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Division of Global Affairs

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# **Journal of Global Initiatives**

## **POLICY, PEDAGOGY, PERSPECTIVE**

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### *Articles*

- 1** Critical Analysis of the Educational Success of African Immigrants and African Americans in the United States  
*Regina J. Giraldo-García and Joshua G. Bagaka's*
- 19** Sustainability Practices of Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Coca-Cola and PepsiCo  
*Hope Torkornoo and Komla Dzigbede*
- 31** The Sacred Forest and the Mythical Python: Ecology, Conservation, and Sustainability in Kom, Cameroon, c. 1700-2000  
*Walter Gam Nkwi*
- 49** Usage of Green Spaces at the University of Cape Coast by Non-African Foreign Students  
*Yaw Asamoah, Ishmael Mensah, Osman Adams, Paul Baidoo, Akosua B. Ameyaw-Akumfi, and Collins Adjei Mensah*
- 69** Increasing Population, Urbanization, and Climatic Factors in Lagos State, Nigeria: The Nexus and Implications on Water Demand and Supply  
*Amidu Owolabi Ayeni*
- 89** Ethnicity, Religion, and Violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
*Jusuf Salih*
- 105** From Revolution and Isolation to Cooperation: U.S.-Cuba Relations in the Context of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act  
*Ngozi Caleb Kamalu*

### *Contributors*

- 131** About the Contributors

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# **Critical Analysis of the Educational Success of African Immigrants and African Americans in the United States**

**Regina J. Giraldo-García and Joshua G. Bagaka's**  
Cleveland State University

## **Abstract**

Using the cultural-ecological and culturally relevant theory as the theoretical overarching framework, this study works to quantify the high school achievement gap in mathematics and reading IRT scores between immigrants and U.S.-born black minorities as well as between these students and whites. Based on a nationally representative sample of 1,669 black and 8,682 white students from the NCES Education Longitudinal Study of 2002, a hierarchical linear regression model confirmed that the achievement in mathematics and reading was statistically significant and higher for voluntary compared to involuntary black minorities, but with a small effect size of about one-tenth of a standard deviation. The black-white achievement gap among native black students in these subjects was found to be approximately three times that of voluntary immigrants. The study recommends a critical analysis of individual and structural variables that influence the academic performance of diverse black minority students.

## **Introduction**

Research indicates that immigration to the United States is marked by a common goal for academic achievement and a better life for the immigrant families, a concept which is often referred to as “the American Dream” (Hill & Torres, 2010). As defined by Adams in 1931, the American Dream is “that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to his ability or achievement” (as cited in McNamee, 2009, p. 2). Wamwara-Mbugua and Cornell (2010) argue that African immigrants, like other immigrant groups, come to the United States to better their opportunities for social and economic improvement. With increased globalization, the United States has been the primary “migrant receiver,” which has significantly increased the level of

diversity within its borders. Increased diversity often has a consequence of promoting inequality among the immigrants who enter new societies to which they have to adapt. On the other hand, for minority groups such as African Americans who have inhabited in the United States for a longer period of time and are therefore considered native to the country, the paths to prosperity, academic achievement, and the American Dream seem to be vanishing.

Barone (2006) discusses Bourdieu's (1986) analysis, stating that cultural capital transferred in different forms from one generation to another can either advance or impede one's movement through the dominant culture. The analysis helps explain the challenges that minorities face in trying to achieve an education. Considering that culture encompasses shared values, beliefs, and attitudes, it can be seen as a channel for shared achievement and societal success. Some minority groups, including native Africans, experience cultural difference among themselves which makes the initial dissonance in Western societies a true obstacle to progress. Individuals whose cultural capital is different from that of the dominant culture carry a set of tools that, though valid and valuable, can actually hinder their achievement (as cited in Barone, 2006).

Ogbu and Simons (1998) discuss the cultural-ecological theory of school performance among minority groups, comparing voluntary black immigrants and nonimmigrant black minorities. Research provides various explanations for the achievement differences between these groups as well as between them and the dominant majority. Two major views are illustrated by Ogbu's (1991, 1998) and Galletta and Cross' (2007) work on immigrant and African Americans as involuntary minorities (Galletta & Cross, 2007 as cited in Fuligni, 2007). The latter looks at the under-achievement and oppositional identity of contemporary black students as a consequence of structural elements of the educational system as well as educational policies that define integrated schooling.

The role of voluntary and involuntary minorities in the achievement gap was explained by Ogbu and Simons (1998), who argue that native African Americans were brought by force to America and subsequently developed an oppositional identity in order to maintain a sense of cultural self-definition, an identity which holds general implications for their school performance. The argument indicates that blacks continue to show resistance against their expected positive performance in the school environment even when nested in educational institutions characterized by fairness, opportunity, and choice. However, Galletta and Cross (2007) contest the "legacy of slavery thesis" based on Ogbu's view (as cited in Fuligni, 2007), while others like Massey, Mooney, Charles, and Torres (2007) explore the discrepancies between black immigrants and black natives attending selective post-secondary institutions in the United States and the impact that newer generations of black immigrant students have on the achievement gap. These contrasting positions and the possible cultural-generational influences on the academic performance of black minority groups make clear the need for a closer analysis of voluntary and involuntary black minorities in the United States.

## **Purpose of the Study**

The analysis of the achievement gap among students of African descent and between these and their white American peers needs to be addressed from an empirical perspective embedded in a cultural-ecological framework. This study examines the groups' academic achievement based on a nationally representative sample of students and is intended to work towards a better understanding of the achievement gap between high school-age black minorities and white students in the United States. Accounting for a more accurate classification and distinction among sub-groups of black students, a distinction which measures the effect of school type and urbanicity, might have implications for policy and practice beyond the sole measure of the achievement gap.

The purpose of the study is to use a nationally representative sample of high school students to empirically examine Ogbu's cultural-ecological theory of "voluntary" and "involuntary" minorities in the United States. The study aims to provide quantitative evidence for Ogbu's cultural-ecological theory by incorporating current findings into the body of literature and further the discussion about possible structural determinants of the groups' academic performance. The study uses gender, socioeconomic status (SES), urbanicity, and school type (public or private) as control variables. The literature review and discussion sections of the study also address educational approaches to culturally diverse black minority groups in the United States. This study uses Ogbu and Simons' (1998) classification in the context of immigrants of African descent (voluntary black immigrants) and native black students (involuntary black immigrants) and seeks answers to the following research questions:

1. Is there a statistically significant achievement gap in mathematics and reading between voluntary and involuntary black immigrants in the United States?
2. Is there a statistically significant achievement gap in mathematics and reading between voluntary black immigrants and white students in the United States?
3. Is there a statistically significant achievement gap in mathematics and reading between involuntary black immigrants and white students in the United States?

## **Theoretical Framework**

Ogbu and Simons (1998) present an argument which focuses on differences among "voluntary immigrants"—that is, those who had not been born in the United States—and "involuntary immigrants" or minorities, described as black students whose parents were native to the United States. The argument favored voluntary immigrants' academic performance when compared to involuntary immigrants, generating both supportive and dissenting discussions among educational anthropologists and other researchers (Galletta & Cross, 2007 as cited in Fuligni,

2007; Jenkins, Harburg, Weissberg, & Donnelly, 2004; Pinder, 2012). Ogbu and Simons' (1998) classification of voluntary and involuntary minorities is an explanation of his cultural-ecological theory of minority school performance. The children of these two kinds of minorities are differentially successful in school because of the different models their subcultures have developed to adapt to their host societies.

The cultural-ecological theory states that a cultural model is observed in a pluralistic society where members of cultural groups come to understand over time what skills they need to survive economically and socially (Ogbu, 1991). In this context, Ogbu (1991) and Ogbu and Simons (1998) state that one must introduce the group's "cultural model" in order to get a better description of the factors involved in group performance differences. This conception of how it is possible for the group to enhance their status mobility can be seen as a model of their situation. The concern was based on the perception that other authors were not aware of a history where black Americans have experienced the burden of "acting white" and, further, held an oppositional collective identity and cultural frame of reference (Ogbu, 2004).

In this context, Galletta and Cross (2007) question Ogbu's "legacy of slavery thesis." They view the low-achievement and opposition of contemporary black students as something that can be attributed to structural elements and educational policies that feature integrated schooling. Galletta and Cross (2007) contend that Ogbu underestimated the role that policies and practices had in helping to produce the oppositional attitudes of black youth (as cited in Fuligni, 2007).

In agreement with Ogbu and Simons (1998), Jenkins, Harburg, Weissberg, and Donnelly (2004) test Ogbu's "cultural-ecological" model regarding the effect on educational achievement of being a "voluntary" or "involuntary" minority at the college level. Jenkins et al. (2004) measured rates of attrition and aspects of college performance. They found that selected measures of academic performance, such as placement tests, were found to be more predictive for the voluntary than they were for the involuntary immigrant group. The researchers discussed the implications of these results and argued around the idea that people often come to the United States to escape political oppression, but in general "they come to better the social and economic prospects for themselves and their families" (Jenkins et al., 2004, p. 1). The assumption is that immigrant or second-generation children will better the family status through educational attainment, which makes immigrant parents place the emphasis on having their children perform well in school in ethnic minority communities.

Ogbu (1991) argues that the differences among minority groups are not a matter of a genetically stronger endowed group having immigrated to the new society. In Ogbu's view, it can be demonstrated that, when viewed in their country of origin, a given group whose language and culture are relatively consistent with the dominant group performs poorly in school. Conversely, when they emigrate, members of this group do well in the new country where their language and culture are quite different from that of the dominant group in the host setting. On the other hand, according to Ogbu and Simons (1998), native-born minorities experience greater and more persistent language and cultural difficulties; consequently, they are less



economically and academically successful than voluntary minority groups. Ogbu and Simons (1998) argue that children of immigrant minorities are also classified as voluntary minorities, although they were born in the United States.

## **Review of the Literature**

Students from minority groups from different generations of immigrants make up a significant amount of the student population in the United States, and their academic performance is shaping the future of the country from multiple perspectives. A recent study by Manuel, Taylor, and Jackson (2012) explored ethnic-related heterogeneity in SES among black persons in the United States. The authors hypothesized that there were ethnic and racial differences across seven indicators of SES and found differences between Caribbean blacks and African Americans in only five of the seven indicators, depending on Caribbean's country-of-origin or duration-of-stay in the United States. According to Manuel, Taylor, and Jackson (2012), Caribbean blacks were found to have an advantage when compared to African Americans in most of the indicators included in their analysis.

Scopilliti and Iceland's (2008) findings indicated few differences between Caribbean blacks and non-Hispanic whites, in contrast to the greater prevalence of African-American and non-Hispanic white differences. This also supports the thesis of black ethnic-related heterogeneity in the economic context: according to the authors, "Blacks are not a homogenous racial group" (Scopilliti & Iceland, 2008, p. 569). These differences among the sub-groups of black minorities are also present in their academic achievement patterns (Pinder, 2012). Pinder's (2012) findings show that, when including family background factors, Afro-Caribbean students outperformed African Americans in the sciences, with the difference being statistically significant. Although the groups share a similar history of slavery as African descendants, there are other factors that may influence such differences in their academic performance.

A critical explanation of the marked differences in academic performances found between Caribbean blacks and African-American students from generation to generation is provided in Valenzuela's (1999) discussion of the structure of the American educational system. Valenzuela (1999) argues that the way that schooling is organized in the United States has an adverse impact on U.S.-born students and that its structure reduces the access to resources especially to those from the lowest societal strata. Given this scenario, low-income African-American students, as a native-born group, are at a disadvantage when compared to black immigrant students who might hold a similar or higher socioeconomic status and face the challenges of the American educational system from a different perspective. Although the Caribbean blacks are also distant from being a monolithic group, differing in many cases among themselves in important aspects such as language and cultural background, "their social networks operate to provide assistance to their members locally, nationally, and transnationally" (Taylor, Forsythe-Brown, Taylor, & Chatters, 2014, p. 149).

The difference in achievement across generations of immigrants could indicate that socioeconomic status is a major factor affecting the students' school

performance with an effect that is reflected not only on the students' level of achievement but also evident in the lack of resources in underserved public schools, which many low-income students attend. Minority students from low-income areas, namely Caribbean blacks, African Americans, or whites, develop their academic skills within an environment frequently lacking key material and cultural resources. Nonetheless, the issue of differences in the educational performance across all races in the United States arises from the economic inequality that emerges from the country's class based social structure, and the way in which the American school system is organized (Jarosz & Lawson, 2002).

### **Voluntary vs. Involuntary Immigrants**

Historically, the United States of America has received numerous immigrant groups from multiple origins: from Europe—including Irish, Jews, Italians, and Greeks, among others—initially perceived as ethnic groups and later on becoming “whites,” as well as diverse immigrants of African descent, among other groups (Hayduk & Jones, 2008).

The cultural-ecological theory differentiates black voluntary and involuntary minorities to the United States as those who have immigrated voluntarily and those who were brought by force to the country during slavery, respectively (Ogbu & Simons, 1998). According to Djajic (2003), immigrants tend to assimilate to a new society in different dimensions and at different rates, which also differs from the way their children assimilate later on. Such varying rates of assimilation are connected to a higher rate of human capital for the second generation of immigrants, but could have an adverse effect on other dimensions such as language, gender, housing, and neighborhood selection (Djajic, 2003).

Research also provides evidence of how residential, cultural, and economic life makes distinct the differences between black immigrants and native African Americans. However, when it comes to American politics, it is assumed that black political behavior in America is unified by a homogeneous perspective based on common ancestry (Alex-Assensoh, 2009). Alex-Assensoh (2009) states that African immigrants see themselves in terms of national identities (e.g., Ethiopian or an ethnic identity like Mandingo), and research evidence indicates that the top countries of birth for black immigrants are Jamaica, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago (approx. 58 %), while Africa is the next largest regional sender (22.7 %), especially from Nigeria and Central America (Scopilliti & Iceland, 2008.)

### **Caribbean Immigrants**

Caribbean-born groups represent a significant part of the black immigrant population in the United States. Massey, Mooney, Charles, and Torres' (2007) exploratory analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Freshmen (NLSF) finds discrepancies between black immigrants and black natives attending selective post-secondary institutions in the United States. The study included 1,028 blacks, 998 Asians, 959 whites, and 916 Latinos over the course of four years. The findings of that study allowed the researchers to frame reasonable explanations for why

Caribbean immigrants are more represented in the U.S. post-secondary institutions than African-Americans (Massey et al., 2007).

Massey et al. (2007) found that admissions representatives might target immigrants for recruitment based on their understanding that Caribbean students are more driven, motivated, and likely to succeed than African-Americans, or because they hold objective characteristics such as better test scores or grades. In reviewing Massey et al. (2007), Hanniford (2012) discusses the possibility that admission officers consider documented information indicating that whites generally feel more at ease with black immigrants than they do with black natives. The context of Caribbean black immigrants in comparison with their native African-American counterpart shows black immigrants as a heterogeneous socioeconomic group (Manuel, Taylor, & Jackson, 2012). Caribbean black immigrants also significantly outperformed African Americans in school sciences, influenced by family background factors (Pinder, 2012).

### **Sub-Saharan African Immigrants**

In the case of Kenyan immigrants, Wamwara-Mbugua and Cornwell (2010) examine the acculturation of this group as a dialogical process. The researchers interviewed immigrants in the South of the United States and found that black immigrant acculturation was a process of adaptation characterized by dialogue rather than as a mere integration of dominant culture to culture of origin. The findings show that immigrants tend to keep their culture of origin but also to move towards the dominant culture, both having an effect on their performance in the new society. Wamwara-Mbugua and Cornwell's (2010) findings suggest that Kenyan immigrants might come to the United States ". . . to better the social and economic prospects for themselves and their families" as also argued in Jenkins' et al. (2004) work, but their adaptation process is impacted by their race and colonial history (p. 69). It is noteworthy to mention that the Institute of International Education (2007), in the 2006-2007 academic year, reported that there were 6,349 students from Kenya studying in the United States (down 3.2% from the previous year). Kenya is the 19th leading place of origin for students coming to the United States, following France, which had 6,704 students in the United States in the same academic period (as cited in Wamwara-Mbugua & Cornwell, 2010).

Comparatively, Afolayan (2011) evaluates the differences in culture and communication that prevented 14 Nigerian immigrants living in Manchester, New Hampshire, from social and economic success in America. Afolayan (2011) found that the longer these Nigerians spent in America, the more difficult it was for them to acquire employment. Nevertheless, such findings are based on the study of a very small group, which limits the chances of generalizability of the findings to the entire group of Nigerians living in the United States. On the other hand, Nwangwu (2012) argues that education is one of the strongest motivators for African immigrants coming to the United States. Critical dimensions of parenting practices to prepare immigrant Nigerian children for college in the United States were observed in relation to cultural orientation, early childhood education, and continuous parental involvement in school activities (Amayo, 2009).

Qualitative research findings on Somali youth suggest that East African Muslim immigrants have experienced religious and cultural discrimination in mainstream U.S. schools (Basford, 2010). It sounds contradictory that the United States, as a Western country traditionally seen as a receiver of immigrants, uses a one-size-fits-all approach giving all children the same mainstream curricula. According to Ajrouch (2004), Western schools expect that all students respond in the same way to practices in their school environments without considering the multiple cultures, religions, and gender differences of the students (Ajrouch, 2004 as cited in Basford, 2010). In the case of Somali students, culturally relevant pedagogy could play an important role in their lives inside and outside the classroom environment.

Somali families who have entered the country as refugees face a number of challenges while making their transition to public schools in the United States (Roxas, 2008). Research provides information on the socio-cultural factors that constrain the academic success of Somali Bantu males in high school, describing their contribution to an increasing diversity in the characteristics of refugee students (Roxas, 2008). According to Roxas (2008) there is deficient diversity in teachers, a group which is predominantly white and mono-lingual.

## **Culturally Relevant Pedagogy**

The review of the literature on voluntary and involuntary immigrants' diverse characteristics and their performance in the American educational system sheds light on individual and contextual factors impacting the students' experiences in school. It also makes a strong case for suggesting a culturally relevant pedagogical approach to learning. A school environment that drastically differs from the students' culture and learning styles could have a harmful effect on the pace of progress and level of academic achievement of the students.

Culturally relevant pedagogy (CRP), a term examined by Hubert (2014), is an intricate process that has the objective of making teaching culturally applicable to students. In this regard, a culturally relevant pedagogy would honor the cultural heritages of the students and a diversity of learning styles, improving the African-American students' attitudes and interest toward mathematics, among other disciplines (Hubert, 2014). African American students reported positive perceptions of culturally relevant interventions when comparing it to traditional mathematics instruction, and expressed their preference for school activities in home-like classrooms, an environment with a prevalent ethic of caring and participation and technology-use opportunities (Hubert, 2014). Likewise, Houchen (2013) describes important lessons derived from the classroom experience and methods of integrating student perspectives and learning needs into course design as a practice of CRP.

In the case of immigrant students, CRP seems to be a key practice for promoting engagement in the classroom and recognizing the presence of African-born immigrants in the U.S. educational system. Harushimana and Awokoya (2011) emphasize the need for a culturally sensitive curriculum that addresses the cultural complexity of African-born immigrants, especially those from the sub-Saharan

Africa. The argument is based on the limited inclusion of African students' voices and cultures in a multicultural curriculum. In addition, the negative portrayal of African countries as primitive, diseased, and underdeveloped areas in the media reinforces stereotypes that diminish the cultural richness of sub-Saharan countries. The inclusion of cultural activities in the classroom would help African immigrant students maintain the continuity of their home culture and build the bridge between their sociocultural roots and their integration into the American society (Obiakor & Afoláyan, 2007).

In summary, the academic performance of students is described in the literature as defined by many aspects including individual characteristics such as race, gender, and learning styles, and contextual factors such as culture, religion, and socioeconomic status, but also by a key aspect such as structural characteristics that frame the educational system in the United States. For voluntary and involuntary black minorities, these differences have an impact on the academic performance of high school students and provide a scenario where particular characteristics need to be considered and the pedagogical approach to the groups needs to be adjusted.

## **Research Methodology**

### **Data Analysis and Procedures**

**Research Design.** The study used a hierarchical linear regression model to examine the achievement gap in mathematics and reading IRT scores between voluntary and involuntary black minorities when students' individual variables such as gender and socioeconomic status and school variables including school urbanicity or attending a public or private school are controlled. In addition, the model examined the black-white achievement gap in these two subjects in the context of both voluntary and involuntary immigrants.

**Data Source.** The data source was The Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS: 2002) from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The ELS: 2002 followed a cohort of students from the time they were high school sophomores through the rest of their high school careers, using survey questionnaires and tests (math and reading) as the primary instruments for the collection of information on the students' academic experiences. This data base includes information from multiple respondents across time from the base line year in 2002 through 2004 to 2006 to 2012 as follow-up data-collection points.

**Sample.** The initial sample drawn from the ELS: 2002 longitudinal study consisted of 2,020 black non-Hispanic students and 8,682 white, non-Hispanic students. Data for the analysis were selected from the base year (2002) and the second follow-up (2006) after the expected completion of high school. This sample was delimited to respondents who had information about their Item Response Theory (IRT) mathematics and reading scores and had valid information to determine their generational status. The selection of item response theory (IRT) mathematics and reading scores was made because IRT trait estimates are more suitable to assess the

relationship between test scores and outcome measures, if compared to summated scores (Xu & Stone, 2012). The literature supports that IRT trait estimates have an interval scale that is a property assumed for dependent variables by the majority of statistical procedures utilized in educational research (Xu & Stone, 2012).

These criteria yielded an analytic sample of 1,669 black students (11.3 % of voluntary and 88.7% of involuntary immigrants) and 8,682 white students. Likewise, 50.4 % of the students were male and 49.6 % were female. The weighting used by NCES for the sample in the final analyses served to reflect the probability of selection for each student and was used to permit valid inferences about the respective populations from which the sample was drawn and to ensure that the results are fully representative of the national population.

**Variables.** The participants' self-reported immigration status was treated as the primary independent variable of the study. First and second generation (children who are born outside the United States and U.S.-born children with at least one foreign-born parent) were categorized as voluntary immigrants in contrast to involuntary immigrants of black non-Hispanic participants from third and later generation (U.S.-born children of U.S.-born parents). Gender (Male = 1; Female = 0) and SES were used as control variables. The SES of the students was measured in a composite variable that includes the following factors: family income, parents/guardian educational level, and parent/guardian occupation. In addition, the model includes school urbanicity (urban vs. suburban/other schools), and whether the students attended a public or private school as independent variables. The dependent variables used as measure of academic achievement were IRT mathematics and reading scores at the end of 12th grade. The IRT scores were used because the test analysis' procedure allows the estimation of a student's ability while accounting for each test question's difficulty, guessing factor, and discriminating ability.

## Limitations

The study uses a large data set from NCES, ELS: 2002, which is considered secondary data. This characteristic represented an advantage and allowed the researchers to make informed inferences for all voluntary and involuntary black minorities and white students in the United States. However, it also limited the researchers' ability to develop their research work beyond the characteristics of pre-existing data, limiting the flexibility for analysis.

Likewise, the study uses data collected during 2002-2006, not accounting for more recent changes in the contexts of the achievement gap between the groups that could indicate a shift in the pattern of performance. Lastly, the study looked at national characteristics overseeing local differences (e.g., students' performance in regions of the country with different concentrations of poverty and voluntary/involuntary black minorities). Therefore, generalizations might not apply to certain areas of the country with particularly different characteristics.

## Findings

### Immigrant Status

In general, the findings indicate that both immigrant and native blacks have significantly lower mathematics and reading IRT scores in comparison to white high school students. The findings also revealed a statistically significant difference between voluntary and involuntary black minority students' academic performance in mathematics and reading.

**Table 1: Multiple Regression Analyses Results for the Prediction of Students' Mathematics and Reading IRT Scores by Migrant Status (Vol vs. Invol), SES, Gender, Urbanicity, and School Type**

Predictor	Reading				Mathematics			
	B	$\beta$	P-value	R <sup>2</sup>	B	$\beta$	P-value	R <sup>2</sup>
<b>Model 1</b> Voluntary vs. Involuntary	1.76	.07	.000	.004	2.38	.08	.000	.006
<b>Model 2</b> Voluntary vs. Involuntary	0.87	.03	.000	.10	1.49	.05	.000	.09
SES	3.70	.29	.000		3.98	.27	.000	
Gender(1= Male)	-1.15	-.07	.000		1.05	.06	.000	
Urban/Suburban- other	-.23	-.01	.000		-.81	-.04	.000	
Public School	-3.45	-.07	.000		-3.68	-.06	.000	

Specifically, research findings presented in Table 1 show that, when considered as a single factor, voluntary immigrants have statistically significant higher scores in both mathematics ( $\beta = 0.08$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and reading ( $\beta = 0.07$ ,  $p < .001$ ) compared to the involuntary black immigrants. The achievement gap between these two groups is less than one-tenth of a standard deviation and accounts for approximately 0.5% of the variance in students' mathematics and reading IRT scores. Even after isolating the impact of this immigrant status by controlling for factors such as SES, gender, urbanicity, and school sector, the variation between voluntary and involuntary immigrants remains statistically significant in both reading ( $\beta = 0.03$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and mathematics ( $\beta = 0.05$ ,  $p < .001$ ) IRT scores, but with an achievement gap of 0.03 standard deviation in reading and 0.05 in mathematics. The other four predictors (SES, gender, urbanicity, and school sector) were all statistically significant predictors of both mathematics and reading IRT scores. The full model with five predictors accounted for approximately 10% of the variance in reading and mathematics IRT scores.

The voluntary black immigrant versus white achievement gap in reading and mathematics was examined in a similar manner. The results presented in Table 2

reveal that, when considered as a single factor, voluntary immigrants have statistically significant lower scores in both mathematics ( $\beta = -0.11$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and reading ( $\beta = -0.09$ ,  $p < .001$ ) compared to white students. The black-white achievement gap in the context of the voluntary immigrants is about one-tenth of a standard deviation in both mathematics and reading IRT scores and accounts for approximately 1% of the variance in students' mathematics and reading IRT scores. When the four other factors (SES, gender, urbanicity, and school sector) are included in the model, voluntary immigrants' achievements remain significantly lower in both reading ( $\beta = -0.07$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and mathematics ( $\beta = -0.08$ ,  $p < .001$ ) IRT scores with an achievement gap of less than one-tenth of a standard deviation in both reading and mathematics. The other four predictors (SES, gender, urbanicity, and school sector) were also all statistically significant predictors of both mathematics and reading IRT scores. The full model with five predictors accounted for approximately 15% and 16% of the variance in reading and mathematics IRT scores respectively.

**Table 2: Multiple Regression Analyses Results for the Prediction of Students' Mathematics and Reading IRT Scores by Migrant Status (Vol vs. White), SES, Gender, Urbanicity, and School Type**

Predictor	Reading				Mathematics			
	B	$\beta$	P-value	R <sup>2</sup>	B	$\beta$	P-value	R <sup>2</sup>
<b>Model 1</b>								
<b>Voluntary vs. White</b>	-5.82	-.09	.000	.008	-8.320	-.11	.000	.011
<b>Model 2</b>								
<b>Voluntary vs. White</b>	-4.53	-.07	.000	.149	-6.446	-.08	.000	.164
SES	4.91	.35	.000		6.420	.38	.000	
Gender (1= Male)	-1.70	-.09	.000		1.221	.05	.000	
Urban/Sub urban-other	-.191	-.008	.000		-.853	-.03	.000	
Public School	-1.860	-.06	.000		-1.572	-.04	.000	

The black-white achievement gap in the context of involuntary immigrants was also examined using a similar hierarchical regression model. The result of this analysis is presented in Table 3. It reveals that, when considered as a single factor, there is a statistically significant black-white achievement gap in both reading ( $\beta = -0.28$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and mathematics ( $\beta = -0.33$ ,  $p < .001$ ) IRT scores. The black-white achievement gap in the context of involuntary immigrants is about three-tenths of a standard deviation in both mathematics and reading IRT scores and accounts for approximately 8% and 11% of the variance in students' reading and mathematics IRT scores, respectively. When the four other factors (SES, gender, urbanicity, and school sector) are included in the model, involuntary immigrants' achievement are



significantly lower in both reading ( $\beta = -.20, p < .001$ ) and mathematics ( $\beta = -.023, p < .001$ ) IRT scores with an achievement gap of about two-tenths of a standard deviation in reading and one-quarter of a standard deviation in mathematics. The other four predictors (SES, gender, urbanicity, and school sector) were all statistically significant predictors of both mathematics and reading IRT scores. The full model with five predictors accounted for approximately 20% and 24% of the variance in reading and mathematics IRT scores respectively.

**Table 3: Multiple Regression Analyses Results for the Prediction of Students' Mathematics and Reading IRT Scores by Migrant Status (Invol vs. White), SES, Gender, Urbanicity, and School Type**

Predictor	Reading				Mathematics			
	B	$\beta$	P-value	R <sup>2</sup>	B	$\beta$	P-value	R <sup>2</sup>
<b>Model 1</b>								
Involuntary vs. White	-7.577	-.283	.000	.080	-10.697	-.328	.000	.108
<b>Model 2</b>								
Involuntary vs. White	-5.301	-.198	.000	.202	-7.615	-.233	.000	.237
SES	4.698	.336	.000		6.107	.359	.000	
Gender (1= Male)	-1.610	-.084	.000		1.089	.047	.000	
Urban/Suburban-other	-.104	.014	.000		-.833	-.031	.000	
Public School	-1.90	-.056	.000		-1.683	-.041	.000	

The primary hypothesis, which examined Ogbu's theory, revealed that, though statistically significant, the achievement gap between voluntary and involuntary black minorities was rather small at less than one-tenth of a standard deviation, accounting for approximately 0.5% of the variance in students reading and mathematics IRT scores. However, by separating voluntary and involuntary black immigrants, the black-white achievement gap can be further quantified. In this case, the hierarchical regression model revealed that, when four educational predictors (SES, gender, urbanicity, and school sector) are accounted for, the black-white achievement gap is about 0.08 and 0.23 of a standard deviation in mathematics IRT scores among voluntary and involuntary immigrant students, respectively. Similarly, the black-white achievement gap is about 0.07 and 0.20 of a standard deviation in reading IRT scores among voluntary and involuntary immigrant students, respectively. In other words, the black-white achievement gap among native blacks is approximately three times that of involuntary black immigrants.

## Other Factors

Students' SES had a statistically significant positive relationship with students' mathematics and reading IRT scores across all groups. The factor was the strongest of the five predictors in all three models in predicting students' reading and mathematics IRT scores with effect sizes ranging from .29 and .27 in reading and mathematics, respectively in comparing voluntary versus involuntary immigrants to .35 and .38 in reading and mathematics, respectively in comparing voluntary versus white students. Gender was also a statistically significant factor across all models, with female students significantly outperforming in reading and underperforming in mathematics compared to their male counterparts. However, the gender achievement gap in all cases was less than one-tenth of a standard deviation. Additionally, though with small effect sizes, students in the urban school and those in public schools had a statistically significant lower reading and mathematics IRT schools compared to their non-urban and non-public schools.

## Conclusions and Discussion

The findings suggest that, when distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary black minorities, there is a significant difference in students' mathematics and reading IRT scores between the groups, though with very small effect sizes. While Ogbu's cultural-ecological theory can be quantitatively tested and be found statistically significant, the small effect sizes indicate a case of little practical significance. According to this finding, the role of culture, while significant, has a small effect on explaining the black-white achievement gap, leaving more space for socioeconomic factors to play a role in the achievement gap. Regardless of the small effect, the authors consider that there is a need for meeting cultural needs in the learning environment while keeping in mind that there are other factors that educators and educational anthropologists should consider. These other factors might be linked to structural characteristics of the educational system.

The data analysis also revealed that students in both groups have significantly lower scores in the two subjects compared to their white counterparts. The black-white achievement gap in these subjects was approximately a quarter and a tenth of standard deviations for native and non-native blacks, respectively. This analysis provided a quantified view of the differences between and within groups at the high school level beyond the commonly documented black-white achievement gap. Though the study revealed marked variations in both reading and mathematics achievement according to the students' immigration status, while controlling for four factors of SES, gender, urbanicity, and school sector, the full model accounted for less than 20% of the variance in students' mathematics and reading IRT scores, leaving over 80% of the variance to be attributed to other factors outside the model.

Consistent with the literature, SES had a positive relationship with student achievement in the two subject areas. The factor remains to be the most dominant predictor in the model. It is also important to note that the gender achievement gap in both reading and mathematics was statistically significant across all groups, with female students underachieving in mathematics but out-performing their male

counterparts in reading IRT scores. As argued by Valenzuela (1999), "U.S.-born youth from a low-income community are themselves symptomatic of the ways that schooling is organized to subtract resources from them" (p. 5), which also aligns with Galletta and Cross' (2007) discussion about the low achievement of black students and their oppositional identity as a consequence of structural elements that define integrated schooling in the United States as well as the effects of educational policies.

These assertions would situate low-socioeconomic-status native at a disadvantage when compared to black immigrants and white students. However, the gender achievement gap in favor of girls in reading and boys in mathematics seems to be consistent across all groups considered in the study, regardless of their generational status or SES.

The cultural-ecological theory helped to identify the distinction between the two subgroups of students. The cultural context in which each group has lived, their SES, and the ingrained expectations of both black minority groups seem to make a difference when they are compared to white students. This study corroborates the view of Jenkins et al. (2004), which holds true for groups such as Kenyan, Caribbean, and Nigerian immigrants, whose adaptation processes are impacted by their race and colonial history (Wamwara-Mbugua & Cornwell, 2010) as part of the larger immigrant group. In the context of this study, the influence of the distinction between black students, as native or immigrants, seems to be adverse for those groups that have inhabited the United States for a longer period of time.

This study unveils differences among black minorities' academic performance, however, the existence of a statistically significant achievement gap between voluntary and involuntary immigrants demands further scrutiny. Immigration status accounts for 1.1% and 0.8% of the variance in mathematics and reading IRT scores, respectively among voluntary immigrants and 10.8% and 8% in mathematics and reading, respectively among involuntary immigrants. There are therefore more factors not included in the model that explain high school students IRT scores in mathematics and reading among involuntary than voluntary immigrants.

## **Implications for Practice**

The results of this empirical study confirm that the size of the achievement gap is on a continuum, narrower between voluntary immigrants and white students and wider between involuntary immigrants and white students. This finding allows us to recommend that the support services provided to black students should be based on their diverse needs. Although the findings indicate that voluntary immigrants have significantly higher scores than involuntary immigrants, there is an indication that the advantage they hold over the involuntary immigrants may not be sustainable (Martin, 1988). Considering the findings of this and other studies, indicating a gap in favor of recent immigrants (Jenkins, et al., 2004; Giraldo García, 2014), it is reasonable to recommend the integration of culturally relevant support services in which the facilitators' knowledge of students' cultural backgrounds in instruction would help to narrow down the achievement gap between both blacks and whites as well as between black sub-groups. However, the study also recommends a critical

analysis of individual and structural variables that influence the academic performance of diverse black minority students as a whole.

Considering Valenzuela's (1999) view of how the school system in the United States is organized to subtract resources, especially from low-income U.S.-native born students, a culturally relevant pedagogy would provide opportunities for adding culturally related activities to the curriculum such as international or multicultural days that help improve the perceptions about African immigrants, their cultures, and characteristics (Harushimana & Awokoya, 2011). Nevertheless, given that cultural and socioeconomic variables do not act in isolation, a culturally relevant practice in the classroom should be characterized by a caring teacher-student interaction where all students, especially low-income students, are expected to achieve higher and be supported in such a way that they can attain their academic goals in a timely manner (Houchen, 2012). It seems that the interplay of the culture of origin of voluntary minorities of African descent and their openness to the new culture works in their favor when compared to African-Americans. However, the achievement gap between these groups also seems to be a result of the way in which schooling is organized in the United States, wherein economic inequalities and a class-based social structure define the quality of resources minority students receive in underserved areas (Jarosz & Lawson, 2002).

In any case, it is recommended that a culturally relevant pedagogy be used to improve the chances of success for both groups, especially "addressing the needs of today's diverse students" by including a culturally diverse curriculum (Gay, 2010). For example, classroom practice that emphasizes the integration of the students' cultures of origin combined with the "ethic of caring," described by Hubert (2014) as the teacher's natural inclination to meet the student's needs. Likewise, low-income minority students especially need to have access to resources and opportunities for the use of technology in a home-like classroom (Hubert, 2014). It is therefore important that all intervention programs and support services be provided to meet both the educational and cultural needs of minority groups, helping them to raise their academic performance and closing the overall black-white achievement gap in United States.

## **Future Research**

The recommendations for further research include the use of more recent data on black minority students collected after 2006 so that recent changes observed in the context of voluntary and involuntary black minorities and white students can be examined in addition to changes in the achievement gap between the groups. Moreover, a thorough analysis of native versus immigrant minorities' performance should be done in local contexts, and it is further important to add a qualitative approach to the research. This qualitative approach will help to analyze groups' experiences in their academic lives in the United States in regions of the country with varying levels of concentration of voluntary and involuntary black minorities. The study also recommends the analysis of structural variables related to the educational system that may influence the academic performance of black students.

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# **Sustainability Practices of Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Coca-Cola and PepsiCo**

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## **Abstract**

Recent scholarly discussions on corporate social responsibility have focused extensively on sustainability but existing studies provide limited insights on sustainability practices of competing global corporations in developing countries. This article compares the sustainability practices of Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo Inc. in developing countries. It uses text analysis and examines corporate sustainability reports to identify common themes and priorities in the sustainability practices of the two global enterprises. The article outlines a simple unified framework of best practice that can guide policy discussions on corporate sustainability across multiple industries in developing countries.

## **Sustainability: The New Phase of Corporate Social Responsibility**

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) posits that companies have obligations to society beyond their commitments to owners, stockholders, and the law of contract (Dubrin, 2012). It emphasizes context-specific initiatives that take into account stakeholders' expectations as well as economic, social, and environmental performance (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). CSR creates opportunities for multinational enterprises to integrate strategic decisions on socioeconomic development and environmental protection into business models to lessen the adverse impacts of profit-making activities in local contexts.

Over the years, CSR has received both support and skepticism among scholars. Supporters argue that CSR balances corporate power with responsibility, corrects

social problems caused by business, improves the public image and reputation of corporations, and promotes long-run profits. Eberstadt (1977) lamented the negative impacts of corporate activities on society if businesses “enjoyed so much power with so little responsibility” (page 22) and Davis (1973) highlighted the principle of legitimacy, which considers businesses to be social institutions and prohibits them from abusing corporate power within society. Additionally, Frederick (1986) viewed CSR as an obligation of businesses towards social betterment, extending beyond economic, technical, and legal requirements of the corporation. Further, scholars have described CSR as a vehicle for businesses to generate trust and goodwill in society (Hollensbe, Wookey, Loughlin, George, & Nichols, 2014) and enhance the dignity and public image of the corporation (Hirsch, 1986; Campbell, 2007). Also, advocates of CSR have noted that it could enhance long-run profits through a combination of institutional, economic, and agency variables. Beliveau, Cottrill, and O’Neill (1994) noted that high levels of market concentration among corporations, when combined with industry norms that support CSR and powerful managers that have a strong social orientation, could expand both CSR activities and long-run profits. Blomgren (2011) showed that the positive impact of CSR on a corporation’s long-run profits, though not excessive, aligns favorably with the industry average.

On the other hand, skeptics point out that CSR gives corporations too much power beyond the realms of business, requires special social skills which business lacks, imposes unequal costs among competitors, and lowers economic efficiency and profits. Saleem, Kumar, and Shahid (2016), citing shareholder theory, noted that the primary responsibility of corporations is to maximize shareholder wealth; therefore, expanding corporate responsibility beyond the realms of business might be “unnecessary and unwise” since corporates, unlike governments and nonprofit organizations, lack essential social skills for solving societal problems (page 949). Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo (2010) showed that CSR varies considerably as market competition intensifies among corporations: some businesses maintain or increase social performance whereas others reduce social engagement, and together these outcomes reflect how CSR imposes additional and unequal costs among competing corporations. Finally, Kim, Li, and Li (2014) showed that CSR could have a negative impact on profitability (measured as stock price crash risk) if managers pursue CSR as a strategy to conceal bad corporate news and divert attention of shareholders.

More recent studies of CSR have emphasized a new theory of responsibility namely sustainability (Montiel & Delgado-Ceballos, 2014; Wang, Tong, Takeuchi, & George, 2016). Corporate sustainability (CS) is the adoption of business strategies that meet the needs of the corporation and its stakeholders and, at the same time, serve as a steward to protect, sustain, and enhance human and natural resources the corporation will need in the future (Hollensbe, Wookey, Loughlin, George, & Nichols, 2014). Sustainability requires that businesses approach their activities in ways that consider the economic, environmental and social implications of their actions on current and future generations (Bansal, 2005). In developing countries, especially, where critical resource and development gaps persist, CS



posits that multinational enterprises cannot thrive for long in local environments where people are suffering and desperately poor.

Many studies on sustainability tend to focus on intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for sustainability initiatives (e.g., Shah & Arjoon, 2015), ways to integrate sustainability initiatives into business strategies and activities (e.g., Abreu, 2009; Hales, 2016), the scope of sustainability practices and reporting in specific industries and countries (e.g., Hahn & Scheermesser, 2006; Bai, Sarkis, & Dou, 2015), and measurement of sustainability performance (e.g., Lee & Saen, 2012; Hansen & Schaltegger, 2016).

As yet, no study to our knowledge has investigated the sustainability practices of competing global enterprises in developing countries. Despite competing in the same industries for market space, multinational enterprises (MNEs) often share the common goal of promoting sustainable development in environments where they operate. Comparing corporate sustainability framework and outcomes among similar global brands in developing countries is beneficial for understanding both the shared and divergent priorities of similar MNEs.

This article compares the sustainability practices of Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo Inc. in developing countries to identify commonalities and contrasts in core sustainability themes and priorities. In the next sections, the article discusses the global business operations of Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, uses text analysis of sustainability reports to compare their core sustainability themes and priorities, and outlines a unified framework of best practice that should guide policy discussions on CS across multiple industries in developing countries.

## **Coca-Cola and PepsiCo: Global Leaders in the Beverage Industry**

In many ways, Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo Inc. are very similar. Both companies have strong presence worldwide and serve a wide variety of brands in the bottled and canned soft drinks, carbonated water, and purified water category of the food and beverage industry. Table 1 compares the companies in terms of their operational reach worldwide, branded products, and recent financial performance. The two companies are present in more than 200 countries worldwide and compete in consumer markets using at least 20 brands each. Coca-Cola accounts for 3.3 percent of the industry share whereas PepsiCo represents 2.6 percent of the share, and each company sells more than 1.5 billion servings of products each day. Also, the companies have strong financial positions, with each showing gross profit margins exceeding 50 percent in 2015.

### **A Text-Based Analysis of Sustainability Emphases**

Sustainability is a major aspect of the global operations of Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo Inc. Annual sustainability reports reveal the companies' strong efforts in local community development, environmental protection, and human development, especially in developing countries. We compare core themes in corporate

sustainability practices using the most recent (FY 2014-15) sustainability report on each company as the foundation for textual analysis.

**Table 1: The Global Business of Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo Inc.**

	<u>Coca Cola Company</u>	<u>PepsiCo</u>
Year Founded	1886	1890*
Countries with a presence	200+	200+
Number of Brands	20	22
Servings sold per day (billion)	1.9	1.5
Industry share (percent)	3.3	2.6
Employees worldwide	123,200	263,000
U.S employees	60,900	110,000
Financial Data (2015 figures)		
Gross Profit (\$US million)	26,812	10,205
Gross Profit Margin (percent)	60.5	54.9
Total Assets (\$US million)	90,093	69,667
Long-term debt (\$US million)	28,407	29,213

\* PepsiCo was incorporated in 1965. It originated from Pepsi-Cola, which was founded in 1890.

Source: Compiled from annual financial reports (Coca-Cola Company, 2016a; PepsiCo, 2016a).

Text-based analysis is an emergent method for studying corporate sustainability reports (Asif, Searcy, Santos, & Kensah, 2013). The method comprises pre-analysis, analysis, and interpretation (Richardson, 1999) and is useful for identifying patterns and themes in textual data (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2012) to make inferences. The text-based method in this article derives from three main steps. In the first step, or pre-analysis stage, we identify key words and phrases in the corporate reports that portray emphases on sustainability. To that end, we draw from existing studies (e.g., Linnenluecke, Russell, & Griffiths, 2009) that identify economic, ecological, and social sustainability as main themes in CS analyses. We also tap into existing studies (e.g., Delai & Takahashi, 2013) that identify key terms in CS analysis, including: air, water, biodiversity, education, training and development, health and safety, job creation, and community welfare. Consequently, we identify key words and phrases that define three main emphases in sustainability practices of Coca-Cola and PepsiCo: community, environment, and human development. The second step, or analysis stage, codes the key words and phrases based on total occurrence (or counts) and lists the count for each category

of sustainability emphasis. In the third step, or interpretation stage, we assess the frequency of occurrence of themes at the category-level and across all categories to make inferences about sustainability emphases.

Results in Table 2 show that Coca-Cola Company emphasized *sustainability* at almost the same rate ( $M=2.1$ ) as PepsiCo Inc. ( $M=2.4$ ). In terms of the ranking of core themes, both enterprises emphasized local community engagement and development more than any of the other core themes. However, while Coca-Cola Company lay more emphasis on human development than environmental protection, PepsiCo Inc. emphasized environmental protection more than human development. In interpreting the text-based outputs, we assume that the frequency of a particular theme in a company's annual sustainability report mirrors the company's emphasis on sustainability practices around that theme. In practice, however, this assumption is limited since the text-based statistics may not accurately reflect actual corporate commitments of financial and human resources to sustainability goals. Nevertheless, the results provide insights on the emphasis on sustainability in the global business operations of two competing enterprises in the food and beverage industry.

**Table 2: Textual Analysis of Major Themes in Annual Sustainability Reports**

	<u>Coca-Cola Company</u>	<u>PepsiCo Inc.</u>
<i>Sustainability</i>		
Total occurrence	144	59
Average occurrence per page ( <i>M</i> )	2.1	2.4
Community		
Total occurrence	396	58
Rank among other themes	1	1
Environment		
Total occurrence	119	40
Rank among other themes	3	2
Human Development		
Total occurrence	136	34
Rank among other themes	2	3

Source: Compiled from recent (FY 2014-2015) annual sustainability reports (Coca-Cola Company, 2016b; PepsiCo Inc., 2016b). Textual analysis is derived from assessments of major themes in sustainability (e.g., community, environment, human development), as well as related themes (e.g., engagement, greenhouse, empowerment).

## A Comparison of Sustainability Practices

Table 3 compares the sustainability practices of Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo Inc. to provide more context to the text-based analysis, and to give a sense of the quality and depth of commitment to major sustainability themes. We align our comparison of sustainability practices with key priorities identified in the corporate reports, namely local community engagement and development, environmental protection and conservation, and human development and empowerment. Data is from annual (FY 2014-2015) sustainability reports, and other corporate reports and periodicals that describe actual project outcomes. Findings show that Coca-Cola and PepsiCo use a diverse range of programs and initiatives to advance community engagement, environmental protection, and human development in developing countries.

Both companies pursue local community engagement and development to address emergent community needs. Coca Cola's *Golden Triangle Initiative* (GTI) is an umbrella initiative that relies on partnerships between business, civil society, and government, and covers multiple programs and projects in communities across the world. NetsforLife, a program under the GTI, builds community support for malaria control in developing countries. Since its inception in 2006, the program has trained 74,000 malaria control agents, distributed 8.5 million mosquito nets, and saved the lives of 100,000 children in Africa (Coca-Cola Company, 2016c). Project Last Mile is another program under the GTI. The project focuses on extending critical medicines to the remotest communities in developing countries, and relies on Coca Cola's supply chain and other community networks. Project commitments amounted to \$21 million in 2014, and since then the project has extended to 10 African countries, including Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania (Coca-Cola Company, 2016d). Early results from the project show significant impacts. In Tanzania, for example, the program has increased availability of critical medicine by 30 percent, as partnerships with local communities have helped to identify the most cost-effective and efficient delivery routes from warehouses to clinics in remote regions.

PepsiCo's *PepsiCorp* is a broad-reaching initiative that organizes small groups of employees to engage with local communities and complete projects that enhance access to safe water, enrich food sources, and promote eco-tourism. Volunteer teams have completed community projects in Brazil, China, Ghana, India, Philippines, and South Africa, and generated positive outcomes in rainwater harvesting, healthy eating habits, and sustainable agriculture (PepsiCo Inc., 2016c). Under *PepsiCorp's* Mother Water Cellar Project, volunteers worked with 180 primary school students in rural China to construct a water purification tower to benefit more than 700 students and teachers. Also, the Food for Good Possibilities program under *PepsiCorp* combines synergies between PepsiCo, communities, and governments to make nutritious foods more accessible to inner city children, especially during vacation months when children do not have access to government subsidized meals. Since the program's creation in 2009, it has delivered 40 million servings of food worldwide (PepsiCo Inc., 2016c).

**Table 3: Overview of Corporate Sustainability Practices of Coca-Cola and PepsiCo.**

Coca-Cola Company	PepsiCo Inc.
<i>Local Community Engagement and Development</i>	
<p><i>Golden Triangle Initiative (GTI)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Seeks to build long-term partnerships between business, civil society, and government.</li> <li>- Focuses on providing disaster relief, delivering critical medicines, and addressing emergent community needs in developing countries.</li> </ul>	<p><i>PepsiCorp</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organizes small groups of PepsiCo employees to engage with local communities.</li> <li>- Undertakes pro bono projects that enhance long-term access to safe water and promote eco-tourism in developing countries.</li> </ul>
<i>Environmental Protection and Conservation</i>	
<p><i>Water Stewardship Program</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aims to return to nature and communities amount of water used in beverage production.</li> </ul> <p><i>EKOCYCLE Initiative</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Encourages recycling through use of recycled materials, such as plastic bottles and aluminum cans, to create needed consumer products.</li> </ul>	<p><i>Liter of Light Program</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Retrieves plastic bottles from waste streams and recycles them to produce eco-friendly natural light for homes in communities that lack lighting.</li> <li>- Uses common materials such as water, chlorine, and corrugated sheet metal.</li> </ul>
<i>Human Development and Empowerment</i>	
<p><i>3.2.1 Move! Program</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Helps to inspire the youth to embrace active and healthy lifestyles.</li> </ul> <p><i>5by20 Initiative</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Seeks to support and empower women’s entrepreneurial potential by providing small business development grants in developing countries.</li> </ul>	<p><i>Sustained Program to Improve Nutrition</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Seeks to simultaneously prevent undernutrition and reduce the risk of obesity in babies living in poor areas in developing countries.</li> </ul> <p><i>Centers of Excellence for Business Skills Development (CEBSD)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aim to improve employment prospects for youth through training in business skills in developing countries.</li> </ul>

Source: Compiled from recent (FY 2014-2015) annual sustainability reports of Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo Inc. Also includes information from corporate reports and periodicals that highlight actual project outcomes.

Coca-Cola and PepsiCo also engage in programs that promote environmental protection and conservation, and human development and empowerment. Both companies demonstrated water stewardship by extending safe water access and replenishment projects, as well as critical wetland habitat protection, to many developing countries, including Brazil, China, Colombia, and India. Also, women empowerment and youth development are at the core of corporate sustainability initiatives such as the *5by20 Initiative* and *Centers of Excellence for Business Skills Development*, which have yielded impressive results in developing countries. The Coca-Cola Company's *5by20 Initiative* actively provided small business development grants to women in developing countries. Between 2010 and 2015, the initiative extended skills training and business loans to 1.2 million female entrepreneurs, most of them in Africa and Asia Pacific, became operative in eight new countries (Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Canada, France, Greece, Somalia and Vietnam) in 2015, and currently operates in 60 countries (Coca-Cola Company, 2016e). Similarly, PepsiCo's *Centers of Excellence for Business Skills Development* actively worked to enhance the business development skills of learning groups in Myanmar and Colombia.

Whether it relates to local community engagement and development, environmental protection and conservation, or human development and empowerment, it appears that both Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have integrated sustainability practices into their core business operations and continue to be active in the developmental progress of developing countries where they operate. However, lack of structured data on the companies' sustainability initiatives and programs makes it difficult to undertake a more systematic assessment of corporate sustainability efforts to understand the specific amounts committed to programs and the welfare impacts in recipient communities in developing countries. Nevertheless, this article's exploratory findings on reach and impact of sustainability practices should provide the groundwork for a more detailed analysis of the subject in future studies.


### **A Unified Framework of Best Practices in Sustainability**

Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo Inc. demonstrate a strong commitment to sustainable development in their global business. A comparison of their sustainability practices shows many points of convergence that could inform standards of best practice across industries in developing countries. Figure 1 presents a simple outline of the unified framework. The framework highlights the value of identifying core themes in sustainability to inform corporate sustainability programs and initiatives. As noted earlier, the core themes in sustainability practices of Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo Inc. are community engagement and development, environmental protection, and human development. The unified framework emphasizes the importance of clearly defining core themes within a common policy space that strikes a balance between business priorities and sustainable development needs.

Additionally, sustainability programs and initiatives should include inputs from business, civil society, and government while emphasizing project longevity. These

are vital aspects of the unified framework described in this article that are not strongly emphasized in sustainability framework of MNEs in developing countries. According to Dartey-Baah, Amponsah-Tawiah, and Agbeibor (2015), MNEs tend to align their sustainability practices mainly with corporate outreach priorities and earlier national development targets of developing countries, resulting in a neglect of current and essential development needs of these countries. The authors underscored the need for MNEs to center sustainability projects on current development needs that span information and communication technology development, fraud detection and prevention, and corruption minimization in developing countries. Thus, the unified framework presented in this article defines an essential role for local and national governments in aligning sustainability practices with development needs.

**Figure 1. A Unified Framework of Corporate Sustainability Best Practices**



## Conclusion

This article examined the sustainability practices of Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo Inc. in developing countries. It used text analysis to identify core sustainability themes and priorities among the two competing businesses in the global beverage industry. Findings show remarkable similarities between the two

companies in terms of core themes and priorities. Both companies emphasize local community engagement and development, environmental protection and conservation, and human development and empowerment, and among these three emphases, they prioritize local community engagement and development highest in their sustainability efforts. The analysis of sustainability practices assumes a connection between corporate emphasis (as portrayed in texts of annual sustainability reports) and actual commitments (both in terms of financial and human resources) to sustainability, which might not hold in practice. Still, a comparison of actual programs and initiatives reveal significant impacts of corporate sustainability practices on communities, the environment, and human capital development in developing countries. The findings also show that it is feasible to develop a simple unified framework of sustainable corporate practices that could serve as a guide in best practice standards across multiple industries in developing countries.

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# **The Sacred Forest and the Mythical Python: Ecology, Conservation, and Sustainability in Kom, Cameroon, c. 1700-2000**

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## **Abstract**

Scholars have taken a keen interest in the social and cultural meanings of the African landscape in the reconstruction of the continent's history (Giblin, 1992; Spear, 1997; Wagner, 1995). But how much did Africans know of their environmental past? This article explores the indigenous history of ecology, focusing on the medicinal forest (*ak'u mii-fii*) and the mythical python (*iigw-im*) and their link with livelihood and sustainability in Kom, Cameroon. The paper argues that the Kom people have always been conserving their forests since the pre-colonial era. During the colonial period and especially in the 1930s many hectares of land including the sacred forest and the sites of the mythical python were carved out as forest reserves. The paper will demonstrate the extent to which colonial and post-colonial forms of conservation have ignored indigenous notions of forest conservation in Kom. It shows that Kom citizens have continued to protect their forest. Using archival sources and secondary material, along with oral interviews, this paper explores the environmental history of sustainable livelihood in Cameroon taking Kom society as a case study.

## **Introduction**

Ecology, conservation, and sustainable development have become buzzwords in international discourses (Beinart & McGregor, 2003; Calvert, 1986; Fairhead & Leach, 1996; Grove, 1995; Grove, Damodaran, & Sangwan, 1998; McCann, 1999; Harms, 1987; Rietbergen, 1993; Ingold, 2000; Kjekshus, 1996; Webb, 1995). The conservation of forest has become a major issue. The emphasis is often laid on the fact that it is a global problem because it is assumed by apologists that the destruction of forest will lead to the disappearance of biodiversity which includes rare and endangered species. As a result of the gravity of the challenge, a lot of

financial and human resources have been put into ecological studies and conservation. For instance, from December 17-20, 2007, an international conference was held in Kunming, China, which was jointly organized by the International Union of Forest Research Organizations (IUFRO), Task Force on Traditional Forest Knowledge, the Chinese Academy of Forestry, and the Asia-Pacific Association of Forestry Research Institutions (APAFRI). Many such conferences have taken place around the world. What is striking is that these efforts have largely ignored indigenous peoples' time-honoured efforts at protecting and conserving their environment.

The conservation of landscape which involves forest and ecology has thus brought lively debates to the forefront. From a global perspective, one school of thought promotes the view that the forest should be saved from indigenous people who are perceived to be destroying it for fuel and food. Others are of the opinion that indigenous people should be compensated for losing their access to resources due to conservation projects, which are also designed to teach them about the importance of forest preservation (Cohen & Odhiambo, 1989; Wilson, 1989). Yet there were others who hold very strongly that indigenous people have been conserving their forest and ecology for a very long time and do not need to be taught how to handle conservation by imposing exogenous strategies (Ranger, 1993, 1999; Vansina, 1990). Others have maintained that the forest and people live hand in hand and so their relationship with nature is mutually interrelated (Kwashirai, 2010; Maddox Giblin, & Kimambo, 1996).

Africa appears to have taken center stage in the ecology, environmental conservation, and sustainable development debates. There have been enormous efforts by researchers to understand the perception and the use of forest (Okali & Eyog-Matig, 2004; Agnoletti, 2000; Anderson & Grove, 1987; Beinart, 1989; Bruce, Cunliffe, & Hudak, 2001; Green, 2002; Ichikawa, 2012; Schoenbrun, 1998; Schoffeleers, 1978). Despite the abundance of writings on the subject, Cameroon has not benefitted much from such studies. In addition, there has been the near neglect by international organizations to understand how African people have conserved their fauna and flora. This paper argues that the Kom of northwest Cameroon, despite the many external forces which have been introduced into their culture, have not lost sight of their sacred. Although the region has undergone significant social transformation since colonial times, the Kom have continued to believe in their sacred forest and mythical python. I will go further to argue, taking Kom as a case study, that Africans have been at the forefront of understanding and preserving their own environment; they are not passively awaiting external redemption.

## **Conceptual Analysis**

Generally, ecology is the relationship of living things to one another and their environment or the study of such relationships (Gumo, Gisepe, Raballah, Ouma, 2012). In many instances, these relationships cover the social, political, economic, spiritual, and natural environment which comprises living and nonliving things (Guha, 2000). The sacred is a thing or things, situations, and places that are set apart,

considered very special, and emit an aura of the holy and mystical (Giles-Vernick, 2002; Green, 2002). They are regarded with respect as they are connected with the supernatural and thus are also super ordinary. In this paper I draw from the notion of the sacred forest propounded by Madeweya, Oka, and Matsumoto (2004). According to these scholars sacred forests have long been in existence in ancient Rome, Greece, and most of Asia and Africa. It is often associated with cultural and religious beliefs of the indigenous peoples. They are known by different names in different societies. For instance, in Kenya, they are called *kaya* forest. In India they are variously known as *Dev* in Madhya Pradesh, *Deorais* or *Deovani* in Maharashtra, *Sarna* in Bihar, *Oran* in Rajasthan, *Devarakadu* in Karnataka, *Sarpa* or *Kavu* in Tamil Nadu, and *Kerela* and *Kaans* in Utara Kannada. In Japan it is known as *Chinju-no-mori*. In Zanzibar the sacred forest is known as *misitu ya jadi* or *misitu ya mizimi* in the Swahili language. Amongst the Kom it is known as *ak'u mii-fii*. This paper makes a contrast between indigenous notions of conservation throughout the world and the modern bureaucratic efforts—and how they seem to be at odds with indigenous mechanisms. This is because conservation schemes around the world have ignored the local conservation carried out by the indigenous peoples who conserve their environments by establishing taboos (Ylhaisi, 2006).

Sustainability as applied in this article is sustainable development. As a concept sustainable development took its roots in 1981 following the work of Brown and in 1987 through the Gro Harlem Brundtlandt Commission. It is a planned cultural, economic, social, environmental, and political change for the better. It also calls for cooperation at all levels by all stakeholders geared towards the well-being of the masses and by the masses. It fosters inter- and intra-generational equity. The respect for other cultures, be high or low, is a necessary condition for a global attempt to achieve sustainable development (Braddotti *et al.*, 1994). Generally, sustainable development is understood as development which meets the needs of the present without altogether compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. (Braddotti *et al.*, 1994). It is often built on three pillars: social, economic, and environmental. To achieve sustainable development, the needs of people must be met. These needs include access to medical care, affordable and suitable housing, better education, and food.

However, sustainable development has recently become a cumbersome subject to define because it encompasses so many different players. The complexity of the subject makes it imperative to look at the significance of sustainable development in a more holistic way. In conventional practice, it has been widely held that development characteristically is top-down rather than bottom-up (Kiawi & Mfoulou, 2002). The social distance in conventional thinking, between development planners and beneficiaries, is wide (Pitt, 1976). In other words, development is externally imposed by governments or other actors (Eyong, 2003; Harcourt, 1994; Weaver & Kusterer, 1997; Wolfensohn, 1998; McCann, 1999; World Bank Group, 2001).

## Objectives

On the backdrop of recent debates on climate change and environmental protection how can indigenous meanings of such concepts be appreciated? During the colonial period and especially in the 1930s, many hectares of land, including woodland with python, were carved out as forests reserves. How have colonialism and the post-colonial state impacted our understanding of African landscapes in relation to their ecology, environment, and sustainable livelihood in local community? How do traditional cultural practices conserve the environment? Finally, what recommendations can be made to policy makers?

## Methodology

Data collection for this paper used several methods. First, I conducted oral interviews with 20 respondents whose ages ranged from 65 to 86 years. The idea was to collect as many versions as possible about the conservation of the sacred forest. Second, I combined these data with my personal observations. I grew up in Kom, observed what was going on in the sacred forest, and also listened to stories told by the old people about the sacred mythical python which led the Kom people out of Babessi. Third, I used archival sources. The Buea National Archives, which is located in Buea, holds a small quantity of documents written by British colonial administrators in the nascent years of British occupation of the territory under the League of Nations Mandate (1919-39) and Trusteeship (1946-61). Although these files were not generally on Kom, they nonetheless show how colonialism attempted to disrupt the traditional ways of forest conservation by carving out hectares of community forest in the British Southern Cameroon of which Kom was a part.

## Kom: The Case Study

Kom is a fondom, located in the Bamenda Grassfields in the present-day northwest region of Cameroon. A fondom (akin to the classical state) is ruled by a *fon* who exercises judicial, quasi-religious, and executive powers over his people. According to the Kom, the *fon* is the spiritual leader, the chief priest, and pontiff of his people. Figure 1 shows the location of Kom in the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon. It is the second largest fondom after Nso (Chilver & Kaberry, 1967; Terretta, 2014).

Kom is one of 250 indigenous ethnic groups found in the Republic of Cameroon. Its geographical area is 280 square miles. Kom shares its eastern boundary with the fondoms of Oku and Nso and the southern frontier with Kedjom Keku or Big Babanki and the Ndop plain. Bafut is on the western border while to the north are Bum and Mmen (Chilver & Kaberry, 1967; Dillon, 1990; Rowlands, 1979; Nkwi, 2003, 2011, 2015). Under the *fon* is the *kwifoyn*, which is like the executive arm of the traditional government. Its main function is to help the *fon* to maintain law and order and also to check the excesses of the *fon*. The *fon* also checks the excesses of the *kwifoyn* (Nkwi, 2015; Ritzenthaler, 1960).

The Kom fondom is believed to have been founded about the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century. It includes sub-chiefdoms which were incorporated into Kom proper as “vassal states” by Fon Yuh (c. 1865-1912), the seventh ruler of Kom. These tributary chiefdoms included Achain, Ake, Ajung, Mbesinaku, Mbueni, Baiso, Baicham, Mejang, Mbengkas, and Mejung (Chilver, 1981; Nkwi & Warnier, 1982). Figure 2 shows the Kom fondom with all its vassals and villages including its capital, Laikom.

**Figure 1: The position of Kom in the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon**



Source: Aaron S. Neba, 1987, *Modern Geography of the Republic of Cameroon* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 15). Bamenda, Cameroon: Neba Publishers.

**Figure 2: Kom Fandom showing its villages and sub-chiefdoms**



Source: Chilver and Kaberry (1967). *The Kingdom of Kom in Cameroon* (p. 126).

The history of the sacred forest and the mythical python could be linked to the Kom migratory history. According to Kom oral traditions or origin myths, the ancestors of the Kom migrated from Ndo in north Cameroon with other Tikar



groups fleeing from the jihads, as those who were not willing to be converted to Islam migrated (Fanso, 1989). Oral information further maintained that the Kom first moved to Babessi where they settled temporarily, and where the king of Babessi plotted to eliminate them (Nkwi, 1976)

A popular legend recounts their movement from Babessi to their present settlement. One day the king of Babessi told the fon of Kom that some of their people were becoming obstinate and might cause a war between the two groups. He therefore proposed that they should each build a house in which the trouble makers would be burnt. The Fon of Kom, Muni, agreed to the plan and the houses were constructed accordingly. But while the king of Babessi constructed his house with two doors, Muni built his own house according to what was agreed, with only one door. After locking the front doors, the houses were set ablaze. The Babessi people escaped through the second door while Kom people were burnt to death. This trick reduced the size of the Kom population in Babessi and made the fon of Kom very angry.


Oral informants further state that in his anger and frustration, Muni promised his surviving wives and sisters that he would avenge the death of his people. He told them that he would hang himself on a tree in a nearby forest and on that spot a lake would emerge and all the maggots from his decomposing body would turn into fish. The lake was discovered by a Babessi hunter and immediately reported to the palace. A royal fishing expedition was organized. At the peak of the fishing the lake turned upside down and all the Babessi people present in it drowned. Following Muni's instructions a mythical python's track, believed to be the reincarnated *fon*, led Kom people from Babessi to Nkar and Idien in the present-day Bui division of the northwest region of Cameroon

At Idien they settled near a stream beside a raffia bush. There, the Queen Mother, Tih, bore a son who was to be the next king. That son was called Jingjua, meaning "suffering." She also gave birth to Nange Tih, future mother of the *Ikui* clan, Nakhinti Tih, future mother of *Itinalah* clan, and Ndzitewa Tih, future mother of the *Achaff* clan. The *Ikwi*, *Itinalah*, and *Achaff* are seen as the founding lineages of Kom because the three people who arrived in Laikom occupied three areas. Once the python trail reappeared Kom people left Idien for Ajung where the python's trail disappeared again. The *fon* of Ajung married Nangeh Tih and bore Jinabo, Nangebo, Nyanga, and Bi. After a while the python's track reappeared and Kom people left again for Laikom. From Idien, the migrants moved through Ijim to Laikom where the mythical python disappeared and has never reappeared again. Figure 3 shows the migratory routes used by the mythical python and survivors of the Kom who were the first to settle at Laikom.

The Kom migratory history to their area of settlement and led by a mythical python (*iigv-im*) has deeper historical and cultural meanings in relation to the understanding of their ecology and cosmos in general. The python is quite relevant to this subject of indigenous knowledge and conservation. It is strongly believed among the Kom that the mythical python represented the lost *fon* and founder of the fondom. According to oral sources, the sacred forest is located in the spot where the mythical python is believed to have disappeared. It is not clear whether the snake met the forest or the forest grew up later. Whatever the case may be, it is the spot

on which the snake disappeared that the sacred forest is located. It is where the dead *fons* are buried. The traditional capital of Kom, Laikom is located where the mythical python disappeared. Consequently, the fondom's traditional ruler lives at Laikom. Pythons and/or snakes are reptiles commonly found in the myths of many African societies. The python, for example, is thought by the Luo of Kenya to be sacred and may not be killed by the people. When such snakes are seen at home they are given food because it is also thought that the snakes are ancestors (Gumo *et al.*, 2012).

**Figure 3: Migratory routes of Kom people to their present site**



Source: Compiled by the author from oral sources.

## **The Sacred Forest *Ak'u Mii-Fii*: Its Historical Role in Conservation and Sustainability**

The sacred forest serves many functions ranging from aesthetic to ecological, spiritual, and cultural. It gained the name “sacred” because the mythical python disappeared on the spot and also because a tree fell down and cried out lamenting that the *fon* has died. (Beatrice Gam, personal communication, August 23, 2013). The forest is linked to the life of the villagers and their activities. This interaction between people and their environment means that people living in the forest both depend on it and act on it. Elsewhere in Africa sacred forests have played similar roles although sometimes it is very difficult to prove using Western science. This demonstrates how little the world understands African ways of interacting with their nature. Amongst the Shona, the word sacred, *inoera*, is an adjective describing a thing or a place. Sacredness has the connotation of being life sustaining such as providing food, fruit, or water. The concept is closely linked to rain and fertility of the land. A sacred place (*nzvimbo inoera*) is a place where spirits are present; it has certain rules of access, as well as behaviours that are not permitted there (Bruce et al., 2001; Ingold, 2000; Kwashirai, 2010; Leach and Mearns, 1996; Poore, 1989).

The talking tree needs further explanation; in the Kom oral traditions, the tree spoke by crying. Again, myths contain fantastical claims which defy every day or scientific logic. For instance, Terence Ranger (1999), writing about Matapo hills in Zimbabwe, suggests that stones can talk. Ranger further explained that the impossible can happen especially when people are so close to their natural *habitats* to the extent that they can take ordinary events seriously or accord them an aura of sacredness.

### **The Sacred Forest and Traditional Pharmacy**

The sacred forest offers many rare plants that are used for treating various diseases in the region. These medicinal herbs are extracted from the sacred forests with little restriction. However, some restriction is imposed on those who wish to exploit the interior of the forest for even more rare and highly valued medicinal plants. Some of the medicinal plants extracted from the forest include *prunus Africana*, tree barks used as quinine long before western quinine was introduced into the region (Iliffe, 1995), and other leaves, fruits, and roots. Traditional healers who were authorized to use the forest showed a deep knowledge of the secrets of the forest (Nkwi & Warnier, 1982).

Traditional societies in Africa and elsewhere have used plants to promote healing and naturopathic medicine, which is still the predominant means of healthcare in many parts of the developing world (Harris, 1987). The forest also provides the population with various uses such as honey production, food, dye, fibre, fodder, medicines, fuel wood, building materials, and production of kitchen utensils.

Closely linked to the pharmaceutical importance of the forest was the fuel it provided for the people. Biofuel has been proven to be of absolute importance for

people living in rural areas of the world (Anderson, 1984; Munslow, 1988; Salim & Ullten, 1999; Webb, 1995). Certain parts of the sacred forest could be used to fetch firewood. Firewood collected from the forest was exclusively of fallen dead branches, because it was forbidden to fell any tree in the sacred forest. Here, we see that indigenous ideas about the sacredness of the area enabled the conservation of the forest. Firewood, which is the main source of energy for heating and cooking, could be very scarce during the rainy season unlike the dry season when firewood could be fetched abundantly and reserved against the rainy days. Since not just anyone was allowed into the sacred forest, the forest has been preserved. Hunting was done once a year, thus preventing the extinction of valuable species of animals, birds, and trees in the forest. For instance, the forest was home to a unique species of bird, *Tauraco bannermani*, believed to be the only one of its kind in all of West Africa (de Hoyo et al., 2014; Njabo & Laguy, 2000).

### Rituals, Conservation, and Sustainability

Agriculture has been the backbone of societies. The sacred forest played a role in Kom agriculture and helped to sustain the fertility of the land and its people. No farming is carried out in the sacred forest. There was no careless fetching of wood or felling of trees. The Kom believe that the forest has to be preserved for societal sustenance. Religious rituals were performed in the forest to inaugurate the beginning of the planting season. The high priests performed the rituals in a dedicated shrine located in the sacred forest. *Fuchuo* was the ritual carried out by the *achaff* and *ekwu* priests (all founding lineages of Kom) to inaugurate the planting season and ensure the steady supply of food in the Kom Fondom. The shrine, *ndo-fuchuo* stood in a spot held to be the place where the mythical python disappeared. It stood on three pillars with a grass thatch roof. The performance of the ritual by the *ekwu* and *achaff* priests was because of their proximity to their traditional settlement when they arrived Laikom. The toponymic explanation further lends credence because the two lineages were kingmakers. They were thought to be sacred. Prior to the ritual, the path leading to the shrine is cleared (*usu leng fuchuo*) and the following day the priests offer guinea corn porridge (*sorghum bicolor*), palm oil (*Elaeis Guineensis*), salt (*sodium chloride*), and palm wine. The rite was followed by a libation in the *ntul* shrine poured by the *fon* and *achaff* priests who both offer prayers for peace, fertility, and more food in the kingdom (Joseph Ndocha, personal communication, August 23, 2014).

In the one week following the *fuchuo* ritual, social gatherings of a festive nature where musical instruments may be used are all forbidden. No funeral ceremonies were to be carried out until seven days had elapsed. The performance of this ritual was followed by the distribution of apostropaic medicine which is believed to protect food and people and compounds against maleficent spirits (Anna Ayumchua, personal communication, July 14, 2013 & May 14, 2015). Persons who are caught uprooting crops and trees maliciously are to be punished by retainers of *fuchuo*. On the eighth day after the ritual, the *fon*'s farms would be planted, with guinea-corn, and then the commoners could start planting their own farms.

Closely related to the *fuchuo* ritual, which is performed in the sacred forest, is *azhea*. *Azhea* is linked in both function and content to *fuchuo*. The shrine is found at the precincts of the sacred forest (Nkwi, 1982). According to Chilver and Kaberry (1961) it is “a ritual which is performed to ensure a regular fall of rain” (p. 76). This ritual also ensures sufficient sunshine and a future bumper harvest. The same ritual is repeated at royal compounds at Yang, Fuli, and Alim. From the royal compounds, other villages are nourished.

The *fuchuo* and *azhea* rituals could easily be understood as territorial cults. These are a typology of religious institutions found widely throughout Central Africa. Schoffeleers (1978) calls them “profoundly ecological . . . apart from engaging in ritual action, however they also issue and enforce directives with regards to community’s use of its environment . . .” (p. 145). Territorial cults operate on the principle that management of nature depends on the correct management and control of society. The Kom case does not show the contrary and rather re-enforces the way indigenous peoples could understand and conserve their environment. By putting in place certain taboos they inadvertently keep the devastation of their environment intact (Thadeus Ngong, personal communication, August 5, 2014).

The *fuchuo* and *azhea* rituals illustrate more importantly the cultural understandings of Kom people of their environment. The premise upon which the rituals are performed is to prevent insecurity thereby protecting the environment. Cultural understandings are means which people employ to deal with insecurity. Through their rituals, the Kom illustrate the extent to which indigenous knowledge is a powerful force for conserving their environment.

## **Conserving the Sacred Forest and Contemporary Challenges**

This sacred sanctuary has been threatened by many factors which either help to degrade the forest or make it lose its original value, especially the cultural aspect. The forest in this area is becoming so rare that it is possible to miss it entirely. Vegetation is currently dominated by grassland with patches of savannah and farms caused by factors ranging from human to natural factors. Two of the dynamics that have threatened the existence and cultural understandings of the forest are colonialism and Christianity

Colonialism has been held as one episode which had lasting effects on Africa. Whether it was the British, French, Germans, Portuguese or Belgians, the impact on African people and their cosmos was virtually the same. Between the wars, the colonial regimes in Africa embarked on the crusade widely known in the colonial lexicon as the “native problem.” By this phrase the colonial administration justified that the native was to be brought out from his jungle and shown the light. As far as the conservation of forest was concerned, the British carved out huge hectares of local and community forests as native reserves and animal parks (Qa, 1946, p. 3; Forestry, Government: General Correspondence).

The ramifications of such policies were striking. Not only was the land of the indigenous peoples taken, the shrines, temples, and sacred forest which had existed long before the colonial administration was introduced in the continent were desecrated. This showed that indigenous forms of environmental conservation had

no place in the colony, yet the Kom people resisted and continued with their rituals and taboos surrounding their forest. In colonial reports found in the Buea National Archives, it is evident that attempts to conserve this forest began in 1931 when the conservator of forests for Bamenda Division, J.O. Fielding, drew limits for the proposed Oku Mountain Forest Reserve, known then as the “Bush of Hill Forest” Type (Qh/a [1939]5 Annual Report of the Forest Administration of Cameroon; Qh/a [1974]4, Annual Reports: 1937, 1939, 1940; Qh/a [1917]1 Forests). When the notice of the proposed reserve was published the people adjacent to it objected very strongly because they saw the cultural meanings attached to the forest being threatened (Qh/a [1916]1 Forestry Ordinance Regulations). An agreement was then reached between the conservator and the indigenous population with the latter given certain use rights in the proposed reserve. Subsequent efforts by government to gazette the proposed reserve failed in 1938, 1961, and 1963. Finally, in 1975, the conservator was successful in demarcating part of the forest although the boundary was not universally respected. By 1986, the forest had been reduced to 50% of its 1963 size (Asanga, 2002, p. 5). The post-independence period continued to implement forestry regulation laws (Forbesseh & Ikfuingei, 2001).

Forest conservation, to be successful, must involve the local population and address their needs (Geschiere, 2004). In ignorance of this the Ministry of Forestry (MINEF) agreed to shelve the original indigenous ways of understanding their forest and went ahead to gazette the whole forest, placed it under government control, with the population restricted on what they could do in the forest.

Christianity followed on the heels of colonialism in Kom. The introduction of the church in Africa in the 19th century brought about tremendous changes. Christianity gained a foothold in Kom in 1912 through the help of the Pallotine Fathers from Germany. When World War I erupted, the missionaries and German colonial administration were sent out of the territory. In 1927 the Mill Hill fathers from London took over from the Pallotines (de Vries, 1998; Nkwi, 2015). Fon Ngam resisted the introduction of Christianity at the early stages (1912-1926) but after his death Fon Ndi embraced and legalized Christianity. Nevertheless, the indigenous practices of environmental conservation and rituals continued side by side with Christianity.

Colonialism and Christianity both made significant efforts to undermine the Kom’s cultural conceptions of their landscape. It is not clear whether the ideology behind the colonial and post-colonial state carving out these reserves was to undermine indigenous knowledge or to preserve it. As in many contexts, the colonial state thought that what was indigenous was not right and, consequently, should be eliminated. This ideology was further re-enforced by the post-colonial state. Colonialism and Christianity did not completely succeed to obliterate Kom beliefs. As a matter of fact, when I was in Kom in May 2015, the rituals at the sacred forest were carried out to mark the beginning of the planting season. This has never failed since the Kom people founded their kingdom and the conservation of the forest has never ceased to happen. The colonial and post-colonial governments seemed to have failed to interrupt or obliterate indigenous methods of conservation.

## Lessons for Today: Recommendation to Policy Makers

From the foregoing, there are practical implications for policy makers. The concept of conservation adopted by international agencies has remained quite narrow and simplistic. This is because the world conservation schemes have taken it only to mean large hectares of forests and parks and ignores the local conservation carried out by the indigenous peoples who conserve their environments by establishing taboos (Byers, 2001; Wanyancha, 1992). Policy makers in Cameroon should encourage and sensitize the indigenous people about the accomplishments of their methods. They should also educate traditional rulers, who would in turn educate their people, on the importance of conserving the forest and protecting their environment. Traditional and modern forms of forest conservation should therefore complement each other rather than operate at loggerheads.

In spite of the scarcity of natural forests in this area, the local community continues to depend on indigenous and exotic trees in their surroundings for survival. Thus, there is need for cultivation, protection, and sustainable management of these valuable resources for rural livelihood. The importance of timber and other tree products from non-sacred forests attracting increasing attention. This may help meet growing demands, and reduce pressure on the sacred forest. Trees growing in open areas seem to have the potential to provide options for rural livelihoods. The introduction of trees like the eucalyptus and *tephrosia* usually planted alongside crops on the farms has helped to alleviate the constant exploitation of the forest for fuel wood. Environmental agencies have now resorted to discouraging Kom people from planting the eucalyptus on the grounds that it consumes a lot of water. Yet these agencies have not given alternatives. People need alternative trees for their biofuel. If these are not provided, people may resort to exploit the forest (Atampugre, 1991; Fairman & Leach, 1998).

## Conclusion

Tropical Africa has been observed as one of those places which is gifted in forests. These forests in many societies have served specific functions. Like in other parts of Africa, the Kom sacred forest serves a variety of cultural and symbolic functions. This forest is intimately linked with ancestry and cultural heritage and it plays a very crucial role in the livelihood of the fendom. The sacred forests are maintained in this region for almost the same reasons in some parts of Africa where these forests serve as habitats for the gods or the spirits of the ancestors, protect species of cultural importance to the community, and serve as sites for religious rituals. However, they are also threatened by recent developments and pressures associated with the growing populations and dynamics which are external such as Christianity, colonial policies, and the changing perceptions of the people. Significantly, environmental protection has become a topical issue today. While there is so much talk about by advocates, there is almost the near neglect of how indigenous people protected their environment. There can be no doubt that cultural values in many

aspects have changed, and will continue to change. Yet the forest continues to play its important role to the Kom people despite external pressures.

Like Bruce et al. (2001) and Clarke, (1999) observed in their study of sacred forest in Zimbabwe, spiritual or religious values can motivate the conservation of natural resources such as the Kom sacred forest. The chief priests and the *fon* influence conservation that is motivated by traditional values and practices (Luig & van Oppen, 1995). This shows that policies that support traditional institutions to empower traditional leaders can foster conservation in such cases. Hence, it is fair to conclude that traditional religious values do play a significant role in forest conservation in Africa.

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# **Usage of Green Spaces at the University of Cape Coast by Non-African Foreign Students**

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University of Cape Coast

## **Abstract**

Universities all over the world have green spaces (GS) as an integral part of their campuses because of the significant benefits derived from them. Aside enhancing the image of universities, GS influence the academic performance of students by reducing stress. This paper examines the preferences and uses of green spaces on UCC campus by non-African foreign students (NAFS). Data was collected through in-depth interviews, observations, and by the use of Arc-GIS 10.1 software. Sixteen NAFS were interviewed during the second semester of the 2013/2014 academic year. The study found that the usage of GS was influenced by factors such as easy access to Wi-Fi connectivity, proximity of GS to lecture and residential facilities, fresh air they provide, the aesthetic nature of those spaces, and the quiet/serene environment they offer. The respondents also lamented on the use of GS as pathways by other users. Hence, the study recommends that future development plans of the university in terms of siting of lecture theaters and residential facilities should be green space friendly.

## **Introduction**

Green Spaces (GS) refer to all open spaces mainly covered by vegetation which are directly or indirectly available for human usage (Fratini & Marone, 2011). Examples include parks, gardens, forests, trees, farmlands, and wetlands. Several experts including psychologists, sociologists, and others concur that the quality of life within many environments depends largely on the amount and nature of green spaces available (Ahmed & Hassan, 2003; Cohen et al., 2006; Mensah, Andres, Perera, & Roji, 2016; Wolch, Byrne, & Newell, 2014). GS are basic to human existence. Frederick Law Olmsted, often referred to as the Father of Urban Parks,

classified GS, especially trees, as “the lungs of a city,” an expression that shows how green spaces serve as valuable assets to the overall wellbeing of city dwellers and the development of cities (Jennings, Johnson-Gaither, & Gragg, 2012).

GS are well acknowledged for the numerous social, environmental, and economic benefits they provide for humankind (Van Leeuwen, Nijkamp & de Noronha Vaz, 2010). Such benefits include improving air quality, ameliorating local climate, and conserving biodiversity, as well as providing venues for leisure and recreation, health benefits, creating job opportunities, and supporting child development. In line with these benefits, many studies have concentrated on exploring and analyzing how different aspects of human life are influenced by green spaces. These studies have centered on the mental health values of GS (Frumkin, 2001; Lee & Maheswaran, 2011), social, community, and economic values (Bell et al., 2008; Woolley, 2003), as well as environmental values (Alvey, 2006; Gill, Handley, Ennos, & Pauleit, 2007; Haq, 2011).

Notwithstanding the fact that much emphasis has been placed on the different benefits of GS, students’ experiences with GS on campus have received little attention especially in Africa. In Ghana, the three top public universities (University of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, and University of Cape Coast) offer admissions to thousands of Ghanaians and foreign students every year due to the wide range of courses they offer at the undergraduate and postgraduate levels. These large numbers of students, combined with stressful academic work, make it essential for many GS to be provided to cater for the recreational and health needs of the students since GS have been found to create a healthier academic environment (Speake et al., 2013). However, there has been no study on GS and students’ life at universities in Ghana and this makes it difficult to know how students rely on GS for different activities on university campuses in Ghana. It was therefore to fill this knowledge gap that this study was conducted using University of Cape Coast (UCC) as a case study.

The main aim of this paper is to examine the preferences and uses of GS on the UCC campus by non-African foreign students (NAFS). It also sought to map out, with the aid of Arc-GIS, the GS on UCC campus, to determine the nature of these spaces available for students. The rationale for focusing the study on NAFS is that most studies on GS have been carried out in developed countries where students have a particular inclination towards the use of such spaces (McFarland, Waliczek, & Zajicek, 2008; Speake et al., 2013). In addition to this, such students due to changes in environment often find it difficult to easily adapt to the Ghanaian lifestyle. Thus, they were selected in order to know the role GS play in their academic life as part of their adaptation to life on university campus in Ghana.

## **Literature Review**

GS restore harmony to the environment and hence, play a vital social role in easing tensions (Ahmed & Hassan, 2003; Hague & Siegel, 2002; Milton, 2002). A probable reason is that green is the color which is most restful for the eyes, presumably because humans evolved in a predominantly green environment (Ahmed & Hassan, 2003).

Human-plant interaction has always existed—stemming from the backdrop that humans rely on nature for survival. However, the interaction exists on different levels—active and passive (McFarland, Waliczek, & Zajicek, 2010). For instance, studies have established that active interaction with nature, such as directly growing plants, has a direct consequence on improved psychological and physiological health such as increased self-esteem and reduced stress levels (Cammack, Waliczek, & Zajicek, 2002; Waliczek, Zajicek, & Lineberger, 2005). On the other hand, passive interaction with nature, which is more visual and observational in nature (Lewis, 1994), is capable of improving one's life satisfaction (Zampini, 1994). Ulrich (1984) reported that patients in hospitals whose window faced natural areas were found to report less incidence of illness. While this may be true, one also needs to interrogate this in the light of all that come to play in ensuring good health. Kaplan (1992) is however quick to add that these reported benefits of human-plant interactions transcends physical borders; they are not restricted by culture, ethnicity, age, place of residence, or occupation.

This human-plant relationship with its benefits has permeated the entire fabric of human life, even the academic environment. Inspiration of human-plant relationship in the academic environment could be traced to Ancient Greece, where the Great Academy of Plato was actually a garden as opposed to a physical building (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005). It is also on record that Epicurus and Aristotle also taught in the gardens of Athens, and not in a physical building (Gager, 1937). All these are indications that education has traditionally taken place within the natural environment. This is perhaps due to the kind of association between students' performance and the study environment.

In fact, Abu-Ghazze (1999) admits that people who patronize GS on university campuses have close ties with these spaces and hence those are the areas they remember so well even after they have left the campus. Specifically, these are places where students usually interact with each other, relax, and study. McFarland (2007) also attests to several studies which report that the academic performance of students is positively affected by the physical environment of the university where they study (McFarland, 2007; McFarland et al., 2008; McFarland et al., 2010; Speake, Edmondson & Nawaz, 2013). One of the earliest examples of this assertion about students and the environment was Karmel's (1965) study which found out that high school students in rooms with windows were generally happier.

Griffith (1994) therefore suggests that universities should create attractive and relaxing campus environments that will help students deal with stress and improve on their academic performance. Caws (1970) is also of the view that universities should be designed to facilitate a certain quality of life. To this effect, Connors (1983) has stressed that since the designed environment (GS) of formal schools actually contributes to controlling the degree of stress of students it is essential for school authorities to pay attention to such facilities. Furthermore, Griffith (1994) posits that authorities of higher educational institutions should re-orient their priorities by adding to their programs, designing attractive and engaging campuses that are favorable to academic activities since “attractively landscaped formal open spaces or habitats left in their natural form, as woods and gorges, help establish a venerable campus identity, stir alumni sentimentalism, create a strong sense of

community, and curb escalating campus densities” (p. 648). In a similar vein, Think (2003) asserts that “a premium should be placed on ensuring that teaching environments provide the best possible conditions to stimulate learning” (p. 2).

## **Methodology**

### **Study Area**

UCC, which is located in the Cape Coast Metropolis of the Central Region of Ghana, is a sea-front university which lies between 5° 8' 10" N, 10 17' 56" W to NE and 5° 5' 51" N, 10 16' 43" W to SE. It is located along the shores of the Gulf of Guinea, which spans the west coast of West Africa (Figure 1). The main entrance to the university campus is 160 meters from the beach.

From an initial intake of 256 students in 1963-64 academic year, the University, as at 2013-14 academic year, had an undergraduate student population of 18,489 regular students, 978 postgraduate students, 5,195 sandwich (summer) students, and 37,606 distance education students. There are also 532 postgraduate students on distance education (Student Records and Management Information Section, 2014). The university admits both Ghanaian and non-Ghanaian students into various colleges including Agriculture and Natural Sciences, Education Studies, Health and Allied Sciences, Humanities and Legal Studies, and Distance Education. The university admits students into bachelor and master's degree, as well as PhD programs. Since its inception in 1999, the Centre for International Education has been in charge of foreign students admitted into various programs. Nigerians form the majority of these foreign students. Others also come from neighboring francophone countries like Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, as well as the United States of America, Sweden, Netherlands, and Germany.


Since 1962 the university has witnessed various forms of infrastructural development with a concomitant improvement in the extent of GS from 2001 to 2008. Between 2001 and 2008, a number of new GS were created while the few old ones were redesigned at the Northern and Southern campuses. The university authorities as well as the Students' Representative Council (SRC) have constructed a number of gazebos at some green locations on campus which serve as meeting points for group discussions, private studies, relaxation, waiting area, and for snacks.

### **Data and Sources**

Data for this study was collected in the second semester of 2013-14 academic year. Pictures of various GS were also taken. Permission to conduct the study was sought from the Centre for International Education at University of Cape Coast and consent was sought from foreign students who were sampled.



Figure 1: Map of the University of Cape Coast



Source: Remote Sensing and Cartography Unit, UCC [RSCU-UCC], (2014a)

By resorting to the census approach, all 16 NAFS who had been admitted for the study of various programs in the mentioned academic year were sampled for the study. Census was resorted to because attempt was made to gather information from every member of this small some group of people. On the other hand, the qualitative nature of this study made it reasonable for 16 respondents to participate in this study (Mason, 2010). This point is defended by Ritchie, Lewis, and Elam (2003) on the grounds of saturation, thus, a point of diminishing return in qualitative data collection where anymore data collected does not necessarily lead to more information. Hence, content and quality of data collected, rather than number becomes paramount in this respect. Sandelowski (1995) concludes therefore that large numbers are unimportant in ensuring the adequacy of a sampling strategy.

Qualitative research techniques, in-depth interviews, and observation were employed. This was done to have deeper understanding of the topic under study. The in-depth interviews were conducted at respondents' places of residence, lecture theaters, and other open spaces. With the help of two field assistants, interviews were conducted for 20 to 50 minutes and during periods that were convenient to respondents. This was usually between 9 am and 7:30 pm each day. The respondents preferred that the researchers wrote their responses instead of audio recording so this was duly followed. Data were collected with an interview guide that was designed to collect demographic information of the respondents, their knowledge and awareness of campus GS, and their use of campus green spaces. This offered respondents the opportunity to construct their own social reality. The data collected through in-depth interviews were manually coded into themes which were informed by the objectives of the study. Thematic analysis which is the most common form of analysis in qualitative research was utilized (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2011). In line with the thematic analysis, the responses were manually transferred from the interview guide to broadsheets, and afterwards the data was coded. Responses with reoccurring patterns were assigned the same codes to reflect a theme. The themes that emerged were further reviewed until a clear pattern emerged. Names were then assigned to the themes that emerged. In addition to this, personal observation sessions were organized to observe various GS on campus to have a first-hand information of student activities that take on these spaces.

Apart from the qualitative data collected, spatial data were also used in the study. A Geo-eye image of the university campus dated March 2012 was sourced from the Geography and Regional Planning Department of UCC. This image served as the base for mapping the GS with the help of Arc-GIS 10.1 software. A polygon layer (shapefile) was created in ArcCatalog 10.1, and this was edited in ArcMap 10.1 by digitizing the shape of various GS from the image and their names assigned. In order to generate the areas for the various GS digitized, a new field (area in meters) was created in the attribute table of the GS shapefile. Geometry calculated tool was then employed to automatically generate the areas of various digitized GS. Also to verify whether digitized GS actually existed on the ground, ground-truthing was undertaken by loading the shapefile of digitized GS onto a Tremble Juno SD GPS. GS that did not correspond with what was observed during the ground-truthing were edited. Also locations of Wi-Fi devices were mapped using the Tremble Juno SD GPS device. The Wi-Fi had a range of 100-150 meters. The

mapped Wi-Fi spots were downloaded and overlaid with the mapped green spaces. In addition, a buffer was created with the maximum range (150m) of the Wi-Fi devices to know areas which are hotspots on campus for browsing.

## Results

### Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

A total of 12 females and four males between the ages of 20 and 24 years participated in the study. Out of this number, 11 of them were nationals of the United States of America while three and two were Swedish and Germans, respectively. The religion of the respondents were varied—ten Christians, an atheist, and the remaining five respondents were not affiliated to any religion but maintained that they believed in God.

The respondents, all undergraduate, were from the Faculty of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, and the School of Physical Sciences, studying courses such as Oceanography, Economics, Sociology, Computer Science, African Studies, Communications, Philosophy, Population and Health, and Development Studies. All respondents resided on campus with 11 of them in the Graduates Hostel, while the remaining five were at the Sasakawa Chalets. All the respondents were unmarried which is typical of most undergraduate students.


UCC has a number of GS which are either consciously or naturally designed for various purposes (Figure 2). As shown in Table 1, the university has a total of 4,818,307 square meters (m<sup>2</sup>) of GS, with 710,328.8m<sup>2</sup> being created reserves (natural and semi-natural including woodlands, forests, and wetlands that have been left for purposes of wildlife and biodiversity conservation). The natural and semi-natural GS form about 84% of the university's total GS. Aside this, 9% of the total GS have been for the enhancement of the appearance of residential and other non-residential areas of the campus such as the halls of residence, lecture theatres, offices, and health facilities.

**Table 1: Area of Green Spaces in UCC**

Amenity Green space	429944.8	8.94
Natural and Semi-Natural	4036752.2	83.92
Outdoor Sports Facilities	47349.51	0.98
Parks & Gardens	47797.2	0.99
Farm	248649.2	5.17
Total	4810492.91	100

Source: RSCU-UCC (2014c)

**Figure 2: Green Spaces in University of Cape Coast**



Source: RSCU-UCC (2014b)

## Respondents' Favorite Locations on UCC Campus

One major interest of this study was to find out respondents' favorite locations on campus and the reasons behind their choices. The respondents indicated various locations for varied reasons—the aesthetic value these areas provided, including fresh air, presence of green vegetation, and access to Wi-Fi. Most of the favorite places mentioned were located at the north campus of the university, and included an area behind the university's main library (the Sam Jonah Library Complex), "Parliament House" (a location where students practice mock parliamentary sessions), College of Education Lecture Theater (CELT) block's surroundings, and lawns at the university's Science Quadrangle (see Figures 3 and 4). Other places mentioned were the GS in front of the Graduate Hostel, Alumni Hostel, Senior Member's Club House, Sasakawa Chalets, and the Casford Gardens. The only favorite location in the South Campus that was mentioned was the GS around the "Old Library" (a GS beside Oguaa Hall, a residential facility).


According to the respondents, the above-mentioned locations are their favorite places on the North Campus because of reasons such as fresh air provided by those areas, their beautiful nature, quiet/serene environment, and venues to socialize with friends and also get easy access to internet (Wi-Fi) (Box 1).

The fact that most of the GS on campus are located at the North Campus as opposed to the South is not surprising because originally the university began from the South Campus. It appears the original plan did not factor in GS especially in non-residential areas between Oguaa Hall and the Old Library block. In addition to this, limited spaces coupled with the locations of surrounding local communities like Apewosika did not permit further expansion of the university on the South Campus, let alone the creation of GS. It was evident that expansion of the university was concentrated on the North Campus, and that all new development projects being undertaken have largely factored in the need for GS.

Though it is touted as one of the finest green regions of the university campus, the Casley Hayford Hall garden, often referred as the Casford Gardens was not mentioned among the favorite locations by the respondents. This was due to the fact that apart from the place being far from lecture theaters it is also not close to the places of residence of the respondents. For instance, an American male respondent indicated that:

I don't see the need to go there (Casford Garden) when there's no business for me to do so. The place is far from lecture theaters and where I stay on campus. If I want to de-stress myself I prefer doing that on the green spaces around my hostel here at Graduate Hostel.

**Figure 3: Green Spaces in the University of Cape Coast with Favorite Locations**



Source: RSCU-UCC (2014d)

## **Box 1: Respondents' Quotes Indicating Favorite Green Space Locations on UCC Campus**

I spend most of my personal study time at the summer huts (gazebos) around the old library when am at the Old Site (South Campus) and those behind the university's main library because there's always nice breeze from the trees, and they're so amazing and beautiful.

--Swedish female respondent

You don't get to get Wi-Fi at most places on campus but I think it is pretty good at the "Parliament House," and you get to meet a lot of funny and friendly guys. It's so cool there

--German female respondent

There's one thing I admire about "Parliament House." You always have various Wi-Fi options to choose from when you go there to browse.

--American male respondent

I just love the lawns at the College of Education Lecture Theatre. They are so beautiful and well kept...I just love to see that place always.

--American female respondent

## **Use of Campus GS**

We gathered from our study that the most important use of GS by the respondents was for relaxation, followed by use as a meeting point, waiting area for lectures, sports, browsing the of internet, and socialization. While males were using it for sports (on the Casford Field), the females mainly used it as a waiting area for lectures and browsing the internet. In all, it was realized that GS on the UCC campus were used for recreational, educational, and social purposes. Here are some examples of the use of GS by some respondents to reflect the various uses already mentioned:

I hang around the "Parliament House" to wait for my next lecture when it is going to be in the next few hours . . . and I take the chance to browse because the Wi-Fi is good here than the hostel I am.

--Swedish female student

I go to the area behind the main library to do my reading assignments because the library normally is too warm, and there is a lot of noise most of the time at the hostel.


--German female student

I always love to play soccer, and that is why I normally go to the Casford Field to play with the Ghanaian friend I have made here. It's not all that good though because most parts of the field are bare; but that's what we can get, I guess.

--American male student



**Figure 4: Respondents' Favorite Locations**



GS behind UCC's Main Library

"Parliament House"

"Science Quadrangle"

CELT Green Space

The study further found situations where respondents referred to as worrying, the littering and the use of lawns as pathways. The respondents reported seeing litter on most lawns on campus, a situation which they blamed on the authorities of the university for failing to place waste bins at some vantage points on campus. They perceived littering as an attitudinal problem on the part of students and other users on the campus. It was realized that sometimes most users would walk on lawns as a shorter route to their destinations. This "common" act, according to some respondents, diminishes the beauty of the GS on the campuses. Again, the respondents blamed the university authorities for not doing enough to deter particularly students from walking on the lawns. Some students were observed walking on lawns when pathways have been provided and signpost erected (Figure 5). Interestingly, at a point, some NAFS took to this behavior of walking on the lawns too. This claim is backed by a response by a 23-year-old female national from Sweden who remarked as follows:



I think this it is so inappropriate to see almost everybody walking on the lawns, and they are not shy of it. But sometimes I think they are right that is why they are not condemned by anybody. So once a while, I walk in the lawns too.

**Figure 5: Lawns used as “Pathways” by Some UCC Students**



## Discussion

The study found that most respondents preferred GS where there is access to Wi-Fi. Equally important were GS with seats where respondents could sit and wait for lectures and do other activities. However, no physical infrastructure was mentioned. The major reason was the benefits respondents derived from such locations including browsing of internet, relaxation, waiting area for lectures, sports, and others social activities. It was not surprising for respondents to mention “Parliament House” and other surrounding areas as favorite locations because of high concentration of operational and open access Wi-Fi connectivity in those areas (Figure 3). Additionally, “Parliament House” is a place at the UCC campus where

students hold mock parliamentary session, hence its attraction of many students. Lastly, “Parliament House” is centrally situated between College of Agriculture and Natural Sciences and Faculty of Social Sciences buildings where most lecture theatres on campus are found. Students can therefore wait or relax in this GS between lecture periods.

Korpela, Hartig, Kaiser, and Fuhrer (2001) had earlier made a similar finding that the favorite locations of college students were natural places, such as the beach because of the feelings of relaxation, calmness, and comfort that were associated with those places. In this study, it is evident that technology (in this case Wi-Fi) plays an instrumental role in attracting students to the GS.

The fact that Casford Gardens was listed as comparatively less favorite location was expected because of proximity. The garden is not close to respondent’s places of residence. Corroborating this finding was an observation made by some authors suggesting that the usage or non-usage of GS could be determined by proximity (Giles-Corti et al., 2005; Van Herzele & Wiedemann, 2003). On school campuses, Speake et al. (2013) opined that students have an immediate or close attachment to GS that are within their learning and living environments. Thus, students of Liverpool Hope University used GS adjacent to their classrooms where they could meet and wait for classes. This is also true in the case of the current study where respondents pointed to the GS at the Old Library as one of their favorite locations on campus, though the area is not within their residential facilities. Rather, the area is close to their lecture theaters where they could have their personal studies and wait between lecture hours. Again, the availability of operational open access Wi-Fi connectivity is a plausible reason.

Also important to this study was the use to which GS on the UCC campus were put. These spaces were used for different purposes including browsing the internet, relaxation, and waiting area for lectures. The use of GS for relaxation, places of meeting, waiting area for lectures, sports, and browsing the internet confirms the findings of Gearin and Kahle (2006). The respondents did not only use the GS for study purposes, but also for socialization and health purposes. This is one strong indication of the “social worth” that GS offer to those who utilize them. The ability of GS to bond two or more extreme cultures while reducing loneliness and eventually reducing academic pressure was phenomenal. This finding corroborates the observations made by Maas, Van Dillen, Verheij, and Groenewegen (2009), Dymont and Bell (2008), Kahn et al. (2008), Gearin and Kahle (2006), and Jim and Chen (2006), who in their studies found that apart from the academic and health relevance of GS, there are cultural and social bonds that GS establishes. The predominant usage of the GS by males for sporting activities also confirmed a study by Speake et al.’s (2013) research that revealed that males often use GS for sporting activities as compared to their female counterparts who mainly used it as a waiting area for lecture and browsing the internet.

## **Conclusion**

As this study sought to achieve, GS map of the university was produced to indicate those which have either been consciously or naturally designed for various

purposes. Not only that, the map gives a pictorial evidence of the scope of greenery of the campus. Apart from this achievements, the use of ARC/GIS to map out the various Wi-Fi hotspots on the UCC campus gives indication of how technology combine with nature to attract users of green spaces.

The findings of this study is consistent with the results of similar studies on campus GS. Thus, GS, rather than physical infrastructure, were listed as the most favourite location at UCC by NAFS. Thus, the respondents being in a different environment (Ghana, which is a developing country) was not influential enough to thwart what they are used to since GS were used the same way they probably would in their homelands. In addition to the on-going discussion on the use of GS in schools' campuses, this study has found out the significant role that modern technology plays in the use of GS. Thus, the study found that Wi-Fi hotspots located in and around GS contributed to the popularity of those places among students. Unfortunately, using campus GS as pathways by some users was identified by respondents, a behavior which some respondents eventually were enticed to do same.

## **Recommendation**

Based on the above, respondents had some suggestions for making the university's GS attractive to its users. These included the provision of seats at some GS locations to enable students have places for relaxation. A specific mention was made of Casford Field where the male respondents complained that one has to stand throughout to watch football or other activities. This suggestion seems to be very popular in most GS studies as noticed by Shaftoe (2008) and Bradley and Millward (1986). However, Shaftoe (2008) cautions that sitting on benches should be rightly and carefully located in order not to create nuisance on campuses. Others also recommended the construction of pathways at some convenient locations especially at the GS around Faculty of Social Science Car Park, planting more trees and shrubs, planting of more flowers to beautify the campus landscape, that GS should be regularly manicured to prevent overgrowing, and lastly building of fountains at some GS for attractions.

While it is important to keep and maintain the GS on the university's campus by mowing overgrown lawn, trimming of hedges, creation of pathways, and provision of benches, caution ought to be exercise to avoid nuisance. Again, school authorities should rather educate and encourage students and other user of GS to use appropriate routes or pathways.

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# **Increasing Population, Urbanization, and Climatic Factors in Lagos State, Nigeria: The Nexus and Implications on Water Demand and Supply**

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## **Abstract**

This study examines the impact of climate, urbanization, and population on water supply in Lagos State. Population baseline data used for this research were based on provisional census data of 1963, 1973, 1991, and 2006. Urbanization assessment were based on multi-temporal imageries from Landsat MSS, TM, NigeriaSat-1, and Landsat ETM+ for 1975, 1995, 2007, and 2015, respectively. Monthly temperature and rainfall data between 1960 and 2015 were collected from the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NIMET), Oshodi, Lagos, Nigeria, and used for climatic assessment. Information on water production, demand, and supply for this study were gleaned from the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Lagos State Water Corporation reports of various years, and relevant literature on Lagos water supply and demand. The census data revealed that the population of Lagos State increased by about 525.9% between 1963 and 2006 and rose to about 754% in 2015 based on 3.4% growth rate. On the other hand, water demand increased from 172,088m<sup>3</sup>/d in 1963 to about 2,392,792m<sup>3</sup>/d in 2015 while water supply rose from about 97,377m<sup>3</sup>/d in 1963 to about 930,531m<sup>3</sup>/d in 2015. Urban land use/build up area increased from 230.8km<sup>2</sup> in 1976 to 805.4km<sup>2</sup> in 2015 while climatic records revealed that temperature and rainfall relatively increased by about 0.0508°C and 0.0159mm respectively for 55 years. The study concludes that there will be more pressure on water as a result of population growth which will further impact the changing functionality in terms of socio-economic and infrastructural development of Lagos State in the near future.

## Introduction

Globally, studies have revealed that urbanization, increasing population, and climatic variabilities have a significant impact on water supply particularly in the fast-growing urban centers and/or cities around the world (Ayeni, Soneye, Fasunwon, Miteku, & Djiotang-Tchotchou, 2011; Ayeni, Kapangaziwiri, Soneye, & Engelbrecht, 2015; Tackle, McGranahan, & Satterthwaite, 2015). Studies have revealed that urban bloom will continue for decades why the increase is expected to reach 60% by 2030 as almost half of the world's population currently lives in urban areas (Cohen, 2006; Kamal-Chaoui & Alexis, 2009; UNESA, 2014). For example, the urbanization rate in Lagos State had escalated out of control in that almost 600,000 people are added to the population annually (Fulani, 2012). Remarkably, the urban and peri-urban areas of the world consumed about 75% of commercial energy (UNEP (2015). As a result, almost 80% of global waste and about 60% of greenhouse gas emissions that cause global climate change originate from cities of the world (Kamal-Chaoui & Alexis (2009; El-Sufi, 2010). Oyemade, Bolaji, & Olowa, (2009), Sikder and Xiaoping (2014), and Bhatnagar (2017) observed that the erratic rainfall, temperature, and other climatic variabilities have ensued to continual drought and flood effects at both global, regional, and local scales. More importantly, these have affected water supply. For instance, availability of surface water or shallow groundwater depends on the precipitation (EEA, 2007; IPCC, 2008). To this end, increasing severe weather risk and its threats to human settlements have become a great concern especially in coastal areas like Lagos. Each day, climate refugees from rural areas that have been hit by drought or flooding intensify migration to the cities in search of ways to sustain their livelihoods. Essentially, the most vulnerable groups to the effects of climate change are the majority of rural population who are face poor health conditions, unemployment, or social segregation. As a result, they tend to migrate to cities within or outside their countries e.g., migration from far northern Nigeria States (e.g., Sokoto, Kano, Borno) to Lagos State (DESA, 2011).

Climate change would be one of the major drivers of human migration in the near future as predicted by the United Nation and this will lead to millions of environmental migrants by 2020 (United Nations, 2005; UNESA, 2014). There is no doubt therefore that climate change exists. Due to the fact that availability of improved drinking water is a critical issue for world population, it is important to note that climate change not only affect water resource base vis-à-vis water availability, quantity, quality, timing, and distribution, as well as other watershed services (Abbott, 2011; Ringer, 2008; USDA, 2008), but directly or indirectly it aggravates existing socio-economic and environmental problems particularly pressure on water supply, daily water utilities, and many other unexpected challenges (Arnell, 2004; Morrison, Morikawa, Murphy, & Schulte, 2009, United Nations, 2009). As observed by Pimentel et al. (2004), to some extent these could have resulted from higher temperatures and reduced precipitation levels and could lead to shortages in available fresh water supply owing to reduced availability of surface water as well as slower recharge rates of groundwater. It should be noted that as the supply of fresh water is limited, both the world's population and the

demand keep increasing rapidly. Therefore, the implication of pressure on limited fresh resources will not only rest on the world urban poor but the rural population will continue to suffer. The implication will not exempt any part of Lagos State.

Over the past four decades, the provision of improved and adequate water to the continuous increasing population of Lagos State residents (both rural, suburban, and urban) has been a big challenge that should not be underestimated if adequate improved water is to be secured. Historically, the Lagos Water Corporation (LWC) formerly known as the Federal Water Supply (under the federal government) constructed the Iju Waterworks in 1910 with the production capacity of 9,161 m<sup>3</sup>/d. Iju waterworks undergone series of expansion stages between 1910 and 1985. It was upgraded to 41,640 m<sup>3</sup>/d in 1954, 132,489 m<sup>3</sup>/d in 1973, and 170,344 m<sup>3</sup>/d in 1985 (Olaosebikan, 1999; LWC, 2016). In order to meet the water demand of increasing population of Lagos State which increased from 1.4 million to over 5.7 million between 1963 and 1991, the Ishashi and Adiyaan Waterworks were constructed in 1976 and 1992 with production capacities of 15,142 m<sup>3</sup>/d and 264,979 m<sup>3</sup>/d, respectively (Olaosebikan, 1999; LWC, 2016). In addition to these three major waterworks, 48 mini/micro waterworks with production capacities of 344,473 m<sup>3</sup>/d had been installed across 20 Local Government Areas (LGAs) in order to boost safe water supply for the rapid growing population of the State (Ayeni, 2015; Fasona, Omojola, Odunuga, Tejuoso, & Amogu, 2005; Gideon, 2014; Olaosebikan, 1999; LWC, 2009, 2015, 2016). Nonetheless, there is still wide gap between water demand and water supply in Lagos State.


Various studies have been carried out to address the water supply issues in Lagos State at different times with different objectives (Ayeni, 2015; Fasona et al., 2005; Gideon, 2014; Olaosebikan, 1999; & LWC, 2009). For instance, the study by Ayeni (2015) focused on the challenges of water supply in urban Lagos under increasing climatic variability between 1963 and 2006. It was observed that the preference of climatic variabilities used in the study as the major controlling factors in the future water demand and supply is subjective and therefore could not be used to justify water supply situation in the near future as projected. This therefore, forms the gap that this study anticipates to address. Consequently, this study aims to examine rapid urbanization, increasing population, and climatic variabilities in Lagos State between 1960 and 2015. This is very germane in examining the challenges facing improved water supply in mega city such as Lagos State, Nigeria. This study also underscores the concerted and integrated efforts of Lagos State government over periods of 55 years in safe water provision and various hardships faced by Lagos State water corporation. The paper finally discusses the various future implications posed by rapid urbanization and increasing population to water supply in the face of changing climatic variables in Lagos State.

## **The Study Area**

Lagos State is the smallest state and formal capital of Nigeria. It is located along the narrow coastal plain of the Bight of Benin on longitude 2<sup>o</sup>42'E and 3<sup>o</sup>22'E and Latitude 6<sup>o</sup>22'N and 6<sup>o</sup>42'N (Fig. 1). The state has a total area of about 3,577 square kilometers including water bodies and bounded to the north and east by Ogun State,

and bounded to the south and west by the Coast of the Atlantic Ocean and the Republic of Benin, respectively. The dominant vegetation of Lagos State is the tropical swamp forest consisting of fresh water and mangrove swamp forests. These two sub vegetation types are influenced by the double rainfall pattern. The annual rainfall of the state generally ranges between 1400 millimeters and 1800 millimeters with a short August break. Two climatic seasons vis-à-vis the dry season (from November to March) and the wet season (from April to October) dominate the state. The air temperature is averagely high and ranges between 30° Celsius and 38° Celsius (Daejeon, 2004; Louche & Keep, 2002). The major water bodies are the Lagos and Lekki Lagoons, and the Yewa and Ogun Rivers. Others are Ologe Lagoon, Kuramo Waters, Badagry, Five Cowries, and Owu. Politically, Lagos State is divided into 20 local government areas (LGAs) with 16 LGAs in the metropolitan area while the remaining four are recognized as sub-urban LGAs (Table 1). The state had a population of about 9.01 million in 2006, which accounted for 6.44% of the Nigeria total population figure 140.003 million in the 2006 Census (NBS, 2007). However, the UN study and the State Regional Master Plan estimated the population of Lagos State to be about 12 million as at 2006 (Fulani, 2012).

**Figure 1: The Study Area**



Source: Compiled by author

**Table 1: The Twenty Local Government Areas of Lagos State, 2006**

LGAs	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	2006 Census Figure
Agege	11	459,939
Alimosho	185	1,277,714
Ifako-Ijaiye	27	427,878
Ikeja	46	313,196
Kosofe	81	665,393
Mushin	17	633,009
Oshodi/Isolo	45	621,509
Shomolu	12	402,673
Apapa	27	217,362
Eti-Osa	192	287,785
Lagos Island	9	209,437
Lagos Mainland	19	317,720
Surulere	23	503,975
Ajeromi/Ifelodun	12	684,105
Amuwo/Odofin	135	318,166
Ojo	158	598,071
Badagry	441	241,093
Ikorodu	394	535,619
Ibeju-Lekki	455	117,481
Epe	1,185	181,409
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,474</b>	<b>9,019,534</b>

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, 2007.

## Methodology

The population baseline data used for this research were based on provisional census data of 1963, 1973, 1991, and 2006. The data were collected from the National Bureau of Statistics, Abuja-Nigeria. Information on water production, demand, and supply for this study were gleaned from the Nigerian Bureau of statistics (NBS), Lagos State Water Corporation reports of different years (LBS, 2010; Olaosebikan, 1999; LWC, 2008; Olukoju, 2003; Oteri & Ayeni, 2014) and other literature related to Lagos state water supply and demand. Using population projection, the data for 1963, 1973, 1991, 2006 were projected appropriately for the subsequent years till 2015 based on each census annual growth rate. For 20 years

(2036) projection from 2016, the 2006 figure growth rate was used. The projection was based on the below formula:

$$PO = Pa (1 + r)^n,$$

where:

*PO* is the projection

*Pa* is the actual population to be projected

*r* defined as  $\frac{\text{Growth rate}}{100}$

*n* is the number of year

The land-use/land-cover (LULC) classification for urbanization assessment for this study were based on imageries from Landsat MSS, TM, NigeriaSat-1, and Landsat ETM+ for 1975, 1995, 2007, and 2015, respectively. The classified maps of 1976, 1995, and 2007 were sourced from the work carried out by SEDEC Associates (2008). Using ENVI version 5.3, the standard procedures for LULC classification (Ayeni, Cho, Mathieu, & Adegoke, 2016; Chander, Markham, & Helder, 2009; de Vries, Danaher, Denham, Scarth, & Phinn, 2007 ) was adopted for 2015 land use analysis.

Based on the scope of this study, monthly temperature and rainfall for 55 years (1960 to 2015) were collected and used for climatic finding. The data which were originally generated from the three synoptic stations in Lagos (Ikeja, Island, and Oshodi) on a daily basis were collected from the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NIMET), Oshodi, Lagos, Nigeria. For trend analysis and a 20-year projection of climatic and water variables, linear regression analysis was adopted using the formula:

$$y = a + bx$$

where:

*y* is the dependent variable

*x* is the independent variable

*a* is the intercept (i.e. value of when  $x = 0$ )

*b* is the slope

The rainfall and temperature projection of Building Nigeria's Response to Climate Change Project (BNRCC) (2011) for Lagos State up to year 2046–2065 (Oteri & Ayeni, 2014) was used for this study. It should be noted that the projections baseline data were in line with the climatic data used for this study.

## Findings and Discussions

### Population

The population rose from about 1.44 million in 1963 to about 9.2 million in 2006 and to 12.3 million in 2015 (projected based on 3.4% growth rate) representing an increase of about 754% within 55 years, i.e., between 1960 and 2015 (Table 2).

Contrary to this projection, the United Nations noted that Lagos is one of the fastest growing mega cities in the world and as a result estimated 23.2 million people to be in Lagos State for 2015 (United Nations, 1999). As compared to other mega cities in the world, the growth rate of 3.7% between 2000 and 2015 was the highest and has continue to contribute to rapid population growth (Oteri & Ayeni, 2014). The rapid population growth is the major factor responsible for the urban expansion and the associated pressure on different land use as well as pressure on available water resources.

**Table 2: Population trends in Lagos State for census years and 2015 projection**

Year	Population (Census & Projected)	Remarks
1963	1,440,000	Census
1973	2,470,000	Census
1991	5,725,116	Census
2006	9,013,534	Census
2015	12,343,176	Projection

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, 1963-2007.

As shown in Figures 6 and 7, there is an increase in both temperature and rainfall trends between 1960 and 2015. Observations from previous studies confirm the increase in temperature and evidence of urban thermal discomfort in Lagos in the last few decades due various urbanization characteristics including high traffic, housing congestions, and industrial activities as well as the level of heat stress (Abotutu & Ojeh, 2013; Ayeni, 2015; Oluwafemi, Akande, & Adebamowo, 2010; Sawka & Montain, 2001; Sangowawa, Adebamowo, & Godwin, 2008). The consistent increase in temperature since 1999, increased in population and rapid urbanization have been noted to be responsible for a wider gap between water demand and supply in recent years (Akinrotimi, Abu, & Aranyo, 2011; Economist Intelligence Unit and GlobeScan (2007); Mirkin, 2010).

### **Urbanization and Land Use Assessment.**

Studies have revealed that water challenges in most world's urban centers are accompanied with population growth and rapid urbanization (Tackle, McGranahan, & Satterthwaite, 2015). Lagos State is not an exception, and it could not be over emphasized as most of land use types have experienced changes in terms of area expansion. Though the changes which is meant to improve the living standard of the population and strengthening urban Central Business Districts (CBDs) is not rather intensifying urban water supply problems. The data on land use show that the urban land use/built up area increased from 230.8km<sup>2</sup> in 1976 to 805.4km<sup>2</sup> in 2015 (Table 3, Figures 2 through 5). This represents an increase of about 249% in 39 years. This could be attributed to intensive residential built-up since Lagos State encourages individual building mostly developed for residential and commercial

purposes. Most of these buildings are bungalows particularly in the suburban and rural areas. Patches of high rise building are only conspicuous in few places in the metropolitan Lagos. If this trend continues, urban slum is expected to increase while there will be serious congestion in the suburban areas of Lagos State vis-à-vis Badagry, Epe, Ibeju-Lekki, and Ikorodu areas. As a result, both metropolitan and suburban areas will be more vulnerable to environmental hazards, e.g., flooding if proper adherence to land use acts/regulations is not enforced.

**Table 3: Urban Land-use Change in Lagos between 1976 and 2015**

Land use	1976 (km <sup>2</sup> )	%	1995 (km <sup>2</sup> )	%	2007 (km <sup>2</sup> )	%	2015 (km <sup>2</sup> )	%
Agriculture	1138.4	31.5	903.9	24.9	86.4	2.4	164.8	4.6
Forest	232.0	6.4	6.0	0.2	501.2	14.2	271.0	7.6
<b>Urban</b>	<b>230.8</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>583.2</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>620.3</b>	<b>17.6</b>	<b>805.4</b>	<b>22.6</b>
Water	743.4	20.6	824.0	22.7	1033.8	29.3	980.9	27.6
Wetlands	1268.7	35.1	1290.6	35.5	1221.8	34.6	1168.1	32.86
Others	-	-	24.9	0.6	69.6	2.0	169.6	4.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>3613.3</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3632.6</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3533.06</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3533.06</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: SEDEC Associates, 2008; Other years by author.


### Climatic Factors

The years 1986 and 2006 recorded the minimum and maximum temperature of 20.71<sup>0</sup> Celsius and 32.02<sup>0</sup> Celsius, respectively with the average annual temperature of 29.55<sup>0</sup> Celsius for the studied 55 years (Figure 6). The 55-year trend shows a slight increase of 0.0508<sup>0</sup> Celsius. The increase could be attributed to the variation in emissions particularly urban heat from urban congestion and industries as well as high volume of vehicular and generator emissions. On the other hand, the 55-year rainfall records revealed that years 1998 and 2014 recorded the minimum and maximum rainfall of 69.89 millimeter and 227.43 millimeter, respectively with the average annual rainfall of 141.36 for the studied 55 years (Figure 7). The 55-year rainfall trend indicates an insignificant increase of 0.0159 millimeter between 1960 and 2015.

BNRCC (2011) projection adopted for this study revealed a 2° Celsius rise in temperature in the 2046 to 2065 while increase in rainfall will about 2 millimeters in monthly rainfall in the 2046 to 2065. This means that significant population of Lagos State will be affected if the quantity and quality of water and/or its accessibility change as a result of climate change.




**Figure 2: Lagos State Land Use, 1976**




Source: SEDEC Associates, 2008

**Figure 3: Lagos State Land Use, 1995**




Source: SEDEC Associates, 2008

**Figure 4: Lagos State Land Use, 2007**




Source: SEDEC Associates, 2008


**Figure 5: Lagos State Land Use, 2015**



Source: by author, 2016

**Figure 6: Average Annual Temperature (°C)**

Source: Figure developed by author.

**Figure 7: Average Annual Rainfall (mm)**

Source: Figure developed by author.

## Water Supply and Demand

Using census data of 1963 and per capita water demand at different times as baseline information for water demand, the study reveals that the estimated water demand increased from about 172,088m<sup>3</sup>/d to about 2,392,792m<sup>3</sup>/d in 1963 and 2015, respectively indicating an increase of about 1290.5%. Based on the information from Lagos Water Corporation (2008) and Lagos Bureau of Statistics (2010), safe water supply rose from about 97,377m<sup>3</sup>/d in 1963 to about 712,900m<sup>3</sup>/d in 2006 (Table 4), which indicate an increase of 632.1%. As at 2015, the production from all water production sources (both surface and groundwater) was about 39% of the

total water demand in the State. This translates to an estimate of about 930,531m<sup>3</sup>/d representing percentages of increase of 855.6% and 30.5% from 1963 and 2006, respectively (Table 4).

**Table 4: Population and Water Supply and Demand Trends in Lagos State**

Year	Population (Census & Projected)	Water Supply (m <sup>3</sup> /d)	Water Demand (m <sup>3</sup> /d)
1960	364,000	-	43,500
1963	1,440,000 [C]	97,377	172,088
1973	2,470,000 [C]	159,000	-
1991	5,725,116 [C]	241,500	-
2006	9,013,534 [C]	712,900	1,747,324
2015	12,343,176	930,531	2,392,792

Sources: LBS, 2010; Olaosebikan, 1999; LWC, 2008; National Bureau of Statistics, 1960-2007; Olukoju, 2003. Note: [C] = Census figures.

On the whole, the three major water sources vis-à-vis the Adiyán, Iju, and Ishashi rivers account for about 47.6% of the total water production distributed across Lagos with production capacities of 264,979 m<sup>3</sup>/d, 170,343 m<sup>3</sup>/d, 15,142 m<sup>3</sup>/d from Adiyán, Iju, and Ishashi water works, respectively (LWC, 2015, 2016). The rest of the water is being sourced from 48 mini/micro water works through boreholes distributed around 20 LGAs in the state and contribute about 344,473m<sup>3</sup>/d (Fasona et al., 2005; Gideon, 2014; LWC, 2015, 2016). In addition, majority of residents also rely on other sources provided by an informal private water sector and vendors (Gideon, 2014). These other sources include the commercial water tankers, the *mairuwas* (the Migrant Hausa water vendors), commercial boreholes and wells (popularly known as *Konga dero*), and sachet water (popularly known as *pure water*).

It is important to note that the overstretched of the potential of Iju production and distribution plant as a result of continuous/rapid population growth and the growth of the industrial and commercial sectors influx in Lagos in the 1970s resulted into the continuous constructions of additional water works since 1977 (Olaosebikan, 1999). These water works/plants include Ishashi (1977) and Adiyán (1992), and several mini/micro water works between 1991 and till date (Lagos State Government, 1987; LWC, 2015).

### The Nexus and Expected Future Implications

Studies have revealed that population, urbanization, and climatic variables have direct and indirect links with water demand and supply. Increase in population and

urbanisation require increasing volumes of water to be extracted from source and transported to point of use (Hunt and Watkiss, 2011; Buytaert and De Bièvre (2012). Population growth is a major contributor to water scarcity and limits the amount of water available per person, drives people into regions (e.g. cities) which are already water stressed (Mogelgaard, 2011). As the population of people living on earth continue to increase and grow, the demand for water mounts and exacerbates pressure on finite water resources, and consequently mounting demand and competition on water for domestic, industrial, agricultural etc (United Nations, 2007; Mogelgaard, 2011). Continuous urban growth increases water pollution as rain water picks up heavy metals, toxic anthropogenic substances, chemicals and other waste materials and discharge them in large, concentrated amounts into nearby water sources, such as a river, stream, lake, pond etc. (Bhatta, 2010; McDonald, 2011) and consequently, subjected the available water sources to pollution and/or contamination. On the other hand, it is obvious that increases in temperature will lead to increased evapotranspiration and therefore less runoff and recharge of groundwater resources while increase and/or prolonged rainfall produces very large volumes of surface water which can easily overwhelm drainage system, and could therefore result to flooding risks in urban centres (Pimentel et al., 2004; Hunt and Watkiss, 2011). Water supply abstraction and treatment plants located beside rivers may be the first objects of infrastructure to be affected by floods and may therefore intensify water shortages in the affected area (IPCC 2007; Satterthwaite, 2008).

Estimates suggest that as a result of increase in population, more people will be living in the urban city centers particularly the megacities and fewer people will be in rural areas by 2025 (UNESA, 2014; UNFPA, UNISDR, & ONU-Habitat, 2014). As stated in UNFPA, UNISDR, and ONU-Habitat (2014) report, it is therefore very germane to plan adequately for this growing population over the next 15 years as changes in the spatial distribution of population will pose a great challenge on policy and sustainable development in cities' infrastructures particularly water supply infrastructure due to a narrow error margin of a population projection over a 5- to 10-years scenario. This will maximize impacts on available water production and demand in the near future as its lies in the relative inertia of what is available today.

In spite the effort of Lagos State to efficiently and effectively improved water demand of ever-increasing population, various factors still significantly responsible for the wide gap between water supply and demand in the State. Since the supply capacity of Lagos State from all sources can only meet about 39% of the total water demand, the potential water supply is put at 930,531 m<sup>3</sup>/d in 2015 as against actual water demand of 2,392,792m<sup>3</sup>/d accounting for a demand gap of 1,462,261 m<sup>3</sup>/d. In other to improve the water supply system and provide pipe borne water for every citizen in the state, the Lagos State Water Corporation inaugurates three master plan phases via-a-vis short term, medium term, and long term (LWC, 2016). The short term phase was a plan designed to be achieved between 2010 and 2013 while the medium term and long term was set to achieve effective water production that will address the demand gap of 2014-2017 and 2018-2020, respectively (LWC, 2016). To meet the projected water demand of 2,774,707m<sup>3</sup>/d for the Lagos megacity in

2020 the state will strive to achieve the projected production capacity of 2,820,132m<sup>3</sup>/d based on LWC, 2010 estimated 136.2lcpd (Gideon, 2014; LWC, 2016).

Aside from the continuous increase in population, more concerns are that industrialization and urban agriculture activities are also growing rapidly with existing poor water infrastructures in the state. Though some old water pipes are recently replaced in some areas of metropolitan Lagos, but the major problem lies in the suburban areas where water infrastructure layout is virtually absent or inadequate. Improved water supply target may not likely be met in the future if this is not well addressed soon. Presently, about 55% population of the Lagos rural and suburban areas mainly depend on shallow wells for their domestic water. In addition, unsafe surface waters like ponds, springs, and lagoons are the major sources of domestic water of some rural areas of Badagry, Epe, Ibeju-Lekki, and Ikorodu LGAs. The location of the state is another factor that cannot be overemphasized. The state is located on a complex interlock of lagoons and creeks that cause albedo to increase as one moves towards city island (Haider, 1997). This may also result to high evaporation and evapotranspiration rate in the city (Appah-Dankyi & Koranteng, 2012). Excessive heat may therefore cause the daily body fluid requirements to be varied from two liters per day to 16 liters per day depending on the locations and the nature of urban characteristics (Gisolfi, 1993). The implication of this is that people may likely subjected to profuse sweating that can cause high rate of water consumption to avoid dehydration. Without a doubt and if this situation continues, water shortage will become more severe in the future as increase in population will result to more water consumption; there will more pressure on available water sources, deterioration of public water infrastructure, and poor management in the water supply sector as well as an increase in vandalization and illegal connection. More so, more people will be “water poor” (i.e., the water poverty index will likely decrease below 25 in 2026). Furthermore, the percentage of residents that were not connected to public pipe borne water in Lagos State was about 55% in 2008 (Ohwo and Abotutu, 2014) and this is likely to go beyond 65% in the near future if water borne pipe lines are not extended to most part of rural and suburban areas. In order to address this sustainably, the wide gap between water supply and demand in Lagos State needs to be bridged. For instance, the population of Lagos State is estimated to reach 19.8 million in 2026 and correspondingly, improved water demand is expected to increase to about 3,213,058m<sup>3</sup>/d. In order to meet this expected demand, Lagos State will need between US \$1.8 billion and \$5.2 billion (Vanguard, 2004; Environmental Rights Action, 2016). For Lagos State to achieve this, private sector involvement will be required through injection of more capital to improve the efficiency of existing state-owned water asset (Premium Times, 2016).

## **Conclusion and Suggestions**

There is no doubt that the rapid urbanization and population growth in Lagos State has had a great impact on water supply patterns. This portends the dangerous trend that pressure on water will pose on population growth and the changing

functionality of Lagos State in the near future. In addition, climate change is becoming more threatening to the natural environment and socioeconomic activities of Lagos State. It should be noted that such changes can intensify the problem facing improved water provision and supply in regions with rapid urbanization and increasing population.

There is an urgent need for effective policy formulation in the State to strengthen and train planners and related professionals in the modern techniques of improving water resources such as efficient waste water management and water harvesting as well as effective management and control of the available water resources infrastructure. Various options for increasing water supply and capacity as well as reducing greenhouse gas emissions will have to be adopted. More water supply infrastructure should be planned and developed for future generations. This can be achieved by developing a highly efficient water supply scheme, encouragement of community water development, and management strategies that will take cognizance of the increasing variability in the climatic conditions of the state. Also, strategies to protect and restore threatened natural resources should be established and global laws that protect them should also be enforced in Lagos State.

Furthermore, in as much the driving forces of future urbanization is still the demographic changes, economic growth, and technological development, and therefore, land use change, urban sprawl and land conversion will be inevitable in Lagos State. As a result, gradual land use change should be enforced and well guided in various developmental activities and properly monitored by the monitoring agencies involved.

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# **Ethnicity, Religion, and Violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

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## **Abstract**

The violence that erupted in the Balkans at the end of the second millennium made fierce enemies of people who had lived together in peace as neighbors, friends, classmates, and married couples. Nationalism, chauvinism, and religious fanaticism quickly grew stronger, leading to the disappearance of centuries-long harmony among its inhabitants. Among the reasons for the conflict were the experienced communist leaders who skillfully used religious slogans to advance their campaigns; also, religious leaders became close associates to political leaders with hopes that they would attain the religious rights denied and limited during the old governance. As a result, nationalism and resilient religious identities appeared as important elements of rhetoric of public figures. The last century ended with the dark events of two world wars and the Balkans as a center of ethnic and religious armed conflicts. The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the first major, post-Cold War-era test of the international community's ability to resolve ethnic conflicts. Its efforts were not effective in preventing a catastrophic war and establishing conditions for stable, long-term peace and stability once the war ended. As a result, Bosnia-Herzegovina has remained troubled by the contradiction between integration and partition. The tension between communities is still evident and powerful. Interfaith relations are also delicate. Memories of the war are still fresh, people have war traumas, and there is a fear that another war could break out anytime.

## **Introduction**

“Communism is dead! Long live nationalism!” were the calls of the end of the 20th century. The contemporary Balkan conflicts, with their knot of ethnic, territorial, demographic, historical, and religious problems have surpassed positive hopes of what should have been a post-communist era. The region has endured a series of ethnic and religious-based hostilities and conflicts, including the largest and

bloodiest military clash in Europe since World War II (Friedman, 1996, p. 1). Therefore, in discussing the fruits of globalization, it is also important to underline wars and organized violence that occurred last century (Alexander, 2012, p. 159).

Violence of a nature very similar to that which is explored in this paper has unfortunately persisted into the present century. Brutal conflicts such as those in Syria and Iraq—often among people who share many values—continue to cast a dark and disturbing pall over modern human history. Such violence has not only resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians and derailed efforts to bring peace and stability to the region, but also resulted in millions of refugees, forced to leave their ancestral homes in order to survive. This, in turn has led to political and economic strife among many European nations conflicted between protecting their borders and helping those displaced and marginalized by war and violence.

The focus of this paper will be religion, violence, and traumas in the last war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Balkans. I will discuss the relationship between religion and politics and the devastation that resulted from political rhetoric. I will also discuss the concept of victimization connected to centuries-old history as a tool to motivate masses and increase awareness of their national and religious identity. Nationalism and religious fundamentalism, very much related to the violence in the region, will also be discussed. I also will debate the role of media in gaining the support of masses and also in manipulating them. Ethnic cleansing, civilian casualties, and war disturbances are also part of the discussion.

The Balkans are at the crossroads of world civilizations, between Eastern and Western Christianity, between Latin and Byzantine cultures, between the remnants of the Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires, and between Christian Europe and Islamic Asia (Appleby, 2000, p. 64). Hence, the region's societies and cultures have been shaped and intertwined for centuries by Christian and Muslim empires and civilizations (Appleby, 2000, p. 68). Also, the importance of the region reminds us of the events that took place in Bosnia in 1914 that led to the beginning of the First World War. It was in Sarajevo that Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, triggering the Great War.

To better understand the multiculturalism of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is necessary to note that the Bosnian Muslims are the only people in Europe, and possibly the world, who are nominally identified by their religion and not their language or ethnicity. Most are Slavs<sup>1</sup> converted during the five centuries of Ottoman rule in Bosnia (Glenny, 1992, p. 139). In this case, ethnicity and religion appear to be the indicators of the cultural identity by which social and political interests were defined (Appleby, 2000, p. 59). But it also shows that religion was the most important factor of national and ethnic identification shown during the hostilities (Appleby, 2000, p. 63). The social constructions of national identity are not unanimous and are subject to disagreements and discussions (Giesen, 2004b, p. 110), but for Bosnian Muslims, Islam was a basis for national identity (Appleby, 2000, p. 66).

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<sup>1</sup> In recent times, there are some voices that challenge this idea and say that Bosnian Muslims are in fact the descendants of ancient Illyrians and are not Slavic people.

## **Fundamentalism, Ethnicity, and War Trauma**

Understanding the real reasons of violence might not be easy to explain. Perhaps people see in others some kind of abyss in which they stand (Taylor, 2002, p. 34) and they may also feel some kind of threat that motivates them to action. Feeling threatened prompts protection, which then leads to certain actions. Vamik Volkan describes the situations when one group feels threatened and senses the danger:

In our routine lives we are more concerned with subgroups under the tent: families or professional organizations, for example. Our relationship with our large-group identity, in ordinary times, is like breathing. While we breathe constantly, we do not usually notice it unless our ability to breathe is threatened, such as if we are caught in a smoke-filled house on fire. When the large-group identity is threatened, people under the metaphorical tent become like the people who are caught in a smoke-filled room. They become constantly aware of their large-group identities and become preoccupied with its protection and maintenance, even if this preoccupation leads to destructive acts. (Volkan, 2009, p. 140)

Ethnic identity is often seen as a reason for violence and is regarded as essential for a collective action (Eder, Giesen, Schmidtke, & Tambini, 2002, p. 38). People with strong national feelings describe their own communities as eternally given some indisputable rights (Eder et al., 2002, p. 43). Such feelings not only separate them from others, but also can lead them to see themselves as elevated above the others. Some of these ethnic groups hold a shared religion, and it is difficult to discuss religion without including ethnic identity. Therefore, ethnonationalists can be seen as a resolute category of people in both their ethnic and religious objectives. Believing that religion gives them a sacred legitimacy to their pursuits, ethnonationalists find justifications for promoting violence against others (Appleby, 2000, pp. 60-62).

But in some places, group identity primarily is defined either by religion or by ethnicity (Volkan, 2009, p. 140). Language is seen as the main carrier of group virtuosity, and when there is opposition to compromise to linguistic assimilation, conflict can result (Eder et al., 2002, p. 42). Many believe that religion has been the major reason for ethnic conflict in recent times. For example, conflicts in Bosnia, Palestine, and Northern Ireland have been described as religious, rather than mainly ethnic or national (Eder et al., 2002, p. 40).

These religiously motivated conflicts raise concerns among skeptics about religion itself: How can people believe in a good and omnipotent God with so much evil in the world (Taylor, 2002, pp. 52-53)? Seeing religion as a source of the violence, they argue for weakening the role of religion in society. However, some also argue that the strengthening of religious feelings in a more genuine way is what is necessary for a peaceful coexistence among members of different faiths (Appleby, 2000, p. 76). They argue that the decline of religion leads to the strengthening of ethnic ideologies that take the role of ethnic or civic religion, which leads to violence (Eder et al., 2002, p. 40). But the complexity about religion is: What are the boundaries, and who defines them?

People of certain ethnic identity will look to some religious indicators to unite (Taylor, 2002, 114-115), and religious language is the one around which they find it meaningful to arrange their moral and political experience (Taylor, 2002, p. 79). Therefore, religious differences can cause conflicts among ethnic groups with different religions (Eder et al., 2002, p. 41). Discussing religion in this context, Charles Taylor (2002) narrates the description of the religion made by William James:

The word “religion” as ordinarily used, is equivocal. A survey of history shows us that, as a rule, religious geniuses attract disciples, and produce groups of sympathizers. When these groups get strong enough to “organize” themselves, they become ecclesial institutions with corporate ambitions of their own. The spirit of politics and the lust of dogmatic rule are then apt to enter and to contaminate the originally innocent thing. (p. 6)

Religious values, in the extreme, can cause fundamentalism and zealotry, making people feel exceptional and superior. As a result, they start to build boundaries around themselves, embracing negative feelings and fear about people who live outside their borders (Volkan, 2009, p. 137). The survival, identity, and protection of the group become its primary preoccupations, and they can begin to feel entitled to hurt “others” and perceive them as a threat (Volkan, 2009, pp. 135-136). Being driven by fear or a sense of superiority, these groups create various hypotheses. When these assumptions become accepted theories without proper and adequate evidence, they can become moral precepts for life in general (Taylor, 2002, p. 44). And believing that they have a special relationship with the divine along with a stand to be apart from others may lead to violence particularly when “others” are perceived as threatening (Volkan, 2009, p. 125).

Although the term “*fundamentalism*” pertaining to religion was first used in the 1920s, the idea is almost as old as religion itself, for there have always been groups from different religions who exaggerated their religiosity (Volkan, 2009, p. 125). Volkan says that the mentality of these religious fundamentalists is preoccupied with keeping the opaque side of the light turned against the real world that is perceived as threatening and frustrating. They refuse to go between illusion and reality and attempt to keep illusion as their special reality (Volkan, 2009, p. 129). And they can be successful in motivating people since the most organized and socially sanctioned “*propaganda*” comes from religious organizations (Volkan, 2009, p. 130).

Beyond destruction and loss of innocent people, religious or ethnic conflicts create traumas in people’s memories and these traumas do not go easily from their memories. In defining trauma, Jeffrey Alexander asserts that trauma occurs when the traumatizing event interacts with human nature. Because people need security, order, and love, if something abruptly undermines these needs, people will be traumatized as a result (Alexander, 2004b, p. 3).

Bernhard Giesen (2004b) describes trauma in more detail:

Birth and death represent ultimate ruptures and breaks in the web of meaning that catches the object of the world. They are like black holes we are unable to



experience directly and to speak about—the unspeakable origin of our human existence. Sometimes, however, external forces invade violently and unexpectedly the personal realm of our existence and remind us suddenly of our mortality. Later on, after a period of latency, we remember this shocking intrusion again and again, we revive it in our dreams, we talk about it, etc. We call this ruminating memory a “trauma.” (p. 8)

Traumas are a part of the violence that are deeply entrenched in people’s hearts and memories. These are tragedies, and people redeem them by experiencing them; however, despite this redemption, they cannot get over it easily. Rather, to achieve redemption, they sometimes feel compelled to dramatize and experience again and again the feeling of the actual trauma itself (Alexander, 2004a, p. 227).

### **The Beginning of War in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

In the cold days of November 1989, after half a century of separation with the Iron Curtain, Europeans from the East and the West could look forward to building “the common European dream.” Rapidly, Eastern European nations left behind their old, monist political regimes and embraced democratic political systems. Liberty and democracy replaced suppression and totalitarianism. But at the same time, the communist bureaucracies throughout Eastern Europe were developing ways to adapt to the new conditions and preserve their privileges (Glenny, 2000, p. 635).

Since the French Revolution, the modern European nation-states tried to minimize the role of ethnicity by favoring political and juridical ties. But the concept of *ethnos* never disappeared (Eder et al., 2002, p. 55). The good example for this is Yugoslavia, which not only failed to solve problems of national identity based on communist ideals, but in fact worsened the problem. Yugoslavia, particularly after the death of Josip Broz Tito (1980), was not successful in keeping the national unity intact under its famous and widespread slogan of “Unity and Brotherhood” among its nations (Appleby, 2000, p. 59). Its populations sought to protect their national interests against other constitutive ethnicities of the country. Such transformational turmoil of the people gave rise to the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic (1941–2006), who reinvented himself as a chauvinist and a devotee of power (Glenny, 2000, p. 635).

Some argue that the main responsibility for the destruction of Yugoslavia lies particularly with the communist leadership that turned to mobilization of national chauvinism in order to create a popular base for their authoritarian rulings rather than face democratization, which became unavoidable in the late 1980s (Denitch, 1994, p. 185). And, since the mass media plays a crucial role in reaffirming the collective identity of communities (Eder et al., 2002, p. 74), these political actors used it effectively in order to mobilize the population for their own political aspirations. However, their nationalistic appetites had also the opposite effect. It generated fear in other nationalities who favored separation and independence from the Yugoslavian federation (Denitch, 1994, p. 185). Therefore, while communist leaders competed in the public arena for public legitimacy among their people,

issues raised by them became politicized (Eder et al., 2002, p. 90) and were seen as a threat by members of other ethnicities.

Yugoslavia could be considered a relatively new state since it first came into existence in 1918, after World War I. Initially, its name was the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; however, after World War II, it became a federation of many nations. The word “Yugoslavia” means “land of the South (Yugo) Slavs.” The central part of Yugoslavia, which is a case of this article, was populated by three major groups (Serbs, Muslims, and Croats), all of which spoke the same South Slavic language called Serbo-Croatian until recently (Sells, 1996, p. 5). It was famously said during Tito’s (1892-1980)<sup>2</sup> time that Yugoslavia had six republics, two autonomous regions,<sup>3</sup> five nations, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, and one party (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 26).

Since the religious extremists or nationalist demagogues create images of their people being victimized at some historical past by some “others” they can seek retribution. And a skilled politician can use such “victimization” feelings of the masses and abuse their emotive streams (Appleby, 2000, p. 69). There are many cases in which the religious marker is manipulated in order to mobilize people, and Milosevic provides one such example (Taylor, 2002, pp. 114-115). In 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the Serb defeat by the Turks at Kosovo, Milosevic went to the legendary battlefield and delivered an inflammatory and provocative speech before 1 million Serbs (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 26). That speech was a beginning of a new era that would eventually lead to an unreturned path for the future of the country leading to its destruction.

As the Serbian nationalistic feelings reached their peak after this speech, nationalism brought annihilation and grief to Yugoslav people. As George Orwell illustrates, a nationalist categorizes people and assumes that “whole blocks of millions can be confidently labeled ‘good’ or ‘bad’” (Elshtain, 1996, p. 51). A nationalist also insists that no other duty must be allowed to override or even challenge the duty to their society. Moreover, a nationalist expresses his need for more power, because he fears that others may have it more (Elshtain, 1996, p. 51). Therefore, Bosnia was not a simple Balkan anomaly, but an intense development of national breakdown under the leadership of political manipulation and misgovernment (Maass, 1996, p. 273).

As a result of the decline of old regime and being unable to maintain Serb-dominated Yugoslavia, Serb nationalists wanted to keep their dominance. Supported by the country’s military, their plan was also to integrate the Serb population living outside Serbia into a so-called greater Serbia. Croat nationalists also were trying to unite the Croat-majority areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a greater Croatia (Appleby, 2000, p. 67). Other nations’ populations were not as big as Serbs and Croats; therefore, their main objective was only acquiring independence and protecting their own integrity.

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<sup>2</sup> The ultimate leader and ruler of Yugoslavia after the end of the World War II until his death in 1980.

<sup>3</sup> Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics and two autonomous regions: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Before the war, some argued that Yugoslavia had been perhaps the most successful experiment in building a multinational and multicultural federation in Europe since World War II (Denitch, 1994, p. 1). But this successful testing was converted into the most dreadful actions of violence in post-war Europe. The country was drastically impoverished with a deteriorated economy. Tens of thousands of talented young people left the universities, institutes, and research centers in pursuit of better lives in different parts of Europe (Denitch, 1994, p. 193).

The construction of boundaries in most cases is linked to institutional domain that represents the public perspective (Giesen, 2004b, p. 11). The political institutions are required to act responsibly, and when this is not followed, ethnic conflicts can arise. Moreover, when these institutions favor and provide means for one group to articulate its demands (Eder et al., 2002, p. 49), it can lead other groups to distance themselves from and lose trust in these institutions. Hence, all units of the Yugoslavian federation desired to separate and reject being under the hegemony of others. Bosnia also sought the separation, and in October 1991, the European Community announced that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be granted recognition as an independent state once it had passed a referendum of its citizens (Glenny, 1992, p. 162).

Bosnians held a referendum between February 29 and March 1, 1992, and the majority voted for independence. On April 7, 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was officially recognized by the United States and most European Community countries. In May 1992, Bosnia was admitted as a full member of the United Nations. The war began in April 1992, when Serb forces crossed the Drina River<sup>4</sup> from Serbia and laid siege to the cities of Zvornik, Visegrad, and Foca. By mid-April, all the country was involved in war (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 129).

The Bosnian people did not want the war, and in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they conducted massive demonstrations against the war. But snipers opened fire on the crowd, killing many civilians, and in the following days, the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) units began to shell Sarajevo from hillside. The insensitivity of the shelling and sniping from the surrounding hills showed the courage of the Sarajevans under siege, who gained sympathy around the world for their determination to stay and live under constant attacks (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 133). This situation showed that the shared language of people of Bosnia-Herzegovina were not enough to overcome discrimination based on their religious differences (Appleby, 2000, p. 63).

The Yugoslav army had been the major aggressor in alliance with the leadership of Serbia (Denitch, 1994, p. 8). At the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the civil population did not have an organized structure for defense. Ordinary citizens, including some gangs, played an important role in its defense. Some say that Sarajevo's survival in the early days of the fighting was due to gangs and others who assumed responsibility for the resistance and defense of the city. Serb forces surrounding Sarajevo had little experience in urban warfare, while the groups that protected Sarajevo were in their element (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 138).

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<sup>4</sup> Drina is a river that divides Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

## **Violence and Collective Memory in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The animosity between Muslims and non-Muslims did not emerge during this particular war; as stated before, its roots date back to 1389 and the battle between the Ottomans and Christian armies in Kosovo. The Serbs, among others who fought the Ottomans, lost the war, and the spread of Islam in the Balkans began in the region. This victory also signified centuries long ruling of the Balkans by the Ottomans. In the latest war in Bosnia, Serb nationalists saw an opportunity for revenge they waited 600 years for. Serb nationalists used the martyrdom of the Serbian Prince Lazar at this battle as a central component of the ideology of “ethnic cleansing.” In their commemoration of this battle, Prince Lazar is portrayed as a Christ figure with disciples, one of whom is a traitor. The Turks were regarded as Christ-killers, and the Judas figure becomes the ancestral curse of all Slavic Muslims. This perception can also be seen from Miroslav Jevtic, an academic from Belgrade:

Because of this (the battle of Kosovo and the conversion of Bosnians to Islam), the hands of the Muslims who are with us are stained and polluted with the blood of their ancestors from among the inhabitants of Bosnia at that time, namely those who did not embrace Islam. (Sells, 1996, p. 24)

Thus, Bosnians feel prey to genocide-legitimizing propaganda that showed them as “race traitors and apostates” (Appleby, 2000, p. 79). As a result of the Serbian loss of the Battle of Kosovo, the sense of national domination and oppression, the sense of virtue in suffering and struggle, was deeply interwoven with the religious belief and loyalty. This creates a feeling of belonging to a group, and moral issues of the group’s history tend to be implied in religious categories (Taylor, 2002, p. 78). This shows that memory provides an important area for imagination and is an important way of creating a space in which people reflect upon and imagine their identity (Giesen, 2004b, p. 9).

Collective memory at once creates heroes and victims and remembers them as the triumphant or traumatic embodiment of collective identity (Giesen, 2004b, p. 10). But memory also can be linked with cultural traumas. Outlining a theory of cultural trauma, Alexander (2004b) highlights:

Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their identity in fundamental and irreversible ways. (p. 1)

The lost wars create a sense of anger, and the memories about the past guide visions about the future (Alexander, 2004b, p. 3). The social structures of collective identities are not unanimous, nor are the ways of remembering the past. They are prone to disagreements and debates; they vary based on life experiences and differ from generation to generation (Giesen, 2004a, p. 112). Remembering is associated with special places and times, and the collective identity is powerful within religious

communities that bring the people together for annual celebrations (Giesen, 2004b, p. 27). The nationalist myths emphasized the centuries-old war against the Ottoman Turks; Bosnians were transformed into the legendary Turkish enemy and made to pay for the years of Turkish dominance (Denitch, 1994, p. 184). Religion, therefore, was a very powerful force to motivate masses and break the long history of peaceful coexistence among the ethnically and linguistically identical Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims.

The ethnic identification can spread rapidly, capturing people in processes of which they may have very little understanding and no control (Eder et al., 2002, pp. 162-163). The mass media are effective in spreading the propaganda. The last century is full of examples of people who claimed in the media that they were damaged and traumatized by some ethnic or political groups that are commonly regarded as hostile “others” (Alexander, 2012, p. 13). Pictures and images in the media are particularly powerful, as repetition can turn images into icons (Giesen, 2004b, p. 104). The Serbian media played an important role in motivating the population against the Bosnian Muslims.

The importance of the public propaganda for influencing public identity is enormous and creates ways of constructing an institutional order (Eder et al., 2002, p. 133). Since the public communication is open to all, it offends some people and flatters others, and this can intentionally be planned to have such effects (Eder et al., 2002, pp. 105-106). Mobilizing the hesitant and undecided for a common cause is a principal goal of public propaganda. Sometimes this type of publicity takes the form of a crusade that appeals to supposed common ethical convictions among the members of one group (Eder et al., 2002, pp. 134).

Because national identity does not necessarily demand identification with the state only (Appleby, 2000, p. 59), and when threats from the outside world become excessive, people with religious conservatism may seek the company of others of the same faith (Volkan, 2009, p. 133). Hence, the impact of the war extends globally; people from various parts of the world come in order to help their “brothers in faith.” The waves of such activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina were also powerful and aided in weakening and damaging the fragile interfaith relations and deepening mistrust among people.

The international community was not very successful in stopping the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Politicians lectured that negotiations should continue, and special envoys and diplomats were sent to find solutions, but their efforts had no results. Bosnian people were caught up in a game that they couldn’t manage (Friedman, 1996, p. 225). In the turmoil following the Soviet Union’s collapse, the West was probably unable to commit the resources for an expansion sufficient to stop the war (Friedman, 1996, p. 225). But, if there had been a stronger determination to stop the war, the international community could have pursued alternative policies. Military threats, stricter sanctions, and even military actions could have effectively stopped the hostilities (Denitch, 1994, p. 195).

Bosnia’s president, Alija Izetbegovic, and his multinational government did everything in their power to avoid the war: they attempted to defuse potential areas of conflict; they refused to arm their people; they tried to act in accordance with the advice of the European Community (Bennett, 1995, p. 245). Moreover, the support

from the Muslim world was slow partially because some Muslim leaders viewed Bosnians as not good enough in their practice of Islam (Sells, 1996, p. 39).

The country was also filled with refugees who had fled their homes in war zones either by force or by fear of the consequences that they would face if they remained home. Bosnian Serbs enjoyed substantial military superiority as well as logistical and political support from Milosevic (Glenny, 2000, p. 644). Mass killings occurred in every occupied area; even when captives thought they were being released, they were often disabused of their hope. For example, on the Vlasic Mountain, groups of Bosnians who had been freed from the Trnopolje camp were stopped by Serb soldiers and murdered (Sells, 1996, p. 20). In the Banja Luka region, the site of the infamous concentration camps Omarska, Trnopolje, and Manjaca, Serbs sent eviction notices to non-Serbs, forcing Catholics and Muslims to sign forms stating that they agreed voluntarily to leave their homes. Those who hesitated to sign faced harsh consequences, including being killed (Appleby, 2000, p. 70).

Among the burned institutions was Sarajevo's Oriental Institute, which had one of the largest collections of manuscripts in the region; it was reported that thousands of irreplaceable manuscripts of Bosnia's history from the centuries of Ottoman rule were destroyed. Bosnia's National Library had more than 1 million volumes (Sells, 1996, p. 25). Art, manuscripts, and historical sites that had existed for centuries were destroyed. In many cities, the religious monuments of different faiths, built next to another as symbols of religious tolerance, were not spared (Sells, 1996, p. 25). In many places, the religious temples were leveled and turned into parking lots or parks. Legal documents of people who lived in these areas vanished as well (Sells, 1996, p. 3). Even hospitals were targets. The Kosevo Hospital, the biggest hospital in Sarajevo, was habitually bombed during visiting hours. One of Sarajevo's ironies became people saying you could be injured while visiting an injured friend at the hospital (Maass, 1996, p. 140). Kosevo Hospital became a symbol of resistance.

The situation of the refugees was depressing. Refugees had to walk days and nights in the cold mountains of the Balkans through mine fields, without food, alone in the wilderness. Peter Maass described one refugee camp in the city of Split in nearby Croatia. He said he was terrified by the story of a woman he met who came from Foca to Split with her two children, a daughter, seven, and a son, five. The distance between these two cities is only six hours' drive, but she had to walk 45 days to arrive to safety. She could walk only in evenings, under hidden cover, from one village to another, in order to find shelter (Maass, 1996, p. 4).

A short time after the war started, major towns in northwest Bosnia, once home to Muslim majorities, were devoid of Muslim populations. Many were killed, kept in concentration camps, or deported. The method of deportation was confirmed by Stojan Zupljanin, the police chief in Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina's second-largest city: he stated that they "arranged 'safe transportation'" for people who wanted to emigrate (Gutman, 1993, p. 37). With more than 1 million Bosnians left homeless, passenger trains full of deportees were waiting at the borders of the former Yugoslavia for willing host countries. According to eyewitnesses, the first

two trains, carrying thousands of deportees from the town of Kozarac, passed through Banja Luka (Gutman, 1993, p. 37).

On July 12, 1995, when Serbian forces took over the city of Srebrenica, which was under the protection of the United Nations, the Bosnian Serb general, as he entered the city, announced that he was “presenting this city to the Serbian people as a gift” (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 69). He added, “Finally, after the rebellion of the Dahijas [Serbian volunteers, brave soldiers] the time has come to take revenge on the Turks in this region” (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 69). Over the next week, the largest single mass murder in Europe since World War II took place (Holbrooke, 1998, p. 69). More than 8,000 Bosnian men were killed. All of this was done in a “safe area,” announced and protected by the UN. The rest of the city’s inhabitants, mostly women and children, were sent as refugees to other parts of Bosnia.

Witnesses to the violence have focused on individual cases in order somehow to touch people’s feelings and increase awareness about the war. A reporter noted that after the second Sarajevo market massacre on August 28, 1995, a Bosnian child turned to her mother, saying, “Mommy, I’ve lost my hand,” as her mother, herself significantly wounded, moaned, “Where is my husband? I’ve lost my husband” (Sells, 1996, p. 142-143). After the Serb army shelling of a Sarajevo suburb in 1992, a reporter wrote of a young boy found next to his dead mother, repeating, “Do you love me, Mommy” (Sells, 1996, p. 142). Also, after the Srebrenica shelling massacre of 1993, in which the Serb army opened fire on a group of civilians waiting to be evacuated by the UN, an official with the High Commission for Refugees told of a young girl who had half of her face blown away. He said her suffering was so intense that he could do nothing but pray that she would die soon, which she did (Sells, 1996, pp. 142-144).

Among those who were able to see and write about the war was journalist Peter Maass. He described the violence he witnessed as traumatic and tragic scenes of the war.<sup>5</sup> He recounted the city of Visegrad after its fall into Serbian hands, saying that all of the doors of the houses were open with their contents destroyed, dried blood splattered on the walls. Anything valuable had been demolished or taken. Maass also reported about the discussion he had with the executive mayor of the city, who denied ethnic cleansing, saying that the civil population left voluntarily (Maass, 1996, pp. 8-9).

Massacres were carried out in many locations, including the Drina River Bridge at Visegrad; the Drina Bridge at Foca; the stadium at Bratunac; and at schools, stadiums, and roadsides throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The famous Visegrad Drina Bridge,<sup>6</sup> built in the 16th century, was used for nightly killing “sport festivals.” After being tortured, victims were thrown off the bridge, and the captors

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<sup>5</sup> Peter Maass’s book on the conflict in Bosnia, *Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War*, was published in 1996 by Alfred A. Knopf, and a paperback edition was published in 1997 by Vintage. It won The Los Angeles Times Book Prize (for nonfiction) and the Overseas Press Club Book Prize, and was a finalist for several other literary awards.

<sup>6</sup> This bridge was also a title of the famous novel *The Bridge on the Drina* written by Ivo Andric (1892-1975), the winner of the Noble Prize in Literature in 1961.

tried to see if they could shoot them as they tumbled down into the Drina River (Sells, 1996, p. 26).

One of the most dreadful actions of the war was the rape of women. The acts of rape were committed systematically as a weapon to degrade women, some of whom were left pregnant and forced to carry and deliver their children. Among the victims were many teenage girls. Victims endured various abuses and psychological pressure to feel powerless in the hands of their rapists (Sells, 1996, p. 21). Rape occurred in public buildings and private houses behind closed doors; to increase the level of humiliation, also it happened in front of others (Gutman, 1993, p. 157).

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Hague was the first international tribunal since Nuremberg to prosecute those who violated human rights and committed war crimes in the Balkan wars (Alexander, 2012, p. 85). Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic, one of the accused, rejected any possibility that his army raped women. He claimed that such accusations were false, that rapes occurred on only a few occasions at the hands of lone maniacs. But many international institutions confirmed that rape had been pervasive (Gutman, 1993, p. 158). In March 2016, he was found guilty of genocide and war crimes against humanity and sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment.

There are no precise data on the displaced people, but estimates range between one-third and two-thirds of the total population. The number of people expelled from their homes in the Serb-occupied areas of Bosnia is usually placed between 700,000 and 1 million. According to an official study of the national health organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, every other citizen of the territory of the Bosnian Federation as of the end of 1994 was a refugee (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 171).

## **The End of the War and Instituting of Peace**

Three events showed the world the magnitude of the Bosnian crisis and its centrality to the growth of the international community's involvement in the conflict resolution: the bread line massacre of May 27, 1992; the Markale market massacre of February 5, 1994; and the second shelling of the Markale marketplace on August 28, 1995 (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 164). The death toll was 68 on the morning of Saturday, February 5, 1994, when a mortar exploded in the middle of Markale, the main outdoor market in Sarajevo, packed with people buying food (Glenny, 2000, p. 646). Media-generated pressure and the threat of a massive influx of refugees into Western Europe finally forced the international community to take on a more active role in the conflict (Bennett, 1995, p. 239).

The international community regarded Milosevic as the main reason for these atrocities. President Bill Clinton emphasized that the Balkan crisis could not be understood or tolerated as something inevitable based only on centuries-old enmities of its people. He highlighted that these murderous atrocities were "systematic slaughter," carried out by organized political and military power under Milosevic (Alexander, 2004a, p. 247). In 2001, when Milosevic was arrested and sent to the war crimes tribunal at the Hague, President George W. Bush recounted "chilling images of terrified women and children herded in trains, emaciated



prisoners interned behind barbed-wires, and mass graves unearthed by the United Nations investigators,” all traceable to Milosevic (Alexander, 2004a, p. 249).

While Yugoslavs were responsible for creating the conflict, the international attempts to halt the fighting were farcical (Bennett, 1995, p. 236). But with the threat of military deployment and the portrayal in the Western media of the deaths of tens of thousands innocent people as genocide finally pushed Serbia to participate in peace talks (Alexander, 2012, pp. 80-81). These atrocities were seen as contemporary forms of genocide and ethnic cleansing (Alexander, 2012, p. 151), collective victimization and icons of innocent suffering (Giesen, 2004b, p. 45). After more than three years of fighting, the leaders of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina signed the Dayton Peace Accords on November 21, 1995. Based on the Contact Group plan, which gave the Bosnian Federation 51% of territory and the Republika Srpska 49%, Dayton brought the fighting to an end. That was a significant achievement of the international community (Glenny, 2000, p. 651).

### Present and Future

The failure to prevent war does not belong solely to political institutions; the religious leadership of Yugoslavia did not take any active or preemptive role, and did not succeed in leading their own people toward nonviolent practices of religious activism. They were not successful in advocating values that religions share: peace, healing, and reconciliation. It cannot be assumed that this was because of their unwillingness; however, reasons could have included insufficient programs for education in emerging conditions; political ignorance; and limited experience in organized and institutional interfaith relations (Appleby, 2000, pp. 74-75).

As Volkan (2009) says, even during *ordinary times* when there is no imminent threat to one group's security, a religious organization can build psychological borders around themselves that separate them from others (p. 136). Probably this can describe the current situation among people in the Balkans. Although there is no imminent threat for clashes today, the tension between communities is powerful. Memories of the war are still fresh, and people fear that another war could break out anytime. Therefore, the role of political and religious leaders is crucial to ease these tensions and strengthen their relations. Communication is vital to such situations between people, particularly when religious convictions become elements that point to an enemy from outside of the community (Eder et al., 2002, p. 105).

Ethnoreligious conflicts increased after the world wars (Appleby, 2000, p. 58) and are marked with ethnic groups' requests for acknowledgment of their "nationhood," aspiring to establish political independence in order to secure their rights and values (Appleby, 2000, p. 59). The Balkans were at the center of the most violent ethnic and religious conflicts in Europe since World War II (Friedman, 1996, p. 1). Moreover, the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the first major, post-Cold War-era test of the international community's ability to resolve ethnic conflicts. Its efforts were not very successful in preventing the war and establishing peace and stability once the war ended. As a result, Bosnia has remained troubled

by the contradiction between integration and partition (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 388).

Obstacles remain for promoting the peace. Among the internal problems of the Balkans today is that people who are politically responsible for the violence are still in power. They not only deny their involvement in war crimes, but they accuse others of mass murder by transferring bodies of unidentifiable victims to the media. For example, although the atrocities in Srebrenica cannot be disregarded, the involvement of parties is still an issue of public debate and revision that need to be addressed (Giesen, 2004a, p. 150). There is hope, however, of the internal and international pressure to discredit and exclude wrongdoers among the influential and powerful people. Still, it's difficult to expose all the offenders, who hide behind a hypocritical façade (Eder et al., 2002, p. 135). Communities must admit that some of their own members were perpetrators who violated the principles of their own identity. Such reference to the past can be traumatic (Giesen, 2004a, p. 114), but facing it can open the path of reconciliation and peace.

Confession of guilt should not be seen as some kind of inconvenient and distressing responsibility of political rhetoric. On the contrary, it provides the only way of getting the recognition of national identity beyond reclaiming some rights and false justifications (Giesen, 2004b, p. 153). Alexander emphasizes an important issue, saying that today, East and West, North and South, must learn and share the experiences of one another's traumas and take vicarious responsibility for others' afflictions (Alexander, 2004a, p. 262).

Today, the modern moral order of mutual benefit and the ideals of fairness and mutual respect of each other's freedom are as strong among youth as they ever were (Taylor, 2002, p. 89). This makes us hopeful for a better future, not just in the Balkans, that we do not see innocent people suffer and go through traumas of warfare. But also we should be alert and take seriously any kind of political or religious rhetoric that can result in violence toward others. Ignoring these early signs and not dealing with them properly at the time of their emergence can make us blunder again, resulting in damaging religious and ethnic relations.

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# **From Revolution and Isolation to Cooperation: U.S.-Cuba Relations in the Context of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act**

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## **Abstract**

Since Cuba's independence in 1902, its relationship with the United States has been unsteady primarily because of Cuba's opposition to American hegemonic ambitions and designs, as exemplified by the 1934 Treaty of Relations and the 1902 Platt Amendment. The relations even worsened following Cuba's revolution in 1959 which swept Fidel Castro to power and resulted in Cuba's adoption of communist ideology and the nationalization of American owned businesses in 1961. In reaction to these hostile moves, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba as well as imposed a trade embargo. These developments however, pushed Cuba deeper into the Soviet orbit. This paper reviews events leading to and resulting from the passage of the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act.

## **Introduction**

Over the years, American foreign relations and policy have been characterized as shifting from periods and states of revolution and isolation to cooperation. These were the cases with respect to the United States' relations with the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam. The same is however unfolding in terms of U.S.-Cuba relations, where the situation has moved from a state of conflict to a new form of rapprochement. The Republic of Cuba is an island nation occupying an area of about 44,200 square miles. It is bounded in the north by the United States; in the south by Jamaica; in the east by Haiti; and in the west by Mexico—all across bodies of water. With its capital at Havana, the island state is ringed by the Caribbean Sea in the South; the Atlantic Ocean in the East, and the Gulf of Mexico in the west.

Following the victory of Fidel Castro's Cuban revolution in January 1959, the communist manifesto (Party platform), which formed the ideological underpinnings

of the failed revolutionary movements of 1933 and 1940 was resurrected. It should be noted that the 1940 constitution banned the commercial ownership of landed estates and also discouraged ownership of land in Cuba by foreign elements. In 1976, a new Cuban constitution was born under the tutelage of Fidel Castro. Castro, who installed a communist rule in Cuba, incorporated most of the ideological elements envisioned in the Cuban revolutionary document, the constitution of 1940. Since 1959, Cuba has remained a loyal ally of the Soviet Union. As its caretaker in the American hemisphere, Cuban oil supplies were subsidized by the Soviets until the end of the cold war in the early 1990s. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the 1990s, the price of oil rose dramatically. This forced Cuba to reexamine her economic policy. In 1993, Cuba adopted a new economic philosophy, dubbed “dollarization” complimented by an economic form of liberalism that encouraged foreign investment and decentralized state-owned companies.

One of the cornerstones of the 1976 constitution was repression of freedom for all those who opposed the revolution. Although Cuba remained in the Soviet orbit or sphere of influence, it consistently ran an independent foreign policy outside the control of the Kremlin. In other words, Cuba’s foreign policy was dictated by its national interest. This conclusion could be drawn by virtue of its membership and active participation in the nonaligned movement.

The history of U.S.-Cuba relations has been long and unsteady. It all began in 1898 at the end of the Spanish-American War, when vanquished Spain surrendered and signed over its rights to its colonial territory, Cuba, over to the United States. Thereafter, the United States granted independence to Cuba on the ground that it retained the right to intervene in the affairs of Cuba and the other possessions if necessary or when justified, and that it be granted perpetual lease on its naval base at Guantanamo Bay. It was not until the Cuban Revolution in January 1959 by Fidel Castro and his band of revolutionaries that overthrew the government of Fulgencio Batista, and suffered under the U.S.-imposed arms embargo of 1958 that the conditions deteriorated for the worse. But, reluctantly, the United States recognized the Castro regime anyway.

Regardless, Castro in 1960 pursued a new policy of seizing private land, and the nationalization of many private multinational companies most of which were local subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, and resulting in the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States. This deep economic and diplomatic isolation eventually pushed Cuba under Castro further into Soviet orbit and resulted in expanded trade with the Soviet Union.

Although U.S.-Cuban relations never ended, it rather took on low-intensity and covert life of its own with respect to attempts to undermine, overthrow, or even kill Castro. All these attempts reached their climax in the Bay of Pigs incident of April 1961, a failed attempt by the United States to overthrow Castro using armed Cuban rebels and exiles in an operation dubbed “Mongoose.” The consequence was that Castro immediately felt the need for a powerful ally, the Soviet Union that would help provide its urgently needed security.

The new Cuban-Soviet military and diplomatic intercourse soon resulted in the establishment of Soviet missile bases in Cuba and leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. The danger and threat posed by Soviet military presence in

the hemisphere led President Kennedy to impose a naval blockade of Cuba in order to prevent further Soviet shipment of offensive military weapons to the island nation. The brinkmanship between Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union and Kennedy ended when Nikita Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy's secret proposal to remove U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for American assurances that it would not invade Cuba. It is worth noting that in 1962, American Jupiter missiles were stationed in Turkey, which was well in Soviet sphere of influence. Through this "linkage" political strategy, the Soviet Union achieved a proportionate response to the missiles in Turkey while at the same time making the United States be more accommodating and flexible on other bilateral and global concerns such as the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

Another explosive issue in the U.S.-Cuba relations came in April 1980 resulting from a near-collapse of Cuban economy. Thousands of dissatisfied Cubans in search of political freedom and jobs sought political asylum in the United States. Castro on the other hand, used the opportunity of the mass emigration to empty its jails filled with criminal inmates and mental- hospital patients. Cuba also adopted a lukewarm policy attitude to the plight of those who wanted to leave the Island and migrate to the United States. In this massive effort known as "Mariel Harbor Boatlift", thousands of Cubans made their way in a mass flotilla to Miami, Florida, causing great anxiety among the American populace whose jobs were up for grabs. Deafening calls then arose in United States Congress to punish Cuba for creating a refugee problem.

The incident in February 1996 resulted in the downing of two U.S. civilian "Brothers to the Rescue" aircraft accused of dropping leaflets over Cuban territory and violating Cuba's airspace was the trigger that resulted in the imposition of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996. The account by Crossette (1996) showed that Cuba claimed that the incident that resulted in the downing of 2 aircraft occurred 9 nautical miles outside Cuban airspace. Another report by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) concluded that the authorities in Cuba had earlier notified U.S. authorities of multiple violations of its airspace by the "Brothers to the Rescue" group in the previous year; and that as a follow-up to their complaints, U.S. authorities had issued public statements advising and warning the group of the potential dangers and consequences of their unauthorized entry into Cuban airspace in violation of Cuba's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Another issue of contention between the United States and Cuba involved Elian Gonzalez who was sent back to his father in Cuba from Miami against the will of his mother and the Cuban community. Gonzalez, in the company of his mother and stepfather, had tried to escape to the United States; and were rescued by U.S. Coast Guard when their boat capsized. Elian was ordered by U.S. courts to rejoin his father in Cuba after many protracted court battles to effect his stay in the United States.

In this paper, the Helms-Burton Act and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act will be used interchangeably. The purposes of the paper are as follows:

- a. Examine the nature of Cuban-American relations from Cuban independence through the Cold War to the present.

- b. Explore the events leading to the passage of Helms-Burton Act of 1996, also known as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.
- c. Analyze the provisions of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996.
- d. Discuss the attitudes of subsequent U.S. administrations toward the Act.
- e. Predict the future of U.S.-Cuba relations in the context of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996.

## **History of Tangled US-Cuba Relations**

Following the Cuban revolution of January 1959, Fidel Castro established a nationalist government antagonistic to American foreign policy designs in Central America. At the root of the anti-American sentiments in Cuba was the Platt Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill of 1901 that went into effect during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt.

The United States fought for Cuban independence from Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898. In the war, the United States defeated Spain, which gave up all claims to Cuba and ceded it to the United States. Cuba became independent in 1902 with Tomas Estrada Palma as its president. Following the resignation of Estrada in 1906, the United States occupied Cuba between 1906 and 1909 in the wake of a rebellion led by Jose Miguel Gomez. In 1909, Gomez became president following the election supervised by the United States. However, his government was tarnished by excessive government corruption. In 1933, Gerardo Machado was overthrown in a coup led by Fulgencio Batista, and later toppled by Fidel Castro in 1959.

In 1902, the year of Cuban independence, Congress passed the Platt Amendment which conferred on the United States, a caretaker role in Cuba. The Amendment, which later became part of the treaty between the United States and Cuba, gave the United States access to naval bases in Cuba; and the right to intervene in Cuba's internal affairs when necessary. According to Bailey (1964), the purpose of the Platt amendment was to make Cuba a quasi-protectorate of the United States. This was intended because of America's fear that Germany might secure a foothold in Cuba, thus threatening not only the isthmian lifeline, but all of Latin America, and the shores of the United States. The Platt Amendment had many provisions beyond keeping the island under U.S. protection and the right to intervene in Cuban affairs.

First, it barred Cuba from entering into any treaty that would compromise its independence or permit a foreign power like Germany to secure a base on the island. Second, it prohibited Cuba from incurring debt that could provoke foreign invasion because of its inability to pay. Furthermore, the Amendment obligated the United States to intervene in Cuba for the purpose of maintaining order and Cuban independence. Also, it allowed the United States to operate a sanitation (environmental) program of eradicating yellow fever. Finally, it forced Cuba to sell or lease sites for naval and coastal stations to America. Guantanamo thus became the principal American base. (Bailey 1996). In 1934, the Platt Amendment was repealed. By then the United States had not only intervened militarily in Cuba three



times, but had established a naval base at Guantanamo Bay, which had endured as a primary source of confrontation between the two nations during the Cold War.

By 1960, Cuban Communism had posed a menace to American dominance in Central America, with no room for reconciliation. In an exercise to reinstate his Cuban policy, on January 26, 1960, President Eisenhower released a five-point American policy toward Cuba. According to Congressional Digest (1960), Eisenhower stated that the U.S. government would:

1. Adhere strictly to the policy of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of Cuba.
2. Prevent illegal acts in territories under its jurisdiction directed against other governments.
3. View with increasing concern the tendency of the Cuban government to create the illusion of aggressive acts and conspiratorial activities aimed at the Cuban government and attributed to the United States officials or agencies.
4. Recognize the right of the Cuban government and people in the exercise of their national sovereignty to undertake those reforms which, with due regard to their obligations under international law, they may think desirable.
5. Believe that U.S. citizens had made constructive contributions to the economies of other countries by means of their investments and their work in those countries; and would continue to bring to the attention of the Cuban Government any instances in which the rights of its citizens have been disregarded.

The president stated also, that the United States government and people would continue to assert and to defend, in the exercise of their own sovereignty, their legitimate interests. He further said that it was the hope of the United States government that differences of opinion between the two governments in matters recognized under international law be subject to diplomatic negotiations. In the event that disagreements between the two governments should persist, it would be the intention of the United States government to seek solutions through other appropriate international procedures.

Shortly after these conciliatory policy statements for peaceful coexistence were pronounced, the Cuban government alienated the United States by signing an agreement for collaboration with the Soviet Union. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on February 13, 1960, between President Fidel Castro and Soviet first Prime Minister Anastas I. Mikoyan. Next, the two heads of government signed a contract for the purchase of Cuban sugar by the Soviet Union. In reaction to this event, the Commerce Department revoked licenses for American exportation of helicopters to Cuba. This decision went into effect, despite Cuban protests against American action.

Hence, President Eisenhower planned the infamous Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. He had issued orders to train a small force of Cuban exiles in March 1960 to invade Cuba and topple the Castro regime. When President Kennedy came into office, he pursued the Eisenhower plan, which later failed in 1961. The bungled Bay of Pigs invasion was not taken lightly by Cuba. To further protect itself, Cuba entered into alliance with the Soviet Union. Under this relationship, Cuba would

qualify for Soviet military protection. In the fall of 1962, the U.S. intelligence discovered that the Soviets were building secret ballistic missile sites in Cuba. The stakes were high as the American tolerance of harboring a strategic threat 90 miles away from its shores that would deny it any reaction time in the case of Soviet missile attack grew thinner.

In September 1962, American intelligence confirmed the arrival of Soviet missiles in Havana. On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy announced a “quarantine” of Cuba and threatened the Soviets with nuclear retaliation. In the dramatic confrontation, Soviet President Khrushchev agreed to American demands that the missiles be dismantled provided that Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba. The United Nations, under the auspices of its Secretary General U Thant, verified and reported that the Russians had dismantled and shipped back the missiles. In return, Kennedy promised to lift the blockade against Cuba, and also pledged not to undertake aggressive actions against Cuba.

One ancillary international issue raised by the Cuban Missile Crisis was that of aerial intrusion. America’s violation of Cuban airspace soon became a parallel incident to the U-2 debacle over Soviet territory on May 1, 1960. It should be noted that it was the U-2 plane over-flight missions that violated Cuban airspace and took aerial photos of the entire island state that revealed the presence of Soviet surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba. In such military exercise, Cuban airspace was violated many times. Under international law principles, such over-flights are illegal and justified Cuban military responses to enforce its territorial sovereignty rights. The only defense of aerial intrusion over Cuba was made by President Kennedy, who justified his action, on the basis that the national security of the United States was threatened.

The Cuban missile crisis once again set the stage for future Soviet-American negotiations, “detente” during the Cold War. Also, the success of this superpower reconciliation at the height of the Cold War era gave impetus to the application of linkage politics as a legitimate tactic in international diplomacy. According to Stein (1980), international linkage politics occurs when a state adopts the policy of making its course of action concerning a given issue contingent upon another state’s behavior in a different issue area. As Kamalu (2001) put it, linkage politics is a means of exerting influence on each of the states involved in disputes as a result of its relatively weak position to achieve outright regional hegemony. As Wilkenfield (1973) also noted, implicit in the linkage concept is the notion that at least two distinct areas of concern exist which in certain circumstances overlap in a way that events in one sphere of influence affect events in others. From henceforth, not only did subsequent American administrations fan anti-Cuban sentiments, but they implemented policies that further kept Cuba in total political, economic, and cultural isolation.

Total isolationist goal was vigorously pursued under the administration of Ronald Reagan who saw Cuban communism as a threat to American interests in Central America and the Caribbean and vowed to contain it. One major American instrument in Cuban containment was not only to counteract its international involvement in the third world, but to build global alliance against it by either denying Cuba its potential allies or extending American military and economic

support to its enemies. In pursuit of the former objective, the United States intervened in the Caribbean Island of Grenada in October 1983. It did so under the auspices of the five members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States to restore order and democracy in Grenada in the wake of a coup in which Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several of his cabinet ministers were executed. This denied Cuba a foothold in Grenada since American intervention halted the construction of an airport for military use being constructed with Cuban finances and expertise. The United States had been a vocal critic of Bishop's leanings to Cuba, although the invasion was justified on the basis that it was necessary to ensure the safety of hundreds of American medical students studying on the Island.

Also, the Reagan Administration tried to undermine the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas had overthrown Dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979 with Cuban support and arms. Thereafter, they entered into alliance with Cuba. Despite congressional prohibition of American military assistance to Nicaraguan Contras under the provisions of the 1982 Boland Amendment, President Reagan still organized a clandestine sale of arms to Iran and then transferred their profits to the Contras. The conflict created by this covert activity between late 1985 and 1987 later came to be known as the "Iran-Contra" affair or "Iran-gate". The Boland Amendment in effect, limited U.S. government assistance to the Contras in their attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, while the Iran-gate was a scandal pertaining to the sale of arms by the Reagan administration without congressional approval to Iran in order to gain release of American hostages held captive in Lebanon. Profits accruing from the deal were to be used to fund arms supplies as well as provide financial support to the Contra guerrillas fighting to overthrow the government of Nicaragua.

The Cuban-American relations deteriorated much further in the wake of Cuban rapprochement with Granada. Following Granada's independence from Britain on February 7, 1974, Sir Eric Gairy was installed as its first Prime Minister. In 1979, his government was overthrown in a coup led by Maurice Bishop that steered Granada away from the American orbit. Thereafter, Cuban influence began to grow. Signs and symptoms of the Cuban influence in Granada were evidenced by the growing reliance of Granada on Cuban doctors for the operation of its hospitals and other healthcare systems. Further complicating matters were the construction and expansion of the Granada international airport with Cuban engineering, know-how, and expertise.

On October 19, 1983, Bishop and several of his senior cabinet ministers were executed in a successful coup attempt led by Bernard Coard and General Hudson Austin. Perceived as anti-Americans and Cuban sympathizers, the Reagan administration felt that a unilateral change of government by the United States would work against long-term American national security and foreign policy interests and goals in Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, the United States built a military coalition with many Caribbean nations to intervene in Grenada. The invasion resulted in the arrest of the coup leaders and the subsequent restoration of the 1974 Grenada's constitution pending new election which eventually took place in December 1974. The American intervention was justified on the pretext that it was a Cuban-inspired coup; and that it was intended to liberate American citizens

and students residing in the island. Finally, the invasion culminated in the installation of Herbert Blaize as Granada's new Prime Minister on December 3, 1984, along with his new National Party in Granada's general elections.

In order to build a regional alliance against Cuba, President Reagan proposed a major economic development initiative, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which passed Congress in 1982. Among the major elements of the initiative were: increased economic aid to the region; preferential trade access to American markets by goods manufactured in the Caribbean (duty-free status); tax breaks and other incentives to American firms that invest in the Caribbean. According to this initiative, only nations that agreed to lower duties on imported or exported products (tariff) from the United States and enter into military alliance with it would benefit from this relationship. As Bernell (1994) observed, the bitter rivalry between the United States and Cuba stands out as one of the principal political disputes in the Western Hemisphere since the Cold War. This relationship has been one of mutual hostility, and distrust fueled by differences in national interest, political culture, power, and ideology, and exacerbated by geographic proximity.

### **The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (The Helms-Burton Act of 1996)**

Cuba's downing of two U.S. planes raised the ante in the Cuban-American relations. President Clinton condemned the act and received condemnation resolution from the U.N. Security Council deploring the Cuban action. Furthermore, President Clinton suspended all charter flights to Cuba indefinitely until the order was rescinded in March 1998. The presidential (executive) order imposed additional travel restrictions on Cuban diplomats in the United States. In addition, it limited visits of Cuban officials to the United States. President Clinton followed with the authorization of \$300,000 payment to each of the families of the four victims. The money was to be drawn from the account of Cuban assets frozen in the United States. On December 17, 1997, a U.S. federal judge awarded \$187.6 million to the families of the downed victims. However, Cuba refused to recognize the court's jurisdiction on the basis of sovereignty claims. The most significant impact of this incident is that the tragedy helped to unite the working relationship between a Democratic president and Republican -controlled congress. Sooner rather than the latter, a consensus on American foreign policy toward Cuba was formulated. This policy relied heavily on isolating the island nation by relying on strict economic sanction. Hence, on March 12, 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. The act, which is often referred to as the Helms-Burton Law, was named after its sponsors: Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana).

The Helms- Burton Legislation was designed to buttress Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) already promulgated in 1992. The CDA prohibited American subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba. It also penalized the entry into the United States of any vessels for the purpose of loading or unloading freight if it had engaged in trade with Cuba within the last 180 days of its passage. The primary

purpose of the Helms-Burton law was to tighten the economic screws on Cuba and forcing it to pursue a path to a democratically elected civilian government.

### **Key Provisions of the Helms-Burton Act**

According to Congressional Digest (1999), the Helms-Burton Law, as enacted on March 12, 1996, contains three salient features:

1. Title 1, Section 102 (h) of the Act codifies all existing executive orders and regulations affecting Cuba and denies American Presidents of any authority to apply waivers or modify the embargo provisions. Thus, it guarantees a long lasting sanctions policy toward Cuba even during subsequent American Administrations.
2. Title 111 of the law permits American citizens whose property were confiscated in Cuba to bring law suits against those who traffic in them in federal courts for the purpose of collecting monetary damages. It also extends the right to sue, by Cuban- Americans who acquired American citizenship after their properties were confiscated. However, it provides the president with the discretion to delay implementation of the rules for a period of six months at a time if he determines that such action would serve American national interest, and also expedite Cuba's transition to democratic rule.
3. Title IV of the legislation denies admission to the United States of all those involved in the confiscation and/ or trafficking of American property in Cuba. These include corporate officials and shareholders with controlling interests in any entities involved in the confiscating or trafficking in such property. It also includes minor, child, spouse, or agent of aliens who would be excludable under the provision. Although the provision is mandatory, it provides a waiver on case-by-case basis for travel to the United States for humanitarian medical reasons or for the purpose of defense in legal actions with respect to the said confiscated property.

### **International Reactions and the Praxis of Titles III and IV**

Many international entities, including American allies: Japan, Canada, European Union, and Mexico have reacted negatively to the implementation of the Act. In the observation of Morici (1977), the above mentioned countries have consistently maintained that the law's provisions permitting foreign persons to be sued in American domestic courts constitute a bad application of the principles of international law. In contrast, the United States claims that its actions are for the purpose of promoting its national security interest and preserving its sovereignty rights in a manner consistent with its obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

With respect to Title III of the Act, President Clinton had, since its passage in July 1996 suspended for six months the right of those persons benefiting from the confiscation of American property in Cuba as provided by the Act. The first suspension was on July 16, 1996. This, according to the Clinton Administration, would put foreign companies in Cuba on notice regarding their high probability of both lawsuit and liability claims in the United States' domestic courts in the future.

He then announced in a second suspension on January 3, 1997, that he would allow Title III to go into effect on August 1, 1996, thus allowing liability for trafficking to take effect on November 1, 1996. The president had justified this second suspension on the ground that it was necessary as long as American allies continued their onward march toward democratic governance in Cuba. The president had, also, continued to suspend the rights to file Title III lawsuits at six-month intervals. In the case of Title IV of the legislation, the president banned from travel to the United States a number of executives and their families from many companies for their dubious role in confiscated American property in Cuba.

### **Pope John Paul's Visit and the Clinton Corollary**

Pope John Paul II visited Cuba in January 1998. His visit refocused world attention on the plight of Cuban population because of the effects of American sanctions. Before departing from Cuba, the Pope appealed to President Clinton to relax or lift on humanitarian basis, U.S. embargo on Cuba, particularly in the area of food and medical supplies. The Pope's comments brought back the American sanctions policy to the policy agenda of the United States by generating new heated debates on the merits and disadvantages of sanctions on Cuba. The Papal appeal, thus culminated in President Clinton's reexamination of his earlier Four-Point Cuban policy announced on March 28, 1998. Thus, a deviation from America's traditional approach was considered after a series of policy debates in Congress prior to voting on the Helms-Burton bill.

### **U.S. Congressional Debate on the Merits of American Sanctions against Cuba**

In the May 7, 1998 testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee on U.S. Economic and Trade Policy toward Cuba, Representative John Joseph Moakley (D- Massachusetts), in support of lifting Cuban sanctions, argued that "the Pope's visit has done a great deal to teach the world about Cuba; and thus has put a human face on this most mysterious and troubling nation. It is time that we lift the embargo on food and medicines and allow the Cuban People access to the best medical and food supplies. "Our Cuba policy is 38 years old and it just hasn't worked. In fact, it is a complete failure." (Congressional Quarterly, March 1999, pp 92-94).

Also, Silvia Wilhelm, Executive Director of Cuban Committee for Democracy argued that "There are countless reports that link the effects of the long standing U.S. trade embargo to conditions of malnutrition. Politics should never interfere with the health and nutrition of a people." (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, pp. 92-94). In contrast, Representative Robert Menendez (D-New Jersey) argues that: "Change in Cuba has occurred as a result of U.S. policy not in spite of it. So long as Castro dictates the terms of engagement, as he does, engagement itself will not lead to change in Cuba." (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, pp. 77-79).

In support of sanctions, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Florida) noted that despite the claims of those who wish to engage with Castro, U.S. policy is

working. Ironically, far from removing or reforming the Castro government, the embargo has served as a convenient scapegoat. Without U.S. sanctions, Castro would have had more cash available to maintain and strengthen its military capabilities. America must begin now to open channels of influence with the Cuban people. Let us not be fooled by cosmetics and temporary staged shows of so-called cooperation.” (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, p. 10).

Francis J. Hernandez, President of Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), in support of sanctions against Cuba argued that “the time is now to send a message to the international community on the United States’ seriousness of purpose in pushing democracy in Cuba. (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, p. 89).

Also, Claudio Benedi, Secretary of Foreign Relations, Cuban Patriotic Board argued that sanctions against Cuba are necessary because “the current total imbalance of the Cuban economy is due to the communist system that has subjugated that country. The Helms-Burton law is for the legitimate defense of rights and freedoms of which both U.S. and Cuban citizens are deprived. The need for expulsion of current communist government of Cuba remains. Nothing has changed” (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, pp. 91-95).

On January 5, 1999, President Clinton announced a five-measure plan to augment his four-plan policy changes of March 28, 1988. The purpose of the president’s four-plan policy change was to build on the momentum of Pope’s visit to Cuba; and to help prepare the Cuban populace for a democratic transition and to support the role of the Church and other elements of civil society in Cuba. The four-point plan changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba announced by President Clinton were:

1. The resumption of licensing for direct humanitarian charter flights to Cuba, which was curtailed after the downing of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996.
2. The resumption of cash remittances up to \$300 per quarter for the support of close relatives in Cuba, which had been curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis with Cuba.
3. The development of licensing procedures to streamline and expedite licenses for the commercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba.
4. A decision to work on a bipartisan basis with Congress on the transfer of food to the Cuban people. (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, p. 73)

Thereafter, a major revision by President Clinton was announced on January 5, 1999. This announcement was partially given impetus by the May 6, 1998 report to Congress by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency on Cuba’s military threat to the United States. The report proved reassuring to the United States. It concluded that Cuba has little or no motivation to engage in any military adventures except for the purpose of protecting its territorial integrity and national sovereignty; and that the island state has limited military and intelligence capability to pose any significant threat to American interests or those of its citizens. The five-point plan stipulates the following actions:

1. To broaden cash remittances to Cuba to include all U.S. residents (not just those with close relations in Cuba.) to remit up to \$300 per quarter to any Cuban family, and licensing larger remittances by U.S. citizens and non-governmental organizations to entities independent of the Cuban government.
2. To expand direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than the current flights from Miami to other Cuban cities other than Havana.
3. To re-establish direct mail service to Cuba, suspended in 1962.
4. To authorize the sale of food to independent entities in Cuba, such as religious groups and private restaurants; and the sale of agricultural tools to independent agents such as private farmers and farmer cooperatives producing food for sale in private markets.
5. To expand people-to-people contact (public diplomacy) through two-way exchanges among academics, athletes, scientists, and others. This measure would, also, allow the Baltimore Orioles baseball team to explore the possibility of playing exhibition games in Cuba. The Baltimore Orioles finally played the Cuban national team in April 1999 amid great public controversy in the United States. (Congressional Quarterly, 1999, p. 72)

### **The Bush Legacy and Footprint**

Upon assuming the Presidency, George W. Bush on July 16, 2002, notified the congress of his suspension of Title III of the Helms- Burton Act. Title III promotes the legal actions to be brought against for trafficking in confiscated properties in Cuba. In its final form, the act allows the president to either waive, or enforce its provision every six years. It is interesting to note that his predecessor, President Clinton chose to suspend the Title III throughout his second term in office. President Bush, however, justified his actions as being designed to promote American national interest, and expediting the transition of Cuba to multiparty democracy in the face of strong opposition from its European allies. (Washington File, July 16, 2001). Consequently, on January 16, 2002, President Bush informed the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, the House Committees on International Relations, and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations of his intentions to suspend for additional six months beyond Feb 1, 2002. (Washington File, January 16, 2002).



## Domestic Political Calculations

Two major political events during the Clinton and Bush Administrations had the potential to redefine the fate of the Helms-Burton Act. They were the Elian Gonzalez case of 2000 and the Carter Cuban visit of 2002. Many in the United States, especially, activists in the Cuban community in Miami, pushed for the boy to stay in the United States, in honor of his mother's wishes, but in opposition to those of Elian's maternal grandparents and father that he be brought back to Cuba. As a back drop to this case, Elian was detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in violation of its accord with Cuba which requires that he be denied parole and sent back to Cuba.

Following intense political debate, protests, and litigation, the court in the end decided that the Justice Department and the INS in particular should send him back to Cuba; an action that eventually brought the issues to an abrupt end. Nonetheless, deep -rooted resentment and anger on the part of Cuban- Americans manifested themselves in the November 2000, presidential elections between George W. Bush and Al Gore that eventually decided the outcome of the presidency and bound to influence future local, state, and national elections for years to come. (Washington File, June 28, 2002).

The next case with grave foreign policy impact on the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 is former President Carter's Cuba visit in 2002. This trip came amid increasing criticism of American embargo from members of Congress and business leaders who have been lobbying to break into Cuban market now dominated by the Europeans. It should be recalled that under Carter, the United States lifted travel restrictions on Cuba in 1977; and also established quasi-diplomatic mission in both countries that at least guaranteed some reasonable levels of contacts after breaking off full diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1962. The full impacts of Carter's visit to Cuba are not far-fetched. First, it led to the release of thousands of prisoners in Cuba, with Cuban- Americans allowed to travel to Cuba to visit relatives for the first time. Also, prior to Carter setting foot on Cuban soil, Cuban authorities unconditionally released Vladimiro Roca, a prominent Cuban dissident in prison two months before the completion of his five-year prison sentence. Carter also met with Roca, Oswaldo Paya and Elizardo Sanchez in the last days of his visit. In addition to Gross, the plights of other prisoners, including those of Rolando Sarruff Trujillo were raised. Trujillo who worked as an agent for American intelligence was locked up in Cuban prison for nearly 20 years. By January 2015, all dissidents in Cuban prisons were released.

Another critical impact of Carter's visit was his ability to refute charges that Cuba was developing biological weapons, and had also shared such technology with "rogue" nations; a suspicion that arose with Cuba's innovative advances in genetic engineering, and biotechnology, and other ground-breaking research which American officials believe threatened U.S. national interest and security, with respect to proliferation of both nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. According to Cuba, these charges were mere fabrications designed to maintain American embargo and resist the revocation of the Helms-Burton Act by the U.S. Congress. Carter's transparent tour of the Cuban Center for Genetic Engineering

and Biotechnology with select members of Congress, media, and business leaders at least, brought such unfounded charges and allegations to a close. However, time will tell the full impacts of the Carter visit to Cuba on the Helms-Burton Act in particular and the U.S.-Cuba relations in general. The U.S.-Iraq war of March 2003 and its post-war challenges eventually dominated the American domestic legislation and foreign policy agenda, thereby relegating the Cuban-American relations and enforcement of the provisions of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 and related issues to the back burner of America's international relations. (Whitworth, 2002).

### **President Barack Obama's Policy Initiatives in Normalizing Relations between Cuba and the United States.**

From its inception in 2008, the Obama administration announced a series of changes in U.S. policy. According to the White House Office of the Press Secretary Policy Brief of April 13, 2009, the Obama new policy rests on the following policy principles and goals:

Goal 1: To facilitate greater contact between separate family members in the United States and Cuba and increase the flow of information and humanitarian resources directly to the Cuban people. As such, the President directed the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and Treasury to take the needed steps to actualize them through the following causes of action:

- a. Lift restrictions on transactions related to the travel of family members to Cuba.
- b. Authorize U.S. telecommunication network providers to enter into agreements to establish fiber-optic cable and satellite telecommunications facilities linking the United States and Cuba.
- c. License U.S. telecommunications service providers to enter into roaming service agreements with Cuba's telecommunications service providers.
- d. License U.S. satellite radio and satellite television service providers to engage in transactions necessary to provide services to customers in Cuba.
- e. License persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to activate and pay U.S. and third country service providers for telecommunications, satellite radio and satellite television services provided to individuals in Cuba.
- f. Authorize the donation of certain customer-telecommunication devices without a license.
- g. Add certain humanitarian items to the list of items eligible for export through licensing exceptions.

Goal 2: To increase the flow of remittances and information, Lift all restrictions on family visits to Cuba, strengthen contacts between Cuban and American people, increase access of Cubans to resources to create opportunities, as well as promote and extend American good will to the Cuban people. These values, according to the Obama Administration would be achieved through the institution of policies and programs that include:

- a. Authorizing remittances to individuals within three degrees of family relationship (e.g., second cousins) and to allow individuals who share a

common dwelling as a family with an authorized traveler to accompany them.

- b. Remove limitations on the frequency of visits.
- c. Remove limits on the duration of a visit.
- d. Authorize expenditure amounts that are the same as non-family travel.
- e. Remove the 44 –pound limitation on accompanied baggage.
- f. Remove restrictions on the amounts and frequency of remittances to a person’s family member in Cuba.
- g. Authorize Cuba-bound travelers from the United States to carry up to \$3,000 in remittances.
- h. Establish general license for banks and other depository/ financial institutions to forward remittances.

Goal 3: To expand the scope of humanitarian donations eligible for export through license exceptions, using the following strategies:

- a. Restore clothing, personal hygiene items, seeds, veterinary medicines and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, and soap-making equipment to the list of items eligible to be included in gift parcel donations.
- b. Restore items normally exchanged as gifts by individuals in “usual and reasonable” quantities to the list of items eligible to be included in gift parcel donations.
- c. Expand the scope of eligible gift parcel donors to include any individual.
- d. Expand the scope of eligible gift parcel for beneficiaries to include individuals other than Cuban Communist Party officials or Cuban government officials already prohibited from receiving gift parcels, or charitable, educational, or religious organizations not administered or controlled by the Cuban government.
- e. Increase the value limit on nonfood items to \$800.

Relations between Cuba and the United States still remained tenuous into the second term of Obama’s presidency, but since Fidel Castro stepped down from official leadership of the Cuban state and Barack Obama became president of the United States, both countries improved relations somewhat because of the new faces on both sides.

In April 2009, Obama, who had received nearly half of the Cuban-American vote in the 2008 presidential election, began implementing a less strict policy towards Cuba. Obama stated that he was open to dialogue with Cuba, but that he would only lift the trade embargo provided Cuba underwent political change. In March 2009, Obama signed into law a congressional spending bill which eased some economic sanctions on Cuba and relaxed travel restrictions on Cuban-Americans (defined as persons with a relative who is no more than three generations removed from that person traveling to Cuba). The executive decision further removed time limits on Cuban-American travel to the island. Another restriction relaxed in April 2009 was in the realm of telecommunications, which would allow quicker and easier access to the internet for Cuba. The loosening of restrictions in the sector would likely help to spur joint scientific research in both countries in terms of working together on issues of mutual concern, such as destruction of shared biodiversity and in medicine particularly with diseases that affect both populations.

At the 2009 Summit of the Americas, President Obama signaled the opening of a new beginning with Cuba.

Obama's overtures were reciprocated, to some degree, by Cuban President Raúl Castro, who in July 2012 agreed to hold talks with the United States. In December 2013, at a state memorial service for Nelson Mandela, Barack Obama and Raúl Castro shook hands, which symbolized yet a strong prospect for improving U.S.-Cuba relations. Beginning in 2013, Cuban and U.S. officials held secret talks brokered in part by Pope Francis and hosted in Canada and Vatican City, to start the process of restoring diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States. In December 2014, the framework of an agreement to normalize relations and eventually end the longstanding embargo was announced by Raul Castro in Cuba and Barack Obama in the United States. Cuba and the United States pledged to start official negotiations with the aim of reopening their respective embassies in Havana and Washington.

As a symbolic gesture and part of the agreement, aid worker Alan Gross and an unnamed Cuban national working as a U.S. intelligence asset were released by the Cuban government, which also promised to free an unspecified number of Cuban nationals from a list of political prisoners earlier submitted by the United States. In return for its part, the U.S. government released the last remaining Cuban nationals in its jail. Even though reaction to this change in policy within the Cuban-American community was mixed, opinion polls indicated the thaw in relations was broadly popular with the American public.

Under the new rules implemented by the Obama administration, restrictions on travel by Americans to Cuba were significantly relaxed as of January 2015, and the limited import of items like Cuban cigars and rum to the United States was allowed, as was the export of American computer and telecommunications technology to Cuba. In April 2015, the Obama administration announced that Cuba would be removed from the United States "Terrorist Sponsor" list. The House and Senate had 45 days to review and possibly block this action and failed to act. As a consequence, the Obama Administration officially removed Cuba from the United States' list of state sponsors of terrorism. This move by President Obama marked a significant departure by the United States from the Cold War conflicts that strained Cuba-United States relations.

## **Reinstatement and Normalization of Trade Relations**

During the Obama Administration, trade relations between Cuba and the United States was reactivated. Under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Enhancement Act of 2000, exports from the United States to Cuba particularly food and medical products are allowed with the proper licensing and permissions from the U.S. Department of Commerce and the United States Department of the Treasury. The Obama administration eased specific travel and other restrictions on Cuba in January 2011. Moreover, the U.S. Congressional delegation including Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and Richard Shelby (R-Alabama), ranking member of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban

Matters; travelled to Cuba as part of a delegation of senators and representatives of the Congress of United States.

Travel and import restrictions levied by the United States were further relaxed by executive action in January 2015 as part of the “Cuban Thaw”, a historic warming of Cuba–U.S. relations that began in December 2014.

In December 2014, Presidents Obama and Castro announced the beginning of a process of normalizing relations between Cuba and the United States. The normalization agreement was secretly negotiated with the assistance of Pope Francis in meetings held in both Canada and Vatican City. It is worth reiterating that the said agreement required the lifting of U.S. travel restrictions and remittances, and U.S. banks’ access to the Cuban financial system. The agreement also required reopening of embassies in Havana and Washington, which closed in 1961 after the breakup of diplomatic relations following the establishment of Cuba’s close alliance with the Soviet Union.

### **Swapping of Prisoners**

A broad account of the release of prisoners was established by Katel (2015) who argued that most of the moves to normalize relations between Cuba and the United States had come from the American side, on the basis that the United States exclusively made most of the bidding or compromises. A list of American concessions included:

- Releasing from prison 3 members of Cuban spy ring
- Loosening restrictions on trade and travel to Cuba
- Removing Cuba from “state sponsor of terrorism” list
- Expanding the list of goods and products that can be exported to Cuba and
- Permitting U.S. travelers to use American credit and debit cards in Cuba

In return, Cuba reciprocated by:

- Freeing 53 political prisoners held in Cuba;
- Releasing USAID contractor Alan P. Gross; and
- Releasing Cuban Intelligence Officer Sarraff Trujillo accused of spying on Cuba on behalf of the CIA.

The “exchange of prisoners” process was marked by the return of Gross to the United States in December 2014. As far back as May 2012, it had been reported that the U.S. had declined a “spy swap” proposed by the Cuban government, wherein the remaining group of convicted Cuban spies in prison in the U.S. since the 1990s, would be returned to Cuba in exchange for USAID contractor Alan Phillip Gross. Gross had been imprisoned in Cuba on charges of illegally providing computer equipment, satellite phones, and internet access to Cuba’s Jewish community without a permit required under Cuban law. The prisoner swap marked a major strategic foreign policy shift by the United States towards Cuba since the

imposition of the embargo in 1962, and also removed a key obstacle to the normalization of bilateral relations between Cuba and the United States.

### **Relaxation of Travel and Trade Restrictions**

Although the Cuban trade embargo can only be ended by the U.S. Congress, the Obama administration took executive action to substantively ease restrictions on travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens, as well as restrictions on the import and export of goods between the two countries. In his 2015 State of the Union Address to Congress, Obama, in making the case to the nation called on lawmakers to lift the embargo against Cuba. In February 2015, Conan O'Brien became the first American television personality to film in Cuba for more than 50 years.

Also, in February 2015, American Major League Baseball began talks about playing spring training games in Cuba. Furthermore, charter flights between John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City and José Martí International Airport in Havana, operated by Sun Country Airlines, began in March 2015. In May 2015, the United States gave approval for companies to offer chartered ferry service between Miami and Cuba. Similarly, the Cuban government opened the first bank account in the United States, enabling it to do non-cash business and other transactions in the United States for the first time since the embargo began.

### **Bilateral Talks and Diplomacy**

Having mutually identified the opening of diplomatic embassies in both capitals (Havana and Washington, D.C.), bilateral talks on the matter proceeded in January 2015. The U.S. delegation was led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson, and Josefina Vidal Ferreiro, Cuba's head of North American affairs. The talks focused on migration policy. In particular, Cuban representatives urged the United States to end its immigration privileges to Cuban refugees as governed by the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, also known as the wet foot, dry foot policy. According to Reynolds (2011) and Arteaga, (2008), this policy would allow any fleeing Cuban citizens U.S. residency and later citizenship, as long as they were found on U.S. soil and not at sea. The act essentially says that anyone who fled Cuba and entered the United States would be allowed to pursue residency a year later. Under the Clinton administration, the United States came to an agreement with Cuba that the former would stop admitting people found at sea. Since then, a Cuban caught on the waters between the two nations (with "wet feet") would summarily be sent home or to a third country except those who make it to shore ("dry feet") who would get a chance to remain in the United States, and later would qualify for expedited "legal permanent resident" status and would then eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship.

Uncertainty about the status of U.S. immigration policy was known to promote a surge of emigrants fleeing Cuba for the United States in order to beat the deadline for anticipated policy reforms by the American Congress through enactment or presidential executive order. It should be noted that all this was happening in the context of heated debate in the United States that the wet foot/, dry foot policy was

racially discriminatory as it allowed only Cuban immigrants and refugees to be processed and resettled in the United States in contrast to Haitians who were rounded up and sent back or repatriated to Haiti by the U.S. Coast Guard and immigration authorities. Despite Cuban objections, the United States stated that it would stand by its Cuban migration policy under the Cuban Adjustment Act. The next item of discussion in the U.S.-Cuba agenda was the issue of Cuba's listing among state "sponsors of terrorism" by the U.S. government, a matter that remained a significant sticking point, according to Cuba, arguing that its removal was a precondition to reopening embassies. Following the Obama and Castro meeting in the Summit of the Americas in Panama, Castro once again called for the reopening of the embassies between the two countries. High-level diplomats from Cuba and the United States met in Havana, Cuba, in January 2015. As a consequence, President Obama announced that formal diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States would resume with the opening of embassies in Washington and Havana respectively; a promise that eventually came to realization on July 20, 2015.

### **Removing Cuba from the Blacklist**

Removing Cuba from the black-list – states designated as "terrorist sponsors" though important to Cuba, would legally free the U.S. government to do business with Cuba. Cuba was one of the countries on the list, the others being Iran, North Korea, and Syria. President Obama informed the U.S. Congress that he had decided to lift the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism on the ground that:

- The government of Cuba had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period; and
- Cuba had provided assurances that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

Under American law, the U.S. Congress could prevent the removal of Cuba's designation by passing legislation within 45 days of presidential request. If Congress failed to pass such legislation within this window or time frame, Cuba would automatically be removed from the U.S. list of "state sponsors of terrorism". However, Congress failed to act, and the lapse in congressional action on the matter eventually cleared the way for Cuba to be officially removed from the list in May 2015.

According to Schectman (2015) and Daugherty (2015), the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) removed Cuban companies, boats and persons from its list of entities linked to terrorism and drug trafficking. The OFAC list sometimes referred to as the "Clinton List" prohibited individuals and organizations from doing business with the United States. The affected parties or business entities included select shipping, fishing, and tourist companies and vessels, most of which were based in and operated out of Panama.

## The Unsettled Issue of Guantanamo Bay

The issue and controversy over Guantanamo Bay still remained the thorny and unresolved threat to the full normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba. As a reminder, while attending the meeting of Latin American leaders in San José, Costa Rica, President Raul Castro insisted that the United States should return to Cuba, the Guantanamo Bay naval Base and lift the embargo on Cuba before reestablishment of relations could take place. The White House responded in dissent, indicating that any such move was out of the question. It should be noted that President Obama, right during the presidential campaign days in 2008 consistently argued that the prison at Guantánamo Bay should be closed down, but not the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay. In the argument of international relations and foreign policy scholars, including Parmly (2013), Guantanamo Bay has dominated international news cycle because of the 166 detainees of the Iraq and Afghanistan prisoners of war accused of terrorist activities by the United States who went on extended hunger strike. Also, the author posited that the 3 major missions of the Guantanamo base are so critical strategically for the United States to give it up to Cuba. President Jimmy Carter had faced a similar challenge before he surrendered the Panama Canal to Panamanian control in December 1999 in compliance with the Torrijos-Carter treaty. The functions of the base include:

- Serving as detention center for U.S. detainees;
- Serving as migrant processing facility; and
- Serving as a base to ensure long-term U.S. presence in the Caribbean.

Short of recommending an outright surrender of Guantanamo Bay to Cuba, Parmly (2013) associated America's presence there as a major hindrance to U.S. foreign policy goals, interests and objectives by noting that "at the present time, to almost everyone around the world, evoking the name "Guantanamo" triggers an anti-American diatribe" (p. 80).

## Summary and Conclusion

Right from Cuba's independence, its relation with the United States has been characterized as shaky, unsteady, and at its worst, rocky. A panoply of thorny issues and tensions have underpinned U.S.-Cuba relations right from Cuba's independence in 1902 to President Obama's normalization of diplomatic relation of July 20, 2015, when the Cuban and U.S. "interests sections" in Washington and Havana were upgraded to embassies:

- The 1902 Platt amendment, which kept Cuba under American protection and right to intervene in its domestic affairs, whenever justified including granting irrevocable lease or right to the Guantanamo Bay
- The 1934 Treaty of Relations superseded the 1903 treaty and agreeing to abrogate the 1903 treaty except that Cuba agreed to continue to recognize as lawful all prior military actions taken by the United States, and affirmed with certain modifications



such as leasing of land by the United States for a naval base unless when modified or abrogated by mutual consent and as regards the Guantanamo Naval Station. Cuba affirmed its territory unless changed by mutual consent or abandoned or agreed by the U.S. and agreed to allow the base to be quarantined in time of contagion (during plague, epidemic, or pandemic disease).

- The April 1959 snubbing of Fidel Castro during his official visit to Washington by President Dwight D. Eisenhower's refusal to meet with him but Vice President Richard Nixon.
- The 1961 U.S. backing of abortive invasion by Cuban exiles in the Bay of Pigs snafu
- The 1961 CIA plans to assassinate Castro as part of "Operation Mongoose"
- 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis surrounding Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba
- February 1962 embargo against Cuba by President Kennedy
- 1980 release of hundreds of Cuban convicts and exiles in Mariel boatlift.
- 1996 Helms-Burton Act which required that embargoes against Cuba not be lifted until Cuba holds free and fair elections and transition to a democratically elected government that excluded Fidel or Raul Castro
- 1996 U.S. trade embargo in response to Cuba's downing of two U.S. aircraft operated by Miami-based Cuban exiles
- 1999 incident in which Elian Gonzalez was repatriated to Cuba to join his father after a protracted and prolonged court battles in the United States
- December 2009 detention of Alan Gross, USAID Subcontractor in Havana accused of spying for Washington

According to Suddath (2009), the rocky relationship between Cuba and the United States goes way back before the emergence of Fidel Castro on the political scene in Cuba. In 1898 at the end of the Spanish-American War, vanquished Spain surrendered and signed over its rights to its colonial possessions or territories including Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Guam over to the United States, which later granted independence to Cuba on the condition that it retained the right to intervene in the affairs of Cuba and the other possessions if necessary or when justified, and that it be granted perpetual lease on its naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Hence, the resentment over America's colonial legacy has become one of the primary thorny features in U.S.-Cuba relations for decades.

It was not until the Cuban Revolution in January 1959 by Fidel Castro and his band of guerrillas that overthrew the government of Fulgencio Batista which had suffered under the U.S.-imposed arms embargo of 1958 that the conditions deteriorated for the worse. Reluctantly, the United States recognized the Castro regime. Even though Castro made overtures to the United States after assuming power by visiting Washington and touring Washington monuments, he was still snubbed by President Eisenhower who refused to meet with him but leaving it to then Vice President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Dean Acheson to receive him. From henceforth, his hostility toward the United States never abated. 1960 saw the seizing of private land, and the nationalization of many private transnational (multinational) companies most of which were local subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. In addition, American products were heavily taxed to the extent that importation of American consumer products dried up. In response, the Eisenhower

Administration imposed trade restrictions on virtually every product except food and medicine. Decrying what was referred to as “Yankee imperialism,” Castro was pushed further into Soviet orbit as he expanded trade with the Soviet Union instead, hence forcing the United States to cut off all diplomatic ties with Cuba, and using Switzerland as a diplomatic intermediary or proxy. In February 1962, President Kennedy made the embargo permanent.

However, U.S.-Cuba relations never ended, but took on low-intensity and covert life, in terms of toppling the Cuban government. After the Bay of Pigs, a botched or failed attempt by the United States to overthrow Castro using Cuban exiles, the new approach called “Operation Mongoose”, a series of attempts on Castro’s life gained ground. As Suddath (2009) reported, there were at least five plots or attempts on Castro’s life between 1961 and 1963. Castro, realizing the importance of Soviet Union as “protector” and “caretaker” of Cuba, dived deeper into Soviet sphere in order to meet its security needs.

Hence, it was not a surprise to learn from U.S. reconnaissance/ spy planes of the presence of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. This event marked the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Declaring that any nuclear missile deployment in Cuba against the United States would be regarded as an attack by the Soviet Union, Kennedy imposed a naval quarantine on Cuba in order to prevent further Soviet shipment of offensive military weapons to Cuba. As the stakes were raised, President Kennedy and Soviet leader Khrushchev came to their senses and tried to avert a nuclear war. This brinkmanship, which is the tendency of political leaders to pursue dangerous policies to the limits of safety before reaching agreement found expression in “linkage politics.”

The ordeal ended when Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy’s secret proposal to remove U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for American assurances that it would not directly or indirectly through its proxies invade Cuba. In 1962, American Jupiter missiles were stationed in Turkey, which was well in Soviet backyard. As Swift (2007) articulated, Soviet-American agreement over the Cuban missile issue would become a cheap way for the Soviets to offset the American missile advantage; serve as a deterrence to the invasion of Cuba; a response to the missiles in Turkey, as well as make the United States more accommodating over other issues, such as the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

In April 1980, as a result of a downturn in Cuban economy, thousands of dissatisfied Cubans sought political asylum in the United States. Using the opportunity to empty its jails filled with criminal inmates and mental-hospital patients, Cuba adopted a lukewarm attitude to the plight of those who wanted to leave the Island and migrate to the United States. In this massive exodus dubbed “Mariel Harbor boatlift”, thousands of Cubans made their way in a mass flotilla to Miami, Florida, and causing great anxiety among the American populace who saw it as an alien invasion. As a consequence, the United States strengthened its embargo in 1996 with the Helms-Burton Act, which applied the embargo to foreign countries that traded with Cuba. The passage of the Act was a retaliatory measure against Cuba for shooting down two U.S. civilian aircraft that entered Cuban territorial airspace in January 1996, and releasing leaflets on Cuban territory. Cuba justified her actions on the ground that they were consistent with international law

and other conventions. It should be recalled that the release of the leaflets occurred outside the 12-mile Cuban territorial limit, thus violating her territorial waters and airspace.

Since Cuba's revolution in 1959, which swept Fidel Castro to power, its communist government has been adversarial to the United States. In 1961, Cuba confiscated or expropriated U.S. owned businesses. This move prompted the United States to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba and imposed trade restrictions. The severance of ties, however, pushed Cuba into the Soviet orbit. Under Cuba-Soviet alliance, the hostility and isolation of Cuba endured for about 50 years. Under President Obama, a new chapter or page was turned in U.S.-Cuba relations. This new rapprochement or détente ended up bridging the economic and political divide between the two nations.

Over the years, many U.S. members of Congress have agreed on a basic goal of American foreign policy: to steer Cuba to a democratic change. Yet, they have differed on the appropriate means to achieve it. While some favor the use of sanctions, others favor the normalization of Cuban-American relations free of economic sanction. In the post- Cold War period, the 104th Congress (1995 and 1996) paid special attention to the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, enacted in the aftermath of the downing by Cuba of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996. The legislation, which was sponsored by Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) and Representative Dan Burton (R-Indiana), provided a number of elements to increase pressure on the Cuban government including:

- Strengthening and continuing U.S. embargo
- Inviting, organizing, and coordinating international sanctions against the Castro regime and
- Supporting transition to a democratically elected government

With the passage of the Act, Congress tightened screws on Cuba until the Papal visit. After the Pope's appeal to President Clinton, the United States showed a change of heart. Increases in humanitarian transactions with Cuba were adopted, to include contacts between the Cuban people and American citizens. Hence, the state of Cuban-American relations took on a new twist. Domestic political consideration, with respect to Cuban -American votes in Florida, a swing state in presidential elections, might have persuaded President Bush not to undermine the Helms-Burton Act, at least with executive orders. However, the visit of former President Jimmy Carter to Cuba in 2002, and the subsequent pressures by agricultural interest groups in the United States, eager to do business with Cuba posed at least, a temporary challenge to the Bush policy on Cuban sanctions.

George W. Bush's foreign policy attitude was not only to prolong the life of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, but, to strengthen its provisions and enforcement. The rigidity and hostility of the George W. Bush's policy toward Cuba was best symbolized by America's outright rejection of Cuba's humanitarian gesture to send Cuban doctors to New Orleans, Louisiana, to assist in the rescue of victims of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.

Under President Barack Obama, American relation with Cuba significantly improved with the exchange of goods and people between the United States and Cuba. Hence, it was not a surprise that Cuba offered to open its airspace for American over-flights in its rescue operations in Haiti after the January 2010 earthquakes. America's tacit acceptance of this goodwill gesture was another indication of a steady and improving relation between Cuba and the United States. While the relaxation of American embargo to Cuba has been incremental, it is now likely for domestic political consideration to allow a total lift of American sanction against Cuba. This is because the public opinion among young Cuban immigrants in the United States has shifted in favor of establishing contact with Cuba. Even though total lifting of embargo against Cuba would require the act of Congress of the United States, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba under robust "public diplomacy" (communication and interaction between Cuban and American citizens that are intended to inform and influence), coupled with overwhelming public opinion in favor of U.S.-Cuban rapprochement would likely sustain this policy initiative.

Therefore, it is safe to say that although Helms-Burton Act was not completely repealed or erased during Obama's tenure because it was not undone through legislation. Nevertheless, Obama succeeded in chipping away at its provisions. But, the progress toward full restoration of diplomatic ties between the United States and Cuba appeared somewhat safeguarded when the restoration of diplomat relations came to fruition on July 20, 2015. However, the election of President Donald Trump in a divided government, where Republican Party controls both Houses of Congress and the White House appears to threaten U.S.-Cuba relations. It will be relatively easy for the president to roll back the progress made so far by Obama in furtherance of U.S.-Cuba relations. It was not possible for President Obama to lift the congressional embargo against Cuba because of the strong opposition in congress and that of many Cuban- Americans who constitute a major voting bloc in an important and swing state of Florida. Thus, President Obama relied heavily on the use of executive authority such as "executive order" to further open up U.S.-Cuba ties around trade, banking, telecommunication, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and travel. This mode of action did not require the approval of congress. The election of President Trump constitutes a setback for U.S.-Cuba relations as his administration is set and bent on reversing all the progress and improvements made under Obama, a talking point he adopted during his election campaigns. With his presidency in a "one-party" government, it would be easy for Trump to advance legislation against Obama's Cuban foreign policy reforms. Time will tell what the future of U.S.-Cuba relations would look like. In the meantime, all we can do is to keep our fingers crossed and watch.

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