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*Forthcoming at the Journal of Politics*

**A Tale of Two Democrats:  
How Authoritarianism Divides the Democratic Party**

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*Abstract:* Authoritarianism has been predominantly utilized in American politics as a predictor of Republican identification and conservative policy preferences. We argue that this approach has neglected the role authoritarianism plays among Democrats and how it can operate within political parties *regardless* of their ideological orientation. Drawing from three distinct sets of data, we demonstrate the impact of authoritarianism in the 2016 Democratic Party's primaries. Authoritarianism consistently predicts differences in primary voting among Democrats, particularly support for Hillary Clinton over Bernie Sanders. This effect is robust across various model specifications including controls for ideology, partisan strength, and other predispositions. These results highlight the potential of authoritarianism to shape leadership preferences within the Democratic Party. We advocate for a reconsideration of authoritarianism as a disposition with meaningful consequences for intraparty dynamics and conclude with practical implications regarding the future of the Democratic Party.

*Keywords:* authoritarianism, Democratic Party, 2016 election

*Short Title for Running Header:* How Authoritarianism Divides the Democratic Party

Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition. Replication files are available in the JOP Data Archive on Dataverse (<http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/jop>). The studies described herein were reviewed by the University of Mississippi Institutional Review Board and deemed exempt. Support for this research was provided by the National Science Foundation, Award #1559125, the University of Mississippi's Office of Research and Sponsored Programs Investment Grant Program, College of Liberal Arts Summer Research Grant Program, and Department of Political Science.

Although the 2016 election brought authoritarianism into mainstream American political discourse (MacWilliams 2016), the dominant narrative focused almost exclusively on Republicans who consistently fall on the high end of the authoritarianism scale (Federico and Tagar 2014; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). While it is true that high authoritarians have sorted en masse into the Republican Party, it is a misconception that authoritarianism has little to no significance within the Democratic Party. Though Republicans tend to exhibit higher levels of authoritarianism than Democrats, there is substantial *variation* in authoritarianism among Democrats. We argue that disregarding these *intraparty* divisions provides an incomplete account of authoritarianism's role in the current political landscape.

This research note addresses these concerns by demonstrating that authoritarianism not only exists within the Democratic Party, but exerted strong and divisive effects on voting preferences within the 2016 primary between relatively moderate, establishment candidate Hillary Clinton and progressive, populist candidate Bernie Sanders. Specifically, high authoritarian Democrats supported Clinton while low authoritarian Democrats supported Sanders. We speculate that this authoritarian divide will further complicate the Democratic leadership's attempts to unify their party's base in future elections.

### **Authoritarianism and the Democratic Party**

Authoritarianism reflects a spectrum of psychological group orientations ranging from individual autonomy to social conformity (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005), where high authoritarians possess dispositional needs for order, certainty, and security, and adherence to conventional, established institutions (Jost et al. 2003; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Accordingly, authoritarian dispositions provide a functional link to ideological conservatism (Federico and Tagar 2014), right-wing policy preferences (Johnston and Wronski

2015; Hetherington and Suhay 2011), and traditionalism (Federico, Fisher, and Deason 2011).

Yet the construct of authoritarianism also contains group-centric components, which motivate authoritarians to structure their group in ways that, "...enhance sameness and minimize diversity of people, beliefs, and behaviors" (Stenner 2005: 16). From this perspective, authoritarians aim to protect the group's cohesion from members and leaders who do not comply with the group's values and norms. Importantly, this component of authoritarianism is grounded in the desire to be part of a group, not in identification with a *particular* social or political group (Duckitt 1989; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005). Taking these conceptualizations together, authoritarians should be more committed to their political party (per Luttig 2017), and support leaders that are more conventional or prototypical of the group (Hogg 2001).

The 2016 Democratic primary election provides an excellent context of intra-party competition within which to examine the effects of authoritarianism on vote choice. On one hand, Clinton was a traditional candidate, being relatively hawkish and religious, and a group exemplar with a decades-long career in the party. On the other hand, Sanders was a non-traditional, party outsider who adopted the Democratic label more recently and distinguished himself as a "democratic socialist." Authoritarianism could, therefore, shape Democratic primary vote choice on the basis of its association with traditionalism (Federico, Fisher and Deason 2011; Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and its latent motive to preserve group uniformity and support more prototypical group leaders (Stenner 2005; Stellmacher and Petzel 2005; Hogg 2001). We thus predict an authoritarian divide among Democrats in the 2016 primary elections, with high authoritarians gravitating towards Clinton and low authoritarians towards Sanders.

## **Data and Methods**

To test the effects of authoritarianism among Democrats, we utilized data from two

nationally diverse sources: the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) University of Mississippi module (Dowling 2016), and a YouGov study fielded Fall 2017 (N=1000 each, see Table A1). We also used a nonprobability sample of undergraduates from five Southern universities, comprised predominantly of first-time voters (N=955, see Table A1). The student sample provides a test of our hypothesis among individuals whose political ideology and partisan loyalties are still malleable (Campbell et al. 1960), while their dispositional traits, like authoritarianism, are relatively stable and exogenous to political socialization (McCourt et al. 1999). Thus, although the student sample is non-representative, it allows us to examine to what extent authoritarianism among young Democrats is already a predictive force of their voting behavior and how its effect compares to their developing political preferences such as partisanship and ideology. Since we are primarily interested in divisions within the Democratic Party, our full models only include Democrats who voted for either Clinton or Sanders in the 2016 primary<sup>1</sup> (N=295 CCES, N=217 YouGov, and N=163 student sample).

All datasets contained the child-rearing measure of authoritarianism (Feldman 2003), coded 0-1, with higher values reflecting greater authoritarianism. This scale relates directly to the aggression and submission components of authoritarianism (see Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005), and is highly correlated with conventionalism and Altemeyer's (1988) Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (see Feldman 2003). Of particular relevance, this child-rearing scale is the standard measure of authoritarianism used in contemporary American politics research (see Hetherington and Weiler 2009) and in examining vote choice in the 2016 election (MacWilliams 2016). Though some scholars argue that this scale assesses authoritarianism


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<sup>1</sup>Democratic primary voters not voting for Clinton or Sanders either voted for a Republican (student sample: N=10, CCES: N=18), or did not recall who they voted for (YouGov: N=6).

differentially across race (Pérez and Hetherington 2014), our analyses combine Whites and non-Whites in order to properly reflect the ethnic and racial diversity of Democratic voters (though our key results generally hold when examining Whites and non-Whites separately despite reduced sample size, see Figure A4, Table A7a & A7b).

The distribution of authoritarianism in our primary national dataset, the CCES (see Figure 1a), confirms that Republicans (N=341, mean=0.62) are significantly more authoritarian than Democrats (N=461, mean=0.48,  $t=-6.4$ ,  $p<0.001$  in an independent t-test with unequal variances). Concurrently, however, the *variation* in authoritarianism is significantly higher among *Democrats* than Republicans (standard deviations of 0.35 and 0.30 respectively,  $F=1.39$ ,  $p<0.0012$ , in a standard variance comparison test). Notably, the difference between Clinton and Sanders supporters (N=187, mean=0.52, and N=108, mean=0.29, respectively,  $t = 5.66$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) is larger than the difference between Republicans and Democrats (0.23 versus 0.14 respectively, see Figure 1b). We replicate this pattern of variation in our other national sample (YouGov), while the student sample reveals equal variances in authoritarianism across parties (Figures A1a-A2b). There is no similar divide among Republicans between Trump and Cruz primary voters in any of our samples (Figure A3a-A3c). Thus, the intraparty distribution of authoritarianism is largely unique to the Democratic Party.

**Figures 1a and 1b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (CCES)**



Note: Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group.

Our dependent variable is the dichotomous primary vote choice between Sanders (0) and Clinton (1). We control for self-reported ideology and partisan strength in order to examine the effects of authoritarianism independent of these relevant factors. In the YouGov study, we account for the possibility that alternative individual difference variables, including social dominance orientation (SDO), need for cognitive closure, and racial resentment, could shape vote choice. Last, in all three samples, we include controls for education, church attendance, gender, and race, while the CCES and the YouGov sample add controls for income, union membership, Southern residence, and marital status<sup>2</sup>.

### **Predicting 2016 Democratic Primary Vote Choice**

We first logistically regress vote choice for Clinton versus Sanders on authoritarianism and our aforementioned control variables<sup>3</sup> (Figure 2 & Table A3, see also Tables A4-A6 for robustness checks). In line with our expectations, authoritarianism is a significant and positive predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders in all samples. In the CCES and YouGov samples, partisan strength is also a positive predictor of voting for Clinton. However, it was not a significant determinant in the undergraduate sample, demonstrating the primacy of authoritarian dispositions in shaping young people's political preferences. Similarly, ideology is only a significant predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders in the YouGov sample, indicating that authoritarianism operates above and beyond ideological identification and partisan strength. Finally, we find that authoritarianism is the *only* significant predispositional measure, suggesting

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
<sup>2</sup> These variables are dropped in the student models given their lack of variation. See Table A2 for all variable descriptions.

<sup>3</sup> Addition of the controls reduces the CCES sample to N=260, the YouGov sample to N=195, and the student sample to N=101 in the presented models.



that this candidate match-up specifically resonates with Democrats' authoritarian dispositions.


**Figure 2: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders**



*Note: Plots show coefficients from logistic regression models. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and the 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades (see Table A2 for variable details).*

The predicted probabilities displayed in Figure 3 clearly illustrate the effects of authoritarianism on Democratic vote choice in all three data sets. As a Democrat in the CCES sample moves from the minimum value on the authoritarianism scale to the maximum value, the probability of voting for Clinton increases from 0.33 to 0.76 while holding other influential factors constant. Similarly, the probability of voting for Clinton rises from 0.36 to 0.71 across the range of authoritarianism in the YouGov sample, closely mirroring the results from the CCES. Among students, the effect is even larger – the probability of voting for Clinton increases dramatically from 0.18 to 0.867 as young Democrats shift from the lower end of authoritarianism to its maximum value.

**Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities based on Logistic Regression Results  
Voting for Clinton Over Sanders**



*Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated holding all variables at their mean or modal categories (see Table A1).*

These results provide evidence for an authoritarian divide among Democrats that played a crucial role in the 2016 primary. Importantly, these effects are driven by respondents at both the low and high ends of authoritarianism. Surprisingly, we do not find any significant effect of authoritarianism among Republicans' primary vote choice in all three samples (see Figure A5 & Table A8), which underlines the uniquely divisive nature of authoritarianism among Democrats. Moreover, as we have shown by replicating our results with a student sample, this authoritarian divide is already discernable among young Democrats whose party loyalties and ideological preferences are not yet solidified. This emphasizes the importance of authoritarianism, even among first-time voters.

### **Conclusion**

We have demonstrated that authoritarianism 1) exists within the Democratic Party, where variation on this disposition abounds, 2) imparts differential effects on vote choice, highlighting intraparty conflicts, and 3) predicts political preferences, even among youth, for whom partisan strength and ideology are less stable factors. In 2016, Clinton was the more traditional candidate,

with a long history as a brand name party figure who had taken on various leadership roles – characteristics which should appeal to authoritarian Democrats. In contrast, Sanders was an Independent turned Democrat, who promoted an aggressively liberal agenda with an unambiguous disdain for the party establishment, all of which authoritarians should eschew. While we discuss traditionalism and group-centric aspects of authoritarianism, the causal mechanism by which this trait affected Democrats’ vote choice remains unclear in the present data. Future research should assess how these aspects of authoritarianism shape electoral behavior among voters in both parties.

Where do Democrats go from here? Our results suggest that the party should be cognizant of the potentially conflicting leadership preferences of their base. Indeed, within months of Trump’s victory, the election for Democratic National Committee Chair again divided the party into Sanders and Clinton factions. The newly formed Justice Democrats Political Action Committee has called for the ousting of establishment incumbents, and has endorsed dozens of Sanders-style candidates for the 2018 primaries. All of these events are indicative of intraparty battles that could continue dividing Democrats along the authoritarian dimension. Such disputes over the party’s brand have the potential to weaken party attachments and political engagement among Democrats (Huddy, Mason and Aarøe 2015). Notably, such divisions were not found in Republican primary voting patterns, highlighting an important partisan asymmetry (per Federico, Deason and Fisher 2012). We hope that our findings motivate further research on authoritarianism among Democrats and how this disposition affects the party’s future leadership.

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## Appendix

Table A1: Sample Characteristics for Democrat Primary Voting Respondents

	CCES Sample	YouGov Sample	Student Sample
Authoritarianism	0.44	0.41	0.28
PID Strength	0.74	0.74	0.67
Ideology	0.30	0.29	0.20
Church Attendance	0.36	0.27	0.42
Gender	54% Female	60% Female	54% Female
Race	67% White	64% White	65% White
Education	0.63	0.54	--
Income	0.34	0.27	--
Union Membership	33% Union	30% Union	--
Marital Status	48% Married	46% Married	--
Age	5.1	5.3	--
Southern Residence	30% live in the South	26% live in the South	--
Need for Closure	--	0.61	--
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)	--	0.18	--
Symbolic Racism/ Racial Resentment	0.15	0.31	--
Democratic Primary Vote Choice	Clinton 63%, Sanders 37%	Clinton 56%, Sanders 44%	Clinton 28%, Sanders 72%
N	295	217	163

*Sample characteristics are calculated for Democrats who voted for either Clinton or Sanders in the 2016 primary. We provide sample characteristics for this subset of respondents, rather than the full sample, because these are the respondents used in the key analyses presented in Figures 1b, 2, and 3. For partisan strength, ideology, church attendance, education, need for closure, SDO, and symbolic racism/racial resentment we report mean values on a 0-1 scale. For age (in decades) and income, we report median values. For gender, race, union membership, and marital status, we report the percentage of observations in the specified category. See Table A2 for all item descriptions and coding.*

*Sample methodology: The 2016 CCES University of Mississippi module (N=1000) was administered by YouGov/Polimetrix, and included the child-rearing authoritarianism scale in the pre-election wave of the survey. The 2016 CCES pre-election wave common content supplied the dependent and control variables. The YouGov survey (N=1000) was administered September 29-October 10, 2017, though 2016 primary vote choice and other demographic variables were gathered as part of the YouGov/Polimetrix panel in 2016. Thus, the Democratic primary vote choice variable in the CCES and YouGov samples reflect a similar recall task. YouGov/Polimetrix matches respondents to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest. This frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2010 American Community Survey with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements. 955 students across five public universities in the South participated in our survey the week prior to the 2016 general election either voluntarily or for course credit.*


Table A2: Item Descriptions and Coding

Item Name	Item Description
Authoritarianism	<p>"Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. Please select which one you think is more important for a child to have:"</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Independence or Respect for Elders</li> <li>2. Curiosity or Good Manners</li> <li>3. Self-Reliance or Obedience</li> <li>4. Being Considerate or Well-Behaved</li> </ol> <p>All four items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent greater levels of authoritarianism.</p>
PID Strength	1=Strong Democrat/Republican, .5=Not so Strong Democrat/Republican, 0=Weak Democrat/Republican
Ideology	5-point (CESS & YouGov) or 7-point (student sample) ideological self-placement scale, recoded 0-1 from 0=Very Liberal to 1=Very Conservative
Church Attendance	6-point scale, recoded 0-1 to range from 0=Never Attend to 1=Attend more than once a week
Gender	1=Female, 0=Male
Race	1=White, 0=non-White
Education	6-point self-placement scale of highest level of education, recoded 0-1 from 0=No High School to 1=Post-Graduate Degree
Income	16-category family income self-report item, recoded 0-1 from 0=Less than \$10,000 to 1=\$500,000 or More
Union Membership	1=Previously or currently belong to a union, 0=Never belonged to a union
Marital Status	1=Married, 0=Otherwise
Age	Years old in decades
Southern Residence	1=Lives in the South (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia), 0=Otherwise
Need for Closure	<p>"For the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement."</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.</li> <li>2. I dislike unpredictable or uncertain situations.</li> <li>3. I dislike questions that could be answered in many different ways.</li> </ol> <p>Each item includes the following 4 response options: Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All three items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent greater need for cognitive closure.</p>
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)	<p>"Please respond to the following statements by indicating the extent to which you agree or disagree with them. Choose the response from the rating scale that best represents your evaluation of the item."</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.</li> <li>2. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems.</li> <li>3. Group equality should be our ideal.</li> <li>4. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.</li> </ol> <p>Each item includes the following 6 response options: Strongly Agree,</p>




	<p>Moderately Agree, Slightly Agree, Slightly Disagree, Moderately Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All four items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent greater SDO.</p>
Racial Resentment (YouGov sample)	<p>"Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements."</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.</li> <li>2. It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.</li> <li>3. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class.</li> <li>4. Most blacks who don't get ahead should not blame the system; they only have themselves to blame.</li> </ol> <p>Each item includes the following 4 response options: Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All four items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent greater racial resentment.</p>
Symbolic Racism (CCES sample)	<p>"Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?"</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. I am angry that racism exists.</li> <li>2. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.</li> <li>3. Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations.</li> </ol> <p>Each item includes the following 6 response options: Strongly Agree, Agree, Agree Slightly, Disagree Slightly, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. All three items are scaled together, and coded 0-1 such that higher values represent greater symbolic racism.</p>
Democratic Primary Vote Choice	<p>In the CCES sample, respondents were first asked if they voted in any 2016 primary, while in the YouGov sample they were first asked if they voted in the 2016 Democratic primary. In both studies, those that answered "yes" to this item received a follow-up question asking who they voted for. Options in the CCES included: Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Another Democrat, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Marco Rubio, Another Republican, and Someone else who is not a Democrat or Republican. Options in the YouGov study included: Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Someone Else, and Don't Recall.</p> <p>In the student sample, respondents were asked: "Who did you vote for in your state's presidential primary?" Response options included: Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, John Kasich, Other, and Didn't Vote in Primary.</p> <p>For each sample, the variable of Democratic primary vote choice is constructed such that those who said they voted for Bernie Sanders were coded 0, and those voting for Hillary Clinton were coded 1. The few primary voting respondents who did not choose either of these Democratic primary candidates either voted for a Republican, or could not recall who they voted for. We treat these other responses as noise, and are coded as blank.</p>

Figures A1a & A1b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (YouGov)




Note: Data come from the 2017 YouGov study. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference in authoritarianism between Democrats ( $N=358$ , mean=0.47) and Republicans ( $N=233$ , mean = 0.61,  $t= 4.82$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). In a variance comparison test, we also find that Democrats (st.dev. = 0.37) exhibit significantly higher variation in authoritarianism than Republicans (st.dev = 0.31,  $F = 0.69$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ). In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference in authoritarianism between Democrats who supported Hillary Clinton ( $N = 112$ , mean = 0.54) and Democrats who supported Bernie Sanders ( $N = 72$ , mean = 0.29,  $t = 4.96$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ).

Figures A2a & A2b: Distributions of Authoritarianism (Students)




Note: Data come from the 2016 student sample. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference in authoritarianism between Democrats ( $N=349$ , mean=0.30) and Republicans ( $N=405$ , mean = 0.52,  $t= 10.23$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ). In a variance comparison test, we find no significant difference in the variation in authoritarianism between Democrats (st.dev. = 0.28) and Republicans (st.dev. = 0.30,  $F = 1.14$ ,  $p < 0.18$ ). In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find a significant difference in authoritarianism between Democrats who supported Hillary Clinton ( $N = 43$ , mean = 0.40) and Democrats who supported Bernie Sanders ( $N = 113$ , mean = 0.22,  $t = -3.20$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ).

Figure A3a: Distribution of Authoritarianism among Republicans by Primary Vote Choice (CCES)




Note: Data come from the 2016 CCES. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent  $t$ -test with unequal variances, we find no significant difference in authoritarianism between Republicans who supported Donald Trump ( $N=125$ , mean = 0.66) and Republicans who supported Ted Cruz ( $N=44$ , mean = 0.61) in the 2016 primary elections ( $t = 0.94$ ,  $p < 0.35$ ).

Figure A3b: Distribution of Authoritarianism among Republicans by Primary Vote Choice (YouGov)



Note: Data come from the 2017 YouGov. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent  $t$ -test with unequal variances, we find no significant difference in authoritarianism between Republicans who supported Donald Trump ( $N= 69$ , mean = 0.64) and Republicans who supported Ted Cruz ( $N=34$ , mean = 0.58,  $t = -0.93$ ,  $p < 0.36$ ).

Figure A3c: Distribution of Authoritarianism among Republicans by Primary Vote Choice (Students)



*Note: Data come from the 2016 student sample. Authoritarianism is scaled from 0 (min) to 1 (max). Open circles indicate mean values for each group. In an independent t-test with unequal variances, we find no significant difference in authoritarianism between Republicans who supported Donald Trump ( $N=73$ , mean = 0.54) and Republicans who supported Ted Cruz ( $N=44$ , mean = 0.59,  $t=-0.86$ ,  $p<0.39$ ).*

Table A3: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (corresponding with Figure 2)

	CCES	YouGov	Students
Authoritarianism	<b>1.88 (0.50)</b>	<b>1.47 (0.57)</b>	<b>3.36 (1.12)</b>
PID Strength	<b>1.01 (0.42)</b>	<b>1.56 (0.49)</b>	0.49 (0.67)
Ideology	1.14 (0.76)	<b>2.74 (0.92)</b>	-1.03 (1.92)
Church Attendance	0.22 (0.50)	0.48 (0.83)	0.65 (0.86)
Gender	-0.30 (0.32)	-0.54 (0.39)	-0.01 (0.49)
Race	-0.51 (0.37)	-0.70 (0.47)	0.93 (0.56)
Education	-0.52 (0.58)	0.01 (0.67)	-
Income	<b>3.16 (0.94)</b>	1.11 (1.03)	-
Union Membership	-0.23 (0.31)	<b>-1.04 (0.39)</b>	-
Marital Status	-0.24 (0.35)	0.28 (0.42)	-
Age	0.21 (0.09)	0.14 (0.13)	-
South	0.43 (0.33)	0.34 (0.44)	-
Need for Closure	-	-0.54 (1.07)	-
SDO	-	-1.57 (1.27)	-
Racial Resentment	-	0.39 (0.86)	-
Constant	<b>-2.60 (0.80)</b>	-1.97 (1.10)	<b>-2.80 (0.97)</b>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.19	0.23	0.15
N	260	195	101

Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and 1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at  $p < 0.05$ .

Table A4: Heckman Probit Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders

	CCES	YouGov	Students
Authoritarianism	<b>0.76 (0.22)</b>	<b>0.55 (0.24)</b>	1.91 (1.09)+
PID Strength	-0.06 (0.19)	0.30 (0.20)	0.47 (2.03)
Ideology	<b>0.63 (0.30)</b>	<b>1.04 (0.33)</b>	-0.39 (0.94)
Church Attendance	0.12 (0.22)	0.38 (0.28)	0.35 (0.52)
Gender	-0.09 (0.15)	-0.13 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.48)
Race	<b>-0.40 (0.16)</b>	<b>-0.26 (0.19)</b>	0.56 (0.41)
Education	-0.31 (0.25)	0.01 (0.26)	-
Income	<b>1.56 (0.41)</b>	0.48 (0.39)	-
Union Membership	-0.11 (0.13)	<b>-0.48 (0.16)</b>	-
Marital Status	-0.12 (0.14)	0.04 (0.16)	-
Age	0.07 (0.04)+	-0.04 (0.05)	-
South	0.16 (0.15)	0.14 (0.14)	-
Need for Closure	-	-0.35 (0.40)	-
SDO	-	-0.71 (0.47)	-
Racial Resentment	-	0.13 (0.26)	-
Constant	-0.07 (0.34)	0.72 (0.41)+	-2.03 (3.56)
<b>Selection</b>			
PID Strength	<b>0.90 (0.16)</b>	<b>0.48 (0.16)</b>	<b>1.02 (0.19)</b>
Age	0.07 (0.04)+	<b>0.14 (0.04)</b>	-
Gender	-0.24 (0.13)+	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.20 (0.16)
Race	<b>0.33 (0.13)</b>	-0.03 (0.13)	0.01 (0.15)
Constant	<b>-0.72 (0.22)</b>	<b>-1.01 (0.22)</b>	<b>-0.96 (0.19)</b>
N	427	423	340
Censored N	167	228	239
Uncensored N	260	195	101

*Note: Estimates were obtained using a Heckman probit model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and 1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. PID strength, age, gender, and race were used as selection variables for the models relying on the CCES and YouGov data, whereas the student sample model relies on PID strength, gender, and race. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at  $p < 0.05$ , and + when  $p < .10$ .*

Table A5: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders Excluding Partisan Strength and Ideology

	CCES	YouGov	Students
Authoritarianism	<b>2.05 (0.49)</b>	<b>2.13 (0.50)</b>	<b>3.07 (0.92)</b>
Church Attendance	0.54 (0.48)	0.95 (0.64)	0.56 (0.84)
Gender	-0.14 (0.31)	-0.29 (0.32)	-0.12 (0.48)
Race	-0.58 (0.36)	-0.54 (0.37)	1.01 (0.56)+
Education	-0.76 (0.58)	-0.06 (0.60)	-
Income	<b>3.02 (0.91)</b>	-0.01 (0.89)	-
Union Membership	-0.18 (0.30)	-0.66 (0.34)+	-
Marital Status	-0.09 (0.34)	0.31 (0.35)	-
Age	<b>0.21 (0.08)</b>	0.20 (0.11)+	-
South	0.44 (0.33)	-0.12 (0.35)	-
Need for Closure	-	0.20 (0.85)	-
SDO	-	-1.21 (1.03)	-
Racial Resentment	-	-0.34 (0.77)	-
Constant	<b>-1.63 (0.70)</b>	-1.12 (0.92)	<b>-2.53 (0.76)</b>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.15	0.13
N	262	220	101

Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and 1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at  $p < 0.05$ , and + when  $p < .10$ .

In the CCES and YouGov samples, the coefficients for authoritarianism are larger when not controlling for respondents' partisan strength and ideology, suggesting that a portion of authoritarianism's effect on Democratic primary vote choice may be mediated through individuals' partisan strength and ideological self-identification. However, as seen in Figure 2 and Table A3, authoritarianism is still a significant predictor of vote choice even when holding partisan strength and ideology constant, meaning that authoritarianism operates above and beyond its association with increased party attachment (see Luttig 2017) and ideological conservatism (see Federico et al. 2011). Interestingly, the coefficient for authoritarianism in the student sample is smaller when not controlling for partisan strength and ideology, indicating that any mediation of authoritarianism through partisanship and ideology has not occurred yet among these younger voters.

Table A6: Two Additional Robustness Models – Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders Including Symbolic Racism (CCES) & Excluding Church Attendance (Students)

	CCES	Students
Authoritarianism	<b>2.00 (0.60)</b>	<b>2.30 (0.77)</b>
PID Strength	0.84 (0.45)+	0.91 (0.56)
Ideology	<b>1.89 (0.90)</b>	0.77 (1.37)
Church Attendance	-0.54 (0.57)	-
Gender	-0.25 (0.35)	0.26 (0.39)
Race	-0.77 (0.42)+	0.52 (0.44)
Education	-0.56 (0.67)	-
Income	<b>3.46 (1.18)</b>	-
Union Membership	-0.41 (0.34)	-
Marital Status	-0.25 (0.41)	-
Age	<b>0.27 (0.10)</b>	-
South	0.36 (0.36)	-
Symbolic Racism	-0.33 (1.16)	-
Constant	<b>-2.50 (0.93)</b>	<b>-2.94 (0.71)</b>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.08
N	208	154


*Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and 1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at  $p < 0.05$ , and + when  $p < .10$ .*

*We find that when holding racial attitudes constant in the CCES sample, authoritarianism is still a significant predictor of voting for Clinton over Sanders. Further, symbolic racism has no bearing on Democratic primary vote choice.*

*Since not all of the universities participating in the student sample asked about church attendance (dropping  $N=53$  respondents from the model shown in Figure 2), we wanted to ensure that the effect of authoritarianism on Democratic vote choice held even when including those respondents – which it does.*



Figure A4: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (Whites v. Non-Whites)



*Note: Plots show coefficients from logistic regression models distinguishing between White and non-White respondents. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades.*

Table A7a: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (Whites)


	CCES	YouGov	Students
Authoritarianism	<b>2.14 (0.64)</b>	<b>1.90 (0.88)</b>	<b>2.71 (1.19)</b>
PID Strength	0.69 (0.49)	<b>2.38 (0.63)</b>	0.52 (0.97)
Ideology	1.72 (0.99)+	<b>2.47 (1.26)</b>	6.30 (3.41)+
Church Attendance	0.07 (0.62)	1.11 (1.11)	-0.15 (1.07)
Gender	-0.28 (0.38)	-0.33 (0.56)	0.32 (0.68)
Education	-0.57 (0.73)	-0.66 (0.85)	-
Income	<b>3.47 (1.10)</b>	2.72 (1.47)+	-
Union Membership	-0.41 (0.38)	<b>-1.18 (0.55)</b>	-
Marital Status	-0.11 (0.42)	-0.42 (0.58)	-
Age	<b>0.30 (0.11)</b>	0.27 (0.15)+	-
South	0.71 (0.42)+	0.27 (0.60)	-
Need for Closure	-	-2.35 (1.50)	-
SDO	-	<b>-4.76 (2.26)</b>	-
Racial Resentment	-	0.97 (1.24)	-
Constant	<b>-3.67 (0.96)</b>	-2.63 (1.39)+	<b>-2.97 (1.26)</b>
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.21	0.29	0.17
N	173	125	59

Table A7b: Logistic Regression Results Voting for Clinton over Sanders (Non-Whites)

	CCES	YouGov	Students
Authoritarianism	0.70 (0.91)	2.36 (1.30)+	<b>6.03 (1.90)</b>
PID Strength	<b>2.70 (1.16)</b>	-0.44 (1.32)	2.10 (1.85)
Ideology	0.56 (1.42)	2.90 (2.40)	-5.26 (3.14)+
Church Attendance	0.92 (0.96)	0.13 (1.27)	2.02 (2.54)
Gender	-0.69 (0.67)	-2.04 (1.10)+	0.28(1.09)
Education	-0.03 (1.22)	3.10 (1.65)+	-
Income	3.21 (2.33)	-3.01 (1.88)	-
Union Membership	-0.18 (0.66)	-0.51 (0.88)	-
Marital Status	-1.10 (0.92)	<b>2.14 (0.98)</b>	-
Age	0.07 (0.17)	-0.12 (0.29)	-
South	0.10 (0.64)	0.93 (0.96)	-
Need for Closure	-	<b>6.95 (3.12)</b>	-
SDO	-	0.46 (2.54)	-
Racial Resentment	-	3.53 (1.90)+	-
Constant	-2.50 (1.68)	<b>-5.47 (2.42)</b>	-5.02 (3.02)+
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	0.39	0.39
N	87	70	42

*Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Sanders and 1 indicates voting for Clinton, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at  $p < 0.05$ , and + when  $p < .10$ . In the non-Whites models, the non-significant authoritarianism coefficient may be the result of insufficient N, or the nature of the child-rearing authoritarianism measure "behaving" differently for non-Whites (see Perez & Hetherington 2014). In all models the authoritarianism coefficient is still in the direction of predicting vote choice for Clinton over Sanders.*

Figure A5: Logistic Regression Results Among Republicans Voting for Cruz over Trump



*Note: Plots show coefficients from logistic regression models. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Sample is restricted to Republican identifiers who voted for either Trump or Cruz in the 2016 Republican primary.*

Table A8: Logistic Regression Results Among Republicans Voting for Cruz over Trump

	CCES	YouGov	Students
Authoritarianism	-0.63 (0.91)	-1.18 (0.78)	1.34 (0.93)
PID Strength	0.06 (0.62)	0.26 (0.56)	-1.35 (1.23)
Ideology	<b>3.98 (1.09)</b>	<b>4.46 (1.37)</b>	-0.07 (2.03)
Church Attendance	0.65 (0.65)	0.79 (0.77)	1.23 (1.08)
Gender	0.15 (0.49)	<b>-1.00 (0.48)</b>	0.36 (0.57)
Race	0.80 (0.69)	0.05 (0.67)	-1.05 (1.11)
Education	<b>1.92 (0.95)</b>	-1.08 (1.06)	-
Income	-0.92 (1.23)	1.40 (1.43)	-
Union Membership	0.81 (0.52)	0.03 (0.52)	-
Marital Status	0.24 (0.59)	0.14 (0.55)	-
Age	-0.11 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.16)	-
South	0.03 (0.44)	0.35 (0.51)	-
Need for Closure	-	0.48 (1.18)	-
SDO	-	0.60 (1.41)	-
Racial Resentment	-	-1.05 (1.26)	-
Constant	<b>-5.45 (1.65)</b>	-2.88 (1.95)	-0.09 (1.99)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.14	0.15	0.07
N	145	119	76

*Note: Estimates were obtained using a logistic regression model whereby 0 indicates voting for Trump and 1 indicates voting for Cruz, with all standard errors in parentheses. Data is taken from the 2016 CCES, 2017 YouGov, and 2016 student sample. To facilitate comparisons, all variables are scaled to range from 0 to 1, except for age, which is measured in decades. Bolded coefficients are significant at  $p < 0.05$ . Sample is restricted to Republican identifiers who voted for either Trump or Cruz in the 2016 Republican primary.*