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An Examination of Cybersecurity Knowledge Transfer: Teaching, Research, and Website Security at U.S. Colleges and Universities

Abstract

This work seeks to answer the question: Does faculty cybersecurity knowledge gained from teaching and research transfer to other IT units in the university? Specifically, do colleges and universities that excel in cybersecurity teaching and research have more secure websites? This work explores a unique setting where the knowledge of the source and recipient are both directly related and observable without outside intervention. Our study employed data from 591 U.S. colleges and universities, the National Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) program, accepted paper data from the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) and the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SSP), as well as the results from the SSL Labs Server Test. Our data suggest that universities with cybersecurity research excellence receive higher grades for website security. However, university website security is not significantly associated with cybersecurity teaching excellence, institution size or tuition costs.

Keywords

Cybersecurity, Knowledge Transfer, SSL Labs Server Test, National Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE).

INTRODUCTION

The 2016 U.S. Presidential election brought heightened attention to the importance of cybersecurity and the dangers of cybercrime. However, while the public may be just awakening to the seriousness of the issue, the problem has been growing for years. As early as 2012, nearly one in five Americans was the victim of an internet crime (NCSA, 2012). In 2016, the average firm was victimized by two successful cyber-attacks per week (Ponemon Institute, 2016). Cyber-attacks cost the average U.S. firm more than \$17 million per year.

The threat of cybercrime is fueling the growing demand for technical and managerial professionals capable of defending public and private networks and safeguarding organizational infrastructure. As the demand for cybersecurity professionals has grown, several colleges and universities have started offering cybersecurity-related degrees. These programs train cybersecurity specialists for both the public and private sectors. They also boost student enrollments and help students land high-paying jobs. Cybersecurity professionals report an average salary of \$116,000 (NICCS, 2017).

However, to date, no one has investigated the impact of increased faculty attention to cybersecurity on other IT units within the university. Does cybersecurity knowledge gained from teaching and research transfer to other IT units in the university? Specifically, do colleges and universities that excel in cybersecurity teaching and research have more secure websites?

Extant knowledge transfer research has often relied on self-reported or indirect evidence. This study is unique in that the cybersecurity knowledge of the source unit (i.e., the faculty) and the performance of the recipient unit (i.e., the IT department) are both publicly observable. University faculty demonstrate their cybersecurity knowledge through teaching and research publications. University IT staff demonstrate their cybersecurity knowledge through the configuration of the university's web servers.

The goal of this work is to examine the relationship between faculty cybersecurity teaching and research and the observable security of the university's website. To study our research problem, we will examine data on cybersecurity teaching and research coupled with institutional characteristics and assessments of university web server configurations.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Organizational knowledge transfer is the process of moving pieces of knowledge from one unit (i.e., the source unit) to another (i.e., the recipient unit) (Easterby-Smith, Lyles & Tsang, 2008). According to Smith (2001), explicit knowledge or "know-what" is knowledge that "can be described in formal language, print or electronic media." Tacit knowledge or "know-how" is based on practice and acquired by personal experience (Smith, 2001). Explicit knowledge can be transferred via books, articles or blog posts. Tacit knowledge is more "sticky" or difficult to transfer (Szulanski, 2000). Personal interaction between the knowledge source and recipient is needed to facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge (Ko et al., 2005).

Knowledge transfer changes the performance of recipient units (Argote & Ingram 2000). As a result, knowledge transfer can be observed by measuring recipient unit performance. Tacit knowledge transfer is enhanced by cognitive proximity or shared knowledge (Forman & van Zeebroeck, 2015). Shared knowledge helps partners better understand the technical knowledge of others. Similarly, organizational proximity, cultural and structural closeness, all promote knowledge transfer by reducing uncertainty and increasing the effectiveness of coordination (Forman & van Zeebroeck, 2015; Levin & Cross, 2004).

Knowledge transfer is associated with physical, cognitive and organizational proximity (Forman & van Zeebroeck, 2015). Physical closeness facilitates social interaction, which is crucial to tacit knowledge transfer (Zucker, Darby & Armstrong, 1998; Zucker, Darby & Brewer, 1998). As a result, knowledge diffuses locally within organizations. For example, the effect of a good teacher spills over to other teachers in the same school (Koedel, 2009). University teaching and research also have spillover effects throughout the region. Firms tend to co-locate in technology clusters near universities to take advantage of these spillover effects (Van Wijk, Jansen & Lyles, 2008). The growth of Silicon Valley and the Boston's Route 128 corridor are often attributed to the teaching and research of local universities (Bania, Eberts & Fogarty, 1993).

Knowledge Transfer Between University IT Faculty and Staff

Living and working in proximity means that there are numerous opportunities for IT faculty and IT staff members to engage in knowledge transfer. On campus, there is a great deal of "cross-pollination" between university information technology faculty and IT staff. University IT staff members, like the staff in all functional areas, often are also alumni of schools where they work. For example, more than 2,400 of Virginia Commonwealth University faculty and staff hold one or more degrees from the university (Working for," 2018). As a result, many of a university's IT staff members will have taken classes from existing IT faculty. Similarly, IT staff often serve with faculty on university committees or teach IT-related courses as adjunct instructors.

Since IT staff and faculty live in the same region, they may volunteer at the same non-profits or belong to the same religious or civic organizations. They may be neighbors, or their kids may attend the same schools or participate in the same activities. These informal connections provide opportunities for the socialization and the exchange of ideas and information. Personal interaction, either face-to-face or electronically, between the knowledge source and recipient facilitates the transfer of tacit knowledge. This exchange of tacit knowledge can be "informal and spontaneous" (Malhotra & Majchrzak, 2012).

Living and working in proximity coupled with the vast amount cross-pollination between IT staff and IT faculty means that there are a large number of potential "boundary spanners." Boundary spanners act as liaisons, facilitating the transfer of information and knowledge between groups (Sonnenwald, 1996). A boundary spanner may be a formal position assigned by the organization, or a role assumed voluntarily (Fleming & Waguespack, 2007). Both direct and indirect interunit relations aid in knowledge transfer by facilitating the search for useful knowledge (Hansen, 2002). These relations help the knowledge seeker learn of "the existence, whereabouts and relevance of substantive knowledge residing in other business units." (Hansen, 2002). In other words, a boundary spanner may not personally possess the needed knowledge, but they know where to find it and can facilitate knowledge transfer by connecting the knowledge seeker to the appropriate person or unit.

Hypotheses

With the growing importance of cybersecurity, there is a strong demand for cybersecurity professionals. This strong demand means that salaries are high for those with cybersecurity skills. Robert Half (2018) reports that the median salary for an Information Systems Security Manager is \$137,000. In 2017, there were 350,000 unfilled cybersecurity jobs in the U.S. (Fazzini, 2018). Globally, by 2021, the number of unfilled cybersecurity jobs could grow to 3.5 million (Fazzini, 2018). As a result, colleges and universities need to offer attractive salaries to recruit and retain cybersecurity professionals. Larger organizations have more significant resources and can provide higher compensation (Yanadori & Marler, 2006). Higher compensation may allow larger organizations to better attract and retain IT staff.

In addition, several studies suggest that size has a positive association with knowledge transfer (e.g., Dhanaraj et al., 2004; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Laursen & Salter, 2006). However, there are notable exceptions. Tsang (2002) found no relationship, and Makino and Delios (1996) found a negative association between organizational size and the extent of knowledge transferred. Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) also found that economics played a role in knowledge transfer. Innovative employees require additional compensation. Finally, absorptive capacity, a key facilitator in knowledge acquisition, is positively associated with job satisfaction via compensation (Evans & Davis, 2005). We believe that schools with larger numbers of students will have greater resources to attract and retain high-quality cybersecurity professionals. Further, the bulk of extant research suggests that organizational size has a positive association with knowledge transfer. Thus,

H1. The number of students will be positively associated with university website security.

Schools with larger budgets may be able to offer higher salaries. While tuition is just one of many inputs to a college or university's overall budget, in recent years, tuition's share of the overall budget has been growing. Douglas-Gabriel (2015) reports that in 2003, state funding accounted for 32 percent of state school revenue and tuition contributed 17 percent. By 2012, tuition's portion had grown to 25 percent, and state funding had fallen to 23 percent (Douglas-Gabriel, 2015). As a result, for state schools, tuition is now a more substantial part of the university budget than state funding.

In a study of faculty salaries, Lugt (1983) found that tuition and pay were positively correlated. That is, institutions with higher tuition paid their faculty and staff more than schools with lower tuition. Institutions with higher tuition have larger budgets and can offer more generous compensation packages. This may allow institutions with higher tuition to better recruit and retain high-quality workers—including cybersecurity professionals. Thus,

H2. Tuition costs will be positively associated with university website security.

Source credibility is positively associated with knowledge transfer (for example, Levin & Cross, 2004; Ko, Kirsch, & King, 2005; Slaughter & Kirsch, 2006). Ko et al. (2005) define source credibility as "an attitude a recipient has about a source along multiple dimensions, including trustworthiness and expertise." When source credibility is high, the knowledge receiver is more likely to communicate and collaborate with a knowledge source (Ko et al., 2005). When faculty members have papers accepted at prestigious cybersecurity conferences like the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) or the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Symposium on Security and Privacy (SSP), it not only

demonstrates their excellence in cybersecurity research, it also enhances their source credibility. When a recipient views a source as credible, the recipient is more likely to believe the source is an expert and the knowledge trustworthy (Dholakia and Sternthal, 1977). When a knowledge receiver trusts in the competence of a knowledge source, they are more likely to seek out the source and more likely to learn from the interaction (Levin & Cross, 2004). As a result of increased source credibility, institutions with demonstrated excellence in cybersecurity research should have enhanced cybersecurity knowledge transfer. Thus,

H3. Institutions with cybersecurity research excellence will have more secure university websites.

Colleges and universities designated as DHS/NSA Centers of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity have completed an in-depth assessment and met rigorous requirements. To receive the designation are evaluated by Subject Matter Experts (SME) with assistance from CAE Program staff ("What is a Center," 2018). These SMEs assess the school's course content, course relevance, laboratory facilities, and faculty involvement, ensuring that faculty have the needed expertise and are providing students the most relevant content ("National Centers of Academic Excellence," 2018).

When a college or university is designated as a DHS/NSA Center of Academic Excellence in Cybersecurity, they not only receive recognition from the federal government, the designation also enhances the source credibility of the school's cybersecurity faculty. In 2017, there were only 177 four-year colleges recognized as NSA/DHS National CAE institutions. As a result of increased source credibility, institutions with demonstrated excellence in cybersecurity teaching should have enhanced cybersecurity knowledge transfer. Thus,

H4. Institutions with cybersecurity teaching excellence will have more secure university websites.



Figure 1: Summary of Hypotheses

DATA GATHERING

For this project, we utilized data from several online sources. Data were extracted, cleaned and analyzed using a combination of Python (van Rossum, 1995) and R scripts (R Core Team, 2017). When available, we used an official or user-created application programming interface (API).

Forbes Top-Rated U.S. Universities List

We started by collecting data on U.S. colleges and universities. Each year, Forbes Magazine posts a list of the top-rated U.S. colleges and universities. The latest installment lists 660 universities (Chuck., 2016). The list includes each university's name, as well as their Forbes ranking, number of students, tuition fees and website Uniform Resource Locator (URL). We accessed the data using R and the *forbesListR* package (Bresler, 2016). The *forbesListR* package facilitates access to the Forbes' list API. The API is useful for obtaining data from the college list and numerous other lists posted by Forbes Magazine.

	Forbes Rank	Students	Tuition
Mean	332.74	11,802.65	\$46,971.27
St. Dev.	189.25	12,345.64	\$11,879.60
Minimum	1	230	\$8,475.00
Maximum	660	81,459	\$70,100.00
N	591	591	591

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all colleges and universities included in study.

National Centers of Academic Excellence

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Security Agency (NSA) jointly sponsor the National Centers of Academic Excellence (CAE) program. To become an NSA/DHS National CAE designated institution, colleges and universities must meet stringent criteria. CAE institutions receive "formal recognition from the U.S. Government as well as opportunities for prestige and publicity for their role in securing the Nation's information systems" (NICCS, 2017).

	Forbes Rank	Students	Tuition
Mean	342.42	23,213.59	\$43,431.75
St. Dev.	191.26	13,382.59	\$11,686.05
Minimum	3	2,127	\$17,718.00
Maximum	659	61,642	\$69,912.00
Ν	112	112	112

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for NSA/DHS National CAE designated institutions.

We were able to obtain the list of CAE institution names and locations using *Web Scrapper* (webscraper.io), a Google Chrome browser extension. Given the stringent criteria needed to earn CAE recognition, we used CAE recognition as a proxy for cybersecurity teaching excellence in our model.

IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Data

Next, we gathered information related to cybersecurity research excellence. To this end, we gathered accepted paper data from both the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Symposium on Security and Privacy (SSP). The conferences are both highly rated with low acceptance rates. From 2007-2016, the ACM CCS had an 18% acceptance rate (Zhou, 2016). Over the same 10-year period, the IEEE SSP had a 13.8% acceptance rate (Zhou, 2016).

For this project, we extracted data from each conference for 2012-2016. Given the high rankings and low acceptance rates, we used paper acceptance at the ACM CCS or IEEE SSP as a proxy for cybersecurity research excellence in our model. To gather IEEE SSP accepted paper data, we used the R statistical programming language and the *IEEER* package (Wiggin & Broman, 2017).

	Forbes Rank	Students	Tuition
Mean	201.71	27,559.94	\$52,182.40
St. Dev.	205.42	13,882.08	\$12,952.24
Minimum	3	6,298	\$27,284.00
Maximum	654	50,320	\$69,084.00
N	35	35	35

Table 3: Descriptive statistics for IEEE SSP institutions (2012-2016).

The *IEEER* package is a user-created R interface to the IEEE Xplore Search Gateway. For each IEEE SSP accepted paper, we obtained author names and their university affiliations.

ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security Data

We extracted accepted paper data from the from the last five (2012-2016) ACM Conferences on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). Unlike the IEEE, the ACM does not have an API that allows easy access to conference and journal publication data.

	Forbes Rank	Students	Tuition
Mean	178.73	28,314.93	\$52,958.67
St. Dev	164.58	12,815.30	\$11,842.28
Minimum	1	6125	\$31,471.00
Maximum	654	58322	\$69,912.00
N	60	60	60

Table 4: Descriptive statistics for ACM CCS institutions (2012-2016).

We used Python and the *Beautiful Soup* (Richardson, 2015), *lxml* (Behnel, Faassen, et al., 2017) *pandas* (McKinney, 2010) and *numpy* (van der Walt, Colbert & Varoquaux, 2011) libraries to scrape each year's conference website. For each ACM CCS accepted paper, we obtained author names and university affiliations.

	ACM	IEEE
Mean	0.90	0.29
Std Dev	4.69	1.75
Maximum	61	23
Minimum	0	0
Schools with publications	60	35
Schools without publications	531	556

Table 5: Papers accepted at ACM CCS and IEEE SSP by school (2012-2016).

In Table 5, *ACM* schools are institutions with faculty who have had papers accepted at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). Similarly, *IEEE* schools are institutions with faculty who have had papers accepted at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SSP).

In our data, only a small number of schools (n = 62) had faculties with the research proficiency needed to publish their work at IEEE SSP or ACM CCS. In the past five years, only 24 institutions had faculty publish their work at both IEEE SSP and ACM CCS.

SSL Labs Grades for University Websites

The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol and its successor, Transport Layer Security (TLS), use encryption to protect data communicated between browsers and web applications (Dierks, 2008; & Freier, Karlton & Kocher, 2011). The two protocols, commonly referred to as SSL/TLS or simply SSL, are the de facto Internet standards for safeguarding the privacy of Internet data (Church, Moloney & Bannister, 2013).

The SSL Labs Server Test is a free online tool to assess SSL\TSL server configurations. The test examines a certificate to verify that it is valid and trusted (Ristić, 2017). It also examines server configuration for protocol support, key exchange support, and cipher support. The test also examines a certificate to verify that it is valid and trusted. After examining these four areas, the area scores combined into an overall score and an academic letter grade (A+, A, A-, B, C or F) is calculated. These letter grades are adjusted downward if the server has not implemented specific patches, or if exploitable vulnerabilities are detected. For example, if the server is deemed

In certain situations, the SSL Labs Server Test will not provide a (A + -F) letter grade. For example, if the site certificate is not trusted the test will issue grade of T. If there is a certificate name mismatch, the test will issue grade of M. As the SSL Labs Server Test documentation notes, if the site certificate is not trusted or there is a certificate name mismatch, the actual security grade is irrelevant because active network attackers will be able to subvert connection security (Ristić, 2017).

SSL Server Test	Number of
Grade	Schools
A+	13
А	237
A-	56
В	104
С	89
F	92
Total	591

Table 6: SSL Labs Server Test Grades.

There is one other situation where the SSL Labs Server Test will not produce an (A + -F) letter grade when the organization has asked SSL Labs not to permit tests on its servers. One school in our list requested that their web servers not be tested. In all cases where SSL Labs could not, or would not, provide an (A + -F) letter grade, we dropped the college or university from our analysis.

On July 01, 2017, there were 177 four-year colleges recognized as NSA/DHS National CAE institutions. Of these, 65 either were not on the Forbes list or received a grade of T or M on the SSL Server Test. We dropped these schools from our analysis. We also dropped military service academies from our analysis. Our resulting dataset contained 591 schools, including 112 colleges or universities recognized as NSA/DHS National CAE institutions.

SSL Server	CAE	ACM	IEEE	All
Grade	Schools	Schools	Schools	Schools
A+	3	2	0	13
А	43	24	16	237
A-	12	5	5	56
В	23	17	7	104
С	18	6	4	89
F	13	6	3	92
Total	112	60	35	591

Table 7: SSL Labs Server Test Grades by school type.

In Table 7, *CAE Schools* are colleges recognized as NSA/DHS National CAE institutions, *ACM Schools* are institutions with faculty who have had papers accepted at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), and *IEEE Schools* are institutions with faculty who papers accepted the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SSP). *All Schools* includes all 591 colleges and universities in our dataset.

While 20% of all web servers tested received an F grade on the SSL Server Test (Qualys Inc., 2018), 92 schools (16%) in our dataset received F grades. Just under 12% of CAE schools, 10% of ACM Schools and 9% of IEEE schools received F grades. To aid in analysis, we converted the SSL Server Test letter grades to their academic numeric equivalent. We followed the method that is commonly employed in the United States for calculating students' grade point average (GPA) (Stanford University, 2017).

	CAE	Non-CAE	All
	Schools	Schools	Schools
Mean	2.99	2.85	2.88
St. Dev.	1.31	1.45	1.42
Minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	4.33	4.33	4.33

Table 8: SSL Labs Server Test result statistics for NSA/DHS National CAE schools.

	IEEE	ACM	Neither	All Schools
Mean	2.86	3.10	3.19	2.88
St. Dev.	1.44	1.23	1.19	1.42
Minimum	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Maximum	4.33	4.33	4.00	4.33

Table 9: SSL Labs Server Test result statistics for IEEE SSP and ACM CCS schools.

In Table 8, *CAE Schools* are colleges recognized as NSA/DHS National CAE institutions and *Non-CAE Schools* denote colleges that are not CAE institutions. In Table 9, *ACM Schools* are institutions with faculty who have had papers accepted at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). Similarly, *IEEE Schools* are institutions with faculty who have had papers accepted at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SSP). *Neither* schools include institutions without accepted papers at either the CCS or SSP. In both Tables 8 and 9, *All Schools* includes all 591 colleges and universities in our dataset.

RESULTS AND OUTCOMES

As the response variable, *SSL Server Test Grade* is ordinal, we first attempted to use ordered logistic regression analysis. One of the fundamental assumptions of ordinal logistic regression is that the relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 2016; Williams, 2016). This is called the proportional odds (PO) assumption (or the parallel-lines assumption) (Harrell, 2013).

The omnibus Brant Test (Brant, 1990), suggested that the PO assumption for the model was violated. Examining each predictor, we found that two predictor variables, *Research* and *Teaching*, met the assumption, while the assumption did not hold for *Tuition Costs* and *Number of Students*. The Brant Test was significant for both *Tuition Costs* (χ^2 (4) = 13.48, p = .009) and *Number of Students* (χ^2 (4) = 19.13, p = .001). For this reason, a partial propositional odds (PPO) model was chosen. The PPO model allows the effects of predictor variables to vary when the proportional odds assumption does not hold (Liu, 2015).

We used Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2015) and the *gologit2* package (Williams, 2006) to estimate the ordinal outcome variable *SSL Server Test Grade*. The predictor variables were *Tuition Costs*, *Number of Students*, Cybersecurity Research Excellence (*Research*) and Cybersecurity Teaching Excellence (*Teaching*).

$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(All)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	VARIABLES	SSL	F vs C,B,	F, C vs B,	F, C, B vs	F , C, B , A-	F , C, B , A-
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		Grade	A-, A , A+	A-, A, A+	A-, A, A+	vs A, A+	vs A+
Excellence (0.219) Research 0.592^{**} Excellence (0.300) Tuition Costs 0.204 0.0589 -0.510 -0.753^{**} -3.284^{***} (0.500) (0.402) (0.369) (0.370) $(1.199)Number of 0.396^{***} 0.168 -0.0689 -0.179^{*} -0.682^{*}Students (0.151) (0.111) (0.101) (0.102) (0.389)Constant 1.719^{***} 0.789^{***} 0.0324 -0.352^{***} -4.166^{***}(0.129)$ (0.100) (0.0939) (0.0951) $(0.366)Observations 591Pseudo R- 0.0179SquaredII -902.0df_m 12chi2 32.92$	Teaching	-0.0964					
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$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(0.219)					
Excellence (0.300) Tuition Costs 0.204 0.0589 -0.510 -0.753^{**} -3.284^{***} (0.500) (0.402) (0.369) (0.370) $(1.199)Number of 0.396^{***} 0.168 -0.0689 -0.179^{*} -0.682^{*}Students (0.151) (0.111) (0.101) (0.102) (0.389)Constant 1.719^{***} 0.789^{***} 0.0324 -0.352^{***} -4.166^{***}(0.129)$ (0.100) (0.0939) (0.0951) $(0.366)Observations 591Pseudo R- 0.0179Squared 11 -902.0df_m 12chi2 32.92$	Research	0.592**					
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Excellence						
Tuition Costs 0.204 0.0589 -0.510 -0.753^{**} -3.284^{***} (0.500) (0.402) (0.369) (0.370) (1.199) Number of 0.396^{***} 0.168 -0.0689 -0.179^{*} -0.682^{*} Students (0.151) (0.111) (0.101) (0.102) (0.389) Constant 1.719^{***} 0.789^{***} 0.0324 -0.352^{***} -4.166^{***} (0.129) (0.100) (0.0939) (0.0951) (0.366) Observations591Pseudo R- 0.0179 502.0 (0.100) (0.0939) (0.0951) (0.366) Off_m12 232.92 32.92 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100)		(0.300)					
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Tuition Costs		0.204	0.0589	-0.510	-0.753**	-3.284***
Number of Students 0.396^{***} 0.168 -0.0689 -0.179^{*} -0.682^{*} Students (0.151) (0.111) (0.101) (0.102) (0.389) Constant 1.719^{***} 0.789^{***} 0.0324 -0.352^{***} -4.166^{***} Observations591 (0.129) (0.100) (0.0939) (0.0951) (0.366) Observations591Pseudo R- 0.0179 Squared 11 -902.0 41 -902.0 df_m 12 32.92 32.92 41.68^{***}			(0.500)	(0.402)	(0.369)	(0.370)	(1.199)
Students (0.151) (0.111) (0.101) (0.102) (0.389) Constant 1.719^{***} 0.789^{***} 0.0324 -0.352^{***} -4.166^{***} Constant (0.129) (0.100) (0.0939) (0.0951) (0.366) Observations 591 Pseudo R- 0.0179 Squared 11 -902.0 df_m 12 chi2 32.92	Number of		0.396***	0.168	-0.0689	-0.179*	-0.682*
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Students						
Constant 1.719^{***} 0.789^{***} 0.0324 -0.352^{***} -4.166^{***} (0.129)(0.100)(0.0939)(0.0951)(0.366)Observations591Pseudo R-0.0179Squared11-902.0df_m12chi232.92			(0.151)	(0.111)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.389)
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Constant		1.719***	0.789***	0.0324	-0.352***	-4.166***
Observations 591 Pseudo R- 0.0179 Squared 11 11 -902.0 df_m 12 chi2 32.92			(0.129)	(0.100)	(0.0939)	(0.0951)	(0.366)
Pseudo R- 0.0179 Squared	Observations	591					
Squared 11 -902.0 df_m 12 chi2 32.92	Pseudo R-	0.0179					
II -902.0 df_m 12 chi2 32.92	Squared						
df_m 12 chi2 32.92	11	-902.0					
chi2 32.92	df_m	12					
	chi2	32.92					

Standard errors in parentheses *** *p*<0.01, ** *p*<0.05, * *p*<0.1

Table 10 presents the coefficients and standard errors of the predictor variables. The log likelihood ratio chi-square statistic LR χ^2 (12) = 32.92, p < .001, indicated that the model was significant. Two predictor variables *Research* and *Teaching*, those meeting the PO assumption, had the same regression coefficients across all binary models. For *Research*, $\beta = .592$, p = .048; and for *Teaching*, $\beta = -.096$, p = .660.

Table 10: Results of the Partial Proportional Odds Model using gologit2—Coefficients.

$\begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		(All)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $	VARIABLES	SSL Grade	F vs C,B,	F, C vs B,	F, C, B vs	F , C, B , A-	F , C, B ,
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$		Log Odds	A-, A , A+	A-, A, A+	A-, A, A+	vs A, A+	A- vs A+
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$							
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	Teaching Excellence	0.908					
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Tuition Costs 1.226 1.061 0.600 0.471^{**} 0.0375^{**} Tuition Costs (0.613) (0.426) (0.222) (0.174) (0.0450) Number of 1.485^{***} 1.183 0.933 0.836^{*} 0.506^{*} Students (0.225) (0.131) (0.0942) (0.0855) (0.197) Constant 5.577^{***} 2.202^{***} 1.033 0.703^{***} 0.0155^{**} $*$ (0.718) (0.221) (0.0970) (0.0669) (0.00568) Observations 591 $8quared$ 11 -902.0 41 12 11 -902.0 41 12 42 42.92 42.92	Research Excellence	1.807**					
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Number of Students 1.485^{***} 1.183 0.933 0.836^{*} 0.506^{*} Students (0.225) (0.131) (0.0942) (0.0855) (0.197) Constant 5.577^{***} 2.202^{***} 1.033 0.703^{***} 0.0155^{**} (0.718) (0.221) (0.0970) (0.0669) (0.00568) Observations 591 Pseudo R- 0.0179 Squared 11 -902.0 df_m 12 chi2 32.92			(0.613)	(0.426)	(0.222)	(0.174)	(0.0450)
Students (0.225) (0.131) (0.0942) (0.0855) (0.197) Constant 5.577*** 2.202*** 1.033 0.703*** 0.0155** (0.718) (0.221) (0.0970) (0.0669) (0.00568) Observations 591 Pseudo R- 0.0179 Squared 11 -902.0 df_m 12 chi2 32.92	Number of Students		1.485***	1.183	0.933	0.836*	0.506*
Constant (0.122) (0.131) (0.0512) (0.00512) (0.0050) (0.151) Constant $5.577***$ $2.202***$ 1.033 $0.703***$ $0.0155**$ * (0.718) (0.221) (0.0970) (0.0669) (0.00568) Observations 591 Pseudo R- 0.0179 Squared 0.0179 Squared 11 -902.0 df_m 12 chi2 32.92	Students		(0.225)	(0.131)	(0.0942)	(0.0855)	(0.197)
(0.718) (0.221) (0.0970) (0.0669) (0.00568) Observations 591 Pseudo R- 0.0179 Squared 1 11 -902.0 df_m 12 chi2 32.92	Constant		5.577***	2.202***	1.033	0.703***	0.0155**
Observations 591 Pseudo R- 0.0179 Squared			(0.718)	(0.221)	(0.0970)	(0.0669)	(0.00568)
Pseudo R- 0.0179 Squared	Observations	591	~ /			× /	````
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II -902.0 df_m 12 chi2 32.92	Squared						
df_m 12 chi2 32.92	11	-902.0					
chi2 32.92	df_m	12					
	chi2	32.92					

Standard errors in parentheses *** *p*<0.01, ** *p*<0.05, * *p*<0.1

Table 11: Results of the Partial Proportional Odds Model using gologit2—Odds Ratios.

Table 11 presents the odds ratios and standard errors of the predictor variables. For the *Research* predictor, OR = 1.807, p = .048, which indicates that the odds of receiving a higher *SSL Grade* were 80.7% higher than the odds for a school without research when adjusting for other predictors (Williams, 2006; Liu, 2015). For the *Teaching* predictor, OR = .908, p = .660, which indicates that there was not a significant relationship between *Teaching* and the cumulative odds of earning a higher *SSL Grade*.

The odds ratios for *Tuition Costs* were different across each binary model. The ratios were 1.226, 1.061, .600, .471 and .037 respectively. The odds were decreasing across cut lines. Only the 4th (p = .042) and 5th models (p = .006) appear significant. The odds ratios for *Number of Students* were different across each binary model. The ratios were .412, .184, -.057, -.169 and -.6716 respectively. The odds were decreasing across cut lines. Only model 1 (p = .009) appears significant.

As the response variable, *SSL Server Test Grade* is ordinal, we first attempted to use ordered logistic regression analysis. One of the fundamental assumptions of ordinal logistic regression is that the relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 2016; Williams, 2016). This is called the proportional odds (PO) assumption (or the parallel-lines assumption) (Harrell, 2013).

The omnibus Brant Test (Brant, 1990), suggested that the PO assumption for the model was violated. Examining each predictor, we found that two predictor variables, *Research* and *Teaching*, met the assumption, while the assumption did not hold for *Tuition Costs* and *Number of Students*. The Brant Test was significant for both *Tuition Costs* (χ^2 (4) = 13.48, p = .009) and *Number of Students* (χ^2 (4) = 19.13, p = .001). For this reason, a partial propositional odds (PPO) model was chosen. The PPO model allows the effects of predictor variables to vary when the proportional odds assumption does not hold (Liu, 2015).

DISCUSSION

Our analysis suggests that there is a positive and significant association between a college or university's website cybersecurity and faculty with cybersecurity research excellence. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported. However, our data suggest that there is a negative, but not statistically significant association between a college or university's website cybersecurity and tuition costs. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is not supported. Similarly, our analysis does not support Hypothesis 2. Our data suggest that there is a negative, but not statistically significant, association between a college or university's website cybersecurity and the size of the student body. Finally, Hypothesis 4 is also not supported. Our data suggest that there is a negative, but not significant association between the security of the college or university's website and cybersecurity teaching excellence.

CONCLUSION

While there is a rich history of IT research examining the role of information technology in knowledge transfer (for example, Alavi and Leidner 2001; Markus, 2001; & Malhotra et al., 2005) and examining knowledge transfer in software development (for example, Ko et al., 2005; Pavlou & El Sawy, 2006; & Joshi et al., 2007), this work the first to investigate cybersecurity knowledge sharing between academic faculty and IT staff. This work contributes to both the literature on cybersecurity and knowledge transfer.

The bulk of knowledge transfer research employs self-reported or indirect evidence. In most settings, it is difficult to determine which organizations possess superior, or inferior, technical skills and to separate marketing hype from actual prowess. It can also be difficult to obtain objective measures of an organization's true technical skills (Grant & Verona, 2015). However, universities are unique organizations in that their workers (faculty) publicize their expertise (teaching and research). This makes it easier to measure their expertise in cybersecurity. This study is unique in that the knowledge flow at both ends is fully observable. The source unit (i.e., the faculty) and the recipient unit (i.e., the IT department) both publicly display their cybersecurity knowledge. In addition, the SSL Labs Server Test (Qualys Inc., 2016) gives us a significant, and publicly available, measure of each university's website security.

Our findings suggest that college and universities with research excellence, regardless of size or tuition costs, have more secure websites. More work is needed to determine why research excellence was associated with higher SSL grades, but teaching excellence was not.

Several researchers have noted that knowledge transfer between units is not easy or typical. Von Hippel (1994) used the term 'stickiness' to describe this difficulty. Szulanski (2006) suggested that characteristics of the source of knowledge, characteristics of the recipient of knowledge, and characteristics of the context contribute to the stickiness of knowledge. Szulanski (2000) found that the recipient perceptions of the reliability of the source were associated with the difficulty of knowledge transfer. Our findings may suggest that university IT staff may attach more weight to ACM CCS or IEEE SSP publications than the NSA/DHS National CAE designation.

	CAE	ACM	IEEE	IEEE or	Both IEEE
	Schools	Schools	Schools	ACM	and ACM
Mean	342.42	178.73	201.71	180.47	131.75
St. Dev.	191.26	164.58	205.42	176.94	141.92
Minimum	3	1	3	1	3
Maximum	659	654	654	654	654
N	112	60	35	62	24

Table 12: Forbes Rankings for NSA/DHS National CAE, IEEE and ACM schools.

As Table 12 shows, IEEE and ACM institutions have higher Forbes Rankings. NSA/DHS National CAE designated institutions have lower average rankings than schools that are not CAE designated institutions (i.e., non-CAE institutions) in our sample. As a result, IT staff may not trust the relevance or usefulness of CAE faculty knowledge. However, our data suggest that only a small number of schools have faculty with the research proficiency needed to publish their work at IEEE SSP or ACM CCS.

Another possible explanation is the frequency of the cybersecurity-related events. NSA/DHS National CAE designation is a single event, but research publications potentially occur more frequently. Perhaps the higher frequency makes publication announcements more salient and creates the impression of greater cybersecurity activity.

It may also be the case that colleges and universities that put a premium on research excellence also place more emphasis on knowledge transfer. Worasinchai and Daneshgar (2012) note that transfer capability is a critical factor for the knowledge source, and absorptive capacity is a critical factor for the knowledge recipient.

As cybersecurity grows in significance, it is essential to understand the flow of cybersecurity knowledge within organizations and to identify the factors that aid or inhibit the flow of this knowledge between IT units. The next step in this research is to survey cybersecurity faculty and university IT staff to examine motivation, absorptive capacity, transfer capability, arduous relationship and other factors known to impact organizational knowledge transfer.

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