

The Leadership of N. S. Khrushchev: a reassessment.

Triumphs and Limitations, 1961-2.

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ABSTRACT.

The Leadership of N. S. Khrushchev: a reassessment.

Triumphs and Limitations 1961-2.

This thesis provides a reassessment of the policies of the Soviet government in the years 1961-2, examining Khrushchev's leadership role in particular. It looks at the internal and external pressures put upon Khrushchev during this period, where possible drawing on recent primary sources for more material.

The thesis can be seen as dealing with three main areas. Internally, Soviet political life is viewed in the context of the Twenty Second Party Congress of October 1961. In the realm of foreign policy, two case studies are carried out, one on the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, the other concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.

The aim of this thesis is therefore to achieve a balanced perspective on the successes and failures of Khrushchev as leader, bearing in mind the constraints of Soviet and international pressures.

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The Leadership of N. S. Khrushchev: a reassessment.

Triumphs and Limitations 1961-2.

Introduction.

This thesis is intended to offer a reassessment of the policies of the Soviet government in the years 1961-2. It aims at giving a new interpretation of the factors underlying the formation of Soviet policies, both internal and external, and a reevaluation of the nature of the leadership of N S Khrushchev himself. The first most obvious question that needs to be asked at this time is "Why is there a need to offer a reassessment of this period of Soviet history at all?" There are three important reasons for this, and they will now be elucidated upon.

1. The Cold War is Over?

Since M S Gorbachev became First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, there has been a fundamental change in the climate of international world politics. With his policies of perestroika and glasnost, major economic, political and social changes have taken place within the Soviet Union, and these have lead to radical changes, ultimately culminating in the disintegration of the

Soviet Union itself. There have been a series of new developments in foreign policy also, with an increased emphasis on economic co-operation between countries, including joint enterprise schemes etc, and a series of increasingly fruitful international conferences and negotiations on topics ranging from ecological issues to arms control. So great have these changes been, that some international commentators have defined this era as "the end of the cold war".

These changes have had enormous repercussions, both on contemporary life, and the way that we view the past. If this is the "end of the cold war", when did it start? What are the identifiable characteristics that comprise this concept of "cold war"? We've looked in the preceding paragraph at some of the signs that recently have seemed to indicate that something has fundamentally changed in the area of Soviet policy, but does this provide us with a reliable general principle which helps to define "cold war"? If it was taken at face value this would then seem to indicate that the "cold war" was a result of Soviet policy-making alone. Can this be a satisfactory definition of the term? A general definition is perhaps that of "cold war" as a state of ideological warfare between countries with differing political goals and belief systems. However, these questions demand a more specific answer, and one way that we can attempt to find this is to look at what is generally accepted as a period of intense "cold war" in the past, ie 1961-2, containing both the Berlin Wall crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, and to try to ascertain the key characteristics of such periods of tension. One issue of particular interest here is the demolition of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989. With the fragmentation of many seemingly unassailable

stereotypes, the physical destruction of the Berlin Wall underlines the need for a fresh investigation on why it was erected in the first place, and the circumstances and possible motivations involved. How far could the traditional concept of "cold war" be a relevant factor here? Although the building of the Berlin Wall has been seen as symbolic of the intensification of ideological warfare, in fact the underlying factors involved might not really suggest this.

One of the reasons why the period 1961-2 is interesting is thus because when one begins to explore it in any detail, concepts of different governments making assumptions and decisions based on an ideological framework of "cold war", ie with the United States and the Soviet Union perceiving each other as the enemy, are not consistently valid. Certainly such concepts are to be found in abundance in the rhetoric of both Soviet and American speeches, but how far were they actually valid in practice? While perhaps the American government, especially the military may have acted on them to a degree, surprisingly this doesn't seem to have been true on the Soviet side. A brief time spent looking at the events of the early 1960's give an indication why. This was a time of increased technological development, with a corresponding sophistication in forms of international communication. It was a time when Khrushchev in the USSR appeared to be successfully attacking the bastions of Stalinism and revitalising Marxist-Leninist theory, while in the United States a youthful J F Kennedy had just been elected President, inspiring in the American people a new pride and hope in their country. In the midst of these events, many missed the significance of one of the most profound changes of the time - the emergence of a deep ideological rift between

the USSR and China. This dispute effectively finalised the split in the communist movement, and irrevocably splintered the accepted "two camp" theory of international politics prevalent in the 1940's and 50's. The Soviet government, unlike the Americans were well aware of what was going on, and thus were often acting, more looking over their shoulder towards China, than towards their "cold war" opponent, the United States. Today's awakening to the realisation of the fact that "cold war" has not perhaps been such an accurate or pervasive state as has been previously been thought stimulates the historian to challenge conventional stereotypes when interpreting sources. Thus one of the aims of this thesis is to submit that the Soviet government was not as constricted by cold war ideology as is sometimes thought.

2. Historiographical balance?

The breaking down of stereotypes is also needed at another vital level-that of historiography itself. In the historical debate as to when the "cold war" started, is another controversial subject - who started it? This issue has encouraged a historiographical trend towards the politicisation of international history in terms of the "traditionalist" and "revisionist" interpretations of history. In the 1940's and 50's, American historians tended to analyse Soviet actions in terms of their own personal and national experiences, reflecting the mood of American politics as much as anything else. Thus, in the McCarthyist era, fear of all Soviet actions ran deep, and it was only with the growing realisation of the mistakes made over Vietnam in the late 1960's, that previously unscutinised American foreign policy

became the subject of closer analysis and criticism. It was during this time that the "revisionist" school of historians came to prominence, people such as W Lefebvre, G Kolko and G Alperovitz. Thus historiography has been very much influenced by the prevailing political climate. In his article "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the origins of the cold war " , J L Gaddis argues that a more balanced view-point is now emerging, a post-revisionist position which gives greater priority to the nature of the available material on a subject. Gaddis criticises the:

"curious American habit of writing about the cold war as if only the United States had a major role in bringing it about" 1 and also points out the absurdity that "not one of the New Left revisionists was a Soviet specialist; few if any knew Russian." Yet in his assessment of areas for further research, Gaddis concentrates on the perception of the American leadership towards the USSR, rather than the need for an examination of Soviet policy-making and also the need to consider the role of "third parties" in international disputes, eg Korea, Germany and Cuba. This is surely necessary if an objective viewpoint is to be achieved.

The accuracy of Gaddis's claims concerning the imbalance of historical sources utilised can be seen when surveying the literature available on the character of Soviet foreign policy. In 1973, A Horelic, A Ross Johnson and J Steinberger wrote:

"In contrast to the rich accumulation of US foreign policy case-studies, the Soviet foreign policy case-study literature is small fragmented and generally underdeveloped. This applies not only to theory-orientated works that employ case-studies as

vehicles for generating or testing hypotheses about crisis or foreign policy decisionmaking, but also to traditional historical narrative case studies designed to advance knowledge about a particular international crisis or foreign policy decision. As the primary external actor in most major US crisis decisionmaking situations since World War Two, the Soviet Union has figured prominently in most US foreign policy decision making case studies. However, Soviet behaviour has been treated in such studies not as an object of inquiry per se, but as an input to US decisionmaking, part of the external setting in which US decision makers have operated. The object of empirical research has been American decisionmakers' perceptions of Soviet behaviour not that behaviour itself. Rarely have any new insights about Soviet foreign policy behaviour or the Soviet decisionmaking process emerged from such a work; few studies of American foreign policy have either been equipped or found it necessary for their purpose to engage in original research on Soviet behaviour.

The small case study component of the academic literature on Soviet foreign policy is disproportionate to the size of the general literature and to the intrinsic importance of Soviet crisis behavior

for the broad field of international relations." 2

Although this was written 17 years ago, till very recently not very much had changed. For example there have only been two major and in any way detailed studies on the Berlin crisis of 1962- that of R M Slusser The Berlin Crisis. and that of H. Adomeit Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis behaviour. Both of these works came to diametrically

opposed conclusions over basic issues, and there still remains much to be discovered and clarified concerning the fundamental relationships and practical workings of the Soviet policy-making process.

In his article, "In the grip of the adversarial paradigm: The Case of N S Khrushchev In Retrospect." A Yanov makes a similar plea for a reappraisal of Soviet history. He argues, somewhat controversially:

"Some people on the conservative extreme of the political spectrum in America assume that Soviet Russia is implacably hostile to the West because of its communist ideology. Others who see the world in terms of realpolitik consider the geographical interests of the superpowers irreconcilable. Still others in the liberal camp believe that, in the face of common annihilation in the nuclear age, there is enough common ground to work out some accommodation. These differences notwithstanding, most Americans, including scholars, perceive Russia as an adversary.

What, however, if this adversarial paradigm itself is no more than a transient convention? "3

While Yanov's stereotypes here are not very helpful, there is an important point in what he is saying. Many historians interpret Soviet history in terms of rivalry with America, and fail to see it in relation to Russian history as a whole. Therefore there is a good case for reassessing Soviet policy-making, paying less attention to conventional stereotypes of cold war on a historical and a historiographical level.

3. New primary Sources.

This process of reassessment is greatly assisted because of the recent

political climate in the Soviet Union. The active encouragement of individuals to take the initiative and to express their ideas has had some remarkable effects. "Glasnost" as applicable to Soviet history, has revealed much new material, which was unavailable in the Brezhnev era, or the "period of stagnation" as it is now known. Although information specifically related to foreign policy has been more limited, there have been a number of new sources about Khrushchev's times generally. One of the most exciting results from glasnost, has been the more open debating of modern Soviet history, and from this discussion, it is possible to build up a more comprehensive and accurate picture of events. One of the first examples of this type of discursive articles on the Khrushchev period, is that of Fedor Burlatsky in Literaturnaya Gazeta in February 1988.

In his analysis, Burlatsky recognises the need to speak more openly about the past:

"at present, twenty five years later, in a comparison of the period before and after October 1964, we see better the strengths

and weaknesses of Khrushchev"⁴

and the need to challenge the official view of Khrushchev:

"Time has not scattered the countless myths around the name of Khrushchev in our country or abroad. Sharing the fate of other reformers, Khrushchev didn't gain objective recognition in the consciousness of the masses."⁵

Thus Burlatsky shows that it is now necessary to reinvestigate the past, and to try and discover what Khrushchev was really like, as a person and as a leader. Burlatsky tries to give a more balanced picture of Khrushchev,

admitting that he made mistakes- his political misjudgement of some matters, his liking of grandiose schemes, of which too many were implemented too fast. Yet he also probes more deeply, recognising the extent of the opposition that he faced especially amongst the cadres and the apparat, and giving him credit for his enthusiasm and sense of justice, his exposure of Stalinism, for his dealing with the cult of personality and his policy of the political rehabilitation of those wrongly convicted. Thus this article seeks to redress the balance after "the years of stagnation", and to present a more accurate picture of the past.

An article in Moscow News three months later, in May 1988, took a more critical view of Khrushchev, emphasising the inconsistency of his reforms and the outright failure of some of his attempted improvements, especially concerning Lysenko's ideas on agriculture, the Riazan initiative etc. Despite this criticism, again two important concepts provide the final thoughts of this article, that you: "cannot learn to swim without entering water" and that even although change was not accepted, it laid the foundations for Gorbachev today, that "after two decades the seeds brought shoots" 6.

There are many other recent articles, providing new light on Khrushchev, for example by V Tendrakov in Novy Mir, but one of the most interesting developments is the appearance of autobiographical accounts of the period, previously unseen. One of the most interesting of these, is contained in the series of articles published in the autumn of 1988 in Ogonyok by Sergei Khrushchev, Khrushchev's son. These articles give a startling new account of how Khrushchev fell from power on 13th-14th of October 1964, revealing the chief

instigators of the "coup" and their motivation for the removal of Khrushchev. While this is not directly relevant to foreign policy decision making in 1962, it does provide insight into some of the stresses and strains in the relations between some of the key members of the Presidium, and provides an excellent basis for trying to decipher some of the policy changes and political manoeuvring during the earlier period.

Other autobiographical accounts of particular interest are those of G Bolshakov, Soviet Information counsellor in their Embassy in Washington, and of Khrushchev's Foreign Minister A A Gromyko. G Bolshakov's account of the Cuban missile crisis in Soviet Weekly emphasises a number of points, one of the main ones being the way that unofficial channels of communication were used between the American and Soviet governments. According to Bolshakov, there was a real division between Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, and Khrushchev himself. He recounts:

"Both sides made the most of the informal channel, and the Khrushchev - Kennedy dialogue gained in frankness and directness from message to message. Sometimes Robert would interupt to say, "Georgie, skip it. That's been written by Gromyko's men, not by Khrushchev. Stick to Khrushchev's words."7

He tells also how the American announcement of there being Soviet missiles in Cuba came as as much of a surprise to him as to anyone else. These comments suggest that perhaps it's possible that even Gromyko didn't know about the existence of the missiles, and that this had been kept from him. This would account for his silence before

Kennedy on the 18th of October, and for his failure to respond to the American announcement on the Tuesday in his speech in East Berlin.

The next step must be to examine Gromyko's Memories themselves in order to find an answer. On the crucial meeting with Kennedy on the 18th of October, Gromyko asserts that:

"Contrary to later assertions made in the West, at no time in our conversation did Kennedy raise the question of the presence of Soviet rockets in Cuba, consequently there was no need for me to say whether there were any there or not."8

Certainly from the stenographic records of the meeting, the question of the weapons was not asked specifically, but to anyone who knew what was going on, the meaning of Kennedy's words could hardly be hidden. It is difficult to believe that such a consummate negotiator as Gromyko would not have given some form of implicit retort to Kennedy's remarks, unless he didn't know to what they referred.

The general background given in Gromyko's Memories, combined with other more recent sources of information, conferences and exhibitions on Khrushchev's life etc are helping to expose some previously held myths about Khrushchev and bring hope that further material will be forthcoming. The publication of Khrushchev's Secret Speech of the 20th Party Congress of 1956, in the Soviet Union in 1989 is another great step forward. Thus the new material already available has provided new perspectives on past events, and confirmation of some views already held, eg about different factions in the Presidium.

A general outline only has been given here of some of the new material recently published in the USSR concerning the Khrushchev period. From this however, we are already beginning to glimpse some of

the ramifications of such new accounts of this period, and to see why a more detailed study of such documents is now so important. Having been freed from the limitations of conventional "cold war" stereotypes past and present, the historian is more able to discern clearly the significance of events and statements made, and is thus able to integrate the recently available material with traditional sources, to give a more comprehensive and accurate account of the period.

The reason for giving such a detailed description of the current position concerning primary and secondary sources, is because they to a large extent influence the form and the aims of this thesis. The object of this thesis is to use the currently available material in order to discover more about the nature and function of the Soviet government in 1961-2. There are many questions to be considered in this matter, and some of the main objectives for analysis are as follows:

1. To analyse the domestic political situation in the USSR, and to identify the most contentious policy issues.
2. To discover the nature of informal domestic political factions over these issues, to identify the main figures involved, and to discern their influence on the leadership of Khrushchev.
3. To assess the impact of ideology, and specifically the ideological revival of the 22nd Party Congress on the formation of foreign policy.
4. To understand the factors that determined foreign policy, central and peripheral, in theory and in practice, and to ascertain how they contributed to the crises over Berlin and Cuba.
5. To offer an evaluation of the effectiveness of Khrushchev's leadership within the political elite in 1961-2, and from this to

reassess the historical significance of his time in power, both in a domestic and international context.

Structure and Methodology.

The above objectives are to be realised within the following general framework; ie to utilise information and insights gathered from the 22nd Party Congress to provide a theoretical formulation with which to examine and explore two specific foreign policy case-studies. By examining material from a domestic and a foreign perspective, this should provide a comprehensive picture of Khrushchev's leadership strengths and weaknesses during the period 1961-2.

Chapters 1-3 will concentrate on the theoretical and ideological implications and variations in Soviet politics. They will try to illuminate trends in policy - making, and will examine mainly domestic issues, especially in relation to the 22nd Party Congress.

Chapter One will begin with a look at the political structures that operate within the Soviet Union, and makes an theoretical assessment of the potential influences on Soviet foreign policy decision-making. This helps provide an indication of the pressures exerted by key groups and individuals in the policy-making process.

Chapters Two and Three will concentrate on the 22nd Party Congress of October 1961, analysing various aspects of political interest. Part of this analysis will utilise database techniques to gain a fuller picture of events.

Chapter Two will be concerned with the chief domestic issues recurring in the speeches of delegates. This will include economic, agricultural and administrative discussions. The predominant area discussed will be the differences of opinion concerning de-stalinisation, both in general and in particular with reference to the anti-party group.

Chapter Three will look at foreign policy, and the variations of ideological positions apparent amongst the speakers. This will relate to Berlin, Cuba, China and Albania, as well as giving an analysis of the wider implications of these statements. More recent sources eg the memoirs of Sergei Khrushchev, will also be used to evaluate the extent of Khrushchev's power as leader. This chapter will also draw extensively on information from the Congress using database techniques. This database contains, amongst other material, information extracted from the speeches of all the Soviet and many of the foreign delegates to the 22nd Party Congress.

At this point, there should be beginning to emerge a pattern of the differing political issues important at the time, and an indication of the position of individual political figures on these issues. In order to see if these observations are accurate, two case-studies will then be made, to verify whether the political factions and groupings

suggested by the Congress material significantly affect policy-making. These case studies will also provide the opportunity to assess Khrushchev as an international statesman and as leader of the communist movement. These case-studies will form Chapters Four to Six.

Chapter Four will examine Soviet policy towards Berlin in 1961. It will attempt to identify the most influential factors in Soviet foreign policy decision-making, looking at the internal political situation as well as the pressures placed upon the leadership by fraternal communist powers, especially China and East Germany.

Chapters Five and Six will concentrate on Soviet policy towards Cuba in 1962. They will look specifically at the build-up to the decision to place nuclear weapons in Cuba, and to assess the ideological and practical factors involved. They will also try to get beyond "cold war" images of this crisis, to discover when and why the decision was made and what the intention behind it was.

The conclusion of the piece will then follow, summarising the conclusions arrived at concerning the Congress, and assessing their validity in terms of day-to-day decision-making in the USSR in 1961-2 with regard to foreign policy. It will reach conclusions about the nature of the distribution of power in the Soviet government of the time, and give a description of Khrushchev's leadership position based on this assessment. A reevaluation of Khrushchev's position in Soviet and international history can then be made.

FOOTNOTES.

Introduction.

1. J. L. Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the origins of the cold war." Diplomatic History, p. 6
2. A. L. Horelic, A. R. Johnson, and J. D. Steinbruner, The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A review of Decision-making theory related approaches. (California. 1975) p. 41
3. A. Yanov, "In the grip of the adversarial paradigm: the case of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev in retrospect." Reform in Russia, ed R.O. Crumney, p. 156
4. Literaturnaya Gazeta 24th February 1988, No 8, p. 14
5. Ibid., p. 14
6. Moscow News 1st May 1988, No 8, p. 9
7. Soviet Weekly 11th and 18th March 1988, p. 10
8. Gromyko, A. A. Memories (London 1989), p. 177

CHAPTER 1.

Foreign and domestic policy in the USSR: the theoretical approach

Foreign policy, ie the policy of a country towards the rest of the world, initially seems quite a simple concept to understand. The primary function of foreign policy is usually to ensure the continuity of the country, and to defend it against any danger. However while such a definition is helpful, it doesn't explain or clarify the system of priorities that lie behind the perception of a country's "best interests". The nature of foreign policy formulation is further complicated by its close relationship with the internal policy processes. Some historians such as H. Adomeit argue that domestic and foreign policy-making are in fact two largely independent areas, eg as when he asserts:

"contrary to widely held assumptions there does not appear to be a direct correlation between orthodox views on ideology, military policy and economics on the one hand, and high proclivities for risk taking on the other."1

and he concludes:

"Decision-making in international crises in the Soviet system is shaped much more by consensus on political issues than by domestic conflict"2

However, by just considering some of the mutual qualities of the two policy processes, foreign and domestic, this doesn't seem a very credible viewpoint - they both work in the same political context, often involve the same personalities, they have close institutional links etc. Hence the conclusion of D. Dallin seems more apt:

"The hypothesis that there is a significant connection between Soviet domestic developments and Soviet foreign policy is supported by common sense, empirical evidence and political science theory."3

Having established that there must be such a link, the next step is to establish its nature. About this there are many theories, V. I. Lenin himself wrote:

"the very deepest roots of both the internal and foreign policy of our state are shared by economic interests: by the economic situation of the dominant classes of our state."4

In this statement, Lenin characteristically sees the underlying economic situation as being a common factor, but the sources of foreign policy are more varied than this analysis would allow. The phrase "sources of foreign policy" was coined by an American G Kennan in his famous article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in 1947, in which he argued that Soviet foreign policy was to a large extent dependent on power struggles in the Kremlin itself. This idea has recurred again and again, from Truman's comment about Stalin - he's: "a decent fellow, but he's a prisoner of the politburo"5

to the present day, and indeed the political situation amongst the most powerful Soviet leaders must be of relevance. Obviously there are many other sources of foreign policy, the chief of these being ideological. Another historian, Barrington Moore Junior, draws our attention to the often reactive nature of foreign policy.

These various threads which interweave in order to form criteria for action, can interact between foreign and domestic policy in four different basic models. These are:

1. a congruence of ideological or economic positions, ie a similar orientation guiding both.

2. the dominance of a group of Soviet institutions which are in positions of influence.

3. the effect of one or more dominating political figures exerting a centralising control.

4. a reciprocal linkage relationship, ie having a simultaneously radical foreign policy and a conservative domestic policy.

5. policies ruled by practical expediency.

These various forms of linkage provide useful concepts for identifying some of the basic types of possible relations between differing sections of foreign and domestic policy. Now it is possible to examine these different areas in more detail. In 1966 the Soviet historian A. A. Arzumanyan emphasised the importance of three fields when considering Soviet foreign policy-ideology, economics, and the role of leaders within the framework of the political system. We shall now look at the first two, and then later assess their influence in terms of individuals and institutions, in order to break down these general theories into more tangible and specific elements.

a. IDEOLOGY

It is a commonly held view today that Marxist-Leninism is dead, and that Soviet politicians are now men of pragmatism. With the recent events in the USSR, ie the failed coup attempt and the official rejection of communism, this view has been confirmed, but in the early 1960's it was a very different situation..As S Bialer points out, the

idea that communist ideology was redundant then is misleading, and implies that political realism has made ideology redundant. While it is naïve to believe that Marxist-Leninist theory has a predominant influence in Soviet affairs, foreign or domestic, in the 1960's it still exerted considerable influence in a variety of ways.

One of the most obvious roles of ideology in the USSR, is to give legitimacy to the regime and to provide the rallying cry in order to unite the Soviet people behind the Communist Party and hence the Soviet government. In this incidence, ideology performs a vital function, both within the USSR and in the communist bloc, where there is a very diverse range of peoples, cultures, languages etc. If nationalism were to be used as a rallying force in the USSR, this would increase the expression of anti-Russian feeling, and intensify ethnic disputes and racial tensions. Thus in some ways it could be argued that ideology served as an instrument of Russian nationalism, and certainly it played an important role in extending Russian control in the USSR and the Communist bloc. This would seem to support the concept of an ideological congruence between foreign and domestic policy, indicating that ideological rhetoric functions as a political control in the Russian Republic's internal and external empires. This abstract theory is borne out by Stalin's methodology in the 1930's, when a repressive and rigorously enforced domestic policy was matched with a rigid and inflexible foreign policy, both being shaped by ideological conservatism.

Ideology also has an important, if often unacknowledged part to play in Soviet politics, in that it forms the language of communication, through which different individuals and groups express

their position. It provides the terms of reference and framework of concepts within which communication is made possible. This terminological framework thus restricts lateral or creative thought. A. G. Meyer defines ideology as:

"the body of doctrine which the Communist Party teaches all Soviet citizens, from school children to the higher party leadership."6

While this definition doesn't really explain the nature of ideology, it is useful because it draws attention to the pervasive nature of ideological orientation at all levels of society. It is true that many individuals will not conform to ideological stereotypes, but because of the intensive nature of ideological pressure, some influence is bound to remain. Although it is impossible to measure the extent of such conditioning, it must influence domestic and foreign policy, as the ruling elite is especially strongly exposed to such pressures. In order for an individual to hold a high position in the Soviet power structure, he must at least outwardly conform to a Marxist-Leninist line. The Prethus theory concerning the strength of ideological orientation of the politically upwardly mobile, that:

"ideology helps to create and educate those upwardly mobile figures of authority.....needed by the administrative machine."7

would reinforce this perception.

Another objection to the relevance of ideology, is that its influence is superficial only, and has little actual influence on decision-making or policy in practice. Hence the conclusion of some historians that by the 1960's there was a : "practical emancipation from

ideological stereotypes"⁸ and that: "action has become a guide to theory" ⁹. However this type of statement doesn't seem to be appropriate to Khrushchev's regime. Ideology remained the legitimising factor in Soviet politics at this time, although it would also have to be admitted that the nature of that ideological basis did change considerably. A.G. Meyer comments on the:

"intellectual problems the regime has willingly endured for the sake of maintaining doctrinal orthodoxy"¹⁰

Why did Khrushchev trouble himself to change the official ideological stance of the Soviet Union in 1956, and to further amend it in 1961, against much opposition, if ideology lacked power or political credence?

Part of the answer to this question lies in the specific nature of the period 1956-64. The reason that Khrushchev himself gave for his Secret Speech of 1956 and his further denunciation of Stalinist excesses at the 22nd Party Congress was that:

"as long as we continue working, we can and must find out a great deal and tell the truth to the Party and the people. It is our duty to do all in our power to establish the truth now, because the longer the time that passes since those events, the more difficult it will become to re-establish the truth."¹¹

In the short-term such a speech can be seen to be politically expedient in that it implicitly emphasised Khrushchev's own predominant position, but long-term he must have been aware of the negative repercussions of the implementation of such a policy. After exposing the falsity of Stalinist society, Khrushchev went on to emphasise the changing nature of the world in order to justify a

change in ideology. In his 1956 Central Committee Report, he talks of:

"a Marxist-Leninist precept that wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists. This thesis was evolved at a time when (1) imperialism was an all embracing world system and (2) the social and political forces which did not want war were weak, insufficiently organised, and hence unable to convince the imperialists to renounce war. "12

and goes on to say that with the event of the nuclear age, this thesis needs modification, and hence justifies his policy of "peaceful co-existence." Thus Khrushchev was admitting the ideological bankruptcy of the Stalinist period, and deriving from that the need for a new relevant ideological framework from which to operate. This adaptation of ideological theory to contemporary circumstances did not just mean that it had become subordinate to pragmatism, but that an attempt was being made to render its principles more effectively. Meyer's observation that:

"The intensity of indoctrination and the rigidity of official dogma are inversely proportional to the credibility of the doctrine."14

is implicit in Khrushchev's line of thinking. In order to revitalise staid ideological rhetoric, it is necessary to allow a certain amount of dialogue in a less restrictive, more creative atmosphere.

This is not to support the argument that once ideology was declared fallible, that it henceforth lost its prominence in Soviet thinking. In fact in the period 1956-64, ideology gained a whole new lease of life. Khrushchev was uniquely in the position after his exposure of Stalinism, to offer a new interpretation of Marxist-Leninism which

because of its timing, seemed to offer a fresh and coherent strategy for the future. Amongst a population still suffering from the excesses of Stalinism, this revised ideological approach was welcome and seemed to offer a new hope comparable in some respects to the early days of the Russian revolution itself.

Additional insight into the importance of ideology in Soviet society at this time, is given by the priority of the Soviet government to the eradication of all those who challenged this ideological line. While the censorship and suppression of some of the more liberal writers and journalists can be seen as having a political motivation, ie to prevent possible challenges to Party authority, the targeting of other groups for persecution cannot be explained in the same way. An example of this, is Khrushchev's religious policy. The harshness and brutality of this campaign especially against the Christian Church in the years 1961-3, initially seems very much at odds with Khrushchev's more liberal cultural policy and desire for individual initiative. It is only in terms of ideology that the severity of the measures against the Church can be explained. This theory is given added credence by the timing of the anti-religious campaign with the renewed ideological attack of the 22nd Party Congress, and would also tie in with the policy of the current Soviet government which doesn't have such a strong ideological orientation and recognises the positive and constructive role of the Church in society. Thus this is another argument to support the strong position of ideology in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev.

Despite the new respect for ideological innovation at this time, there were also some counter-productive elements which obscured its

effectiveness. As in all Communist theory, of whatever date, in Khrushchev's theories of "peaceful co-existence" and "state of all the people", were ambiguities and contradictions. Thus attempting to actually implement these theories was problematic. Also while 1961 was a time of ideological resurgence, it was also a year in which the practicality of many Soviet ideological assumptions was challenged- with continued tension over Berlin and Laos, problems in the agricultural sphere etc. Despite these difficulties, ideology still had a strong role to play, and its importance often seems to have been under-estimated. A comment by Aspaturian:

"The persistence of ideological goals in Soviet foreign policy, which tend to raise international tensions, reflect socio-functional interests which have been traditionally associated with the Party apparatus and professional ideologues"¹⁴

raises some interesting questions on the effect of ideology on the Soviet political landscape. This statement on the connection between ideological outlook with political forces within the Soviet power structure will be examined in more detail later, but even the fact that such a question should come up would indicate that ideology did have a strong role to play in domestic and foreign policy processes.

b. ECONOMIC

As we have seen, there appears to be an ideological congruence in the relationship between domestic and foreign policy - both being more flexible and adventurous in the times of Khrushchev. Another closely related and key influence in policy-formulation is that of the

economy.

Since the times of Peter The Great, Russian trade relations can be depicted in terms of huge cycles of concentrated international involvement and increased technical imports and then periods of autarky and stagnation, as Russia reaches out, and then withdraws into herself, and this pattern can be seen also in Soviet times. Since 1917 however the condition of the economy has become not just a prime political concern, but also has a unique self-legitimising aspect which makes the Soviet government unwilling to admit any shortcomings or failures. Economic priorities are thus of great significance in the Soviet government, as the right/left political dichotomy over economic issues can affect the whole edifice of the political structure. In the immediate years after Stalin's death, there was a reaction against his predominantly heavy industrial and militarily orientated policies, with priority to revitalise the sluggish economy, improve agricultural and technical development and increase the standard of living of the Soviet citizen. Thus to accomodate these new policies, there had to be a corresponding thaw in foreign relations, ie a policy of "peaceful co-existence" with non-socialist states. This would allow improved prospects of trade, especially in specialised technological and agricultural areas. A less conservative foreign policy also provided the opportunity for the type of political relaxation needed internally, in order to encourage individual initiative and creativity in the economic field.

That economic criteria affect both domestic and foreign policy can be seen throughout the Khrushchev period - eg in the 1961 Party Programme it calls for an increased emphasis on consumer goods, only if the

international situation doesn't worsen thus increasing defence expenditure. The political see-sawing involved in trying to balance the budget is an important source of policy-making, as in 1962-3 when the test-ban negotiations were seen as a way of releasing money from military to consumer-orientated investment priorities. A time of economic reform then necessitates political reform, and also a corresponding decrease in international tension. Therefore there is an inverse correspondance between increasing economic restructuring and growth and the aggressiveness of foreign policy directed to the chief industrial producers in the Western world.

That economic motivation had a large influence on foreign policy can be clearly seen, and all the indicators so far would seem to indicate that domestic economic factors generally had precedence. However the debate must have been pretty lively, as Ploss observes there was; "simultaneously and obviously inter-related conflict over economic and foreign policy within the Soviet hierarchy"¹⁵. The type of conflict that could arise, is revealed in the case of Cuba itself. On one hand, from an ideological view-point, the Soviet Union was interested in cultivating friendly links with "vulnerable" (ie potentially politically unstable) under-developed countries. From an economic perspective however, the Soviet Union desired good relations with the West which would be technologically beneficial. In the case of Cuba the two policies clashed, between the desire to placate the Western powers and the ideological drive to support developing countries. In this case, when the political ramifications of placing nuclear missiles in Cuba became clear, the need for peaceful international relations was seen to be paramount. When it came to the crunch,

political and humanitarian considerations outweighed both economic and ideological ones. While this is only a very superficial reading of the crisis, it does allow a better appreciation of the complexity of the issues involved.

The orientation of economic, ideological and foreign policies constantly intertwine, and now the political and institutional ramifications of these different theoretical positions will be outlined briefly.

THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION.

At this stage, a brief look at the nature of the Soviet Constitution would provide a helpful background to the processes of decision-making. The position of the Communist Party is paramount at all levels of government and administration. Party members occupy the majority of State offices, and constitute almost without exception all officials involved in foreign affairs. In Article 31 of the Party rules adopted in the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 it states that: "The supreme organ of the CPSU is the Party Congress"¹⁶, and that from it is elected firstly the Central Committee, then the Presidium: "the paramount collegial organ for the formulation of Soviet foreign policy"¹⁷. Therefore the Presidium lies at the heart of all domestic and foreign policy decisions, and being composed of twelve full and four candidate members, considerable power is being wielded by a very limited number of men.

The importance of the Secretariat although sometimes overlooked, is in fact second only to that of the Presidium in terms of power. It is

responsible for the appointment and dismissal of personnel, formulates the agenda and priority of issues placed before the Presidium and is responsible for executing Party decisions. The position of General Secretary is one of immense prestige and influence over all areas of Party life, including Agitprop which controls Pravda, Kommunist and has considerable control over other Soviet publications. The Party also has a large influence over other State institutions, the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers and its Presidium. In practice, the Russian Republic has the paramount prerogative to implement foreign policy decisions. The Council of Ministers is formal head of a whole network of administrative bodies dealing with foreign policy, directing embassies, consulate operation, overseas missions, trade delegations and also with responsibilities for the official state ministries - defence, foreign affairs and TASS. As such the Council of Ministers itself has a considerable part to play in influencing and implementing foreign and domestic policy. Using the above information as a guide, it can be seen that the organs of domestic and foreign policy overlap considerably in the Presidium, the Secretariat and the Council of Ministers. Hence there is a need to try and distinguish between different interest groups in these bodies, and to discover how they interact.

As we have seen, ideological and economic aspects of the political processes, are closely linked to policy formulation. While the left/right alignment has a role to play in this, there are many additional complexities - personal animosities and rivalries, regional conflicts, institutional interests in the Soviet political processes. As Aspaturian comments, unlike the American political system, there is

a lack of distinction between public and private sectors in the USSR, instead there being an interplay of pluralistic groups. These groups can be roughly divided in their attitude towards foreign policy, along the economic/ideological lines already related.

Hence the groups who favour a relaxation of international tension can be identified as:

(a) those involved in areas of the economy that benefit from a more flexible trading policy abroad, such as those concerned with technological and specialist resources.

(b) those favoured by a less military orientated foreign policy, ie the manufacturers of consumer goods, managers of light industry and those working in agriculture.

(c) those who benefit from an increased standard of living as a result of finance made available due to reductions in military expenditure - consumers, white-collar workers, the working classes and peasantry.

(d) those involved in the cultural and intellectual life of the USSR, eg academics who benefit from the cross-fertilization of Soviet and foreign ideas.

These groups are composed of the majority of Soviet citizens, but as Aspuriatian points out, in any power-structure there is:

"an inverse relationship between the size of the group and what might be called effective power density."¹⁸

That Khrushchev was aware of the potential political power wielded by these groups can be seen in his ideological concept of "the state of all the people", and in such measures eg as in August 1964, the introduction of better salaries and pensions for the white-collar

workers.

There were also a considerable number of people and groups opposed to any reduction of international tension with the West, although for widely different motivations.

(a) bureaucrats and conservatives in the Party Apparatus, who wanted a strong set of ideological norms with which to perpetuate their power and to articulate policy. They felt threatened by Khrushchev's ideological flexibility in internal and foreign Soviet policy.

(b) the military whose very status was dependent on a perpetual fear of capitalist encirclement. During periods of good East/West relations eg when the test-ban agreement was signed in June 1963, there was an amount of demobilisation in the army, and a corresponding decrease of military prestige in society.

(c) those involved in heavy industry favoured an unstable international situation, to emphasise the priority of industrial goods and armaments production in the economy.

(d) the KGB and intelligence agencies, who thrive on uncertainty and intrigue, and who resented Khrushchev's attempts to limit their sphere of operations.

(e) groups opposed to Khrushchev personally, tended to oppose his policies. Thus the "anti-party" group who opposed Khrushchev openly in 1957, composed of such men as Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Vorosilov, Bulganin, Shepilov and the heavy industry managers Pervukhin and Saburov.

The division of the Soviet political spectrum into these two groups obviously is not the definitive analysis, but it does provide a useful guide to some of the alignments possible between differing groups in

Soviet society. There are many other divisive issues operating - regional differences such as the dispute between Siberia and the Ukraine over resources, also specialist rivalries as in the army between traditionalists and innovators over the favouring of rocket and nuclear forces. Personal rivalries, the influence of cliques and factional disputes complicate the picture still further. When examining Soviet foreign policy however, consideration of these tensions are vital to a deeper understanding of how policy is formed. This framework of allegiances will be tested in the case-study made, and by a process of deduction a more satisfactory and sophisticated model should emerge. We are now ready to look in more detail at the actual period in question.

CHAPTER ONE.

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When the name of Khrushchev is mentioned, often the first thing to come to people's minds is the 20th Party Congress of 1956. Khrushchev's name is synonymous with his famous "secret speech" made at that Congress. The 20th Congress is often singled out as the most important event of the Khrushchev era. Why is this claim made, and how is it validated?

The 1956 Congress has been described as being the most crucial event in Khrushchev's time in office, and it is undoubtedly of fundamental importance to any understanding of Khrushchev and of the Soviet political system. The most significant event connected with it however, was in fact Khrushchev's "secret speech", which was made just after the official Congress came to a close. This speech set an important precedent, as for the first time it was revealed something of the truth about the nature of the Stalinist regime, and of the large-scale repressions and deaths that took place.

"the cult of the person of Stalin....became at a specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality."¹

and:

"Stalin used extreme methods and mass repressions" and "showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power.....he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also

against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the Party and the Soviet government."2

Khrushchev went on to give an account of the individuals who were falsely accused and killed through the Stalinist "terror" - Eikhe, Rudzutak, Kossior, Chubar etc.

This speech had enormous repercussions, as the truth about the last twenty-five years of Soviet history was directly acknowledged by the Chairman of the CPSU, and as delegates returned to their own regions to discuss the issues raised and their consequences. The impact of this speech was manifested not just in the reaction to it within the USSR itself, but also in the ensuing revolts in Poland and Hungary in 1956.

Some qualifications have to be given as to the significance of the speech, the most important being the "secret" nature of the speech. Although it was Khrushchev himself who gave the speech, it was done in a closed unofficial session, and its contents although published abroad, were not published in the USSR itself. Thus although radical change did result from this speech, it was mainly one resulting from exposure of truth, ie recognising the mistakes of the past and the need to turn away from them. It led to a change of attitude, and to a greater awareness of the deficiencies of the system. It tended to be a slow and largely passive phenomena however, rather than anything of a more official or tangible form.

In many ways, the 22nd Party Congress of October 1961 was an attempt to implement some of the implications of this recognition of past errors in a more practical and lasting manner, a very much more difficult and demanding process. The 22nd Party Congress provided Khrushchev's one and only opportunity to consolidate the new

ideological position that he had adopted as a response to the need to break away from Stalinism, and to see that take a more definite political shape. The 22nd Party Congress attempted to deal with major issues: to acknowledge an often hard truth of the scale of innocent deaths resulting from political oppression and to reinterpret Soviet history from the mid-twenties in the light of this, for individuals to take responsibility for past actions, and to initiate changes in society to guard against similar events recurring, eg a resurgence of the cult of personality. At the 22nd Congress, more specific allegations and accusations of corruption and criminality were made, issues and events were publicly exposed and discussed, this process culminating in the passing of the resolution to remove Stalin's body from the Mausoleum. In this way the 22nd Congress was much more radical than the 20th, in that it publicly faced controversial and highly sensitive issues, and tried to deal with their implications.

The 22nd Party Congress is also much more representative of Khrushchev's period in power, as it clearly demonstrates his limitations, eg his failure to implement the calls for the expulsion of key individuals from the party. In the months before the Congress there had been much political instability, and while there was great triumphalist talk of "the building of communism", the name of Stalin had not in fact been overtly criticised. Thus the sudden emphasis of destalinisation was one used by Khrushchev to strengthen his own position. There were 5,000 delegates at the 22nd Congress, 3 1/2 times more than at the previous ones. Khrushchev's use of such grass-root support was thus planned to overcome entrenched neo-Stalinist influence in the communist party. That this was not successful reveals a

fundamental though understandable inability of Khrushchev to operate in a more open and therefore less predictable political system. As has been seen time and time again in the USSR and Eastern Europe recently, it is almost impossible for those who have held power in a fixed communist structured system to adapt to the concept of freedom of speech, political responsibility and answerability etc. Khrushchev, despite his undoubted talents, proved that he was unable to cope with mastering political techniques of influencing and manipulating power in a subtle but effective manner, especially when the Soviet people had no experience of how such a situation could function, and were not very responsive. Therefore his attempt to use "de-Stalinisation" as a political weapon backfired, and in fact contributed to his own political demise. Thus the 22nd Party Congress can be seen as the most fitting symbol of the Khrushchev period-depicting the hopes and ideals of a new generation, but the practical and cumbersome ideological restrictions of a people conditioned and scarred by the past. In the 22nd Party Congress can be seen the synthesis of the major traits of the time, the ideological development of the revelations from the "secret speech", the stubborn opposition of vested interest groups and the strange mixture of general confusion and duplicity, reticence and stubbornly held beliefs contained in the political world. In the 22nd Congress can be seen a clear manifestation of the limits of Khrushchev's power, and the seeds of his downfall. The records of the 22nd Party Congress depict the contradictions and confusions of Soviet political life, and give an indication as to the processes of Soviet decision-making.

This Congress provides the historian with insight into the political

conflicts and tensions in a key period of Khrushhev's time in power, and this knowledge can be utilised to bring illumination to the political priorities of many of those in the Soviet leadership over a broader time period. This was not a Congress characterised by a facade of monolithic unity, and there are in fact many significant differences in the speeches of the delegates which can be fruitfully analysed. The following three sections intend to examine key themes and positions adopted by the delegates at the Congress. These themes can be discussed and analysed under the following headings :

1. domestic considerations: a. economic and administrative

b. ideology and the arts

c. the Party Programme and Personnel changes.

d. general aspects of the de-Stalinisation campaign

e. the anti-party group

2. foreign policy considerations:

a: looking at attitudes towards Berlin and Cuba.

b: the relation between de-Stalinisation and relations with Albania and China.

c: the wider significances of the Soviet Chinese split.

3. Khrushchev as leader:
- a: a brief outline of Khrushchev's leadership based on a general summary of the above.
 - b: a consideration of Khrushchev's character will be given.
 - c: with reference to information from Sergei Khrushchev.

With this knowledge we will then be equipped to see how far the pattern of decision-making discerned can explain policy formulation both pre and post October 1961.

SECTION ONE: DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS.

(a) Economic and administrative issues.

The subject of industry and of agricultural administration was one of great controversy and debate in the USSR at this time, and this can be clearly seen in the speeches made at the 22nd Party Congress. Out of the 103 speeches made, at least 10% of them were highly critical of the current situation (see appendix, table 12), while many more made a number of serious criticisms of the governmental structures of administration. One of the most hard-hitting speakers was D S Poliansky who provided a whole range of examples of acute economic mismanagement. He says:

"Production and construction plans are often not well co-ordinated

with plans for material and technical supply and co-operative deliveries.....the construction base lags seriously, and the funds allocated by some economic councils are not being used up....there are serious shortcomings in selecting the orientation in capital work.....poor use of land a fundamental reorganisation of the training of specialists"3

Voronov singles out "serious shortcomings"4 in the All Russian Economic Council, the Council of Ministers and the local party cadres, and many others echoed this complaint. Kirilenko heavily criticises the State Planning Committee and the all Russian Economic Council as being:

"to blame for the unsatisfactory state of capital construction; they are making serious mistakes in planning the opening of capacity, doing a poor job of working on long-range designing of equipment for new enterprises under construction etc..."5

There was a general impression given of poor management in many of the Republics, and a call for greater co-ordination between the different groups involved. Different methods of reaching this goal were proposed, with Brezhnev calling for increased involvement of the masses in administration, Krotov talking of the need for more forward planning, to have a more incentive based economy etc. Again on this issue it was Poliansky that spoke out using the most direct language:

"Unfortunately, we still have in our midst a highly tenacious category of people who consistently make a mess of things and yet for some reason remain numbered amongst the "reponsible officials" year after year"6

Thus there was a very visible dissatisfaction not just with the decisions of the various planning bodies, but with the nomenklatura

itself. Although very often specific names were not mentioned, everyone knew the groups referred to. Some delegates went to great lengths to avoid attributing blame to identifiable individuals. Thus M T Yefremov makes the point that criticisms of the planning bodies mentioned are not a reflection on those in charge of them, ie Novikov, Gerasimov and Afansyev, as they have only taken up their posts comparatively recently. Thus despite much rhetoric and heavy criticism, no-one seems to be directly to blame. Everyone is afraid for their own reputation and no-one is prepared to cast the first stone.

In the agricultural arena also, there are many criticisms, although as one would have expected, there is considerable regional variation. The predominant complaints are however the shortages of equipment, the need for advancement in animal husbandry, changes in the grass-crop rotation system, the need for more specialisation etc. There was also a certain amount of advancements acknowledged, and predictably enough some praise of Khrushchev in this particular area. Khrushchev is praised by V M Kavun for his intervention on a Ukrainian working farm, while A V Gitalov earnestly and emotionally thanks him for his role in bringing about greater corn harvests. Smirnov manages even to put in a word for Khrushchev in advocating the use of automatic welding gear at the Baltic shipyards, and comments on the wonderful change that this brought. Despite these favourable mentions however, Khrushchev's name is not in fact mentioned as many times as might have been expected. Talk is centred around mismanagement and unsatisfactory conditions, and the predominant tone was one of frustration.

(a) Ideology in the arts and society.

Khrushchev, in his Central Committee Report given to the Congress on the 17th October, states:

"Our Party conceives the whole point of its activity to lie in raising the people's well-being, in cultivating the material and spiritual demands of Soviet man and satisfying them more fully."⁷ Khrushchev talks of there being "the most favourable opportunities created for the flowering of free artistic creativity and for active participation by the masses in the creation of cultural values" and asserts that:

"art is called upon to educate the people first and foremost on the basis of the positive values in life, to educate people in the spirit of communism."⁸

This view was the general concensus of the delegates, although the Minister of Culture, Ye. A. Furtseva commented that more writers were needed that had closer ties with the people. Only two main speakers elaborated on the didactic element that was seen to characterise sound communist literature. Adzhubei called for increased humanitarianism and compassion in artistic work saying that the:

"callousness towards the sincere impulse of a man who wants to do something good and useful is intolerable."⁵³

Tvardovsky, while admitting that "writers have been called the Party's right hand helpers", perceptively commented that this did not mean that novels should concentrate on issues like whether Grunya should milk above capacity to increase the efficiency of her unit, but that the complexity of life should be characterised.

"One of the astonishing features of art is that unless the artist

himself is moved.... no miracle occurs"54

It is surprising that there was not more open debate about the role of the arts by the delegates, as it was a sphere of continued and vigorous controversy in the early 1960's. A brief survey of the happenings in the cultural affairs of the Soviet Union at this time will be given as it's illustrative of Khrushchev's leadership style. As we have seen at the Party Congress, while greater freedom in artistic endeavour was encouraged, art and literature's function was still seen as a way of promoting communist goals and inspiring the Soviet people to greater achievement.

Certainly when Khrushchev came to power there was a thaw in the literary world, and from 1956 onwards books such as Dudintev's Not By Bread Alone, which was highly critical of the Soviet system was published. This apparent freedom continued into the early 1960's when a number of controversial works were published. However this "freedom" was as always carefully channelled towards the one end, ie to encourage criticism of the previous regime, and to inspire people to take the initiative and to work for a better future. This ideological aspect can be seen in the publication of works such as the poem Stalin's Heirs, and Solzenitsyn's One Day in the life of Ivan Denisovitch in 1962, a novel which is famous for presenting a gruelling and bitter portrayal of the Soviet labour camp. It is interesting that the decision to publish such works did not reflect a general attitude of the recognition of literary merit. There was much international criticism of the Soviet decision of 1958 to ban Pasternak's Dr Zhivago, and this

seemed to be a reflection of the fact that this novel was not seen as serving a Marxist-Leninist goal.

If, as has been suggested above, Soviet arts were strongly manipulated for political reasons, to what extent was Khrushchev himself involved in this? It is interesting to note that the body officially in charge of cultural policy was the cultural section of the Central Committee. However this was a very conservative body, and it was not in favour of more radical publications of any kind. In fact true power lay not with the committee, but with influential figures amongst the intelligentsia that were favoured by Khrushchev. Khrushchev took a keen personal interest in the arts, and was very much influenced by men with more liberal sympathies. Two of the most important of these men were VS. Lebedev, on the Council of Ministers, and A. Tvardkovsky, Editor of Novy Mir. Both men worked hard to get more outspoken pieces of work published, and it is highly significant that they did so by going directly to Khrushchev. Khrushchev operated to bypass official channels that did not agree with him by creating personal coteries of advisers who gained influence over issues far exceeding their official capacity. One of Khrushchev's most trusted advisers was A. Adzubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law. Adzubei wrote glowing reports of Khrushchev's achievements in the press, in 1959 even writing a book to recount all the details of Khrushchev's trip to the United States. Adzubei is an interesting figure in a number of ways, as Khrushchev also used him in other spheres, particularly in foreign policy, where he was often used as link man to relay information to foreign officials.

Policy formation in the arts then is highly instructive, as it

confirms Khrushchev's methods of bypassing departments or committees with whom he was not in sympathy. Khrushchev instead often relied on his own instinctive judgement as in the Manege, or got his own way by acting on the advice of a small band of select advisers who received privileged information and status because of this. Khrushchev's willingness to "hold court" in this way alienated many, and can be seen as symbolic of his failure to work effectively within the Soviet political system.

(b) The Party Programme, and Personnel changes.

The very fact of there being a new draft party Programme in 1961 in itself is indicative of the extent of Khrushchev's influence. This was only the third party programme since 1903 (the second one being in 1919). It was thus long overdue, and its very existence was due to Khrushchev's recognition of this fact. Tucker says of the draft programme that "the input of Khrushchev's political orientation lies clearly upon it."¹¹ He uses the following examples, the re-organisation of MTS's (ie machine tractor stations), the virgin land scheme etc. Certainly in the field of agriculture Khrushchev seems to have had considerable influence. Much of the tone of the Party Programme is very much of Khrushchev, the optimistic assertion that there would be huge improvements in living standards, housing and education etc. However there is one vital area where Khrushchev's influence is not so clear, that of industry. In any society it is in the industrial sector that the critical battles are fought and won, and it seems to be precisely here that the limits of Khrushchev's power can

be seen.

Political reform also, the introduction of the rotation of all senior positions and the cadres, the increased number of central committee members (in 1956 there were 133 full members and 122 candidate members, in 1961 175 members and 155 candidates), and the concept of the withering away of the state seemed to reflect Khrushchevian views stressing the importance of the individual. Khrushchev understood that the only way to overcome the nomenklatura and the inertia of the bureaucrat was to encourage individual initiative: "It is the millions of such innovators that are the flower and pride of our Soviet society."¹¹ A reflection of his attempt to achieve this is that 110 of the 175 Central Committee members of October 1961 were new. To this extent Khrushchev was successful. However in practice many of Khrushchev's plans were not in fact carried out. One area which reflects this is that of personnel changes.

In terms of personnel, an examination of changes in the membership of the Presidium and the Secretariat are enough to show the political trends of the time, and to demonstrate something of Khrushchev's power in practice. The Presidium was reduced from 14 full members to 11: A.B. Aristov, Ye. A. Furtseva, N. G. Ignatov and N. A. Mukhitdinov all were demoted, whilst G. I. Voronov entered into the Presidium. In this case Khrushchev lost two of his allies Furtseva and Ignatov. Khrushchev appears to have had more of a say in composing the voting lists for the Secretariat, in that there is a greater number of young officials coming in - I. V. Spiridonov, P. N. Demichev, A. N. Shelepin, L. F. Ilyichev and B. N. Ponomarev. Out of these as has been seen from the speeches made at the Congress, Ilyichev and Shelepin both played a prominent role in

the de-Stalinisation drive. Thus on the whole Khrushchev does not seem to have a firm or consistent influence on the major political appointments of the day.

DE-STALINISATIN.

De-Stalinisation is as the name suggests, a campaign which aimed at reducing the influence of the Stalinist philosophy on all aspects of Soviet political life. This process had been gaining momentum ever since the death of Stalin in March 1953, and had been given an enormous boost as we have seen at the 20th Party Congress, where the evils of excessive Stalinism were clearly seen. It's important to notice when considering the issue of de-Stalinisation, that there was no indication before the Congress that this would even be mentioned, never mind that it would become the major issue of the entire Congress. As M.Fainsod comments:

"The highlights of the Congress were the open airing of the Sino-Soviet differences over the treatment of the Albanian Workers Party and the full-scale attack on Stalin and the anti-party group. Neither was foreshadowed in the Agenda"13

In the days leading up to the Congress, the main topic of conversation was the Third party programme, and the new ideological emphasis contained therein. While this fact has been noted earlier, it would be interesting to attempt to develop this further. Was this a deliberate policy by Khrushchev to surprise delegates with possible Stalinist sympathies? Even that looks unlikely, as in his opening speech, Khrushchev talks about the struggle against the anti-party group in the

past tense: "it was a struggle of principle, a sharp political struggle, a struggle between the new and the old"¹⁴, and even gave qualified praise to Stalin:

"Of course J. V. Stalin did make great contributions to the Party and to the Communist movement, and we give him his due."¹⁵

Thus there was little indication given about the primacy that de-Stalinisation was to have in the days to come. Another anomaly is that Voroshilov, one of the targets of the later campaign of anti-party rhetoric was sitting on the dais with the other members of the congress presidium. Perhaps this was a result of Khrushchev wanting to display publically his magnanimous heart, but that appears to be the only explanation unless the implications of the de-Stalinisation campaign was not anticipated by Khrushchev himself directly before the Congress. Therefore if there was a change of emphasis or policy, it must have taken place in the early days of the Congress itself.

On first perusal, there are no obvious clues contained in the philosophical and theoretical justification given by delegates as to why this issue was raised with such force at this particular time. Statements like that of Semenov:

"The Stalin cult, with its dogmatism and gross violations of socialist legality, was alien and hostile to Soviet scientists"¹⁶ and of D. Razulov;

"Life has fully borne out the soundness and timeliness of the measures taken by the Central Committee of the CPSU to expose and put a stop to the divisive activities of the anti-party group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin and others."¹⁷ didn't provide any reason of why it had become so important to discuss

these issues further. Certainly there was a general realisation that Stalinism had done much damage, but it was seen by many as an issue solely relating to past events, and there was not so much indication as to why the issue was raised with so much vehemence and so unexpectedly at the Congress.

Perhaps a greater insight into the whole issue can be gained from looking at some of the stated aims of de-Stalinisation. Here the ideological framework being introduced seems especially important - the concept of the "new man" and "the state of all the people". The stated aims of the new Party Programme: the construction of the foundation of communism, the concept of "the state of all the people" and of the need for individual initiative were a radical departure from those of Stalin and were a development even of the ideas propounded by Khrushchev in 1956. The new Party Programme emphasised individual initiative and responsibility, so here at least a change of attitude towards the past was needed, plus a method of translating this into practical terms. De-Stalinisation was thus partly to increase individual awareness of the past, and to create an realisation of the creative potential and opportunities for the present. This concept is reinforced by the new emphasis on party legality also, in order to try to provide people with a greater sense of security and confidence. Thus the justification and reinforcement of the Party Programme remained one of the main aims of the Congress. The de-Stalinisation campaign became a vehicle for this.

There were of course other reasons also for the ferocity of the de-Stalinisation campaign, and as you begin to study the nature of some of the speeches made, this soon becomes more apparent. The first speech of significance in this area is that of P. A. Satuikov. He singles out

Molotov particularly for vilification as a Stalinist who flouted the laws of socialist legality. In the 1920's, Molotov was apparently described as being accused of:

"lack of proper tact....the factual groundlessness of the accusations and completely inadmissible demagogy have forced the conference to censure the afore-mentioned comrades"¹⁸

also that in the 1930's Molotov was described as "guilty of flagrant abuses of revolutionary legality"¹⁹. All then becomes clear, when at the climax of this speech, Satiukov states: "The delegates to this Congress should know that in October of this year, just before the Congress opened, Molotov sent a letter to the Central Committee."²⁰

Although the contents of this letter has never been publicly disclosed, an understanding of the contents does become discernible. It is described as an attack on the draft Party Programme and Central Committee. Another delegate, Pospelov revealingly talks of "the anti-party attacks by Molotov against our programme"²¹, implying that the anti-party group still has some influence at that time. He then proceeds to state: "There is no doubt that the 22nd Congress will unanimously approve the proposal of a number of delegates to exclude these fanatics from the Party's ranks."²² Thus Pospelov in his influential position as Director of the Institute of Marxist-Leninism, perhaps unwittingly reveals that Molotov, and all that he represents, is still seen as some type of threat. Yet again it must be asked, why make such a fuss about a letter from a discredited political leader?

There are two main reasons that can be derived from the speeches made. The first is related to the nature of the de-Stalinisation campaign, and particularly to the denunciation of the anti-party group. This

group of eight people; Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin and Saburov and Shepilov, derive their identity from being the key political figure who acted against Khrushchev in the 1957 coup attempt. Yet this is not presented as the main accusation against them, ie their main crime is not one of ideological deviation. Instead, attention is drawn to their role in the "mass repressions" in the 1930's themselves. Thus F. N. Petrov declares that:

"This group bears direct responsibility for the mass repressions against honest Party members, including the infamous persecution of many old Bolsheviks"23.

L N Yefremov puts it even more bluntly:

"The bitter attacks made by Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, and the other members of the anti-party groups on the Party's Leninist policy reflected their anxiety to escape personal responsibility for the mass acts of repression against many Party and state officials."24.

The matter was not left to rest there either, and a later speaker, the head of the KGB, A. N. Shelepin made the following statement:

"Numerous documents in our possession prove irrefutably that the members of the anti-party group were guilty of illegal mass repressions against many Party, Soviet and Young Communist League workers and military people, and bear direct personal responsibility for their physical destruction."25

Shelepin then goes on to give more details about the Kirov assassination and the purges in general in the 1930's. Some of this information was new to the delegates there, eg Shelepin spoke of Voroshilov's mistreatment of Yakir, Malenkov's involvement with the

Leningrad case etc. The point that seems to have been being made, especially with the phrase "numerous documents" was that the whole area of personal and culpable responsibility for the purges was not a closed matter, but could be re-opened at any time. Coming as it did from the head of the KGB, this then was surely an ominous warning to those with Stalinist political outlook that if they made their views too blatant, they too might be subject to scrutiny about their activities in the 1930's and early 50's. Thus de-Stalinisation was partly a political weapon used by Khrushchev to intimidate and divide the opposition to the ideological theory and implementation of the Third Party Programme.

The second reason why Molotov's letter was perhaps treated in a more serious way was because of Khrushchev's awareness of the ideological congruence of Molotov's position with that of the Chinese Communist Party. This divergence of opinion between China and the Soviet Union had been worsening for some time, and statements like Molotov's accusation that the draft Party Programme was "anti-revolutionary, pacifist and revisionist"²⁶ was deliberately intended to be both provocative and divisive. Kuusinen was the only delegate to draw out this inference, commenting that:

"In essence, Molotov is trying to concoct a kind of sectarian platform for his further anti-party profiteering. He apparently has decided to stir up the waters in order to try later on to catch a fish in these muddy waters. Perhaps the bait will be swallowed by some bony sprat if not here in home reservoirs, then at least somewhere in foreign waters."²⁷

The dispute between the two communist parties became painfully obvious during the heated exchanges between Khrushchev and Zhou Enlai,

especially over Albania, with the attitude of the Chinese delegation to Khrushchevian ideology being thinly veiled criticism, eg:

"Openly exposing disputes between fraternal parties and fraternal countries for enemies to see cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist approach....The Communist Party of China sincerely hopes that the fraternal parties between which the disputes and disagreements exist will reunite on the basis of Marxist-Leninism"²⁸

Some form of alliance between certain factions in the Chinese communist party and key individuals on the Soviet political scene was a real possibility, and again this made the form of Molotov's attack more potentially powerful and troublesome. Tatu offers an interesting perspective on this. Of Khrushchev he states:

"his 1961 attacks against these men now defeated, were really aimed at other opponents, still in the saddle, whom he was trying to eliminate.....And who were they? To begin with, probably Suslov....Who seemed a likely candidate for "guilt by association".

But even men like Mikoyan and Kosygin might eventually feel threatened."²⁹

With Khrushchev's position under threat in the worldwide communist movement, he didn't want to have to face increased political pressure from within also.

The effect that Molotov's letter appears to have had on Khrushchev again would seem to indicate the insecurity of his position. This is backed up in a number of ways. Firstly Khrushchev himself was open to

suspicion concerning his actions in the 1930's and 50's. Attention was brought to this, probably completely inadvertently by Ye. A. Furtseva. Of a Central Committee Presidium meeting in late 1957 she comments:

"The meeting was discussing the complete rehabilitation, including rehabilitation in the Party, of persons who at one time had been prominent in our army's leadership - Tukhavevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Yegorov, Eideman, Kork and others. So obvious was their innocence that even Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and others declared for their rehabilitation, although they had had a hand in their tragic deaths.

And at that point in the discussion Nikita Sergevich very calmly but bluntly asked them: "When were you right, then? When you voted to doom them, and that doom was so tragically sealed, or now that you are for completely rehabilitating them? Tell us, when were you right?" This blunt behaviour infuriated and flustered them"³⁰

This question could equally well have been asked of Khrushchev himself.

Another area which shows ironically both the apex and the nadir of Khrushchev's power are the events concerning de-stalinisation in the aftermath of the Congress. Yes Stalin's body was removed in dramatic fashion from the Mausoleum, yet it is likely that this decision was taken on the basis of the ratification of the Congress itself, and not of the Presidium. In Khrushchev's closing speech to the delegates he states:

"Mass repressions began after the assassination of Kirov.

Considerable effort will still be required to establish who was guilty of Kirov's death. The man who guarded Kirov was

killed. Afterwards the people who had killed him were shot. This was obviously not an accident but a deliberate crime. Who could have committed it? A thorough study of this complicated case is now being made."³¹

Despite all this rhetoric however, the matters that Khrushchev raises are not brought up again. This would seem to indicate that there was too much opposition from Khrushchev's political colleagues for this issue to be aired more fully. Khrushchev's power seems to be strongest when he has support outwith the Presidium, eg with the direct vote on the removal of Stalin's body. However in other areas, he seems to be very much restricted.

Some of the nuances of the various possible political alignments involved in these disputes are further explored in the section "Khrushchev as leader".

(c) The Anti-Party Group.

The mechanics of de-Stalinisation involving the anti-party group itself are also worth investigating at some length, as it was one of the most controversial issues at the Congress, and therefore also one of the most revealing. While the issue of de-Stalinisation generally was one mentioned by practically all the delegates (unless they were one of the more obscure functionaries), the way in which this was done often varied radically. As we have seen, the anti-party group was seen as the embodiment of Stalinism, yet it was defined and associated with greatly differing concepts. Therefore an investigation of these differences by the use of a database provides a good way of gaining

insight into different individual's positions and attitudes to fundamental questions of ideology and politics. The study of the controversy over the anti-party group is one of the most fascinating and revealing phenomena of the Congress.

In the initial speeches of the Congress, the issue of the anti-party group was not really central. This can be explained through examining the political background concerning the fate of the anti-party group in the period between June 1957 and October 1961. At the June plenum in 1957 there was an attempt within the Presidium to oust Khrushchev from his position as First Secretary, a move which Khrushchev countered by involving and gaining the backing of the Central Committee. Of the eight main characters (Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Bulganin, Pervukhin, Saburov and Shepilov) involved in this coup attempt only Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich and Shepilov were expelled from both the Presidium and the Central Committee, Saburov was dropped from the Presidium and Pervukhin was demoted to candidate member of the Presidium. Despite the seriousness of the accusations brought against the anti-party group not one of them was expelled from Party membership, this being indicative even at this early stage of the limitations of Khrushchev's power. While at the 21st Congress confessions were made by Pervukhin and Saburov as to their involvement in the plot, again little action was taken. By October 1961 there was no obvious reason to resurrect this whole sensitive area.

In October 1961 therefore, while passing reference was made to the anti-party group, initially it was not a main concern. It was only as the Congress progressed that it became a central issue. There was a wide variety of reasons given for criticising the anti-party group at

the 22nd Party Congress. There were three predominant and significantly different themes. These can be defined in terms of the particular time period referred to.

One main group of speakers composed of slightly over 1/5 of the delegates, ie twenty two , emphasised in their speeches the crimes of the anti-party group in the 1930's (see appendix, table 8). Very often speakers would single out specific leaders who brought devastation to their particular republic or area in the USSR. Hence Podgorny and A. Ye. Korneichuk talk about Kaganovich's crimes in the Ukraine, while I. V. Spiridonov talks of Malenkov's destructive ways in Leningrad. These speakers talk of the anti-party group's criminal behaviour, with thirteen talking of "arbitrariness" and "mass repressions". Thirteen of these called for the expulsion of the individuals concerned on these grounds. Thus Ignatov says "the factionalists realised that the time would come sooner or later when they would have to answer for their villainous deeds"³² and Abramov declares: "the factionalist activity, collusion and outright crimes that we have heard about are incompatible with the title of Party member."³³ (It is worth noting here that both these men lost their positions at the end of the Congress, another factor suggesting Khrushchev's lack of influence.) On examining this group as a whole, it should be noticed that out of the thirteen delegates involved here, most of them were in their late fifties and ten of them were party members by 1930 or before (app, table 1). Thus the delegates who were most prepared to speak up about the repressions of the 1930's were the ones who lived through it and had perhaps seen relatives and friends losing their lives. This generation were aware of the injustices of Stalinism, yet were not closely enough involved that

they would feel vulnerable to accusation. The nature of the action desired against those accused of criminal behaviour is ambiguous, as expulsion from the Party was a formal prerequisite before a Party member could be prosecuted in a Soviet court of law for a criminal act. Thus calls for expulsion could either be an end in themselves or the beginning of a major purge. A sense of proportion seems to evaporate as the distinction between criminal acts in the past and political deviance in the present seem to become confused.

Another train of thought emphasised the 1957 struggle, with nineteen delegates taking this line (table 10). One of them Ponomarev the historian argued:

"The struggle proceeded around fundamental questions of the Party's line, including questions of ideology"³⁴

This more impersonal emphasis of ideology was one of just under a 1/10 of the delegates who spoke (table 7), and perhaps suggested a desire not to delve too deeply into the past, and instead demonstrate a contemporary concern with finding approval for the Party Programme. Most of these delegates interestingly enough, six out of the nine, were relatively young men who were in their forties, who hadn't joined the Communist Party until the late 1930's.

A third group of delegates related these two different set of circumstances in explicit fashion. Thus there were comments regarding the anti-party group eg: "fearing it would be exposed and brought to responsibility, it simply clung to power"³⁴. Poliansky too links it all together. Of the anti-party group he says: "They feared exposure. This united them, bound them in a mutual conspiracy." ³⁵. Skolnikov took the matter further:

"It is horrible to even think about the ruinous path onto which the factionalist Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov and their accomplices were pushing us"³⁵.

Again the whole issue of the anti-party group is given a very direct relevance to the past and present conduct of individuals. Four of the delegates Adzubei, Iliachev, Mzhavanadze and Pospelov actually directly talked of their chief crime being the way that they conducted themselves in 1961 itself (table 9). This would again tie in with an opposition group focused around the position taken in Molotov's letter. This is further backed up by the fact that 9 delegates saw the anti-party group's chief crime as ideological, a significant proportion when the new Party Programme was being introduced.

Some participants mentioned and censured the anti-party group, but stressed that it was all in the past. Thus Kosygin says;

"It is not because the anti-party group constitute a force at the present time, or a danger to our party in its work, that we are speaking about them at our Congress. Our party is stronger and more unified than ever.....But we are doing this to show the Party and the People once again what the cult of the individual leads to..."³⁷

Considering some of the many valuable exhortations to Khrushchev personally, there is an underlying note of threat in this remark. This provides a suitable reminder of the way in which the whole campaign against de-Stalinisation could have had detrimental ramifications not only for many senior delegates at the congress, and also for Khrushchev himself.

There are many areas of confusion over this whole affair, eg the

position of Voroshilov one of the conspirators. Many people called for the expulsion of Voroshilov from the Party, because of his role in the attempted coup of 1957. All the way through the Congress, Voroshilov as part of the platform delegation, had to listen to accusations against him, till at the end on receiving forgiveness from Khrushchev, he was re-elected. As we have seen previously this could well provide a suggestion that the ferocity of the anti-Stalinist campaign was not part of a long term plan of Khrushchev.

Having looked at the background to the de-Stalinisation campaign, and realised some of the issues involved, it would be enlightening here to pause and see what results we can obtain from a database analysis of the speeches on this issue.

The very definition of the anti-party group in terms of the number and the specificity of those mentioned by the delegates is informative in itself. Out of the speeches used in this database survey, from 103 delegates, 48 of the delegates defined the anti-party group specifically as containing between 3-8 members (table 3). That means that 55 delegates only briefly mentioned the anti-party group as having two main members, and hence failed to give any detail or any real attention to them. Only 13 of the delegates indeed mentioned all 8 members of the anti-party group - a very low proportion. These delegates were Brezhnev, Furtseva, Grishin, Ignatov, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kuusinen, Mikoyan, Mukhitdinov, Nuriev, Ponomarev, Satiukov, and Shvernik. It is significant that these were all leading members in the Communist Party hierarchy, and it could be speculated that Khrushchev was relying on men such as these to persuade and influence

the majority of delegates because of their personal positions, as opposed to having an overall numerical superiority.

The accusations against this group varied enormously, with over half the delegates who spoke, ie 55, denouncing the anti-party group in the mildest and non-committal of terms, talking vaguely of the group as violating "party legality". 9 emphasised the ideological element, possibly in order to emphasise the contemporary relevance of the anti-party group to the Third Party Programme. Only 13 of the delegates admitted people within the group as being guilty of " mass and arbitrary repression", although 27 demanded the expulsion of the anti-party group from the party. (table 1). As has been seen it was necessary under the law that a person must be expelled from the ranks of the party if they were going to be tried for criminal acts. Thus the number of 26 delegates demanding expulsion, 1/4 of the delegates is a little ambiguous, as there is no way of telling to what lengths they wanted the anti-party group to be punished.

The statistics given in the above examples, and which can be examined in more detail from the information in the appendix, clearly show the pressure that Khrushchev was under. Over half the delegates barely referred to the de-Stalinist campaign, and most of the "old guard" had a vested interest in not examining their own past actions in too much detail.

CHAPTER TWO.

1. N. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. ed. E. Crankshaw. (London 1971), p559-60
2. Ibid., p.569
3. Poliansky, D. S. Current Soviet Policies IV: The Documentary Record of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (CSP.), (New York, 1962)
4. Voronov, G. I. CPS. p.132
5. Kirilenko, A. P. Pravda, 26th October 1961, p5-6. CDSP.
6. Poliansky, D. S. CSP. p.152
7. Khrushchev, N S. The Road To Communism. p.101
8. Ibid., p.111
9. Adzhubei, A. I. Pravda. p5-6, 28th October 1961, CDSP.
10. Tvardkovsky, A T. Pravda. p7, 29th October 1961, CDSP.
11. Tucker, R C. "The CPSU Draft Programme: a credo of conservatism"
Problems of Communism.
12. Khrushchev, N. S. Report to the 22nd Party Congress. 17th October 1961, CDSP
13. Fainsod, p.1
14. CSP. p.69
15. CSP. p.68
16. DSP. p.177
17. CDSP. vol xiii, no 50, p.21
18. CDSP. vol xiv, no 4, p.27-8
19. CDSP. vol xiv, no 4, p.28
20. CDSP. vol xiv, no 4, p.28
21. CDSP. vol xiv, no 5, p.19
22. CDSP. vol xiv, no 5, p.20
23. CDSP. vol xv, no 3, p.22
24. CDSP. vol xiii, no 50, p.18
25. CSP. p.180
26. CDSP. vol xiii, no 49, p.12
27. CDSP. vol xiv, no 4, p.33
28. Tatu, M. Power in the Kremlin. (London 1969) p.147
30. CDSP. vol xiii, no 50, p.18
31. Khrushchev, N. S. Closing Speech to the Congress, 27th October 1961, CDSP.
32. CDSP. vol xiv, no 1, p.18
33. CDSP. vol xiv, no 3, p.16
34. CSP. p.147.
35. CDSP. vol xiii, no 52, p.22
36. CDSP. vol xiv, no5, p.17
37. CDSP. vol xiii, no 51, p.23

CHAPTER THREE.

Foreign policy considerations.

(b) While the issue of Albania was perhaps the most controversial in the realm of foreign policy, there are other interesting areas covered. Concerning Berlin, the silence was perhaps more meaningful than what was actually being said. Out of all the speeches analysed, only 8 actually mentioned the German situation in any detail. In fact a reader of the official reports of the Congress could be forgiven for not noticing anything in particular going on in East Germany. This in itself must be highly significant when one considers that the Berlin Wall had been erected only eight weeks previously, and that there was still a considerable amount of tension in the whole area. A number of explanations could be put forward to account for this, one of which being that Soviet action in Berlin was rather an embarrassment because of the hard-line military action, but also possibly because Soviet action there could not credibly be justified by line of Marxist-Leninist doctrine being espoused at that time. It could be responsibly argued that in this case, Soviet action proceeded the doctrinal

justification that it was meant to follow.

Out of the eight delegates who referred to the situation even in passing, the two who talked about it in most detail were exploiting the issue in order to further their own interests. Thus Malinovsky, the Defence Minister suggested that Western countries were preparing for war over Berlin, and that hence the Soviet Union needed to re-arm. He criticises Adenauer as being bellicose, and speaks of the Soviet Union's need for new missiles, anti-aircraft and anti-missile defences. Gromyko is the only delegate apart from Khrushchev, who discusses the diplomatic position in any detail. While Gromyko talks of the Vienna meeting with Kennedy as "one of the outstanding events of our time", he comments that if war is coming from anywhere it is coming from the U.S. He describes the world situation as "tense and unstable", and places a large part of the blame for this on West German militarism. Gromyko tries to make out that the U.S. government has no vital interest in Berlin, and that:

"If for certain figures in the West the German question is simply a "theoretical concept", for us it represents the millions of lives laid down by our compatriots for our country's freedom and for the liberation of Europe from fascist barbarism, it is a question of our security and the security of our allies." 1

Gromyko thus speaks of the German question as an issue of defence.

and calls for a German peace treaty as a way of "normalising" the situation and of establishing Berlin as a "demilitarised free city". Gromyko tries to justify the need for a German peace treaty, a pressing matter of international concern at this time. That Gromyko seems to emphasise this seems partly to reinforce his own belief in the need for a hard-line foreign policy. It is interesting that he does so by indicating that Soviet policy in the German dispute is defensive, as this doesn't seem to have been generally accepted by delegates at the Congress. Perhaps it was the tenuous nature of Gromyko's arguments combined with the aggressive rhetoric that accompanied it that seemed out of step with the mood of the Congress as a whole. This again could suggest that the decisions taken over Berlin only a couple of months before now looked difficult to justify. Does it also indicate a change of political alliance within the Soviet Presidium? That matter will be considered in more detail later. Only Kuusinen and Shelepin followed a line of reasoning in any way similar to Gromyko, Kuusinen talking of NATO as an aggressive body, and Shelepin emphasising the extent of CIA subversive activities being carried out there. The above mentioned speeches were very much the exception to the general rather embarrassed silence on the whole subject of the German question, the most likely reason for this being that it was not easily integrated into the ideological framework advocated at the Congress.

The speeches of Khrushchev himself are most revealing concerning the German question. In his opening speech to the Congress, Khrushchev makes a very significant statement:

"If the Western Powers show readiness to settle the German

problem, the issue of a time limit for the signing of a German peace treaty will no longer be so important; in that case, we shall not insist that a peace treaty absolutely must be signed before December 31, 1961."2

This deadline had been imposed by Khrushchev....., and the withdrawal of the deadline, largely unnoticed within the Soviet Union, marked a significant policy shift. That this whole matter was still a live issue can be seen in some of the events in East Germany. On the 21st of October the New York Times recorded Ulbricht as saying that he desired a peace-treaty to be signed "with no delay". Later in the week, on Friday the 27th it was noted by the same paper that Soviet tanks had moved into East Berlin, a sight not seen for several years. On Monday the 30th of October the Soviet Union exploded its first 50 megatonne bomb. Thus while at the Congress itself the German question was barely mentioned, it seemed to be a difficult issue for the Soviet leadership to agree on, judging by the contradictory signs sent out. That this issue wasn't aired more openly is more evidence to support the contention that Khrushchev was feeling vulnerable.

Cuba also was very seldom mentioned in speeches, except in general terms - Mikoyan refers to Cuba as a beacon of light in Latin America, while Adzhubai talks of Khrushchev's meeting with Castro and the need to support Cuba in the time to come. Again there is no indication of the decisions that were going to be made concerning Cuba in the next six months.

(b) The relationship between De-Stalinisation and relations with China.

Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 1956 was not just significant in that it exposed something of the truth about de-Stalinisation in the Soviet Union, but also because it reinforced Khrushchev's line on foreign policy. His concept of "peaceful co-existence" was strengthened by the realisation of the paranoid nature of Stalin's reaction to events abroad. By 1959, Khrushchev was challenging three of Lenin's perceptions of the international order, that there was a capitalist conspiracy to fight the Soviet Union, that war was inevitable, and that Soviet military action was necessary to intervene in Third World countries was now outmoded and that wars of "national liberation" were more effective instead. Thus Khrushchev called for creative Marxist-Leninism, an application of Leninist principles to the world at that time, which he argued had changed quite dramatically since the times of Lenin. Thus Khrushchev wasn't just reviewing and reinterpreting Stalin's regime internally, but the basic precepts of Marxist-Leninism as well.

At the 22nd Party Congress this trend was developed, with Khrushchev pursuing a flexible approach to foreign policy emphasising the political and economic aspects of communist expansion as much as the military one. As might be expected there was much opposition to this within the communist party hierarchy, with many viewing it as a "soft" and feeble approach. This was especially true of the position of the army, who were fearful that this would mean a cutback in their power and influence. Thus Malinovsky's speech sounds very different in emphasis to Khrushchev's, with him describing:

"the intensified practical preparations for war being made by the

Western countries with the "Berlin crisis" as pretext"

and saying:

"We have no intention of attacking anyone, but at the same time we are firm in stating that we shall destroy any aggressor who ignited the torch of a world war"³

Khrushchev by contrast said in his closing speech:

"if the Western powers show a readiness to settle the German problem, the issue of dates will not be so important....The important thing is not the date, but a businesslike and fair solution of the problem."⁴

Khrushchev attempted to strengthen his position by identifying all those who opposed him on this ideological issue as "Stalinist" and as being vulnerable to charges of having connections with the anti-party group. That this was not an entirely fictitious manoeuvre is demonstrated at the Congress itself. In the speeches of some of the delegates, a letter was referred to, written by Molotov to the Central Committee shortly before the Congress. This letter, although the content of which was never officially disclosed in detail, seemed to contain accusations against Khrushchev and his philosophy of "peaceful co-existence". Thus Satiukov states of Malenkov:

"His contentions lead to the conclusion that it is impossible to continue the advance to communism without the most serious political conflicts with the imperialist countries and hence without war."⁵

In this way, Malenkov is said to have exposed himself as "a factionalist and a plotter". How then was this difference of opinion over foreign policy manifested at the Congress?

This issue had a direct relevance to all the countries represented at the Congress, and this was manifested most openly in relation to China. The Chinese delegate at the 22nd Congress was Zhou Enlai, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, who made his speech very near the beginning of the meeting. Zhou Enlai goes to great lengths to praise Soviet achievements in space, and then speaks of the Soviet desire for peace, saying that "the resumption of test explosions of nuclear weapons " by the Soviet Union was also a decision for peace. A more traditional Marxist-Leninist line was espoused: "the capitalist system is continuing its decline and decay and the imperialist camp headed by the USA is day by day nearer the point of breaking up."⁶ The USA is portrayed as determinedly embarking on military action, and the Kennedy Administration is depicted as:

"insidious and adventurous. Seeking to make itself more attractive with an "olive branch", it spouts "peace", "progress" and "the prosperity of mankind", while under the cloak of "peace" it is actually making even more frenzied efforts in the arms race and in preparing for war."⁷

Thus Zhou Enlai sees the world purely in terms of militant Marxist-Leninist theory, and characterises the USA as war-mongering.

Another major difference can be witnessed through Zhou's comments on unity between the Communist Parties. In his initial speech, Khrushchev had made a number of comments concerning Albania stating:

"the Albanian leaders have lately reversed their policy for no apparent reason, despite their previous assurances and contrary to the decisions of the Congress of their own Party, and have

set out to seriously worsen their relations with our Party, with our country. They have begun to depart from the common agreed line of the Communist movement of the whole world on major issues of the day"⁸

The reaction of the Chinese delegation to Khrushchev's speech was noticeable: "they got slowly to their feet during the ovation, chatted, and then casually clapped "^{38a}. Meantime Albania looked to China for support, a role which the Chinese communists were more than willing to take on. The Chinese leadership used the issue of Albania and the ideological differences that it symbolised with great vehemence, in order to encourage other communist parties to see that there were possibly two different viewpoints held by the two major communist powers, and that individuals had the opportunity to choose between them, ie the Chinese Communists were using the issue to challenge Soviet supremacy within the Communist world. This approach can be seen in the following quotation from Zhou Enlai's speech:

"...if, unfortunately, disputes and disagreements have arisen amongst the fraternal parties and fraternal countries, we should resolve them patiently, being guided by the spirit of proletarian internationalism and by the principles of equality and the achievement of identity of views through consultations.....

Openly exposing disputes between fraternal parties and fraternal countries for enemies to see cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist approach. Such an approach can only pain friends and gladden enemies. The Communist Party of China sincerely hopes that the fraternal parties between which the

disputes and disagreements exist will reunite on the basis of Marxist-Leninism..."9

It is revealing to note that TASS didn't publish Zhou Enlai's comments on Albania. Zhou Enlai left the Congress unexpectedly early, again in a bid to embarrass Khrushchev. As it was Khrushchev who was openly challenging the leadership in Albania, Zhou Enlai was obviously criticising Khrushchev's judgement and his fundamental loyalty to Leninist principles, thus also directly challenging Khrushchev's position as head of the communist movement. The implications of this issue can be demonstrated in that at the Congress, N Korea, N Vietnam and Japan were silent on the issue of Albania, whilst India and Indonesia "tacitly" sided with China. This helps to show why Khrushchev felt he was under so much pressure.

It is interesting again to note the number of Soviet communists who went out of their way to show support for Khrushchev's position. Ignatov describes the Albanians as "moving further and further from the internationalist position" and says that "We cannot hush this matter up"¹⁰, while Mukhitdinov claimed "the anti-Marxist conduct of the present leaders of Albania stand out like a dirty spot"¹¹. In total 5 of the 103 delegates surveyed support this position.

(c) The wider significances of the Soviet-Chinese split.

Before we leave the question of foreign policy discussed at the Congress, it would be useful to view the issues involved in a wider context, firstly in terms of ideological justification and then in terms of the practical implications for the world communist movement.

As we have seen shortly after Khrushchev came to power as First

Secretary of the Communist Party in 1953, he revised traditional Leninist foreign policy. War was no longer seen as inevitable, and it was felt that by economic competition socialist forces would have the victory over capitalism, which would decline and collapse. In the case of "Third World " countries "wars of National Liberation" were favoured as a way of freeing them from capitalist bondage. Khrushchev argued that because of the existence of nuclear weapons, there was a need too for an adaption of Leninist principles and that a new flexibility was needed. This is spelt out by him in some detail in his opening speech. The philosophy justifying this change is laid out here:

"This (Leninist) appraisal of the nature of imperialism fully retains its validity. Our Party, far from denying the accuracy of this appraisal, reaffirms it, and proceeds from it always in shaping its policy, in elaborating the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary struggle, as our Draft Programme clearly shows. At the same time the Party must, if it is to adhere to creative Marxist-Leninism, take account of the important changes that have come about in the world since Lenin furnished his analysis of imperialism."12

It is important to keep this statement in mind when looking at Soviet-Chinese relations.

The wider implications of Khrushchev's split with the Chinese over this issue of who was the true heir of Lenin are of profound significance. The severity of the attack on Molotov as has been demonstrated, was indicative of the mood against the Chinese and all those who held a similar political viewpoint. Fainsod sees to the

heart of the questions raise at the congress:

"The vision of the communist future unveiled at the Congress left a most important question unanswered - whose vision, Khrushchev's or Mao's?"¹³

This had an immediate relevance for communist parties in emerging third world countries, countries especially in the Asian, Indian and Indonesian areas, where communist parties were readily influenced both by the ideological line and scale of practical help given by either super-power. Ultimately it was the ideological dispute between the two super powers that split the communist world in two, and changed the shape of the political map of the world.

Khrushchev as leader.

There have been many different evaluations of Khrushchev's leadership. There is controversy over Khrushchev not only in terms of his ideological orientation, but of his political effectiveness. In trying to make an objective decision about Khrushchev's leadership abilities we have to look not just at his rhetoric and presentation, but also at the extent of his power to influence policy and make decisions. The historian Fainsod, writing at the time of the Congress commented:

"for the moment at least, Khrushchev's status as leader of the Soviet communist party appears to be beyond challenge."¹⁴

That this wasn't by any means a unanimous view is illustrated by an article written in the New York Times on the 2nd of November:

"The key fact about this Congress is that it did not go off as

planned and that on balance it probably represents a major setback for Premier Khrushchev himself."15

The French political journalist Michel Tatu tries to evaluate all this saying:

"For the period under survey no one was thinking of replacing Khrushchev as First Secretary.....neither he nor anyone else had the slightest doubt....that he would be triumphantly "re-elected."16

One of the main aims of this section is to try to piece together from all the evidence that has been considered to what extent Khrushchev had control within the Soviet leadership.

One way of approaching such an issue is to attempt to discover how far Khrushchev's policy preferences were carried out, and to what extent personnel favoured by him retained their positions by the end of the Congress. As the model for this, Khrushchev's initial speech to the delegates will be used. While it is recognised that this will to some extent be flawed because of the constraints put upon him, it can still act as a guide, especially when used in conjunction with other speeches made by him in the preceding years. Thus the extent of Khrushchev's influence in a number of areas will be assessed.

- (a) Khrushchev's leadership position
- (b) Khrushchev's personality.
- (c) Conclusion taking into account recently released information.

We will then set this in perspective of the other material already gathered, eg concerning the economy, the anti-party group etc, to

build up a comprehensive picture of the strengths and weaknesses of Khrushchev's leadership position during the Congress.

(a) Khrushchev's leadership position.

As we have seen, Khrushchev's leadership was challenged in most of the principal areas of Soviet politics, both internal and external. In terms of domestic politics, Khrushchev had some victories - the adoption of the new Party Programme, increased liberalisation in the Arts, bringing more party members into the decision-making process and the symbolic removal of the body of Stalin from the Mausoleum at the end of the Congress.

However, it has also been clearly demonstrated from the speeches themselves that Khrushchev's position, even at this time, looked distinctly shaky. The whole issue of renewing the attack on the anti-party group seems to stem largely from Khrushchev's awareness of the insecurity of his own position. There was criticism of Khrushchev's policies in every sphere from agriculture to industry, and the fundamental tenets of Khrushchev's ideological beliefs were being openly undermined by a still powerful opposition. There were other areas too which starkly revealed Khrushchev's limitations. The closing resolutions that the Congress voted on contradicted Khrushchev on two key points. On discussing Stalinism it said:

"The Party has told the people the whole truth about the abuses of power in the period of the cult of the individual and has vigorously condemned the mistakes and perversions and the methods alien to the spirit of Leninism that were spawned under

the cult of the individual"17

However, it never mentions the seriousness of the charges specifically, or that they could be characterised as "repressions". This statement also makes the ridiculous assertion that "the whole truth" had been told, a statement which was blatantly untrue, and which Khrushchev himself had contradicted, Khrushchev stating, as we have seen, that more investigations should be called for. No mention of this delicate topic was ever heard again however. Thus Khrushchev's aims and objectives seem to have been very different from his political associates.

The congruence between the political alignment of Khrushchev's detractors within the Soviet Union are strikingly similar to the problems he faced with the Chinese in the battle for the leadership of the world communist movement. This helps to explain the way that Khrushchev must have felt pressurised from all sides at times, at home and abroad, and perhaps also accounts for some of his more erratic decisions in foreign policy.

(b) Khrushchev's personality.

Achieving a degree of understanding of the character and motives of Khrushchev is essential in making an appraisal of Khrushchev's leadership. Often the image of Khrushchev that most people hold is that of the "harebrain schemer", as he was so vividly described by the Pravda article of October 1964. Yet this image needs to be reassessed in order to obtain a more accurate and historically researched view.

As we have seen, Khrushchev constantly talks of the need to revive true Marxist-Leninism, and it would seem from the consistency with which this view was held, eg from his own memoirs Khrushchev Remembers, and indeed right to the end of his life, that it was a sincere belief. Certainly Khrushchev pursued de-Stalinisation and democratisation to bolster his own political position, but there was more to it than this. Khrushchev went to extraordinary lengths to enact his belief re the injustices of Stalinism, eg in the late 1950's over eight million people were released from Soviet jails, and six million were posthumously rehabilitated. Khrushchev won international respect as a result of measures such as these. Some historians recognise that Khrushchev had a "genuine feeling for his own country and its people", and that he "had a vision for the Soviet Union...which he was driven to implement"¹⁸. While this last statement captures one of Khrushchev's greatest strengths, it was also his major weakness, as at times the grandness of his vision obscured his recognition of the obstacles to achieving it, thus leaving him with ideas which were impossible to translate into practice in a tangible form.

Over the years Khrushchev has been cast in a number of different roles. Medvedev, the dissident historian describes Khrushchev as being hard-working and uninspired, portraying him as "a victim of his own exuberance." ¹⁹. For a long time many people in the West have seen Khrushchev as the antithesis to Stalin, the reforming and liberalising hero. Yet this view from the other side of the political spectrum is also misleading, as it fails to take account of the Khrushchev who was uncertain about too much liberalisation in the

arts, and who introduced and enforced some of the harshest anti-religious laws in Soviet history, ie the anti-parasitism laws. As we have seen in terms of the arts, Khrushchev seems to embody many Leninist ideological ideals, paradoxically, simultaneously attempting to allow the people a greater say and responsibility, as long as it didn't challenge the official line of Marxist-Leninist thought as he defined it. One historian describes the Soviet regime under Stalin as undergoing "an inner deradicalisation of revolutionary ideologies."^{20a} What Khrushchev seemed to seek was to reenergize these revolutionary ideologies within the Soviet political structure, ie while he rebelled against the conservatism and inefficiencies of the Soviet system he in fact sought to reintroduce the ideas of 1917. In this way Khrushchev could be seen as the orthodox rebel, whose "crime" was to wish to reinstate a creed which under Stalin had long since died, but which officially had never been negated. In accusing the Soviet political system of such duplicity, Khrushchev was thus challenging the legitimacy and integrity of all involved in Soviet political life.

(c) Khrushchev: the current theories elucidated.

Since Gorbachev came to power in 1985, much has been written about N S Khrushchev. Under Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, Khrushchev's name was not acknowledged in any way, so when "glasnost" began to become a reality, the opportunity for Soviet people to assess and discuss Khrushchev's achievements and true place in history for the first time was eagerly taken.

There have been two very differing conclusions regarding Khrushchev's

achievement. In an article in Time on 14th November 1988 written by Sergei Khrushchev, Anushavan Arzumanyan is openly critical of Khrushchev. He records the plenum of October 1964 as where:

"Khrushchev was accused of various sins, the unsatisfactory situation in agriculture, the disrespectful treatment of members of the Central Committee Plenum and disregard for their opinions and many other things."²⁰

He goes on to say:

"The accusations that Khrushchev had undervalued other members of the Presidium and was tactless in dealing with them was a serious one. There was a considerable measure of truth in it."²¹

As has been seen from this study, Khrushchev did undermine the official decision-making process in a number of important areas, so this specific criticism of Arzumanyan seems to have a factual foundation.

An article in Moscow News by Levada is harsher, blaming the development of "our first perestroika at a jerky pace"²² directly on Khrushchev's own inconsistencies. He argues that Khrushchev didn't break free from the old ways, claiming:

"One of the tragic paradoxes of our development is that the reformers who carried out the 20th Party Congress, while condemning Stalin's theory about the aggravation of the class struggle, revived it in a somewhat mitigated form as the "aggravation of the ideological struggle."²³

On foreign policy he says:

"Inconsistency and frequent sharp turns in foreign policy played up to aggressive forces in the West, complicated the

international system and deflected resources."24

While Levada admits that "the people, just emerging from political unconsciousness, were unprepared for change", he still blames Khrushchev personally for acting in a way that is inconsistent with his own words and ideals.

As we might expect, in his recent articles and interviews, Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita's son, attempts to justify many of his father's actions and character. In an interview published in Sobesednik in November 1988, Sergei portrays his father : "everything that could bring possible quick and practical benefit (for the Soviet people) caused his burning interest and active participation."25 He describes the "decade of Khrushchev" as:

"the original prologue to our perestroika: the restoration of truth and historical justice, success in the economic sphere, much promise, and important steps in the foreign policy of our state - all this is now justly associated with the name of N S Khrushchev."26

Obviously Sergei Khrushchev is eager to give what he sees as his side of things in support of his father, but at times S. Khrushchev's judgement or memory have been subject to question.

Sergei Khrushchev has written a four part account in Ogonyok giving new information regarding the overthrow of Khrushchev in October 1964. He describes how V. I. Galyukov telephoned Sergei to warn him of the plot against his father, but that when confronted with this information Khrushchev dismissed it feeling that: "No, that can't be, Brezhnev, Podgorny, Shelepin - they're completely different people."27. Khrushchev then recounts how his father then went on

holiday to his dacha at the Black Sea, how the conspirators called him back, and finally how Khrushchev decided to leave his posts without a fight. This presents a much more dignified Khrushchev than F. Burlatsky portrays, Burlatsky claiming that Khrushchev twice tried to divert the plane from Pitsunda to Moscow. A. Adzhubei also casts doubt on Sergei's reliability as a witness when he says: "Sergei didn't know anything his father did: I don't believe that for a minute."²⁸ referring to Sergei's assertion that Castro had wanted the missiles fired at the height of the Cuban missile crisis. In this particular case, Sergei's words have subsequently been confirmed, but Sergei himself says in his Sobesednik interview:

"Concerning affairs of state, father could not bear the least interference on the part of his family. This area was absolutely forbidden to us, and I never even tried to push my opinion."²⁹

This would suggest that Sergei's knowledge comes largely from when he helped his father with his Memoirs in the later 1960's, and not from direct experience at the time. A reviewer of S. Khrushchev's book in the weekend section of The Times remarks that Sergei tends to portray himself as rather an innocent, and Sergei's account could well not be telling the full story. (NB. also rather a refined version)

F. Burlatsky has written a number of interesting articles on the place of Khrushchev in history. One of these in particular makes a number of perceptive points. Burlatsky tends to see Khrushchev as rather a romantic character, who: "saw his mission in bringing peace and a better life to the Soviet nation" and that this was the "main aim of his work"³⁰. Burlatsky rightly gives Khrushchev much credit for speaking out against Stalinism:

"In the composition of the post-Stalinist leadership there was not one other leader who decided to come forward with a similar speech about the cult of personality."31

Burlatsky sees Khrushchev acting because of " a sense of personal guilt; a protest built up over a decade, which under strain broke free, as steam pours out of a kettle." Burlatsky sees Khrushchev's main achievement as:

"on his own initiative put forward the task of creating solid guarantees against a recurrence of the cult of personality. He struggled without compromise for this within the country and in the international arena, not considering the cost which such a struggle would introduce in relations with other member nations of the socialist camp."32

This would seem a very perceptive remark, as this would explain much about Khrushchev's attitude and frustrations towards the Chinese, his main preoccupation being with trying to secure guarantees for a fairer society within the Soviet political arena.

Burlatsky's comments about Khrushchev's limitations are also perceptive. Like many other commentators he identifies one of the main problems as:

"Khrushchev was inclined to rely on flatterers rather than genuine supporters of reforming changes. Therefore he surrounded himself with such flatterers eg N. Podgorny.....He had little use for people of an independent nature, of substance, of scope..And this became one of the causes of his fall."33

This as we have seen, is an accurate viewpoint. Burlatsky also claims as one of the reasons for Khrushchev's fall:

" 'the fate of a man - is in his temperament.' Nikita Khrushchev was a victim of his own temperament, but was also a victim of his surroundings. Haste, speed and emotion were for him his insurmountable features.³⁴

As has become apparent , many recent authors have concentrated on the reasons for Khrushchev's fall in October 1964. Yet these remarks are relevant to earlier years also, as many of them are applicable to the character of NS Khrushchev himself. It is interesting to see that many of the perceptions about Khrushchev's leadership style made during the analysis of material from the 22nd Party Congress are confirmed by people who knew Khrushchev well, and are writing about him now for the first time.

From all the different sources looked at in the last two chapters concerning the 22nd Party Congress and more recently available material, it can be recognised that while Khrushchev may well have been sincere and even idealistic in his beliefs, he alienated people by the political methods he used and thus made himself vulnerable to accusations from an attentive and growing opposition. This opposition was composed of the "old Guard", the army, staid Party apparathiks, conservative bureaucrats in establishments like the foreign ministry, and people who were frustrated with Khrushchev's inconsistency and heavy-handedness. This background gives important information of the pressures that Khrushchev was under even as early as 1961, and this must surely help to explain some of the contradictory signals given out in Soviet foreign policy around this period.

Chapter Three.

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3. CDSP. vol xiv, no 1, p. 19
4. The Road To Communism. p. 325
5. CDSP. vol xiv, no 4, p. 28
6. CDSP. vol xiii, no 49, p. 11
7. CDSP. vol xiii, no 49, p. 12
8. The Road To Communism. p. 133
9. CDSP. vol xiii, no 49, p. 12
10. CDSP. vol xiv, no 1, p. 19.
11. CDSP. vol xiv, no 2, p. 15
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14. Ibid., p11
15. NYT. 2nd of November 1961, p. 4
16. Tatu, p. 176
17. CSP. p226
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19. Medvedev, R.
20. Khrushchev, S. Time. 14th November 1988.
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23. Ibid., p. 9
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25. Interview with K. Mashkin. Sobesednik, November 1988. p. 12
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28. The Guardian. 25-26th March 1989, p6-7.
29. Interview with K. Mashkin. Sobesednik.
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p. 13-14. February 1988.
31. Ibid
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE BERLIN CRISIS.

"Time past and time present
Are both perhaps contained in times future
And time future contained in time past."

Burnt Norton, Four Quartets. T. S. Eliot.

In order to understand contemporary events it is always first necessary to look to the past. A time of particular importance to this process is the period June 1961-August 1963, a decisive time in the shaping of the contemporary world. With the last major resurgence and abatement of the Berlin crisis, many of the ghosts of the Second World War were laid to rest, and a new era of apparent "peaceful co-existence" seemed possible. In both the USSR and the USA, major and significant changes were taking place: in the USSR, Khrushchev seemed to be successfully attacking the traditional bastions of Stalinism and revitalising Marxist-Leninist theory, while in the USA, a youthful John F. Kennedy had just been elected President, inspiring in the American people a new pride and hope in their country.

Internal changes in domestic politics often have important ramifications on the international scene, and this period was no exception. Of far the most long-term significance was the ideological conflict between the USSR and China, as it effectively finalised the split in the Communist movement and irrevocably splintered the accepted "two camp" theory of international politics prevalent in the 1940's and 50's. This example of the way in which domestic developments can have major international repercussions helps

demonstrate the increasing degree of interdependence between domestic and foreign policy. As Hanrieder comments, it becomes necessary to see:

"foreign policy as a continuous process that bridges the analytical barriers between the international and domestic systems."¹

In the years 1961-3, with the advent of increased technological development and a corresponding increase in the role of the press in international communication, there was a fundamental change in the form and pace of international relations. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev deliberately used the press as a way of delivering veiled signals and informal dialogue between the two super-powers, in a way which as we shall later see brought a new style and substance to international politics. Through a more detailed look at developments in international relations and in Soviet foreign policy, greater understanding of Khrushchev's position within the Communist movement and within the Soviet leadership should be derived.

The Berlin Crisis 1961.

Historians hold widely differing viewpoints about the nature of Soviet policy determinants and actions over the months of tension over the status of West Berlin in the summer and autumn of 1961. Certainly Soviet policy seems varied in character, and any underlying policy determinants are not easily ascertainable. In order to try to make some sense of this period, the following approach will be taken.

1. A brief outline will be given concerning the controversy amongst historians on some of the issues to be discussed concerning Berlin.

2. The background to the period - looking at some of the major areas of contention between East and West in the summer of 1960-1, and examining some of the barriers to communication resulting from this.

3. A more detailed examination of the period from the Vienna Summit in June 1961 till the 13th of August. This will cover the Soviet internal position, the nature of communication between the Soviet leadership and other relevant countries and from this will try to discern the most influential figures holding power in the Soviet Union.

4. The period from the 13th of August onwards will be assessed in some detail, using all the available sources to identify why the border between East and West Berlin was sealed and what the intention behind this move was.

5. Conclusions will be drawn from the material considered, and these will be viewed in the light of the additional knowledge that we have about the 22nd Congress itself.

1. Berlin: the theoretical and historical issues.

There are a wide variety of theories concerning the Berlin crisis, about why it happened and what its significance was. In order to come to terms with these different approaches a short time will be spent looking at the different arguments, with a view to later trying to discover their accuracy and value as the case study itself progresses.

Some historians identify the military dimension of the European strategic situation as being a primary source of Soviet interest in a revision of the German situation. Thus Khrushchev's sudden

announcement that the Allied occupation of West Berlin must end soon, made on the 10th of November 1958, is seen as a direct response to his perception of growing American strategic nuclear superiority in Europe. Hence too the idea of an ICBM missile gap was introduced by the Soviets. This idea is developed in Schickt's book The Berlin Crisis, in which he talks of the Soviet desire to conclude a German peace-treaty as a reaction to the decision of the Eisenhower administration to deploy ICBM's^{*} in Europe. The possibility of stationing nuclear weapons in West Germany at this time was a live issue, and this could have been a contributory factor in the Soviet decision. Historians, such as Mackintosh feel that the Soviet leadership were pursuing the idea of securing central Europe - Germany, Austria and Switzerland as a demilitarised zone. There are theories that the aim of this new Soviet pressure was to pressurise the NATO alliance and to divide West Germany and France from Britain and the United States, thus weakening the military power of the Western governments. All these theories would stress the importance of Soviet military strategic objectives in Europe.

Other historians such as Isaac Deutscher assert that it is only against a background of the world Communist movement as a whole that Soviet actions can be understood. He sees the Berlin crisis within the context of Sino-Soviet tension, and feels that Khrushchev took a hardline aggressive foreign policy stance over Berlin in order to demonstrate that he was not being "soft" with capitalism or betraying Marxist-Leninist theory. Deutscher argues that the dispute with China was especially important at this time, because of its intensity and because of Khrushchev's concern over the fate of the Communist

* Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.

movement as a whole, and especially in underdeveloped countries. By initiating a more aggressive foreign policy, the Soviet leadership was thus attempting to influence other communist countries, especially those vulnerable to Chinese influence eg in Asia, that the Soviet Union was still the leading communist power and hence the one to be aligned with.

An important influence on the Berlin crisis was obviously the situation in Germany itself. The role of East Germany in particular must have been of great importance in determining the policies of the Soviet Union. In 1960 Ulbricht, the East German leader, launched a new and ambitious 7 year economic plan, which in turn led to an increasingly inflexible and authoritarian mode of implementation. The process of intensive socialisation and the total collectivisation of agriculture had a devastating effect on the people of East Germany. Not only was there a forced movement of people from one area to another, but there was a disconcerting economic instability, food shortages etc, and these pressures combined with a long term awareness of the comparative economic stability and freedom of West Germany, meant that many decided to flee from the East via the East German frontier. The professional classes were particularly aware of the possibilities and the attractions of the West. The numbers of East Germans fleeing to West Berlin increased as the Soviet propaganda against the capitalist West intensified. This became an urgent problem of crucial importance. On an already precariously balanced economic system, the effect of this drain on the labour force, especially amongst the skilled and professional classes, meant that Ulbricht was under enormous pressure to take some kind of counter-measures. His

desire for urgent action must have put pressure on Khrushchev also.

Throughout the period 1958-61, Ulbricht's statements were consistently more virulent and aggressive than those of Khrushchev. Many historians feel that there was considerable East German pressure on Khrushchev to pressurise the West into signing a German peace treaty, which was seen as a way of relieving some of the internal pressure building up in East Germany. When this line of reasoning is pursued, then statements like those of Hanrieder seem relevant: "The building of the wall....had antecedents and causes that were not entirely under the control of Moscow."² This idea is also prevalent in Windsor's book in which he sees the local moves against Berlin in 1960-61 as being made on East German initiative, and as often conflicting with Soviet policy. In this way some of the anomalies of what the American government and press saw as the Soviet communist monolith attitude towards the German issue could be explained. While the USA and the USSR saw the Berlin question in terms of global strategy and the fight for strategic predominance in Europe, East and West Germany at the ground level of this dispute were concerned that their respective superpowers might make concessions that would impair the economic and political position of their country. Hence at local level, the stakes *seemed* very much higher than for the two super-powers, and local actions could be misinterpreted by either side as being part of a constant and provocative policy directed by the other. The idea of East German pressure for action within the Soviet Union, and of a pro-Ulbricht faction in the Presidium seem very credible in a number of ways. As we have seen there were a number of hard-liners in the Presidium who could well have supported a harder military line. This

could correlate with a pro-Chinese faction who favoured a similar line, with the two working together. Two major studies have been made of the relation of foreign and domestic policy in the Soviet Union specifically over the Berlin crisis, one by Robert Slusser, the other by Hannes Adomeit. Both studies come to quite different conclusions about the nature of the Soviet leadership at this time.

In Slusser's The Berlin Crisis Of 1961., published in 1971, he argues that the Soviet leadership were fundamentally split over policy. He asserts that Khrushchev favoured a moderate foreign policy, and that it was only when under pressure from his Presidium colleagues that he took a more hard-line policy. Slusser claims to substantiate this by doing a survey of Khrushchev's speeches which he analyses to be consistently more conservative (ie less aggressive) than those of his Kremlin colleagues. In order to explain why the Presidium line was often more aggressive, Slusser identifies a conservative -military opposition, lead by Kozlov and Suslov, who pursued a more right-wing policy whenever they had the opportunity. Thus Slusser portrays Khrushchev as continually struggling against hard-liners - Gromyko at the Foreign Ministry, Kozlov at the Presidium and the senior army commanders. These pressures are seen to correlate with Khrushchev's increasing use of giving press interviews to Western journalists as a way of bypassing official channels.

"It was not merely, however, the officials of the Soviet foreign Ministry whom Khrushchev's unorthodox manoeuvres were designed to circumvent, but his own colleagues in the Presidium."³

Slusser also backs his argument by referring to contemporary reports from Italy concerning the existence of a hard-line faction in the

Kremlin, and from Yugoslavian sources reporting the existence of a military clique in the Soviet government. Slusser's final conclusion is that:

"an opposition faction could play Russian roulette with the peace of the world by taking actions which deliberately risked nuclear war, and which a struggle for internal political power was successfully masked from the outside world"⁴

Hence this is the reasoning that Slusser gives to explain the contradictions of Soviet policy in 1961.

The case-study conducted by Adomeit on the Berlin crisis of 1948 and '61 comes to a very different conclusion. It asserts that:

"There is no evidence for the existence of a hard-line faction, alone or in conjunction with the military, pushing, forcing or egging on the political leadership to take reckless action."⁵

Adomeit goes to great lengths to show that it is quite in accordance with Khrushchev's interpretation of Marxist-Leninism ideology for him to pursue an ambitious foreign policy. Adomeit proceeds from this line of reasoning to argue that it was Khrushchev himself who demanded a vigorous and ambitious foreign policy, and that in fact it was the other members of the Presidium that were trying to stop him. Hence he argues:

"individual military leaders and members of the Party Presidium were concerned that Khrushchev might be going too far in his challenge of the West on Berlin, or that he might act too impulsively."⁶

Thus Adomeit's conclusion is almost diametrically opposed to that of Slusser.

These different historians' views have been considered at this point to illustrate the controversy over events in the Soviet leadership at this time. This helps us to focus on some of the difficult questions concerning Berlin and to understand why attention should be given to this area. A case study should provide some insight into how the various factors that have been mentioned relate - the strategic importance of Europe, pressure from the communist movement abroad, the influence of Ulbricht, and how the Soviet leadership reacted to all these.

The background: linguistic ambiguities in an international setting.

"Will there be a Third world war?"

-No, but there will be such a terrible struggle for peace, there'll be no stone left standing."¹⁰

Soviet joke.

This "joke" has a very great significance for any historian trying to comprehend the workings of international politics as it clearly demonstrates the way in which the meanings of words can become distorted and warped.

".....Words strain,
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still....."7

This detachment of word from meaning often allows apparent theoretical agreement between countries. When the practical ramifications become evident however, the agreement disintegrates as the reality of the positions of the countries involved break through. In contrast sometimes an agreement can seem linguistically impossible although the necessary framework for this to happen is well established. The difficulties and frustrations inherent in communication are acknowledged by the United States and the Soviet Union. Kennedy remarked at a press conference:

"it was important that we try to get at the real meaning of words, dealing with access and rights and freedom and the rest."8 while Khrushchev struggles to determine: " the borderline that.....separates "cold war" from war in the fullest sense of the word." 9

Misunderstandings between countries, whether genuine mistakes or political contrivances, can create an atmosphere of mistrust or cynicism on all sides. This can be demonstrated by looking at the remarks of Dean Rusk, the American Secretary of State, in a speech made on the 11th of July 1961. He comments of the Soviet quest for power:

"In this process, the very language of international intercourse becomes distorted and contrived. "Peace" has become a word to describe whatever condition would promote their world

revolution. "Aggression" is whatever stands in its way. "People's democracy" is a term applied to regimes no one of which has been chosen by free elections. Self-determination is loudly espoused, but only in areas not under communist control.

The normally attractive word "negotiation" is used as a weapon for the only subjects to be negotiated are further concessions to communist appetite. Agreements are offered, but against the background of a long and sobering list of broken promises; and agreement is apparently a rest-camp, where one pauses and refits for a further advance. New assurances are offered in the very act of withdrawing those earlier given. Law, as one of their spokesmen put it: is like the tongue of a wagon - it goes in the direction in which it is pointed." And the gains of lawlessness are cited as the "new conditions" which justify new invasions of the rights of others."⁹

This type of public statement would not it must be supposed be conducive to a furthering of any dialogue, but does provide insight into the frustrations of communication which must have been felt by negotiators on both sides. One of the difficulties for the historian is to, as Kennedy puts it "get beyond the rhetoric to the reality."¹⁰. Yet this difficulty needs to be addressed before any significant headway can be made.

The negotiating process over the fate of Germany as early as during the latter stages of the second world war was full of complexities and ambiguities. The initial agreement on the status of Berlin and Germany was drawn up by the European Advisory Commission, and in a

joint Protocol of 12th September 1944 it confirmed that:

"'Greater Berlin'.....will be jointly occupied by armed forces of the USA, UK and the USSR assigned by the respective Commanders-in-Chief."11.

In the Yalta Protocol basic principles were agreed upon concerning the treatment of Germany as "a single economic unit"12 to be disarmed and demilitarised. It is important to notice here that at Potsdam it was envisaged that the four occupying powers, ie the USA, USSR, UK and France would co-operate during this period of occupation until a satisfactory German political settlement be achieved. However even at this early stage ambiguous phrasing concealed fundamental differences. Phrases such as "democratic" were interpreted by the United States as implying a Western style electoral system, while the Soviet government saw it being socialist-orientated. The Potsdam Declaration's reference that:

"supreme authority in Germany is exercised on instructions from their respective governments by the Commander-in-Chief.....each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole in their capacity as members of the Control Council."13

was ambiguous in its declaration that Commanders-in-Chief were to work both jointly and independently. In practice this meant that when they didn't agree, they all followed their own individual policies. Thus joint control broke down in Berlin, and in Germany by 1949 two separate and sovereign states were set up - East and West Germany. From the start Soviet policy in East Germany was contradictory, on the one hand ruthlessly seeking economic benefits and reparations, on the

other seeking to win approval from the German people themselves for the new communist regime. These two concurrently pursued aims succeeded only in alienating any support for communist rule that might have existed. The geographic and strategic position of Germany as a whole was a prize that neither super-power was prepared to relinquish, so the two sides remained in stalemate from 1949 and it was clear that the question of Berlin would continue to be a contentious issue.

The years 1949-58 were relatively quiet in terms of the Berlin question. In the early 1950's attention was drawn away from Europe to the Far East when the Korean War broke out on the 25th of June 1950. The effects of the Korean war had profound ramifications in Europe, bringing the increasing militarisation of NATO and bringing West Germany into the organisation. With the death of Stalin on the 4th of March 1953 and the ensuing struggle for power, the Soviet Union was too internally preoccupied to be on the offensive over Berlin. By the end of 1958 however, with Khrushchev's success at the 20th Party Congress, consolidated by the defeat of the anti-party group in 1957, with increased agricultural success and the launching of the Soviet Sputnik, stability seemed to have returned within the Soviet Union and the leadership appeared more confident.

In the spring of 1958, Khrushchev began to talk of "normalisation" of Berlin, and by the 27th of November 1958 he declared: "The Potsdam Agreement has been grossly violated by the Western powers."¹⁴ and hence that a German peace treaty was long overdue:

"It is well known that the conventional way to put an end to the occupation is for the parties that were at war to conclude a peace-treaty offering the defeated country the conditions

necessary for the re-establishment of normal life."15

On first reading this sounds very reasonable until you come to passages like the following:

"Of course the most direct and natural way to solve the problem would be for the Western part of Berlin now actually attached to the GDR, to be reunited with its Eastern part, and for Berlin to become a unified city within that state in whose territory it is situated."16

Thus the Soviet goal becomes more apparent. Khrushchev was claiming that as West Berlin is surrounded by East German territory, the logical conclusion to this is that West Berlin should become officially part of East Germany. The underlying threat here is not further developed, but the implication seems to be that by not pursuing the matter further the Soviet leadership is making some form of concession. Khrushchev announced at this time that West Berlin should be a free city, and that the Western powers would be allowed six months to decide on their line of action. This began a new phase of concern over the German question. While the Soviet ultimatum was withdrawn in 1959, for the next three years the Berlin question continued to simmer away. Negotiations by the major powers over the German question continued sporadically at various foreign ministers conferences, at Camp David in 1959, and was to be raised again at the Big Four summit conference in May 1960. This meeting failed to take place however, after the Soviet shooting down of the U2 plane. By the beginning of 1961, the atmosphere was much calmer, so much so that Lord Home, the British Foreign Minister declared: "As far as we are concerned there is no German question"17. Yet at the Vienna summit of

3rd and 4th of June, the Soviet delegation lead by Khrushchev raised the subject of Berlin as an urgent and vital matter. If it could be discovered why the matter was raised so strongly at this time, perhaps some of the processes of Soviet decision-making would be clarified.

It would be helpful at this point to spend some time piecing together a picture of official Soviet policy, and the Khrushchevian Marxist-Leninist ideological framework that permeated all levels of Soviet education and training, and therefore Soviet officials. This could help provide a framework for analysing Soviet attitudes and statements made in relation to foreign policy.

The traditional difficulty of knowing how to distinguish between an offensive or a defensive foreign policy is as true of Khrushchev as for any other Soviet leader. Khrushchev's rhetoric about the end of capitalist encirclement and the beginning of "peaceful co-existence" initially seemed to mark a substantial change from the "two camp" doctrine of Stalin. It seemed a great advance towards a new era of international co-operation and reconciliation. Yet when the substance of this ideology is more carefully scrutinised, the difference becomes less tangible. In a speech given on the 25th of January 1961, Khrushchev defines peaceful co-existence as: "a form of intensive economic, political and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive face of imperialism in the international arena" 18, and says that the Socialist countries: "can maintain co-existence, if they fight against imperialism"19. This seems to indicate a demilitarisation of Stalinism, a return to a broader interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory as a result of technical developments in the

international arena eg the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides. It was obviously a complex issue, as the argument was that if both superpowers had nuclear weapons, then war brings the danger of annihilation, and therefore war itself is no longer an option for either side.

Khrushchev addresses this problem in this same speech of the 25th when he identifies three types of war; world war, local war and wars of national liberation. The first two types of war are seen as undesirable because of the danger of escalation - this is borne out by an article in Pravda later in the year which states: "any armed conflict, however minor at first, would inevitably develop into a general nuclear missile war should nuclear powers be drawn into it."20. However the third type of war mentioned by Khrushchev, that of "national liberation" as in Angola or Vietnam, is seen as not only desirable but as inevitable. Wars of national liberation are seen as internal class struggles, the fight of socialist forces against the agents of imperialism. Despite claims that:

"Every people has a right to free and independent national existence and no-one should interfere in the internal affairs of other countries."21

Khrushchev's ideological stance denies that the: "national liberation movement is developing independently of the struggle of the working class for socialism"22. Thus all internal dissension in a country is seen as a manifestation of the class struggle for socialism, which allows for wars of liberation to take place in every country. Hence when Khrushchev states; "The Soviet Union does not export its system, but it cannot prohibit other people from following its example."23 The

use of Soviet military equipment and advisers to help this process is not prohibited, so in actuality "peaceful co-existence" means only that direct confrontation between the two superpowers is recognised as undesirable. Khrushchev's ideological framework gives him the opportunity to allow Soviet intervention at any time into any country. This is the background to be remembered when studying the dynamics of Soviet policy.

The stated Soviet belief in non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries and the theoretical acceptance of self-determination are not obviously manifested in Soviet-East German relations. Here issues of Soviet security take precedence over ideological niceties. Similarly when the Soviet leadership wished to assert pressure, it seemed to have no qualms about making aggressive statements: "not only to deal a shattering blow to the territory of the United States, but also to render the aggressor's allies harmless, and to crush the American military."²⁴ Thus by examining just a few of the statements concerning foreign policy in the Soviet press, the confusion and illogicality of Soviet ideology when put into practice becomes apparent. This lack of coherence is important, as it indicates that the role of ideology in the processes of foreign policy might at times well have been diminished, subordinated to more immediate and pressing practical concerns.

In the Soviet press any action which is seen as either anti-Communist or anti-Russian is seen as being inspired by the American imperialists, so much time and effort is devoted to vilifying the American government and society. Thus they are accused of a lack of "democracy" in taking decisions over Hiroshima and the U2 incident,

and it is said that the imperialists: "play the role of throttlers of the freedom of the people."²⁵ In order to portray Communism as a strong and ever developing creed, American imperialist policy is depicted as failing because of its own shortcomings. There are enormous variations and discrepancies in the Soviet view of the outside world, depending on the political priorities of the moment. An example of this can be seen in the Soviet press's treatment of J. F. Kennedy. In Izvestia on the 11th of May, he is seen as the "young American President", while in Kommunist of the same month, the American government is described as being "headed by a millionaire."²⁶ These type of references were made in the period just before the Vienna summit, and seem to indicate that the Soviets wanted to have some-one to blame if everything went wrong at the summit itself. After the summit however, on the 15th of June Khrushchev commented: "I formed the impression that President Kennedy appreciates the great responsibility that rests with the government of two such mighty states."²⁷ On the 9th of August, Pravda talks of Kennedy displaying "sober realism"²⁸. Thus when political progress is being made Kennedy is seen in terms of his trustworthiness, when things are difficult a more standard economic interpretation is taken. Again this example would seem to indicate the triumph of expediency over ideological integrity.

As we have seen, one of the main motivating factors in the Soviet cry for a German peace treaty to be signed appeared to be to get West Berlin incorporated into East Germany. In Pravda on the 11th of June a similar plea is made, for a peace treaty to be signed, the borders of Germany to be legalised and the situation in West Berlin to be normalised. This can all sound quite admirable until some of the finer detail is revealed. Thus the article states:

"In the interest of achieving agreement on a peace-treaty, the Soviet Union does not insist on the immediate withdrawal of the FGR from NATO. Even after the conclusion of a peace-treaty, both German states could for a certain period remain in the military alignment of which they are now members."29.

Thus it was a specific objective for the Soviet Union that West Germany should leave NATO, which may well be related to the decision just taken that nuclear weapons should be stationed in West Germany as part of NATO's military deployment there.

Other significant points are made in this article. It points out that:

"Occupation rights will naturally terminate with the conclusion of a German peace-treaty, whether it be signed with both German states or only with the GDR within whose territory West Berlin is situated."30

Thus it is stated that if the Soviet Union and East Germany alone sign a "peace-treaty", then automatically American, British and French troops would have no legal right to stay in West Berlin. This is spelt out:

"This will at the same time mean doing away with the occupation

regime in West Berlin, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom. In particular, questions concerning the use of land, water and air communications across the territory of the GDR will have to be decided solely on the basis of appropriate agreement with the GDR."31

This is justified by:

"This is natural, since the exercise of control of such communication is the inalienable right of every sovereign state."32

Thus the USSR is not just speaking of a Western evacuation of West Berlin, but that even its status as "free city" would be in grave doubt as East Germany would have full control over all communications and transport between West Berlin and the outside world. Thus while the rhetoric of 1961 may initially seem milder than that of 1958, the underlying objective has changed very little - ie to absorb West Berlin into East Germany.

This is just one example of how words are manipulated to give misleading impressions. The Soviet call for a German peace treaty sounds very credible, as it implies that the overriding objective is to achieve a peaceful and just settlement, however neither of these concepts stand up under scrutiny. What the Soviet leadership were really seeking was the imposition of an agreement, signed without the participation of West Germany or the Allied powers, to enable West Berlin to come under East German jurisdiction and to ensure that West Germany came out of NATO.

Although all these undercurrents are present in Soviet propaganda of the time, Soviet rhetoric followed a logic of its own. By refusing to

sign a German peace treaty on Soviet terms, the imperialist Western powers were accused of showing their true expansionist colours. Hence on the 15th of July it was said:

"History has confronted the peoples of Western Europe with a choice. Either move towards a dangerous exacerbation of relations between countries and move towards military conflict; or fight with all your energies for the conclusion of a German peace-treaty."33

This type of "either...or" scenario presents a flagrant distortion of the truth bearing in mind the nature of the German peace-treaty proposed. If the West protests or doesn't accept Soviet proposals, then the West is seen as guilty of aggression. On the 15th of June Khrushchev took this a stage further:

"Some people in the West are threatening us, declaring that if we sign a peace-treaty it will not be recognised and that armed force will even be employed to prevent its implementation."34

Thus the Western powers are seen as the aggressors, when in fact they are talking of responding to the implementation of an essentially aggressive act of the Soviet Union. Thus although Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful co-existence" sounds very different from Stalin's "two camp theory", in practice it was very similar.

As a result of the intricate and often ambiguous nature of the Marxist ideological framework, an ideologically motivated foreign policy does not seem very credible unless in the most general of terms. The ideological framework is still significant because every Soviet citizen was educated within a Marxist-Leninist cocoon, and therefore, for example, it affects the attitudes of those determining

foreign policy. However from Soviet speeches of 1961, it is difficult to discern any ideological change which could account for the more assertive Soviet demands from Vienna onwards. If this is the case, why was the issue of Berlin raised again with such vehemence at this time?

Vienna and the summer of 1961.

Domestically by 1961, the weaknesses and defects of the Soviet economy were beginning to become apparent. The virgin land scheme, the flagship of Khrushchev's agricultural revolution was no longer fruitful, both literally and metaphorically. The fall in agricultural production combined with an increase in inflation meant a deterioration in the strength of the economy. Increased spending on new technology, especially in the military sphere, meant that troop reductions had had to be made in January 1960 of 1,200,000 men. Economic constraints thus indicated that a provocative foreign policy involving some type of military commitment was not sought after. If this was the case, it might help to explain why Khrushchev wanted to negotiate concerning a German peace-treaty at Vienna. It seemed to provide a way of achieving major foreign policy success without vast financial expenditure. In his speeches, Khrushchev repeatedly stressed his belief in the power of negotiation.

In terms of foreign policy, the timing of the Vienna conference was highly favourable to the Soviets. It is to be noted that the meeting was a result of Soviet initiative:

"on May the 12th, Kennedy had received an unexpected reply from N.

S. Khrushchev to his letter of February the 22nd, reopening the question presumed dead after the Bay of Pigs, of a meeting in Vienna in early June."35

Thus it was Khrushchev who took the initiative in establishing contact. As we have seen there were domestic reasons favouring negotiations. There were also international ones. The Soviet Union's position in world affairs had been steadily increasing in the late 1950's with the successful launching of a Sputnik in 1958, with Khrushchev's visit to America in 1959, and with the shooting down of the U-2 in May 1960 which cast the American government in a very poor light. These were not the only setbacks for the Americans. The communist advances made in Laos and the communist gains in Korea helped to increase Soviet confidence. Thus the prestige of the United States was at a very low ebb. If Khrushchev wanted to put pressure on the United States government to make concessions in central Europe, this must have seemed the ideal time to do so.

It was not just a time of American weakness, it was also a time when Khrushchev must have been keen to demonstrate Soviet strength and superiority. Especially after the 81 International Communist Party Conference of November 1960, the growing antagonism between the Soviet Union and China was becoming increasingly apparent. China's preference for a hard-line foreign policy, openly antagonistic to the West and granting no concessions, meant that they were highly critical of Khrushchev's preferences for negotiation, seeing it as a sign of weakness. Thus Khrushchev was constantly under pressure from the East. One of the reasons that this was so potentially damaging was because of the effect on non-aligned and embryo communist parties within the

world communist movement. Khrushchev had spent much time and trouble in the early 1950's trying to encourage Soviet communist sympathies in countries such as Egypt, India and North Vietnam by means of loans of foreign aid, material and military assistance, and he didn't want China to reap the benefit of these policies. If China's claim to be the true successor of Marxist-Leninism was seen to be at all credible, then this could result in communist groups abroad changing their allegiance from the USSR to China, especially in East Asian countries where Chinese influence was already strong anyway.

There is also considerable evidence to suggest that Chinese relationships with Eastern European countries could undermine Soviet influence and security in Eastern Europe itself. The country of which this is most obviously true is Albania, but it is significant that East German-Chinese links were very strong in the late 1950's. This alliance deteriorated in the 1960's however, and Zagoria comments:

"One may suppose that Khrushchev tightened the screws on Ulbricht and offered some inducementsome sort of promise to renew the Berlin crisis." 36

Certainly, as will be shown later, Ulbricht took a much more hard-line attitude than Khrushchev, and this reversal in Sino-German relations indicates that a renewed commitment by Khrushchev to finding a solution to the German question might have been the price that Khrushchev had to pay. Hence Chinese pressure seems to have played a large role in persuading Khrushchev of the need to re-open the German question. This combination of different pressures would go a long way to explaining why Khrushchev could one moment seem to be quite conciliatory, and the next very demanding. It also helps explain

Khrushchev's methods, ie of seeking to achieve ambitious and grandiose schemes through vigorous negotiations and exchanges. The Vienna summit is a good example of this, as Khrushchev was pursuing a vigorous foreign policy to satisfy his left-wing critics, while trying to do so in a relatively conciliatory manner. If he had been successful, he would have pacified his internal and external critics, and would have gained a greater flexibility in policy formation. It is interesting to note that the Soviet press were more optimistic about the Vienna meeting than Kennedy and his advisers were, as it corroborates that there was a feeling in the Soviet Union that there would be a successful outcome. Thus Khrushchev went to Vienna under pressure, yet hopeful that he would be able to gain concessions from the West.

The items discussed at Vienna centred on three main areas - Laos, disarmament and the German situation. Laos was the subject over which there was the most progress, with Khrushchev reasserting his commitment to giving the implementation of the ceasefire there a high priority. Despite this area of agreement, there was little progress on the other two issues. As was revealed in Pravda on the 11th of June, Khrushchev's position on the testing of hydrogen weapons at the conference had not changed since the Geneva talks two and a half years previously. On the German question, Khrushchev was uncompromising, stating that a German peace-treaty was central to the security needs of the USSR. In the Soviet press, West Germany was accused of cultivating: "sabre-rattling militarism, and advocates reconsideration of the German borders." 37 and: "stockpiling armaments and building an army plainly in excess of defence requirements" 38.

West Germany is constantly portrayed in the Soviet press as an outpost of German revanchism.

There seems to be some confusion over when Khrushchev introduced a time-limit for the German peace-treaty, as both Adomeit and Wolfe claim that it was first done during Khrushchev's television appearance on the 15th June. However if the Pravda publication of the 11th of June is correct, then Khrushchev gave Kennedy a time-limit before then, ie at the Vienna conference itself:

"To keep the matter of a peace-settlement from dragging out, a time-limit must be set during which the Germans must seek the possibility of agreements on questions within their internal competence." The Soviet government considers a period of no more than six months adequate for such negotiations."39

Thus it was at Vienna that Khrushchev resurrected his ultimatum of 1958, that if an agreement was not reached by East and West Germany by this time, the Soviet Union would have the right to sign one unilaterally with East Germany alone. The consequences of this were laid out as the peace-treaty:

"will at the same time mean doing away with the occupation regime in West Berlin...In particular, questions concerning the use of land, water and air communications across the territory of the GDR will have to be decided solely on the basis of appropriate agreements with the GDR."40

Despite the threatening rhetoric, there are signs that Khrushchev was in fact seeking the neutralisation of Berlin, and in terms of the peace-treaty that he wanted a "de-facto" recognition of the East German state, rather than a "de jure" one. It is quite possible that this

concession, made in the statement:

"The Soviet proposal does not link the conclusion of a peace-treaty with recognition of the GDR or the FRG by all the parties of the treaty. It is up to each government whether or not it will recognise one or the other state."⁴¹

and the concept of the UN guaranteeing that Berlin would remain a free city, combined with the US acknowledgement of USSR conventional superiority in Europe and the strong prestige of the USSR would be enough to sway Kennedy into considering attending a peace-conference.

In traditional Soviet fashion, Khrushchev seems to have used carrot and stick techniques simultaneously. Thus he negotiated, but made thinly veiled threats at the same time, ie hinting at the consequences of a unilaterally signed German peace-treaty to pressurise the American government into action. This was counterproductive, as by drawing the American's attention to the consequences of such a treaty, it highlighted the pitfalls that could be involved in negotiations - especially when the Soviet side had been so uncompromising and obstructive in the past, eg at the Geneva disarmament talks.

The Americans were well aware of the nature of the issues. Kennedy remarked: "All Europe is at stake in West Berlin."⁴² There were differences in American perception of Soviet intentions in Berlin. Acheson felt that Soviet objectives in Berlin were unlimited - this would tie in with the assertion in the Penkovsky Papers that Khrushchev was a proponent of hardline and adventurous policies in Berlin. However L. Thompson, American ambassador in Moscow, and A. Harriman both believed that Khrushchev's objectives were limited and were more realistically based. If opinion at the time was divided, so

too is the attitude of historians. From this study so far, it is indicated that the role of the Chinese and East German pressure, whether it was coincidental or co-ordinated, has been underestimated. As for Khrushchev himself, he seems to have been responding to pressures put on him from abroad, and attempting to take advantage of perceived American weakness. Hence his desire to return to the question of Berlin. The extent to which he was successful can be seen as we look at the events of the ensuing months.

In the aftermath of the Vienna meeting, both Kennedy and Khrushchev had time in which to reflect on and reconsider their positions. After his brief visit to Britain, Kennedy made a television broadcast speaking of Vienna as: "sombre as it was, to be immensely useful."⁴³, and that: "our views contrasted sharply but at least we knew better at the end where we both stood."⁴⁴. In Khrushchev Remembers, he speaks of "being impressed"⁴⁵ by Kennedy, and says that some form of rapport between the two leaders had been established. This is more than borne out by their later exchange of letters at critical times. In Izvestia on the 8th of June, Vienna was described as: "no decisions were adopted in the course of it. Nevertheless it is being talked about everywhere in the globe." and serves as "a point of departure for new contacts" ⁴⁵. On the very same day at a local level the Soviet Foreign Ministry published notes protesting against the German Republic's desire to hold a Bundesrat session in West Berlin on the 16th June. The timing of this note raises some interesting questions about the nature of Soviet policy formation and co-ordination. (The Western decision to accede to this request, despite its lack of substance must

be criticised, as it seems to indicate to the Soviet government that the Western governments were prepared to make concessions over Germany, thus encouraging them to apply further pressure to this end.)

On the 15th of June, Khrushchev made a television and radio broadcast to the people of the Soviet Union. His language was tough and uncompromising in tone, trying to justify a unilaterally signed peace-treaty between the USSR and East Germany by an analogy with the American unilateral signing of a peace-treaty with Japan in 1951:

"relying on their edge in atomic weapons"⁴⁶. Yet again there is at the same time an emphasis on diplomacy, Khrushchev saying of Vienna:

"We consider such meetings indispensable, because under present day conditions, problems that defy solution by normal diplomatic means make head of government meetings imperative."⁴⁷

and that:" the holding of such a meeting was worthwhile"⁴⁸. While Khrushchev reaffirmed the six month deadline taken at Vienna, he sought to achieve this by political and diplomatic pressure.

That Khrushchev was seen by many of the communist bloc as pursuing too moderate a policy can be seen by a comparison with the stridency of Ulbricht at a press conference on the same day, the 15th of June. That Khrushchev was actually in his eyes pursuing one of the less radical options available could explain a "prophetic" remark of Ulbricht: "We have no intention to build a wall"⁴⁹. Adomeit interprets this remark as Ulbricht trying to force Khrushchev's hand into taking stronger action. For Ulbricht to start talking of a "wall" would increase tension in East Germany, to increase the number of fleeing refugees, and thus to force some kind of quick and decisive action. There is indicated a growing East German frustration at what they saw

as Soviet intransigence and slowness to act.

Even more important, this reference to a "wall" means that it's probable that the possibility of sealing the East/West German border had already been discussed as a possible plan at some time in the past. There could be perhaps a series of contingency plans agreed in case the peace-treaty was not signed within the agreed time-limit. These plans might also become possible courses of action if there was a further deterioration in the East German economic situation, or further political unrest there. If so, it was in Ulbricht's interest to heighten tension, that the number of fleeing refugees would increase, and thus to force Khrushchev's hand.

There were a variety of reactions to Khrushchev's speech of the 15th. In a Times article of the 16th, it commented that Kennedy had failed to convince Khrushchev of the Allied commitment to West Berlin. The Soviets seemed unhappy about the reception of the Western press to Khrushchev, accusing the American press especially of portraying Khrushchev too harshly, and arguing that the press was in the power of the capitalist monopolies, and hence portrayed a distorted picture of events. Khrushchev was thus in a position where he could do no right, Ulbricht accusing him of being weak and procrastinating, yet at the same time the American government seeing him as harsh and uncompromising. The Vienna conference and its aftermath was a direct result of Khrushchev trying to reconcile these various pressures. Khrushchev attempted to attack the Western powers Achilles' heel, in order to increase his personal prestige, and to silence his critics at home and abroad.

16th of June - 25th of July.

There is evidence of internal debates within the Presidium at this time which must have resulted in pressure on Khrushchev. On the 16th of June, an Uzbek newspaper talks of this being a time of "Presidium decision-making", and it was shortly after this on the 19th of June that the Party Statutes were unanimously ratified by the Central Committee. The Party Statutes were controversial in nature, and it must have been a time of tension, when quite possibly Khrushchev had to make concessions. It would therefore be worth investigating whether there was a marked change of policy in the ensuing weeks.

In the week beginning on Monday the 19th of June, there was a renewed outbreak of anti-German sentiment, eg in Pravda on the 20th of June there was a torrent of invective directed against a West German "revanchist rally" where it was claimed that groups of men who had invaded Russia twenty years previously met:

"we recognise them by their stupid and arrogant faces, by the bitterness and hatred flashing in their eyes"⁵⁰

and that:

"hopes are placed not only on the revival of the Wehrmacht, now called the Bundeswehr, but also on the atom bombs piled up in American warehouses in West Germany, and which those exercising power in Bonn are striving violently to possess."⁵¹

This type of crude and vigorous rhetoric preceded Khrushchev's speech of the 21st of June, marking the 20th anniversary of Hitler's attack on the USSR. In this speech Khrushchev took a very aggressive foreign policy stance, and threatened to resume nuclear testing. Concurrently

there were also a number of articles and speeches made by military generals at this time, praising Khrushchev and strongly attacking the Western position over Berlin. It is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason for the increasingly aggressive line over Berlin: it could simply relate to increased militarism as a result of the 20th anniversary of Hitler's invasion of the USSR, or it could indicate a stronger role for the military as a result of negotiation concerning the Party Statutes.

Soviet pressure on the Berlin situation continued in the last week in June, with Khrushchev in his Alma-Ata speech on the 24th of June continuing to stress the inevitability of Soviet economic supremacy and the need for a German peace-treaty. The comment in The Times on this speech is especially interesting:

"There is really no doubt in the minds of many Western representatives that he means what he says, and that he will announce a separate peace-treaty with East Germany probably before or during the Communist Party Congress in Moscow in October, if no East - West negotiations have been arranged meanwhile."⁵²

and that hence the West should enter into negotiations. This comment indicates the seriousness with which the West regarded the situation, and that much attention was being given to the consequences of the proposed Soviet action. The Soviet intention of forcing the West to the negotiating table must have seemed to have had a chance of success.

Khrushchev's speech of the 28th of June depicts the West as being committed to policies that were now obsolete:

"The Western powers are now unable to get out of the quicksands of brinkmanship where Dulles and Eisenhower led them."53

and that:

"On the way to a relaxation of tension we apparently will be obliged to pass through a stage of "chilling" so to speak, of the climate in Europe."54

Typically Khrushchev makes out that the West is the one that is making the difficulties, and that they will come to see the error of their ways. Meanwhile he reiterates:

"we are prepared to enter into negotiations, to try honestly and sincerely for an agreement and the signing of a peace-treaty."55

Pressure was thus being built up to a crescendo, and was beginning to have an effect. On the 29th of June, Lord Home made a speech warning of the extreme dangers of the German situation, while the following day De Gaulle stated: "we are on the brink of a major international crisis."56 By this stage Khrushchev's war of verbal attrition seemed to be making Western leaders reconsider the idea of negotiations with the Soviet Union over Germany.

At the beginning of July, Khrushchev's behaviour was a little erratic: on the 2nd of July he was threatening Britain and France with nuclear extinction, on the 4th was joking happily with ambassadors at an Embassy reception. Meanwhile, differences between the USSR and China were becoming increasingly evident, as noticed by Isaac Deutscher in The New York Times. On the 5th of July the Soviets revealed that the Chinese owed them a large debt, and the next day a Soviet-North Korean military Pact was signed. The latter action was seen to be a Soviet attempt to consolidate their position in Asia, and to increase its

influence there at Chinese expense. At this time also Ulbricht was making statements about the need to destroy West German militarism, and Albania officially complained to the USSR that undue pressure was being put upon her. All these various pieces of information help to show the enormous strain that the Soviet Union was under trying to uphold her position within the communist bloc. It helps account for Khrushchev's speech of the 8th of July announcing increased military expenditure of \$3.5 billion more than the USA. Such expenditure was very much out of line with the Soviet economic situation, and it seems likely that this situation was precipitated by the pressure from other communist countries. Whether this was done with support from hard-liners in the Presidium and the military can't be proved, but would seem likely as the army had a high profile at this time.

Contradictory signs were apparent at the beginning of July. There were Soviet displays of rocket power which happened to coincide with Khrushchev's announcement of troop reductions in the Soviet army. On the 5th of July, Kornienko from the Soviet Embassy in Washington visited Schlesinger expressing puzzlement at American hostility to the idea of negotiations. Schlesinger's view of Kornienko's remarks were as follows:

"While nothing Kornienko said indicated that discussions would lead to agreement, it did look as if the Russians might want to get off a collision course."⁵⁷

ie perhaps Khrushchev wanted to make an aggressive show for the communist world, but to communicate to the Americans that the Soviet Union would be prepared to be reasonable. Three days later, Khrushchev attempted another way of opening negotiations, ie by re-introducing

the Polish plan for a "nuclear-free zone". This was greeted with interest by Brandt in West Germany, but not by Adenauer. Amazingly enough all the signs of tension within the communist world were noticed but dismissed by many within the American establishment, by both journalists and politicians alike. On the 10th of July the editorial column of The New York Times conceded that there might be Chinese pressure on Khrushchev to take a tough line, but that to envisage friction between the two would be wishful thinking. Similarly and even more extraordinarily, a speech made by D. Rusk made on the 10th of July said that:

"there was solid evidence of tension between the Soviet Union and China, but that this tension did not provide a "sound basis" for Western policy making."⁵⁸

The contrast between the official Soviet view and underlying tensions continued. Gomulka gave Khrushchev a clear sign of his support when he made a speech in Outer Mongolia on communist unity, while in the background China was signing a pact with North Korea, and the Soviet Union drastically censored a Chinese radio broadcast which met with its disapproval.

In East Germany meantime it seemed as if Ulbricht wanted to bring matters to a head. On the 11th of July he introduced legislation prohibiting Grenzeganger being used to buy major consumer goods in East Berlin, and the number of refugees fleeing rose accordingly. Adenauer's visit to West Berlin was seen as being provocative. Pravda made its contribution regarding the situation:

"History has confronted the peoples of Western Europe with a choice: either move towards a dangerous exacerbation of relations

between countries and towards a military conflict or fight with all your energies for the conclusion of a German peace-treaty."59 As Soviet threats and East German actions escalated, Western leaders became increasingly anxious. Western fears were exploited by the East German magazine Neue Justiz which provocatively published plans for the administration of West Berlin after a peace-treaty was signed. While the American government considered a partial mobilisation of its troops, in the Soviet Union there was less concern. As Osgood Carruthers puts it: "the people had heard it all before."60.

There was a brief respite in mid-July as Khrushchev spent some time at Sochi, and public pronouncements from both sides on the subject briefly abated somewhat. In West Germany Adenauer continued to seek support from the EEC, and the situation in East Berlin continued to worsen.

As the tension continued, both Kennedy and Khrushchev saw the need to act sensibly and cautiously, attempting to calm the war hysteria. On the 25th of July, Kennedy made a television broadcast to the American people on the current state of affairs in Berlin. This was an emotional speech talking of West Berlin as:

"a showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in a communist sea. It is even more than a link with the free world, a beacon of hope behind the iron curtain, an escape hatch for refugees.....it has become the great testing place of Western courage."61

In this speech, Kennedy also announced a new commitment of the American military, especially to Europe, involving an increase of

military expenditure of \$3,247,000,000 and an increase in manpower and conventional weapons which was to be submitted before Congress. After these announcements Kennedy emphasised:

"the choice is not merely between resistance and retreat, between atomic holocaust and surrender. Our peace-time military posture is traditionally defensive, but our diplomatic posture need not be."62

He continued that:

"As signers of the U.N. Charter we will always be prepared to discuss international problems.....we shall also be ready to search for peace - in quiet exploratory talks - in formal or informal meetings."63

It is worth looking at this speech in some detail, as there were many different interpretations of it. In his memoirs Schlesinger recounts that Kennedy's intention was not to: "drive the crisis beyond the point of no return" and that he "rejected the programme of national mobilisation and sought the beginning of careful negotiation."64

Schlesinger feels that both the American press and Khrushchev misinterpreted this speech and felt that it was more hard-line than it was intended to appear. When Khrushchev at Sochi heard the translation of the speech, McCoy the American negotiator visiting him at the time bore the full brunt of Khrushchev's anger when: "he told McCoy emotionally that the United States had declared preliminary war on the Soviet Union."65 The speech which apparently was intended to be firm but deflatory, in practise had the opposite effect. A few days later Secretary of State Rusk said in a speech that he believed that the Berlin dispute could be settled peacefully, and that there was a need

to have a multi-nation disarmament conference. At the same time he recommended that the number of NATO divisions in Germany grow from 22 to 30.

Thus speeches were made calling for peace, yet announcing the need for greater arms. These ambiguous speeches were interpreted in the worst light by both sides, tension mounted and events seemed to be spiralling out of control. It is possible that both leaders were aware of this process, and it is here that more informal means of communication came into their own. McCoy for example, returned to Kennedy with a message concerning the possibility of new negotiations. This type of confidential correspondence allowed more direct communication without the need for rhetorical show, and had an important role to play in international relations at this time.

By the 31st of July Khrushchev was back in the Kremlin, and the Draft Party Programme had just been published. The Party Programme was ambitious in its economic objectives, but the comments of one American analyst at the time, felt that the Party programme departed seriously from the Khrushchevian pro-consumer line quite significantly. To back this perception, he refers to an Embassy reception on the 20th of May where Khrushchev had remarked:

"Now we consider our heavy industry as built. So we are not going to give it priority. Light industry and heavy industry will develop at the same pace."66

This remark for some strange reason was not published in the Soviet press. Now unless Khrushchev had radically changed his mind between the middle of May and the middle of June when the draft party Programme was adopted by the Central Committee, then pressure

must have been exerted upon him from some source to make him change his mind. Thus here is more evidence which strongly suggests that Khrushchev's authority was under some strain at this period, and that the inconsistencies of Soviet foreign policy might in part reflect tension amongst the political leadership.

By the beginning of August the East German government was again putting pressure on West Berlin, on the 1st suggesting the suspension of all East/West German traffic because of a polio epidemic, on the 2nd increasing border guards at crossing points sixfold. In many ways the first week of August seems crucial to the outcome of the Berlin crisis. Slusser speculates that just after Khrushchev's return to the Kremlin there was a Presidium meeting, and this would seem highly likely considering the amount of time that Khrushchev was away and the considerable tension over the German question. It would also help to explain why there was a Warsaw Pact meeting on the 3rd to the 5th of August in Moscow. This meeting was not announced in advance which could indicate that the decision to hold it was made in a hurry. The duration of the meeting, three days in length, would also indicate that something of importance was being discussed or decided.

In order to attempt to understand what happened at this meeting, it is helpful to gauge what possibilities lay before the participants of this meeting. Although it was nominally a Warsaw Pact meeting, it is clear that the Soviet Union had the greatest influence. Ulbricht too, with his country's direct involvement in the Berlin crisis must have had a strong voice. Ulbricht's renewed campaign over the previous few days also indicates that the meeting might well have been convened at his insistence. The decisions reached at this meeting were not

revealed in the official communique, but Windsor talks of a plan being worked out there: "which prevented most East Germans reaching Berlin at all."67, with large numbers of police on duty all over East Germany to prevent East Germans reaching East Berlin and having the opportunity to escape to West Berlin. If this was so, it would seem that Khrushchev had managed to stave off Ulbricht's more radical plans. Ulbricht must have been under enormous pressure to curb the number of refugees fleeing from his country, at this point leaving at a rate of 1,000 a day. In January 1961, women already comprised 45% of the East German labour force, and this proportion was increasing. The large number of agricultural and professional workers fleeing left large gaps in the economic structure of the country, leaving it on the verge of collapse. Hence Ulbricht's demand for a speedy and effective resolution to the situation. Khrushchev had a world perspective on events, and did not wish to take such potentially inflammatory action unless it was absolutely necessary. As we have seen on the 15th of June Ulbricht's reference to the building of a wall was considered by the West as a possible action taken in conjunction with the unilateral imposition of a German peace-treaty. Yet it would seem that this scheme was not immediately adopted, but instead the interim measure of a police clampdown of the movements of East Germans was implemented. Meanwhile back at the conference table, the talks over Laos were deadlocked. There was increased Allied anxiety regarding East German measures at border crossings. Rusk was making optimistic statements that there was:

"a growing feeling at the State Department that Washington's firm stance, without closing the door on negotiations, was having the

desired effect." 67a

Similarly at the meeting of Western Foreign Ministers in Paris, it was noted that there had been a milder tone in Soviet notes recently. At the State Department the idea of curtailing US-USSR trade in protest over Berlin was rejected. On the 6th-7th of August, the flight of Vostok-2 took place, and on the 7th Khrushchev made a major television address to the Soviet people. In this speech many of the concerns and themes previously dispersed throughout Soviet propaganda were brought together. The economic superiority of the Soviet Union meant there was: "no need to impose that system on other people by force or arms"68. The danger of Berlin was seen as very real, but damage was seen as preventable: "West Berlin must not be permitted to turn into a kind of Sarajevo."69

The whole tone and content of the speech however is aggressive, full of warnings against American procrastination: "If the Western powers persist in their refusal to sign a German peace-treaty, we shall be obliged to solve the problem without them."70 and that if the peace-treaty was postponed it:

"would give NATO and the Bonn government even greater encouragement to form more and more new divisions in West Germany, equip them with atomic and thermonuclear weapons and turn West Germany into the main force for unleashing a new world war."71

Accusations are repeated against current Western aggressors who: "are using West Berlin as a jumping off point for subversive activities against the GDR."81. In many ways, this speech seems a last ditch attempt by Khrushchev to get the Americans to come to negotiate over

Germany. In the Western press also, pressure for American action grew. That Khrushchev must have been hoping for a rapid and favourable response can surely be ascertained from the fact that he must have known that his speech would increase the number of refugees fleeing. Soviet pressure mounted further with the announcement of a new Soviet megatonne weapon, the increase of military manoeuvres taking place in Eastern Europe, and by the appointment of Marshal Konev to take command of Soviet troops in East Germany.

By this time, it was clear to everyone that something dramatic must happen soon. In East Germany the Foreign Minister, Dr Lothar Bolz again spoke of the need for West Berlin to be a de-militarised free city, and for a peace-treaty to be signed. On the same day, Friday the 11th of August, Ulbricht paid a rapid visit to Moscow. It would seem to be at this meeting between Khrushchev and Ulbricht that Ulbricht was at last allowed to implement his border sealing operation between East and West Berlin. On the 12th, while Khrushchev made another speech about the need for a German peace-treaty, a Warsaw treaty declaration announced measures to be taken at the border to stop "diversionist activities" which would be removed when a peace-treaty was signed. The significance of this statement soon became apparent, when on the early hours of Sunday morning, East German guards started to secure the border crossing between East and West Berlin.

In his book, City on Leave, P. Windsor talks of "twin crises", and this idea can be developed further. The reason for the rapid escalation of tension over Berlin and Germany in 1961 was the interaction between two concurrent events, one at international level, one specific to the economic and political situation in Germany

itself. As in all international disputes, there is a great danger in seeing all the actions of your opponent's ally as being directed by your opponent. In this case, yes Khrushchev was seeking to increase Soviet prestige and influence in Eastern Europe, and his methods of achieving this objective were at times provocative and risky, but the real threat to world peace came from the way that Ulbricht single-mindedly pursued nationalist goals with little regard for international consequences. Khrushchev could be impetuous in his foreign policy, but he was aware of the potential danger of going too far. The added economic and social decline of East Germany distorted the balance of the situation however. The two different policies clashed - Khrushchev's desire to get the West to negotiate and make concessions over Germany, and Ulbricht's intention to stop the economic drain on his country and to reintroduce stability. These two different emphasis confused American policy-makers who saw them all as coming from the same source. They failed to recognise the significance of hard-line influences of China or East Germany, and thus were not inclined to be sympathetic to Soviet pleas for negotiations.

Insight into the reasons behind the border-sealing operation can be gained by a study of the changing nature of the official Soviet explanations of these events. Before the 13th of August, West Berlin was portrayed as: "a jumping off point for the subversive activities against the GDR."⁷² and:

"a place where Bonn revanchist circles constantly maintain a state of extreme tension and organise all sorts of provocations that are highly dangerous to the cause of peace."⁷³

By the 14th of August, three accusations were being levelled against

the Western powers, that they had tried to:

"recruit spies and to incite hostile elements to organise sabotage and disturbances in the GDR.....undermine the economy of the German Democratic Republic.....encourage a certain unstable part

of the GDR population to leave for West Germany."74

Thus for the first time, it was officially acknowledged that there was an economic element in the problems in East Germany. That it was a sensitive issue however can be seen in the article in Izvestia, on the 18th of August, where there is an abrupt refutation of criticism of the East German economy: "every word in this reasoning is a lie."75 It has only been with the passage of time that the economic and demographic crisis of August 1961 has been given more weight. Thus the Russian historian Vysotskii talks of:

"the recruitment of qualified labour and the luring away of the technical intelligentsia inflicted even greater harm to the GDR than the machinations in the exchange rates and different forms of speculation."76

Therefore the significance of the effect of the drain of professional and skilled workers is acknowledged to have made a vital difference to the East German economic situation. This factor more than any other appears to have been decisive in the decision to seal the East/West Berlin border.

It is very tempting for the historian in retrospect to comment on this period and to identify the events of the 13th of August as the "apex" of the Berlin crisis, and that after this things returned to a more normal routine. This type of interpretation is very far from the

truth. This can be ascertained by a survey of American and Western reaction to the events of the 13th of August. The headline of the New York Times. was:

" Berlin Border Curb seen as first of Soviet moves."

ie that this was just the initial phase of an operation to put pressure on the West, and signified: "that Premier Khrushchev had decided irrevocably to conclude a separate peace-treaty with East Germany." 77 It would seem fair to say that whatever the reasoning behind the border sealing, the result was a master-stroke for the Soviet Union, as it evoked very contradictory and a confused response from Western politicians. While they were highly indignant and outraged at the Soviet action, no-one seemed quite sure of what counter-measures to take.

It wasn't until the 15th of August that Kennedy made a strong and vigorous protest against the Soviet action. The perhaps unforeseen ingenuity of the border sealing operation by the Soviets was that Western Berlin could not be said to be under threat by the action taken. Dean Rusk puts it like this:

"available information indicates that measures taken thus far are aimed at residents of East Berlin and East Germany, and not at the Western position or access thereto."78

Thus Western powers found themselves in an awkward position for two reasons. The first was that they were not ready to take any immediate action on a local level. Schlesinger comments: "Despite the Presidential and other anticipations, the action caught the State Department and the CIA by surprise."79. Also because the action did not affect American, British, French or West German movement directly,

only the East Germans, this made the authorities in the West cautious about taking action. While the border-sealing operation had horrendous consequences for many in terms of dividing families etc, this did not provide a clear cut mandate for action. The border-sealing was successful because it split the Allies, the Americans not having the motivation to act, the European powers reluctant to get involved by themselves. The Soviet action did contravene the 1949 Foreign Minister's agreement guaranteeing freedom of movement, but this was not major enough for the Americans to act. Hence Kennedy's remark: " I can get the Alliance to move if he tries to do do anything about West Berlin, but not if he just does something about East Berlin."80 Thus the Americans responded with what Schlesinger describes as "Apparent American passivity"81, but Adenauer and Brandt were not as desperate for action as might be suspected either. The only people who seemed truly worried were the West Berliners themselves, who not surprisingly feared that the Soviet action was just a prelude to a direct attack on their freedom.

Another reason that the Soviet government had to congratulate itself about was their method of acting. Contrary to popular mythology, Soviet troops did not build the Berlin wall overnight. In fact East German troops occupied most of the crossing points and barbed wire fences were put up. The building of the wall itself did not start till the 17th of August. The gradual nature of the Soviet backed actions helped to sow dissension amongst the Western powers when they were trying to decide on a suitable reponse to the East german moves. It is an interesting theory that the cautious nature of the border sealing might perhaps have indicated that the Soviet-East German leadership

might have backed down if they had been challenged more vigorously by the West.

When considering the Soviet - East German action of the 13th of August, what in fact were Khrushchev's motives? It is quite common to suppose that Khrushchev's rhetoric about a peace plan was a subterfuge, to divert the West from perceiving his true purpose, ie to seal the East/West Berlin border. This argument seems seriously flawed on a number of accounts however. Firstly, it would be grossly out of proportion to spend so much time and effort on such a propoganda campaign for such a small objective. Secondly, what however if the border sealing operation was only a minimum objective for the Soviet Union to achieve? This perhaps sounds more likely. Khrushchev also has a reputation as an opportunist - did he capitalise on the disarray of the Western powers after the 13th? While the Soviets may have begun with a weak hand in Berlin - as it describes in The Times on the 14th of August:

"The East German government has now made an open confession of failure.....it has admitted that its country is such a thoroughly unpleasant and inefficient place in which to live that its unhappy citizens must be kept there by force."82

yet the overriding impression left from this is that of Soviet aggression and Western weakness. After the 13th of August the Soviets had everything left to play for.

Thus it seems quite probable that Khrushchev was pursuing the concept of a peace-treaty, albeit on Soviet terms, and that the events of the 13th of August were just a response to an urgent local situation rather than the climax to an international campaign. There were

indications at the meeting of Foreign Ministers at the beginning of August that the West was just about to agree to a four power conference to negotiate over the German situation. It would seem probable that this was Khrushchev's objective, and that the decision to intervene in Berlin was due largely to Ulbricht's pressure. Perhaps Khrushchev agreed in the hope that the border-sealing would persuade the West into acknowledging the need for talks. While all this remains speculation, it would provide a rational explanation for some of the apparent contradictions in Soviet policy, ie on the one hand the longstanding pursuit of a peace-treaty, and on the other taking military action in Berlin.

It is now time to move on and to consider the events in the rest of August and in September, in order to see if they help provide more clues as to Soviet policy intentions concerning the German question. During the week after the border-sealing, various notes of protest and counter-protest flew backwards and forwards. About the 20th of August, Khrushchev seems to have left Moscow, and the next set of moves seem to have been made in his absence, though whether with his approval or not is another matter. On Wednesday the 23rd two significant events took place. For the first time in this period measures were taken to restrict the movement of West Berliners, as a new regulation was introduced stating that if they wanted to go to East Berlin they would need a permit. This move was of major significance and should not be disregarded as it seems to follow a pattern of an escalating campaign to isolate West Berliners from the rest of West Germany. On the same day, the Soviet government sent a note to the American government that the Western powers were illegally using their air-corridors to West Berlin, conniving:

"at interference by the German Federal Republic in the affairs of West Berlin and the use of the city's territory for international provocations."⁸³

The timing of these actions could be co-incidental, but it looks very much like the beginning of a renewed campaign by the Soviet leadership and the East Germans to either bring the West to the negotiating table, or at least to deter them from taking any major retaliatory action in the immediate future. This time the American response was swift, the next day saying that this:

"is clearly but one more step in a deliberate campaign of deception and attempted intimidation.....any interference by the Soviet government or its East German regime with free access to West Berlin would be an aggressive act, the consequences of which the Soviet government would bear full responsibility."84

Although Khrushchev was outwith Moscow, he kept a high profile during this period, on the 24th emphasising the willingness of the USSR to negotiate with the West over Berlin, on the 25th declaring that he would talk with the Italians about a peace-treaty. He also arranged through an intermediary Y. G. Zhulov to meet an American journalist Drew Pearson. While Khrushchev was making these conciliatory noises, Ulbricht made another speech on the 25th of August claiming that while the West Berliners themselves were innocent of sabotage, the Western powers were not. He continued to pressurise the West Berliners, and to isolate them by driving a wedge between them and their Western Allies. On the 28th of August, Khrushchev continued his campaign for a German peace-treaty, stating:

"When the peace-treaty is signed it is quite natural that rights of the conquering powers which stem from the surrender of the conquered country come to an end."96

thus effectively he was saying that Western access to West Berlin would be at an end. Of equal importance to this threat is the emphatic use of "when the peace-treaty is signed." Reinforcing this, the editorial in Pravda the same day said that the treaty would be signed by the end of the year. The next day Pravda carried an article speaking of the aggressive and provocational acts of the West

Berliners. Thus after the slight abatement in the rhetorical storm, a renewed campaign to put pressure on West Berlin seemed about to start.

On the 30th of August, despite some favourable signs such as American concessions in the Geneva test-ban negotiations and talk of a foreign ministers meeting, tension was still high. At a press conference, Kennedy appointed Lucius Clay to be his personal representative in Berlin, as a morale booster for the West Berliners. That there was still concern over the situation is demonstrated by the statement of a journalist that:

"if one takes the public statements of the two sides at face value, it would seem that the US and the USSR are on something of a collision course here."85

Ironically, while the Americans were taking an optimistic line with Kennedy saying that "negotiations can be successful" 86, the Soviet government announced that it had decided to resume nuclear testing. This announcement came as a surprise to the Americans. In the Soviet statement it talked of Western obduracy over negotiations and complained bitterly over the continued conduct of nuclear testing by France. It also implicitly linked the resumption of nuclear testing with the German situation:

"The more appreciable the danger of West Germany's unleashing of a military conflict, the more imperative and urgent becomes the conclusion of a German peace-treaty.....The policy of the leading NATO powers - the US, Britain and the FGR - and of the aggressive bloc as a whole leaves the Soviet Union no

alternative."87

On the same day Pravda reported the Central Committee's decision to extend military service, this time directly related to the need for a German peace-treaty:

"The interests of the Soviet Union's security demand that the best-trained Soviet servicemen remain in the armed forces of the Soviet Union until a peace-treaty is signed with Germany."88

The reason behind this Soviet decision is hard to gauge. If it was to put additional pressure on the American government they scored an own goal as it just strengthened the Americans in their resolve not to make more concessions. It is possible that the Soviet decision was the result of pressure from the military or from the Chinese. Yet even then that leaves questions unanswered, as the Americans themselves were on the verge of resuming nuclear testing and if the Soviets had waited a little longer they could have scored an enormous propaganda victory.

One historian, Mackintosh argues that the Soviet decision for the resumption of nuclear testing was made as early as March 1961, and that the time-lag until the 30th of August was the time needed to prepare testing sites in Asia and the Arctic. There is little evidence to support this proposition however, and greater insight into the matter is given by Khrushchev's remarks to two visiting Labour MPs Sir Leslie Plummer and Konni Zilliacus that his action was: "to shock the Western powers to negotiate on Germany and disarmament."89 The Western press drew similar conclusions:

"the Soviet Union hoped to demoralise and frighten the Western allies, perhaps reducing their will to stand firm in West

Berlin" 90

and:

"to risk alienating the rest of the world so completely at this time, Khrushchev must be overwhelmingly, even dangerously confident."91

From whatever angle you look at, it must be said that Khrushchev's foreign policy did not look very coherent at this time, as he consistently uses carrot and stick policies simultaneously. While there was a pervasive awareness of the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing, Khrushchev repeatedly stressed his awareness to negotiate over Berlin.

On the 2nd of September, the Soviet Ambassador in Rome, Kozyrev delivered to Fanfani a message about how Khrushchev was anxious to negotiate with the West. On the 5th of September in his interview with the American journalist Sulzberger, Khrushchev said he would be prepared to meet Kennedy at any time. Thus Khrushchev used informal channels of communication to express his interest in negotiations, while official Soviet rhetoric was more strident. A series of Soviet announcements and moves built up the tension. In the Soviet note of the 2nd of September, it stated that agreements over the rights of air-corridors across GDR territory:

"were concluded before the establishment of sovereign German states which have already won broad international recognition."92 and that the USA bears full responsibility for the use of the air-corridors by "West Berlin revanchists, militarists, spies and saboteurs."93 The West responded to this on the 8th of September warning the Soviets against: "aggressive action against established

rights by the Soviet government and the East German regime."94 In Pravda there were charges made against Western hypocrisy and demanding change in the German situation. On the 10th of September, large scale Warsaw Pact military manoeuvres in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia were announced. The military kept a high profile, with General R.Y. Malinkovsky, Defence Minister, repeatedly calling for the strengthening of Soviet armed forces.

A possible incident of great importance was Kozlov's speech of the 12th of September in Pyonyang, in which he stated that there was no longer a time-limit on the German peace-treaty. Whether this indicates a crucial change of policy or an indication of an internal policy difference is difficult to ascertain. Such a remark certainly seems at odds with the buzzing of American commercial planes over East Germany by two MIG fighters the following day. Yet certainly it was about this time that the Soviet government began to take a slightly less aggressive line.

The sudden death of Dag Hammarskjold, the UN Secretary General, proved to be a diversion, focusing attention on the controversial question of whether there should be a change in the fundamental structure of the UN. With the absence of any more confrontations in Berlin itself, by the 23rd of September M.Kharlamov was able to remark to Pierre Salinger: "The storm is now over"94, and to deliver a 26 page letter from Khrushchev to the President. Negotiations were in progress at different levels, and Gromyko went to Washington where he had several lengthy if largely unproductive sessions of discussions with Kennedy. Ulbricht continued to make inflammatory speeches, but in practice he could do little.

Another reason why the German question was receiving less attention in the Soviet Union was that the dominating concern was becoming the preparations for the 22nd Party Congress opening in October. On the world scene, the public dispute between the Soviet Union and China was becoming more pressing. In East Germany itself, the measures perhaps initially seen as "interim", ie to close the East/West German border had of itself achieved many of the objectives that the concept of a peace-treaty was meant to fulfil. Economic and social stability had been brought to East Germany, and hence greater security for Soviet interests also. The Soviets had also won a prestigious victory in relations with the US. The last major confrontation in Berlin in 1961 was that of the Checkpoint Charlie incident of the 22nd of October. This attempt by East German troops to restrict and hence have control over the movement of Allied personnel into East Berlin should not be dismissed as an unimportant incident as argued by historians such as Adomeit. It is important as if the allies had taken no action it would have set an important precedent, acknowledging that the East German government had complete authority over all traffic passing through the West/East German border, a right not previously claimed. One aspect of particular note is that the harsh and aggressive note of the speeches of Ulbricht found no echoes in the Soviet press. The East German action seems a direct response to Khrushchev's speech of the 17th of October in which he lifted the deadline for the signature of a German peace-treaty, while asserting that it was still a matter of urgency. Khrushchev was still interested in concessions from the West over Berlin, but was no longer willing to take major risks in order to win

West Berlin. The situation in East Germany was stabilised, and the matter was no longer urgent.

Conclusion.

After such a detailed examination of the events of the summer of 1961, it is now time to stand back a little, and to discern the overall trends and information gained about Khrushchev's leadership. Are we any closer in classifying Khrushchev as following an aggressive or cautious foreign policy? As we have seen, R. Slusser argues that Khrushchev wanted a moderate foreign policy, while Adomeit sees Khrushchev as pursuing an ambitious and aggressive policy, held in check only by his more conservative colleagues. Adomeit's conclusions seem in line with Penkovsky's, the Soviet army colonel with Military Intelligence. He^{*} argues that many in the Soviet leadership, including Mikoyan and the Soviet Generals were against such aggressive policies saying: "What in hell do we need Berlin for?. We have endured it for 16 years: we can put up with it for a little longer."⁹⁵

Many distinguished historians advise caution when referring to The Penkovsky Papers. Thus E. Crankshaw comments:

"Penkovsky, as I have said, was shocked by the size and magnitude and malevolence of the secret service of which he formed a part. He was also shocked by the behaviour of Khrushchev and others. Here I think, he can be very misleading"⁹⁶.

He also comments that Penkovsky "detested Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership" and was unable to "distinguish between government intentions and government precautions."⁹⁷ These observations, made

* Penkovsky

after a close examination of Penkovsky's notes, cast doubts on Penkovsky's reliability as a source.

There is a greater objection to Penkovsky's argument however, and that is that they fail to have any verification from the evidence examined. Khrushchev was put under pressure from Ulbricht re the signing of a German peace-treaty, yet in the end he decided against this. In their speeches, time and again the military took a harder policy line than Khrushchev, yet these were not implemented. Khrushchev can also be seen to be diffusing tension as when talking directly to the press he often took a much less severe line than that of official Soviet policy, eg the Sulzberger interview. On numerous occasions Khrushchev took action which if not moderate, was certainly not as radical or extreme as the options open to him. Even the decision to seal the East/West Berlin border, was taken after some hesitation, and was tentative in that they didn't immediately build a wall, but were prepared to retreat if directly challenged. The one exception to this pattern could be the decision to resume nuclear testing on the 30th August. Repeatedly Khrushchev has shown an awareness of the serious consequences of escalating actions by either side, and while he takes risks he seemed to do only if he felt that the circumstances were favourable. Thus he raised the question of a German peace-treaty at the Vienna Conference as he felt that the Western and especially the American position was weak, and that he could take advantage of this.

Khrushchev was willing to take opportunities to exploit Western weakness for Soviet advantage, but usually withdrew if he judged the risks to be too great. In the Berlin crisis because the Soviet Union

was economically vulnerable, the Soviet government acted quickly and productively to secure the stability of one of its Warsaw pact allies. By the border sealing operation for East Germans leaving East Berlin for West Berlin, the Soviet government achieved its aim at minimum cost.

The Berlin crisis has been seen in a number of ways. The Soviet historian Vyotskii asserts:

"it can be said for certain that the socialist countries won the battle, and that the erection of a defensive wall against militarism and revanchism on the border with West Berlin was a major achievement by the ethnic socialist community and an event of truly historic significance."⁹⁸

In his Memoirs, Khrushchev sees it as:

"a great victory for us, and it was won without firing a single shot. By refusing to back down in the face of intimidation by the West, we guarantee the GDR's right to control its own territory and borders."⁹⁹

By contrast, many Western historians see the Berlin crisis as a time when: "Western strength and moderation had triumphed over Khrushchev's bluster."¹⁰⁰, while A.M.Schlesinger talks of Kennedy as a man who:

"applied power and diplomacy in combination and sequence which enabled him to guard the vital interests of the West and hold off the holocaust."¹⁰¹

On the whole, after sifting the evidence, it does look like, whether by chance or design, the Soviet government wrong-footed the Americans over Berlin, gaining a number of advantages at little cost.

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Chapter 5. Cuba 1962 - a case-study.

"If it was a triumph, it was the triumph of the next generation, and not of any particular government or people"1

R. Kennedy on the Cuban missile crisis.

Outline of the study.

In the next two chapters, in order to try to analyse the mechanics of Soviet foreign policy, and to identify its sources, an evaluation of the period in 1962, involving the period concerning the Cuban missile crisis will be made. The following framework is going to be adopted;

1. A background analysis of the situation leading to the Cuban missile crisis. This will focus particularly on the influence of China in various areas of Soviet foreign policy, and then towards Cuba especially.

Chapter Six.

2. A case-study based on a specific period of time, in this case the months of January to November 1962, in order to identify the main patterns and variations in Soviet policy-making, and the nature of their implementation.

This will include recent input from a conference in the Soviet Union in January 1989 concerning the Cuban missile crisis.

SECTION 1. A BACKGROUND TO THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, is one of the most commonly discussed and debated incidents of post-war international relations. Many scholars and historians have spent considerable time and energy to search out all the facts and exact times of various incidents and meetings between the key American political figures and their Soviet counterparts, in an effort to explain the string of decision-making, from the American discovery of the existence of Soviet missiles on Cuba to the final conciliatory telegram sent by Khrushchev on Sunday the 28th of October. Yet despite the profusion of personal accounts, memoirs etc and the intensity of historical analysis, these works chiefly depict the American viewpoint. Thus it would seem logical to attempt to redress this balance, to assess Soviet and Cuban government statements and policy, to seek their attitudes and possible motivations for action.

Apart from this need to challenge stereotypes of American historiography, there are many other reasons to look at this period afresh. As a result of recent developments in the Soviet Union, some new and relevant source material has come to light, articles, memoirs etc, whose information needs to be assimilated into the broader spectrum of previously known facts. 1962 was a year in which it began to be discovered that the old fallacies of the "communist monolith" were discovered to be false, and something of the political diversity possible in nations in both East and West was realised. It was this year that laid the foundations for the Test-ban Treaty of 1963

providing a new and more cooperative basis for Soviet-American relations. Events in Cuba should also be seen within this broader context of world events, especially with regard to Sino-Soviet relations. Therefore time will now be spent giving an analysis of some of the main issues in the months leading up to the autumn of 1962, in order to gain a more comprehensive perspective on events. This will involve the study of three main topics:

(a) Soviet and Chinese attitudes towards Cuba, and under-developed countries.

(b) Soviet and Chinese attitudes towards India.

(c) Soviet-Cuban relations since 1959.

(a) The influence of Chinese-Soviet relations on Soviet attitudes to under-developed countries

Initially, the link between Chinese policy and the Cuban missile crisis looks at best tenuous, and at worst completely irrelevant, yet on closer inspection Chinese policy does seem to influence Moscow quite considerably. When the Chinese People's Republic was declared on the 1st of 1949, the Soviet government was one of the first in recognising the new regime, and by 1950 an Alliance Treaty had already been signed between the two countries. In the early 1950's, various economic and political agreements were signed, culminating in a secret Soviet agreement in 1957, providing help to enable China to build her own nuclear weapons. However already there were tensions emerging between the two countries. The Chinese government was no longer

willing to follow the Soviet lead in the international communist movement, and realising its own capabilities and capacities tried to assume a more influential role amongst communist states. While there is some controversy over the role of ideology in this split, it is significant that it was after Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 1956 that antagonism started to flare up. While the Soviet Union propounded "peaceful co-existence" and a "peaceful transition to socialism", which for them offered economic advantages - trading advantages and a less hefty military budget, this type of policy offered little hope for China to increase her influence in the world. The Chinese government had fewer influential contacts, and felt that it had more to gain from an aggressive policy of forcibly exporting revolution and encouraging territorial expansion. While theoretically it may seem possible for both countries to pursue these policies independently and amicably, in practice it lead to confrontation.

Manifestations of this disagreement can be seen as early as 1958, in the case of the Iraqi revolution. While the Soviets were trying to support and influence the existing government, the Chinese were intriguing against the government and encouraging more radical left-wing groups. As Zagoria comments: "The Russians cannot be indifferent to Chinese led Communist assaults on the very government that the Soviets are trying to woo."² Therefore even in 1958, real policy divergencies and indeed actively contradictory policies can be identified, and characteristics of the later "full split" can be seen in embryo form. The vast majority of the West was oblivious to the implications of this policy conflict, a noticeable exception being Isaac Deutscher. He was aware as early as 1958 the influence that the

Chinese exerted over Soviet foreign policy:

"The events of this summer have brought to light, with somewhat artificial sharpness, the fact that Soviet foreign policy is no longer made in Moscow alone, that Peking plays an essential part in formulating it, and that Mao Zedong may have a decisive say at crucial moments."³

That the encroaching Chinese influence was taken seriously in the Kremlin, can be seen in the Soviet decision of 1959 when they repudiated their agreement to help the Chinese build nuclear weapons. Other potential sources of conflict included the nature of the Sino-Soviet border and the position of the Mongolian People's Republic.

By 1958-9, the outline of Sino-Soviet conflict had been set, and the implications for communist and non-communist countries alike were immense. It wasn't just "neutralist" countries who saw here the opportunity for self-advancement, but more ominously for the Soviet Union, communist ones also. The Albanian Communist Party, with their historically based fear of invasion and hatred especially of the Yugoslavs, were alarmed when Khrushchev began to re-establish Soviet-Yugoslav links, and to rehabilitate Tito in the communist bloc. Hence Hoxha, looking for an ally against a resurgence of Yugoslavian power, began to see China as the ideal partner. In order to gain a guarantee of Albanian security against Yugoslav attempts to interfere in her internal affairs (there had been two Yugoslavian attempts to overthrow Hoxha already) the Albanian leadership seized the opportunity to exploit Sino-Soviet differences for their own advantage. (NB the Yugoslav government felt it was to its advantage to increase tension to gain stronger Soviet support). The Chinese were only too pleased to

encourage Albania in its rebellion against Soviet domination, seeing it as an opportunity to gain a foothold in the Soviet backyard. The extent of the Chinese challenge at this time, eg at the 81 communist party conference in July 1960, seems to have been consistently underestimated by historians.

The Chinese had an obvious advantage in Asian and Far Eastern Communist Parties, having influential majorities in the Indonesian, Malaysian and North Vietnamese Communist Parties, and considerable influence in North Korea. The Chinese had no hesitation in using the American aggression in the Bay of Pigs incident of April 1961 to justify a more aggressive policy in Laos and South Vietnam. This American action was of course to have major repercussions on Soviet policy also.

Chinese actions were thus no marginal concern to the Soviet Union. The Chinese government had no compunctions about challenging Soviet activities in countries where the Soviet government felt it had the sole right to interfere such as in the Congo. Meantime in Algeria, Khrushchev was taking a strong diplomatic line trying to take advantage of the division between Eisenhower and De Gaulle, while the Chinese government were encouraging Ababas in order to support his bid for power.

As the Chinese began to realise the possibilities of their activities, they became more determined and more ambitious, and the dispute began to escalate to the stage where:

"an international setback for either Russia or China tended almost immediately to rebound against the Sino-Soviet relationship, prompting mutual recriminations."⁴

This cycle of events was exacerbated by individual countries exploiting the situation for their own advantage, as we have seen, and in these years the Kremlin's policy-makers faced very real difficulties. It could well have been in the context of these circumstances that Khrushchev felt forced to make his dramatic and unexpected condemnation of Albania at the 22nd Party Congress of 1961. It seems that this move was devised as a method of making communist parties from different countries to make a definite commitment one way or another, for China or the Soviet Union. However many delegates were reluctant to make such a display of allegiance, so little was decided and everything remained to play for.

Such continuous Chinese pressure on the Soviet Union over so many areas of the world, probing every weak spot, offers a fresh perspective on Soviet motivation concerning Cuba. By placing nuclear weapons in Cuba, the Soviet government was not just trying to close the "missile gap" with the United States, but to increase its influence in the Latin American countries. It must also be remembered that the Chinese too were interested in Cuba, and that by placing the missiles there, the Soviet leadership were reasserting their predominant role in Cuba and symbolically in the world communist movement as a whole. The fear of being out-manoeuvred by the Chinese seems a crucial element in explaining Soviet actions in Cuba.

(b)Soviet and Chinese attitudes towards India.

The Indian case is of particular interest because both of its

ambiguous geographical position (between East and West), and the nature of the connection between the Chinese invasion and Soviet actions in Cuba. Indeed one aspect of the Cuban crisis that is often overlooked is the concurrent events taking place in India, when the Chinese invaded at several points along the border. Again the Soviet-Chinese divergence is crucial to forming an accurate picture of events, and a brief review of events in India to outline Soviet and Chinese policy trends is needed.

In 1959, during the Chinese-Indian border clash, it was:

"the first time that any communist nation had ever taken a neutral stance in a dispute between another communist nation and a non-communist state."⁵

To understand how this situation came about, it is necessary to look at Soviet policy towards India on two levels:

(1) its policy towards the Indian state and government.

(2) its policy towards the CPI.

As we have seen, the 1956 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, marked a watershed in Soviet internal and external policy, with the denunciation of Stalin and the pursuance of a more rightist course. This had major repercussions in India, where there were already significant differences and turmoil within the communist party. Confidence in the CPSU waned, only to recover with the Kerala election results, which seemed to make a parliamentary path to socialism a more realistic possibility. Lasting damage was done however, as the central leadership of the CPI was losing control of an increasingly fragmented party, there being strong left-wing and Chinese-orientated groups in the provinces of West Bengal, Punjab and Andhra. Paradoxically, while

Khrushchev's policies of wooing neutral countries in a non-military manner lost him support amongst the Indian communists, it meant Soviet-Indian relations on a state-level were increasingly cordial and further enhanced by now mutual suspicion of China.

By 1961, the CPI were uncertain of their position in the Chinese-Soviet division. In 1960 at one point, the Central Committee of the CPSU had condemned Chinese policies, only to be criticised in turn by the West Bengalis for their biased attitude. Matters were brought to a head by the 22nd Party Congress of October 1961. In 1961, Khrushchev was facing renewed opposition within the Party and the bureaucracy, and sought both to consolidate his position and to pave the way for further reforms. Khrushchev's vigorous attack on Stalin at the Congress, offered him the chance to disperse his opponents, but was not without risk. This internal campaign was matched by a vehement attack on Albania, which affected the communist movement very deeply. In India, it led to the further process of radicalisation of the CPI - the General Secretary Gosh tried to assume an ambiguous non-committal position, while the more left-wing of the Party eg in Uttar Pradesh published an article eulogising Stalin and suggesting that if Stalin's body was to leave the Kremlin walls, then they would be happy to bury it in their town. Thus as H.Gelman comments:

"by the end of 1961, the internal division of the CPI into moderate and leftish factions reflecting the divergent attitudes and policy positions of Moscow and Peking had become clearly defined."6

Meanwhile in Eastern Europe, Khrushchev's attempt to isolate Albania and cause China to backtrack had not been successful. With the

failure of the 1961 22nd Party Congress to reunite the world communist movement around the Soviet leadership, the Soviet government would need to embark on another course of action.

(c) Soviet-Cuban relations since 1959.

One of the most interesting and controversial questions of the Cuban missile crisis, lies in the nature of its origins. Why did Khrushchev decide to take such a drastic and bold decision as to place nuclear weapons in Cuba? While this question is very much dependent on the timing of this decision to place missiles into Cuba, the history of Soviet-Cuban relations also has a part to play. By attempting to isolate some of the motivating factors of the Soviet government with regard to Cuba, it should be possible to gain a deeper understanding of the Soviet government's perceptions of the international scene.

Castro's revolution in Cuba against the Batista regime was victorious in 1959. While some communists were involved, that the nature of this revolution was in any way communist was far from certain, eg only in 1962, under much pressure would Castro even go as far as to say: "the basis for a single united revolutionary party was being created and that its members were very seriously studying Marxist-Leninism."⁷ This in no way can be seen as an enthusiastic espousal of Marxist-Leninism, and it was hard for the Soviet government to accommodate even in the flexible "national liberation" theory. It was quite possible, in the early months of 1959 that Cuban-American relations could have been quite strong, were it not for Castro's ill-fated attempt to invade the

Dominican Republic in June of that year. From then on, Castro was forced to seek an ally elsewhere, though again it was by no means certain as to whom he should turn. In 1960 Mikoyan visited Cuba in January, and by February a Soviet-Cuban trade agreement was signed. Shortly afterwards in April, Cuba was constituted a socialist state. Yet even then in Cuba rival factions were keen on having different allies. Escalante on the leftist side of politics wanted a greater radicalism of the Cuban revolution, and looked to the Chinese model as an example. In 1960-1, Cuba signed trade-agreements with both the Soviet Union and with China, and the issue could have gone either way.

Why at this stage, was the USSR so interested in Cuba? There are many reasons. As a result of Cuba's geographical position, so close to the United States, Cuba would make a useful strategic ally for the USSR, to increase her prestige. With the Soviet Union's policy of encouraging and aiding under-developed countries still strongly held, Cuba seemed the ideal prize. Another strong motivating purpose must have been the Chinese influence. Irrespective of the intrinsic merit of Cuba itself, the very fact that China herself was interested in an alliance with Cuba, increased Soviet interest. As Lowenthal comments:

"both Moscow and Peking turned decisively and skilfully to a policy of respect for the independence of the emerging states and offered them economic aid and support in all conflict with the imperialists."⁸

As a result of Chinese interest, Cuba's value was enhanced, despite the ideological difficulties of incorporating her into the Marxist-Leninist mode. Thus in the initial years at least, Soviet interest was primarily for reasons of prestige, for a victory over China, and to

gain a potential foothold into Latin America.

1961, from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, must have seemed to be one of triumph for Khrushchev. In April he saw the new President lose much respect and credibility by his sanctioning of the invasion of Cuba in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The importance of this failed invasion should not be underemphasised in giving Khrushchev motivation to be more involved in Castro's situation. It's interesting to look at new material published in the form of previously hidden tapes made by Khrushchev himself. These tapes were published in Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes. In extracts from Time magazine, he claims that the Cuban missiles were put in Cuba for defensive reasons:

"I was haunted by the knowledge that the Americans could not stomach having Castro's Cuba right next door to them. Sooner or later the US would do something. It had the strength and it had the means. As they say, might makes right. How were we supposed to strengthen and reinforce Cuba? With diplomatic notes and TASS statements?

The idea arose of placing our missile units in Cuba."⁹

This remark emphasises the effect of the Bay of Pigs incident in Soviet thinking, and that Cuban pressure on Khrushchev must have had some degree of influence on Khrushchev as a result. This helps to partly explain Khrushchev's desire to place Soviet missiles in Cuba, as shall be explored in greater depth later.

After a time of uncertainty about Eastern Europe and how to stabilise East Germany's deteriorating economic condition, the creation of the Berlin Wall had taken some of the pressure off, even if only temporarily. At the end of September 1961, the Soviet Union resumed

nuclear testing, while in October Khrushchev launched a new de-Stalinisation drive and a new assault on Chinese influence in the communist movement. In Cuba things were also looking more hopeful, as by the 2nd of December, Castro had openly espoused Marxist-Leninism. There must have been a considerable degree of confidence amongst the Soviet leadership at this time.

A theory concerning the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee to put Soviet missiles into Cuba is advanced by Andrez Suarez, who estimates that the decision must have been taken a year in advance, sometime just after the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt. He argues that it was Castro's insecurity after the American action that made him seek Soviet protection in earnest, because he could receive from them a nuclear guarantee. Thus he states: "It would take Castro more than a year to break Moscow's resistance."¹⁰ This theory lacks substance however. It would be unlikely that the Soviet Union would be willing to place nuclear weapons in Cuba, especially when bearing in mind that no other communist country even in Eastern Europe had Soviet nuclear weapons on their soil, just because it would make Castro more secure. As Tatu argues:

"had Castro's defence been the main object, it would have been far simpler to extend the Warsaw Pact guarantees to cover the island, or else for the USSR to commit itself only to declare war in case of aggression against its ally"¹¹

When the decision to put nuclear weapons in Cuba was made, the defence of Cuba itself can only have been part of a much greater plan.

From the evidence of Castro himself, much of a contradictory nature still emerges as to who initiated the idea of putting nuclear weapons

in that country. In a six month time span, at least three different theories were produced. Castro:

"told a Cuban audience in January 1963 that sending the missiles was a Soviet idea; he repeated this idea to Claude Julien of Le Monde in March 1963; in May he described it to Lisa Howard of the American Broadcasting Company as "simultaneous action on the behalf of both governments"; then in October he told Herbert Matthews of the New York Times that it was a Cuban idea, only to tell Jean Daniel of L'Express in November that it was a Soviet idea....."12

One interesting remark he did make, was that he claimed that the decision to place the missiles in Cuba was in fact made "at the beginning of 1962"13. This assertion needs to be investigated, to see if it provides a clue as to whether there was a more tangible reason for the Soviet Union to decide to take such a decision then, and if there was any evidence of a change of political line in January/February 1962.

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Chapter 6.

SOVIET POLICY WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO CUBA: A CASE STUDY JANUARY TO
NOVEMBER 1962.

As we have seen, Fidel Castro has claimed that Khrushchev took the decision to put missiles into Cuba at the beginning of 1962, and that this was the critical period for policy making. In the early months of 1962, Chinese-Soviet relations were poor, with a number of polemical outbursts on both sides. There was also a number of reports of dissension within the communist bloc. One report of particular interest, was in the New York Times on the 13th of January:

"One experienced American reported that the Soviet Union was being urged by the Polish and Czechoslovakian governments, as well as by the East Germans, to move rapidly towards a final settlement of the East German problem, of which Berlin was a part."1

If this was so, it would suggest that the Soviet focus was on Europe rather than Cuba. It is also possible, although less likely that it could have been as a response to this pressure that a scheme involving missiles in Cuba could have been conceived. A salient factor that would appear to back Castro's assertion is that at this time Soviet-Cuban relations were close - eg thus on the 11th of January the Cuban-Soviet trade agreement was renewed.

Despite these happenings, there is evidence which suggests that it is unlikely that such a decision was made at this time. There were some Soviet initiatives concerning Germany at this time, but they were of a diplomatic character rather than being aggressive. On the 8th of

January, the Soviet government seemed to be manoeuvring to isolate West Germany politically from the rest of the alliance, and to profit from the disarray and dissension prevalent amongst West German politicians at this time. Various attempts to encourage negotiations were made by the Soviet Union, but little was achieved in practice. Thus at this time it would seem that the Soviets favoured a quieter, more subtle approach. With Ulbricht's visit to Moscow in February of that year, the Soviet government resumed a slightly more antagonistic line, putting pressure on the Allied air corridors etc. This seemed more a change in emphasis rather than a drastic change of policy however.

From a domestic viewpoint also it seems unlikely that such a major decision was made at this time. Khrushchev was absent from public life for the first two weeks of January, and there seems to have been a considerable amount of confusion in policy making. This is manifested in the various contradictory Soviet statements about Molotov's return to his post in Vienna. The announcement of this move was interpreted by some observers as: "an indication that Mr Molotov still had powerful friends in the Party."² On the 10th, the original Soviet statement was retracted, and by the 18th there was an attack on Molotov in an article by N. Inozemtsev in Pravda, and again on the 19th. At this time attention seems to have been concentrated on the implementation of the internal de-Stalinisation drive, and on ways of replying to Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda, rather than on planning a new initiative. One Western correspondent commentated at the end of January:

"Soviet diplomacy has been strangely quiescent of late. Premier

Khrushchev has not had anything to say on foreign affairs for some time.....On East/West relations, Moscow has seemed content to mark time."3

While it could be argued that there was little going on precisely because the Soviet government was planning new activity in Cuba, there is little to support this idea. There were few signs of consultations being held with other leaders, either internally or externally at this time. It appears to have been largely a reactive and self-absorbed period for the Soviet leadership, rather than one of taking new initiatives. There were too many pressing domestic concerns for a decision of the magnitude of placing nuclear missiles in Cuba to have been taken.

The next time which seems a possible time of decision is towards the end of April. During this period, there were a number of significant policy changes, both internally and in a number of foreign policy areas, which would indicate some major policy readjustment originating within the Kremlin. Therefore this period will be considered in some detail.

Soviet motivation for the placing of missiles in Cuba, is a neglected area when it comes to a consideration of the Cuban missile crisis, although it is crucial to an understanding of Soviet thinking. A survey of some of the major pressures on the Soviet Union at this time could help provide insight into their reasoning. Berlin surely must have played a major part in Soviet calculations as it was the focal point of much discontent and protest in Eastern Europe, as well as Western pressure. By the placing of missiles in Cuba, this would redirect pressure onto the American government, and might allow a more

flexible American stance on Berlin. While at the moment it is not necessary to assess the relative importance of Berlin in Soviet calculations, it can clearly be seen that it had a definite role to play.

If we accept this premise, then when a decision was made regarding Cuba, you would expect a corresponding change in Soviet rhetoric about West Berlin. This is mirrored in policy statements by Soviet leaders at this time. In Khrushchev's speech on the 21st of April in Sofia, he made some of his most aggressive speeches on Berlin. On 24th of April, Gromyko made a speech, expressing his desire for a German Peace Treaty as opposed to merely a settlement over Berlin.

"the best thing to do would be to sign a single peace treaty with both the German Democratic Republic and the Federal German Republic or, if it would suit the Western powers better, to sign separate treaties with each of the German states."⁴

Another significant remark was made by Khrushchev on the 25th when he told the American publisher George Cowles that plans to have a US-USSR summit should be postponed. He argued that there should be preparatory negotiations first, to avoid "big disappointment for people who want to see urgent problems find their positive resolution"^{4a} and referred pointedly to the U2 incident on the eve of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting in May 1960. Interestingly, Khrushchev talks about the possibility of the international situation deteriorating and that in this event:

"there may then be a need for urgent efforts on the part of the leaders of the great powers to prevent the spark that could cause a military conflagration; this is another case where I do

not rule out a summit meeting, one that would be aimed at averting such an outcome."⁵

This would seem to correspond to the later Soviet concept of negotiating from a position of strength, after the missiles were established and operational on Cuban soil. By the end of April therefore, the Soviet government was giving less emphasis to diplomacy and negotiations, and was pursuing a hardline and antagonistic attitude over the German question. For Khrushchev to do this after spending much time trying to achieve a negotiated settlement, and considering the urgency of the question, it seems highly probable that some alternative plan was being considered or had been adopted.

This was a time of internal tension also. In the political arena, Voroshilov was unexpectedly retained in the Supreme Soviet, perhaps indicating something more than a tremor in Khrushchev's political control. Plans for a prestigious Soviet World Trade Fair on the 50th anniversary of the Revolution had to be dropped because of lack of capital, indicating that the Soviet Union was still in considerable financial difficulty. Signs of economic difficulty were mentioned in the Editorial column of the New York Times, which commented that the USSR was:

"under considerable strain in trying to meet all its many commitments, an impression shared by many observers."⁶

If the Soviet government was feeling itself to be under economic pressure, this would have made the relatively "cheap" option of putting missiles in Cuba an attractive way of increasing its world standing. Michel Tatu, the French correspondent of Le Monde, argues that there were important changes in army personnel in April, and

makes a convincing case to connect this with a decision over Cuba. He points out that in the spring of 1962, three Marshals lost their influence, and that the demotion of two in particular, K. S. Moskalenko and F. I. Golikov was kept secret till the summer, and that both were reinstated after the missile crisis. Thus Tatu argues that it was Khrushchev's desire to place nuclear weapons in Cuba which caused these disruptions amongst the military. This theory is also consistent with : "what the Chinese later called "an excessive reliance on atomic weapons "7. Thus there are indications, from a military viewpoint, as well as an economic one, that a major policy decision was made at this time, and that the concept of putting nuclear missiles in Cuba looked to be an attractive option to Khrushchev.

Another interesting and related development of this time, took place in the sphere of Sino-Soviet relations. During three weeks in April, the Chinese Party Congress took place, at which a number of ideological concessions were made which seemed to be aimed at reconciliation with the USSR. Just after the end of this, on the 21st of April, a Sino-Soviet trade agreement was signed. Much of this new conciliatory attitude can be explained in terms of China's poor economic situation - the bad harvest of the last three years, the droughts, mass malnutrition etc, but it could also be that relations were improved because the Soviet government had hinted at the possibility of a new military initiative, which the Chinese considered to be a vindication of their more aggressive foreign policy line. The installation of the missiles must also have seemed a method of exerting more substantial control within Cuba, and of providing a new momentum in Soviet power and influence in underdeveloped countries and

the world as a whole.

A last but crucial factor in all this is the Soviet-Cuban exchanges that took place at this time. On the 28th of April, Khrushchev met Ceinfuegos, the Cuban Minister for Public Works. A few days later on the 1st of May, Castro declared Cuba to be a socialist state, which could indicate some form of deal having been made between the two countries. Although this evidence is only circumstantial, when all the different pieces are brought together - the change in Soviet policy towards Berlin, better relations with China, internal economic, political and military pressures and close Soviet-Cuban contacts at this time - it does amount to a formidable collection of evidence that the Soviet government made the decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba at the end of April.

Reference has been made previously to a conference that took place relatively recently in the Soviet Union concerning the Cuban missile crisis, and it seems an appropriate time to consider some of the remarks and insights that can be gained from that. This conference took place in Moscow in January 1989, and the following people attended: Gromyko, Dobrynin, MacNamara, Bundy, Sorensen, Mikoyan and Khrushchev's son Sergei. The conference was covered by the Soviet press in articles in Izvestia on the 6th of February and the 17th of April 1989, and also in The Guardian on the 25th of March. In some ways the results of this conference were disappointing, as not much progress was made about some of the most controversial issues of the crisis. The major point everyone seemed to agree on was how much difference new technology made to international relations today, especially the "hot-line" between the Kremlin and the White House. Yet

some interesting information did emerge. In the article of the 28th of February it states:

"The idea of placing the missiles in Cuba was a Soviet one, by N. S. Khrushchev in person. It was confirmed in Moscow in the summer of 1962 after the visit of the Soviet delegation to Havana."8

This is slightly ambiguous, as "confirmed" could mean the decision to go ahead with the final stage of an action already begun, or a decision to instigate a completely new line of action. As previously intimated, the former seems the more accurate, as much of the evidence would indicate it was a longer term plan, and that the decision to proceed at least in part, must have been made in the spring.

By the summer of 1962, the pressures on Khrushchev were increasing from all sides. At home Khrushchev was still under considerable political attack after the 22nd Party Congress, and his control over the Secretariat had been weakened. It was in June that due to economic difficulties prices rose - meat by 30%, butter by 25%, and also in June when there was much political discontent and riots in Rostov. An indication of the seriousness of this little reported event is given by the fact that as senior a figure as Kozlov was sent to calm the situation and reimpose central government authority.

The arms race situation between America and the Soviet Union was at a critical stage by the summer. By July 1962, the American government was fully aware of the fallacy of the "missile gap" myth propounded by the Soviets. Thus Khrushchev felt that he was losing out in his relations with the West. To make matters worse, due to the strictness of the budgetary restraints, there was very little he could do about

it. The Soviet economic crisis had another important consequence, as it limited:

"Soviet capacity to relieve economic distress in Communist China and to provide meaningful aid to the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, no matter how high a priority in propaganda value it might attach to such activities."9

Khrushchev's foreign policy aims were very much limited by the shortage of economic resources in the USSR. The situation in the satellite countries also gave cause for concern, especially in East Germany where chronic food shortages provided the focus of discontent, and a renewed surge in the number of people attempting to flee. By mid-June the Berlin crisis was centre-stage, accompanied by more Soviet calls for a German peace-treaty. Thus by the end of June, a New York Times correspondent reported:

"Observers here believe that pressure is mounting on Premier Khrushchev to obtain a Berlin settlement both for political reasons and for considerations of personal prestige. Some Western officials here fear that a new East-West crisis will develop before the end of the year if the Soviet/United States talks fail to produce any results."10

This comment was perceptive, but the author didn't realise quite the form such a conflict would have.

Some historians, such as R. Slusser attribute the decision re Cuba to have been made during this period. They argue that the prime reason for this move was to readdress the strategic balance lost after the "missile gap" discovery. Yet surely there must have been more to the decision than that. Certainly Raul Castro, Castro's brother and

Minister of the Armed Forces in Cuba visited Moscow for two weeks in early July 1962, and it does seem likely that some of the details of the actual deployment were made then. However the heavy missile shipments to Cuba started by mid-July and peaked 22nd-31st of July, which would indicate that the actual decision to deploy the missiles must have been taken quite some time previously, in order for the logistics to have been worked out, the parts made ready etc. Thus even though Khrushchev records in his Memoirs that the final decision wasn't made until the 1st of August, this could only be so if this was the final decision in a long train of decisions that the actual construction of the missile sites in Cuba might proceed. This is further supported by remarks made by the Chinese Ambassador to Moscow Liu Siao who:

"indicated on several occasions to Ambassadors from neutral countries that the Chinese were glad that the Soviets at last had found the right way to solve the Berlin crisis"¹¹

As to the question of who actually initiated the idea of bringing Soviet missiles to Cuba, there is much controversy. Khrushchev declared: "The Cubans asked the Soviet government for extra help"¹². while Castro at various times, as we have seen, made completely contradictory statements. It does seem most likely judging from the available evidence that Khrushchev must have been the main instigator - the scheme has all the hallmarks of his character-intelligence, boldness, unexpectedness and a significant element of risk. While it may have been Castro who asked the Soviet Union for extra help, the nature of that help must have been determined by Khrushchev. It is unlikely that Castro himself, without prompting, would have been

ambitious enough to ask for Soviet nuclear weapons to be established on Cuban soil, when they had not even been placed in Eastern Europe. Thus the essence of the idea must have been from Khrushchev.

This brings us back to Khrushchev's motivation to take such decisive action. It would be unlikely that such plans went forward unopposed. As has been seen, there was opposition from conservatives in the Army. It is not enough to say that the missiles were placed in Cuba for security reasons. As has been noted previously, it would have been far simpler for Khrushchev to extend some form of military pact regarding the defence of Cuba, than for him to place nuclear weapons there. From this Tatu concludes that hence: "Cuba was only part of a bigger game"¹³, and this would seem to be borne out by the circumstances involved. Although the Bay of Pigs incident provided some motivation for retaliation of some description, and as we have seen it did influence Khrushchev, the main motivation for the Soviet Union's actions lay outwith Cuba itself, and the most urgent and difficult problem on the international scene at this time was Berlin. It is very noticeable in the period leading up to the autumn of 1962, that the Soviet Union hinted repeatedly that a summit meeting

might be possible in November, or that Khrushchev might visit the UN then. It seems that Khrushchev wanted then to present the Americans with a fait accompli, ie with missiles already established and operational in Cuba, and then to bargain on that basis. Mikoyan's retrospective comment that Moscow had wanted to inform Washington about the missiles, but: "not till after the American elections, to prevent it from becoming a campaign issue."¹⁴, seems like another way

of saying that the Soviet government didn't want to draw attention to what was going on until it was ready and the results would be most beneficial to itself. Thus at this stage in August, it seems, as M. Tatu asserts, that the majority of the Soviet government favoured putting the missiles secretly into Cuba, then they planned a dramatic announcement to the world, possibly at the UN, to see what concessions and advantages they could gain from their action, especially in relation to Berlin.

August began quite promisingly, with the successful conclusion of an agreement over Laos and concessions made by Kennedy concerning the international control of nuclear testing. In Cuba however things were running less smoothly, discontent being reported. On the 4th of August a Soviet-Cuban protocol was signed, the Soviet Union providing Cuba with technological aid in the development of commercial fishing. It seems quite likely that the purpose of this agreement was to distract American attention from other activities. Meanwhile this was a time of tension in Germany as the first anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall approached. On the 1st of August Ulbricht visited Moscow, and because of the deteriorating economic situation pressed with increasing fervour for a German peace-treaty. This situation was not helped by the Soviet Union's own economic difficulties - in 1962 Soviet trade with both China and Eastern Europe fell sharply, and the Soviet government was less able to give economic aid to East Germany than previously. Accusations and threats flew back and forward on both sides, and sometime about the 10th a meeting between W. Stoph, Grotwohl and Khrushchev at the Black Sea was said to have taken place, the substance of which would surely make interesting reading.

By mid-August, once more there was deadlock at the test-ban negotiations at Geneva, with both sides accusing the other of blocking progress. Within the Soviet Union there were food riots eg in Rostov, and in the continuing Sino-Indian conflict at this time centred on the territory of Ladakh, the Soviet government was finding it increasingly difficult to placate both sides. The decision of the Soviet government to make an aviation agreement to sell MIG-21 jet fighters to India didn't help relations with China. Another indication of the state of Sino-Soviet relations is the Hungarian purge, in which 25 Communist Party members were expelled including Emoe Geroe and Matyas Rakosi. The purge was said to be a response to Chinese communist pressure to try to gain influence in Hungary at the Soviet's expense, with the help of the Hungarian Minister of the Interior Antai Bartos. If this is correct, this would provide an additional factor to explain the Soviet government's desire for swift and decisive action to demonstrate its power both within and outwith the Communist movement.

The attitude of the Soviet Union to the UN at this time is of particular interest. It was widely believed in West German political circles in mid-August that any plans that the Soviet Union had had to take the Berlin Question to the UN for a settlement had now been abandoned. The Soviet's policy of trying to gain the support of neutral countries in the UN General Assembly had not been effective. Yet despite this the Soviet Leadership seemed to maintain their confidence in a possible UN solution. On the same day, 20th of August, at a flamboyant Soviet ceremony in Red Square to welcome the cosmonauts back, Khrushchev made a strong call for Western forces to be withdrawn from West Berlin and to be replaced by UN troops. At the

end of August there was an announcement in Pravda by the USSR Ministry of Defence, ordering the abolition of the office of Commandant of the Soviet garrison in Berlin. While this move had few practical implications, it was a way of antagonising the West who had been demanding a conference of the 4 Commandants, and of undermining the existing order. This new Soviet activity provoked speculation in the West that: "The simmering Berlin crisis seems to be rushing towards a new climax"¹⁵, and that a Treaty could soon be imposed. This impression was fortified by renewed Soviet threats against American air-space and a continual stream of border incidents. At the end of August, the UN Secretary General U Thant met with Ulbricht and Khrushchev at the Crimea to discuss the German question, and U Thant said that Khrushchev would be willing to talk with Kennedy. It was widely expected that Khrushchev would come to give a speech at the UN in the autumn. Although there was concern over the resources and ability of the UN to play a major role in international politics, especially in the American Congress, the Soviet leadership seemed to be calling upon it to play an ever increasing role. As we have seen there was no logical reason for this change in Soviet policy, countries were no more likely to vote for the Soviet Union than before. The Soviet leadership must therefore have been relying on some unexpected factor capable of dramatically ameliorating their position at the UN, and that mysterious "factor" must have been the effect of there being Soviet missiles in Cuba.

By September the missile shipments to Cuba were well underway, and this should be remembered as the background to the events of this month. Partly in order to explain the increased volume of Soviet and

Soviet chartered ships heading towards Cuba, on the 2nd of September the Soviet Union announced that it was sending arms and more technical specialists to Cuba. In reaction to this, both the Secretary of State and President Kennedy made statements saying that any installation of ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba would be unacceptable. At this time the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin arranged to meet R. Kennedy to reassure him as to Soviet intentions. R. Kennedy related that Dobrynin:

"told me I should not be concerned, for he was instructed by Soviet Chairman Nikita S. Khrushchev to assure President Kennedy that there would be no ground-to-ground missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba. Further he said, I could assure the President that this military build-up was not of any significance and that Khrushchev would do nothing to disrupt the relationship of our two countries during the period prior to the elections." (ie, the American Congressional elections in November)16

Reverting back to the old stratagem that attack is the best form of defence, a campaign was launched critical of Western policies in other areas of the world, eg that under the auspices of the UN the Western powers were "competing to seize the riches of the Congo"17 by supporting Tshombe and his separatist demands for Katanga. There were also reports of American U2's flying over Soviet airspace, and complaints against the activities of the CIA. Thus at the beginning of September, the policy of the Soviet government seemed to be to assure the Americans that nothing of importance was happening in Cuba, and to draw attention to other issues instead.

This was a time of great political activity within the Soviet Union,

and as we shall see, this had a great relevance to foreign policy objectives also. On the 9th of September there appeared in Pravda an article by Professor Y. G. Liberman advocating possible ideas to improve the Soviet economic system. This was to involve less centralised control, more autonomy for local managers and a profit orientated incentive system. This article has been seen as expressing the policy preferences of Khrushchev himself, as it corresponds to remarks made by him, and these ideas were to be discussed at a plenum in mid-November. At this plenum these radical plans to reform the Soviet managerial system were to be introduced, as were Khrushchev's proposals to separate the Party into industrial and agricultural sections. These new plans obviously aroused much opposition and created political instability, and the key decision time was to be this plenum in mid-November. It can't be mere coincidence that this internal political activity, happens to coincide with Khrushchev's statements hinting at a UN appearance also at this time. It seems that Khrushchev saw mid-November as the zenith of his achievements: in foreign policy - the existence of functional nuclear weapons in Cuba, perhaps announced dramatically by Khrushchev himself in a speech at the UN, resulting in a deal over Berlin bringing stability to Eastern Europe: in domestic policy his foreign policy success augmenting his personal authority, lessening the effectiveness of the opposition and allowing him to introduce and implement his radical plans to reorganise the economic framework of the country. Thus there seems to be a recognisable framework to events, a congruent pattern in domestic and foreign policy, culminating in the mid-November finale.

A TASS statement made on the 11th of September gives considerable

attention to the Cuban situation, and it is worth looking at this major foreign policy statement in some detail. The United States is seen as bellicose and aggressive, after having called up 150,000 reservists. Thus Soviet military aid, requested by the Cuban government, is seen as a natural response, and that:

"the means of defence which Cuba is acquiring will not be used, for the need to use them would arise only in the extent of aggression against Cuba."

The statement continues:

"The government of the Soviet Union has authorised TASS to state also that there is no need for the Soviet Union to set up in any other country - Cuba- for example, the means it possesses for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow. The explosive power of our nuclear weapons is so great and the Soviet Union has such powerful missiles for delivering these nuclear war-heads that there is no need to seek sites for them somewhere beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union"¹⁸

This statement is intentionally misleading - implying that nuclear weapons would not be placed in Cuba because there is no "need" for them. The emphasis on TASS having "government authorisation" is designed to make it seem reliable and reassuring, when in fact that was exactly what it was not. Another statement which gives us insight into Soviet thinking is:

"The whole world knows that the United States of America has surrounded the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with its military bases.....set out along the frontiers of the Soviet Union - in Turkey, Iran, Greece, Italy, Britain, the

Netherlands, Pakistan and other countries."19

Then there is a demand for "Equal rights and equal opportunities must be recognised for all countries of the world". This plea for equal rights, linked to the emphasis on US military bases abroad, seems to provide a theoretical justification for the Soviet Union to turn Cuba into just such a base. J. F. Kennedy seems to have been at least partly aware of these implications, and on the 13th of September he warns that:

"If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or to interfere with our security in any way....or if Cuba should ever..... become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."20

In retrospect many hints concerning the true situation in Cuba at this time can be distinguished, but they were presented in such an ingenious manner that they were almost inconspicuous in the deluge of Soviet rhetoric.

The latter part of September was considerably quieter, partly perhaps in anticipation of what was to come. There were some happenings of interest - on the 18th an article in Pravda defended the Soviet decision to abolish the office of commandant of the Soviet garrison in Berlin, while on the same day, a new session of the UN General Assembly opened. Even Gromyko's speech there was moderate in tone. One of the reasons for this inaction again lay in the internal situation. There was an enlarged Presidium meeting which took place from the 17th to 22nd of September. From the 24th onwards, Brezhnev's visit to

Yugoslavia also concentrated Soviet attention slightly nearer to home. Further signs of an internal power battle was manifested with the publishing of a "new" Leninist document found and published in Pravda on the 28th, departing significantly from some of Lenin's earlier works, and bearing a coincidental resemblance to Khrushchev's own line of thought, with emphasis on the "production principle" for example. That there was some form of vigorous struggle at this time can be seen in the literary world, where there is criticism of "Silence" in Oktybr and Zvezda while at the same time it is vigorously defended in Izvestia. During this period both the Soviet Union and America seem to be absorbed in their own domestic problems, the United States little guessing that this was just the lull before the storm.

* Yu Bondarev (see Izvestia 28 th October.)

By the beginning of October, Soviet pressure and activity were again becoming more perceptible in different areas of the world. Press speculation continued to thrive on reports of a possible meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev. On 1st of October, Stewart L. Udall the American Secretary of the Interior, reported that Khrushchev wanted to invite President Kennedy and his wife to visit the USSR. By the 3rd of October however it became known that Khrushchev had since rejected this idea, saying that the U2 incident was too fresh in the minds of the Soviet people for such a visit to be practicable. This mention of the U2 seems a mere pretext, as surely it was applicable too, when the original suggestion was made two days earlier. It seems more likely that Khrushchev floated the idea in order to gauge the reaction to it, not from the Americans but from his more conservative-minded colleagues. If so, their response must have been overwhelmingly negative for him to change his mind so quickly. It could also be argued that Khrushchev came to think the better of his offer, because of the uncertain nature of events over the next few months. This incident gives another indication of there being contradictory forces at work amongst the Soviet leadership, and the pressure on Khrushchev's leadership.

The talks between Gromyko and Rusk over Berlin continued, but seemed to get nowhere. In East Germany Ulbricht repeated his desire for urgent action over Berlin, while on the border itself East German border guards refused to let ambulance men aid an injured man. Once more the situation regarding Berlin should be seen in terms of Eastern Europe as a whole, and in relation to the Sino-Soviet rivalry. It is significant at this time when Brezhnev was visiting Yugoslavia,

Soviet-Yugoslav relations had taken a turn for the better. This was seen by the Chinese as antagonistic, especially as the Chinese already resented what they considered to be a lack of economic aid, and deviant Soviet economic and political policies. The fact that the Chinese were so eager to increase their influence in Eastern Europe made it all the more vital for the Soviets to consolidate their own power there, and to settle the most destabilising and damaging problem there, ie Berlin.

In Eastern Europe the diversity within the communist "monolith" was being manifested more clearly as a political polarisation over the German issue emerged. Gomulka, the Polish Communist Party Chairman was to visit Ulbricht the next week. Unlike the previous year the Polish harvest was not so good, and there was less food to send to East Germany to alleviate the effect of critical food shortages. Gomulka was expected to advise Ulbricht to be less impatient over a German settlement. Tito was also showing signs of having fundamental differences with Ulbricht, as he wasn't in favour of the signing of a separate German peace-treaty. The Soviet leadership must have been aware for a long time of the dangers of a major split developing in Eastern Europe, and decided to take action accordingly. It was no coincidence that Warsaw Pact military manœuvres were just being concluded at this time, and indeed there were rumours that this was a preliminary step before an outright Soviet military assault on West Berlin.

While Berlin was still the chief focus of attention for the United States, the build-up of Soviet forces in Cuba was also attracting attention, and by the 3rd of October the American government had

decided to take unilateral action against American, Allied or neutral ships transporting arms to Cuba, by closing American ports to such ships. By the 9th of October, Kennedy had authorised U2 surveillance of Cuban territory. While the Americans had a keen interest in what was going on, their policies were moderated at this time by the fact that 1,000 Cuban exiles, being held prisoner since the Bay of Pigs invasion, were on the verge of being released.

During the second week in October, all kinds of unusual statements and odd happenings increased fears that some major move by the communist bloc was imminent. A major Soviet press campaign concerning Berlin began, with Krasnaya Zvezda being particularly vehement. Seymour Topping, a journalist for The New York Times commented:

"some Western diplomats here believe this campaign will culminate in November with the appearance of Premier Khrushchev before the General Assembly of the United Nations. He would apparently seek support for a Berlin solution on Communist terms."21

Thus observers at this time felt that the situation was deteriorating, and that Khrushchev was going to use the opportunity of a UN platform to make new demands over Berlin, and to gain support by wooing nonaligned nations. In other parts of the world while foreign troops had left Laos as part of the recent agreement, in the Congo discussions were still continuing, and Chinese proposals for talks with India had been rejected.

American attention was again directed towards Cuba, in particular to the remarks of Fidel Castro. On the 7th of October, the Cuban President said that Cuba had weapons to defend herself with, but

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preferred not to use them, while on the 10th he claimed that he had "special support" from the USSR. In Pravda on the 11th, these remarks were censored. Tension escalated when a Cuban exile group based on the Florida coast, Alpha 66 said that it had raided Cuba on Monday the 10th, killing 20 Cubans. On the 12th, Senator Keating made the dramatic assertion that he had received information that six missile launching sites had been built in Cuba. In the already tense atmosphere, this statement was explosive, even if there seemed to be no available evidence to confirm these allegations. It wasn't long before the President was confronted with absolute proof, as on the Monday evening of the 15th of October, photographs from Sunday's reconnaissance flight over Cuba revealed the presence of Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. When J. F. Kennedy was informed he gathered together a group of senior politicians and officials, later known as the Excomm, to decide upon the most appropriate form of response. This secret committee met for a week, before Kennedy made the discovery of the weapons public on Monday the 22nd of October. During this week, it would be worthwhile to examine the nature of Soviet foreign policy.

On the 15th of October, a report by Thomas J Hamilton in the New York Times, said that a Soviet UN official, with Khrushchev's authorisation, had said that if America would ease its stand on Berlin, then the Soviet Union would change its policy towards Cuba. The next day, in an interview with the new American Ambassador F. D. Kohler, Khrushchev is reported to have made a sharp reference to the American military bases in Turkey and Italy. Tension remained around Berlin itself, and Adenauer brought forward his visit to Kennedy in Washington to the 7th of January, so as to be ready for any Soviet

action after then. Khrushchev continued to make a determined attempt to settle the Berlin question, and a direct meeting was set up between Gromyko and Kennedy for Thursday the 18th.

The events described above are worth dwelling on. At the UN there was talk of a Cuba-Berlin deal, while Khrushchev himself seemed concerned with Turkish and Italian bases. In an article on the 18th of October in Izvestia, N. Polianov wrote a strong piece criticising the idea of a Berlin/Cuba deal, and saying that this rumour was created by the United States to increase Cuban influence in the Soviet Union. It seems strange for Izvestia to be so critical of an idea that Khrushchev was said to favour only two days before. On the same day Khrushchev said he might put the Berlin question before the UN, while in his talks with Kennedy, his foreign minister Gromyko took a tough uncompromising line. How can all these conflicting policy statements be explained?

One theory is that there were two different factions at work within the Soviet government, one being more ambitious than the other. In this case it appears that one group favoured a deal involving Cuba, another being more concerned with Italian and Turkish bases and with Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry staff being the most conservative of all of them, unwilling to pursue adventurous policies with possibly unpredictable results. One way of explaining Gromyko's impassive facade at his meeting with Kennedy on the 18th, incredible as it seems, is that perhaps he wasn't aware that the missiles were actually being placed in Cuba. It is well-known that Khrushchev was quite happy to bypass the Foreign Ministry when it suited him. Certainly as we shall see, other senior figures in the diplomatic service were

oblivious to the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba. This possibility will be dealt with in greater detail at a later stage. Another theory relates more to Khrushchev's methodology. It is quite likely that Khrushchev intended to present the question of Berlin to the UN only when he was in an advantageous position to do so. As Ambassador Dobrynin told Sorensen earlier:

"Nothing will be undertaken before the American Congressional elections that could complicate the international situation or aggravate the tension in the relations between our two countries... This includes a German peace settlement and West Berlin... If the necessity arises for (the Chairman to address the United Nations), this would be possible only in the second half of November. The Chairman does not wish to become involved in your internal political affairs."22

ie the Soviet Union sought to tell the American government about the missiles in Cuba, but only when it was convenient for it, ie when the missiles were safely installed and operational. It might have been planned that the information would be made known only to the American government, and that a secret deal would be made. If the Americans were to unexpectedly make important concessions at the UN in response to a speech by Khrushchev, this would have the effect of greatly enhancing the personal prestige of Khrushchev himself, as well as the Soviet Union. Hence the concept of a deal of this type would be very much an unofficial one as yet, and perhaps the Soviet UN official involved acted prematurely.

For a major breakthrough to take place for the Soviet Union in the UN, the Soviet Union would also have wanted the support of many of the

non-aligned nations, and this might help explain the line taken in Polianov's article. This article didn't just criticise the concept of a Berlin/Cuba trade, but gave as a reason that this had been made up by the Americans to give Castro greater influence amongst the Soviet leadership. Thus the author was in fact trying to put pressure on Castro, to remind him of his true position and to warn him against excessive ambition. What was Castro doing to merit such a warning? Castro at this time was seeking allies amongst under-developed nations such as with Ben Bella of Algeria. If Castro was successful in his manoeuvring, he could have attempted to lead a revolt against the Soviet Union at the UN. When the agreement between the Soviet and Cuban government was made to put missiles into Cuba. it is unlikely that Khrushchev explained to Castro some of the possible strategic and diplomatic purposes they might serve. While this is mere speculation, if Castro had come to realise the Soviet government's true intentions, this would explain his desire to stir things up, and to threaten the plans of the Soviet Union. Afterall it wasn't in Castro's interest that the missiles be taken out of Cuba as quickly as they went in. Then the world would see that the Soviet government had been exploiting Cuba for her own political ends. Castro's ill-considered remarks about a new type of weapons in Cuba must have prompted the Soviet Union to take action, to warn him against further exploits. The Polianov article could have been Khrushchev's way of calling Castro to heel and reassuring him that a Berlin/Cuban deal was not an option for the Soviet government. The Soviet leadership must have been treading a fine line between placating the Germans with the idea of an agreement over Berlin soon, satisfying Cuban demands for aid, keeping Chinese

influence at bay and dropping hints to the American government of a possible deal over Cuba without making its nature public.

Here we come to another set of intriguing questions. One of the reasons that the American government was taken by surprise by the Soviet missiles in Cuba, was not just that there was no precedent for such an action, but that on a more practical level the installation of SAM ground to air missiles was not yet complete. It would seem logical that before taking such a dangerous step of installing nuclear weapons the Soviet government would wait until the ground-to-air missile system was installed and fully operational, providing protective air-cover over Cuba and allowing the construction of the missile sites to proceed undetected. Why did the Soviet government not pursue this seemingly sensible policy? There are many reasons for this - firstly even if military construction had been co-ordinated in such a sequence, the appearance of ground-to-air missile sites in themselves would have attracted American suspicions. If the Americans had persisted in sending U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba, the Soviet leadership would still have been reluctant to take action against it by shooting it down. Other factors also seemed to be at work in favour of the Soviet government. In the article in Time "Khrushchev's Secret Tapes", Khrushchev says:

"Our security organs assured us this was possible even though American planes overflew Cuban territory all the time.

Supposedly, the palm trees would keep our missiles from being seen from the air. "23

Whether he actually believed this or not is another matter - it doesn't sound very credible. It is true however that in the Caribbean

in the autumn, hurricanes were a prevalent characteristic, which at the very least would have brought continual delays and disruptions in American aerial surveillance. These interruptions would have limited the comprehensive nature of reconnaissance, and this combined with the unexpectedly fast installation time of the missile systems, must have provided the Soviet government with reason for hope. A. Schlesinger comments about Khrushchev in the following way:

"He had an advantage unknown to us: Soviet engineering had enormously reduced the time required for the erection of nuclear missile sites."²⁴

The Soviets also seemed to believe that even if the American government detected the missile sites, that it would not make the information public till after the Congressional elections, so as not to risk damaging its public image and losing votes. This line of Soviet reasoning would seem to indicate a complete lack of comprehension of the workings of the American political system, and needs further investigation. It is interesting to speculate on whether this interpretation of American policies was a subconscious reflection of Soviet governmental priorities in decision making, ie that domestic policies were prevalent over foreign policy considerations.

In order to probe more deeply into the professed unity of mind in the Soviet government's attitudes and policies, an investigation will be carried out into the pattern of policy developments in the Soviet Union during the week of the Cuban missile crisis.

On the weekend of the 20th-21st of October, there were already many significant events taking place, such as the Chinese launching of a massive "defensive" action on the Ladakh and North-East border of

India. The sheer scale of the attack would indicate that it must have been planned by the Chinese government for a considerable period in advance. While an article in People's Daily, November 2nd 1963, stated that the Chinese had informed the Soviet government of their intentions a week before the invasion, this was not borne out by the subsequent reactions of the Soviet government. The Soviet leadership and press seemed bewildered as to how to respond. They were embarrassed by the aggressive Chinese action, especially because the Soviets had spent so much effort in establishing good economic relations with the Indian government, and were reluctant to cause increased dissension within the Indian Communist Party. Hence the Soviet government was in a very delicate situation - the Chinese expected their backing, being a fraternal Communist power, while the Indian government were looking to them to put pressure on the Chinese to retreat. Over the weekend, the military situation being unclear, the Soviets tried to adopt an ambiguous position, but it must have been obvious that a decision would have to be forthcoming at some stage. This must have been a time of sharp debate within the Kremlin.

On the Sunday, Pravda published Yevtushenko's Stalin's Heirs pointing out that:

"He left many heirs on the face of the globe"

and asking:

"....How to root Stalin

out of Stalin's heirs?"²⁵

and Komsomolskaya Pravda published Yevtushenko's Fears. The publication of both these pieces would seem to show that a less hard-line faction was predominant. Talks continued between the Soviet

Union and the United States over Berlin, and there were more rumours of a Khrushchev-Kennedy summit. It is interesting to note that it was on Monday the 22nd of October that Penkovsky was arrested. On the same day, TASS was referring speculatively to secret American meetings taking place at the White House, and by six o'clock that day Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin was summoned to meet Secretary of State Rusk. Rusk showed Dobrynin photographs taken by American U2's, saying that the installation of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba was intolerable and that a quarantine would be placed around the island until they were removed. At 7pm that same day, Kennedy made a television broadcast making the discovery of these weapons known to the world. (NB the term "quarantine" was chosen in preference to "blockade" because it was seen as a milder measure, blockade under international law, constituting an act of war.)

The reaction to Kennedy's speech in the USSR was mixed, revealing a whole spectrum of differing opinion. Soviet

"diplomats across the world were displaying all the symptoms of improvisation; as if they had been told nothing of the placement of the missiles and had received no instructions what to say about them. Ambassador Dobrynin himself gave every indication of ignorance and confusion. As late as Wednesday a message to Robert Kennedy from Mikoyan repeated that Cuba was receiving no weapons capable of reaching the United States. Georgi Bolshakov, who transmitted the message and who had seemed to us all an honest fellow, assured the Attorney-General that he believed this himself"²⁶

Confirmation of this perception by Schlesinger was given in a recent

article in Soviet Weekly by G. Bolshakov himself. He says that evidence of the missile sites in Cuba "came like a bolt from the blue" and that:

"We Soviet diplomats in Washington found ourselves in a very awkward position. Information was withheld not only from "them" but from "us" 27

This lack of basic knowledge by key members of the Soviet diplomatic personnel, seems to be reflected throughout the Soviet press also. On Tuesday the 23rd of October, while the American action was seen as piracy, no threat of Soviet counter-action or attack was made. A Moscow radio broadcast said that the photographs were fake, and completely dismissed the American charges. The Defence Minister Malinkovsky put Soviet military forces on alert, and hinted at doing some type of Cuban/Turkey missile deal, which surely by implication acknowledged that there were Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuba, although this was not admitted officially. At the UN in a debate, A. Stevenson lodged a demand for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, and the Soviet representative V. A. Zorin failed to respond except to denounce the blockade. Therefore while the Soviet press and the UN Ambassador denied the existence of the weapons, the Defence Minister was more adventurous, seeking a missile trade with the West. Thus there was a lack of coherence or co-ordination in the Soviet Union's initial responses, which would indicate that the Soviet leadership were completely wrong-footed by the sudden American public statement, while at lower levels Soviet officials were totally ignorant of what was going on. The week of deliberation by the Excomm seemed to have borne fruit, as the idea of imposing a quarantine was a carefully

thought out compromise measure which left the Soviet government with no obvious course of action to adopt in response.

On the Tuesday of that same week, the Soviet Foreign Minister A. Gromyko was scheduled to make a speech at Humbolt University in East Berlin. Now as we have seen, one of the Soviet government's chief motivations in placing weapons in Cuba was to gain some form of advantage in the Berlin dispute. Thus a militant and defiant speech would be expected by the conservative hardliner Gromyko. This however was not the case. In his speech Gromyko didn't use the Cuban situation to put pressure on the West, in fact amazingly enough he didn't mention Cuba at all. Why did he fail to exploit this opportunity? To a certain extent this was because the Soviet government were caught off-guard by Kennedy's speech and was reluctant to take precipitate action. Although Gromyko had a reputation for toughness in negotiation, he was not one to take rash or hasty action, and at this time the Soviet government must have found it very difficult to decide upon a course of action which would not result in an escalation of the situation. Even Khrushchev himself didn't make an official response until 5pm on Tuesday. In this speech Khrushchev didn't acknowledge the existence of the weapons, and said that the Soviet Union wouldn't accept the American blockade and that there could be catastrophic consequences for America if she attempted to enforce it. This picture of confusion and indecisiveness was reinforced by an encounter between R. Kennedy and Dobrynin at 9.30pm on Tuesday evening. Dobrynin was described as: "very shaken, out of the picture and unaware of any instructions"²⁸ When questioned:

"Dobrynin's only answer was that he told me there were no

missiles in Cuba; that this was what Khrushchev had said, and, as far as he knew, there were still no missiles in Cuba."²⁹ This, and the shaky non-committal answers from other Soviet delegations across the world, further corroborate that no clear instructions were issued from the Soviet government concerning the line to be taken on Cuba. This perhaps provides verification of Khrushchev's remark "Only a narrow circle of people knew about the plan"³⁰. Both Gromyko and his Foreign Ministry seemed unable to give any clear policy indication. This is in sharp contrast to Malinkovsky's rapid reactions, to place Soviet forces on alert and his remarks on Turkey. This would indicate that during this time of confusion the Foreign Ministry under Gromyko's instruction were prepared to wait or perhaps more likely were unaware of the true situation, while the army grabbed the opportunity to play as dominant a role as they dared.

By Wednesday morning, the military situation around Cuba had reached a critical point. 20 Soviet ships, 6 of which were tankers, were fast approaching the American imposed quarantine line shadowed by a Soviet submarine, and a US interception was expected between 10.30-11.00 am. The Soviet ships stopped dead in the water, but only at 10.32am, so that American nerves were tested to the utmost. Eventually 14 of the 20 Soviet ships turned back, although the tankers proceeded. At the last moment the Soviet leadership backed down, but only when actual military conflict seemed otherwise unavoidable.

Very often the Soviet Union is portrayed as being militant and unyielding in the Cuban affair. However there is another relevant perspective to their behaviour, as the Soviet government, like the American government, were very much aware of the dangers of

confrontation. This can be clearly seen, as on this day, Wednesday, there were five different approaches made by various Soviet representatives to seek peaceful negotiations. U Thant, the General Secretary of the United Nations, suggested that the USSR should suspend shipments to Cuba if the United States suspended its quarantine, and Khrushchev eagerly accepted this, welcoming the "proposal which meets the interest of peace"³¹. Kennedy rejected this plan because it would allow the continued construction of the existing missiles on the island to reach operational capacity. Bertrand Russell's telegram to Khrushchev received a similar reply, ie that the Soviet Union wanted to prevent war, and saying that:

"The question of war and peace is so vital that we should consider useful a top-level meeting in order to discuss all the problems which have arisen"³²

This Soviet desire for peace was also indirectly reflected in Pravda, in which it was said that Cuba desired negotiations over the situation. Yet the internal situation must have been very uneasy at this time, as even the existence of the missiles had not been admitted in the Soviet Union. That there was considerable time for peaceful negotiations and also much opposition, can be gauged from the types of channels used to indicate that the Soviet Union wanted peace. The American Ambassador Harriman phoned Schlesinger, saying that he felt that the Soviets and Khrushchev in particular wanted peace. Harriman felt that Khrushchev was under pressure to take a tough stance, and that the American government:

"must give him an out..... (to) downgrade the tough group in the Soviet Union which persuaded him to do this."³³

Another piece of information which shows a strong desire for a negotiated peace, is that Ivanov of the USSR Embassy in Britain asked Stephen Ward to use his influence to get the British government to invite Kennedy and Khrushchev to a summit meeting. This contact resulted in a column by Lord Arran in the Evening News. Some people have questioned whether these peaceful initiatives came from Khrushchev himself, but this seems to have been verified by other sources, eg the meeting between Khrushchev and William Knox, an American businessman on the Wednesday evening. While Khrushchev said that the Soviet subs would sink American ships if provoked, he also reassured the Americans that the Soviet missiles were under Soviet (and not Cuban) control, and that a summit meeting between the two powers was possible. Khrushchev was taking quite a considerable risk in saying this, even unofficially, as he hadn't admitted that there were Soviet missiles in Cuba previously. (In fact this didn't appear in the Soviet press till Saturday).

Despite these various proposals for negotiations, there remained considerable concern over other areas, especially Berlin. The Chinese invasion of India was seen by many German peoples as if it might be intended to coincide with a Soviet campaign of action against Berlin: The American government shared these European worries about the situation in Germany:

RFK
"We might expect that they will close down Berlin - make the final preparations for that."³⁴

It may seem at this point that there is a noticeable discrepancy between Soviet initiatives and Western perceptions of their actions. However while the Soviets seemed genuinely eager to hold negotiations,

the exact nature of these is open to speculation. It is quite possible that these were favoured by the Soviet leadership, just because a summit meeting was closer to the original plan envisaged and would seem surer ground. It did not mean that the Soviet leadership was willing to make any more concessions. This still seems to have been a time of disarray in the political sphere, with Pravda making a strong supportive case backing the Chinese in preference to the Indians. At the same time in Izvestia children outside the UN were described with the caption "let them live", and in Literaturnia Gazeta an article by SS Smirnov again emphasised the need for a peaceful settlement. These differences in the official line could be the result of differences with Castro also. It must have been quite likely that the Cuban government didn't want its newly acquired weapons to be bargained away, and hence didn't want negotiations. The Soviet campaign at this time lacked co-ordination and therefore credibility, as when at the UN Zorin stubbornly denied the presence of missiles in Cuba, even when the photographic truth was placed before him. That Khrushchev wasn't fully in control can be seen as when on the 25th the town of Khrushchev in Kirovgrad was renamed. As it appears that Khrushchev himself was the originator of many of the moves towards peace, the opposition must have been seeking more radical solutions - involving a deal over Cuba, possibly with regard to American bases in Turkey or Italy, or in relation to Berlin itself. It seems that when Kennedy made his dramatic speech on Monday the 22nd, Khrushchev realised his plans for producing his ace hand at a summit was no longer a possibility, and decided to cut his losses rather than risk escalation. Any hope of a swift, sudden military operation in East

Berlin was also curtailed. Other factions must have disagreed with this analysis and wanted to salvage as much as possible. Hence the disunity of the previous few days continued to manifest itself in Soviet policy making.

On Friday, despite an attack by Izvestia on progressives in India, the majority of the media were still anxious for peace. In the Pravda editorial, the need for a summit and a possible agreement of U Thant's proposals on Thursday regarding a voluntary suspension was acknowledged. Yet once again a harder line was seen in the military Krasnaya Zvezda, containing a very selective selection of Khrushchev's speech, and with the addition of the possibility of a Cuba/Turkey deal, as mentioned by Malinkovsky on Tuesday. At this point V. A. Zorin was saying at the UN:

"his government would not fall into the American "trap" of retaliatory action in Berlin."35

but asserting that the Soviet Union would negotiate over Cuba, if a UN inspection of Florida and Cuba could take place. Thus Zorin's conditions for negotiations seem to be slightly different from the rest of the Soviet politicians, taking a more demanding stance.

At 1.30pm on Friday, a Soviet Embassy official, Fomin phoned and arranged to meet with John Scali, an ABC News-correspondent, emphasising the need for a peaceful end to the dispute, and saying that the USSR would withdraw its missiles from Cuba if the United States lifted its quarantine and guaranteed no invasion of Cuba. This episode was the start of twenty four hours of the most confused and controversial period of the missile crisis.

At the meeting with Scali, Fomin was described as "haggard and alarmed" and his attitude that: "war seems about to break out. Something must be done to save the situation."³⁴ Fomin's bid for peace does seem to be a genuine attempt to avoid conflict, and to bring about a peaceful resolution to the Cuban dispute. The problem in interpreting this episode however, is trying to determine who Fomin was representing. To use such a lowly Soviet official for such a crucial communication does seem rather strange. R. Kennedy commented:

"why they selected this means of communication was not clear, but an unorthodox procedure of this kind was not unusual for the Soviet Union."³⁷

It is quite possible that Fomin was used in order to bypass official channels of communication, from which there could be such opposition. The approach must therefore have undermined the official Foreign Ministry line, which as we have seen tended to be primarily conservative in attitude and hard-line in policy. The exact source of the authorisation for the Fomin approach still needs further clarification.

Traditionally the Fomin-Scali meeting is associated with a letter from Khrushchev which reached the White House later that day at 6pm. 'Fomin presented a clearer version of this proposal'³⁸. Khrushchev's letter: This four part cable, was according to those who saw it, long and emotional, and contained;

(a) a promise to remove Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba under UN inspection and not to reintroduce them.

(b) this being conditional on an American promise to lift the quarantine and not to invade Cuba.

These proposals, very similar in nature to Fomin's, in essence were to form the terms of the final Soviet-American agreement. When this letter was received by the American government, they felt that a peaceful resolution of the dispute was in view.

The first sign of trouble came when Scali met again with Fomin at 7.30pm that same Friday evening. When Scali entered, hoping that a mutually acceptable solution had now been found, Fomin had changed his tune and was now making new demands - that not only should there be UN inspections of Soviet missiles in Cuba, but there should also be inspections made of US bases on the Florida coast. At this point, Scali reacted angrily, saying that the Soviets couldn't expect to play around any longer, and repeating Rusk's message on the urgency of the situation. It is interesting to note that V. A. Zorin at the UN made a similar proposal to U Thant, ie to negotiate over Cuba if UN inspections of both Cuba and Florida could take place. This would indicate that Fomin's approach was not just a one-off, but was part of a carefully co-ordinated scheme.

Yet between 1.30 and 7.30 pm Fomin's instructions had changed dramatically. How can this be explained?

There are various different possibilities. One is that it was Khrushchev who, realising how dangerously the situation was developing, used Fomin as a way of contacting the US government, and assuring them of his commitment to a peaceful negotiated solution. Michel Tatu, correspondent of Le Monde, argues that Khrushchev had to use this indirect form of communication because although he personally favoured reconciliation, he was outnumbered by his colleagues in the Presidium. This would explain the change in Fomin's attitude, as it

could have been when the unofficial "offer" was put before the Presidium that a sterner amendment was made. However why did Khrushchev not wait until the second meeting, to learn if the deal was acceptable to the Americans, before putting his offer in the form of an official telegram?

Another recent theory, that of J. L. Scherer, is worthy of consideration. He controversially asserts that Khrushchev was the most aggressive amongst the Soviet leaders over Cuba. He argues that the letter of Friday the 26th was ambiguous, and that while Khrushchev said he would withdraw the missiles in return for a non-invasion pledge, he didn't say that the USSR would withdraw its weapons first or even simultaneously. Thus Scherer argues that it was Khrushchev who was the hardliner. The Fomin approach to Scali is seen by Scherer not as an attempt by Khrushchev to gain peace, but as an effort by a beleaguered opposition, worried about the what later would be described as: "wild schemes, half-baked conclusions and hasty decisions and actions"⁶⁶ of Khrushchev, to save the situation. This would then explain why Fomin was used, rather than Bolshakov or Dobrynin.

This argument which challenges the traditional interpretation of events, has some attractive qualities, as it helps explain some of the events, especially why Fomin was used in an ambassadorial role. However it doesn't seem in harmony with Khrushchev's other statements, eg to William Knox on the Wednesday, when he assured him that the missiles were under Soviet control, nor with the fact that the military in particular, as we have seen, consistently took a harsher line towards the American government than Khrushchev, which would seem

to indicate that if Khrushchev was under any pressure it was to be more bold. The fact that by late Friday evening the missiles in Cuba were almost operational must also have strengthened the position of the military in the Presidium. This could explain the change in Fomin's attitude between 1.30 and 7.30 pm. Another reason for increased Soviet expectations would be the article by Walter Lippmann in the Washington Post on Thursday the 25th, talking of the possibility of trading US weapons in Turkey for Soviet weapons in Cuba. Thus there are reasons to explain why Khrushchev, if it was he who sent Fomin, would have adopted a harsher line late on Friday. This would therefore seem the most probable explanation. A way of investigating this further in the future would be to establish the role of the KGB in this dispute, as whoever had most influence over them, might have favoured the use of Fomin. It is here where recently published materials show their worth, as Sergei Khrushchev quite clearly implicates Semichastny, head of the KGB, in the plot against his father. However this still does not provide conclusive evidence. While the happenings of Friday the 26th are puzzling enough, the series of events that followed on Saturday the 27th of October are even more intricate and confused. One of the first events that the American Excomm was faced with was that one of their U2's had been shot down over Cuba and the pilot Major R. Anderson Jr was killed. This obviously raised the political tension considerably, and could perhaps be indicative of an impatience on Castro's part, hoping that the Soviet Union would not soften, but would get the best deal possible for Cuba. While this is supposition, it serves to remind us that there must have been enormous pressure on the Soviet leadership from Castro at this

time. The next development to take place, was the publication of an article in the normally peaceable Izvestia, by a correspondent called Matveev, who called for the withdrawal of all American and Allied troops from foreign bases, and saying that a Cuban-Turkey deal was "cynical bargaining". For such a radical article to be published at such a crucial moment, it must have had quite a high authorisation, yet who? On that same day, in Kraznaya Zvezda, Al. Leontyev launched another attack on American aggression, the army again demonstrating its militancy.

The next surprise for the Americans, before they had had a chance to respond to the first Soviet telegram was another Soviet letter, this time adopting a stiffer position - that the Soviets would withdraw their missiles from Cuba only if the Americans withdrew their Jupiter missiles from Turkey. This new demand, from what seemed a weaker Soviet position, surprised and shocked the Americans, who felt that the Soviets had now upped the stakes. Why did the Soviet leadership if they were so concerned about a peaceful settlement, at the last moment antagonise the situation and jeopardise prospects for agreement?

Firstly as mentioned before, the article by W Lippmann could have swayed the situation, as the Soviet government are inclined to view such press articles as having governmental backing. (This concept has interesting ramifications, as it means that the Soviet government could well use its own press to make its attitude known indirectly to foreign governments.) Another possible influence that the Trachtenberg theory suggests is that when the Soviet government became aware of secret American activity at the UN re the possibility of trading missiles, they decided to respond to this, thinking that such a deal

was on offer. Another idea is that it was Cuban, Chinese and Eastern European pressure on the Soviet government which had made them seek a more "honourable settlement".

The nature of the letter itself needs to be taken into consideration, as this could provide clues to its authorship. The letter, which has not been published, has been described by R. Kennedy as: "very formal.....it was obviously no longer Mr Khrushchev himself who was writing, but the Foreign Office of the Kremlin."⁴⁰ It would seem at face value that Khrushchev had hardened his position, perhaps under pressure from the military or from hard-liners in the Presidium - Kozlov, Mikoyan etc. In this case, Khrushchev was perhaps compromising between those content to get the missiles out of Cuba and restore peace, and those who wanted American troops to leave all overseas bases.

Pachter explains the two official Soviet letters, by arguing that the second letter was in fact written first, ie on the Thursday, but that it was not released till Saturday, but it seems very unlikely and rather contrived. Scherer suggests that the second letter was in fact written by a committee and not Khrushchev himself, and that it contained the Presidium's way of appeasing Khrushchev's adventurous intentions, and reconciling them with the idea of a reasonable compromise. There seems little tangible proof to support this, it seeming unlikely that the Presidium would have acted in such an independent manner. This interpretation of Khrushchev's position also fails to correspond to the statements made personally by him during the crisis, and thus doesn't seem credible.

On the afternoon of Saturday the 27th, Fomin met Scali once more. At

this meeting, Fomin is described as "puzzled and unhappy", and explained the stiffening in attitude of the Soviet leadership as being because: "the Saturday morning cable had been drafted before his report on the favourable American reaction had arrived."⁴¹ Yet if the Soviet authorities had been concerned about the American response, surely they would have waited. In fact the concept of the Soviet leadership collectively deciding on the "compromise" solution of a Turkey/Cuban swap is actually more likely than it initially seems. Firstly it was a way of placating the military, of gaining a reduction of hostile overseas military bases and providing some compensation for the loss of the missile bases in Cuba. Secondly it was designed to appeal to the moderates also, as there had been many unofficial American indications that such a deal was a real possibility. Thus Khrushchev would have had many good reasons to suppose that such a proposal would have had a strong chance of success, and of obtaining a favourable response. This, as demonstrated by later events was quite a reasonable assumption. In the 7.45 meeting between Dobrynin and R. Kennedy, even though R. Kennedy was insisting that dismantling of the missiles must start the next day, Dobrynin still mentioned Turkey. In fact an unofficial agreement was made between the two, Robert Kennedy confirming that American military bases in Turkey and Italy would be removed at some time in the near future, although it would never be officially acknowledged as being decided at this time. Thus the Soviet leadership must have felt that they had gained something out of this crisis, being unaware that the Americans were about to remove them soon anyway. By nine o'clock the next morning, Washington received

confirmation that the Soviet leadership had accepted the American proposals

Even after Khrushchev's official acceptance of the American proposals, ie that the Soviet Union would remove the weapons from Cuba, if the government of the United States would abandon its quarantine and give assurances that it would not invade Cuba, things were not clear cut. Chinese disapproval of Soviet capitulation was soon manifested. Despite many articles in Pravda and Izvestia approving Khrushchev's actions, there were signs that Khrushchev was under severe pressure. American newspaper reports of 30th and 31st of October respectively said:

"Premier Khrushchev was represented as labouring to defend his "peaceful co-existence" policy towards the West against a radical or a "Chinese" wing within his government."42

and:

"The probability is that Mr Khrushchev's personal future now depends on the attitude of the Soviet army.....The Soviet Premier is under serious attack from the communist right, a mixture of activites, extremists, Stalinists and Sinophils."43

A strong attack on Khrushchev published in Unen, the Mongolian Communist Party paper, was republished in Pravda on the 1st of November, obviously with the approval of someone in a position of power. It wasn't till the 8th of November that Malinkovsky spoke in favour of Khrushchev's policy over Cuba, and it was at this time also

when Kosygin lost some of his power. This would indicate that Khrushchev was beginning to strengthen his position

This was a troubled time in Soviet-Cuban relations, with Castro obstructing UN supervision of the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. Even when Mikoyan was sent there at the beginning of November, he couldn't persuade him to allow the UN their agreed role re inspection procedure. In the months to come, Castro, under Peking's umbrella was increasingly critical of Soviet policy, and their foreign policy, eg by saying that they were not giving sufficient assistance to Vietnam. Thus in the aftermath of the actual Cuban crisis itself, many previous trends are confirmed, problems in relations between Khrushchev, the military and hard-line factions, who perhaps had Chinese sympathies or connections, and difficulties in Soviet-Cuban relations.

SECTION 3. ANALYSIS.

From the information examined, quite a few conclusions can be offered concerning Soviet foreign policy. Firstly, the effect of the Sino-Soviet split on the Cuban missile crisis is much greater than is conventionally thought. Brzezinski puts it well:

"It is difficult to exaggerate the historical significance of the Sino-Soviet conflict. It has influenced every facet of international life, not to speak of the Soviet bloc itself. No analysis of the relationship between Washington and Moscow, of the pattern of nuclear proliferation, of the orientation of Indian nationalism, of the thrust of revolutionary movements in the Third World would be complete without taking into account

the impact of the increasingly bitter dispute between the two seemingly close allies."44

It was in the years 1961-2 that the Soviet Union experienced "perhaps the very high point in Soviet global optimism"45, and the deterioration in Soviet expectations after October 1962, was not so much because of damaged prestige after the withdrawal of the missiles, but because of the growing recognition of polycentralism in the world. As has been seen, Chinese influence in Eastern Europe, in Albania, but also in Hungary, was one of the key motivations for the Soviet Union to settle the Berlin question and to demonstrate Soviet power anew, and this must have been a strong contributory factor to the decision to place the missiles in Cuba. It was largely as a reaction to the missile crisis that the nuclear Test-ban Treaty was signed in 1963, and this was looked upon with disgust by the Chinese:

"In signing the nuclear Test-ban Treaty in mid 1963, Khrushchev completed his betrayal by entering into a new "Holy alliance" with Kennedy, Nehru and Tito."46

In many ways the Cuban crisis was a catalyst for the increased worldwide perception of the fragmentation of Communist monolith and decline in Soviet influence.

The decision to put Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, was almost definitely taken in April 1962 by Khrushchev, who planned to inform the Americans of the missiles there in November. At this time, at a summit or a UN meeting, Khrushchev hoped to gain concessions over Berlin, in order to reunite Eastern Europe, and to spectacularly demonstrate his dexterity and skill in foreign diplomacy. In a congruent domestic policy position, he would then use his newfound

prestige and power to gain approval for new economic policies to be passed at the November plenum. This theory is corroborated by the Soviet leadership's confusion and unpreparedness at the early discovery of the missiles, and the initial desire to have a summit meeting to resolve the matter.

The other major theme that has kept recurring throughout this period, is the degree of dissension amongst Soviet policy makers. During the missile crisis itself, the military, eg Malinkovsky can clearly be seen to take a more aggressive stance, but there is disunity even amongst the Presidium itself, as is reflected by some of the attacks on Khrushchev in the press. There seems to be major differences between the Presidium and the Foreign Ministry, with key diplomatic personnel, perhaps even Gromyko himself, being unaware of essential facets of Soviet foreign policy, eg the existence of missiles in Cuba. Certainly as has been previously mentioned in the article "Khrushchev's secret tapes" in Time magazine he says: " Only a narrow circle of people knew about the plan".⁴⁷ This could indicate a major breakdown of communication in the governmental structure of the USSR, when so many informal contacts and approaches between countries are used to decide key issues. This ties in with the other areas already examined, ie to what extent there were differences in the Foreign Ministry and Soviet leadership, the role of the Soviet press, which seems to reflect different viewpoints, Izvestia and Literaturnaya Gazeta being more conciliatory in foreign policy, Pravda and Kraznaya Zvezda taking a stronger more aggressive line. This all serves to confirm the vulnerability of Khrushchev's position.

CHAPTER SIX.

1. New York Times, 13th of January 1962, p.2
2. NYT, 9th of January 1962, p.2
3. NYT, 29th of January 1962, p.8
4. COSP Vol XIV, No 18, 1962, p.12
5. COSP Vol XIV, No 17, 1962, p.19
6. NYT Editorial, 26th April 1962, p.4
7. M. Tatu, p.238
8. Izvestia 28th February 1989.
9. NYT Editorial 4th of June 1962, p.4
10. NYT 27th of June 1962, p.1
11. M. Tatu, p.235.
12. M. Tatu, p.230
13. Ibid p.231
14. Ibid p.232
15. NYT Editorial, 23rd of August 1962, p6
16. R. Kennedy, p.30
17. "Pravda" 5th of September 1962. COSP
18. Tass Statement of 11th September 1962. Dinerstein, H p197
19. Tass Statement of 11th September 1962, COSP Vol XIV, No 37 p13 1962
20. M. Tatu, p.242
21. NYT, 8th October 1962, p.1
22. T. C. Sorensen, Kennedy p.667
23. Time, October 1st 1990, p.77
24. A. Schlesinger, p.684
25. Yevtushenko's "Stalin's Heirs", Pravda 21st October 1962, p.4
26. A. Schlesinger, p.701
27. G. Bolshakov, Soviet Weekly. 18th March 1989, p.10
28. A. Schlesinger,
29. R. Kennedy, p.67
30. Time October 1st 1990, p.77
31. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Ed Larsov, D L p.131
32. Ibid., p.127
33. A. Schlesinger, p.702
34. R. Kennedy, R. p.73
35. A. Schlesinger, A. p.704
36. Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behaviour: the emerging new context for US Diplomacy - a study prepared by the Senior Specialist Division. Congressional Research Service. (Washington 1979), p.344
37. R. Kennedy, p.91
38. "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Introduction to the Excomm Transcripts" International Security, Vol 32, No 3, 1987. p.8
39. Pravda Editorial, 17th October 1964
40. R. Kennedy, p.91
41. R. Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of J F Kennedy. (New York 1967), p.222
42. NYT 30th October 1962, p4
43. NYT 31st October 1962, p4
44. Brzezinski, I p.397
45. Ibid p.413
46. Stein. p158

CONCLUSION.

In this thesis, an examination has been made of various aspects of policy and practice of the Soviet government during the period 1961-2. The powers and limitations of Khrushchev's leadership have been analysed to reveal as much as can be discerned from the existing material available. Two major areas have been examined in this work, that of domestic and foreign policy, and the conclusions reached from these studies will now be outlined.

In the domestic sphere, the use of database techniques on the recorded speeches of the delegates of the 22nd Party Congress has revealed that the amount of disharmony between delegates has been greater than perhaps had been previously suspected. With the relaxation of political controls under Khrushchev's leadership, much discontent came to the surface. Frustration amongst farmers and administrators about inefficiencies in the agricultural system, and criticism from the intelligentsia were common. Khrushchev's desire to get away from the more Stalinistic interpretation of Marxist-Leninism antagonised many groups who felt their own position to be threatened by it - especially amongst the military, the nomenklatura, the diplomats etc. It's interesting that at the 22nd Congress, it comes out that it's admitted that the campaign against the anti-party group is not just about setting the historical records straight, but about dealing with a still active group of politicians whose policies clash in a basic way with the policies of Khrushchev. This is shown by the references to Molotov's letter at the Congress, which seems to spark

the whole anti-party group campaign off. Khrushchev did achieve some notable victories - the new Party Programme did represent a Khrushchevian ideological stance, and the influence of Stalinism on society was admitted as a more tangible and pervasive phenomena than it was ever publically admitted before. The removal of Stalin's body from the Mausoleum at the end of the Congress is often seen as epitomising Khrushchev's achievement. In many ways this is true, but it is also double edged. As we have seen this decision was not reached by the Presidium or Central Committee, but by an open vote at the Congress. If it had been an official governmental decision it is likely that it would not have been passed. Despite the impressive and dramatic finale, Khrushchev didn't get his way even in retaining some of his closest allies in governmental office, and overall his powerbase was being eroded. As we have seen, men such as Kozlov, Suslov, Brezhnev etc were already putting pressure on Khrushchev and were forming the basis of a strong group opposing the implementation of Khrushchev's ideas. Thus even at this early point, there were signs of strain and weakness in Khrushchev's leadership position.

In terms of foreign policy, this thesis concentrated on two particular aspects, that of Soviet policy towards Berlin and Cuba. In the case of Berlin, it comes over very strongly that Soviet actions were very much out of Khrushchev's hands, being dictated largely by circumstances. The need to stem the thousands of refugees who were leaving East Germany through the East Berlin/ West Berlin border, and to prevent the economic and perhaps political collapse of East Germany. In this instance, practicalities won over ideology in a way

which actually prevented the more militant long-term action which Khrushchev threatened in the form of an imposed German Peace-Treaty. Khrushchev gained much from this situation, as in sealing the East Berlin/ West Berlin border he prevented a serious threat to the East German government, as well as posing a threat to the West which they found difficult to react to with any substance. As well as Chinese pressure on Khrushchev to act, there was a great deal of behind the scenes pressure from Ulbricht to try and force Khrushchev's hand. In this way Khrushchev's position was largely reactive, with him trying to moderate Ulbricht's demands yet to use the opportunity to enhance his own position at home and in the communist world movement.

In the Cuban situation it is much more difficult to assess Khrushchev's role. The information available, from sources both old and new, regarding the Soviet position often seems confused and contradictory. The time leading up to the actual crisis itself has therefore been looked at in some detail in order to try and bring a new understanding of Khrushchev's role in events.

From the information available, it looks as if Khrushchev initiated the placing of missiles in Cuba to bolster his own prestige, his intended outcome being a quiet Soviet disclosure of the existence of the missiles in the UN summit in November. This would then be used as a lever in order to gain a German Peace-Treaty, and perhaps the removal of American nuclear bases in Turkey and Italy. Khrushchev would also have been very much aware of the importance of the underdeveloped countries and of indigenous Communist Parties scrutinising how Khrushchev dealt with the requests for aid and

military help from Castro. Placing missiles in Cuba thus seemed to guarantee a number of advantages - concessions in Germany, gaining support amongst communist parties abroad, and humiliating the United States government. The plans all went wrong when the missiles were discovered by reconnaissance surveillance by a US military aircraft. At this point it seems that Khrushchev's position became one of trying to salvage as much as possible from the affair without jeopardising the peace. From the exchanges with the American government it would seem that there was some disagreement in the Presidium as to how to proceed. Khrushchev seemed to have no faith in the traditional official channels of communication, using friends and contacts in order to communicate to American officials directly. This would again indicate the weakness of Khrushchev's position and also personal weakness, as his scheme was very grandiose and involved high risks, which were not perhaps the most wise considering the stakes he was playing for. The Cuban Missile crisis must have precipitated a quickening of the plot which led to his downfall two years later.

From the survey made of the afore-mentioned areas, the following conclusions can be drawn.

One of the main themes that has emerged is the varied role that ideological influence has played. In terms of developing a more accurate understanding of Soviet thinking, the concept of "cold war" and the "two camps" theory has proved to be highly misleading. This can be more clearly seen after recent events in the USSR which have caused many people to re-examine the nature of past events. When

the events of Khrushchev's time in office are examined from a Soviet viewpoint, a picture very different from the traditional one emerges. The influence of China, and Chinese rivalry for the allegiance of under-developed countries is much more powerful than was previously thought.

Very often the role of ideology in the Soviet outlook has been played down, with the "superpower rivalry" element at the fore. Yet for Khrushchev, both within and outwith the USSR, his distinctive ideological stance gave him his identity. It was his concepts of "peaceful co-existence" and destalinisation that brought him respect in 1956 at home and abroad, and Khrushchev constantly tried to uphold these ideals throughout his time as General Secretary. For Khrushchev, ideological change was a way of returning to true Marxist-Leninist roots, was a political weapon against internal adversaries, and the basis for asserting Soviet supremacy in the world communist movement. When that ideological line was challenged in various circumstances, Khrushchev was politically astute enough to be flexible, eg to close the East/ West German border, to back down over Cuba etc. Khrushchev was undoubtedly a pragmatist when the situation required, but communist ideals continued to be his inspiration, and played an important role in decision making at every level.

It was Khrushchev's less militant Marxist-Leninist line that so antagonised the Chinese, and which led to such intensive rivalry between the two powers. The competition between them was seen in their conflicting attitude about how to deal with America, with Khrushchev often being accused by the Chinese of cowardice. Militant communist theorists, such as the Chinese, satellite power leaders like Ulbricht

and Castro and the internal Soviet group lead by Suslov all acted as a constraining force on Khrushchev's leadership, as they constantly criticised him if he didn't conform more to their line. The opinion of the governments of underdeveloped countries, and of communist parties in them also helped persuade Khrushchev of the importance of presenting a clear ideological line which would win their support. Countries like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, North Korea and a variety of African countries were all watching to see how Khrushchev dealt with Castro, in terms of backing his words with substantial economic and political support.

Ultimately much of our understanding of Khrushchev's leadership comes from our understanding of the man himself. While recently published information perhaps offers little that is new concerning Berlin, and many of the mysteries of the Cuban situation remain undisclosed, the writings of prominent Soviet journalists and historians do stimulate a new understanding of Khrushchev as an individual, and as a historical figure. Elsewhere in this thesis I've described Khrushchev as "the orthodox rebel" who rejected the excesses of stalinist thinking in order to return to what he saw as "pure Marxist-Leninism". Khrushchev does seem to have had a genuine desire to work towards a fair and equal socialist society. Personality-wise, Khrushchev was a shrewd and ambitious man, who seems to have had flashes of insight, but who lacked the vision or opportunity to carry them through. Khrushchev was inconsistent in his policy-making, perhaps at times as much from political pressure as personal weakness, however he was not very politically adept, and made many enemies by his sweeping statements

and blunt accusations.

In many ways after seeing the experiences of Gorbachev, we can come to understand Khrushchev's position better. Gorbachev emerged as General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985, with the image of a confident and astute politician, and became known as a bold and innovative thinker, and a skilled international statesman. Yet within six years, despite all his initial impetus and enthusiasm, all the international and diplomatic successes etc, the Soviet Union is in chaos, economically and politically, and it has now disintegrated completely as a functioning political unit. In a similar way, the accusations against Khrushchev as a "hare-brained schemer" etc are not entirely justified, as the difficulties facing a reformer of any sort, were and are overwhelming. There are many parallels between the two men, both tried to bring economic and political reform to a country of people who had been long used to the preservation of the status quo. The frustrations of opponents in both cases lead to coup attempts, one successful, the other not. Gorbachev presided over the disintegration of the USSR, Khrushchev over the fragmentation of the world communist movement as a united body. The parallels are indeed striking, and help to put Khrushchev's limitations in perspective, for while he was not successful at much that he tried to achieve, his objectives were from the start difficult if not impossible.

Khrushchev's leadership then was characterised by a fight against a spectrum of opposition - from political opponents like Molotov, Suslov etc, interest groups like the military and the nomenklatura, and pressures from abroad - the Chinese more than the Americans, satellite states, and the awareness of the opinions of various underdeveloped

countries. The leadership period of Khrushchev was beset with difficulties, and not by any means all of his own making. As for his triumphs, there were a number. Within the Soviet Union, Khrushchev exposed the injustices of Stalinism, past and present, with great determination, and at a high cost. In terms of foreign policy his master stroke was the sealing of the East/West Berlin border, ironically the consequences of this were probably largely unforeseen by him. In the Cuban crisis, Khrushchev also demonstrated the ability to know when to back down. In all these areas, Khrushchev's single-mindedness and insight, however thwarted in practice, deserve the respect of those who came after him.

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APPENDIX : Database information used in
Chapters 2 and 3.

This database is based on information taken from the 22nd Party Congress in the Soviet Union in October 1961. It uses the following sources:

Sovetskaia Istoricheskaia Entsiklopediia.
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press.

Additional background information has come from the following:

The New York Times.
Keesings Contemporary Archives.
East European and Soviet Data Handbook.
Radio Liberty: composition of the Leading Organs
of the CPSU.

This database was constructed using a Nimbus computer and a software package called Quest containing facilities for database work.

For each of the 103 delegates who spoke at the Congress, a survey of their speeches were made, with the specific intention of identifying their position on a range of issues. Basic background information concerning each delegate as far as possible was sought, covering such information as date of birth, date of Party Membership etc. Twenty two different categories for each delegate were in the end decided upon as being the criteria to decide upon the attitude and political persuasion of each delegate as far as possible.

An explanation of the abbreviations for each field:

1. name.
2. dob. date of birth.
3. dop. date of joining the communist party of the Soviet Union.
4. nat. nationality, ie the Republic that the delegate originates from.
5. po61. the position/title held by the delegate in 1961.
6. genocc. the area of occupational specialisation.
7. fullmem. the date/dates that a delegate became and desisted from being a full member of the Presidium of the CPSU of the Soviet Union.
8. candm. the date/dates that a delegate became and desisted from being a candidate member of the Presidium of the CPSU of the Soviet Union.
9. mob53. These three categories look at the political mobility of
10. mob57. individual delegates in the key years 1953, 1957 and 1961. It is noted whether delegates were promoted or
11. mob 64 demoted at this time.
12. pos. This indicates the order that the speeches were given in, eg 1.
13. sdom. This represents the candidate's position on the issue of

the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union in his speech.
The coding is as follows:

- | | | | |
|-----|-----------|--|----|
| | | very critical | 1. |
| | | critical | 2. |
| | | ambiguous | 3. |
| | | no mention | 4. |
| | | optimistic | 5. |
| 14. | scul. | position on the cultural position of the government: | |
| | | conservative | 1. |
| | | innovative | 2. |
| | | ambiguous | 3. |
| | | non-mention | 4. |
| 15. | sapdef. | How the delegate defines the anti-party group in his speech:
This gives a listing of which if any of the 8 members of the anti-party group are mentioned. | |
| 16. | sapdes. | How the delegate describes the anti-party group, ie the severity of the accusations made by the individual delegate: | |
| | | condemned | 1. |
| | | have violated Party Legality | 2. |
| | | are guilty of ideological deviance | 3. |
| | | are guilty of mass repressions
and arbitrariness | 4. |
| | | should be expelled from the Party | 5. |
| 17. | sde-stal. | Period focus ed on as the reason for de-stalinist measures: | |
| | | 1930's | 1. |
| | | 1940's -53 | 2. |
| | | 1953 - 7 | 3. |
| | | 1961 | 4. |
| | | non-mention. | 5. |
| 18. | sfratc. | State of relations with other communist parties-
assessment based on whether a delegate mentions Albania,
and their attitude towards it. | |
| | | non-mention | 1. |
| | | Albania mentioned | 2. |
| | | Strong criticism of Albania, eg
mentioning the cult of personality | 3. |
| | | link between Albania and China made | 4. |
| 19. | sfp. | Attitude of the delegate to Berlin and to foreign policy in general. | |
| | | non-mention | 1. |
| | | militant | 2. |

ambiguous 3.
conciliatory 4.

20. sk. Reference of the delegate to Khrushchev's leadership.

enthusiastic 1.
praise 2.
mentioned briefly 3.
not mentioned 4.
criticism 5.

21. sergei Information from Sergei Khrushchev

22. other. This category has been used to comment on historian's perceptions of the allegiance of the individual delegate. The initial letter indicates which faction is favoured:

k - Kozlov. X - Khrushchev. S - Suslov.

The second letter refers to the historian's initial who makes the connection.

L - Linden. T - Tatu. S - Slusser.

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4. Names, dob and dop of delegates who mentioned seven or less of the anti-party group.
5. Names, dob and dop of those delegates who only mildly denounced the anti-party group.
6. Names, dob and dop of delegates who emphasised arbitrariness and mass repression.
7. Names, dob and dop of delegates who emphasised the ideological threat of the anti-party group.
8. Names, dob and dop of delegates who mentioned especially the 1930's in relation to the anti-party group.
9. Names, dob and dop of delegates who emphasised the importance of 1961 in relation to the anti-party group, and those who didn't mention it at all.
10. Names, dob and dop of delegates who emphasised the role of 1953-7

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14. Names, dob and dop of delegates who made a link between Albania and China.
15. Names, dob and dop of delegates who mention Albania itself.
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17. Names, dop, definition and description given of the anti-party group for all delegates born after 1921.
18. Names, dob, definition and description given of the anti-party group for all delegates who joined the Party before 1930.
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20. Names, dob, definition of the anti-party group of delegates demoted in 1953.
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22. Names, dob, definition of the anti-party group of delegates promoted in 1957.
23. Names, dob, definition of the anti-party group of delegates demoted in 1964.
24. A comparison of name, dob, dop, anti-party definition and description and position concerning de-stalinisation of all delegates.
25. A comparison of name, dob, dop, anti-party description and attitude towards communist parties abroad.

Table One

NAME	DOB	DOF	SAPDES
Abramov G G	1918	1945	5
Beshchev B P	1903	1924	5
Bodiul I I	1918	1940	5
Georgiev A V	1913	1943	5
Golikov F I	1900	1918	5
Goriachev F S	1905	1927	5
Ignatov N G	1901	1924	5
Kirilenko A P	1906	1931	5
Kolchina O P	1918	1946	5
Leonov P A	1918	1944	5
Mazurov K T	1914	1940	5
Nuriev Z N	1915	1939	5
Olshansky M A	1908	1932	5
Ponomarev B N	1905	1919	5
Pospeov P N	1898	1916	5
Rodionov N N	1915	1944	5
Satiukov P A	1911	1939	5
Shchetinin S N	1910	1932	5
Shelepin A N	1918	1940	5
Shibaev A I	1915	1940	5
Shkolnikov A M	1914	1940	5
Sholokhov M A	1905	1932	5
Toka S K	1901	1929	5
Vecherova Yu M			5
Yefremov L N	1912	1941	5 (maj)
Yegorychev N G	1920	1942	5
Zarobian Ya N	1908	1932	5

Table Two

NAME	SDESI
Denavakhishvili G O	1
Furtseva Ye A	1
Georgiev A V	1
Goriachev F S	1
Ignatov N G	1
Khrushchev N S	1
Kirilenko A P	1
Korneichuk A Ye	1
Kozlov F R	1
Lazurkina D B	1
Mazurov K T	1
Mukhitdinov N A	1
Petrov F N	1
Podgorny N V	1
Serdiuk Z T	1
Shelepin A N	1
Shvernik N N	1
Sniekus A J	1
Spiridonov I V	1
Vecherova Yu M	1
Vorobiev G I	1
Yegorychev N G	1

TABLE FOUR

Camb. Notes
1-7

NAME	DOB	DDP	SAPDEF
Abramov G B	1910	1945	3 mol mal kaq
Adzhubei A I	1924	1933	1 mol
Akhundov V Yu	1916	1939	0
Basov A V	1912	1945	4 NOL MAL KAG SHEP
Beshchev B P	1903	1924	1 KAG
Bödiul I I	1919	1940	3 NOL MAL KAG
Bulganin N A	1895	1917	
Chernyshev V Ye	1908	1928	3 mol kaq mal
Chou En-lai			0
Demichev P N	1918	1939	0
Dymshits V E	1910	1937	gen
Dzhavakhsivili G D	1912	1940	3 mol mal kaq
Gagänova V I	1932	1957	0
Georgiev A V	1913	1943	3 mol kaq mal
Gitälov A V	1915	1948	0
Golikov F I	1900	1918	3 mol mal kaq
Gomulka W			0
Goriachev F S	1905	1927	3 mol mal kaq
Grachev V V	1904	1932	0
Gribächev N N	1910	1943	0
Gromyko A A	1909	1931	0
Gubanov V I			gen
Ilichev L F	1906	1924	4 mol kaq mal shep
Iögarson B V	1893	1943	0
Kagänovich L M	1893	1911	
Kalïrov I A	1893	1917	0
Kävun V M	1928	1954	0
Kazanets I P	1918	1944	gen
Kebin J B	1905	1927	0
Keldysh M V	1911	1959	0
Khrushchev N S	1894	1918	4 mol kaq mal vor
Kochetov V A	1912	1944	0
Koichik A A			0
Kolchina D P	1918	1946	3 mol kaq mal
Korneichuk A Ye	1905	1940	4 mol kaq mal shep
Kozlov F R	1908	1926	3 mol kaq mal
Kucherenko V A			1 kaq
Kunaev D A	1912	1939	gen
Lezurkina D A		1902	gen
Leonov P A	1918	1944	3 mol mal kaq
Malenkov G M	1902	1920	
Malinovsky R Ya	1898	1926	7 mol mal kaq vor bul per sab
Mazurkov K T	1914	1940	3 mol kaq mal
Mblätöy V M	1890	1906	
Mzhevandadze V P	1902	1927	gen
Nalivaiko G A	1910	1945	0
Nbviköy I T	1906	1926	1 mal
Ostfänsky M A	1908	1932	3 mol mal kaq
Ozerov B	1915	1939	0
Pavlov S P	1929	1954	0
Pelse A Ya	1899	1915	3 mol mal kaq
Pervukhin N G	1904	1919	
Petrov F N		1896	gen
Podgorny N V	1903	1930	4 mol kaq mal vor
Poliansky D S	1917	1939	4 mol kaq mal vor
Pospeov P N	1898	1916	1 mol
Rashidov Sh R	1917	1939	gen
Rasulov D	1913	1939	5 mol kaq mal vor bul
Rodionov N N	1915	1944	4 mol kaq mal vor
Rozhneva N I			gen
Saburov M Z	1900	1920	
Semenov N N	1896	1917	gen
Serdiuk Z T	1903	1925	3 mol kaq mal
svil-l-telo G H	1910	1930	3 mol kaq mal

TABLE. FIVE DOIR DOF SAFDES

NAME	DOIR	DOF	SAFDES
Akhundov V Yu	1916	1939	0
Basov A V	1912	1945	2
Bulgadin N A	1895	1917	
Chernyshev V Ye	1908	1928	1
Chou En-lai			0
Demichev P N	1918	1939	0
Dymshits V E	1910	1937	1
Gaganova V I	1932	1957	0
Gitalov A V	1915	1948	0
Gomulka W			0
Grachev V V	1904	1932	
Gribachev N M	1910	1943	
Gromyko A A	1909	1931	
Ioganson B V	1893	1943	
Kaganovich L M	1893	1911	
Kairov I A	1893	1917	
Kavun V M	1928	1954	
Kazanets I P	1918	1944	1
Kebin J B	1905	1927	
Keldysh M V	1911	1959	
Kochetov V A	1912	1944	0
Kolchik A A			0
Kosygin A N	1904	1927	2
Kucherenko V A			1
Kunaev D A	1912	1939	1
Kuusinen O V	1881	1904	1
Malenkov G M	1902	1920	
Molotov V M	1890	1906	
Mukhitdinov N A	1917	1942	2
Mzhavandadze V P	1902	1927	2
Nalivaiko G A	1910	1945	
Novikov I T	1906	1926	1
Ozerov B	1915	1939	
Pavlov S P	1929	1954	
Pelse A Ya	1899	1915	2
Pervukhin N G	1904	1919	
Rashidov Sh R	1917	1939	2
Rasulov D	1913	1939	2
Rozhneva M I			1
Saburov M Z	1900	1920	
Semenov N N	1896	1947	1
Shepilov D T	1905	1926	
Shitikov A P	1912	1939	0
Shvernik N M	1888	1905	
Smirnov V A	1922	1948	0
Sniektis A J			2
Tabeev F A	1928	1951	0
Thorez N			0
Titov G S	1935	1961	0
Tvardovsky A T	1910	1940	0
Ulbricht			
Usulaliev T	1919	1941	2
Voroshilov K Y	1881	1903	
Yefremov M T	1911	1932	(mol mal kaq bul vor shep)

→ NB, chang

Table Six

NAME	DOB	DOP	SAPDES
Dzhavakhishvili G D	1912	1940	4
Furtseva Ye A	1910	1930	4
Gubanov V I			4
Khrushchev N S	1894	1918	4
Korneichuk A Ye	1905	1940	4
Kozlov F R	1909	1926	4
Lazurkina D A		1902	4
Malinovsky R Ya	1898	1926	4
Petrov F N		1896	4
Podgorny N V	1903	1930	4
Serdiuk Z T	1903	1925	4
Spiridonov I V	1905	1928	4
Suslov M A	1902	1921	4

Delegates who talked of
artfulness & masquerade

Table Seven

NAME	DOB	DOP	SAPDES
Adzhubei A I	1924	1953	3
Erëzhnev L I	1906	1931	3
Spishin V V	1914	1938	3
Ilichev L F	1906	1924	3
Mikoyan A I	1895	1915	3
Poliansky D S	1917	1939	3
Tolstikov V S	1917	1948	3
Vorobiev G I	1914	1939	3
Voronov B I	1912	1931	3

Delegates who
voted

Table Eight

NAME	DOB	DOP	SDEST
Dzhavakhishvili G D	1912	1940	1
Furtseva Ye A	1910	1930	1
Georgiev A V	1913	1943	1
Goriachev F S	1905	1927	1
Ignatov N G	1901	1924	1
Khrushchev N S	1894	1918	1
Kipilenko A P	1906	1931	1
Korneichuk A Ye	1905	1940	1
Kozlov F R	1908	1926	1
Lazurkina D A		1902	1
Mazurov K T	1914	1940	1
Mukhitdinov N A	1917	1942	1
Petrov F N		1896	1
Podgorny N V	1903	1930	1
Serdiuk Z T	1903	1925	1
Shelepin A N	1910	1940	1
Shvernik N N	1888	1905	1
Sniekus A J			1
Spiridonov I V	1905	1928	1
Vecherova Yu M			1
Vorobiev G I	1914	1939	1
Yegbrychev N G	1920	1942	1

Table Nuo

NAME	DOB	DOP	SDEST
Ahremov B B	1918	1945	5
Adzhubei A I	1924	1953	4 -
Akhundov V Yu	1916	1939	5
Basov A V	1912	1945	5 ns
Chernyshev V Ye	1908	1928	5
Chou En-Lai			5
Demichev P H	1918	1939	5
Dymshits V E	1910	1937	5
Gaganova V I	1932	1957	5
Gitalov A V	1915	1948	5
Gomulka W			5
Grachev V V	1904	1932	5
Gribachev N H	1910	1943	5
Gromyko A A	1909	1931	5
Gubanov V I			5
Ilichev L F	1906	1924	4 -
Ioganson B V	1893	1943	5
Kairov I A	1893	1917	5
Kavun V M	1928	1954	5
Kebin J G	1905	1927	5
Keldysh M V	1911	1959	5
Kolchik A A			5
Kucherenko V A			5
Leonov P A	1918	1944	5
Mikoyan A I	1895	1915	4 -
Mzhavandadze V P	1902	1927	5
Nalivaiko G A	1910	1945	5
Nuriev Z N	1915	1939	5
Olshansky M A	1908	1932	5
Ozerov B	1915	1939	5
Pavlov S P	1929	1954	5
Pelse A Ya	1899	1915	5
Pospeov P N	1898	1916	4 -
Rashidov- Sh R	1917	1939	5
Rozhneva M I			5
Satiukov P A	1911	1939	5
Semenov N N	1896	1947	5
Shchetinin S N	1910	1932	5
Shibaev A I	1915	1940	5
Sholokhov M A	1905	1932	5
Smirnov V A	1922	1948	5
Tabeev F A	1928	1951	5
Thorez M			5
Titov G S	1935	1961	5
Toka S K	1901	1929	5
Tvardovsky A I	1910	1940	5
Usubaliyev T	1919	1941	5
Voronov G I	1912	1931	5

Table Ten

NAME	DOB	DOP	SDEST
Beshchev B P	1903	1924	3
Bodjul I I	1918	1940	3
Brezhnev L I	1906	1931	3
Golikov F I	1900	1918	3
Grishin V V	1914	1938	3
Kazanets I P	1918	1944	3
Kosygin A N	1904	1927	3
Kunaev D A	1912	1939	3
Kuusinen O V	1081	1904	3
Malinovsky R Ya	1898	1926	3
Novikov I I	1906	1926	3
Poliansky D S	1917	1939	3
Ponomarev B N	1905	1919	3
Rasulov D	1913	1939	3
Rodionov N N	1915	1944	3
Shkolnikov A M	1914	1940	3
Tolstikov V S	1917	1948	3
Yefremov M T	1911	1932	3
Zarobian Ya N	1908	1932	3

Table Eleven

NAME	DOB	DOP	SDEST
Yefremov L N	1912	1941	2

Table Twelve

NAME	DOB	DOP	SDON
Akhundov V Yu	1916	1939	1
Basov A V	1912	1945	1
Kirilenko A P	1906	1931	1
Mazurov K T	1914	1940	1
Olshansky N A	1908	1932	1
Podgorny N V	1903	1930	1
Poliansky D S	1917	1939	1
Shibaev A I	1915	1940	1
Shitikov A P	1912	1939	1
Voronov G I	1912	1931	1
Yefremov N T	1911	1932	1

Table Thirteen

NAME	DOB	DOP	SCHL
Ioganson B V	1893	1943	2
Sholekhov M A	1905	1932	2
Tvardovsky A T	1910	1940	2

Table Fourteen

NAME	DOB	DOP	SFRATC
Khrushchev N S	1894	1918	4
Kuusinen O V	1881	1904	4

Table Fifteen

NAME	DOB	DOP	SFRATC
Chou En-Jai			2
Korneichuk A Ye	1905	1940	2
Yegbrychev N G	1920	1942	2

NAME	DOB	SA	SAPDES	DOB
Beshchev B P	1924	1	5	1903
Drezhnev L I	1931	8	3	1906
Bulganin N A	1917			1875
Chernyshev V Ye	1928	3	1	1908
Chou En-lai		0	0	
Dymshits V E	1937	ge	1	1910
Furtseva Ye A	1930	8	4	1910
Bolikov F I	1918	3	5	1900
Gomulka W		0	0	
Goriachev F S	1927	3	5	1905
Grachev V V	1932	0		1904
Gribachev N N	1943	0		1910
Gromyko A A	1931	0		1909
Gubanov V I		ge	4	
Ignatov N B	1924	8	5	1901
Ilichev L F	1924	4	3	1906
Ioganson B V	1943	0		1893
Kaganovich L M	1911			1893
Kairov I A	1917	0		1893
Kebin J B	1927	0		1905
Khrushchev N S	1918	4	4	1894
Kirilenko A P	1931	8	5	1906
Kblchik A A		0	0	
Korneichuk A Ye	1940	4	4	1905
Kosygin A N	1927	8	2	1904
Kozlov F R	1926	3	4	1908
Kucherenko V A		1	1	
Kuusinen D V	1904	8	1	1881
Lazurkina D A	1902	ge	4	
Malenkov G M	1920			1902
Malinovsky R Ya	1926	7	4	1898
Mikoyan A I	1915	8	3	1875
Molotov V M	1906			1890
Mzhavandadze V P	1927	ge	2	1902
Nalivaiko G A	1945	0		1910
Novikov I T	1926	1	1	1906
Oleshansky H A	1932	3	5	1908
Pelse A Ya	1915	3	2	1899
Pervukhin M B	1919			1904
Petrov F N	1896	ge	4	
Podgorny N V	1930	4	4	1903
Ponomarev B M	1919	8	5	1905
Pospeov P N	1916	1	5	1898
Rozhneva N I		ge	1	
Saburov M Z	1920			1900
Semenov N M	1947	ge	1	1896
Serdiuk Z T	1925	3	4	1903
Shchetinin S N	1932	3	5	1910
Shepilov D T	1926			1905
Sholokhov N A	1932	ge	5	1905
Shvernik H M	1905	8		1888
Sniekus A J		4	2	
Spiridonov I V	1928	1	4	1905
Suslov N A	1921	5	4	1902
Thorez M		ge	0	
Toka S K	1929	3	5	1901
Tvardovsky A T	1940	0	0	1910
Ulbricht				
Veberkova Yu M		3	5	
Voroshilov K Y	1903			1881
Zaidiyan Ya N	1932	1	5	1908

Table Seventeen

NAME	DOB	SA	SAPDES	DOB
Adzhubei A I	1953	1	3	1924
Gaganova V I	1957	0	0	1932
Kayun V M	1954	0		1928
Favlov S F	1954	0		1927
Smirnov V A	1948	0	0	1922
Tabeev F A	1951	0	0	1928
Titov G S	1961	0	0	1935

Table Eighteen

NAME	DOB	SAPDES	SA	DOB
Beshchev B P	1903	5	1	1924
Bulganin N A	1895			1917
Chernyshev V Ye	1900	1	3	1928
Chou En-lai		0	0	
Golikov F I	1900	5	3	1918
Gomulka W		0	0	
Goriachev F S	1905	5	3	1927
Gubanov V I		4	ne	
Ignatov N G	1901	5	8	1924
Ilichev L F	1906	3	4	1924
Kaganovich L N	1893			1911
Kairov I A	1893		0	1917
Kebin J G	1905		0	1927
Khrushchev N S	1894	4	4	1918
Kolchik A A		0	0	
Kosygin A N	1904	2	8	1927
Kozlov F R	1908	4	3	1926
Kucherenko V A		1	1	
Kuusinen O V	1881	1	8	1904
Lazurkina D A		4	ne	1902
Malenkov G M	1902			1920
Malinovsky R Ya	1898	4	7	1926
Mikoyan A I	1895	3	8	1915
Molotov V M	1890			1906
Mzhavandadze V P	1902	2	ne	1927
Novikov I T	1906	1	1	1926
Pelse A Ya	1899	2	3	1915
Pervukhin N G	1904			1919
Petrov F N		4	ne	1896
Ponomarev B N	1905	5	8	1919
Pospeov P N	1890	5	1	1916
Rozhneva M I		1	ne	
Saburov M Z	1900			1920
Serdiuk Z T	1903	4	3	1925
Shepilov D T	1905			1926
Shvernink N M	1888		8	1905
Sniekus A J		2	4	
Spiridonov I V	1905	4	1	1920
Suslov M A	1902	4	5	1921
Thorez M		0	ne	
Toka S K	1901	5	3	1929
Ulbricht				
Vecherova Yu M		5	3	
Voroshilov K Y	1881			1903

Table Nineteen

NAME	DOB	SAPDES	SA	DOF
Gaganova V I	1932	0	0	1957
Kavun V M	1928		0	1954
Keldysh N V	1911		0	1959
Pavlov S P	1929		0	1954
Titov G S	1935	0	0	1961

Table Twenty

NAME	DOB	SAPDEF	HOUS3
Brezhnev L I	1906	8	d
Kosygin A N	1904	8 mol kaq mal vor bul per sab shep	d
Kuusinen O V	1881	8 mol kaq mal vor bul per sab shep	d
Shvernik N M	1888	8 mol kaq mal vor bul per sab shep	d
Suslov M A	1902	5 mol kaq mal vor bul g	d

Table Twenty-One

NAME	DOB	SAPDEF	HOUS7
Kaganovich I M	1873		d
Malenkov G M	1902		d
Molotov V M	1890		d
Pervukhin M B	1904		d
Saburov M Z	1900		d
Shepilov D T	1905		d

Table Twenty Two

NAME	DOB	SAPDEF	HOUS7
Brezhnev L I	1906	8	p
Furtseva Ye A	1910	8 mol kaq mal vor bul per sab shep	p
Ignatov N B	1901	8 mol kaq mal vor bul per sab shep	p
Kirilenko A P	1906	8 mol kaq mal vor bul per sab shep	p
Kosygin A N	1904	8 mol kaq mal vor bul per sab shep	p
Kozlov F R	1908	3 mol kaq mal	p
Kuusinen O V	1881	8 mol kaq mal vor bul per sab shep	p
Nazurov K T	1914	3 mol kaq mal	p
Mzhavandadze V P	1902	gen	p
Pospeov P N	1898	1 mol	p
Shvernik N M	1888	8 mol kaq mal vor bul per sab shep	p

Table Twenty Three

NAME	DOB	SAPDEF	HOUS4
Ilichev I F	1906	4 mol kaq mal shep	d
Khrushchev N S	1894	4 mol kaq mal vor	d

Table Twenty Five

NAME	DOB	DOP	SA	SAFOES	SDESI
Abrahamov G B	1918	1945	3	5	5
Adzhubei A I	1924	1953	1	3	4
Akhundov V Yu	1916	1939	0	0	5
Basov A V	1912	1945	4	2	5 ns
Beshchev B P	1903	1924	1	5	3
Bodiul I I	1918	1940	3	5	3
Brezhnev L I	1906	1931	0	3	3
Bulganin N A	1895	1917			
Chernyshev V Ye	1908	1928	3	1	5
Chou En-lai			0	0	5
Demichev P H	1918	1939	0	0	5
Dymshits V E	1910	1937	ge	1	5
Dzhavakhishvili G D	1912	1940	3	4	1
Furtseva Ye A	1910	1930	8	4	1
Gaganova V I	1932	1957	0	0	5
Georgiev A V	1913	1943	3	5	1
Gitalov A V	1915	1948	0	0	5
Galikov F I	1900	1918	3	5	3
Gomulka W			0	0	5
Goriachev F S	1905	1927	3	5	1
Grachev V V	1904	1932	0		5
Gribachev N M	1910	1943	0		5
Grishin V V	1914	1938	8	3	3
Gromyko A A	1909	1931	0		5
Gubanov V I			ge	4	5
Ignatov N G	1901	1924	8	5	1
Ilichev L F	1906	1924	4	3	4
Ioganson B V	1893	1943	0		5
Kaganovich L M	1893	1911			
Kairov I A	1893	1917	0		5
Kayun V M	1928	1954	0		5
Kazanets I P	1918	1944	ge	1	3
Kebin J G	1905	1927	0		5
Keldysh M V	1911	1959	0		5
Khrushchev N S	1894	1918	4	4	1
Kirilenko A P	1906	1931	8	5	1
Kochetov V A	1912	1944	0	0	(5)
Kolchik A A			0	0	5
Kolchina O P	1918	1946	3	5	
Korneichuk A Ye	1905	1940	4	4	1
Kosygin A N	1904	1927	8	2	3
Kozlov F R	1908	1926	3	4	1
Kucherenko V A			1	1	5
Kunaev D A	1912	1939	ge	1	3
Kutsinen O V	1881	1904	8	1	3
Lazurkina D A		1902	ge	4	1
Leonov P A	1918	1944	3	5	5
Malenkov G M	1902	1920			
Malinovsky R Ya	1898	1926	7	4	3
Mazurov K T	1914	1940	3	5	1
Mikoyan A I	1895	1915	8	3	4
Molotov V M	1890	1906			
Mukhitdinov N A	1917	1942	8	2	1
Mzhavandadze V P	1902	1927	ge	2	5
Nalivaiko G A	1910	1945	0		5
Novikov I T	1906	1926	1	1	3
Nuriev Z M	1915	1939	8	5	5
Olshansky M A	1908	1932	3	5	5
Ozerov B	1915	1939	0		5
Pavlov S P	1929	1954	0		5
Pelse A Ya	1899	1915	3	2	5
Pervukhin M G	1904	1919			
Petrov F N		1896	ge	4	1
Poddobny N V	1903	1930	4	4	1

NAME	DOB	DOF	SO	SFRATE
Abramov G G	1918	1945	3	1
Adzhubei A I	1929	1953	1	1
Akhundov V Yu	1915	1939	0	1
Basov A V	1912	1945	4	1
Beshchev B P	1903	1924	1	1
Bodiul I I	1918	1940	3	3
Brezhnev L I	1906	1931	8	3
Bulganin N A	1895	1917		
Chernyshev V Ye	1908	1928	3	1
Chou En-lai			0	2
Demichev P N	1918	1939	0	1
Dymshits V E	1910	1937	ge	1
Dzhavakhishvili G D	1912	1940	3	1
Furtseva Ye A	1910	1930	8	1
Gaganova V I	1932	1957	0	1
Georgiev A V	1913	1943	3	1
Gitalov A V	1915	1948	0	1
Golikov F I	1900	1918	3	1
Gomulka W			0	3
Goriachev F S	1905	1927	3	1
Grachev V V	1904	1932	0	1
Gribachev N N	1910	1943	0	1
Grishin V V	1914	1938	8	1
Gromyko A A	1909	1931	0	1
Gubanov V I			ge	1
Ignatov N G	1901	1924	8	3
Ilichev L F	1906	1924	4	1
Ioganson B V	1893	1943	0	1
Kaganovich I M	1893	1911		
Kairov I A	1893	1917	0	1
Kavun V M	1928	1954	0	1
Kazanets I P	1918	1944	ge	1
Kebin J G	1905	1927	0	1
Keldysh M V	1911	1959	0	1
Khrushchev N S	1894	1918	4	4
Kirilenko A P	1906	1931	8	1
Kochetov V A	1912	1944	0	1
Kolchik A A			0	1
Kolchina O P	1918	1946	3	1
Korneichuk A Ye	1905	1940	4	2
Kosygin A N	1904	1927	8	3
Kozlov F R	1908	1926	3	3
Kucherenko V A			1	1
Kunaev D A	1912	1939	ge	1
Kuusinen O V	1881	1904	8	4
Lazurkina D A		1902	ge	1
Leonov P A	1918	1944	3	1
Malenkov G M	1902	1920		
Malinovsky R Ya	1898	1926	7	1
Mazurov K T	1914	1940	3	1
Mikoyan A I	1895	1915	8	3
Molotov V M	1890	1905		
Mukhitdinov N A	1917	1942	8	3
Mzhavandadze V P	1902	1927	ge	1
Nalivaiko G A	1910	1945	0	1
Novikov I T	1906	1926	1	1
Nuriev Z N	1915	1939	8	1
Olshansky M A	1908	1932	3	1
Ozerov B	1915	1939	0	1
Pavlov S P	1929	1954	0	1
Pelse A Ya	1899	1915	3	3
Pervukhin M G	1904	1919		
Petrov F N		1896	ge	1
Podgorny N V	1903	1930	4	1
Poliansky D S	1917	1939	4	3
Ponomarev D N	1905	1919	8	3
P. H.	1898	1916	1	3

NAME	Table	Trety	Age	DOB	DOF	SA	SRATE
Pospelov	P	N		1898	1916	1	3
Rashidov	Sh	R		1917	1939	qe	1
Rasulov	D			1913	1939	5	1
Rodionov	N	N		1915	1944	4	1
Rozhneva	M	I				qe	1
Saburov	N	Z		1900	1920		
Safurkov*	P	A		1911	1939	8	1
Semenov	N	N		1895	1947	qe	1
Serdiuk	Z	T		1903	1925	3	1
Shchetinin	S	N		1910	1932	3	1
Shelepin	A	N		1913	1940	4	1
Shepilov	D	T		1905	1925		
Shibaev	A	I		1915	1940	3	1
Shitikov	A	P		1912	1939	qe	1
Shkolnikov	A	M		1914	1940	4	1
Sholokhov	M	A		1905	1932	qe	1
Shvernik	N	M		1888	1905	8	1
Smirnov	V	A		1922	1948	0	1
Sniekus	A	J				4	1
Spiridonov	I	V		1905	1928	1	1
Suslov	M	A		1902	1921	5	3
Tabeev	F	A		1928	1951	0	1
Thorez	M					qe	1
Titov	G	S		1935	1961	0	1
Toka	S	K		1901	1929	3	1
Tolstikov	V	S		1917	1948	qe	1
Tvardovsky	A	T		1910	1940	0	1
Ulbricht							
Usabaliev	I			1919	1941	qe	1
Vecherova	Yu	M				3	1
Vorobiev	G	I		1914	1939	5	1
Voronov	G	I		1912	1931	qe	1
Voroshilov	K	Y		1881	1903		
Yefremov	L	M		1912	1941	4	1
Yefremov	M	T		1911	1932	6	3
Yegbrychev	H	G		1920	1942	3	2
Zarobian	Ya	N		1908	1932	1	1