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FORGOTTEN WARRIORS: AMERICAN INDIAN SERVICEMEN IN VIETNAM

Tom Holm

During the Second World War, whites in the United States were presented with a new image of American Indians to contemplate and finally to accept as truth. When the United States entered the war, Native Americans seemingly flocked to the enlistment stations and draft boards, volunteering for the armed forces in numbers far out of proportion to their actual population. The poverty-stricken reservations not only provided human resources but donated money and land to the crusade against the Axis powers.¹

From the outset of the war, the media paid a great deal of attention to the American Indian contribution. Popular magazines like the *Saturday Evening Post*, *Collier's*, *New Republic* and *Reader's Digest* reported with a great deal of satisfaction that American Indians were not only giving all they had to the war effort but were uniquely valuable to the military. Typical of the images conjured up of Indians was Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes' description of American Indian "inherited talents" for *Collier's* in 1944. According to Ickes, the Native American fighting man had:

endurance, rhythm, a feeling for timing, coordination, sense perception, and an uncanny ability to get over any sort of terrain at night, and, better than all else, an enthusiasm for fighting. He takes a rough job and makes a game of it. Rigors of combat hold no terrors for him; severe discipline and hard duties do not deter him.²

Even the motion picture industry, perhaps the most powerful medium for creating stereotypes, began subtly to change its image of American Indians. Hollywood "horse operas" tended to glorify the American expansionist past. Indians, a non-Indian idea in the first place, were depicted as barriers to American progress. On the screen, Indians raped and pillaged without conscience. But contemporary Westerns began to portray, more and more, the "Indian companion" character who, just as he had in the war, aided whites in a crusade against injustice. War movies exploited this new image of Indians even further. Soon the steely-eyed, stoic Indian member of the All-American platoon, who was willing to die for his non-Indian comrades,

became an American cinematic cliché.³

The new stereotypes could only have gratified both the state elites and the larger American public. The image of Indians as loyal, brave, trustworthy fighters, dedicated to the American cause, boosted morale and validated the American sense of mission. To most Americans the war was a duel to the death between righteous democracy and fascist injustice. It was a war to free the people of the world from the clutches of totalitarianism. American Indians, in throwing themselves so unflinchingly and wholeheartedly into the war effort, appeared to be seeking to share in the victory, legitimizing themselves as American citizens. Indians had been treated miserably but they were committed to the American crusade.

According to one young Columbia River tribal member who was quoted in a national magazine, even though his people had been treated badly by the United States, Hitler would be much worse: "We know that under Nazism we should have no rights at all; we should be used as slaves."⁴ If an oppressed people such as the Indians sided with the United States then logically the American crusade was a just cause. Moreover, the media gave the impression that Indians were fighting in order to become assimilated into the body politic. Indians had been transformed, unlike blacks, Latinos, and Asians, into a "safe" (meaning politically reliable) minority.

In marked contrast to the World War 2 media attention given to their fathers, American Indians who fought in Vietnam have received little or no notice. American Indians, for example, have not been included in a single general study of Vietnam veterans. Regarded as an "insignificant population," Indian veterans of Vietnam were only accepted as a group worthy of mention after the passage of Senate Bill 2011, requiring the Veterans Administration: "to carry out a scientifically-valid study of PTSD....among Asian-American, American-Indian, Native-Hawaiian, other Native-American Pacific-Islander (including American Samoan Native) and Alaska Native Vietnam veterans."⁵

Despite the differences in media coverage of Indian servicemen between the two wars, there is every reason to suspect that Native American enlistment rates and numbers of draftees were relatively as high—compared to the total United States population—as those during World War 2. It has been estimated that over 42,000 American Indians served in Vietnam between 1966 and 1973.⁶ This number is more than likely a tribal estimate arrived at by adding together the numbers of veterans from each of the different reservations. That being the case, the estimate might not include some American Indians from urban or non-reservation rural areas, members of tribes that are not recognized by the federal government and those people of less than one-fourth Indian blood.

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There is, simply put, no way of obtaining a completely accurate count of American Indians who served in Vietnam. Enlistment and draft contracts of the period contained no "American Indian" racial category, and recruiters habitually assigned racial categories to individuals rather than asking them to what group they belonged. Consequently, Indian veterans report that they were listed as being anything from Caucasian to Mongolian to "Other". It is also very likely that a number of the people listed as Hispanic are tribal Native Americans. Many Apaches and Navajos and practically all of the Pueblos and Tohono O'odam have Spanish surnames.

Even if the number of American Indians in Vietnam is accepted to be 42,000 it is exceptionally high. During the Vietnam war the total Indian population of the United States was less than one million. American Indians thus made up at least 1.4% of all the troops sent to Vietnam, while Indians in general never constituted more than 0.6% of the total population of the US in the same time period. Approximately one out of four eligible Native Americans served, compared to one out of 12 in the general American population. In other words, Indians, like other minority groups, bore a disproportionate share of the war.⁷

The explanation for the relatively high numbers of American Indian servicemen in Southeast Asia during the war is complex. A study of 170 American Indian veterans conducted by Robin LaDue, Harold Barse, Frank Montour and myself between 1985 and 1988 reveals that not only were Indians recruited heavily, but they were often very willing to serve. The study group, although fairly small in number, was extremely responsive. It was culturally diverse, representing 77 tribes or combinations of tribes: Kiowas and Comanches from the southern plains; Cherokees, Creeks and Seminoles from the southern woodlands; Sioux and Blackfeet from the northern

**TABLE 1:
AMERICAN INDIAN VIETNAM VETERANS. REASONS FOR ENTERING
SERVICE OR ACCEPTING CONSCRIPTION**

	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Too Important	Not Important At All
Financial Security	20.6%	29.4%	27.6%	22.4%
To Gain Respect from Indian People	35.3%	27.1%	17.6%	20.0%
To gain Acceptance by Non-Indians	15.3%	23.5%	25.3%	35.9%
Family Tradition	51.2%	24.1%	11.8%	12.9%
Tribal Tradition	43.5%	31.8%	12.9%	11.8%

plains; Chippewas, Sac and Fox, and Menominees from the Great Lakes; Navajos, Apaches, Tohono O'odam and Hopis from the Southwest; Colville, Shoshone from the northwest plateau; Tlinget and Haida from the northwest coast; Iroquois from New York, and Inuit from Alaska. Most were born between 1944 and 1952, and all entered the military between the ages of 17 and 21. Nearly half of them now live in urban areas, but only about one-fourth of them actually grew up in large population centers. In other words, they were representative of the demographic trends among all Indians of their age group. On the whole, their educational levels were high for American Indians, but most said that these levels were attained only after their military service.

Even though the media focused little attention on Indians during the 1960s, Native Americans were heavily recruited by the military. To the general public and to military elites, Indians were still a "safe" as well as a "martial" race. According to several participants in the study, military recruiters constantly emphasized that Indian people were natural fighters and military men. Also, American Indians were a youthful population, averaging between ages 18 and 22. Theoretically, a large portion of the Native American population were prime candidates for military service in the first place, and would have been recruited and drafted in disproportionate numbers compared to other, older groups.

Besides being recruited and conscripted in relatively large numbers, Indian males in the 1960s had their own reasons for entering the service and specifically for seeing combat in Vietnam. In general, American Indians in the United States live on reservations, in rural non-reservation areas, or in low-income sections of large metropolitan centers. The lack of employment, even during the prosperous 1960s, was marked in all three locales. During the period, a number of Indian communities in several states were involved in confrontations with whites over hunting and fishing rights and land and water disputes. Opportunity was nil, education was limited, and poverty was rampant. Military service, according to most of the Vietnam veterans who took part in the study, offered at least some degree of financial reward.

There were, in addition, some cultural and social reasons for young Indian males to make the decision to leave their home communities. Many traditional Indian communities simply have very little room for young males. Older males in these communities traditionally control the economic and religious aspects of life, while females are often the arbiters of a community's social arrangement. American Indian males between the ages of 18 and 25 are almost expected to leave the community for a period of time in order to mature and gain outside experience. Some Indian elders believe that this

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situation is a holdover from the times when young men prepared for and went off to war. When young Indian males leave their home communities there is very little opportunity outside of joining the military service.⁸

Within the last seventy years, a number of tribes have built a tradition around service in the United States armed forces. This development is ironic to be sure and somewhat complex, but basically rooted in individual tribal cultures. Several members of the study group stated that they had taken part in tribal ceremonies related to warfare. Historically, some tribes had lived under the constant threat of attack by enemies and felt that unless the military dimension of life was placed in a ritual context, it might well permanently dominate all other considerations. Other tribes viewed warfare as a disruption in the natural scheme of things—a disruption great enough to cause disharmony, sickness and social disintegration. In either case, the tribes developed ceremonies to cross over the line from peace to war and back again. Warriors were ritually prepared for war and offered protective medicine to assure their safe return to the community. In addition to the rituals for war, many tribes devised purification ceremonies to restore individual warriors, as well as the community, to a harmonious state. Unless the returning warriors were purged of the trauma of battle, it was felt they might bring back memories of conflict to the tribe and seek to perpetuate patterns of behavior unacceptable to the community in its ordinary functioning. All these ceremonies were thought necessary to maintain a tribe's continued harmonious existence with its environment.⁹

Despite bureaucratic complaints and government prohibitions, many tribes maintained a variety of war-related ceremonies. In 1919, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells expressed his irritation at the fact that dances and ceremonies were being conducted among a number of tribes for the Indian soldiers who had just returned from the trenches in France.¹⁰ Ceremonies to honor and purify Indian veterans also followed World War 2 and the Korean War, despite the widespread (and erroneous) idea that Indian soldiers would refuse to take part in "yesterday's culture."¹¹ The Sioux held victory ceremonies; Kiowas took part in soldier dances; Cherokees were ritually cleansed of the taint of battle by medicine men; and Navajos went through elaborate "Enemy Way" ceremonies to restore returning veterans to a harmonious place in the community.¹²

All of these ceremonies help keep intact a tribe's identity. Along with language, a sacred history and the knowledge of a specific homeland or holy land, particular ceremonies maintain group cohesion and distinction. In short, they keep alive a group's sense of peoplehood. Since most tribal societies in the United States are based on kinship, the continuity of family tradition is extremely important. An

overwhelming majority of veterans who took part in the study said that they entered the military to retain the respect of their own people and to carry on family or tribal traditions. Rather than joining the military in an attempt to become part of the American mainstream, Native Americans seemed primarily interested in remaining a distinctive people. Military service, simply put, is one thing that Indian males do.

Several tribes in the United States—the Kiowas and Comanches, the Cheyennes, and to a certain extent the Winnebagos, the Sioux and the Chippewas—have syncretized service in the American armed forces with their own tribal customs. For these tribes there are certain functions that can only be performed by veterans. At pow-wows, for example, if a dancer drops an eagle feather, it can only be retrieved by a veteran. At some tribal gatherings, veterans are still asked to “count coup”, or tell a war story, before any ceremonies can begin.

There is also a certain amount of status to be gained in several Indian communities by fighting in a war. Traditionally, most tribes in the United States were gerontocracies. That is to say, elderly people took leadership roles because of their experience. Age and experience were equated, in most cases, with wisdom. Warfare was considered a life experience and, in fact, most tribal civil chiefs had good war records. War was not necessarily a positive experience but it was one that gave the participant a firsthand look at human suffering and death. As a Winnebago elder remarked before the performance of a veteran's honor song during a pow-wow in Wisconsin, “We honor our veterans for their bravery and because by seeing death on the battlefield they truly know the greatness of life.”

Once in the military during the Vietnam conflict, American Indians typically were assigned to combat military occupational specialties (MOS)—infantry, airborne, tanks, artillery, gunships, Rangers, combat engineers. It has been demonstrated that recruits and inductees from the lower socioeconomic strata were more likely to be assigned to the infantry and to actually see combat. Studies made since the close of the Vietnam war indicate, in fact, that these men were twice as likely to find themselves in combat in Southeast Asia as soldiers from either the middle or upper classes.¹³ Historically, Indians were crushed by United States military might, forced to abandon many of their religious ceremonies, stripped of numerous tribal institutions, and left as one of the poorest economic groups in the nation. Low economic and educational levels (some reservations have reported unemployment rates as high as 80% and education averaging out at the eighth grade level) virtually assured that most Indians would be assigned to non-technical combat duties. Indians also seemed to have volunteered for combat assignments in relatively large numbers. Combat duty appears to have been a mark of distinction within several American Indian communities. As one

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Cheyenne veteran remarked: "I'm proud of our warrior status."

The lack of media attention given to American Indian servicemen in Vietnam did not curb or in any way put an end to the old stereotypes that had followed World War 2 Indian veterans. The old stereotypes, in fact, followed American Indian fighting men into the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam. It became all too clear that many small unit commanders were still infected with the "Indian Scout Syndrome", which lasted for the duration of the war. In general, there was an idea that Indians were more attuned to nature than their fellow soldiers and were thus able to pick up signs of the enemy quickly and easily. The stereotype also included a notion that Indians were more stealthy and could utilize their senses of sight, smell, touch, and hearing better than non-Indians. These notions would seem laughable had they not forced Indian troops into some perilous duties. It was typical for Indians in Vietnam to be assigned to walk point on patrols and in large-scale troop movements.

Troops in Vietnam considered walking point extremely dangerous because the point man walked ahead of the main body of soldiers. In some units, the assignment was given to a new man who was considered expendable. In other units, point became the duty of a veteran who not only knew the enemy but the lay of the land. Generally, the danger of the position had to do with the topography or the flora in an area of operations. If a unit was moving through tall elephant grass, for example, the point man could literally walk into a concealed enemy position. He would also be in the position most vulnerable to booby traps and mines.

A number of the veterans who took part in the survey stated that they walked point more than any other member of their respective units. A Menominee from Wisconsin related that his platoon commander thought that since Indians "grew up in the woods" they should know how to track and generally "feel" when something in the immediate area of operations was disturbed or out of place. "Old Snoop and Poop" was the name given to a Cherokee marine who seemed to draw the point position more often than not. The phrase was used in the Marine Corps to designate a man who was a careful and enemy-wise scout. Another veteran, a Navajo from Arizona, concurred with the judgement that Indians had been falsely labelled, and stated that it had made the war somewhat more dangerous for him personally. He said that he was "stereotyped by the cowboys and Indian movies. Nicknamed "Chief" right away. Non-Indians claimed Indians could see through trees and hear the unheardable. Bullshit, they believed Indians could walk on water."

Along with walking point, other assignments became fairly routine for American Indians in Vietnam. The veterans involved in the study were regularly assigned to daytime outposts (OPs) and nighttime

listening posts (LPs) to take advantage of their supposed natural talents. But perhaps the most disturbing and dangerous assignment some of the men talked about was being selected as members of "killer teams." A killer team was a small patrol sent into an enemy-controlled area to conduct hit and run raids. Sometimes dressed in conical hats and Vietnamese clothing, killer teams were utilized tactically to harass enemy sympathizers and to disrupt enemy troop movements. The teams were exposed to several dangers, not the least of which was being sighted and attacked by an American or a South Vietnamese unit.

The composition of killer teams was frequently based on race. In order to penetrate enemy territory, the killer team was supposed to "look" Vietnamese. The selection of individuals for the teams narrowed, according to several veterans, to Indians, dark-skinned Latinos, Asian-Americans, Pacific Islanders and lighter-skinned blacks. (Ironically, enemy-controlled areas, where the killer teams worked, were more often than not referred to as Indian Country, in obvious mimicry of the old Cavalry versus Indian films.)

American Indians performed other duties while in Vietnam. Some were truck drivers, clerks, and supply personnel. But their numbers appear to be comparatively very small considering the fact

**Table 2:
INDIAN VIETNAM VETERANS. THE UNITS THEY SERVED IN**

Unit	Percentage of Indians in Survey who Served in Unit
Infantry	41.8
Airborne	8.2
Artillery	82.
Air-Helicopter	7.7
Air-Fixed Wing	5.1
Tanks	4
Communications	3
Engineer/Combat	3
Medical Unit	3
Ship	3
Classified	2
Combined Action Group-Infantry	2
Gunboat	2
Intelligence	2
Military Police	1
Special Forces	1
Ranger	1
POW-Infantry	1
Seabee	1

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that in all modern armies logistics and support personnel always outnumber combat troops. The following table shows the units that Indian veterans who took part in the survey had served in while in Southeast Asia.

Because of their duties and apparently high rate of infantry service, American Indians garnered a number of combat decorations and also suffered considerable casualties. The 170 members of the study group, for example, were awarded 38 decorations for personal valor. The physical cost was high, for over 30% of them were wounded in action. For the same reasons that hamper the efforts to gain an accurate count of American Indian servicemen in Vietnam, the number of Indians killed in action in Southeast Asia may never be known with certainty.

The emotional trauma of combat in Vietnam was as great as the physical cost. Stressful combat experiences were compounded by a general dissatisfaction with United States Indian policies. Native American soldiers found themselves in the ambiguous position of fighting a white man's war while the whites themselves suffered little, and at the same time white men carried out policies designed to disrupt tribal cultures and remove rights that the tribes had historically possessed. Said one veteran: "The white dudes stayed in school, you know, and we fought the war. They don't know nothing about anything except what they get out of a book. But they get the jobs..." A number of the veterans surveyed joined Indian political organizations such as the American Indian Movement and the National Indian Youth Council after their periods of service and took part in protests against federal policies and local racism directed at Indian people:

Table 3:
AMERICAN INDIAN VIETNAM VETERANS. TYPES OF COMBAT EXPERIENCE*

Heavy	36.5%
Moderate	27.6%
Light	18.8%
None	17.1%

*Criteria used: Wounded in action, number of days in combat, close contact with enemy, seeing battle deaths, actually returning fire, etc.

Even while they were in Vietnam several of the veterans realized that the federal government's wartime policies conflicted with their own cultural training and notions of justice. One man was made painfully aware of the differences between his own tribal culture and military tactics:

We went into a ville one day after an air strike. The first body I saw in Nam was a little kid. He was burnt up—napalm—and his arms were kind of curled up. He was on his back but his arms were curled but sticking up in the air, stiff. Made me sick. It turned me around. See, in our way we're not supposed to kill women and children in battle. The old people say it's bad medicine and killing women and children doesn't prove that you're brave. It's just the opposite.

Another veteran saw striking similarities in the condition of the Vietnamese peasants and his own people "back in the World" [the US]:

We went into their country and killed them and took land that wasn't ours. Just like what the whites did to us. I helped load up ville after ville and pack it off to the resettlement area. Just like when they moved us to the rez [reservation]. We shouldn't have done that. Browns against browns. That screwed me up, you know.

Still another veteran was forced to take a hard look at the racial aspects of the war. During a search and destroy mission, this particular man was approached by one of the Vietnamese whose home had just been burned to the ground. The old farmer looked at the Indian soldier, compared their skin and hair color and said, as if confused, "You...me, same-same."

For a significant number of Indian veterans the return to the United States was not what they had expected. If they sought acceptance by the whites they were disappointed. If they had thought that service in the military would bring them opportunity, they discovered that it had only lowered their status within the American mainstream. It seemed as if American society, of which they were only a peripheral member, had sent them to war and then rejected them for actually serving. One man described his arrival back in the World with a great deal of bitterness: "We fought a white man's war, you know, and the first thing that happens when I get back is that some white kid, a girl, at the LA airport spits on me."

Given their combat experiences and their lack of acceptance by the general public, it is understandable that fully 80% of the veterans in the study admitted that after returning home they suffered from one or more of the symptoms associated with post traumatic stress and post traumatic stress disorder. Generally, the symptoms include frequent inexplicable headaches, flashbacks, depression, severe alienation, sleep intrusions, extreme nervousness, and a heightened startle response. The disorder is often manifested in antisocial behavior, chemical abuse, chronic unemployment, or the inability to maintain close personal relationships with friends or family members.¹⁴

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Table 4:
AMERICAN INDIAN VIETNAM VETERANS. PTSD SYMPTOMS by %.

	Severe	Mild	None
Depression	36.5%	43.5%	20.0%
Sleep Intrusions	33.5%	42.9%	23.5%
Flashbacks	20.0%	43.5%	26.5%
Rage	38.8%	32.4%	28.8%

Despite their problems, few American Indians seem to seek help from the government. The Veterans Administration Advisory Committee on Native American Veterans (formed in 1987) found that Indian veterans underutilize VA benefits and health care services and cite several reasons:

Underutilization is related to several geographic factors such as distance and topography; unavailability of resources including transportation; cultural values; eligibility for Indian Health Service Programs; and the lack of coordination among federal agencies, especially between the Veterans Administration and the Indian Health Service.¹⁵

On the other hand, a number of the veterans have sought and found relief in their own tribal ceremonies. According to a Navajo veteran: "When I got back I had a lot of trouble. My mother even called in one of our medicine men. It cost them but my folks had an "Enemy Way" done for me. It's a pretty big thing.... It snapped me out of it." In the same vein, a Kiowa veteran related:

My people honored me as a warrior. We had a feast and my parents and grandparents thanked everyone who prayed for my safe return. We had a "special" and I remembered as we circled the drum I got a feeling of pride. I felt good inside because that's the way the Kiowa people tell you that you've done well.

Increasingly, Indians who fought in Vietnam have begun to seek support and healing among their own people.

Since the end of the Vietnam war, some attention has been focused on the representation of minority or ethnic personnel in national military services. One of the most insightful studies of minority-to-military relationships can be found in Cynthia H. Enloe's *Ethnic Soldiers* (1980). As part of a larger hypothesis, she suggests that militaries not only provide security for the horizontal *nation* against foreign enemies but are the protectors of hierarchical *state* institutions. Enloe demonstrates that state elites—those in control of the autonomous structure of public authority—normally have a clear

idea of "what pattern of interethnic relations best insures the state's survival." ¹⁶ These elites do not ignore ethnic patterns, nor do they work to ensure that the military service reflects the nation's ethnic mix. Rather, these elites judge the political reliability and military competence of different groups and assign minority troops to military occupations according to these criteria, thus assuring that politically unreliable groups are strictly controlled or unarmed.

State elites would prefer to arm minorities who have a propensity for soldiering and are politically safe. But recruiting even safe minorities for military service is a double-edged sword. Though it saves the elite from having to expend its own sons in a war, there is always the risk that the safe minority will figure out that it is being taken advantage of, and begin to turn the guns around (as did a number of black soldiers in Vietnam).¹⁷ Additionally, such employment of ethnic forces puts the elite under a moral obligation to the minority group that suffered on the battlefield. In some cases the state recognizes the obligation, in others, it does not.

During the Vietnam era, American Indians were considered politically safe. For well over forty years they have been stereotyped as tenacious, well-disciplined, stealthy, courageous, and knowledgeable fighters. The Indian population has been relatively small and remained politically quiet until the late 1960s. In fact, between the early years of this century and the adoption of more militant political tactics—the fish-ins in Washington state (1965-1967), the occupation of Alcatraz (1969), the takeover of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Washington, DC (1972), and the occupation of Wounded Knee, South Dakota (1973)—Indians typically worked within the structure of the state (bringing court cases, lobbying, etc.) to redress their grievances. In addition, Indians had not yet adopted a supratribal political organization willing to rattle the *Status Quo* until the formation of groups like the National Indian Youth Council and the American Indian Movement. The federal government, in turn, simply focused attention on tribal governments and worked to create and image of the supratribal groups as being non-tribal and, therefore, non-Indian. By the time Indian activism reached its zenith, the war was already winding down. The late start of Indian activism and the rather easy way the federal government successfully applied divide-and-rule tactics to suppress supratribal militancy made sure that Indians continued to be a relatively safe political group.

The American state apparatus has recognized an obligation to Indian veterans, but only to a degree. Indian veterans are eligible for benefits, but as the recently formed Indian Advisory Committee to the Veterans Administration has pointed out, these benefits and services have not been utilized to any great extent. In a larger sense as well, the state obligation to Indians in general has yet to be fulfilled. The

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American Indians who fought and died in Southeast Asia have been neglected and all but forgotten by the state they served.

¹ Tom Holm, "Fighting a White Man's War: The Extent and Legacy of American Indian Participation in World War 2," *Journal of Ethnic Studies*, (9) 1981: 69-81.

² Harold Ickes, "Indians Have a Name for Hitler," *Collier's*, (113) 1944: 58.

³ Ralph & Natasha Friar, *The Only Good Indian: The Hollywood Gospel* (Drama Book Specialists) 1972: 194, 196-197.

⁴ Richard L. Neuberger, "On the Warpath," *Saturday Evening Post*, (215) 24 October 1942

⁵ US Senate, *Senate Report 100-439 to Accompany S. 2011* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) 1988: 128.

⁶ *Talking Leaf* (2) 1973: 3.

⁷ Lawrence Baskir & William Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, The War, and the Vietnam Generation* (New York: Vintage) 1978: 9. Estimate of eligible American Indian males from Robert K. Thomas, interview with author, May 2, 1989. See also, Sam Stanley & Robert K. Thomas, "Current Demographic and Social Trends Among North American Indians," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (436) 1878: 111-120; 1970 and 1980 *Census of the Population*; also see Francis Paul Prucha's *Demographic Map of American Indians in the United States*, 1985.

⁸ See especially Albert L. Wahrhaftig, "More than Mere Work: The Subsistence System of Oklahoma's Cherokee Indians" (paper presented at the Southwestern Anthropological Association Conference, San Francisco, 1973).

⁹ Tom Holm, "Culture, Ceremonialism and Stress: American Indian Veterans and the Vietnam War," *Armed Forces and Society* (12) 1986: 243.

¹⁰ Commissioner of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) 1919: 317.

¹¹ Oswald G. Villard, "Wardship and the Indian," *Christian Century* (61) 1944: 397.

¹² See especially James H. Howard, "The Dakota Indian Victory Dance, World War 2," *North Dakota History* (18) 1951: 31-40; and Broderick H. Johnson, ed., *Navajos and World War 2* (Tsaile, AZ) 1977.

¹³ Baskir & Strauss: 8-9.

¹⁴ See especially Marc Pilisuk, "The Legacy of the Vietnam Veteran," *Journal of Social Issues* (31) 1975: 3-12; Arthur Egendorf, et al., *Legacies of Vietnam: Comparative Adjustment of Veterans and their Peers* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) 1981; and WE Penk, et al., "Adjustment Differences among Male Substance Abusers Varying in Degree of Combat Experience in Vietnam," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* (49) 1981: 426-437.

¹⁵ Veterans Administration Advisory Committee on Native American Veteran, *Final Report* (Washington, DC: Veterans Administration) 1988: v.

¹⁶ Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in a Divided Society* (New York) 1980: 15.