Policy-making in Teacher Education in Scotland, 1959-81.

by

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SUMMARY.

This thesis attempts to describe and explain the national policy issues in teacher education in Scotland between 1959 and 1981. It concentrates on the main structural issues of the expansion and contraction of the teacher education system and its relations with the rest of higher education.

These issues are set within the context of debates about policy-making. The thesis takes as its theoretical framework a 'process model' of policy-making derived from Hogwood's 'From Crisis to Complacency'. Within that framework, it particularly explores how far the concept of a 'policy community' was applicable to teacher education in Scotland. In addition to using these theoretical insights, it also uses comparisons and contrasts with developments in England and Wales to explain those in Scotland.

The thesis draws on a variety of sources : published material; the archives of the Joint Committee of Colleges of Education, of the General Teaching Council and of individual colleges; the Scottish Education Department files in West Register House (the author was granted privileged access to those still closed under the 30 years rule); and interviews with a number of the significant policy-makers.

The argument of the thesis is that, for most of the period, there was a close-knit policy community for teacher education in Scotland, within which most policy decisions were reached after consultation by a process of 'bureaucratic accommodation'. It analyses the roles within the policy community of the main participating groups : the Scottish Education Department, the Scottish Council for the Training of Teachers (1959-67), the General Teaching Council (after 1967), the Committee of Principals, the Educational Institute of Scotland and the universities. It shows how the relationships between these groups changed over time and in respect to different issues. It then suggests that the process of bureaucratic accommodation does not work when issues are politically controversial and, therefore, that the problem of contracting the teacher education system could not be resolved within the normal boundaries and by the normal procedures of the policy community.

It also notes that contraction in Scotland did not, as in England and Wales, lead to the virtual disappearance of separate institutions for teacher education, and suggests reasons why the Scottish colleges were not merged with other institutions in this period.

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INTRODUCTION

SCOPE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY.

The Scope of the thesis.

The purpose of this thesis is to describe and explain the major policy issues in teacher education in Scotland between 1959 and 1981. 1959 is an obvious starting point: the moment when the National Committee for the Training of Teachers was replaced by the Scottish Council for the Training of Teachers [SCTT] and when the training colleges escaped from the National Committee's tutelage and became colleges of education with their own governing bodies.

Those issues may be divided into three categories :

a)   structural issues concerned with the size and form of provision for teacher education and with its relationship with the rest of higher education;

b)   educational issues concerned with the nature of the teacher education provided; and

c)   process issues concerned with the way in which these matters were dealt with.

During these two decades the main structural issue is undoubtedly that of the expansion and contraction of the colleges of education. This has been followed down to 1981 by which time two of the colleges (Hamilton and Callendar Park) had been closed and the two Catholic colleges merged. The story of contraction did not end there. To complete it would require a description of the take-over of Hamilton by Jordanhill and of Callendar Park by Moray House, of the merger of the two Catholic colleges, and of the later mergers between Aberdeen and Dundee (to form Northern College) and between Moray House and Dunfermline. That phase of contraction is so complicated and created so many organisational problems that it would merit a thesis in itself.

Because of the importance of this main issue and of the related questions about the place of the colleges in higher education, the thesis concentrates on structural and process issues. In consequence, the educational issues, although themes of

interest in the general history of teacher education, have had to be excluded or touched on lightly. There is therefore little on such themes as the changes in the curriculum of teacher education, the impact on that curriculum of the Open University or of external validation by the Council for National Academic Awards [CNAA] and the Scottish Council for the Validation of Courses for Teachers [SCOVACT], the development of inservice education, and the training of lecturers in further education - all of them major research projects in themselves.

The Scottish education system has always prided itself on being different from that of England and Wales, and that difference has been reflected in the arrangements for teacher education. Nevertheless, the structural changes in Scotland have been paralleled by similar changes in the U.K. and, indeed, elsewhere in developed countries which have experienced the same demographic and economic pressures. 'Practising sociologists', Runciman (1) has argued (and he would include historians), 'should normally be looking neither for regularities nor for probabilities but for suggestive contrasts'. If this is so, it should be illuminating to compare developments in Scotland with those in England and Wales because that comparison should shed light on the reasons for those developments being different in some respects. The thesis therefore includes a chapter outlining developments in England and Wales so that such comparisons can be drawn.

Sources.

When I started this thesis in 1986, practically nothing had been written on policy-making in Scottish education in the period after 1960 other than Humes' interesting but polemical work on 'The Leadership Class in Scottish Education'.(2) This situation, however, was transformed in 1988 by the publication of McPherson & Raab's pioneering study 'Governing Education'.(3) Like all serious students of recent Scottish education, I am deeply indebted to their work, both as a source of information and of ideas. However, their research is mainly concerned with the period from 1945 to the early 1970s, and does not deal specifically with teacher education. There is therefore some overlap in time with my own research but very little in content. So I hope that this research will in some small way complement theirs.

Given the almost total absence of secondary sources, I have had to look elsewhere. There are some primary sources generally available, notably the minutes of the Scottish Council for the Training of Teachers and those of the General Teaching Council [GTC]. These have been supplemented by other public sources, such as parliamentary questions and debates, the press (particularly the Times Education

Supplement, Scotland), and various official reports. Of these, the annual reports issued by Scottish Education Department [Education in Scotland] are very useful until they peter out in the late '70s.

These public sources, however, would not have taken me very far. Fortunately, because of my former position as Assistant Principal at Jordanhill from 1976-86, I have been able to negotiate access to primary sources not generally available. The Committee of Principals [CP] agreed to allow me access to its minutes and those of its various sub-committees, which are held by its Secretariat at Moray House. Similarly, the Registrar of the GTC agreed to let me see the minutes of its committees, as well as the public minutes of the Council. I also approached the Principals of the individual colleges for permission to delve into their archives. This was readily granted by everyone, except the Principal of Moray House. I have therefore been able to use minutes of Boards of Studies and Boards of Governors, as well as other papers.

Use of this set of sources has posed at least two problems : the first by the nature of the archives. The records of the Committee of Principals and of the GTC, as one would expect, are very systematically organised and well kept. The individual colleges, on the other hand, do not have the resources to employ archivists, and do not have any system for deciding what will be retained and how it should be stored. So, while the central documents, the minutes of Boards of Governors and Boards of Studies, are retained in an orderly fashion, it is to some extent a matter of chance whether other documents survive. Those which do are not catalogued. As a result, there are gaps in the historical record, either because documents cannot be traced or because they have simply been lost. This, of course, is a general problem. As Kitson Clark observes:

> 'The extent of the evidence which survives from any date that is past, however recent, is always to some extent a matter of chance. There will always be gaps in it. Sometimes they will be serious, sometimes they will not matter. Sometimes diligent research can partially fill them, sometimes they can never be filled and very often an historian can only bridge them by trusting to hearsay evidence, or uncorroborated evidence or partisan evidence'. (5)

The other problem is that of constraints. I have been given access to these archives because, it is assumed, I can be trusted to use the information 'responsibly'. In some cases this assumption was unstated, but the Committee of Principals made

a formal condition that access was 'subject to the usual rules concerning the confidentiality of such records and the non-identification of individuals in any published material'. In practice, this condition has not been strictly enforced.

These problems are even more acute in relation to the other major primary source I have used - the Scottish Education Department [SED] files in West Register House. These represent only that small proportion of the original files which are selected for preservation in the archives and which are not eventually shredded. Most of those related to my period which are deposited at West Register are closed under the thirty years rule, but I have been able to negotiate access to those relating to teacher education on certain conditions, namely that

a)   I sign the Official Secrets Act;

b)   any information relating to named individuals shall be used only in
        such a way that the individual cannot be identified; and

c)   that anything incorporating information derived from the records shall be
        submitted to the Scottish Office for clearance before publication.

I have accepted these constraints because, without access to the SED and CP archives, only a very superficial study of policy-making would have been possible. However, the act of accepting them inevitably shapes the way in which this study is written. One obvious effect is that anything written about SED has to be impersonal e.g. 'the inspectorate argued that.'. or 'officials proposed that....'., as though everyone in that group interpreted their role in the same way, and the personalities and views of individuals counted for nothing. On some occasions, perhaps the individual made little difference, but the case cannot be argued.

More seriously, the thesis has had to be written bearing in mind both the implicit assumptions and the explicit conditions on which I have been given access to the archives. In practice, there have not been many difficulties. When drafts have been submitted to SED, for instance, they have come back with very few requests for changes, mainly of a minor or factual nature but occasionally, it would seem, to avoid embarrassment. However, the fact remains that the thesis has been written with these particular audiences in mind, and their lack of comment may only prove that I have been reasonably successful in gauging what those audiences would find acceptable. I hope I have done so without compromising the honesty of the research.

Interviews and their methodological problems.

Official documents yield a good deal of information about what happened but less about the reasons why things were done or not done. Therefore, in order to explain as well as describe, one has to try to reconstruct - and it can only ever be a partial reconstruction - the elusive processes of which the documents are part and without knowledge of which their meaning cannot be apprehended. (6) This in its turn depends on some knowledge of the interests and assumptions of those involved in the process, knowledge which could only come from the participants themselves. Interviews therefore become an essential source.

Who should be interviewed ? Because teacher education is a small world, some of the choices were obvious : the Secretaries to the SED, key members of the inspectorate, the Principals of the colleges, and the Registrars of the GTC. Beyond these, I have interviewed a number of people whose names came up as I studied the documents or as I conducted other interviews. This selection was necessarily opportunistic : there were other people who could equally well have been interviewed instead or in addition.

The negotiation of these interviews was eased because I was known professionally to nearly all the people involved. (7) My procedure was to write a letter outlining what I was doing and asking them to agree in principle to an interview. This was usually followed up by a phone call or meeting in which we discussed the areas to be explored and agreed on procedures. What I sought agreement for was a procedure similar to that followed by McPherson and Raab i.e. that the interview should be tape-recorded; that it should then be transcribed and the interviewees sent a copy of the transcript to which they could make any amendments or additions which they wished; that the tape should then be wiped and the revised transcript should be a document in the public domain which I could freely quote from. (8) For ease of identification, these quotations are printed in italics in the text and notes.

Most of the interviewees accepted these procedures but some preferred me to take notes of the meeting. These notes were sent back to the interviewees for checking in the same way as the transcripts of the tapes. After that, in most cases, the interviewees were willing to see them placed in the public domain but a few wished them to be non-attributable i.e. I could use the notes on their interviews as background information but could not quote from them. So, in the end, there were three different outcomes from the interviews : transcripts in the public domain, notes in the public

domain and notes which are non-attributable. The list of people interviewed in Appendix 1 shows what the outcome of each interview was.

Two further points need to be made about the notes and transcripts. Firstly that, as I transcribed from the tapes, I did make some small cosmetic changes, simply to eliminate the obvious repetitions and digressions or the little irrelevant asides which naturally occur in an unscripted discussion. Secondly that most, but not all, of the interviewees exercised their right to amend or add to the transcripts. This was to be expected of SED officials and HMI who had worked in a culture where every draft is carefully gone over word by word to make sure that the right meanings and nuances are conveyed. Other interviewees had sometimes said things in an unguarded way, which they were unhappy to see in cold print. For instance, one interviewee described two people as 'a couple of hatchet men'. On reflection he substituted a softer turn of phrase. All the changes made were changes of this sort : ones of tone and emphasis. Nobody asked for changes to the basic message.

Nevertheless, anyone reading the transcripts should be aware that these changes have been made. The originals were probably a little nearer to the interviewees' real attitudes and opinions. The edited versions represent the more composed face they wished to present to the world. On the whole, however, very little has been lost, and it was worth paying the small price of that loss to bring the vast majority of the notes and transcripts into the public domain.

How useful are the notes and transcripts as sources ?

Although I have found them invaluable in exploring motives and attitudes, they do pose problems of bias, of reliability and of interpretation. They are biased because in the time at my disposal I have concentrated on interviewing people in positions of authority. So the interviews mainly record the views of the policy-makers but not of their critics; a defensible bias if one is concerned to analyse why things happened as they did. They are biased towards the West of Scotland, because some of the key principals of eastern colleges (James Scotland of Aberdeen, Inglis and McIntosh of Moray House) are dead or no longer available for interview. For the same reason, they are biased towards the non-denominational colleges. (9) Moreover, there is one very significant gap - the views of the leading politicians. Ross, McElhone and Fletcher are dead. Millan has gone to be a European Commissioner. Ewing was approached but refused to be interviewed. Younger was not approached at all.

Then there are the well-rehearsed problems of the reliability of oral history. To quote Kitson Clark again: 'Relatively little history depends solely on human memory, and what does is by general agreement the least reliable historical work'. (10) One problem is that old men forget. I have in some cases been interviewing elderly, but still very alert, people about events twenty or thirty years ago. Although they remember a great deal, some things have gone beyond recall. This is equally true of the not so elderly. Indeed, I myself have found it a chastening experience to be looking at records of events I was involved in and had completely forgotten.

Factual details can sometimes be cross-checked from documentary evidence or discovered in it. The more difficult problem is that memory is never just recall - it is always a selection from and re-ordering of the past. Like Henry V's warriors, we remember our deeds 'with advantages'. Ackroyd makes the same point when he writes of Dickens (11) :'In these letters, he treats the real world rather as people treat the past in memory, smoothing it, idealising it, heightening the episodes of comedy and pathos'. It is all part of the general process in which people, without any deliberate dishonesty or conscious falsification, nevertheless tend to present themselves in a favourable light to those who matter to them. And my interviewees must have been aware that, in talking to me, they were potentially putting their views before their friends and colleagues in Scottish education. (12)

How then are the interviews to be interpreted ? What weight should be put onto the explanations and conjectures which they offer ? The first procedural step is to take account of the personalities of the interviewees, their ideas and the positions which they held. The second is to attempt some sort of 'triangulation' - to compare explanations and conjectures made by people from different perspectives. This has been possible only to a limited extent; by comparing perhaps the views of a college principal with those of SED, or by comparing the views of people at different levels in a hierarchy. The difficulty in this case is that all the interviewees are in a sense 'in it together' - they may have differing perspectives but only within the small world of Scottish education.

This difficulty is compounded by the fact that I am myself an 'insider', having spent 19 years at Jordanhill, 10 of them as a senior administrator in regular contact with HMI and SED officials, followed by 5 years as a part-time consultant to SED. This has affected both the interviews and my interpretation of them and of the evidence in general. Because most of the interviewees knew me, they came expecting to talk to a sympathetic colleague. This may have encouraged them to talk

more freely than they would have done to a stranger, but it also made it difficult for me to question them as sharply as others might have done. Similarly, my experience may have helped me to interpret the evidence, to understand and explain why things happened as they did; but it has also made it difficult for me to stand back from and criticise a system of which I was part. However, this is only a more acute form of the dilemma that faces all historians : that they cannot divest themselves of the knowledge, ideas and assumptions with which they approach the task of interpretation.(13) All they can do is to be alert to their distorting effects, as I have tried to be in the account which follows.

NOTES

1. Runciman (1983) p.168.

2. Humes (1986).

3. McPherson and Raab (1988).

4. From 1976, Education in Scotland becomes very much shorter (only about a fifth of its previous 60 plus pages) and disproportionately concerned with the work of the Inspectorate.

5. Kitson Clark (1967) p.17.

6. This simple phrase could lead the way into the controversial area of the interpretation of texts (hermeneutics). See, for instance, the chapter on Jacques Derrida in Skinner (1985). This, however, is a theoretical morass, which I have thought it best to skirt round.

7. The exceptions were the three Secretaries of SED (Graham, Fearn and Mitchell), Gray and Pollock.

8. Each interview normally lasted between 1 and 3 hours, but several people were interviewed more than once.

9. The three surviving ex-Principals of Catholic colleges - Sister Francis (Notre Dame), Sister Margaret (Notre Dame) and Sister Sheila (Craiglockhart) are now all living outwith Scotland.

10. Kitson Clark (1967) p.61.

11. Ackroyd (1990).

12. For a fascinating discussion of the presentation of self see Goffman (1972) to whom I am indebted for the idea of the interview as a performance in which an idealised view of events is presented to an audience.

13. McIntyre (1973) includes a valuable discussion of the difficulties of interpreting the ideas of other.

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction.

If the purpose of this thesis is to describe and explain the major policy issues in teacher education in Scotland from 1959 to 1981, how is this task to be carried out? Currently one of the commonest pleas is that history and sociology should be more firmly based on theory. Humes and Paterson (1) argue that :

> 'Most standard histories of Scottish education present no intellectual challenge....It is our belief that the failure to challenge is mainly a consequence of the lack of a consciously articulated conceptual and explanatory frame or context'.

Similarly Archer (2) has argued for a theoretical approach to the problem of explaining why educational systems develop and change.

> 'The nature of these problems means that our approach to them must be both historical and comparative. If sociology is to add to the work of the educational historian and the comparative educationist, it must be by developing theories which over-arch their findings'.

What such theories should be and, indeed, whether it is possible to develop them, are matters for dispute. (3) McPherson and Raab (4), however, begin their work by analysing the problems of creating such a framework. They argue that there are three main approaches to the explanation of policy-making. (5) The first stresses the interpenetration of political and civil society; the second their separation; while the third regards their connection as relatively unimportant for the distribution of power. This third line of argument most commonly leads to some form of **pluralism**, which has provided one of the most influential approaches to the study of policy-making.

Pluralism and its critics.

Pluralism is not a theory which puts forward any very specific hypotheses; rather it is a theory in the sense, which Runciman (6) finds defensible, of 'a body of ideas rather than a set of laws'. The central idea of pluralism (7) is simply that in many societies, particularly those of Western Europe and North America, power is shared among a number of bodies: governments, political parties, trade unions,

business corporations, professional associations, pressure groups and so on. Decisions are made in a large number of different arenas, and the power or influence of organisations fluctuates from one arena to another. The Educational Institute of Scotland [EIS], for instance, is a significant participant in the educational arena but could do little to affect the future of Ravenscraig.

Pluralism, therefore, as McPherson and Raab point out, has many variants. (8) However, following from their analysis of types of explanation, they suggest that the variants can be grouped into two main categories. The one sees politics as largely independent of the social order; in which case, politics becomes a process of bargaining between groups or between groups and the government. The other sees interest groups rooted in more enduring elements in civil society, which bind people with the ties of class, race, kinship or locality.

In one variant or another, recent analysts of educational policies in Britain [e.g. Kogan(1975), Hargreaves(1985), Howell and Brown(1983)] have all been led by their analysis of the situation to adopt a stance which is basically pluralist. Perhaps the most influential of these has been Kogan,(9) who has been able to reflect in his academic life on his previous experience as a civil servant in the Department of Education and Science [DES]. He argues that the system of policy-making is pluralistic in two senses. (10) One is that power is dispersed among a number of institutions (11); the other, that the nature of the educational process is such that institutions and even individual teachers exercise discretion about what is actually done. Nevertheless, at a national level, he stresses that the dispersal of power assumed by pluralism is limited by the central role of the DES and by the power which it has to put the 'insider groups' which it chooses to deal with in a privileged position.

> The only certainty is that the DES wields determinant authority and
> great power. Democratic and pluralistic ideals demand more than that,
> particularly since the Department can itself act as an interest group'. (12)

The qualifications which Kogan makes, while defending his pluralist stance, point the way towards some of the more general criticisms of pluralism. Although these take different forms, they all share the view that pluralism exaggerates the dispersal of power and underestimates the extent to which the process of policy-making is dominated by certain privileged groups.

For instance Lindblom, a leading American pluralist, has come round to the view that even democratic societies are only pluralist on issues which do not challenge the main vested interests and the dominant ideology.

'Although I continue to see great value in social and political pluralism if, when, and where it can be practised, I see in actual practice only a limited amount of it in contemporary polyarchies. When I have argued that the policy-making agenda in these systems is typically incremental, an implication is that many non-incremental issues simply do not appear on the agenda. Why? Because (among other reasons) with respect to many issues, including many of the most fundamental issues concerning political and economic structure, there exists no pluralism of opinions or of political initiatives sufficient to bring them to the agenda. In other words, a highly homogeneous (and indoctrinated) set of attitudes and beliefs governs us - specifically, constrains what governments can do. Roughly speaking, I have suggested, politics is pluralist only on secondary issues, not on primary issues'.(13)

Another line of criticism has been developed by Salter and Tapper,(14) writing within a broadly Marxist perspective which emphasises the influence of social changes on the political process. Although they take up Kogan's point that the DES plays a dominant part in policy-making, they criticise him for still putting too much emphasis on the interplay of interest groups and not enough on the 'less easily accessible but nonetheless influential processes ... at work in the formation of educational policy'. (15)

Their essential argument is that educational change is socially determined. As examples, they cite demographic trends and the pressure from a capitalist society to produce a technically competent and disciplined workforce. The response to these social changes, however, has to be worked out in the political arena, where tensions and disagreements exist within the institutions of what, in Marxist terms, they regard as the superstructure.(16) Because they believe that the impact of politicians is too ephemeral to be of any great account, this tends to leave power in the hands of the central bureaucracy, which has a vested interest in increasing its own influence.(17) So the consequence, as they see it, is 'the increasing centralisation of educational power ... The control of the dominant bureaucratic apparatus, the DES, is increasing and will continue to increase'. (18) The motor forces for change may lie in social changes and the consequent political inputs, but the actual policy emerges from 'increasingly bureaucratically controlled

negotiations'. (19)

At this point, Salter and Tapper's arguments begin to have affinities with those of **corporatism**. This, like pluralism, is a term with many meanings, but Jordan and Richardson offer the following definition : (20)

> 'The concept assumes that interest groups do not merely attempt to influence governmental actions, but themselves become part of the decision-making and implementation system. In return for this participation in policy-making, the groups - through the control of their members - make society more manageable for the state or government'.

Therefore the essential distinction between pluralism and corporatism seems to be this. Pluralism tends to assume that interest groups compete, in some sort of free market, with the government acting as referee; whereas corporatism sees the government managing the 'market' by giving privileged access to it to those groups which it regards as important in return for their co-operation. (21)

Put this way, some measure of corporatism would seem to be necessary as a means of ensuring continuity and stability. However, corporatist trends can be evaluated in two ways. (22) An authoritarian view would see them as a way in which the coercive power of the state repressed the interests of the co-opted groups; the liberal view as a voluntary process by which governments can rule by consent.

If one takes this latter view, the distinction between 'liberal corporatism' and Kogan's 'contrived pluralism' begins to look like one for a medieval schoolman. People in both camps seem to be describing the same phenomena, but attaching different labels to them. Perhaps it does not matter greatly which label we use, as long as we remember Popper's injunction to read all definitions from left to right (23) i.e. to remember that they are always shorthand terms for a complex reality.

Incremental or rational planning?

Whichever label is adopted, there is no doubt that power is dispersed to some extent even within totalitarian regimes. Once this is conceded, the process of policy-making is bound to be a complex one, because it inevitably involves some degree of bargaining or negotiation between groups, however unequal in power. Negotiation in its turn implies that the outcomes will normally be some sort of compromise and so

by definition, uncertain, and that the more power is dispersed the more uncertain they will be. On this view, policy-making in Western democracies, inevitably shuffles along from one compromise to another, and planning has to be a one-step-at a-time, incremental process.

This view, however, has been challenged by the advocates of rational planning, and so two broad schools of thought on policy-making have emerged: the rational and the incremental.(24) While accepting that there are limits to rationality, proponents of the rational school, like Simon,(25) argue that planning should involve the listing of all the alternative strategies, the determination of the consequences that flow from them, and the comparative evaluation of these sets of consequences. (26) Against this, incrementalists like Lindblom argue that policy-making normally starts from the consideration of a problem and consists of considering a comparatively narrow range of alternatives, which are judged to be feasible. The result is that policies tend to be 'small-scale extensions of past efforts with the expectation that there will be a constant return to the problem' (27) - a process which he describes as one of successive limited comparisons. This, he would argue, is bound to be the case if policies are arrived at by bargaining between groups.(28) In that sense, pluralism and incrementalism go hand in hand.

Although the two schools of thought are often presented as rivals, Richardson and Jordan suggest that there is a 'remarkable agreement between both approaches on the description of how policies are actually made'. (29) The division between them seems to arise because the two theories are both descriptive and normative.(30) They agree on the description: that policy-making is actually incremental but whereas the rationalists see this as a weakness the incrementalists see it as a strength.

The essence of the rationalist critique is that their model is an ideal which policy-makers should strive to realise. Because they fall short in practice, incremental policies tend to lack a sense of direction, to be conservative because they only modify the status quo a little at a time, and often unjust because in the bargaining which produces them the weak go to the wall.

In his defence of incrementalism, (31) Lindblom acknowledges that these criticisms have some force. He accepts that there should be strategic analysis, as long as its limitations are recognised, and that incremental approaches, because of their incompleteness, may not produce the best policies. Nevertheless, he considers that it has two over-riding virtues when properly conducted : its concern to remedy

identifiable ills and its potential for intelligent exploration through sequences of trial and error. (32)

What then is the theoretical issue for policy-making in teacher education in Scotland which emerges from this debate? Not how to describe its incremental process, but whether that process had the strengths which Lindblom argues are possible, or whether it was just 'muddling through'.

The contribution of systems theory.

Another important approach to the analysis of policy-making is that of systems theory. Various attempts have been made to apply some version of this to educational policy. Howell and Brown (33), for instance, in their studies of ILEA'S review of its Vocational Further Education Service and of the introduction by London University of its B.Ed degree take as their starting point the ideas of the American political scientist, David Easton. (34) He argues that a political system consists of 'those patterns of interaction through which values are authoritatively allocated for a society and these allocations are accepted as authoritative by most persons in the society most of the time'. (35) By definition, this system has a boundary. Across that boundary it receives inputs from the wider society which forms its environment.

Those inputs take two main forms : wants/demands and support. The 'wants' are those of the different sections of society. As there will always be more 'wants' than can be met, they have to be filtered into the political system through such gate-keepers as political parties, pressure groups or administrators, and then become 'demands'. The persistence of societies which, for Easton, is the central question of political theory (36), depends on their ability to satisfy sufficient of those demands to generate support in three key areas which he calls the 'political community', the 'regime', and the 'authorities'.

> The political community consists of the groups which support the
> system, the regime of the structures and rules by which authoritative
> decisions are reached, and the authorities of those who are responsible
> for making the decisions'. (37)

The way in which the system sustains that support is through its outputs, which consist of government policies and their implementation. The system is therefore conceived as being, by the very fact of its existence, in some sort of equilibrium; but that equilibrium is constantly threatened by the demands being made upon it

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which create the stresses with which it has to cope. In order to do so, it needs an effective feed-back loop.

> The capacity of a system to respond to stress will derive from two central pressures found within it. Information about the state of the system and its environment can be communicated to the authorities; through their actions the system is able to act so as to attempt to change or maintain any given condition in which the system may find itself. That is to say, a political system is endowed with feedback and the capacity to respond to it'. (38)

A political system can therefore be regarded as a process by which society responds to the various pressures upon it and turns them into political demands which can be accommodated at least sufficiently to allow it to adapt and survive.

> 'What I am depicting here is, in effect, a vast conversion process. In it the inputs of demands and support are acted upon in such a way that it is possible for the system to persist and to produce outputs meeting the demands of at least some of the members and retaining the support of most'.(39)

As Howells and Brown admit (40), these ideas are open to a number of criticisms. For one thing, the concepts used are relatively loose, and the hypotheses to which they give rise are imprecise. Although Howells and Brown do not themselves push the argument that far, it would seem perfectly possible to restate the essentials of Eastonian theory in everyday language without any significant loss of meaning along the following lines :

> 'Except in very simple enclosed societies, governments have to cope with all sorts of events and pressures - war, famine, economic crises, political and social demands etc. These pressures are often conflicting as in the present controversy over the choice between lower taxes and improved public services. In order to survive, governments have to decide which demands to meet and to mobilise support for their policies. If they fail, as did the Ancient Regime in France, they will be overthrown, or at least put out of office'.

Put in this way, it becomes a series of generalisations which may be useful but which lack the rigour to which systems theory aspires.

Another major criticism is that of the phenomenological school [e.g. Silverman(1970) or Greenfield(1978)] that systems theory concentrates too much on functions and not enough on purposes; that it is too mechanistic and takes too little account of the ways in which the people inside organisations or systems define their situation and try to modify it to suit their own ends. As Gouldner (41) puts it, systems theory shows a 'lack of systematic concern with the way in which the diverse social identities that people bring to the organisation affect organisational behaviour'.

These and other criticisms lead to the fundamental question: in what ways does systems theory contribute to our understanding of events? Does it explain events in some way which is clearer or more satisfying ? In this connection, it is interesting to analyse Howell and Brown's attempt to use the theory. Having argued for its importance, they then try to apply it in two case studies. However, the one on the introduction of the University of London B.Ed begins with a description of all the groups concerned with the B.Ed., and an analysis of their interests and relative strengths. It then goes on to describe how proposals were fed into the decision-making machinery and how they were eventually accommodated by the usual processes of negotiation and discussion. Finally , it describes the outcomes and how support was created and maintained for the B.Ed. scheme.

These events are, indeed, described in the Eastonian terminology of inputs, outputs, conversion and so on; but it is not at all clear in what way these add to our understanding of them.

In a way, this criticism is unfair to Easton. His claim is that he is analysing the necessary functions and processes of any political system, and he admits that his theory does not in itself provide explanations for the choice of particular policies :

> 'My approach to the analysis of political systems will not help us to
> understand why any particular policies are adopted by the politically
> relevant members in a system'. (42)

Another recent and ambitious attempt to frame a general theory about the development of educational systems is that of Archer. (43) Her main concern is with what she calls 'broad educational politics', which she defines as:

> The attempts (conscious and organised to some degree) to influence the
> inputs, processes and outputs of education, whether by legislation,

pressure group or union action, experimentation, private investment, local transactions, internal innovation or propaganda'. (44)

Within this broad arena of educational politics, she sees three types of negotiation taking place:

a)   Internal initiation, in which change is begun from inside the system by educational personnel;

b)   External transaction, which involves relationships between internal and external pressure groups, in which the latter are usually seeking new or additional services; and

c)   Political manipulation, which becomes important the more education depends on public funds, as political pressure then becomes the main way by which groups can hope to achieve their purposes or influence policy.

Unlike Easton, she seeks 'to explain and understand the real events taking place in educational systems' by analysing 'the changing interrelationship between the structure of the resource distribution and the structure of educational interest groups.(45) In order to do this, she uses a conceptual framework derived partly from exchange theory and partly from general systems theory from which she takes the notions that 'the overall distribution of resources provides the context within which all transactions occur and that negotiations completed in one quarter have repercussions in another'. (46) In terms of exchange theory she suggests that all educational interests groups have three main types of bargaining counter - power, wealth and expertise - whose value changes over time, because it is socially determined, and cannot be reduced to a common currency. Success in negotiations depends on possession of these counters and on their relative value. The current distribution of resources therefore becomes crucial in placing limitations on three basic aspects of educational transactions: the nature and number of people admitted to them; their initial bargaining positions; and the volume and kind of demands which can be negotiated.

Without going further into the details, it is clear that analysis along these lines can be valuable in drawing attention systematically to the interrelationship between factors which are likely to be significant and in generating hypotheses which may be illuminating e.g. the suggestion that political manipulation becomes more important

the more a system becomes centralised.

However illuminating, such generalisations are of limited value, for the complex of events can rarely be explained satisfactorily in terms of one general theoretical statement. A good example would be the Scottish teachers' long campaign (1984-7) for an independent pay review. Exchange theory would look at this in terms of the resources held by the Government (cash, legal powers) and by the teachers (the necessary expertise to run the schools), but it could not predict the actual trade-offs which were affected by many other factors such as the political skill of the protagonists in mobilising public support, the value which the government placed on progress with Standard Grade reforms, or calculations of electoral advantages in a general election year. These in their turn would require explanation in terms of other generalisations.

The problem of explanation in the social sciences.

This leads naturally to the wider question of what constitutes explanation in the social sciences, on which there is a voluminous and contentious literature. (47) To discuss this adequately would require a major and largely philosophical work far beyond the scope of this thesis. However, Runciman (48) has provided a masterly review in his 'Treatise on Social Theory', in which he attempts to put the problem of explanation in the wider context of what is meant by understanding in the social sciences.

The starting point of his argument is that there are three types of understanding.

> 'But what then is to count as understanding ? .....It [the question] can be answered adequately only when the concept of understanding has itself been broken down into what I shall from now on refer to as its primary, secondary and tertiary senses. The first of these is the understanding necessary for the reportage of what has been observed to occur or be the case; the second is the understanding of what has caused it; and the third is the understanding necessary for its description in the special sense here given to that term'. (49)

There are, of course, problems with all three types of understanding. It may sound simple to say that the first stage is to report what happened, but in fact there are all sorts of difficulties. There are, for instance, the difficulties of selective perception - 'no observation without presuppositions'; of categorising the events which are being reported; of interpreting what is going on when so much depends on the context and on the intentions of the participants. Against those who stress the

importance of theory, therefore, Runciman cautions that the crucial stage for the social scientist may be that of primary understanding.

> 'The distinction between reported behaviour and the explanation, description or evaluation of it is not between straightforward empirical observations on the one hand and subtle theoretical speculations on the other. It can just as well be the observations which are speculative and the theories which are straightforward'. (50)

At the stage of primary understanding, Runciman accepts that there are differences between the natural and the social sciences because 'the relation between the agent's intentions and the context which gives the intention its meaning is...problematic at both ends'. (51) However, he then argues that, when it comes to secondary understanding, there is no difference between the sciences in the logic of explanation. In his view, an explanation involves a two-fold claim :

> 'First, that a reported event, process or state of affairs has taken place, or been the case, because and only because some other specified event, process or state of affairs took place or was the case beforehand; and second, that this connection holds for some more general reason whose conceptualisation derives in turn from some set of presuppositions to which the researcher is willing to subscribe but which he cannot directly test'. (52)

This implies that social scientists have to state the counter-factual conditionals on which their explanations depend ('if x had not been the case, y would not have happened') and that the strength of the explanation will depend on that contrast.

However, Runciman acknowledges (53) that, even if the hypotheses suggested by these counterfactual conditionals are plausible, the demand for their grounding in theory has to be met. In the last resort, all explanations imply some underlying regularities, but in the social sciences these cannot be stated, as the classical scientific view of theory would require, in the form of a tightly specified 'covering law'.(54) The explanation may take the form not 'because it invariably does' but 'because it can and in this case did'. Attempts to state general theoretical laws of any precision are continually being nullified.

> 'Attempts to generalise across a sufficient range of events, processes or states of affairs as thereby to extend or test a provisional theory are time

and again frustrated by the imposition of qualifications which progressively diminish the scope and interest of the presumptively causal connection. It is not a matter of the complexity so much as the diversity of influences on which the variations in human institutions and practices depend'.(55)

From this Runciman concludes that social scientists often have to make do with what he call 'weak but adequate theories', relatively loose generalisations which may be ad hoc but which provide the most plausible explanation in their context. Popper makes much the same point when he argues that the generalisations used by historians are often taken for granted because they are so trivial.

'If we explain, for example the first division of Poland in 1772 by pointing out that it could not possibly resist the combined power of Russia, Prussia and Austria, then we are tacitly using some trivial universal law such as: "If of two armies which are about equally well-armed and led, one has tremendous superiority in men, then the other never wins"....Such a law might be described as a law of the sociology of military power; but it is too trivial ever to raise a serious problem for the students of sociology, or to arouse their attention'.'(56)

A process model.

If this view of the role of theory is accepted, then the plea for a grand theoretical framework, with which this chapter started, must be rejected. Instead, it would seem more profitable to use some form of 'process model', which simply tries to set out systematically the sorts of events which are likely to take place in policy-making and leaves it open to seek their explanation in whatever theories are appropriate.

I therefore propose to take as a framework the process model set out in Hogwood's 'From Crisis to Complacency? Shaping public policy in Britain'. (57) The main propositions in this are that :

1. Policy can be viewed as a process by which proposals are transformed into activities.
   Policy-making is a process which develops over time from the raising of an issue, discussion of it, and subsequent government action or inaction. The process approach emphasises that policy can be shaped

at all stages of the policy process'. (58)

2. The policy process takes place within a political system. At this point, Hogwood draws on Eastonian systems theory in a qualified form because he sees it as useful, at a high level of generality, in mapping out the relationships between the elements in a political system and in drawing attention to the connection between the system and its social and economic environment. His main qualification is that systems theory does not explain how inputs are converted into outputs. Therefore -

3. To understand a political system, it is necessary to look at the organisations involved and at their relationships. This leads him to analyse the concept of 'policy communities'. (59)

4. The policy process can be expected to go through a number of stages, although not in practice in a neat linear sequence. Those stages can be set out diagrammatically as follows :

Initial state of society

1. Agenda-setting

2. Processing of issue

3. Selection of option

4. Legitimation of option

5. Allocation of resources to policy

6. Implementation

7. Adjudication

8. Impact and its evaluation

Feedback

One value of this model is that it introduces the concept of a 'policy community'. (60) The basic premise of this is the truism that modern government is so complex that it has to work through other agencies, who actually deliver the services be they education, or health care or transport. Ministers can therefore only pay infrequent and limited attention to many of the issues with which their departments deal. As a result, policy-making tends to be broken down, first into broad sectors and then further fragmented into more manageable, semi-independent units below the level of a department.(61) This in turn creates problems of co-ordination with which governments, and indeed all large organisations, continually have to wrestle.

It is to these manageable units that the term 'policy communities' has been applied. They consist of the civil servants in the relevant ministry - typically, it is suggested, led by an Under Secretary or an Assistant Secretary - (62) and a group of 'recognised interests' with which they are in regular contact. What those recognised interests are will vary over time, as will their relative importance. However, because they essentially consist of the major interest groups, policy communities tend to be stable. Most processing of issues tends to take place within them, with the public (and Parliament) normally excluded unless and until the issues become matters of political concern.

Various commentators, but particularly Jordan and Richardson, have argued that within policy communities the basic style of policy-making is that of consultation. (63) They do, of course, recognise that there are various forms of consultation, and that it is certainly not the case that all parties to the consultation are of equal weight, especially if one controls crucial resources. However, they suggest that consultation tends to be the norm for two main reasons. One is that there is a bias towards it in democratic cultures : decisions are not generally regarded as legitimate unless they have been preceded by some consultation with those affected, however cosmetic that may sometimes be in practice. (64) The other is simply functional necessity : that government departments, still largely staffed by generalists, need the specialist knowledge of the recognised interests. The situation is therefore one of mutual, but not equal dependency; another way of describing it is 'bureaucratic accommodation'. (65)

This process has its dangers for both parties. In order to become and remain 'recognised', the interest groups have to learn to observe the rules of the game: to preserve confidentiality, to accept the need for compromise, not to embarrass ministers too much - in short, to become accepted as 'responsible' organisations. The

danger is that some of their members may then see them as having been 'tamed'; what the leaders see as accepting the realities of the situation may seem to their followers a feeble surrender of their interests. The danger for the civil servants is that they may be 'captured' by the interest groups because of their political clout or specialist knowledge, with the result that the policy community largely becomes a vehicle for the defence of their vested interests. (66)

If the concept of a policy community is to be applied to Scottish education, the question arises as to where boundaries are to be drawn. In 'Governing Education', McPherson and Raab see the whole Scottish educational system as one policy community. The strength of their case lies in the undoubted fact that the Scottish system has been relatively centralised and that its component parts have been strongly linked. Not only have there been strong formal links through the activities of the inspectorate and through interlocking membership of committees (67), but these have been reinforced by informal links - personal relationships and the shared background of the 'Kirriemuir career'.(68)

Against this it can be argued that, within this wider framework, there are smaller groups of civil servants and recognised interests working away at particular issues (e.g. the curriculum, the examination system, teacher education) below the level of the whole SED, and that such groups more nearly meet the definition of a policy community. So the question is whether one describes these as sub-communities or as communities linked together in a wider policy-network. As a working hypothesis I propose to take the latter view, and explore the idea that there was a policy community for teacher education.

The other value of the process model is that it sets out the stages in policy-making in such a way that it focuses attention on a number of important questions.

a)   What issues get on the 'policy agenda', defined as 'those demands made upon government which policy-makers choose or feel obliged to pay attention'? (69)

b)   Why do some issues receive attention and others not, and why does attention lead to action in some cases and not in others ?

c)   What are the main sources from which issues come ? Are they political parties, pressure groups, bureaucracies, the media etc.?

d) Once on the agenda, how are issues processed? Are policies imposed does or does consultation take place ? Is that consultation genuine or cosmetic ? Is it about policy or simply about its implementation ?

e) In the process what are the groups involved seeking from one another ? Is it, for instance, simply information, or political support, or the legitimation of their proposals ?

Such questions will provide the framework in this thesis for analysing educational policies whether they obviously enter the general political arena, or whether they are largely determined within the more private world of the 'policy community'.

NOTES

1. Humes and Paterson (1983) p.4.
2. Archer (1979) p.1.
3. Dale (1986) suggests that there are four main approaches : Marxism, Neo-liberalism, Pluralism and Systems Theory.
4. McPherson & Raab (1988).
5. Ibid. p.6.
6. Runciman (1983) p.150.
7. Newton (1976) gives a account of pluralist theory and the criticisms of it.
8. McPherson & Raab (1988) p.6.
9. Kogan (1975 & 1978). For a critical account of his views see Salter & Tapper (1981) pp.90-91, and McPherson & Raab (1988) pp.10-14.
10. McPherson & Raab (1988) p.12.
11. Kogan (1975) p.231. 'The system is pluralistic inasmuch as authority and power are distributed among well-defined institutions at different levels, such as the DES, local authorities, schools and colleges'.
12. Ibid. p.238
13. Quoted Dale (1986) p.76.
14. Salter & Tapper (1981).
15. Ibid. p.91.
16. Ibid. pp.7-8.
17. Ibid. p.39.
   'The input of politicians, whatever their formal powers may be, consists essentially of providing general support for the inevitable logic of the policy-making process. They simply lack the skills, time, resources and inclination to involve themselves in working out the detailed implications of demographic trends or what it means in specific educational terms to set new goals for schooling'.
   This judgement would surely have to be revised in the light of the impact of politicians on education in the 1980s.
18. Ibid. p.30.
19. Ibid. p.44.
20. Jordan & Richardson (1987) p.18.
21. Cawson (1978).
22. McPherson & Raab (1988) p.8.
23. Popper (1945) Chapter 11, Section 2.
24. Jordan & Richardson (1979).
25. Ibid. p.112 for a discussion of Simon's view of 'bounded rationality'.

26. Ibid. p.113 for Simon's Behaviour Alternatives Model.

27. Ibid. p.114.

28. Lindblom (1979) p.135.

29. Jordan & Richardson (1979) p.111.

30. Smith & Day (1980).

31. Lindblom (1979).

32. His defence is very similar to Popper's defence of 'piecemeal social engineering' in 'The Poverty of Historicism'.

33. Howell and Brown (1983).

34. Easton (1965).

35. Ibid. p.96.

36. Ibid. p.78.

37. Howell And Brown (1983) p.21.

38. Easton (1965) p.128.

39. Ibid. p.131.

40. Howell and Brown (1983) pp.21-4 gives a summary of the criticisms.

41. Quoted in Silverman (1970 p.68.

42. Easton (1965) p.89.

43. Archer (1979) and (1985).

44. Archer (1985) p.39.

45. Ibid. p.43.

46. Ibid. p 44.

47. e.g. Ryan (1973), Gardiner (1953), Dray (1957).

48. Runciman (1983).

49. Ibid. p.65.

50. Ibid. p.63.

51. Ibid. p.62.

52. Ibid. pp.154-5.

53. Ibid. p.161.

54. For a discussion of covering laws, see Dray (1957) pp.1-21.

55. Runciman (1983) pp.169-70.

56. Quoted in Dray (1957) p.5.

57. Hogwood (1987)..

58. Ibid. p.8.

59. Ibid. pp.18-22.

60. Rhodes (1988) p.78.
     'Policy communities are networks characterised by stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery responsibilities and insulation from other networks and

invariably from the general public (including Parliament)'.

61. Rhodes (1988) p.58 calls it 'factorisation'.

62. Hogwood (1987) p.18.

63. Jordan & Richardson (1987) pp.169-176.

64. Ibid. pp.170-171.

65. Ibid.p.30.

66. Hogwood (1987) p.62.

67. The Scottish educational establishment is like a stage army : as one moves from one committee to another, the same people keep appearing in different guises. To give just two examples of some of the offices held at various times and among others outwith Scotland by people prominent in Scottish education in this period.

Dr T R Bone: Principal of Jordanhill College, Vice-chairman of the Scottish Examinations Board, Vice-chairman of the Dunning Committee, Chairman of the Scottish Council for Educational Technology, Chairman of the Committee of Principals, and Chairman of the supply committee of the GTC.

Dr M R Green: Chairman of Strathclyde Regional Education Committee, Chairman of the COSLA education committee, Chairman of the Joint Negotiating Committee for Salaries and Conditions of Service, Chairman of the National Committee for the Inservice Training of Teachers.

68. McPherson & Raab (1988), Chapter 17.

It seems to me doubtful whether the Kirriemuir career is now such a strong factor within the policy network as it was in the period they analyse.

69. Hogwood (1981) pp. 33-34.

CHAPTER TWO

DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLAND & WALES.

The English system circa 1960.

The period between 1959 and 1981 saw a far greater transformation of teacher education in England & Wales than in Scotland. North of the border the landscape of teacher education in the 1981 would still have been recognisable to someone familiar with it in 1959. All five non-denominational colleges were still in existence (Jordanhill and Moray House on the same sites); the two Catholic colleges had just amalgamated; all were still essentially institutions for teacher education. Continuity has been strong. In England and Wales, however, the landscape would have seemed very strange; the colleges of education as a separate sector had virtually disappeared.

The development of the two systems between 1959 and 1981 started, for historical reasons, from very different points. In England and Wales, the colleges had originally been developed in the nineteenth century by the Churches to train people to teach in elementary schools. Training remained in the hands of these voluntary bodies until after the 1902 Education Act, which gave the newly constituted education authorities the power to spend money on teacher training. The Local Education Authorities [LEAs] naturally had an interest in training teachers for their schools - as had the Churches - and began to create their own colleges. Up to the outbreak of World War II, these LEA colleges were still in a minority, but the post-war expansion tipped the balance decisively in their favour. By 1962, there were 48 colleges run by the voluntary bodies and 98 by the LEAs. (1)

It can therefore be seen that one effect of these historical developments had been to create a large number of colleges, many of which were necessarily relatively small. In 1962/3, when Robbins surveyed higher education, there were 146 colleges, 126 of which had fewer than 500 students, and only one of which had more than 1,000. (2) Many of them were educationally isolated, as only 61 were in or near university towns. (3) The majority were residential and single-sex.

All these colleges were still essentially concerned with training non-graduates to teach in primary or secondary modern schools. They did have a small number of graduate students taking the one year course, - in 1962-63 460 students which represented 1% of post-graduates (4) - , but they too were mainly training for primary schools. The

normal route into grammar school teaching was to take a university degree followed by a one year course at one of the 24 university department of education, or to go straight from university into schools as training for graduates was not compulsory.

Because this split in teacher education between the colleges and the universities left the colleges with only primary and secondary modern work, most of the college students were women. There was, however, a significant proportion of men: 14,230 out of a student population of 47,320 in 1962/3 (5), but only 2,300 of these were on courses which led exclusively to primary teaching. The rest were on secondary or junior/secondary courses. (6)

Up to the start of this period, the basic course leading to the Teachers' Certificate whether primary or secondary had only lasted two years. However, in a misplaced moment of optimism about teacher supply, the Minister of Education (then David Eccles) had agreed in 1957 that it should be extended to three years in 1960. Until then, the academic standards of the colleges were constrained by the shortness of the course and by the qualifications of their intake. In 1961, 38% of the entrants had the minimum qualifications (2 A Levels) for university entry, but 39% had no qualifications above O Level. (7) In these circumstances, academic standards could not be high.

Moreover, there were other constraints on standards. The staff of the colleges were normally recruited from former teachers, many of them non-graduates. (8) Bedford, for instance, appointed its first graduate principal in 1956. (9) The colleges were too small to have a wide range of specialist staff, and their basic culture was not an intellectual one. Taylor describes it as :

> 'a concern for the personal development of the student, and a corresponding emphasis on pastoral care; a residential tradition (even when many students lived in lodgings or at home); especially in the older voluntary foundations, a continuing dedication to a somewhat etiolated version of gracious living; small group teaching; awareness of the social and moral responsibilities of teachers, and of the importance of lifestyles and restraints that reflected these; a playing down of the importance of subjects and of disciplinary frontiers in favour of a child-centred, problem-focused approach; anxiety about the dangers of academicism coupled with fears about the limitations of over-emphasising relevance and the practical; a vision of the world that viewed technological advance with some scepticism, that gave a valued

place to personal relations and quality of life, that ranked sincerity, integrity and a degree of moral seriousness above training in critical analysis or a commitment to social change'. (10)

Whereas the university departments of education were clearly part of the higher education system, the position of the colleges, given their size and standards, was uncertain. (11) Their relationship with the universities had been the subject of a long-running debate. The last attempt to settle the issue had been the McNair Report of 1944, which had been split on the question of whether the universities should take over direct responsibility for teacher training. Out of the inconclusive discussion which followed, a compromise solution was evolved in which the colleges were associated with the universities through what were known as Area Training Organisations [ATOs]. This left the colleges as separate institutions, but linked to their local university through the ATOs, which were responsible for validating the courses in the constituent colleges and for recommending students to the Ministry as qualified teachers. (12) The colleges were therefore in an obviously subordinate position, associated with the universities but perceived to be doing inferior work. As Alexander puts it :

'Under the ATO system, university control over the structure, content and rationale of initial training was established. The power relationship was unequal and not infrequently characterised on the university side by paternalism, if not autocracy. This relationship depended to some extent on a consistent definition of the colleges' work as inherently problematic and on college staff as needing to climb to "higher" standards which - inevitably and intrinsically in this kind of relationship - the universities saw themselves as representing and defending'. (13)

This relationship was symbolised in its extreme form by Cambridge, which refused to recognise its Institute of Education as an integral part of the University.

Teacher education has rarely been without its critics, and the arrangements just described were no exception. The McNair Report had complained that arrangements for the training and supply of teachers were 'chaotic and ill-adapted to present needs'. (14) The colleges, it alleged, were too small and poorly equipped; the courses too short; and the institutions 'not related to on another in such a way as to produce a coherent training service'. Although by 1963 the course had been lengthened, the Robbins Report repeated substantially the same criticisms and concluded:

'One thing that may be said with certainty is that, if the country had to plan a system of higher education from the outset, the pattern of Training Colleges would be very different from the one that we have'. (15)

By the early 1960s, however, pressures for change were intensifying. The most direct came from those demographic factors which have had such a potent influence on the structures of teacher education both in Western Europe and North America. After falling fairly steadily from 1947 to 1955, the birth rate in England & Wales began to rise in 1956. In that year there were 700,000 births; by the peak post-war year of 1964 the number had risen to 876,000. (16) Another pressure came from improvements in the education system. As a result of the post-war move to secondary education for all and of increasing affluence, a higher proportion of the population was obtaining qualifications for entry into higher education. Between 1954 and 1961, the proportion of an expanding age group which obtained university entrance qualifications rose from 4.3% to 6.9%. The number of university places too was expanding, but more slowly than the number of qualified applicants. So the proportion of qualified applicants actually obtaining university places was tending to go down. (17)

The Robbins Report.

It was against this background that the Robbins Committee was appointed to review the pattern of higher education in Great Britain, and from this point policy-making for teacher education in England and Wales came to be indissolubly linked to that for higher education as a whole.(18) When the Committee came to consider the education and training of teachers, its proposals seem to have been based on two assumptions. One was that small monotechnic institutions could not satisfactorily provide higher education. This underlay the criticisms in para.318 and the suggestions about diversification in para. 313. The second was that the natural line of development for the colleges was to come into closer association with the universities. It noted that :

> 'Since the establishment of University Institutes of Education following the McNair Report of 1944, and more especially since the lengthening of the course, the Training Colleges in England and Wales have felt themselves closer to the universities and desirous of coming more clearly yet into the university orbit'.(19)

The Report then argued that the links between the colleges and the universities should be further strengthened for two reasons: because it would 'greatly help and encourage the colleges' and because it 'would at the same time give the universities a major responsibility for direct leadership in a vital sector of higher education that has so far been only marginal to their main activities'. (20) It therefore rejected the suggestion that the colleges should develop separately under a central body on the model of the National Council for Technological Awards. Instead it revived the proposal in Scheme A of the McNair Report that colleges should become constituent parts of university Schools of Education, but went beyond McNair in proposing that the universities should be responsible not only for the academic work of the colleges but, within a federal structure, for their finance and administration.

The other key proposal in Robbins was that, in recognition of their rising standards, the colleges should be encouraged to develop four-year courses leading to a degree, which might be available to about 25% of students by the mid-1970s. This degree should be known as the B.Ed. and should be awarded by the universities through the proposed Schools of Education.

These two sets of proposals met very different fates. There was, as we shall see, fairly ready acceptance of the idea of a B.Ed, and developments were soon under way. The Schools of Education, however, had a more mixed reception. (21) The local authorities opposed them mainly because, as Shearman had argued in his Note of Reservation to Robbins, they would break the link between teacher training and those responsible for the schools; but also because they feared that closer links between the colleges and the universities would have a harmful effect. As Sir Alec Clegg said in his evidence to Robbins:

> 'To put it bluntly, if the training colleges come to be more closely under
> the influence of the universities and university training departments,
> essential as that is for the teaching of the grammar school pupil or
> youngsters in the main stream of the modern school, the danger is that
> this present development of teaching (child-centred), which I think is
> most exciting, in the education service and is essential is likely to be
> lost'.(23)

The DES was doubtful about them 'on the ground that it leaves to twenty or more separate universities the responsibility for producing the very large numbers of teachers we shall require to staff our schools'. (24) The Universities Grants

Commission [UGC] opposed them, fearing quite rightly that, if it took over responsibility for the colleges and hence for teacher supply, this would 'jeopardise the principle of non-accountability in respect of university expenditure'. (25)

As opinion in the universities themselves was divided (26), it was not surprising that, under strong pressure from the local authorities, the UGC and its own officials, the Labour government accepted the academic proposals of Robbins but not the administrative and financial. This decision, as Sir Edward Boyle argued (27), was probably inevitable given the attitudes of the universities, the just apprehensions of the education authorities, and the dislocation which the proposals would have created at a time when expansion was causing its own upheavals. However, it left the colleges in an anomalous position as public sector institutions, but still looking to the universities for the validation of their courses, an anomaly which was underlined by the government's decision in 1965 to adopt a 'binary policy' and thereby to encourage the development of institutions of higher education outwith the university sector whose degrees would be validated by the CNAA. So the colleges straddled the binary fence, and the decision was left for the future as to which side they would come down on.

However, the immediate post-Robbins period was dominated, not by structural issues, but by breakneck expansion within existing structures. Between 1964 and 1971, the number of students on Certificate or B.Ed courses rose from 22,281 to 37,794. (28) In order to cope, new day colleges for mature students were opened (29) and other colleges had to resort to all sorts of makeshift arrangements: 'box-and-cox' in which half the students were out on teaching practice so that the other half could be accommodated in college; lengthening the college terms; even a three session day.

Despite these strenuous efforts to meet the apparently insatiable demand for teachers, the colleges still found themselves the focus of criticism. Much of this centred on the quality of training. The Plowden Committee acknowledged that 'teacher training institutions have been working under great strain in the last decade', but called for an inquiry into teacher training on the grounds that the colleges were too isolated from higher education, forced their students into choices too early, and were not equipping their students adequately for the new pedagogy of child-centred education. (30) There were criticisms too that the new B.Ed arrangements were simply adding academic content to the courses, and were diverting attention from professional training.(31) Because of these concerns, the Parliamentary Select

Committee on Education and Science chose to inquire into teacher training in 1969. It conducted extensive hearings (32) but, before it could report, Parliament was dissolved in 1970 and a Conservative Government came into office with Margaret Thatcher as Minister of Education.

The James Report.

One of her first actions was to appoint a committee of inquiry into teacher education and training under the chairmanship of Lord James. This committee was unlike Robbins in several respects: it was only concerned with England and Wales; it was not a representative committee but, perhaps presaging a style of government which has since become familiar, it was a small hand-picked committee, which was asked to report quickly.

When it came to report (33), the Committee started from the premise that the existing system of teacher education was no longer adequate. 'That inadequacy arises from an overdependence upon initial training, as distinct from continuing education, and from an unhelpful distinction between two kinds of training, one route for graduates and another for non-graduates'. (34) To remedy that inadequacy, James produced proposals which, it was intended, (and how ironically the passage reads in retrospect):

> 'should reflect and help to enhance the status and independence of the
> teaching profession and of the institutions in which many teachers are
> educated and trained. For too long the teaching profession has been
> denied a proper degree of responsibility for its own professional affairs.
> For too long the colleges of education have been treated as junior
> partners in the system of higher education'. (35)

The bold solution which James offered was to divide teacher education into three 'cycles'. The first cycle was to last two years and to concentrate on the personal education of the students. This would lead to a Diploma in Higher Education, which could either be a qualification in its own right or the first part of a degree course. (36) The advantages of this, James argued, were that it would allow students to keep their options open rather than committing themselves to teaching at the age of 18, and that it would help 'to break down the "isolation" in which many teachers are at present educated'.(37)

The second cycle, in which professional education began, was also to last two years. The first was to be a full time year of training in colleges or universities in which

the emphasis was to be 'unashamedly specialised and functional'.(38) This was to be followed by a properly organised probationary year in which 'the emphasis....must lie upon further training to complete the initial phase'. (39) At the end of this cycle, teachers would be awarded a B.A.(Ed.)

This reform of initial training depended, in James' view, on the proposals for the third cycle. By this he meant 'the whole range of activities by which teachers can extend their personal education, develop their professional competence and improve their understanding of educational principles and techniques'.(40) Because 'it is self evident that pre-service training, together with the probationary year, can be no more than a foundation', (41) it was of prime importance that all teachers should have regular access to third cycle activities.

This new structure was to be administered by a National Council for Teacher Education and Training, under which were to be a series of Regional Councils. These were to be responsible for the recognition of all professional teaching qualifications, for making recommendations on the planning and rationalisation of all second and third cycle provision and of first cycle work in the colleges of education and the polytechnic education departments. Because the proposed B.A.s and M.A,s in Education were to be validated and awarded by the National Council, this would have had the effect of preserving a separate teacher education sector with its own machinery for planning and validating courses, both pre-service and inservice.

According to the 1972 White Paper :

> 'The six objectives at which the [James] Committee aimed have
> received universal acclaim. These are they : a large and systematic
> expansion of in-service training; a planned reinforcement of the
> process of induction; progressive achievement of an all-graduate
> profession.....; the improved training of further education teachers;
> the wholehearted acceptance of the colleges of education into the
> family of higher education institutions; and improved arrangements for
> the control and co-ordination of teacher training and supply'.(42)

Despite this alleged acclaim, very little of what James recommended was ever realised in practice. This was, as Lynch suggests (43), partly because such radical changes challenged too many vested interests; partly because of the demographic time-bomb which was already ticking away under teacher education while the James Committee was at work. Although the Committee was made aware that the demand

for teachers would fall sharply,(44) the only reference in the Report is a cryptic sentence tucked away in para.6.21 :

> 'To put it bluntly, the supply of new teachers is now increasing so rapidly that it must soon catch up with any likely assessment of future demand, and choices will have to be made very soon between various ways of using or diverting some of the resources at present invested in the education and training of teachers'.

What is not clear is why James did not publish these downward projections, which would have strengthened its own case for the Dip.H.E. and for the expansion of inservice. (45)

The contraction of teacher education.

By the time the White Paper was published, that time-bomb was already beginning to burst. In 1971-72, the DES forecast for the number of initial training places in colleges and polytechnics needed in 1981 had been 114,000. The White Paper reduced this to 60,000-70,000, but softened the blow by proposing by then to expand in-service to the equivalent of 15,000 places. (46) Such a drastic reduction could only be achieved by a major reorganisation of teacher education. The government's proposals for this completely destroyed the James' concept of a strong, separate and co-ordinated system of teacher education. The reasons for this policy were largely logistical: too many of the colleges were 'comparatively small and inconveniently located'. (47) But it also reflects the underlying assumption that the isolation of teacher education was a mistake and that the future lay with multi-purpose rather than with mono-technic institutions.

The White Paper therefore set out a number of options for the future of the colleges:

> 'Some colleges either singly or jointly should develop over the period into major institutions of higher education concentrating on the arts and human sciences, with particular reference to their application in teaching and other professions. Others will be encouraged to combine forces with neighbouring polytechnics or other colleges of further education to fill a somewhat similar role...... Some will continue to be needed exclusively for purposes of teacher education with increasing emphasis on in-service rather than initial training. Some may seek greater strength by reciprocal arrangements with the Open

University...Others may find a place in the expansion of teachers' and professional centres. Some must face the possibility that in due course they will have to be converted to new purposes; some may need to close'. (48)

The government was also prepared in a few cases to consider mergers between colleges and universities. However, for the great majority of colleges, the options on offer amounted either to closure or to 'much closer assimilation into the rest of the non-university sector of further and higher education'. (49)

The White Paper was followed up by DES circular 7/73 inviting local authorities to submit schemes for reorganisation and initiating consultation with the voluntary bodies. This could not have come at a more awkward time for the local authorities which were going out of existence because of local government reform in 1974.

However, pressure for action was mounting because it was already clear that even the revised figures for the birth rate on which the White Paper had been based were too optimistic. (50) This coupled with the economic difficulties which followed from the rise in oil prices made the government more determined than ever on a major reorganisation. So began a period of upheaval which lasted for the next decade.

The detailed story of the changes has been told elsewhere and is too complicated to be recounted here. Broadly they fell into three phases. The first ran roughly from 1974-76, during which the government was negotiating with the local authorities and the governing bodies of the colleges on the basis of the White Paper figures. These negotiations were inevitably more complicated than the subsequent ones about the Scottish colleges. The education system in England and Wales did not lend itself to contraction. (51) The DES had to negotiate with 104 education authorities and an even larger number of very diverse institutions. There was the added complication that the colleges belonged to the local authorities or to the voluntary bodies. In such circumstance, collective planning was virtually impossible. Although it did have reserve powers, the official DES line had to be that it was giving advice. In practice, its financial powers and control over intakes meant that it could exert very strong pressure and that advice shaded into direction.

These negotiations were carried out in great secrecy. (52) Sheltering behind its claim to be advising individual bodies, the DES never made any statement of general

policy and was never compelled to show its hand. The consequent uncertainties created an atmosphere in the colleges of 'total chaos and confusion', (53) as staff who had struggled to bear the burdens of expansion suddenly found their whole future in doubt.(54) However, behind the apparent chaos of individual negotiations, the general pattern of DES policy began to be manifest. It was basically to run down the teacher education sector in line with falling demand, and to use the resources of the colleges, both buildings and (where possible) staff, to expand public sector higher education; in the words of Harding [DES official responsible for negotiations with the colleges] 'to put teacher training in a context where spare resources could be put to a wider variety of uses'. (55)

By 1975, the immediate fate of most colleges had been settled in principle. A few were marked for closure; most of the rest were in the process of merging with polytechnics or forming other sorts of amalgamations. But this first phase was not even complete before the DES began to regard it as insufficient. As early as March 1975 a DES report on teacher supply proposed further cuts and closures. The impetus to these continued to come from the falling birth rate and the country's economic difficulties. We have already seen how these difficulties made it tempting for the government to use the colleges as a cheap way of expanding higher education. They also provided reasons for holding back on the improvements in staffing ratios and on the expansion of inservice which had been envisaged in the White Paper. On top of these came the effects of the Houghton award of 1974 which made the employment of teachers more costly and which, along with a tightening job market, reduced wastage rates from the profession.

Together these factors gave the DES a powerful case for its proposals to move towards 'a minimum system'. The idea was to stabilise the teacher education system at a level which would meet foreseeable demand and be capable of expansion should the need arise. Adoption of this policy was delayed by a ministerial reshuffle in the summer of 1976, which brought Shirley Williams to the DES, but by January 1977 she was ready to announce a plan to reduce the number of teacher training places in the public sector to 45,000, including about 10,000 for inservice. A further 5,000 were to be provided by the universities. This inaugurated the second phase, in which different planning procedures were adopted. Instead of negotiation and 'advice', which had proved slow and time-consuming, the government proceeded to issue proposals and invite representations. The final decisions were announced in July 1977.

As some compensation for this greater centralisation, the government published for the first time a general statement about its strategy for a coherent national system of

teacher education. This took the form of a paper prepared for the Advisory Committee on the Supply and Training of Teachers, which set out five criteria for a policy for teacher education: (56)

    i)   teacher education should be integrated with other forms of higher education;

    ii)   initial and inservice training provision should be related to the geographical distribution of teachers;

    iii)   the teaching force should move towards an all-graduate profession;

    iv)   the teacher education system should be stabilised at a level from which it was capable of expansion;

    v)   the output should be sufficient to meet the needs of the schools, including specialist provision.

The government then moved quickly towards an all-graduate profession - a move which essentially involved the replacement of the three-year Certificate courses for primary teachers with a three-year B.Ed. A Green Paper in July 1977 reaffirmed its commitment (57) and in August 1978 a decision was announced that the last intakes to the Certificate courses would be for session 1979-80. (58)

However, its hope that the 'minimum system' would provide stability proved short-lived. In 1979 a Conservative government came into office with the declared intention of cutting public expenditure. With school rolls falling, and projected to go on falling throughout the 1980s, teacher education was an obvious target. So a third phase of re- organisation began which led to a further 9 colleges losing initial teacher training in 1982.

Overall there were two obvious consequences of these three phases. Firstly, the number of students being trained as teachers fell dramatically. In 1973-73, 37,000 students were admitted to three and four year teacher training courses in the colleges; by 1980-81, that figure had dropped to 7,000.(59) As the number attending one-year PGCE courses at the universities remained roughly constant, the impact of contraction fell wholly on the colleges.(60)

Secondly, there was a sea-change in the number and nature of the institutions. In 1972,

there had been 159 involved in initial teacher training (excluding the universities and the colleges which trained technical teachers). By 1981 that number had been reduced to 74. What happened to the institutions which disappeared ?

'26 colleges ceased initial training without merging, all but one of which closed;

there were 36 fewer colleges and departments of education as a result of mergers;....

7 colleges ceased initial teacher training after merging with colleges of further education to form 6 new colleges;

4 colleges ceased initial training after merging with polytechnics;

12 colleges joined universities.' (61)

The survivors in the public sector were 22 polytechnics and 54 other colleges, most of which called themselves Colleges or Institutes of Higher Education, although in the eyes of the DES there was no such category. (62) Fourteen of these had been formed by amalgamation between colleges of education and colleges of further education. The remaining 38 were either 'free-standing' former colleges of education, or the result of a merger between colleges. However, the majority even of the 38 had diversified to some extent. Only a handful remained exclusively concerned with teacher education.

The development of the B.Ed.

The government had therefore clearly been successful in bringing teacher education out of its isolation, as almost all of it was now provided in multi-purpose institutions. Whether by so doing it had improved its quality is another matter, but the structural re-organisation which we have just been describing had considerable effects on the curriculum of teacher education, particularly on the development of the B.Ed courses.

In 1960 the colleges were still offering a curriculum which had changed little since the end of World War II. Normally the pattern was that suggested by the McNair Report: a tripartite structure of education courses, curriculum courses (including teaching practice), and subject courses (63). McNair had intended these subject courses to prepare the students to teach, but increasingly they had come to be regarded as 'concerned primarily for.. the personal development of the student, and not

necessarily having any direct connection with his teaching work'. (64) The result was to create a dichotomy between 'academic' and 'professional' education, which remains one of the problem areas of teacher education.

The introduction of a three year course in 1960 did little to alter this basic pattern and at the end of the decade the Principal of Coventry College was still able to describe the balance of the curriculum in terms which would have been familiar twenty years earlier. (65) The pressures on the colleges to expand and to respond to Robbins had been such that it would have been unrealistic to expect major revisions of course structure or patterns of training as well.(66) What changes had taken place tended to reinforce the boundary lines within the certificate courses. For, in their quest for academic respectability, one of the main responses of the colleges to the extra year was to attempt to raise academic standards, partly by extending and deepening the main subject courses, and partly by changing the education courses from an 'undifferentiated mush' to separate courses based on the disciplines of psychology, sociology, philosophy and (sometimes) history of education. These developments had their critics outside the colleges, who complained that courses were becoming too academic to the neglect of practical skills. Inside the colleges, they tended to divide staff between those who sought academic rigour and those who clung to the older college tradition with its emphasis on a pastoral concern for the students.

These divisions were intensified by the main curriculum development of the 1960s - the introduction of the B.Ed degrees following from the recommendations of the Robbins Report. Although the number of students following these courses by the early 1970s was quite small, perhaps no more than 5% (67), their significance to the colleges was very great because for the first time they gave them the kudos of degree-level work. In order to achieve this, however, they had at that time to seek validation from the universities. Moreover, they were under pressure to seek it quickly, and this had two consequences of importance. One was to encourage the colleges to produce B.Ed courses which were similar in structure to the Certificate courses, but with the main subject elements strengthened to meet the universities' demands for academic rigour in degree courses in the traditional subject areas with which they were familiar. The other was that there was no time for consultation among the universities to produce any general view of what a B.Ed degree should be (whether a general view would have emerged had there been time is doubtful!), and so there developed a very great degree of diversity in degree structures. There was, for instance, great concern among teachers at the inequalities created by the fact that some universities were willing to validate Honours B.Eds and others were not.

So it was not long before the B.Ed became the centre of controversy in which the essential issue was that already raised about the extended Certificate courses: that they were emphasising academic work at the expense of the professional preparation of the students. Some people in the colleges and universities naturally defended the B.Ed. Hewett, the secretary of the Association of Teachers in Colleges and Departments of Education [ATCDE], argued (68) that the universities had been generous and flexible in their validation of the B.Eds and that the future of the colleges lay in closer links with them along the lines advocated by Robbins. Against this view were ranged criticisms from representatives of the education authorities, the teachers, and other teacher educators. In a memorandum to the Select Committee on Education and Science, Sir Alec Clegg [Director of Education, West Riding] wrote: 'I fear and deplore the effect of the B.Ed degree'.(69) The National Union of Teachers [NUT] complained that :

> 'A conservative university outlook has in, some cases, deliberately
> excluded the study of some subjects from the pattern of B.Ed courses,
> and has sometimes ordained a content and structure of courses with no
> regard to the distinctive purposes for which the Robbins Report
> recommended the institution of a B.Ed degree'. (70)

Eric Robinson put the argument against university validation more forcefully :

> 'I see the damage done [to the colleges] by the University
> association as firstly, their isolation from and resistance to popular
> democracy; secondly, their humiliating and degrading domination by
> the universities; and thirdly, their failure to resolve the conflict between
> the demands of vocational and academic education'. (71)

This crucial third point was taken up by Renshaw at a more philosophical level (72) in articles exploring the proper nature of a professional education for teachers, but this promising line of thought had little practical impact at the time; the over-riding influences of the 1970s were James and the reorganisation of the colleges.

The James Report lent official weight to these criticisms of the university connection and its effects on college courses:

> 'Their courses have in many cases become too academic, in the bad
> sense which that word should never have acquired. In an attempt to
> make the college courses academically "respectable" students are

sometimes fed with a diet of theoretical speculation, based on researches the validity and scholarship of which are not always beyond question'. (73)

Its solution, as we have seen, was to endorse the principle of consecutive training by separating the personal education of the students in the first cycle from their professional training in the second and third.

Although the Report did encourage the separation of personal and professional training, as well as a move away from university validation, its practical effects were overshadowed by the contraction and reorganisation which followed the 1972 White Paper. Mergers with polytechnics, or amalgamations to form new institutions of higher education, brought teacher education into the advanced further education sector, which normally looked to the CNAA for the validation of its courses. Falling student numbers and uncertain employment prospects for teachers forced course designers towards more flexible arrangements which linked B.Ed courses to a Dip.H.E. or to another degree in order to make them viable.

The result was what Alexander has called 'the container revolution' (74): the move to produce courses which were either modular or at least interlocking with other courses to some degree. During the 1970s a high proportion of institutions developed courses of these types. (75) Opinions differ, however, about the extent to which this period of 'almost continuous course development' (76) brought about changes of real significance. Lynch has argued (77) that the new courses moved strongly towards integration of the academic and professional, but others like Alexander (78) are sceptical and see them more as old wine in new bottles. Perhaps it would be fair to say that, just as the pressures to expand in the 60s had inhibited a fundamental reappraisal of course content and structure, so did the pressures of contraction in the 70s, when survival was the first priority. Reviewing the situation in 1979, the Inspectorate found a great diversity of course structures in the 15 institutions which they surveyed. (79) All but two, however, retained the old tripartite structure of education studies, subject studies and professional studies, even though in nearly all cases the courses now had some form of modular structure. While congratulating the colleges on having come successfully through one of the most turbulent periods in their history and urging that they should now be given a period of stability, HMI expressed concern about two aspects of the curriculum. One was that the three elements in the tripartite structure were insufficiently integrated in most colleges; the other that the curriculum had not been modified sufficiently to take account of changing circumstances in schools with the result that students were

inadequately prepared for such things as mixed ability teaching, multi-cultural education or dealing with pupils with special educational needs.

These criticisms pointed the way towards a more 'professional' type of degree course, one based more on an analysis of the knowledge and skills required by a beginning teacher. However, they also marked a shift in the argument about teacher education from institutional arrangements to the curriculum, from the numbers game to the questions about quality and nature of teacher education which were to become prominent in the 1980s.

Diversification and inservice training.

The most direct effect of the structural changes was not on the curriculum of initial training but on the other work of the colleges. Most of them were absorbed into multi-purposes institutions. Even for those which remained 'free-standing' and therefore more like the Scottish colleges, diversification was seen as the key to survival.

There were usually two approaches to this. The first, which had no parallels in Scotland, was to develop completely new areas of work, like the B.A.(Combined Studies) at Bulmershe (80) or the B.A. degrees in the Humanities Division at Edge Hill. (81) The other, which did have its Scottish counterpart, was the development of inservice work.

The context for this, as for other aspects of teacher education, was very different in England and Wales. The McNair Report, far-seeing in this as in so many other respects, had recognised the need to expand the provision of inservice courses and had made various recommendations, most of which were not implemented. (82) Development throughout the 1950s was slow: the university Institutes of Education gradually expanded their provision of award-bearing courses; the larger LEAs expanded their short course programmes as they built up their advisory services; the DES sponsored a programme of one-year supplementary courses specifically designed for those teachers who had only one or two years training. What all this amounted to, when our period opens in 1960, is difficult to tell because inservice education excited such low interest that little was being written about it. During the 1960s, however, all that changed quite dramatically as a result of major developments in the curriculum and organisation of schools. For this was the decade of the Plowden Report, the Nuffield projects, the creation of the Schools Council, the move towards comprehensive secondary Schools, the introduction of the Certificate in Secondary Education. Alongside all these, new technologies were beginning to make

their impact. At a time when not merely new techniques but new philosophies were being advocated inservice education could no longer be regarded as something unimportant or peripheral. Indeed, most of the major reports of the 60s - Plowden, Newsom and Gittens -advocated its expansion, and expansion did take place quite rapidly but in an haphazard way.

By 1970, therefore, inservice provision was becoming better documented. (83) It continued to be conceived, in practice, almost entirely as the provision of a menu of courses from which individual teachers chose their own fare. What was on offer depended largely on the skills and resources of the various providers.

Much of this provision was in the form of short courses lasting less than 4 days. 73% of all courses were of this sort and nearly 80% of those provided by the LEAs. Even at this level, however, the universities remained significant agencies, and in some areas were still probably the major providers. (84)

In long course provision, the universities were dominant. The colleges' main contribution had been the one-year supplementary courses, but the 60s saw a sharp decline in the numbers on these from 2054 in 1961/62 to 233 in 1969/70 as the proportion of teachers with less than three years' training dwindled. This was only partly compensated for by the growth in one-term courses in areas of need like mathematics. In the same period, the numbers on diploma courses went up from 136 to 524 and higher degree courses from 114 to 679. Most of this expansion was in the university sector.

By 1970 three clear differences from the Scottish context can be discerned. One is the strength of the university sector. The second is the corresponding weakness of the colleges, due to their size and location, the strain put on their resources by the expansion of initial training, the lack of encouragement from the DES or LEAs to undertake inservice, and - it must be admitted - doubts among teachers about their capacity to do so. (85)

The third was the development in England and Wales of teachers' centres. Before 1960, these had scarcely existed but, according to Thornbury (86), by 1967 there were 270 and by 1972 this number had shot up to 617. The original impetus to this growth came from Nuffield projects looking for ways in which their materials could be piloted (and later disseminated) locally, and it was greatly encouraged by the support of the Schools Council set up in 1964. By the early 1970s, teachers' centres had become the focus of international attention and were spawning a literature of

their own. (87) Writing in 1973, Hollins (88) described them as 'the most promising element in current inservice training'. Part of their attraction was that they seemed to offer a new approach, moving away from the idea of courses in which 'experts' offered solutions to that of supporting 'teacher-professionals' in trying to answer questions for themselves. (89) How far this ideal was realised in practice is open to dispute - in some cases, the Centres were used mainly for local authority courses or for the dissemination of national projects; in others, the wardens may have lacked the skills to act as genuine facilitators. (90) But the ideal certainly chimed in with the prevailing view that successful curriculum development had to be from the grass-roots upwards.

When all this provision was put together, how extensive was it? Several enquiries were made into this (91) and the conclusion was that 'provision in the mid-1960s was at a general level of about four course-days per teacher per year'. (92) This average, of course, concealed the fact that a significant proportion of teachers were not involved in any inservice activities; that provision was unevenly distributed and ill-coordinated (inevitably so when over 500 separate organisations were involved); and that what was provided was not necessarily what the teachers either wanted or needed. (93)

Such was the unsatisfactory scene viewed by the James Committee. Its reaction was to stress the prime importance of the 'third cycle', and to argue that 'a much expanded and properly co-ordinated programme of inservice education and training is essential to the future strength and development of the teaching profession'. (94) Its specific proposals were:

1.   that there should be more opportunities to obtain degrees, higher degrees and advanced professional qualifications, including Inservice B.Eds which should be professional rather than academic;

2.   that the variety of inservice activities should be widened to include secondments and work experience;

3.   that much more inservice should be school-based.

      'Inservice training should begin in the schools....Every school should regard the continued training of its teachers as an essential task, for which all members of staff share responsibility' (95);

4.	that teachers should be entitled to one term's release for inservice every 7 years; and

5.	that inservice should be supported by a nation-wide network of professional centres.

Although in some respects the James Report was old-fashioned in that its concept of inservice was still largely that of an a la carte provision for the individual teacher, it was nevertheless of great importance in focusing attention on inservice and stimulating debate about it.(96)

In general, the response to James was favourable and a climate was created in which the prevailing wisdom was that inservice should be expanded as much as possible. The possibilities, however, were severely curtailed by the ensuing economic difficulties, and the central idea of James - that of a planned third cycle - was not implemented. Nor were some of his other more ambitious and costly proposals, such as sabbaticals for teachers. Instead, developments in the ensuing decade were both slow and piece-meal.

The most visible development was the expansion of award-bearing courses: Inservice B.Eds, diplomas and higher degrees. The creation of B.Ed Degrees post-Robbins inevitably stimulated a demand among non-graduate teachers for the opportunity to upgrade their qualifications. The initial responses to this were cautious. The DES issued a circular in 1969 which allowed serving teachers to be admitted to the fourth year of B.Ed courses. It was within these regulations and the context of university validation that most of the early Inservice B.Eds were developed. In consequence, they were full-time courses, with an emphasis on comparability with the academic content of the preservice B.Eds., because the universities did not have provision for the award of part-time first degrees. This situation was clearly unsatisfactory. Teachers complained about the inconsistency of university arrangements (as they did about the preservice B.Ed); about the difficulties of access due to geographical imbalances and the costs of secondment; above all, about the unsuitability for serving teachers of courses designed for students.

This dissatisfaction was one of the pressures which helped to produce new course patterns. Others stemmed from the structural changes in teacher education. As initial training was cut back, the DES agreed to use some of the spare capacity to expand inservice, and gave the colleges an allowance of 22% of their preservice complement for this which they had to justify by recruiting to courses. At the same

time, the new institutions being created were tending to take their inservice courses to the CNAA for validation, partly as institutional policy, and partly in the belief that the CNAA would be more sympathetic to part-time, professionally-orientated courses.

As a result, part-time courses expanded rapidly and the Inservice B.Ed became big business. When Evans carried out his evaluation study in 1979 (97), there were 62 Inservice B.Ed courses, 33 validated by the Universities (15 FT and 18 PT) and 29 validated by CNAA (2 FT and 27 PT). Altogether there were 6,740 teachers enrolled on them, of whom 93% (6253) were on part-time courses.

Alongside the development of the Inservice B.Ed, and to some extent fuelled by it, went the expansion of Higher degrees and diplomas. Between 1976/7 and 1981/2, the number of teachers enrolled for higher degree courses rose from 452 to 1169 full-time students and from 2196 to 4901 part-time. Some of this expansion was accounted for by developments in the public sector where by 1981/2 there were 34 masters degree courses, 15 validated by universities and 19 validated by the CNAA. The CNAA courses accounted for 48 of the full-time students (10.6%) and 750 of the part-time (15.3%); so this sector was still university dominated. (98)

The great growth area for the public sector was in part-time diploma courses. The original CNAA diploma regulations had been restrictive, specifying a first degree as the normal entry requirement to a diploma course and assuming that it was a first step towards a higher degree. However, the Council came to recognise that a post-graduate diploma did not fit with the circumstances of the teaching profession (99), and so new regulations were formulated for a separate Diploma in Professional Studies in Education [DPSE]. The first two of these began in 1978/9; by 1984/5 there 82, with 1754 students enrolled nearly all of them part-time. The public sector had become as dominant here as the universities in higher degrees.

The period therefore saw several significant changes in course provision. (100) The number of award-bearing courses increased sharply and the range of topics covered widened, but part-time became the norm. The role of the public sector became more important, and with it that of the CNAA. Along with the increase in LEA and other short courses (e.g. the one term courses sponsored by DES), this represented a considerable increase in course provision. Paradoxically, this took place at a time when thinking about inservice was stressing the inadequacies of courses and suggesting different approaches to what was coming to be called 'staff development'.

Ever since it began in the 19th century, people had thought about inservice mainly as the provision of external courses for individual teachers. The model was that of personal professional development - improve the knowledge and skills of the individual teacher and all would be well. As long as schools were relatively small and stable, and inservice provision was on a small scale, this model went unchallenged. The 1960s, however, were a period of rapid change in schools. Inservice activities began to become an important aspect of teacher education and, as their demands on resources mounted, so the value of the traditional model began to be questioned. What effects, it was asked, were all these courses having on the practice in the schools ? Once that question was asked, the answer could hardly be in doubt. Courses, particularly short courses (the staple fare of inservice), could be valuable in all sorts of ways (101), but they were not an effective way of bringing about improvements in schools. (102)

The response to these doubts about the personal, professional model of inservice was to shift the emphasis away from meeting the needs of the individual teacher to meeting those of a school or of a functioning group within the school - a systems development model. (103) The roots of this response were both practical and theoretical. The practical roots were in school-based activities, related to changes like the introduction of comprehensive schools, or in local curriculum development groups justified by the arguments against centre-periphery models of curriculum innovation. The theoretical roots were in the adoption of the concept of staff development from industry and the civil service, with its central idea of a planned programme of activities to meet the needs of the organisation.

This new concept was defined by the HMI then responsible for teacher education as :

> 'all the strategies employed by trainers and teachers in partnership to
> direct training programmes in such a way as to meet the identified needs
> of a school, and to raise the standards of teaching and learning in the
> classroom'. (104)

Such official endorsement reinforced the position of school-focused inservice as the prevailing orthodoxy. Whether it had any great effect in practice is another matter. (105)

The CNAA and the Open University.

So far this account of teacher education has been largely confined to the traditional providing agencies - the universities, the colleges and (for inservice) the LEAs. However, it would be incomplete without some mention of the CNAA and the Open University [O.U], two important U.K.-wide institutions created within this period which had an impact in Scotland.

The CNAA had been created, following the recommendations of the Robbins Report, to validate degree courses in the public sector. (106) Initially, its involvement in teacher education was confined to courses for teachers in FE, but in the period after the James Report it began to become extensively involved in the validation of both preservice and inservice courses. There were several reasons for this. One was that, as we have seen, many colleges of education were absorbed by, or merged with, other institutions for whom validation by the CNAA was the norm. There was therefore a tendency for such institutions to transfer validation of teacher education courses to the CNAA, although this did not invariably happen. Another was the reaction within the teacher education sector to what some regarded as the academic straitjacket of university validation. Coupled with this might be the desire to escape from university tutelage into the CNAA system of peer review.

The consequences of these pressures can be seen from the following figures. In 1971-72, the CNAA validated its first B.Ed course with 57 students. By 1984-85, it was validating 56 preservice B.Eds with 12381 students, 45 Inservice B.Eds, with 3188 students, and 33 PGCE courses with 1996 students (107), in addition to the Inservice Diplomas and Higher degrees we have already noticed. The CNAA validated courses accounted for slightly more teacher education students than did all the universities in the U.K put together. (108) The implications of this were very considerable, both for course design and for the internal organisation of institutions on both sides of the Border.

The influence of the Open University was more indirect. (109) Initially, a very high proportion of the applicants for its degree courses - over 30% of the first two intakes - were teachers and lecturers. Although this proportion then slowly declined, it was still 21.2% in 1978. The reason for this was simply the large number of non-graduate teachers, attracted to the O.U by the accessibility and quality of its courses. Many of these were following courses in faculties other than education, and thereby extending their knowledge in fields like mathematics, science or design and technology. Others were following courses within the Faculty of Educational Studies, which built

up a programme covering all main areas of educational concern. The success of the courses led the O.U. to move into the inservice field, where it began to develop diploma courses and study packs for teachers.

Apart from its obvious influence on the large number of teacher or lecturer students, the Open University had an influence in other ways more difficult to quantify. Because its course materials were public, they set new standards in quality both of content and presentation. Those standards became widely known throughout the world of teacher education, through the publication of the materials (many of which were bought by people not taking O.U. courses) and through the involvement of many staff in colleges as part- time O.U. tutors. They therefore became something of a yardstick by which clients could judge the quality of other courses.

Issues.

From this survey of developments in England and Wales a number of issues emerge.

1.   Despite the recommendations of James, teacher education virtually disappeared as a separate sector in England and Wales. This was widely regarded as necessary because of the large number of small colleges, and as desirable on the grounds that student teachers would benefit from being educated alongside others. As Fowler put it :

It made no sense in the 1970s to persist with a teacher education system which relied so heavily on lengthy, single-profession courses in monotechnic institutions'. (110)

Yet this is precisely what the Scottish did. Why was this ?

2.   Within the system, what should be the role of the colleges and the universities ?
In England, the universities had a dual role as providers of preservice and inservice education, and as validating bodies. They preserved this, though the boundary between them and the public sector became more untidily drawn, as public institutions developed their secondary and inservice work, and looked increasingly to the CNAA for validation. Why, in Scotland, did the universities (except Stirling) remain confined to the provision of diplomas and higher degrees, and see their role as validating bodies diminished as that of CNAA spread?

3.	The English colleges have been encouraged to diversify. On the whole, the Scottish colleges have not. Why should this be so ?

4.	On both sides of the border, the colleges have developed their inservice role, but in different ways. Why and with what consequences have they diverged ?

5.	In general both the English and Scottish systems have seen the evolution of the basic pre-service course through three phases: i) 3 year diploma; ii) a mixed economy of diploma and B.Ed; iii) the B.Ed as part of the move to an all-graduate profession. But why has the timing and nature of the evolution has been different ?

In the rest of this thesis, we will consider how these issues and other issues arose and were processed within the Scottish context.

NOTES

1. CHE (1963) .Appendix 2(a) p.66.
2. CHE (1963). Table 37 p.110.
3. Ibid. Appendix 2(a) p.67.
4. Ibid. p.75
5. Ibid. p.61
6. CHE (1963). Table 39 p.113. Peck (1973) p.46 points out that the expansion of the 1960s did not alter this imbalance.
7. Ibid. Table 6 p.18.
8. Ibid. p 28.
9. Smart (1982) p.132.
10. Taylor W. 'The National Context 1972-82' in Alexander et al .(1984) p.18
11. CHE (1963) p.107. 'The Colleges of Education in England & Wales and the Colleges of Education in Scotland alike feel themselves to be only doubtfully recognised as part of the system of higher education'.
12. Turner J .'The Area Training Organisations' in Lomax (1973).
13. Alexander R.J. 'Innovation and Continuity in the Initial Teacher Education Curriculum' in Alexander et al.(1984) p.119.
14. Ibid p.112.
15. CHE (1963) p.109.
16. Alexander et al. (1984) Table 1.1 p.12.
17. Fowler G. 'Policy Formulation and Administration' in Alexander et al .(1984) p.268.
18. CHE (1963) . Table 2. p.12.
19. Ibid p.108.
20. Ibid p.117.
21. Hencke (1978) p.31 quotes the hostile comments of the Director of Education for Sheffield. Similar fears were expressed by the local authorities in Scotland.
    See the comments by ADES in SED file ED51/8/289.
22. Gosden P.H.J.H. 'The Role of Central Government and its Agencies' in Alexander et al. (1984) p.33.
23. Fenwick K. 'Change in the Public Sector and the Role of the LEAs' in Alexander et al .(1984) p.50.
24. SED file ED51/8/289.
25. Ibid.
26. Niblett (1975).
27. Boyle E .'Teacher Education and the State'. in Taylor (1969).

28.   Alexander et al .(1984) Table 1.2 p.xvii.

29.   Peck (1973) pp.42 and 70.

30.   DES (1967) para 949.

31.   DES (1972a) p.32 'It is also true that much of the evidence has expressed widespread disappointment with the degree...with the fact that, although designed as a degree for professional teachers, it has kept students away from the professional situation for periods well in excess of a year before their entry into teaching and, by its compulsory inclusion of an academic subject, has often been inappropriate for many non-specialist teachers'.

32.   Summarised in Willey and Maddison (1971).

33.   DES (1972a).

34.   Ibid p.1.

35.   Ibid p.1.

36.   This was part of a wider development of short cycle higher education in Europe and the U.K. Holmes B'.Teacher Education in England and Wales', in Lomax (1973) p.17.

37.   DES (1972a) p.41.

38.   Ibid. p.23.

39.   Ibid p.25.

40.   Ibid p.5.

41.   Ibid p.6.

42.   DES (1972b) p.16

43.   Lynch (1979) p.33.

44.   SED file ED26/1212 contains a copy of a DES paper 'Teacher Training Places in Higher Education' submitted to the James Committee and the Education Sub-committee of the UGC, dated June, 1971.

45.   Hencke (1978) pp. 42-47. Harding (1978) admitted that the DES submitted a paper on teaching supply to James, but claimed disingenuously that :'As far as I know, it did not affect the report's recommendations'.

46.   DES (1972b) p.44.

47.   Ibid. p.44.

48.   Ibid. p.44.

49.   Ibid. p.46.

50.   Taylor W. 'The National Context 1972-82' in Alexander et al .(1984) p.23.

51.   Fowler op.cit. pp.272-3.

52.   Hencke (1978) pp.59-60.

53.   Hencke (1978) p.61.

54.   There is a good example of this in the case study of Bradford in Alexander et al .(1984).

55. Harding (1978).

56. Locke et al .(1985) p.15.

57. THES 22 July,1977.

58. TESS 5 August,1978. Exceptions were made for certain shortage subjects - music, business studies and craft, design and technology.

59. Alexander et al.(1984) Table 1.2.

60. Locke et al .(1985) p.37.

61. Ibid. p.19.

62. Ibid. p.46.

63. Smart (1982) p.128 gives an example of a certificate course curriculum.

64. London University regulations for the Teachers' Certificate 1951-52, quoted by Renshaw in Tibble (1971)

65. Brown J.D. 'The Balance of a College of Education Curriculum', in Taylor (1969).

66. Hewett S. 'The Colleges: Prospects and Possibilities' in Tibble (1971).

67. Alexander in Alexander et al. (1984) p.108; Locke et al .(1985) Table 5.

68. Hewett op.cit.

69. Willey and Maddison (1971) p.71.

70. Lynch (1979) p.25.

71. Robinson E .'The Colleges of Education and the Universities' in Taylor (1969).

72. Renshaw P. op.cit .(1971) and 'A flexible curriculum for Teacher Education' in Lomax (1973).

73. DES (1972a) para 5.7.

74. Alexander in Alexander et al .(1984) p.110.

75. There is an example of this in the case study of Bulmershe in Alexander et al.(1984).

76. Macnamara and Ross (1982) p.40.

77. Lynch (1979) Chapter 4.

78. Alexander in Alexander et al. (1974) p.137.

79. DES (1979)

80. Alexander et al.(1984) p.256

81. Hencke (1976)

82. Eraut M. 'Inservice Teacher Education : Developments in Provision and Curriculum' in Alexander et al. (1984) p.162..

83. e.g. Cane (1969) and DES (1970).

84. Bradley H. 'Change in the University Sector' in Alexander et al. (1984) p.85. For the work of the Bristol Institute, see Taylor (1976).

85. Hollins 'Inservice Training' in Lomax (1973) p.306.

86. Thornbury (1973).

87.   e.g. Thornbury (1973) and Adams (1975).

88.   Hollins in Lomax (1973) p.305.

89.   Kahn (1976).

90.   Henderson and Perry (1981).

91.   See note 83 above.

92.   Eraut in Alexander et al.(1984).

93.   Hollins in Lomax (1973) p.307.

94.   DES (1972a) para 2.3.

95.   Ibid para 2.21.

96.   Shortly afterwards, for instance, the first professional journal devoted to inservice, the British Journal of Inservice Education, was launched by ATCDE.

97.   Evans (1981).

98.   Eraut in Alexander et al .(1984) pp. 183-8.

99.   Nokes (1982).

100.   Morant (1981) provides a useful summary of developments.

101.   Rudduck (1981) p.171.

102.   Henderson and Perry (1981) p.7.

103.   Bolam (1982a).

104.   Henderson and Perry (1981) p.12.

105.   See Appendix 5.

106.   CNAA (1982).

107.   The figures are from the CNAA Annual Reports.

108.   The figures for enrolments in the U.K. for 1983-84, taken from DES (1985) Table 1. and the CNAA Annual Report, are :

	Universities	CNAA
Initial B.Ed.	9837	11161
Inservice B.Ed	2854	3468
PGCE	1857	1784

109   Raynor J. 'The role of the Open University' in World Year Book of Education, 1980.

110   Alexander et al.(1984) p.281.

CHAPTER 3

EXPANSION UNDER THE SCOTTISH COUNCIL FOR
THE TRAINING OF TEACHERS.

The Scottish Colleges of Education.

Compared to England, where there were 146 colleges and the university departments of education, Scotland in 1959 had relatively few colleges. On a pro-rata basis, there would have been about 15. In fact there were only seven : Aberdeen, Craiglockhart, Dundee, Dunfermline, Jordanhill, Notre Dame and Moray House. These colleges fell into two distinct groups, one might almost say a first and second division. The four city colleges, Aberdeen, Dundee, Jordanhill (in Glasgow) and Moray House (in Edinburgh) were relatively large, non-denominational institutions, which trained men and women, primary and secondary teachers. The other three were small and for women only: Dunfermline for secondary P.E teachers; Craiglockhart for Catholic primary teachers, and Notre Dame also mainly for Catholic primary teachers but with a few graduates (30 in 1959-60) training for secondary schools.

As all of them were in the four major cities, less than a quarter of the students were residential. (1) This average conceals the fact that in the large mixed colleges, like Jordanhill, the proportion was much lower, but was higher in the three all-women's colleges. The Catholic ones, in particular, had a policy of insisting on residence for their students, relaxed only for their mature students.

In 1960-61, the overall student population was 5233 but it was very unevenly spread.(2) 85% of the students were in the four city colleges, two of which - Moray House with 1361 students and Jordanhill with 2073 - were a great deal larger than most English colleges. (See page 29)

The size of the four Scottish city colleges was due to the fact that they carried out a wider range of work and were committed to admitting, without selection, all qualified graduates who presented themselves for training. In 1959, the English colleges were still essentially concerned with training non-graduates for primary or secondary modern schools. In Scotland, because of the exclusion of the universities from teacher education, the colleges had the monopoly of post-graduate training, whether primary or secondary. Moreover, they had a long tradition of providing inservice training, a field in which there was then little competition from either the universities or the education authorities. In 1960-61, about 700 teachers attended courses at the colleges leading to

special qualifications, and another 4,000 or so attended short courses or conferences. (3)

Inservice, however, was peripheral to the main work of the colleges : the initial training of primary and secondary teachers. This was organised in rigid categories : a hierarchy of schools (senior secondary, junior secondary, and primary) related to a hierarchy of qualifications (honours degree, ordinary degree, diploma of a central institution, and primary diploma). In essence, the system went back to 1905 and had changed very little since. (4) The last formal revision of the Regulations had taken place in 1931, as the SED admitted in a Memorandum on the Training of Teachers, which it issued in June 1960 :

> 'Since 1931, the training of teachers in Scotland has been conducted under the Regulations for the Preliminary Education, Training and Certification of Teachers for Various Grades of Schools (Scotland) .... they have never undergone a fundamental revision and no major change has been made in the basis of training'. (5)

These Regulations provided for four main types of certification.(6)

1. The Teachers' Special Certificate, which could be awarded under Chapter V of the Regulations to Honours Graduates (and until 1959-60, only to 1st or 2nd class Honours Graduates) who had done a one year course at a college of education. This was the normal route into teaching in senior secondary schools.

2. The Teachers' General Certificate, awarded under Chapter IV to those who had trained under the conditions set out in Chapter III. This was a certificate to teach in primary schools, which could be obtained by one of two routes : either by taking a university degree followed by a one-year course at a college, or by taking a three-year course (only open to women) for a college diploma.

3. Endorsement under Article 39, which allowed graduates with at least two graduating passes in a subject to obtain a qualification to teach it in junior secondary schools or in the lower classes of senior secondary.

4. The Teachers' Technical Certificate, awarded under Chapter VI to diplomates of central institutions, normally after a one-year course at a college, which was the qualification for art, music, homecraft, commercial subjects, educational handwork and physical education. The route for PE teachers, however, was

different. They did a three-year diploma course, the women at Dunfermline College and the men at the Scottish School of Physical Education [SSPE] based at Jordanhill.

These Regulations were based on a utilitarian view of the purpose of teacher training and of the role of the colleges, which Wood [Principal of Jordanhill] describes as follows :

> 'The basic assumption underlying all Scottish training was enunciated by David Stow over 120 years ago - i.e that institutions responsible for training should deal solely with Professional Training and not with academic or practical or aesthetic subjects. It is assumed in Scotland that the ideal is that all academic or practical or aesthetic qualifications should be obtained in a University or Central Institution and that people so qualified should then proceed to training colleges for Professional Training. The various three-year courses in the training colleges are regarded as uncharacteristic deviations from a desirable norm. This outlook had repercussions on the nature and quality of work done in training colleges'. (7)

This approach was very different from the 'person-centred education' which Taylor saw in the English colleges. Moreover, it was reinforced by the Scottish academic tradition which stressed the importance of knowledge of academic subjects, rather than practical or aesthetic, and which revered the ancient universities as the guardians of standards.

These assumptions were among the factors which made the ethos of the major Scottish colleges very different from the cosy, close-knit world of the smaller English colleges. It is, of course, impossible to generalise about a Scottish ethos. At one end of the spectrum was Craiglockhart, a small, residential, Roman Catholic college catering only for women primary teachers; at the other, Jordanhill, about 10 times its size, with less than 10% of its students resident, and with a considerable intake of graduates, both men and women. However, the bulk of Scottish students were taught in the four city colleges which were essentially nine-to-five institutions, as were the main urban universities. It was therefore difficult to create a community feeling. One of the problems facing the colleges was to devise a regime which was appropriate for such different groups as the primary diplomates (mainly young women straight from school),(8) the graduates and the mature women being trained under the Special Recruitment Scheme. The graduates, in particular, often felt that the regime, geared as they saw it to the primary diplomates, was too paternalistic and authoritarian, and they tended to compare it unfavourably with their experience of the universities.(9)

Moreover, the colleges were not helped by their difficulties with staffing and accommodation. As Robbins noted, staffing ratios in the Scottish colleges were the worst in British higher education - 16:1 as opposed to 10:1 in the English colleges - although in academic terms the staff were better qualified than those in England. (10)

The basic problem with accommodation was that very little had been spent on college building since before the war. (11) Because they were non-residential, the Scottish college had managed to cope with the post-war bulge of ex-servicemen without any of the emergency building programme which had expanded provision in England & Wales. So, as student numbers began to rise in the late 1950s, the pressure on accommodation became acute. With old-fashioned and inadequate buildings, the colleges found it difficult to create a sense of community and - more fundamentally - to provide proper training.

At Jordanhill student numbers had risen from 1389 in 1953 to 1731 in 1958. In November of that year Wood submitted a report to the Glasgow Provincial Committee on the plight of the college.

> 'It has been stated very often that Jordanhill is too large ... The fundamental problem is NOT size but OVERCROWDING ...... The overcrowding is most evident in the following ways :
>
> Shortage of accommodation for staff - cloakrooms, lavatories, storage for books and equipment, places to work, lack of effective bases for most departments.
>
> Shortage of accommodation for students - classrooms, lavatories, cloakrooms, common rooms, facilities for meals, library facilities .....
>
> The students are required to work harder than ten years ago (for an equivalent number of students, the issue of books from the library has doubled in that time) but they are disturbed by bustle, lack of quiet and space. They stand in queues for food and for lavatories, and in free periods and lunch hours they have difficulty finding anywhere to sit since common rooms and reading rooms are too small and the library seats only 60. Our isolated position increases the problem since students cannot leave the main building and use cafes or libraries in town'. (12)

As a result, Brunton, the Senior Chief Inspector, and Rodger, the Assistant Secretary responsible for teacher training, came to the college in February 1959 to see the situation for themselves. Rodger then wrote a note which was sympathetic, though in Wood's view it showed a limited appreciation of the real needs of a large college.(13) However, it did start the process of planning new permanent buildings. While this was going on, the college had to cope as best it could with ever-increasing numbers, the strain of which was only slightly relieved by the erection of temporary hutted classrooms.

Such in outline was the Scottish college system in 1960: very different in many ways from that in England & Wales. Its apparent advantage was that the four city colleges provided both primary and secondary training within the one institution, whose size enabled it to recruit a wider range of well-qualified specialist staff. They did, however, have serious weaknesses. One was that subject staff had, as Wood put it, 'too many irons in the fire' (14), because they had to teach across the whole range of students. No one was completely responsible for running a single course. Moreover, the gap between theory and practice was perhaps wider than in England and Wales because lecturers in Education and Psychology (normally taught as two separate subjects) seldom had any direct involvement with schools or with teaching practice.

The administrative framework.

The administrative framework within which the Scottish colleges worked was markedly different from that in England and Wales where, as we have seen, there were a large number of small colleges, controlled either by the LEAs or by voluntary bodies, and the universities played a significant part in the training of secondary teachers. In consequence, the role of the DES was more limited.

By contrast, in Scotland, there was a strong tradition of central control by the SED. Since the setting up of the Provincial Committees in 1905, the training of teachers had been recognised as a direct responsibility of the State. (15) At that time there had been no Education Authorities capable of taking responsibility, as the schools were still run by over 900 School Boards. The Universities had been excluded because the SED distrusted their independence and doubted both their commitment to teacher training and their competence to undertake it. (16) Church colleges were later brought within the system with the result that from the 1920s the whole of teacher education was under one national system of administration.

This had three tiers. Firstly, the Provincial Committees who were responsible for 'the management of the training centres (colleges) and were also authorised to conduct

classes for practising teachers'.(17) At the next level, their work was co-ordinated in theory by the National Committee for the Training of Teachers (NCTT). In practice, because the National Committee was a large body which only met once a year, the real work was done by its Central Executive Committee, whose Executive Officer, Sir William McClelland, was a key figure in the system. (18) Behind this again was the SED which retained control not only of finance and key aspects of policy but also to some extent of academic matters. The Department still approved the outline structure of college courses, though not their content, and still sometimes exercised its right to inspect staff and to visit students.(19)

This tight system of central control lasted throughout all the changes of the post-war period and it was not until the late 1950s that steps were taken to loosen it as part of a wider reform of Scottish education. An influential part in this was played by Brunton, the Senior Chief Inspector from 1955-66, (20) and his allies in the SED like Rodger, the Under-secretary from 1959-63.(21) Brunton realised that the reforms he wished to see, particularly the reforms of secondary education and the examination system, could not be carried out by the inspectorate alone using the traditional 'top-down' approach. Instead he saw the need to enlist the willing co-operation of teachers, teacher trainers and education authorities. The most visible sign of this new approach was the setting up in the 1960s of bodies such as the Scottish Certificate of Education Examination Board (SCEEB) which took over from the inspectorate responsibility for secondary examinations; the Consultative Committee on the Curriculum (CCC); and the General Teaching Council (GTC).

The effects of this attempt to create partnership were first felt in teacher training. In 1957 Brunton made a deal with the Wood and Inglis to end formal inspection of the colleges.

> WOOD. When he [Brunton] became Senior Chief, he exercised the right
> for the first time to go to meetings of the Board of Education where he
> heard about developments like the Schools Council and this gave him
> some of his ideas for change in Scotland.
>
> Early on he came to Jordanhill to speak to me and then he went to Moray
> House to see Inglis. He said he wanted our help with his ideas for
> curriculum development. Inglis and I talked him into giving up formal
> inspection of the colleges in return for our help.

This however was a purely informal agreement. The Department did not give up its right to inspect the colleges. It simply chose to let it fall into disuse, and the assumption in the

60s was that it would never be revived. (22)

In 1958 new regulations altered the colleges' status. (23) The Provincial Committees were abolished. The training colleges were renamed colleges of education and were given their own representative governing bodies. The majority of governors were appointed by interested groups - the education authorities of the area served by the college, the Senate of the local university, the appropriate Church, and the Secretary of State - but a substantial minority (e.g. 7 out of 25 at Moray House and Jordanhill) were to be elected by local teachers.(24) The governors were to be a 'body corporate' and as such the employers of the staff. The colleges were given powers to provide preservice and inservice courses for teachers and community workers, and to award their own diplomas and certificates.

As a first step towards more internal partnership, the colleges were required to prepare a scheme for a Board of Studies.

> 'The function of the Board shall be to advise upon, and assist the Principal in relation to the co-ordination of studies, including teaching method and practice, in the various courses, the maintenance of standards ... and generally questions falling within the ambit of the teaching staff'. (25)

However, this move towards greater independence for the colleges was still within a framework of central co-ordination.

The new co-ordinating body was the Scottish Council for the Training of Teachers [SCTT].(26) Like its predecessor, the National Committee, this was a large group with 25 members (the 7 chairmen of college Boards of Governors; 15 people selected by the chairmen to represent the education authorities, the universities, the teachers, the churches, and the Association of Directors of Education; and three nominees of the Secretary of State) and 9 assessors (the 7 college principals and 2 representatives from SED). Like the other bodies set up at the time, its members were drawn predominantly from the East of Scotland and from those with experience in the long-established and more traditional schools. (27) For instance, its first chairman was Sir James Robertson, the distinguished Rector of Aberdeen Grammar Schools and a classics man. (28)

The powers of the new council were partly advisory and partly executive. Its advisory powers were to do with such matters as teacher supply and the regulations for admission to the colleges, or for the certification of teachers (including exceptional recognition). Its

executive powers were limited originally to such matters as administration of the Special Recruitment Scheme or decisions about whether a college could launch a new course.

The remit of the Council was an attempt to strike a balance between the detailed control which the colleges had often found irksome (29) and the widely-held view within the Scottish tradition that, in fairness, the same general regulations should apply across the teacher education system. Addressing the first meeting of the Council, Niall Macpherson, the Parliamentary Under-secretary of State, claimed that the purpose of the new regulations was to simplify the system and to devolve responsibility downwards.

> 'The governing bodies of the colleges will have much more independence than in the past and the central body, the Scottish Council will no longer exercise the same detailed supervision of local matters...At the same time, there are many aspects of training which ought to be uniform throughout Scotland.... In short, the Regulations confer a far greater degree of autonomy on the colleges of education, while reserving to the central body the essential functions of co-ordination'. (30)

Compared to the National Committee, the Scottish Council was an active body meeting about six or seven times a year. However, as is the case with most large committees, these meetings were largely formal and much of the work was done in standing committees; for instance, all the detailed work in connection with individual applications for exceptional recognition.

Of these committees the most important was the Committee of Principals [CP]. Previously, this had met informally outside the structure of the NCTT; now its position was formalised as a standing committee consisting of the principals and SED assessors, from which the SCTT could seek advice.(31) Moreover, it was given a privileged position. Whereas the Chairman and Vice-chairman of the SCTT were ex-officio members of the other standing committees, they were excluded from the CP. (32) This enhancement of the position of the CP was a deliberate act of Departmental policy. Rodger describes the reasons for it.(33)

> RODGER : I have tried to emphasise .. that I have really felt that ..the body that was the really efficient ruling body - it didn't matter what the regulations said - was the Principals and Assessors. All of the Departmental people who had anything to do with it felt that, and that was why we aggrandised the power of the Principals and Assessors.

When Rodger talked about the CP, he was thinking of a very small group of Principals with whom the SED was used to working closely and informally. As the four city colleges were much larger and offered a wider range of courses, their Principals (all men) carried much more weight than the Principals of the other three (all women). Ruth Mellor, secretary to the CP from 1969 to 1979, describes the situation as she saw it.

> *MELLOR : In the '60s the CP and the SED were more closely knit. You had more of a group feeling; more of a sense of common aims and purposes. Of course, the CP was then a bit of a club. It was only the principals of the four city colleges that mattered, and Moray House held rather aloof. So that a lot of things were settled informally between Sir Henry Wood, David Stimpson [Dundee] and Jimmy Scotland [Aberdeen]. A lot was done through gentlemen's agreements. And a lot was done informally with the SED. Sir Henry often used to go through early to meetings so that he could discuss things beforehand with the SED officials. (34)*

Because of the ability, professional knowledge and contacts of its key members the CP came to have a strong influence on the policies of the SCTT. For instance, the SCTT response to SED's 1960 memorandum on the Revision of Regulations for the training of teachers (35) 'followed closely the observations presented by the Principals'. (36) The Council's response to Robbins was 'substantially a report prepared by the Committee of Principals'. (37) Despite opposition from the Educational Institute of Scotland [EIS] the Council accepted in 1964 a report from the CP based on a memorandum by Wood, which argued for a four-year associateship course which would have qualified both men and women to teach in primary and secondary schools.

The influence of the CP had its critics (38), but there was no other group within the SCTT which could match its commitment and expertise, according to Gray, the Secretary of the SCTT.

> *WBM. The Minutes of the SCTT suggest - and your comments seem to confirm - that a lot of Council policy came from the Principals.... Why was this so ?*

> *GRAY. Partly because the new arrangements had given the colleges and the Boards of Governors greater scope for initiative. But the main reason was that the Principals were in daily touch with the problems of teacher training. They knew about the problems of supply, entrance*

requirements, accommodation and so on. So they were the ones who really knew the problems and were seeking solutions.

The policy community for teacher education.

Formally, therefore, the SCTT was the focus of the policy community for teacher education. What then were its members in the early 1960s ? The recognised interests could then be divided into four main groups : the providers, the teachers, the education authorities and the SED. However, policy communities are not fixed bodies. Their membership changes over time, as does the relative strength of the interests represented. These changes will have to be analysed as they occur, but first the policy community of the 60s must be described.

Foremost among the providers were the colleges of education. They were in regular contact with the SED: partly over financial and administrative matters, partly because their staff were involved in a wide range of activities beyond preservice training - curriculum development, inservice, research, examination board panels - which were also the concern of the inspectorate. The relatively small scale of the Scottish system therefore made possible close working relationships between college staff and the inspectorate (some of whom were themselves former college staff). As regards policy-making, the formal focus for this working relationship was the CP, which met monthly, which included senior members of the inspectorate and of the administrative side of the SED as assessors, (39) and from which radiated a network of informal CP/SED relationships.

The universities were also providers, but on a very small scale. In 1960, there were university departments of education at Aberdeen, Dundee, Edinburgh and Glasgow but they were only concerned with academic Diplomas, with higher degrees and with research. University provision of pre-service training only came with the creation of a department of education at Stirling University, but it was not allowed to extend beyond it. In the mid-60s, however, the universities did take on a new and potentially influential role, that of validating bodies, once the colleges began to develop B.Ed degree courses.

Teachers, for the first time, were beginning to have some direct influence on their own professional training through their membership of the SCTT and of the new college governing bodies - a type of influence limited by the fact that they were a small minority on all these bodies. Their real and important source of influence was through the unions, particularly the EIS, which was regularly consulted on issues connected with teacher

supply and the status of the profession, and which was a powerful pressure groups on certain issues in teacher education. (40)

Like the teachers, education authorities could be an important pressure group. In a period of teacher shortage, their main concern tended to be teacher supply, but the larger ones were also beginning to become providers of inservice education.

Given its powers over finance and legislation, the real centre of the policy community, as opposed to its formal focal point, was inevitably the SED. However, the SED, like the DES (41) - or, indeed, any large organisation - was not monolithic. Three main groups can be distinguished. For most people in teacher education, the most prominent were the inspectorate, whom they knew and worked with as professional colleagues. Behind them were the career civil servants, who were gradually ousting the inspectorate from the key policy positions. (42) Finally, there were the politicians, whose interest in teacher education tended to be slight and intermittent. For, teacher education, as opposed to teacher supply, is not a topic which normally excites much public interest, nor is it one in which there is much political mileage.

> *WBM. One of the recent developments has been that politicians have taken quite a lot of interest for various reasons in teacher education. Were they interested in your time?*

> *WOOD. Only to the extent that they wanted more teachers. There was very little difference whichever government was in power.... There was no hard political thrust. There was, I think, in other ways like comprehensive education, but not on teacher training. All they wanted was more teachers, and they wanted them as soon as possible.*

As a result, the policy community for teacher education was a closed one in which neither the politicians nor the press took much interest. One measure of this is that very few questions about teacher education were asked in parliament. (See Appendix 6) In this respect, it was no different from most educational policy communities in the U.K. (43)

The pressures for change.

Whatever their differences, the systems north and south of the border were subject to the same two fundamental pressures for change. One came simply from the demographic trends and the related rise and fall in pupil numbers. The main effects of this were to be

on the size and structure of the college system. The other came from changes in the schools. In the 1960s in Scotland that meant mainly the introduction of the new O grade, the impact of the Primary Memorandum of 1965 (44) and, later in the decade, the accelerating trend towards the reconstruction of secondary education on comprehensive lines. These were to have effects both on the content of initial training and on the development of inservice.

The demographic trends in Scotland over the whole period from 1960 to 1985 were similar to those in England & Wales. (See Diagrams 3.1 and 3.2) Live births per thousand in Scotland reached a post-war peak of 113,147 in 1947. (45) They then declined steadily and in 1953 stood at 90,913. From there, there was another up-swing, which took the figure above 100,000 in 1960, where it remained until 1965. The subsequent downswing began slowly, but gathered momentum from 1971 so that, by 1977, live births were down to a post-war low of 62,342. After that, the graph rises slightly and more or less levels out between 65,000 and 70,000 until 1985. One comparison summarises the contrast between the beginning and end of the period. The annual average of live births per thousand from 1961-65 was 102,642; from 1976-80, it was 65,758 and from 1981-85 it was 66,442. Therefore the drop between the first and last five year period was 36,220, a decline of 35%

Inevitably the rise and fall in the birth rate was reflected in pupil numbers. (See Table 3.3) So the big rise in pupil numbers did not really begin until the mid-60s. In 1960-61, the number of pupils in education authority schools was about 860,000. Five years later, it had risen to 875,000; but over the next decade the upswing took numbers to 1,053,000 by 1975-76, an increase of 23% over 1960-61. Then, just as the birth rate had fallen slowly at first and then more quickly, so pupil numbers declined slowly to 970,000 in 1980-81; but by 1985-86 they were down to about 860,000, almost exactly the level of 1960-61.

This decline, however, affected the primary and secondary sectors differently. In primary schools the effects of any change in the birth rate begin to be felt five years later, and have results which almost exactly reflect the changes in the birth rate. So primary numbers hit their peak at 635,800 in 1972-73. By 1985-86 they were down 31% to 435,500. In secondary schools, the effects are not felt for twelve years. So the secondary peak - 410,400 - was not reached until 1978-79. By 1985-86, the numbers had only dropped 12% to 360,600. This was partly because the demographic effects had not had time to work their way fully through the schools; but it was also partly due to the increasing proportion of secondary school pupils staying on beyond the statutory leaving age. Given these trends, teacher education could not avoid a cycle of expansion

and contraction, which improvements in staffing standards or the expansion of inservice could mitigate but could not prevent.

In 1960, however, all this was in the future. The main problem, as it had been since 1945, was that of teacher supply.(46) Because of its concern about this, the SED resurrected the Advisory Council on Education in 1957 and asked for its advice on supply, but the Council rejected steps like the recruitment of non-graduate men for primary teaching, which the SED favoured, and suggested measures like full pay and pensions for retired teachers returning to service, which ran counter to general policy on public service superannuation. So the problem remained acute, particularly in secondary schools. In 1960, the SED produced a memorandum (47) in which it estimated that there was a shortfall of 1,823 secondary teachers, on average 10.4% below the estimated needs of the education authorities, but worse in subjects like maths, science and homecraft. Between 1960 and 1967, the annual SED reports on 'Education in Scotland' give estimates of the number of primary and secondary teachers needed to fill vacancies, to reduce oversize classes and to replace uncertificated teachers and teachers over 70 years old, which fluctuate between 3482 and 3838, but still represent about 10% on top of the existing teaching force. These estimates were unreliable, based as they were on figures provided by authorities with differing ideas on what was adequate staffing.(48) They must, however, be seen in the context of the Schools Code (1956), which defined an oversize class as more than 45 in primary schools and more than 40 in secondary. (49) Whatever the inadequacies of the statistics, there could be no doubting the reality of the shortages.

The problem of teacher supply, moreover, was complicated by imbalances within it. There was the perennial problem of recruiting mathematics, science and technical teachers for secondary schools. There was a more general problem of maldistribution. (50) In a period of overall shortage, schools in the industrial areas of the West of Scotland - particularly parts of Glasgow and Lanark - found it difficult to attract teachers, and many of them were chronically under-staffed.(51) The Roman Catholic secondaries were particularly badly affected.(52) Another issue which greatly concerned the SED was the 'wastage' of women teachers. Between 1960 and 1965, this was regularly commented on in 'Education in Scotland', and figures were produced which suggested that about a quarter of the women who completed training had left teaching within five years.(53)

Faced with this difficult situation, all sorts of measures were considered. Following the Fourth Report of the Advisory Council, the Department prepared a long submission to the Secretary of State in August, 1962, reviewing past efforts to improve supply and

outlining all the possibilities, however remote : reducing the demand for teachers (by postponing the start of compulsory schooling to the age of six, using teacher auxiliaries); increased incentives (higher salaries, payments during the training year, full pay and pensions for teachers working beyond 65); compression of college courses (the colleges to work a 40 week year so that the diploma course could be cut to seven terms and the one-year post-graduate to two); and the inevitable recruitment of non- graduate men.(54) Most of these, the memorandum recognised, were non-starters in practice. So it concluded that, as there was no single remedy, 'efforts should be concentrated on those measures most likely to produce material results'- the shortening of courses, full pay and pensions for the over 65s, and the recruitment of non-graduate men.

The Department returned more than once to the theme of 'compressed' courses (See Appendix 7) and the recruitment of non-graduate men did eventually come. Meanwhile, various other measures were resorted to, some of them new, others a continuation of previous efforts. One of the first actions of the SCTT was to allow 3rd Class Honours graduates to teach at any level of a secondary school (55) and to agree that the shortened two-term course for Honours graduates should continue. (56) The SED organised regular publicity campaigns, with recruiting visits to universities and central institutions as well as advertisements in the press and on radio and television. The education authorities agreed to participate in a voluntary scheme, by which those which were staffed above the national average did not recruit additional staff so that those below might have a better chance.(57) The scheme did have some effect, but not enough; and in 1964 a committee was appointed under Dame Jean Roberts 'to secure a more equitable distribution of teachers'. Its report came out in 1966 and recommended that the education authorities should review what it described as their extravagant allotment of non-teaching periods and their over-ambitious proposals for a diversity of courses. Its more practical recommendation was that teachers in designated areas should receive an extra £100 a year and a travelling allowance. A scheme along these lines was eventually approved in 1968 and provided initially for 3625 designated posts, including 1120 in Glasgow, 1290 in Lanark and 540 in Renfrew.(58) This did bring about some improvement in the pupil-teacher ratios in the designated schools and narrowed the gap between them and the non- designated. (59)

Alongside these measures, the SED continued to organise regular publicity campaigns. It also continued the Special Recruitment Scheme, the most successful of these palliative measures. This had been started in 1951 to give financial assistance, in the form of fees and a maintenance grant, to people from other occupations who wanted to train as teachers. In 1960, just under 400 completed training under the scheme, and the number rose throughout the 1960s reaching 595 by 1967. (60) This was partly the result of

annual publicity campaigns, which were considered important enough to be launched by Under-secretaries of State (by Judith Hart in 1965 and by Bruce Millan in 1966) - a measure of how seriously governments took the teacher shortage and the Special Recruitment Scheme as a way of alleviating it.

However, all these measures taken together were quite insufficient. The gap between supply and demand remained and was inadequately bridged by the employment of several hundred teachers over the age of 70 and of several thousand uncertificated teachers. (61) There was therefore no doubt in most people's minds that more teachers would have to be trained, not only to meet the forecast increase in pupil numbers, but also to improve staffing standards and to rectify the problems of maldistribution.

Expansion of the training system: the problems defined.

Expansion of the training system was therefore an inescapable item on the agenda of the SCTT. At its first meeting, Niall MacPherson, the Parliamentary Under Secretary responsible for education, asked it to consider three policy issues urgently : the system of certificating teachers; the supply and training of F.E. teachers; and 'whether existing colleges are adequate to train the increasing numbers of students coming forward, and whether it will be necessary to provide a new college'. (62)

This third issue - providing accommodation for increased numbers of students - was to be the main preoccupation of the SCTT. 'No other problem', it was noted in its Second Report, 'has occupied so much time or involved such concentrated efforts'.(63) There were, however, two aspects to the problem. One was that of improving or extending the existing colleges, if need be by relocating them on new sites; the other that of creating a completely new college or colleges.

These problems were too important and too urgent to be simply given to a large advisory committee of part-time members to solve without any guidance. In practice all such committees depend, if they are to make progress, on small groups who do the spadework of preparing papers which define problems and outline possible solutions, and the only group with the knowledge to do that spadework was the SED. So, between the formal meeting with MacPherson and the first business meeting of SCTT in October, 1959, the Department took steps to prepare the ground, but it did so in consultation with the policy community.

To begin with, Rodger prepared a paper 'Tentative forecasts of future student population', (64) which suggested that by the late 1960s the student population in the colleges would have risen by about 2,000 to 6,900. This was sent to the Principals to put before their Boards of Governors with a covering letter in which Rodger said :

> The whole problem I am raising is so wide that it will require to be considered not only by the several governing bodies but also by the Scottish Council as a whole. For example, the Scottish Council might consider that a new College, or even two new Colleges, should be set up and if a decision of this sort were to be taken there would obviously be repercussions on the size of all the rest'.

Rodger followed this up in September with another paper for the governing bodies - 'Considerations regarding the development of colleges of education'.(65) This started from the premises that expansion was necessary and that ' there is general agreement that Jordanhill College is already too big and that its further expansion should be checked'. It therefore suggested that a new college might have to be built and analysed in detail those areas which might provide sufficient teaching practice places.

While the governing bodies were being given this chance to formulate their views, the Departmental officials were holding internal meetings to prepare their contribution to the SCTT discussions. (66) They reviewed the principles on which expansion should be based : the need for convenient teaching practice places; the need for the students to have access to cultural amenities (67); the need to keep the size of colleges between 300 and 1200 students. They agreed that Jordanhill must be divided and that either one or two new colleges must be built, preferably all-purpose colleges in the Scottish tradition.

The funding of the Roman Catholic colleges.

They also discussed another potentially awkward issue - that of funding the expansion of the Roman Catholic colleges. Since the colleges had come under the NCTT in the early 1920s (68), the two teaching Orders (the Institute of Notre Dame and the Society of the Sacred Heart) had been responsible for buildings while the National Committee met the costs of training the students. At the beginning of October, SED representatives went to an informal meeting at Notre Dame, at which the Governors told them that they wished to move from their cramped site at Dowanhill (already overcrowded for 330 students) and build a new college in Bearsden, but that the Order simply did not have the money to finance a new college. Craiglockhart, which was looking for extensions, was in a similar financial position. (69)

To leave the Orders to meet the costs of these proposals would have placed on them a financial burden, which they could not have met and would have left the Catholic colleges at a serious disadvantage. The Department was therefore faced with a similar situation to that which had led it to take financial responsibility for the Catholic schools and it decided that it required the same solution. However, having just set up the SCTT as a new advisory body, it felt constrained to prompt the Council to give it the advice it wanted.

> 'The Council were informed by Mr Rodger that the Secretary of State would value a letter from the Council stating that in their view capital funds should be available to the two Roman Catholic Colleges'.(70)

And that advice was duly given.

Negotiations with the Treasury.

Once it had secured the support of the SCTT, the Department felt ready to open negotiations with the Treasury to secure funding for 'a fairly large investment programme in the Colleges of Education in Scotland'. (71) It therefore wrote outlining the problems and stressing particularly how little had been spent since the War and how important it was to meet the needs of the Catholic colleges.

Initially the Treasury was far from sympathetic, pointing out that only a few months previously the SED had been forecasting that capital expenditure on the colleges would be negligible. In reply the Department had to admit that it had been slow to realise the seriousness of the situation: that it had not expected the continued rise in the birth rate or the sudden increase in the number of applicants for teacher training. Nor had it fully realised how overcrowded the colleges already were. However, it was able to convince the Treasury that action was now needed, and approval was given in principle for capital expenditure of £2.9 million in the period up to 1964-65.

Unfortunately the building programme this money was supposed to fund consisted, in 1959, of a set of uncosted aspirations, because the new governing bodies had no time to do any detailed planning. As a result, very little could be spent in the first few years and, as the plans became more definite, it became clear that their realisation would be much more costly. So in 1962 a rather embarrassed SED had to write back to the Treasury and admit that: 'At that time [1959] we had very little idea what work would be required to provide the amount of accommodation needed by modernisation and new building, and the estimates given were of the most tentative character'. The bid was now

for three new college buildings (Hamilton, Dunfermline and Notre Dame) and for modernisation or extensions at all the others at a total cost of over £6 million over the next five years.

Not surprisingly the Treasury was taken somewhat aback when it discovered how little had been built and how much more money was now being bid for. So it argued that the shortage of infant teachers was not serious, that this part of education was not then an economic priority, and that increased spending on the training of women teachers was wasteful when so many left the profession so soon. The SED came back with the undeniable facts that the teacher shortage in Scotland was very serious, that very little had been spent on the Scottish colleges compared to those in England and Wales and that it was only trying to make up for past neglect. These strong arguments might in themselves have carried the day, but they were helped politically by the fact that Eccles, the Minister for Education, was pressing successfully for a crash programme to provide additional teacher training places in England and Wales. So Scotland got its share of expansion in the promise to sanction £1 million of new starts in 1963-64 and 1964-65.

This was not the end of the story as the SED, like other government departments, had to negotiate annually with the Treasury,(72) but its success in pressing for capital investment can be seen in the rise in capital expenditure on college buildings. In the five years from 1959-64, the cost of the building programme was £1,764,000; in the next four years to 1968 it was £10,569,000. (73) Despite this, there was never enough money to finance all the projects proposed. The most fortunate colleges were Aberdeen, Dunfermline and Notre Dame, which won approval for relocation on new sites. Aberdeen moved to Hilton Place in 1968 and Notre Dame opened its Bearsden campus in 1967. The other colleges had to make do with piece-meal development on their existing sites, with all the inconvenience that entailed. Jordanhill, in particular, was a tangle of temporary huts, in the midst of which some major building work was always in progress from 1960 through to 1975.

In these key financial battles, on which the whole success of the expansion programme depended, the SCTT played little part. Nor was it much involved in extensions and improvements to existing colleges. All such schemes had to be formally approved by the SCTT, but the initiatives came from the Governors of the colleges and the real control rested with the SED which made the decisions about capital expenditure.

The relocation of Dunfermline College.

In other ways, however, the SCTT did play an important part in the expansion of the

colleges. The first issue which came to it was that of the relocation of Dunfermline. The college's lease of the buildings at Woolmanhill in Aberdeen was due to expire in 1965. So, in April 1959, the Governors wrote to the SCTT urging that a new college should be built somewhere in the Edinburgh area. Like so many others, this issue was referred to the Committee of Principals, for whom Inglis produced a long and carefully argued memorandum on the Training of Women P.E. teachers.(74) This considered various options, including integration of training within other colleges and the joint training of men and women; but in the end came to the rather conservative conclusion that there should be one specialist college for women and that it should be near Edinburgh to provide better facilities for teaching practice and better chances of recruiting staff and students. For once, however, the expert advice of the Principals did not find favour with the Council. Sir James Robertson led a lobby for Aberdeen, and successfully moved a motion that there should be two training centres, one at Aberdeen and the other in Central Scotland.(75) This advice was sent to the SED, but it would have none of it. Instead, approval was given for the acquisition of a site for one college, which eventually opened at Cramond in 1966 - an example of the way in which the advice of an advisory body could be ignored, when that body was divided and there was no political penalty to be paid for over-ruling the majority.

The building of Hamilton College.

There was, however, no serious difference of views between the SCTT and the SED about the building of new colleges. The need for expansion was so obvious and the problems of overcrowding at Jordanhill so acute that no-one doubted that at least one new college was necessary. This left the SCTT to grapple with the practical questions : how many colleges? where ? what range of courses should they offer? and what sort of accommodation should be provided ?

Initially it seemed that the first two questions could be quickly dealt with. It was generally assumed in 1959 that there should be at least one new college in the West to take the pressure off Jordanhill. (76) So by December 1959, the Council had agreed to recommend that there should be a new college built in the Hamilton area. (77)

While the search was begun for a suitable site, the SCTT turned to the question - what range of courses should the college offer? Broadly, there were three options : an all-purpose college providing the full range of graduate and non-graduate training; a college simply providing the three-year diploma course for primary teachers; and one providing the diploma course and a limited range of other types of training.

The college most affected by this issue was Jordanhill, as the practical effect of creating a college of the first type in the West would have been to split Jordanhill vertically. So, in response to SED memoranda on the future estimated student population of the colleges, the Jordanhill Governors passed a resolution supporting the provision of one new college, preferably at Hamilton, along the lines of the third option.

> 'While a simple vertical division of Jordanhill College was not desirable, the new college should not be too narrowly based. For example, a possible arrangement might be for the college to provide for Chapter III three-year women and for Chapter VI in Art, Music and Physical Education (Women)'. (78)

A similar recommendation was then made by the Chairman's Committee of SCTT (79) and endorsed in principle by the Council at its meeting on 3rd/4th December,1959, but at that point the issue became confused with that of the optimum size of colleges, raised by Sir James Robertson.

At the following Council meeting on January 28th, 1960, he formally moved :

> 'That in future no college of education be allowed to expand beyond a roll of 1,000 students; and that, so far as is consistent with the full discharge of the responsibilities which will meantime fall on Jordanhill and Moray House colleges, all alterations and additions to the two colleges should be so designed as to facilitate their return, when conditions allow, to a maximum roll of 1,000 students each'.(80)

In retrospect, this seems an extraordinary proposal to have made, ignoring as it did all the problems of providing a full range of specialist graduate training in a small college although, as we have seen there were people within SED who felt that colleges should not exceed 1200. When asked what was behind it, Stimpson replied :

STIMPSON : Sir James. I think that's the simple answer.

WBM : Why should he want to do this ?

STIMPSON : If you go back further, there was a report on the training of teachers just after the war, with McClelland as chairman of the committee. You'll find in McClelland's report a recommendation regarding the ideal size of colleges. What you have to remember is that

McClelland was Principal of Dundee and he felt that he had the ideal college.... I think the comparison made in the report was with Aberdeen rather than Dundee but the influence was McClelland's experience in Dundee. So that you had in 1946 a recommendation - I think the effective recommendation would be for 6-700. Therefore Sir James' 1,000 was an increase not a reduction as Jordanhill and Moray House thought. It was due to a belief that if you had too many students the quality of training would suffer.

While acknowledging that there was an educational argument that teacher training involved developing relationships and that this might be better done in small institutions, Wood suggested that there were personal prejudices at play.

WOOD.It was partly Sir James. He had been at Jordanhill in the 1920s and he didn't like the place. He was a friend of Willie Kerr (81). Willie Kerr was a marvellous man and a good teacher, but he wasn't an administrator, and he found Jordanhill a great burden.....He used to moan to people like J J . Robertson. Then, in his old age...JJ .became external examiner to the Institute of Education in Leeds. The Professor of Education in Leeds was a man called Walsh, who had been ..in Moray House. He hated Moray House, Dr.Inglis and all his works. He convinced Sir James of the benefits of university departments of education which trained teachers and also of the value of the Institute which was civilising the teacher training colleges'.

Whatever the motives behind it, the motion sparked off a fierce debate in which the representatives of the large colleges condemned it as unrealistic. In the end an amendment was carried which said simply that :'In future no college of education be allowed to expand beyond a roll of approximately 1,000 students'. If it had been implemented, this policy would have restricted all the colleges except Jordanhill and Moray House to 1,000 students, but the forces of expansion were so strong that it remained a dead letter.

This unnecessary debate about college size had left unresolved the question of the nature of the new college. This was debated again at a full-day meeting on November 4th, 1960 by which time the SED had written to the SCTT approving in principle the building of a college at Hamilton and had decided that all training for women P.E. teachers would be in the one specialist college, thereby making it more difficult to give the new college a limited range of Chapter VI specialisms. Although arguments were

again put forward against siting a college at Hamilton and against a college exclusively for women primary teachers, these arguments were rejected. As Dewar [Headmaster, George Heriot's School] pointed out, the Council was constrained by decisions already taken.

> 'One point of view strongly stressed by Mr.Dewar was that the Council were facing the consequences of decisions already taken. They must accept the fact a) that the transfer of Dunfermline College to Edinburgh entailed the concentration of all women P.E students there, and b) that the Secretary of State had approved the selection of Hamilton as the general area for the eighth college. It was with extreme reluctance that he accepted the logical deduction.... that the new college should in the main cater for 3 or 4 year trained women diploma students'. (82)

Nevertheless, the motions finally carried neatly offered some crumbs of comfort to the various cross-currents of opinion in the Council. They stated :

1.   That the maximum roll of the new College be 900;

2.   That the College be for women only;

3.   That provision should be limited to three- and four-year Diploma courses in the first instance;

4.   That the possibility be envisaged of the provision of additional qualifying courses in certain subjects at present grouped under Chapter VI. (83)

These motions, however, did not specifically endorse the siting of the new college at Hamilton, and attempts were made to persuade the SED to reconsider its decision. Dewar, who had seemed to accept the Hamilton site in November, brought motions to the December meeting of SCTT proposing that, instead of one college at Hamilton, there should be two - at Stirling and Inverness. (84) This may have been partly because, like many traditional secondary graduates, he felt that teacher training should be in a university town and saw that the new college might be linked to a university at Stirling, the possibility of which was already being discussed.

Although Dewar did not press these motions, they gave the CP an opportunity to suggest other alternatives. These were debated at a meeting on February 9th, 1961 (85) as a result of which Wood, as Chairman, wrote to the SCTT summarising the CP's

views. They expressed doubts whether Hamilton was a suitable site (86) and suggested that the new college should be at Ayr and that the possibility of 'feeder colleges' should be considered to deal with temporary emergencies. There was however, strong opposition in the SCTT to the suggestions of the CP. Robertson and Lees [Vice-chairman and Rector of Glasgow High School] both supported Hamilton, and McEwan, the Director of Education for Lanarkshire, used his position on the SCTT to press the Hamilton case. (87) On their side, they had the fact that Lanarkshire was an area of chronic teacher shortage, which a college at Hamilton might help to alleviate. So the SCTT endorsed its earlier recommendation in principle for a college at Hamilton, along with the recommendation that it should be for women diploma students only.

This recommendation then went to the Department. (88) Although there seem to have been some reservations among both officials and the inspectorate, the eventual consensus was that the recommendations should be accepted and the case for Hamilton was therefore put to Ministers. It was argued that, with the increasing demand for teachers, it was vital to take the pressure off Jordanhill; that there should be one college in the West, as one college would be cheaper than two smaller ones and would attract better staff; that it should be 'in the Lanarkshire nexus of towns' to meet the needs of teaching practice (the alternative at Ayr would be too costly); and that it must be mainly for diploma students if it were to take pressure off Jordanhill as to hive off small groups of graduates would be wasteful.

However sensible, some aspects of these recommendations were politically unpopular in several quarters. On the Labour side, Margaret Herbison [M.P. for Lanarkshire North] attacked the proposed segregation of non-graduate students from graduates and argued that decisions about the siting of the new college should not be taken separately from those about the new university. (89)

There was opposition too on the Conservative side for quite different reasons. One of the Scottish Office Ministers minuted :

> 'The prospect [of a college at Hamilton] fills me with foreboding. One can envisage the set-up ....a large, hygienic and spiritless building in the dispiriting landscape, a swarm of girls going out from this to do their practical work in the overcrowded, difficult and, in places, still grim surroundings of Lanarkshire schools, and these young and emotionally impressionable girls being subjected to constant contact with the militant "agin-it-ness" of Lanarkshire teacher politics'. (90)

The officials, however, continued patiently to press their case, using as one of their arguments the difficulty of rejecting SCTT recommendations. These internal arguments went on for several months, but in the end the official view prevailed and in October, 1961 the SCTT recommendations were officially endorsed.(91)

While these discussion were going on inside the SCTT and then the SED, other difficulties over the creation of a new college had to be resolved. Because the 1958 Regulations had not envisaged a new college, they had made no provision for it and so there was no body in Scotland with the statutory power to build one. The first difficulty over the building of Hamilton was therefore that the Regulations had to be amended to give powers to the SCTT to arrange for the building and to appoint the Principal, before handing over to a new Board of Governors. (92)

Once the Regulations had been amended, the Council set up, in the autumn of 1960, a Special Building Committee which quickly decided that the best site in Hamilton was one near to the race course. This was unpopular with the racing fraternity, as it would have necessitated the realignment of the course and consequently a public inquiry.(93) So, when the recommendation went to the Secretary of State, he insisted that the Building Committee look for alternative sites. This meant further delays; and by the time a site was found, an architect appointed, plans drawn up and the project put out to tender, it proved impossible to start the actual building until 1964. Thus the first students were admitted to a still-unfinished college in October 1966 - through no fault of the SCTT, almost six years from the time the SED had approved the project.

However, out of the discussion about the building of Hamilton and the proposals for new buildings elsewhere came some valuable thinking about college facilities. In February 1960 the CP, with Brunton and Aldridge (Assistant Secretary, SED) present, spent two days discussing what sort of accommodation was needed for the future, during which they looked at the plans for the new college at Nottingham then under construction, the first new college built specifically for the new three-year course in England & Wales. (94)

These discussions seem to have left the Department slightly uneasy. Before the next meeting of the Principals, Brunton sent them a memo pointing out that the SED was about to give formal consent to various proposals from Governing Bodies for new accommodation and that it therefore wished to be assured 'that the Principals are quite clear in their minds as to the type of accommodation which they would like to have'.(95) It then went on to describe the visit which Brunton and Aldridge had paid to three of the larger English colleges. (96) One of the things which had struck them was the extent of

group work and individual tutorials.

'It seems to me that, in our training system, we have copied the less admirable features of university education in Scotland with its great reliance on lecturing and on regular written examination of students. It should, I think, be considered at this stage of our development whether our training colleges could not depart from this tradition of lecturing and adopt, as fully as possible, the tutorial system, with a view to helping the individual students to reach as high standards as practicable'.

The Department was thus encouraging the colleges to look for new types of accommodation : the provision of small tutorial rooms, departmental bases, staff study areas, proper library accommodation and adequate laboratories - none of which were to be found in colleges like Jordanhill at that time. Perhaps because of the cost implications, Brunton felt that this encouragement had to be given behind the scenes. In the introduction to the memo he made it clear that it was for the information of the Principals only and was not an official paper: a glimpse of the tensions between Brunton's promotional policies and his position as a government adviser. So, his ideas were almost certainly discussed at the next meeting of the Principals on 12 May, but there is no mention of the paper in the Minutes (97) - a good example of how elusive the policy process is when so much takes place through informal meetings and off-the-record discussions.

New Building Standards.

One practical difficulty in providing the new buildings was that there were no building standards for the colleges. According to Wood, they were created in a very rule-of thumb way.

> WOOD : At that time...there were no building standards for the colleges - no-one had built one in Scotland for 50 years. So Sister Mary [Principal of Notre Dame] and Brunton and I had to work out how much teaching accommodation would be required. We simply took the amount of teaching space at Jordanhill per student and doubled it. There was nothing scientific about it. But that was what Hamilton and the other colleges were based on, and it was important in establishing the idea of a number of places.

Scientific or not, the new formula provided a framework within which the desired facilities could be provided. Through their membership of the Building Committees, the ideas of the Principals were fed into the plans for the new colleges. This in turn set standards for the re-siting or extension of the existing colleges, and so by the time the SCTT came to an end college facilities had improved tremendously. Unfortunately, the improved quality of the facilities was not always matched by quality in the buildings themselves, some of which had structural or design faults which were to cause serious problems sooner or later.

The new colleges at Callendar Park and Craigie.

But this is to run ahead of our story. The immediate problem in the early 60s was that the delay in the building of Hamilton, combined with an inexorable rise in the number of students, (the number entering training rose from 1,100 in 1559-60 to 1,906 in 1963-64) was putting intolerable pressure on the colleges. There were limits to what could be done by more intensive use of existing accommodation and by using temporary or makeshift buildings.(98) Stimpson describes some of the expedients resorted to at Dundee.

> *WBM. Did Dundee have problems of overcrowding as acute as those at Jordanhill ?*
>
> *STIMPSON. Oh yes. There was one period I remember when we sent students out to Mayfield, which is quite a distance away, for a whole morning. We used the Board Room; we used derelict property; we constructed a second gym out of an industrial building; we extended the college day for an hour, and we took over the demonstration school having built a new one.*

What was to be done? The debate was sparked off in February 1962 by a request from Moray House for an extension which would enable the college to expand to 1600. This rekindled the controversy about the optimum size of colleges. The Moray House proposal was opposed by the Dundee representatives on the SCTT, who saw it as a threat to their own plans for expansion.(99) To resolve the conflict, it was agreed to remit the issue to an Ad Hoc Committee, which was the Chairman's Committee enlarged to include Urquhart [Director of Education, Selkirk] and P Robertson [a teacher at Morgan Academy, Dundee]. By the time this met in October, the CP had carried out its own review of the position, based on a paper by Inglis, (100) and had concluded that the demand for places would outstrip supply from 1964 onwards. They therefore

recommended that, in addition to Hamilton, two new centres of training should be planned.(101)

This time there was little debate about the type of centre as it was generally assumed that they would follow the Hamilton precedent and offer only the primary diploma course to women. What was at issue was whether the new centres should be temporary or permanent, whether they should be independent or auxiliary to Jordanhill and Moray House, and where they should be.

When the Ad Hoc Committee discussed these issues, it accepted the Principals' estimate of demand and recommended that two new centres should be planned, not as separate colleges but as 'auxiliary' centres to Jordanhill and Moray House.(102) The SCTT accepted this, and set up a Sub-committee to plan the first of the centres under the auspices of Jordanhill. Then followed several months of unsuccessful search for buildings which could be adapted as temporary centres. When this was reported to the Council in May, 1963, it altered tack and decided to recommend that there be two additional permanent colleges, one at Ayr and the other in the Stirling area.(103) Two Special Building Committees were set up and began the quest for suitable sites, but before this had got very far the SED stepped in with an instruction that 'the Council should meantime address itself primarily to the establishment of temporary facilities at Ayr and Stirling for 600 students each'. (104)

Because they were to be temporary colleges for women only, it was decided that the Principals should be women, and that they should be seconded from within the college system for a four-year term of office, in the first instance. (105) On this basis, the SCTT proceeded to the appointments in September to what were described as the temporary colleges in Ayrshire and Stirlingshire. (106) (See Appendix 8)

From this point on events moved with remarkable rapidity. By the end of the year sites had been found and the projects approved. Building started early in 1964 and, by the use of industrialised building methods, both colleges were sufficiently advanced to be able to admit their first students in October.

So, despite the delay in building Hamilton, sufficient new accommodation was provided in time to avert the threatened crisis and to allow expansion of students numbers to continue. From 4884 in 1959-60, the total student population of the colleges more than doubled to 10,242 in 1967-68.(see Table 3.5) The provision of accommodation could not really keep pace with such a rapid rise. Enough was done to avert the crisis, but the older colleges were still bursting at the seams.

One good example of the way in which student numbers outran the building programme was at Notre Dame. The new college at Bearsden had been planned for 900 students, but even while it was being built it became clear that it would be too small. So the Governors approached the SED.

> 'After prolonged discussion, it was decided that a third College for
> Catholic students be established, that this should be a day college for
> men and women, graduates and central institution diploma holders,
> students taking four year courses ('Robbins type') and some three-year
> diploma students'. (107)

A proposal along these lines was put to the SCTT and agreed in principle. (108) However, the building of this third college was put off because of the costs. Instead, the overflow from Bearsden was accommodated by allowing the Notre Dame governors to buy the old college site at Dowanhill from the Institute of Notre Dame - a solution which left the college to wrestle with the problems of split-site working and an unsuitable building.

The creation of the new colleges was undoubtedly the main achievement of the SCTT. In the short space of seven years, the Council through its Special Building Committees had planned them and overseen the building of them. It had appointed their senior staff and taken them forward to the point at which they could be handed over to their newly-created Boards of Governors. This was a task which absorbed a great deal of the members' time and energy - the Hamilton Building Committee alone met 22 times (109) - and it says a great deal for their commitment and for the energy and ability of Gray, the Secretary, that it was successfully carried through despite minimal administrative support.

> GRAY : 'It was a very hectic time. I was Secretary of the Scottish
> Council itself, the Committee of Principals, the Exceptional Recognition
> Committee, and all three Building Committees. All that with only one
> elderly, but very efficient, secretary'.

The reform of the Regulations.

College building, however, was only one part of the Council's work. It also addressed itself to the other two issues which Niall MacPherson had brought to its first meeting : the reform of teacher training for FE (which is outside the scope of this study) and the reform of the training regulations.

At an early meeting, the SCTT had before it the SED Memorandum on the Training of Teachers (June 1960) reminding it that the Regulations had not been significantly changed since 1931. The Department saw two main problems : the expansion of secondary education bringing with it an increased proportion of less able pupils in the schools, and the small proportion of men (all necessarily graduates) in primary schools.(110) They therefore raised a number of issues. Should the form of the Regulations be changed to make them broader and less detailed ? Were the academic qualifications demanded of teachers in selective secondary schools still appropriate ? Should all male primary teachers have to be graduates? Should the content of the Three-year Diploma course be revised to provide optional courses at a higher standard so that some of the students might become qualified to teach in secondary schools?

Some of these issues were highly contentious. The suggestion that there should be non-graduate men primary teachers ran counter to the Scottish teachers' aspirations for an all-graduate profession.(111) Feelings ran so high on this that it twice figured prominently in Parliamentary debates on Scottish education. (112) The EIS of course waged a strong campaign against it as 'dilution', as it also did against the suggestion that there might be non-graduate teachers in secondary schools. (113)

Not surprisingly, therefore, the SCTT was divided on these issues. It was quite happy to endorse the proposals for the simplification of certification and for four-year courses for women wishing to specialist in subjects like physical education or homecraft in primary schools. But motions in favour of admitting men to the diploma course, or for creating a four-year college course which would have qualified men or women to teach in both primary and junior secondary schools were defeated.(114)

Faced with these 'sharp differences of opinion' (115) and with fierce opposition from the EIS, the SED decided to shelve any comprehensive review of the Regulations while waiting for the outcomes of the Wheatley and Robbins Reports.

Once those Reports were out, however, reform of the Regulations came back on the agenda. In order to push through reform, the two most contentious items - the admission of men to the three year Diploma course and of non-graduate teachers to secondary schools - were put on one side, temporarily in the first case but permanently in the second. This done, the review could concentrate on simplifying the Regulations and redefining the academic qualifications for secondary school teaching. Even this involved a great deal of discussion, in which the groundwork was again done by the CP (116), before recommendations emerged which were embodied in the Teachers (Education , Training and Certification)(Scotland) Regulations 1965, and which created

the system which has lasted until the present-day. The old terminology of 'Chapters' and 'Articles' (which still lingers on in conversation) was swept away and replaced by three Teacher's Certificates : for Primary, Secondary and Further Education. The Primary Certificate could be obtained by following either the Three-year Diploma course, or a Four-year B.Ed Course, or by taking a university degree followed by a One-year course at a college of education; the Secondary Certificate by either the B.Ed or a university degree and a One-year college course, now quite separate from the primary course. To accompany these changes, the SED agreed to publish each year a 'Memorandum on Entry Requirements' which recorded decisions on which qualifications were suitable for teaching a particular subject in a secondary school or in further education.

These reforms were a clear improvement. The new Certificates corresponded with the accepted division of education into three stages. They ensured that primary and secondary teachers were trained for the stage at which they were to teach (117), and that secondary teachers had some academic background in the subjects they were teaching. Two graduating passes do not amount to subject mastery; but at least Scottish schools were protected from the looseness of the English system in which people may be asked to teach subjects in which they have no qualifications at all.

The weaknesses of the new system lay in its inflexibilities. It perpetuated the barrier between primary and secondary schools, which primary teachers could only cross in the lowly guise of remedial teachers. Its emphasis on qualifications (118) may have contributed to a continued academic emphasis in secondary schools; that emphasis certainly reinforced the powerful divisions between subject departments in secondary schools, which continue to inhibit the development of multi-disciplinary courses.

These weaknesses were apparent at the time, and the Principals' proposals for associateship courses, described below, would have gone some way towards remedying them. Another way of mitigating inflexibility was through reform of the arrangements for supplementary courses and courses leading to additional teaching qualifications. (119) These provided the means by which secondary teachers could obtain the academic qualifications to teach another subject or, if they had the academic qualifications, could extend their secondary certificate to another subject. Once the 1965 Regulations were in being, the SCTT undertook this further reform. As its Third Report records :

> This task fell to the Committee of Principals to advise and they in turn
> were deeply indebted to the Principal of Dundee College of Education
> [Stimpson] for the memorandum on which they based their study. In due

course the text, with minor amendments, was adopted as Council policy'. (120)

Another example of the part played by the Committee of Principals in shaping SCTT policy.

The Proposals for College Associateship Courses.

As we have seen, the SED had raised the issue of opening secondary teaching to non-graduates in its Memorandum on the Training of Teachers in June 1960. (121) It was spurred to do this by its doubts 'whether the supply of graduates can possibly equal the prospective needs in the primary and secondary schools'. (122) It therefore put forward for consideration two questions which were to underly all the debates of the following years :

a) 'Whether the academic and technical qualifications which were considered appropriate at the time when the secondary school population was largely composed of the abler pupils are necessarily the only, or indeed the most appropriate, qualifications for all teachers in the secondary school of today; and

b) whether all men teachers of general subjects should still be expected to gain degrees, or whether it should be made possible for some to receive both their higher education and their professional training within the college of education, with the further opportunity of qualifying as secondary teachers of one or more academic subjects'. (123)

In response to this Memorandum, Wood produced some 'Notes on the Training of Teachers in Scotland' (124) in which he argued that future developments depended on a solution to the problem of teacher shortage but that attempts to remedy this were constrained by the conservative attitudes of the teaching profession and by the pressure to maintain the Scottish tradition that all secondary teachers should be graduates. 'If there is to be any hope,' he wrote,' of adequately staffing the schools of Scotland .... then the present system of certification .... must be altered and the present very limited academic functions of training colleges must be changed'. The possibilities he envisaged were : a change to the English system which allowed non-graduates to teach in secondary schools; the development of the colleges as liberal arts colleges granting their own degrees and diplomas; or closer academic links between colleges and universities, which would enable the universities to grant degrees to college students completing

approved courses.

As time went on these issues were given added urgency by the increasing number of 'non-certificate pupils' staying on in secondary schools, by the possibility of the raising of the school leaving age, and by the Brunton Report 'From School to Further Education' (1963) with its advocacy of new courses which would provide 'meaningful incentives for learning' for pupils below the highest levels of ability. (125) So, in May 1964, the SED produced another Memorandum dealing with developments in secondary education and their implications for teacher training, which Brunton probably played a large part in shaping. (126)

As he still attended the CP regularly, he then had a chance to shape its response: to recommend to the SCTT the introduction of four year college courses, leading to an associateship which would qualify people to teach in primary or secondary schools.(127) As Wood's Notes show, such ideas came at least as much from the Principals as from the Department. However, it is unlikely that they would have gone forward if the SED assessors had not supported them

When the CP's recommendation came before the SCTT, its reasonable reaction was to ask for more detail. So it was agreed that Wood would produce some draft proposals, which were discussed and amended at a further CP meeting on December 2nd. (128)

After rehearsing the arguments for improving supply and for new types of training to prepare teachers for their changing tasks, the CP paper recommended that :

1.   the colleges should offer four year associateship courses for men and women;
2.   the entry qualifications should be those under Article 15 i.e. essentially the same as for the Diploma course;
3.   the courses should be designed to produce 'teachers for primary schools and for the non-academic pupils in secondary schools as well as sub-specialists in practical subjects for either primary or secondary schools';
4.   the courses should qualify teachers to work with specific age ranges e.g. 5-12 (leading to a primary certificate), 9-14 (leading to a primary and secondary certificate), and 12-16 (leading to a secondary certificate).

Because these proposals challenged two positions strongly defended by the teachers' associations - that there should be no non-graduate men in primary schools and no non-graduates at all in secondary - opposition was only to be expected. The SED therefore

felt it necessary to throw its weight openly behind the Principals' proposals. So, after clearing the matter with Ministers, it wrote to the SCTT reminding it that the Secretary of State was seriously concerned about the problem of supply in view of ROSLA and the need to reduce class sizes and reiterating the educational argument that secondary teachers must be trained to devise courses suitable for non-certificate pupils. 'The Secretary of State is sure', the letter concluded, 'that, in these circumstance, the Council realise the strength of the case, on grounds of educational need and teacher supply, for a broadening of the base of the training system'. (129)

At its meeting on December 10th, the SCTT therefore had before it both the CP recommendations and the Department's supporting letter.(130) Despite the obvious signs of official endorsement, there was considerable resistance in the Council to the proposals. The opposition was led by Lees, the Chairman, who argued that the lower entry qualifications might produce an inferior type of teacher, that the associateships would further sub-divide the profession and that they might well jeopardise the chances of introducing the B.Ed. Although others argued that the proposals merited a trial because of their possible benefits to schools, Lees was successful in persuading the Council that they should take no action before consulting the teachers' associations - doubtless because he calculated, correctly, that the teachers would oppose them.

Because of this danger, the SED took steps to head off that opposition. The press was briefed on the seriousness of the teacher shortage, and meetings were held in January with the EIS and SSTA 'to make sure that the main teachers' associations would consider the proposals of the Principals in full knowledge of the facts and figures of teacher supply and demand'. (131) All to no avail. When the responses came in, the only support came from the Headteachers. Both the EIS and the SSTA opposed what they regarded as a lowering of standards which, they argued, would do little to improve teacher supply. Nor did they accept the educational case for an associateship. As the EIS put it: 'It is not less highly qualified teachers who are needed for a new curriculum, but teachers who have undergone a new type of training'. (132) Backed by these negative responses, Lees was then able to persuade the Chairman's Committee to vote by 3 to 2 against the proposals (133) but, later the same day, the full Council voted in their favour by 13 to 6. (134)

Once this recommendation was made, the EIS naturally campaigned against it.(135) To counter this, the Department organised some discreet lobbying. Letters were sent to the local authority associations and to ADES inviting their views on the Associateship proposals because they could be expected to sympathise with anything that promised to help with their supply problems. (136) The four Principals of the city colleges were

invited to a working lunch with Ministers to give them an opportunity to press their case. (137)

There was also an interesting exchange of letters between SED and Treasury officials, which sheds light on external pressures to modify the Scottish system. (138) SED anticipated that the Treasury would be concerned about the cost of the four-year associateship proposals and therefore wrote to forestall criticism by suggesting that they were the first move towards the admission of men to the three- year course for primary teachers - a change which it knew the Treasury would welcome. This had the desired effect. The Treasury agreed to give general support to the proposals because they would help teacher supply, but with two reservations :

a) that the SED should continue to work towards a three-year course for all non-graduate teachers, comparable to that in England and Wales; and

b) that the entry requirements for the associateship course had been pitched too high in view of the likelihood of continuing teacher shortage.

The Treasury, however, did not press this latter point as it recognised how strong the opposition of the teachers' associations would be to anything that smacked of 'dilution'.

How hopeful the officials were of securing approval for the proposals can be seen from the fact that a Commons statement was prepared, and a Circular was drafted, setting out the necessary changes in the Regulations, which got as far as having proof copies printed. (139) However, at the end of April, the EIS Council had again reiterated its opposition to the proposals,(140) and so Ministers were becoming worried by the political difficulties which would face them if they went ahead. These tactical issues were discussed at a meeting between the officials and Ministers in mid-May, at the end of which the politicians decided 'to make early soundings of the attitude of Government supporters .... and also to have private conversations with certain EIS members known personally'. (141) The results of these were decisive - a decision that, whatever the merits of the Associateship proposals - their effect on teacher recruitment would not be substantial enough to warrant the political row that would ensue.

This left the SED officials with two problems : how to explain to the SCTT why a policy which it had been urged to adopt had now been rejected and what to do instead. While they were pondering, Ministers themselves took the initiative. In the Scottish Grand

Committee on July 8th, Judith Hart [Joint Parliamentary Under-secretary of State] made a speech designed to conciliate the EIS. After referring to the proposals for the Associateship and for the admission of men to the three-year diploma course and their possible contribution to teacher supply, she went on :

> 'But there is another area of opinion to be considered, that of the teaching profession itself, which, from time to time - indeed almost continuously in the last few months - has been expressing its view ...... We have looked very closely at all the suggestions made by the profession for improving recruitment ... On a number of them we have taken action ... But my right honourable Friend and I believe that any new steps should be taken, if at all possible, with the co-operation of the profession. So we propose to invite representatives of the profession to discuss with us - in an open-ended discussion - the courses of action open to us'. (142)

This initiative was viewed with scepticism by the officials. The politicians clearly hoped that the EIS would make some concessions in return for the goodwill which the Government had shown by offering them the discussions and a General Teaching Council. The officials doubted whether the EIS would be willing to compromise in any way, and were unhappy at the prominence given to seeking the support of the teachers' associations to the exclusion of other interested groups, notably the SCTT and the local authorities.(143)

The open-ended meetings duly went ahead, and the SED did its best to achieve what it saw as a constructive outcome. The EIS was given its best available forecasts on teacher supply and demand and, when it set up an ad hoc committee to study these, the Department gave it all the help it could. In doing so, it hoped to make the EIS more aware of the difficulties of teacher supply and therefore more willing to make concessions. However, the officials' scepticism proved to be justified. At their meeting with Ministers in December, the EIS was only willing to talk about the problem of uncertificated teachers, and the final issue of the SEJ in 1965 reiterated its opposition to the proposals for the Associateship and for non-graduate men primary teachers. (144)

By this time it was too late to take any further action before the GTC held its first meeting. The government therefore had to give up its hopes of reaching some arrangement with the teachers by which it could have avoided bringing these controversial proposals before the GTC early in what was likely to be a troubled life. It did indeed hold back for a while but, by the summer of 1966, the SED felt that it could delay no longer in view of the urgent problems of teacher supply. Its preferred option

was still for the Associateship for which, it argued, there was 'a very strong, if not compelling case'. (145) The political difficulties, however, were unchanged : it was opposed by all three teachers' associations and the government was lukewarm in its support. The Department was therefore coming round to the view that it might be better to go for the admission of men to the three-year diploma course, which was not opposed by the SSTA and the SSA and which had stronger Ministerial backing. It still hoped that this would be a first step and that it could move on to open up secondary teaching to associates, while well aware that the first step might be all the 'dilution' the teachers would accept.

However, to keep its options open, the SED sent a letter to the GTC asking for 'early consideration of some broadening of the basis for entry to teacher training'. (146) This referred to both proposals but was slanted towards the need to attract more men into teaching. When this came before the Council on September 29th, nearly all the teacher members spoke against change, but a decision was deferred while an ad hoc committee considered the matter and reported to a special meeting in November. (147) To prepare the ground, the SED fed to the ad hoc committee a lengthy memorandum - 'Teacher Training: Considerations bearing on possible new courses' - and arranged for them to meet Ministers. At that meeting the GTC representatives wanted to talk mainly about the problems of registration and the elimination of uncertificated teachers. This gave the SED a chance to suggest a trade-off; their support in moves to eliminate the uncertificated in return for some movement on the broadening of entry. With this package, the ad hoc committee went back to the GTC and, despite vocal opposition from some of the EIS members, secured a vote by 21 to 11 for a recommendation that men should be admitted to the diploma course (148) - a recommendation which the government quickly accepted.(149)

However, no decision had yet been made on the Associateship proposals. In this situation, the EIS decided to acquiesce reluctantly in the admission of men to the diploma course, (150) but to seek an immediate meeting with Ministers to head off the Associateship. (151) That meeting proved to be unnecessary. On December 9th, the GTC had before it a motion for the introduction of Associateships, but decided at Wood's suggestion that a decision should be deferred because this second step would antagonise the teachers' organisations too much at a time when it was vital to build up their confidence in the Council.(152) Once deferred, the proposal was never revived: stymied by the opposition of the teachers and the resource implications of the introduction of the B.Ed.

The Associateship and the policy process.

Although nothing came of the Associateship proposals, the episode provides some interesting insights into the policy process.

Firstly, it shows how teacher supply dominated the policy agenda at that time. Anything which offered a chance of helping supply was therefore likely to be seriously considered by the Department.

Secondly, it illustrates the role of the Department as a 'gate-keeper'. The idea of an Associateship had been in the air for some time. It needed signals from the Department to put it on the practical agenda.

Thirdly, it shows the preferred method of processing such an issue. To begin with there were talks, formal and informal, with a trusted group of 'insiders' - the Principals of the four city colleges. Once definite proposals had emerged from these, they were taken for ratification to the formal advisory body - the SCTT. Up to this point it was a classic case of 'bureaucratic accommodation'.

Fourthly, it shows the considerable part played by the teachers' organisations (particularly the EIS) within the policy community on certain issues, and their power to block change.

Finally, it shows that bureaucratic accommodation works best when the issues are technical and arouse little or no political interest. However, the Associateship proposals, though technically about a new type of course, went beyond the technical in challenging some of the fiercely-held positions of Scottish teachers. Once the proposals were out in the open, the policy process could no longer be confined within the narrow policy community of insiders and advisory bodies. It moved out into the political arena, where all those involved (the Principals, the SCTT, the SED and the teachers' associations) lobbied for support in various ways. In that arena, the views of the official advisory body counted for far less than those of the EIS - a well- organised pressure group whose support the Government courted. So, even an alliance between the SCTT and the SED officials was unable to carry the day.

The demise of the SCTT.

For a good deal of its short life, the SCTT worked under the threat of extinction. In response to teacher unrest the Government set up the Wheatley Committee in November, 1961 'to review .... the present arrangements for the award and withdrawal of certificates of competency to teach, and to make recommendations regarding any changes that are considered desirable in these arrangements and any consequential changes in the functions of the teacher training authorities'. (153) This was part of the general trend towards seeking teachers' co-operation in educational developments (154), for which the government was prepared to concede some measure of teacher control over entry as a sign of professional status. So from 1962 onwards it was clear that the future of the SCTT was in doubt. When the Wheatley committee, on which the SCTT was represented by Lees and Wood, reported in 1963, it recommended the setting up of a General Teaching Council. As this was intended to be the main advisory body on such matters as admission to teacher training, exceptional recognition and teacher supply, the Wheatley proposals left the SCTT without sufficient responsibilities to justify its continuing existence. (157) It was therefore suggested that the SCTT should be abolished and its functions split between the GTC, the SED, and a new Joint Committee of the Colleges of Education [JCCES].

However, the government hesitated to implement Wheatley, partly because the SED felt that the proposed shift in power went too far, partly because it dreaded the inevitable furore over the registration of uncertificated teachers. (156) While it delayed, the routine work of the SCTT had to go on; so a Third Council was set up in 1964 and continued to operate until 1967 when it was finally replaced by the GTC.

Although it only lasted eight years, the SCTT could claim a considerable record of achievement. (157) It had successfully administered useful routine business in fields such as exceptional recognition and the Special Recruitment Scheme. It had revised the entry qualifications to the colleges (158) and reformed the system of salary negotiations for college staff.(159) It had created the current system of certification for teachers and tidied up the area of supplementary and additional qualifications. It had produced important reports about the training of technical teachers and teachers in Further Education.

Its most visible achievement, as we have noted, was the building of the three new colleges. One effect of this was to accentuate the two-tier system of teacher education. By 1967, the status of the 'big four' city colleges had been enhanced by the development of the B.Ed. (See Chapter Four) Of the other six colleges (still all-female),

four were for primary-training only and the number of graduates at Notre Dame had only risen to 50.(160)

This situation was not the result of a conscious plan that teacher education was best served by having the two types of college. It was rather the outcome of series of decisions designed to deal with the immediate problems of teacher shortage. In the optimistic days of the late 1960s, when it seemed as if everyone in higher education could look forward to expansion, the two-tier system did not seem to matter; but it held within itself the seeds of future tensions.

The SCTT and the Government: the role of an advisory body.

What part did an advisory body like the SCTT play in the policy process? At that time, governments generally wished to carry through changes with the active co-operation of those concerned. The approach was therefore one of consensus-seeking and of genuine consultation, in which discussion took place before decisions were made. Within that context, the basic function of an advisory body was to provide the relevant government department with a forum where, out of the public eye and relying on the discretion of the committee members, it could try out its ideas and tap expertise. How useful this was depended on the standing of the committee members and the willingness of the department to listen. There is little doubt that there were people on the SCTT, like Sir James Robertson, Wood or Dewar, whose views carried weight and who were listened to. The advice of the SCTT might be rejected, as it was over the re-siting of Dunfermline, but it was an important factor in the decision to site the new college at Hamilton and to make it a primary college only rather than, as the SED had originally preferred, a fifth 'general college'.

Of course, the SED did not simply wait for advice. It was to some extent manipulating the SCTT; feeding ideas to it (e.g. through informal discussions or through Rodger's 1959 papers) which shaped its policy recommendations and then using those recommendations within the Department. In working with the SCTT (or any advisory body) the officials took on the classic role of the go-between, relaying messages from SCTT to government and suggesting to SCTT what messages might be acceptable. Such a role is inescapable and well understood by all concerned. How well the system works depends on the degree of trust the go-betweens can create. The evidence from this period suggests that the close working relationships of SED with key members of the SCTT, and especially with the leading Principals, did generate an atmosphere of trust and co-operation, in which a good deal could be dealt with in small informal groups.

In addition to its basic function the SCTT was useful in at least three other ways. One was to provide a pool of volunteer experts who could help to get essential tasks done, for instance in the work of the Special Building Committees. Another was that, as a national advisory body, it could be used to throw a cloak of legitimacy over a policy the SED had already decided on. The best example is its 'advice' to pay the capital costs of expanding the Catholic colleges. As a considerable amount of anti-Catholic prejudice still existed in Scotland, this was potentially a sensitive political issue. So it was helpful to all concerned for the SED to appear to be responding to a recommendation from a body outside the political fray.

Thirdly, the SCTT could be valuable to SED officials and the inspectorate as an ally in their internal manoeuvres inside the Department. Although its advice could be disregarded, as it was over the resiting of Dunfermline, it could also be used to help overcome Ministerial opposition, as it was over the choice of the Hamilton site.

If the SCTT worked successfully in an climate of co-operation with the government, two special factors in the 1960s helped to create that climate: that the college system was still small-scale and relatively simple and that it was a period of expansion. It was therefore a period of optimism, a period in which everyone, including politicians of both parties, shared a common aim, a period in which all the main institutional players could expect to reap benefits sooner or later. As people were in general agreed about what should be done and policy discussion was about how to achieve it, agreement could normally be reached among the groups involved by 'bureaucratic accommodation'.

Diagram 3.1   Live Births in England & Wales ('000s) , 1946-1982

Based on Alexander (1984) Figure 1.1

Diagram 3.2   Live Births in Scotland ('000s) , 1946-1985

Based on the Annual Report of the Registrar General for Scotland, 1985

Table 3.3: Pupil Numbers in Education Authority Schools in Scotland ('000s): 1960-81.

Year	Nursery	Primary	Secondary	Special	Total
1959-60	5.1	593.1	278.1	10.3	880.3
1960-61	5.4	583.4	287.8	10.4	886.9
1961-62	5.8	581.2	292.2	10.4	889.3
1962-63	5.7	583.5	286.4	10.5	886.3
1963-64	5.8	589.1	287.7	10.7	893.3
1964-65	6.2	594.8	284.6	10.9	896.3
1965-66	6.6	592.2	271.0	9.0	878.8
1966-67	6.7	597.2	275.3	9.3	888.5
1967-68	7.4	605.8	282.7	9.4	905.3
1968-69	9.1	613.9	294.8	9.5	926.8
1969-70	10.5	622.5	304.4	9.7	946.7
1970-71	12.4	627.7	314.4	9.9	964.4
1971-72	14.6	634.3	324.4	10.1	983.4
1972-73	16.6	635.8	338.1	10.1	1000.6
1973-74	19.6	634.7	370.8	10.1	1035.2
1974-75	20.5	626.8	393.0	11.9	1052.2
1975-76	22.7	621.1	397.0	12.4	1053.2
1976-77	25.9	611.8	402.7	13.0	1053.4
1977-78	29.3	594.6	406.2	12.9	1043.0
1978-79	31.3	569.1	410.4	12.4	1023.2
1979--0	31.8	545.1	410.2	12.3	999.4
1980-81	32.5	518.5	407.8	11.8	970.6

Notes on the statistics of pupil numbers.

During the period 1959-65, the procedures for the collection and presentation of the statistics of pupil numbers changed more than once, which makes it difficult to present a consistent series.

1.   1959-65. Tables were published annually in Education in Scotland of the number of pupils in Public and Grant-aided Schools.

2.   1965-74. Tables were published annually in Scottish Educational Statistics of Pupils receiving primary and secondary education in education authority schools. The number of pupils in grant-aided schools was given separately and

averaged about 22,500. (highest figure 23,256; lowest figure 22,311) This figure therefore should be deducted from the totals for 1959-65 (above the line) to give a consistent series.

3.   After 1974, the figures are from Statistical Bulletins.

4.   Up to 1973-74, statistics were collected in mid-January.

After that, they were collected in September. In Statistical Bulletin No.2/A1/1977 it is estimated that the change to collection in September meant that the Nursery figures were 15% lower; that the Primary were little changed; that the Secondary were 4% higher; and that the Special Education were 2% higher.

Table 3.4 : Student numbers at each Scottish College of Education, 1959-70. - from SCES (1970)

YEAR	Ab	CP	Cr	Cl	Dd	Df.	Ham	J'hill	MH	ND
59-60	630	-	-	223	352	181	-	1927	1240	331
60-61	638	-	-	227	372	187	-	2073	1361	375
61-62	676	-	-	239	375	196	-	2179	1429	420
62-63	704	-	-	233	438	214	-	2546	1535	474
63-64	832	-	-	249	586	215	-	2813	1625	652
64-65	968	170	192	239	716	227	-	2838	1657	772
65-66	1141	400	409	295	837	274	-	2727	1581	898
66-67	1306	576	572	331	837	335	366	2468	1506	866
67-68	1410	615	612	358	957	379	732	2587	1510	1082
68-69	1513	666	678	364	991	436	876	2641	1744	1211
69-70	1626	736	789	358	1057	435	953	2687	1961	1435

Table 3.5 : Total student numbers at Scottish Colleges of Education, 1959-70.

YEAR	TOTAL
59-60	4884
60-61	5233
61-62	5514
62-63	6144
63-64	6972
64-65	7779
65-66	8562
66-67	9163
67-68	10242
68-69	11120
69-70	12037

NOTES

1.　CHE (1963) p.29. Although Hamilton was built as a residential college, there was really very little change in this respect in the '60s. In 1968-69, the percentage of students in residence in the four major colleges was : Jordanhill 5%, Aberdeen and Moray House 12%, Dundee 21 %. Peck (1973) p.44.

2.　See Table 3.3.

3.　Ed.in Scot. (1961) p.76.

4.　Ed.in Scot.(1960) p.79.

5.　SED (1960).

6.　Ibid.

7.　Wood (1959a).The SSTA Memorandum to the SCES expresses this view strongly. SCES (1970) Vol.2 p.600.

8.　CHE (1963) Appendix 2(b) Table 97.

9.　SCES (1970) Vol.2 pp. 550-51.

10.　CHE (1963) para.523.

11.　SED file ED51/8/261. Letter to Treasury, 16 October,1959.

12.　Wood (undated).

13.　Ibid.

14.　Letter to Eaglesham (Professor of Education at Durham) dated 31 October,1959. This has appended to it a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the Scottish system. In view of Wood's commitment to it, it is interesting that he concludes: 'The againsts may appear to be fewer but they are more fundamental than the fors'.

15.　Cruikshank (1970) p.137.

16.　Ibid. p.117. For the weaknesses of the university departments of education see Bell (1983). Stocks (1986) gives a detailed account of the way in which the SED excluded the universities from teacher training.

17.　Ibid. p.161.

18.　McPherson & Raab (1988) p.94. Gray, Stimpson & Wood all testified in their interviews to the strength of McClelland's influence. e.g. 'Under the CEC the power rested essentially with McClelland'. Stimpson. Interview on 5 March,1990

19.　SED file ED81/8/93 contains a circular letter to HMI outlining the arrangements for inspecting the colleges. It summarises their duties as a) to enquire into the whole scope and method of the teaching of the subject and b) to enquire as to the data on which the relative merits of students has been determined.

20.　There are conflicting views about the extent of Brunton's influence. McPherson and Raab put a good deal of emphasis on it, and are supported by shrewd

contemporary witnesses, like Wood and Stimpson. On the other hand, sources within the Scottish Office have suggested to me that they exaggerate Brunton's influence and that some of the policy initiatives ascribed to him personally came out of collective discussion within the SED.

21.   In his interview with McPherson and Raab, Rodger described the attitude of the Department to the colleges :

'Perhaps I should say right away that the tradition in the department, as far as I knew it, was : ride the colleges on as light a rein as possible. This was for one or two reasons; our inspectorate ....were recruited from the same kind of people as were the college lecturers; therefore, it would have been rather infra dig for people who were more or less their equals to be in any way superior to them; and similarly we regarded the colleges as important institutions ..and therefore they should not be subjected to minor scrutinies and minor interference'.

22.   SCES (1968). Letter to the Committee from Sir Henry Wood p.53 Also his evidence paras. 199-202. This decision was not universally welcomed. ADES, for instance, thought it gave the colleges too much freedom. Ibid. p.69.

23.   The Teachers (Training Authorities) (Scotland) Regulations, 1958.

24.   This gave teachers a greater influence on the colleges.

For instance, teachers were often elected as Chairmen of the Boards of Governors. This teacher representation was so novel that the first teacher representatives reported back through the SEJ. See Vol.43 No.21.

25.   The Teachers (Training Authorities) (Scotland) Regulations. s.27(1).

26.   Ibid. Part IV. Functions of the Scottish Council. Also, CHE (1963) Appendix 4 pp.52-3 summarises its membership and powers.

27.   McPherson & Raab (1988) p.422.

28.   Ibid.p.422 for a comment on the unusually high proportion of classics graduates on the SCTT. Stimpson made the same point :

I'll tell you an interesting side-light: the number of people on that committee [SCTT] who had first class honours degrees in classics was quite astounding. At least eight - Robertson, Adams, Dewar, Lees, McEwan, I think McIntosh, two other Robertsons and among the assessors was myself. Later there was Brunton's successor, Dickson, and Aldridge from the Department'.

29.   Wood (1959a).

30.   SCTT (1961). Minutes of meeting of 26 March,1959.

31.   McPherson & Raab (1988) p.282. For a more general discussion of the CP, see Osborne (1979).

32.   SCTT (1961) p.36. 'Except in the case of the Committee of Principals, the

Chairman and Vice-chairman shall be members of all Committees'. (Standing Order No.11). According to Gray *'Sir James Robertson did not approve of this arrangement and urged unsuccessfully that the CP should have an independent chairman'.*

33. Transcript of interview with McPherson & Raab.

34. It was typical of the way in which relationships interlinked that both Scotland and Stimpson had served on the Jordanhill staff under Wood.

35. SCTT (1961). Minutes of meeting of 30 January, 1961.

36. SCTT (1967) .2nd Report of Proceedings. s.xiv.

37. Ibid. 3rd Report of Proceedings. s.x.

38. McPherson & Raab (1988) p.282 quotes Gray's view that the CP was given too much power to go its own way. He told me that he still holds this view and *'would have liked to see more educational ideas coming from other groups in the SCTT'.*

39. For instance, during the period of the 1st SCTT from April 1959 to May 1961, the CP met 23 times. Brunton attended 18 of those meetings; Rodger attended the first and was then promoted to be Under-secretary at the SED. His successor, Aldridge, then attended 19.

40. See, for instance, SEJ. Vol.43.No.50; Vol.47.No.43; Vol.48.No.8.
     On the general question of the unions as pressure groups, see McNie (1971).

41. Kogan (1978) p.117.

42. McPherson & Raab (1988) Chapter 6. This was another change unwelcome to ADES. SCES (1970) p.69.

43. Kogan (1978) p.119.

44. SED (1965).

45. Figures are from the Annual Reports of the Registrar General for Scotland.

46. McPherson and Raab (1988) pp.218-235 gives a overview of the post-war problems of supply.

47. SED (1960b).

48. Ed.in Scot. (1968) p.36. This outlined the results of an inspectorate survey of 47 secondary schools in 11 authorities. It concluded :
     'For many years the teacher shortage has been generally recognised as
     the most serious problem in education and much attention has been given
     to measures designed to alleviate it. The shortage has hitherto been
     measured by reference to figures provided by the education and based to
     a large extent on the demands of the schools. Discussions have
     concentrated mainly on measures of recruitment designed to make good
     the deficiencies shown by these figures. Less attention has been paid to
     the reliability of the figures themselves'.

49.   The Schools (Scotland) Code,1956. S.15. The official class sizes were not all as large as this suggests.e.g.the regulations laid down a maximum of 20 in nursery classes, 25 in one-teacher primary schools, 25 in 'a class for backward or retarded pupils,' and 20 in classes for practical instruction etc. But the Regulations also went on to say that 'the District Inspector may authorise a class to be larger than in prescribed in this Regulation for as long as he considers reasonable'.

50.   Ed. in Scot. (1968) p.36. The inspectorate survey (see Note 48) showed that the secondary schools investigated had pupil/teacher ratios which varied from 13.5:1 (Aberdeen City) to 21.2:1 (Lanarkshire).

51.   This was a regular theme in parliamentary debates. See Appendix 6.

52.   Fitzpatrick (1986) pp.135-7 describes the problems of the Catholic sector.

53.   Ed. in Scot. (1965).

54.   SED file ED51/8/217. Memo dated 23 August,1962.

55.   SCTT (1961). Minutes of meeting of 30 April,1959.

56.   Ibid. Minutes of meeting of 18 February,1960.

57.   Ed.in Scot.(1960).

58.   Ed.in.Scot. (1969).

59.   Ed.in Scot. (1971) pp.28-9. Table E.

60.   Figures are from the annual reports in Education in Scotland.

61.   According to Education in Scotland, there were 2958 uncertificated teachers employed in December 1966, and 2578 in December 1967.

62.   SCTT (1961). Minutes of meeting of 26 March,1959.

63.   SCTT (1967) .2nd Report of Proceedings. s.x.

64.   SED (1959a). Wood described this in his notes for the Governors as 'the first attempt to forecast student population on a national basis I have seen in my fifteen years here'.

65.   SED (1959b).

66.   SED file ED51/8/261.

67.   Ibid. 'Colleges should be sited where students have cultural and recreational contacts with other students, and with theatres, concerts and art galleries'.

68.   Cruikshank (1970) p.162

69.   SED file ED51/8/261.

70.   SCTT (1961). Minutes of meeting of 5 October, 1959.

71.   SED file ED51/8/261. Letter from SED to Treasury, 16 October,1959.

72.   SED file ED51/8/315 on which this and the subsequent paragraphs are based.

73.   The figures are from the Annual reports in Education in Scotland.

74.   SCTT (1961) Minutes of meeting of CP, 15 October,1959.

75.   Ibid. Minutes of meeting of 22 October,1959.

76. SED 1959b.

77. SCTT. Minutes of meeting of 3/4 December,1959.

78. Jordanhill College. Minutes of Board of Governors. 20 November,1959

79. SCTT (1961) .Minutes of Chairman's Committee, 26 November,1959. An example of the way in which important proposals were initiated by small groups.

80. Ibid. Minutes of meeting of 28 January,1960.

81. William Kerr was Director of Studies (Principal) of Jordanhill from 1940 to 1949.

82. SCTT (1961). Minutes of meeting of 4 November,1960.

83. Ibid.

84. SCTT (1961). Minutes of meeting of 10 December, 1960.

85. Ibid. Meeting of CP, 9 February,1961.

86. Their concern seems to have been that Lanarkshire was not a wide enough catchment area either to recruit enough students or to provide enough teaching practice places. (Wood's paper 'The new College of Education at Hamilton' in the Jordanhill Archives). This was a stumbling block if it was assumed that a college of education would be mainly non-residential as (with the exception of Craiglockhart) the existing ones were. The decision in favour of Hamilton thus led to the building of a mainly residential college.

87. SCTT (1961) Meeting of 20 February,1961. McEwan intervened in the discussion to say that 'if there was to be one college, he could see no alternative to Hamilton'.

Gray told McPherson and Raab : 'Quite naturally any director who was on the Council [SCTT] and who had a problem in his area was very anxious to have a college put down there. McEwan, for example, in Lanarkshire, having a great difficulty with teacher supply, was very keen on the college at Hamilton'.

88. SED file ED51/8/262.

89. Hansard. 7 November,1960.

'I want to take up one point on the question of teacher training which is perturbing everyone who is interested in education in Scotland ......
This is the fear of the segregation of the non-graduate teacher from the graduate teacher in training. We have never had it before in Scotland, but I understand ..... that the Secretary of State has sent out a memorandum with the proposal that the only new training college we are to have in Scotland should be a training college for non-graduates. This is a very shocking thing indeed'.

90. SED file ED 51/8/262.

91. Ibid.

92. SCTT (1961). 1st Report of Proceedings s.xiv.

93.   SCTT (1964). 2nd Report of Proceedings. s.xxvi..

94   SCTT (1961). Minutes of meeting of CP, 4 February,1960

95   Brunton (1960).

96.   Two of them - Goldsmiths and Leeds - are named in the memorandum.

97   SCTT (1961). Minutes of meeting of the CP. 12 May,1960.

98.   Ibid. The minutes of the meeting of 20 February,1961 include a letter from the SED pressing the colleges to take emergency measures to ease pressure on accommodation.

99.   SCTT (1964). Minutes of meeting of 23 March,1962.

100.   Inglis (1962).

101.   SCTT (1964). Meeting of CP, 24 October,1962.

102.   Ibid. Meeting of Chairman's Committee, 25 October,1962.

103.   Ibid. Meeting of 3 May, 1963. The minutes do not show why the SCTT changed its recommendations.

104.   Ibid. Meeting of Chairman's Committee, 5 September,1963.

105.   Ibid. Meeting of Chairman's Committee, 11 June,1963.

106.   Ibid. Meeting of Chairman's Committee, 5 September,1963.

107.   Notre Dame. Minutes of the Board of Governors, 8 October,1964.

108.   SCTT (1967). Minutes of meeting, 28 October, 1964.

109.   SCTT (1967). 3rd Report of Proceedings. s.xxvii.

110.   SED (1960).

111.   See for instance 'The Scottish Schoolmaster', January 1962. The evidence of the SSTA to Robbins. 'The Association believes in the ultimate aim of a graduate profession'.

112.   Hansard. Parliamentary debates of 30 March and 11 May, 1961.

113.   SEJ Vol.43 No.50, Vol.44 No.1. See also the EIS 'Case against the introduction of non-graduate men teachers of general subjects', in SED file ED51/8/274.

114.   SCTT (1961). Minutes of meeting, 30 & 31 January,1961

115.   Ed.in Scot. (1961) p.75.

116.   SCTT (1967). 3rd Report of Proceedings. s.viii.

117.   Training for FE lecturers was not, and still is not, compulsory.

118.   McPherson & Raab (1988) p.268 quote Wood's criticism of this.

119.   Supplementary course were those taken at either a university or college of education which gave teachers the equivalent of one graduating pass in a subject. Courses leading to additional teaching qualifications were short courses (typically two weeks in the summer vacation) which allowed teachers who were already qualified in one subject to teach another, provided that they had the requisite academic qualifications.

120. SCTT (1967). 3rd Report of Proceedings s.xv.

121. SED (1960).

122. Ibid. para.8.

123. Ibid. para.9.

124. Wood (1959a).

125. Gray, McPherson and Raffe (1983) pp.106-7.

126. SCTT (1967). Third Report of Proceedings. s.x.

127. Ibid. Minutes of CP meeting, 19/20 October,1964.

128. Ibid. Minutes of CP meeting, 2 December,1964.
    The draft proposals are in Appendix III.

129 SED file ED51/8/295.

130. SCTT (1967). Minutes of meeting of 10 December,1964.

131. SED file ED51/295.

132. Ibid. contains copies of the responses from the EIS, SSTA, SSA, HAS and the Scottish branch of the Headmistresses' Association.

133. SCTT (1967). Minutes of Chairman's Committee, 24 February,1965.

134 Ibid. Minutes of 24 February,1965.

135. SEJ. 14 May,1965. Undesirable Associates. According to this, the EIS had distributed an Information Bulletin to all schools setting out the case against the associateship courses.

136. SED file ED51/8/295.

137 Ibid.

138. SED file ED51/8/296.

139. Ibid. It is a good example of the close links between the SED and the Principals of the four city colleges that the draft Circular was sent to them in confidence for their personal comments.

140. SEJ. Vol.45. 14 May,1965. 'Undesirable Associates'.

141. SED file ED51/8/296.

142. Scottish Grand Committee. Debate on Scottish estimates. 8 July,1965.

143. SED file ED51/8/297.

144. SEJ. Vol.45. 31 December,1965. 'Problems of Teacher Supply'.

145. SED file ED51/8/298.

146. GTC. Minutes of meeting, 29 September,1966.

147. Ibid.

148. Ibid. Minutes of meeting, 9 November,1966.

149. SED file ED51/8/298. SED letter to the SCTT dated 22 November,1966. The decision was made public on November 23rd in an answer to a written question in the Commons .

150. Ibid.

151. SED file ED51/8/299. EIS letter of 5 December to SED...

152. GTC. Minutes of meeting, 9 December, 1966.

153. SED (1963) p.1.

154. McPherson & Raab (1988) p.275.

155. SED (1963) paras.154-5.

156. McPherson & Raab (1988) p.275.

157. SCTT (1967) 3rd Report of Proceedings.

158. The introduction of the Ordinary and Higher Grades of the Scottish Certificate of Education in 1962 meant that entry qualifications for the diploma course had to be redefined. The SCTT recommended that they should be two Higher and four Ordinary passes (or equivalents), one of the Ordinary passes to be in Arithmetic or Mathematics.

159. The SCTT inherited a situation in which there were different salary scales in different colleges. It set up two National Joint Salaries Committees, one for academic and the other for administrative staff. These then negotiated uniform salary scales across the college system. These developments are summarised in the three reports of the SCTT's proceedings.

160. Fitzpatrick (1986) Appendix II, Table 34.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROBBINS REPORT AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE B.Ed DEGREE.

While the SCTT was dealing with the problems of expanding the colleges, reforming the Regulations and broadening the base of entry into teaching, structural issues were arising for teacher education in the 1960s which were crystallised in the Robbins Report.

These issues arose because the number of pupils in schools was increasing, while at the same time a higher proportion was seeking education beyond the statutory limit, first in schools and then in universities and colleges. The general effect was to increase the demand for higher education. The particular effects on teacher education were two-fold: firstly, to exacerbate the problem of teacher supply which, as we have seen, dominated the sector in the 1960s; secondly, to raise issues about the relationship between teacher education and the rest of higher education.

Both aspects were being widely discussed in the early 1960s. Wood, who had earlier raised the issues in a specifically Scottish context (1), returned to the same themes in his lecture to the British Association in Aberdeen in 1962. (2)

> 'In both countries there is a very serious shortage of teachers .... The reaction in Scotland has been to ask for another university, to promise to build new colleges for women only and to overcrowd the existing colleges with young women. I do not think that the shortage in Scotland can be met without training more men for primary and junior secondary schools, and I regard the training solely of women as a waste of money that could be put to better use.
>
> Professional opinion in Scotland is strongly against admitting men to the three-year college course. I think a reasonable alternative would be to have a four-year college course for men and women and for the students completing it to be granted a Bachelor of Education Degree either by a university with which the college was associated or by an association of colleges'.

By this time, however, the Robbins Committee had been set up and reform of the Scottish colleges was caught up in the wider review of the whole of higher education

in the United Kingdom.

Although the Scottish colleges represented only a small segment of higher education, Robbins was well-informed about them and about higher education in Scotland. James Drever, then Professor of Psychology at Edinburgh, was a member of the Committee, the colleges were included in the detailed research which it undertook, and a good deal of Scottish evidence was submitted to it.

The most important source of evidence was undoubtedly the SED. To begin with, it supplied the Committee with three background memoranda (3) and then followed these up with a more detailed document on 'The Future Pattern of Higher Education in Scotland'.(4) After outlining the familiar problems of teacher supply, the section on teacher education raised what the SED considered were the key issues :

1.   Whether the colleges should continue to train graduates, when their courses were often criticised for being 'not sufficiently adapted to the needs of students of this degree of maturity'.

2.   Whether the primary diploma course should be open to men.

3.   How the academic standards of the diploma course might be raised and the course made less narrowly vocational.

4.   Whether more of the work of the colleges might be raised to university standards by developing for some students a four year degree course.

This fourth issue raised the wider question of the relationships between the universities and the rest of the Scottish higher education system, which the Department saw as the major problem in higher education in Scotland. In its view, there was a marked tendency for the universities to concentrate exclusively on full-time degree courses for students with the traditional entrance qualifications and to weaken their links with other institutions of higher education. So, while not advocating that the Scottish universities should come under its jurisdiction - 'a retrograde step' it thought at that time - one can sense some resentment at the tendency of universities to go their own way regardless of the consequences for the rest of the education system.(5)

Having raised the issues, the Department made clear what its own views were both in the Memorandum and in its subsequent verbal evidence.(6) It argued that the training of graduates was best left to the colleges, that men should be admitted to the primary

diploma course, and that the colleges should try to raise more of their work to university standard and develop 'a more enlarged and liberal atmosphere'. The colleges, however, were to remain essentially vocational. The Department would have no truck with the idea of liberal arts colleges - 'a new kind of institution without any real roots in the past evolution of Scottish education and differing little from the arts faculty of a university'. Instead they saw standards being raised by the development for some students of a four-year degree, equivalent in standard to the Ordinary M.A. but 'designed for a particular profession'. In order to achieve this, the colleges would have to come under the academic tutelage of the universities in the short run, despite the real danger of friction.

After that from the Department, probably the next most substantial evidence was the lengthy memorandum submitted by the SCTT, but prepared by the Committee of Principals.(7) Much of it was descriptive but, looking to the future, the Principals argued that the Scottish colleges should continue to be responsible for all teacher training. They doubted whether the universities should take over teacher training if this meant that other interest groups like the education authorities and the teachers were excluded from its administration; and whether the universities would want to take it over when so many of the students did not meet their entrance requirements. They doubted too whether the expansion of higher education could, or should, take place solely within the university system. In their view, there was a need for the expansion of professional training and for bodies other than the existing universities to be given degree-granting powers. In all this, their thinking was very much in line with that of the SED.

On how this was to be achieved, the Principals could not reach agreement, and simply outlined various possibilities :

a)   that the colleges should be affiliated to the universities;

b)   that they should remain independent but grant their own degrees;

c)   that they should develop as Liberal Arts Colleges; or

d)   that they should form federations like the State University of New York by combining with other professional institutions e.g. colleges of Art, Music or Commerce.

The SCTT accepted the descriptive parts of the memorandum but added a note about the other parts 'which either do not commend themselves to all members of the Council or are entirely unacceptable to a substantial number of them'. The main notes of dissent came from those who thought that graduate training should be transferred to the universities or who were 'opposed to any proposal that institutions other than universities should have the right to award degrees' - an opposition which would have ruled out most of the possibilities suggested. (8)

Although the SED and the SCTT were the two main official sources of evidence, the Committee also spoke informally to people like Wood and received written submissions both from organisations(e.g. EIS and AUT) and individuals (e.g. Inglis and Sir James Robertson). Perhaps because of the peculiarities of the Scottish system, the task of collating all this evidence was undertaken, not by the secretariat of the Robbins Committee, but by officials within SED. More than that, those same officials, acting of course in consultation with members of the Committee, drafted the Scottish sections of the final report.(9) The Department's influence on the Scottish recommendations in Robbins could hardly have been more powerful.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the Report described the Scottish teacher system very clearly and recognised that it was different; for instance, in the greater strength of the major colleges.

> 'In Scotland they [the colleges] have increasingly felt themselves to be
> near-university institutions in their own right'. (10)

This recognition of strengths, however, went along with awareness of weaknesses. There was, as in England and Wales, a 'perceptible discontent' with the colleges, though for different reasons. (11) Those which Robbins singled out were the awkward division between the colleges and universities in the teaching of education and psychology (12), the 'distaste among graduates .... for college courses whose content provides a less stimulating academic atmosphere than that to which they have been accustomed in the university' (13), and the slowness of training to adapt to the needs of those teaching in the 'newer reaches of secondary education'. To these might be added the unfavourable staffing ratios already noted, and the difficulties which these created in moving towards the more varied teaching methods which the Report advocated and which many in the colleges wanted. (14)

Basically the Robbins recommendation for Scotland were the same as for England

and Wales: to bring the colleges of education within the university sector. On the administrative side, Robbins recognised that its preferred solution for England and Wales - the Schools of Education - was inappropriate for Scotland, partly because of the greater size of the Scottish colleges but perhaps more because of the indifference of the Scottish universities to teacher education. However, as it was advocating that all higher education should be funded through an expanded UGC, it had in some way to bring the colleges within that system. So it suggested that, 'the grants machinery .... should include a separate education committee for Scotland, to which the Grants Commission would delegate its responsibilities in relation to the Scottish colleges of education'. (15)

Such a change would have meant some loss of power by the SED, even though it would undoubtedly have been influential on the Scottish committee. Nevertheless, their first reaction was to swim with what appeared to be the tide. One of the officials minuted :

> 'The proposal that the universities and all the other institutions to be brought within that group - the autonomous institutions as Robbins calls them - should receive their funds from a grants commission i.e. from an enlarged UGC is one that is likely to command general support. We accept it and also that it should function on a UK basis, with special provision for the Scottish colleges of education in view of the differences from England in this field'. (16)

However, doubts about the Robbins proposals soon began to arise both North and South of the Border. Although the local authorities did not have the direct interest in teacher education of their English counterparts, they were concerned lest control of the colleges slipped away to the universities and to a UK-based Grants Commission. So ADES met the SED to press these points and was assured that the Department was determined to safeguard Scottish interests and that 'any agreement that impaired the Secretary of State's power to discharge his responsibilities for the education service would be resisted'. (17) The Church of Scotland Education Committee also wrote to SED urging the Department to defend the Scottish character of the colleges. (18) One can only speculate on how well the SED would have been able to preserve the special features of the Scottish system had it been brought within the over-all control of the proposed Grants Commission. Instead, it was able to stand by and watch the Robbins proposals being defeated by opposition in England and Wales; so the Department retained its power without having to fight for it.

On the academic side, Robbins proposed :

> 'that the Colleges of Education should develop courses of four year's
> duration leading to a degree, and that these courses should be of a
> balanced, concurrent nature, liberal in content and approach,
> although directed towards the professional work that lies ahead'. (19)

The name of the new degree should be Bachelor of Education, even though this would
involve renaming the Ed.B degree of the Scottish universities. It should be open to
men and women, and should be for the abler students academically.

> 'But selection for it should depend upon the standard achieved in the
> work of the first two years and, as in England and Wales, should not be
> limited to those who had university entrance qualification at the
> beginning of their college course'.

This recommendation raised structural issues about the relationship between the
colleges and the universities. If the colleges were not to be brought within Schools
of Education nor given degree-granting powers, some other university-college
links had to be forged. Robbins made two proposals. One was that 'all graduates in
arts and science who wish to become teachers should take the course for the
[University] Diploma in Education'.(20) The other was that the universities and
colleges should set up joint subject boards to oversee the new B.Ed degree and
that the universities should recognise 'certain members of staff in the colleges as
fitted to teach for an internal degree'. (21).

These proposals left the structural problem unresolved. Were they the first step
towards integration of the colleges into the universities? This was a prospect for
which the universities showed no enthusiasm, partly because of the disdain felt in
some quarters for education as a subject (22), partly because of their belief that
many of the diploma students were incapable of degree work.

> WOOD : At one point, I went to Glasgow and suggested that they
> should take over Jordanhill as a Faculty of Education. It could have
> worked. But the University refused because some of the college
> students did not have university entrance qualifications.

Or were the proposals pointing the colleges towards becoming degree-granting

institutions in their own right, after a probationary period under university supervision? If so how were degree-granting powers to be achieved? And was this a realistic goal for the smaller colleges, like Craiglockhart, or even Dundee?

Once the Robbins proposals about the B.Ed had been accepted in principle, negotiations began about their implementation. Although it kept a watching brief, the SED played no direct part. Judith Hart described the government's policy :

> 'On the question of colleges of education and the B.Ed courses and the relation between both and the universities and the two Secretaries of State, discussions with the colleges are carried out by the universities themselves. This kind of relationship is entirely academic and is not the kind of thing in which Government in any way intervenes'. (23)

These discussions took place in a context which was markedly different from that in England where, through the Area Training Organisations, there had been experience of co-operation between the universities and the colleges and the machinery for it. In Scotland, neither existed. The universities had been at best indifferent and at worst hostile, especially in the sour relations between Moray House and Edinburgh (24) which, in Nisbet's view, did wider damage to university-college relationships.

> *NISBET : Just before we leave the Edinburgh business. I think that the tension in Edinburgh over more than 10 years between the college and the university .... did a lot to disturb the progress of what was happening. [the implementation of Robbins]*

On the other side, the strength of the major Scottish colleges made them less willing than their English counterparts to accept the role of junior partner to universities, especially universities which knew little or nothing about teacher training. Yet if they wished to secure the prize which Robbins offered - degrees for some of their students and the prestige which went with that - they needed the universities in a way in which the universities did not need them.

In these negotiations, a number of issues had to be resolved, of which the first two were the more important.

1. What should be the nature of the degree? Should it be largely academic, modelled on the traditional Scottish Ordinary degree, or should its main focus, as Robbins suggested, be the professional training of teachers?

2.   Closely linked to this was the question of the relationship between the B.Ed and the Diploma. Should the students for the B.Ed be required to have university entrance qualifications and pursue a separate course, or should there be, again following Robbins, a common B.Ed/Diploma course for two years, at the end of which students would be selected for the B.Ed on the basis of their performance?

3.   To what extent would the universities insist that their staff were involved in teaching the B.Ed, as there were no precedents in Scotland for external degrees?

4.   Should the Robbins proposals about the university Diploma of Education be implemented ?

In Scotland these issues had to be resolved within the context of the Regulations, which posed more sharply than in England the question : What was the degree for ? Was it intended as a way of improving the quality of training for primary teachers and/or junior secondary? If so, this would have pointed towards a professional degree, which was what the colleges had hoped for in their proposals for a 4-year associateship. Or was it mainly a device for recruiting more secondary teachers in face of the continuing shortage? In Wood's view this was the prime concern of the SED, but not of the CP.

> *WOOD : It is important to remember that .... the English colleges produced only certificated teachers - admittedly with a Young Children or Junior Secondary specialisation - but no primary teachers so labelled. Robbins must have assumed that the B.Ed would do just this. But the Scottish 3-year course produced primary teachers only. The Principals wanted a degree to replace the 3-year course and to get rid of the non-graduate stigma. The Department could not contemplate abolishing the 3-year course while the teacher shortages were severe and latched onto the possibility of the B.Ed for increasing the supply of secondary teachers.*

It also later became the official SED view that 'when the first B.Eds were instituted in response to the recommendations of the Robbins Committee their main purpose was to provide an additional source of teachers for the secondary school'. (25) This was a rationalisation after the event. At the time, the SED was pinning its hope for improving secondary supply on the Associateship proposals and expected

very little from the B.Ed. As it noted in 1966,

> 'The entry qualifications required for the B.Ed course are the same as those for university entrance and the likelihood is that some two-thirds of the entrants to it will be women. Accordingly for purposes of teacher supply, this course does not represent the new source of recruitment for which we must essentially look'. (26)

Nevertheless the pressures were very strong to make the B.Ed comparable academically to a university degree. One was the pressure for speedy action, and therefore to take the easy course of building on the familiar. Just as in England most of the early B.Eds were developed from existing Diploma courses, so in Scotland they were developed from the Ordinary M.A. (27) Most of those involved in the negotiations in Scotland were themselves the products of the Scottish system and saw the traditional Scottish degree patterns as the norm by which all proposals should be judged. Nisbet [Professor of Education, Glasgow University] made this point when commenting on the Glasgow-Jordanhill negotiations.

> *NISBET : It was interesting that when one discussed what sort of courses the B.Ed should have, it was quite clear that the conservatives on both sides [university and college] talked in terms of the Glasgow Ordinary M.A. - the Ordinary Course and the Higher Course - and the number of courses one would have to take. They understood the language and they got on fine. When anyone talked of something new, they felt that this was something too dangerous to be experimented with.*

This conservative pressure comes out just as strongly from the teachers as from the universities. Right at the start, the SED had told Robbins that the teachers would oppose degree-granting powers for the colleges 'because they think of a degree as only being a degree of one of the four Scottish universities', (28) and predictably, the EIS Observations on Robbins, while supporting the B.Ed in principle, insisted that it should be a degree of a university. (29)

However, perhaps the most conservative pressure was the general assumption that the majority of diploma students were incapable of work of degree standard. It was to be expected that this view would be taken by the secondary teachers (30); it was equally shared by many of the staff of the colleges. When giving evidence to the Select Committee on Education and Science on behalf of the Jordanhill Board of Studies, Bone replied to a question about the proportion of Jordanhill students who could

potentially take the B.Ed:

> 'There would be varying views about this, but I am really saying
> that there would be at least 10 to 15 percent of the primary diploma
> students, that there would be at least 10 to 15 percent of the physical
> education students capable of being stretched in this way, and that
> these students at present are not sufficiently stretched. If the
> possibility was there, I am sure that it would grow. I do not think for a
> moment that they would all ever be doing degrees.' (31)

Few at the time would have disputed his general conclusion, though the suggestion
that degree work might be limited to 'at least 10 to 15 percent' seems excessively
cautious, given that over 40% of diploma students had the basic university
entrance qualifications. (32)

These pressures constrained the negotiations between the colleges and the universities :
more so in Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Glasgow, less so in Dundee.(33) To avoid
repetition, those between Jordanhill and Glasgow may be taken as an example of the
more general trend. In Dundee, the situation was different and requires separate
treatment.

Formal response to the Robbins proposals began at Jordanhill in December 1963,
when the Board of Studies had a general discussion of the issues. Members were
invited to submit comments by the end of the following January. Out of this came a
paper summarising their views (34), which shows that there was support in the
college for the idea of a professional degree, with a two-year common course and
(influenced by developments at Keele and York) a Foundation Course for all students.
At the same time, informal talks began between Wood and Sir Charles Wilson,
Principal of the University, which were followed by talks between a group of staff
and the university members of the Board of Governors.

The next formal move was a special meeting of the Board of Governors on 14
February, 1964. After hearing reports on the talks which had taken place, the Board
agreed in principle that there should be a four-year degree and that an approach should
be made to Glasgow University. So a small sub-committee was set up to meet a
committee of the Senate.(35) All this was reported to the Board of Studies on
February 25th, along with papers summarising the comments members had made. At
this point, the Board came out strongly for a degree which would be 'very strictly a
professional degree, with a course more akin to a medical course than to an Arts or
Science course', one in which 'education, psychology, professional studies and

teaching should form a specific part of degree studies'. (36)

These aspirations were embodied in the 'Preliminary Proposals for a Four-year Course Leading to the Degree of B.Ed'., which were sent to the Clerk to the Senate in May. At this stage, the major concession made by the college was that study for the degree should begin in the first year and that the entrance requirement should be the Certificate of Attestation of Fitness of the Scottish Universities Examination Board. But this was virtually forced upon them by the fact that the older Scottish universities were required by law only to admit students with that qualification. (37)

In addition to this legal difficulty, conservative pressures made themselves felt from several quarters. Some, as Nisbet pointed out, came from within the college staff, but Wood had enough internal support and personal power to have overcome this comfortably. The intractable pressures came from bodies over which he had no control, notably the Governors and the University. According to Wood, some of the teacher representatives on the Governors did not believe that the college staff were capable of teaching at degree level. (38) However, in negotiations with the university, the most important group of Governors were the university representatives. In Nisbet's view, the most influential of these were Professors Chambers and Gunn, both of whom favoured 'the more conventional resolutions of problems'. (39) He described the situation as follows :

> *NISBET. It was clear that the dominant voices in the Glasgow/Jordanhill committee that was responsible for drawing up the [B.Ed] proposals were those of people who were thirled to the structure of Glasgow University's Ordinary M.A. degree. One was Walker Chambers, who was a dominating person - he was Professor of German and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the time.*

> *WBM. Was he very much a traditionalist ?*

> *NISBET. Very much a traditionalist and strong in his opinions. They were conservative in almost every way. At the same time he was well-disposed towards collaboration with the college unlike other members of the university who had little interest in the education of teachers.*

This last point is important, as both Wood and Nisbet stressed that the university representatives supported the idea of a B.Ed and were very helpful in the negotiations, particularly in making college staff aware what sort of proposals were likely to be acceptable to the university.

Within the university itself, however, there was a good deal of opposition to the very idea of the B.Ed. Some of it came from the principled stance that teacher training was a lowly vocational task, unworthy of a university.

> *NISBET. There were always those who took the view - and had done for the past half century - that the universities should steer clear of teacher training. There was also the view that a vocational degree was something quite alien to a university, which of course it was not.*

However, there was also an element of self-interest in that some university staff saw the B.Ed as an unwanted competitor.

> *WOOD. Many of them [university staff] were opposed to it because teaching was an outlet for their Ordinary graduates, and they saw the B.Ed as competition. The Scottish universities had a lot of Ordinary graduates to bolster up departmental claims for staffing and for research facilities.*

These conservative pressures had two consequences. One was that the college 'had to come round to the view that the nearer the degree was to a Scottish Ordinary degree the more likely we were to get one'. (40) The other was that negotiations with the university proved both slow and difficult. After the college submitted its proposals in May 1964, very little happened for about a year. Wood found the university's inaction both irritating and frustrating.

> *WOOD. 'We submitted these draft proposals and no action was taken whatsoever for months. I think at one stage I complained to the Secretary of the Department, who may have discussed the matter with the university. The university was not anxious to move at all'. (41)*

The key figure on the university side was the Principal, and we do not have his side of the story. Why did he appear to drag his feet over the B.Ed.? One possible explanation is that, from his point of view, the B.Ed was of little importance - a new venture from which the university had little to gain and something to lose.

However, the university could not hold out indefinitely against what were U.K-wide trends. Wilson was at that time Chairman of the Committee of Vice-chancellors. So he could hardly ignore a statement by the UGC in June, 1965 which made it clear that

its policy was to encourage closer links between universities and colleges rather than to steer colleges towards the CNAA. B.Ed arrangements, therefore, were both possible and desirable and the UGC hoped that they would soon be carried forward successfully. (42)

Perhaps it was this which broke the log-jam because, at about the same time that the UGC was making this policy statement, Wilson wrote a conciliatory letter to Wood accompanying an 'Outline of constitutional and administrative arrangements for the award of a degree in association with Jordanhill'.(43) As a result, negotiations were resumed on the basis of the college's previous proposals. However, the university pressures already described moved these away from a professional degree towards an academic one based on the seven graduating passes of the Ordinary M.A. The only concession which the university made was that students might choose in their 4th Year to do a College Study in Physical Education, Youth Service or the Education of Young Children in place of one of the graduating passes. Otherwise, practical and aesthetic subjects were squeezed out. Students were to opt at the end of the first year to prepare for either the primary or the secondary certificate, but professional studies and teaching practice were to be a college concern and did not count towards the degree. The proposed foundation course survived as a compulsory graduating course in the 3rd Year, called 'Background to Modern Society', but the university insisted that this should be taught at the university not at the college.

From the college's point of view, the outcome was far from satisfactory. The B.Ed was weak academically for the preparation of secondary teachers, and unsuited to the professional training of primary. But the college simply had to accept it. As Wood said in his evidence to the Select Committee on Education and Science :

> The kind of degree we obtained in the early days was the best we could
> get in dealing with the established universities. I think they are too
> much akin to the ordinary M.A or B.Sc. of the Scottish university and
> they have not been sufficiently experimental and different from
> previous degrees'. (44)

So far, in this description of the Glasgow/Jordanhill negotiations, no mention has been made of the University Department of Education. This is because its role was in fact peripheral. As Nisbet put it :

> *NISBET. 'Certainly, I was out of most of the game... Probably the*
> *Professor of Education in the university should have had a more*

prominent role. It was only after Robbins that the University was prepared to take the Education Department seriously - it tended to be regarded as a marginal activity of the university'.

Nisbet in fact wrote a number of interesting papers outlining possible responses to Robbins. (45) One of these for instance suggested that all the Education and Psychology courses of the B.Ed should be taught within a Graduate School of Education. Nothing came of this, or of the Robbins' proposal that all graduate students should take the Dip.Ed., a proposal opposed by the college because it did not want to lose students and by the university because it did not want to take on extra staff.(46) In the end, the Education Department did not even get a guaranteed place on the Joint Board set up to oversee the B.Ed. degree.

At Dundee circumstances were initially the most difficult of all because the University of St. Andrews showed little interest in the B.Ed. The SED noted :

> The whole attitude of [the Principal] is very off-putting ..... I would not be at all surprised if in the end he persuaded his Senate either to decline to consider students who took their courses in the College of Education for the award of university degrees, or to impose on the College academic conditions which would make collaboration between the two institutions unacceptable to the college'. (47)

What transformed the situation was the creation of Dundee University. At the same time as the College was beginning to negotiate with St.Andrews, discussions were starting - themselves sparked off by Robbins' proposals for the expansion of higher education (48) - for Queen's College, Dundee to become a separate university. Once it became clear that the separation would take place, it was natural for the College to attach itself to its local university. It therefore found itself negotiating with the Academic Advisory Committee of a new university, rather than the Senate of one bound by long tradition.

There were also personal factors of which the most important was the attitude of Drever, the Principal of Queen's College and then first Principal of Dundee University.

> *WBM: 'How did you pull it off [i.e. achieve a Robbins-type B.Ed.] when the others would perhaps have liked to have done and failed ?*

> *STIMPSON. Start off with the fact that the Principal of the University*

was a member of the Robbins Committee. So that we had guidance and we had sympathy. The second point is the relationship between the college and the university department of education, particularly the personal relationship between my vice-principal [Bill Thom] and the Professor of Education [Leitch Adams]. They'd been at university together.

The other favourable factor on which Stimpson laid stress was the comparative flexibility of the Dundee degree structures, particularly in the social sciences.

It was in these more propitious circumstances that Stimpson brought a paper on Robbins to his Board of Studies in January 1964.(49) After discussion and amendment, the Board approved a paper to go forward to the Governors which laid down the principles on which the Dundee B.Ed would eventually be based :

1.   that it would be a concurrent professional course geared to the needs of future teachers;

2.   that the first two years should be a general course, shared with the Diploma;

3.   that selection for the B.Ed should be based on performance in the first two years and should not be limited to those with university entrance qualifications.

On receipt of this, the Governors set up a sub-committee which did some preliminary work on the Degree and produced a draft report. (50) Progress was then stalled because of the impending separation of Queen's College from St. Andrew's. However, by September, the Governors were able to note the proposed elevation of Queen's College to university status, and to agree that it would be the appropriate body to contact about the implementation of Robbins 'but failing that it might be possible to establish links with the CNAA' - an interesting early mention of CNAA validation, which was later to become so important. (51)

Once the college began dealing with Dundee University, negotiations proceeded very smoothly. A joint university/college committee was set up which, according to Stimpson worked very harmoniously and informally.

STIMPSON. 'The whole thing was carved out at meetings in my room. Bill Thom acted as scribe and...we had Professor Drever in the background'.

As a result, the final report which came back to the Governors (52) could begin with a declaration of principle that ran counter to developments elsewhere :

The new degree should be broadly based in order to meet its vocational requirement of preparing well-educated teachers for the primary schools and the earlier years of secondary schools. It is not the purpose of the degree to offer an alternative channel for the production of narrowly-based sub-specialist secondary school teachers'.

On the basis of that principle, the college was able to devise a degree course in which Part One was the first two years of the Diploma course, to choose students for Part Two on the basis of their performance in Part One, and to give practical and aesthetic subjects a greater place in the course than did other colleges. (53)

The general outcome of Robbins was the creation of four B.Ed courses : Aberdeen took in its first students in 1965; Jordanhill and Moray House in 1966; Dundee in 1967. The courses at Aberdeen and Moray House were very similar to the Jordanhill pattern already described. (54) All three selected their B.Ed students for a separate course, and demanded university entrance requirements. All three emphasised academic subjects. Virtually, they were Ordinary degree courses, in which the academic work took place concurrently with professional training but largely remained separate from it. Dundee could therefore fairly claim to be the only college in Scotland to have achieved the sort of B.Ed which Robbins had envisaged.

One notable omission from the group of colleges offering the B.Ed was Notre Dame. The college did in fact approach Glasgow unsuccessfully. (55) The official reason for this rebuff, given by Professor Gunn, was that it would have been uneconomic to start a second course in Glasgow.

' The reasons for our not doing this when they [Notre Dame] asked us [Glasgow University] about a year ago were really the ones of numbers, purely ; the entry to Jordanhill at that time was about 60 for the B.Ed....To start a further stream, which would involve getting the staff to do the teaching, seemed very wasteful'. (56)

However, both Wood and Nisbet believe that another important factor was one which could not be stated openly - doubts about the quality of the staff of Notre Dame at that time.(57)

NISBET. 'There was a feeling, certainly in this university, that the academic quality of the Notre Dame staff was poor. Some people were saying that they wouldn't like to see a degree of university standing being taught by the then existing staff.....In my view, that was the most important consideration'.

Having failed in its approach to Glasgow, the college then tried Strathclyde and was again rejected. The principal, Sister Francis, thought that there was an element of sectarian prejudice in this : the University did not wish to be seen supporting a Catholic college :

> SISTER FRANCIS : 'I tried Strathclyde with the same result of delay [as with Glasgow] ..My personal opinion is that it was because we were a denominational college, they did not want to establish their B.Ed with us'. (58)

Structurally, Robbins had much the same sort of impact in Scotland as in England & Wales. In both systems it led to the development of concurrent B.Ed degrees, validated initially by the universities. So the Scottish colleges were left, like those in England, uneasily straddling the binary line - public sector institutions with degree courses validated by the universities. 'A rather strange half-way house', Donald Dewar called it. (59) The question - whither the colleges of education ? - was left unresolved.

In one respect, however, the outcome of Robbins in Scotland was different. As we have seen, the three largest colleges offering the B.Ed had been obliged to accept that it should be based on the Ordinary degree structure. This meant that Scotland initially avoided the proliferation of widely differing B.Eds about which English critics complained. It also meant that innovation was hampered, that Honours courses were difficult to develop and that, except at Dundee, the B.Ed courses did not in any way grow out of the Diploma courses but were quite separate from them. This made it difficult to devise courses to up-grade primary diplomas to a degree, and was one of the reasons why In-service B.Eds were so slow to develop in Scotland.(60)

Within the Scottish colleges, Robbins had the same general effects as elsewhere. The development of degree courses undoubtedly gave a boost to the morale of the colleges and, to a limited extent, to their status. There were, however, prices to be paid. One was that, in order to teach the degree courses, the colleges recruited

some staff whose primary interests were academic and this tended to shift the concerns of staff away from professional education, in which the colleges could be centres of excellence, towards the teaching of academic subjects in which they could not. It also led to the proliferation of courses and options within courses, which initially could not be economic. The justification was that the B.Ed numbers would expand and that it would make an important contribution to the shortage of secondary teachers. As long as these assumptions seemed plausible, the SED was willing to accept that the B.Ed required generous staffing but, when circumstances changed, the B.Ed was left in a vulnerable position.

The Robbins Report and the policy process.

The post-Robbins developments in teacher education are unusual in that they took place largely outside the normal policy community. The principal players - the SED, the SCTT, and the CP - all gave evidence and the Department virtually wrote the Scottish sections of the Report; but the Government's response to Robbins was mainly determined by its views on higher education in the U.K. as a whole. Purely Scottish considerations counted for little in the decisions either to reject the Grants Commission or to accept the B.Ed.

Once the government had decided in favour of the B.Ed development, neither the SED nor the SCTT was in a position to have much influence on events. This was still a time of jealously guarded - and generally respected - university autonomy. The development of the B.Ed was thus left to bi-lateral negotiations between the universities and the colleges, in which the universities were inevitably the dominant partners.

The result was a pluralistic policy process which was less managed by SED than was usually the case. In the absence of any national planning, the formation of policies resulted from the interplay between institutional ambitions such as those which led Aberdeen College to 'jump the gun', individual initiatives and understandings as in the Dundee negotiations, and the constraints of the conservative shibboleths which forced most of the new B.Ed. degrees into the traditional mould of the Scottish Ordinary degree. From this interplay, came a set of outcomes which may have been partly foreseen, but which some of the major players certainly regretted. (61)

NOTES

1. Wood (1959a).
2. Wood (1964).
3. SED file ED51/8/357.
4. SED file ED 26/634.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. SCTT (1961b).
8. Ibid.
9. SED file ED26/634 contains successive SED drafts and correspondence relating to them.
10. CHE (1963) para.312.
11. Ibid. para.362
12. At that time, graduates could opt to take the University Diploma in Education, concurrently with their teacher training at the colleges. If they did so, they attended classes in education and psychology at the university and were exempt from those at the college.
13. CHE (1963) para.362.
14. Ibid. para.573.
15. Ibid. para.373.
16. SED file ED26/636.
17. SED file ED26.289.
18. Ibid.
19. CHE (1963) para.363.
20. Ibid. para.372.
21. Ibid. para.370.
22. Bell (1983) pp.168-9.
23. Parliamentary Debates. Scottish Grand Committee, 8 July, 1965.
24. Bell (1990) p.102 refers to this.
25. SED (1974).
  'When the first B.Eds were instituted in response to the recommendations of the Robbins Committee their main purpose was to provide an additional source of teachers for the secondary school'.
26. SED file ED51/8/298.
27. There was a feeling in the other colleges that Aberdeen had jumped the gun and accepted traditional structures in order to get its B.Ed off the ground quickly, which then made it more difficult for the other colleges to resist their universities. Wood, Miller and Paton all made this comment independently.

28. SED file ED26/634. Verbal evidence to Robbins.

29. SED file ED51/289. In his interview with McPherson and Raab, [McPherson and Raab(1988) p.443], Bryden claimed that the EIS had been successful in initiating the B.Ed degree. The EIS certainly supported it, but it is doubtful whether this support was crucial.

30. SCES (1970) para.506.

31. Ibid. para.867.

32. CHE (1963) Appendix 2(b) Table 96.

33. Aberdeen was somewhat less rigid than Glasgow. It did allow practical and aesthetic subjects within the degree course, and it did not insist on teaching one of the graduating classes itself. SCES (1970) pp.748-50.

34. Jordanhill College Archives. Robbins Report. Papers submitted to the Principal.

35. Jordanhill College. Minutes of the Board of Governors. 14 February,1964

36. Jordanhill College. Minutes of the Board of Studies. 25 February,1964.

37. Nisbet (1967).

38. Wood. Interview on 31 January,1990.

39. Nisbet. Interview on 13 February,1990.

40. Wood. Interview on 32 January,1990.

41. SED file ED51/8/289. The SED were concerned about the slow progress of the Glasgow/Jordanhill negotiations and sympathetic to Jordanhill's difficulties. 'Prospects for Glasgow are rather uncertain. Jordanhill has been attaching importance to ensuring that the new course should not simply be a copy of the Ordinary degree course, but should include to graduating level subjects which are not university subjects in the traditional sense; and it is this fundamental consideration - on which we have a good deal of sympathy with Jordanhill - which has led to the relative lack of progress in discussions with the university'.

42. SED file ED51/8/292.

43. A copy of this is in the Wood papers in the Jordanhill Archives.

44. SCES (1970) para.119.

45. Nisbet (1964a,b & c).

46. Commenting on Nisbet's paper 'Pros and Cons of Possible lines of action in response to Robbins', Bone wrote about the proposal that all graduates should take the Dip.Ed. :
'You won't get agreement on this, since the College would be against it, the University Department of Psychology won't want it, and the university authorities will be reluctant to face the increase in staff and accommodation'. MS note in author's possession.

47.	SED file ED51/8/289.

48.	Southgate (1983) p.355

49.	Dundee College. Minutes of the Board of Studies. 7 January,1964.

50.	Dundee College. Minutes of the Board of Governors. 10 April,1964.

51.	Ibid. 14 September,1964.

52.	Ibid. 23 September,1966.

53.	At Dundee, students who successfully completed college courses in practical or aesthetic subjects like music, arts and crafts, home economics or physical education were granted exemption from one university subject.
Minutes of the Board of Governors. Meeting of 23 September,1966.

54.	Nisbet (1967).

55.	SCES (1970) para.990.

56.	SCES (1970) para.1020.

57.	These doubts were probably justified at the time. Until 1966, the Notre Dame staff were all women recruited mainly to teach the three-year diploma course. Fitzpatrick (1986) p.179.

58.	Wood supported Sister Francis' view.
'Notre Dame was also rebuffed by Strathclyde, which did not want to be thought of as a Catholic University'.

59.	SCES (1970) para.81. Donald Dewar, then Labour M.P. for Aberdeen South and subsequently (1984-92) Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland.

60.	Because its B.Ed was linked to the Diploma, Dundee was able to offer an opportunity for teachers to obtain the degree. To do so, they had to attend early evening preparatory classes for one year, and then take the 3rd and 4th years of the B.Ed course full-time. A few obtained secondment, but the opportunities were very limited. Stimpson. Interview on 5 March,1990.

61.	Wood's regrets have already been noted. We shall see in Chapter Five that the SED came to have regrets about the lack of system and about the dominance of the universities.

CHAPTER FIVE

CALM BEFORE THE STORM, 1967 - 76.

By the time that the SCTT was wound up, the new college at Hamilton had opened; the ones at Callendar Park and Craigie had reached their original complement of 600 students ; Dunfermline had moved to its new site at Cramond; Aberdeen had moved out to Hilton Place and Notre Dame had opened its new site at Bearsden. Although student numbers continued to rise and further building was to take place, the most hectic period of college expansion was over. There followed a period of relative stability before the storm broke over the college system in 1976. Stability, however, was only relative to what came before and after. In any system, there is a constantly shifting balance between the forces of continuity and those of change. In the earlier part of the period from 1967-76, the balance perhaps shifted towards continuity; but in the later part, the forces for change were gathering strength.

Changes in the policy community.

From the start of the period there were changes in the composition of the policy community. As we have seen, the work of the SCTT had been split up among a number of bodies, and this left teacher education without any national co-ordinating body. However, the SED wished to retain some mechanism, other than its own regulatory powers, to maintain the cohesion of the teacher education system and to continue the close working relationship it had with the CP.(1) So a Joint Committee of Colleges of Education in Scotland [JCCES] was created, which consisted of the Chairmen of Governors and Principals, with an SED assessor; but this was a formal body which normally only met once a year. Stimpson describes it as 'the cover under which the Committee of Principals operated'. (2)

As its name suggests, the CP consisted of the 10 college principals, joined by the Registrar of the GTC and SED assessors, normally an official and the Chief Inspector in charge of teacher training. In theory, it was a sub- committee of the JCCES as it had been of the SCTT, but its relationship with the new body was quite different. The SCTT had been the recognised national advisory body on teacher education, and the CP was clearly subordinate to it. For instance, its minutes had to go to the SCTT for approval. Although the advice given by the SCTT was often strongly influenced by the CP, it carried extra weight because it came from a body on which other interests - local authorities, teachers and universities - were represented.

The JCCES had neither the powers nor the prestige of the SCTT. As a result, the CP found itself dealing more directly with the Department. So policy issues tended to be discussed initially in a private dialogue between the SED and the colleges. 'Dialogue' suggests that the colleges always spoke with one voice, but of course they often did not. To give just one instance, the Hamilton proposal for a joint course with Bell College to train technical teachers, was vigorously opposed by the four colleges which already trained them. (3)

Although the CP was a forum in which the colleges might aim for consensus, it had no power to co-ordinate. While, on the one hand, there was pressure on the Principals to promote a national system, which came both from the SED and from the long tradition that the colleges should work within a common framework, there was pressure, on the other hand, from each college for the defence of its own interests. This left the Principals with a dilemma which Stimpson describes :

> *STIMPSON : I felt that the Scottish Council represented a better system*
> *for the colleges than the GTC. One of the problems for the colleges*
> *has always been - when are they alone and when are they together. If*
> *you go back in history, the 1906 Regulations did not envisage any sort*
> *of concerted effort, but within three or four years they were having*
> *joint meetings to try and resolve issues.*

Although in this key sense the policy community became more closed, it also became less homogeneous because a number of new players entered the arena at different times and with differing degrees of influence. Because of the statutory changes, the GTC was there right from the start. Under the terms of the Teaching Council (Scotland) Act 1965, it was to be the Secretary of State's principal advisory body on all matters concerning the training and supply of teachers. It was to keep under review the standards of education, training and fitness to teach appropriate to persons entering the teaching profession, and was to advise the Secretary of State about the length and nature of courses of instruction. Among its duties was that of keeping itself informed about the nature of instruction given in colleges of education. It had the right, under Section 5(3) of the Act to make recommendations to Boards of Governors and, if they refused to accept them, to report the matter to the Secretary of State.

Another new entrant to the arena in 1967 was the University of Stirling. The only one of the post-Robbins universities in Scotland to be created from scratch, it set out to be innovative in several ways. One was that it adopted an American-style two-

semester year instead of the traditional three terms. It also decided, despite SED attempts to divert it into research or inservice training (4), to enter the field of preservice training, hitherto the monopoly of the colleges. However, instead of developing the normal route of a degree followed by a year of professional training, it offered a seven semester course for a general degree or nine semester course for honours, in which education was taken as a main subject concurrently with academic studies. At the end of the course, the students were to be awarded a B.A. or B.Sc., along with the Teaching Qualification (Secondary Education). (5)

These proposals aroused a good deal of suspicion. At the very first meeting of the new Committee of Principals, their repercussions were one of the main items on the agenda. Wood expressed his concern that they might lead to a demand for shorter training courses in the colleges and that they might have an adverse effect on the development of the B.Ed. The CP decided to make known its concerns to the GTC, and to advise the Secretary of State that 'the experiment should not be extended until its value was more fully assessed'. (6)

When the proposals came to the GTC for approval as a teaching qualification, they were opposed on the grounds that they were lowering standards by shortening the courses. (7) The motion against approval was defeated, but the Stirling qualification was only given a five year approval subject to review. In fact, it was not until 1975 that the GTC finally approved the course without a time limit, although still open to GTC scrutiny, and thereby put it on the same basis as the college courses.(8)

This is symptomatic of the way in which the Education Department at Stirling was seen as being outwith the mainstream of Scottish teacher education. That, indeed, is where it remained for a number of reasons. The concurrent Stirling courses had no direct imitators and the number of secondary teachers qualifying through Stirling has been a small fraction of that qualifying through the colleges.(9) Perhaps the key factor was that Stirling was funded through the UGC and not through SED. It therefore did not have the day-to-day contact with the Department which was a feature of the college scene. Individual members of the Stirling staff might serve on national advisory bodies, but most discussions of teacher education policy took place between the SED and the colleges, with the role of Stirling as somewhat of an afterthought.

In the early 1970s two new bodies began to operate in Scotland, both of which were based south of the Border and both of which fitted uneasily in some respects into the Scottish scene. In 1971, the OU began to enrol its first students. Although

its impact on Scottish teachers and teacher educators has been considerable, it has been an impact on people rather than on institutions. (10) Except in the field of inservice education, the OU has not been part of the policy community.

1970-71 also saw the validation of the B.Ed. degree at Notre Dame by the CNAA, to whom the college had turned after its rejection by Glasgow and Strathclyde. This showed other colleges that another source of validation was possible, should that by their local university prove unsatisfactory.

The main result of these changes in the policy community - the demise of the SCTT and the entry of the new players - was to increase its fragmentation. Instead of one national forum, there was a looser network centred round the SED, which sought advice principally from the CP and the GTC, themselves interlinked bodies. The effect was to increase the power of the SED and its potential for tighter control, once it judged the circumstances right to assert it. Wood thought that this was a change for the worse.

> WBM: In 'Governing Education', you are quoted as regretting the
> ending of the SCTT. I think you said : 'The colleges were left naked
> without any national body to take an overview'. Did you feel that it
> made a big difference to the system when the SCTT was wound up?

> WOOD : Yes, I think so. Fundamentally the power rests, and has
> always rested with the Department. There has always been more
> central control in Scotland than in the South - until recently. Once the
> SCTT went, then the Department was dealing with theoretically
> independent Boards of Governors, which were not independent .

Wood is probably right in thinking that the end of the SCTT left the colleges in a weaker position, but it could not have protected them against some drastic reorganisation when the demand for teachers fell. Rather the question is whether it could have influenced that reorganisation in ways which would have made it more satisfactory educationally.

Despite these changes in the policy community, the end of the SCTT did not mark any sharp break with the past. As so often happens, the stage army marched off and marched on again. Among the prominent figures of the SCTT who reappeared in the first GTC were Lees (Chairman), Gray (Registrar), Wood and Stimpson. As Lees was also Chairman of the Jordanhill Governors, the links between the GTC and

the colleges remained strong and, as we have noted, the CP was reconstituted to provide a common forum for discussions between the colleges and the Department. There was continuity too in structures, as the ten-college system remained unchanged beyond 1976, and in issues, as the central problems in the public eye remained those of teacher supply and the staffing of schools.

Teacher supply and student numbers.

The nature of these problems, however, was changing because of the demographic trends and of the expansion of the colleges. Although falling away from the peak of 104,355 in 1964 (see Diagram 3.1), the number of live births was still over 95,000 in 1967. After that, it fell away gradually at first, then more steeply from 1971, so that by 1976 it had dropped to 64,895 - a fall of about one-third in under ten years. This, of course, had a delayed effect on the school population. Primary numbers continued to be affected into the early 70s by the high birth rates of the 60s. So primary numbers (in thousands) rose from 605.8 in 1967-68 to a peak of 635.8 in 1972-73, from which they had fallen back to 611.8 by 1976-77. Secondary numbers simply rose throughout the whole period, boosted by the raising of the school leaving age to 16 in 1972. In 1967-68 they were 282,700; by 1976-77 they stood at 402,700 and were still rising.

While the school population changed in these ways, the output of teachers from the colleges continued on the whole to rise. (See Table 5.1) One new factor in the colleges' output was the opening of the primary diploma course to men, who began to enter the colleges (except Craiglockhart) under the new arrangements in 1967. (11) This change realised neither the fears of its adversaries nor the hopes of its advocates. The fear had been that they would 'dilute' the teaching force; in fact, some of them, particularly the mature students, brought new strengths to it. Notre Dame had proportionately more of them than any other college and Sister Francis commented :

> 'In our first intake we had over 90 and a good number of those 90
> were mature men, who had not had the opportunity and now were
> seizing it.....They were really excellent and made a real difference
> to earnestness of life in the College'. (12)

The hope had been that the men would provide an important new source of recruits; in fact, for the first eight years they averaged little more than 10% of the intake. (See Table 5.2) After 1975, when job prospects in primary schools became more

difficult, this modest flow of men into the sector dried up to a trickle. So primary teaching remained a predominantly female profession.

However, initially, the admission of men did help supply in the primary sector. The high output from the colleges, combined with the modest increase and then decline in pupil numbers, removed the more acute staffing difficulties. From the beginning of the 70s, staffing ratios steadily fell from 27.9:1 (70-71) to 22.4:1 (75-76).(13) As a result, emergency measures could be withdrawn. The employment of uncertificated teachers in primary schools was banned from 1st April,1968 (14) and, from 1972, the Special Recruitment Scheme was ended for diploma students, although it was retained for graduates as a way of continuing to attract them into both primary and secondary teaching.(15)

In addition, more positive steps could be taken. In 1972, along with the first modest restriction on the intake to the diploma course, the minimum entry qualification to it was raised from 2 Higher and 4 O grade passes to 3 Higher and 2 O grade passes with effect from August 1974. (16) In the same year, Circular 819 introduced improved staffing standards for primary schools.

> 'The new standards expressed in terms not of maximum class size but
> of a minimum complement of teachers according to the role of the
> school .... will give scope for different patterns of organisation but
> their effect is to produce in a traditionally organised school a class size
> of at most 35'. (17)

In contrast, the staffing situation in secondary remained very difficult in some areas despite the high output from the colleges. Although the average pupil-teacher ratio nationally was tending to improve slowly, wide disparities between authorities remained, and these were accentuated by the raising of the school leaving age in 1972. The results were summed up in 'Education in Scotland' :

> 'Disparities in staffing were somewhat reduced in session 1972-73
> but increased again in 1973-74. On the whole the better staffed
> authorities were able to recruit enough teachers to cope with the
> demands of the extra year of compulsory education. Of the larger
> authorities, Aberdeen improved its pupil-teacher ratio from 12.6:1 to
> 12.2:1 and Edinburgh from 15.7:1 to 14.8:1. On the other hand, in
> Lanarkshire the over-all pupil-teacher ratio rose from 19.2:1 to 19.8:1.
> Glasgow and Renfrewshire both improved their ratios... but remained

relatively badly staffed ... Part-time education, the incidence of which was much reduced in 1972-73, was necessary again in a number of schools in Glasgow and Lanarkshire, as well as in a few schools in other areas'. (18)

These problems were most acute in the Catholic secondaries in west central Scotland, which were disproportionately concentrated in deprived areas and where relatively fewer pupils had stayed on beyond the age of 15.

As a result, the emergency measures to boost teacher recruitment continued in the secondary sector : the Special Recruitment Scheme and the scheme by which teachers in certain designated schools received extra payments. Long before ROSLA, however, the SED had become concerned that the staffing difficulties in secondary schools might be as much to do with uneven deployment as with inadequate recruitment. So, in 1968, the inspectorate carried out a study of teacher deployment in 47 secondary schools in 11 different authorities, which discovered wide discrepancies in pupil-teacher ratios not only among authorities - Aberdeen City's 13.5:1 compared to Lanarkshire's 21.2:1 - but also between similar schools. The official summary in Education in Scotland concluded :

> For many years the teacher shortage has been recognised as the most serious problem in education and much attention has been give to measures designed to alleviate it. The shortage has hitherto been measured by reference to figures provided by education authorities and based to a large extent on the demands of the schools. Discussions have concentrated mainly on measures of recruitment designed to make good the deficiencies shown by these figures. Less attention has been paid to the reliability of the figures themselves as a reflection of the real dimensions of the shortage and there are several questions which must be asked. For example, would comparative analysis show that similar standards are observed throughout the country and that differences in staff deployment reflect, in the main, local circumstances ? Is it possible to devise criteria by which needs can be measured in a realistic way ? If such criteria were found and applied, how far would they reveal recruitment or deployment as the major factor in satisfactory staffing?' (19)

The SED followed this up with further and more detailed staffing surveys and with theoretical studies of the organisation and staffing in secondary schools. The

outcome in March,1973, was the report 'Secondary School Staffing'(20) - familiarly known as 'The Red Book' - which for the first time proposed a uniform system of staffing complements which all authorities were to be encouraged to work towards in their schools.

The Department, however, calculated that 'a national pupil-teacher ratio of about 15.0:1 would be needed to enable all schools to be staffed to the new standards'. (21) At that time, the average was 16.0:1. Therefore, with overall pupil numbers still rising and the improved staffing standards being phased in, the colleges could look forward to a continuing strong demand for secondary teachers.

Teacher supply was always the most important factor in the environment in which the colleges worked. The fact that demand for all types of teachers was buoyant in the late 1960s and into the 1970s created hopes of expansion and an atmosphere of optimism which was reflected in the evidence given to the Select Committee on Education and Science in 1969. (22)

The evidence to the Select Committee on Education and Science.

This committee, it will be recalled, had turned its attention to teacher training because of the widespread feeling in England & Wales that the training colleges had not adjusted themselves to the changing needs of the schools. (23) However, it also took a substantial body of evidence about the situation in Scotland. Not only were representatives of the SED and the colleges interviewed, but those of a wide range of other bodies : e.g the GTC, the Association of County Councils, the Association of Directors of Education, the Scottish Union of Students and all the teachers' associations. Nevertheless, the evidence was skewed in various ways. It was weighted towards the larger city colleges, as none of the new ones set up in the 60s was visited. It was weighted against the Catholic sector, as there was only one brief visit to Craiglockhart, the smaller of the two RC colleges. Moreover, even at a time when feminist issues were less to the fore than they now are, the Committee itself remarked on how little of its evidence came from women, despite the fact that they were a majority both of students and of teachers. The question was put very directly to the ALCES delegation and received answers which moved from embarrassed evasion to honest admission of bias.

> 'WILLEY : Why have you not brought a lady along with you ? Why are you an all-man delegation ?

NICOLSON : It just so happens we have not....

MORRISON : Perhaps there is some difficulty in getting able women to take on posts of responsibility. There is a prejudice against appointing them in Scotland'. (24)

Even if it did not reflect all relevant interests, the evidence did reflect the distribution of power within the policy community. It therefore reflects what the policy makers thought were the strengths and weaknesses of the system, but the voices of their critics were also heard, particularly in the evidence taken from the students, the teachers and the local authorities.

Compared to that in England & Wales, the criticism was muted. (25) In the aftermath of the events of '68, the students were predictably critical of a number of aspects of college life. (26) They complained about poor welfare facilities and the lack of separate students' unions. The graduates, in particular, compared the regime of the colleges, which they saw as one of petty restrictions and paternalism, with that of the universities whence they came. There were complaints, too, that the disciplinary procedures left too much arbitrary power to the principals. Many of these criticisms were justified, as the colleges were in the process of adjusting to the changes in their intakes : the B.Ed students, male students on the diploma course, more mature students through the Special Recruitment Scheme, more social work or youth and community students. Better facilities, of course, depended on the SED and money for students' unions was never high on its list of priorities. In matters which the colleges could control, changes were made in the following years. Petty restrictions (e.g. dress regulations) were withdrawn and disciplinary procedures codified in ways which better protected students' rights.

Important as they were to the students, these were not issues of much public concern. The questions posed by the Select Committee focused mainly on secondary training, the B.Ed., and the place of the colleges in higher education.

This may seem surprising when the primary diploma courses comprised most of the colleges' work. There were complaints from the students that the courses were pitched at too low a level intellectually and provided very little academic stimulus (27) but this point was not followed up to any great extent. The conventional wisdom, expressed by I.W.Cunningham, the Senior Depute for Glasgow, seems to have been that primary training was not a problematic area.

'WRIGHT : Would you say that the quality of the people coming into your schools is as high ? ......

CUNNINGHAM : I would say that we are happier on the primary side than on the secondary side, broadly speaking. The product of the three-year primary course is very good indeed. Going round the schools, it is a rare exception indeed to find a head teacher who is critical of the young girls coming out of the colleges'. (28)

As Cunningham's remarks suggest, secondary training attracted more criticism. Students complained that the quality of the courses was poor. (29) Employers complained that the courses had not adapted sufficiently to the needs of the comprehensive schools and would have liked to see a less subject specific training which would have enabled them to deploy teachers more flexibly.(30) ADES even tried to revive the idea of a college associateship by suggesting that 'courses should be provided to make it possible for some with a primary qualification to obtain a qualification enabling them to teach at least in the earlier years of the secondary course'.(31) The reaction of the EIS to this idea was suspicious; that of the SSTA implacably hostile. (32)

Another frequent criticism was that liaison between the colleges and the schools was far from perfect and that this widened the divide between theory and practice. Schools, it was said, might be ignorant of the colleges' intentions, hostile to them, or simply indifferent to students as a result of the other pressures on them. (33) Part of the problem was that the colleges had to respond to the pressure of numbers by using almost every available school.

WRIGHT : Is it really possible in today's school situation to be sure that they [the students] are getting adequate guidance when they go to particular schools ?

OSBORNE : I would think it varies enormously from school to school. The fact is that we use almost every school in the area...... This means that we must be using schools which one must describe as unco-operative'.(34)

This criticism led naturally to suggestions for the greater involvement of schools in training, for instance by the appointment of teacher tutors.

While there were good educational arguments for improving the quality of courses and the partnership between colleges and schools, the whole debate about graduate training was driven more by concern to improve teacher supply than to improve the quality of training. Throughout the 1960s, it had frequently been argued that the extra year of unpaid training discouraged graduates from entering teaching and that it would greatly help supply if they were paid during training (35) These same arguments were put to the Select Committee particularly by the education authorities, who floated the idea of taking the graduates into employment and then releasing them for short blocks of training, as they did for FE lecturers. In a different form, this idea of a 'sandwich course' was soon taken up by the SED.

Because of the novelty of the B.Ed., the Select Committee spent far more time on it than the small number of students justified. (36) In contrast to England and Wales, where the B.Ed. had been criticised for being too academic, the main criticism in Scotland was that it was not academic enough. This contrast was due to the fears in England and Wales that the B.Ed. was distorting the education of primary teachers; in Scotland, to fears that it was lowering the academic standards of secondary teachers. These fears were most strongly expressed by the SSA and SSTA. For instance, the SSTA argued that all secondary teachers should obtain their subject qualifications at a university or central institution, and that the colleges should only be concerned with professional training. 'The Association', they wrote,' is completely opposed to any proposal which would allow colleges of education to produce secondary teachers of academic subjects'. (37) However, somewhat illogically, they then went on to say that they were willing to accept the B.Ed. as an experiment, provided that the standards were guaranteed by universities. (38)

Suspicion of the Dundee B.Ed. was particularly strong. Both the secondary associations disapproved of it because they thought it was lowering standards.

> 'We think there is a danger of dilution of the teaching profession
> through a lowering of standards required 1) for entry and 2) for
> qualification'. (39)

These doubts, moreover, were not confined to the teachers. Similar reservations were expressed by the Aberdeen students (40) and, more guardedly, by the Jordanhill staff. (41) On the whole, of course, the colleges defended the B.Ed., and the general feeling that emerged from the evidence was that this was an experiment which should be given time to show its worth, especially as it might help to ease the secondary teacher shortage. (42)

Discussion of the B.Ed. was closely linked with that of the relationship of the colleges to the universities, and hence to their future place in higher education. Experience of the B.Ed. had not created any strong desire for the integration of colleges into the universities. The universities showed little interest in it. (43) It was opposed by ADES because it might make college courses too academic (44), while the SED poured cold water on the suggestion that any closer links would be necessary in the foreseeable future. (45)

If the colleges were to remain free-standing, this raised the question whether they were to be encouraged to diversify and become more broadly-based institutions. Again, the SED showed itself firmly in favour of the status quo. Graham argued that there was no need for liberal arts colleges in Scotland, because the universities were meeting that need through their general degree courses. (46) Any other developments were not to be based on 'some theory about what the colleges ought to be doing', (47) but on considerations that were purely pragmatic - a word much beloved of administrators comparing their hard-headed approach to other people's airy-fairy schemes. So the colleges had been encouraged to develop courses to train social workers or youth and community workers :

> 'If there is a need for them which the college is equipped to meet and this seems a sensible place to provide this sort of training. We would not feel inhibited by any hard and fast doctrines that this was somehow or other inappropriate for a college of education. But the important thing is that there should be a real need and that the college should be the appropriate place to meet that need. Our approach would be purely pragmatic'. (48)

This is a classic illustration of the incremental approach to policy-making. There is the almost scornful repudiation of doctrine or theory, and the emphasis on the immediate solutions to practical problems e.g. how many social workers are needed and where should they be trained? It meant, however, that the policy-makers in the SED had no development plan for the colleges; only a desire to maintain the system as it was.

If they were neither to integrate with the universities, nor to be allowed to diversify beyond the point they had already reached, the colleges had little option other than to carry on as they were. In his personal evidence, Wood floated the idea of a 'City University' in Glasgow, linking Jordanhill with the art school, the RSAMD and the college of domestic science. (49) James Scotland had similar ideas for links between

Aberdeen, Robert Gordons and the university. (50) However, the general opinion (51) was that the colleges should remain essentially institutions for the professional training of teachers and associated groups but that, after a period of supervision by the universities, they might become independent degree-granting institutions. With the recent examples in mind of the creation of Strathclyde and Heriot-Watt universities, this seemed a feasible scenario at the time especially for colleges like Jordanhill which were then larger than some universities. It depended, however, on two assumptions. Firstly, that the SED would allow the colleges to acquire university status and the greater freedom that went with it. Secondly, that the expansion of the 1960s would continue apace. That second, optimistic, assumption underlay most of the evidence to the Select Committee about the future of the colleges, and it was to be some years before it proved to be unfounded.

Although it provides an interesting snapshot of the state of the colleges at the end of the 60s, nothing came directly of the work of the Select Committee. Before it could make any recommendations, the Wilson government had fallen and been replaced by the Conservatives under Heath. Its report was shelved and overtaken, in England and Wales, by the Inquiry of the James Committee.

Proposals for an inquiry into teacher training.

In Scotland no equivalent inquiry was instituted even though, it could be argued, the Scottish system suffered from the same inadequacies as those highlighted by James : over-rigid separation of primary and secondary training and over-reliance on initial training. The DES did suggest that the remit of James should extend to Scotland, but SED headed this off on the grounds that 'if it was felt appropriate to set up a Scottish enquiry into teacher training, it would be inappropriate to look beyond the GTC as it is by statute the Secretary of State's principal advisory body on this matter'.(52) Having said that, the SED felt obliged to keep in step with England and Wales to the extent of inviting the GTC to prepare a general report on the system of teacher training. (53) However, the Council, probably mirroring the views of the Scottish policy community (particularly the SED and the colleges), did not see any urgent need for a review and decided to defer any action until the Visitation Committee had reported on all ten colleges.

The only group with a strong sense of grievance were the students, who felt that the criticisms they had made about conditions in the colleges - paternalistic attitudes and poor facilities - were being lost sight of with the demise of the Select Committee. It may have been as a result of student pressure that the question of an inquiry into

teacher training was raised several times in the Commons both in 1970 and 1971.(54) By 1971, however, the government had decided that the main need was for reform of graduate training and that any wider inquiry was unnecessary. (55)

The students did not give up immediately. Instead they attempted to enlist the support of the EIS. In June 1971, the Executive Committee of the EIS met a delegation from the SUS. As a result, it approved a three-part motion: that the students' grievances merited attention; that they should preferably be dealt with by the GTC (if its statutes could be amended to give it powers to do so); and that, if the statutes could not be amended, the EIS would support the demand for an independent inquiry. The EIS then asked the GTC to conduct an inquiry (56). The Council did agree to seek evidence and eventually met the NUS; but some continued pressure from the EIS (57) weighed less heavily than the opposition of the Department. The matter was deferred again, this time until the working party on secondary training had reported (58) and in the end nothing was done - a good example of the difficulties which groups outside the policy community, like the students, have in getting their concerns onto the working agenda.

So there was no Scottish equivalent of James and the Report necessarily had an even more limited impact there than in England. (59) It did in a general way help to focus attention on the development of inservice training and to foster a climate of opinion which saw this as desirable. However, there was little interest in its more specific proposals for the three cycles or for the Diploma in Higher Education, which the SED felt to be unnecessary in Scotland because, it argued, 'the three year ordinary degree gives a broad education in arts and science not generally paralleled in England and Wales'. (60)

Even groups within the policy community could be equally unsuccessful if the SED did not want an issue on the agenda. In 1973, the college principals revived the idea of a comprehensive and public enquiry into teacher education, concerned by the Government's proposals for reorganisation in England and Wales and by the fear that the new regional authorities would want to play a greater part in teacher training. (61) The SED would have none of it.

> 'The Secretary [Sir Norman Graham] expressed surprise at the idea of such a comprehensive enquiry. Even if a suitably representative and authoritative committee could be established, it would take some years to report, with the result that nothing could happen while it was in operation and uncertainty and frustration would arise. There seemed

to be two separate issues involved; first, the future function of the colleges, and their management and financial arrangements, and second the future content of teacher training. On the first issue, there was perhaps a case for re-appraising the role of the colleges and also of the central institutions, but this seemed to be within the scope of the Department and the governing bodies. As regards training, the General Teaching Council Working Party report on secondary teacher training was now being examined and until conclusions had been reached on this, it would not be reasonable to start an inquiry into primary teacher training, still less to mount any further inquiry into teacher training generally'. (62)

In short, the Department wished to preserve the status quo and its central position in it, and to keep policy discussion within the policy community. So, not only was there no Scottish equivalent of the James report, but the Scottish White Paper of 1972, unlike its English counterpart, barely mentioned teacher education, confining itself to the bald statement that :

'It seems likely that the teaching profession will in future require a smaller proportion than hitherto of the output of the higher education system, and therefore no significant further expansion is required in the next decade in the colleges of education'. (63)

The concerns of the policy community.

In the absence of an inquiry, what then were the concerns of the policy community in the wake of the Select Committee's report ? The answers to that question vary with the perspectives of the different groups involved. While the EIS tried to keep the issue of an all-graduate profession on the agenda, (64) for the Government and the SED the over-riding problem continued to be that of teacher supply. This shows very clearly in the teacher training sections of the SED's annual reports in 'Education in Scotland', which treat mainly of teacher recruitment, pupil-teacher ratios, the elimination of uncertificated teachers, or the problem of maldistribution and the working of the designated schools scheme.

As long as the shortage and maldistribution of secondary teachers persisted the Department continued to take a close interest in teacher training. Its concern can be gauged from the frequency of the meetings which took place between the Department and the Committee of Principals,(65) meetings which were mainly about intake to

the colleges and its repercussions and which will be discussed in detail later.

From the perspective of the Committee of Principals, the agenda was not very different from that of the SED. The Minutes of their meetings show them mainly discussing admissions, the development of inservice, and matters internal to the college system, such as staffing, conditions of service or the powers of Boards of Studies. The Minutes also show that the CP was not a body which initiated policy, except to some extent in the inservice field. Indeed, after the demise of the SCTT, it had little power to do so, even if its members had been able to agree on the policies they wanted.

> *WBM. I get the impression from the Minutes that the CP was largely a reactive rather than a planning body. Would you say that was true ?*
>
> *MILLER : I would say it was true. ... But everybody was so busy protecting his or her own corner that it was very difficult to get any kind of co-ordinated effort. One can understand why.*

What the CP had to react to were proposals from the SED (e.g. those for a three-year B.Ed), reports from the GTC (e.g the report on graduate training) or initiatives from individual colleges. All of these had their own agendas but, apart from the expansion of inservice, two main policy trends stand out. One was the reform of the curriculum of teacher training in response to two challenges : the effects of the Primary Memorandum on primary schools and the combined effects of comprehensivisation and ROSLA on secondary - a topic deliberately omitted from this thesis. The other was the extension of the B.Ed to those colleges which had been left in the cold by the immediate post-Robbins reforms.

The extension of the B.Ed.

Those reforms had left three groups of colleges without B.Ed degree courses for different reasons. The two Catholic colleges because of doubts about the ability of their staff to mount them; the three new colleges because they had been set up to produce only primary teachers; and Dunfermline (along with the SSPE at Jordanhill) because of the conservative attitude of the Scottish universities towards degrees in physical education (66). As the GTC Visitation Committee noted in its first Report, this created 'a division of the colleges of education into first and second class citizens' (67) - a distinction which the second division colleges wished to end because of the aspirations of their students and their staff.

RENNIE : I was always well aware of playing in the second league. Everything about me, my natural vanity and professional vanity, was angered by that and I was absolutely hell-bent on changing that, and the Department knew it.

Paton describes the feelings which he found when he moved from Dundee to take up his post as Principal of Hamilton in 1970.

WBM. What did you see as the main difficulties facing you going into a new college ?

PATON : Some Heads of Department were aware of what they were already calling the 'Craigie syndrome'; that was a feeling of being end-stopped, being trapped if you like, doing something well but within a limited sphere. They were not necessarily being fair to Craigie with whom we worked very closely, but it was a phrase that was used at the time.

This type of frustration moved the principals of the six 'second division' colleges to make a joint approach to the GTC in November 1970, arguing their case to be allowed to mount B.Ed courses on the grounds that their students were being denied opportunities, that their best staff were liable to move to other colleges and that they were disadvantaged compared to comparable colleges in England and Wales. (68) Although the GTC had no power to help them, the colleges saw the Council as a sympathetic ally, whose support could be useful in the separate negotiations in which they were already involved with the Department.

The first college to initiate negotiations was Notre Dame, which had the strongest case, in that both the Catholic colleges had been left in the second division. The SED was therefore likely to look favourably on its proposal for a secondary B.Ed., especially as the college stressed it might help 'to alleviate the difficult staffing situation in Catholic schools, especially in the West of Scotland, where the shortage of teachers is serious and is likely to worsen with the raising of the school-leaving age'. (69) Moreover, to improve its links with the Department, the college recruited a former Chief Inspector, Charles Forbes, as Assistant Principal in charge of secondary training and this may have helped to consolidate the support which the SED would have given anyway.

Support from the Department was only half the battle; the college also needed a validating body. After its previous rebuffs from Glasgow and Strathclyde, a decision was made to approach the CNAA. This was a venture into the unknown for both parties as, at that time, the CNAA had not validated any B.Ed courses. After preliminary negotiations, a submission was made and a Visiting Party, led by Sir Derman Christopherson [Vice-chancellor of Durham University] came to the college in October, 1970. According to Wood, it was touch and go whether the CNAA would validate the degree.

> *WOOD : Notre Dame was rebuffed [by Glasgow] mainly because it did not have the quality of staff at that time..... They would have been rebuffed by CNAA too.... But I wrote to the chairman, Christopherson, and urged them to give Notre Dame a chance as it would be such a help to Catholic education. So they did, and since then Notre Dame has developed and appointed stronger staff academically.*

The degree, which was eventually approved by the CNAA in time for an intake in 1971, followed the Dundee pattern in the sense that it provided for a Foundation Year, common to B.Ed and Diploma students. After that, the B.Ed students did a further three years for the degree. Apart from the superficial difference that the three years were divided into six semesters rather than nine terms, the course itself was an academic one, on similar lines to those at Aberdeen, Jordanhill and Moray House. It could hardly have been otherwise, if it were to meet the requirements of the Memorandum for secondary subject teachers. Even so, the relatively minor variations which it made were regarded as problematic, and the GTC Education Committee had to set up a sub-group under Stimpson to adjudicate on the extent to which units in the Notre Dame B.Ed equated with traditional university graduating passes. So it was not until May, 1972 that the degree was finally approved as a teaching qualification. (70)

The case for a B.Ed at the other colleges (leaving aside the special case of Dunfermline) was less clear cut. So, when Hamilton made the first approach to the SED in 1969, it was turned down.(71) The next initiative came, somewhat surprisingly, from Strathclyde University in July 1970. Paton describes what happened :

> *PATON : Principal Sam Curran invited ..to a lunch the principals of Craigie, Hamilton, Callendar Park and Notre Dame...When it got to the coffee, Sam finally said :'We've been thinking that it might be a good idea if we could get some sort of joint effort and what I thought*

might be a good idea   would be if we took your diplomates..for another year and   gave   them a degree'. That's a summary. It was all done charmingly and well. I think it was intended to see what sort of response we would give as much as anything else. I had come from Dundee. I had been involved..... in quite a lot of structural arguments as Head of Department and Assistant Principal. 3 + 1 was not what the colleges were after. It did nothing for the colleges anyway. And while it might do something for the students, I was selfish enough to believe that it had to do something for the institution as well. So I responded that a better way of thinking about this would be 2 + 2'.

By the time this initiative came, Notre Dame was already well into its negotiations with CNAA and Callendar Park was already looking towards Stirling University. So, although they joined the working party which Strathclyde set up, they dropped out early on in the discussion, leaving Craigie and Hamilton to carry on. The working party, chaired by Professor Pack, held meetings throughout 1971, punctuated by joint meetings of the staff of the two colleges (72), and presented its report to the Senate in December. (73) This proposed that the college students should all follow the Diploma course for their first two year, at the end of which the top 25% would be given the opportunity of transferring to the B.Ed. In their third year, the B.Ed students would be taught in college, but in the fourth year they would become full-time students at Strathclyde, attending as far as possible existing university classes.

This scheme traces its origins back through Dundee to Robbins, as it bears a strong resemblance to one which was being discussed internally in Hamilton even before the Strathclyde initiative was launched.

WBM. The Minutes give the impression that Hamilton made the running, because the final outcome of the deliberations of the working party were not all that far from your original Paper to the Board of Studies...Did you feel that by and large things were going your way.

PATON : I think that last sentence is true...I believe I knew what we were doing and what we would end up with. I think I had fairly clearly in my head problems relating to structures, to what was acceptable and what Scottish educational opinion would say was good and what they wouldn't. I did feel that the structure which came out was very close to what I was looking for.

The Strathclyde University Senate accepted the scheme, and so did the SED, (74) which as recently as April 1971, had been reserving its position about all proposals except those from Notre Dame and Dunfermline. (75) Why this change of heart? Probably it had something to do with the fact that the Strathclyde scheme allowed students to come out with either a primary or a primary and secondary qualification - and Hamilton was in Lanarkshire which had the most serious shortage of secondary teachers. While this was a card which Hamilton played (76), it cannot be the whole explanation, as Craigie chose to have a mainly primary output and the Callendar Park/Stirling scheme did not allow for anything else. Paton thought that the SED was still willing to be influenced by the educational argument that students should be given the opportunity to develop.

> *PATON: Of course, the Robbins ideas were still floating round and we had not yet entered the realities of the '70s. Those were years of great discussion about how people could grow. I think that they [SED] were influenced by that rather than suiting a college by giving them a course. That was certainly one of the strong arguments that was put.*

To round off quickly the story of B.Ed expansion, Callendar Park came to an agreement with Stirling for a primary B.Ed with a somewhat similar 2 + 2 structure to that of the Strathclyde scheme and this began in 1973.(77) Meanwhile, Dunfermline had been developing proposals for a B.Ed in Physical Education and Human Movement. This scheme broke new ground in Scotland, as it offered the possibility of a four year course leading both to an Honours Degree and a Teaching Qualification. The SED was willing to accept this at a time when it was floating the idea of a three year degree for primary teachers. The CNAA saw it simply as conforming to U.K. patterns and validated it in July, 1973. (78) Once Dunfermline had been successful, the SSPE at Jordanhill could not rest content with a diploma course and the limited opportunities for P.E as an option within the Glasgow B.Ed structure. Helped by the recruitment of a new Director for the SSPE from England with CNAA experience, they brought forward their own proposals which were validated in 1975.(79).

Altogether these developments added six new B.Eds to the original four. Three of them were validated by CNAA; the other three by local universities, partly because the smaller colleges felt too weak to go to CNAA. Two of the new B.Eds were in the specialist field of P.E.; one was exclusively secondary; one was primary; and two were, like the older B.Eds., both primary and secondary.

The obvious effect of this expansion was to end the two-tier system, except in so far as Craiglockhart (which did not take part in it) might be said to constitute a second division on its own. This was good for the morale of the Catholic sector and of the smaller colleges, but the other side of the coin was that it left the colleges open to the same criticisms that had been made of the B.Ed in England and Wales. One was that the B.Ed degree courses had become so diverse that it was not clear what a B.Ed meant; the other was that there were too many courses chasing too few students, with the result that too much staff time was being diverted into teaching uneconomic groups.(see Appendix 9)

The expansion of the B.Ed shows what happens when there is piece-meal development without any overall strategy. It came on the agenda, not as a result of any national debate about the shape of the system, but essentially as a result of college or university initiatives prompted by institutional ambitions. Teams in the second division have never liked being told that they have no chance of promotion. But, in the absence of any clear strategy, the SED found it difficult to hold the line against those ambitions and perhaps did not try very hard as long as the resource implications were small.

The two issues which the SED did put on the agenda and which did become issues for national debate were the reform of graduate training and the move towards an all-graduate profession by means of a three-year degree for primary teachers.

The reform of graduate training.

Graduate training had come in for a good deal of criticism in the evidence to the Select Committee on the grounds that it was ill-adapted to the changing needs of comprehensive schools; that inadequate schools/college liaison widened the gap between theory and practice; and that the extra year of unpaid training adversely affected supply. However, it was essentially the problem of supply which put the issue on the agenda, and the SED had decided to take the initiative even before the Select Committee had heard the evidence. In July, 1969, the Department wrote confidentially to Stimpson, inviting him to a meeting with the Secretary and the Senior Chief Inspector. (80)

> 'The purpose of meeting is to discuss with you, as Chairman of the
> Committee of Principals, proposals that we have in mind to put
> forward to all the interests concerned regarding a different form of
> graduate training. As a first step we shall, of course, consult the

Committee of Principals but, before doing so, we should like your initial reaction....

We think it is pretty generally agreed that the one-year post-graduate course is a disincentive to graduate recruitment. Its principal disadvantage is that it requires the graduate to spend some 15 months following graduation on a student's allowance before he can begin earning a salary'.

The letter then went on to outline a possible pattern of training, long wished for by SED (see Appendix 7), consisting of :

1.   an initial course in college of two months in September and October;

2.   paid teaching employment from November to October of the following year;

3.   a final period of training in November and December of that year.

It also stressed, with ROSLA in mind, that such a scheme would give a 'once-for-all' boost to recruitment by producing in effect a double intake of graduates in its first year.

After informal discussions with college principals and with directors of education (81), the SED proceeded to issue a 'Memorandum on the Training of Graduates for Secondary Teaching' in May 1970.(82) This forecast the need to increase further the number of graduates entering training and reiterated the argument that 'more graduates would be attracted into training...if the course were modified in such a way as to shorten the period between graduation and paid employment'. It therefore proposed a three-phase pattern of training, suggesting two options similar in principle, though slightly different in detail, to the one outlined in the letter to Stimpson.

Initially, this memorandum was not well received. The EIS criticised the proposals for shortening and narrowing initial training, thereby reducing its quality. 'The scheme', they argued, 'is really an expedient to improve supply for ROSLA with improvement of training a secondary aim'.(83) Wood took the unusual step for someone in his position of denouncing the proposals in the pages of the Times Educational Supplement as 'an ill-considered memorandum'. (84)

Meanwhile, the Department was following its usual practice of sounding out the views of the policy community to see if a consensus could be established. The memorandum was therefore sent out generally for comments and specifically to the GTC for its advice. In response to it, and to the request which the Secretary of State had made in June 1970 for a comprehensive review of teacher training (85), the Council set up a working party under the chairmanship of Brunton. (86)

This met for the first time in January, 1971 and altogether held 29 meetings over the next 15 months.(87) To focus its discussions, Brunton produced a paper for the second meeting which posed what he considered to be the key questions, such as :

1.   What kinds of pupils are the potential teachers to be trained to teach ?

2.   What kinds of teachers are needed for these pupils and to meet the needs of the system ?

5.   What are, and should be, the respective places of theory and practice ?

7.   Is greater teacher participation in training desirable. Is so, how can it be achieved ?

9.   The SED memorandum suggested one form of 'sandwich' course but it was found to have serious disadvantages. <u>Would any other type of 'sandwich' course be feasible</u>? [underlining in original] (88)

Brunton seems to have used this paper and one which Bone subsequently presented (89) to steer the working party to accept two main ideas : that there should be some form of 'sandwich' training and that teachers in schools should play a larger part in training.(90) Certainly, the working party accepted quite early on the principle of a 'sandwich' course (91) and decided to seek the views on it of the education authorities, the teachers' organisations and the colleges. (92)

Those views were collected, both orally and in writing, and were summarised for the nineteenth meeting in October, 1971.(93) In very general terms, they showed some common ground : the need for closer liaison between colleges and schools; the need for greater involvement of the colleges in the training of probationers; the value of appointing teacher tutors in schools and of providing more inservice. But, on the crucial question of a 'sandwich' course, most of the evidence was hostile because it created too many practical difficulties. The only definite support came from

ADES, and then only if the three phases were compressed into one year.

Faced with this widespread criticism, the first reaction of the working party was to retreat from the idea of a compulsory Phase 3 in college.(94) After lengthy discussion of the alternatives, Brunton proposed a new pattern for the 'sandwich' course : Phase I, a college course from September to Easter leading to provisional registration; Phase II, a period of paid probation lasting three or four terms and leading to final registration; Phase III, voluntary inservice organised by the education authorities with college help.

This proposal was accepted by the working party, but for some reason it then began to swing back to the idea of a compulsory Phase III. Perhaps the turning point came at the 21st meeting. At this James Scotland, who had missed the previous two meetings, argued that, as long as Phase III was voluntary, the proposed new pattern of two terms in college plus four terms probation would give a poorer training than the existing one year course. So the working party began to look at the possibility of some form of release in the fourth term of Phase III (95) and gradually came round to recommend a new Phase III in which release 'of a flexible nature' should be arranged by employing authorities, the colleges, the schools, all working in conjunction.(96)

Nevertheless, the decision to go back to a compulsory Phase III in the face of all the contrary advice the working party had already considered remains something of a puzzle. Perhaps it was partly because the working party felt that it could not ignore the pressure to shorten the initial phase of training in college. Although most of the arguments in the working party may have been educational, this pressure surfaced on a number of occasions.

> 'It was agreed that the major purpose of the Working Party was to recommend a course of training justifiable on educational grounds; but it was also necessary to remember how much more acceptable any course would be if the trainees began to earn a salary in April rather than September'. (97)

But to accept a shorter Phase I kept pushing the working party towards a compulsory Phase III.

Perhaps it was also because most members of the working party felt that the 'sandwich' course was right in principle because of 'the chance it appeared to give

to trainee teachers to continue and deepen theoretical studies in the light of actual classroom experience' (98) - the same assumption that underlay the three cycles of the James Report. However, perhaps the key factor was that Brunton himself was committed to the 'sandwich principle' and was determined to retain it whatever misgivings might be expressed. (99)

As a result, when the Report came out,(100) it recommended a 'sandwich' course lasting two years and consisting of :

Phase I : from September to Easter in college, including teaching practice and leading to provisional registration;

Phase II : three terms of paid employment, but with a lightened time-table and training supervised by teacher 'regents', helped by college staff;

Phase III : approximately 40 days of release to courses organised by the colleges with the help of local committees, on which teachers and education authorities would be represented.

The working party was well aware of the difficulties which these proposals would create and these are very fairly set out in the Report. (101) Because of them, the Report had a very mixed reception. It did have some influential supporters. The GTC stood by its working party and recommended the Report to the Secretary of State for implementation, despite an attempt by Clark [Director of Education for Aberdeen] to persuade it to mount a feasibility study first.(102) The EIS, though initially doubtful about a compulsory Phase III,(103) eventually endorsed the Working Party's proposals provided that the principles were applied to all primary and secondary courses.(104)

Nevertheless, the weight of opinion was against it, as it was opposed by the three groups mainly concerned to put it into effect : the education authorities, the colleges and the headteachers. (105) Many of the opposition arguments were summarised by Bone and Riddell,(106) who pointed out that the Report's proposals created difficulties for students, who found it easier to start in schools at the beginning of a session rather than at Easter. They created difficulties for the schools, which would have to release staff in Term 3 without being guaranteed a matching replacement. They created difficulties for the colleges : for instance, that of standardising their courses in Phase I to allow for the fact that teachers might well do Phase III at a different college, or that of fitting training in more than one subject into a two term

Phase I. Moreover, they pointed out that Phase III was administratively complicated and that many teachers were opposed to it because it passed the final decision about registration from the GTC to the colleges. Yet, if Phase III could not be made to work, the danger, as James Scotland had pointed out, was that graduates would end up simply with a shorter period of initial training.

While this public opposition was becoming manifest, the SED was carrying on its own internal debate.(107) At its very first meeting to discuss reactions to the Report most of the comments were critical : doubts about the administrative difficulties, about the feasibility of leaving students unqualified at the end of Phase I, even about the need for any sort of radical change. These doubts were then reinforced both by the external criticisms and by the Department's own internal studies which suggested : a) that the implementation of Brunton would be costly and b) that it would not bring about the improvement in recruitment which the Department had originally sought but which was no longer such a serious consideration 'since there seems every indication that with the present training arrangements we shall have to curtail very seriously the intake of graduates .... to secondary teacher training within a very few years'. There was therefore never any likelihood that the Department would accept the Brunton recommendations. Nevertheless, they did contain educational ideas which the inspectorate saw were valuable and wished to salvage as best they could. So they brought forward alternative proposals which would have provided for : a) a one-year course of initial training in the colleges, but with revised teaching practice arrangements in which the schools were to play a bigger part, and b) improved arrangements for probation - a lightened time-table in the first year and four weeks block release for courses in the second. While retaining something of the sandwich principle, these proposals had the double advantage of being less complicated and less costly. They were seriously discussed within the Department, and a point was reached in July, 1974 when it seemed that the advice to Ministers would be to respond to the GTC by saying that, while Brunton could not be implemented, there was a case in principle for some of its ideas and that a pilot scheme would be undertaken along the lines of the inspectorate proposals.

Action was then delayed by the preparations for the General Election in October. Once it was over the issue surfaced again, but by this time the Treasury was beginning to frown even on the modest costs of the pilot scheme. So, in the absence of any strong external pressure for change, it was quietly dropped and the submission that went to Ministers simply recommended that the SED and GTC should jointly examine various experimental schemes designed to improve liaison between the colleges and the schools.

When Ministers received the submission they were not impressed. One of them commented :

> 'I have not seen the [Brunton] report but do not find the recommendations as described very attractive. What I do not like is that SED is now recommending virtually the status quo ... But we took the view circa. 1969 or 1970 that the set up was not satisfactory and published our own proposals which I recollect as being at least as attractive as anything described in this submission. Subsequently the matter was referred to the GTC - perhaps inevitably - .... with predictable delay and now it serves little purpose. There must be a better way of proceeding'.

Ministerial misgivings were eventually overcome, but only after more minutes were written and meetings held. So, it was not until July 1975 that the GTC received a short letter from SED which, while giving a nod in the direction of closer partnership between colleges and schools, rejected the recommendations of the Brunton Report on the grounds that the benefits from the proposed sandwich pattern 'would not outweigh the disturbance to school staff and pupils or the serious administrative difficulties'. (108) As an olive branch, the Department said that it accepted the arguments for greater involvement of teachers in initial training and induction, and suggested that there should be a joint SED/GTC working party to evaluate existing experimental schemes and to explore 'specific ways in which the schools and colleges might collaborate to achieve the improvements in the training and induction process recommended in the Report'.

Some of the GTC members were so annoyed by the delay and the apparently off-hand way in which SED had dismissed the Report that they were for refusing to co-operate. However, tempers cooled and the working party was set up under Sneddon, the only tangible result of the Brunton Report except for some experiments with voluntary schemes for teacher regents. (109)

Perhaps the last word on it should lie with Brunton himself. James Miller sent him a copy of the SED letter rejecting the Report, and he wrote back :

> 'It has certainly taken the Department long enough to produce a relatively negative response to the recommendations made in the Report. The decision is disappointing in that it leaves virtually

unaltered a training system that is crying out for improvement'. (110)

Originally, the SED itself had put reform on the agenda and had suggested a three-phase course. Why did it end up accepting the status quo ? The obvious answer is that the impetus for change had come from the looming problem of staffing the schools for ROSLA. By the time the Brunton Report came out and consultations had taken place on it, ROSLA was over and, while staffing remained difficult in the West, the Department could foresee that improvements were on the way. So, while the administrative complexities and cost implications of the 'sandwich principle had become clearer, the problem which the Department had intended it to solve was simply going away.

The proposal for a 3 Year B.Ed. degree for primary teachers.

Meanwhile the issue of an all-graduate profession had come onto the agenda. This was a long-standing aspiration of Scottish teachers (111), and the EIS had renewed pressure for it in the early 1970s for instance in its report on teacher training to the Brunton working party, which reiterated its view that 'the ultimate goal should be an all-graduate profession'. (112)

What gave new point to the EIS campaign was the fact that the English White Paper encouraged the colleges to develop three-year B.Ed degrees and held out the hope that this would eventually lead to an all-graduate profession. (113) As the Scottish White paper held out no such hopes, the EIS sought a meeting with SED in April, 1973 to press their case. What they wanted was a four-year degree to give primary teachers esteem in the eyes of the public and parity of status and salary with their secondary colleagues. (114) The SED pointed out that the EIS was invoking the support of the English White Paper for an all-graduate profession, while rejecting its proposals for three-year degrees. However, sensitive to the argument that Scotland was lagging behind, the Department floated the idea that the diploma might be replaced by a three-year degree followed by inservice training.

Two main factors seem to have influenced Departmental thinking. The most important was that the demand for primary teachers was falling in response to the demographic trends and that the intake to the three-year diploma course was beginning to be reduced. (See Table 5.5) From a high point of 2912 across the colleges in 1969-70 it had been cut to 2044 by 1974-75, a drop of 30%. The other was the influence of trends in England and Wales. In his notes made at the time, Bone certainly felt that there had been an English influence on the Department's thinking.

'This idea of the three year B.Ed (which would be quite unlike our existing B.Ed and much nearer to our existing Diploma course) is clearly something that Mr McGarrity [HMSCI] and Miss Sandison [HMCI] are pushing very hard. They are anxious to satisfy the aspirations of the teachers if possible, but unwilling to spend more money to do so, and therefore oppose any move to a four year initial training for the primary school. This would also bring us into line with what will be the English pattern.

The obstacle is seen as being the Scottish universities and, though it was not specifically stated, it was clear that some of the Department's officials regret the fact that arrangements for B.Eds were ever made with them. CNAA would almost certainly validate 3 year B.Ed's, since they do so in England, and that is what the Department wants'. (115)

However, influence is not the same as direct pressure to fall into line with the English system.

WBM : Did the initiative for this [the three-year primary degree] come from the Department and, if so, was it influenced by the proposals in the White Paper for England & Wales ?

SANDISON : It was a Departmental initiative, but I don't remember much influence from England. Of course, in a general way, we were well aware of the changes that were taking place south of the Border.

These same two factors naturally affected the thinking of the Principals. The first cuts in the primary intake came in 1973 in the East. Aberdeen, which was the worst affected, saw its intake cut from 280 in 1972-73 to 200 in 1973-74. (116) So it is not surprising that James Scotland, perhaps with Departmental encouragement, brought a discussion paper to the CP suggesting that it was time they looked again at the possibility of a 3 or 4 year primary degree.

The colleges had mixed motives for doing this. Undoubtedly they had a genuine desire to take the educational opportunity provided by a higher quality intake (in terms of SCE passes) to raise the standard and status of primary training. They were also aware that colleges in England, which seemed academically weaker (at least to those in the larger Scottish colleges) were rapidly developing primary B.Ed

degrees validated by CNAA. Moreover, there was a more basic self-interest in degree courses : they were allowed a higher staffing ratio and a switch to them would therefore help to defend staffing in a period of contraction. (117)

When the issue was raised at a meeting between the Principals and the SED about the future of the colleges in June, 1973, they were perhaps not surprised to find that it was already on the Department's own agenda. The official note records that :

> 'The Secretary [Sir Norman Graham] said that the Department was currently working on the assumption that the 3-year diploma course would in time disappear and would be replaced by a 3 or 4-year B.Ed course.....He urged the colleges to think very seriously about replacing the primary diploma with 3-year B.Ed degrees'. (118)

This put the Principals in a tricky situation. The Department was offering the chance of a primary degree, which they wanted, but on conditions (a three year degree, validated by CNAA) which they knew would be unpopular with the teachers, the universities (119) and with many of their own staff.

> *BONE : That [the 3 year degree] was what the SED would have liked. ...... But it was not in the Scottish tradition. This is yet another example, and there are many, where the distinctive nature of the Scottish tradition, backed up by the pressure group force of teacher opinion and opinion in colleges that is very like teacher opinion, resisted it successfully.*

If the Principals spurned the offer, it would damage their relationship with SED; if they agreed to explore it, they could appear to be colluding with SED against their own colleagues in the colleges and universities. It was a classic case of the danger of a group being 'captured' by the department it is dealing with (120) and the Principals could hardly avoid it. In fact, their response was to co-operate with SED in carrying out a study of the feasibility of a three-year degree. A working party was set up, chaired by Bone, which brought a report back to the Principals in December 1973 giving a possible outline structure.(121)

When they saw the report, the Principals were far from happy with it and expressed all sorts of misgivings. Was the 3-year course outlined worthy of a degree ? Would it give a better training than the diploma ? Would it be acceptable in Scotland ? Was it even necessary ? (122) Nevertheless, since the Department had asked for a feasibility study, they agreed that is should go forward.

Although Sandison had been a member of the working party, it took some time for the Department to respond. Then, in August 1974, it produced its own paper (122) arguing that the time was ripe for a primary degree, but that what was needed was 'a radical rethinking of the education and training proper to a primary school teacher and the development of a first-rate vocational degree course' built up from the existing diploma course. It also argued that it would be better if the colleges planned the course jointly and then sought collective validation from the CNAA : an example of the recurring tension between the desire of the Department to systematise and that of the colleges to retain their academic freedom.

By this time the Principals had been engaged in confidential discussions about the proposal for over a year and had come round to accept that there should be a 3-year degree.(124) However, as their Boards of Studies and Boards of Governors knew nothing about it, they did not wish to be seen to play any part in making the proposal. So it was agreed that the first public move would be made by the Department, which sent a letter to the GTC in October, asking it to consider the possibility of a three-year degree course, designed for primary teachers, taught by the colleges and externally validated by 'a body of university standing'. At the same time, the colleges were invited to make their own comments.

Once the proposals became public, they met with strong opposition. The EIS condemned them on two grounds - that they were 'dilutionary' and that they came 'like too many others in Scottish education.. from developments in England' - either of which was enough to damn them in the eyes of many Scottish teachers.(125) The universities were bound to be opposed to a proposal which put their Ordinary graduates at a disadvantage by requiring them to take four years to qualify as a primary teacher. Glasgow for instance showed some willingness to co-operate in devising a new primary degree, but only if it were a four-year course. (126)

Other reactions were not quite so hostile. The GTC supported the principle of a degree for primary teachers and was willing to accept external validation by CNAA. However, it could not reach agreement either on the length of the degree course or on whether it should totally replace the existing diploma. So it reserved its position on

both these issues. (127) The colleges were torn between their desire for a degree and their concerns that a three-year degree would be of inferior status and would sever the links with the universities, which many of their staff wished to retain. (128)

Overall, therefore, there was very little enthusiasm for the three-year degree and a great deal of opposition to it. The Department could have pushed it through, but only if it had insisted on CNAA validation. As this would have been interpreted as anglicisation and an attack on the Scottish universities, it was not an attractive option. Equally unattractive from the Department's point of view was the option of funding the four-year degree. As there was no political advantage in pushing the three-year degree, the government seems to have decided that it was not worthwhile trying to overcome the opposition.

> *WBM : In the end, why do you think the initiative [for a three-year degree] failed? You and Mr McGarrity [HMSCI] both supported it and there was support within the Department right up to Sir Norman Graham. Was this not enough to overcome the resistance ?*

> *SANDISON : I think a touch of politics comes in here. There was resistance, not only from the colleges but from the teachers, and the government did not want to fight the battle.*

So nothing was done and the proposal was soon lost in the turmoil over college closures. The result was that there was no parallel in Scotland to the developments which took place in the B.Ed degrees in England and Wales in the 1970s. There the combined effects of reorganisation and of CNAA validation produced a period of experiment - the 'container' revolution. All this passed Scotland by. The B.Ed degrees remained locked in their original and traditional forms until the four-year degree was finally achieved in 1984. By that time, the age of experiment was over and the age of national guidelines had arrived.

The erosion of the colleges' autonomy.

In recent years guidelines have proliferated, not only in the narrow context of teacher education but in the wider one of the 5-14 curriculum. They are not, however, an invention of the 1980s. The idea underlying them is that, in a country the size of Scotland, there should be a reasonable degree of consistency across the system, an idea which is one strand in the Scottish tradition of central control over education.

When that control was relaxed and the colleges given, by the 1959 Regulations, the power to devise and assess their own courses, it seemed like the dawn of a new era of academic freedom. Writing in 1970, Cruikshank was able to give her story an up-beat conclusion.

> 'For too long the influence of the past dominated and depressed teacher education. The changes of recent years have dispelled many of those influences. Today, perhaps the most striking feature is the autonomy of the colleges. It is the new independence combined with the extension in the scope of the work, the improvement in facilities and structures of the older colleges.....and the injection of ideas which has brought a liberality unknown before'. (129)

This conclusion would have been generally accepted at the time. In its Memorandum to the Select Committee on Education and Science, the Committee of Principals stressed the academic freedom of the colleges (130). The Department, in its turn, conceded that such freedom was desirable, subject only to guidance and advice, although there does come through in its evidence a feeling that the balance had perhaps swung a bit too far in the direction of freedom.(131) Nevertheless, the general assumption was that the colleges would eventually become autonomous degree-granting institutions. (132) When discussing the powers of Boards of Studies with the Committee of Principals in 1970, McGarrity argued that they should become like university Senates; (133) and for several years thereafter the SED pursued the idea of giving Boards of Studies executive powers in academic affairs. (134)

From a present day vantage point, this period of comparative autonomy for the colleges looks less like a new dawn than a temporary deviation from the tradition of central control. It was always precarious, as Wood pointed out in his attack on the SED Memorandum of May, 1970.(135) The fundamental reason for this was that the SED had the ultimate control over college resources, and had retained the right of inspection even though it did not choose at the time to use it.

Moreover, there were genuine doubts as to how far college autonomy should go. Should each college be completely free to devise its own courses ? The educational argument against this was that courses leading to the same vocational qualification should be broadly similar so that employers knew the nature and the level of training they could expect. On the other side, there was the danger that guidelines would become so prescriptive that they crushed creativity and made it difficult to respond

flexibly to students' needs.

These doubts were widely shared within the policy community. Therefore, even in the hey-day of college autonomy, there were pressures on the colleges to work as a national system. These did not come only from the SED. They came from within the colleges, from people who believed that they should work on similar lines across the country. They also came from other groups who shared this view. For instance, the EIS wrote to the CP in 1969 complaining about the variations in the form and content of the B.Ed degrees, (136) and the response of the Craigie Governors to the proposals for a 3 year B.Ed was that there should be a national pattern with local variations - 'consistency without uniformity'.(137)

This tension between college autonomy and the pressure for a national system showed itself on a number of occasions. One clear example of SED pressure was in the field of technical education. Following discussions in both the SCTT and the GTC of a revised pattern of training for technical teachers, the Department insisted on the JCCES setting up an Advisory Committee on the Diploma in Technical Education. In his opening remarks as chairman, Wood described the situation in his usual succinct way :

> 'The Secretary of State considers that the courses in the various colleges should be closely comparable in all essentials and that it will be necessary, therefore, for the colleges of education to constitute what in effect will be a joint board of studies.... The first task of the joint board will be the preparation of the broad outline of the new course. It will also serve to co-ordinate arrangements for external assessment and to keep the course under review'. (138)

Despite complaints from some members that this was contrary to 'the general trend towards the autonomy of College Boards of Studies'(139) , the Committee went ahead to construct a common syllabus and examination system for the four colleges then involved.

Perhaps for slightly different reasons, the SED pressed for a common pattern across the colleges in its proposals for a 3-year primary degree.

> 'The Scottish group of colleges is eminently suited to fit CNAA's recommendation that there should be a "mechanism whereby colleges offering a CNAA B.Ed degree should come together at regular

intervals to discuss their work". It is recommended that the Colleges as
a group seek CNAA approval of a basic structure for a primary
B.Ed'. (140)

In addition to the basic desire for a national pattern, the SED may have been motivated on this occasion by a wish to protect the smaller colleges which would have been too weak individually to go to CNAA but would have been put in a stronger position as part of a national consortium. (141)

Some pressure also came from the GTC. Had the proposals of the Brunton working party for a sandwich course for secondary graduates been implemented, they would have implied that Phase I should be similar in all the colleges.(142) They were therefore met by college complaints that the GTC was infringing the rights of Boards of Studies to determine the content and methods of courses. (143)

This issue came up again over the proposals for an Upper Primary Associateship. These came from a committee set up by the colleges themselves and chaired by Rennie, which suggested that the new course should have a common pattern across the country, that there should be a National Advisory Committee to approve courses and to organise a national system for the moderation of assessment.(144) Because the colleges sought the status of a special qualification for the Associateship, the proposals went to the GTC which accepted them, provided that there was national moderation.

This sparked off a debate within the Committee of Principals where powerful voices like those of Bone and Stimpson argued that college Boards of Studies could not be bound by these national arrangements. (145) At one point Rennie was so pessimistic about the chances of establishing a national scheme of moderation that she floated the idea that a national consortium might take the Associateship to CNAA for validation. (146) The practical difficulties of doing this were so great that the idea got nowhere. Instead, pressure from the GTC and the SED was sufficient to persuade the colleges to set up the National Advisory Committee, which then worked out the arrangements for national moderation. On the surface, this looked a weak form of central control, as the advice given by the Committee could in theory be rejected by individual colleges. In practice, any college doing so ran the risk that its proposals to offer the Associateship would not be approved by SED.

These instances have suggested that, in addition to the pressures for national patterns, the autonomy of the colleges was being eroded in two other ways : by

external scrutiny and by tightening of SED procedures for the approval of courses.

External scrutiny of college courses began to come from two quarters. One was the GTC, which had been given powers to visit colleges and to recommend whether courses should be approved as suitable to lead to an initial teaching qualification. These powers aroused some apprehension in the colleges, but on the whole had little effect in this period. The second was the CNAA, which had come into the Scottish scene when it validated the B.Ed at Notre Dame and the two B.Eds in P.E. This was the beginning of a most significant trend, but one which had little general impact in this period because CNAA validation was largely confined to the specialist field of P.E.

The question of SED approval of courses had not been much raised in the 1960s because, on the whole, the colleges ran the same courses year after year. Any new developments tended to be marginal and could be dealt with in an informal, ad hoc way. In the early 1970s, the situation changed because the colleges were bringing forward more new proposals, particularly for inservice courses, at a time when SED was beginning to realise that the days of easy expansion were over and tighter control over resource allocation was needed. Therefore in 1973 the SED instituted new formal procedures for the approval of courses. (147) Sandison explains the SED's reasons for this.

SANDISON : In the '60s the colleges were the spoiled darlings of the system. I came to them from the CIs which hated and despised them.

....

In the CI sector at that time there was no formal inspection, but HMI visited a lot, and there was a formal system of course approval. By the early '70s there was a general feeling in SED that it was time to tighten up control of the colleges, and so I brought forward proposals for approving courses. I thought also that if we started with course approval we could encourage co-operation between the colleges and perhaps between colleges and CIs, but that met with a lot of resistance.

Then as the '70s went on there was more pressure to restrain public spending. So the SED was forced to tighten up its control of resources.

These procedures required the colleges to submit to the Department all proposals for courses leading to qualifications and for inservice courses not leading to qualifications but lasting one month or more. The Department would then 'examine the proposals on administrative and financial grounds in order to determine the need for it in the national situation'. This simply formalised what had always been the reality of the situation, and all the Principals could do was to remind the SED that evaluation of academic content was for other bodies.(148) In practice, this neat dividing line between resources and curriculum could not be maintained. The SED could block proposals of which it disapproved and, in my experience, HMI could and did give informal 'advice' to colleges about the academic content of their proposals.

However, in the early 1970s, the atmosphere was still one of partnership and co-operation. The developments outlined did not seem substantial changes at the time. Only in retrospect do some of them appear as minor portents of the gathering storm.

Reductions in intake and their consequences.

The real storm clouds were the fall in the birth rate and the consequent, though delayed, fall in pupil numbers. Because of these, people were already beginning to foresee cutbacks in student numbers, particularly for the primary diploma, before the end of the 1960s. (149) However, action was slow in coming. Until well into the 1970s, the SED was working on misleading projections of live births and pupil numbers. (See Tables 5.3 and 5.4). It was also trying to use the improved supply position to improve staffing standards to the levels laid down in Circular 819 for primary schools and in the Red Book for secondary. Nevertheless, as the internal comments on Brunton showed, it was well aware by the early 1970s that the general shortage of teachers was coming to an end, and that awareness was shared by the well-informed outside the Department. Its difficulty was to convince some of the other key players in the policy community. As long as there were still acute shortages in some subjects and more general shortages in areas like Glasgow and Lanark, education authority officials and teachers, who lived with the day-to-day reality of understaffed schools and curriculum imbalance, were bound to be sceptical of the suggestion that the promised land was just round the corner. In these circumstances, Ministers of both Parties, both North and South of the Border, saw any restraint on teacher recruitment as a political 'hot potato'. (150)

So it is not surprising that SED was wary of cutting back too much too soon. The intake to the primary diploma course did begin to fall after 1972-73, but it remained

high down to 1975-76 as did the intake to the one-year post-graduate secondary course. (See Table 5.5)

Despite this cautious approach, the question of cutting back the intakes to the colleges was high on the SED's agenda from the early 1970s onwards. In December 1971, it arranged a special meeting with the University Principals to warn them that, while the demand for graduates would be strong for the next few years, after that there would probably be severe reductions. (151) It warned the EIS that the teacher shortage was coming to an end.(152) In the two years 1971-73 alone, it held at least 6 meetings with the CP, chaired by the Secretary [Sir Norman Graham], at which intake was the principal item for discussion. (153) Although it was supposed to be the Department's principal advisory body on supply, the GTC was not involved in these discussions and, for all it did, its Supply Committee might well not have been there. (154)

By this time, the overall shortage in primary schools was beginning to disappear, except for some pockets in the West. So the Principals could hardly object to some restriction when the SED proposed to limit the 1972-73 intake to 2200. All they could do was to persuade the Department to lift it to 2500. The following year this was reduced to 2400 at the expense of Aberdeen, Dundee and Moray House who between them lost 170 students in order to give Craigie, Callendar Park and Hamilton some extra. The Eastern colleges protested, unconvincingly and without avail. So the policy of gradual cuts at their expense continued until 1975-76, when the SED was still allowing an overall intake of 2200 - a level which its intake paper for 74-5 had suggested was likely to be sustainable.

Discussions of the secondary intake were more complicated. In addition to the basic problems of shortage and maldistribution, there was that of recruitment for the different subjects. While the overall shortage was very acute, people had worried about particular shortages in maths or physics, but not overmuch about gluts in history or chemistry. However, as the overall shortage began to ease, so the SED began to raise the question of restricting intake in certain subjects. This was first hinted at in 1972 and by 1974 the pressure was beginning to mount. The intake paper for 1974-75 described the situation as follows :

> 'The September 1973 census shows that in most areas, excluding
> Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Renfrew, the improved standards set for
> 1977-78 have already been achieved or are clearly in sight. ...At the
> same time the deficiencies in these three areas are so substantial that

the overall supply of secondary teachers needs to be increased to the greatest extent possible with the minimum delay. Accordingly no restriction on intake for session 1974-75 is contemplated...

Unrestricted intake in 1974-75 will not solve all the problems of maldistribution or offer a solution to the subject shortages. But subject surpluses are already in prospect, and these together with area differentials suggest that some control of intake in 1975-76 may be necessary...

Against this background and a declining secondary school population, the employment prospects for secondary B.Ed students may be expected to decline sharply. To avoid disappointing these students and to conserve college resources, it is felt that some restraint is desirable'.(155)

Given that the B.Ed produced mainly Arts graduates, of which the universities could offer an ample supply, the threat to it was obvious and the Principals did their best to defend it. Bone noted at the time :

'I launched an attack on the section of the paper which referred to the B.Ed, and to the imposition of restrictions on it, arguing that it was not appropriate that the B.Ed should be used as a regulator since (a) it would take four years to operate, as against the operation of restrictions on ordinary graduates, which would only take one year to apply and (b) that the B.Ed gave a better preparation for secondary teaching than did ordinary M.A'.s or B.Sc.s'. (156)

Similar arguments had earlier found favour with Graham,(157) but that was in 1972 before the oil crisis. In the changed circumstances of 1974, they counted for less in face of the Department's concern to 'conserve college resources'.

Apart from the B.Ed., no restrictions were made at all on the secondary intake in this period. The Scottish colleges therefore got through to 1976 without any of the upheavals which were already taking place in England & Wales. They could not, however, fail to be aware of those upheavals and that problems of a similar nature, which had been delayed by the acute teacher shortage in parts of Scotland, were on their way. Discussions with the SED about intake therefore led necessarily to discussions about the future of the colleges.

As we have seen, the Principals' first move was to suggest a committee of inquiry. Although the Department rejected this, it was quite willing to discuss the future of the colleges privately, and did so on several occasions, notably its meeting with the Principals on 19 June, 1973. This considered all the obvious options. At the start, Graham ruled out diversification just as firmly as he had done in his evidence to the Select Committee and made it clear that any expansion of general higher education would be through the universities and the central institutions.

> 'The colleges of education would continue to be utilised for the training of teachers and in the provision of the other courses at present offered'.(158)

If the colleges were to remain primarily professional training institutions, the only hopes of expansion to counterbalance cuts in initial training lay in the fields they were already involved in. The meeting therefore looked at social work and youth and community, and had to conclude that there were no great hopes of expansion there. It looked too at training for nursing, but the colleges were warned that there were no plans for the expansion of its educational aspects and that, if expansion came, it was more likely to be in the FE sector.

The second main option was that of mergers, either with the universities, or with central institutions to form something like the English polytechnics. Again, Graham ruled this out.

> 'The Secretary said that while the Department obviously did not know what the regional authorities' ambitions would be in this regard, Ministers had no plans to place the colleges under their control and he had grave doubts about the wisdom of doing so. As long as the Department controlled courses in the central institutions and the further education colleges overlapping between them could be prevented. The central institutions and the colleges were governed in the same way but there seemed no real need to combine them and there was no sign of the Scottish universities showing interest in taking over teacher training'.(159)

Denied the possibility of diversification or mergers, the only line of development left open to the colleges was the expansion of inservice training. As long as this was conceived mainly in terms of college courses, expansion depended on two uncertain factors : the ability of the colleges to persuade the authorities that the

courses were worthwhile and the ability of the authorities to release teachers to attend them.

Although there was a serious policy issue at stake - whether the colleges should remain monotechnic - it was debated largely within the closed circle of the Department and the Committee of Principals. Looking at developments, by this time from the outside, Wood commented to McPherson and Raab:

> 'Some policy decisions are made by doing nothing. There is the current situation in higher education outside the universities. There is tremendous activity in England which may or may not be misplaced, but we don't even talk about it in Scotland. We just assume that we are all right. We've got the Central Institutions and Colleges of Education, FE colleges. It is working all right; just leave it alone'. (160)

This cosy private debate could go on as long as no major changes in the system were contemplated. Once drastic surgery was proposed, the debate inevitably moved into more public and political arenas.

Table 5.1 : No. of students successfully completing teacher training in Scotland, 1967-75. (Scottish Education Statistics.)

	67-68	68-69	69-70	70-71	71-72
TQ (primary)	2431	2180	2518	2654	2834
TQ (secondary)	1791	2104	2244	2321	2917

	72-73	73-74	74-75
TQ (primary)	2638	2725	2457 (prov)
TQ (secondary)	3095	2678	2731 (prov)

Table 5.2 : Intake of men to the primary diploma course in all Scottish colleges, 1967-75. (Scottish Education Statistics.)

	67-8 :	68-9 :	69-70 :	70-1 :	71-2 :	72-3
Number :	293	283	288	280	378	351
%age of intake :	11.4	10.1	9.8	10.2	13.1	14.2

	73-4 :	74-75 :
Number :	286	178
%age of intake :	12.4	8.7

Table 5.3. Projections of live births ('000s) in 1969 and 1973. (Scottish Education Statistics)

	1969 projection	1973 projection	Actual
1970	95	-	87.3
1975	99	80	67.9
1980	99	92	68.9
1985	103	98	66.7

Table 5.4. Projections of pupil numbers ('000s) in 1969 and 1973. (Scottish Education Statistics)

	1969 projection	1973 projections	Actual
1970-71	960	-	953.9
1975-76	1020	1020	1030.5
1980-81	1030	990	938.1
1985-86(est)	1070	970	806.6

Table 5.5 Student intake to Scottish Colleges of Education, 1967-76.

	67-8 :	68-9 :	69-70 :	70-1 :	71-2 :	72-3
Primary Diploma :	2577	2803	2912	2744	2893	2476
1-yr post-grad :	2286	2372	2419	3213	3413	2932

	73-4 :	74-5 :	75-6 :	76-7
Primary Diploma :	2305	2044	1959	1188
1-yr post-grad. :	2932	2387	2644	2007

(From the annual intake documents in the CP Minutes)

NOTES

1. SED file ED51/8/304. Note of a meeting between SED officials and the principals of the four city colleges, 17 August, 1966.

    'The Department had found its meetings with the Principals of the four larger colleges most helpful and while, with the demise of the SCTT, the CP would lose its statutory background, it might be possible to establish a system providing for regular meetings between its successor and the Department. This would permit the useful working relationship which had been developed with the present small representative body to continue'.

2. Stimpson. Interview on 5 March,1990.

3. JCCES. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Diploma in Technical Education. 12 February, 1976

4. SED file ED/51/8/292

5. Perrott (1967).

6. CP. Minutes of 18 April, 1967.

7. GTC. Minutes of Council Vol 1. 5 June, 1967

8. GTC. Minutes of Council Vol III. 9 December, 1975.

9. The total output from Stirling University of secondary teachers in all subjects between 1971 and 1985 was 716.

    I am indebted for this information to Mr D G Wood, the University Planning Officer.

10. Marker (1991).

11. As result of this four colleges became mixed.

    Fitzpatrick describes one of the side effects at Notre Dame.

    WBM: What effects did this [the coming of men students] have on the college?

    FITZPATRICK : Perhaps the first thing that comes to me is that those in charge - the Sisters particularly - had to think about dress. In those days the girl students all wore some kind of cloak. In order to identify the men as Notre Dame students, ... the college insisted that the men wear the same cloak as the girls. Now this was patently ridiculous....So it wasn't long before we had a bit of trouble...and cloaks were eventually abandoned.

12. Fitzpatrick (1982). Transcript of Interview in October,1978.

13. Figures from Ed. in Scot.

14. Ed. in Scot. 1967. p.65.

15. Ibid.1972. p.31.

16. Ibid.p.31.

17. Ibid.p.31.

18. Ibid.1973 p.30.

19. Ibid.1969. p.36

20. SED (1973) Secondary School Staffing. For a fuller account see McPherson & Raab (1988) pp.229-30.

21. Ed.in Scot. 1973. p.31.

22. SCES (1970).

23. Willey & Maddison (1971) p.22.

24. SCES (1970) Q.214. The absence of women from the SUS delegation was equally glaring. Q.324.

25. Willey & Maddison (1971) p.96.

26. SCES (1970) pp.550-57. Memorandum of the Scottish Union of Students.

27. Ibid. Q.784 and 1251

28. Ibid. Q.242.

29. Ibid. p.766 Memorandum of the Aberdeen students..

30. Ibid. Q.252-4 and Q.246. James Miller made a similar criticism of graduate training.

    MILLER : When I went to Jordanhill in 1966, I hadn't had much contact with the colleges for 17 years... and really the secondary graduate course had hardly altered. ...They [the colleges] were still producing their secondary students as if they were all going into the traditional Scottish senior secondary school. Up to about the mid-60s this was fine...but there was an enormous change in the schools in the 60s and it took a long time for the colleges to catch up with this. I never thought they caught up with it in my time as far as secondary training was concerned. They didn't seem to be dealing with the comprehensive school properly at all.

31. Ibid. p.539 Memorandum from ADES.

32. Ibid. Q.406-7 for the views of the EIS and Q.531-2 for those of the SSTA.

33. Ibid. Q.768-771.

34. Ibid. Q.1323.

35. For instance by Margaret Herbison when opening the 'Education Scotland' debate, 10 July, 1962. Or see the SEJ 19 February, 1965.

36. Ibid. p.472. Up to the end of session 1968-69 only 50 B.Ed. students had graduated.

37. Ibid. p.600. Memorandum by the SSTA.

38. Ibid. Q.2502

39. Ibid. Q.491. Evidence of the SSA.

40. Ibid. Q.1280.
41. Ibid. Q.865.
42. Ibid. Q.127. Wood, however, warned against expecting too much from the B.Ed.

    'It would be fair to regard the possibility of the B.Ed. becoming an important factor in the production of secondary teachers, but not a major factor. The major production ..must come from the universities'.
43. Ibid. Q.130 and 1226.
44. Ibid. Q.271.
45. Ibid. Q.76
46. bid. Q.1718.
47. Ibid. Q.82. Reply by J M Fearn.
48. Ibid. Q.1720.
49. Ibid. Q.119 and 970.
50. Ibid. Q.1393.
51. Ibid. Q.132 (evidence of D Stimpson), Q.917 (evidence of T R Bone), pp.823-4 (Memorandum from Aberdeen Board of Studies.)
52. SED file ED/51/8/403.
53. GTC. Minutes of Council Vol.I. 22 September,1970.
54. Hansard. Vol.803. OQ Mr Mackenzie. 8 July,1970.

    Vol.804 WQ Mr McArthur. 24 July,1970.

    Vol.812 WQ Mr Stewart. 3 March,1971.

    Vol.813 WQ Mr Hamilton. 15 March,1971.

    Vol.814 WQ Mr Oswald. 24 March,1971
55. Hansard. Vol.812. WQ 3 March,1971. Mr Stewart asked the Secretary of State [Gordon Campbell] what plans he had for an independent review of teacher training. The reply was that the GTC had set up a working party on secondary training. 'After consultation with the Council, I have concluded that a wider inquiry is not needed at present'.
56. GTC. Minutes of the Council Vol.II. 6 October, 1971.
57. SEJ. Vol 54 No.44 10 December,1971. Inquiry into Teacher Training.
58. GTC. Minutes of the Council. Vol.II. 7 March,1972.
59. TES 28 January,1972. 'James in Scotland'.
60. SED file ED/26/1212.
61. CP. Minutes of 30 April,1973. Appendix A.
62. SED Note of meeting with CP, 28 March,1973.
63. SED (1972b) pp.7-8.
64. SED file ED/51/8/409 includes a report of the meeting in April,1973 and Bryden's letter.

65. In the CP's Minutes I have managed to trace records of 12 meetings between the CP and the SED between October,1970 and January,1975.

66. SCES (1970) Q.132. Evidence of Miss Blunden.

67. GTC. Minutes of Visitation Committee. Consolidated Report 1966-71.

68. GTC. Minutes of Council. 3 December 1970

69. Notre Dame College. B.Ed submission to the GTC.

70. GTC. Minutes of Council. 25 May 1972.

71. Hamilton. Minutes of the Board of Studies. 26 February,1969.

72. Ibid. 19 November,1971.

73. Strathclyde University. Senate December 1971. Paper 9.

74. As a result, the first students transferred into the B.Ed courses at Craigie and Hamilton in October 1972.

75. GTC. Minutes of the Education Committee. 29 April,1971.

76. Hamilton. Minutes of the Board of Studies. 6 May 1970.
'It seems to the Board that finance will be forthcoming for this degree only if it is seen as producing a secondary teacher'.

77. GTC. Minutes of the Education Committee. 24 April 1973.
[Copies of the scheme and of the Dunfermline B.Ed submission are in the Craigie Archives. Box GTC Education Committee, January 1972 to November 1973]

78. GTC. Minutes of the Education Committee, 19 November 1973.

79. Jordanhill. Minutes of the Board of Studies. 15 October,1975.

80. JCCES File J/4/34.

81. SCES (1970) Q.1680.

82. SCES (1970) pp.895-8.

83. TES 15 September, 1970.

84. Ibid.

85. SED (1972a) p.1

86. Why was Brunton invited to be chairman when he was not a member of the GTC ? Gray told me that there may have been some slight pressure from SED, but both Wood and Nisbet thought it was simply because of the high regard in which he was held and that he was not felt to be the Department's man. It is hard to believe that his appointment was not engineered when he was known to be in favour of the 'sandwich principle' which the SED was pushing for.

87. GTC File Ed/8/3. Minutes of the Working Party on the Training of Graduates.

88. GTC File Ed/8/1. Graduates in Secondary schools.

89. GTC File Ed/8/3. Minutes of meeting of 4 March,1971.

90. By all accounts Brunton was an excellent chairman but it would be surprising if he had not tried, however subtly, to guide the working party in the direction he

wanted it to go. Nisbet thought so.

WBM : Is it your recollection that he gave the committee a strong steer ?

NISBET : I think so. The opening remarks certainly felt like a strong steer...At the beginning he emphasised the fact that the whole of the discussion must assume that all secondary schools were comprehensive. Also the idea of the sandwich principle......He gave that sort of direction. He himself didn't interfere a great deal in the actual discussion. He sat back and let the discussion flow, but I think that was his method in all his committees - to say a little and do a lot.

This view is supported by a letter Brunton wrote to Gray on March 10th,1971 (GTC File Ed/8/1/). In it he refers to some opposition from Wood and continues :

'I'm afraid the working party will have a lot of trouble if, as I hope, it pursues the line of thinking into which it is slowly and painfully being guided'.

See also Note 99 below.

91.   GTC File Ed/8/3 : Minutes of meeting of 26 April, 1971.

92.   SED (1972a). Appendix 3 gives the questionnaire they were asked to respond to.

93.   GTC File Ed/8/3. Paper 28 for meeting of 14 October,1971. The evidence is also summarised in Cowie (1977) pp.46-55.

94.   Ibid. According to the minutes, 'Brunton said that he had been reluctantly driven to consider abandoning Phase 3, as envisaged'.

95.   Ibid. Minutes of meetings of 1 and 9 December,1971. At this point, the working party also seems to have been influenced by a paper from Whiteford about how Phase 3 might be organised.

96.   Ibid. Minutes of meeting of 17 December,1971.

97.   GTC File Ed/8/3. Minutes of meeting of 14 October,1971.

98.   SED (1972a) p.2

NISBET : There was a great deal of agreement that...the stage in teachers' professional development at which some theoretical questions about the nature of education could be appreciated was not at the beginning but after enough practice to let them combine theory and practice....For that reason they tended to be committed to some form of Phase 3.

99. SED file ED51/8/404 records the comment that 'the majority of its [the GTC Working Party] members favoured the minority report but had felt unable to dissuade the Chairman from pursuing his own views'.

100. SED (1972a). It is usually referred to as the Brunton report, but Gray told me that he actually drafted it and Nisbet confirmed this.

101. Ibid. pp.37-9.

102. GTC. Minutes of Special Meeting of 18 August,1972.

103. SEJ. Vol.55 No.42. 1 December,1972.

104. JCCES. File J/4/34. Copy of letter from Thomasson to GTC dated 7 May,1972.

105. CP. Appendix to Minute of 31 January, 1973. TESS 22 June,1973. Headteachers criticise training report.

106. TESS 2 March 1973. September is better than Easter.

107. This and the subsequent paragraphs are based on SED files ED51/8/403-5.

108. At the Council's insistence, the Registrar wrote to SED asking for a fuller explanation of its reasons for rejecting the Report. The reply is printed as Appendix II to the Minute of 3 May,1976.

109. But how far was the Sneddon Report a tangible result?
Although the inspectorate probably saw it as a way of keeping hopes of reform alive, some officials probably saw it as little more than a face-saving device. At a meeting with the Registrar to discuss the setting up of the Working Party, 'It was explained by the Department that from an expenditure point of view a very speedy report would not be welcome'. In the end, the Sneddon Report suffered the same fate as Brunton.

110. GTC file Ed/8/6.

111. Cruikshank (1970) p.170 describes the pressure from the EIS in the inter-war period.

112. SEJ Vol 54. No.33 24 September,1971..

113. DES (1972). 'The Government propose to work towards the achievement of a graduate profession as the ultimate aim'.

114. SED file ED 51/8/409.

115. Jordanhill. Minutes of Principal's Committee. Note on meeting of Principals with the SED, 19 June,1973.

116. Note of the meeting between SED and the Committee of Principals. 28 March,1973.

117. At that time the staffing ratio for diploma courses was 13:1, but for degree courses it was 9:1.

118. Note of the meeting between SED and the Committee of Principals. 18 June,1973.

119. ED/51/8/409 records the defence by some of the Principals of the university connection.

120. Hogwood (1987) p.62

121. CP. Minutes of 18 December,1973.
The members of the working party were Bone, Sister Francis, Miss Rennie, and HMCI Miss Sandison.

122. Ibid.

123. SED (1974).

124. Jordanhill. Minutes of the Principal's Committee. Note on the meeting of Principals with the SED, 26 August,1974.

125. TESS 28 November,1975. Report of John Pollock's speech to the Edinburgh local association.

126. Jordanhill. Minutes of Principal's Committee. Report on a meeting of the Glasgow University Senate. 6 November,1975

127. GTC Minutes of 12 June,1975.

128. For examples of college reactions, see Craigie. Minutes of Governors. 16 October,1975. Jordanhill. Minutes of Board of Studies.19 March,1975; Minutes of Governors.19 September,1975. Notre Dame. Minutes of Board of Studies. 12 November,1974.

129. Cruikshank (1970) p.216.

130. SCES (1970) pp.485-6.

131. Ibid. Q.1708-1713. Because of the contrast it shows with future developments, the whole passage is reproduced in Appendix 10.

132. Scotland (1973). '.By the end of the century, possibly a good deal earlier, Jordanhill and Moray House may be universities'.

133. CP. Minutes of 27 October,1970.

134. JCCES file J/4/39. Letter from Fearn to McIntosh. 16 April, 1973.
'As regards the boards of studies... we think that there may now be a case for the academic business of the colleges of education to be dealt with in a similar way to that which obtains in other areas of higher education, particularly the central institutions.... This would mean that the governing body would be required to delegate responsibility for academic matters to the board of studies and that the latter would have an executive rather than an advisory role'.

135. Wood (1970).

136. CP. Minutes of 3 March 1969.

137. Craigie. Minutes of the Board of Governors. 16 October,1975.

138. JCCES. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Diploma in Technical Education. 23 March,1970.

139. Ibid. 26 June,1970

140. SED (1974).

141. Both Sandison and Paton separately attested to this weakness of the smaller colleges.

    a) WBM: I have the impression that some of the colleges had very cosy relationships with the Scottish universities.

    SANDISON: They had, and they were afraid of the CNAA because they knew that they would have difficulty in getting their courses validated.

    b) PATON : There was the problem for the smaller colleges that we might not meet the requirements of the CNAA in respect of library facilities and staffing, and so fail to get our courses validated. Scottish universities knew better.

142. SED (1972a) para.33.

143. GTC. File Ed/8/6.

144. JCCES (1973).

145. CP. Minutes of 18 December,1973.

146. Craigie. Principal's memo of 2 April,1975 on the validation of College Associateships.

147. SED (1973).

148. CP. Minutes of 13 September,1973

149. See for instance 'Education in Scotland (1967), Scotland J (1969), Wood in the Minutes of the CP, 23 October,1969

150. Harding (1978). 'In the absence of any political will to tackle the problem the Department [DES] was disinclined to peer into the future'.

151. SED file ED26/1212

152. McPherson & Raab (1988) p.441.

153. In the Minutes of the CP there are Notes of meetings held on 4 November,1971; 7 January 1972; 10 May 1972; 14 March 1972; 28 March 1973; 19 June 1973. The paragraphs which follow are based on these Notes which were made by the SED.

154. During the period of the Second Council (1971-75) the Supply Committee only met six times.

155. CP. Minutes of 26 March, 1974.

156. Jordanhill. Minutes of Principal's Committee, 23 April,1974.

157. SED Note of meeting with CP, 10 May,1972.

158. SED Note of meeting with CP, 19 June, 1973.

159. Ibid.

160. Transcript of interview with McPherson and Raab, 1976.

CHAPTER 6

THE FIRST ATTEMPT TO CONTRACT THE COLLEGE SYSTEM.

The changing political arena.

The political arena into which the colleges were to be pitchforked was undergoing major changes. The immediate cause of these can be traced to the crisis which followed the Yom Kippur war of 1973. The consequent rise in oil prices triggered off the worst bout of inflation in post-war Britain and by mid-summer 1975 it was running at over 25%. (1) Faced with this situation, the Treasury, with the support of Denis Healey (then Chancellor), introduced new measures to control public spending, of which the most significant was the switch to a system of cash limits. As Sir Leo Pliatsky, the main architect of the new system put it: 'Instead of waiting to see what the rate of inflation turned out to be and providing extra cash to cover it when the time came, the government would, in snooker terms, be calling the shots on inflation and declaring in advance what cost increases it would be prepared to finance'. (2)

This shift from 'inflation-proof' public spending to cash limits was reinforced by the sterling crisis of 1976 and the insistence of the International Monetary Fund on the adoption of deflationary policies as a condition of its loans. However, this shift was not just a short-term measure to meet a crisis; it was a change in the direction of policy which was accentuated when the Conservatives came into office in 1979 and which has lasted until the present day. 'Since 1976', as Midwinter says, 'control of public expenditure has been a central element of British Government strategy'. (3) Moreover, it has been persuasively argued by Marquand that these budgetary changes were a symptom of something more fundamental - the breakdown of the post-war consensus, which he labels 'Keynesian Social Democracy', with its commitments to full employment, to a strong public sector within a mixed economy and to the 'welfare state'. (4)

If the whole climate in which the public sector operated throughout Britain was changing in these ways, the colleges could not fail to be affected. They were also affected by two changes in the Scottish political arena (Appendix 11): the growth of nationalism within a four party system and the reform of local government.

At the beginning of our period in 1959 Scotland still seemed firmly locked into the British two party system. North and south of the Border, voting patterns continued

to move in line as a consequence of an apparently stable two-party system based on class. This situation held good until 1970, although there were already some signs that the old party system could not accommodate new pressures, the most spectacular of which was the SNP success in the Hamilton by-election in 1967. However, after 1970, politics began to move into an 'era of partisan de-alignment'. (5) The most obvious features of that in British politics were that support for both the major parties declined and that votes were decreasingly cast along class lines. In the 1970 election, Labour and the Conservatives still accounted for 89.5% of the votes cast; by 1983, that had dropped to only 70%. (6)

In addition to this general trend there was one peculiar to Scotland : the growing divergence between its voting patterns and those in England and Wales. One aspect of this was the collapse of the Conservative vote. In the 1959 election, the Conservatives polled 49.3% of the votes in the UK and 47.2% in Scotland. By 1983, their share of the UK vote had dropped to 42.4%, but their share in Scotland had plummeted down to 28.4%, leaving them with only 21 out of the 72 Scottish M.Ps at a time when they had a massive majority at Westminster.

The other aspect was an upsurge of nationalism and the later development of a four-party system. In terms of representation at Westminster, the obvious beneficiary of the Conservative collapse was the Labour Party. From 1966 onwards, it never had less than 40 of the Scottish seats; but this concealed the fact that, even if more erratically than the Conservatives', its share of the vote also declined from 47.2% in 1959 to 35.1% in 1983. However, the first-past-the-post system worked in its favour in Scotland, where minority Labour votes continued to return Labour majorities just as minority Conservative votes in the UK returned Conservative majorities in 1979 and 1983.

Although Labour became and remained the dominant party in Scotland, even after 1979, two other parties emerged as serious political forces. The Scottish Liberals (later the Alliance) need not concern us, as their upsurge did not come until the 1983 election in which they polled nearly 25% of the vote, for which they were meagrely rewarded with 8 seats. Much more significant for teacher education were the fluctuating fortunes of the Scottish National Party.

The bare bones of its story are quickly told. (7) After the excitement of the Hamilton by-election success, support for the SNP waned somewhat. Nevertheless, in 1970 they retained one seat (Western Isles) and polled 11.4% of the vote. This provided them with a base from which to launch their campaign round the slogan 'It's

Scotland's Oil', which took them to their high-water mark of 30.4% of the votes and 11 M.P.s in the election of October 1974. As the Labour government had a slender over-all majority of three, (8) this put the Scottish question firmly on the political agenda and made Labour very vulnerable to the charge that it was not defending Scottish interests.

After 1974, the popularity of the SNP remained high for several years. In the 1977 district elections, for instance, it made sweeping gains, mainly at the expense of the Labour Party. During the devolution debates, that popularity waned, and in the 1979 election the SNP was reduced to 2 M.Ps. Since then its electoral fortunes have fluctuated but it has never again achieved the measure of popular support or direct political influence which it enjoyed in the mid-1970s. (9)

However, one has to look beyond these fluctuating fortunes because Scottish nationalism is something deeper and more widespread than support for the SNP. As Kellas points out, 'The whole fabric of Scottish society is now geared to stressing Scottish nationality and the separateness of Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom'.(10) Because consensus about UK government has weakened and politics has moved into the phase of 'partisan de-alignment', national cleavages have become more important as class loyalties have declined. The divergence between Scottish and UK voting patterns is both a result of this and a factor which reinforces it. Reform of teacher education in Scotland therefore cannot be understood except against this background of nationalist feeling and direct political pressure. It became a political issue for a variety of reasons, which we shall explore, but not least because its opponents were able to 'play the Scottish card'.

Reform of local government also affected teacher education. Following the Report of the Royal Commission under Lord Wheatley, the former education authorities - the County Councils and the Counties of Cities - were swept away in 1975 and replaced by 9 mainland regions and the three island authorities. Some of these larger regions began to harbour ambitions to take over colleges and to play the same role in teacher education as did the local authorities in England and Wales. (11) The Department, however, had no intention of relinquishing control (12) and so the possibility of a regional take-over was never seriously on the agenda.

Nevertheless, the new regions did have greater influence in two fields. One was that of teacher supply where they could clearly speak with a more powerful voice in the arguments over college closures. The other was that of inservice, where national developments now depended crucially on the willingness of a few large regions to

support them. Indeed, through its control over teacher release, Strathclyde could largely dictate what inservice education was, or was not, available to half the teachers in Scotland.

The problem of supply.

It was within this changed political context that the SED had to look again at the beginning of 1976 at the perennial problem of teacher supply. As we have seen (Diagrams 3.1 & 3.2), the message from the demographic trends was unmistakable. Ten years before, in 1965, the number of live births in Scotland had been 100,660; by 1975 it had fallen to 67,943. Though it was to rise slightly (never above 70,000), by 1985 it was even lower at 66,422. Pupil numbers were therefore bound to fall, much more rapidly in the primary sector than in the secondary, which was still coping with the effects of the higher birth-rates of the 1960s. In fact, primary numbers fell between 1975-76 and 1984-85 from 620,000 to 427,000 (down 31%), while secondary numbers only fell from 397,000 to 378,000 (down 5.3%).

In 1976, however, the policy-makers had to peer into the future and to make decisions based on the best forecasts available to them. As those decisions became the subject of fierce political debates, doubts were repeatedly cast on the reliability of those forecasts and hence on the validity of the policy decisions based on them. Such doubts were given credence by what seemed like substantial discrepancies between the forecast from one year to the next, for instance between the figures for the projected numbers of primary pupils in the intake document for 1976-77 (13) and those in the document on the future of the colleges issued a year later. (Table 6.1) (14) Indeed it did undermine confidence in the SED that an extra 12,000 primary pupils should be discovered for 1977-78 at such short notice.

However, when one turns to what was to be the key planning document in the controversies 'Teacher Training from 1977 onwards' (1977 projection) and compares its forecast to what actually happened, the SED appears in a more favourable light. The tables show that the SED forecasts for secondary numbers were reasonably accurate, based as they were on children already born, whereas the primary forecasts, beyond 1981, were based on projected trends in the birth-rate. The critics were right in suggesting that these primary forecasts might be misleading but, because they turned out to be an over-estimate, they were actually favourable to the colleges.

If there were problems in forecasting future pupil numbers, they were much less than those of forecasting the demand for teachers. This was affected by a whole range of factors. In making its calculations, the SED had to make two assumptions. One was about the 'net wastage' from the teaching force (15), which the government could guess at but could not control. The other was about staffing standards, which the government did control to a large extent by stipulating what levels of staffing it would subsidise through the Rate Support Grant. However, this control was not absolute, as the education authorities could - and did - employ teachers beyond the minimum standards and pay for them out of the rates. The extent to which they did this was another factor which made forecasting difficult.

Throughout the controversies over cutbacks in teacher education, the government was constantly under fire for not being willing to improve the standards of Circular 819 and the 'Red Book'. When the GTC Supply Committee complained that these standards were unacceptable, the Department replied that they had been agreed with the education authorities 'on the basis of what the nation could afford' and that the government had no intention of improving them.(16) Moreover, the government could legitimately point out that, on average, Scottish standards were better than those in England & Wales and compared well with those in Western Europe. (17) As Bruce Millan said later, when defending the government's proposals to the Scottish Grand Committee: 'If 10 years ago we had had the staffing position we now have, most of us would have thought that the promised land had been reached'. (17)

Even while stressing the overall improvement in secondary staffing, the SED admitted that this had not solved the two problems which had been endemic in the secondary sector and which continued to make forecasting supply difficult. (19) One was that of matching supply to demand in specific subjects : serious shortages continued in technical education, mathematics, business studies, physics, art and music. The other was that of maldistribution.

> 'So far as maldistribution is concerned, there are wide variations in the standards achieved by individual education authorities and schools. For example, at the September 1975 count Lothian had in employment nearly 300 teachers more than the number required to meet the standards and Grampian had about 250 more. On the other hand, Strathclyde had about 500 fewer teachers than they needed, with the greatest shortages in Glasgow (-157) and Lanark (-240). The Roman Catholic schools in these two divisions were particularly short of teachers'. (20)

The opening skirmish - 1976.

These twin pressures - the falling demand for teachers and the government's policy of curbing public expenditure - put the questions of the size and nature of the teacher education system back on the agenda. In the circumstances, any government would have sought to contract it, rather than use resources to train teachers for unemployment, (21) and Scotland could not expect to escape contraction when the DES was pushing for the 'minimum system'.

The first move was for the SED to produce its proposals for intake to the colleges in 1976-77.(22) These forecast that the current output of primary teachers (still running at about 2,400 for the end of session 1975-76) was well in excess of likely demand. For 1979, when the 1976-77 intake would qualify, they calculated that an output of about 1,000 was all that was required. That would have meant cutting the intake to half its 1975 level. So, erring on the side of caution, the Department took the view that 'a reduction of that order in the diploma intake in 1976/77 .... could be too drastic for the organisation of training in the colleges, and may not allow sufficient margin for possible changes in rates of wastage from the profession'.

Calculations for the secondary sector were more complicated, but even here the SED decided that it could no longer continue with the open door system, under which all qualified applicants had been trained regardless of their subject. Instead it proposed an overall quota of 2,700, within which subjects were to be placed in three broad groupings: a) shortage subjects; b) those where the national supply was more nearly in balance and c) those which were well supplied generally. Colleges were asked to take all qualified applicants in category a) (e.g. in Maths or Physics), but to apply for the first time selection procedures to those in the other categories.

The production of intake figures had for years followed time-honoured procedures. The SED put suggestions privately to the CP, quotas for individual colleges were discussed and agreed, and the intake proposals were then made public. These procedures had not been questioned while the colleges were expanding or only contracting at the margins. It was another matter, however, when the SED proposed major surgery and made it clear in the covering letter that went out with the intake document that it was contemplating a review of the college system.(23) What had previously been dealt with within the policy community then became a matter of public concern, and aroused complaints about the inadequacy of consultation and the secretiveness of procedures. (24)

So when the proposals were put to them in the usual private way on 23 February, 1976, the Principals found themselves in the same sort of dilemma as over the 3-Year degree: to what extent should they co-operate with the Department and perhaps appear to collude with it before their Governors or Boards of Studies had any knowledge of the situation. (25) However, on this occasion, the dilemma was more acute because the interests of the individual colleges diverged.

The Principals could readily agree on the educational arguments against contraction. Four main lines of defence were sketched out, which all centred round the general idea that the new situation of teacher surplus should be seen as an opportunity to bring about improvements in the educational service: to improve staffing standards in schools; to provide extra teachers in areas of deprivation (many of which had suffered recently from part-time education and were still suffering from unfavourable staffing ratios); to introduce a four-year degree course for primary teachers; and to use any surplus staff in the colleges for inservice training. Over the next two years, these were the central arguments of the policy community, outwith the SED, and to some extent within it (26), constantly reiterated with local variations by the GTC, by Boards of Governors, by ALCES and by the teachers' associations.

However, right from the start, a rift was apparent between the larger colleges, which expected to ride out the cutbacks, and the smaller ones which feared for their survival. Bone describes the first private meeting of the Principals after their meeting with SED on February 23rd.

> 'The longest part of the discussion concerned the question of the future of the ten colleges of education. Mr Paton was anxious that the Principals should make a statement saying that they believed that the ten colleges must at all costs be preserved, and told us that he had heard that that was to be the line taken by ALCES (who felt that sacrifices would have to be made by the two biggest colleges to help the others survive). Obviously this approach was popular with some of my colleagues, but Mr.Ruthven, Mr.Scotland and I were forced to stress that, though we would support the four arguments above as forcefully as possible, and thereby try to save the existence of all ten colleges, if none of these arguments was accepted we could not commit ourselves to the idea that no college could be closed'. (27)

If their educational case was to have any political impact, the colleges needed allies. So, once the intake proposals were made public, the search for support began. The first ally which the colleges sought to enlist was the Supply Committee of the GTC - on the face of it an unlikely source of support, as it had been virtually moribund for the previous ten years. (28) However, by chance, its convenor resigned in January, 1976 and was replaced by Bone. So, at its first meeting under Bone's chairmanship on 29 March, the Committee had before it the SED paper on intake. To avoid appearing simply as a defender of the colleges, Bone took as the first item for discussion the statutory position of the GTC as the principal advisory body on teacher supply and suggested that the SED had ignored it - a suggestion which was true but which turned a blind eye to the fact that the CP had colluded in this for years. From there the discussion moved on to the possibility of using surplus teachers to improve staffing standards (which all the teacher members could be relied on to support) and to the accuracy of SED predictions (which almost everybody could be relied on to criticise). Having taken first the status of the GTC and the question of staffing standards, the Committee was then ready to adopt the educational case (more inservice, more help for probationers, a 4-year degree) and recommendations along these lines went to a special meeting of the GTC on April 14th.(29) They were then endorsed with only one significant addition. As a result of a forceful contribution by Edward Miller [Director of Education, Strathclyde Region] on Strathclyde's problems in staffing Roman Catholic secondaries and schools in deprived areas in general, a section was included on the need for special treatment for Strathclyde in the letter sent by the GTC to the Secretary of State. (30)

In the same letter, the GTC also tried to assert its position as the principal advisory body on supply. It complained that it had not been asked to comment before consultations with others, and requested that, in future, its views should be sought before those of other bodies and be given particular weight and that it should be given the necessary information on which to base its advice. This request fell on deaf ears. The SED had ignored the GTC for years and continued to do so. (31) At its next meeting it was noted that :'The arguments put forward by the Council .... had not persuaded the Secretary of State to change his draft proposals in any respect'. (32) Although the GTC was a useful forum for obtaining publicity, as a political ally it was proving ineffectual - 'a lamentably impotent body' as the TESS described it.(33)

Other allies of limited value were the colleges' Boards of Governors. Naturally, these could be relied on to spring to the colleges' defence. Guided by the Principals, they tried to make the reasoned, educational case. For instance, Section One of the comments to SED by the Jordanhill Board began :

The Board accepts that in the present economic situation of the
country reductions in public expenditure are desirable, and that the
decline in the birth-rate makes it appropriate that the teacher
education system should be one of the areas affected by these
reductions, but the Board would urge most strongly that the
reductions should not be made so severely that there is a complete
failure to take advantage of opportunities for improvement which are
presenting themselves at this time'. (34)

The Board then went on to argue for extra staff for schools in areas of serious socio-
economic disadvantage, for a four-year degree for primary teachers and for
improved provision of school-based inservice. These arguments were essentially
those already sketched out by the Principals, and with minor variations they were
repeated by other colleges. (35)

The college staffs, however, were not so naive as to believe that reasoned argument
would carry the day. At a meeting of the Jordanhill Board of Studies on May 12th,
some members argued that 'the matter had passed beyond the civil servants into the
hands of the politicians, and it was only by pressure on politicians that anything
further might be achieved'. (36) As a result, letters were sent to Ministers and to
Strathclyde Region, and arrangements were made for M.Ps of all parties to visit the
college. Whether pressure from the colleges alone would have brought the M.Ps along
is very doubtful. What transformed the situation politically was student unrest.

This was sparked off, not by the proposed cutbacks in intake, but by the looming
prospect of unemployment, particularly for the primary students. At the beginning of
June, local authorities were estimating that about 400 of the secondary students and
nearly 1,500 of the primary students about to qualify would not get jobs. (37) This
came as a tremendous shock to the students, who had entered college like their
predecessors for years, confident that a teaching qualification was a job-ticket for
life. They therefore felt that they had been misled and argued that the government had
a moral duty to employ them. If it turned a deaf ear to the moral argument, it should at
least listen to the economic one - that it had invested so much in their training that it
would be wasteful not to employ them. These local arguments, however, became
entangled with the national Broad Left campaign against cuts in public expenditure (38)
and this made the government all the more determined to resist them.

The lead in organising the students' protests was mainly take by left-wing activists.
(39) Action committees were formed in the colleges, and a series of sit-ins began

starting at Moray House on May 12th and spreading within days to all the colleges. Most of the colleges, however, were in peripheral sites and sit-ins had limited publicity value. So other demonstrations were organised: the Dundee SRC boycotted the opening of the new college buildings by the Queen Mother (40); marches took place in Edinburgh and Glasgow and there was a brief occupation of part of Glasgow City Chambers. (41) All this made for good publicity and reports of the unrest regularly made the pages of the quality papers, (42) but the students needed more than that. Like the colleges, they needed effective political allies.

Their first move was an attempt to make their campaign UK wide. So a delegation was sent to the NUS whose left-wing executive (43) agreed to call for an extension of the Scottish campaign to all the English colleges. (44) Their main hope, however, was that the Scottish teachers would take industrial action to support them. In this they were disappointed. While pressing the case for the employment of more teachers, the EIS executive decisively rejected the proposal that it should call out its members for a one-day 'right-to-work' strike. (45)

Meanwhile student complaints were swelling the mailbags of M.Ps. to add to the pressure from the demonstrations, from the colleges and from the EIS. Their response was a flurry of parliamentary activity. Questions in the House came thick and fast : 42 in May and June alone. (46) An all-party motion was tabled deploring a situation which was 'a gross waste of human resources trained at public expense as well as a personal tragedy for those involved' (47); and the issue was raised again in an adjournment debate. (48) The government, however, was quite determined that cuts in public spending were necessary and therefore had to remain unmoved by all the protests. (49) As the end of term approached, the students' sit-ins crumbled, and their protests died away, having achieved none of their objectives. Their main consequence was that the colleges could not even recruit their reduced quotas for 1976-77. (50)

The SED proposals : Teacher Training from 1977 Onwards.

The collapse of student unrest over the summer gave the government a breathing space in which to review the long- term future of the colleges. That review was being set in motion even while the unrest was at its height. In May, when the SED confirmed that it was not willing to alter the reduced intakes proposed earlier, the CP was informed that 'the implications of these and other forms of college activity for the future shape and size of the college system were at present under consideration and a paper would be prepared and circulated for comment later that year'. (51)

The promised paper was originally expected in the early autumn. In the early autumn hopes were held out that it would be ready by the end of October. (52) but it was delayed as Sandison describes.

> *SANDISON. There were two main reasons for the delay. One was that there were long discussions in the inspectorate about how the system could best be reduced. The other of course was that there were political battles being fought inside the Scottish Office over the proposals.....The original draft was produced by a team of inspectors which I chaired. We agonised long and hard over the educational criteria which should be used when reducing the system - trying to answer questions like "Should there be colleges which only trained primary teachers ? What was the optimum size of student population needed to support a particular course ?" So we tried to make a case for a smaller system based on educational criteria. We recommended that Craiglockhart should merge with Callendar Park to keep a college in Central Region, which was short of teachers, that Dunfermline should be transferred to Dundee to make it part of a general college, and that Craigie should close. Then the draft went upstairs and was modified for political reasons. The actual recommendations that came out were not very different from those in the inspectorate drafts. What was missing were the educational arguments.*

This delay throughout the Autumn Term kept the colleges in suspense; according to the TESS, a suspense that paralysed constructive thought.(53) In truth, there were too many conflicting interests within both the CP and the GTC for either body to come forward with a scheme for contracting the system. So the only voices raised were those of the smaller colleges, which felt most threatened, firing their opening salvos in the propaganda war.(54)

In January,1977 the SED finally came out with its proposals: 'Teacher Training from 1977 onwards' (55), at the same time (perhaps deliberately) as Shirley Williams' proposals for a 'minimum system'. The SED proposals were based on a number of assumptions: that staffing standards had been fixed until at least 1979-80 by the public expenditure White Paper; that pupil numbers would fall much more sharply in primary than in secondary (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3); that net wastage, though fluctuating, would average 7.5%; and that there would for several years be a pool of unemployed teachers competing for jobs with newly- qualified students. Working on these assumptions, the SED forecast that for the next few years the

colleges' intake of primary students (both diploma and post-graduate) should be little over 1,000, but would begin to rise after 1980-81 to reach about 2,400 by 1984-85. This forecast turned out to be well in excess of what was eventually needed. (56) Secondary forecasts were complicated by the endemic problems of maldistribution (though the worst of this was over), of subject shortages and of the unpredictability of the B.Ed output. Nevertheless the SED could confidently predict a steady decline in the numbers needed (57) and therefore questioned the value of continuing the secondary B.Ed courses. Its case was a powerful one: 'The existing B.Ed courses ... cater largely for the subjects which are already well supplied; the classes in some subjects are unviably small; and this session there has been a dramatic drop in intake to the direct entry B.Ed courses'. (58) On the basis of these forecasts the Department therefore proposed that the colleges' intake should be 1,000 primary students (830 diploma and 170 post-graduate) and 1,800 for all courses of secondary training.

Intakes at these levels clearly called into question the continuation of a ten-college system. According to the Department, the colleges could accommodate over 14,000 students, whereas they foresaw (optimistically) pre-service student numbers running at about half that figure from 1977 to 1984 and rising to 10,000 by the end of the decade. (59) As in England, any compensation for this decline in the demand for teachers would have had to come either from diversification or from the expansion of inservice. However, the Department did not expect any great increase in the numbers being trained at the colleges for social work, youth and community work or speech therapy, nor did it envisage any significant further diversification. (60) The only hope that it did hold out was that 'it may be possible at some stage during the period covered by the review to increase the inservice training work carried out by the colleges'.(61) However, since most of this increase was to be in the form of school-based inservice, it would do little to off-set the under-utilisation of college facilities.

In the Department's view, therefore, the only sensible course of action was to close unwanted colleges. What it proposed was to go back more or less to the system as it had been before the great expansion of the 1960s. The four city colleges (Aberdeen, Dundee, Moray House and Jordanhill) were to be retained, as was Notre Dame to serve the Catholic sector. Hamilton, which by this time was offering a range of secondary courses, (62) was to be reprieved because 'it is situated in an area with a long history of educational deprivation and disadvantage'. Craigie and Callendar Park, which had essentially been built as temporary colleges to cope with the shortage of primary teachers, were to be closed. The training of women PE

teachers was to be transferred to Dundee, thus allowing Dunfermline to be closed. This left the awkward problem of Craiglockhart - too small to continue as a separate college, but the only Catholic training centre in the east. The suggested solution was that it should merge with an east of Scotland non-denominational college (Dundee or Moray House) 'on the basis that within the combined college a Roman Catholic training element would be preserved'. (63)

As Cope has pointed out,(64) the SED had produced a set of proposals that were in many ways weak and tactically inept. To begin with, the Department gave the impression that consultation was a cosmetic exercise, by setting the closing date for responses at the end of February. (65) Moreover, it probably underestimated the strength of Catholic opposition to the proposal to amalgamate Craiglockhart with a non- denominational college .

> *SANDISON : We always expected opposition from the Hierarchy. However, we thought they might consider the merger of Craiglockhart with Callendar Park if we gave them everything else they wanted. So we offered them separate religious teaching, a separate chapel, separate history teaching and of course better facilities. But Cardinal Gray was totally opposed. Nothing would satisfy the Hierarchy other than completely separate provision.*

It should also have foreseen, when it argued that the two main reasons for contraction were falling numbers and 'the continued pressure for reductions in public expenditure' (66), that it would be attacked for failing to provide any costings of the savings to be achieved. (67) However, perhaps the greatest weakness was that the educational criteria which the inspectorate had tried to provide had been removed. Mitchell defended this decision.

> *MITCHELL : If we had tried to put in educational issues, it would have been regarded as whitewash in what was primarily a financial cutting of over-capacity .... I think it would have been treated as a cosmetic exercise. I do remember that at a later stage, on the Hamilton/Craigie/Dundee issue which was in the later round, the question then being raised: 'We have to close some college. Which is the best educationally?' There, I think, the feeling in the Department and among Ministers was 'Don't let's get into that invidious argument. You can only say one college is better by saying that another one is worse. So what evidence is there for this?' One has*

subjective views on good and bad colleges, but at the end of the day it has to be a political decision.

The result was that the document did not make any educational case for the closures and amalgamations it proposed, and so these looked too much the product of economic or administrative considerations, like that of covering up the embarrassment of a newly-opened and half- empty college at Dundee. (68)

Yet implicit in the proposals there was a good educational case. What the SED was proposing was to phase out colleges which provided only one type of training, either for primary teaching or for teaching PE. Instead, training would be provided in colleges which would train primary and secondary teachers together; which would offer a wider range of courses, not exclusively in teacher training; and which had a better balance between men and women. Such colleges could attract better qualified staff and provide better facilities (e.g. in libraries and in educational technology), both of which were essential if the colleges, like other institutions in the mainstream of higher education outside the universities, were to have their courses validated by the CNAA. In short, it could have been argued that contraction into a smaller number of better-balanced, better equipped institutions was the best way to improve the quality of provision. However, ministers and officials decided not to be drawn into making such arguments - all of which would have been contested - and so the educational case went by default.(69)

The 1977 campaign against closures.

In one way, the reaction to the SED proposals was a re-run of the campaign against the intake cuts in 1976. The colleges, the GTC (70) and the EIS (71) all reiterated their argument that the situation provided an opportunity for improvements. Again, an attempt was made to use the GTC as a pressure group. When the GTC Supply Committee met on February 8th, (72) Bone as chairman tried to steer it away from discussion about individual colleges. When this failed, he had to vacate the chair, thus opening the way for Edward Miller to make a case for the retention of Craigie - and even for its extension to include secondary training - because of Strathclyde's staffing difficulties, and for others to make suggestions about the fate of Craiglockhart, Dunfermline or Callendar Park. At the subsequent special meeting of the Council, (73) the GTC readily agreed to press for better staffing standards, more teachers for deprived areas, the extension of the probationer allowance and more inservice. With some dissenting voices, it also agreed to press for a 4-year primary degree, for the retention of the secondary B.Ed. and for the retention of Craigie. On

that basis, it had a meeting with Millan who showed no sign of accepting any of its arguments, except that for more teachers for deprived areas. (74) So there is nothing to suggest that the Council's representations had any more effect in 1977 than in 1976.

If the 1977 campaign was a re-run in the sense that the same groups put the same educational arguments, there was one very significant difference: this time the future of institutions was at stake. The result was a much more intensive political campaign in which the lead was taken by the staff rather than by the students.

The campaign naturally began in those colleges which were fighting for survival. In all four colleges staff-student action committees were formed and these then organised the protests, using broadly similar tactics. To take the Craigie campaign as an example, the Action Committee decided at its second meeting (75) to plug the line that 'the whole community would suffer by the withdrawal of Craigie and Callendar Park from the their areas'. In order to enlist local support car stickers were produced, handbills printed and distributed to all households in three local constituencies (via the SNP!) and to all schools in Ayr and Dumfries and Galloway, (76) a petition was organised which attracted over 50,000 signatures (77), and stories were fed to the local media.

More than this was needed to bring pressure to bear on the Government. So a letter-writing campaign was organised. Students and staff were encouraged to write to M.Ps and to the Secretary of State, and were provided with specimen letters and a list of points to make.(78) All local M.Ps and councillors of whatever party were contacted. The M.Ps were invited to come to the college and speak to staff and students, both individually and at a public meeting on February 25th, an invitation which most of them accepted. Deputations were sent to Westminster for the meeting of the Scottish Grand Committee, to St. Andrew's House and to the various party conferences.

Although they all employed the classic tactics of protest, each of the four colleges gave an individual slant to its campaign. Dunfermline took the line that it was a specialist 'centre of excellence' in purpose-built accommodation, and that the facilities at Dundee were quite inadequate. These allegations were fed to M.Ps and the House enjoyed irreverent (and irrelevant) mirth over Robin Cook's claim that secondary school trampolines could only be used in the Dundee gymnasium if the students took care to jump between the hanging structural beams. (79)

Both Callendar Park and Craigie tried to make the most of their location, and argued for their value to local schools and to the local community. Thompson, at the time on the staff of Callendar Park and a member of the ALCES national executive, comments on this.

WBM. When the campaign got launched, the college generated quite a lot of material of one sort or another. How would you describe its main line of defence ?

THOMPSON. Very much the local card - the convenience of travel and the money generated by the college - which was a hard card to play because, like all colleges of education, I think we had largely neglected the local community up till then. And all of a sudden we were courting them furiously, persuading them that they would be terribly lost without us. The truth is that most people in Falkirk probably didn't know we were there, far less cared two hoots about us.

Despite these initial difficulties the College was able to exploit local feeling to its political advantage and Craigie was probably able to do so even more. When asked why he thought the Craigie campaign had been successful, its Principal, McNaught, replied :

MCNAUGHT : Two factors in addition to the geographical and educational case. One was the all-party support from M.Ps in Ayrshire and the South-west. The other was public support locally. In Ayrshire and Dumfries and Galloway, it was always possible to play the anti-Edinburgh, anti-Glasgow cards. All sorts of influential people whose roots were there were willing to rally to what they saw as a South-west Scotland cause.

As the smallest college, Craiglockhart might have seemed the most vulnerable but politically it had a stronger hand than any of the other three - the support of the Roman Catholic hierarchy.(80) The Government's vague proposal to merge the college with a non-denominational one while preserving some Catholic element touched the Church on a sensitive spot - that of separate provision for Catholic education. Although the Government had certainly no intention of challenging the Church on that issue, apprehensions were aroused and the merger opposed because it might be the thin end of a secularising wedge. In an extravagant moment, Bishop Thomson of Motherwell was so carried away by his own rhetoric that he described

the fight to save Craiglockhart as 'a fight for Christianity in Scotland', (81) - forgetting how the great Catholic satirist, G K Chesterton, had once made fun of similar inflated claims. (82)

More seriously, Cardinal Gray stepped early into the fray with what the Glasgow Herald described as a 'hard-hitting sermon' (83) defending Craiglockhart and attacking the Government's educational policies. The campaign then continued with large-scale public meetings (84), meetings with ministers, and the best-orchestrated campaign of letters to the Scottish Office. This was pressure which a Labour Government, which traditionally drew a great deal of electoral support from Catholic working-class voters in the West of Scotland, could not ignore and by the beginning of March, McElhone was already dropping hints that the Craiglockhart proposals would be modified. (85)

The fact that the four colleges began by fighting individual campaigns inevitably created tensions between them. (86) It also left the larger colleges in an awkward position. As they were not directly threatened, they could not mount their own campaigns, but it was obvious to people in them that, if the smaller colleges were kept at a viable size, it was likely to be at their expense. In these circumstances, the ALCES national executive decided that the best way of defending any college was to defend the college system as a whole against contraction. It therefore tried to bring all the colleges, whether threatened or not, into a national campaign against the cuts.

Initially this was not easy. The Callendar Park leadership was very committed to national action.

> *THOMPSON : We had decided at Callendar Park quite early on that we wanted to be part of an ALCES campaign.... I think we were very aware that if it just degenerated into three or four colleges slagging others off, the central issues would just be overtaken and that it wouldn't be effective for anyone.*

Craigie, however, was reluctant to give up its independent line (87) and Dunfermline had the special problem that its local Tory M.P., Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, was campaigning vigorously on its behalf but might be reluctant to support an ALCES campaign because it was trade union-led. Moreover, just as there were some suspicions in the smaller colleges that ALCES might be too much dominated by the larger ones and would therefore not defend their corner (88), so there were fears in the larger ones that they might have to make disproportionate sacrifices to save the

smaller. Such fears were strong at Jordanhill in case all the extra students to keep Craigie viable were taken from the College, and it successfully sought assurances from the SED that it would not suffer alone. (89)

John Maxton, then national chairman of ALCES, describes some of the difficulties that faced them.

> *WBM : It has been suggested to me that it wasn't easy for ALCES to persuade them [the smaller colleges] to come together into a national campaign. Was that in fact a difficult task for you ?*
>
> *MAXTON : Yes, it was. And there were obviously always going to be some problems. There was going to be that problem that, if we fought for Craigie and Callendar Park, then we were putting at risk other institutions...And also you, had to persuade people that there might have to be an overall cut - that all colleges would stay open but all of them would have to take some form of cut....It was always a tricky situation and one which demanded a fair amount of tact. But I always felt we succeeded. We always managed to limit it so that colleges were working through their M.Ps and the national campaign dealt with central government.*

Like the colleges in 1976, ALCES fought its campaign both educationally and politically. It naturally made an educational case against the closures: contesting the SED's assumptions about school staffing and its projections of school population and attacking it for its failure to cost the savings it claimed would be made. But the essential argument as before was that an opportunity for improvements was being wasted. (90)

> *WBM: This brings us to the second line of argument which you and others deployed - that here was an opportunity for considerable improvements.*
>
> *MAXTON : It was an essential argument, and it was one which I used very much politically to a Labour Government - that for the last 15 years we had been complaining about teacher shortages and not being able to supply the sort of educational service we wanted because we were short of teachers, and now suddenly instead of saying 'Here's the opportunity come. We don't have to spend any more money,*

but just by spending the same amount of money we can provide a much better education service' - at that point we begin to cut and that was a nonsense.

However, ALCES soon found that the educational arguments cut little ice. Maxton led their deputation to the Commons in February and came out of their meeting with the Secretary of State complaining that 'they had left frustrated at the total intransigence shown by Mr Millan'. (91) So they had to exert what political pressure they could through writing to M.PS, through their contacts within the Trade Union and Labour movements, and through lobbying the Government and all the political parties. (92) In so doing, they sometimes found themselves with strange bedfellows.

WBM : Did you [Maxton] find any difficulty, given your position, in going as you did to the Tory party conference and chairing a fringe meeting ?

MAXTON : With a most remarkable platform. Teddy Taylor was there; Alec Fletcher and Hector Monro were there....The platform was made up of all those who closed the colleges later on. It was slightly awkward.

Normally political pressure from a small union like ALCES would have cut no more ice than its educational arguments, but in the peculiar circumstances of the time its campaign met with a fruitful response. The SNP naturally sprang to the defence of the colleges, the threat to which they portrayed as an attack by an English government on the Scottish Education system. (93) As the SNP was at this time riding high in the polls, their stance put a lot of pressure on the other parties to appear to be defending Scottish interests.

As the main opposition party, the Tories saw the defence of the colleges as a stick with which to beat Labour and win votes. Their leaders therefore trotted out arguments which were subsequently to come back to embarrass them. Teddy Taylor, for instance, beat the nationalist drum and described the Government's proposal as 'one of the most savage blows to Scottish education we have ever had .... a cold, savage, statistical exercise in butchery'(94); and Alec Fletcher was willing to use the ALCES argument that the Government was failing 'to grasp the educational opportunities which the temporary fall in pupil numbers presents'. (95) Perhaps the ultimate irony is that Mrs Thatcher herself opposed the closures and described the vote against them in the Commons as 'a victory for common-sense and humanity'.

(96) One does not have to be a cynic to see in this an example of adversarial politics at its worst. Maxton, a biased but in this case probably an accurate witness, commented on the Tory stance :

> *MAXTON : It was either vote-catching or defence of constituency interests. People like Younger were there specifically to defend their constituency interests.*

> *WBM : But the fact is that the whole Conservative group opposed the closures.*

> *MAXTON : It was a pure political move. They did deploy some of our [ALCES] arguments, but they didn't believe any of them.*

Tory and SNP opposition put the Labour Party in an awkward situation. Not only was it vulnerable in a general way to the charge that it was failing to protect Scottish education, but two of the proposed changes entailed specific political dangers. The closure of Callendar Park threatened the seats of local Labour M.Ps in an area where the SNP were strong; while the merger of Craiglockhart, as has been noted, threatened to lose Catholic votes. None of this would have mattered had not the Labour government had such a small majority, and had the Party itself not been split over the cuts in public spending which its left wing found repugnant. Instead of rallying to support the government, many trade union leaders and backbenchers spoke out openly against it. (97) So strong was this grass-roots opposition that, in defiance of government policy, a resolution was passed at the Scottish Labour Party conference in March rejecting the consultative paper and calling for a four-year degree for primary teachers, more inservice training, an improvement in staffing standards and better provision for nursery and special education. (98)

This unnatural alliance between all the opposition parties (99) and some of its own backbenchers created a broader opposition than the government had bargained for.

> *MITCHELL : I think it is true that the strength of the opposition here was greater than we had expected. It was absolutely predictable that the colleges for which closure and merger was proposed would object. I think it probably was a surprise to all of us, including Ministers that it broadened out from that, particularly at a political level in both parties.*

This put the government under heavy political pressure. Resolutions condemning its policies were passed at all the party conferences; it faced frequent questioning in the Commons (100); and it suffered several damaging setbacks in parliamentary debates. It was defeated by 39 to 25 at the end of the two-day debate in the Scottish Grand Committee in which no one except Ministers defended it (101); it brought scorn on itself for McElhone's ridiculous filibuster in the Adjournment Debate on March 1st (102); and it was again defeated in the Adjournment Debate on April 5th.(103)

Faced with this national pressure and with the vigorous local campaigns of the individual colleges, the Government decided to make a tactical retreat. In May, it issued a statement designed to take some of the heat out of the controversy and to buy time by making some concessions. (104) Heat was removed by the decision 'that Craiglockhart should continue as a college of education and should not be merged with any other college', (105) a crucial concession to the Catholic lobby in that Craiglockhart was the smallest of the colleges and its reprieve made it difficult to argue that other colleges were too small to be viable. Time was bought by the decision to allow all the colleges an intake for 1977-78 pending further consultations about their future. However, as this was accompanied by further cuts in intake, the threat of closure was clearly postponed rather than removed.

To underline that point, the paper stressed the continuing decline in the demand for teachers and the consequent under-utilisation of the colleges. Moreover, it made very few concessions to the educational arguments put to it. There was to be no primary B.Ed, and little encouragement for diversification. The only concessions were that the secondary B.Ed was to continue for the time being and that some unspecified expansion of the colleges' inservice work was promised.

In the next few months that promise was made good. The colleges were allocated the full-time equivalent of 200 members of staff, provided that they were mainly employed on various types of school-focused inservice. This was a different approach to that in England and Wales, where the colleges had been allocated a notional number of places for teachers attending college courses (106), but the underlying considerations in both countries were the same: to avoid the embarrassment of too many redundancies too quickly and at the same time to improve what was generally recognised to be the inadequate provision for inservice.

In addition, the government responded to another of the educational arguments - that more teachers should be provided in the areas which had suffered so long from the shortages. So, in September, it issued Circular 991 which offered specific

grant to help Education Authorities to employ up to an extra 500 teachers in schools serving urban areas of deprivation. (107) For the schools this was a welcome move but, given the numbers of unemployed teachers, it gave no help to those arguing against cuts in intake.

As a result of these concessions and particularly because the immediate threat of closures had been lifted, tension in the colleges eased a little during the Autumn Term. (108) Few articles appeared in the press and the spate of parliamentary questions shrank to a trickle: 14 between June and December compared to 117 in the first half of the year. By this time, consultations were largely over, the arguments had all been rehearsed, and the further policy discussions were taking place behind closed doors in St.Andrew's House. What arguments were aired in that policy debate is cloaked in secrecy, (109) but it seems reasonable to guess that it was highly political. Given the general direction of government policy, and its success in closing colleges in England and Wales, it is probable that the Secretary of State would have preferred to go ahead with the proposed closures of Craigie and Callendar Park and was only prevented by the divisions within his own ranks.

Those division were not only on the backbenches, but reached into the heart of his ministerial team. As Parliamentary Under-secretary of State, Harry Ewing would normally have been expected to support the Government's line but, as M.P for Stirling, Falkirk and Grangemouth, there was local pressure on him to defend Callendar Park. Initially he was reluctant to do so. When asked why he thought Callendar Park had survived, Thompson replied:

> THOMPSON : It hung on a knife-edge. If we hadn't finally persuaded Harry Ewing that his survival as an M.P. depended on it, we wouldn't have won. It was a question of whipping up the public. Harry actually said to us very early on: 'Show me that this is a big community issue, that I will lose votes as a result, and I'll think about it'. So that's what we had to do, and at the end of the day we succeeded ... I don't think we won him over by convincing him of the justice of our cause. But he had decided that he personally might lose his seat, and I think that the other Labour M.Ps round about felt so too'.

In response to this local pressure, Ewing spoke publicly in defence of Callendar Park (110) and was promptly attacked by Malcolm Rifkind on the grounds that it was 'totally unprecedented for a Government Minister to call for a united campaign to fight

the proposals of a Government of which he is a member'. (111) However, Ewing's importance lay not in his public gestures, but in his influence behind the scenes in the Scottish Office. When matters came to a head in the late Autumn of 1977, he almost certainly threatened to resign if Callendar Park were closed. (112) This was probably the moment when the Government decided that the political price of closing Craigie and Callendar Park was too high and that it was better to sound the retreat.

So in December Millan announced that he had decided to retain all ten colleges. Since he rejected any substantial schemes for diversification and since the expanded inservice provision was to be mainly school-focused, this left the problem of spare capacity in the colleges. The Government now proposed to tackle this by making some of the accommodation available for other uses. Callendar Park was to share its accommodation with the Forth Valley Health Board, Craigie with Ayr Technical College, and Aberdeen with the Robert Gordon Institute. Notre Dame was to lose its Dowanhill site, Dunfermline was to be linked to Queen Margaret College, while Hamilton, Jordanhill and Moray House were all to review their use of space. The most serious problem, that of Dundee, was to be tackled by 'a reappraisal of the overall provision for non-university tertiary education in the Dundee area'.

This amounted to a substantial retreat by the Government. As the Glasgow Herald commented (113): 'For M.Ps, local councils and the colleges themselves it is a great victory. For Mr. Bruce Millan ... it is an embarrassing admission of defeat'. Naturally there was a good deal of initial euphoria in the colleges, but wiser heads realised that only the first battle had been won, not the war.

Why had the Scottish colleges been successful, at least in the short run, when their counterparts in England and Wales had not? (115) In 1977, the colleges there had been reduced by Shirley Williams to the 'minimum system' - the second phase of cutbacks - without any serious difficulties. Yet in Scotland the Government failed to close even two temporary colleges.

A small part of the answer lies in differences in the educational system. Because there was a longer tradition of compulsory teacher training in Scotland and the colleges were on the whole larger, the colleges were probably seen as more important institutions. They also probably fought harder because some of the escape routes open in England were closed to them: no amalgamations with universities or polytechnics; no diversification; no alternative employment for staff such as local authorities in England could offer to people in the colleges they controlled.

Moreover, they were better placed to fight because of the close links of their union leaders, like Maxton, with the Trade Union and Labour movements in Scotland.

However, none of these considerations, nor even the strong local campaigns like that mounted by Craigie, would have won the day but for the unique political situation in Scotland; the fact that a Labour Government with a slim majority could be accused by a resurgent SNP - and by other parties - of failing to defend Scottish interests and, in the face of these attacks, could not count on support from all its backbenchers, nor even all its Ministers, for two main reasons: either they were afraid of losing their seats to a nationalist backlash or they were unhappy with the cuts which the Government was making in public expenditure. So it bowed to the political pressure and reprieved the colleges. (115) 'Educational arguments', the Scotsman noted, 'counted for little during this sorry saga'.(116)

The policy process 1976-77.

What do the events of 1976-77 reveal about the policy process? There is no doubt what put the re-organisation of the colleges on the Government's policy agenda, nor that it felt obliged to meet the expectation that the policy community should be consulted. However, it had learned from the general opposition to the intake cuts in 1976 that proposals for closures or mergers would be opposed by all the main educational bodies concerned. There could therefore be little hope that consultation would lead to agreement on the principle that there should be contraction of the system, and even less hope that there would be agreement about how any contraction should be carried out.

The normal processes of 'bureaucratic accommodation' therefore could not work. Whereas the proposals for a three-year primary degree had been floated to the CP and a feasible scheme worked out in private before any public consultation, on this occasion the SED felt obliged to prepare its own scheme in secret through the inspectorate working party. So, when the proposals came out in January, 1977, the form which they took was a shock to the system, even though it was known that SED were preparing a paper on reorganisation of the colleges.

> *WBM. : How surprised was ALCES originally by the Government's proposals to close two colleges and merge two more?*
>
> *MAXTON : I think a little taken aback by the suddenness of it. There was no prior consultation. There was nobody coming along and*

whispering in ears, saying this could happen, what is your response? It all came rather out of the blue.

Perhaps the SED believed that shock treatment would work and that reorganisation could be pushed through with no more difficulty than in England and Wales. Several pieces of evidence point that way. There is the short period allowed for responses. There is the reported surprise of Ministers at the vehemence of the colleges' campaign. According to Livingstone, McElhone complained to an ALCES delegation:

'What's all this about? Shirley Williams is closing dozens of colleges down there. And ... we're talking about two and the merger of two more. Look at this. What's the bloody score?'

There is also the unanimous view of the three ALCES officials interviewed that the SED were not initially well- prepared to meet the educational case which the colleges put to them. When asked whether he would agree with his colleagues about this, Maxton replied :

MAXTON : I think I would. I must say I felt on one or two occasions that they were actually very badly briefed. These were the people who were supposed to have drawn up the plans and were supposed to know the arguments. They really didn't seem to know at the first two or three meetings. They didn't have a case to argue against what we were saying.

WBM: Are these the officials you're talking about ?

MAXTON : Yes, people like the Assistant Secretaries. The interesting thing is that once we'd had a meeting with Bruce Millan, it struck me that Bruce knew his case better than his officials even though for him it must have been - though politically sensitive -a fairly minor part of his overall job as Secretary of State.

Although they seem to have made this initial misjudgement, (117) the SED and the Government soon realised that they had a political battle on their hands. One obvious effect of this, as we have seen, was to open up the issues for public debate in Parliament, in the press, in the media and in all sorts of local and national forums. Another was to force the Government into dialogue with the rest of the policy community and, perhaps because of their precarious political position, Millan and

McElhone proved very willing to meet a wide range of interested bodies. In that sense, the policy process became more open, though one has only to read the Parliamentary Debates and scan the Questions to realise how superficial a great deal of the scrutiny was.

> *THOMPSON : One of the lessons I learned [from the 1977 campaign] was that not only are decisions taken politically but that the politicians are taking decisions on the basis of a very slim understanding of the situation. I hadn't realised - being still young and naive - the extent to which M.Ps depended on instant briefings so that they could make instant reactions to things.*

There were however still severe limits to the open-ness. Not only did Ministers stonewall over parliamentary questions in the usual way, they also stonewalled over demands that they should produce an educational case and that they should produce costings. Moreover, since the crucial decisions to compromise on closures in May 1977 and to abandon them in December were essentially political, they were taken within a small closed circle and the reasons for them can only be surmised.

One casualty of these political battles was the sense of belonging to a policy community. Even before 1976, as has been noted, there had been tension within the CP between the genuine desire to work together as a system and the need for Principals to defend the interests of their own colleges. From 1976 onwards the willingness to co-operate became progressively weaker as the cutbacks, followed by the closure proposals of 1977, threw an apple of discord into the CP. McNaught commented :

> *MCNAUGHT : The 1977 proposals in particular were an apple of discord. They threw every college on the defensive. To give just one example of the mood of the time. One of my colleagues came back from an ALCES conference in 1977 with a poster of animals, which had the caption: 'We'll just have to eat some of the smaller ones'.*

The controversy over closures also created tension between the CP and the SED. All the Principals interviewed agreed with Ruthven's view that 'it made the relationship a very wary one' and Sandison agreed that this was the case.

> *SANDISON : Things were very different afterwards [after 1976-77]. I think that relationships had been very good and that we were generally*

regarded as friends of the colleges. Because of the threat of closure, we were inevitably regarded with more suspicion.

Nor was this change in relationships to prove a passing phase. In retrospect, it can be seen as an early example of the breakdown of the post-war consensus about the development of the welfare state. Most of the professionals in the colleges, in common with others in the public services, had grown up with the assumption that, if they made a good case for improvements, those improvements would probably follow sooner or later. In 1976-77, they were not only alarmed by the threats to their institutions, but bewildered and hurt because their educational arguments went largely unheeded.

It was the start of a period of painful readjustment to a new situation. In the 1960s and early 1970s, periods of expansion or relative stability, the SED could work with the CP and the rest of the policy community and emphasise partnership while retaining ultimate control. This consensual approach simply could not cope with the problems of contraction, about which there could be no agreement. Consensus was therefore replaced by conflict; conflict not only about the policies to be pursued but about the assumptions and values on which those policies were to be based.

Table 6.1 : Numbers of primary pupils in '000s projected in 1976 (intake document) and 1977 (Teacher Training from 1977 onwards).

	77-78	78-79	79-80	80-81	81-82	82-83	83-84	84-85
1976	584	565	542	518	499	483	471	470
1977	596	577	556	534	513	492	474	462

Table 6.2 : Pupil numbers in education authority primary schools in '000s : the 1977 projection compared to actual numbers.

	a)1977 projection	b)Actual numbers	c)Error=a)- b)
1977-78	596	595	+ 1
1978-79	577	569	+ 8
1979-80	556	545	+11
1980-81	534	519	+15
1981-82	513	493	+20
1982-83	492	468	+24
1983-84	474	448	+26
1984-85	462	437	+25

Table 6.3 : Pupil numbers in education authority secondary schools in '000s : the 1977 projection compared to actual numbers.

	a) 1977 projection	b) Actual numbers	c) Error=a)- b)
1977-78	407	406	+1
1978-79	409	410	-1
1979-80	409	410	-1
1980-81	406	408	-2
1981-82	400	405	-5
1982-83	395	399	-4
1983-84	388	391	-3
1984-85	378	376	+2

NOTES

1. Hennessy (1989) p.251.
2. Ibid. p.252.
3. Midwinter et al. (1991) p.110.
4. Marquand (1988) Chapters 1 & 2.
5. Rhodes (1988) p.64
6. Kellas (1989) pp.106-7
7. This paragraph is based on Kellas (1989), Chapter 7.
8. At the General Election in October,1974, the results were : Labour 319; Conservatives 276; Liberals 13; SNP 11; Others 16.
9. Levy (1990) gives a recent analysis of the reasons for the decline.
10. Kellas (1989) p.126.
11. During the controversy over college closures in 1977, COSLA made a bid for control of the colleges. Hamilton Minutes of the Board of Governors. 6 June,1977.

    According to Edward Miller, there was no great enthusiasm for this in Strathclyde. This may have been another factor which made it easy for the Government to reject the idea.

    WBM : 'You may remember that ...... COSLA in 1977 .... did publicly make a bid for control of the colleges. ... Was this something that came more from other authorities than Strathclyde ?

    MILLER : Yes. At that stage, Strathclyde wasn't particularly prominent in COSLA. As I recall, the chairman of the COSLA Education Committee at that time was George Foulkes. He was also chairman of the Lothian Education Committee. ... Any take-over wasn't part of Strathclyde's policy'

12. As early as 1973, Sir Norman Graham told the Principals :

    'While the Department obviously did not know what the regional authorities' ambitions would be in this regard, Ministers had no plans to place the colleges under their control and he had grave doubts about the wisdom of doing so'.

    Note of SED/CP meeting on 19 June,1973.

13. SED (1976).

14. SED (1977a).

15. 'Net wastage', as defined in the 1976-77 intake document (SED,1976) was the combined effect of :

    a) teachers leaving employment because of retiral, resignation or death;

    b) the number of students qualifying as teachers who chose not to take up employment after completing the course;

    c) teachers entering employment after training outside Scotland; and

    d) qualified teachers returning to teaching after a period of years of absence from employment.

16. GTC. Minutes of Supply Committee. 29 March,1976.

17. In 1975, the average pupil teacher ratios in Scotland, England and West Germany were :

	Scotland	England & Wales	West Germany
Primary	22.3	24.2	27.3
Secondary	15.1	17.2	16.2

    The figures for Scotland and England are from TESS (2 January,1976). Those for West Germany are from the Eurydice European Unit (1986). The secondary figures refer only to German comprehensive schools.

18. Hansard. 15 February,1977. Debate in Scottish Grand Committee.

19. SED (1976), para.23.

20. Ibid.

21. As its critics pointed out, the government could have financed the employment of more teachers and improved staffing standards, but this would have had to be done in competition with other demands for spending on public services.

22. SED (1976).

23. SED letter of 22 March to Boards of Governors.

24. For instance by Iain Thorburn, educational correspondent of TESS in the issue of 19 March,1976.

25. Jordanhill. Minutes of Principal's Committee, 23 March,1976. In his report on the Principals' private meeting (without SED assessors) on March 15th, Bone wrote :

'When the Principals meet with SED on 18th March, they will be prepared to give their professional opinions, but will do so as individuals, and must not be regarded as speaking for their colleges. The colleges will have to be properly consulted though their Boards of Governors. The Principals will seek to avoid a situation where they become joint authors, with SED, of a plan for the future which involves serious reductions'.

26. SED file ED51/8/363 contains an inspectorate paper suggesting consideration of the possibility of a four year degree because the supply position made it possible and because it would be 'a gesture of great educational significance at a time of low morale'.

27. Jordanhill. Minutes of the Principals' Committee, 23 March,1976.

28. In the period of the Second Council (1971-75), the Supply Committee only held 6 meetings, which were largely general discussions and produced no recommendations.

29. GTC. Minutes of Supply Committee. 26 March,1976.

30. GTC. Minutes of Third Council. Appendix to Minute of 14 April, 1976.

31. *JAMES MILLER: If you take the issue of supply, where the GTC has the official duty of advising the Secretary of State, we year after year produced reasonable proposals for supply - not utopian proposals at all because we knew better- and they were simply ignored.*

32. GTC. Minutes of Third Council. 3 June,1976.

33. TESS. 1 October, 1976. 'The suspense that kills'.

34. Jordanhill. Appendix to Minutes of Board of Governors. 15 April,1976.

35. For the Hamilton response, see Minutes of the Board of Governors. 29 March,1976. The response of the Aberdeen Board is reported in TESS, 2 April. 1976.

36. Jordanhill. Minutes of the Board of Studies. 12 May,1976.

37. TESS, 4 June,1976. The position varied from college to college. For instance, because of the situation in Lanarkshire, Hamilton was not as badly affected as others. On May 18th, the Principal reported to the Governors that 118 out 227 diploma students had posts. Comparable figures for Jordanhill were 91 out of 310. (Minutes of Board of Studies. 12 May,1976) The most unexpected change was in Strathclyde, which up to then had absorbed all the output of the local colleges. But on May 26th, its Director of Education presented a paper to the GTC Supply Committee, which showed that Strathclyde only needed to recruit about 450 primary teachers to staff the schools to the standard of Circular 819. This was partly because, with a surplus of teachers

looming, wastage rates had dropped and part-time teachers had applied for permanent posts.

The primary output (diploma, post-graduate and B.Ed) of the four colleges in Strathclyde was about 1,200.

38.   One indication of the rifts in the Labour Party was that the National Executive Committee voted by 11-9 to condemn the Government's White Paper on Public Expenditure because it conflicted with election pledges to shift the balance of wealth and power to working people. Glasgow Herald. 29 April,1976.

39.   e.g. Stewart McIntosh (SUS president) and Ian Davidson (later Chairman of Strathclyde Education Committee and M.P. for Govan).

40.   Glasgow Herald. 14 May,1976.

41.   Ibid. 27 & 28 May,1976.

42.   Between the end of April and the middle of June (when the sit-ins collapsed) the Glasgow Herald carried on average a story every other day.

43.   A Broad Left/Communist alliance had made a clean sweep of the recent elections to the national executive. Glasgow Herald. 7 April,1976.

44.   Ibid. 24 May,1976.

45.   SEJ. 28 May, 1976. In a subsequent defence of this decision (TESS 28 May,1976), John Pollock said :

'The executive had thought that few members would be convinced that
a one-day token strike by teachers would lead to a reversal of the
Government's economic policy. .... The real danger was that EIS
initiatives, a constructive package of proposals, would be undermined
by those seeking to use students in a political campaign against
the economic policy of the Government'.

46.   Altogether there were 61 questions about the colleges in 1976, compared to 69 in the previous 15 years. (see Appendix 6) This is not an exact comparison because of he difficulties of classifying the questions, but it does give an indication of the extent to which the political spotlight suddenly focused on teacher education and teacher supply.

47.   SEJ 28 May,1976.

48.   Ibid. 4 June,1976. The signatories were Richard Buchanan (Labour), Teddy Taylor (Conservative), David Steel (Liberal) and Gordon Wilson (SNP).

49.   Ibid. 11 June,1976 and TESS 4 June,1976 carry reports of Millan's unyielding attitude at meetings with the teachers' organisation and with local

authorities.

50.   TESS. 24 September,1976.

51.   CP. Minutes of meeting of 27 May,1976.

52.   CP. Report of Meeting of JCCES with the Secretary of State. 29 September,1976. 'Miss Sandison said that the SED paper would not be ready by the end of September but she was reasonably sure that it would be by the end of October'.

53.   TESS 1 October,1976. 'The suspense that kills'.

54.   See articles in TESS by Paton (27 August,1976), McNaught (24 September,1976) and Brown (19 November, 1976).

55.   SED (1977a) 'Teacher Training from 1977 onwards'.

56.   For instance, the SED forecast an intake of 1,190 primary students (diploma and post-graduate) for 1980-81, and 2080 for 1983-84. The actual figures were 682 and 602 respectively.

57.   The secondary forecast for 1980-81 was 1950 and for 1983-84 was 1380. The actual figures were 1380 and 1049.

58.   In 1977, the combined intake to the first year of the B.Ed courses at Aberdeen, Jordanhill (excluding P.E.) and Moray House was only 90. Exact comparisons with earlier years are difficult because the Jordanhill figures include P.E. but in 1975 the combined intake was approximately 225.

59.   SED (1977a) Tables 10 & 11.

60.   Ibid. para.36.

61.   Ibid. para.35.

62.   In addition to the primary diploma and B.Ed., Hamilton was offering one-year post-graduate courses, both primary and secondary, and was preparing to offer a course for technical teachers, taught jointly with Bell College.

63.   SED (1977a) para.52

64.   Cope (1978).

65.   TESS 21 January, 1977. 'A harvest on the midden'.

'Not a single soul in Scottish education believes that the Government's consultative document on college of education closures is consultative in any meaningful sense at all'.

66.   SED (1977a) para.42.

67.   The government tried to defend itself (e.g.Bruce Millan in the Scottish Grand Committee, 15 February,1977) by arguing that it was impossible to give figures until it was known which colleges would close and how many lecturers at what point in the salary scales would take early retirement under the

'Crombie' scheme. This was true, but the failure to produce even approximate figures for its preferred option still made the Government look incompetent.

68.   The figure most often quoted was that Dundee was built for 1800 students, but this was disputed by the Dundee Governors. (see Stimpson's letter in SEJ. Vol.61 No.2 26 January,1978). In 1977-78, Dundee had a total of 579 students in training.

69.   For instance, Paton described it as:'not just non-educational but anti-educational....There is no educational argument in it from start to finish'. SEJ 20 January,1977.

70.   GTC. Minutes of the Special Meeting of Council. 16 February,1977.

71.   SEJ 20 January,1977 gives John Pollock's comments.

72.   GTC. Minutes of the Supply Committee. 8 February,1977.

Also, Jordanhill. Minutes of the Principal's Committee, 16 February,1977 for Bone's account of the meeting.

73.   GTC. Minutes of Council. 15 February,1977.

74.   GTC. Minutes of Council. 1 June, 1977 (Appendix II).

75.   Craigie. Minutes of the Action Committee. 25 January,1977.

76.   Ibid. 26 January,1977.

77.   Ibid. 27 January,1977. The wording of the petition was:

'We, the undersigned, request the Secretary of State to withdraw the proposal to close Craigie College of Education. We believe that the retention of the college is essential to the educational, economic and social future of the South-west of Scotland'.

78.   The letter-writing campaign was relatively successful. In reply to a written question asking how many representations had been received about the Government's proposals, Lord James Douglas-Hamilton was told (Hansard. 28 March,1977) that the approximate numbers were about 2,700 : 90 for Callendar Park, 160 for Dunfermline, 500 for Craigie and 1,600 for Craiglockhart.

79.   Scotsman. 14 March,1977.

80.   McGettrick told me that Craiglockhart was also defended because it had a special relationship with the Hierarchy.

McGETTRICK : 'Craiglockhart was a very interesting phenomenon in

Catholic education in Scotland. .... I have come to understand that it was not only a college but a rallying ground for Catholic society in the East of Scotland. It was used by the Cardinal and the Bishops in that part of the country for meetings and they were there very frequently. .... That gave it a status in the eyes of the Church which was perhaps different from that of any other college, because it was part of a fabric of society .... Therefore the threat of closure was something that was eating at the heart of Catholic society in Edinburgh'.

81.   TESS. 25 February,1977. <u>Church raises its voice against college closure</u>.

82.   In 'Anti-Christ, or the re-union of Christendom' ridiculing F E Smith's rhetoric about the Welsh Disestablishment Bill.

83.   Glasgow Herald. 31 January,1977.

84.   Ibid. 21 February,1977 for a report on a meeting in Edinburgh organised by the Association of Catholic Teachers. The estimated attendance was over 2,000, and the meeting was opened by Cardinal Gray. There were 7 Labour and Tory M.Ps from the East of Scotland on the platform.

85.   Hansard. 1 March,1977. Adjournment debate.

86.   Craigie. Minutes of the Action Committee. 21 February,1977. This reports McNaught's appearance on the BBC 'Current Account' programme and the subsequent complaint to the CP by the Principal of Callendar Park that the programme had been biased towards Craigie to the detriment of other colleges.

87.   Craigie. Ibid. 25 February,1977. Memo to staff from the ALCES representative.

'It had been hoped that a substantial representation from the staffs and students of the College would be present... outside Old St. Andrew's House in order that a united demonstration of inter-college opposition to the Secretary of State's document could be made, under the broad organisation of leadership by ALCES.... While we wish to participate.... we believe that it is also essential that each college retains a clear identity'.

88.   *WBM: As I understand it, there was tension ... because ALCES wanted to control a joint campaign and some of the colleges, like Craigie, wanted to wage separate campaigns as well.*

MCNAUGHT : The tension was certainly there. ALCES nationally

was trying to keep all the colleges in a campaign to defend the ten college system and this had the effect of splitting the Craigie ALCES between those who followed the national line and those who wanted a separate campaign. They felt that ALCES was too much dominated by the larger colleges and did not trust it to defend the smaller ones.

89. Jordanhill. Minutes of Principal's Committee. 8 March and 24 April,1977.
90. Jordanhill archives. File 9/12. ALCES response to SED paper on intake.
91. Glasgow Herald. 16 February,1977.
92. Jordanhill archives. File 9/12 has examples of copies of letters to M.Ps, pamphlets for different parties etc.
93. Hansard. 23 February,1977. Margaret Bain.[SNP, East Dunbartonshire] 'While the people of Scotland are coming to expect more and more betrayal from this House, they will feel ... that the biggest betrayal of all is of educational services in Scotland'.
94. Debate in Scottish Grand Committee. 15 February,1977.
95. Hansard. 23 February,1977.
96. TESS 20 May,1977. Report on Scottish Tory Conference.
97. For instance, Jimmy Milne, Secretary of the STUC (Glasgow Herald 7 February,1977) and Dennis Canavan MP (in the Debate in the Scottish Grand Committee)
98. TESS. 18 March,1977.
99. The Scottish Liberal Party also opposed the Government on this issue, but this was of little political significance.
100. According to my calculations, 117 parliamentary questions about the colleges were asked in the period from January to June, 1977.
101. Two Labour M.Ps, Dennis Canavan (W. Stirlingshire) and James Dempsey (Coatbridge and Airdrie), voted against the Government.
102. Hansard. 1 March,1977.
103. Ibid. 5 April,1977.
104. SED (1977b). Teacher Training from 1977 onwards.
105. Ibid. para.15.
106. Alexander et al .(1984) p.26.
107. SED (1977c). Circular 991. Employment of additional teachers in schools serving urban areas of deprivation.
108. One sign of this was that the Craigie Action Committee was wound up on 30 May,1977, having by then held 53 meetings.
109. Harry Ewing MP refused my request for an interview. In his reply, he said :

'Not on the public record, for obvious reasons, is the discussions at Ministerial level in the Scottish Office and with respect I would not want to discuss what took place in private between my colleagues and myself at that time'.

110. Glasgow Herald. 28 February,1977. He is quoted as saying :

'An MP called upon to serve his government may often be faced with the dilemma of how to go on representing the views of his constituents ... The fact that I have not been able to speak from the back benches does not mean that I have not carried on the fight to save Callendar Park'.

111. Scotsman. 2 March,1977.
112. Ibid. 22 November,1977 reports his threat of resignation as something believed by Labour M.Ps. The Guardian of 14 December reported it as a fact.
113. Glasgow Herald. 14 December,1977.
114. Cope (1978) gives an interesting account of the events of 1977, which in my view, gives too much emphasis to the colleges' campaign and not enough to the political factors which favoured it.
115. There is a good analysis of this political pressure in the Guardian of 14 December,1977. When asked why he thought the ALCES campaign had been successful Maxton commented :

MAXTON : I think the reason why we were successful was that we were able to mount a campaign which put the political pressure on. But from there on, once we'd done that and made it into an issue, it was the political pressure which we were only marginally influencing - Harry Ewing's threat of resignation, the fact that there were seats we might lose to the SNP if the Labour Party continued to be seen as the closure party, the fact that the Government had a very narrow majority and there were some Labour M.Ps who wouldn't support it on this issue.

116. Scotsman. 14 December,1977.
117. McNaught took the same view.

WBM : Some people have suggested to me that the SED were not prepared for such strong resistance from the colleges. Would this be

your view ?

McNAUGHT : Yes. I believe that the SED misjudged the situation and did not expect the furore that there was. They had advised Ministers that the battle could be fought and won; that ALCES could be ignored and the colleges picked off one by one. They were however right in thinking that the colleges were not united. I remember the CP debating whether it could offer a better plan than that proposed by SED, but it could not reach agreement.

CHAPTER 7

THE SECOND ROUND, 1978-81.

Introduction.

After the defeat of the government's attempt to close colleges, the immediate reaction in some quarters was one of satisfaction that the apparent underdogs had won. Cope, for instance, wrote an article for the Scottish Government Yearbook in 1978 (1) posing the question why relatively powerless institutions like the colleges had been successful in 'mustering support and mounting a challenge which has left government and the central bureaucracy deeply embarrassed'. After analysing some of the reasons for the success of the campaign, she came to an upbeat conclusion :

> 'The Scottish colleges, previously compliant elements in the education sector, have challenged the bureaucracy on the basis of openness in decision-taking and diversification in provision. They have enlisted public opinion, the media, the unions, the Roman Catholic Church, the law and parliamentary democracy, and have demonstrated that bureaucracy can be embarrassed and to some extent checked. Both sides have been educated in the process. The relationship between the SED and the Scottish colleges of education will never be the same again'.

What this analysis failed to grasp was firstly, that the colleges had essentially been saved by an unusual and temporary political grouping - the opposition of the Tories, the SNP and rebellious Labour MPs; and secondly, that the success of the colleges' campaign had not lessened their dependence on SED. The Department still controlled all the key resources : finance, student numbers and the range of courses offered. So, even at the time, people more aware of the realities of power realised that the colleges had simply won a respite and that, sooner rather than later, the college system would have to contract.

> *MCNAUGHT : Although some of the more naive members of staff thought that the battle was over and we could go back to normal, most of us realised that things could never be the same again; that the SED had been thwarted, but was only biding its time. I remember Ken Purves, [Director of Education for Dumfries and Galloway] who was then Chairman of our Board of Governors, warning staff in 1978 that 'They'll be back'.*

SED policies : 1978-80.

In 1977 the government's solutions had been rejected, but the problems remained. Although the number of live births rose from 64,295 in 1978 to 69,054 in 1981 (a minor peak before a renewed downward trend), the number of pupils continued to fall, particularly in primary schools. In 1978-79 there were 569,000 primary pupils and 410,000 secondary; by 1981-82 the figures were 492,000 primary and 404,000 secondary. Because the cutback in intake had been slow and cautious, the consequence was a continuing surplus of primary teachers who could not find employment. By 1981 secondary teachers were beginning to be affected as well. In March of that year the GTC Supply Committee had before it figures for the estimated local authority needs in August and the estimated college output. These indicated that the local authority needs were for primary 78 teachers against an output of 703, for secondary 991 against an output 1,684. (2)

Faced with this falling demand for teachers, the government made further cuts in the college intakes, which only made the problem of over capacity in the colleges more acute. (See Tables 7.1 and 7.2) As the biggest cuts were in the primary intakes, the smaller colleges were the hardest hit. By 1980-81, six out of the ten colleges had fewer than 500 students on initial training courses: Callendar Park - 181; Craigie - 200; Craiglockhart - 202; Dundee - 447; Dunfermline - 390; Hamilton - 254.(3) The total number of students on all courses of initial training had dropped to 5967 (4) in a college system which was estimated by SED to have places for 14,450 students (5).

By this time, however, the capacity of the colleges had been somewhat reduced. Under pressure from the Treasury to contract the system and to secure financial savings (6), the SED, as we have seen, had tried to compensate for its failure to close colleges by proposing alternative uses for college accommodation. In 1978 these were pursued with vigour but with varying success. In order to produce an agreed basis for the negotiations, the SED insisted on all the colleges carrying out room utilisation surveys in which the inspectorate were involved. Naturally progress was slow, as some of the colleges were reluctant to accept the SED proposals, but by July, 1978 SED were able to report to Ministers that most of the targets set had been achieved. (7)

The two difficult areas proved to be the rationalisation of tertiary education in Dundee and the proposed links between Dunfermline and Queen Margaret College. In both cases the negotiations were conducted in at atmosphere which ranged from mutual suspicion to outright hostility. Stimpson describes the situation in Dundee :

STIMPSON : Just as I was leaving there was another move which was obviously trying to combine the higher education resources in the area. There was a working party, but it was an impossible situation because it was asking a good deal of each of us to surrender our autonomy. And the SED representatives were not taking a strong line. They were trying to get consensus and there was no way they were going to get consensus.

WBM : I wonder why the SED took this line, because in England and Wales the DES pushed through equally difficult mergers.

STIMPSON : There is a background to that in Dundee. There used to be the Dundee Institute of Art and Technology. The situation was that they had one Board of Governors, one college secretary but they had two principals. There was constant bickering and the two separated. So here were two components of any centralised institution already at loggerheads.

In Edinburgh the crux of the situation was that Queen Margaret College was expanding and badly needed further teaching accommodation. (8) Plans for this had been put forward in 1976 but a decision had then been postponed during the dispute over the closing of the colleges. In December 1977, the government statement reprieving the colleges had suggested that links should be developed between Dunfermline and Queen Margaret without giving any clear indication of what sort of links were envisaged. This suggestion, possibly made to save face by not allowing any one college to claim unqualified victory, would appear to have been based on two assumptions : firstly, that there would be surplus accommodation at Dunfermline which Queen Margaret might use; secondly , that some form of co-operation would emerge from constructive dialogue between the two institutions. Both these assumptions proved to be unfounded. In the short term, the demand for women PE teachers was higher than anticipated (9) and neither of the two college principals showed any interest in co-operation. The Department tried to exert pressure by insisting that Dunfermline's plans for new degree courses could not go ahead until the possibilities of linkage with Queen Margaret had been explored. This provoked a furious reaction from Abbott, the Principal of Dunfermline, but the Department stood firm. In the long run to no avail, as it eventually had to admit that Dunfermline did not have enough surplus accommodation for Queen Margaret's needs and therefore had to sanction a new extension at Queen Margaret.

The interesting thing about both these failures is that they would have been moves towards polytechnic type structures. However, both seem to have been motivated by the desire to rationalise resources rather than by any idea that teacher education might be better conducted in more diversified institutions. Both were strongly and successfully resisted by Dundee and Dunfermline in order to defend their separate existence; but all they gained was a stay of execution. In the end both were merged with different, but perhaps more congenial, partners. (10)

Rationalisation of accommodation was just one part of a general trend towards greater SED control over resources, just as this in its turn was part of the general move to tighten scrutiny of public expenditure which followed the 1976 financial crisis. SED was no more exempt from that than any other government department. So the colleges found themselves living in the atmosphere of cash limits, and found the SED extending their scrutiny in other directions notably staffing and course approval. Scrutiny of staffing took two main forms. Inevitably, as the college system contracted, the SED insisted that there should be appropriate reductions in college staffing and so the number of academic staff in the colleges fell from its peak of 1,401 in 1975-76 to 1,042 in 1980-81. (11) The mechanism for doing this was to calculate a staffing complement for each college and to fund the college accordingly.

The reduction in staff numbers would have been more drastic but for the allocation of 200 full time equivalents for inservice training. This represented a substantial investment and so SED set up procedures for monitoring its use. Formulae were devised for translating both courses and school-focused activities into full-time equivalents, (12) and each college was required to record everything done in the inservice field and to make an elaborate annual return to SED, which was then discussed with HMI.

The framework for course approval was changed in several ways. Following from the precedent set by the AUPE, there was further extension of the principle of national guidelines, notably for the new Diploma in Special Educational Needs (non-recorded pupils), which replaced the old special qualifications in remedial education. (13) Part of the colleges' work was also brought within the network of co-ordinating committees set up for the Central Institutions (14) and eventually within common procedures for the approval of courses by the SED.(15) The colleges tried to resist what they saw as centralising tendencies. Bone describes a meeting of the CP:(16)

'The most difficult part of the meeting by a long way was that concerned with the proposals for course submission procedures which had been produced by HMCI Mr H F Smith. There were doubts about this and points of criticism were made from a number of quarters but the strongest criticism was made by myself ...... I was criticising mainly on the basis of the undermining of academic freedom involved .... but of course was also speaking about the inevitable delays there would be in dealing with paperwork'.

However, these and other protests only delayed what the Department was determined to push through.

Initially, the effects of these changes were mainly felt in the inservice field, as this was where most of the new courses were being developed. Starting with the Jordanhill Diploma in Educational Technology in 1977, the colleges slowly began to develop a programme of award-bearing courses (diplomas and inservice B.Eds) validated by CNAA. (17) Although the main developments came after 1981, the changed procedures pointed the way to the future, in that all such courses could only be taken to external validation with SED approval. Up to 1981, these procedures affected the colleges very little, but later, as inservice expanded and as the main preservice courses were brought within national guidelines and taken to external validation, they significantly increased SED control.

The colleges naturally tended to see these policies as negative and to chafe at the cutbacks and controls, which they contrasted with the relative freedom of the period of expansion. Financial stringency was simply an unpleasant constraint that the colleges, like the rest of the public services, had to accept. Nevertheless, even within this difficult period there were positive developments.

Course approval, for instance, had a positive side, in that SED used it to compel the college to take new courses - and eventually all courses leading to awards or qualifications - to external validation. This had important repercussions on the design and delivery of college courses, and in consequence on the internal organisation of the colleges. Some aspects of these changes were criticised and resisted but, in my view, their overall effects were beneficial.

(Appendix 12: Note on the impact of CNAA on college courses)

Developments in inservice

The most positive developments were in the inservice field. These took a very different form from those in England and Wales. There the approach had been to allocate to colleges a full-time equivalent number of inservice students, calculated as a proportion of their pre-service intake, and to include money in the rate support grant so that the authorities could fill these inservice places by sending teachers on courses. This helped to underpin the expansion of award- bearing courses described in Chapter Two, but doubts were cast on this approach by two factors, one practical and the other theoretical. The practical was that, because the grant for inservice was not ear-marked, there was no guarantee that authorities would not divert it to areas they considered more urgent. The theoretical was the growing scepticism about the value of external courses as the main form of staff development.

With the benefit of the prior English experience, SED took the decision to press successfully for the system by which the colleges were allocated staff for inservice, calculated on the notional number of schools they served, on the understanding that those staff would be used mainly for school-focused inservice. Obviously one strong reason (which staffroom cynics saw as the only reason) for this policy decision was to cushion the colleges against the impact of excessively severe cutbacks in staffing. But other factors mingled with this. In England and Wales, thoughts turned more naturally towards financing attendance at award-bearing course, because the authorities had been in the habit of sending people on such courses, mainly run by the university departments of education. In Scotland there had been no such tradition of teachers being released for long courses,(18) and the SED rightly believed that, if the English approach was adopted and money included in the rate support grant, most of the authorities would not release teachers on a sufficient scale. The only practical way forward at the time was therefore to support school-focused inservice. (19) This had several advantages : it built on the existing inservice work of the colleges which, unlike those in England and Wales were already major providers of short courses and had experimented with school-based inservice; it chimed in with the current theoretical thinking about staff development and it also retained SED control of developments.

Although for these reasons the emphasis was on the development of school-focused inservice, neither the SED nor the colleges lost sight of the potential value of other forms of inservice training. In 1979, the National Committee for the Inservice Training of Teachers produced a report on 'The Future of Inservice Training in Scotland'. (20) This argued that teachers needed support for their professional

development throughout their careers. This would necessarily take a variety of forms, but one essential element should be the opportunity to undertake serious and sustained studies leading to recognised awards. The Report therefore proposed the development of a national system of credit accumulation and transfer leading to awards at three levels: certificate, diploma and Master's degree. In 1981 this was accepted in principle by the Secretary of State and has shaped the subsequent development of post-initial award-bearing courses, but it did not begin to have any practical effects until after our period.

Meanwhile, the SED decision to provide staffing for school- focused inservice gave a tremendous and valuable boost to inservice education in Scotland but, like many decisions taken in response to crisis, it created difficulties. The major problem was that the colleges had been given, through their staffing allocation, one of the main resources for inservice provision, but that the local authorities were the employers of the teachers and hence responsible for their staff development. The problem this created was that of matching the resources held by the colleges with the needs of the teachers. This was never satisfactorily resolved. On the one hand, most of the authorities never developed adequate procedures for articulating the needs of their teachers. On the other, the colleges had difficulties in staffing inservice satisfactorily. In some areas, random redundancies left them with only sufficient staff to meet preservice commitments; in others, staff recruited for preservice proved unsuitable for inservice work. There was also the structural problem that most of the college staff were expected to do both preservice and inservice work, with the result that they had fixed commitments to courses and to student visits, which made it difficult to make them available for inservice as and when the authorities or schools requested them. As a result, too much of the school-focused work was of an ad hoc and unstructured nature: a comment which must not be taken to denigrate the high quality of work done by many college staff despite the unsatisfactory nature of the system.

Although the policy decision about inservice was an important one in its way, it aroused little controversy at the time. The general feeling within the policy community was that the expansion of inservice was a desirable development and few questioned that the allocation of staffing to the colleges was a reasonable way of achieving it in the circumstances. The crisis of 1977 did however raise, at least temporarily, more fundamental questions about the role of the colleges and their place in the higher education system.

During 1977 these questions were approached in two different ways: one general and public, the other specific and private. Generally, as an off-shoot of the devolution debates, the Government decided that there should be some preliminary thinking about the organisation of higher education under a Scottish Assembly. It therefore created a new advisory body, the Council for Tertiary Education in Scotland [CTES], under the chairmanship of Sir Norman Graham. This was given a broad remit to advise the Secretary of State on the whole of post-school education, excluding the universities, and did discuss whether teacher education was best done in specialised 'monotechnic' institutions (21), but when it did eventually report in September 1981 it made no recommendations for change. (22)

Meanwhile back in July 1977, there had been a meeting between the STUC and Ministers, at which John Pollock had taken the lead in pressing for a long-term review of teacher education. Coming from this quarter, the pressure seems to have convinced Ministers that this was not just another piece of special pleading by the colleges. So the Department was asked to undertake its own internal review to see what improvements could be made 'although .... for financial and other reasons it might be necessary to bring forward proposals which fell short of the ideal'. (23) Nothing came directly of this private review, which will be discussed more fully as part of the move towards an all-graduate profession. So, without any advice from the CTES or from the SED about their future role, the colleges were left to adjust as best they could to an uncertain future and to prepare for the anticipated second round of closure proposals.

During this period of uncertainty the colleges looked to three main developments to safeguard their future : the growth of inservice, diversification and the replacement of the primary diploma by a four-year degree. Of these the only one which had taken place by 1981 was the growth of inservice. In their annual returns, the colleges were able to show that they could successfully use, at least in numerical terms, their inservice staffing allocation (24). As preservice numbers declined, inservice became an increasingly large proportion of their work,(25) but there was never any real likelihood that the allocation would be increased. Given the pressure to restrain public spending, the best the SED could do was to defend it.

Diversification.

As soon as the threat of contraction or closure became serious, the colleges began to submit to SED proposals for diversification, and indeed were encouraged to do so in a rather guarded way by the SED statement of May, 1977. (26) So, by the end

of the year, most of the colleges had submitted proposals. When these were summarised by the Department in February 1978, it was noted :

> 'The form in which proposals have been presented varies widely from college to college. Not surprisingly, the colleges under threat of closure produced the most wide-ranging and seriously considered proposals. On the other hand, proposals from some of the other colleges have been perfunctory in the extreme'. (27)

Of the more serious proposals, those from Craigie may be taken as an example. (28) After the standard plea for a four-year degree, the Craigie Board of Studies went on to argue for an enlarged portfolio of courses including an inservice B.Ed for primary teachers, a post-graduate secondary course, initial training for social workers, initial training and an inservice B.Ed for community education workers, a Dip.H.E., courses for shop stewards (in association with the STUC) and courses for unemployed 16-18 year olds following up the recommendations of the Holland Report.

Such proposals clearly illustrate the problems facing the colleges. If they sought to expand into new fields (e.g. the training of adult literacy workers), this meant extra resources which the government did not wish to provide; if they sought to expand into existing fields, all the niches were already occupied. General education was provided by the Ordinary M.A. of the Scottish universities (29); vocational education by the Central Institutions and FE colleges; training for social work or community education by the larger colleges and other institutions. So, when the Department came to review the colleges' proposals, some of the comments were highly critical.

> 'Past Departmental policy has preserved the colleges of education as monotechnic institutions whose function, and in many cases, sole function has been the training of teachers. They were staffed and equipped for this purpose and all their thinking has been directed to the admittedly narrow objective of providing the best possible preservice and inservice training for teachers. It is not therefore surprising that when suddenly called upon to make suggestions for diversifying their work they had considerable difficulties in deciding what exactly diversification meant, and what types of course they should propose. There were no obvious gaps in the general provision of further and higher education which they could rush in to fill and therefore their

proposals tend to overlap with provision made elsewhere, to seize upon insignificant types of provision and blow them up and, in desperation, to pursue various flights of fancy'. (30)

This criticism was rather hard on the colleges. Part of their problem was that they were working in the dark. As the SED gave them no guidance as to what sorts of diversification might be acceptable, they were hardly in a position to criticise the colleges for having difficulty in deciding what courses to propose. When questioned on this point, Sandison commented :

> *SANDISON : That was not one of our [SED's] more creditable episodes. We were exhorted to try to help the colleges to diversify and invited them to put in proposals ....*
> *The trouble was that everything they wanted to do was either being done by someone else or was something they were not equipped to do. So there was a good deal of threshing around, and we in SED were really encouraging people to do something when there was really nothing for them to do.*

> *WBM : One of the Principals complained to me that the colleges were asked to put up these proposals but were never given any guidance as to what was likely to be acceptable.*

> *SANDISON : That was because there was none to give.*

But this could not have been said at the time, as it would have been politically inexpedient to admit that the colleges were boxed in.

Failing any serious diversification, the only other hope for the colleges was the four-year degree for primary teachers.

The campaign for a four-year degree.

One of the first reactions to the cuts in college intakes in 1976 had been to renew pressure to replace the diploma course with a four-year degree for primary teachers. Two further developments in 1977 added strength to that campaign. The more important one was that some colleges were then faced not just with cutbacks but with closure. The other was that the DES published its Green Paper 'Education in Schools' reaffirming its commitment to an all-graduate profession. This naturally

provoked the same reaction as the 1972 White Paper : why was Scotland being left behind again? Several of the college principals promptly wrote to SED to press the case. (31) The GTC Supply Committee discussed the Green Paper and urged the Council to set up a working party to consider the implications of replacing the primary diploma with a degree. This was duly done. (32)

Both privately and publicly the initial SED reaction to this renewed pressure was unfavourable. The version of 'Teacher Training from 1977 Onwards' issued in May (33) held out no hope of change in the foreseeable future.

> 'The Secretary of State has considered the arguments which have been advanced by many bodies for the introduction of a new four-year degree course to replace the present three-year diploma course. He is not however convinced that such a development should be given priority in present circumstances and he has decided therefore to adhere to the decision which he announced in January that the primary diploma course will continue'.

There seem to have been three strands in SED thinking : that the diploma produced competent primary teachers and that the urge to replace it had more to do with enhancing status than with competence; that much of the pressure was special pleading by the colleges and the EIS; and therefore that a four-year degree would produce relatively little improvement at a relatively high cost. (34)

For such reasons Ministers were unwilling to give much weight to arguments coming from the colleges or the GTC. It was a rather different matter when they came from their own political supporters. In July, the Secretary of State had a meeting with the STUC, at which the case was pressed very strongly for a review of possible long-term improvements in teacher training. This seems to have convinced Ministers that there might be more to the matter than special pleading and so the Department was asked to explore the possibilities. (35)

This was a task which it undertook without much enthusiasm, as officials could see no way to make substantial improvements without extra costs and no way of giving those extra costs sufficient priority. Nevertheless, they went ahead in a way which is an interesting example of their approach to policy-making.

The review consisted of a list of all the recent proposals for changes in teacher training either made by the Department or made to it by other bodies. (36) The first part listed seven proposals for changes in the basic system of training : the SED Memorandum of 1970; the EIS Education Committee's proposals of 1971; the Brunton Report; the report of the SED/GTC working party on the training and induction of teachers (37); various proposals for an all- graduate profession from the EIS and SSTA; the replacement of the primary diploma by a three-year degree (the SED initiative of 1973) or by a four-year degree (as urged by the colleges, the GTC etc.); and a Diploma in Higher Education as the first part of a three-year degree (an idea floated but not pressed by the Treasury). The second part listed suggestions for changes within the system : mainly for new teaching qualifications (e.g. computing, outdoor education) or for changes to existing courses stemming from reports like Pack and Dunning. (38)

All these were neatly tabulated, giving their origin, date, the nature of the proposals and the outcomes (i.e. the reasons why nothing had come of any of them). What is entirely missing is any vision of the sort of teacher training system which was desirable and hence any sense of the direction in which improvements might be made. The review document seems designed to underline the official view that no worthwhile improvements could be made without unattainable resources. So, at their forthcoming meeting with the STUC, Ministers were advised to reiterate their view that the four-year degree was not a priority, but to lighten the gloom in two ways: firstly, by indicating that they accepted the principle of an all-graduate profession and were willing to explore how moves might be made towards it through more flexible patterns of training; secondly, by stressing that they attached very great importance to inservice and had already made more generous provision for it than that in England and Wales. This was substantially the line which Ministers took at their meeting with the STUC in November and, for the time being, it blunted the edge of criticism. In any case, reform of teacher training, although at one of its peaks of political saliency, was not high on the STUC agenda. Most of the meeting was taken up with matters to do with staffing standards, improvements in nursery education and school buildings. It was only at the tail-end of the meeting that the EIS representatives were given an opportunity to raise the issue of the four-year degree. (39)

Nevertheless, the SED felt bound explore the possibilities for moving towards an all-graduate profession. (40) Internal discussion rapidly ruled out some options : a three-year degree plus inservice (feasible but not acceptable); a three and a half year degree like the Stirling Ordinary B.A. (possibly acceptable but awkward for schools); and

expansion of the existing B.Eds (most of them not specifically designed for primary teachers and just as costly as a new degree). In the Department's view, this left two main alternatives. One was to increase the output of the post-graduate primary course. Despite the attractions of this for regulating supply, SED recognised that it was generally felt to be an unsatisfactory form of training and that it should not be the main route into primary training. Instead, it argued that the way forward was to move the colleges away from purely vocational training. 'We seriously doubt', it said in a submission to Ministers, 'the wisdom of training the majority of primary teachers through directly vocational four-year degree courses'. What it suggested was a two-year foundation course, which might eventually be linked to social work and youth and community courses, and which could be followed either by one further year of study leading to an Ordinary Degree or by two years of concurrent training leading to a degree and teaching qualification. The advantage of such a scheme would have been to provide more career outlets, and so make it easier to avoid the embarrassment, then very much in people's minds, of the over-production of teachers.

When the Department's review of the possibilities was discussed with Ministers in May 1978, the idea of a more flexible degree structure met with a favourable response. However, before any public statement was made, it was felt politic to wait for the report of the GTC working party on the primary degree and also -perhaps with memories of the rebuffs over the three-year degree - to take informal soundings. (41)

When the GTC report came out, (42) the Department was not impressed by its proposals for a four-year degree over-influenced, like the original B.Eds, by the traditional pattern of an academic Ordinary degree. 'The trouble with the GTC report', it was minuted,' is that it just churns out exactly what we have already heard from the Teachers' Unions and the Colleges of Education'. (44)

Meanwhile, the informal soundings had been going well. Senior officials and members of the inspectorate had spoken to a number of university and college principals and to directors of education, most of whom had found the idea of a two-year foundation course, plus one or two years, attractive in principle while, naturally, pointing out some of the practical difficulties. Encouraged by this, the SED prepared a draft consultative paper and, because of the financial implications, sent it to the Treasury for approval.

As the government had accepted the principle of an all-graduate profession in England and Wales, the Treasury recognised that there was bound to be pressure

for Scotland to follow suit. (44) However, as the DES was resisting demands for four-year B.Eds, the Treasury had reservations about conceding them in Scotland and suggested that the continuation of the diploma should be included as an option in the consultative paper - an illogical suggestion, as the SED pointed out, in a paper about moving to an all-graduate profession. Nevertheless, Treasury reservations meant that the paper had to be redrafted but, before agreement could be reached to issue it, Ministers' attention was distracted, first by a teachers' strike and then by the impending general election.

After the change of government in 1979, a draft consultation paper was resubmitted, and the idea of a more flexible degree structure was as well-received by the new Ministers as by the old. Further negotiations then ensued with the Treasury, which was now pressing for a three-year degree to be included as an option, despite SED complaints that it was failing to take account of the differences between the English and Scottish systems. However, these negotiations were not pursued with any great sense of urgency because, by the end of 1979, officials were already beginning to discuss the possibility of college closures, which some of them saw as desirable, given the continuing decline in student numbers, and likely to be politically feasible, given that the government had come into office with the intention of eliminating waste in the public services. (45)

The changed political situation.

The political situation in which this question was being raised was very different from that in 1977. The general election had given the Conservatives 339 seats; a lead of 70 over Labour and a comfortable over-all majority. (46) Moreover, the nationalist vote had fallen sharply and the SNP had been reduced to an impotent rump of 2 M.Ps. For the time being, the nationalist threat could be completely discounted.

The government was therefore in a strong position to carry out its declared intentions of reducing public expenditure, and the Scottish colleges seemed an obvious target. They were also an embarrassing one. Tory M.Ps had been vociferous in their defence of the colleges in 1977, and would have to do a complete U-turn if they were to close them. To add to the embarrassment, two of the most threatened colleges - Dunfermline and Craigie, were in marginal Tory seats held by Lord James Douglas Hamilton and by the new Secretary of State, George Younger. The government must therefore have had problems in deciding when and how to move but, while it was pondering on these, help arrived from an unexpected quarter - the GTC. (47)

1980-81 : The opening skirmishes.

The train of events, which was eventually to lead to college closures, was set off publicly by the circulation in February, 1980 of the SED's annual consultation paper on the intake to teacher training courses. (48) This proposed very severe cuts, especially in the primary intakes. (Table 7.3) This paper was circulated as usual to the colleges, to COSLA and to the GTC, who were all pressed for an early reply so that a parliamentary statement on intakes might be made before the Easter recess. (49) As the GTC was due to hold its quarterly meeting on 5 March and would have to comment then if it was not to be too late, Bone decided to convene a special meeting of the Supply Committee to discuss the intake paper which, because of the short notice, did not take place until March 4th.

Meanwhile, quite independently, Bloomer, who was then a leading light on the teachers' side in the GTC, had produced a substantial paper outlining a possible GTC response, which he asked Bone to table.(50) This paper was in two parts. The first was a cogent criticism of the SED paper, which pointed out that it made assumptions without providing the data on which they were based; that some of the assumptions (e.g. on wastage rates and staffing standards) were disputable, and that SED estimates had proved unreliable in the past. From this Bloomer drew the conclusion that it was a mistake to try to match supply to demand too precisely and that it would be better to plan a rolling programme of training over three to five years, which would give some stability to the system, even if it meant some over-production.

In so far as this was a plea for less drastic cuts (though it was more than that) Bloomer could count on support within the GTC. The controversy was raised by the second part of the paper, which tried to address what Bloomer saw as a fundamental weakness of the GTC as an advisory body on supply. Bone described this when commenting on the difficulties of his position as convenor of the Supply Committee.

> BONE. There was one inherent weakness in my being convenor .... This was that the GTC could not bring itself to discriminate among the colleges. It would never make comments on where the intake was to be distributed. It would say that there should not be such severe cuts, but it would not say in what ways the cuts should be distributed. And there was a clear need through most of the period for there to be more teachers in the West than in the East. But for me to argue for that was to be seen to be arguing for Jordanhill.

This was the nettle which Bloomer partly grasped. While urging the expansion of college inservice and of support for probationer teachers, Part II of the paper accepted that there was substantial overcapacity in the colleges, which could not continue indefinitely. The key sentences read :

> 'The Council would accept that some rationalisation of the existing college of education system is necessary and inevitable ....It is undeniable that there remains considerable surplus capacity which cannot be used either by the expansion in inservice work that the Council advocates nor by the upturn in initial training anticipated from the middle of the decade ...... The Council believes that the retention of ten autonomous colleges, each substantially underused, can only serve to weaken the training system in Scotland'.

The paper then stopped short of recommending which colleges should be closed, but it did suggest four criteria on which rationalisation might be based: the need to -

a)   retain and develop the larger colleges because, in Bloomer's view, they were 'better able to diversify, to respond rapidly to changing demands, to support specialist facilities, to foster research and development and to provide centres of excellence';

b)   pay attention to the special position of Strathclyde and, in particular, to the needs of the areas of traditional shortage within Strathclyde (Glasgow and Lanarkshire);

c)   provide for the specialist needs of the Roman Catholic schools which were most acute in the West; and

d)   retain, as far as was consistent with the other criteria, the greatest geographical spread of colleges.

Although wrongly suspected of conspiring with the larger colleges, Bloomer seems to have had no other motive than to persuade the GTC to face up to the realities of the situation.

> *BLOOMER : I had two concerns at that time. The first, which I still have, was that I had little confidence in attempts to balance supply and demand simply by controlling supply. I felt that it would be better to*

put supply on a more stable basis, even if this meant that more teachers
were trained than eventually found posts. The first part of my paper
was about that concern, but nobody took any interest in it. My second
concern was that, since it was inevitable that the training system
would be cut in some way, it was important that what was left
should be viable. I argued that, if cuts were made all round, many of the
colleges would be too weak and that it was no longer possible to sustain
a ten college system.

The production of this paper put Bone in an awkward position. If he kept it off the agenda, the Supply Committee would probably end up as before bemoaning the cuts but not making any constructive suggestions. If it went on the agenda, he would have to reveal that it was in line with his own thinking and thereby incur the wrath of some of his fellow Principals. Bone describes what happened :

BONE : Here we were, faced with this intake paper that suggested very
severe cuts, and Keir [Bloomer] came along with a paper and asked if
it could be tabled..... He discussed it with me and I knew what was in
the paper, but I hadn't written it or helped to write it.... Keir said that
we had to face up to this issue of reducing the number of colleges.
Keir thought, I thought, and I think everyone thought that what that
meant in practice was doing something like Bruce Millan had proposed
in 1977. There was no attempt in the paper to say which colleges should
be closed. It went through, as far as I remember, the Supply
Committee unanimously. I was chairing it. It was in line with thoughts
I'd had and, there is no getting away from it, I aided and abetted Keir'.

When the Minutes of the Supply Committee were tabled at the Council meeting on the following day, an unsuccessful attempt was made to rule discussion out of order. In the ensuing debate the opposition was led by Paton, repeating his 1977 role as a defender of the ten-college system. There were, however, powerful voices on the other side, such a James Scotland and Edward Miller, who saw the arguments in the paper counteracting what he regarded as the inbuilt bias in the GTC against the West of Scotland. (51)

E MILLER : I might say that it was difficult for Tom Bone and, for that
matter, for myself to secure recommendations from the Supply
Committee and from the GTC which we wanted, because the GTC as a
whole was weighted towards the North and East of Scotland. I

argued repeatedly and consistently that the West of Scotland had unique problems in terms of teacher shortage and maldistribution and that the Supply Committee of the GTC should recommend to the SED a better allocation of places to colleges in the West because of that.

On this occasion the pro-Strathclyde case was accepted, as was the view of the Supply Committee that the GTC would lose all credibility if it failed to say anything about rationalisation. So, with minor changes, the Minute was approved by 25 to 5,(52) and its recommendations relayed to the Secretary of State.

Inevitably these recommendations aroused strong feelings, particularly among those who felt threatened by them.

> *BONE : The newspapers were there [at the GTC meeting] and next day all hell broke loose in the papers and there were very strong reactions especially from Ayrshire and Callendar Park and, I think, Dunfermline. Keir was attacked; I was certainly attacked. It was a matter that was in the Daily Express and the Daily Record and the kind of papers that don't usually pay any attention to teacher education.*

There is no doubting the furore which the recommendations caused. They quickly came under attack from many quarters : from the principals of the smaller colleges, both in the press and at an acrimonious meeting of the JCCES on March 14th (53); from ALCES, the NUS and the SNP , and in the editorial columns of the TESS. (54). They were also attacked by the EIS. Pollock wrote to the SED expressing his shock at the decision of the GTC to recommend the closure of four of the smaller colleges of education. (55)

> The Government's own policy argues for the retention of the colleges. It insists that any progress that is made in education must be achieved with existing resources. The Institute cannot agree that existing resources are in fact sufficient for the improvements the Department recognises are necessary but at least let us keep what resources we have, including college resources, so that any spare resources in them may be re-deployed, to quote the consultative paper on the 16-18s, "in such a way as to bring about real improvements in the service offered to the public"'.

These attacks grumbled on for months (56) but, for all the furore which they roused, did the GTC recommendations in fact make any difference ? Bloomer believed that they did.

> *WBM : Your paper created quite a stir at the time but do you think that it had much effect on the course of events ?*

> *BLOOMER : I think it may have done. Perhaps the debate in the GTC shifted the ground and encouraged the government to go ahead. So, it may have had two effects. Firstly, on the timing of the decision - it may have hastened it on; secondly, on the extent of the cuts - it may have encouraged the government to make them all at once rather than in smaller stages.*

Bloomer may be right : there is no evidence in the SED records available either to support or rebut his suggestions. However, we do know that officials were preparing the ground for the cuts before the end of 1977 and that they were very much in line with general government policy. Doubtless it was convenient for Younger to be able to claim that 'the GTC has recommended that I should give serious consideration to a reduction in the number of colleges engaged in teacher training'. (57) It was also doubtless comforting for Ministers to know that the policy community was divided and that they would not have to face its united opposition, as in 1977; but it is hard to believe, had the GTC come out in defence of the ten-college system, that Ministers would have stayed their hand to any great extent or for any great length of time.

In addition to revealing these divisions, what the GTC recommendations proposals did undoubtedly do was to help to create a climate of opinion in which some college closures were seen as inevitable and imminent. As the Scotsman commented the following day :'Even those who sympathised with the anti-closure campaign of 1977 may now be driven to admit that ten colleges are too many for training a diminishing number of teachers to instruct a falling schools population'. (58) These feelings were reinforced when the Secretary of State announced his decisions about intake figures in April. (59) The concessions he had made were negligible : an extra 5 students on the primary diploma course (new quota 545) and 15 on the primary post-graduate course (new quota 145). The result was to bring the primary diploma intake below 55 in five of the nine colleges training primary teachers. (Table 7.2) At this level of preservice work, clearly all colleges could not remain viable. The great counter-argument of the small colleges was their value as inservice centres but

this argument glossed over the considerable limitations on the range of inservice support they could provide. (60)

During the summer term, while the government prepared for action, the arguments about the future of the colleges continued. Those who felt threatened were the more vociferous. (61) For instance, the Hamilton Board of Governors and Board of Studies sent a paper to the SED arguing that 'the effective professional education of teachers has to be founded upon a close partnership between colleges of education and schools' and that 'it follows that there must be the widest possible geographical spread of colleges'. (62) Suggestions were made from both right and left in the political spectrum that a good solution would be either to close Jordanhill and Moray House or, at least, to take away their primary courses and distribute the students among the smaller colleges. (63) These suggestions, along with the implied threat to the larger colleges in the Hamilton paper, were taken sufficiently seriously for Jordanhill to feel the need to defend its own position. The Board of Studies agreed to approach local M.Ps and to send a letter to the Secretary of State arguing against either the closure of the college or the removal from it of major courses. (64) As anxiety mounted within the colleges, it was increased by the government's decision not to issue a consultative paper, but simply to announce its intentions, thereby breaking its earlier promises. (65)

The 1980-81 campaign against closures.

Whether by chance, or in a futile bid to dampen controversy, those intentions were not announced until early August - in the middle of the summer holidays and just before the Parliamentary recess. When the announcement came, it was in the form of a written answer to a question, accompanied by an SED paper 'The Future of the College of Education System in Scotland'.(66)

To forestall the sort of criticisms made in 1977, this was more of an educational document than its predecessors. It spoke of the opportunity provided by the fall in demand for teachers to put 'an increasing emphasis on improving the quality of the teaching force'. It tried to indicate how the work of the colleges might develop in fields like research and development and inservice training; and it gave the long awaited promise that 'it is the firm intention of the Secretary of State that in due course entry to the primary teaching profession should be on an all-graduate basis'. (67)

Nevertheless the key argument remained that of over-capacity which meant that the options were either further cuts all-round - which the SED argued quite rightly would have left some of the colleges too small to function effectively - or the closure of some colleges. On what basis was this to be done? The paper set out very fairly the various factors which had to be considered, but only as a preamble to a classic let-out clause, which allowed the Secretary of State to do what he liked.

'It is inevitable that any decisions must be taken on a balance of considerations. Within a contracted system each college of education must be large enough to justify staffing resources sufficient to promote versatility and flexibility, to facilitate a quick response to changing demands, to make a variety of input to inservice training and to give reasonable attention to research and development work. The Secretary of State is not however attracted to the concept of a highly centralised system based on a few large colleges. He attaches great importance to the preservation, to the maximum extent compatible with efficiency and reasonable economy, of a regional distribution of colleges which will enable local contacts to be made'. (68)

This left it open for the Secretary of State to propose, as he did, that College A should be closed because it was too small, but College B should be kept because it met the need for geographical distribution. So the actual decisions announced were that Callendar Park and Hamilton should be closed; that Craiglockhart, as in 1977, should be merged with another college in the East while preserved as 'a distinct Roman Catholic unit'; and that Dunfermline should be retained but its position kept under review.

In most respects this policy was similar to that of the Labour government in 1977, surprisingly so in the case of Craiglockhart which showed that the SED had not learned from the experience of 1977 that the Catholic Church would not accept any merger that seemed to threaten the principle of separate Catholic provision.(69) The only differences were that Dunfermline was reprieved and that Hamilton was to close instead of Craigie. These changes had been made almost entirely for political reasons.(70) Although an educational case could be made for the retention of PE training at Dunfermline, (71) that case must have been strengthened by the fact that it was in the constituency of Lord James Douglas-Hamilton. The decision to save Craigie, almost certainly made by Younger against the advice of SED, was 'blatantly political'.(72) (Appendix 13) The TESS acutely summed up these political

factors:(73)

> 'It will be remembered that Callendar Park and Hamilton are in Labour
> constituencies where the Conservative candidate only goes along for the
> ride. Craigie on the other hand is not only in the constituency of the
> Secretary of State but is held by just 2,768 votes. As for the closing of
> Craiglockhart, Conservative governments are less susceptible to the
> outrage of the Scottish Catholic hierarchy than Labour with its solid
> Catholic following in the West'.

The government's plans naturally produced a bitter reaction from the threatened colleges, particularly at Hamilton.(74) Although, as we have seen, the Hamilton staff had been apprehensive enough to make some defensive moves, they had basically felt quite secure. For most of them the proposal to close the college came as a traumatic shock.

> *WBM : Did the decision in 1980 come as a bolt from the blue to them*
> *[the Hamilton staff]?*
>
> *LIVINGSTONE : Absolutely .... It may be overstating it slightly but,*
> *just as many Americans will tell you where they were when John*
> *F.Kennedy was shot, people on the Hamilton staff will tell you where*
> *they were when they first found out about it. I can remember in vivid*
> *detail. I was on holiday in England at the time and phoned one of my*
> *ALCES colleagues to ask if anything had happened. There was a long*
> *silence on the phone and then he said: "You mean you don't know?"*
> *It was absolutely a bolt from the blue.*

Not only were the Hamilton staff shocked, they were angered at being sacrificed to safeguard Younger's constituency interests and incensed at what they saw as betrayal by their colleagues in other colleges.

> *LIVINGSTONE : There was a very strong feeling for example that*
> *the GTC had stabbed us in the back, or had stabbed the smaller colleges*
> *in the back, through what was seen as a nexus of Tom Bone and Keir*
> *Bloomer, who happened to be on the Governors of Jordanhill, making a*
> *very strong and well-argued case in the GTC for the larger colleges.*
> *And if that meant that the smaller colleges had to go to the wall,*
> *then so be it. The staff felt very strongly about that.*

As well as these general feelings, Paton had a more personal reason for feeling betrayed because, as Chairman of the CP, he had fought hard in 1977 to defend the colleges which were then threatened; but when he looked to them for support in 1980 he found that their gratitude was short-lived.

> *PATON : I think we worked quite hard for a system [in 1977]. I think some of the individual threatened colleges inevitably felt that they were on their own and very shortly afterwards were insisting that they got no help .... Craiglockhart tried to remind them at one meeting what I had done for them but nobody wanted to remember.*

Unlike the 1977 situation, there was never a chance that the colleges would present a united front against the closures. By 1980 there was a widespread feeling that contraction was inevitable (75), because people could see it happening throughout the developed world in response to demographic trends. Looking no further than England and Wales, they could see that the number of institutions involved in teacher education had already been more than halved. As a result, as Ruthven put it:

> *RUTHVEN: Individual principals were under a great deal of pressure from their own staff to make sure that, if there were going to be any redundancies, they were not going to be in their college.*

So, when the CP held an emergency meeting the day after the government's proposals were announced, all it could agree on was to criticise the way in which the statement had been made, particularly the fact that the decisions had been announced without consultation when consultation had been promised. (76) Matters were not improved when the proposals were discussed by the various Boards of Governors. According to Bone, when the JCCES met in September,

> 'it was clear that most Boards of Governors had avoided saying whether they agreed with the Secretary of State's paper, although only three (Callendar Park, Hamilton and Craiglockhart) had come out as opposed to it. In a lengthy discussion there were accusations of cowardice, of breaches of faith, of desertion of those who had been allies in 1977, and of self-interest'. (77)

These divisions were reflected in ALCES, which had shifted its ground from fighting to preserve ten colleges to fighting to save its members from compulsory redundancy.(78) The threatened colleges therefore simply had to fight their own

individual campaigns, which they did with great vigour but no sense of common purpose. (79)

The Notre Dame/Craiglockhart merger.

The Craiglockhart campaign would in any case have been separate because its essential purpose was different. Even before the SED proposals came out, the Catholic Church had been alerted by the intake figures to the renewed threat to Craiglockhart. To this, the response of the Hierarchy was to form an advisory committee drawn from the higher academic staff of Notre Dame and Craiglockhart and from the Catholic Education Commission 'to consider the future of Catholic teacher training in the current circumstances of contraction in student numbers, with a view to preserving the denominational sector in a way which would be helpful to the Church'. (80)

However, this had made little progress before the SED came out with its merger proposal for Craiglockhart. The immediate reaction of the Governors was to fight for the college's continued existence as a separate institution,(81) but behind the scenes the Hierarchy was sounding out views about the best way of preserving the principle of separate Catholic provision. McGettrick, then Vice-principal of Notre Dame, describes how he was involved in this.

> McGETTRICK : The chairman of governors of Notre Dame, Bishop Devine [then Titular Bishop of Voli, later Bishop of Motherwell] , asked me if I would talk to him on a long car journey about this issue when we went together to Derbyshire College of Higher Education.

> ..... On the car journey we spoke a little about what was happening and he told me that on the Monday the Cardinal was to meet the Secretary of State at a dinner party. ..... At that dinner party they were going to talk about the future of the Catholic colleges and Bishop Devine wanted to know what advice he should give the Cardinal. He was delegated by the Cardinal to phone him on Sunday night with a view. So, on the Saturday afternoon, Bishop Devine and I took a walk on the hills above Matlock. I remember saying : 'Well, if I were starting from square one, I wouldn't begin from where we are at. What I would be looking for would be one strong college, because that is all we need. But what I would do would be to have a strong preservice unit and a devolved inservice operation. If you want to think of that in

relation to what we have in Scotland, you really need to set the
strong college in the heartland of where you've got the people who are
coming and for Catholics that's the West of Scotland. But you need to
devolve in other places.

With this idea in mind, Bishop Thompson of Motherwell, at the request of the Bishops' Conference, convened a meeting in early October to consider the possibility of a merger between Craiglockhart and Notre Dame. He stressed that, if the principle of a merger with a non-denominational college were accepted in the East, it could later be applied in the West and 'the continued existence of a Catholic institution within the tertiary education sector might be seen as an anomaly'. (82) As separate Catholic teacher education, unlike that in the schools, was not legally safeguarded, this seemed a real danger. So the Governors of both colleges agreed that staff should be represented on a group considering the possibility of merger.

Before negotiations about the merger could get under way, two sets of difficulties had to be overcome. One was to change the policy of the SED which was sticking to the view that the only options open to Craiglockhart were merger with either Moray House or Dundee. (83) The other was to persuade the staff in the two colleges that merger was essential for the sake of Catholic education. Initially, the gulf between them was so large that the first meeting of the joint group in November came to the pessimistic conclusion that there was 'not sufficient common ground to justify pursuing discussions'. (84)

The Hierarchy, however, was not deterred. The first hurdle was to persuade the SED to change its mind. As overt political campaigning might well have been counter- productive, the Hierarchy seems to have relied on informal networks. According to Mitchell, the seeds of the eventual compromise were sown outside the official round of meetings.

> *MITCHELL : I don't think that there was any escape from closures at*
> *that time [1980-81]. We of course still had a lot of argument on the*
> *Notre Dame/Craiglockhart merger. I remember a private dinner party*
> *with both [Catholic] Archbishops, Alec Fletcher, Malcolm Rifkind and*
> *myself. That in effect worked out what eventually came - St. Andrew's*
> *having two wings, one in the East and the other in the West.*

What tipped the scales in SED thinking is difficult to tell. It may have been partly that its own joint working party with the Craiglockhart Governors had made it more aware

of the difficulties of merging a Catholic and a non-denominational institution. (85) It may have been that the talks with the Bishops had led to a belated realisation of the political hazards of offending the Church which, though perhaps less for a Conservative government, were still real.

Certainly, by December, Sister Margaret [Principal of Notre Dame] was able to report to her Governors that the SED was now considering the merger of Craiglockhart with Notre Dame 'as a result of the intervention of the Hierarchy'. (86) Following this change of tack, the SED formally invited both colleges to join with them in a tri-partite working party. As this invitation came with the blessing of the Hierarchy, the two colleges could not refuse to resume the talks so abruptly terminated the previous November.

The second hurdle was to change the attitudes of the staff of the two colleges. In an atmosphere of uncertainty, both naturally tried to protect what they saw as their own interests. The Craiglockhart staff sought for a merger in which they would be allowed to carry on much as before. The senior staff at Notre Dame staff foresaw, quite correctly, that falling student numbers would not allow this and that the future pattern would be 'one Catholic College of Education in the West with an inservice outpost in the East' (87), but had difficulty in reassuring their colleagues that their interests would not be sacrificed in order create this new national organisation.

> McGETTRICK : I wonder if the key to the way in which the merger took place was to change the minds and attitudes in Notre Dame in the national interest. It was more to get the people in Bearsden to see that they had national responsibilities because, if they did not take them on, Catholic teacher education in Scotland was likely to disappear. Because, if the merger had taken place between Craiglockhart and Moray House, I have little doubt that there would have been a merger between Notre Dame and Jordanhill.

However, from the time when the two colleges agreed to join SED in the working party there was little real doubt that some form of merger would go ahead. Apart from the technical problems of merging two institutions run by different religious orders, the obstacles to be overcome were essentially those which had previously caused the talks to break down. Notre Dame tended to see the merger as a take-over on the model of the arrangements which, as we shall see, were then being negotiated between Jordanhill and Hamilton. The implications of this would have been that Craiglockhart would have become part of Notre Dame (with a suitably

enlarged Board of Governors) and that initial training in the East would have ceased or, at best, continued on a very small scale. (88)

These Notre Dame proposals met opposition from Craiglockhart, from some of the Bishops (89) and, one suspects, from SED anxious to keep some political balance between East and West. The eventual compromise was that both Boards of Governors were to be dissolved and a new college created (later named St. Andrew's). Its main base was to be the Notre Dame site in Bearsden, but the primary diploma and post-graduate courses were to be offered at Craiglockhart, alongside inservice courses. For the coming session, the quotas for initial training courses would be determined by the Department. After that, it would be up to the new Board of Governors.

So the independent existence of Craiglockhart came to an end. Within four years, the site was taken over by Napier Polytechnic and the Catholic presence in the East reduced to an inservice base on the Moray House campus. Nevertheless, from the Church's point of view, their quiet campaign had been a success. The Hierarchy had achieved what they had early identified as the essential goal: a viable College of Education which could act as the national centre for Catholic teacher education and which could preserve the principle of separate Catholic provision.

'Hands off Hamilton College'.

The campaigns run by Callendar Park and Hamilton were bound to be similar to one another and different from that of Craiglockhart. The two colleges were fighting for their survival whereas, after the first flurry of resistance, Craiglockhart was negotiating initially to avoid merger with a non-denominational colleges and later to achieve merger with Notre Dame on the best possible conditions. Because of these similarities, only the Hamilton campaign will be described in detail.

Once the government's proposals were announced, that campaign was quickly launched. Within two days the Hamilton Governors had held a special meeting to prepare their defence of the college. (90) Paton denounced the proposals in the TESS (91), while the staff began the sort of direct action which was soon to be orchestrated by a staff/student Action Committee.

> *LIVINGSTONE : The Hamilton staff was outraged, offended, all sorts of feelings were aroused, and they instantly put together an intention to act. One week into the campaign they were already pursuing the Secretary of State round the country, making protests*

wherever he was.

As in the 1977, there were two aspects to the campaign: rational argument to win over public opinion and political pressure to force the government to change its policy. One argument used was that against the waste of educational resources: that it did not make sense to close colleges when there was a long-term need to expand higher education. Instead the colleges should be retained as inservice centres and developed as centres of higher education in their areas. (92) In support of this case, people could have cited developments in England and Wales (it is an indication of the insularity of the Scottish system that they did not) where the closure or merger of colleges had been partly used to switch resources and so expand other forms of higher education.

In some ways this was easier in England and Wales because many of the colleges and polytechnics were under local authority control. In Scotland it could only have come about had the SED engineered it. Their difficulty would have been to find suitable partners for the colleges of education when neither the universities nor the central institutions showed any desire to take on board contracting colleges. With encouragement from SED, Hamilton had been forging links with Bell College to mount a new type of course for technical teachers. Paton believed that this was a possible way forward.

> *PATON : The green buttons [from SED] for Hamilton were straightforward: anything which suggested extending the links with the technical education group. I began to believe that there must be Hamilton type units [around the country]. I could see a big thing developing: Bell College, Hamilton College of Education, possibly Motherwell [F.E. College] because they were involved in the technical course. There were similar possibilities in Falkirk between Callendar Park and Falkirk Tech. It was similar in Ayrshire.*

The problem with this scenario was that it took insufficient account of the difference between Bell College, which had a considerable proportion of advanced work (and which might have become a central institution at the same time as Glasgow and Napier Colleges), and the local Further Education colleges at Ayr and Falkirk, which were mainly concerned with non-advanced F.E. There was no future for colleges of education in linking up with them, and the SED would never have allowed it when its policy was to encourage the larger colleges to take their courses to external validation and to collaborate with central institutions and with the Open

University.(93)

In any case the 'Hamilton-type units' were long-term aspirations and what was needed was immediate help. The only white knight on the horizon was Strathclyde Region, which might have been interested in acquiring Hamilton as a residential inservice centre and/or community college. The officials did indeed explore the possibility with their elected members and with SED but, when they were told that they would have to pay the District Valuer's price, (probably about £3 million and certainly way above what the college was eventually sold for) the Region backed off. (Appendix 14)

A more cogent argument politically than the waste of resources was that closing the colleges would not make savings, as the government claimed. As in 1977, the government was in the awkward position of not being able to provide reasonably accurate figures of the savings until the details of the closures had been worked out. (94) Meanwhile, ALCES and the Hamilton Action Committee produced their own figures, which suggested that the closures would not save money (95) and opposition M.Ps needled the government on its failure to substantiate its claims. (96) The government did eventually produce costings, (97) but these came too late to dispel the feeling that the it was as much concerned with political gestures as with genuine savings.(98) This feeling was reinforced when the chairman of the Scottish Select Committee put it to Fletcher that it was not clear what the savings would be and Fletcher replied that 'the colleges would be closed regardless of the figures'. (99) This was yet another example of the government's attitude. Ever since it decided in the summer of 1980 to state its decision rather than put out a consultative document, it had been clear that it was not interested in counter-arguments and that the only thing which might move it was political pressure.

The problem facing the political campaigners was to create the sort of broad-based movement which had been successful in 1977. This was obviously going to be more difficult in 1980. To begin with, the policy community was disunited. The GTC had endorsed the principle of college closures; the CP was split; COSLA was no longer defending the ten-college system; and even though the official EIS line was to defend them, some of its leaders had private doubts.

> *WBM: Did you still think at that stage [in 1980] that the ten-college system could be preserved ?*

POLLOCK : No, speaking personally. ..... I think that publicly our argument was that all ten colleges should be retained, that we should be producing more teachers to give teachers more time off to allow for inservice training. That would be our basic argument ...... What I was arguing, I think, at that time was more along the lines that these were educational facilities which should be retained for education rather than that all ten colleges should be retained as colleges of education. That there shouldn't be a sell-off, as there was.

In order to mount its campaign, Hamilton adopted the tactics which had previously served other colleges well. A petition was signed by over 200,000 people and sent to the Secretary of State; car stickers were issued; letters were sent to the press; individuals and organisations were encouraged to write to SED;(100) demonstrations were organised and local organisations lobbied. As a result a considerable body of support was built up. Naturally the college could count on the support of the NUS, which organised in October a week of action: leafleting, marching and picketing New St. Andrew's House. (101) It also had the official support of the EIS (102) and of the GTC, which twice wrote to SED complaining that the Secretary of State had ignored its advice that his decisions about closures should take into account the needs of the areas of traditional shortage in Strathclyde. (103) Strathclyde Region pressed the SED to retain Hamilton (104) but was inhibited from lobbying too hard for Hamilton by its unwillingness to attack Craigie.

MILLER : I was extremely disappointed that Hamilton was closed. It placed me and officers in a very difficult position inasmuch as, while we were in despair at Hamilton being closed, we certainly didn't want to argue that Hamilton should be retained at the expense of Craigie. ...

WBM: Did the Region become involved at all in the campaign to save Hamilton, or did the dilemma you've just described inhibit you from working on Hamilton's behalf?

MILLER: We were inhibited to a fair extent by the dilemma. Because, as I recall, it was being put to us that it was either Hamilton or Craigie. .... Therefore, it was difficult to become involved when it became obvious that one or the other would be closed.

None of these organisations could exert very strong political leverage and there was therefore perhaps even more emphasis than in 1977 on enlisting the support of M.Ps.

> *WBM : What more can you tell me about the 1980 campaign?*

> *LIVINGSTONE : The tactics were basically the same [as in 1977] but they had to be varied because of the different contexts. There was still a high level of rational argument .... That was the same. I think what we did more extensively was far more personal lobbying. There was a point where the M.Ps started to blanch when they saw us coming yet again.*

> *WBM : You mean that you went down to Westminster a great deal?*

> *LIVINGSTONE : Repeatedly. The members of the [ALCES] executive were repeatedly down there for meetings with all sorts of groups, lobbying individuals in all sorts of places.*

Labour opposition to the closures could be taken for granted, not only because of its natural adversarial stance against government policies, but because both Callendar Park and Hamilton were in Labour constituencies. So when the threatened colleges sent a delegation to the Labour Party conference at Blackpool, they came back with a promise that the Scottish Labour M.Ps would back their campaign 'to the hilt'. (105) One result was a flurry of questions in Parliament: 41 in the three months October-December, 1980, mainly asked by George Robertson, Harry Ewing and Dennis Canavan.(106) This, however, was less intense than the barrage which had faced the Labour government in the first few months of 1977; perhaps because these opposition M.Ps felt that they had less chance of success or perhaps because the closures were less a matter of political life or death to them than they had seemed to Ewing, Younger or Lord James Douglas-Hamilton in 1977.

By itself there was very little that the Labour opposition could do. The success of the campaign hinged on the reactions of the Tory backbenchers. Mitchell stressed how crucial that generally is :

> *MITCHELL : I think that at the end of the day Ministers are much more likely to respond to political pressures, especially within their own party, than they are to outside vested interests. It's particularly when*

they begin to feel that their own backbenchers are going to desert them.

This point was not lost on the campaign organisers.

> *LIVINGSTONE : We still went for the opposition, but what we now recognised was that we would have to get to the governing party. So that we had to get close to the Conservatives in some way and we succeeded remarkably well .... in discovering all of a sudden many members of the Hamilton staff who, if they did not have direct affiliation to the Conservative Party, certainly had sympathies. We were able to use them and their contacts to make some very fruitful contacts with some Conservative M.Ps - notably Allan Stewart, who was very powerfully helpful.*

On the face of it, lobbying Conservative M.Ps cannot have looked very promising: the government had a secure majority and Conservative M.Ps are traditionally loyal. Yet there were some hopeful signs. The local Tories in Renfrew and Lanark opposed the closure with Allan Stewart as their spokesman.(107) Other influential Tories, like Michael Ancram, seem to have been impressed by the college's case. But the real point of attack on Ministers was the leading part which they had played in defending the colleges in 1977. This was a source of acute embarrassment to them. Of course they tried to argue that since 1977 the situation had changed, but it only had in the sense that the over-capacity of the colleges had become more obvious. The logic of the situation had not changed and Ministers were essentially arguing the case which Bruce Millan had put to them and they had rejected.

This embarrassment came to a head in the debate in the Scottish Grand Committee on December 9th, 1980.(108) After predictable speeches from Younger and Millan, there came two significant contributions from Conservative backbenchers. Allan Stewart spoke strongly in defence of Hamilton, the decision to close which had 'touched a raw nerve in the body politic of the west of Scotland'. But the startling speech came from Tam Galbraith [Glasgow, Hillhead], a Conservative M.P of the old school whose words had all the more impact because he rarely spoke. Essentially it was a criticism of his own front bench for making an unprincipled U-turn and a plea for consistency and integrity.

> 'Saying one thing and doing the opposite the next is not good for democracy. The public should be able to rely on what we say and, when we express a point of view, to have confidence that we shall

stick to it. Yet I am sorry to say that the line taken by my right hon Friend today, and in his August statement, is completely different from what he was arguing three years ago in this Committee. Apart from the fact that he wants to retain Craigie, while his predecessor, the right hon Member for Craigton (Mr Millan) wanted to retain Hamilton, there is not much to choose between the two speeches. Though this morning the voice was the voice of Younger, the word, or the theme behind the words, were undoubtedly those of Millan....... Is it the case that our views cannot be relied upon and that they swing backwards and forwards, depending on whether we are on one side of the Committee or the other? With regard to teacher training colleges, sadly that seems to be the position'.

Finding no support from the backbenchers, except for a speech by John MacKay,[M.P. for Argyll and Bute] the Conservative Whips decided to advise their members to abstain, and the government was defeated by 40 votes to nil; in itself of no practical significance but a blow to its esteem comparable to the Labour defeat in the Grand Committee in 1977.

At this point the government seemed in considerable disarray. 'Ministers', said the Scotsman, 'have been completely inept in handling the case' (109), while the TESS talked about their 'sorry plight' and suggested that 'they are in danger of coming such a cropper that they will have to abandon their plans'.(110) Although some people in the colleges felt that success was within their grasp, it was not to be. The government's majority was too big, and the backbenchers' disquiet stopped short of outright rebellion. Nevertheless, the political pressures were strong enough to make Ministers look for some concessions that would take the sting out of the opposition. (111)

This was beginning to happen even before the debate in the Grand Committee. As we have seen, SED had begun to consider the possibility of merging Craiglockhart with Notre Dame. It also began to float the idea that some way might be found of continuing the inservice work which Hamilton did in the Lanark Division. When the Hamilton Governors met the Secretary of State on November 19th, he 'indicated that it was not his intention either to reduce the level of provision for inservice training in Lanarkshire or to require teachers to travel to Jordanhill...... He would wish to be advised from Hamilton College about how this might be effected'. (112) This request put the Governors on the spot, because they could not give that advice without conceding that the College was going to be closed, which at that point they

were not prepared to do.(113)

The government responded by keeping on the pressure. In January, 1981 it announced that inservice outstations would be created in Lanarkshire and Central Scotland and that the staffing complement of other colleges would be increased by the equivalent of the inservice staffing currently allocated to Hamilton and Callendar Park. (114) At the same time as it was thus weakening the case for the retention of the two colleges, the SED was trying to re-open informal lines of communication. As a result, Gold [Chairman of the Hamilton Governors] and Paton went to an informal meeting with SED officials at the beginning of February, at which the Department reaffirmed its intention of maintaining inservice provision in Lanarkshire, dropped hints that closure might be postponed for the sake of the existing students, (115) and urged the College to join a working party, which might eventually be a tri-partite one involving Jordanhill, to work out detailed proposals. (116)

By this time it was becoming clear that there would be no serious Conservative backbench rebellion, and even the campaign's supporters among Labour M.Ps were beginning to lose heart to judge from the few questions asked in Parliament from January onwards. (117) The Action Committee therefore had to decide whether to carry on with the campaign to save the college or to switch their aims to saving jobs and trying to ensure that the students suffered as little disruption as possible. When Gold and Paton reported back to the Board of Governors on their meeting with SED, the Action Committee representatives argued that the campaign should still go on until the end of February, but at this stage more with a view to extracting further concessions than with any real expectation of victory. (118)

By this time the issue had been taken up by the Scottish Select Committee, and the Governors decided to postpone any meeting with SED until the college had had a chance to present its case. This it did at the beginning of March (119) but, as we have noted, Fletcher brushed aside its arguments about the costs of closure. Therefore, when they met the Hamilton Governors on March 16th, the SED representatives made it clear that 'they were not present to talk about the merits of the closure decision, but to look at the method of promulgation of the regulations and the transfer of the assets to another college, as yet unnamed, but clearly recognised as Jordanhill'. (120) What they wanted, before making any formal approaches to Jordanhill, was an assurance that the Hamilton Governors were now willing to co-operate.

At the subsequent Board meeting on 18th March, Gold recommended that 'it was now time to enter into discussions with the Department about the closure of the college'. (121) While conceding that 'the central case to save the college was now lost', some of the staff still proposed further obstruction and delay and so the meeting of the Governors was adjourned while staff were balloted on whether negotiations should begin. However, at the resumed meeting on 23rd March, it was finally conceded that closure was inevitable and that negotiations must begin for the sake of the students and the staff.

Even before this, informal discussions had been taking place between Hamilton, Jordanhill and the SED which reassured the Hamilton people that Jordanhill would not attempt to impose unreasonable conditions.

> *PATON : Eventually in March I phoned Tom [Bone] and we met in the bar at MacDonald's hotel and had a wee talk. I told him that we intended to surrender and he said that he had kept quiet until I approached him. Obviously the only solution that could happen was the transfer of staff to Jordanhill. That started the negotiation . ... After that I went with our Chairman, Bill Gold, to see Angus Mitchell and Ian Wilson [Under-secretary, SED]. Wilson was the highest level at which the campaign had been conducted. ..... I never saw Angus Mitchell at all except that one day when he received my broken sword.*

> *Wilson and I cobbled together the six conditions.[See below] And ... once we reached that stage, I think that Jordanhill was pretty generous, though I would have welcomed a comment beforehand which never came.*

Once the Hamilton Governors had conceded defeat, these informal talks could be followed up by more formal meetings with Jordanhill representatives (122) and then by an approach to the Jordanhill Governors, who agreed at a special meeting on April 8th to join the tri-partite working party. From that point on events moved swiftly, driven by the government's political imperative to be seen to be closing the colleges at the end of the session. By June the negotiations had been completed (123) and it had been agreed that the Hamilton Board would be wound up and that the College would become the responsibility of the Jordanhill Board, enlarged by four additional members from the Hamilton Board. The six conditions were :

1. that Jordanhill took over the Hamilton College buildings, but was to dispose of them once they were no longer needed by pre-service students i.e. after the end of session 1981-82;

2. that the Hamilton academic staff were all to be transferred to Jordanhill, with their salaries conserved;

3. that the non-academic staff should be transferred to Jordanhill, if they wished to go and could be absorbed;

4. that the primary diploma students entering their final year in 1981-82 would complete it at Hamilton. Those entering their second year, would continue their course at Hamilton in 1981-82 but would then be transferred to Jordanhill

5. that the B.Ed students in Year II at the end of 1981-82 should be allowed to transfer either to Jordanhill or Craigie;

6. that inservice provision would be maintained in the Lanark Division, using the College in 1981-82 and thereafter an outstation to be established in Lanarkshire.

Therefore, even though the Hamilton campaign had failed in its main objective, it had been sufficiently effective to win a number of significant concessions. The staff had not lost their jobs; the interests of the students had been reasonably well-safeguarded; guarantees had been given about the inservice provision; and the Hamilton college site had been given an extra year's life for the sake of a more orderly transition.

In making these tactical concessions, the Department did not in any way abandon its strategic aim of closing the college. Indeed, once it woke up to the fact, the SED realised that it was greatly to its advantage to work for mergers or take-overs rather than simple closures, as this transferred all the problems of selling buildings and making staff redundant to the governing bodies. As Mitchell admitted :

> MITCHELL: I do recall a sigh of relief in SED when Jordanhill said, 'Yes, we'll play ball on this one'. Because it was a considerable imposition on the college to take it on.

Meanwhile, the Callendar Park campaign had been following a similar course. Their Governors tried to hold out a little longer, but the end result was a take-over by Moray House.

The 1980-81 campaigns failed to repeat the success of 1977; not because they were less well-organised or because their arguments were less cogently presented, although in the interim the case for contraction had become more self- evident. The reasons for failure lay essentially in the changed political situation. Although the splits in the policy community made the government's task easier, the crucial factors were that the government had a secure majority; that its backbenchers had no ideological qualms about cutting government expenditure; that there was no nationalist threat to scare them into rebellion; and that, even if they had rebelled, there were so few Scottish Conservative backbenchers that the government could have ridden the rebellion out.

So session 1981-82 started with the ten-college system reduced to seven. Hamilton had become part of Jordanhill, Callendar Park part of Moray House, and Craiglockhart had merged with Notre Dame to form the new Catholic college, St. Andrew's. This ended the first phase of contraction. Doubtless contraction was necessary given the falling demand for teachers, but the form it took seems to have been driven largely by political expediency and very little by thoughts of what was best for teacher education.

Why did teacher education in Scotland develop differently?

Up to 1981, the development of the teacher education system in Scotland differed from that in England and Wales in several significant respects. At the risk of some repetition, it may be useful to summarise those differences and the reasons for them.

1.   Seven of the ten Scottish colleges had survived as separate institutions, a much higher proportion than south of the Border.

2.   Where mergers had taken place, they had been between colleges of education. Polytechnic arrangements had found no favour in Scotland.

3.   Nor had diversification. The seven colleges were still largely devoted to teacher training and the range of courses they offered had altered little in the previous twenty years.

4. Progress towards an all-graduate profession in Scotland had been slower.

5. The Scottish colleges had developed a more extensive and different pattern of inservice provision.

What were the reasons for these differences ? One key factor in the survival of the seven colleges was that they started from a stronger base. The large Scottish colleges were very much larger than their English counterparts, and had the added strengths of a) a monopoly (Stirling University excepted) of graduate training; b) courses for social workers, youth and community educators and speech therapists; and c) stronger involvement in inservice training. The other factors, as we have seen, were political. When faced with the threat of closure, the Scottish colleges fought harder, partly because ALCES was more militant and partly because initially they were offered no alternative to closure, whereas the staff in LEA colleges in England and Wales could see prospects for themselves in merged institutions or elsewhere in the LEA's service. However, that harder fight would not have been as successful as it was if the colleges had not been able to portray closures as an attack on the Scottish educational system and had not found allies willing to exploit the peculiar political situation in Scotland.

Their stronger base was also one of the reasons why none of the colleges merged with other institutions of higher education to form polytechnics. During their period of expansion in the 1960s and early 1970s, the colleges saw no need for mergers. If they looked anywhere for links, it was towards the universities which validated their B.Eds and from which most of their staff had graduated. To have merged with a Central Institution would have seemed, to many college staff, a step down in the world. The universities, however, showed no interest in closer links with the colleges. Nor for that matter did the Central Institutions, whose traditions were in technical and commercial training. Sandison summed up the situation very succinctly.

WBM : One thing that helped the English colleges to diversify was that most of them were merged with polytechnics or institutes of higher education. Why do you think this did not happen in Scotland ?

SANDISON : The [college] principals were not keen on it.

WBM : But neither was the Department. According to the records, Norman Graham was set against it.

SANDISON : You have to remember that there were no polytechnics as such in Scotland. The Scottish tradition in the CIs was one of specialist institutions offering a relatively narrow range of courses, and the Department wanted to preserve that. So the CIs did not offer a natural home for the colleges. They always looked more towards the universities, but the universities at that time had no interest in taking over teacher education.

Because the colleges, the CIs and the SED were all satisfied with the status quo, the post-Robbins debate about the place of the colleges in higher education died away in the 1970s and 1980s. In other countries (e.g. England, Australia and the U.S.A) it was regarded as axiomatic that it was better for both students and staff if teacher education was carried on in a multi-disciplinary institution, usually a university, but Scotland clung to its tradition of separate specialist institutions. Whether or not this was the best course, the issue was scarcely debated. I put this to Mitchell :

WBM : In the great reorganisation of the '70s, most of the English colleges disappeared .... and in Scotland that didn't happen. There doesn't seem to have been a great deal of debate in Scotland about the possibility of a polytechnic type solution.

MITCHELL : It was certainly discussed within the Department but not pursued. I don't remember the details of the argument, but certainly there was no sign of outside pressure for that solution. .... And there was absolutely no sign of any desire on the part of the colleges to move towards polytechnic solutions. It may well be that the Department itself ought to have put that more strongly as a possible option. ..... I think there are quite good educational arguments for mergers with polytechnics which were never properly debated or addressed.

An example, perhaps, of the tendency of the Department to wait for pressure for change and then react to it, rather than take initiatives which it knew would be resisted.

If there was no encouragement for mergers from the SED, neither was there for diversification. In the Department's view, any new field the colleges might want to move into was already occupied by some other, more appropriate institution. So, even had they wished to do so - and most of them did not - the Principals could not have

led their colleges away from their specialist roles.

> *PATON : There was no way in which any linkages could be made which threatened established empires. But more importantly, I think, it was just that even those of us who felt, like me, that there must be some wider role for the colleges, couldn't really articulate what we were after. Was it something very different ? And liberal arts colleges began to have a bad name because of some of the failures in America. So there was a reluctance to end up as that. We were at least professional institutions and leaders in a particular field. Jimmy Scotland was very articulate on that. That's what he knew and wanted to do. But I think there were only two voices [in the CP] against.*

With mergers considered undesirable and diversification blocked off, the colleges looked to counterbalance contraction by moving to a degree for all primary teachers and by expanding inservice. By 1981 in England and Wales the primary diploma course had been phased out; in Scotland, the possibility of a primary degree was still being explored. The reason for this was simple : the insistence of Scottish educational opinion on a four-year degree and the reluctance of the Treasury to agree to it.

If Scotland lagged behind in this respect, it was more fortunate in the inservice field. The response to contraction in England and Wales had been to try to increase the number of teachers attending award-bearing courses. In Scotland, this option was not available as there was no tradition of releasing teachers for long courses, other than those leading to special qualifications. Most authorities were - and remain - unwilling to meet the costs of release and suspicious of the claim that teachers want or need post-experience qualifications. So the Scottish response to contraction was to allow the colleges to retain staff provided that they were used for school-focused inservice. Politically, this was a device to cushion the colleges from drastic cutbacks; but educationally it was argued that school-focused inservice, properly organised, was often a better way of bringing about improvements in schools than releasing teachers for courses.

If the changes in Scotland are compared to those in England and Wales, the Scottish teacher education system may well be judged somewhat conservative, even complacent. Although there would be truth in that judgement, conservatism has had beneficial effects. Because the Scottish colleges did not undergo institutional upheavals to the same extent, there has been more continuity and hence a more secure framework within which to get on with the business of training teachers

and in which to respond to change in a more considered way. Perhaps as a result of this, as well as of the different political climate in Scotland, the Scottish colleges, though regularly criticised, did not become the targets of such fierce criticism as that levelled at English teacher education institutions in the 1980s.

Epilogue.

However, this takes us beyond 1981, in some ways an awkward place to end because several major changes have taken place subsequently, notably :

1. The coming of the all-graduate profession through the phasing out the Diploma course and its replacement by a primary B.Ed from 1984.

2. The further contraction of the system. In 1987 Aberdeen and Dundee merged to form Northern College and Dunfermline was absorbed into Moray House. This reduced the seven colleges to five and it could just as well have been four. However, as the Ayr constituency became more marginal with every passing election, Craigie continued to enjoy political protection.

3. After defending their separateness in their evidence to STEAC, the colleges finally had to abandon it when the government decided to abolish the binary line. Three of the five are now in the process of becoming constituent parts of universities. This will virtually bring the history of the colleges of education to an end, while ushering in a new era in teacher education in Scotland.

Chapter 7: Tables.

Table 7.1 : Intake quotas to all Scottish Colleges of Education, 1978-81.

Year	Primary Diploma	Primary post-graduate	Secondary
1978-79	700	150	1600
1979-80	760	200	1900
1980-81	545	145	1600

Table 7.2 : Intake quotas for individual colleges, 1978-81.

College	Course	Year		
		1978-79	1979-80	1980-81
Aberdeen	Primary Dip.	100	100	70
	Primary PG	20	25	180
	Secondary PG	210	245	180
Callendar Park	Primary Dip.	55	65	45
	Primary PG	10	10	10
Craigie	Primary Dip.	50	75	55
	Primary PG	10	10	15
Craiglockhart	Primary Dip	50	55	40
	Primary PG	10	10	10
	Secondary PG	60	60	45
Dundee	Primary Dip	50	55	40
	Primary PG	10	10	10
	Secondary PG	130	155	115
Dunfermline	B.Ed P.E	100	110	80
Hamilton	Primary Dip	60	70	50
	Primary PG	15	15	15
	Secondary PG	25	35	30
Jordanhill	Primary Dip.	120	125	90
	Primary PG	30	35	25
	Secondary PG/P.E	545	655	630
Moray House	Primary Dip.	125	125	90
	Primary PG	25	30	20
	Secondary PG	350	415	305
Notre Dame	Primary Dip.	90	90	65
	Primary PG	21	25	20
	Secondary PG	180	225	215

Table 7.3: The extent of intake cuts in 1980/81.

	1979/80 quotas	1980/81 proposals	Decrease	%age decrease
Primary Diploma	760	540	220	29
Primary Post-grad.	200	130	70	35
Secondary	1900	1600	300	16

NOTES

1. Cope (1978) p.81.

2. GTC. Minutes of Supply Committee, 31 March,1981. The Committee noted 'with deep regret' that there was a massive surplus of primary teachers; that for the first time there was a serious secondary surplus and that this was likely to get worse.

3. The figures for Dundee include students on Social Work and Youth and Community courses.

4. The figures are from the annual return of students in training as at 31 October,1980. They include students on Social Work, Youth and Community and Speech Therapy courses.

5. SED (1977a). This was only a rough estimate as there were no agreed building standards for colleges of education and therefore no reliable figures.

6. SED file ED26/1409.

7. Ibid. By this time the position was that Aberdeen had agreed to make surplus teaching accommodation available to Grampian Region and residential accommodation to RGIT. Callendar Park had allocated a block of accommodation to the Forth Valley Health Board; Craigie to Ayr Technical College; Craiglockhart to Napier, and Hamilton to the Lanarkshire Division Resource Centre.

   Jordanhill was centralising its accommodation by giving up various buildings outwith the campus, and Notre Dame was giving up its Dowanhill site. A room utilisation survey had shown that Dunfermline had no spare capacity. The only outstanding problems were in Dundee, where the working party was considering rationalisation of tertiary education, and at Moray House which had surplus accommodation but of such poor quality that it would need costly work to turn it to good use.

8. SED file ED51/8/413.

9. Ibid. By 1978 the SED had revised its estimates of the need for women PE teachers mainly because it believed that it had underestimated the likely wastage. This can be seen by comparing its 1977 and 1978 estimates for the number of students taking the pre-service B.Ed.

	78-79	79-80	80-81	81-82	82-83	83-84	84-85
1977 est.	478	435	381	335	290	243	228
1978 est.	536	465	415	400	380	357	328

At the same time, the demand for male P.E teachers was falling and this was leading to under-utilisation of the SSPE facilities at Jordanhill. One obvious solution, which appealed to some people in the SED was to make both institutions mixed.

'This scheme', it was noted, ' is attractive educationally , certainly to the generalist. A mixed institution is more in line with present thinking than a single sex one. The time has perhaps come to examine the common needs of young people in physical activities rather than to continue to highlight differences'.

Unfortunately these enlightened views did not prevail at the time. Had they done so, there would have been no need to destroy the SSPE.

10.   See Epilogue to this chapter.

11.   SED (1982). The way in which this contraction was managed would be an interesting research topic in itself.

12.   SED note : Staffing of Colleges for Inservice Training (undated).

13.   These guidelines were produced by a National Advisory Committee set up by the CP and chaired by James Scotland. The first of the Diploma courses were offered in 1981-82. The CP had set up a similar advisory committee for guidance courses in 1978.

14.   There were four such co-ordinating committees for Science, Technology and Business Studies; Art, Architecture and Cognate Subjects; Food, Nutrition and Cognate Subjects; and Health and Recreation. The colleges of education were only involved in the Health and Recreation Committee through their courses in Physical Education and Speech Therapy.

The purpose of these committees was to produce a record of existing courses and to plan developments so that there were no unnecessary duplication. After attending the first meeting of the Health and Recreation Committee, Bone reported back :

'HMCI Mr Smith [convenor of the committee] had at one point mentioned the usefulness of our being able to agree on something, and I asked how agreement might be reached. The answer made it clear that they [SED] reserve the right of the Secretary of State to approve courses, and therefore it is the SED which takes decisions. It hopes to be able at meetings of this kind to persuade the colleges to agree to its own policies'.

Jordanhill. Minutes of the Principal's Committee, 31 October,1979.

15. SED. Explanatory Note. Colleges of Education : Procedure for the submission and approval of courses. February,1981.

16. Jordanhill. Minutes of the Principals' Committee, 15 February,1981.

17. Marker (1980a).

18. Except for the courses leading to special qualifications i.e those for nursery or remedial teachers, or teachers of children with special educational needs.

19. Another way would have been to adopt the present system of giving the regional authorities a specific grant for inservice and require them to purchase services from the colleges, but this was not considered a possibility in the late 1970s.

20. NCITT (1979).

21. CTES (1981) paras 5.1 and 9.1.

22. The only change which came out of the CTES report was that Napier College and Glasgow College were both transferred from local authority control and became central institutions.

23. SED file ED51/8/419.

24. The returns are in the Minutes of the Inservice Committee of the CP.

25. Jordanhill, for instance, had a staffing allocation for inservice of 48 FTE. Between 1976-77 and 1980-81 the number of full-time staff in the college fell from 365 to 291. So, by 1980-81, the 48 FTE for inservice accounted for 16.5% of the college's work. After the take-over of Hamilton, the proportion rose to 25%.

26. SED (1977b) paras.12 and 13.

27. SED file ED51/8/413.

28. Craigie College. Minutes of the Board of Studies. Report of Working Party on Future College Developments. 7 July,1977.

29. SED file ED51/8/413. Commenting on the colleges' proposals in general, the SED noted that they raised two issues of principle. One was whether to develop the Dip.H.E. when proposals for this from the central institutions had been rejected on the grounds that there was sufficient provision for non-vocational higher education in Scotland through the general Arts Degrees at the universities. The other was whether to continue the present policy of confining such general degrees to the universities.

30. Ibid.

31. SED file ED51/8/383.

32. GTC. Minutes of the Council. 5 October,1977.

33. SED (1977b).

34. Much of this may be found in the Secretary of State's responses to the GTC at their meeting on 28 February,1977. GTC. Minutes of Council, 1 June,1977.

Appendix II.

35.   SED file ED51/8/419

36.   Ibid.

37.   At this point, the Sneddon Report had not been published but SED was aware of its contents.

38.   SED (1977d) and SED (1977e).

39.   SED file ED51/8/419.

40.   SED file ED51/8/384.

41.   Ibid.

42.   The report from the working party is printed as Appendix III to the GTC Minutes, 5 October,1978.

43.   SED file ED51/8/384.

44.   SED file ED51/8/385.

45.   SED file ED51/8/364.

46.   The results were : Conservative 339, Labour 269, Liberals 11, SNP 2, Others 14.

47.   The government's dilemma was analysed in a leader in the TESS, 1 February,1980 and can also be seen in its temporising answers to parliamentary questions e.g. on 10 December,1979, 5 March,1980 and 2 April,1980

48.   SED (1980a).

49.   SED letter to colleges, 21 February,1980 (copy in Jordanhill Archives).

50.   General Teaching Council. Intakes to Teacher Training: a response to the Secretary of State's consultative paper.

51.   GTC. Minutes of the Supply Committee. 4 March,1980.

    'With regard to secondary teachers, Mr E Miller provided considerable evidence of existing shortages within the Strathclyde region, and persuaded members that the proposed college output in Secondary would be quite inadequate for Strathclyde's needs unless a much higher proportion of the output went to Strathclyde than in previous years'.

52.   GTC. Minutes of Council. 5 March,1980.

53.   THES, 14 March,1980. Smaller Scottish colleges under threat. and TESS 21 March,1980. Alternative view of training. (letter from George Paton)

54.   TESS,14 March,1980. Dangerous presumption.

55.   Letter to SED, 7 March,1980 (copy in Jordanhill Archives). These views did not find favour with all his colleagues. At a subsequent meeting of the EIS executive, a motion reaffirming EIS policy of opposition to college closures was only carried by 11 to 9. TESS 4 April,1980. There was, however, much

stronger support for Pollock in the Council.

56. See for example the articles in TESS by Forbes (Craigie) 4 April,1980; Bloomer 18 April,1980; and Rae and Jenkins (Callendar Park) 23 May,1980.

57. Hansard. 2 April,1980.

58. Scotsman, 6 March,1980. Colleges under threat.

59. Hansard 2 April,1980.

60. Marker (1980b). Most articles of this sort were quickly followed by rejoinders. This one was not. Either the people in the smaller colleges thought it was irrelevant or, as I would prefer to think, could not find convincing arguments against it.

61. In addition to the articles in TESS by Forbes and by Rae and Jenkins (note 58 above), there were others by Peddie (Craigie) 25 April,1980, and Paton and Robertson (Hamilton) 2 May,1980.

62. Hamilton. Minutes of the Board of Studies.23 April,1980.

63. George Foulkes (Lab.) as reported in the Glasgow Herald 31 March,1980; and John McKay (Con.) Decline and fall of college rolls. TESS, 18 April,1980.

64. Jordanhill. Minutes of the Board of Studies. 1 May,1980.

It is difficult to know how serious this threat was, but it seemed so at the time and Bone was given to believe that this letter helped to head it off.

BONE : In defence of their own position, Hamilton and Craigie argued quite strongly that Jordanhill and Moray House should be shut or, if they weren't shut altogether, they should give up primary training and concentrate on secondary. We were talking earlier about a letter I drafted .... which pointed out the folly of that. .... Keeley [Assistant Secretary SED] once told me in an unguarded moment that that was an influential letter, because some people were seriously thinking: 'Can we fudge it all by leaving Jordanhill and Moray House as the secondary colleges and leaving primary everywhere else ?

Ruthven told me that Moray House took the danger equally seriously.

65. TESS. 4 July,1980.

66. SED (1980a).

67. A Consultative Paper [SED(1980b)] was issued but during 1980-81 it was overshadowed by the controversies over the closure of colleges and so there was little progress towards an all-graduate profession. This finally came when B.Ed degrees replaced the primary diploma starting in 1984.

68. SED (1980a).

69.   One interesting minor point is that there was clearly a last minute change in the section of the document relating to Craiglockhart. At that time official documents were duplicated from stencils, which could not easily be changed. It can be seen quite clearly in paragraph 30 that the key last sentences are in a different type and out of line. These sentences read as follows, with the changed words in italics.

'It would not, however, be practicable at present to accommodate the Craiglockhart students at Notre Dame and, in any event there is a strong case for retaining a Roman Catholic *training facility* in the east of Scotland. The Secretary of State has *concluded that in the circumstances it would be desirable that Craiglockhart should be discontinued as a separate college and merged - preserving a distinct Roman Catholic unit - with another institution in the east of Scotland. Discussions will take place about this.*

This suggests that there were differences of opinion within SED, but we do not know what they were nor what the wording was before the changes.

70.   Even the Scotsman, normally favourable to the Edinburgh establishment, commented (Leader, 7 August,1980):

'Why should Hamilton and Callendar Park be doomed while Craigie escapes unscathed? Mr Younger's explanation is that there should be a fair geographical spread. By that criterion the East of Scotland appears to be well favoured. Craigie is to the south-west of Hamilton but both are in Strathclyde, and presumably the deciding factor was that Craigie is in Mr Younger's constituency ..... Callendar Park benefited in the past from its location in Mr Harry Ewing's constituency, and politicians of all parties are inclined to look after their own'.

71.   *MITCHELL : I think by that time [1980] both Ministers and officials had come to recognise that Dunfermline had a respectable case for preservation, at least as a plant, whether it was independent or not.*

72.   Glasgow Herald. 7 August, 1980, quoting comments by Paton.

73.   TESS. 15 August,1980. Ruling a divided profession.

74.   Glasgow Herald. 7 August, 1980. Comments by Paton and Rae.

75.   For instance, COSLA refused to take any action to support the colleges and Green, the Convenor of its Education Committee, commented that there was no point in asking for more teachers to be trained than Scotland had the capacity to

employ. TESS. 5 September,1980.

76. CP. Minutes of meeting. 7 August,1980.

77. Jordanhill. Minutes of the Principal's Committee, 1 October,1980. Bone's report on the JCCES meeting on September 29th.

78. Scotsman. 8 August,1980. ALCES later shifted its official line to defending the threatened colleges, but it is doubtful how far the members in the larger colleges supported that stance.

79. TESS. 19 September,1980 reports Harry Ewing's attack on what he regarded as Hamilton's selfish campaign to save itself.

80. Notre Dame. Minutes of the Board of Governors. 18 April,1980.

81. Scotsman. 29 August,1980.

82. Notre Dame. Minutes of the Board of Governors. 9 October,1980.

83. TESS, 7 November,1980. This reports that Fletcher had met the Craiglockhart Governors and had told them that the only possible alternatives were merger with either Moray House or Dundee. The Governors commented:

     'We were astonished that these should be the only suggestions since precisely the same locations were proposed in 1977 by the previous government and successfully opposed by the Governors of Craiglockhart with help from Mr Fletcher'.

84. Notre Dame. Minutes of the Board of Governors. 9 December,1980.

85. TESS 9 January,1981.

86. Notre Dame. Minutes of the Board of Governors. 9 December,1980.

87. Ibid

88. Notre Dame. Minutes of the Board of Governors. 27 March,1980.

89. Ibid. 'Father Hart expressed concern at the apparent pressure from the Hierarchy for the retention of a Primary Diploma Course in the East. Bishop Devine hinted that the bishops were divided over this'.

90. Hamilton. Minutes of the Board of Governors, 8 August,1980.

91. TESS, 15 August,1980. Mindless cuts solve nothing.

92. The EIS had already made this case in John Pollock's letter to SED, 7 March,1980. It was made again by the Hamilton Board of Studies in Section 5 of their response to 'The Future of Colleges of Education in Scotland'. Hamilton. Minutes of the Board of Studies, 15 October,1980.

93. Marker (1991) includes a brief description of the co-operation between three colleges (Dundee, Jordanhill and Notre Dame) and the Open University in connection with its Diploma in Reading Development. Jordanhill also co-operated with Paisley College to mount a post-graduate Diploma in Computer Education.

94. This point was made by Younger in his speech to the Scottish Grand Committee, 9 December,1980.

95. TESS, 31 October,1980.

96. Questions by Maxton (7 November,1980); Robertson (13 and 26 November,1980) and Canavan (8 December,1980).

97. Fletcher's letter to Ancram, 20th January,1981.(Scottish Office Press Notice)

98. I am not arguing here that, in the long term, it was not cheaper to run a five college system than a ten college system. But initially the costs of compensation for the redundant staff and of the alternative arrangements (e.g. the inservice outstation in Lanarkshire) were such that the net savings were probably quite small.

99. TESS, 13 March,1981.

100. Hansard, 3 November, 1980 gives a list of the organisations which had made representations on behalf of Hamilton and Callendar Park.

101. TESS, 17 October,1980.

102. SEJ, 3 October,1980. Institute urges rethink on college closures.

103. GTC. Minutes of Council. 1 October and 3 December,1980.

104. Glasgow Herald, 20 September,1980.

105. Ibid. 1 October,1980.

106. During this period, Robertson asked 14 questions, Ewing 6 and Canavan 4.

107. Allan Stewart's Speech to Scottish Grand Committee, 9 December,1980.

'My purpose is limited and single: to express to the Committee and to the Government the concern, anxiety, and opposition of a large number of my constituents to the proposal to close Hamilton College. That criticism has also been expressed publicly by such bodies as the Conservative group in the Strathclyde Region and North Lanarkshire Conservative district councillors'.

108. Parliamentary Debates. Scottish Grand Committee. Colleges of Education. 9 December,1980.

109. Scotsman, 10 December,1980.

110. TESS, 12 December,1980.

111. According to Livingstone, Michael Ancram played an important part in shaping the eventual compromise.

LIVINGSTONE : One other Tory .... who was very helpful - in fact who was probably the fixer in the end - was Michael Ancram. By the fixer, I mean the one who worked out the deal by which, instead of Hamilton being closed and all its staff sacked, there would be the

opportunity of merger. Michael Ancram was heavily involved in that behind the scenes. ......

WBM. Why was Michael Ancram so important in all this?

LIVINGSTONE : He was the local member for one of our [ALCES] executive. He was a very sympathetic figure, simply. And we had been able to get to him - I don't mean anything pernicious by that. I just mean that we had been able to get our message to him and met him repeatedly on quasi-social grounds.

I wrote to Ancram asking for confirmation of this but he replied that he now had no recollection of it.

112. Hamilton. Minutes of the Chairman's Committee of the Governors. 10 December,1980.
113. Ibid.
114. Scotsman, 16 January,1981.
115. According to the report in the Minutes of the Hamilton Board of Governors, 18 March,1981: 'The SED officials had promised to attempt to dissuade the Secretary of State from his June 1981 intention'. - an interesting example of the tensions between the officials (including the inspectorate) and the politicians.
116. Hamilton. Minutes of the Board of Governors, 9 February,1981.
117. From January to July,1981, there were only 9 questions asked, all written. Four of these were asked by John MacKay and were obviously planted by SED.
118. Hamilton. Minutes of the Board of Governors. 9 February,1981.
119. TESS. 6 March,1981.
120. Hamilton Minutes of the Board of Governors, 18 March,1981.
121. Ibid.
122. Jordanhill. Minutes of the Board of Governors, 8 April,1981.
123. Ibid. 23 June,1981.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE POLICY PROCESS IN TEACHER EDUCATION.

The policy agenda.

If we go back to Hogwood's model of the policy process, one possible starting point is his concept of a policy agenda - 'those demands made upon government to which policy makers choose or feel obliged to give serious attention'. (1) This definition focuses attention on those issues which are actively being considered with a view to some action being taken. Beyond them, at any one time, there will be other issues being raised and other lines of action being urged which government refuses to regard as practical possibilities.(2) The demand for an all-graduate profession, for instance, was put forward by the EIS for decades, was taken up by both the CP and the GTC in the aftermath of the 1976 cutbacks, but was resisted by the SED and only reached the policy agenda in 1980 when the SED produced its consultative paper 'All-Graduate Entry to Primary Teaching'.(3)

How did issues reach the policy agenda? Since teacher education is a subsidiary system which is there to serve schools which in turn serve society, the really big issues were generated by social changes. In this period, the expansion and contraction of the system was a response to demographic changes and to economic circumstances which induced governments to choose cutbacks in teacher training rather than improved pupil/teacher ratios. The Robbins Report and the developments which followed from it were a response to an increasing demand for higher education which reflected complex social changes. In such cases, the initiative in putting the issues on the agenda had to come from government, as can be seen in the way in which Niall McPherson set out an agenda for the SCTT. Individuals or groups might, however, influence either the timing of the initiative or the way in which the issues were perceived. For instance, the way in which Wood made the SED aware of the problem of overcrowding at Jordanhill may have helped to shake them out of their complacency about college accommodation and to define the problem of expansion as one of building a college in the West to take the pressure off Jordanhill.

The smaller issues had more varied origins. The pressure for college associateships came originally from the CP as a result of its desire to meet the changing needs of the secondary schools and at the same time to enhance the status of the colleges. The pressure to extend the B.Ed beyond the four city colleges came from the

institutional ambitions of those colleges which did not wish to remain permanently in the second division.

Although issues like these originated with particular interest groups, probably even the smaller issues were mostly put on the agenda by the Department. The GTC working party on graduate training was set up in response to the SED memorandum of May 1970. The proposals for a three-year primary degree were initially put by the Department to the CP. The increasing SED control over college courses and the eventual decision that they should all be externally validated came because experience of working with the CNAA and the Central Institutions had convinced key members of the inspectorate that this was necessary to improve the quality of college courses.

Not all issues came onto the agenda in these considered ways. Policy-making might be forward planning, but it might also be crisis management. So the building of the temporary colleges at Ayr and Falkirk can be seen as a reaction to the crisis created by the delays in building Hamilton and the sudden expansion of college inservice in 1977 as a reaction to the cutbacks in preservice intakes. It was, of course, more than that. People both inside and outside SED had been advocating the expansion of inservice for a number of years, but the cutbacks of 1976-77 provided the opportunity and without them the expansion would probably not have happened when it did nor on the same scale.

Wherever the issues came from externally, whether from crises or interest groups, the SED was the gate-keeper to the policy agenda. Both Ruthven and Paton commented on the power of the SED to control developments and the futility of pursuing policies without a clear signal of SED support.

> *RUTHVEN : I think that most college principals realised that, if they wanted to innovate and have anything new introduced, they had to discuss it with SED and get agreement in principle at any rate.*

> *PATON : Suddenly the SED was talking about a post-graduate secondary course in 1974. This was a good thing but it had to be struggled for, the way these games are usually played. It was really someone like the good Doctor John [J . McEwan, Director of Education for Lanarkshire] who had pushed the SED but the SED let it be known that it was possible and then the college had to take the initiative.*

Where this power was most clearly seen was in respect of the issues which never reached the agenda or only did so after long delay. For instance, the SED twice headed off demands for a fundamental review of the teacher training system; once in the wake of the James Report and again during the attempted closures in 1977. It discouraged debate about alternative roles for the colleges with the result that, as Mitchell admitted, the arguments for and against polytechnic type structures were never properly rehearsed. It also managed, with Treasury support, to delay the coming of an all-graduate profession. Indeed it is difficult to think of any issue which reached the agenda without active SED support. The nearest might be the extension of the B.Ed to the smaller colleges, which the SED seems to have acquiesced in rather than promoted.

How were policy issues processed ?

Once on the agenda, how were policy issues processed ? This study bears out Jordan & Richardson's view (outlined in Chapter One) that, provided the issues are routine ones which do not generate political controversies, the process will be one of 'bureaucratic accommodation' i.e. of negotiation between 'civil servants and civil-servant like officers of interest groups' (4); that business will proceed by discussion and negotiation rather than by dictatorial fiat for two main reasons. One is that a generalist civil service may lack technical expertise. The Minutes of the SCTT suggest that the SED relied quite heavily on the technical advice of the CP in the 1960s. However, this was at a time when the Department had withdrawn from inspection of the colleges and the main formal contact was between the Principals and the Senior Chief Inspector. Once the Inspectorate was reorganised and a Chief Inspector appointed in charge of teacher education, the dependence on the CP probably lessened, although it certainly did not disappear.

The second is that, if a government department can claim to have consulted what are seen as the relevant interests and to have discovered (or established) a consensus in support of a policy, this gives that policy a cloak of legitimacy. So, faced with contentious issues, the SED found it convenient to claim the support of independent advisory bodies: the SCTT over capital grants to Catholic colleges; the GTC over the admission of men to the primary diploma course; and the GTC over the closure of colleges in 1980.

A great deal of the consultation which took place was informal. Within the small world of teacher education, there were constant comings and goings in three main directions : between institutions (e.g. between colleges or between colleges and

local authorities); between the SED and outside bodies; and within the Department between the inspectorate, officials and (more rarely) politicians. This created a network in which many of the participants felt that personal influences and relationships were very important. Bone talked about this in relation to the CP.

> *BONE : The factor I didn't make enough of in our earlier discussions was personalities. ...... The leader of the group ([CP] throughout the '70s was Jimmy Scotland. He wasn't chairman all the time. Other people took their turn. But while Jimmy was alive he was virtually the leading personality. It was not that others bowed to him, but he carried a lot of weight. The one who had the second greatest amount of weight in the early years was Ethel Rennie. Not in terms of the size of Craigie, but in terms of personality and the way she knew other people and to some extent her own easy contacts with senior people in SED.*

These informal contacts may well have been crucial in forming ideas about what should be done and what in current circumstances is feasible, as were the informal contacts between Ministers and the EIS over the associateship proposals. However, one can only catch glimpses of them in the records or retrieve fragments of them through interviews. We have seen, for instance, the dinner at which Curran floated the idea of a Strathclyde University B.Ed; the walk which Bishop Devine and McGettrick took on the moors above Buxton; the dinner at which Mitchell and the Catholic Hierarchy agreed on the main lines of the compromise over Craiglockhart. But these must be just a fraction of the significant discussions which took place off-the-record.

> *WBM.: Did you feel that pressure from the GTC brought about quite significant changes ?*

> *J MILLER : In some cases it certainly did. There was at least one occasion where we flatly said we wouldn't endorse the proposal*

> *WBM. : I haven't found that in the Minutes.*

> *J MILLER : It may very well not be in the Minutes. This could very well have been done by a phone call from me to a certain [college] Principal.*

Sometimes these informal networks would be used deliberately to float ideas or to sound out opinions about individuals. Mitchell describes this process from the standpoint of the SED.

WBM : One thing you see in the records, which of course one knew about anyway, is the way in which the Department took individual soundings about issues before perhaps it consults the relevant organisation, or perhaps decided not to go ahead with consultation. Was that a fairly regular feature of Departmental procedures ?

MITCHELL : I would say it is used occasionally but not as a matter of course. One of the drawbacks to it, of course, being the risk of premature leakage which can be politically very embarrassing to Ministers, particularly if a tabloid gets hold of something and twists it. But obviously there are some people whom you know well enough to trust that they will not leak. With others you can't be so sure.

WBM : I've found in the files a number of occasions on which you've sounded out individual college or university principals or directors of education on particular matters and obviously they are not the sort of people who leak things to the Daily Record.

MITCHELL : I would say that the individual soundings are particularly valuable when you are talking about individual people. You know, 'Shall we make so-and-so chairman of such-and-such a body, or who are the other candidates in the offing to go onto a quango ?' Where you really can't treat that too openly, though sometimes you may go to a trade union and say 'Please give us some names'. But that's a different situation.

WBM : But I have come across instances where you have sounded out views on something we'll come across later. When you were looking at the idea of changes in teacher training post 1977, that of having some sort of 2-year general course followed by one year for an ordinary degree or two years for the degree and teaching qualification. Soundings were taken from one or two of the college principals, one or two university principals and some others. There were about half a dozen people that the inspectors went out and chatted to, asking them what their reaction to this would be. So that was a policy issue on

which you put your toe into the water in that way.

MITCHELL : Before we leave that, I should say that this is quite a useful mechanism if you're not sure whether a thing will be accepted or not. If you feel a bit more confident, you can go straight into a consultation paper or a Green Paper. The trouble is that, as soon as you've done that and published it, the public, particularly if its interests are adversely threatened, tends to assume 'Government's made up its mind. Why weren't we consulted earlier on ?'- ignoring the fact that it is a consultation and that this can sometimes change minds.

This passage makes very clear the advantages of this process to the SED. The obvious dangers in the policy process are that the SED has complete control over whom it consults and that, in order to preserve confidentiality, consultation is confined to a small circle of trusted insiders. On one occasion, a Minister wrote in the margin: 'I have consulted X about this'- X being one particular member of an advisory body. This leaves one wondering why he chose X, what passed between them, and whether this necessarily idiosyncratic consultation made any difference to subsequent decisions.

Although there is no means of knowing, this largely invisible informal network may well have been more influential than the visible process of formal consultation. Some of the formal consultation was purely cosmetic, as we have seen over the question of capital funding for the Catholic colleges, but during this period that was the exception rather than the rule. Governments were still willing to consult both on questions of principle and on their implementation. Inevitably in any ensuing negotiations governments held a stronger hand than anyone else round the table, but negotiations could be skewed in the government's favour and still be genuine. This can be seen in the way in which governments backed off from the proposals for associateship courses, for a three-year primary degree or for a sandwich-type course for secondary graduates. Even when a politically driven decision had been taken, like that to close the colleges in 1980, there were still considerable negotiations about its implementation during which the government modified its original proposals. Indeed, until the controversies over the closing of the colleges, the general picture was one in which governments were reluctant to push policies unless they had the support of what, on any particular issue, were the key elements in the policy community.

The policy community for teacher education.

One of the questions raised in interviews with all those involved in policy-making nationally was the relationship between groups within the policy community. Without exception, those interviewed accepted that the concept of a policy community was a useful one within this period. (5)

> *WBM : My next area of interest is that of the 'policy community' - the concept ...... that a great deal of policy discussion takes place within a fairly closed circle which centres on the relevant government department, but round which there is a group of bodies it normally draws into consultation, at least when things are not too hot politically. Do you see that as a sensible way of looking at things ?*
>
> *MITCHELL : Yes, I do. I think this is how things in general have been done. And it's not just organisations but to some extent individuals too.*

This, of course, does not resolve the question posed earlier in this thesis as to whether the whole Scottish educational system should be regarded as one policy community. In suggesting that it should, McPherson and Raab drew their evidence from interviews in the 1970s with people some of whom who were looking back over the whole of the post-war period. These gave an impression of one small, tightly knit community in which SED, it might be added, was a relatively quiet backwater run by ex-inspectors. John A. Smith [Vice- principal of Jordanhill], who was an HMI in the 1950s, gives a flavour of those more leisurely times.

> *SMITH : I was the first inspector for the handicapped and because of that I got direct access to Rodger, Arbuckle and Brunton. These three were very important in the Department at that time. My favourite was Arbuckle ..... because he was always sending for me. And it was nothing to do with education. It was stories about the Hebrides. (6)*

In the 1960s, however, the situation was transformed. As a result of demographic pressures and rising expectations, all sectors of education expanded: primary, secondary, F.E. and, in the wake of Robbins, higher education. This made the education service larger and more complex and led inevitably to a greater degree of specialisation within it. So the 1960s saw the creation of a number of statutory bodies, like the Examination Board and the GTC, to which SED hived off some specialised

functions and of various advisory bodies like the SCTT, the CCC and the NCITT. This greater specialisation was mirrored in the reform of the inspectorate at the end of the 1960s, which created specialist division each headed by a Chief Inspector based in the Scottish Office. Therefore, I would argue that the close-knit community of the 1950s began to 'factorise' (7) in the 1960s and from that time onwards the Scottish education system is best described as a policy sector consisting of a network of inter-related policy communities. (8)

The counter-argument would be that, in the Scottish context, those inter-relationships would be very close. It was certainly the case that the communities were linked together by over-lapping membership, by the ubiquitous presence of HMI as assessors, and by informal contacts - the simple fact that, in Scottish education, everyone of consequence knew practically everybody else and could pick up the phone and ring them. Nevertheless it is doubtful whether the formal arrangements for co-ordinating the communities within the SED were strong.(9) Certainly, anyone with experience of dealing with SED can think of instances where different Divisions seemed to be ploughing their own separate furrows.

On balance the evidence seems to be that 'factorisation' took place and to support my working hypothesis that a 'policy community' for teacher education can be distinguished. What then were its boundaries and who was within them ? In a formal sense, that question is simply answered : the groups who were normally consulted. A typical list would be like that of the organisations invited to give oral evidence to the GTC Working Party on the training of graduates for secondary education.(10)

It is important to know what those formal boundaries were. As Raab says :

> 'Boundaries play an important part in action and in the thoughts of
> actors. They mark the limits of the groups or network of those who
> are regarded as legitimate participants in public policy processes'. (11)

However, the difficulty is not to map the formal boundaries, or even the shifts which take place as groups come into or drop out of the charmed circle, but to describe what goes on inside them; to know what groups are striving for, what the relationships between them are, and which ones are influential on particular issues.

To pose the question in that way is itself misleading. Although much of the description and analysis must be in terms of formal bodies or institutions - the GTC

advised this or the SED decided that - within these there were often small informal groups or key individuals who were the people who really mattered. So, though we may write that the CP made proposals in the early 1960s, it must be remembered that in practice that often meant a triumvirate of Wood, Scotland and Stimpson; though it may be true to say that SED consulted ADES on a particular issue, it may have paid most attention to one or two Directors whose views it respected, like Ian Flett [Fife] or David Robertson [Tayside].(12) With this proviso in mind, we must now look at the fluctuating influence of the groups within the policy community.

a)   The Committee of Principals.

In the early 1960s the principal group (other than SED) within the policy community formally was the SCTT, whose role has been analysed in Chapter Three. However, the CP was, in Stimpson's phrase, 'the powerhouse'. Indeed, the period of the SCTT was probably that of the CP's greatest influence. Its key members enjoyed a very close and supportive relationship with SED which Wood describes.

> *WOOD : When the Committee of Principals and Assessors operated, you became very close to the Department's assessors. Probably too close in the eyes of the teachers. You got quite friendly with people like Brunton and Rodger. Brunton ..... was very highly thought of, certainly in the colleges. He supported the colleges a great deal. .. When he retired the Principals gave him a dinner at Pitlochry, which was very unusual.*

It was also an advantage to the CP to be able to channel its views, often but not always successfully, through the SCTT thereby making it appear that they came from a more representative group. However, the greatest advantage of the CP throughout the 1960s was simply the strength of its bargaining position, when governments were so keen to increase the output of teachers. Both Wood and Sandison commented on this.

> *WOOD : In the '60s, it [SED] rode the colleges on a fairly loose rein. Because of the teacher shortage, the Department needed the help of the colleges and money flowed fairly easily.*

> *SANDISON : It was a golden age for the colleges in Brunton's time. In a sense, they got away with murder. There was such a desperate*

shortage of teachers - their product was so much in demand - that they
could get almost anything they wanted. Whether they wanted extra staff
or new buildings, the SED was under pressure to give it to them.

After the demise of the SCTT, the Department made sure that the CP would continue and that there would be formal links through the attendance of its assessors at the CP's meetings. Nevertheless, the relationship was changing. On the one side, the CP had been enlarged to ten members. This meant that it was less of a club, even though the Principals of all three new colleges came from Jordanhill, and that there was more scope for institutional rivalry as the new colleges jockeyed for their place in the sun. On the other, as SED became aware in the early 1970s that the end of teacher shortage was in sight, its bargaining position strengthened and its need to favour the colleges diminished. One sign of this was that the status of the SED assessors on the CP was downgraded. In the 1970s, the Chief Inspector in charge of teacher education normally attended instead of the Senior Chief, along with a principal in SED instead of an Assistant Secretary. Inevitably, therefore, the influence of the CP waned somewhat, but relationships with SED remained close and cordial up to 1977, helped by the fact that Sandison was highly regarded by the Principals.

Relationships may have remained cordial, but how great was the influence ? Before answering that question, we must first ask what the members of the CP saw as its role. When they were questioned, two main schools of thought emerged. One, exemplified by McNaught and Ruthven, saw the CP as the group which tried to negotiate with SED on behalf of all the colleges.

> *RUTHVEN : I suppose one of its [CP] main functions was to ensure*
> *that the colleges presented a united front as far as policy was concerned*
> *to the SED.*

Others, like Bone, McGettrick and Williamson, saw it as a body which co-ordinated the work of the colleges into a national system.

> *BONE : It [CP] saw itself as the controlling body for teacher education*
> *in Scotland. It saw itself as sustaining and making effective a system*
> *of teacher education.*

As the CP had no legal powers and each Principal was responsible to his or her Board of Governors, that co-ordination depended on voluntary agreements. Nevertheless it could be effective especially in professional matters. This could be

seen, for instance, in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the work of the advisory committees which co-ordinated the development of the AUPE, the Certificate courses in Guidance and the Diplomas in Special Educational Needs or in the inter-college agreement on grading students introduced after the shortage of primary teachers ended in 1976.

Outside these professional matters, the influence of the CP was limited. Even Sandison, well-disposed as she was to the colleges, did not rate it very highly.

> *WBM : What about the role of the CP? Did the SED see this as in any way a co-ordinating body or was it more of a sounding board ?*

> *SANDISON : I don't really think it was either. I don't remember a lot of bouncing of ideas between the SED and the CP. Of course, the inspectorate were in and out of the colleges a lot, and there was a great deal of informal discussion going on between HMI and people in the colleges. .... But the CP was more of a forum for the exchange of information. While I was assessor to it, the whole situation changed. At the start we were dealing with teacher shortages; by the end there was over-supply and the colleges were being cut. This changed relationships. Because the colleges were no longer seen as so important, this probably reduced the influence of the CP and as time went on its advice was less heeded. Another change was that the SED was no longer seen as a friend bringing gifts but as something much more unfriendly.*

Sandison's comments highlight two of the main reasons why the CP became less influential after 1977 : its weaker bargaining position and its strained relationship with SED. (13) Perhaps the most fundamental reason was that the future of the colleges had become a political issue and, the more political the issue, the less the CP counted for. Even when it preserved a facade of unity, as it did in 1977, the CP had no means of bringing pressure to bear on governments. In fact, as soon as colleges began to feel threatened, that appearance of unity could not long be sustained

> *BONE : When the first hints of serious cuts appeared, the CP tended to split into two factions. There was a faction which contained George Paton, who I suppose was the senior figure, Mollie Abbott who was a great manoeuverer all the time, Charles Brown and then Tom Rae and Peter MacNaught. .... The other faction I suppose was bound to*

include Jordanhill, Moray House, Aberdeen and Dundee .... and I suppose that group came to be led by Jimmy Scotland and me.

Hence in the controversies over college closures from 1977- 81 the CP played little part collectively though in professional matters the colleges continued to work with one another and with SED.

b)   The GTC.

The other bodies with a continuing interest in teacher education were the GTC and ALCES. According to its statutes, the GTC was the principal advisory body to the Secretary of State on all matters concerning the supply and training of teachers. In practice its sphere of influence was very much more circumscribed. The Supply Committee rarely met in the first ten years of its existence and, when Bone tried to revive it, it found that its advice was consistently ignored. The Council's proposals for changes in teacher training, such as the Brunton proposals for reform of graduate training or those for special qualifications for teachers of practical and aesthetic subjects in primary schools, met with the same fate. As the SED was unwilling to accord it any wider advisory role, this left the GTC as a body dealing essentially with registration (including probation) and with discipline.

> *WBM : I have an impression, gleaned from informal discussions with your colleagues in the inspectorate, that the SED did not have a high regard for the GTC, which it tended to see as union-dominated, and that the Department therefore wanted to circumscribe its activities - to confine it to dealing with registration and the qualifications for initial entry. Is that fair ?*

> *SANDISON : Yes, on the whole, though in the '70s the GTC was not so dominated by the EIS as it later became. However, you're right that the Department was willing to see the GTC deal with matters relating to initial qualifications but did not want to see it extend its role beyond that. Within the field of initial qualifications, the GTC did a lot of good work.*

This unwillingness stemmed from the constitution of the GTC which had been designed to make it representative of the profession by giving a majority on the Council to directly elected teachers. However, after the first election, the teachers' associations began to put up slates and independent members were frozen out.

As a result, the teachers' representatives on the Council were union activists, but the work of the Council was not such as to attract the most able and ambitious of them. Bloomer put this in his usual trenchant way.

> BLOOMER : *The teachers on the Council were always the B team. The most able activists did not seek election to the GTC.*

> WBM : *But there were some able teachers on the GTC in the '70s, like Lockhart Whiteford and Norman Macleod. Were they squeezed out because the GTC became more politicised ?*

> BLOOMER : *Of course there were exceptions, but it was always the B team. That wasn't due to politicisation, which is more a phenomenon of the '80s than the '70s. In my time, the GTC was not dominated by an EIS block vote. There was no party line in meetings, although of course people tended to vote in line with EIS policy. The only organised caucus meetings were at the start of each Council to agree on the elections for office. (14)*

To this weakness in the quality of teacher representatives had to be added the weakness that the majority of teachers showed little interest in the work of the GTC (15) and the leader of their largest union, John Pollock, made no secret of the fact that he had little time for it.

> POLLOCK : *I cannot think of much that the GTC has done. But again I've got to say that I am in a minority and when I go abroad I tend to boast about the GTC controlling our profession but we know that it doesn't. Ministers only pay attention to what they want to pay attention to.*

Even though the GTC was not as politicised in our period as it subsequently became (16), the reaction of the SED to these weaknesses was to regard the GTC as an unrepresentative body, subsidiary to the teachers' associations and therefore not to be taken into Departmental confidences. It was symptomatic of this attitude that the CP and not the GTC was asked to carry out the feasibility study into the three-year primary degree. Mitchell's comments show the SED's attitude and Whiteford's that it was known to members of the GTC.

MITCHELL : The GTC were rather more at arms length.[from SED] ...... They had a statutory role but tended to look at issues very much from a vested interest point of view rather than from a public interest point of view - which was understandable given their constitution.

WHITEFORD : There is also, and there is no doubt about this, the view of the inspectorate and SED officials that the GTC is a pretty toothless body, which doesn't carry much weight because it doesn't carry much weight with the teaching profession.

As was seen when SED brushed aside the recommendations of the GTC working party on a primary degree, the GTC seemed to the Department little more than the second-hand voice of the teachers' associations.

c)   ALCES.

Although ALCES certainly had a continuous interest in teacher education, its main purpose as a trade union was to negotiate about wages and conditions of service. Normally it was one of the 'peripheral bodies' in the outer circle of the policy community (see Diagram 8.1) - invited to make comments but little heeded. In 1977, however, ALCES was able to play an important role because, in those exceptional circumstances, it found powerful political allies through its links with the STUC and with the Scottish Labour movement in general.

d)   Other bodies.

The CP and the GTC were then the main bodies with a continuous interest in teacher education. Beyond them were other groups who were regularly consulted, but who tended to be interested only in particular issues. There were regular links between SED and ADES and, after regionalisation, with the COSLA Education Committee. Although some members of COSLA flirted with the idea of taking over teacher education, the main interest of both ADES and COSLA was in teacher supply. Mitchell stressed the importance of COSLA.

WBM : I made a little list of the bodies which seemed to be regularly consulted [on teacher education]: the CP, the GTC, ADES and the EIS. Is there any one I've missed ?

MITCHELL : COSLA, of course, in the sense that the Directors [of Education] were servants of COSLA and it had a very considerable influence on them. But certainly if it was a question of making allowance in the Rate Support Grant for improved staffing ratios, it would be the main COSLA body which would look at RSG issues. But the COSLA Education Committee was quite an influential body and we certainly attached value to having regular meetings with them.

The universities, except Stirling, showed little interest in teacher education, but their co-operation was important in launching the original B.Eds and their unwillingness to co-operate perhaps important in blocking the proposals for a three-year primary degree. But probably the most influential of these other bodies was the EIS.

e)   The EIS.

In the 1960s the EIS, under the leadership of Gilbert Bryden, successfully cultivated a very close relationship with SED officials and with Ministers. (17) Evidence of its influence can be seen in the rejection of the associateship proposals, in the willingness of Ministers to invest a good deal of time in the open meetings which followed that rejection (18), and in the difficulties encountered by the Department in opening the primary diploma course to men. As time went on, however, the character of the EIS began to change. It had always prided itself on being as much a professional association as a trade union. In the 1970s the balance between these elements shifted decisively, and it became predominantly a trade union.

BLOOMER : In the '70s ..... it [EIS] was transforming itself from a professional association into a trade union.

WBM : When would you say that transformation took place ?

BLOOMER : I can only speak for my own time in the EIS. I became active in 1973 and left in 1984. The EIS was certainly changing before 1973, but the 10 years I was active were the period in which the changes gathered momentum, so that by the end the transformation was complete. The watershed was the mid-'70s. For instance, in 1973 it was still possible for some individual members to argue at the Conference that teachers should not go on strike and get a hearing. By 1976-77 that would not have been possible any longer.

Pollock agreed that this transformation had taken place and placed it in wider contexts : the perennial struggle against the downwards pressures on public sector pay but, more significantly, the expansion of education and the consequent demands for resources which brought it more into the political arena.

> *POLLOCK : There is no doubt that in that period from the '60s onwards a lot of factors - increasing teacher numbers, more secondary teachers, the raising of the school leaving age and the problems it forced on the profession, and a gradual drift downwards of the comparative salary levels of all public service employees - affected the EIS significantly. .... Also within that period you had one or two major political initiatives from government. For example, Circular 600 from Willie Ross about 1965 which introduced comprehensive education in Scotland. ......*

> *WBM : I'm interested in that point - that one of the things which brought the EIS more into the trade union arena was the fact that education was becoming more of a political issue, through comprehensive education for instance, than it had been before.*

> *POLLOCK : It wasn't just that it brought the EIS into the political argument, it brought the politicians in. That is a significant difference, for what had been happening beforehand was that the EIS, on education, was talking to civil servants. ......*

> *WBM : Was the fact that someone coming from your more political background became General Secretary a reaction to events, or did it help to shape them ?*

> *POLLOCK : I think it was part of the transition. I think that anyone coming in would have had to have a higher profile politically.*

It was also a factor that Pollock, an ex-chairman of the Labour Party in Scotland and headteacher of a comprehensive school, came to the EIS from a very different background to Bryden's. All these factors together altered the relationships between the EIS and SED as they tended to move away (though of course not completely) from the closed world of discussions between officials into the political arena. In the wider sector of national educational policy the EIS remained a powerful player throughout this period, whatever the complexion of the government. (19)

However, its interest in the narrower field of teacher education was limited. Although it might from time to time produce substantial documents, like the Education Committee's report on teacher training, (20) or comments on others' proposals (21), teacher education was never an important issue for most EIS members, except for one aspect of it: the goal of an all-graduate profession. This was behind all their major interventions in this period: the successful opposition to the associateship proposals and to the three-year primary degree; the unsuccessful opposition to non-graduate men teachers in primary schools; the pressure on the Labour government in 1977 for a review of teacher training in the hope that it would lead to a four-year primary degree.

On all these issues, the intervention of the EIS had a significant, sometimes decisive, influence. This marks a key difference between the CP and GTC on the one hand and all the other bodies in the policy community. They all had some real political clout or at least, in the case of the universities, some independent power. The CP and GTC had none. Nor did they have any close links with the groups that did. Essentially the lines in the teacher education network ran out separately to each group from the SED at the centre. There were, of course, links running between the groups. The CP was linked to the GTC on which it was strongly represented by four Principals (22); there were for much of the period regular links between ADES and the EIS (23); and all the groups were represented on the GTC. Nevertheless, once the SCTT was abolished, SED was for most of the time negotiating separately with groups which were either intrinsically in a weak position, like the CP and the GTC, or had only a limited and intermittent interest in teacher education, like the EIS or ADES. Some critics of the SED have alleged that it pursued a policy of 'divide and rule' (24) but it had no need to. The divisions in the policy community were there - to be exploited if necessary.

f)   The SED.

At the centre of the policy community lay the SED. Basically its commanding position derived from two factors. Firstly, its statutory powers which enabled it, for instance, to determine college intakes or to decide which courses the colleges might offer. Secondly, its total control of the resources for teacher education, except in the University of Stirling. This control might be relaxed in the exceptional circumstances of the 1960s, when SED had to be seen to be helping the colleges increase the output of teachers, but it was always there.

If these were the basic sources of its power, SED also had other ways of influencing policy, not least its powers of patronage. Humes rightly calls attention to the importance of this (25) and quotes Sir William Kerr Fraser to the effect that senior people in SED spend a good deal of time considering whom to appoint to committees. In the quotation earlier in this chapter, Mitchell commented on the way in which soundings were taken before appointments were made, and experience suggests that this process goes on at all levels, from the major national bodies like the CCC down to minor working parties.

Evidence for this can also be seen in the SED files. One can see there a sifting process in which various criteria are used : ability or lack of it('X does not carry sufficient weight'); gender ('It would also no doubt be desirable to have one or two women on the Council'); political views ('Y would be particularly acceptable to present Ministers'); and 'responsibility' ('Z can be relied on to adopt a statesman- like attitude', which in SED-speak means that he was a good committee man who would not rock the boat). One can also see known critics of government policy being weeded out. Above all, one can see the determination of SED to control the process, to resist the notion that outside bodies had a right to be represented by nominees of their own choice. Where some form of representation was unavoidable, SED's preferred tactics were to ask for several names from which it made the final choice. The Department would defend this process of selection, with a good deal of justification, on the grounds that it produced people well-suited for the task in hand; whereas outside bodies sometimes nominated people without real interest or expertise simply because it was buggins turn or to suit their own internal politics. The other side of the coin is that ex-officio or elected members of committees have an independence which government nominees tend to lack.

Although this patronage system pervaded the whole of Scottish education, it was relatively weak in the policy community for teacher education. The SED did not control the membership of SCTT, the CP, the GTC, the NCITT or even the governing bodies of the colleges in the same way as it did that of, for instance, the CCC. Its influence was felt more when it came to deciding which people from the colleges should serve on national bodies like the Munn and Dunning committees or, at a lower level, on working parties or panels. Nevertheless the influence of SED cannot be understood without appreciating the extent to which the pressures of patronage were flowing through the policy community networks.

Another strength of the SED in negotiations was that it played as a team in a way in which it was difficult for other groups, like the CP or the GTC, to match. Indeed,

one can conceptualise SED in Goffman's terms as a 'back region'.

> 'A back region or backstage may be defined as a place, relative to a given performance, where the impression fostered relative to that performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course. ... It is here that the capacity of a performance to express something beyond itself may be painstakingly fabricated; it is here that illusions and impressions are painstakingly constructed'. (26)

In this concept and that of a 'team', Goffman helps us to understand two features of the way in which SED operated. One was that there might be a good deal of discussion and disagreement during the often lengthy process by which policy decisions were arrived at, but that these discussions took place 'backstage', hidden from view under a cloak of confidentiality. However, once policy was agreed on, once the 'performance' was constructed, it was presented to the outside world by a unified team.

Because of the pressures on members of the team to support one another (27) any rifts between them rarely show. Pollock provided an illuminating example.

> *POLLOCK : When Frank McElhone was in office as Under-secretary for Education, he asked for and got a more direct relationship with us.[EIS] It's interesting there how the civil service resented this trend and opposed it. I can give you two specific examples of that. At that time, the civil service continued to wish to appoint individuals, who happened to be EIS members but were not representatives, to bodies like the CCC. When Frank McElhone came into office, we discovered that the Department had reduced the number of EIS people on it. They said that they were simply selecting people. So I went down to Dover House with a delegation to meet Frank McElhone and his civil servants. We came up against a blank wall. They had just appointed another member to the CCC who happened to be from the EIS, but this was to frustrate us from getting onto the CCC at that time, John Bell, who was convenor of our Education Committee. Our convenor of Education had always been on these committees. Never a question about it but the inspectorate for some reason had cut him out. We thought it a sufficiently important issue to see Frank McElhone about. Frank said to me: 'John, can we have a word on our own?' and he took me through to another room. He showed me the letter from the*

civil servants - that they had now appointed an additional member, that
this was the balance for EIS people, and that it would upset the
balance to put one more on. Frank said: 'What do you think of it ?' I
said :'It's typical civil service skulduggery. They've put one more on to
make it difficult'. So he said :'What do you want me to do?' I said:
'How difficult would it be ?' and he said: 'It would be difficult but if
you think it has to be done I'll do it'. So I said: 'I think they've put you
in an impossible position and so we won't ask for that to happen'. So
that was an example of the civil servants deliberately thwarting the will
of Ministers.

As well as the light this throws on the patronage system, it also illustrates the sort of
tensions which could arise between groups within the SED each with their own
agendas.

Backstage, three groups were trying to influence policy: the inspectorate, the
administrators and Ministers. Of these, only the inspectorate were in regular
contact with the colleges and had any detailed knowledge of them. The
inspectorate therefore played a key part giving advice about ways in which teacher
education might be supported or improved and, it is fair to say, in the post-Brunton
period that it saw its task in these developmental terms. In giving advice, however, the
inspectorate had to resolve the tension between two possible roles : that of the
independent critic and that of the confidential adviser. Throughout the period, the
Scottish inspectorate chose the latter. When questioned by the Select Committee in
1968 about the independence of the inspectorate, Dickson replied :

> 'I should have thought quite frankly that the people whom I have met
> and naturally discussed it with over the years would very much
> prefer to see the Inspectorate able to influence the Department than
> merely to stand back from it and shout at it as it were'. (28)

When questioned, Mitchell too saw the inspectorate integrated into SED as part of the
policy-making team.

> *WBM : Some people have suggested that the Scottish inspectorate*
> *have become too much part of the policy-making process, as*
> *compared to their English counterparts, who seem to have retained*
> *more of the function of a critical outside body.*

> *MITCHELL : I think there is a lot in that. I was quite surprised when DES, after I had retired, asked me to do a Rayner study on school closures. There was a very marked difference, particularly when I went to talk to Chief Education Officers in England, in that they regarded the inspectorate with much less esteem than one had seen in Scotland. But I think you're also right, as far as policy work is concerned, that the inspectorate is much more involved in Scotland than in England.*

> *WBM : Then, of course, in teacher education as elsewhere, the Scottish tradition has been a more centralised one.*

> *MITCHELL : Yes, indeed. To put it another way, I can't recall any bust-ups in the Department as between the administrators and inspectors, taking totally different views. I would have thought that by-and-large we saw eye-to-eye on most issues. That didn't mean, of course, that our advice was always accepted by Ministers, but at official level we got on well.*

The inspectorate therefore had traded off independence for influence, but how much influence had it gained ? That depended on the political importance of the issues and, to a lesser extent, on the personal relationships between the inspectorate and the relevant officials.

> *SANDISON : In general, inspectorate views would have a very strong influence on first drafts, but these might be modified further up the line. Nevertheless, the inspectorate still had a strong influence at least up to 1976. After that, political considerations affected the colleges more. But, unless you worked with the administrators, you were lost. You had to get onto their wave-length to have any chance of influencing policy.*

The SED records bear out Sandison's view that, in teacher education, the inspectorate had a substantial influence on non-political issues. One can see them at the root of a number of policy initiatives: the proposals for a three-year primary degree; the idea of a two-year common course for teachers, social workers and youth and community educators; the creation of scheme for school-based inservice; the push for external validation of college courses.

This last initiative is a good illustration of the extent and limitations of inspectorate influence. The inspectorate pushed for external validation as a way of raising the quality of teacher education courses and the decision to insist upon it was largely theirs. It had of course to be sold to administrative colleagues, but it is doubtful if it ever went to Ministers. For the same reason, the inspectorate would have preferred validation to be done by CNAA. However, the Scottish university departments of education woke up to the danger that the colleges would develop post-graduate courses which would compete with their traditional M.Eds, and persuaded the Scottish Universities to set up their own validating body, the Scottish Council for the Validation of Courses for Teachers in 1983.(29) Left to themselves the inspectorate would have insisted that all college courses should go to CNAA, but this would have been resisted by the universities, which could have posed as defenders of a separate Scottish system. So they had to concede that validation by SCOVACT should be an option.

Just as the inspectors were the essential link between the colleges and SED, so the administrators were the essential link between the inspectorate and Ministers. As one would expect, the records show that papers were drafted, circulated for comments, discussed at meetings, amended and recirculated, so that at the end of the process it is difficult to say whose the decisive influences were. Nevertheless, the final drafting and presentation of advice was in the hands of the officials which, as Sandison's comments imply, gave them the crucial influence if they chose to use it. This is perhaps more the case in the Scottish Office than in other departments because the need for Ministers to be frequently in London means that they have to rely more on written advice - and that can only come from the senior officials.

While influence within SED and within the policy community was dispersed, the last word lay outside the policy community with Ministers. Up to 1976, there was little political interest in teacher education and most issues were settled in discussion between SED and the groups in the policy community. Examples would be the reform of the Regulations in 1965, the siting of the temporary colleges at Ayr and Falkirk, or the extension of the B.Ed to the smaller colleges. On the rare occasions when political issues did arise, an alliance of the SED with the policy community might prevail against Ministers as it did over the choice of Hamilton as a site. However, this was simply a case of overcoming Ministerial prejudices; if there was a lobby it was for Hamilton rather than against it. However, when there was a strong lobby, as there was against the associateship proposals, Ministers rejected the advice of the SED and SCTT. From 1977-1981 the situation was entirely different. The controversies over the closure of the colleges fragmented the policy

community and had to be resolved by processes quite different from those of 'bureaucratic accommodation'.

Some comments on the policy community.

With the SED at its centre, one can visualise the policy community as a series of concentric circles. (See Diagram 8.1) Outside the SED are the core groups - those whose views matter on any particular issue. Normally in teacher education that would have included the SCTT (during its lifetime) and the CP, joined for instance on the associateship proposals by the EIS or on the feasibility of the Brunton proposals by ADES. On other issues, however, the EIS or ADES would be in the next circle, that of the peripheral groups who would be formally consulted but whose views would carry little weight. This was the position in which the GTC Supply Committee invariably found itself. Beyond this again, there would be groups which were not normally part of the policy community, but which might become influential in exceptional circumstances, as did the STUC or individual M.Ps during the 1977 controversies.

Such a diagram is useful in drawing attention to certain features of the policy community, but it presents a static picture of something in constant flux. Groups might be created or abolished, like the SCTT or GTC; they might be given a new position of influence as happened to the CP in 1959. Yet another example of the way in which SED could influence the policy process. Groups might move nearer to or further from the centre, either because the issues did not concern them or because their influence was waxing or waning. Groups might change in character, as did the EIS, and so modify their relationships within the community. Alliances might form, as they did among the smaller colleges pressing for the B.Ed, or be dissolved.

The shifting of alliances is a reminder that the notion of a policy community has to be qualified. In one sense all the groups within the concentric circles formed a community: all were recognised as having a legitimate interest; all were trying to make the system work rather than to subvert it. Yet, within that framework, groups, smaller groupings within the groups and individuals were pursuing their own interests. Conflict and competition were therefore as much in evidence as co-operation, but conflict bounded by the expectation that solutions would be sought through negotiation and compromise.

Most of those negotiations took place in circles which were relatively closed. Normally, there was little outside interest in teacher education as can be seen in the

lack of parliamentary scrutiny or press coverage. Policy proposals were generally formulated by small groups or working parties, as were the CP's feasibility study of the three-year degree or the GTC Working Party's proposals for the reform of secondary graduate training. Comments might then be invited within the policy community, but the responses might not be public and the processing of them by SED was entirely private. The closed circle was only broken twice in this period. Once by the Select Committee's Report in 1970, which had no definite outcome, and again by the controversies over college closures which completely, if temporarily, rewrote the rules of the game.

This closed circle was almost entirely male-dominated. In the '60s this was perhaps to be expected. When asked about the impact of the new colleges, Wood commented :

> *WOOD : It was quite considerable. On the CP, for instance, Miss Rennie spoke. The two Catholic Principals never spoke and Miss Blunden rarely. So this was quite a change.*

Although Rennie went on to become an influential figure in the CP, the change was very limited. The only women Principals were in those posts reserved for them i.e. in the two Catholic colleges, in Dunfermline, and initially at Craigie and Callendar Park. In every case, once the posts were no longer reserved, they fell to men. Indeed, in the whole period, Sandison was the only woman to hold a significant post in the policy community which was open to both men and women. In this respect teacher education was no different from any other policy community; but her success suggests how much was lost by that.

The policy process : Incremental or rational?

The SED normally adopted a cautious, step-by-step approach to policy-making. This could be seen, for instance, in its twin-track attempt to ease the difficulties of supply in the 1960s - edging forward both with the proposals for college associateships and for the opening of the primary diploma course to men. When its preferred option - the associateship - had to be abandoned, it was ready to bring forward the other. It was even clearer in the SED attitude to suggestions that there should be some over-all review of teacher education. Graham dismissed these in the aftermath of the James Report in favour of what he called a 'purely pragmatic approach'. Later, in 1977, when Ministers insisted that SED carry out a review, it did so internally simply by reviewing past proposals for change and the reasons for their failure.

When questioned on this approach, Mitchell made some interesting comments.

WBM : One gets the impression from the records that what one might call the normal style of policy-making in the Department is a rather cautious, one-step-at-a-time approach. If I could just quote your own submission about the Council for Tertiary Education in Scotland, you ended up by saying : 'In our view, an announcement along the lines of paragraphs 39-42 represents a cautious but definitive response to the CTES report. Although open to criticism, it avoids accusations of inaction but stops short of radical moves of the sort likely to provoke a confrontation with the local authorities. It also leaves options open for the future'.

It struck me that wasn't untypical, not of you personally, but of the general departmental approach : let's make a cautious move and see what happens.

MITCHELL : I suppose one could regard it as a strength or a weakness, or just a habit, of officials to be fairly cautious on the whole. One knows that whatever you do, you will be criticised by somebody or other, inevitably. I can't remember whether the impending election was a factor in that. The general stance, I think, is probably fair enough, except that, when an emergency arises, you've got to take action. I've heard, for instance, criticisms of my predecessors in the Department for not raising much earlier the question of the excessive capacity of the teacher training system. It tended to hit us rather in 1976.

WBM : I'd like to come back to that later. But one has a feeling, from the outside, that maybe long years in administration breeds caution because it always makes one conscious of the difficulties.

MITCHELL : I'm afraid that is so. It's our job to warn Ministers that there will be difficulties. Otherwise, I think you're not doing your job. You may recommend something but I think you've always got to point out the drawbacks. It's very rarely that something is all good.

This submission and Mitchell's comments illuminate several facets of the SED approach - the awareness of difficulties, the preference for proceeding one step at a time, the

desire to avoid confrontation, the concentration not on ideal solutions but on those which will seem satisfactory to most members of a policy community.(30) Only occasionally does one come across comments on this gap between the ideal and the feasible, as when one senior SED official minuted in 1978 on the proposals to set up a Council for Tertiary Education in Scotland :

> 'I personally have long thought that there ought to be some sort of higher education council for Scotland which would cover the universities also and might indeed eventually assume UGC-type functions for the whole of Higher Education in Scotland. This, however, is presumably not yet a 'starter' in political terms'.(31)

Nor must one forget that a great deal of the time and energy of administrators, whether within SED or elsewhere, is taken up with systems maintenance rather than with policy initiatives. Graham made this point very strongly in his interview, and Wood made a similar comment with a different twist :

> WOOD : The tendency of the professional Civil Service is to let the system just keep ticking over and to ensure that not too much public money is spent on it, while the educationalists like Brunton wanted change for the sake of the children of Scotland and obviously that meant spending more money. (32)

Within these limits, policy-making often aimed to be 'rational'. The records are liberally sprinkled with clear and considered papers which outline a problem, analyse the relevant factors and suggest the strengths and weaknesses of possible lines of action. One thinks of Inglis on the siting of the new women's P.E. college, of Bone on 'The Politics of Change' and of such SED submissions as the 1962 one on teacher supply. It was of course, in Simon's terms, a 'bounded rationality' (33); limited by the preconceptions of the agents, the limits of their knowledge of the situation, and their inevitable inability fully to envisage the future. Moreover, all the papers focused on one particular problem. Their 'rationality', therefore, is still part of a piece-meal approach, a process of 'successive limited comparisons'. Policy-making in teacher education was unquestionably incremental.

The 'rationalists', however, would accept that policy-making in practice is normally incremental; their critique is that it should be less so. Certainly, the evidence of this study suggests some problems in the incremental approach. One was that a decision taken in isolation to solve one problem might close off options in the solution of

another. Thus the decision to build a separate women's PE college in Edinburgh made it difficult for the SCTT to avoid making Hamilton a college exclusively for women diploma students. More seriously, in SED submissions to Ministers, the concentration on specific issues meant that there was often little sense of any ideal criteria against which decisions might be judged. Such criteria might be found in some of the inspectorate documents I have seen (34), but were usually filtered out as drafts moved up the hierarchy and were certainly swept away in the political turmoil from 1977 onwards. (35) As a result, it was difficult to see any sense of direction in the policy-making for teacher education; any vision of an ideal state towards which the actual might, however haltingly and painfully, be brought to approximate.

This weakness stems from deep-rooted features of the system. Although the inspectorate did undertake some fundamental thinking about the system, SED officials (quite apart from their heavy involvement in day-to-day administration) were inhibited from long-term planning by the need to serve and defend their political masters. It cannot have encouraged them when they saw their advice rejected for short-term political considerations, as it was over the associateship proposals or (almost certainly) over the closure of Craigie. Nor when they saw the politicians unwilling to fight a particular battle, as over the three-year degree, or to face up to an uncomfortable reality, as probably happened over the failure to cut college intakes early enough.

Because of its predominant influence, most of the leadership had to come from SED. Some might have come from SCTT had it continued but, once it had gone, the CP was always too divided by the separate interests of the individual colleges to put forward collective views on the structure of the system. Faced with the crisis of contraction, it could only agree temporarily to defend the status quo.

The colleges of education themselves, the main agents of teacher education, also operated in an environment that made long term planning very difficult. They did not know from year to year what their intakes would be or what budget they would be allocated. Indeed, on some occasions they had to start a financial year without knowing what money they would have available. SED also had the power at any time to change the rules about such matters as staffing ratios, limits on capital expenditure needing Departmental approval or course approval procedures. Such an environment did not encourage developmental planning, of which there was little evidence in the colleges in this period.

Pluralism or Corporatism.

The interplay we have described between the groups within the policy community can be described as pluralistic, at least in the basic sense that no one group, not even the Department, always got its own way. This not surprisingly is the same conclusion that McPherson and Raab drew from their more general study of the Scottish education system.

'Between 1945 and 1975, say, every group in Scottish education discussed hitherto, including the Department itself, had successes and failures, not only in proposing new lines of action but also in opposing initiatives taken by others. In this respect, pluralism was a feature of the policy process, and partnership a fair description'. (36)

They then, however, add two qualifications both of which apply to teacher education: that the issues determined by negotiation within the policy community were of limited scope and that central government itself played an important constitutive role in the activities of the policy community. The power of central government was probably stronger in teacher education than in other parts of the education sector. We have seen how it controlled access to the policy community and to the policy agenda; we have seen how it influenced policy through patronage. Moreover, in its negotiations with the other principal players, the colleges of education, we have seen how through its control of resources it held all the trump cards.

So, if the system was in one sense pluralistic, it was a limited and managed form of pluralism. Does this then shade into corporatism ? According to McPherson and Raab,

'The distinction between pluralism and corporatism turns largely on the degree of conflict or consensus in the relations between groups and government. In broad terms, pluralism holds that a dispersed array of groups presses demands on government, while corporatism holds that selected groups collaborate with government in formulating and implementing policy'. (37)

In those terms, the policy process in teacher education did have corporatist features. No single label, therefore, can be applied without qualifications but, as soon as one tries to make those qualifications, one is back to describing and explaining events rather than categorising them.

Conclusion.

This thesis offers no startling new theoretical conclusions. On the whole it endorses the general picture drawn by McPherson and Raab. It underlines the importance of policy communities, while suggesting, firstly, that from the 1960s onwards Scottish education was tending to separate into a number of inter-related communities and, secondly, that the extent of conflict within communities must be recognised. It also accepts the view that policies are normally arrived at by negotiations within policy communities, while pointing out how this process breaks down once issues become politically significant.

Such generalisations do not make any contribution to grand theory. Rather they are examples of the 'weak theories', to use Runciman's terms, which underpin historical explanation. Instead of pursuing theory, this thesis has tried to answer the basic questions: What happened ? Why? and (to a lesser extent) What was it like to be there? That in itself is difficult enough. So much goes unrecorded. The evidence that does survive is, in both senses, partial. The historian then brings to it his own limited horizons. The result can never be what Ranke hoped for - the story as it really happened. It is more like the work of a portrait painter: one man's interpretation of reality but, if well done, recognisable to those with first-hand knowledge of his subject.

Diagram 8.1

An educational policy community in Scotland

External Pressure Groups

Peripheral Groups

Core Groups

SED

(Issue - Specific)

NOTES

1. Hogwood (1987) pp. 33-34.
2. Ibid. p.34 Hogwood makes a distinction between 'systemic' agendas, which are essentially discussion agendas and 'institutional agendas', which 'are composed of those issues to which public officials and politicians in specific government bodies give attention'.
3. SED (1980).
4. Jordan & Richardson (1987) p.30.
5. It has been suggested to me that it would be less applicable to the later 1980s when policy was again strongly politicised.
6. John A. Smith was himself a Gaelic speaker, originally from Mull.
7. Rhodes (1988) p.58.
8. Jordan & Richardson (1987) p.175
9. Humes (1986) p.49, quoting evidence from the Rayner Report.
10. SED (1972a). The organisations listed were :
    Association of County Councils in Scotland, Association of Directors of Education, Association of Headmistresses (Scottish Branch), Association of Lecturers in Colleges of Education in Scotland, Committee of Principals, Counties of Cities Association, Educational Institute of Scotland, Headmasters Association of Scotland, National Union of Students (Scottish Region), Scottish Universities Council for Studies in Education, Scottish Schoolmasters Association, Scottish Secondary Teachers Association.
11. Raab (1982b).
12. My sources agree with McPherson & Raab (1988) that in consultation with ADES, as with other bodies, it was the views of a few key individuals that counted.
13. All the Principals interviewed commented on this changed relationship. To give one example:
    WBM: Did that rather difficult year [1977] change the CP's relationship with SED?

    RUTHVEN : Yes, it made the relationship a very wary one. One was constantly thinking about the fact that the SED was going to make cutbacks, and one was always aware of that.
14. Barrie (1981) p.64 makes the same point.
15. *J MILLER : The great majority of teachers didn't know anything about it [the GTC] and didn't want to know very much about it.*
16. This point was made by several of the interviewees e.g. McIntyre and Sandison

as well as by Bloomer.

17. McPherson & Raab (1988). p. 437.

18. SED file Ed/51/8/297.

19. *POLLOCK : The relationships were extremely good with the political parties and, even through the bitter dispute we had in the 1980s, I believe that we managed to maintain reasonable relations with all the political parties and that included the Conservatives.*

MITCHELL : I had a good relationship with John Pollock, I think, who was Secretary [of the EIS] right through my period. Both of us recognised that we had to confront one another now and then. But I always felt that I could ring him up and ask : 'John, what do you think of so-and-so? That worked reasonably well, though there was perhaps a slightly wary relationship on both sides.

20. SEJ. Vol 54. No.33. 24 September,1971.

21. For instance, its comments on Robbins or Brunton.

22. There were complaints that the Principals had an undue influence.
WBM : Some people have said that the Principals exercised an influence in the GTC, at least in the 1970s, out of all proportion to their numbers.
WHITEFORD : I would agree with that absolutely. There was a general tendency on the part of the teacher members of the GTC to grumble quietly in the background about the influence of the Principals, but to have to accept that they knew what they were talking about. And of course there is no doubt about the quality of the Principals at that time. .... They tended to dominate the proceedings.

23. *POLLOCK : With ADES we did have this regular annual meeting. It was quite a formal meeting .... and it used to be an all-day one. .... That was weakened once Strathclyde was formed. Because I think that the Strathclyde directorate tended to think that they were the big boys, above the directorate of the smaller authorities, and tended often not to come. But these were very good meetings and a surprising amount was achieved through them.*

24. *McNAUGHT : The SED was in the habit of sounding out the Principals, sometimes collectively but sometimes individually, because their tactics were to divide and rule.*

25. Humes (1986) p.42.

26. Goffman (1969) p.114.

27. Ibid. p 91.

28. SCES (1968) Q.65.

29. Humes (1986) pp.189-91. SCOVACT was finally set up outside our period,

but the train of events began with the Green Report (NCITT 1979).

30. Vickers (1965) describes this process as 'optimising/balancing.

31. SED file ED51/8/378.

32. Interview with McPherson & Raab, 1976.

33. Jordan and Richardson (1987) pp.11-12.

34. I have had access to some inspectorate documents which are not in the archives and which I cannot cite.

35. Vickers (1965) stresses the importance of such criteria - what he calls an appreciative system - in policy - making.

36. McPherson & Raab (1988) p.472.

37. Ibid. p.473.

APPENDICES.

Appendix 1 : List of people interviewed.

[Only the main positions relevant to this thesis are listed. All the college Principals were ex officio assessors to the SCTT and members of the CP.]

(T) indicates that the record of the interview was made from the transcript of a tape recording.

(N) indicates that the record was made from notes taken during the interview.

In both cases, the record was submitted to the person interviewed and any amendments which they requested were made. Tapes were then wiped so that only the agreed version of the interview remains.

Mr F W L Bigwood. [UNATTRIBUTABLE]
HMI responsible for inservice 1975-83; HMCI in charge of teacher education 1983-85.
20 August,1992.(N)

Mr K Bloomer.
Depute General Secretary of the EIS 1981-84 and Vice-chairman of the GTC 1979-81.
12 December,1991.(N)

Dr T R Bone CBE.
Principal of Jordanhill College, 1972-92; member of the GTC from 1975; Convenor of the GTC Supply Committee, 1976-84.
28 February,1991 (T) and 31 March 1992.(T)

Mr J Martin Fearn. [UNATTRIBUTABLE]
Secretary to the SED, 1973-76.
27 January,1992 (N)

Dr T A Fitzpatrick
Vice-principal of Notre Dame College of Education, 1973-80.
28 January,1991. (T)

Sir Norman Graham. [UNATTRIBUTABLE]
Secretary to the SED, 1964-73.
27 June,1991 (N)

Mr G Gray CBE.

Secretary to the SCTT 1959-66 and Registrar of the GTC 1966-72.

14 March,1991.(N)

Mr G Livingstone.

Formerly Principal Lecturer in Primary Education, Hamilton College of Education and national secretary of ALCES.

10 October,1991.(T)

Mr B J McGettrick.

Vice-principal of Notre Dame College of Education (later St.Andrew's) 1980-85 and Principal of St. Andrew's College since 1985.

2 July,1992 (T)

Dr D McIntyre.

Head of the History Department, Jordanhill College 1980-87 and member of the GTC 1979-83.

4 October,1990 (T)

Mr N MacLeod.

Rector of Bearsden Academy since 1981; Convenor of the GTC Visitation Committee 1971-75; member of the GTC working party on 'The Training of Graduates for Secondary Education'.

1 October,1990 (T)

Mr P C McNaught.

Principal of Craigie College, 1976-87.

24 October,1991.(N)

Mr J Maxton M.P.

Formerly Lecturer at Hamilton College of Education and national chairman of ACLES, 1976-79.

23 September,1991.(T)

Miss R Mellor.

Secretary to the Committee of Principals 1969-79.

1 November,1991. (N)

Mr E Miller CBE

Director of Education for Strathclyde Region, 1974-88; member of the GTC, 1975-82.

25 February,1992.(T)

Dr J Miller.

Vice-principal, Jordanhill College 1966-1972, and Registrar of the GTC 1973- 85.

9 October,1990.(T)

Mr J Angus Mitchell CB.

Secretary to the SED, 1976-84.

21 April,1992. (T)

Professor S D Nisbet.

Professor of Education, Glasgow University, 1951-78.

13 February,1990 T) and 11 February,1991 (T)

Mr G A Paton.

Principal of Hamilton College of Education, 1970-81; member of the GTC, 1975-81.

25 January,1991 (T) and 25 November, 1991. (T)

Mr J Pollock.

General Secretary of the EIS, 1975-88.

12 May,1992. (T)

Miss E Rennie CBE.

Principal of Craigie College, 1963-75; member of the GTC, 1972-75.

17 April,1991. (T)

Professor B Ruthven.

Professor of Education, Stirling University,1972-75, and Principal of Moray House College, 1975-81.

2 June,1992. (T)

Miss H J Sandison.

HMCI in charge of teacher education, 1973-80.

14 May, 1991 (N) and 12 December,1991.(N)

Mr J A Smith,
Vice-principal, Jordanhill College 1963 -1975.
27 March,1990. (T)

Mr D Stimpson CBE.
Principal of Dundee College, 1959-79; member of the GTC, 1966-79.
5 March,1990 (T) and 27 September,1991 (T)

Mr A Thompson.
Director of Post-initial Training, Scottish School of Further Education; Lecturer at
Callendar Park College of Education, 1973-78; Member of ALCES National Council,
1974-78.
25 June,1991. (T)

Mr T Wallace.
President of the SSTA 1987-89 and member of the GTC 1979-90.
5 December,1990.(T)

Mr J Lockhart Whiteford.
Rector of Stirling High School, 1968-82; member of the GTC, 1971-79 and Vice-
chairman 1976-79; member of the GTC working party on 'The Training of Graduates
for Secondary Education.
11 March,1991. (T)

Miss Rosemary Williamson.
Secretary to the Committee of Principals from 1980 and subsequently Depute Secretary
of the Conference of Scottish Centrally Funded Colleges.
10 June,1992. (N)

Sir Henry P Wood CBE.
Principal, Jordanhill College, 1949-71; member of the GTC, 1966-71; member of the
GTC working party on the Training of Graduates for Secondary Education.
6 November, 1989 (N), 31 January,1990 (T)
27 February,1991 (T) and 4 December,1991. (T)

Appendix 2 : List of abbreviations used in the text.

ALCES	Association of Lecturers in Colleges of Education in Scotland.
ATCDE	Association of Teachers in Colleges and Departments of Education.
ATO	Area Training Organisation.
AUPE	Associateship in Upper Primary Education
CCC	Consultative Committee on the Curriculum.
CI	Central Institution.
CNAA	Council for National Academic Awards.
COSLA	Convention of Scottish Local Authorities.
CP	Committee of Principals.
CTES	Council for Tertiary Education in Scotland.
DES	Department of Education and Science.
EIS	Educational Institute of Scotland.
GTC	General Teaching Council.
HMI	Her Majesty's Inspector
HMCI	Her Majesty's Chief Inspector
HMSCI	Her Majesty's Senior Chief Inspector
JCCES	Joint Committee of Colleges of Education in Scotland.
LEA	Local Education Authority (England & Wales).
NCTT	National Committee for the Training of Teachers.
NCITT	National Committee for the Inservice Training of Teachers.
NUT	National Union of Teachers.
RGIT	Robert Gordon Institute of Technology
ROSLA	Raising of the School Leaving Age
SCES	Select Committee on Education and Science.
SCOVACT	Scottish Council for the Validation of Courses for Teachers.
SCTT	Scottish Council for the Training of Teachers.
SEJ	Scottish Educational Journal
SED	Scottish Education Department.
SNP	Scottish National Party
SSPE	Scottish School of Physical Education.
SSA	Scottish Schoolmasters Association
SSTA	Scottish Secondary Teachers Association.
TESS	Times Educational Supplement, Scotland.
THES	Times Higher Educational Supplement.
UGC	University Grants Committee

Appendix 3: Principal office holders in the Scottish Office and SED, 1959-81

1. Secretaries of State.

1957-62	John S Maclay
1962-64	Michael Noble
1964-70	William Ross
1970-74	Gordon Campbell
1974-76	William Ross
1976-79	Bruce Millan
1979-86	George Younger

2. Permanent Under-secretary of State.

1957-64	Sir William S Murrie
1964-73	Sir Douglas Haddow
1974-78	Sir Nicholas Morrison
1978-86	Sir William K Fraser

3. Secretary to the SED.

1957-64	Sir William F Arbuckle
1964-73	Sir Norman W Graham
1974-76	J M Fearn
1976-84	J A M Mitchell

4. Under-secretaries to the SED before 1972.

1960-65	H H Donnelly (Deputy under-secretary)
1959-63	A G Rodger
1965-72	I M Robertson (Deputy under-secretary to 1967)

5. Under-secretaries to the SED after 1972.

From 1972 to 1982, the work of the SED was divided into three main groups, each with an Under-secretary in charge. Although the exact allocation of duties changed, the broad divisions were :

a)   Primary and secondary education and special services.

1972-76   W Hutchison
1976-82   Miss P A Cox

b)   Further and Higher Education.

1972-78   I M Robertson
1978-82   I l Sharp

c)   Teachers, Administration of Colleges of Education, Buildings.
1972-73   J M Feam
1973-77   J B Hume
1977-82   I M Wilson

6.   **Divisions dealing with the colleges.**

In 1966, a Supply and Training of Teachers Division was created, and in 1971 a Teachers' Pay Division, including Administration of Colleges of Education.

Both these Division were headed by as Assistant Secretary (listed below). After 1972, they were responsible to the appropriate Under-secretary.

Supply and Training of Teachers Division.

1966-67   W Baird
1967-72   W A M Good
1972-75   B J Bennett
1975-79   A K Forbes (HMCI)
1979-84   M H Orde

Teachers' Pay Division

1971-76   G M Fair
1976-79   R E Smith
1979-84   J Keeley

7. H M Senior Chief Inspector.

1955-66	J S Brunton
1966-69	D Dickson
1969-73	J Bennett
1973-81	J F McGarrity
1981-	J A Ferguson

8. H M Chief Inspector : Teacher Education and Supply

1969-73	J F McGarrity
1973-80	Miss H J S Sandison
1980-82	H F Smith

Appendix 4 : Principals of Scottish Colleges of Education, 1959-81.

ABERDEEN	1939-61	J L Hardie
	1961-83	J Scotland
CALLENDAR PARK	1963-69E	E C F Leggatt (Mrs)
	1970-79	C E Brown
	1979-81	T Rae
CRAIGIE	1963-75	E M Rennie (Miss)
	1975-87	P C McNaught
CRAIGLOCKHART	1946-74	Mother Veronica (Blount)
	1974-81	Sister Sheila (Hayes)
DUNDEE	1959-79	D E Stimpson
	1979-86	W A Illsley
DUNFERMLINE	1959-70	N Blunden (Miss)
	1970-83	M P Abbott (Miss)
HAMILTON	1965-69	W S Walker
	1970-81	G A Paton
JORDANHILL	1949-71	Sir Henry P Wood
	1972-92	T R Bone
MORAY HOUSE	1951-66	W B Inglis
	1966-74	D M McIntosh
	1975-81	B Ruthven
NOTRE DAME	1946-65	Sister Mary (Rooney)
	1965-78	Sister Francis (Ellen Henry)
	1978-85	Sister Margaret (Sheridan)

Appendix 5: Staff development and school focused inservice.

The concept of staff development was underpinned by ideas about how to effect change in organisations, largely derived from American theorists like Havelock (1) or Bennis et al. (2), which were disseminated in the U.K through writers such as Hoyle and Eraut.(3) Following Havelock, they argued that schools should regard themselves are problem-solving organisations; that their diagnosis of their own needs should be the starting point for innovation; that their own expertise was the main resource for this, and that the role of outside agencies was essentially to stimulate and support; and that such self-initiated problem-solving was the best way of achieving genuine and lasting innovation because of the participants' commitment to it.

These ideas were neatly summarised in 1975 by Isaacs (4) who argued that, because the teachers were the key resource in any school, their professional development could not be left to chance in a period of accelerating change. Instead there had to be staff development - 'a planned programme that co-ordinates the needs of the individual with the functions of the school'. This was best carried out within the school and should start from an analysis of its problems. One facet of this needs analysis would almost certainly have to be a series of individual appraisal interviews with members of staff. Outside agencies might, however, be valuable in stimulating the needs analysis and in providing resources for internal or external training.

Clearly, between this concept of staff development to meet the needs of the organisation and that of personal, professional development, there was a potential conflict. One stressed the concept of the teacher as an employee; the other that of the autonomous professional. In order to avoid this conflict, the idea was developed that inservice should be 'school-focused' i.e. that it should be directed towards the needs of one specific school and its teachers. (5)

This became a popular concept, but it is doubtful whether many schools practised it in the form the theorists recommended. ' School-focused', Bolam wrote in 1982, 'is still a relatively untried concept; rather few examples were reported in the case studies'. (6)

Of course, it did have some effects. Providers of long courses began to build in more opportunities to work on problems closely related to school needs and to describe such projects as 'school-focused'. (7) Some institutions began to develop advisory services, although these were hampered by administrative arrangements

which forced them to charge fees. (8) Perhaps the best documented effort was the School and Inservice Teacher Evaluation Project (SITE) funded by DES and based at Bristol University. (9) This tried to involve 49 schools in 4 LEAs with some success; but the project report had to conclude that the response from schools had varied widely. Some had done nothing; some had simply expanded inservice for individuals; all that could be claimed was that some school-focused programmes had been developed which seemed to be valuable. All this suggests that the concept of school-focused inservice may have won the battle of ideas; but in practice inservice still largely meant the provision of external courses.

It is not surprising that it should be so. To have developed school focused inservice widely would have required a) that schools were willing to carry out a sophisticated process of needs analysis and had the skills to do so; and b) that support services would then be available on a scale that no education authority then or since has been able to contemplate.

NOTES.

1. Havelock (1969).
2. Bennis et al.(1976).
3. Hoyle (1973) and Eraut (1973).
4. Isaacs (1975).
5. Henderson (1979).
6. Bolam (1982b) p.61.
7. Grady (1980).
8. Sefton Davies. Providing INSET consultancies for Schools. in Bolam (1982a)
9. Baker K. Planning School Policies for INSET: the SITE project ,in World Year Book of Education, 1980.

Appendix 6 :

The policy community : 'open' or 'closed'?

If one is to argue that the policy community for teacher education was 'closed', there must be criteria by which one judges to what extent a community is 'open' or 'closed'.

Two possible indicators are the extent to which its policy issues are discussed: i) in the ordinary press (as opposed to specialist journals like TESS) and the other media (radio and TV) or ii) in Parliament.

I cannot pretend to have carried out an exhaustive analysis of the coverage of teacher by the press and the media. But study of the Glasgow Herald and the Scotsman in 1976-77 suggests the obvious conclusion : that the quality press at least devotes regular coverage to any topic when it is politically sensitive. For instance, in the first six months of 1977 (i.e. over 156 issues) the number of items (leaders or articles of varying length) carried by the Herald was 54 and by the Scotsman 90. In the second half of the year, when the controversy had gone off the boil, there were hardly any.

The politicians also give a topic like teacher education the same sort of intermittent attention.

I have tried to trace every question asked in Parliament directly about teacher education between 1960 and 1975. In those 15 years, I have only been able to find 69, although there were quite a number of others on related matters e.g. the teacher shortage, the working of the Special Recruitment Scheme or the Roberts Committee's proposals for designated schools.

From an analysis of those 69 questions, the following points emerge :

1.   Most of them (58 = 84%) were written questions, which therefore did not give an opportunity for any further probing of policy. On average, there was less than one oral question a year.

2.   Nearly half of them (31 = 45%) were about intake or output i.e. questions about the number of applicants, the number of students in training in various categories, the number completing training etc. These were mainly

factual questions, which could have no impact on policy.

3.   The other questions covered a range of topics : e.g. new buildings, the length of courses, inservice training, the qualifications of college staff. The only topics to attract more than 5 questions were the training of technical teachers (9) and the possibility of an inquiry into teacher education (6).

One is therefore left wondering why these questions were asked. There seem to have been three main reasons. Firstly, some were obvious 'plants' e.g. On 8 March 1960, Mr Dempsey asked the Secretary of State what steps he was taking to provide a new college and where, which enabled him to announce his intention to build Hamilton. Secondly, some were to make political points e.g. On 17 February 1965, Lady Tweedsmuir asked what steps the Secretary of State was taking to provide salaries for graduates in training, simply to embarrass Willie Ross. This was an obvious gambit because, in opposition, Labour had criticised the Tories for not providing salaries but, once in government, were not taking any action. Thirdly, some were probably in response to constituents' grievances. This was probably the reason for the flurry of questions (5 in 1974) about the new Diploma in Technical Education, as some of the existing teachers resented having to qualify for it.

None of this adds up to serious parliamentary scrutiny of teacher education. The one obvious exception to this rule in the period up to 1975 is the Report of the Select Committee on Education and Science, (SCES 1970) but nothing came of this because of a change of government.

This contrasts sharply with the interest which the politicians took in the question of teacher supply. There were relatively frequent debates on Scottish education in the 1960s, which focused mainly on the problem of teacher shortage. See Hansard 30 March,1961; 11 May,1961; 10 July,1962; 2 July,1974; 1 May,1965; and 3 July,1967.

It also contrasts with the large number of questions asked about teacher education in 1976 and 1977 (see Chapter Six).

Of course, counting the number of newspaper items or of parliamentary questions is only really an indication of the extent of public interest. In one sense that makes the policy process more open; but it is only opened to a limited extent if the policy-makers are secretive about their policy options, the information on which they are based and the criteria on which the choice of option is made.

Appendix 7 : 'Compression' of college courses.

Throughout the period from the late '50s to the mid-'70s, One recurrent theme in SED thinking was that college courses might be 'compressed' i.e that the same amount of training could be undertaken in a shorter time. This was seen as a way of tackling the problems of teacher shortage by getting the trainee teachers into schools earlier and by paying them sooner - so making entry into teaching more attractive financially.

As a first step the length of training for Chapter V (Honours Graduates) was reduced to two terms in 1958-59, initially for a three-year period. When the SCTT came to consider this reduction, it decided to recommend that the shortened courses should end after two years, and it was only after considerable pressure from the Department that it agreed to extend it for a third and final year. (1)

Of course, the problem of teacher supply continued to be of great concern to the Department, which held internal meetings in 1962 to consider all the possibilities for improvement. These led to a submission to the Secretary of State which successfully sought permission for an approach to the SCTT for what was described as 'more intensive use of the colleges' i.e. for the 40 week year and the compressed courses.(2)

When this suggestion was put to the SCTT in September,1962, it provoked a very hostile reaction. This was to be expected from the college Principals but, according to the SED note on the meeting :

> 'The Principals were supported ..... by representatives of all the interests there - Teachers, Directors, Universities and the Churches. Eventually, after a pacifying interjection [by one of the SED assessors] it was agreed that the matter would be remitted simpliciter to the governing bodies'. (3)

When, in due course, the governing bodies responded, all of them opposed 'compression'. So did the EIS which saw shorter training as a threat to the professional status of its members. In December,1962, it wrote to the SED 'to inform you that the Institute is very strongly opposed to the reduction in the period of training on the lines so far canvassed'. (4) Encouraged by this support from the governing bodies and the teachers, the SCTT reaffirmed its opposition to 'compression' (5) and the SED decided to make a tactical retreat.

However, it still believed that shorter courses would help supply, and raised the issue several times in its private meetings with the Principals.(6) For instance, the SED note of a meeting in July 1965 records that their representatives pointed out that English colleges worked a longer year than Scottish and therefore the Scottish colleges should consider more intensive use of their facilities 'e.g. by lengthening the session, by starting courses earlier and releasing students earlier for employment in schools, or by staggering training e.g training graduates for 2 terms only in the first instance, then releasing them for employment on probation subject to a further term's training at a later date'. As Brunton was still Senior Chief at that time, one can see here the germ of the idea which underlay the Brunton Report (7) and which he was to pursue for the next decade.

Nothing came of this or of subsequent private discussions, but the proposal surfaced again in May 1970 when the SED issued its 'Memorandum on the Training of Graduates for Secondary Teaching', which is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.

NOTES :

1.   SCTT. First Report of Proceedings. s.xii.
2.   SED file ED/52/8/251.
3.   SED file ED/51/8/303..
4.   Ibid.
5.   SCTT. Second Report of Proceedings. s.xi.
6.   SED file ED/8/304 contains notes of meetings.
7.   SED (1972a).

Appendix 8 : Callendar Park and Craigie : temporary or permanent colleges?

It is quite clear from the SCTT Minutes that the original intention was that the two colleges should be temporary, presumably because the SED suspected, quite rightly, that the demand for primary teachers would slacken and that the other eight colleges would then be able to satisfy it. Hence their suggestion to the SCTT (letter of 25 July,1963) 'that for various given reasons the Council should meantime address itself primarily to the establishment of temporary facilities'.

The SCTT accepted what was virtually a directive and, in the minutes of the Chairman's Committee of 5 September 1963, paragraph 3 refers to the appointment of the principals of the temporary colleges and paragraph 5 to the organisation of temporary colleges. Moreover, the Committee had previously decided on June 11th :

a)   that women Principals be appointed;

b)   that in the first instance notice of the appointments be circulated to the Colleges of Education; only if the response were unsuitable would the posts be advertised;

c)   that the Governing Bodies be invited to be responsible for secondment of the two officers concerned;

d)   that the tenure of the posts be for four years ending in summer 1967.

The first departure from this was in 1964, when the SCTT (Minutes of 5th May,1964) removed the four year time limit. So by the time he wrote his Second Report on the proceedings of the SCTT later that year, Gray glossed the situation by referring to the erection of 'two colleges of indeterminate life'.

But did the SED ever make a definite decision that they should be regarded as permanent? When questioned, neither Wood nor Stimpson knew of such a decision, and Sandison confirmed that no such decision had been made.

> *WBM : When the first proposals for college closures were made, Callendar Park and Craigie tried to refute the suggestion that they were in any sense 'temporary' colleges. As you know, it is quite clear from the records that they were originally intended to be temporary. Did the SED ever formally*

change its policy on that?

SANDISON : No. As time went on, Callendar Park and Craigie settled happily into the system and it was difficult to go on reminding them that they were only temporary. Perhaps we should have done. But there was no formal change of policy and the Department always considered them to be temporary colleges.

When the proposals for closure were made, Ethel Rennie wrote an article ('The dark side of political necessity' TESS 4 February,1977) arguing against the closure of Callendar Park and Craigie and claiming that both were permanent colleges. In support of this claim, she referred to the SCTT Minutes, Vol.II p362, for 30 October, 1963.

These include two relevant items. The first is a report from the Special Building Committee (Stirlingshire) which records that there was 'considerable discussion as to the "permanency" of the proposed colleges' and that :

'It was further decided that advertisements to the new Colleges should be framed in the same terms as those for appointments at other colleges; that is, that the word "temporary" should not be used except where appointment for a limited period was desirable'.

The minutes of the Council then refer back to this report and state that :

'It was again recorded that, unless where appointment for a limited was specified, appointments at the above colleges should be regarded as having the same degree of permanency as those held at older Colleges'.

This is hardly the conclusive argument that Rennie claimed it to be. The Minutes seem to mean simply that appointments to the two colleges were not to be for a fixed term - a provision which was essential if the new colleges were to compete for well-qualified staff. However, this does not to my mind entail any guarantee that the colleges themselves were to be permanent.

When I interviewed McNaught, I put the issue to him.

WBM : It is quite clear from the Minutes of the SCTT that the original intention was that they [Callendar Park and Craigie] should be temporary

colleges. Would it be fair to say that the policy was never changed but that, as time went on and the colleges were seen to be running successfully, people forgot about the original intention and began to assume that they were now permanent.

MCNAUGHT : I think that's a fair description. But I would stress that by the mid-'70s Craigie had put down roots in the local community and had acquired a number of permanent buildings like the theatre and the residences.

Appendix 9 : Number of B.Ed students :1974-76.

1. The annual JCCES returns give the number of B.Ed students each session. These are only given for the 3rd and 4th Years because students followed a common course at Notre Dame for one year and at Callendar Park, Craigie and Hamilton for two years.

2. Figures of the 4th Year students for 1974-76 have been extracted because at that time B.Ed numbers were at their peak.

Table 1 : Total number of 4th Year B.Ed students (excluding P.E students at Dunfermline and Jordanhill.)

	1974	1975	1976
Secondary	262	257	242
Primary	82	102	98
Total	344	359	340

3. Therefore, in each year, about 350 students were spread across 8 colleges and a range of subjects. The size of teaching groups is difficult to determine, as students from different years might be taught together; or, in the case of Craigie and Hamilton might share classes with one another and with Strathclyde University students. However, an indication is provided by the returns which show the number of students taking secondary qualifications by subject.

Table 2 (over) gives the figures for Aberdeen (which had the largest number of B.Ed students), Dundee, and Craigie and Hamilton combined. It clearly shows how small the numbers were in each subject, except in English and the Social Subjects.

Table 2 : Number of 4th Year students taking a B.Ed secondary qualification, 1974-76.

	1974			1975			1976		
	Ab.	Dd.	C/H	Ab.	Dd.	C/H	Ab.	Dd.	C/H
Mathematics.	0	2	1	2	2	1	0	1	3
Science	5	2	2	6	2	3	2	2	7
English	17	9	13	18	3	13	14	7	17
History	11	3	2	11	1	2	5	4	10
Geography	11	1	3	13	4	2	8	0	3
Modern Langs.	8	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0
Economics	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Modern Studies	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
R.E.	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0

Appendix 10 : Evidence of SED to the Select Committee on Education and Science, 12 May, 1970.

1708. Mr Dewar. The colleges are autonomous in terms of curricula organisation? -(Mr Graham) Yes.

1709. We have had a mass of evidence, sometimes contradictory, about the nature of the three year diploma curricula. This is something where the SED obviously have views as being involved in education, but you have no way of influencing the decisions taken by Craiglockhart, for example, where we are told there were 14 subjects in the first year ? - I would not say there is no means of influencing if we wanted to influence, because contact between the colleges and the Department is very close, the informal contact. There is no formal control, no formal approval of courses by the Department.

1710. Mr Park. This is largely the work, is it not, of HMIs, who act as a bridge between the Department and the colleges, is that correct ? - (Mr McGarrity) This is so. I would think the bridge in Scotland has been of lighter construction than the one in England over recent years, and this has been in fact a policy decision that the colleges in Scotland could stand on their own feet. Perhaps you have now been seeing some of the consequences of this in terms of variety of course, and so on.

1711. You would feel quite happy, would you, with the present nature of the bridge? You feel it is right it should be of slighter construction than in England? - Yes, I think it is right it should be of slighter construction, but it should perhaps be a little stronger than it is now.

1712. Mr Dewar. You would not say, for example, the SED was uneasy about any of the developments which are taking place within the colleges ? - I would not say the SED was uneasy.

1713. There is no feeling there is need for change? - No.

Appendix 11 : A Scottish political system?

In using the term 'arena' rather than system, I am following Midwinter. (1).

There has been a good deal of debate as to whether it makes sense to talk of a 'Scottish political system' within the British one. Kellas (2) argues that it does for two main reasons . One is that people in Scotland tend to think of themselves primarily as Scots rather than British. The other is the extent of the objective differences : in the legal system and in various social institutions such as education, the churches, the media and sport. Midwinter has criticised this view, arguing cogently that, in strict Eastonian terms, Scottish politics does not constitute a separate system. (3) To some extent these disagreements are semantic: a question of how the situation is described rather than what it is. For there can be little dispute, though there may be differences of emphasis, over the propositions that Scotland is part of the British system, that nevertheless there is a distinct Scottish dimension to British politics, and that the Scottish Office has some room for manoeuvre which varies from one issue to another. Rhodes sums up the situation very clearly :

> 'The national offices operate within dual political environments: the shared environment of UK politics and the individual political environments of each constituent nation with its own distinct ethnic identity, sub-central political organisations, legal, educational and religious institutions. For these reasons, government within the peripheral nations has been bestowed with a variety of labels : e.g. the Scottish political system, decentralised government, administrative devolution, devolved government and pro-consular government. The problem with each and every such label is that they imply a high degree of separateness from the centre. It will be argued here that the key feature of the offices is their dual character; they are simultaneously in the centre and for a territory'. (4)

1.   Midwinter et al .(1991) p.201.
2.   Kellas (1989) Chapter 4.
3.   Midwinter et al. (1991) pp.196-9.
4.   Rhodes (1988) p.144.

Appendix 12A : A note on the impact of the CNAA on college courses.

The main impact of the CNAA on college courses and organisation was not felt until after our period. In 1981, the only substantial courses validated by CNAA were the B.Ed at Notre Dame, and the B.Eds in P.E. at Dunfermline and Jordanhill.

Later on, as CNAA validation spread, it had a very significant effect on college courses, which merits a research study in itself.

Put at its simplest, the change was from time-tabling to course planning. Before CNAA, decisions were taken about the time which would be allocated to a subject within a course and about when it would be taught. It was then up to the subject departments to teach their part of the course as they thought best. Therefore, however well the subjects were taught, the courses tended to be fragmented.

The CNAA changed this radically by insisting that courses should be planned as a coherent whole. The course team had to decide on its aims and objectives; select appropriate content; devise the course structure and sequence; and demonstrate how the various element contributed to the overall aims. All these decisions had to be justified, first by the rationale in the course documentation and then in discussion with the visiting party from CNAA.

To achieve all this, course teams had to engage in a great deal of discussion, in which the ideas and practices of individuals and departments were subjected, often for the first time, to proper professional scrutiny. This became even sharper as colleges developed, under pressure from CNAA, their own procedures for internal validation. The result, in my view, was a very marked improvement in the quality of course design.

These changes were so marked and had to be accomplished so quickly that they inevitably attracted criticisms. The main charges levelled against CNAA procedures were :

1.   That they involved the production of very elaborate documentation, and that the time and effort which went into this took staff away from the prime tasks of teaching and research;

2.   That they imposed too much inflexibility on courses because, once a course was validated (usually for five years), any major changes required

CNAA approval;

3.   That they lent themselves to 'window-dressing' i.e. that those responsible for drafting submissions to CNAA could become skilled in forms of rhetoric which masked reality and that, in the course of a one-day visit, CNAA parties did not always succeed in probing beyond the rhetoric.

In my experience there was some force in all these criticisms, but one can accept that CNAA procedures had their drawbacks while still believing that they transformed the colleges' approach to course planning and for the better.

Appendix 13 : Did George Younger over-rule SED advice that Craigie should be closed?

The files relating to the closure of Hamilton are not available at West Register House and, when I interviewed Mitchell, understandably he was not willing to say what the SED advice to Ministers had been.

Nevertheless there are strong grounds for believing that the SED advice was that Craigie should be closed and that Younger over-ruled this.

1.   The SED view in 1977 had been that Hamilton, not Craigie, should be retained. Nothing had happened subsequently to alter the educational case, or to make the SED depart from its view that Callendar Park and Craigie were temporary colleges built to cope with a situation which, by 1980, no longer existed. This point came out very clearly in the interview with Sandison quoted in Appendix 8.

2.   Two well-placed people within the SED (other than those I have interviewed) have independently told me off-the-record that the SED advice was to close Craigie, and that Younger over-ruled it.

3.   There is also the evidence of Wood, who was still in touch with events through his membership of the Strathclyde University B.Ed Committee.

        WOOD : Professor Fletcher and I went to see Craigie about something in the January before the closures were announced [i.e. January,1980] and McNaught was able to say that he had been assured by the Secretary of State that he need not worry at all'.

These three pieces of evidence do not amount to conclusive proof, but they do strongly support the generally held and inherently plausible belief that Younger intervened to save Craigie at Hamilton's expense.

Appendix 14: The Strathclyde Region's attempt to buy Hamilton College.

In view of the subsequent controversy over the sale of Hamilton, Edward Miller's account of the Region's attempt to buy Hamilton is worth quoting in full :

E MILLER : As officers, we put a series of proposals to elected members about alternative usages of Hamilton - not only the building but of how it might be operated as part of the educational strategy of the Region. But, probably for financial reasons, the authority did not proceed with these proposals.

WBM : I'd picked up that you were putting forward the idea that it might become some sort of community or further education college.

MILLER : That was one possibility. ..... It could have been, for instance, a residential inservice training establishment. If you think in terms of what Coombe Lodge has done as a residential inservice establishment for further education in England & Wales, it gives you an idea of what Hamilton could have been as a residential establishment for inservice courses. That was our alternative proposal.

WBM : But it was cost that shot it down?

MILLER : Presumably it was cost. The regional councillors at that time gave us really no encouragement to take the paper to committee. Certainly Strathclyde as a whole was in serious financial difficulties.

WBM : If they had known what Hamilton was eventually sold for, they might have changed their minds.

MILLER : That was absolutely monstrous.

WBM : Probably at the time the costs being discussed were much in excess of that?

MILLER : I'm glad that you asked the question, because I can tell you exactly what we were told at the time. ... We had a meeting at that time [with SED officials] to discuss what would it cost us. We felt that as a major local

authority we could help. Given the decision to close the college, we could have taken the SED off the hook and at the same time have done a service to education in Strathclyde. We had a meeting with the key SED officers and asked them how much it would cost us. They had to take it to avisandum and came back and said that it would be at the District Valuer's price. We all know that the price eventually paid for Hamilton was way below the District Valuer's price, and yet they said that we would have to pay the District Valuer's price. There were to be no advantages given to Strathclyde. Later, when it was sold for a song to a private entrepreneur, the regional councillors were angry that an opportunity had been lost.

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Section A : Printed sources

Section B : Archive material not generally available

N.B. Some of the detailed references (e.g. Wood 1959a) appear only in Section B.

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SECTION B

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