruption policies.

---

<sup>15</sup> Some authors use political will and leadership interchangeably (Lawal, 2007, p. 6; Rotberg, 2017, p. 223).

Political will is now a frequently used but still vague concept (Post, Raile, & Raile, 2010, p. 654). When this terminology was first introduced, there was no consensus about its definition. Some writers construed political will as the will of a political individual such as a king (Norman, 1974, p. 13; Sloane, 1899, p. 446). A few scholars have used the term as an abstract idea, such as the national will and the social will (MacIver, 1911, p. 42; Sumner, 1876, p. 87). Some researchers have used the term of political will to mean the political will of the people (Reinsch, 1901, p. 475).

**Figure 2** Frequencies of "lack of political will"



Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer (2013)

After 1998, some different definitions of political will have been observed. Explaining some factors that encourage political will to fight corruption, Kpundeh (1998) regards political will as “the demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level” (p. 92). Examining anti-corruption policies, Brinkerhoff (1999) construes political will as “the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives – in this instance, reduced corruption –

and to sustain the costs of those actions over time” (p. 3). Treadway, Hochwarter, Kacmar, and Ferris (2005) conceptualize political will as “an actor’s willingness to expend energy in pursuit of political goals” (p. 231). Rose & Greeley (2006) understand political will as “the sustained commitment of politicians and administrators to invest political resources to achieve specific objectives” (p. 5). Post, Salmon, and Raile (2008) explain that political will is “the sustained commitment of politicians and administrators to invest political resources to achieve specific objectives” (114). According to Quigley (2009), political will can be defined as “the demonstrated credible intent of political actors to take meaningful action toward reform” (p. 16).

These definitions have some common components: actors, demonstrated commitment, and political goals. Political will can be constructed at an individual level such as a political leader, or collective levels such as politicians (Brinkerhoff, 2010; Post et al., 2010, p. 656). Whatever the level, political will should be accompanied by demonstrated commitment (Brinkerhoff, 2010). Without commitment or manifestation, political will is empty rhetoric. Finally, these definitions mention political goals. Political will exists for political goals or specific objectives. It can, therefore, be generally construed as the demonstrated commitment of a political leader or political actors to achieve political goals.

A broad consensus has emerged that political will is an important concept to explain the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. An extensive body of literature suggests that strong political will should support the implementation and administration of anti-corruption policies to reduce corruption significantly (Altamirano, 2007, p. 547;

Brinkerhoff, 2000, p. 240; Rotberg, 2017, p. 223). Many researchers maintain that the lack of political will is negatively associated with the effect of anti-corruption efforts in many African countries (Amundsen, 2006, p. 39; Asongu, 2013, p. 18). Scholars who study Asian countries argue that the absence of political will is the most important factor in the failure of anti-corruption policies (Perlman, 2008). Today, it is widely accepted that the lack of political will is the main reason for the failure of anti-corruption policies (Zhang, 2015, p. 254), and a substantial body of literature emphasizes that the successful cases of reduced corruption are correlated with the presence of political will (Rotberg, 2017, p. 14).

Political will, however, is not a panacea for explaining the success and failure of anti-corruption policies. First, political will is usually treated as a one-dimensional concept. A substantial body of literature understands political will as “a binary or a continuous concept” (Post et al., 2010, pp. 655–656). However, the implementation of anti-corruption policies is uneven, so this concept cannot explain why political leaders adopt and implement different anti-corruption policies. While some countries are interested in investigating corruption, other countries try to educate public officials to obey a code of ethics (Meagher, 2005, p. 90). If political leaders discipline public servants but refuse to build an investigative agency to fight corruption, then how can we evaluate their political will? It is obvious that the current version of political will cannot sufficiently explain these situations.

Second, political will is a normatively loaded concept. If the lack of political will is the leading cause of the failure of anti-corruption policies, then we can blame political



leaders for the failure. Political leaders may, therefore, be stigmatized because of their lack of political will. The concept of political will can be used by anti-corruption reformers to blame political leaders when the level of corruption has not decreased. Moral judgment, however, does not help us analyze the reality of decision-making on the implementation of anti-corruption policies.

Finally, the discussion of political will overlooks the fact that political leaders are self-interested. Social scientists who emphasize the importance of political will have the implicit assumption that political leaders should be altruists: Political leaders should fight corruption because it is right and desirable. However, it is hard to believe that political leaders merely work for the public interest. It is more plausible that they control corruption for their own self-interest.

These pitfalls partly come from unsophisticated definitions of political will. Today, political will is a popular but ambiguous concept (Charney, 2009). Its current definitions focus only on who has the political will. They are not interested in what it is for. An extensive body of literature evaluates whether political leaders have a strong political will to fight corruption. The current definition of political will about fighting corruption is too broad to explain the variation in adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies amongst different countries. We need a more sophisticated version of political will. If the political leader of a country is only interested in investigating corruption and does not implement other institutional reforms, then it is hard to evaluate whether the leader has a strong political will to fight corruption. It is more reasonable to assert that the leader has a strong political will to investigate corruption but a weak

political will to adopt institutional reforms. Thus, to fully explain the complex reasons for the failure of anti-corruption policies and to understand the variation in adoption and implementation of these policies, we should conceptualize political will in a new way.

A lack of research on what encourages or discourages political will also degrades the concept's explanatory power. Only a small body of literature tries to explain some factors that affect political will (Kpundeh, 1998, p. 92). Odugbemi and Jacobson (2008) assert that political party, coalitions with interest groups, and timing can be factors that have a significant effect on political will (p. 121). Wayne (2008) argues that domestic events can affect political will in China (p. 66). Kpundeh (1998) explains that "the rule of the political game" is associated with political will (p. 92). However, it is not easy to find various and profound explanations about what generates political will.

To overcome these pitfalls, this thesis defines political will as the willingness of a political leader to adopt and implement a certain policy. Political will is construed as an individual will because the research question focuses on the behavior of the top political leader of a country. The purpose of political will is narrowly defined because political leaders show different levels of political will when adopting different policies. To answer what factors affect political will, this dissertation begins by exploring a question: What are the interests of political leaders?

### *Rational Power Maximizer*

It is widely believed that political leaders want to foster a clean society because they know the detrimental effect of corruption. This belief is related to the assumption

that political leaders have a political will to fight corruption when their subordinates are corrupt (Klitgaard, 1988, p. 22). With this assumption, scholars believe that if they can give the right prescription to political leaders, then the leaders will take it.

Yet, their belief still has not been realized. This prediction fails due to the assumption that political leaders want to fight corruption. This assumption is related to the principal-agent model (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015, p. 2). Traditionally, the principal-agent model has been used to explain why subordinates are corrupt (Fjeldstad & Isaksen, 2008, p. 9). This model was developed by neo-institutional economists, who assume that the interest of the agents is different from that of the principal. Since the principal cannot monitor the behavior of the agents, the agents work not for the principal's interests, but for their own interests (Groenendijk, 1997, p. 208). This model has been developed to suggest how the principal controls the agents.

This model, however, has paid little attention to the motivation of the principal. This dissertation focuses on the motivation of political leaders while the principal-agent model focuses on the rational choice of agents. The principal-agent model assumes that the agents have their interests and try to maximize them, but this study pays attention to another assumption: The principals also have interests. With this assumption, this thesis argues that political leaders select a policy when they believe that the policy is good for their interests.

The interests of political leaders are closely related to power (Alvarez, 2017, p. 17). Political leaders are power maximizers: They want to maximize their power. Realists in the field of international relations construe the state as a rational power maximizer

(Halliday, 1990, p. 508). This thesis borrows their idea and applies it to the behavior of political leaders. Instead of viewing leaders as purely philanthropic, we can explain their behavior with the idea of rational power maximizers.

If political leaders are power maximizers, why do they want power? With power, political leaders can attain their goal: governing their people effectively. Why do they want to govern their people effectively? They can survive for long lengths of time when they maintain power (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007, p. 1290). Thus, their ultimate goal is to survive for long lengths of time, and their intermediate goal is to govern their people effectively. These goals can be a strong motivation for political leaders to maximize their power. To maximize their power, they should respond to their circumstances effectively. To respond to the circumstances, they develop their governance strategy.

### *Governance Strategy*

This dissertation develops the concept of governance strategy to elucidate the variation in the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. A governance strategy is a grand plan that is selected by political leaders to maintain and fortify their power within national affairs (Roberts, 2018a, p. 10). The governance strategy is a new concept developed from the grand strategy.

There is not a clear consensus on the concept of grand strategy amongst political theorists (Monaghan, 2017, p. 6). However, the grand strategy can be sufficiently defined as a set of policies that are chosen by a state to increase power and national security within international affairs (Brands, 2014, p. 1). After World War I, scholars in the field

of military affairs popularized the idea of grand strategy (Brands, 2014, p. 1). At that time, the discussion of grand strategy focused on how to win a whole war (Barrows, 1942, p. 207).

After World War II, the concept of grand strategy broadened (Brands, 2014, p. 2). Today, the idea of the grand strategy includes not only military affairs but also international affairs. Brands (2014) construes grand strategy as “the intellectual architecture that gives form and structure to foreign policy” (p. 3). Kennedy (1992) also asserts that a grand strategy should help a country “to survive and flourish in an anarchic and often threatening international order” (p. 6). Thus, a grand strategy can be formulated “both in peacetime and in wartime” (Kennedy, 1992, p. 4).

The idea of grand strategy has several properties. First, it consists of various policies. Christensen (1996) explains that the grand strategy has “the full package of domestic and international policies” (p. 7). Second, the goal of the grand strategy is to secure national interests (Kennedy, 1992, p. 5). Third, to pursue these national interests, long-term strategies are developed (Liddell, 1967, p. 202). Fourth, although grand strategy takes a long view, it changes over time. For instance, the grand strategy of the United States has had to change from the era of the Cold War to the present day. Finally, grand strategy is influenced by various circumstances (Monaghan, 2017, p. 35). Liddell (1967) argues that a grand strategy should consider “the power of financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, commercial pressure, and, not least, ethical pressure” (p. 188).

If a country has a grand strategy that deals with international affairs, then it would be plausible that this country has another grand strategy for national affairs (Roberts,

2018c).<sup>16</sup> While grand strategy typically deals with international affairs, the governance strategy in this dissertation focuses on national affairs. Governance strategy has several properties. First, it is a grand plan for selecting a set of policies. Second, political leaders formulate grand strategies (Roberts, 2017, p. 3). Third, governance strategy takes a long view. Fourth, governance strategy can be changed over time (Roberts, 2017, p. 3). Finally, international, political, economic, and social circumstances affect the construction of a governance strategy (Roberts, 2017, p. 3). Since the governance strategy of a leader is constrained by various circumstances, translating a governance strategy into actions is not an easy task (Roberts, 2018b, p. 1).

---

<sup>16</sup> Some authors understand that grand strategy can deal with not only international affairs but also national affairs. For example, Trubowitz (2011) construes grand strategy as “the purposeful use of military, diplomatic, and economic tools of statecraft to achieve desired ends” (p. 9). His concept of desired ends includes both international affairs and national affairs. However, this idea is not popular amongst scholars in international affairs.

## **CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK**

This chapter begins with a description of the research question. After explaining the research question, this dissertation explains the model that sheds light on the variation in the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. The comparative-historical method is introduced and applied to the model to evaluate its validity. This chapter ends with an explanation of the criteria for case selection.

### **Research Question**

What causes the variation in the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies? In other words, why do political leaders, who exercise power within a state, adopt and implement different anti-corruption policies? This research question focuses on the variation in anti-corruption policies. Scholars have not yet provided satisfactory answers to this question. While a substantial body of literature deals with the failure of anti-corruption policies, it seems that, at present, there is no good study that sufficiently explains the variation in the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies.<sup>17</sup> Thus, this research question has still not been fully investigated.


This research question is related to preferences in the adoption of anti-corruption policies, and it helps us understand their failure. Figure 3 explains this relationship. To curb corruption, various types of anti-corruption policies, such as legislation, the independence of investigation agencies, education, and third-party participation, need to

---

<sup>17</sup> A few studies mention the variation in anti-corruption policies or the types of anti-corruption policies (Michael & Bowser, 2009; Pavlovska-Hilaiel, 2016; Vyas-Doorgapersad, 2007). These studies, however, are not closely related to the research question of this dissertation.

be introduced. Political leaders, however, usually select one particular type of anti-corruption policy and refuse to adopt other types. Their biased selection leads to incomplete compliance with anti-corruption policies. Moreover, due to this preference, combinations of anti-corruption policies vary amongst countries. This incomplete compliance within a single country and the variation amongst different countries cause anti-corruption policies to fail because one type of policy is not enough to handle pervasive corruption. Therefore, the variation in the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies is responsible for their failure. Understanding leaders' preferences in their adoption of anti-corruption policies helps us investigate the real reason for the failure of those policies.

**Figure 3** Biased Selection and Failure of Anti-Corruption Policies




### **Model**

Political leaders, who exert power and claim to take charge in a state, face and respond to international, social, economic, and political circumstances (Roberts, 2018a, p. 6). They want to maximize their power under their own circumstances to govern their people effectively (Roberts, 2017, p. 9). To maximize their power, they need strategic



guidance in the selection of policies. This guidance, a governance strategy, helps political leaders react to their circumstances efficiently. Since they need to use their governance strategy in response to various circumstances, it is in their interest to fortify that strategy. Figure 4 visually explains these relationships.

**Figure 4** Political Leaders with Circumstances and Governance Strategy



Political leaders cannot maximize their power without thinking about the international, social, economic, and political constraints that they face. Different situations elicit the different reactions from political leaders. For instance, authoritarian leaders oppress their people by using coercive institutions to fortify their power while populist leaders try to win the favor of the voters by increasing welfare subsidies excessively. If a country suffers from poverty, then political leaders might placate the poor to avoid to possibility of being attacked by an angry mob. If a country has a strong civil society, then political leaders cannot ignore the voice of people. Thus, when we think about how political leaders maximize their power, we should first consider their international, political, economic, and social circumstances.

International conditions vary amongst countries. Political leaders face various international problems such as territorial disputes with neighboring countries. Some countries are in continuous conflict with international organizations because of regulations and donations. These types of problems can affect domestic issues.

Potential social or internal circumstances include the power of civil society, social trust, and the level of education. If a country has a robust civil society, then the political leader cannot ignore the voice of people. If a country has a high level of social trust, then the political leader can implement a new policy with ease. Furthermore, if people are highly educated, then it might be not easy for the political leader to deceive the citizens.

The economic circumstances that concern political leaders are economic growth, income inequality, and foreign dependence. The high popularity that results from a high level of economic growth makes it easy for the leaders to fortify their power. On the other hand, when people are angry with a high level of poverty, then it is very difficult for the political leader to consolidate power. Moreover, if a country bears the burden of enormous external debt, the political leader may be vulnerable to the influence of foreign investors.

Political leaders also consider some political circumstances, such as the level of democracy, the level of elite politics, and the level of centralization. First, the level of democracy influences the decisions of leaders. Authoritarian leaders and democratic leaders react differently when they face a crisis of power. Political conditions, however, are not confined to the type of political regime. Another political circumstance is the level of elite politics. While mass politics are related to voting, protests, and riots, elite

politics are associated with the media, corporate conferences, and lobbies (Varshney, 2014, pp. 285–286). While authoritarian regimes are only close to elite politics, democratic regimes are related to both elite and mass politics (Varshney, 2014, p. 286). The level of centralization is also considered by leaders. If the political system of a country is centralized, then the power of political leaders will be consolidated with ease.

Political leaders react to their circumstances, and their reactions are determined by the fact that they are power maximizers. Their primary interest is to maximize and maintain their power, which enables them to choose a specific response to each of their circumstances. Different political leaders react differently because their circumstances are different.

To respond to their circumstances effectively, political leaders rely on their governance strategy, which is a grand plan that helps them maintain and fortify their power within national affairs (Roberts, 2018a, p. 10). Depending on their international, political, economic, and social circumstances, political leaders sometimes retaliate against their political opponents, control their subordinates, or get economic aid from the international organizations. These various actions are tied to the governance strategy of political leaders.

Since political leaders use their governance strategy to respond to their circumstances, it is in their interest to fortify their governance strategy. Therefore, when they select policies, they mainly consider the effectiveness of those policies on their governance strategy. To maintain their governance strategy, they carefully select policies. Figure 5 shows the process of policy selection.

**Figure 5** Process of Policy Selection



Political leaders tend to judge a new policy based on whether or not it can be consistent with their governance strategy. When they think that an anti-corruption policy is consistent with their governance strategy, they have a strong will to adopt it. In contrast, when they believe that an anti-corruption policy is not consistent with their governance strategy, their political will to adopt this policy is weak.

If political leaders have a strong political will, then they support the adoption and implementation of a new anti-corruption policy. Political leaders adopt and implement an anti-corruption policy not because they want to fight corruption but because they believe that the policy is consistent with their governance strategy. In such situations, political leaders have a strong will to adopt and implement the policy. In contrast, political leaders refuse to adopt an anti-corruption policy not because they do not want to fight corruption, but because they believe that the policy is not consistent with their governance strategy. In this case, political leaders have a weak political will to adopt and implement the policy. Thus, the selection of a new anti-corruption policy is related to the governance strategy of political leaders, who use anti-corruption policies as tools to meet their needs.

This model can shed light on the broad range of anti-corruption policy types because political leaders who are faced with different circumstances have different governance strategies. The types of governance strategies are various. While some

leaders try to win elections to maintain their power, other leaders fortify the power of their party. Different governance strategies are associated with different political motivations. The differences of political will make anti-corruption policies differently adopted and implemented. Even when political leaders have not clearly mentioned what their governance strategies are, observing their reactions enables us to sketch their strategies. To understand these governance strategies and their choice of anti-corruption policies, this study adopts comparative-historical approaches.

### **Comparative-Historical Method**

To evaluate the validity of the model, this dissertation uses the comparative-historical method. The comparative-historical method is a method that compares various cases in an attempt to find complex causal relationships to understand the general idea behind the external appearance of those cases (Mahoney & Thelen, 2015, p. 7). The comparative-historical method employs case study research. Case studies help us explore complex social phenomena since we can deeply examine the cases involved (Yin, 2014, p. 4).

Comparative-historical methods have a long tradition (Lange, 2013, p. 22; Mahoney & Thelen, 2015, p. 3). Adam Smith, Baron De Montesquieu, and Max Weber used these methods when they wrote their major works (Lange, 2013, p. 22). These methods are still in use. For example, Theda Skocpol (1979) explained the reasons for social revolutions by using a comparative-historical method.

Comparative-historical methods have several properties. First, comparative-historical studies are interested in big questions (Rueschemeyer & Mahoney, 2003, p. 8).<sup>18</sup> Big questions are complicated questions. Comparative-historical researchers are therefore interested in real-world puzzles that consist of complex questions (Mahoney & Thelen, 2015, p. 12). Big questions also deal with big units, so comparative-historical methods deal with large-scale units (Mahoney & Thelen, 2015, p. 5). A country is a popular unit of analysis in comparative-historical methods (Lange, 2013, p. 41).

Second, context matters in comparative-historical studies. Comparative-historical methods deeply consider context (Mahoney & Thelen, 2015, p. 7). Scholars in this camp believe that without context, we cannot solve real-world puzzles. Contexts vary with time and location, so if the time and location of cases were different, then the contexts would change. For this reason, comparative-historical analysts place importance on time and location (Mahoney & Thelen, 2015, p. 21).

Third, to help us solve real-world puzzles, comparative-historical analyses use within-case methods to obtain causal inference (Lange, 2013, p. 40). Comparative-historical methods adopt case-based research (Mahoney & Thelen, 2015, p. 12). To deal with cases, comparative-historical analysts adopt historical methods. The historical approach is to gather data that come from secondary sources such as government documents and other studies (Lange, 2013, p. 15).

---

<sup>18</sup> It does not mean that these studies deal with universal knowledge. Rather, comparative-historical studies are not interested in universal knowledge that can be applied to all cases without considering the context of the cases (Rueschemeyer & Mahoney, 2003, p. 8).

Fourth, comparative-historical methods employ small-N comparisons (Lange, 2012). Comparing a small number of cases is suitable for testing the validity of a theory (Lange, 2012).<sup>19</sup> This approach is different from large-N studies that can be defined as comparing a large number of cases with quantitative approaches. Small-N comparisons examine individual cases more deeply (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 546).

This method is appropriate for explaining the variation in the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. First, the research question in this dissertation is so-called, “a big question.” It concerns the complicated motivation of political leaders behind the choice of anti-corruption policies. Second, the various circumstances faced by political leaders create different contexts, and therefore governance strategies vary over time and location (Roberts, 2018a, p. 18). Third, complicated relationships between the types of anti-corruption policies and governance strategies can be explained by within-case methods. Fourth, small-N comparisons can elucidate the reactions of political leaders to various circumstances.

For these reasons, this dissertation selects several cases to employ within-case methods and small-N comparisons. The comparative-historical method consists of gathering the evidence, analyzing it, and presenting the results (Lange, 2013, p. 43). This study follows this process. After selecting countries, this dissertation gathers various sources such as administrative documents, news articles, and other studies. To check the reliability of the sources, this dissertation compares multiple sources. After gathering

---

<sup>19</sup> Lange (2013) uses the term, “pattern matching” (p. 53).

reliable sources, countries are investigated. Finally, the results of the analysis are suggested to test the validity of the model.

### **Criteria for Case Selection**

Criteria for case selection in this thesis include corrupt countries, the differing reactions of political leaders, geostrategic importance, and data accessibility. Countries which suffer from corruption are selected because they need to adopt anti-corruption policies. The differing reactions of political leaders should be considered because this dissertation seeks to explain the variation in adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. Countries with geostrategic importance are selected because readers are more interested in these countries. Lastly, data accessibility is important because this study requires ample and various resources for investigating cases deeply.

Within these criteria, this dissertation has selected three countries: India, Russia, and China. India, Russia, and China all meet the criteria mentioned above. First, corruption is a severe problem in these countries (Healy & Ramanna, 2013). Second, the choices of anti-corruption policies are different amongst them. While India focuses on institutional reforms, China sticks to punishment. Russia is mostly uninterested in anti-corruption policies. Third, everyone knows these superpowers; we cannot ignore their influence in the geopolitical sphere. They have huge populations. The strong military and economic power of these countries cannot be ignored.<sup>20</sup> Finally, there are ample data to deal with these countries since many authors write about them. Although these countries

---

<sup>20</sup> For example, many developing and underdeveloped countries adopt Beijing's model to boost their economies (Ramo, 2005, p. 27).



are not representative of all nations, concentrating on small-N countries helps us investigate complex causal relationships and evaluate the validity of the model (Lange, 2013, p. 14).

**Table 1** Indices of Countries

Country	India	Russia	China
Integrity	Middle	Low	Middle
Criminalization	Low	Low	High
Freedom of Information	High	Middle	Low
Independence of Judiciary	High	Low	Low
Disciplining Subordinates	Low	Low	Middle
Freedom of Media	Low	Low	Low

Table 1 shows some indices of countries. These indices come from the Corruption Perception Index, the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, the Latent Judicial Independence Index, and the World Press Freedom Index. There are three rankings in each category, and these rankings are proportionally distributed. For example, if a country is ranked 29<sup>th</sup> out of 90 countries in a category, then the country will be marked as high in the category. In the same way, if a country is ranked 61<sup>st</sup> out of 90 countries in a category, then the country will be marked as low in the category. There are seven categories. One category is related to the level of corruption, the other categories are related to the types of anti-corruption policies. The independence of the investigative agency, the protection of whistleblowers, and the enlightenment of citizens are not displayed in this table due to a lack of indices.

The row of integrity shows the level of corruption. In the Corruption Perception Index 2016, India was ranked 81<sup>st</sup> out of 180 countries, and its score was 40 on a scale of zero to 100 (Transparency International, 2018).<sup>21</sup> Russia was ranked 135<sup>th</sup>, and its score was 29 (Transparency International, 2018). China was ranked 77<sup>th</sup>, and its score was 41 (Transparency International, 2018).

The row of criminalization shows how effective the criminal investigation systems are. In the Criminal Investigation Effectiveness Factor of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2016, India was ranked 99<sup>th</sup> out of 113 countries, and its score was 0.29 on a scale of zero to one (World Justice Project, 2016).<sup>22</sup> Russia was ranked 106<sup>th</sup>, and its score was 0.24 (World Justice Project, 2016). China was ranked 13<sup>th</sup>, and its score was 0.65 (World Justice Project, 2016).

The row of freedom of information measures the openness of governments. In the Open Government Factor of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2016, India was ranked 28<sup>th</sup> out of 113 countries, and its score was 0.66 on a scale of zero to one (World Justice Project, 2016).<sup>23</sup> Russia was ranked 67<sup>th</sup> out of 113 countries, and its

---

<sup>21</sup> Zero indicates a high level of corruption.

<sup>22</sup> The Criminal Justice Factor is factor 8 of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. “8.1 Criminal investigation system is effective” (hereafter the Criminal Investigation Effectiveness) is a sub-factor of the Criminal Justice Factor. Higher ranking indicates higher effectiveness. One indicates the highest level of effectiveness.

<sup>23</sup> The Open Government Factor is factor 3 of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. This factor is closely related to freedom of information. One indicates the highest level of openness. According to World Justice Project (2016),

Factor 3 measures whether basic laws and information in legal rights are publicized, and assesses the quality of information published by the government. It also measures whether requests for information held by a government agency are properly granted. Finally, it evaluates the effectiveness of civic participation mechanisms and whether people can bring specific complaints to the government (p. 32).

score was 0.49 (World Justice Project, 2016). China was ranked 89<sup>th</sup>, and its score was 0.44 (World Justice Project, 2016).

The row of the independence of judiciary shows how much of the judiciary is independent. In the Latent Judicial Independence Index 2012, India was ranked 48<sup>th</sup> out of 153 countries, and its score was 0.71 on a scale of zero to one (Linzer & Staton, 2015). Russia was ranked 103<sup>rd</sup>, and its score was 0.36 (Linzer & Staton, 2015). China was ranked 120<sup>th</sup>, and its score was 0.26 (Linzer & Staton, 2015).

The row of disciplining subordinates indicates how many government officials are sanctioned for misconduct. In the Government Officials Sanction for Misconduct Factor of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2016, India was ranked 79<sup>th</sup> out of 113 countries, and its score was 0.38 on a scale of zero to one (World Justice Project, 2016).<sup>24</sup> Russia was ranked 82<sup>nd</sup>, and its score was 0.37 (World Justice Project, 2016). China was ranked 50<sup>th</sup>, and its score was 0.48 (World Justice Project, 2016).

The row of freedom of media shows to what extent governments guarantee the freedom of the media. In the World Press Freedom Index 2017, India was ranked 138<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries, and its score was 43.24 on a scale of zero to 100 (Reporters Without Borders, 2018).<sup>25</sup> Russia was ranked 148<sup>th</sup>, and its score was 49.96 (Reporters Without

---

<sup>24</sup> The Constraints on Government Powers is factor 1 of World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. “1.4 Government officials are sanctioned for misconduct” (hereafter the Government Officials Sanction for Misconduct) is a sub-factor of the Constraints on Government Powers. A higher ranking indicates higher effectiveness. One indicates the highest level of effectiveness.

<sup>25</sup> Zero indicates the highest level of freedom.

Borders, 2018). China was ranked 176<sup>th</sup>, and its score was 78.29 (Reporters Without Borders, 2017).

In sum, while the levels of integrity vary, the types of anti-corruption policies are also different. Even though the level of integrity is not significantly different, the selection of anti-corruption policies is different. This dissertation explains why policy selection varies by exploring these countries in sequence: India, Russia, and China.

First, this study focuses on the same time span. Only political leaders who have come into power since 2000 are examined. This essay mentions Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi in India, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping in China, and Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin in Russia. The reason is that the governance strategies may differ between the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, the anti-corruption movement has been launched recently. This dissertation focuses on three countries at the same time span to employ small-N comparisons.

The next chapters investigate the international, social, economic, and political circumstances of each country. These conditions affect the formation of the governance strategies of political leaders. While explaining the relationship between the circumstances and the governance strategies of political leaders, each chapter introduces the anti-corruption policies in these countries. At the end of each chapter, this thesis elucidates why political leaders select specific policies.

## CHAPTER 4: INDIA

### Overview

Corruption is a serious and rampant problem in India (Riley & Roy, 2016, p. 73; Singh & Sohoni, 2016, p. 112). In the Corruption Perception Index 2016, India was ranked 81<sup>st</sup> out of 180 countries, and its score was 40 on a scale of zero to 100 (Transparency International, 2018). Sixty-two percent of Indians have given bribes, and the estimated annual amount spent on bribes is five billion dollars (Center for Media Studies, 2005, p. 3). 1,456 trillion dollars associated with Indian corruption are hidden in Swiss banks (Hussain, 2012, p. 2). India is one of the largest economies in the world, but it still suffers from corruption (Chêne, 2009, p. 1).

Despite rampant corruption, the political leaders who exercise power within India do not want to seriously punish corrupt officials. They have introduced some anti-corruption policies such as a radical currency reform and freedom of information laws. However, they refuse to build the strong investigative agency that anti-corruption activists want. How can we explain their behavior?

To answer this question, this chapter investigates the governance strategy of political leaders in India. A governance strategy is a grand plan that is selected by political leaders to fortify and then maintain their power within national affairs (Roberts, 2018a, p. 10). Political leaders face and respond to international, social, economic, and political circumstances. Their responses are various and partly determined by the fact that political leaders are power maximizers. Their main interests - to maximize their power -

lead them to choose a certain response. To make these responses effective, leaders rely on their governance strategy. Even when they have not clearly mentioned what are their governance strategies, observing their reactions enables us to sketch these strategies.

When we understand the governance strategies of political leaders, we can predict what their policy choices. Since they need their governance strategies to respond to their circumstances, it is in their interest to fortify those governance strategies. If they have a powerful governance strategy, then their responses will be effective. How can they strengthen their governance strategy? They fortify their governance strategy by choosing policies that are consistent with that strategy. Political will, the willingness of a political leader to adopt and implement a certain policy, is highly associated with governance strategy. If a policy is not consistent with their governance strategies, then their political will to adopt this policy will be diminished. If a policy is consistent with their governance strategies, then their political will to adopt this policy will increase.

Therefore, understanding the governance strategies of leaders also helps us explain their preference for anti-corruption policies. When corruption is rampant, experts recommend that political leaders adopt a general anti-corruption toolkit that consists of various anti-corruption policies. Political leaders, however, tend not to follow the instructions of the experts to the letter. Although experts emphasize the importance of a holistic approach to fighting corruption, political leaders often select a certain policy in the toolkit and refuse to adopt the other policies. Their preference is based on their evaluation of anti-corruption policies in relation to the impact of those policies on their governance strategy. A leader's political will to adopt anti-corruption policies decreases

when those policies are not consistent with the leader's governance strategy. Likewise, an anti-corruption policy that is consistent with the governance strategy is more likely to be implemented. Thus, this chapter explains the circumstances in India, India's governance strategy, and the leaders' preferred anti-corruption policies.

To understand the governance strategy of political leaders in India, we should understand the circumstances that those political leaders face. Internationally, India has some trouble with neighboring countries and invests a large amount of money in the military (Ayres, 2018). India, however, wants to solve these conflicts peacefully. India sticks to non-alliance policy because India does not want to bring the problems to their people. Furthermore, since national identity is not strong in India, people in India are not very interested in expanding military power.

Internally, India faces conflicts between religious and ethnic groups (Varshney, 2014, p. 16). Geographic integrity is an imperative issue in Indian politics because of the country's linguistic and religious diversity. To increase geographic integrity, the Indian government not only suppresses riots but also controls insurgents by letting them participate in elections and have autonomy (Varshney, 2014, p. 33). While the Indian government has successfully dealt with issues related to geographic integrity, Indian politicians have not satisfactorily solved other problems such as poverty and discrimination.

Economically, India suffers from mass poverty (Guha, 2008, p. 589). Although Indian politicians adopt various policies to fight poverty, the results of these policies are not close to being successful. Leaders also continuously adopt anti-poverty policies

because they need the support from the poor. In India, the voting power of the poor cannot be ignored.

Politically, democracy has successfully entrenched itself in India (Varshney, 2014, p. 4). Political leaders in India know that the present political system will not be subverted. However, while the political system is stable, political power is not stable. Voters can choose the opposite party. For this reason, political leaders in India want to stay in power as the leaders of the ruling party.

These circumstances indicate that the governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections. To maintain their non-alliance policy, they need the support of people. To maintain geographic integrity, they need legitimacy. When they adopt anti-poverty policies, they need the consent of people. To stay in power, they need votes. Thus, when they win elections, they can maintain their foreign policy, increase geographic integrity, implement anti-poverty policies, and stay in power as the governing party. However, to win elections, political leaders in India need their political allies because there is no internal democracy within the parties. They cannot ignore the voice of civil society either. Doing so might cost them votes. Thus, they protect their political allies and avoid the pressure of the civil society simultaneously.

While political leaders in India focus on freedom of information to fight petty corruption, they are not much interested in criminalization. They do not want to build an effective anti-corruption agency for catching big fish. However, because of the pressure of civil society, political leaders in India have adopted the Whistleblowers Protection Act.



While the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed, the Indian government is not interested in disciplining public officials and enlightening citizens.

Why do political leaders in India adopt anti-corruption policies incompletely? The political leaders of India are indeed interested in partially adopting some anti-corruption policies that are consistent with their governance strategy in order to assuage civil society. They are interested in controlling petty corruption as long as it is not associated with their political allies. They adopt freedom of information acts as a tool for curbing petty corruption. However, the political leaders of India do not want to build a strong anti-corruption agency because they are concerned that such an agency may harm their political allies. For example, in 2016, Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India since 2014, announced a radical currency reform to fight corruption but refused to appoint the *Lokpal*, or the ombudsman (Singh, 2016).

The rest of this chapter explains the conditions faced by political leaders in India. After reviewing international, social, economic, and political circumstances, this chapter explicates the governance strategy of the Indian political leaders. Anti-corruption policies in India are then introduced and evaluated. Finally, this chapter explains why the Indian political leaders have only partially adopted anti-corruption policies.

## **Conditions Faced by India's Leaders**

### *International Affairs*

India has some trouble with neighboring countries such as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereafter Pakistan). Conflicts between Pakistan-based militants and Indian

security forces are common (Ayres, 2018). In January 2016, six terrorists attacked an Indian Air Force base in Pathankot, a city in the Punjab state of India (Kumar, 2016). India believes that Pakistan is closely related to these terrorists (Anand & Kumar, 2016a). In July 2016, Burhan Muzaffar Wani, a twenty-two-year-old separatist in Kashmir, was killed by Indian security forces, and his death ignited riots in Kashmir (Anand & Kumar, 2016a). The tension between India and Pakistan led both countries to expel diplomats each other (Wilkes & Ali, 2016).

The conflicts between these nuclear-armed countries have a long history. In 1947, India and Pakistan became independent from Great Britain. The First Kashmir War between India and Pakistan began the following year. In 1949, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan mediated this dispute, and the fighting ended (United Nations, 2018). War broke out again in 1965 and continued for a year until the Soviet Union helped the two countries to accept the Tashkent agreement in 1966 (United States Department of State, 2018). In 1971, the third war occurred, which resulted in the independence of Bangladesh (Pike, 2018).

India has spent a significant amount of money on fortifying their military power. More than 53.5 million dollars were invested in the armed forces in 2016 (Behera, 2017). India had the seventh highest military expenditure in 2015 and the fifth highest in 2016 (Tian, Fleurant, Wezeman, & Wezeman, 2017). Thus, the military power of India is not negligible.

India today, however, does not want to solve conflicts with only military expansion. In May 2014, Narendra Modi invited Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, the

former Prime Minister from 2013 to 2017, to attend Narendra Modi's inauguration as Prime Minister of India (BBC, 2014). In July 2015, Nawaz Sharif invited Narendra Modi for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit (BBC, 2015). Narendra Modi visited Lahore to meet with Nawaz Sharif in December of the same year, the first visit of an Indian Prime Minister to Pakistan in more than ten years (Indian Express, 2015). Although the conflict is not yet over, the Indian political leaders are trying to solve this problem in peaceful ways.

Traditionally, India's foreign policy has been defined by the non-alignment movement. Vengalil Krishnan Krishna Menon, an Indian nationalist and Jawaharlal Nehru's friend, coined this term in 1953. At the time, Jawaharlal Nehru did not want to have close relationships with either the United States or the Soviet Union (Jeffrey, 2017, p. 56). Since then, Jawaharlal Nehru and his successors have supported this idea. The non-alignment movement consists of five principles: "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence" (Haquel, 2017). Although these principles were developed in the era of the Cold War, India does not want to abandon this policy. For example, until today, India is not interested in spreading democracy in other countries (Ayres, 2018).

Why does India maintain a foreign policy based on non-alliance? Why is India so interested in avoiding conflict? India might know that wars would have no positive effect on its national interests. Moreover, India does not want to bring foreign conflicts to their people. Due to its ethnic diversity, the national identity of India is not strong. Only

seventy-four percent of people admit that they are Indian (Varshney, 2014, p. 178). Triumph in war might have no meaning to many Indians. If Indian people have no interest in the international power of India, then Indian politicians have no reason to be concerned about the country's foreign policy.

### *Social Affairs*

India is not a centralized state. The country is ethnically divided (Varshney, 2014, p. 16). India has more than 2,000 ethnic groups (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2015). There is also a great deal of linguistic diversity. According to the census of India 2001, there are at least twenty-two languages in India (Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 2001).<sup>26</sup> India is well-known for its religious diversity (Jeffrey, 2017, p. 34). There are six major religions in India: Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, Buddhism, and Jainism (Varshney, 2014, p. 57). While more than eighty percent of people are Hinduism, more than thirteen percent are Muslims (Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 2001). Hindus are also further divided into four groups: Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras. Although the constitution of India has banned discrimination based on these categories, the caste system has not disappeared.<sup>27</sup>

This diversity presents paramount obstacles to geographic integrity in India. Conflicts between different groups have caused tragedies. The most serious conflicts are

---

<sup>26</sup> Since 2011 Indian census does not include information on languages, these numbers are the latest information. While more than forty-one percent of people use Hindi, less than 0.01 percent of people use Sanskrit.

<sup>27</sup> The negative effect of the caste system was exacerbated during the British colonization of India (Jeffrey, 2017, p. 47). This study, however, deals mainly with the history of India after the independence.

related to religion. Hindu nationalism has fomented anti-Muslim sentiment that has led to riots (Varshney, 2014, pp. 32–33). More than 7,000 citizens have been killed in riots from 1950 to 1995 (Varshney, 2014, p. 144). On February 27<sup>th</sup>, 2002, a train carrying Hindu pilgrims was burning in Godhra was burned, and more than fifty passengers were killed (AlSayyad, 2011, p. 14). After that incident, 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus were murdered, and 2,500 citizens were injured (BBC, 2005).

Geographic integrity, therefore, is an imperative issue in Indian politics (Varshney, 2014, p. 6). Mahatma Gandhi and his followers tried to overcome this obstacle by promoting English as an official language (Varshney, 2014, p. 23).<sup>28</sup> Political leaders in India accept any measures that might have a positive effect on increasing geographic integrity. The Indian government not only suppresses riots, but also controls insurgents by letting them participate in elections and have autonomy (Varshney, 2014, p. 33). Controlling this multinational country without major trouble may be one of the main outcomes of maintaining democracy (Varshney, 2014, p. 4).

Indian politicians, however, do not want to adopt radical prescriptions to solve other social issues. They know that the present political system will not be subverted even if they fail to fix their social problems. Because the ethnic structures in India are dispersed, ethnic conflict is not a problem that threatens the political structure of India (Varshney, 2014, p. 17). Although religious conflicts are serious, their impact of the conflicts is not significantly damaging to the stability of the present political system. In sum, Indian politicians want to maintain geographic integrity, but that does not mean that

---

<sup>28</sup> According to Constitutional Provisions, Official Language Related Part-17 of the Constitution of India, Article 120 in Chapter I, Hindu and English are official languages of the Indian government.

they want to fix their social problems entirely. If they can remain in these conflicts while avoiding serious threats, then they will not dedicate themselves to fixing these problems.

### *Economic Affairs*

India has suffered from poverty. In the 1960s, thirty-three percent of people living in rural areas were poor (Guha, 2008, p. 468). Today, at least one-third of people in India suffer from poverty (Vaishnav, 2016, p. 460). Poverty is closely related to starvation in India (Jeffrey, 2017, p. 81). For example, more than 1,000 people in Koraput and Kalahandi, districts of Odisha in eastern India, have died due to malnutrition or starvation (Guha, 2008, p. 589).

Reducing mass poverty has been one of India's main projects since its independence (Varshney, 2014, p. 3). The Public Distribution System was introduced in some regions before India's independence from the British Empire (Tarozzi, 2002, p. 3). Through fair price shops, the Public Distribution System helps the poor get wheat, rice, sugar, and kerosene (Kattumuri, 2011, p. 11). The mid-day meal scheme, which was launched in various regions such as Uttar Pradesh in 1995 and Maharashtra in 2003, fights poverty by providing poor students with meals (Kattumuri, 2011, p. 13). India's fight against poverty is halfway to its goal. The proportion of the poor who earn less than about two dollars a day has decreased from about forty-six percent in 1993 to about twenty-one percent in 2011 (Jeffrey, 2017, p. 78).

However, the war against poverty is not over. Due to corruption, the Public Distribution System still fails to deliver enough food to the poor (Kattumuri, 2011, p. 12).

In 1997, the Targeted Public Distribution System was launched to improve Public Distribution System, but the effectiveness of the program has not improved (Kattumuri, 2011, p. 15). Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister from 1984 to 1989, adopted a welfare program for the poor in rural areas. Rajiv Gandhi's government confessed that eighty-five percent of subsidies did not reach the intended recipients (Jaffrelot, 2010, p. 620). Due to corruption, Rajiv Gandhi's welfare delivery program failed (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 5). The Indian government has also failed to provide basic services for fighting poverty (Guha, 2007, p. 704).

Why do political leaders in India continue to adopt and implement various anti-poverty policies even though these programs have not been successful in the past? Indian politicians have adopted various policies related to fighting poverty because they need support from the poor (Thachil, 2016, p. 263). In India, because the poor vote more than others, their opinion cannot be overlooked (Varshney, 2014, p. 39). With the support of the poor, politicians can win elections (Thachil, 2016, p. 4). For example, Jayaram Jayalalithaa was elected the chief minister of Tamil Nadu five times but was also charged with corruption twice (Stacey, 2016). However, she enjoyed immense public popularity because of her populist policies. The poor loved and supported her because one rupee could buy them food (Stacey, 2016). Her corruption has no effect on the support of the poor and other politicians. Narendra Modi tweeted, "Jayalalithaa ji's connect with citizens, concern for the welfare of the poor, the women & marginalized will always be a source of inspiration" (Stacey, 2016). Thus, Indian politicians cannot ignore the power of the poor.

In sum, poverty is a serious problem in India. Even though Indian politicians have introduced various programs to reduce poverty, these programs have not generated successful results. Despite the failure of these programs, politicians continue to implement anti-poverty policies. They adopt these programs because, in India, the voting power of the poor is significant.

### *Political Affairs*

Democracy has successfully entrenched itself in India (Varshney, 2014, p. 4). On August 15<sup>th</sup>, 1972, celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of Indian independence, Indira Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India from 1969 to 1977 and 1980 to 1984, declared, “Our democracy has found roots” (Guha, 2008, p. 467). India is not a politically fragile state. People in India do not want to replace the current democratic system with other systems such as authoritarianism.

India’s federal democracy is possible because it based on accepting cultural, ethical, and religious diversities (Varshney, 2014, p. 202). The founding fathers of India built nationhood without the unification of language and religion (Varshney, 2014, pp. 23–24). Due to their efforts, India has maintained unification. Since its independence, India has not been divided. More than eighty percent of people have a sense of national identity although it is not strong (Varshney, 2014, p. 179).

However, democracy does not work efficiently in India. India faces several problems that should be handled: maintaining geographic integrity, building social justice, and reducing mass poverty (Varshney, 2014, p. 3). While Indian politicians



successfully maintain geographic integrity, they fail to fix other problems. Discrimination based on the caste system has not been eliminated, and due to a lack of irrigated land, one-third of agricultural land is dependent on rain (Rajshekhhar, 2011).

Although the Indian democracy has not fixed these problems, political leaders in India are not interested in the efficiency of the current political system. Why don't they pay much attention to the efficiency of their democracy? They know that the efficiency of the current political system is not closely related to the sustainability of the political system and regime. Even if they fail to fix problems that people want to solve, they can win elections. Varshney (2014) writes:

India's democracy has become Janus-faced. Political power is used at the time of elections to please citizens. Between elections, it is often used to treat citizens in an unfeeling manner. Empowered at the time of elections, the citizen often feels powerless until the next elections arrive (p. 39).

Thus, the Indian political leaders are confident that democracy in their country will not be destroyed.

Because Indian democracy is secure, political leaders in India are not interested in the stability of today's political system. They are interested in winning elections. Since the stability of the political system in India does not guarantee the power of the ruling party, politicians are never certain that they will be elected. The Bharatiya Janata party won 182 seats in 1999, but the Indian National Congress won 145 seats in 2004 (Ghosh, 2013). In 2014, Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata party came into power again when it won a landslide victory against Sonia Gandhi's Indian National Congress and became the ruling party (Burke, 2014). The Indian National Congress had been the ruling party for a long time after the country's independence, but that does not mean that the party will win

the next election. The Bharatiya Janata party cannot be sure of their victory in the next election either. Thus, although the political system is stable in India, the power of any one party is not.

## **Governance Strategy**

A governance strategy is a grand plan that is selected by political leaders to maintain and fortify their power within national affairs (Roberts, 2018a, p. 10). The Indian political leaders use their governance strategy to respond to international, social, economic, and political circumstances. Therefore, these circumstances directly affect the formation of the governance strategy in India. This section explains how various circumstances and leaders' reactions can form the governance strategy in India.

The governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections. Why do political leaders in India want to win elections? When they win elections, they are able to respond to their circumstances effectively. We can presume their governance strategy when we observe their responses to international, social, economic, and political circumstances.

First, in international affairs, political leaders in India need their governance strategy to adopt the non-alliance policy. They try to remain at peace with other nations because they know people in India have no interest in international affairs. Therefore, conflicts with neighboring countries do not affect how people vote. Politicians maintain the non-alliance movement because they have the support of the majority. If political

leaders in India have little legitimacy, then they could not pursue the non-alliance policy. Thus, they should win elections to gain legitimacy.

Second, in social affairs, political leaders in India need their governance strategy when they try to increase geographic integrity. The Indian people are so divided that increasing geographic integrity is an imperative issue. However, increasing geographic integrity is not an easy task. If political leaders in India have little legitimacy, then they could not pursue increased geographic integrity. Thus, they should win elections to gain legitimacy.

Third, in economic affairs, the political leaders in India need their governance strategy when they try to adopt various anti-poverty policies. They introduce various policies to curry the favor of the poor. Many resources and a great deal of support are necessary for implementing these policies. They should persuade people to support these policies. If political leaders in India have little legitimacy, then they could not pursue implementing these policies. Thus, they should win elections to get legitimacy.

Finally, in political affairs, the political leaders in India need their governance strategy when they want to stay in power as the leaders of the ruling party. Democracy has successfully entrenched itself in India, and there is little possibility of subverting today's political system. Therefore, a military coup is not a smart way to obtain power, and winning elections is the only feasible way to stay in power. The Indian political leaders can only obtain their legitimacy from elections.

Therefore, winning elections is the major concern of political elites in India. However, because there is no internal democracy in parties, to win elections, they need

their political allies. The Jeep Scandal connected with Jawarhalal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, is a prime example of the importance the Indian political leaders place on political allies. Jawarhalal Nehru seemed to be a clean politician, but his subordinates were not (Jaffrelot, 2010, p. 622). Vengalil Krishnan Krishna Menon, the former Indian High Commissioner in London, was responsible for the Jeep scandal in 1948 (Jaffrelot, 2010, pp. 621–622). He ignored the legal process of public procurement to buy 4,000 jeeps, and, in the end, only 155 unusable jeeps arrived in India (Jaffrelot, 2010, pp. 621–622). Despite this clear misuse of power, Jawarhalal Nehru protected him from the investigation and appointed him as a minister (Jaffrelot, 2010, pp. 621–622). More interestingly, this scam had little effect on a major election because the Indian people did not take this issue seriously (Raju, 2010). This case shows the extent to which political leaders in India need and protect their followers.

On the other hand, to win elections, the Indian political leaders also need to listen to the voice of civil society. If they ignore it, then they might lose votes. Even though the Indian government does not intend to control corruption, a strong civil society performs that function. In 2011, a strong anti-corruption movement occurred in India. Anna Hazare, an anti-corruption activist, initiated a peaceful demonstration to ask the government to establish the *Lokpal*, or ombudsman (Yadav & Chopra, 2015, p. 412). Indian politicians had rejected the *Lokpal* bill, or the ombudsman law, ten times since 1968 (Menon, 2006, p. 338). However, in 2014, Anna Hazare's movement finally forced the government and politicians to enact and promulgate the bill (Singh, 2016). This story shows that the Indian political leaders can be swayed by the voice of civil society.

If the governance strategy of political leaders in India is to win elections, what are the differences between India and other countries? For example, democratic institutions such as voting systems are implemented in both India and Russia. India is a democratic country, and Russia, although not as democratic as some Western countries, still has some democratic systems. One might reasonably expect that the governance strategies of these two countries would be the same.

Their governance strategies, however, are very different. Compared to the Russian political leaders, which this essay will discuss in the next chapter, the Indian political leaders cannot win elections by manipulation. Election fraud might be possible in India, but not plausible. In contrast, election results in Russia are often determined before voting begins due to heavy manipulation. Therefore, while the governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections fairly, the governance strategy of the Russian political leaders is to fortify vertical power.

## **Anti-Corruption Policies**

### *Political Leaders and Anti-Corruption Policies*

Political leaders in India have declared that they will seriously fight corruption. Indeed, they have partially adopted anti-corruption policies, but those actions have not been effective. Rather, they have been reluctant to adopt the anti-corruption policies that anti-corruption activists want. Thus, people do not believe their political leaders' promises regarding the fight against corruption.

Manmohan Singh, the former Prime Minister of India from 2004 to 2014, declared that he would fight corruption seriously, but people did not believe his words. In February 2012, the upper house rejected the *Lokpal* bill. (BBC, 2012). After that, Manmohan Singh announced that the government would fight corruption although there might be many obstacles (BBC, 2012). However, his words failed to gain the support of the people because of his own connections with corruption scandals. The Comptroller Auditor General reported that coal blocks had been secretly distributed to private companies without auctions from 2005 to 2009 (Krishnan, 2012). Manmohan Singh asserted that he was not related to this scam, but because he was responsible for the energy ministry at that time, people did not believe his assertion (Krishnan, 2012).

Narendra Modi tries to show his strong commitment to combat corruption, but his contradictory actions confuse people. On November 8<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Narendra Modi announced a radical currency reform (Anand & Kumar, 2016a). People in India were required to exchange their old 500 and 1,000 rupee notes for the new 500 and 2,000 rupee notes at banks until December 30<sup>th</sup> (Anand, 2016). If people want to exchange more than 250,000 rupees, then they required to explain to tax officials where the money came from (Anand, 2016). The reform has caused chaos because the two notes that are being replaced covered eighty-six percent of the current currency (Anand & Kumar, 2016c). There has therefore been a shortage of new notes. While this currency reform continues to cause chaos in the Indian economy, its impact on curbing corruption is still not clear (Biswas, 2016). If people neglect to change their behavior and keep their cash in private safes, then this reform will not be effective at reducing corruption (Anand, 2016).

While Narendra Modi instituted the currency reform, he is not interested in building a powerful anti-corruption agency through the *Lokpal*. The *Lokpal* has the potential to be a powerful organization in the fight against corruption. The key features of the *Lokpal* and *Lokayuktas* Act, 2013 are as follows. The *Lokpal* will be an independent anti-corruption agency that has investigation power (Hussain, 2012, p. 160). The *Lokpal* will consist of a chairperson and members ordained by the President on the recommendation of a selection committee.<sup>29</sup> The selection committee will be composed of the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House of the People, the Leader of Opposition in the House of the People, the Chief Justice of India or a Judge of the Supreme Court, and one eminent jurist.<sup>30</sup> The Consolidated Fund of India will pay for its expense.<sup>31</sup> The *Lokpal*'s investigations will be free from the impact of politicians (Yadav & Chopra, 2015, p. 412). The *Lokpal* will conduct a preliminary inquiry and will prosecute corrupt public servants without permission.<sup>32</sup> The *Lokpal* can order the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate corruption cases.<sup>33</sup>

Although the *Lokpal* and *Lokayuktas* Act was already enacted in 2014, India remains without a *Lokpal* (Singh, 2016). A selection committee has never been formed. The Modi's government insists that a selection committee cannot be established due to the absence of the Leader of Opposition in the House of the People (Singh, 2016). It is clear that Narendra Modi is simply not interested in establishing the committee.

---

<sup>29</sup> The *Lokpal* and *Lokayuktas* Act, 2013, Article 3.

<sup>30</sup> The *Lokpal* and *Lokayuktas* Act, 2013, Article 4.

<sup>31</sup> The *Lokpal* and *Lokayuktas* Act, 2013, Article 13.

<sup>32</sup> The *Lokpal* and *Lokayuktas* Act, 2003, Article 11.

<sup>33</sup> The *Lokpal* and *Lokayuktas* Act, 2003, Article 20.

If Narendra Modi showed the efforts to build a selection committee for the appointment of the *Lokpal*, then people would believe that his political commitment to carry out the cash reform is genuine. His reluctant attitude, however, leads people to doubt his intention. According to Harsh Pant, a King's College London professor, Narendra Modi might have adopted the radical currency reform because it is more visible (Anand & Kumar, 2016b). A visible anti-corruption policy like the cash reform would have a positive effect on increasing his popularity (Marlow, Pradhan, & Chaudhary, 2016). On the contrary, he refuses to appoint the *Lokpal* because it could potentially harm his political allies.

Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi share some similarities and differences. They both adopted some anti-corruption policies, but these policies were not the same. Manmohan Singh and his party, the Indian National Congress, enacted the Right to Information Act and the Whistleblowers Protection Acts. Narendra Modi and his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party, launched the radical currency reform. These policies failed to gain enthusiastic support from the people because the parties associated with them have not been free from various corruption scandals (Chêne, 2009, p. 4).

### *Types of Anti-Corruption Policies*

Political leaders in India are not interested in punishment, and criminalization is weak in India. The Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), enacted in 1947, is the leading anti-corruption law (Mondal, 2014). To build a single law that includes all pertinent



provisions of other codes and acts, the PCA was amended in 1988 (Mondal, 2014).<sup>34</sup> The PCA applies to central and local public officials as well as workers in state-owned enterprises.<sup>35</sup> Special Judges, ordained by the government, deal with corruption cases exclusively.<sup>36</sup> According to the PCA, the accused are presumed guilty until proven innocent (Mondal, 2014).<sup>37</sup>

The PCA, however, has limitations. First, the PCA only criminalizes bribe-taking (Nishith Desai Associates, 2016, p. 3). Bribe-giving is not punished. Second, the PCA deals only with public officials. Even if contractors commit a corrupt act, the PCA cannot apply to them because they are not public servants (Nishith Desai Associates, 2016, p. 3). Third, there is no time limit for trials that deal with corruption cases (Nishith Desai Associates, 2016, p. 3). Due to these limitations, only a few public officers have been prosecuted due to corruption, and the conviction rate is not high (Bajoria, 2011). Moreover, the convicts have not been influential officials (Tummala, 2009, p. 44). Thus, criminalization for reducing corruption is weak in India.

While political leaders in India do not press for criminalization, they enforce India's freedom of information act more vigorously. In many countries, the primary goal of a freedom of information act is to foster a more democratic government (Roberts, 2010, p. 925). In India, however, the primary goal of the Right to Information Act (RTIA) is to fight corruption (Roberts, 2010, p. 926). Since the United States enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in 1966, over seventy nations had adopted FOIA-

---

<sup>34</sup> The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 1(1) in Chapter I.

<sup>35</sup> The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 2(c) in Chapter I.

<sup>36</sup> The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 3 and Section 4 in Chapter I.

<sup>37</sup> The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Section 20 in Chapter IV.

style laws by 2010 (Roberts, 2010, p. 925). India is not an exception. In 1997, the state of Tamil Nadu enacted a freedom of information law for the first time in India (Singh, 2010, p. 1). After that, several other states adopted freedom of information laws (Roberts, 2006, p. 3).<sup>38</sup>

In 2002, the central government's first freedom of information law was enacted due to pressures from civil society (Singh, 2010, p. 8). However, these laws were not effective (Peisakhin & Pinto, 2010, p. 264). For instance, in the government freedom of information law, there was no penalty for refusing to provide the information that people requested (Peisakhin & Pinto, 2010, p. 264). To overcome this disadvantage, the RTIA was promulgated in 2005 (Yadav & Chopra, 2015, p. 419).

Compared to other FOIA-style laws, the RTIA was an improvement in many ways (Agrawal, 2012, p. 28). First, public authorities are required to computerize their records.<sup>39</sup> Second, the records must be disseminated so that people can access the information with ease.<sup>40</sup> Third, the government must appoint a public information officer (Rani, 2015, p. 61).<sup>41</sup> Fourth, people are allowed to ask the government to provide the information that they requested within thirty days as long as the information is not related to national security (Peisakhin & Pinto, 2010, p. 264).<sup>42</sup> Fifth, the RTIA includes both the federal government and the state governments (Roberts, 2010, p. 925).<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> The states are Assam (2001), Delhi (2001), Goa (1997), Karnataka (2000), Madhya Pradesh (2003), Maharashtra (2002), Rajasthan (2000), and Tamil Nadu (1997).

<sup>39</sup> The Right to Information Act, 2005, Section 4(1) in Chapter II.

<sup>40</sup> The Right to Information Act, 2005, Section 4(3) in Chapter II.

<sup>41</sup> The Right to Information Act, 2005, Section 5(1) in Chapter II.

<sup>42</sup> The Right to Information Act, 2005, Section 7(1) in Chapter II.

<sup>43</sup> The Right to Information Act, 2005, Section 1(2) in Chapter II.

The RTIA is a strong transparency law that might be successful in fighting corruption (Singh, 2010, p. 2). Indeed, some scholars assert that the RTIA has shown a substantial impact on curbing corruption (Hussain, 2012, p. 5; Peisakhin & Pinto, 2010, p. 278; Yadav & Chopra, 2015, p. 419). Their assertion is based on the assumption that with information technology and informational infrastructure, the circulation of information can reduce corruption (Dahlström, 2016). When the RTIA is assisted by information technology, it brings information asymmetries to light, thereby helping people fight corruption effectively (Menon, 2006, p. 338).

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) is a popular example of the success that the RTIA has had with fighting petty corruption and poverty. In 2005, the NREGA was enacted (Menon, 2008, p. 1).<sup>44</sup> Its goal is to help the poor in rural areas by giving them a chance to work, thus helping them live with dignity (Aakella & Kidambi, 2007, p. 347). The main characteristics of the NREGA are as follows. First, the state government is required to provide at least 100 days of guaranteed employment to every household (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 8).<sup>45</sup> Second, if an applicant fails to get a job within fifteen days, the applicant will acquire an unemployment allowance (Menon, 2008, p. 2).<sup>46</sup> Third, the central government is tasked with establishing the National Employment Guarantee Fund.<sup>47</sup>

The relative success of the NREGA is due to a few factors. First, local contractors are excluded from the NREGA (Ambasta, Shankar, & Shah, 2008, p. 41). Contractors

---

<sup>44</sup> The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, Section 1(1) in Chapter I.

<sup>45</sup> The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, Section 3(1) in Chapter II.

<sup>46</sup> The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, Section 7(1) in Chapter III.

<sup>47</sup> The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, Section 20(1) in Chapter V.

often earn money illegally by inflating the number of workers they hire and asking for rice quotas for unfinished works (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 10). Former programs such as Food for Work were not effective due to this type of corruption from contractors (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 10). Because contractors are excluded, the NREGA can make progress.

Second, social audits are a successful tool for limiting corruption in NREGA (Aakella & Kidambi, 2007, p. 345). The idea of social audits was invented by Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sanghatan (MKSS), a rural activist group, in the 1990s (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 8). In 2005, social audits were enshrined in the NREGA. In 2006, the first social audit was launched in Andhra Pradesh (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 12). The *Gram Sabha*, a meeting of adults in a village, is required to execute social audits at least once every six months (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 7).<sup>48</sup> Social audits help both the government and civil society work together to increase the effectiveness of the NREGA (Aakella & Kidambi, 2007, p. 345).

Last, the NREGA has made progress because of information disclosure (Menon, 2008, p. 2). According to the NREGA, the state government should disclose key documents to the public without a request (Menon, 2008, p. 3). Proactive disclosure applies to the NREGA (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 6).<sup>49</sup> Additionally, all information related to the NREGA should be computerized (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 7). According to the guidelines of the NREGA, all participants must have job cards, and muster rolls must be posted on the worksite (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 7). The *Gram Sabha* can access these

---

<sup>48</sup> The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, Section 17 in Chapter IV.

<sup>49</sup> The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, Section 4 in Chapter III.

records (Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 7). Thus, the *Gram Sabha* can conduct social audits more efficiently (Aakella & Kidambi, 2007, p. 346).

However, the performance of the RTIA has not been without criticism (Roberts, 2010, p. 926). Its enforcement has been weak (Chêne, 2009, p. 1). Complaints about corrupt public officials are often ignored (Mohapatra, 2013, p. 43). The lack of awareness of the RTIA creates barriers to access information (Roberts, 2010, p. 927). Threats from public officials increase “a psychological cost” for requesters asking for information (Roberts, 2010, p. 927). Moreover, Indian politicians and bureaucrats are trying to amend the RTIA to further weaken the law (Roberts, 2010, p. 932). Without effective implementation of the RTIA, its success is not possible (Roberts, 2010, p. 926). In sum, although the RTIA has some limitations, politicians allow it to fight petty corruption effectively.

While the RTIA has shown some successful results in curbing corruption, the Whistleblowers Protection Act has not generated favorable outcomes. The Whistleblowers Protection Act was introduced in 2010 in response to the death of some prominent whistleblowers, such as Shanmugam Manjunath, the former Indian Oil Corporation sales officer, and Satyendra Dubey, the former Indian Engineering Service officer (Rai, 2015).<sup>50</sup> The courts have asked the Central Bureau of Investigation to investigate the assassination of whistleblowers, but the cases have not been seriously examined (Hussain, 2012, p. 6). People in India have been angry about this situation and

---

<sup>50</sup> Shanmugam Manjunath was killed on November 2005, Satyendra Dubey was murdered on November 2003.

have asked the government to protect whistleblowers. Finally, in 2014, the Whistleblowers Protection Act received the President's assent.<sup>51</sup>

The act has several positive features. The central government is accountable for protecting whistleblowers.<sup>52</sup> The identity of whistleblowers will not be disclosed.<sup>53</sup> If public servants or citizens reveal the identity of a complainant, then they will be punished.<sup>54</sup> In these regards, this act made an important step towards combating corruption.

However, this act is not strong enough to provide comprehensive protection (Daya, 2016). First, this act does not mention how to punish retaliation against whistleblowers (Liu, 2014). Second, it does not allow whistleblowers to report complaints anonymously. To be protected, whistleblowers must provide their own identity.<sup>55</sup> Third, whistleblowers who intentionally report false complaints will be punished (Liu, 2014).<sup>56</sup> Punishing complainants who falsify reports is an acceptable response. However, the problem is that the government can misuse this article to punish bothersome whistleblowers by insisting that their complaints are wrong. Thus, whistleblowers are not sufficiently protected.

---

<sup>51</sup> *Lok Sabha* is the lower house, and *Rajya Sabha* is the upper house. According to the Constitution of India, 2015, section 111 in Chapter I of Part V, when the two houses pass a bill, it will be sent to the President. The bill can become an act when it receives the President's assent (Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2014). The President of India is the head of state of India. Pranab Mukherjee was the former President from 2012 to 2017. Therefore, Pranab Mukherjee gave his assent. The incumbent President is Ram Nath Kovind.

<sup>52</sup> The Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2011, Section 11(1) in Chapter V.

<sup>53</sup> The Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2011, Section 5(1)(b) in Chapter III.

<sup>54</sup> The Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2011, Section 16 in Chapter VI.

<sup>55</sup> The Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2011, Section 2(6) in Chapter II.

<sup>56</sup> The Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2011, Section 17 in Chapter VI.

Anti-corruption agencies in India are also ineffective. India has two main anti-corruption agencies: the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). In 1941, the Government of India created the Special Police Establishment (SPE) to fight corruption.<sup>57</sup> In 1946, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act (DSPEA) was established.<sup>58</sup> In 1963, the SPE changed its name to the Central Bureau of Investigation. The CBI is the police agency that investigates corruption cases (Tummala, 2009, p. 44).<sup>59</sup>

The central government appointed the Director of the CBI on the recommendation of a committee that consisted of the CVC Chairperson, Vigilance Commissioners Members, and Home Secretary.<sup>60</sup> Since the 2013 *Lokpal* and *Lokayuktas* Act was enacted, the selection committee has consisted of the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition, and the Chief Justice of India or a Supreme Court Judge.<sup>61</sup> The director's term is two years.<sup>62</sup>

The CBI, however, has not seriously fought corruption. When the CBI deals with grand corruption cases, they show their lack of ability to combat corruption. For instance, in the 1980s, when Rajiv Gandhi received bribes from Bofors AB, a Swedish weapons company, the CBI investigated the case, but seemed to have no interest in pursuing it (Corbridge, 2013, p. 224). They removed the name of a key testifier, Ottavio Quattrocchi,

---

<sup>57</sup> The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, section 2(1).

<sup>58</sup> The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, section 1(1).

<sup>59</sup> The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, section 2(2) and section 3.

<sup>60</sup> The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, section 4A(1).

<sup>61</sup> The Delhi Special Police Establishment (Amendment) Act, 2014.

<sup>62</sup> The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, section 4A(1).

from the wanted list (Hussain, 2012, p. 36). Ironically, Rajiv Gandhi had declared that he would fight corruption (Jeffrey, 2017, p. 66).

One of the main reasons for this ineffectiveness is that the CBI is not independent (Mohapatra, 2013, p. 42). Due to this lack of independence, the CBI has a limited capacity to investigate corruption cases (Menon, 2006, p. 339). The central government supervises the CBI.<sup>63</sup> It means that the CBI has no authority to investigate corruption cases related to the high public officials of the state if the state government does not give the CBI permission to investigate (Hussain, 2012, p. 159).<sup>64</sup> Without the approval of the central government, the CBI cannot investigate public officials with the rank of Joint Secretary and above.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, a lack of human resources have further undermined the effectiveness of the bureau (Tummala, 2009, p. 44).

In contrast, the CVC is an independent corruption-fighting agency. In 1964, the *Santhanam* Committee, or the Committee on Prevention of Corruption, recommended that the government create an independent anti-corruption agency (Raju, 2010). The government accepted the Committee's recommendation, and the CVC was established in 1964 (Tummala, 2009, p. 44). The CVC gives counsel to the Government of India and reviews the investigation process of corruption cases with which the CBI deals (Tummala, 2009, p. 44)<sup>66</sup>.

---

<sup>63</sup> The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, section 4(2).

<sup>64</sup> The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, section 6.

<sup>65</sup> The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, section 6A(1).

<sup>66</sup> The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, section 8(1) in Chapter II and The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, section 4(1).



The independence of the CVC is secured by the Central Vigilance Commission. The chairperson of the CVC, a Central Vigilance Commissioner, is appointed by the President, but the appointment must obtain the recommendation of a Committee that consists of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Home Affairs, and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of the People.<sup>67</sup> The chairperson's term is four years.<sup>68</sup> A chairperson's term may only be ended by the President if the Supreme Court reports misbehavior or incapacity on the part of the chairperson.<sup>69</sup> The Consolidated Fund of India pays for the expense of the CVC.<sup>70</sup> The CVC is responsible for the Parliament but not any Ministry.<sup>71</sup>

The CVC, however, has also shown its limited capacity in fighting corruption (Hussain, 2012, p. 157). The CVC has no capacity to investigate corruption cases and has only limited authority to recommend investigations (Vittal, 2012, p. 2).<sup>72</sup> Only federal public officials are under the CVC's jurisdiction, and the CVC has no capacity to deal with corruption cases related to state civil servants (Chêne, 2009, p. 8). Moreover, the CVC receives complaints and refers them to the CBI when the complaints are reliable (Hussain, 2012, p. 117). The CVC has been blamed for dealing mainly with small fish (Vittal, 2012, p. 2). Mohapatra (2013) explains, "The CVC is independent but does not have powers while CBI has power but is not independent" (p. 42). Thus, political leaders in India do not appear to be interested in building effective anti-corruption agencies.

---

<sup>67</sup> The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, section 4(1) in Chapter II.

<sup>68</sup> The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, section 5(1) in Chapter II.

<sup>69</sup> The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, section 6(1) in Chapter II.

<sup>70</sup> The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, section 13 in Chapter IV.

<sup>71</sup> The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, section 14 in Chapter IV.

<sup>72</sup> The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, section 8(1)(g) in Chapter II.

Although anti-corruption agencies in India are not effective, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed (Jaiswal, 2013; Sen, 2011). The President appoints judges of the Supreme Court, and judges have the security of tenure by the age of sixty-five (Singh, 1999, p. 252).<sup>73</sup> Judges of the Supreme Court are not removed from office unless they are impeached (Jaiswal, 2013).<sup>74</sup> The salaries of Judges of the Supreme Court are drawn from the Consolidated Fund of India (Jaiswal, 2013).<sup>75</sup> Thus, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed in India.

However, it seems that the Indian government is not interested in disciplining public officials and enlightening citizens. The Indian Penal Code (IPC), established in 1860, states that public servants should obey the law, but it does not mention corruption (Nishith Desai Associates, 2016).<sup>76</sup> In 2002, the CVC issued “the Citizens’ Guide to Fighting Corruption” (Alexander, 2002). However, except for this document, the Indian government has not promoted any educational movement to lead citizens to combat corruption.

Furthermore, the freedom of the media is partially guaranteed in India. More than 360 television stations present various political perspectives (Sen, 2011). Some of them criticize the Indian government without hesitation (Sen, 2011). However, this does not mean that the Indian government fully guaranteed the freedom of the media. Since 1992, twenty-seven journalists who investigated corruption cases have been murdered (Galhotra, 2016). The Indian government declares that freedom of the press should be

---

<sup>73</sup> The Constitution of India, 2015, section 124 (2) in Chapter IV of Part V.

<sup>74</sup> The Constitution of India, 2015, section 124 (4) in Chapter IV of Part V.

<sup>75</sup> The Constitution of India, 2015, section 112(3)(d) in Chapter I of Part V.

<sup>76</sup> The Indian Penal Code 1860, section 166 in Chapter IX.

fully respected, but journalists feel that the government puts pressure on them to refrain from reporting corruption related to powerful politicians (The New York Times, 2018). It is clear that the Indian government does not construe the freedom of the media as its main anti-corruption measure.

**Figure 6** Evaluating Anti-Corruption Policies in India




Figure 6 shows the characteristics of anti-corruption policies in India. While the Indian government promotes freedom of information to fight petty corruption, the government is not much interested in criminalization. Because of the pressure of civil society, political leaders in India have adopted the Whistleblowers Protection Act, but it lacks effectiveness due to a lack of support. While the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed, politicians do not want to build an effective anti-corruption agency for catching big fish. Moreover, the Indian government is not interested in disciplining public

officials and enlightening citizens. The freedom of the media is partially guaranteed in India.

## **Conclusion**

The governance strategy of political leaders in India is to win elections. To win elections, they need their political allies. There is no reason for them to fight corruption if doing so hurts their allies. For this reason, criminalization of corruption is weak in India. Political leaders in India are not much interested in protecting whistleblowers. They do not want anti-corruption agencies to be effective. They are not interested in disciplining public officials and enlightening citizens.

To win elections, political leaders in India should listen to the voice of civil society too. They seek to appease the people by adopting some anti-corruption policies that can reduce petty corruption. They vigorously implement the freedom of information act and guarantee the independence of the judiciary. They adopt visible reforms that have a positive effect on their popularity.

The preference of anti-corruption policies in India can be explained by the Indian political leaders' behavior in relation to their governance strategy. They do not want to build a strong anti-corruption agency because such an agency might attack their political allies. Political leaders in India, however, are forced to adopt some anti-corruption policies that control petty corruption by social movement from civil society.

## CHAPTER 5: RUSSIA

### Overview

Corruption is rampant in Russia (Pavroz, 2017, p. 145). Since 2000, various surveys have indicated that corruption is the country's most important problem (Clarkson, 2018, p. 26). The World Economic Forum survey revealed that corruption has remained endemic in Russia (Healy & Ramanna, 2013). Furthermore, businesspeople surveyed in 2000 and 2008 felt that corruption had increased between those years (Frye, 2010, p. 80). Russians think that giving bribes is a better solution than obeying the law (Orttung, 2006, p. 4). For these reasons, Russia is the most corrupt country amongst the cases in this study.

Political leaders in Russia have announced that they understand the detrimental effects of corruption. Dmitry Medvedev, the former President from 2008 to 2012 and the incumbent Prime Minister of Russia, and Vladimir Putin, the former President from 2000 to 2008 and the incumbent President of Russia, declared that they would fight corruption (Man, 2009, p. 1). However, they have failed to reduce corruption, and they do not seem to be seriously interested in adopting anti-corruption measures. How can their behavior be explained?

To answer this question, this chapter investigates the governance strategy of political leaders in Russia. Political leaders are elites who exercise power within a state. A governance strategy is a grand plan that is selected by political leaders to fortify and then maintain their power within national affairs (Roberts, 2018, p. 10). Political leaders

face and respond to international, social, economic, and political circumstances. Their responses are various and determined by the fact that political leaders are power maximizers. Their main interests -to maximize their power- lead them to choose a certain response. To make these responses effective, leaders rely on their governance strategy. Even when they have not clearly mentioned what are their governance strategies, observing their reactions enables us to sketch their strategies.

When we understand the governance strategies of political leaders, we can predict what their policy choices. Since they need their governance strategies to respond to their circumstances, it is in their interest to fortify those governance strategies. If they have a powerful governance strategy, then their responses will be effective. How can they strengthen their governance strategy? They fortify their governance strategy by choosing policies that are consistent with that strategy. Political will, the willingness of a political leader to adopt and implement a certain policy, is highly associated with governance strategy. If a policy is not consistent with their governance strategies, then their political will to adopt this policy will be diminished. If a policy is consistent with their governance strategies, then their political will to adopt this policy will increase.

Therefore, understanding the governance strategies of leaders also helps us explain their preference for anti-corruption policies. When corruption is rampant, experts recommend that political leaders adopt a general anti-corruption toolkit that consists of various anti-corruption policies. Political leaders, however, tend not to follow the instructions of the experts to the letter. Although experts emphasize the importance of a holistic approach to fighting corruption, political leaders often select a certain policy in

the toolkit and refuse to adopt the other policies. Their preference is based on their evaluation of anti-corruption policies in relation to the impact of those policies on their governance strategy. A leader's political will to adopt anti-corruption policies decreases when those policies are not consistent with the leader's governance strategy. Likewise, an anti-corruption policy that is consistent with the governance strategy is more likely to be implemented. Thus, this chapter explains the circumstances in Russia, Russia's governance strategy, and the leaders' preferred anti-corruption policies.

To understand the governance strategy of political leaders in Russia, we should understand the circumstances that those political leaders face. Internationally, tensions between Russia and Western powers have increased. EU-US economic sanctions have had a negative effect on Russia's economy. However, Russia continues to pursue military expansion and aggressive diplomacy. Despite the economic crisis, Russia has not faltered at all. For instance, EU-US economic sanctions have had no impact on Russia's military campaigns in Syria and Ukraine. These actions from political leaders are based on the belief that aggressive diplomacy has a positive effect on their popularity and patriotism within Russia.

Internally, protesters have asked the government to fix social problems. When these demonstrations have a negative effect on the political regime, political leaders in Russia control the media and suppress civil society. Politicians thereby seek to reduce the impact of the people's voice on their political stability.

Economically, Russia has suffered from a low level of economic growth. Russia relies heavily on natural resources (Pant, 2016). Falling oil prices and EU-US economic

sanctions prevent the political leaders from boosting the Russian economy. Despite a bad economy in Russia, there is no threat to its leaders' legitimacy. Political leaders can maintain their popularity by blaming Western powers for Russia's current economic crisis. Since political leaders in Russia know that there is no easy way to boost the economy in the short term, they seek to reduce the impact of the bad economy by persuading the people that the Western powers are responsible for the situation.

Politically, Russia is a managed democracy. The freedom of elections seems to be guaranteed, but candidates are selected by political leaders (Healy & Ramanna, 2013). Opposing parties are ineffective, and there is little chance of a change in leadership. In this political situation, political leaders in Russia aim to win elections overwhelmingly in order to verify their popularity.

These circumstances have led the Russian political leaders to employ a governance strategy based on controlling the various apparatuses consistently with vertical power (Gel'man, 2015, p. 96; Inozemtsev, 2011; Monaghan, 2017, p. 5).<sup>77</sup> Control of the military is necessary for territorial expansion and aggressive diplomacy. The media and coercive agencies are needed to suppress protesters effectively. State apparatuses are responsible for making economic plans and criticizing Western powers. Manipulation of elections is accomplished by controlling the campaign machine and the electoral body. The power vertical controls every one of those apparatuses: the military, secret police, the media, and state-friendly organizations. To fortify the governance strategy that helps the Russian political leaders to control these organizations, they should

---

<sup>77</sup> Monaghan (2017) call it the vertical of power, and Gel'man (2015) call it the power vertical. This dissertation uses vertical power, the vertical of power, and the power vertical interchangeably.



form a symbiotic relationship with the corrupt elites who comprise the power vertical. *Oligarchs* are business elites, and *siloviki* are politicians from military and security organizations.

Political leaders in Russia do not seem to be interested in fighting corruption seriously. Dmitry Medvedev declared war against corruption and adopted some anti-corruption policies such as the National Anti-Corruption Plan, but he focused mainly on basic criminalization and failed to reduce the level of corruption. Although Dmitry Medvedev at least made an attempt to control corruption, Vladimir Putin willingly tolerates corruption. The Russian government enacted some anti-corruption laws, but these laws are not effective because they lack specific provisions. The independence of anti-corruption institutions is not guaranteed, and the Kremlin is not interested in educating subordinates and citizens to fight corruption. The Russian political leaders control civil society and the media, but they do not support their role as watchdogs.

Why do political leaders in Russia implement incomplete anti-corruption policies? The Russian leaders refuse to adopt anti-corruption policies that have a negative effect on their governance strategy and their symbiotic relationship with corrupt elites. They tolerate corruption that helps elites accumulate wealth. Anti-corruption activists have asked the Kremlin to adopt institutional reforms, but they have refused. (Krastev, 2016).

The rest of this chapter discusses the conditions that political leaders in Russia face. After reviewing the international, social, economic, and political circumstances in Russia, this chapter explicates the governance strategy of the Russian political leaders.

Anti-corruption policies in Russia are introduced and evaluated. Finally, this chapter explains why the Russian political leaders have adopted incomplete anti-corruption policies.

## **Conditions Faced by Russia's Leaders**

### *International Affairs*

Tensions between Russia and Western powers have increased. EU-US economic sanctions have had a negative effect on Russia's economy. In June 2017, the United States Congress decided to impose sanctions against Russia (Porter, 2017). These sanctions are aimed at persuading Vladimir Putin to remove Russian forces from Syria and Ukraine. This is not the first time that Western powers have put economic pressure on Russia. In July and September 2014, the United States and the European Union imposed economic sanctions on Russia (Kanter & Herszenhorn, 2014). These sanctions included the restriction of imported food, exported energy technology, and access to the credit market (Kanter & Herszenhorn, 2014).

Russia, however, continues to pursue military expansion and aggressive diplomacy. Despite the economic crisis, Russia has not faltered at all. EU-US economic sanctions have had no impact on Russia's military campaigns in Syria and Ukraine. Rather, on March 1st, 2018, Russia announced new missile systems that have the ability to pierce the defensive missile shield of the United States (MacFarquhar & Sanger, 2018). Despite the bad economy, Russia has spent more money on national defense. Since 2008, The Russian leaders have initiated military reform to increase combat

readiness and to modernize military equipment (Monaghan, 2017, p. 69). Russia's military expenditure was 3.40 percent of the GDP in 2011 and 4.84 percent in 2015 (Cooper, 2017, p. 2). In 2017, six percent of the GDP was allocated to military expenditure (Hanson, 2016, p. 18). Many experts predict that this trend will continue (Hanson, 2016, p. 20).

Some experts in international relations believe that Vladimir Putin does not understand the consequences of military expansion to Syria and Ukraine and therefore is a poor strategist (Monaghan, 2017, p. 1). They expect that his aggressive diplomacy will have a negative effect on Russia's international power and leave his country isolated (Monaghan, 2017, p. 1). This point of view suggests that Vladimir Putin is not smart enough to understand the impact of his choice. These scholars construe Russia's intervention in Ukraine and Syria as "a self-defeating strategy" (Monaghan, 2017, p. 1). However, if Vladimir Putin is not smart enough to understand the impact of his military move, how has he held on power since 2000?

In fact, there are some reasons for selecting military intervention. First, political leaders in Russia want to maintain their country's influence in the post-Soviet states. Russia is striving to be as great as it was during the time of the Soviet Union (Hanson, 2016, p. 14; Tsygankov, 2014, p. 105). The threat of terrorism, which has increased since the intervention in Syria, has no significant impact on the popularity of the Russian leaders (Kolesnikov, 2016). The Syria intervention made Russians believe that their country was again acting as a great power (Kolesnikov, 2016).

Second, Russia feels that their enemy is at the gate. Russia hopes that the former Soviet Union countries maintain close ties to Russia even though these countries are no longer part of Russia anymore. Some of these countries, however, do not seem to be close to Russia but rather tend to build strong relationships with Western powers. For example, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and instead they are now members of the European Union (Danzig, 2013). Their joining has led Russia to believe that there are no bumpers between them and Western powers (Monaghan, 2017, p. 52). Russian politicians construe Western sanctions as pressure for changing today's regime. The increased influence of Western powers on the former Soviet Union countries is a formidable threat to the Russian leaders. Based on this belief, the leaders of Russia assert that their military expansion is not aggressive, but defensive and preventive (Kolesnikov, 2016; Monaghan, 2017, p. 52).

Third, this aggressive strategy has a positive effect on sustaining the domestic popularity of political leaders in Russia (MacFarquhar & Sanger, 2018; Porter, 2017). Vladimir Putin's popularity partly comes from his leadership in international affairs (Kolesnikov, 2016). One survey shows that Vladimir Putin's popularity has increased from sixty percent to ninety percent after the intervention in Syria and Crimea (Kolesnikov, 2016). Thus, the leaders of Russia know that this military expansion has a positive effect on popular support (Kolesnikov, 2016).

Finally, both Western powers' sanctions and Russia's military expansion have a positive effect on encouraging patriotism (MacFarquhar & Sanger, 2018). According to a survey conducted by the Levada Center in 2015, sixty-nine percent of Russian people

supported the Russian government's decisions related to military expansion despite the economic difficulty (Kolesnikov, 2016). The Russian people seem to believe that they are in a constant battle against evil Western powers. A survey shows that about sixty percent of Russia citizens have a negative image of the European Union after 2014 (Kolesnikov, 2016).

These reasons are interrelated. For instance, the Russian leaders encourage patriotism by insisting that enemies are at the gates (Monaghan, 2017, p. 52). From the experience of World War II, especially the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany, the Russian leaders have learned that fighting an enemy has a positive effect on increasing national unity (Kolesnikov, 2016). Thus, military expansion is not "a self-defeating strategy," but rather a well-calculated strategy because international responses are closely related to domestic situations (Lo, 2015, p. 3).

### *Social Affairs*

Internally, many protesters ask the government to fix various problems. The failure of social reforms in Russia sparked huge demonstrations in 2005 (Monaghan, 2017, p. 22). Before 2005, more than thirty million Russians depended on pensions that consisted of seventy dollars a month and other benefits such as free public transportation and housing subsidies (Bukharin, 2015). In January 2005, the government launched a new plan that increased the pension by ten dollars a month but removed benefits (Titova, 2005). In various cities around the country, Russian citizens joined rallies against this reform. For instance, about 13,000 citizen demonstrators participated in the protest in St. Petersburg (Bukharin, 2015).

However, the Kremlin did not suppress these protesters (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 160). Most of the demonstrators were not arrested. Rather, Vladimir Putin admitted the failure of this reform and promised a better plan (Bigg, 2005; Tsygankov, 2014, p. 160). This response pacified moderate protesters and isolated radical demonstrators (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 160).

Election fraud in 2011 triggered another mass protest. In December 2011, the Russian legislative elections were held. The ruling party, United Russia, took 238 of 450 seats in the Lower House (Barry, 2011). After the elections, many observers asserted that they had been manipulated (Lally & Englund, 2011). Alexei Navalny, an anti-corruption activist, published the slogan, “Putin is a thief” (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 159). More than 25,000 citizens chanted this slogan and at a protest in Moscow (Barry, 2011).

The response from the government, however, was not the same as before. Alexei Navalny and hundreds of protesters were arrested (Barry, 2011). Dmitry Medvedev publicly blamed the protesters (O’Flynn, 2011). Vladimir Putin asserted that the radical protesters had been supported by Hillary Clinton, the former United States Secretary of State (Barry, 2011; Tsygankov, 2014, pp. 160–161).

In 2017, Navalny and his supporters came back again to protest another issue: corruption. The Anti-Corruption Foundation, which was established by Navalny, reported that Dimitri Medvedev had a hidden estate worth eighty-five million dollars (Tamkin, 2017). The Foundation also asserted that Dmitry Medvedev accepted over one billion dollars as bribes from various people in business (Bennetts, 2017). Thousands of demonstrators joined rallies in about 100 cities (Meyer, 2017).

The Russian leaders responded even stronger than before. Alexei Navalny was detained again (Meyer, 2017). Hundreds of protesters were arrested (Balmforth, 2017). The government-controlled media did not broadcast the protests: Russian state television did not show the rallies, and Pro-Kremlin newspapers did not report the protests (BBC, 2017). It was a perfect example of how political leaders in Russia can control the media and suppress protesters.

In 2005, the government accepted people's needs, but in 2012 and 2017, the government used coercive power. What caused the difference between the responses of the government? Why was there inconsistency in their reactions? The answers lie in their evaluation of the protests.

When protesters do not appear to affect the present political regime, political leaders in Russia tend to accept their requests. Political leaders in Russia understand that people construe the country as a paternalistic state (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 104). The Russian leaders are willing to listen to requests for help from the people as long as they are not critical of the government.

On the contrary, when radical protesters negatively affect the present political regime, political leaders in Russia criticize and punish them (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 160). The Russian leaders have no reason to listen to the demonstrators' voice because their only aim is to get the leaders to step down. Resigning their posts is the last thing that the leaders want to do. To shut down the influence of anti-government activists, the Russian leaders stifle protests by controlling the media so that the protests are not broadcast and by using the police to quell the demonstrations.

## *Economic Affairs*

The global economic crisis of 2008 had a negative effect on the Russian economy (Monaghan, 2017, p. 35). The Russian leaders, like political leaders in other countries, are concerned about the economy, and they are always seeking to boost it (Hanson, 2016, p. 13; Monaghan, 2017, p. 19). Vladimir Putin argued that an efficient economy was imperative for a strong Russia. In 2012, Vladimir Putin launched an economic plan (Monaghan, 2017, p. 19) which aimed to increase labor productivity by fifty percent by 2018 (Hanson, 2016, p. 18). Russian politicians thought that this ambitious dream would be possible because Russia had enjoyed high economic growth from 2000 to 2008 (Hanson, 2016, p. 21).

Their dream, however, was not realized. The productivity of labor has not significantly improved over time (Hanson, 2016, p. 21). There are several reasons for the failure of this ambitious plan. First, the price of oil matters. The high economic growth from 2000 to 2008 relied heavily on the high prices of oil (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 104). About fifty percent of Russian GDP comes from foreign trade, and oil is a big export (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 104). Without the high prices of oil, the Russian economy cannot enjoy a high level of economic growth. From 2012 to 2015, the Russian economy had stagnated due to the low prices of oil (Hanson, 2016, p. 22).

Second, the budget deficit is another obstacle to economic development. In 2013, the Finance Ministry announced that the budget deficit required for implementing this economic plan was 285 billion dollars (Monaghan, 2017, p. 39). However, military spending has exacerbated the budget deficit. Due to the huge amount of money spent on



the defense budget, Russia cannot increase the budget for economic development (Monaghan, 2017, p. 43).

Due to this lack of money, the plan could not be well implemented. For example, Vladimir Putin's economic plan included increasing the salaries of state workers (Hanson, 2016, p. 22). The plan predicted that if the salaries of the employees increased, then their consumption would increase. Moreover, increasing the salaries of public officials would be an effective approach to control petty corruption because economically satisfied officials might not ask for as many bribes (Quah, 2013c, p. 248). However, this plan was not effective. The central government did not allocate any funds and instead ordered the local government to increase the salaries of their officials (Hanson, 2016, p. 22). Due to this order from the central government, the budget deficits in local governments have increased (Hanson, 2016, p. 23).

To boost the economy, Russia needs more than idealistic plans. Russia needs strong rule of law and a low level of corruption to attract foreign investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993, p. 615). Property rights, the financial system, and the efficiency of the labor force should support the structure of the economy (Monaghan, 2017, p. 37). Making these fundamental reforms is a long-term plan that can lead to a strong economy. This prescription, however, is not effective in the short-term.

If political leaders know that they cannot boost the economy in the short-term, then they will try to find how they can reduce the negative impact of the current bad economy on their popularity. To pacify people's anger about the economic depression, The Russian leaders have blamed Western powers for their situation (Polyakova &

Taussig, 2018). In 2008, Dmitry Medvedev asserted that the selfishness of the United States and the protectionism of Western powers exacerbated a global economic crisis that also had a negative effect on the Russian economy (Blomfield, 2008b). In December 2014, Vladimir Putin announced at a press conference that the current economic recession stemmed from the aggression of Western powers (Farchy & Weaver, 2014).

### *Political Affairs*

Politically, Russia is a managed democracy (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 132). Although Russia is not a liberal democratic country, it is also not nearly as undemocratic as the former Soviet Union (Inozemtsev, 2011). Basic human rights are somewhat guaranteed, but political freedom is limited. Their democracy is not close to the same level as Western democracy. Rather, today's Russia is close to an autocracy (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 7).

Although they are not completely satisfied with today's political system, people in Russia do not tend to change their political regime. Various surveys show that the Russian citizens prefer order with political stability to freedom with chaos (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 138). They also believe that a strong state can be compatible with democracy (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 130). They are generally satisfied with the status quo.

In this situation, it is easy for the Russian leaders to win elections. In 2000, Vladimir Putin won a presidential election with fifty-three percent of the vote (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 104). In 2004, he was re-elected with more than seventy percent of the vote (Lally & Englund, 2011). In 2008, Dmitry Medvedev, Vladimir Putin's

successor, was elected as President with about seventy percent of the vote (Blomfield, 2008a). In 2012, Vladimir Putin won the presidential election again, this time with sixty percent of the vote (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 104). In March 2018, he started his fourth term with seventy-five percent of the vote (Roth, 2018).

These victories, however, do not accurately reflect the will of the people. These election elections come partly from manipulation and fraud. In the 2007 parliamentary elections, opposition parties, such as the Union of Right-Wing Forces and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, took anti-corruption as their main issue (Orttung, 2006, p. 3). In 2011, United Russia won the election with about fifty percent of the vote, but people believed that this result was owed to a fraudulent election (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 158).

Russian citizens have the right to vote, but the Russian leaders can manipulate elections. Moreover, candidates are selected by political leaders (Healy & Ramanna, 2013). For example, Ksenia Sobchak, a daughter of Vladimir Putin's mentor, asked Vladimir Putin to let her become a presidential candidate, and he allowed her to do so (Kranz, 2018). Thus, political leaders in Russia carefully design the structure of elections although they are sure of victory.

Why do the Russian leaders manipulate elections even though they expect that they will win elections without fraud? Their goal is to win elections in a landslide. This is not a new phenomenon. Every autocrat tends to have overwhelming victories in elections. In 1987, Muhammad Suharto, the former President of Indonesia, led his ruling party to win the election with more than seventy percent of the vote (Wedel, 1987). In 2005,

Hosni Mubarak, the former President of Egypt, won the presidential election with about eighty-nine percent of the vote (Whitaker, 2005). Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev are not much different from these dictators.

Why do political leaders in Russia want to win elections in a landslide? The Kremlin knows that the beginnings of a small crack can lead to the demise of the current political regime. Boris Nemtsov, the former deputy Prime Minister of Russia in Boris Yeltsin's government, led an opposing party, the People's Freedom Party, and declared his opposition to Vladimir Putin (Kara-Murza, 2018). In 2013, his party entered the regional Parliament of Yaroslavl with seventeen percent of the vote while Vladimir Putin's party earned twenty-four percent of the vote (Kara-Murza, 2013). Although the ruling party defeated Boris Nemtsov's party, seventeen percent of the vote was not negligible. In 2013, Alexei Navalny received about twenty-seven percent of the vote in the Moscow mayoral election (Baczynska & Tsvetkova, 2013). This figure was enough to surprise the Kremlin.

However, the Russian leaders do not allow their rivals to gain strength. In February 2015, Boris Nemtsov was assassinated (Amos & Millward, 2015). Alexei Navalny was charged with embezzlement, and the Central Election Commission disqualified him from running in the presidential election of 2018 (Luhn, 2017; Soldatkin & Osborn, 2017). Thus, political leaders in Russia continuously check their potential rivals by using various controversial methods.

## **Governance Strategy**

A governance strategy is a grand plan that is selected by political leaders to fortify and then maintain their power within national affairs (Roberts, 2018a, p. 10). The Russian political leaders use their governance strategy to respond to international, social, economic, and political circumstances, which in turn affect the formation of the governance strategy. This section explains how various circumstances and leaders' reactions to them can form the governance strategy in Russia.

To handle issues related to international, social, economic, and political affairs, political leaders in Russia need vertical power (Gel'man, 2015, p. 96; Inozemtsev, 2011; Man, 2009, p. 27; Monaghan, 2017, p. 5; Tsygankov, 2014, p. 106). Vertical power, in this dissertation, is defined as political leaders' capacity to control their subordinates. The Russian political leaders use the power vertical when they respond to their circumstances. We can presume their governance strategy when we observe their responses to international, social, economic, and political circumstances.

First, in international affairs, political leaders in Russia need the vertical of power to control the military. They pursue military expansion and aggressive diplomacy despite sanctions from Western powers. They know that their military actions have a positive effect on their popularity and people's patriotism. They understand that the benefit of military actions outweighs their cost. When they adopt policies of military expansion and aggressive diplomacy, they need vertical power that can control the military. If they could not control the military, then they would not choose military expansion as their reaction.

Second, in social affairs, political leaders in Russia need vertical power to control the media and coercive agencies. When protests affect their political stability, they want to be able to suppress protesters effectively. Suppressing demonstrators effectively is easier than making social reforms successful. When they suppress protesters, they need the vertical power that can control the media and coercive agencies. If they could not control the media and coercive agencies, then they would not try to suppress protesters severely.

Third, in economic affairs, political leaders in Russia need vertical power to control the state apparatuses. They want people to believe that the failure of economic plans is not related to the capacity of their political leaders. Economic development is a long-term plan, and there is no effective tool for boosting the economy in a short time. Blaming Western powers for economic plight is easier than making economic plans successful. When they blame Western powers and make economic plans, they need the vertical of power that can control the state apparatuses. If they could not control the state apparatuses, then it would not be easy to shift the blame on Western powers.

Finally, in political affairs, political leaders in Russia need vertical power to control the campaign machine and the electoral body. It is important for leaders to win elections overwhelmingly for the verification of their popularity and to prevent their rivals from gaining strength. To win elections in a landslide, they tend to launch smear campaigns against their political enemies and obstruct their enemies from coming forward as candidates. These actions are sure ways to win elections overwhelmingly. When they manipulate elections, they need the power vertical that can control the

campaign machine and the electoral body. If they could not control the campaign machine and the electoral body, then it would not be easy to manipulate elections.

To increase vertical power, the Russian leaders form a symbiotic relationship with corrupt elites. There are two types of elites with which political leaders in Russia have been associated: *oligarchs* and *siloviki*. *Oligarchs* are business elites who have rapidly acquired wealth since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. *Siloviki* are politicians from military and security agencies. Political leaders in Russia manage economic issues with the help of *oligarchs* and maintain social order with the help of *siloviki* (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 105).

If the governance strategy of the Russian political leaders is to control the various apparatuses consistently with the use of vertical power, how is Russia different from other countries? It is plausible that every political leader wants vertical power. Checks and balances prevent political leaders in democratic countries from having vertical power, but political leaders in authoritarian countries can fortify their vertical power due to a lack of checks and balances. If so, what accounts for the uniqueness of the Russian governance strategy? The governance strategy of the Russian political leaders is different from that of the Chinese political leaders although these countries have authoritarian features. Compared to the Chinese political leaders, which this essay will discuss in the next chapter, the Russian leaders have no powerful parties. They have a political party, United Russia, but compared to the Communist Party of China, this ruling party is not powerful.

Unlike Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin has no strong party that supports him in managing everything. The ruling party, United Russia, was established in 2001 after Vladimir Putin's first presidential election (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 107). Unlike China, Russia is not a party state. United Russia helps Vladimir Putin to win elections, but this ruling party has no capacity to control various apparatus effectively. Moreover, Vladimir Putin does not need the party badly. For instance, in 2018, Vladimir Putin ran for president as an independent candidate unaffiliated with United Russia (Ellyatt, n.d.).

Vladimir Putin does not have a one-party system as Xi Jinping has (Polyakova & Taussig, 2018). Ostensibly, Russia is a democratic country. Its power is divided into the legislative, the judicial, and the administrative branches, which means that the present political system in Russia does not allow the ruling party to control the government absolutely. A Russian ruling party cannot give the Russian political leaders the power to control everything. While the Chinese leaders control everything in the name of the party, the Russian leaders control their elites personally.

The governance strategy of the Russian political leaders is also different from that of the Indian political leaders. First, the Russian political leaders are not much interested in winning elections, which is the governance strategy of the Indian leaders. Winning elections is already guaranteed to the Russian leaders. On the contrary, the Indian political leaders try to win elections because it is the source of their legitimacy.

Second, the Russian leaders do not think that *oligarchs* and *siloviki* are their friends. These corrupt elites are their subordinates, and the relationship is vertical. If these elites do not show loyalty, then political leaders in Russia construe them as traitors.



Vladimir Putin has mentioned the gravity of betrayal many times, and many betrayers who fled to Western countries were assassinated (Higgins, 2018). On the contrary, the Indian political leaders' relationship with political allies is not vertical. Their allies are not their subordinates, but their friends.

## **Anti-Corruption Policies**

### *Political Leaders and Anti-Corruption Policies*

Since 2000, political leaders in Russia have adopted some anti-corruption laws and plans. In August 2008, Dmitry Medvedev declared that he would fight corruption in an effort to generate foreign investment (Levy, 2008). A Presidential decree, *On Measures to Combat Corruption*, was promulgated, and it approved the National Anti-Corruption Plan (Ageev & Kuzmenko, 2016, p. 2924). This plan included three sub-plans: giving incentives to upright officials, punishing corrupt employees, and building a culture of zero tolerance to corruption (Man, 2009, p. 31). He also enacted three anti-corruption laws (Man, 2009, p. 31). The name of the main law, *On Combating Corruption*, was enacted in December 2008 (Ageev & Kuzmenko, 2016, p. 2924). This law forced public officials to disclose their assets to the public (Man, 2009, p. 31). In 2010, another Presidential decree, *the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and the National Anti-Corruption Plan for years 2010-2011*, was issued (Ageev & Kuzmenko, 2016, p. 2924).

Dmitry Medvedev, however, failed to reduce corruption. In January 2011, he confessed that these policies had not curbed corruption significantly (Tulaeva, 2011, p.

9). Vladimir Putin is no different from Dmitry Medvedev. Vladimir Putin declared that he would fight corruption and establish the rule of law, but corruption has not significantly decreased (Man, 2009, p. 25; Orttung, 2006, p. 1).

The efforts of the Russian political leaders to reduce corruption is in vain. They have enacted anti-corruption laws and established plans, but they have not adopted other measures to reduce corruption such as empowering civil society and guaranteeing the freedom of the media (Man, 2009, p. 26). Rather, they have weakened civil society. Without anti-corruption watchdogs, the government has been free from public scrutiny (Man, 2009, p. 31).

Why do political leaders in Russia fail to reduce corruption? The first reason for this failure is that these policies have not gone beyond the level of rhetoric. There are no specific, concrete plans for implementing anti-corruption policies. The second reason is that the Russian leaders focus only on enacting laws. They are not interested in action.

### *Types of Anti-Corruption Policies*

Political leaders in Russia do not seem to be interested in anti-corruption measures. They have enacted some anti-corruption laws, but there are no systematic approaches to fight corruption. There are indeed some provisions for punishing corrupt actors in Russia. By *Article 209 and 291 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation*,

taking bribes is prohibited.<sup>78</sup> This law also mentions embezzlement.<sup>79</sup> However, these provisions are nothing but basic criminalization.

While the Russian leaders focus mainly on basic criminalization, freedom of information is not fully guaranteed. Before 2009, there were no freedom of information laws in Russia. In January 2009, the Lower House, *Duma*, passed a bill to guarantee the freedom of information (Right2INFO.org, 2009). This bill, which is called “*On providing access to information on the activities of government bodies and bodies of local self-government*,” has been in effect since 2010 (University College of London, 2011).

Although Russia now has a freedom of information act, the effectiveness of this law is elusive (University College of London, 2011). According to the law, restricted information will not be released.<sup>80</sup> However, there are no definitions of restricted information. Moreover, public officials tend to ignore this law when citizens request information (University College of London, 2011).

Russia also has no comprehensive whistleblower protection laws. The Russian anti-corruption laws have not mentioned the protection of general whistleblowers (Shvets, Maximenko, & Klutchareva, 2017). The law can protect only public officials. *Article 9 of On Combating Corruption* provides that public officials should be protected when they report corruption (Lubitzsch, 2018).<sup>81</sup> In contrast, citizens cannot be protected by this law. In 2017, the government proposed a draft law that includes protection for

---

<sup>78</sup> The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 1996, Article 290 and 291.

<sup>79</sup> The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, 1996, Article 160.

<sup>80</sup> *On providing access to information on the activities of government bodies and bodies of local self-government*, 2009, Article 20.

<sup>81</sup> *On Combating Corruption*, 2008, Article 9.

whistleblowers who are not civil servants, but the bill has not been passed yet (Lubitzsch, 2018). Moreover, there are no provisions that explain how the government protects whistleblowers.

Retaliation against whistleblowers is also common. The Kremlin does not protect whistleblowers, but rather punishes them. For example, Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer, found that police officers, tax officials, and bankers were involved in 230 million dollars tax fraud (Aldrick, 2009). After whistleblowing, he was charged with tax evasion, and he died in prison in November 2009 (Barry, 2009). Many whistleblowers in Russia have been falsely charged or threatened to be killed.

Additionally, the independence of the anti-corruption agency is not guaranteed in Russia. In 2007, Vladimir Putin created the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor General (Galeotti, 2010). In 2011, the Investigative Committee was established, and Dmitry Medvedev appointed Alexander Bastrykin as the head of this anti-corruption agency (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 184). These anti-corruption agencies are not free from the pressure of the President. The President appoints the head of the agency, and the agency is instructed by the President (Galeotti, 2010). Thus, the investigations performed by these agencies are also not free from politics.

There is no independence of the judiciary, and the court is not interested in punishing corruption (Man, 2009, p. 28). Many experts argue that Russia should guarantee the independence of the judiciary (Pomeranz, 2013). Vladimir Putin's reform, however, is going in a different direction. In 2013, he suggested that the commercial courts and the general courts should be under a single supreme court (Pomeranz, 2013).

This plan would weaken the independence of the judiciary because the vertical power of the supreme court would be fortified (Pomeranz, 2013). Moreover, the judges have decided cases according to the preference of the Russian political leaders. For instance, the court ruled that the decision of the Central Election Commission, which disqualified Alexei Navalny from running in the presidential election of 2018, was valid (Luhn, 2017; Soldatkin & Osborn, 2017). If the judiciary were independent, then whistleblowers and anti-corruption activists would not be punished.

Also, the political leaders in Russia are not interested in promoting education as a tool for reducing corruption. While the Investigative Committee punishes some corrupt officials to instill discipline in the ranks of public officials, there is no education to discipline public servants. The Kremlin is also not interested in educating and enlightening citizens about how to fight corruption. In 2016, the government announced that anti-corruption lessons would be taught in schools, but there are no specific plans for it (Sharkov, 2016).

Furthermore, empowering civil society is not an anti-corruption policy that the Russian leaders consider. Experts suggest that the empowerment of civil society is important to curb corruption in Russia (Orttung, 2006, p. 5). The Russian leaders, however, are hardly interested in working with civil society to fight corruption (Man, 2009, p. 40). They do sometimes use non-profit organizations when they can control these organizations. One such organization, the All Russian Popular Front, was established in 2011 (Monaghan, 2017, p. 58). Formally, the main purpose of this organization is to build a bridge between the government and civil society, but the real

purpose is to work for Vladimir Putin (Monaghan, 2017, p. 58). It is a state-friendly agency. Vladimir Putin has supported this organization, and the All Russian Popular Front has helped him to maintain his high popularity (Monaghan, 2017, p. 58).

Political leaders in Russia also control the media. The media in Russia has no capacity to detect corruption (Orttung, 2006, p. 2). The main television networks and the print media are controlled by Kremlin-friendly companies, such as Gazprom (Orttung, 2006, p. 3). The media serves the government as its propaganda agency (Kolesnikov, 2016). If the media does not follow the guidelines given to it by the Kremlin, then it will be suppressed (Man, 2009, p. 28).

**Figure 7** Evaluating Anti-Corruption Policies in Russia




Figure 7 shows the characteristics of anti-corruption policies in Russia. The Russian government has enacted some anti-corruption laws, but these laws are not effective because there are no specific provisions. The independence of anti-corruption institutions is not guaranteed. The Kremlin is not interested in educating subordinates and

citizens to fight corruption. The Russian leaders control civil society and the media, but they do not support them when they act as watchdogs. Thus, they are not interested in fighting corruption seriously.

## Conclusion

To increase the vertical of power, the Russian leaders form a symbiotic relationship with corrupt elites. There are two types of elites with which political leaders in Russia have been associated: *oligarchs* and *siloviki*. *Oligarchs* are business elites who have rapidly acquired wealth since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. *Siloviki* are politicians from military and security agencies. Political leaders in Russia manage economic issues with *oligarchs* and maintain social order with *Siloviki* (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 105).

How can the Russian leaders control *oligarchs* and *siloviki*? They use a carrot and stick scheme. When corrupt elites show a strong loyalty, the Russian leaders can tolerate corruption and allow their subordinates plunder the state. (Schulze & Zakharov, 2018, p. 2). If elites do not show loyalty, then they are deemed corrupt and prosecuted (Schulze & Zakharov, 2018, p. 2).

The Russian political leaders reward their subordinates for loyalty. In 2013, Vladimir Putin made a new regulation that allowed the president to dismiss elected governors and also select the candidates for elections (Carbonnel, 2013). Vladimir Putin has since dismissed former governors and appointed the new governors (Monaghan, 2017, p. 56). In 2016, Aleksei Diumin, Vladimir Putin's former bodyguard for 15 years,

was appointed as the governor of Tula province (Kashin, 2016). Andrei Turchak, whose father was Vladimir Putin's judo sparring partner, was selected as the governor of Pskov province (Kashin, 2016).

Meanwhile, some big names who showed disloyalty were punished. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former chairman of Yukos oil company from 1997 to 2004, was arrested because Vladimir Putin asserted that this oligarch was related to corruption (Man, 2009, p. 29). However, experts believed that Mikhail Khodorkovsky went to jail, not because of corruption, but because of his lack of loyalty (Man, 2009, p. 29). In 2013, Boris Berezovsky, one of the most famous oligarchs, escaped to the United Kingdom to avoid persecution related to his opposition to Vladimir Putin (Edward, Verkaik, & Williams, 2013; Tsygankov, 2014, p. 106). Both of these men were punished not because of corruption, but because of disloyalty.

When the Russian leaders fortify their vertical power with a carrot and stick scheme, fighting corruption is not an ultimate goal (Clarkson, 2018, p. 28). Rather, corruption is one of the key tools that this regime uses to manage Russia (Pavroz, 2017). The Russian government can be construed as a corrupt kleptocracy (Healy & Ramanna, 2013). Malgin (2014) asserts that "Corruption is actually the backbone of President Vladimir Putin's power vertical." Corrupt officials are rarely punished (Schulze & Zakharov, 2018, p. 2). The Russian leaders allow the elites to loot the country (Dawisha, 2015, p. 3).

Corruption in Russia can furthermore be construed as "neo-feudalism" (Inozemtsev, 2011). The power vertical is closely related to corruption (Inozemtsev,



2011). Bribes should be offered to bosses as verification of their unconditional loyalty (Inozemtsev, 2011). Thus, corruption has a positive effect on maintaining the loyalty of subordinates in Russia (Schulze & Zakharov, 2018, p. 2).

In sum, the Russian leaders refuse to adopt anti-corruption policies that have a negative effect on their vertical power and their symbiotic relationship with corrupt elites. They tolerate corruption to help elites accumulate wealth. Anti-corruption activists have asked the Kremlin to adopt institutional reforms, but the Russian leaders are not interested in adopting anti-corruption policies that might have a negative effect on the support of the elites (Krastev, 2016).

## CHAPTER 6: CHINA

### Overview

Corruption remains endemic and rampant in China (Lee, 2017, p. 1). According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators 2015, China was ranked 105<sup>th</sup> out of 209 countries, and its score was -0.27 on a scale of -2.5 to 2.5 in Control of Corruption Index (World Bank, 2018). In 2016, the Pew Research Center released a survey that revealed that four out of five Chinese people believe corruption is widespread in their country (Lockett, 2016). The expected cost of corruption in China is 86 billion dollars a year (Wang, 2017).

The political leaders who exercise power within China have introduced strong anti-corruption campaigns. These campaigns focus mainly on punishment. However, leaders refuse to adopt other anti-corruption policies, such as increasing transparency, protecting whistleblowers, and empowering civil society, although these policies are highly recommended by experts. How can we explain this preference of anti-corruption policies in China?

To answer this question, this chapter explores the governance strategy of political leaders in China. A governance strategy is a grand plan that is selected by political leaders to fortify and then maintain their power within national affairs (Roberts, 2018, p. 10). Political leaders face and respond to international, social, economic, and political circumstances. Their responses are various and partly determined by the fact that political leaders are power maximizers. Their main interests - to maximize their power - lead them

to choose a certain response. To make these responses effective, leaders rely on their governance strategy. Even when they have not clearly mentioned what are their governance strategies, observing their reactions enables us to sketch these strategies.

When we understand the governance strategies of political leaders, we can predict their policy choices. Because they need their governance strategies to respond to their circumstances, it is in their interest to fortify those governance strategies. If they have a powerful governance strategy, then their responses will be effective. How can they strengthen their governance strategy? They fortify their governance strategy by choosing policies that are consistent with that strategy. Political will, the willingness of a political leader to adopt and implement a certain policy, is highly associated with governance strategy. If a policy is not consistent with their governance strategies, then their political will to adopt this policy will be diminished. If a policy is consistent with their governance strategies, then their political will to adopt this policy will increase.

Therefore, understanding the governance strategies of leaders also helps us explain their preferences for anti-corruption policies. When corruption is rampant, experts recommend that political leaders adopt a general anti-corruption toolkit that consists of various anti-corruption policies. Political leaders, however, tend not to follow the instructions of the experts to the letter. Although experts emphasize the importance of a holistic approach to fighting corruption, political leaders often select a certain policy in the toolkit and refuse to adopt the other policies. Their preference is based on their evaluation of anti-corruption policies in relation to the impact of those policies on their governance strategy. A leader's political will to adopt anti-corruption policies decreases

when those policies are not consistent with his or her governance strategy. Likewise, an anti-corruption policy that is consistent with the governance strategy is more likely to be implemented. Thus, this chapter explains the circumstances in China, China's governance strategy, and the leaders' preferred anti-corruption policies.

To understand the governance strategy of political leaders in China, we should first understand the circumstances that its political leaders face. Internationally, tensions between China and neighboring countries have become increasingly visible. To handle these conflicts, China uses military expansion and aggressive diplomacy. China selects this approach because it wants to be great again. This dream has a positive effect on internal cohesion and patriotism.

Internally, China has problems with regions that ask for autonomy and independence. China wants to maintain social cohesion and has not let Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong become independent. The Chinese political leaders believe that the demands for independence are closely related to domestic turbulence, which they fear could lead to the collapse of the current political system in China. The country has also faced public outrage, which it has sought to pacify while simultaneously suppressing civil society to stabilize society.

Economically, China is worried about their economy slowing. China needs foreign investments to maintain a high level of economic growth. Political leaders in China know that a strong economy has a positive effect on maintaining internal order and believe that their legitimacy relies heavily on economic growth (Economy, 2016). The high level of economic growth is essential for convincing the Chinese people that the

China model is superior to other economic models. To boost the economy, the Chinese government maintains state capitalism.

Politically, the fragility of the political system seems to be increasing. Since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, the sustainability of the Chinese political system has been controversial (Ringgen, 2016, p. 169). To increase its sustainability, political leaders in China have tried to fortify the present political system (Hu, 2015). A transition from the present authoritarianism to democracy is too dangerous for the Chinese leaders, and the present Chinese political system has worked relatively well.

These reactions indicate that the governance strategy of the Chinese political leaders is to fortify the power of the party. Because the party is the core of the system, it must be preserved to maintain the current political system. Furthermore, to pursue military expansion and aggressive diplomacy, political leaders in China need the support of the party, which controls the military. The party also controls the media and coercive agencies, which are needed to maintain internal order. Additionally, the party influences bureaucrats and businesspeople, who are necessary to maintain state capitalism. To make China great again, maintain social cohesion, control the media and civil society, maintain internal order, and keep the present political system working well, The Chinese political leaders need the party. To fortify their power within the party and the power of the party as a whole, leaders should retaliate against their enemies in the party and abandon democratic measures.

Regarding anti-corruption measures, while the Chinese political leaders focus on criminalization and discipline their subordinates, they do not want to empower civil

society and the media. China has a strong investigative agency, but it is not independent. China disciplines officials, not citizens. Political leaders in China want the media to conduct propaganda in the interests of the Chinese government, but they do not want to grant the media autonomy.

Why do political leaders in China implement incomplete anti-corruption policies?

The anti-corruption policy preferences in China can be explained by the impact of anti-corruption policies on the power of the party. The Chinese political leaders have punished officials because punishment has a positive effect on increasing their power in the party. However, they refuse to adopt Western prescriptions including increased transparency and democratic accountability because these policies might have a negative effect on the power of the party.

The rest of this chapter explains the conditions that political leaders in China face. After reviewing the international, social, economic, and political circumstances, this chapter explicates the governance strategy of the Chinese political leaders. Anti-corruption policies in China are introduced and evaluated. Finally, this chapter explains why the Chinese political leaders have inadequately adopted anti-corruption policies.

## **Conditions Faced by China's Leaders**

### *International Affairs*

Internationally, tensions between China and neighboring countries have become increasingly visible. For example, China is not comfortable with the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. In July 2016,

South Korea approved the United States' deployment of the THAAD system (Ryall, 2017). In September 2017, the THAAD launchers were finally deployed (Lee & Griffiths, 2017). The Korean government announced that THAAD would be a missile defense system to prepare for the possibility of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (hereafter North Korea) nuclear attack (panda, 2017). China has not believed South Korea's explanation. China perceives that THAAD can detect Chinese missiles and curb its military power (Diaz & Shuai, 2017).

This story is only one example of the conflicts that China faces. Tensions between China and the Philippines were the reason why U.S. troops were brought back to the Philippines. In March 2016, the United States and the Philippines agreed that five U.S. military bases would be established near the South China Sea (Tilghman, 2016). In January 2017, according to the Philippine government, the United States would upgrade these military bases. This territorial dispute is not a new issue. In the 1990s, there were several clashes in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines (Rowan, 2005, p. 421). China also has many territorial disputes with Malaysia, the Nation of Brunei (hereafter Brunei), and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (hereafter Vietnam) in this area (Glaser, 2012, p. 1).

Within these situations, China tries to increase its influence over other states by using military expansion and aggressive diplomacy. China is not the only state that is worried about THAAD; Russia has also criticized its deployment. However, their reactions are different (Lee & Griffiths, 2017). While Russia does not put their words into action, China has retaliated against South Korea.

To punish South Korea for implementing the THAAD system, China boycotted South Korean products. Since China is the biggest trading partner of South Korea, the repercussions of economic retaliation are fatal (Kim, 2017). In August 2017, the Hyundai Motor Group, a South Korean multinational automotive conglomerate, was forced to discontinue production in China (Mullen, 2017). In the second quarter, sales of their vehicles plummeted by sixty-four percent compared with the previous year, mainly due to the Chinese boycott of their products (Mullen, 2017). China also banned their people from touring South Korea (Diaz & Shuai, 2017). According to the Economic Research Institute of the Industrial Bank of Korea, the damage to South Korea was estimated to be at least 7.69 billion dollars (Nguyen, 2017).

Interestingly, South Korean business people are not the only victims of this retaliation. Many Chinese business people have also suffered from this boycott because China and South Korea are deeply connected economically. Some Chinese scholars argue that this retaliation is not a helpful solution to the THAAD problem. Jia Qingguo, the Associate Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, argued that this retaliation would have a negative effect on China (Jae-hyuk Park, 2017). Eventually, in October 2017, China and South Korea announced that they would normalize their relationship (Kim, 2017). However, this agreement does not guarantee that China's retaliation will never happen again.

This story is only one example of the Chinese way to deal with international conflicts. There are many other cases of China's retaliation. When Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese anti-communist, won the Nobel peace prize, China banned Norwegian salmon imports



(Diaz & Shuai, 2017). In another instance, China punished Japan by prohibiting Chinese companies from exporting rare minerals to them, although the Chinese government denied it had done minerals so (Aredy, Fickling, & Shirouzu, 2010). This sanction began because Japanese patrol vessels arrested the captain of a Chinese fishing boat in the waters of the Senkaku islands (Aredy et al., 2010).

Economic sanctions are not the only way China retaliates against other states. In 2015, a military policy document issued by Xi Jinping proclaimed that it is time for China to manage the ocean strategically (French, 2017, p. 272). China's strategy dealing with the South China Sea disputes is to use military expansion and aggressive diplomacy for strengthening its claims (Fravel, 2011, p. 292). China has continued to threaten military action against the Philippines although the Permanent Court of Arbitration dismissed China's claims to the South China Sea (Chandran, 2017). China has also continuously violated Japanese territory in the East China Sea and has asserted that it is justified in occupying Japanese territory in the waters of the Senkaku islands (Shirk, 2008, p. 4).

In 2016, China spent 144 billion dollars fortifying military power (Buckley & Myers, 2017). Xi Jinping has increased military spending from 1.82 percent of the GDP to 1.92 percent (Griffiths, 2017). China is a big and powerful state, and its power is not limited to its economics (Ringgen, 2016, p. 170). China also uses military expansion to threaten neighboring countries.

Why does China pursue military expansion and aggressive diplomacy? China wants to be great again, at least in Asia and the Western Pacific (Buckley, 2018; French,

2017, p. 11; Roberts, Armijo, & Katada, 2018, p. 115). The name of China in its native language is “Zhongguo,” which means “the central state.”<sup>82</sup> Once upon a time, China was believed to be the center of the world in Asia (French, 2017, p. 3). For a long time, China had influenced neighboring countries politically, economically, and culturally (French, 2017, p. 5). The foreign policy of the Chinese dynasties was based on managing barbarians (French, 2017, p. 6).

For much of its history, China was the sole superpower in Asia, but China today is not the superpower that it once was. The Opium War was the beginning of their Century of Humiliation, the period of intervention by Western powers and Japan in China (Schiavenza, 2013). Deng Xiaoping, the former Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China from 1978 to 1989, asserted that China should keep “a low profile in international affairs” until it gained strength (Wang, 2011, p. 70). In the 1980s, in order to maintain friendly relations with other countries, China did not show aggressive diplomacy (Wang, 2011, p. 69). In the 1990s, China’s strategy in the South China Sea was to delay the resolution of the dispute (Fravel, 2011, p. 292).

China’s strategy, however, has changed since its power has increased. China believes that it is time for it to great again in Asia. As China has been stronger than expected for decades, it has asserted more aggressive diplomacy. At the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum in 2011, Yang Jiechi, the former Foreign Minister of China, made the disrespectful statement: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact” (Kurlantzick, 2011). Thus, the

---

<sup>82</sup> The full name is “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo.”

aggressive diplomacy of China is based on its belief that it is now resurrected as the major superpower in Asia. It seems that China is trying to subjugate neighboring states as the Chinese dynasties had done.

Why does China want to be great again? Why does China pursue this dream of expansion? This dream has a positive effect on internal cohesion. The goal of Chinese foreign policy is related to the national affairs of China (French, 2017, p. 8). Some Chinese scholars argue that although China maintains a low profile, Chinese people should maintain “self-confidence, self-respect, and self-strength” (Zhang, 2012, p. 15).<sup>83</sup> Aggressive diplomacy and military expansion can be construed as signals sent not only to neighboring countries, but also to the Chinese people. The message is that Chinese people should be proud of their country because of its power. Thus, aggressive diplomacy and military expansion have a positive effect on boosting patriotism.

### *Social Affairs*

Internally, China has problems with regions that ask for independence. Tibetans have called for independence from China for a long time. The Chinese army defeated the Tibetan army in 1950. In 1951, China asked Tibet to form a treaty called the Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (Goldstein, 1991, p. 45).<sup>84</sup> In 1959,

---

<sup>83</sup> Deng Yingchao, the wife of Zhou Enlai, advocated “four selves”: “self-confidence, self-respect, and self-strength, and self-independence” (Lin, 1999, p. 83). Zhou Enlai was the first Premier of China from 1949 to 1976.

<sup>84</sup> Here are the first three points.

- 1) The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the family of the Motherland the People's Republic of China (PRC).
- 2) The local government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defenses.
- 3) In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

protesters and Tibetan rebel forces fought against Chinese troops in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet (Jian, 2006, p. 54).<sup>85</sup> The uprising ended in defeat for Tibetan forces. The fourteenth Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetans, who claimed that the treaty was legally invalid, fled to India after this uprising (Jian, 2006, p. 54). Tibet's resistance, however, is not over. In March 2008, hundreds of Tibetan monks in Lhasa demonstrated against China and commemorated the 49<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising (CNN, 2017a). Since the 2008 Tibetan Uprising, more than 150 Tibetans have set themselves on fire in a strong protest against the One-China policy, which is the assertion that the independence of regions in China cannot be allowed (Carrico, 2017).

Tibet is not the only region that calls for independence. Xinjiang, a provincial-level autonomous region of China, is another region that has continued to ask for independence.<sup>86</sup> In July 2009, more than 1,000 people demonstrated to ask for independence in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang. This event was the biggest demonstration in Xinjiang, and the largest clash since the 2008 Tibetan Uprising (Wong, 2009). Since the Urumqi Uprising, terror has continued in Xinjiang. In December 2016, suicide bombers attacked a government building in the region. Due to this attack, one bystander was killed, and three people were wounded (Reuters, 2016).

Hong Kong is another region that asks for autonomy. On June 4<sup>th</sup>, 2009, about 150,000 citizens gathered to commemorate the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre at Hong Kong's Victoria Park (Bradsher, 2009). In 2014, thousands of citizens

---

(CPPCC), the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government (CPG) of the PRC.

<sup>85</sup> The official name of Tibet is the Tibet Autonomous Region.

<sup>86</sup> The official name of Xinjiang is the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

in Hong Kong protested in front of the Hong Kong government headquarters to ask for electoral freedom after the Chinese government announced that it would select the candidates for the Hong Kong chief executive (McCarthy, 2014). This protest continued for seventy-nine days and became commonly known as the Umbrella Movement because people used umbrellas as shields (Ramzy & Wong, 2015; Stout, 2015).

Within these situations, the Chinese government tries to hold regions that ask for autonomy under heavy control. In 1959, China ruthlessly suppressed Tibetans (Jian, 2006). The 2008 Tibetan unrest began with a peaceful demonstration, but it turned violent when demonstrators clashed with the police (The Economist, 2008). Special police teams were deployed, and thousands of people were arrested (Yardley, 2008). Tibetans' self-immolation has no impact on Chinese suppression; it does not cause China to falter at all. The Chinese government construes this self-immolation as a primitive religious practice (Carrico, 2017).

China has encouraged conflicts between Uighurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang to weaken the demand for independence in the region. The Chinese government has pushed Han Chinese to migrate to Xinjiang. Only six percent of people in Xinjiang were Han Chinese in 1949, but, in 2011, the number of Han Chinese had risen to thirty-eight percent (South China Morning Post, 2015). While Uighurs, the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang, desire independence, Han Chinese people do not want the province to be independent (Wong, 2009). The conflict between these ethnic groups has led to the deaths of hundreds of citizens (Reuters, 2016). China has also suppressed Uighurs heavily through direct intervention. During the 2009 Urumqi riots, more than 140 citizens

were killed, more than 800 protesters were injured, and hundreds of participants were arrested (Branigan, 2013). It is obvious that China will not allow Xinjiang to become independent (Li, 2016, pp. 355–356).

China did not falter at all during the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. After the end of the protest, the retaliation began. The police investigated protesters, and Joshua Wong, one of the protest leaders, was sentenced to six months in prison (Chan, 2017). Hong Kong's Umbrella Revolution failed to change the political system of China (Stout, 2015). The Chinese government has maintained the principle that the government selects candidates for the Hong Kong chief executive. Moreover, China asked Hong Kong to adopt the *National Anthem Law*, which sends people who disrespect the national anthem to jail (Polyakova & Taussig, 2018).

Why does China try to hold independence-seeking regions under heavy control? China wants to maintain social cohesion. The Chinese leaders construe regions that ask for independence as parts of China in Chinese history. China construes Tibet as an old territory of China. China claims that Tibet has been part of China since before the twentieth century. Xinjiang is not an exception. China argues that Xinjiang was a part of China after the Qing dynasty conquest of the area in 1759. Hong Kong was also a part of China that the Qin dynasty conquered. China had lost control of these territories during the Century of Humiliation. However, China has recovered control of them and refused to go back to the Century of Humiliation.

The Chinese political leaders believe that the demands of independence are closely related to domestic turbulence that can bring about China's collapse. In Chinese

history, domestic disorders led to the collapse of dynasties in Chinese history (Wang, 2011, p. 69). China consists of various nations such as Han, Manchurian, Mongol, Tibetan, and Turkic (French, 2017, p. 4). If China allows Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong to become independent, then other regions might ask for autonomy and independence.

For these reasons, China sticks to the One-China policy, the assertion that there is only one China in the world. With this idea, China does not admit that the Republic of China (hereafter Taiwan) is a state. Chinese people believe that Taiwan should be reunified (Shirk, 2008, p. 2). Maintaining internal stability is one of the imperative goals for China (French, 2017, p. 8). Because they seek to maintain social cohesion, China does not want regions of the country to ask for unacceptable conditions.

China faces another issue related to social affairs: public anger. For example, in 2011, a crowd in Wukan, a village of Guangdong province, clamored for justice for farmers whose land had been confiscated and sold to real estate developers by corrupt officials (Lim, 2011). The protest in Wukan was not an exceptional event. In 2012, citizens in Ningbo took to the streets to protest the expansion of a petrochemical plant (Caragliano, 2012). Zhou Ruijin, a former People's Daily deputy editor-in-chief, asserts that there were over 90,000 protests per year from 2007 to 2009 (Pomfret, 2011). The Chinese Academy of Governance estimates that the number of protests was 180,000 in 2010 (Pomfret, 2011). Wukan's protest is not over. In 2016, protesters in Wukan demonstrated again because of the same issue (Bandurski, 2016).

Within these situations, the Chinese government tries to tighten its control over civil society and the media. In June 2016, Lin Zulian, a chief of Wukan village, was arrested while he led protesters (Huang, 2016). In September 2016, riot police suppressed protesters in an attempt to quell Wukan's disturbance. Yet, because it is very dangerous for journalists to criticize the Chinese government, the media in China only reported the peaceful relations between the police and citizens (Bandurski, 2016). Forty-nine journalists were confined in 2015, and most of them are charged with subverting state power (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017).<sup>87</sup>

What leads China to seek control over civil society and the media? The Chinese leaders want to maintain peace. These protests might have a negative effect on political stability. If political leaders in China fail to put down uprisings against their political system, then they would lose power. If this turbulence spreads to other regions, then it might ignite a color revolution that is able to subvert the present political regime. Thus, political leaders in China do not want the protests to spread to other cities. Civil unrest may make China fragile.

### *Economic Affairs*

China has achieved remarkable economic development over the last three decades. In 1978, China adopted economic reform that opened the economy to foreign investment (Wu, Zhang, & Dong, 2013, p. 2301). From 1978 to 2007, the average GDP growth was about ten percent (Wu et al., 2013, p. 2301). China attracted foreign

---

<sup>87</sup> In 2016, 176 journalists are imprisoned over the world (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017). Thirty-seven is not a small number.



investment successfully and became the largest trading country in 2013 (Monaghan, 2014). However, the present economic success in China is not enough: Fifty-five million people living in rural areas remain in poverty (The World Bank, 2018). Thus, China continuously needs a high level of economic development.

Economic growth, however, has slowed in China (French, 2017, p. 270). In January 2017, the Chinese foreign exchange reserves decreased to less than three trillion dollars (Bradsher, 2017). To protect the value of the Chinese fiat money, China must sell copious dollars. However, due to its sale of dollars, China has lost one trillion dollars over three years (Bradsher, 2017). One of the main reasons for this is that economic growth has slowed, and many signs indicate that the Chinese economic growth has decelerated (Brodrick, 2014). Economists expect that the economic growth rate of China will drop below four percent before 2023 (French, 2017, p. 278).

The Chinese political leaders are concerned about economic growth. To boost the economy, the Chinese government relies on state capitalism. First, the Chinese government makes plans for economic development. China launched the 13<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan from 2016 to 2020 to maintain a high level of economic growth (The World Bank, 2018). The goal of this plan is to maintain 6.5 percent GDP growth (The World Bank, 2018). Second, the Chinese government tries to increase the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (Griffiths, 2017). At the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, Xi Jinping announced that the Chinese government would implement economic reforms to open its markets to foreign companies (Reuters, 2017). Economists, however, do not believe that China adopts free-

market capitalism completely. Xi Jinping also has emphasized the role of state capitalism to preserve state assets (Reuters, 2017).

Why is the Chinese government concerned about economic growth? Political leaders in China know that a healthy economy has a positive effect on maintaining internal order. A high level of economic growth helps political leaders fortify legitimacy. China's economic growth has enabled 800 million people to escape from poverty (The World Bank, 2018). Political leaders in China want to maintain a high level of economic growth because so that they do not lose the support of the people. Economic development is more important in China because political leaders in China believe that their legitimacy relies heavily on economic growth (Economy, 2016). Moreover, Chinese politicians believe that the level of economic growth can easily measure the performance of the Chinese government.

The legitimacy of the Chinese leaders does not come from votes. Political leaders in China are selected and supported by their ability (Zhang, 2012, p. 156). According to Bell (2016), China's political system is a meritocracy, which is the ideology that maintains that the most capable leaders should have the most political power (p. 6). In 2013, an animation video about Xi Jinping's success was released. This video asserts that the Chinese leaders are competitive because they have won various competitions (Jiang, 2013). The main message of the video is that the Chinese political system is perfectly capable of choosing the right person to manage the state. Political leaders in China try to make people believe that their leaders are capable. The failure to boost economic growth has a negative effect on this belief. Thus, the failure to boost economic development will

be negatively associated with the legitimacy of the party and the consolidation of the present political system (Dickson, 2016, pp. 1–2; French, 2017, p. 270).

Why do the Chinese leaders adhere to state capitalism? First, the Chinese leaders do not want to take a risk. China has achieved remarkable economic development over the last three decades with state capitalism. There are few success stories about the transition from state capitalism to free market capitalism. For example, in the 1990s, Russia implemented privatization, but it failed to generate desirable outcomes (McFaul, 1995, p. 210).

Second, they do not want to lose their influence over companies and financial systems. Privatization and the free market economy might weaken the power of the Chinese government because the government would not be able to control the private sector after completing privatization. Political leaders in China believe that free market capitalism without regulations is dangerous because it has an adverse effect on the power of the state. Economic growth is not their ultimate goal. They only need economic growth to fortify their legitimacy and power.

### *Political Affairs*

Politically, the fragility of the political system seems to be increasing. On April 15, 1989, Hu Yaobang, the former General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, died at the age of 73 (CNN, 2017b). Hu Yaobang, who had a reformative mindset, had been divested of his office in 1987 (Stallings, Gentry, & Luo, 2016). After his death, more than 100,000 students from forty different universities

congregated to commemorate him at Tiananmen Square (Stallings et al., 2016). Citizens and workers also participated in this demonstration (Stallings et al., 2016). They peacefully asked for a transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Ma, 2014). The Chinese government, however, did not allow the media not to broadcast this protest and dispatched 200,000 soldiers to quell it (Ma, 2014). On June 4<sup>th</sup>, 1989, the People's Liberation Army opened fire on protesters (Stallings et al., 2016). More than 10,000 protesters were arrested, and several hundreds of people died (CNN, 2017).

Since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, the sustainability of the Chinese political system has been controversial (Ringgen, 2016, p. 169). Some researchers believe that the future of China will not be bright. Meritocracy in China might not work properly (Bell, 2016, p. 1). The lack of legitimacy is one of the weak points of the China model (Bell, 2016, p. 8). In the long-term, if China does not give suffrage, it is not easy to maintain legitimacy (Bell, 2016, p. 152). Scholars assert that China should adopt several democratic systems such as the rule of law and freedom of speech to increase the sustainability of the China model (Bell, 2016, p. 152).

Within these situations, political leaders in China try to fortify the present political system (Hu, 2015). While they adopt some liberal market reforms, they refuse to adopt democratic reforms (Wang, 2014). After the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989, one of the top priorities of China is political stability (Carrico, 2017). Political leaders in China do not allow their people to reveal any thoughts related to alternative political systems (Stallings et al., 2016). At the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, Xi Jinping announced that China would be a modern socialist state with the guidance of the party (Kuhn, 2017). He

also mentioned that people in China should have confidence in the Chinese political system (Kuhn, 2017). He declared that the Chinese government would not tolerate “any speech or action that weakens, distorts or negates the party’s leadership, or China’s socialist system” (Kuhn, 2017).

Why do the Chinese leaders seek to maintain their present political system? First, they feel that a transition from the present authoritarianism to democracy is not a good option (Ringgen, 2016, p. 170). The transition might not guarantee political efficacy, the citizen’s trust in the government, and stability. Many experts who live in China assert that democracy is not a good option for China due to the low level of education in rural areas (Bell, 2016). Furthermore, there are few success stories about a transition from authoritarianism to democracy. China does not want to repeat the mistakes that the Soviet Union made.

The transition is also potentially dangerous for the Chinese leaders. An example of a successful transition can be South Korea, but political leaders in China know that the end of the former authoritarian leaders was not bright. Chun Doo Hwan, the former President of South Korea from 1979 to 1988 was sent to jail when Kim Young Sam, a pro-democracy leader and the former President of South Korea from 1993 to 1998, was elected (Brademas & Heimann, 1998). Since the Chinese political leaders are aware of this cautionary tale, there is no strong motivation for them to make a move toward democracy.

Second, the present Chinese political system has worked relatively well. In 1989, many experts predicted that the Chinese Communist Party would not survive after the

Tiananmen demonstrations (Dickson, 2016, p. 1). Their expectation, however, turned out to be wrong (Zhang, 2012, p. 1). The party has survived (Dickson, 2016, p. 1). Moreover, some scholars believe that the Chinese political system is superior to democratic systems. Zhang (2012) argues that the East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan should abandon the Western political model and follow China because the Western political model makes the state more divided, more corrupt, and less productive (pp. 146–147).

### *Governance Strategy*

A governance strategy is a grand plan selected by political leaders to fortify and then maintain their power within national affairs (Roberts, 2018a, p. 10). The Chinese political leaders respond to international, social, economic, and political circumstances by using their governance strategy. Therefore, these circumstances affect the formation of the governance strategy in China. This section explains how various circumstances and leaders' subsequent reactions are related to the governance strategy of the Chinese political leaders.

To handle various issues that are related to international, social, economic, and political affairs, political leaders in China need the power of the party. Therefore, the governance strategy of the Chinese political leaders is to fortify the power of the party. Since political leaders in China use the power of the party in response to their circumstances, we can presume their governance strategy when we observe their responses to international, social, economic, and political circumstances.

First, in international affairs, political leaders in China need the power of the party to control the military. They challenge neighbor states with unilateralism and are not interested in keeping peace with other nations at the cost of the national interest. To maintain external security, China has increased defense spending. When they adopt military expansion and aggressive diplomacy, they need the power of the party to control the military. If they could not control the military, then they would not choose to pursue military expansion.

Second, in social affairs, political leaders in China need the power of the party to control the media and to suppress civil society. To maintain power and restrain internal conflict, China refuses to allow Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong become independent (Li, 2016, PP. 355–356). China controls the media and suppresses civil society because it does not want people to demand freedom actively (Li, 2016, p. 355). Furthermore, China does not want to promote human rights. For the political leaders, the sacrifice of ordinary citizens is an inevitable and negligible result of achieving political goals (Ringen, 2016, p. 170). When political leaders in China suppress protestors, they need the power of the party, which controls the media and coercive agencies. If they could not control the media and coercive agencies, then they would not try to suppress protestors severely.

Third, in economic affairs, political leaders in China need the power of the party to control their subordinates and private companies. To promote economic growth, China has adopted state capitalism. To maintain state capitalism, political leaders need to control their subordinates and private companies. Without control their subordinates and

private companies, which is guaranteed through the party, political leaders would not adhere to state capitalism.

Finally, in political affairs, political leaders in China need the power of the party to limit the fragility of the political system. They strive to maintain their political system because a transition from the present authoritarianism to democracy is dangerous. Additionally, the present political system has led China to become a strong and powerful state. To maintain the present political system, they need the power of the party.

To make China great again, to maintain social cohesion, to control the media and civil society, to maintain internal order, and to make the present political system work well, the Chinese leaders should control the military, coercive apparatuses, the media, private companies, and bureaucrats. To control each of these groups, political leaders in China need the power of the party. For this reason, it is in their interest to fortify the power of the party. The governance strategy of the Chinese political leaders is therefore different from that of the other authoritarian leaders.

Some researchers construe China as an authoritarian country, but China is not an ordinary authoritarian state (Shambaugh, 2016, p. xv). The political system of China is unique (Ringgen, 2016, p. xi). Today's Chinese political system is different from not only that of other authoritarian countries but also that of China in the past (Ringgen, 2016, p. xii). However, it is not easy to fully show the uniqueness of the Chinese political system because the decision-making process of Chinese politics is not open to outside observers (Li, 2016, p. 1). We do not precisely know "the black box manipulation" of China (Li, 2016, p. 1). However, according to Bell (2016), we have information about the party's



working process, and at least China is not “a bad authoritarian regime” such as North Korea (p. 180).

Some scholars construe the China model as a political meritocracy. According to Bell (2016), political meritocracy is “the idea that political power should be distributed in accordance with ability and virtue” (p. 6). In the China model, there is no clear distinction between the party members and public officials, so promotions from one group to the other can be made on merit (Bell, 2016, p. 4). The political leaders of China believe that political meritocracy helps the Chinese government hire competent people. The party has selected brilliant students as the party members, and it is expected that those students will become politicians or public officials in the future (Bell, 2016, p. 185). To become a high-ranking public official, they must climb step by step from the bottom (Bell, 2016, p. 186). Only selected people who show their ability to lead the organizations can get a chance to become the leading party members, such as the members of the party’s Central Committee and the Politburo (Bell, 2016, p. 186).<sup>88</sup>

Some experts assert that the China model is better than both democracy in developing countries and dictatorships in other countries (Bell, 2016, p. 4; Ringen, 2016, p. xi). They argue that the China model is superior to the democratic model of many developing countries because China has shown impressive economic success (Zhang, 2012, p. 14). Zhang (2012) asserts that, even though some scholars worry about the future of China, it will become the leader of the world because the Chinese model works successfully. The party also asserts that their meritocracy is superior to democracy (Bell,

---

<sup>88</sup> The Politburo is the executive committee for the party in communist states.

2016, p. 1). The Chinese government claims that the political system of China is more legitimate than that of other democratic countries (Bell, 2016, p. 1). In this point of view, China does not have to worry about the instability of its political system (Zhang, 2012, p. 1).

The fragility of the Chinese political system is controversial, but it is evident that the party is the main machine that controls China. Political leaders in China want to solve threats to its stability by using the power of the party. To that end, Xi Jinping has consolidated his political power through his party (Ringen, 2016, p. 169). Xi Jinping has three titles: the General Secretary of the Communist Party, President of the People's Republic, and Chairman of the People's Liberation Army (Babones, 2017). At the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, the party decided to put the term, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” into the constitution of the party (Aleem, 2017). Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Xi Jinping are the leaders whose names are in the constitution (Babones, 2017). Only two names have been added to the constitution while the leaders have been alive: Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping (Babones, 2017). The 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress shows that Xi-Jinping has successfully fortified his power in the party. Xi Jinping construes the party as the best tool for solving the problems that China and he face (Buckley, 2018).

## **Anti-Corruption Policies**

### *Political Leaders and Anti-Corruption Policies*

Since 2000, political leaders in China have launched strong anti-corruption campaigns that have focused on punishment. Hu Jintao, the former General Secretary of the Communist Party of China from 2002 to 2012, emphasized the severe impact of corruption on economic growth in China (Chicago Tribune, 2004). He proclaimed that the first and foremost political agenda would be combating corruption (OECD, 2005). In 2012, he also declared that he would fight corruption with the guidance of the party.

Xi Jinping, the incumbent President of the People's Republic of China, started a more powerful anti-corruption campaign to fight corruption (Li, 2016, p. 3). Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign was developed in 2012 (Giannetti, Liao, You, & Yu, 2017, p. 2). After the 18<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2012, Xi Jinping appointed Wang Qishan as the secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and ordered him to eliminate corruption (Quah, 2015, p. 4). Due to Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign, about 180,000 public officials were punished in 2013 (Li, 2016, p. 356; Yuen, 2014, p. 42). Thus, the Chinese political leaders have noticed the detrimental impact of corruption on society and economics, and they have done more than just talking about it. (Dai, 2010, p. 59; Ravi, 2015, p. 101).

However, the efforts of the Chinese political leaders to reduce corruption have failed to generate successful results. The level of corruption in China has not decreased. One of the reasons for this failure is the absence of a holistic approach. Although experts

recommend various anti-corruption policies, the Chinese political leaders are not interested in anti-corruption measures other than punishment. They rely heavily on anti-corruption campaigns with hard punishment and refuse to adopt the other types of anti-corruption policies.

### *Types of Anti-Corruption Policies*

The two pieces of Chinese legislation focusing on criminalization, The Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China and the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, contain anti-corruption provisions.<sup>89</sup> The constitution of the Communist Party of China deals with the structure of the CCDI and the accountability of the party members. According to the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, party members must obey the party discipline which includes the duty of integrity (Guo, 2009, p. 235).<sup>90</sup> These provisions focus mainly on punishment.

The criminal procedure of China is basically not much different from the system of Western countries. The public security organs, the People's Procuratorates, and the People's Courts are involved in criminal cases. The public security organs investigate criminal cases and arrest criminals.<sup>91</sup> The People's Procuratorates conduct investigations and prosecute criminals.<sup>92</sup> The People's Courts adjudicate

---

<sup>89</sup> Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People's Republic of China, 1993, Article 7, 8, 22, and 31. The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, 1997, Chapter VIII.

<sup>90</sup> The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 2012, Article 3.

<sup>91</sup> Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, 2012, Article 3.

<sup>92</sup> Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, 2012, Article 3 and Article 136.

criminal cases.<sup>93</sup> Only the people's procuratorates and the public security organs can arrest or detain people; other agencies do not have the right to do so (Wong, 2014).<sup>94</sup>

However, corruption cases follow a different process. The CCDI can investigate corruption cases without the support of the public security organs (Aredy, 2014). There is no rule of law in the process of the CCDI's investigation (Aredy, 2014). The CCDI has secret investigation teams which torture more than several thousand suspects to obtain confessions (Wong, 2014). For example, in 2013, Bo Xilai, the former secretary of the Communist Party's Chongqing branch, was detained by the CCDI and gave a confession (Yunshi, 2013). Thus, Xi Jinping's anti-corruption approach is not close to the legal system in China (Yuen, 2014, p. 41).

The CCDI can begin the initial stage of the verification when it notices that any party member has violated the party discipline.<sup>95</sup> When the CCDI receives complaints from whistleblowers, it starts preliminary examination (Yunshi, 2013). If the results of the examination show the need for an investigation, the CCDI converts the complaints into cases and investigates them (Yunshi, 2013). After the investigation, the CCDI transfers the cases to the public security agencies (Yunshi, 2013).<sup>96</sup>

The investigation process of the CCDI, the so-called 'Shuanggui,' is carried out in secret (Jacobs, 2012). The Shuanggui process is not close to the due process of law in China (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The CCDI can detain suspects for months, and the

---

<sup>93</sup> Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, 2012, Article 3.

<sup>94</sup> The Criminal Procedure Law, 2012, Article 3 in Chapter I.

<sup>95</sup> The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 2012, Article 44 in Chapter VIII.

<sup>96</sup> The public security organs are similar to the police.

suspects cannot receive the assistance of counsel for their defense (Areddy, 2014; Human Rights Watch, 2016). Legally, the CCDI only examines the party members (Quah, 2015, p. 25). However, the CCDI detains not only suspects but also their families if the suspects refuse to confess (Wong, 2014).

While punishment is a tool for fighting corruption in China, freedom of information is not fully guaranteed. In 2007, the State Council of China, also known as the Central People's Government, promulgated Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open Government Information. This FOIA-style law took effect on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2008. In this authoritarian country, enacting a freedom of information act was impressive (Xiao, 2013, p. 791). The Chinese government also issued new guidelines for increasing the transparency of the government organizations (Article 19, 2015).

This law has been criticized, however, because it is less progressive than other FOIA-style laws that have been adopted by local governments (Article 19, 2015). According to this law, public organizations must disclose information.<sup>97</sup> Citizens can ask the government organizations to provide information.<sup>98</sup> However, the scope of information is confined to certain categories, such as education, medical care, and public transportation.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, a number of requests for information have not been accepted (Freedominfo.org, 2012). While the government insists that eighty-five percent of the requests amongst 1.3 million cases were accepted, lawyers, scholars, and activists argue

---

<sup>97</sup> Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open Government Information, 2007, Article 6.

<sup>98</sup> Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open Government Information, 2007, Article 20.

<sup>99</sup> Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Open Government Information, 2007, Article 37.

that the actual figure is not close to this number; for example, only four of thirty-one departments answered requests related to toxic emissions in 2011 (Caragliano, 2012).

China has no comprehensive whistleblower protection laws, and retaliation against whistleblowers is common (Article 19, 2015). The CCDI reported that more than 300,000 complaints were received online from 2008 to 2012 (Reuters, 2013). Although the CCDI mentions that they can protect whistleblowers, whistleblowers do not trust the CCDI to keep that promise (Reuters, 2013). In 2016, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Finance announced that they would build strong regulations for protecting whistleblowers (VandePol, Wu, & Hui, 2016). Yet, people in China seem to doubt that they can be protected when they blow the whistle.

China has a strong anti-corruption agency, but it is not independent. The CCDI is the top and central anti-corruption agency in China (Yunshi, 2013). Founded in 1978, the current CCDI is the highest disciplinary body of the party (Guo, 2009, p. 239).<sup>100</sup> The CCDI oversees the party members (Becker, 2008, p. 289).<sup>101</sup> Its main function is to investigate those party members. Almost all public officials are the party members, so the CCDI investigates public officials effectively. For example, in 2004, the CCDI investigated 166,705 cases and disciplined 170,850 members of the party (Cheung, 2007, p. 55). About 200,000 people have been investigated by the CCDI over the past three decades (Giannetti et al., 2017, p. 7).

---

<sup>100</sup> The CCDI was established in 1949, but the party abolished the CCDI in 1969 due to the impact of the Culture Revolution (Guo, 2009, pp. 236–237).

<sup>101</sup> The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 2012, Article 44 in Chapter VIII.

Theoretically, the CCDI is an independent agency, but in actual practice it is not. The National Congress elects the members of the CCDI, whose term is five years. (Young, 1984, p. 50).<sup>102</sup> The party's Central Committee supervises the CCDI.<sup>103</sup> Yet the party's top leaders take *de facto* control of the CCDI. Xi Jinping can issue commands to Wang Qishan, the Secretary of the CCDI, to operate the Central Inspection Team at the CCDI (Aredy, 2014). Thus, Xi Jinping controls the CCDI.

Another anti-corruption agency is the Ministry of Supervision (MOS). In 1949, the People's Supervisory Commission was founded (Ma, 2008, p. 154). The commission was renamed the Ministry of Supervision in 1954 (Quah, 2015, p. 27). The MOS was abolished in 1959 and re-established in 1986 (Ma, 2008, p. 154). The MOS supervises public officials and probes their misconduct (Ma, 2008, p. 154).<sup>104</sup> The role of the MOS and that of the CCDI overlap because almost all public officials are party members (Quah, 2015, p. 28). In the China model, there is no clear distinction between the party members and public officials (Bell, 2016, p. 4). For this reason, the CCDI and the MOS were merged in 1993 (Quah, 2015, p. 28). Now, the MOS is part of the CCDI, and the CCDI controls the MOS (Guo, 2009, p. 233). The CCDI is superior to the MOS because of "the Party's unified leadership" (Ma, 2008, p. 154).

The National Bureau of Corruption Prevention (NBCP) was established in 2007 (Quah, 2015, p. 28). The primary purpose of the NBCP is to implement a comprehensive anti-corruption policy, not just punishment. The NBCP tries to prevent corruption by

---

<sup>102</sup> The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 2012, Article 43 in Chapter VIII.

<sup>103</sup> The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 2012, Article 43 in Chapter VIII.

<sup>104</sup> The Law of the People's Republic of China on Administrative Supervision, 1997, Chapter IV.



making anti-corruption agencies cooperate (Quah, 2015, p. 28). Ma Wen, the Deputy Secretary of the CCDI, was the Minister of Supervision and the head of the NBCP (Quah, 2015, p. 29). Her triple role likely helps the NBCP facilitate the cooperation among China's anti-corruption agencies.

However, it is not easy to find instances in which the NBCP's actions have curbed corruption or facilitated cooperation among the agencies. The first reason for this powerlessness is that the NBCP has no capacity to investigate corruption cases (Becker, 2008, p. 291). The second reason is that China might have created the NBCP not to fight corruption but to prepare for the inspection of the UN convention against corruption. The establishment of the NBCP might have been a symbolic event (Quah, 2015). Thus, the CCDI controls these two agencies, and political leaders in China control the CCDI.

Moreover, there is no independence of the judiciary in China (Wu & Keliher, 2015). Trials are not open to the public, and the conviction rate is higher than ninety-nine percent (Aredy, 2014). These illegal actions are hardly reported because the party controls Chinese media (Wong, 2014). The Chinese press cannot access the political decision-making process (Lev, 2004). The rule of law is not essential to this party-state (Wolf, 2016).

Public officials are disciplined strongly by the Chinese government. In 1998, the party issued "the Notification on Building a Target-based Responsibility System on Building Upright Party Style and Clean Government," which emphasized moral education for the party members (H. S. Chan & Gao, 2008, p. 101). In 2012, Xi Jinping adopted an eight-point code for public officials (Hoffmann, 2014; Jacobs, 2013).

According to the code, public officials cannot use luxury cars or receive extravagant presents (Yuen, 2014, p. 41). The members of the party must review their behavior and criticize others' misbehavior (Dai, 2013). One of the roles of the CCDI is to educate the party members to obey party discipline.<sup>105</sup> If the party members commit an infraction of the party rules, then the CCDI will punish them. In 2013, about 30,000 public officials were punished for violating the code (Hoffmann, 2014; Yuen, 2014, p. 42).

However, the Chinese government is not much interested in educating citizens. In 2007, the Ministry of Education launched a program, the Opinions of the Ministry of Education on Anticorruption and Integrity Education in University and Schools (UNODC, 2017). In 2008, the Ministry of Education issued the Guiding Outline for Anticorruption and Integrity Education in Universities and Schools to help schools effectively implement the program (UNODC, 2017). However, the program seems to be ineffective. Chinese students know that their parents bribe schools, and yet the Chinese government does not want them to become whistleblowers (Badkar, 2013).


Moreover, the Chinese government is not interested in empowering civil society and the media. Instead, they seek to maintain heavy control over both groups. Suppressing demonstrations is a hallmark of the Chinese government. To control the media, the Chinese government operates more than a dozen agencies, such as the Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department (Xu & Albert, 2017). More than two million employees monitor internet posts (Xu & Albert, 2017).

---

<sup>105</sup> The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 2012, Article 44 in Chapter VIII.

Figure 8 shows the characteristics of anti-corruption policies in China. While the Chinese government focuses on criminalization and disciplines subordinates, the government does not want to empower civil society and the media. Political leaders in China want the media to conduct propaganda in the interests of the Chinese government, but they do not want to grant the media freedom. They also control anti-corruption agencies and the judiciary. They have some programs for enlightening citizens, disclosing information, and protecting whistleblowers, but people do not believe that these policies work properly.

**Figure 8** Evaluating Anti-Corruption Policies in China



## Conclusion

Despite punishing corrupt officials harshly, China has failed to decrease the level of corruption (Fungáčová, Määttä, & Weill, 2016, p. 7). The efforts of the Chinese political leaders to reduce corruption are useless. For example, in 2012, Xi Jinping

emphasized the importance of curbing corruption, but there was no significant difference in the level of corruption between 2012 and 2016. In the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 2012, China was ranked 80<sup>th</sup> out of 176 countries, and its score was 39 on a scale of zero to 100 (Transparency International, 2018). In the CPI 2016, China was ranked 79<sup>th</sup> out of 176 countries, and its score was 40 on a scale of zero to 100 (Transparency International, 2018).

Despite Xi Jinping's strong anti-corruption campaign, corrupt officials have asked for more money (Anderlini, 2017b). The Chinese anti-corruption campaign has had the negative effect of mainly increasing the price of corruption. Despite severe punishments, corrupt officials, instead of changing their behavior, find ways to avoid leaving evidence. Xinhua, the official press agency of China, reported public officials' new maxim: "Eat quietly, take gently and play secretly" (Jacobs, 2013).

Many experts have tried to explain the failure of anti-corruption campaigns in China. They argue that punishment alone is not enough to combat corruption (H. S. Chan & Gao, 2008, p. 100; Lee, 2017, p. 7). Some of them assert that, without changing Chinese culture, curbing corruption may not be possible. According to them, Chinese culture has promoted corruption (Anderlini, 2017a; Lee, 2017, p. 3; Ravi, 2015, p. 101). The culture that generates corruption in China is the special relationship, the so-called 'Guanxi,' which is based on a repeated gift-giving practice (Lee, 2017, p. 1). Guanxi, therefore, has a negative effect on curbing corruption (Fungáčová, Määttä, & Weill,

2016, p. 7; Lee, 2017, p. 1; Ravi, 2015, p. 101).<sup>106</sup> Punishment cannot change the behavior of public officials because their behavior is deeply rooted in their culture.

Some experts argue that the political leaders of China adopted not only punishment, but also moral education as tools to curb corruption (Dai, 2013, p. 67). Although the present anti-corruption reforms have been adopted and implemented seriously, these reforms have failed to change the culture of public officials in China. The purpose of these reforms is not to change the culture but mainly to strengthen disciplines. Therefore, scholars insist that the Chinese government should adopt a much wider variety of anti-corruption policies.

Why do political leaders in China rely heavily on punishment? Why are they not interested in other types of anti-corruption policies? The preference of anti-corruption policies in China can be explained by the impact of anti-corruption policies on the power of the party. Xi Jinping has a strong will to punish officials because punishment has a positive effect on the power of the party. However, he has no political will to adopt Western prescriptions including increasing transparency and democratic accountability because these policies might have a negative effect on the power of the party.

Xi Jinping wants to purge political enemies and proclaimed that he would catch not only street-level bureaucrats but also political elites (Branigan, 2013). Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign is not neutral. The CCDI's attacks focus on former Party

---

<sup>106</sup> Guanxi is not closely related to Confucianism. Confucius philosophy does not generate corruption. Today's Chinese culture related to mass corruption is far from the teachings of Confucius.

leaders and their friends (Yuen, 2014, p. 42). The Chinese people believe that Xi is using the CCDI to retaliate against his political rivals (Schell, 2016).

Zhou Yongkang, the former Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China, was a “tiger” which Xi Jinping was hunting. When Zhou Yongkang was charged with corruption, he became the highest ranked public official convicted of corruption in the history of the People’s Republic of China (Ravi, 2015, p. 102; *The Economist*, 2015). In 2015, Zhou Yongkang was condemned to life in prison (*The Economist*, 2015).

Xi Jinping’s CCDI investigated not only Zhou Yongkang but also his relatives and friends. More than 300 suspects were related to Zhou Yongkang (Lim & Blanchard, 2014). *The Diplomat* says, “Xi Jinping may be mandating this because, for him, Zhou Yongkang and his allies are first of all expendable. They showed disloyalty during the leadership transition and backed the wrong horse” (Brown, 2014).

The wrong horse refers to Bo Xilai, the former Communist Party Secretary of Chongqing and the former member of the Central Politburo, who was a leading candidate for the next General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (Li, 2016, p. 2). Bo Xilai hailed from the political elite, and he conducted a robust anti-corruption campaign (Li, 2016, p. 2). He had become complacent, but his political ambition hit an unexpected snag when Wang Lijun, the former Chongqing police chief and Bo’s right-hand man, sought asylum at the U.S. consulate in 2012 (Li, 2016, p. 2). Wang revealed that Gu Kailai, Bo’s wife, was implicated in the assassination of Neil Heywood, a British businessman (Li,

2016, p. 2). Unfortunately, Zhou Yongkang was a well-known patron of Bo Xilai, and this incident led to Zhou Yongkang's downfall (Wu, 2015).

Zhou Yongkang's case is a strong signal to Xi Jinping's political enemies. Xi Jinping has successfully fortified his power in the party. In 2013, Xi Jinping created the Central National Security Commission and the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, both of which he chaired (Li, 2016, p. 3). Xi Jinping uses anti-corruption campaigns as a tool for retaliating against his enemies and fortifying his power.

However, retaliating against political enemies is not always the Chinese political leaders' preferred strategy. Xi Jinping's predecessors did not punish high-level politicians severely (Marquis & Yang, 2014). The former political leaders after Deng Xiaoping were not interested in catching "tigers." Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao did not attack big politicians because it might have had a negative effect on political stability. Jiang Zemin warned Xi Jinping and said, "the footprint of this anti-corruption campaign cannot get too big" (Anderlini & Rabinovitch, 2014).<sup>107</sup> Hu Jintao also warned Xi Jinping not to execute the anti-corruption campaign too rapidly and widely (Anderlini & Rabinovitch, 2014). By contrast, Xi Jinping, like Mao Zedong in the early 1950s, ignores his predecessors' advice and purges political enemies (Anderlini & Rabinovitch, 2014).

The main difference between Xi Jinping and the former political leaders is that while the former leaders had reliable political allies in the party, Xi Jinping does not. Xi

---

<sup>107</sup> Jiang Zemin and Zhou Yongkang had a close relationship (Anderlini & Rabinovitch, 2014).

Jinping wants to avoid attacks from his enemies. He seeks to plant his allies in top positions instead of his enemies. This way of fighting corruption fortifies his power in the party (Yuen, 2014, p. 41).

Political leaders in China also use anti-corruption policies to tame their subordinates. In 2016, CCTV broadcasted “Always on the Road,” a program about the end of corrupt officials and Xi Jinping’s strong will to fight corruption (Buckley, 2016). One of the primary goals of the video is to warn public officials not to break the rules. Many experts believe that the real purpose of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is to discipline the party members (Lockett, 2016). The management of 90 million party members is a great task for Xi Jinping (Wu & Keliher, 2015). Anti-corruption policies help political leaders control party members and public officials (Dai, 2013, p. 69). Even if Xi Jinping is reluctant to replace the present structure of the state with democratic systems, he can replace his subordinates with ease (Wu & Keliher, 2015).

Anti-corruption policies can also pacify the anger of people (Dai, 2013, p. 68). Xi Jinping fights corruption because if people refuse to tolerate corruption anymore, then they might subvert the current political system (Wolf, 2016). This is a common event because, in our modern states, people do not trust their politicians (Birch, Allen, & Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, 2017, p. 1). In China, cronyism had been rampant among people because big politicians were not being investigated. People did not believe Xi Jinping’s commitment to fighting corruption when he declared that he would catch “tigers,” but now, the public’s opinion has changed considerably (Marquis & Yang, 2014). People in China supported Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign when Zhou Yongkang was



punished (The Economist, 2015). Wo Qiang, a lecturer at Tsinghua University, argues that Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign is a populist policy because the news about punishing corrupt officials pacifies the anger of people (Branigan, 2013). According to the Pew Research Center, two-thirds of people in China answered that corruption would decrease for the next five years (Lockett, 2016).

Purging political enemies, taming subordinates, and calming the anger of people have a positive effect on increasing the power of the party. Thus, Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign has a positive effect on the consolidation of the party system (Li, 2016, p. 352). Governance strategy and the selection of anti-corruption policies are interrelated. Xi Jinping refuses to adopt anti-corruption policies that are closely related to democracy such as the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the media. Xi Jinping adopts anti-corruption policies not because he is a man of justice but because the policies are good for him politically.

Xi Jinping's efforts to fortify the power of the party have paid off. In February 2018, the party announced that Xi Jinping could stay in power without term limits (Buckley & Bradsher, 2018; Gallagher, 2018; Myers, 2018). The current constitutional law declares that the number of presidential terms is limited to two. The party will revise the constitutional law to abolish term limits. The position mentioned is the President of the People's Republic of China, but Xi Jinping has two other positions, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and there are no term limits (Buckley & Bradsher, 2018). Today, there are

no party members who are willing to oppose this constitutional revision (Buckley & Bradsher, 2018).

## **CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION**

### **Introduction**

The main research question in this dissertation has been why political leaders adopt and implement different anti-corruption policies. To answer this question, this essay has developed a model that deals with the motivation of political leaders. This model adopts a new concept, governance strategy, which can be defined as a grand plan to fortify a political leader's power within national affairs. Political leaders are power maximizers who want to maximize power to govern their people efficiently. They react to their international, social, economic, and political circumstances to maintain their power. To respond to these circumstances, they use governance strategies, and to react to the circumstances effectively, they seek to strengthen their governance strategies. They fortify their governance strategies by choosing policies that are consistent with those strategies. Therefore, if a new anti-corruption policy is consistent with a leader's governance strategy, then they have a strong political will to adopt this policy. Otherwise, they will not be willing to adopt it. Thus, the different governance strategies of political leaders produce different choices of anti-corruption policies.

To test the validity of this model, this essay has employed the comparative-historical method in an exploration involving three countries: India, Russia, and China. These countries face different international, social, economic, and political circumstances. The political leaders of these states are the same in that they are power maximizers. However, their methods of maximizing power are not the same. They have

different governance strategies to respond to their different circumstances effectively. Their governance strategies can be fortified by adopting and implementing policies that are consistent with their governance strategies. Since the governance strategies of political leaders are different, their choices of anti-corruption policies are also various. Thus, political leaders respond differently to pressures to adopt anti-corruption policies because they face different circumstances.

In this concluding chapter, the distinguishing characteristics of the three countries are highlighted. Then this chapter moves on to compare the countries in pairs. After that, contributions and implications are mentioned. Finally, directions for future research are offered.

## **Distinguishing Characteristics**

### *India*

Political leaders in India focus on freedom of information to fight petty corruption, but they are not much interested in criminalization. Narendra Modi announced a radical currency reform, but he has not shown effort in building a selection committee for the appointment of the *Lokpal*, or the ombudsman (Singh, 2016). The governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections, and they adopt some institutional reforms that have a positive effect on this governance strategy. Conversely, they refuse to adopt other anti-corruption policies that might have a negative effect on their governance strategy.

Their reactions to their circumstances formulate their governance strategy.

Political leaders in India face various circumstances. Internationally, India has some trouble with neighboring countries. Socially, national unity is an imperative issue because India is ethnically and religiously divided (Varshney, 2010, p. 16). Economically, India has suffered from poverty. Politically, democracy has successfully entrenched itself in India, so political leaders in India are uncertain of their future because people can elect an opposing party (Varshney, 2014, p. 4).

The Indian leaders respond to their international, social, economic, and political circumstances in a variety of ways. Internationally, India wants to solve the conflicts peacefully, so its foreign policy is non-alliance because India does not want to bring the problems to their people. Internally, to maintain national unity, the Indian government not only suppresses riots, but also controls insurgents by letting them participate in elections and have autonomy (Varshney, 2014, p. 33). Economically, Indian politicians adopt various policies to fight poverty in order to gain the electoral support of the poor. Politically, they want their party to stay in power as the ruling party.

Observing these reactions indicates that the governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections. When they win elections, they can maintain their foreign policy, increase national unity, implement anti-poverty policies, and stay in power as the governing party. To win elections, political leaders in India need their political allies because there is no internal democracy in the parties. They cannot also ignore the voice of civil society because doing so might lose them votes. Thus, they try to protect their political allies and to avoid the pressure of the civil society simultaneously.

The governance strategy of the Indian leaders, winning elections, explains their preference in adopting anti-corruption policies. They are interested in controlling petty corruption that might not be associated with their political allies. They adopt freedom of information acts as tools for curbing petty corruption. They assuage civil society by partially adopting anti-corruption policies. The political leaders of India, however, do not want to build a robust anti-corruption agency because they are concerned that such an agency may harm their political allies.

One might reasonably ask: Why do the Indian political leaders avoid retaliating against their political enemies? Eliminating their political rivals could be an easy way to win elections. They might selectively punish their enemies and protect their political allies because the Central Bureau of Investigation is not independent. What makes them hesitate to fight grand corruption related to their political rivals?

Political leaders in India do not want to punish their political enemies because they must protect their political allies. Although the Central Bureau of Investigation is under their control, they cannot entirely control the media. If they begin to investigate their political rivals selectively, then the rivals might reveal political leaders' scandals. If the media broadcasts corruption scandals that are related to political leaders and their friends, the situation would become more complicated. Thus, punishing enemies is not risk-free. Unlike China, if they retaliate against their rivals, they cannot protect their friends.

## *Russia*

Political leaders in Russia enacted several anti-corruption laws, but because there are no specific provisions, these laws are not sufficient. Moreover, they are not interested in adopting various anti-corruption policies that might empower civil society and guarantee the freedom of the media (Man, 2009, p. 26). They tolerate corruption. They believe that the implementation of some anti-corruption policies might have a negative effect on their governance strategy.

Their governance strategy, fortifying the vertical of power, is formulated by their reactions to their circumstances. Political leaders in Russia face various circumstances. Internationally, tensions between Russia and Western powers have increased. Internally, many protesters have asked the government to fix social problems. Economically, Russia has suffered from a low level of economic growth. Politically, Russia is a managed democracy, so the freedom of elections seems to be guaranteed, but candidates are selected by political leaders (Healy & Ramanna, 2013).

The Russian leaders have many responses to these international, social, economic, and political circumstances. Internationally, they stick to military expansion because their aggressive diplomacy has a positive effect on sustaining their domestic popularity (MacFarquhar & Sanger, 2018; Porter, 2017). Internally, when demonstrations have a negative effect on the political regime, they control the media and suppress civil society. Economically, they persuade people to believe that Western powers are liable for today's economic crisis. Politically, they want to win elections overwhelmingly for the verification of their popularity.

Observing these reactions indicates that the governance strategy of the Russian political leaders is to control the various apparatuses consistently with the vertical of power (Gel'man, 2015, p. 96; Inozemtsev, 2011; Monaghan, 2017, p. 5). With the power vertical, the Russian political leaders can control the military, the secret police, the media, and state-friendly organizations to react to various circumstances effectively. To increase vertical power, they should form a symbiotic relationship with corrupt elites such as *oligarchs*, business elites, and *siloviki*, politicians from military and security organizations.

The governance strategy of the Russian leaders, fortifying the vertical of power, explains why they implement anti-corruption policies incompletely and tolerate corruption. The Russian leaders refuse to adopt anti-corruption policies that have a negative effect on their governance strategy and their symbiotic relationship with corrupt elites. They ignore corruption because it helps elites accumulate wealth. Even though anti-corruption activists have asked the Kremlin to adopt institutional reforms, political leaders in Russia do not want to adopt anti-corruption policies that might have a negative effect on the support of the elites (Krastev, 2016).

## *China*

To fight corruption, political leaders in China focus on criminalization and discipline subordinates, but they are not interested in other measures, such as empowering civil society and the media. They also refuse to guarantee the independence of anti-corruption agencies and the judiciary. They focus on criminalization and punishment because these approaches can have a positive effect on their governance



strategy. They ignore other anti-corruption policies because those measures might have a negative effect on their governance strategy.

The governance strategy of the political leaders in China, fortifying the power of the party, is formulated by their reactions to their circumstances. Internationally, tensions between China and neighboring countries have become increasingly visible. Internally, China has problems with regions seeking autonomy and independence. Economically, China is worried about a slow economy. Politically, the fragility of the political system seems to be increasing.

The Chinese leaders react to their international, social, economic, and political circumstances with various methods. Internationally, they use military expansion and aggressive diplomacy to make people believe that China can be great again. Internally, to maintain social cohesion, China does not let Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong become independent. Economically, they adhere to state capitalism to boost the economy. Politically, they try to fortify the present political system to guard against threats to its stability (Hu, 2015).

Observing these reactions indicates that the governance strategy of the Chinese political leaders is to fortify the power of the party. To respond to the various circumstances effectively, the Chinese political leaders need to control the military, coercive apparatus, and bureaucrats, which are all controlled through with the power of the party. Thus, it is in their best interest to fortify the power of the party.

The governance strategy of the Chinese political leaders, fortifying the power of the party, explains their preferences for anti-corruption policies. They rely heavily on

punishment to retaliate against their political enemies in the name of the anti-corruption campaign. They know that punishment has a positive effect on increasing both the power of the party and their power within the party. In contrast, they refuse to adopt Western prescriptions including increased transparency and democratic accountability because these policies might have a negative effect on maintaining the power of the party.

## **Comparisons**

Until now, this study has focused on within-case methods to explain why states adopt and implement particular types of anti-corruption policies. This essay has explained that the selection of anti-corruption policies is related to the governance strategy of a political leader. The within-case-methods are useful to obtain this causal inference. However, the study in this subchapter focuses on small-N comparisons to unpack the effect of different circumstances on policy selection.

Small-N comparisons might enable us to understand why this dissertation has adopted a model that deals with governance strategy. Political circumstances are important, but the governance strategy is formulated not only by political factors, but also by international, social, and economic factors. The small-N comparisons in this subchapter show that India, Russia, and China differ in their selection of governance strategies and anti-corruption measures.

### *Three Countries*

When we look at these countries simultaneously, we can understand them more clearly. Table 2 shows the different circumstances in India, Russia, and China.

Internationally, these countries have some trouble with neighboring countries, but the level of tensions is different. While tensions between Russia and Western powers are high, India stays relatively at peace. Internally, these countries face different problems. India is ethnically and religiously divided, Russia faces anti-government protests, and some regions in China seek autonomy and independence. The economy is an important issue in these countries, but their concerns are not the same. India suffers from poverty. Russia also struggles with a bad economy. Although they have achieved remarkable economic development, political leaders in China are concerned about a low level of economic growth at present. Political leaders in these countries find themselves in different political systems. While democracy is deeply entrenched in India, Russian democracy is not close to the level of Western democracy. China is a party state, and the fragility of the political system seems to be increasing.

The reactions of political leaders in India, Russia, and China also vary.

Internationally, while India sticks to their non-alliance policy, Russia and China prefer military expansion and aggressive diplomacy. Internally, India tries to maintain national unity, but Russia and China tend to suppress civil society and regions fighting for autonomy. Economically, India adopts various anti-poverty policies that do not tend to be very effective. In contrast, Russia blames Western powers and their sanctions on the Russian economy to convince their people that the Western powers are responsible for the poor economic situation in Russia. China uses state capitalism to boost the economy. Politically, political leaders in India want their party to stay in power as the ruling party. Political leaders in Russia want to win elections overwhelmingly for the verification of

their popularity. In contrast, political leaders in China do not think about elections. They try to fortify the present political system that is controlled by the party.

**Table 2** Circumstances and Reactions

Countries		International Affairs	Social Affairs	Economic Affairs	Political Affairs
India	Circumstances	Trouble with neighboring countries	Ethnic and Religious divisions	Poverty	Consolidated Democracy
	Reactions	Sticking to Non-Alliance policy	Maintaining Geographic Integrity	Adopting various anti-poverty policies	Staying in power as the ruling party
Russia	Circumstances	Tensions between Russia and Western Powers	Anti-Government Protests	Bad Economy	Managed Democracy
	Reactions	Sticking to Military Expansion and Aggressive Diplomacy	Controlling the Media and Suppressing Civil Society	Blaming Western Powers	Winning Elections Overwhelmingly
China	Circumstances	Tensions between China and Neighboring Countries	Regions that Ask for Autonomy and Independence	Slow Economy	Fragility of Political System
	Reactions	Sticking to Military Expansion and Aggressive Diplomacy	Suppressing Regions	Sticking to State Capitalism	Fortifying Political System

The reactions of political leaders indicate what their governance strategies are.

Table 3 shows the governance strategies and political will to adopt anti-corruption policies in these countries. The governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections because they need legitimacy and supports. Votes enable them to maintain their foreign policy, to increase national unity, to implement anti-poverty policies, and to stay in power as the governing party. The governance strategy of the Russian political

leaders is to fortify the vertical of power, which is necessary to secure the loyalty of the elites. The loyalty of the elites enables them to control the military, secret police, the media, and state-friendly organizations. The governance strategy of the Chinese political leaders is to fortify the power of the party because the party enables them to control the military, coercive apparatus, and bureaucrats.

**Table 3** Governance Strategies and Political Will

<b>Country</b>	<b>Needs</b>	<b>Governance Strategy</b>	<b>Fortifying Governance Strategy</b>	<b>High Political Will</b>	<b>Low Political Will</b>
India	Votes	Winning elections	Protecting Political Allies Assuaging Civil Society	Freedom of Information Law	Criminalization
Russia	Loyalty of Elites	Fortifying Vertical Power	Building Symbiotic Relationship with Corrupt Elites	Anti-Corruption Laws	Empowering Civil Society
China	Party	Fortifying Power of Party	Purging Political Enemies Abandoning democratic measures	Criminalization	Freedom of Information Law

Since political leaders use their governance strategy to respond to their circumstances, they want to fortify their governance strategy. To win elections, political leaders in India need their political allies because there is no internal democracy in the parties. They also cannot ignore the voice of civil society, since doing so might lose them votes. Thus, they try to protect their political allies and to assuage the civil society simultaneously. To fortify the vertical of power, political leaders in Russia must form a symbiotic relationship with corrupt elites. To fortify their power in the party and the

power of the party, political leaders in China retaliate against their enemies in the party and abandon democratic measures.

The governance strategies of political leaders in India, Russia, and China explain the different choices of anti-corruption policies in these countries. The Indian political leaders have a strong political will to adopt freedom of information acts as tools for curbing petty corruption because these types of policies can assuage civil society. However, they have not punished corrupt elites because they want to protect their political allies. The Russian political leaders do not have a strong political will to adopt anti-corruption policies, and they have enacted some anti-corruption laws that were not effective. They do not tend to fight corruption seriously because they want to build a symbiotic relationship with corrupt elites. The Chinese political leaders focus on criminalization because they want to purge their enemies in the party. However, they do not adopt democratic measures that might have a negative effect on the power of the party.

Table 4 shows the implementation of anti-corruption policies in India, Russia, and China. Although empowering civil society in India and disciplining subordinates in China show middle levels of anti-corruption policy implementation, overall, these countries are not much interested in education and third-party empowerment. However, in the other categories, it is obvious that these countries adopt and implement different anti-corruption policies. The freedom of information and the independence of the judiciary are highly guaranteed in India while criminalization is poorly implemented. Russia is generally poor at implementing anti-corruption policies. China focuses on

criminalization, but the other measures are poorly implemented. By adopting these pairwise comparisons, this essay will explore the details of the differences between these countries.

**Table 4** Anti-Corruption Policies

	Country	India	Russia	China
Laws	Criminalization	Low	Low	High
	Freedom of Information	High	Middle	Low
	Protection of Whistle-blowers	Middle	Low	Low
Investigation & Enforcement	Independence of Investigative Agency	Middle	Low	Low
	Independence of Judiciary	High	Low	Low
Education	Disciplining Subordinates	Low	Low	Middle
	Empowering Citizens	Low	Low	Low
Third-Party Empowerment	Empowering Civil Society	Middle	Low	Low
	Freedom of Media	Low	Low	Low

### *India and Russia*

India and Russia face different circumstances. Internationally, while India stays relatively at peace, tensions between Russia and Western powers are high. Internally, while India is ethnically and religiously divided, Russia faces anti-government protests. Economically, while India suffers from poverty, Russia struggles with a bad economy.

Politically, while democracy is deeply entrenched in India, Russian democracy is not close to the level of Western democracy.

The reactions of political leaders in India and Russia are different. Internationally, while India sticks to non-alliance policy, Russia prefers military expansion and aggressive diplomacy. Internally, while India tries to maintain national unity, Russia suppresses civil society. Economically, while India adopts various anti-poverty policies, Russia blames Western powers. Politically, while the Indian political leaders want their party to stay in power as the ruling party, the Russian political leaders want to win elections overwhelmingly for the verification of their popularity.

Since their circumstances and reactions are different, their governance strategies are not the same. The governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections because they need legitimacy and supports. Votes enable them to maintain their foreign policy, to increase national unity, to implement anti-poverty policies, and to stay in power as the governing party. In contrast, the governance strategy of the Russian political leaders is to fortify the vertical of power because they need the loyalty of the elites in order to control the military, secret police, the media, and state-friendly organizations.

The different governance strategies of different political leaders lead to their different choices of anti-corruption policies. The Indian political leaders have a strong political will to adopt freedom of information acts as tools for curbing petty corruption because this policy can assuage civil society. They, however, have not punished corrupt elites because they want to protect their political allies. In contrast, the Russian political



leaders do not have a strong political will to adopt anti-corruption policies, and they have enacted some anti-corruption laws that were not effective. They do not tend to fight corruption seriously because they want to build a symbiotic relationship with corrupt elites.

What makes governance strategies in India and Russia different? There are some democratic institutions in both India and Russia. India is a democratic country. Although Russia's level of democracy is not close to Western democratic countries, there are some democratic systems in Russia. At least, ostensibly, Russia is a democratic country, and its power is divided into the legislative, the judicial, and the administrative branches. Although it is easy for them to win elections, the Russian political leaders have been selected by votes.

If voting systems are implemented in two countries, then one might think that the governance strategies of the leaders should be winning elections in both cases. This study, however, argues that their governance strategies can be different. The governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections, but the governance strategy of the Russian leaders is to fortify the vertical of power.

Although they both participate in voting systems, the significance of the elections is different between them. The Russian political leaders are not much interested in winning elections because their victories are already guaranteed. In contrast, although India is not free from the possibility of manipulated elections, it is not easy for the Indian political leaders to win elections every time.

Moreover, the relationships between political leaders and their allies are different between India and Russia. The Russian leaders think that *oligarchs* and *siloviki* are not their friends, but their subordinates. The relationship between the Russian leaders and their subordinates is vertical. In contrast, in India, political leaders do not share the same type of relationships with their political allies. Their allies are not their subordinates, but their friends.

These governance strategies were formulated not only by political factors, but also by international, social, and economic factors. For example, India and Russia face different international circumstances. Russia is very concerned about its conflicts with Western powers, but India can maintain its non-alliance policy and remain at peace. The Russian political leaders need the power vertical to control the military and the media as they pursue military expansion and aggressive diplomacy. In contrast, the Indian political leaders are not as desperate for the vertical of power because they know that people in India are not very interested in international affairs.

### *Russia and China*

India and Russia face different circumstances. Internationally, while India stays relatively at peace, tensions between Russia and Western powers are high. Internally, while India is ethnically and religiously divided, Russia faces anti-government protests. Economically, while India suffers from poverty, Russia struggles with a bad economy. Politically, while democracy is deeply entrenched in India, Russian democracy is not close to the level of Western democracy.

The reactions of political leaders in India and Russia are different. Internationally, while India sticks to non-alliance policy, Russia prefers military expansion and aggressive diplomacy. Internally, while India tries to maintain national unity, Russia suppresses civil society. Economically, while India adopts various anti-poverty policies, Russia blames Western powers. Politically, while the Indian political leaders want their party to stay in power as the ruling party, the Russian political leaders want to win elections overwhelmingly for the verification of their popularity.

Since their circumstances and reactions are different, their governance strategies are not the same. The governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections because they need legitimacy and supports. Votes enable them to maintain their foreign policy, to increase national unity, to implement anti-poverty policies, and to stay in power as the governing party. In contrast, the governance strategy of the Russian political leaders is to fortify the vertical of power because they need the loyalty of the elites in order to control the military, secret police, the media, and state-friendly organizations.

The different governance strategies of different political leaders lead to their different choices of anti-corruption policies. The Indian political leaders have a strong political will to adopt freedom of information acts as tools for curbing petty corruption because this policy can assuage civil society. They, however, have not punished corrupt elites because they want to protect their political allies. In contrast, the Russian political leaders do not have a strong political will to adopt anti-corruption policies, and they have enacted some anti-corruption laws that were not effective. They do not tend to fight

corruption seriously because they want to build a symbiotic relationship with corrupt elites.

What makes governance strategies in India and Russia different? There are some democratic institutions in both India and Russia. India is a democratic country. Although Russia's level of democracy is not close to Western democratic countries, there are some democratic systems in Russia. At least, ostensibly, Russia is a democratic country, and its power is divided into the legislative, the judicial, and the administrative branches. Although it is easy for them to win elections, the Russian political leaders have been selected by votes.

If voting systems are implemented in two countries, then one might think that the governance strategies of the leaders should be winning elections in both cases. This study, however, argues that their governance strategies can be different. The governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections, but the governance strategy of the Russian leaders is to fortify the vertical of power.

Although they both participate in voting systems, the significance of the elections is different between them. The Russian political leaders are not much interested in winning elections because their victories are already guaranteed. In contrast, although India is not free from the possibility of manipulated elections, it is not easy for the Indian political leaders to win elections every time.

Moreover, the relationships between political leaders and their allies are different between India and Russia. The Russian leaders think that *oligarchs* and *siloviki* are not their friends, but their subordinates. The relationship between the Russian leaders and

their subordinates is vertical. In contrast, in India, political leaders do not share the same type of relationships with their political allies. Their allies are not their subordinates, but their friends.

These governance strategies were formulated not only by political factors, but also by international, social, and economic factors. For example, India and Russia face different international circumstances. Russia is very concerned about its conflicts with Western powers, but India can maintain its non-alliance policy and remain at peace. The Russian political leaders need the power vertical to control the military and the media as they pursue military expansion and aggressive diplomacy. In contrast, the Indian political leaders are not as desperate for the vertical of power because they know that people in India are not very interested in international affairs.

### *China and India*

China and India face different circumstances. Internationally, while the tensions between China and neighboring countries are not negligible, India stays relatively at peace. Internally, some regions in China ask for autonomy and independence, and India is ethnically and religiously divided. Economically, China faces a low level of economic growth, and India suffers from poverty. Politically, while China is a fragile party state, democracy is deeply entrenched in India.

The reactions of political leaders in China and India are different. Internationally, while China prefers military expansion and aggressive diplomacy, India sticks to their non-alliance policy. Internally, while China suppresses civil society, India tries to

maintain national unity. Economically, while China adheres to state capitalism, India adopts various anti-poverty policies. Politically, while the Chinese political leaders try to fortify the present political system, the Indian political leaders want to keep their party in power as the ruling party.

Since their circumstances and reactions are different, their governance strategies are not the same. The governance strategy of the Chinese political leaders is to fortify the power of the party because the party enables them to control the military, coercive apparatus, and bureaucrats. In contrast, the governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections because they need votes, which enable them to maintain their foreign policy, to increase national unity, to implement anti-poverty policies, and to stay in power as the governing party.

The different governance strategies of these different political leaders lead them to choose different anti-corruption policies. The Chinese political leaders focus on criminalization because they want to purge their enemies in the party. They do not adopt democratic measures that might have a negative effect on the power of the party. In contrast, the Indian political leaders have a strong political will to adopt freedom of information acts as tools for curbing petty corruption because this policy can assuage civil society. However, they have not punished corrupt elites because they want to protect their political allies.

What makes governance strategies in China and India different? China and India are different in many ways. For example, politically, China is an authoritarian state, but India is a democratic state. Since they face different political circumstances, their

governance strategies are different. The governance strategy of the Chinese political leaders is to fortify the power of the party, but the governance strategy of the Indian political leaders is to win elections. The Chinese political leaders want to make China great again, maintain social cohesion, control the media and civil society, maintain internal order, and make the present political system work well. They can do that when they control the military, coercive apparatus, and bureaucrats. In contrast, the Indian political leaders focus on how to win elections because they want to maintain the non-alliance policy, increase national unity, implement anti-poverty policies, and remain in power.

One might reasonably ask: Why do the Indian political leaders avoid retaliating against their political enemies? Eliminating their political rivals could be an easy way to win elections. They might selectively punish their enemies and protect their political allies because the Central Bureau of Investigation is not independent. What makes them hesitate to fight the grand corruption that is related to their political rivals?

Political leaders in India do not want to punish their political enemies because they must protect their political allies. Although the Central Bureau of Investigation is under their control, they cannot perfectly control the media. If they begin to investigate their political rivals selectively, then those rivals might reveal the political leaders' scandals. If the media broadcasts corruption cases related to political leaders and their allies, the situation would become complicated. Thus, punishing enemies is not risk-free. Unlike China, if political leaders retaliate against their rivals, they cannot protect their friends.

## **Contributions**

This dissertation has sought to broaden our knowledge of the adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. This essay presents a novel assertion that political leaders adopt and implement anti-corruption policies not because they want to fight corruption, but because these policies are consistent with their governance strategies. The current literature in corruption studies assumes that political leaders adopt and implement anti-corruption policies because they want to fight corruption. In this assumption, the failure of anti-corruption policies has been explained by the concept of political will to fight corruption. The current studies argue that political leaders refuse to adopt anti-corruption policies because they do not have a strong political will to fight corruption.

This explanation, however, cannot explain why political leaders adopt different anti-corruption policies. This essay assumes that political leaders are power maximizers. Political leaders develop their governance strategies in order to react to their circumstances effectively. To fortify their governance strategies, they select anti-corruption policies that have a positive effect on their governance strategies. This novel explanation will shed light on the complexity of choices of anti-corruption policies in various countries.

The argument in this dissertation suggests that experts should overcome the politics-administration dichotomy, which can be defined as administration free from politics. Many corruption studies assume that political leaders want to create a clean society because they are aware of the detrimental effect of corruption. With this



assumption, scholars have believed that if they can give the right prescription to political leaders, then the leaders will take it.

However, in reality, political leaders do not adopt anti-corruption policies completely. The naïve belief that political leaders implement anti-corruption policies unconditionally has not been realized. This flawed expectation comes partly from a lack of studies on the behavior of political leaders. When experts suggest prescriptions for reducing corruption, they should think about the governance strategies of political leaders. If not, their suggestions might not be accepted.

Thus, we should not expect political leaders to adopt anti-corruption policies which are not consistent with their governance strategies. If we want them to adopt anti-corruption policies, then we should understand the circumstances that affect their governance strategies. If we can change their circumstances, then their governance strategies would be altered. For example, if people refuse to vote for corrupt politicians in a democratic country, then political leaders in the country could not protect their corrupt allies. Changing circumstances is not an easy task. However, although it is difficult, we must try to change the circumstances of political leaders. Without changing their circumstances, we will not be able to force them to adopt a new anti-corruption policy.

This study carefully has selected cases to generalize this new explanation. Criteria for case selection in this thesis comprise corrupt countries, the different responses of political leaders, geostrategic importance, and data accessibility. Severely corrupt countries have been selected because they need to adopt anti-corruption policies. The different responses of political leaders should be considered because this dissertation has

sought to explain the variation in adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies. Geostrategic important countries have been selected because readers are more interested in these countries. Data accessibility was important for this study because it has needed ample and various resources in order to investigate these cases deeply.

Within these criteria, this dissertation has examined India, Russia, and China. Corruption is a severe problem in these countries, the choices of anti-corruption policies are different amongst these countries, everyone knows these superpowers, and there are ample data to work with from these countries since many authors write about these countries. Although these countries do not represent all nations, these properties have helped this study to generalize the model.

### **Directions for Further Research**

There are some inevitable limitations. First, this study has only examined the same time span: political leaders who have come into power since 2000. This essay mentions Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi in India, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping in China, and Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin in Russia. The reason is that the governance strategies may differ between the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, the anti-corruption movement has only been launched recently. This dissertation focuses on the three countries at the same time span to employ small-N comparisons.

However, these comparisons cannot detect changes of governance strategies and anti-corruption policies within a state. If we could look at a country over time, then the validity of this model could be rigorously tested. For example, South Korea is a country

that has evolved from authoritarianism to democracy. Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, the former authoritarian leaders, were not interested in reducing corruption. In contrast, to differentiate himself from the former authoritarian leaders, Kim Young-Sam, the former President of South Korea from 1993 to 1998, initiated the Real-Name Financial System.<sup>108</sup> In 2002, the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption, the first anti-corruption agency of South Korea, was established by Kim Dae-Jung, the former President of South Korea from 1998 to 2003. These changes can be explained by examining the different grand strategies of the political leaders in South Korea. Thus, the second step toward explaining the variation in adoption and implementation of anti-corruption policies would deal with cases in different time spans.

The second limitation comes from the fact that this study has only looked at three big states. These countries are so huge that they cannot be accurately compared to smaller countries. It is not easy to find a big state that reduces corruption dramatically. On the contrary, some small countries fight corruption successfully. For example, Georgia has decreased their level of corruption. Mikheil Saakashvili, a former President of Georgia from 2004 to 2013, replaced all traffic police officers with well-educated people by increasing wages (Healy and Ramanna, 2013). The hiring process of public officials was open to the public (Healy and Ramanna, 2013). In the Corruption Perception Index 2003, Georgia was ranked 124<sup>th</sup> out of 133 countries, but in the Corruption Perception Index 2013, Georgia was ranked 55<sup>th</sup> out of 175 countries (Transparency International, 2018). If

---

<sup>108</sup> Before the system was enforced, clients could open a bank account under an alias. The Real-Name Financial System compels all Korean citizens to hold bank accounts under their real name (J. Lee, 1995, p. 101).

big countries are different from small countries in fighting corruption, then we should also test the validity of the model in small countries.

Finally, to explain the failure of anti-corruption policies more deeply, we need other research questions. For example, which anti-corruption policies are effective? This dissertation explains why political leaders adopt and implement different anti-corruption policies, and this explanation partly elucidates the reasons for the failure of anti-corruption policies. The failure of anti-corruption policies can come from a lack of political will to adopt anti-corruption policies. However, the failure also might come from the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption policies themselves.

We should understand the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies to fight corruption effectively. The extant literature concludes that the political will to adopt a holistic approach is imperative for curbing corruption significantly. However, implementing various anti-corruption policies at the same time is not an easy task. Our prescriptions for political leaders to fight corruption should be more detailed. We should inform them of which anti-corruption policies have top priorities and which anti-corruption policies would be useful in their countries.

## REFERENCE

- Aakella, K. V., & Kidambi, S. (2007). Challenging corruption with social audits. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 42(5), 345–347.
- Ageev, V. N., & Kuzmenko, V. I. (2016). The State Anti-Corruption Policy in the Russian Federation. *The Turkish Online Journal of Design, Art, and Communication*, 6, 2922–2927.
- Agrawal, C. (2012). Right to Information: A Tool for Combating Corruption in India. *Journal of Management and Public Policy*, 3(2), 26.
- Aiyar, Y., & Samji, S. (2009). *Transparency and accountability in NREGA: a case study of Andhra Pradesh* (Accountability Initiative Working Paper No. 1) (pp. 1–28). New Delhi, India: Accountability initiative.
- Aldrick, P. (2009, November 19). Russia refuses autopsy for anti-corruption lawyer. *Telegraph*. Retrieved from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/6608505/Russia-refuses-autopsy-for-anti-corruption-lawyer.html>
- Aleem, Z. (2017, October 25). Chinese President Xi Jinping was just written into the Communist Party's constitution. *Vox*. Retrieved from <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/10/24/16533526/china-xi-jinping-constitution-chinese-congress-mao>
- Alesina, A., & Angeletos, G.-M. (2005). Corruption, inequality, and fairness. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 52(7), 1227–1244.

- Alexander, M. (2002, January 1). The citizens' guide to fight corruption. *The Hindu*. Retrieved from <http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/op/2002/01/01/stories/2002010100170100.htm>
- Alo, E. N. (2014). Independent Commissions in ant-corruption fights: The Nigeria, Uganda and Botswana examples, 2000-2007. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 16(2), 47–66.
- AlSayyad, N. (2011). The Fundamentalist City? In N. AlSayyad & M. Massoumi (Eds.), *The fundamentalist city? religiosity and the remaking of urban space* (pp. 3–26). London ; New York: Routledge.
- Altamirano, G. D. (2007). The Impact of the inter-American convention against corruption. *The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review*, 38(3), 487–547.
- Alvarez, J. P. (2017). Putting Out the Fire of Anti-Corruption Demands: The Symbolic Adoption of a National Anti-Corruption Office in Peru, 2007-2008. *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities*, 6(3), 15–31.
- Ambasta, P., Shankar, P. V., & Shah, M. (2008). Two years of NREGA: The road ahead. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 43(8), 41–50.
- Amos, H., & Millward, D. (2015, February 28). Leading Putin critic gunned down outside Kremlin. *Telegraph*. Retrieved from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11441466/Veteran-Russian-opposition-politician-shot-dead-in-Moscow.html>

- Amukowa, W. (2010). *A Critique of Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission's Initiatives in Combating Corruption and its Implications for Education in the Light of Aristotelian Concept of Akrasia*. University of Nairobi.
- Amundsen, I. (2006). *Political corruption and the role of donors (in Uganda)* (CMI Commissioned Report). Bergen, Norway: Chr. Michelsen Institute. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2474946>
- Anand, G. (2016, November 14). How Narendra Modi of India Plans to Wipe Out 'Black Money.' *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/world/asia/how-india-plans-to-wipe-out-black-money.html>
- Anand, G., & Kumar, H. (2016a, September 21). Kashmir Crisis Poses Major Test for India's Leader, Narendra Modi. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/world/asia/kashmir-india-pakistan-unrest.html>
- Anand, G., & Kumar, H. (2016b, November 8). Narendra Modi Bans India's Largest Currency Bills in Bid to Cut Corruption. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/business/india-bans-largest-currency-bills-for-now-n-bid-to-cut-corruption.html>
- Anand, G., & Kumar, H. (2016c, December 13). India Hobbles Through a Cash Crisis, and Electronic Payments Boom. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/world/asia/india-cash-electronic-payments.html>

- Anderlini, J. (2017a, January 3). The political price of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign. Retrieved January 12, 2017, from <https://www.ft.com/content/3f1938d6-d1cf-11e6-b06b-680c49b4b4c0>
- Anderlini, J. (2017b, January 4). The political price of Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/3f1938d6-d1cf-11e6-b06b-680c49b4b4c0>
- Anderlini, J., & Rabinovitch, S. (2014, March 31). Ex-president Jiang urges Beijing to curb anti-corruption drive. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/1bc9c892-b8c7-11e3-a189-00144feabdc0>
- Andersson, S., & Heywood, P. M. (2009). The politics of perception: use and abuse of Transparency International's approach to measuring corruption. *Political Studies*, 57(4), 746–767.
- Areddy, J. T. (2014, October 17). Anticorruption Agency Gains Power in China. *Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <http://www.wsj.com/articles/anticorruption-agency-gains-power-in-china-1413590068>
- Areddy, J. T., Fickling, D., & Shirouzu, N. (2010, September 23). China Denies Halting Rare-Earth Exports to Japan. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487040628045755096403450702>
- 22
- Article 19. (2015, October 29). Country Report: The Right to Information in China. Retrieved July 19, 2018, from <https://www.article19.org/resources/country-report-the-right-to-information-in-china/>



- Asongu, S. A. (2013). Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption-control levels matter? *International Journal of Development Issues*, 12(1), 36–52.  
<https://doi.org/10.1108/14468951311322109>
- Ayres, A. (2018, January 12). For the people, by the people: democracy in the US and India. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from <https://blog.oup.com/2018/01/democracy-us-india-excerpt/>
- Babones, S. (2017, October 20). Xi Jinping: Communist China’s First Populist President. *Forbes*. Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones/2017/10/20/populism-chinese-style-xi-jinping-cements-his-status-as-chinas-first-populist-president/>
- Baczynska, G., & Tsvetkova, M. (2013, September 8). Putin foe manages strong showing in Moscow vote. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-moscow-election/kremlin-foe-navalny-challenges-putin-ally-in-moscow-mayoral-vote-idUSBRE98703520130908>
- Badkar, M. (2013, October 8). Chinese Parents Are Spending Up To \$16,000 Just In Bribes To Get Their Kids Into Good Schools. *Business Insider*. Retrieved from <http://www.businessinsider.com/china-corruption-begins-at-schools-2013-10>
- Bajoria, J. (2011, March 1). Corruption Threatens India’s Growth. Retrieved May 15, 2018, from <https://web.archive.org/web/20110624053804/http://www.cfr.org/india/corruption-threatens-indias-growth/p24259>
- Balmforth, T. (2017, October 7). Supporters Of Jailed Activist Navalny Stage Nationwide Protests On Putin’s Birthday. *RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty*.

Retrieved from <https://www.rferl.org/a/supporters-of-jailed-kremlin-foe-navalny-to-protest-across-russia/28778471.html>

Bandurski, D. (2016, September 21). In Wukan, Making a Clean Sweep. Retrieved July 16, 2018, from <https://medium.com/china-media-project/in-wukan-making-a-clean-sweep-5bc8eeb69f74>

Barbados Free Press. (2008, August 9). Successive Barbados Governments Refuse to Adopt Anti-Corruption Laws, Freedom of Information. *Barbados Free Press*. Retrieved from <https://barbadosfreepress.wordpress.com/2008/08/09/thousands-of-news-outlets-worldwide-mention-barbados-free-press-credit-our-tiny-snake-story-associated-press-cnn-newsweek-nbc-news-new-york-times/>

Barrows, D. P. (1942). Review of Grand Strategy. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 221, 207–208.

Barry, E. (2009, December 28). Watchdog Issues Scathing Report on Russian Lawyer's Death. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/29/world/europe/29russia.html>

Barry, E. (2011, December 10). Tens of Thousands Protest in Moscow, Russia, in Defiance of Putin. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/world/europe/thousands-protest-in-moscow-russia-in-defiance-of-putin.html>

Batory, A. (2012). Why do anti-corruption laws fail in Central Eastern Europe? A target compliance perspective. *Regulation & Governance*, 6(1), 66–82. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2011.01125.x>

- BBC. (2005, May 11). Gujarat riot death toll revealed. Retrieved from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south\\_asia/4536199.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4536199.stm)
- BBC. (2012, February 3). India PM Manmohan Singh: “Long way to go” on corruption - BBC News. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-16870535>
- BBC. (2014, May 27). Pakistan PM Sharif to go to Modi inauguration in India. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27554193>
- BBC. (2015, July 10). India’s Narendra Modi accepts Pakistan visit invite. *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-33473689>
- BBC. (2017, March 27). Russia condemns protest “provocation.” *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39403714>
- Becker, J. (2008). Tackling corruption at its source: the National Corruption Prevention Bureau. *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 13(3), 287–303.
- Behera, L. K. (2017, February 3). India’s Defence Budget 2017-18: An Analysis. Retrieved December 22, 2017, from [https://web.archive.org/web/20170205204605/https://idsa.in/issuebrief/india-defence-budget-2017-18\\_lkbehera\\_030217](https://web.archive.org/web/20170205204605/https://idsa.in/issuebrief/india-defence-budget-2017-18_lkbehera_030217)
- Bell, D. A. (2016). *The China model: Political meritocracy and the limits of democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Bennetts, M. (2017, April 17). Is Alexei Navalny the Kremlin’s kryptonite? *Newsweek*. Retrieved from <http://www.newsweek.com/2017/04/28/alexei-navalny-russia-vladimir-putin-donald-trump-corruption-protests-moscow-585004.html>

- Benton, L. (2015, November 16). Top 10 Reasons Anti-Corruption Compliance Programs Fail. *Brink*. Retrieved from <http://www.brinknews.com/top-10-reasons-anti-corruption-compliance-programs-fail/>
- Besley, T. (2006). *Principled agents? the political economy of good government*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bigg, C. (2005, January 19). Protests across Russia force Putin to double increase in pension payments. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jan/19/russia>
- Birch, S., Allen, N. J., & Sarmiento-Mirwaldt, K. (2017). Anger, anxiety and corruption perceptions: Evidence from France. *Political Studies*, 65(4), 893–911.
- Biswas, S. (2016, November 14). India rupee ban: Currency move is “bad economics.” *BBC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37970965>
- Blomfield, A. (2008a, March 3). Dmitry Medvedev wins Russian election. *Telegraph*. Retrieved from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1580592/Dmitry-Medvedev-wins-Russian-election.html>
- Blomfield, A. (2008b, June 8). Russian president Dmitry Medvedev blames 'US selfishness for global financial crisis. Retrieved from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/2095070/Russian-president-Dmitry-Medvedev-blames-US-selfishness-for-global-financial-crisis.html>
- Bowles, R., & Garoupa, N. (1997). Casual police corruption and the economics of crime. *International Review of Law and Economics*, 17(1), 75–87.

- Brademas, J., & Heimann, F. (1998, September 1). Tackling International Corruption: No Longer Taboo. *Foreign Affairs*, (September/October 1998). Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1998-09-01/tackling-international-corruption-no-longer-taboo>
- Bradsher, K. (2009, June 4). Thousands Gather in Hong Kong for Tiananmen Vigil. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/world/asia/05hong.html>
- Bradsher, K. (2017, February 7). How China Lost \$1 Trillion. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/07/business/china-bank-foreign-reserves.html>, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/07/business/china-bank-foreign-reserves.html>
- Brands, H. (2014). *What good is grand strategy?: power and purpose in American statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush*. Ithaca, NY; London, UK. Retrieved from <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=3138564>
- Branigan, T. (2013, January 22). Xi Jinping vows to fight “tigers” and “flies” in anti-corruption drive. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/22/xi-jinping-tigers-flies-corruption>
- Brinkerhoff, D. W. (1999). *Identifying and Assessing Political Will or Anti-Corruption Efforts* (IPC Working Paper No. 13) (pp. 1–13). Washington, DC: USAID. Retrieved from [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/pnacm026.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacm026.pdf)
- Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2000). Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: an analytic framework. *Public Administration & Development*, 20(3), 239–252.

- Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2010). *Unpacking the concept of political will to confront corruption* (U4 Brief No. 2010(1)). Bergen, Norway. Retrieved from <https://www.cmi.no/publications/3699-unpacking-the-concept-of-political-will-to>
- Brodrick, S. (2014, May 1). Is China Cracking? Retrieved July 16, 2018, from <https://www.investmentu.com/article/detail/37105/economic-slowdown-is-china-cracking>
- Brown, K. (2014, March 17). Xi Jinping Vs Zhou Yongkang. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/xi-jinping-vs-zhou-yongkang>
- Buckley, C. (2016, October 21). Corruption in China: Crocodile Meat, Jade, Piles of Cash. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/world/asia/china-corrupt-officials-tv-series.html>
- Buckley, C. (2018, February 26). Xi Jinping Thought Explained: A New Ideology for a New Era. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/xi-jinping-thought-explained-a-new-ideology-for-a-new-era.html>
- Buckley, C., & Bradsher, K. (2018, February 25). China Moves to Let Xi Stay in Power by Abolishing Term Limit. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/25/world/asia/china-xi-jinping.html>
- Buckley, C., & Myers, S. L. (2017, October 20). Xi Jinping Presses Military Overhaul, and Two Generals Disappear. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/world/asia/xi-jinping-military-china-purge.html>

- Bukharin, I. (2015, November 20). Russian pensioners reverse welfare cuts. Retrieved March 29, 2018, from <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/russian-pensioners-reverse-welfare-cuts>
- Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. (2015, October 9). U.S. Relations with India. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm>
- Burke, J. (2014, May 16). Narendra Modi's landslide victory shatters Congress's grip on India. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/16/narendra-modi-victory-congress-india-election>
- Caiden, G. E. (2001). Dealing with administrative corruption. In T. L. Cooper (Ed.), *Handbook of administrative ethics* (2nd ed., rev. and expanded, pp. 429–455). New York: Marcel Dekker.
- Caragliano, D. (2012, November 6). China's Transparency Reform: Is It for Real? Retrieved July 16, 2018, from <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/11/chinas-transparency-reform-is-it-for-real/264609/>
- Carbonnel, A. de. (2013, April 2). Putin signs law to allow him to pick Russian governors. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-elections/putin-signs-law-to-allow-him-to-pick-russian-governors-idUSBRE9310GR20130402>
- Carrico, K. (2017, June 13). China's Cult of Stability Is Killing Tibetans. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/13/self-immolation-and-chinas-state-cult-of-stability-tibet-monks-dalai-lama/>

- Center for Media Studies. (2005). *India corruption study 2005*. New Delhi, India: Transparency International India.
- Chan, H. S., & Gao, J. (2008). Old wine in new bottles: a county-level case study of anti-corruption reform in the People's Republic of China. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 49(2), 97–117. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-007-9096-y>
- Chan, K. (2017, August 17). Hong Kong Court Sends Activist Joshua Wong to Prison. *Bloomberg.Com*. Retrieved from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-17/hong-kong-activist-wong-braces-for-possible-prison-sentence>
- Chandran, N. (2017, September 20). Beijing's military threats in South China Sea worrying for companies. *CNBC*. Retrieved from <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/20/beijings-military-threats-in-south-china-sea-worrying-for-companies.html>
- Charney, C. (2009, May 5). Political Will: What Is It? How Is It Measured? Retrieved April 2, 2018, from <http://www.charneyresearch.com/resources/political-will-what-is-it-how-is-it-measured/>
- Chêne, M. (2009). *Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Efforts in India* (U4 Expert Answer) (pp. 1–11). Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. Retrieved from <https://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-efforts-in-india/>
- Cheung, A. B. (2007). Combating corruption as a political strategy to rebuild trust and legitimacy: Can China learn from Hong Kong? *International Public Management Review*, 8(2), 45–72.



- Chicago Tribune. (2004, September 22). Power and peace in China. *Chicago Tribune*. Retrieved from [http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-09-22/news/0409220117\\_1\\_china-last-year-jiang-zemin-tiananmen-square](http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-09-22/news/0409220117_1_china-last-year-jiang-zemin-tiananmen-square)
- Choe, S. (2013, August 3). Scandal in South Korea Over Nuclear Revelations. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/world/asia/scandal-in-south-korea-over-nuclear-revelations.html>
- Christensen, T. J. (1996). *Useful adversaries: grand strategy, domestic mobilization, and Sino-American conflict, 1947-1958*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Clarke, G. R., & Xu, L. C. (2004). Privatization, competition, and corruption: how characteristics of bribe takers and payers affect bribes to utilities. *Journal of Public Economics*, 88(9–10), 2067–2097.
- Clarkson, A. (2018). Post-Soviet Saviours? Ukraine, Russia and the Dark Side of the War against Corruption. *Political Insight*, 9(1), 26–29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2041905818764704>
- CNN. (2017a, January 31). Timeline of Tibetan protests in China. *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2012/01/31/world/asia/tibet-protests-timeline/index.html>
- CNN. (2017b, May 28). Tiananmen Square Fast Facts. *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/15/world/asia/tiananmen-square-fast-facts/index.html>
- Collier, P. (2017, July 11). The C-word: Paul Collier on the future of corruption. *The Times Literary Supplement*. Retrieved from <https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/public/corruption-paul-collier/>

- Committee to Protect Journalists. (2017). Explore CPJ's database of attacks on the press. Retrieved July 16, 2018, from [https://cpj.org/data/imprisoned/2017/?status=Imprisoned&start\\_year=2017&end\\_year=2017&group\\_by=location](https://cpj.org/data/imprisoned/2017/?status=Imprisoned&start_year=2017&end_year=2017&group_by=location)
- Condé, A. (2014, January 22). At Davos, the west must help us root out corruption in Africa. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/22/africa-corruption-west-davos-guinea-offshore-deals>
- Cooper, J. (2017, March 31). Prospects for military spending in Russia in 2017 and beyond. Retrieved from <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/crees/working-papers/prospects-for-military-spending-in-Russia-in-2017-and-beyond.pdf>
- Corbridge, S. (2013). Corruption in India. In A. Kohli & P. Singh (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of Indian politics* (pp. 222–229). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Costantini, I. (2017). The Politics of Corruption and Anti-Corruption Measures in Conflict-Affected Countries: an Exploration through the Lens of Hybridity. In B. Bellak, J. Devdariani, B. Harzl, & L. Spieker (Eds.), *Governance in conflict: selected cases in Europe and beyond* (pp. 171–192). Zürich: Lit.
- Cruz, N. H. (2014, September 8). Corruption would be biggest issue in 2016 polls. *Inquirer*. Retrieved from <http://opinion.inquirer.net/78256/corruption-would-be-biggest-issue-in-2016-polls>
- Dahlström, T. (2016). The role of information in combating corruption. *DIVA*. Retrieved from <http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-31972>

- Dai, C. (2010). Corruption and anti-corruption in China: Challenges and countermeasures. *Journal of International Business Ethics*, 3(2), 58–70.
- Danzig, J. (2013, December 1). Latvia: From Soviet Union to European Union. Retrieved March 14, 2018, from <https://eu-rope.ideasoneurope.eu/2013/12/01/latvia-from-soviet-union-to-european-union/>
- Dawisha, K. (2015). *Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?* New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
- Daya, A. S. (2016, January 13). How are Whistleblowers treated in India? Retrieved May 30, 2018, from <https://www.ethic-intelligence.com/en/experts-corner/international-experts/108-how-are-whistleblowers-treated-in-india.html>
- De Maria, W. (2010). The failure of the African anti-corruption effort: lessons for managers. *International Journal of Management*, 27(1), 117.
- Della Porta, D., & Vannucci, A. (2012). *Corrupt exchanges: actors, resources, and mechanisms of political corruption*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Diaz, A. D., & Shuai, Z. (2017, April 7). China retaliates on South Korea over US THAAD missile defense system by going after Lotte, and K-pop. *CBS News*. Retrieved from <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-retaliates-south-korea-us-thaad-missile-defense-lotte-and-k-pop/>
- Dickson, B. (2016). *The Dictator's Dilemma: the Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Donchev, D., & Ujhelyi, G. (2014). What Do Corruption Indices Measure? *Economics & Politics*, 26(2), 309–331. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12037>

- Dye, K. M., & Stapenhurst, R. (1998). *Pillars of integrity: the importance of supreme audit institutions in curbing corruption* (pp. 1–26). Washington, DC: Economic Development Institute of the World Bank.
- Economy, E. C. (2016, January 25). The Key to Understanding China’s Economy: Its Politics. Retrieved May 31, 2018, from <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-key-understanding-chinas-economy-its-politics-15015>
- Edward, A., Verkaik, R., & Williams, A. (2013, March 23). Police are NOT looking for anyone else in connection with death of Boris Berezovsky as friends say “depressed” oligarch found in his bath faced financial disaster. Retrieved March 28, 2018, from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2298076/Boris-Berezovsky-Police-NOT-looking-connection-death.html>
- Eiras, I. (2003). *Ethics, Corruption, and Economic Freedom* (Heritage Lectures No. 813) (pp. 1–6). Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/Ethics\\_Corruption\\_and\\_Economic\\_Freedom.pdf](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/Ethics_Corruption_and_Economic_Freedom.pdf)
- Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. *Academy of Management Review*, 14(4), 532–550.
- Ellyatt, H. (n.d.). Putin to run as an independent in 2018 election. Retrieved March 31, 2018, from <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/14/putin-to-run-as-an-independent-in-2018-election.html>
- Evans, B. R. (1999). The cost of corruption. *Tearfund Discussion Papers*, 1–29.

- Farchy, J., & Weaver, C. (2014, December 18). Defiant Vladimir Putin blames west for Russia's economic woes. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/ad07ef96-8685-11e4-9c2d-00144feabdc0>
- Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Isaksen, J. (2008). *Anti-corruption reforms: challenges, effects and limits of World Bank support* (IEG Working Paper No. 7) (pp. 1–78). Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2475182>
- Fravel, M. T. (2011). China's strategy in the South China Sea. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 292–319.
- Freedominfo.org. (2012, December 14). Fewer Information Requests Made in China, Report Says. Retrieved July 19, 2018, from <http://www.freedominfo.org/2012/12/fewer-information-requests-made-in-china-report-says/>
- French, H. W. (2017). *Everything under the heavens: how the past helps shape China's push for global power* (First edition). New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Friedrich, C. J. (2002). Corruption concepts in historical perspective. In A. J. Heidenheimer & M. Johnston (Eds.), *Political corruption: concepts & contexts* (3rd ed., pp. 15–24). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Retrieved from [https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc\\_100047069610.0x000001](https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc_100047069610.0x000001)
- Frye, T. (2010). Corruption and the Rule of Law. In A. Åslund, S. M. Guriev, & A. Kuchins (Eds.), *Russia after the global economic crisis* (pp. 79–94). Washington, DC : Moscow: Peterson Institute for International Economics : Center for Strategic and International Studies ; New Economic School.

- Fungáčová, Z., Määttä, I., & Weill, L. (2016). *What shapes social attitudes toward corruption in China? Micro-level evidence* (BOFIT Discussion Papers) (pp. 1–27). Helsinki, Finland: BOFIT Institute for Economies in Transition.
- Galeotti, M. (2010, October 5). The Investigations Committee – not so much Russia’s FBI, more a Kremlin watchdog. Retrieved April 1, 2018, from <https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2010/10/05/the-investigations-committee-not-so-much-russias-fbi-more-a-kremlin-watchdog/>
- Galhotra, S. (2016, September 2). CPJ: Impunity, Lack of Solidarity Expose Indian Journalists to Attack. Retrieved May 31, 2018, from <https://gijn.org/2016/09/02/cpj-impunity-lack-of-solidarity-expose-indian-journalists-to-attack/>
- Gallagher, M. (2018, March 2). Does a Stronger Xi Mean a Weaker Chinese Communist Party? *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/opinion/xi-jinping-china.html>
- Galtung, F. (2006). Measuring the Immeasurable. Boundaries and Functions of (Macro) Corruption Indices. In C. Sampford, A. Shacklock, C. Connors, & F. Galtung (Eds.), *Measuring Corruption* (pp. 163–184). Hampshire: Ashgate.
- Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007). Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(11), 1279–1301. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007305817>
- Gel'man, V. (2015). *Authoritarian Russia: analyzing post-Soviet regime changes*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

- Ghosh, S. (2013, October 28). Looking back at past general elections: 1952-2004. *Oneindia*. Retrieved from <https://www.oneindia.com/feature/looking-back-at-past-lok-sabha-elections-1952-2004-1331872.html>
- Giannetti, M., Liao, G., You, J., & Yu, X. (2017). *The Externalities of Corruption: Evidence from Entrepreneurial Activity in China* (Financial Working Paper No. 536) (pp. 1–64). European Corporate Governance Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2897558>
- Glaser, B. S. (2012). *Armed Clash in the South China Sea* (Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14) (pp. 1–9). New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/report/armed-clash-south-china-sea>
- Godfrey, M., & Yu, P. J. (2014). Patronage driven corruption undermining the fight against poverty in Uganda. *African Social Science Review*, 7(1), 54–70.
- Goldstein, M. C. (1991). *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The demise of the lamaist state*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Google Books. (2013). Google Ngram Viewer. Retrieved April 29, 2018, from [https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=lack+of+political+will&year\\_start=1900&year\\_end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct\\_url=t1%3B%2Clack%20of%20political%20will%3B%2Cc0](https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=lack+of+political+will&year_start=1900&year_end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2Clack%20of%20political%20will%3B%2Cc0)
- Griffiths, J. (2017, October 18). How Xi Jinping’s China stacks up with the rest of the world. *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/18/asia/china-compared-xi-jinping/index.html>
- Groenendijk, N. (1997). A principal-agent model of corruption. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 27(3–4), 207–229.

- Guha, R. (2008). *India after Gandhi: the history of the world's largest democracy* (1st Harper Perennial ed). New York, NY: Harper Perennial.
- Guo, Y. (2009). Historical Evolvement and Future Reform of the China Communist Party Discipline Inspection Commission. *Opening Ceremony of the Centre of Anti-Corruption Studies. Hong Kong*, 2, 233–251.
- Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty? *Economics of Governance*, 3(1), 23–45.
- Habibov, N., Afandi, E., & Cheung, A. (2017). Sand or grease? Corruption-institutional trust nexus in post-Soviet countries. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 8(2), 172–184.
- Halamová, L. (2017). Corruption Problem in Slovakia: the Media Sphere. *Regional Formation and Development Studies*, 22(2), 50–58.
- Halliday, F. (1990). The pertinence of international relations. *Political Studies*, 38(3), 502–516.
- Hanson, P. (2016). Russia's Global Strategy: Is It Economically Sustainable? In A. Ferrari (Ed.), *Putin's Russia: Really Back?* (pp. 13–35). Milano: ISPI.
- Haquel, A. (2017, May 20). Non-Aligned Movement: Jawaharlal Nehru – The architect of India's foreign policy. *Times of India*. Retrieved from <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jawaharlal-nehru-the-architect-of-indias-foreign-policy/articleshow/58767014.cms>
- Healy, P. M., & Ramanna, K. (2013, January 1). When the Crowd Fights Corruption. *Harvard Business Review*. Retrieved from <https://hbr.org/2013/01/when-the-crowd-fights-corruption>



- Heeks, R., & Mathisen, H. (2012). Understanding success and failure of anti-corruption initiatives. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 58(5), 533–549. <https://doi.org/DOI.10.1007/s10611-011-9361-y>
- Heidenheimer, A. J. (2002). Perspectives on the Perception of Corruption. In A. J. Heidenheimer & M. Johnston (Eds.), *Political corruption: concepts & contexts* (3rd ed, pp. 141–154). New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers.
- Heidenheimer, A. J., Johnston, M., & Le Vine, V. T. (1989). *Political corruption: A handbook* (First edition). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Hellman, J. S., Jones, G., Kaufmann, D., & Schankerman, M. (2000). *Measuring governance, corruption, and State capture-how firms and bureaucrats shape the business environment in transition economies* (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2312) (pp. 1–54). World Bank.
- Higgins, A. (2018, March 14). Why Moscow Will Never Apologize for Attack on Ex-Spy. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/14/world/europe/skipal-putin-poisoning-russia.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=EEDB125CF251E226B5E6D6F21D9CEE49&gwt=pay>
- Hoffmann, R. (2014, April 22). The Crackdown of Compliance in China. Retrieved July 20, 2018, from <https://www.ecovis.com/focus-china/crack-compliance-china/>
- Holmes, L. (2015). *Corruption: A Very Short Introduction*. Hampshire, UK: Oxford University Press.

- Hope, K. R. (2017). Fighting corruption in developing countries: Some aspects of policy from lessons from the field. *Journal of Public Affairs*, 17(4), 1–6.  
<https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1683>
- Hough, D. (2013). *Corruption, anti-corruption and governance*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hu, P. (2015, June 3). How the Tiananmen Massacre Changed China, and the World. Retrieved May 31, 2018, from <https://chinachange.org/2015/06/02/how-the-tiananmen-massacre-changed-china-and-the-world/>
- Huang, J. (2016, June 23). Chinese Officials Tighten Control of Wukan Village. *The Voice of America*. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/a/chinese-offiicals-tighten-control-of-wukan-village/3388956.html>
- Human Rights Watch. (2016, December 6). China: Secretive Detention System Mars Anti-Corruption Campaign. Retrieved July 19, 2018, from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/06/china-secretive-detention-system-mars-anti-corruption-campaign>
- Huntington, S. P. (2002). Modernization and Coruption. In A. J. Heidenheimer & M. Johnston (Eds.), *Political corruption: concepts & contexts* (3rd ed., pp. 253–264). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Retrieved from [https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc\\_100047069610.0x000001](https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc_100047069610.0x000001)
- Hussain, Y. (2012). *Corruption free India, fight to finish*. New Delhi, India: Epitome Books.
- IACA. (2018). History. Retrieved April 26, 2018, from <https://www.iaca.int/about-us/general-information.html>

- Indian Express. (2015, December 25). PM Modi lands in Lahore on a surprise visit, meets Pak PM Nawaz Sharif. *Indian Express*. Retrieved from <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pm-modi-lands-in-lahore-on-a-surprise-visit-meets-pak-pm-nawaz-sharif/>
- Inozemtsev, V. L. (2011, March 1). Neo-Feudalism Explained. *The American Interest*, 6(4). Retrieved from <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2011/03/01/neo-feudalism-explained/>
- Jacobs, A. (2012, June 14). Recent Cases Shed Light on China's Feared Interrogation System. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/asia/accused-chinese-party-members-face-harsh-discipline.html>
- Jacobs, A. (2013, March 27). Xi Jinping Imposes Austerity Measures on China's Elite. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/world/asia/xi-jinping-imposes-austerity-measures-on-chinas-elite.html>
- Jaffrelot, C. (2010). *Religion, caste, and politics in India*. New Delhi, India: Primus Books.
- Jain, A. K. (1998). Corruption: an Introduction. In A. K. Jain (Ed.), *Economics of Corruption*. (pp. 1–12). New York, NY: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
- Jaiswal, V. (2013, August 29). Independence of Judiciary in Indian Constitution. Retrieved May 30, 2018, from <https://www.importantindia.com/2146/independence-of-judiciary-in-indian-constitution/>

- Jeffrey, C. (2017). *Modern India: a very short introduction*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Jian, C. (2006). The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union. *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8(3), 54–101.
- Jiang, S. (2013, December 23). Animation of Chinese state leaders a big hit with overseas politicians. *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved from <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1389000/animation-chinese-state-leaders-big-hit-overseas-politicians>
- Johnston, M. (2005). *Syndromes of corruption: wealth, power, and democracy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Johnston, M. (2011). Why do so many anti-corruption efforts fail. *NYU Annual Survey of American Law*, 67, 467–469.
- Kanter, J., & Herszenhorn, D. M. (2014, September 11). U.S. and Europe Back New Economic Sanctions Against Russia. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/world/europe/eu-pushes-forward-with-tougher-sanctions-on-russia.html>
- Kara-Murza, V. (2013, September 20). Boris Nemtsov: Elected by Voters, Prosecuted by Kremlin. *World Affairs*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/vladimir-kara-murza/boris-nemtsov-elected-voters-prosecuted-kremlin>
- Kara-Murza, V. (2018, March 20). Why Putin's sham election shows what he's afraid of. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/03/20/why-putins-sham-election-shows-what-hes-afraid-of/>

Kashin, O. (2016, September 8). How Do You Get to Be a Governor in Vladimir Putin's Russia? *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/opinion/how-do-you-get-to-be-a-governor-in-vladimir-putins-russia.html>

Kattumuri, R. (2011). *Food security and the targeted public distribution system in India* (Asia Research Center Working Papers No. 38) (pp. 1–23). London, UK: LSE Asia Research Center.

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2007). *Measuring corruption: myths and realities* (Africa Region Findings & Good Practice Infobriefs No. 273). Washington, DC: World Bank.

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2010). *The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues* (Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430) (pp. 1–26). World Bank. Retrieved from [http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract\\_S1876404511200046](http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1876404511200046)

Keen, E. (2000). *Fighting corruption through education* (COLPI Papers No. 1) (pp. 1–40). Budapest, Hungary. Retrieved from <http://archive.hrea.org/pubs/keen2000.pdf>

Kennedy, P. M. (1992). *Grand strategies in war and peace*. New Haven, CT; London, UK: Yale University Press.

- Kenny, C. (2009). Measuring Corruption in Infrastructure: Evidence from Transition and Developing Countries. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 45(3), 314–332.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380802265066>
- Khan, M. H. (2006). *Governance and anti-corruption reforms in developing countries: policies, evidence and ways forward* (G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 42) (pp. 1–25). Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Retrieved from [http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9920/1/UNCTAD\\_GDS\\_MDPB\\_G24\\_2006\\_4.pdf](http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9920/1/UNCTAD_GDS_MDPB_G24_2006_4.pdf)
- Kim, H.-J. (2017, October 31). China, South Korea Ease Tensions Over U.S. Missile Defense. *Time*. Retrieved from <http://time.com/5003532/south-korea-china-thaad-missile-defense/>
- Klitgaard, R., & Baser, H. (1998). Working together to fight corruption: state, society and the private sector in partnership. RAND Corporation.
- Klitgaard, R. (1988). *Controlling corruption*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Retrieved from <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=837316>
- Kolesnikov, A. (2016, June). Do Russians Want War? *Carnegie Moscow Center*. Retrieved from <http://carnegie.ru/2016/06/14/do-russians-want-war-pub-63743>
- Kpundeh, S. J. (1998). Political will in fighting corruption. In S. J. Kpundeh & I. Hors (Eds.), *Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries* (pp. 91–110). New York, NY: United Nations Development Program.
- Kranz, M. (2018, March 18). Meet “Russia’s Paris Hilton” Ksenia Sobchak, the 36-year-old socialite challenging Putin for the Russian presidency. *Business Insider*.

Retrieved from <http://www.businessinsider.com/ksenia-sobchak-russian-socialite-challenging-putin-2018-1>

Krastev, I. (2016, May 15). Opinion | Why Putin Tolerates Corruption. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/opinion/why-putin-tolerates-corruption.html>

Krishnan, M. (2012, October 27). Indian PM fights back against corruption allegations. *DW*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/en/indian-pm-fights-back-against-corruption-allegations/a-16196895>

Kuhn, A. (2017, October 18). China's Xi Jinping Lauds "New Era" Of Strength As He Opens National Congress. *NPR.Org*. Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/18/558548515/chinas-xi-jinping-lauds-new-era-of-strength-as-he-opens-national-congress>

Kumar, H. (2016, January 5). India Says All 6 Gunmen Have Been Killed in Pathankot Air Base Attack. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/06/world/asia/india-says-all-6-gunmen-have-been-killed-in-pathankot-air-base-attack.html>

Kuris, G. (2014). *From underdogs to watchdogs: How anti-corruption agencies can hold off potent adversaries* (pp. 1–23). Princeton, NJ: Innovations for Successful Societies.

Kurlantzick, J. (2011, January 26). The Belligerents. *The New Republic*. Retrieved from <https://newrepublic.com/article/82211/china-foreign-policy>

- Kwok, M. T. (2006). Formulating an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy—The Experience of Hong Kong ICAC. *Seventh Course on Corruption Control In Criminal Justice Visiting Experts*, 196–201.
- Lally, K., & Englund, W. (2011, December 5). Monitors find Russian elections flawed. *Washington Post*. Retrieved from [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/monitors-find-russian-elections-flawed/2011/12/05/gIQAzrhqXO\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/monitors-find-russian-elections-flawed/2011/12/05/gIQAzrhqXO_story.html)
- Lambsdorff, J. G. (2005). *Between Two Evils-Investors Prefer Grand Corruption!* (No. V-31–05) (pp. 1–20). University of Passau. Retrieved from <https://www.econstor.eu/obitstream/10419/55027/1/684256142.pdf>
- Lange, M. (2013). *Comparative-Historical Methods*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Langseth, P. (2006). Measuring Corruption. In C. Sampford, A. Shacklock, C. Connors, & F. Galtung (Eds.), *Measuring corruption* (pp. 7–44). Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Lawal, G. (2007). Corruption and development in Africa: challenges for political and economic change. *Humanity and Social Sciences Journal*, 2(1), 1–7.
- Lee, J. (1995). The real name financial system and the politics of economic reform in the Republic of Korea. *Pacific Focus*, 10(1), 101–128.
- Lee, T. C. (2017a). Pernicious custom? Corruption, culture, and the efficacy of anti-corruption campaigning in China. *Crime, Law and Social Change*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9735-x>



- Lee, T., & Griffiths, J. (2017, September 7). South Korea: Deployment of THAAD missile defense system completed. *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/07/asia/south-korea-thaad-north-korea/index.html>
- Levitt, S. D. (1997). Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime. *The American Economic Review*, 87(3), 270–290.
- Levy, C. J. (2008, August 1). Medvedev Pledges Fight Against Graft in Business. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/europe/01russia.html>
- Li, C. (2016). *Chinese politics in the Xi Jinping era: reassessing collective leadership*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
- Liddell, H. (1967). *The strategy of indirect approach*. Faber & Faber.
- Lim, B. K., & Blanchard, B. (2014, March 30). China seizes \$14.5 billion assets from family, associates of ex-security chief. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-corruption-zhou/exclusive-china-seizes-14-5-billion-assets-from-family-associates-of-ex-security-chief-sources-idUSBREA2T02S20140330>
- Lim, L. (2011, December 20). In China, Anger Spreads Over Government Land Grabs. *NPR.Org*. Retrieved from <https://www.npr.org/2011/12/20/144001487/chinese-villagers-angry-at-governments-land-grab>
- Lin, J. (1999). *Social transformation and private education in China*. Greenwood Publishing Group.

- Lindstedt, C., & Naurin, D. (2010). Transparency is not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption. *International Political Science Review*, 31(3), 301–322. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110377602>
- Linzer, D. A., & Staton, J. K. (2015). A Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 1948–2012. *Journal of Law and Courts*, 3(2), 223–256. <https://doi.org/10.1086/682150>
- Liu, C. (2014, June 5). India’s Whistleblower Protection Act - An Important Step, But Not Enough. Retrieved May 30, 2018, from <https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/indias-whistleblower-protection-act-important-step-not-enough>
- Lo, B. (2015). *Russia and the new world disorder*. London : Washington, D.C: Chatham House ; Brookings Institution Press.
- Lockett, H. (2016, October 9). China anti-corruption campaign backfires. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/02f712b4-8ab8-11e6-8aa5-f79f5696c731>
- Lok Sabha Secretariat. (2014). *How a Bill Becomes an Act?* (No. 20). New Delhi, India: Lok Sabha Secretariat. Retrieved from <http://164.100.47.194/our%20parliament/How%20a%20bill%20become%20an%20act.pdf>
- López Claros, A. (2013). *Removing Impediments to Sustainable Economic Development: The Case of Corruption* (Policy Research Working Paper). World Bank. <https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6704>
- López Claros, A. (2014, January 24). Why is Corruption Today Less of a Taboo than a Quarter Century Ago? Retrieved April 26, 2018, from

<http://blogs.worldbank.org/futuredevelopment/why-corruption-today-less-taboo-quarter-century-ago>

Lubitzsch, H. (2018, March 12). Whistleblowing in Russia. Retrieved April 1, 2018, from <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9d652828-1041-4190-b02e-b39f92e89841>

Luhn, A. (2017, February 8). Alexei Navalny: Russian opposition leader found guilty of embezzlement. *Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/alexei-navalny-russian-opposition-leader-found-guilty-embezzlement>

Ma, J. (2014, June 1). Tiananmen Square 25 years on: “Every person in the crowd was a victim of the massacre.” *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/01/tiananmen-square-25-years-every-person-victim-massacre>

Ma, S. K. (2008). The dual nature of anti-corruption agencies in China. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 49(2), 153–165.

MacFarquhar, N., & Sanger, D. E. (2018, March 1). Putin’s ‘Invincible’ Missile Is Aimed at U.S. Vulnerabilities. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/world/europe/russia-putin-speech.html>

MacIver, R. M. (1911). Society and State. *The Philosophical Review*, 20(1), 30. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2177272>

Mahoney, J., & Thelen, K. A. (2015). Comparative-historical analysis in contemporary political science. In J. Mahoney & K. A. Thelen (Eds.), *Advances in comparative-historical analysis* (pp. 3–38). New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Malgin, A. (2014, September 23). Corruption Is the Backbone of Putin's Power | Opinion. Retrieved February 24, 2016, from <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/corruption-is-the-backbone-of-putin-s-power/507678.html>
- Malito, D. V. (2014). Measuring Corruption Indicators and Indices. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 1–34. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2393335>
- Man, M. (2009). Political Corruption in Russia: An Evaluation of Russia's Anti-Corruption Strategies, 1991-2009. *Polis Journal*, 2, 1–40.
- Mango, C. M. (2015). The Political Will and Its Effect Upon the Deterioration of the Land Compensation Value. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2586289>
- Marlow, I., Pradhan, B., & Chaudhary, A. (2016, November 10). Modi surprises India with bold anti-corruption move. *The Toronto Star*. Retrieved from <https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2016/11/10/modi-surprises-india-with-bold-anti-corruption-move.html>
- Marquette, H., & Peiffer, C. (2015, January 12). Corruption: unpacking the black box of political will. Retrieved April 26, 2018, from <http://www.dlprog.org/opinions/corruption-unpacking-the-black-box-of-political-will.php>
- Marquis, C., & Yang, Z. (2014). *Corruption: Chinese People Look For Action, But Words Matter Too* (China Observations). Cornell University. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/1813/36854>
- Martin, B. (2003). Illusions of whistleblower protection. *UTS Law Review*, 5, 119–130.

- Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3), 681–712.
- Mbaku, J. M. (2007). *Corruption in Africa: causes, consequences, and cleanups*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- McCarthy, T. (2014, September 29). Under the umbrellas: what do Hong Kong's protesters want from China? *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/hong-kong-democracy-protests-china-umbrellas-police>
- McFaul, M. (1995). State power, institutional change, and the politics of privatization in Russia. *World Politics*, 47(2), 210–243.
- Meagher, P. (2004). *Anti-corruption agencies: A review of experience* (pp. 1–3). IRIS Center.
- Meagher, P. (2005). Anti-corruption agencies: Rhetoric Versus reality. *The Journal of Policy Reform*, 8(1), 69–103.
- Méndez, F., & Sepúlveda, F. (2006). Corruption, growth and political regimes: Cross country evidence. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 22(1), 82–98. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.04.005>
- Menon, S. V. (2008). Right to information Act and NREGA: reflections on Rajasthan. *MPRA*.
- Menon, V. (2006). Anti-corruption in India: Issues and strategies. In V. Chand (Ed.), *Reinventing Public Service Delivery in India: Selected Case Studies* (pp. 333–362). New Delhi, India: Sage Publications.

- Meyer, H. (2017, September 29). Navalny Arrested Hours Before Latest Rally. *Bloomberg*. Retrieved from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-29/russian-opposition-leader-arrested-hours-before-latest-rally>
- Michael, B., & Bowser, D. (2009). The evolution of the anti-corruption industry in the third wave of anti-corruption work. In *Proceedings from the Konstanz Anti-Corruption Conference* (pp. 1–13).
- Miller, W. L. (2006). Perceptions, experience and lies: What measures corruption and what do corruption measures measure? In C. Sampford, A. Shacklock, C. Connors, & F. Galtung (Eds.), *Measuring corruption* (pp. 163–185). Aldershot, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Mohapatra, A. (2013). Lokpal and the role of media in propping up anticorruption movement in India. *International Journal of Social Science & Interdisciplinary Research*, 2(3), 43–53.
- Monaghan, Andrew. (2017). *Power in modern Russia: strategy and mobilisation*. Manchester University Press.
- Monaghan, Angela. (2014, January 10). China surpasses US as world's largest trading nation. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jan/10/china-surpasses-us-world-largest-trading-nation>
- Mondal, P. (2014). Short Summary of Prevention of Corruption Act, India. *Your Article Library*. Retrieved from <http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/law/acts/short-summary-of-prevention-of-corruption-act-india/39353/>

- Mullen, J. (2017, August 30). China can squeeze its neighbors when it wants. Ask South Korea. *CNNMoney*. Retrieved from <https://money.cnn.com/2017/08/30/news/economy/china-hyundai-south-korea-thaad/index.html>
- Mundial, B. (1997). *Helping countries combat corruption: the role of the World Bank*. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, World Bank.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015). *The quest for good governance: how societies develop control of corruption*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A., & Kossow, N. (2016, August 12). Rethinking the way we do anti-corruption. *NATO Review*. Retrieved from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/anticorruption-corruption-laws-regulation-control-anticorrp-budget-index/EN/index.htm>
- Myers, S. L. (2018, February 26). With Xi's Power Grab, China Joins New Era of Strongmen. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-authoritarianism.html>
- Myrdal, G. (2002). Corruption as a Hindrance to Modernization in South Asia. In A. J. Heidenheimer & M. Johnston (Eds.), *Political corruption: concepts & contexts* (3rd ed, pp. 265–279). New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers.
- Neild, R. R. (2002). *Public corruption: The dark side of social evolution*. London: Anthem Press.
- Nguyen, V. P. (2017, March 29). What Can Vietnam Learn From China's Economic Retaliation Against South Korea? *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from

<https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/what-can-vietnam-learn-from-chinas-economic-retaliation-against-south-korea/>

Nishith Desai Associates. (2016). *A Comparative View of Anti-Corruption Laws of India: A Legal, Regulatory, Tax and Strategic Perspective*. Nishith Desai Associates.

Retrieved from

[http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user\\_upload/pdfs/Research%20Papers/A\\_Comparative\\_View\\_of\\_Anti-Corruption\\_Laws\\_of\\_India.pdf](http://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research%20Papers/A_Comparative_View_of_Anti-Corruption_Laws_of_India.pdf)

Norman, L. (1974). Rossellini's Case Histories for Moral Education. *Film Quarterly*, 27(4), 11–16. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1211390>

Nye, J. S. (2002). Modernization and Corruption. In A. J. Heidenheimer & M. Johnston (Eds.), *Political corruption: concepts & contexts* (3rd ed., pp. 282–300). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Retrieved from

Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Retrieved from

[https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc\\_100047069610.0x000001](https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc_100047069610.0x000001)

Odugbemi, S., & Jacobson, T. L. (Eds.). (2008). *Governance reform under real-world conditions: citizens, stakeholders, and voice*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

OECD. (2005). *Governance in China*. OECD Publishing.

<https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264008441-en>

Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner. (2001). Census of India:

Comparative speaker's strength of Scheduled Languages-1971, 1981, 1991 and

2001. Retrieved May 10, 2018, from

[http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census\\_Data\\_2001/Census\\_Data\\_Online/Language/Statement5.aspx](http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Language/Statement5.aspx)



- O'Flynn, K. (2011, December 12). Russian election results will stand, Vladimir Putin spokesman says. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/8950254/Russian-election-results-will-stand-Vladimir-Putin-spokesman-says.html>
- Olken, B. A., & Pande, R. (2012). Corruption in Developing Countries. *Annual Review of Economics*, 4(1), 479–509. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-110917>
- Orttung, R. (2006). Causes and consequences of corruption in Putin's Russia. *PONARS Policy Memo*, 430, 1–5.
- panda, A. (2017, August 8). China Hits Back at South Korea's THAAD Deployment Following North Korea's Latest ICBM Test. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/china-hits-back-at-south-koreas-thaad-deployment-following-north-koreas-latest-icbm-test/>
- Pant, H. (2016, May 11). Russia's Economy in 2016. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/russias-economy-in-2016/>
- Park, Jae-hyuk. (2017, March 16). Is China toning down THAAD retaliation? *The Korea Times*. Retrieved from [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2018/07/694\\_225828.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2018/07/694_225828.html)
- Park, Ju-min. (2013, October 10). South Korea charges 100 with corruption over nuclear scandal. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-nuclear/south-korea-charges-100-with-corruption-over-nuclear-scandal-idUSBRE99905O20131010>

- Pavlovska-Hilaiel, S. G. (2016). *The EU's Impact on Managing Levels of Corruption in the Post-Communist World*. University of Denver.
- Pavroz, A. (2017). Corruption-oriented model of governance in contemporary Russia. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 50(2), 145–155.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.05.005>
- Peisakhin, L., & Pinto, P. (2010). Is transparency an effective anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a field experiment in India. *Regulation & Governance*, 4(3), 261–280. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2010.01081.x>
- Pellegrini, L., & Gerlagh, R. (2004). Corruption's effect on growth and its transmission channels. *Kyklos*, 57(3), 429–456.
- Perlman, D. (2008, May 19). Number 1 essential to fighting corruption: political will [Text]. Retrieved April 4, 2018, from <http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/number-1-essential-to-fighting-corruption-political-will>
- Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anticorruption reforms fail—systemic corruption as a collective action problem. *Governance*, 26(3), 449–471.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x>
- Pieth, M., Smith, J., & Jorge, G. (2007). *The Recovery of Stolen Assets: A Fundamental Principle of the UN Convention against Corruption* (U4 Brief No. 2) (pp. 1–4). Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.
- Pike, J. (2018). Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from [https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak\\_1971.htm](https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1971.htm)

- Poeschl, G., & Ribeiro, R. (2012). *Everyday opinions on grand and petty corruption: A Portuguese study* (OBEGEF Working Papers No. 013). OBEGEF.
- Polyakova, A., & Taussig, T. (2018, February 2). The Autocrat's Achilles' Heel. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-02/autocrats-achilles-heel>
- Pomeranz, W. (2013, October 28). Russia's Fading Judiciary. *National Interest*. Retrieved from <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/russias-fading-judiciary-9313>
- Pomfret, J. (2011, September 23). Hundreds protest in south China over land grab. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-guangdong-riot/hundreds-protest-in-south-china-over-land-grab-idUSTRE78M30U20110923>
- Pope, J. (2000). *Confronting corruption: the elements of a national integrity system*. Berlin: Transparency International (TI).
- Pope, J. (2008). National Integrity Systems: The Key to Building Sustainable, Just and Honest Government. In B. Head, A. J. Brown, & C. Connors (Eds.), *Promoting integrity: evaluating and improving public institutions* (pp. 13–32). Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
- Porter, E. (2017, July 25). To Punish Putin, Economic Sanctions Are Unlikely to Do the Trick. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/business/economy/economic-sanctions-russia-congress.html>

- Porter, L. E., & Warrender, C. (2009). A multivariate model of police deviance: examining the nature of corruption, crime and misconduct. *Policing & Society*, 19(1), 79–99.
- Post, L. A., Charles, S. T., & Raile, A. N. W. (2008). Using public will to secure political will. In S. Odugbemi & T. Jacobson (Eds.), *Governance Reform: Under Real-World Conditions: Citizens, Stakeholders, and Voice* (pp. 113–124). Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Post, L. A., Raile, A. N. W., & Raile, E. D. (2010). Defining Political Will. *Politics & Policy*, 38(4), 653–676. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2010.00253.x>
- Quah, J. S. T. (2011). *Curbing corruption in Asian countries: an impossible dream ?* (1st ed.). Bingley: Emerald.
- Quah, J. S. T. (2013a). Curbing Corruption in Singapore: The Importance of Political Will, Expertise, Enforcement, and Context. In J. S. T. Quah (Ed.), *Different paths to curbing corruption: lessons from Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore* (pp. 137–166). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Quah, J. S. T. (2013b). Different paths to curbing corruption: a comparative analysis. In J. S. T. Quah (Ed.), *Different paths to curbing corruption: lessons from Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Singapore* (pp. 219–255). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Quah, J. S. T. (2013c). Different Paths to Curbing Corruption: A Comparative Analysis. In J. S. T. Quah (Ed.), *Research in Public Policy Analysis and Management* (Vol. 23, pp. 219–255). Emerald Group Publishing Limited. [https://doi.org/10.1108/S0732-1317\(2013\)0000023009](https://doi.org/10.1108/S0732-1317(2013)0000023009)

- Quah, J. S. T. (2015). Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China: An Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015). *Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, 2015(1), 1.
- Quigley, F. (2009). Growing political will from the grassroots: How social movement principles can reverse the dismal legacy of rule of law interventions. *Columbia Human Rights Law Review*, 41, 13–66.
- Rai, P. (2015, July 11). Is India’s Whistleblower’s Protection Act too weak and too late? Retrieved July 20, 2018, from <https://www.saddahaq.com/whistleblowers-protection-act-needs-to-move-beyond-tokenism>
- Rajshekhar, M. (2011, June 14). How to solve the problems of India’s rain-dependent agricultural land - The Economic Times. *Economic Times*. Retrieved from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/special-report/how-to-solve-the-problems-of-indias-rain-dependent-agricultural-land/articleshow/8845170.cms>
- Raju, R. V. (2010). *Fighting Corruption: How serious is INDIA?* (IPCS Issue Brief No. 158). Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Retrieved from <https://issuu.com/prakashchavali/docs/ib158-raju-corruption>
- Ramo, J. C. (2005). *The Beijing consensus*. London, UK: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Ramzy, A., & Wong, A. (2015, September 25). Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution: One Year Later. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/hong-kong-umbrella-revolution-anniversary/>
- Rani, P. (2015). Anti-Corruption Laws in India. *International Journal of Scientific Research*, 4(12), 61.

- Ravi, S. P. (2015). Does Corruption in a Country Affect the Foreign Direct Investment? A Study of Rising Economic Super Powers China and India. *Open Journal of Social Sciences*, 03(07), 99–104. <https://doi.org/10.4236/jss.2015.37017>
- Reinsch, P. S. (1901). French Experience With Representative Government in the West Indies. *The American Historical Review*, 6(3), 475. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1833512>
- Reporters Without Borders. (2018). 2018 World Press Freedom Index. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from <https://rsf.org/en/ranking>
- Reuters. (2013, September 12). China to protect online whistleblowers, but only via official site. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-corruption/china-to-protect-online-whistleblowers-but-only-via-official-site-idUSBRE98B09B20130912>
- Reuters. (2016, December 29). Xinjiang attack: four “terrorists” and one bystander killed, says China. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/29/xinjiang-attack-four-terrorists-and-one-bystander-killed-says-china>
- Reuters. (2017, October 18). China to Further Open Economy and Deepen Reforms, Says Xi. *Fortune*. Retrieved from <http://fortune.com/2017/10/18/china-xi-jinping-economy-reforms-party-congress/>
- Right2INFO.org. (2009, January 21). Russia’s Duma pass a Freedom of Information Act. Retrieved March 29, 2018, from <http://www.right2info.org/recent/russias-duma-pass-a-freedom-of-information-act>

- Riley, P., & Roy, R. K. (2016). Corruption and Anticorruption: The Case of India. *Journal of Developing Societies*, 32(1), 73–99.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X15609755>
- Ringen, S. (2016). *The perfect dictatorship: China in the 21st Century*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Roberts, A. (2006). *Blacked out: government secrecy in the information age*. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Roberts, A. (2010). A Great and Revolutionary Law? The First Four Years of India's Right to Information Act. *Public Administration Review*, 70(6), 925–933.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2010.02224.x>
- Roberts, A. (2017). Strategies for Governing: An Approach to Public Management Research for West and East. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 1–45.  
<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3087581>
- Roberts, A. (2018a). *Can government do anything right?* Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA: Polity.
- Roberts, A. (2018b). The Devil in the Details: Review of “Power in Modern Russia” by Monaghan. *Governance*, 31(4), 1–7. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3120582>
- Roberts, A. (2018c, February 20). Grand Strategy Isn't Grand Enough. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/20/grand-strategy-isnt-grand-enough/>
- Roberts, C. A., Armijo, L. E., & Katada, S. N. (2018). *The BRICS and collective financial statecraft*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

- Rohwer, A. (2009). *Measuring corruption: a comparison between the transparency international's corruption perceptions index and the World Bank's worldwide governance indicators* (CESifo DICE Report) (pp. 42–52). Munich, Germany: University of Munich. Retrieved from <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/166975/1/ifo-dice-report-v07-y2009-i3-p42-52.pdf>
- Rose, P., & Greeley, M. (2006). *Education in fragile states: Capturing lessons and identifying good practice* (pp. 1–39). OECD-DAC Fragile States Group.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). *Corruption and government: causes, consequences, and reform*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rotberg, R. I. (2017). *The Corruption Cure: How Citizens and Leaders Can Combat Graft*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Roth, A. (2018, March 18). Vladimir Putin secures landslide victory in Russian election. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/18/vladimir-putin-wins-russian-election-with-more-than-70-of-vote-exit-poll>
- Rowan, J. P. (2005). The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, ASEAN, and the South China Sea Dispute. *Asian Survey*, 45(3), 414–436. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2005.45.3.414>
- Rueschemeyer, D., & Mahoney. (2003). Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas. In J. Mahoney & D. Rueschemeyer (Eds.), *Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences* (pp. 3–40). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.



- Ryall, J. (2017, September 5). What is THAAD? South Korea's best defence against a missile attack. *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/thaad-south-koreas-best-defence-against-missile-attack/>
- Sampford, C. (2014). Integrity systems: some history. Presented at the Assessing National Integrity Systems in the G20 and Beyond, Brisbane, Australia: Transparency International.
- Sampson, S. (2010). The anti-corruption industry: from movement to institution. *Global Crime*, 11(2), 261–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17440571003669258>
- Savedoff, W. (2016). *Anti-Corruption Strategies in Foreign Aid: From Controls to Results*. Washington DC: Center for Global Development. Retrieved from <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/assessing-us-feed-future-initiative-new-approach-food-security>
- Schell, O. (2016, April 21). Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse. *The New York Review of Books*. Retrieved from <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/04/21/crackdown-in-china-worse-and-worse/>
- Schiavenza, M. (2013, October 25). How Humiliation Drove Modern Chinese History. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from <https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/10/how-humiliation-drove-modern-chinese-history/280878/>
- Schulze, G. G., & Zakharov, N. (2018). Corruption in Russia-Historic Legacy and Systemic Nature, 2–19.

- Seligson, M. A. (2002). The impact of corruption on regime legitimacy: A comparative study of four Latin American countries. *The Journal of Politics*, 64(2), 408–433.
- Sen, A. (2011, May 12). Quality of Life: India vs. China. *The New York Review of Books*. Retrieved from <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2011/05/12/quality-life-india-vs-china/>
- Shambaugh, D. (2016). *China's future*. Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA: Polity.
- Sharkov, D. (2016, December 13). Will Russia add anti-corruption lessons to the school curriculum? *Newsweek*. Retrieved from <http://www.newsweek.com/russia-could-soon-teach-schoolchildren-how-resist-corruption-531429>
- Shim, D. C., & Eom, T. H. (2009). Anticorruption effects of information communication and technology (ICT) and social capital. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 75(1), 99–116. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852308099508>
- Shirk, S. L. (2008). *China: fragile superpower ; [how China's internal politics could derail its peaceful rise]*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993). Corruption. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(3), 599–617. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2118402>
- Shvets, J., Maximenko, A. V., & Klutchareva, E. (2017, November 3). Russia Considers Enhanced Whistleblower Protections. Retrieved April 1, 2018, from [https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance\\_enforcement/2017/11/03/russia-considers-enhanced-whistleblower-protections/](https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2017/11/03/russia-considers-enhanced-whistleblower-protections/)
- Sindzingre, A. (2017). A comparative analysis of African and East Asian corruption. In A. J. Heidenheimer & M. Johnston (Eds.), *Political corruption: concepts &*

- contexts* (pp. 441–462). Retrieved from [https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc\\_100047069610.0x000001](https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc_100047069610.0x000001)
- Singh, D. (2016, May 30). Why Lokpal eludes India 30 months after Parliament passed a historic law. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from <https://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/darpan-singh-blog/why-lokpal-eludes-india-30-months-after-parliament-passed-a-historic-law/>
- Singh, M. P. (1999). Securing the independence of the judiciary-the Indian experience. *Indiana International & Comparative Law Review*, *10*, 245–292.
- Singh, M., & Sohoni, R. K. (2016). The anti-corruption movement in India and the Lokpal. *Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research*, *2*(4), 107–111.
- Singh, S. (2010, April). *The genesis and evolution of the Right to Information Regime in India*. Presented at the Towards a More Open and Transparent Governance in South Asia, New Delhi, India.
- Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and social revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Sloane, W. M. (1899). Napoleon's Plans for a Colonial System. *The American Historical Review*, *4*(3), 439. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1833431>
- Soldatkin, V., & Osborn, A. (2017, December 25). Putin critic Navalny barred from Russian presidential election. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-election-navalny/putin-critic-navalny-barred-from-russian-presidential-election-idUSKBN1EJ0P2>
- South China Morning Post. (2015, May 8). China's drive to settle new wave of migrants in restive Xinjiang. *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved from

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/1789160/chinas-drive-settle-new-wave-migrants-restive-xinjiang>

Stacey, K. (2016, December 5). Indians mourn Jayalalithaa, film star turned stateswoman. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from

<https://www.ft.com/content/dff41c88-bb15-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080>

Stallings, W., Gentry, K., & Luo, J. (2016, November 15). Tiananmen Square Massacre. Retrieved July 17, 2018, from

<https://thecensorshipfiles.wordpress.com/tiananmen-square-massacre/>

Stout, K. L. (2015, September 28). What became of Hong Kong's "umbrella" protesters? *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/27/asia/hong-kong-protests-one-year-later/index.html>

Sumner, W. G. (1876). Politics in America, 1776-1876. *The North American Review*, 122(250), 47-87.

Tamkin, E. (2017, March 2). Navalny's Anti-Corruption Fund Accuses Medvedev of Secret Massive Estate. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from

<https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/02/navalnys-anti-corruption-fund-accuses-medvedev-of-secret-massive-estate/>

Tarozzi, A. (2002). *The Indian Public Distribution System as provider of food security: evidence from child anthropometry in Andhra Pradesh*. Research Program in Development Studies, Woodrow School of Public and International Affairs.

Thachil, T. (2016). *Elite parties, poor voters*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ Press.

- The Economist. (2008, March 14). Fire on the roof of the world. *The Economist*. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/news/2008/03/14/fire-on-the-roof-of-the-world>
- The Economist. (2015, June 18). After Zhou, who? *The Economist*. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/china/2015/06/18/after-zhou-who>
- The New York Times. (2018, January 20). India's Battered Free Press. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/opinion/india-freedom-of-press-narendra-modi.html>
- The World Bank. (1991). *World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- The World Bank. (2018, April 19). The World Bank in China. Retrieved July 16, 2018, from <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview>
- Theobald, R. (1990). *Corruption, development, and underdevelopment*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan.
- Tian, N., Fleurant, A., Wezeman, P. D., & Wezeman, S. T. (2017). *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2016*. Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved from <https://www.sipri.org/publications/2017/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-world-military-expenditure-2016>
- Tilghman, A. (2016, March 21). The U.S. military is moving into these 5 bases in the Philippines. *Military Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2016/03/21/the-u-s-military-is-moving-into-these-5-bases-in-the-philippines/>

- Titova, I. (2005, January 18). Putin Pledges Pension Increase. *Washington Post*.  
Retrieved from  
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2005/01/18/putin-pledges-pension-increase/e322f179-b1ba-482f-b0cc-573a1a774f0d/>
- Townsend, I. (2009, October 9). No joke: Qld's anti-corruption system a hit worldwide. *ABC News*. Retrieved from <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-10-09/no-joke-qlds-anti-corruption-system-a-hit-worldwide/1099076>
- Transparency International. (2016). Anti-Corruption Agency Strengthening Initiative. Retrieved September 16, 2016, from  
[http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/activity/anti\\_corruption\\_agency\\_strengthening\\_initiative](http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/activity/anti_corruption_agency_strengthening_initiative)
- Transparency International. (2018). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved April 27, 2018, from  
[https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption\\_perceptions\\_index\\_2017](https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017)
- Treadway, D. C., Hochwarter, W. A., Kacmar, C. J., & Ferris, G. R. (2005). Political will, political skill, and political behavior. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 26(3), 229–245. <https://doi.org/10.1002/job.310>
- Trubowitz, P. (2011). *Politics and strategy: partisan ambition and American statecraft*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tsygankov, A. P. (2014). *The strong state in Russia: development and crisis*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from  
<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=868029>

- Tulaeva, S. (2011). How anti-corruption laws work in Russia. *Russian Analytical Digest*, 92, 9–12.
- Tummala, K. K. (2009). Combating corruption: Lessons out of India. *International Public Management Review*, 10(1), 34–58.
- United Nations. (2018). Inida-Pakistan Background. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unipombbackgr.html>
- United States Department of State. (2018). The India-Pakistan War of 1965. Retrieved May 9, 2018, from <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/india-pakistan-war>
- University College of London. (2011, September 30). Russian Federation. Retrieved March 29, 2018, from <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/research/foi/countries/russia>
- UNODC. (2017). Best Practices of Anticorruption and Integrity Education in Chinese Universities and Schools. UNODC. Retrieved from [https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup4/2017-August-21-23/Contributions\\_NV/China\\_EN.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/workinggroup4/2017-August-21-23/Contributions_NV/China_EN.pdf)
- UNODC. (2018). Signature and Ratification Status. Retrieved April 3, 2018, from <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ratification-status.html>
- Uslaner, E. M. (2017). Political trust, corruption, and inequality. In S. Zmerli & T. W. G. van der Meer (Eds.), *Handbook on political trust* (pp. 302–315). Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Vaishnav, M. (2016). Why Voters Sometimes Prefer Criminals as Candidates. *Governance*, 29(4), 459–461. <https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12235>

- VandePol, M., Wu, V., & Hui, S. (2016, May 4). New Rules Offer Greater Protection and Incentives to Whistleblowers in China. Retrieved July 19, 2018, from <https://globalcompliancenews.com/new-rules-offer-greater-protection-and-incentives-to-whistleblowers-in-china-20160504/>
- Varshney, A. (2014). *Battles Half Won: India's Improbable Democracy*. Penguin UK.
- Vittal, N. (2012). *Ending Corruption?: How to Clean Up India*. London, UK: Penguin.
- Vogl, F. (2012, August 22). Corruption Dare No Longer Be a Taboo Topic in This Presidential Election. Retrieved April 26, 2018, from [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-vogl/corruption-taboo-topic-election\\_b\\_1819087.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-vogl/corruption-taboo-topic-election_b_1819087.html)
- Voyer, P. A., & Beamish, P. W. (2004). The effect of corruption on Japanese foreign direct investment. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 50(3), 211–224.
- Vyas-Doorgapersad, S. (2007). Corruption in the Public Sector: a comparative analysis. *Journal of Public Administration*, 42(5), 285–299.
- Wallace, C., & Latcheva, R. (2006). Economic transformation outside the law: corruption, trust in public institutions and the informal economy in transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58(1), 81–102.
- Wallis, J. J. (2006). The concept of systematic corruption in American history. In E. L. Glaeser & C. D. Goldin (Eds.), *Corruption and reform: lessons from America's economic history* (pp. 23–62). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wang, J. (2011). China's search for a grand strategy: A rising great power finds its way. *Foreign Affairs*, 68–79.



- Wang, Z. (2014, April 29). Tiananmen Birthed China's Impossible Balancing Act. *Time*. Retrieved from <http://time.com/73594/china-tiananmen-square-25-years-later/>
- Wang, Z. J. (2017, May 17). China's new anti-corruption body raises worrying questions about the rule of law. *The Conversation*. Retrieved from <http://theconversation.com/chinas-new-anti-corruption-body-raises-worrying-questions-about-the-rule-of-law-77001>
- Wayne, M. I. (2008). *China's war on terrorism: counter-insurgency, politics, and internal security*. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Wedel, P. (1987, April 23). President Suharto's ruling party won a crushing victory Thursday... Retrieved March 31, 2018, from <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/04/23/President-Suhartos-ruling-party-won-a-crushing-victory-Thursday/6060146855874/>
- Whitaker, B. (2005, September 13). How Mubarak won the election. Retrieved March 31, 2018, from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/13/worlddispatch.egypt>
- White, K. R. (2016). Political Corruption and Fractionalization in the United States: Federal Convictions, Public Perceptions, and Societal Diversity. In *2016 NCUR*. Asheville, NC. Retrieved from <http://ncurproceedings.org/ojs/index.php/NCUR2016/article/view/2100>
- Wilkes, T., & Ali, A. (2016, October 27). India, Pakistan to expel diplomats amid Kashmir tension. *Reuters*. Retrieved from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-india/pakistan-says-it-will-expel-indian-diplomat-idUSKCN12R2DU>

- Wolf, M. (2016, December 13). Too big, too Leninist – a China crisis is a matter of time. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/6a1b4010-be4c-11e6-8b45-b8b81dd5d080>
- Wolfensohn, J. D. (1996). *People and development : address to the Board of Governors* (No. 16138) (pp. 1–20). Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/243871468141893629/People-and-development-address-to-the-Board-of-Governors-Washington-DC-October-1-1996>
- Wong, A. (2014, March 7). In China, brutality yields confessions of graft. *USA Today*. Retrieved from <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/07/china-brutality-yields-confession/6179431/>
- Wong, E. (2009, July 5). Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/world/asia/06china.html>
- World Bank. (2018). WGI 2017 Interactive. Retrieved May 3, 2018, from <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>
- World Justice Project. (2016). *The World justice project: rule of law index 2016*. Washington, D.C.: The World Justice Project.
- Wu, H., & Keliher, M. (2015, April 7). How to Discipline 90 Million People. *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/xi-jinping-china-corruption-political-culture/389787/>

- Wu, Q.-J., Zhang, S.-D., & Dong, W. (2013). Economic miracle in China. *African Journal of Business Management*, 7(24), 2301–2308.
- Wu, Y. (2015, October 12). Profile: China's fallen security chief Zhou Yongkang. *BBC*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-26349305>
- Xiao, W. (2013). Freedom of information reform in China: information flow analysis. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 79(4), 790–808.
- Xin, X., & Rudel, T. K. (2004). The Context for Political Corruption: A Cross-National Analysis. *Social Science Quarterly*, 85(2), 294–309.
- Xu, B., & Albert, E. (2017, February 17). Media Censorship in China. Retrieved May 20, 2018, from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/media-censorship-china>
- Yadav, S. K. S., & Chopra, S. (2015). Anti-Corruption Movements & Measures in India. *International Journal of Trade and Commerce*, 4(2), 411–422.
- Yardley, J. (2008, March 15). Violence in Tibet as Monks Clash With the Police. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/world/asia/15tibet.html>
- Yin, R. K. (2014). *Case study research: design and methods* (Fifth edition). Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Young, G. (1984). Control and style: discipline inspection commissions since the 11th Congress. *The China Quarterly*, 97, 24–52.
- Yuen, S. (2014). Disciplining the party. Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign and its limits. *China Perspectives*, 2014(2014/3), 41–47.

- Yunshi, L. (2013, March 14). Graphics: Details of Party's Discipline Watchdog Released. Retrieved January 16, 2017, from <http://english.caixin.com/2013-03-14/100501618.html>
- Zhang, W.-W. (2012). *The China wave: rise of a civilizational state*. Hackensack, N.J: World Century.
- Zhang, Y. (2015). What Can We Learn from Worldwide Anti-Corruption Practices? In Y. Zhang & C. Lavena (Eds.), *Government anti-corruption strategies: a cross-cultural perspective* (pp. 247–261). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Retrieved from <http://www.books24x7.com/marc.asp?bookid=74129>
- Zhelev, V. (2015, September 8). Bulgaria fails to adopt key anti-corruption law. *Euobserver*. Retrieved from <https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/130158>

## **VITA**

Kyoung-sun Min is a Korean citizen interested in anti-corruption policy, state building, and governance capacity. He attended the Korean National Police University in 1996. After graduating from KNPU, he pursued several development courses and training programs. He started working in the public sector as an inspector at the Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) in 2000. To increase his understanding of public administration and policy, he attended graduate school at Seoul National University in 2001 while still working at the KNPA. In 2009, he began working at the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of Korea. He has many years of experience working in government, training police officers, and fighting corruption. He graduated from the University of Missouri with a doctoral degree in Public Affairs in 2018.