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Report

on behalf of the Committee on Transport

on the development of a coordinated European
air traffic control system

Rapporteur: Mr J.L. JANSSEN van RAAY

At the plenary sitting of 10 December 1979 the motion for a resolution by Mr Berkhouwer on behalf of the Liberal and Democratic Group, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure, on the development of a coordinated European air traffic control system was referred to the Committee on Transport.

On 28 February 1980 the Committee on Transport appointed Mr Janssen van Raay rapporteur.

It considered the draft report at its meeting of 18 June 1980 and unanimously adopted the motion for a resolution and the explanatory statement.

Present: Mr Seefeld, chairman; Miss Roberts, vice-chairman; Mr Carossino, vice-chairman; Mr Janssen van Raay, rapporteur; Mr Albers, Mr Baudis, Mr Cottrell, Mr Gabert, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, Mr Helms, Mr Klinkenborg, Mr Moreland, Mr O'Donnell (deputizing for Mr Hoffmann) and Mr Turner (deputizing for Mr Moorhouse).

C O N T E N T S

A

The Committee on Transport hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution together with explanatory statement:

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the development of a coordinated European air traffic control system

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Berkhouwer (Doc. 1-554/79),

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Transport (Doc. 1-274/80),

- having regard to its previous resolutions[1] and reports on the promotion of efficient air traffic control (Doc. 49/78 and Doc. 106/79),

1. Regrets to note that, in spite of its numerous initiatives on European aviation policy and a European approach to management and control of air traffic, there has been no increase in intra-European cooperation and there is now a trend towards 'renationalization';

2. Draws attention in this context to Eurocontrol, which is threatened by a more or less radical erosion of its powers and even, perhaps, dismantlement;

3. Recalls that Eurocontrol is the only European organization with executive functions in a specific field, namely active air traffic control, the quality of which is, moreover, undisputed;

4. Notes with regret that the difficulties concerning Eurocontrol and the threat to its future are due solely to a lack of political will and a resurgence of national egoism;

5. Points out that, although air transport today is characterized by a relatively high level of safety, everything possible must be done to reduce the dangers and risks of aviation without delay, and stresses here the suggestions and recommendations it has already formulated on the subject;

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[1] OJ No. C 131 of 5.6.1978, p. 31 and OJ No. C 140 of 5.6.79, p. 20

6. Notes that, because of the compartmentalization of the already limited Western European air space and the lack of cooperation and coordination between national air traffic services, air traffic in Western Europe displays a number of serious shortcomings;

7. Draws attention most particularly to:

    (i) the disturbing underutilization of capacity of the air traffic control systems;

    (ii) needless overburdening of air traffic control staff and services and air crew;

    (iii) all too frequent congestion with the resultant disruption, diversions and delays for air traffic and inconvenience for passengers;

    (iv) unsatisfactory coordination between military and civil air traffic;

    (v) frequent incompatibility of expensive air traffic control apparatus and equipment;

    (vi) unjustifiable increases in costs and waste of money and fuel;

8. Is quite convinced that these deficiencies can be relieved or removed only by far-reaching cooperation and coordination between the various national air navigation authorities in the management and control of air traffic;

9. Proposes to this end the setting-up of an integrated European system for the management of air traffic flows, to be responsible in particular for the tactical and strategic planning of air traffic;

10. Wishes this task to be entrusted to Eurocontrol;

11. Considers it desirable that for active air traffic control a similar integrated system be introduced involving the Eurocontrol Agency;

12. Considers it necessary therefore that Eurocontrol continue its operational tasks in the upper airspace of the Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg, that the Netherlands fulfil its obligation to transfer control to Eurocontrol, that, with the accession of Italy and Denmark in prospect, negotiations with these countries be intensified and that France, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom give favourable consideration to transferring these tasks to the Agency;

13. Believes that, if there is not sufficient political will to achieve this in the immediate future, the Eurocontrol Convention which expires in 1983 ought to be prolonged automatically in its present form so that at least the air traffic control centres of Eurocontrol at Maastricht and Karlsruhe can be maintained;

14. Considers that such an extension should be made use of for the execution, at the Commission's expense, of a basic study of the relationship between the development of a common air transport policy and an integrated air traffic control system; believes, moreover, that this study needs to be geared to the future, be based on a cost-benefit analysis and be drawn up in consultation with the sectors concerned;

15. Requests its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission, to the competent authorities in Eurocontrol's member states and to the chairmen of the competent committees in the national parliaments.

B

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

1.   In the first recital of Mr Berkhouwer's resolution (Doc. 1-554/79)[1]
which gave rise to this report, the author mentions the preliminary
work done by the European Parliament's Committee on Transport.   Air
traffic safety is indeed a subject to which this committee has given
its close attention on numerous occasions in the past and on which it
has taken initiatives both on air traffic control and safety as such,
and on the question of Eurocontrol.   In the following pages Parlia-
ment's earlier activities in this area will be described in more
detail.

2.   In the resolution referred to above, Mr Berkhouwer states with
reason that he is convinced 'that air traffic control on a national
basis is a dangerous anachronism' (fourth recital) and therefore
calls for 'the development of an efficient and coordinated European
air traffic control system' (paragraph 1) and, as a first step, calls
for the retention and further development of the Eurocontrol centres
in Karlsruhe and Maastricht (paragraph 2).

      This report will therefore consider the question of Eurocontrol
and examine in detail the need for an integrated air traffic control
system.

3.   In preparing his report, your rapporteur was able to refer not
only to the activities of the former Committee on Regional Policy,
Regional Planning and Transport but also to the discussions of the
present Committee on Transport on 19 December 1979 with Mr Lévêque,
Director-General of Eurocontrol, and Mr Jenyns, Chairman of Euro-
control's Trade Union;   likewise to the discussions with Mr Veres of
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), Mr Shaw from IATA,
Air Vice-Marshal Pedder from Nato, Mr Lévêque from Eurocontrol and
Mr Graebel from Lufthansa, on 29 May 1980.

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[1] Please see Annex I for the text of Mr Berkhouwer's resolution on the
development of a coordinated European air traffic control system.

Your rapporteur's visits to Eurocontrol's air traffic control centres at Beek/Maastricht on 15 March 1980, Karlsruhe on 20 March 1980 and Rome on 15 May 1980, were particularly instructive. They afforded him the opportunity to obtain information direct from management and staff delegations. He was also able to observe for himself the extremely advanced equipment at Beek, the way in which civil and military air traffic controllers sit side-by-side in Karlsruhe and the Eurocontrol equipment at Rome ATC which stands ready but has not yet been put into use.

Annex II lists all persons who provided your rapporteur with information for his report.

4. In conclusion your rapporteur wishes to state that in drawing up his report he worked in close consultation with Mr K.-H. Hoffmann, who is at present preparing, on behalf of your committee, a basic report on the contributions of the European Communities to the development of air transport, in which the safety aspect is also dealt with.

II. PRELIMINARY WORK OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

5. As, by virtue of Article 84(1) of the EEC Treaty, the treaty provisions dealing with transport policy do not apply to sea and air transport, from the very outset the European Parliament has pressed for implementation of paragraph 2 of that article, which states that the Council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport'. This was the case in the reports by Mr Corniglion-Molinier (Doc. 107/61) and Mr Battistini (Doc. 117/61) in 1961. Four years later the European Parliament advocated, in the own-initiative report by Mr Drouot-L'Hermine (Doc. 24/65), the integration of civil aviation within the Community. Lastly, early in 1973, a report (Doc. 195/72) and a supplementary report (Doc. 382/72) by Mr Noè were adopted on the first measures of a common approach to air transport.

6. Air transport safety itself was indeed touched on by the European Parliament in these reports but was only really stressed in Parliament's opinions on the proposal by the Commission of the European Communities on the first measures of a common approach to air

transport (Doc. 134/72)[1]. At the request of Mr Noè, Parliament
proposed that the text of the Commission document concerned should
be amplified so as to include 'joint action to improve air safety'
in Community projects in the air transport sector[2].

At its sitting on 13 May 1975 the European Parliament adopted
a resolution tabled by Mr Fellermaier on behalf of the Socialist
Group (Doc. 83/75) in which concern was expressed at a possible cut-
back in the work of Eurocontrol. On 12 November 1975 a debate was
held on air traffic safety on the basis of an oral question on behalf
of the Committee on Regional Policy and Transport to the Council and
the Commission (Doc. 346-347/75). Following this, the resolution
(Doc. 374/75) tabled by Mr Noè, Mr Nyborg, Mr Osborn, Mr Schwabe and
Mr Seefeld was adopted. In this resolution the Commission was
requested to submit to the Council without delay a proposal for joint
action with a view to bringing the entire airspace under the control
of a single body[3].

One year later, on 15 October 1976, following the air disaster
over Zagreb there was a debate in plenary sitting, on the basis of an
oral question by Mr Osborn, Mr Berkhouwer and Mr Noè, on the improve-
ment of air traffic safety.

During the plenary sitting on 15 November 1978, Mr von Dohnanyi,
President-in-Office of the Council, and Mr Burke, Member of the
Commission, were questioned on the intentions of the two Community
institutions with regard to the future role of Eurocontrol and the
establishment of a common air transport policy. The debate followed
an oral question on this subject by Mr Fuchs, Mr Brugger, Mr Alber,
Mr Schyns and Mr Noè to the Council and Commission (Doc. 418/78 and
419/78). There was also the motion for a resolution by Mr Blumenfeld,
Mr Noè and Mr Fuchs on behalf of the Christian-Democratic Group on air
traffic control and the serious disruption of air traffic caused by
the work-to-rule by French air traffic controllers (Doc. 319/78 of
28 September 1978).

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[1] See own-initiative report by Mr Noè on the promotion of efficient
air traffic control (Doc. 49/78), paragraphs 21 to 23

[2] Noè Report, Doc. 328/72, OJ No. C 19, 12.4.1973, p.55

[3] OJ No. C 280, 8.12.1975, p.24, paragraph 1 of the Resolution

A further series of oral and written questions to the Council and Commission were tabled on this subject by Mr Durieux, Mr W. Müller, Mr Glinne, Mr Zywietz, Mr Verhaegen, Mr Blumenfeld, Mr Osborn and others; this clearly illustrates the importance attached to this matter by Members of the European Parliament.

7. Parliament also drew up reports on proposals from the Commission on the matter now under consideration. This was the case with the communication from the Commission to the Council containing initial proposals for priority projects in data processing on which Mr Cousté, on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, drew up a report (Doc. 199/75) containing an opinion drawn up by Mr McDonald on behalf of the Committee on Transport on one of the proposed priority projects relative to the setting up of a study of real-time data processing systems required for air traffic control (ATC) in the 1980s. There was also Mr Noè's opinion, on behalf of the Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Transport, in Mr Guldberg's report, on behalf of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, on the communication from the Commission to the Council concerning an action programme for the European Aeronautical Sector (Doc. 203/76).

8. In October 1976 the then Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Transport decided, on a proposal by Mr Osborn and as a result of the dramatic mid-air collision over Zagreb, to draw up an own-initiative report on the promotion of efficient air traffic control (Doc. 49/78). In Mr Noè's very comprehensive report, he outlines the developments in air transport and air traffic control and proposes a number of measures including, inter alia, research and development of flight safety techniques, meteorology and procedural and organizational measures. In conclusion, the Noè report includes proposals for future cooperation in Europe on air traffic control.

9. In implementation of paragraph 20 of the resolution contained in the Noè report, there was a public hearing on 19 and 20 March 1979 in Paris on the development of efficient air traffic control.

On this occasion representatives of the relevant international organizations (such as ICAO, IATA, NATO, Eurocontrol) and associations (those of air traffic controllers and pilots) were questioned on four main areas:
- general organization of air transport in Europe;
- technological developments;
- social aspects; and
- management and cooperation in air transport.

The European Parliament can take pride in the success of this public hearing. Partly because of the high standard of the experts taking part and the expositions made references are still regularly made in the trade press to what was said on that occasion[1].

10. The results of the hearing are presented in Mr Noè's second report (Doc. 106/79) approved on 7 May 1979 in Strasbourg. There will be references to this document too in the course of the present report.

III. THE EUROCONTROL QUESTION

A. Origins and development of Eurocontrol

(i) Origins

11. The rapid expansion of air transport after the Second World War and the introduction of fast and high-flying jet aircraft meant that, by the 1950s, a need was felt for closer cooperation in air navigation. In view of the specific geographical situation of Western Europe the introduction of a coordinated air traffic control system for the area seemed extremely desirable even at that stage.

12. With this in mind, negotiations were held between a number of West European countries, which resulted in the conclusion of the International Convention for Cooperation in the Interests of Air Transport Safety, the 'Eurocontrol Convention' signed on 13 December 1960 in Brussels by Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Italy took part in the negotiations but did not sign the Convention. The fact that in that country control of both military and civilian air traffic was the responsibility of the military authorities clearly had a bearing on this decision. In the meantime it has been decided to end the military status of civilian air traffic controllers. Italy is apparently preparing to accede to the Eurocontrol Convention, which is naturally to be welcomed. Greece, which will be a member of the European Community as from 1 January 1981, has also expressed its interest.

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[1] A verbatim report of this hearing can be obtained from the secretariat of the Committee on Transport (PE 58.065)

The Convention entered into force on 1 March 1963 for a
20-year period.   It therefore expires at the end of February
1983 unless, pursuant to Article 39 of the Convention, none of
the contracting parties express their intention before the
end of February 1981 to denounce the Convention; in which case
the period of 20 years will be prolonged automatically for
5-year periods.

13.   By virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, the European
Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol)
was established to develop cooperation in air transport and for
joint organization of air traffic control in the upper airspace.
For the lower airspace, i.e. below 20,000 ft or 6,000 metres,
the contracting parties are, under Article 2, free to choose
whether or not to transfer air traffic control functions to
Eurocontrol.

14.   With regard to the internal structure of Eurocontrol, the
Convention provides for the establishment of two bodies, a
Permanent Commission and an Agency for air traffic control.
The Permanent Commission consists of ministers of the Member
States responsible for aviation and defence and has the decision-
making powers.   The Agency is responsible for the actual air
traffic control.

(ii) Development

15.   On 1 January 1965, Ireland became the seventh country to
join Eurocontrol.

The organization has concluded cooperation agreements with
several European countries: with Denmark, Norway and Sweden
(1964), the United States (1964), Switzerland (1965), Italy and
Portugal (1966), Austria (1967) and Canada (1977).   A coopera-
tion agreement with Greece was approved last year.   An associa-
tion agreement was signed with Spain in December 1971.

16.   With regard to the expansion of Eurocontrol, an experimental
centre was set up in Brétigny-sur-Orge (near Paris) in January
1967 and a training institute in Luxembourg in April 1969.

The first Eurocontrol air traffic control centre became
operational on 1 March 1972. The UAC Centre[1] established in the
Netherlands in Limburg at Beek near Maastricht has responsibility
for air traffic control in Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and
the northern sector of the Federal Republic of Germany. Effec-
tive air traffic control in the upper airspace of Belgium and
Luxembourg was taken over by the Eurocontrol Centre in March 1972
and in March 1974 the Federal Republic of Germany transferred the
powers of its Hannover Centre for North German airspace to the
Maastricht Centre. The Netherlands, despite having made such
strenuous and successful efforts to have the first operational
Eurocontrol centre sited on Netherlands territory, has, without
sufficient reason, failed to make the agreed transfer. This
has of course had an adverse effect on the partners listed above,
who had implemented the Convention faithfully in this respect.

Your rapporteur would, incidentally, draw attention to the
fact that Eurocontrol has found an original and very positive
solution to the problem of military and civilian air traffic
control: in Maastricht the civilian and military air traffic
controllers are housed in the same room, while in Karlsruhe they
work side by side at the radar screens.

17. Since 1972, 11 West European countries have made Eurocontrol
responsible for the collection of jointly fixed air route
charges.[2] These should soon be borne completely by the users,
i.e. the airlines, and amount to between 4 and 8% of their
operating costs.

18. In spite of these remarkable achievements, the real purpose
of Eurocontrol, i.e. air traffic control in the upper airspace of
the seven member countries, has unfortunately not been realized.
France and the United Kingdom decided not to transfer this func-
tion to the Agency shortly after Eurocontrol had been set up
(1965) and Ireland took the same decision a few years later,
national security being given as the reason. The Netherlands
has still not transferred air traffic control to Eurocontrol, as
Article 14 of the 1960 Convention requires. Although Eurocontrol
costs a good 20 million guilders a year, operational tasks in
Dutch airspace are still reserved to the national centre at
Schiphol so only the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and
Luxembourg have adhered strictly to the provisions of the
Convention.

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[1] Upper Airspace Control

[2] The seven member states of Eurocontrol, plus Austria, Portugal, Spain
and Switzerland.

B.   **The future of Eurocontrol**

19.   There is considerable uncertainty at present as to the future of Eurocontrol.   It is very probable that a decision will not be taken until 8 July on the continued existence of Eurocontrol after expiry of this Convention at the end of February 1983 and the possible role of Eurocontrol after that date.

Thus, although at present nothing can be said with certainty about how this organization will develop, the future looks rather dark and in some circles it is feared that Euro-control will be dismantled or reduced in size.   The trade unions representing the 1,200 staff of Eurocontrol have in recent years repeatedly expressed their concern.[1]

20.   There are basically three possible options:

(i) maintenance of Eurocontrol in its present form, either by simply prolonging the present Convention or by virtue of a new convention;

(ii) liquidation of Eurocontrol;

(iii) conclusion of a new Convention, with active air traffic control withdrawn from Eurocontrol and, possibly, new tasks given to the organization.

21.   As has already been stated, the Convention setting up Euro-control can simply be extended by virtue of Article 39.   This article reads as follows:

'1. The present Convention shall remain in force for a period of twenty years from the date of its entry into force.

2. That period shall be automatically prolonged for periods of five years, provided that no Contracting Party has, by written notice to the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium at least two years before the expiry of the current period, expressed its intention of denouncing the Convention.'

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[1] Inter alia by memoranda to the ministries concerned and the parliament-arians of Member States, petitions to heads of state and government, press statements, go-slow measures and strikes

22. Eurocontrol in its present form can naturally also be maintained through a new Convention between the seven Member States (and possibly new countries) which ensures the present status quo and in particular the actual air traffic control function.

23. In view of recent developments, it seems hardly likely that either a new Convention, as described above, will be concluded or that Eurocontrol will be completely dismantled.

The eventuality that it will be automatically prolonged seems more likely. Of course, this solution means postponement rather than abolition of the problem. Sooner or later a definitive solution must be found and implemented.

24. As regards a final solution for Eurocontrol, since France and the United Kingdom broke away and a Eurocontrol 'à la carte' emerged there has been much consideration of notes, memoranda and all manner of alternative proposals.

25. One of the most significant documents is the memorandum by Mr Westerterp, who was then the Netherlands Minister of Transport, Water Control and Public Works. The memorandum, which was approved by the Permanent Commission on 20 November 1975, contains ten recommendations on the future tasks and structure of Eurocontrol.

On the one hand it is solemnly stated that Eurocontrol 'should continue in existence' (paragraph 1) and that the central task of Eurocontrol 'should be maintained' (paragraph 2). However, on the other hand, the transfer of air traffic control in fact remained voluntary (paragraph 7) and it was stated that the transfer of air traffic control should be contingent on 'national defence requirements as well as political, operational, technical, economic and social considerations' (paragraph 9).

Whilst it can therefore be assumed that Eurocontrol is not to be dissolved, the memorandum unfortunately offers no clear answer to the fundamental question whether the Agency will actually be responsible for air traffic control after 1983.

26. Since the Westerterp memorandum, there has been consider-
able concern in the Netherlands and German parliaments about
Eurocontrol's future.

27. On 19 December 1979 a resolution was tabled in Bonn by
Mr Tillmann and others on behalf of the Christian-Democratic
Group[1], which denounced the reversion to national solutions by
governments and national officials. This 'renationalization
trend' was considered to be in conflict with the opinions of
experts and the European Parliament and they were strongly
condemned. This resolution therefore presses for the mainten-
ance and expansion of Eurocontrol's powers and for negotiations
at the highest political level. The German Federal Government
is also requested to adopt the recommendations of the European
Parliament as contained in the two reports by Mr Noè and to
oppose at all costs renationalization.

A former Member of the European Parliament, Mr Ibrügger,
is now preparing a report on the subject.

28. There was a debate in the Netherlands Second Chamber on
20 November 1979 on the continued existence of Eurocontrol.
It was prompted by two motions tabled by Mr Riemke and Mr Van
Zeil. Mr Riemke, on behalf of the Socialist Group, advocated
the setting up of a supranational air traffic control authority
and the optimal utilization of existing air traffic control
centres, in particular the Eurocontrol centre at Beek.
Mr Van Zeil, on behalf of the Christian Democratic Group, not
only insisted on the maintenance of the Eurocontrol centre near
Maastricht but also called on the Government to transfer national
control tasks to that centre. Both these motions were carried
by the Second Chamber.

29. At present Socialist and Christian Democratic parliamentar-
ians from Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Federal
Republic of Germany are conducting talks with the aim of esta-
blishing a common position on Eurocontrol's future.

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[1] See 'Drucksache 8/3521'

30.   Within Eurocontrol itself discussions were held at the beginning

of the year on a working document drawn up by a working party of experts
from the Benelux countries and the Federal Republic of Germany.
This proposes that Eurocontrol should be entrusted with air
traffic flow management but would not itself be responsible for
air traffic control.   The air traffic control centre at
Maastricht would become an air traffic flow management centre
and air traffic control would gradually be transferred to the
regional centres at Bremen and Brussels (Semmersaeke).

As already mentioned, further discussions are to be held on
the working document on 8 July and it is very probable that a
final decision will then be taken.

31.   By way of concluding this section, the position of the seven
member states on Eurocontrol's future activities can be summarized
as follows:

(i)   For reasons of sovereignty - particularly in the
         military sphere - France and the United Kingdom seem
         totally unwilling to transfer air traffic control to
         Eurocontrol;

(ii)   Ireland is in a similar situation, because of its
         geographical location to the West of Britain and the
         position adopted by the latter;

(iii)   The French and British refusal and the Dutch procrastina-
         tion has prompted a move towards renationalization in
         the Federal Republic of Germany and all the signs are
         that the air traffic control centre at Karlsruhe will
         soon be under exclusively German control;

(iv)   The Netherlands is still delaying and is using the
         pretext of the German move towards renationalization
         for not transferring the executive functions to
         Eurocontrol;

(v)   Belgium and Luxembourg have faithfully observed the
         Eurocontrol Convention and not challenged it, but are
         of course dependent on their partners' decisions.

IV. ANALYSIS OF AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

32. The aim of the air navigation services and organizations is to
ensure that air transport is as safe, regular, fast and economic as
possible.

While aviation is characterized by a fairly high degree of
safety, there is, unfortunately, far less success - at least as far
as West European airspace is concerned - with regard to the other
three aims, and in some cases no success at all.

33. In his first report Mr Noè demonstrated, on the basis of
statistical material, that in spite of the fast expansion of air
transport and the higher speeds at which it now takes place the
percentage of accidents has steadily dropped. Indeed, the ICAO
(International Civil Aviation Organization) has stated that the world
safety factor in 1979 was eight times better than in 1960: i.e. 0.01
deaths per hundred million passenger-kilometers as against 0.08
twenty years ago.[1]

Although there have therefore been remarkable results in air
safety, your rapporteur would nevertheless point to the psychological
importance of this aspect of air transport and considers that every
effort must be made to reduce still further the danger of air disasters.

This report deals only with the management and control of air
traffic flows. For social measures, technical research and develop-
ment and meteorology, reference should be made to Mr Noè's two reports.

34. Both during the public hearing on the promotion of efficient air
traffic control held in Paris in March 1979 and at the meeting between
your committee and experts on air traffic control in Europe on 29 May
1980, it became absolutely clear that there were a number of defici-
encies in air navigation in West European airspace which could be
rectified only by a different organizational approach and through
closer cooperation and coordination.

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[1] See written comments by ICAO on the Commission Memorandum,
PE 64.992, paragraph 8.

35. The basic problem of air traffic in Western Europe is the inefficient use of airspace because of excessive compartmentalization and inadequate management.

In contrast to the United States, where all airspace is controlled by a single organization, the Federal Aviation Administration, to which 26 air traffic control centres are attached, Western European airspace is divided up into as many separate airspaces as there are sovereign states.[1]

36. The vertical division of airspace corresponding to the national boundaries of the various Western European countries and the lack of cooperation between the national aviation authorities produces the following situation:

     (i) excessive workload for air traffic control staff and installations and airline personnel;

    (ii) congestion and the resultant disruptions, delays, stacking and cancellations of flights;

   (iii) poor coordination between civil and military aviation;

    (iv) inadequate matching of air traffic control equipment and techniques as between countries;

    (v) unnecessary increases in costs and waste of money and fuel.

Brief comments on these will be given below.

(i) Overloading of the air traffic control system

37. A country's exclusive right to its airspace means in practice that a modern jet aircraft, which can overfly the territory of a small country in a few minutes, is continually passing from the control of one national air traffic control centre to that of another. For example, a short flight from Copenhagen to Paris is controlled by the Scandinavian centre over Denmark, by the Eurocontrol Centre in Maastricht over North Germany, by the Schiphol Centre over the Netherlands, again by the Eurocontrol Centre in Maastricht over Belgium and, lastly, by the French controllers over France. On longer flights the air traffic control procedures are naturally even more complicated and cumbrous.

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[1] With the exception of air traffic in the upper airspace of Belgium, Luxembourg and North Germany, which is controlled by the Eurocontrol Centre in Maastricht.

This constant change-over of flights naturally puts heavy pressure on air traffic controllers and ATC installations and equipment, which are already overloaded at certain peak periods. For air crew, too, the constant transferring from one national service to another is an extra burden.

38. The often inadequate coordination and cooperation between national aviation authorities means that in Western Europe aircraft have to take roundabout routes. IATA has calculated that aircraft flying on European routes have on average to travel 15% further than if they had taken the shortest route. On one specific route the distance flown is 47% more than the most direct route.[1] At the meeting on 29 May 1980 Mr Gaebel of Lufthansa demonstrated the additional distances on a map. Thus the shortest air route between Frankfurt and Amsterdam is 197 sea miles but the distance actually flown is 272 miles, in other words a difference of 75 sea miles or 38%. Between Frankfurt and Madrid the difference is 90 miles or 11.7%.

It goes without saying that the extra distances have a negative effect on the capacity of the air traffic control system.

(ii) Congestions, disruptions and delays

39. The inefficient utilization of existing capacity in the air traffic control system and of the airspace leads more and more to congestion, so that at certain times and in certain airspace sectors it is almost impossible to cope with air traffic. Congestion in its turn means that delays occur of varying duration, aircraft are diverted or sent to other destinations, aircraft are stacked and flights may even have to be cancelled. This is naturally extremely annoying and irritating for travellers.

Moreover, experts have predicted difficult times ahead, and pointed out that further expansion of air traffic without better management of traffic flows will increase the frequency of congestion and inconvenience for passengers.

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[1] See speech by Mr Hammarskjöld, Director-General, at the hearing in Paris and the written comments by IATA on the Commission Memorandum, PE 64.942, paragraph 15.

(iii) Poor coordination between civil and military aviation

40. The plethora of independent states with their own aviation
authorities and, with the exception of Italy and Norway, the separa-
tion of military and civil aviation authorities,[1] also contribute to
the underutilization of airspace.

The temporary or permanent reservation of certain airspace
sectors for military aircraft not only restricts the space available
for civil aviation but makes it extremely difficult to trace out
optimum routes, as Mr Noè pointed out, even though certain reserved
sectors are used only very occasionally by military aircraft.[2]

(iv) The lack of compatibility between national air traffic control
equipment and installations

41. In Western Europe ATC centres generally have modern and advanced
air traffic control apparatus and equipment. Unfortunately, it
often turns out that there is functional incompatibility between the
installation and equipment of these various centres. It is disturb-
ing to note that there is no consultation at all with the neighbour-
ing countries when particularly expensive equipment is purchased, so
that communication between the centres in the two countries must be
by telephone or else extra equipment must be obtained. This is
particularly true of the ATC centre at Maastricht, where a special
computer had to be installed so that European Eurocontrol equipment
could 'talk' to the American computers at the English ATC centre at
West Drayton. This does not mean that all European equipment need
be ordered from one company but that the various companies should
work to the same specifications.

It is obvious that the mutual incompatibility of technically
advanced and extremely expensive installations causes unnecessary
complications and delays in air traffic control.

(v) Unnecessary increases in costs and waste of money and fuel

42. Flying extra distances because of inadequate planning and con-
gestion, delays at airports, the pointless circling above airports
and the diversion of aircraft - all this naturally means increased
use of fuels, which are becoming more expensive and scarcer all the
time. This naturally means an increase in the airlines' operating
costs and is inevitably reflected in the level of air fares.

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[1] In Italy, military and civil air traffic is controlled by the
military authorities, though this situation is soon to be changed.
In Norway, the opposite is the case.
[2] Noè report, Doc. 49/78, paragraph 64.

V. NEED FOR CLOSER INTER-EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM FOR THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF AIR TRAFFIC
IN WESTERN EUROPE

43. The answer to the deficiencies which have just been described is
to be found in cooperation and coordination. While isolated measures
may sometimes solve certain aspects of the problem, there can be no
effective management and control of air traffic flows without closer
cooperation and effective coordination.

44. The preceding paragraph does not, of course, mean that absolutely
no cooperation exists or that nothing useful has been done. On the
contrary, numerous organizations have been set up to ensure safe,
fast and economic air traffic or to attempt to improve one or other
aspect. This applies to the ICAO, the European Civil Aviation
Conference (ECAC), IATA, the European Air Navigation Planning Group
(EANGP), the NATO Committee for European Airspace Coordination (CEAC),
the International Civil Airports Association (ICAA) and, of course,
Eurocontrol.

45. What was meant by the introductory remarks in this section was
that, in your rapporteur's opinion, the existing forms of cooperation
are inadequate if we are to arrive at a reasonable and economically
sound method for dealing with the growth in air traffic in West-
European airspace.

46. To prevent misunderstandings and confusion, the term West-
European airspace should be clearly defined. Because of the clearly
international nature of aviation, this airspace is to be understood
as comprising that of the nine Member States of the Community, the
three applicant countries, Scandinavia and Finland, Austria, Switzer-
land, Yugoslavia and European Turkey. Depending on the actual geo-
graphical location of certain countries, a greater or lesser degree
of cooperation can be worked out and implemented. Closer contacts
need to be maintained of course with other parts of the world, in
particular Eastern Europe and North America.

47. The busy air routes in this airspace mean that there is an
increasingly urgent need for an integrated system for the management
of air traffic flows (Integrated Air Traffic Flow Management System
or IATFMS).

48. The term 'management of air traffic flows' is to be understood
as: 'the arrangements made by air traffic services (ATC) agencies to
allow each category of airspace user to achieve their desired aims as
safely and expeditiously and economically as possible with minimum
disruption to other airspace users'.[1]

In contrast to this is the concept of 'air traffic control',
which means the effective control of an aircraft with a view to the
prevention of accidents and collisions. Air traffic control is thus
a much narrower concept and represents only a part of air traffic
management.

49. The principal tasks of an integrated European system for air
traffic flow management should include:

   (i) the study of anticipated aircraft movements during a
       certain period;

  (ii) the tactical and strategic planning of air traffic flows;

 (iii) the study, elaboration and implementation of any other
       useful measures to achieve better utilization of existing
       capacities and expansion of these.

50. Your rapporteur is convinced that it will thus be possible to
rationalize flight plans, eliminate numerous bottlenecks and achieve
significant savings.

51. Such a task could - on the basis of a new convention - be given
to an expanded Eurocontrol. The proposal along these lines recently
submitted by the competent ministers of the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Benelux countries is therefore to be welcomed.

52. The situation is slightly different in actual air traffic
control. The ideal situation would of course be the eventual
achievement of 'unity of control' for West-European airspace, as
an expert informed your committee a short while ago. Integrated
control of air traffic on the FAA model would, however, be difficult
to achieve in Western Europe as the necessary political will is lack-
ing. In this respect Mr Lévêque, Director-General of Eurocontrol,
was right when he talked about the need for a constant political
willingness.

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[1] This definition is by Air Vice-Marshal Pedder, chairman of the NATO
Committee for European Airspace Coordination (see Notice to Members
PE 64.998, paragraph 2).

It is most regrettable that, as Mr Albers put it, at a time when there is increasing mobilization of public opinion and growing parliamentary awareness, there seems to be even less integration in the sphere of air traffic. This sad state of affairs is clearly illustrated by the question of Eurocontrol.

53. Nevertheless your rapporteur urges the governments of the Member States of Eurocontrol to allow the Agency to continue to be responsible for air traffic control functions in the upper airspace of Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany and that the other four Member States should transfer these functions in their upper airspace to the Agency as quickly as possible.

54. This would allow an integrated air traffic control system to take shape in the major part of West-European airspace and new applicant members could also join, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece.

55. If, however, for political reasons this does not seem feasible in the near future, Article 39 of the Eurocontrol Convention, referred to in paragraph 20, ought at least to be applied so that Eurocontrol could continue functioning as at present for five more years.

56. This respite could be put to good use for conducting a basic study of the advantages and disadvantages of Eurocontrol as an integrated air traffic control authority for West-European airspace. Such a study could be entrusted by the Commission of the European Communities to a special working party composed of representatives from all the competent aviation organizations and sectors concerned. Such a study would of course have to consider the economics of setting up such an air traffic control organization. Clearly, this study could furnish the basis for carefully weighed decisions for the future.

57. It is also urgently recommended that the question be examined whether the air sectors and corridors reserved for military aircraft could be made available for civil aviation on a temporary basis without encroaching on military and national defence requirements.

Here too, as with the harmonization of flight safety and air traffic control techniques, the setting-up of an integrated system for air traffic flow management would undoubtedly prove useful.

VI. **CONCLUSIONS**

58. In this report your rapporteur has attempted to set out the main lines for European action to improve the management and control of air traffic in the West-European airspace.

59. Starting with a description (for the benefit of new Members) of the European Parliament's past initiatives in this area (Section II) and the role of Eurocontrol in promoting air traffic (Section III), the fourth section attempted to outline the deficiencies in the air traffic situation in Western Europe.

60. It is a striking fact that the difficulties confronting this sector have not arisen because of a lack of skill on the part of the European air traffic controllers, nor because of inadequate air traffic control equipment but are primarily the result of insufficient cooperation and coordination.

61. The measures proposed in Section V by the Committee on Transport should therefore all be seen as part of an endeavour to achieve intensive cooperation and coordination between Western European aviation authorities.

62. This can be achieved only if there is an integrated system for the management of traffic flows in Western Europe. It would also be desirable for a similar system to be set up for air traffic control. Maximum use should here be made of Eurocontrol's existing and potential facilities.

63. Your rapporteur believes that a number of recommendations and suggestions should be considered by the Commission of the European Communities in close consultation with all representative aviation organizations and sectors concerned in the light of expected trends in air transport and on the basis of cost-benefit analyses.

64. The competent national authorities should promote cooperation and coordination with all the means at their disposal and should certainly not proceed to take decisions, inter alia on the question of Eurocontrol, which in fact amount to a renationalization of aviation.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-554/79)

tabled by Mr C. BERKHOUWER

on behalf of the Liberal and Democratic Group

pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure

on the development of a coordinated European
air traffic control system

<u>The European Parliament,</u>

- having regard to the preliminary work done by its former Committee on
  Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Transport,

- whereas in the United States all air traffic control is dealt with
  through one centre;

- whereas in Europe, on the other hand, only a quarter as much airspace
  is available as in the United States in spite of the fact that there
  is four times as much air traffic and this is still increasing;

- convinced, therefore, that air traffic control on a national basis
  is a dangerous anachronism;

1. Calls on the Commission and the Council immediately to present
   proposals and take decisions on the development of an efficient and
   coordinated European air traffic control system;

2. Expects, accordingly, that as a first step the Eurocontrol air traffic
   control centres in Karlsruhe and Maastricht will be retained as a
   model and further developed;

3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council
   and Commission.

<u>List of experts who provided your rapporteur with information</u>

- At the committee meeting of 19 December 1979:

  Mr LEVEQUE, Director-General of EUROCONTROL and
  Mr JENYNS, representative of EUROCONTROL staff

- At the committee meeting of 29 May 1980:

  Captain M. GAEBEL, Director of flight operations and Chief Pilot with Lufthansa
  Mr LEVEQUE, Director-General of EUROCONTROL
  Air Vice-Marshal I.M. PEDDER, Chairman of CEAC (Committee for European
  Airspace Coordination) at NATO
  Mr SHAW, Deputy Director-General, IATA
  Mr VERES, representative of the European office of ICAO (International
  Civil Aviation Organization)
  Mr K.G. WILKINSON, Vice-Chairman of British Airways

- During the study visit to the Beek air traffic control centre on 15 March 1980:

  Dr von VILLIEZ, director;
  Mr HORSMAN, Mr BONNE, Mr ZIPP, trade union representatives

- During the study visit to the Karlsruhe air traffic control centre on
  20 March 1980:

  Colonel MIETH, director; Mr WIENER, head of operations
  Mr HEIM and Mr PETTER, staff representatives
  Mr KLUMBERG and Mr SKERHUT, trade union representatives

- During the visit to the Rome ATC centre on 15 May 1980:

  Colonel GUIDI, director;

- Mr Pam CORNELISSEN, Member of the Netherlands Second Chamber and Council
  of Europe rapporteur on air traffic control;

- Mr KRÜGER and Mr NAGEL of Lufthansa, Mr JOUSTRA and Mr LAKERMAN of KLM,
  Mr JENNES of the VNV (Netherlands Pilots Association) and various captains
  and pilots.