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The New African Diaspora: Engaging the Question of Brain Drain-Brain Gain²

Akanmu G. Adebayo

The literature on the New African Diaspora is growing. One of the latest is the volume co-edited by Isidore Okpewho and Nkiru Nzegwu,³ published by Indiana University Press in 2009. A common thread in the literature is the identification of the “brain drain” as a major consequence of the establishment of the New African Diaspora. Another common postulation is that the “brain drain” can be turned into “brain gain” through the concerted efforts of African governments, international organizations, and members of the diaspora themselves. This paper interrogates popular and intellectual assumptions about diaspora, brain drain, and brain gain. The paper is divided into four parts. The first reviews the literature and data on the New African Diaspora; the second analyzes the brain drain and its effects on and implications for Africa’s development; the third evaluates the brain gain hypothesis; and the final part introduces a few recommendations to transform brain drain to brain gain.

Introduction: The Literature on the New African Diaspora

Who/what is the African Diaspora? The African Union (AU) defines the African Diaspora as “peoples of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union” (The African Union, YEAR, p.). Based on this definition and on the estimated numbers of people of African descent in Europe (3.51 million), North America (39.16 million), Latin America (112.65 million), and the Caribbean (13.56 million), the AU categorized the African Diaspora as constituting the “sixth region” of Africa (Auma, 2009).

The AU’s definition takes ordinary sojourn—“living outside the continent”—for diaspora. It takes as diaspora all Africans abroad, “even when the

²This paper was first presented at the Global Conference of Black Nationalities, “The Black Race: The Past, Present and Future” at Osogbo, Osun State, Nigeria, August 23-27, 2010.

³Okpewho, I. & Nzegwu, N. (Eds.). (2009). *The New African Diaspora*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

communities concerned may not think of themselves in diasporic terms” (Zezeza, 2009, p. 33). Although diaspora begins with migration or dispersal, this alone is not sufficient. According to Paul Zezeza, Diaspora is as much a process as it is a product (2009, pp. 32-33). Colin Palmer takes a more complex look at diaspora and defines it as follows:

The modern African diaspora, at its core, consists of the millions of peoples of African descent living in various societies who are united by a past based significantly but not exclusively upon “racial” oppression and the struggles against it and who, despite the cultural variations and political and other divisions among them, share an emotional bond with one another and with their ancestral continent and who also, regardless of their location, face broadly similar problems in constructing and realizing themselves. (Palmer, 2000, pp. 27-32)

Palmer further indicates that the African Diaspora was a product of at least five, maybe more, migratory drifts which he calls “diasporic streams.” These include:

- a. prehistoric migrations out of Africa about 100,000 years ago;
- b. migration of Bantu-speaking peoples from the region of Cross River in Nigeria through Central Africa into the Indian Ocean littoral about 3,000 BCE;
- c. trading diasporas created by African merchants, slaves, and soldiers in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia from about the fifth century BCE, whose major component was the increased migration occasioned by Islam in Arabia in the seventh century CE;
- d. the Atlantic Slave Trade to the Americas and Europe; and
- e. the contemporary migration streams which began after the end of slavery and picked up steam in the colonial and post-colonial periods.

It was these diasporic streams, Palmer stresses, “together with the communities that they constructed that form a diaspora” (Palmer, 2000, p. 28). Both the AU’s and Palmer’s approaches to the Diaspora are broad and historical, as they should be. This paper focuses on the New African Diaspora—i.e., the one created after independence, fostered by globalization, and especially fueled by various economic, political, and social forces within Africa in the 1990s.

There is no consensus yet on how to characterize the New African Diaspora. Various scholars use different markers to differentiate it from the “older” African Diaspora. According to Okpewho, Ali Mazrui calls the older diaspora the

“diaspora of enslavement” and the new African Diaspora the “diaspora of imperialism.” By the same token, the older diaspora may be viewed as the diaspora of forced migration while the new may be considered as the Diaspora of voluntary migration. None of these characterizations is without flaws or limitations. This paper borrows Okpewho’s characterization of the older diaspora as “precolonial” and the new diaspora as “postcolonial” (Okpewho, 2009, p. 5).

Assumed, but often lost or unexplained, in these characterizations is the question: who is an African? This question is important especially in the context of the New African Diaspora and in order to identify, track, and mobilize Africans in the Diaspora for the development of the continent. Paul Zeleza attempts to tackle this question in the study referred to earlier. In his view, “African is as much a reality as it is a construct” (Zeleza, 2009, pp. 33-34). It is a geographical reality, but much of that geography is ideologically and racially constructed. In fact, the name Africa is not African at all; it was of Roman origin and it referred to the Roman province of North Africa around present-day Tunisia. Over time, especially since the Portuguese voyages of exploration in the 15th century, the name was expanded to entail all of the continent and adjacent islands; but this was to change in the 19th and 20th centuries when, as a result of racist theorizing, North Africa was dissected from sub-Saharan Africa, the latter being regarded as “Africa proper.” This enabled Eurocentric scholars to deny as “African” the achievements of such major centers of civilizations as Egypt, Carthage, Islamic North Africa, and even the stone buildings of Zimbabwe. The dissection leaves many in contemporary times wondering if an Egyptian, a Tunisian,⁴ or a white South African immigrant to the United States qualifies to be called “African American.” In essence, African and Africanness must be considered in terms of multiple identities, which may be based on geographical, racial, or transnational factors. The African Union takes this multidimensional, multifaceted approach.

Now, let’s do the numbers. For various reasons, population, immigration, naturalization, labor, and other demographic information in the United States are open to gross undercounting. Most censuses usually focus on citizens rather than illegal immigrants. Official figures do indicate that the number of recent

⁴This is ironic. The name “Africa” originally applied to the region of Tunisia. However, as a result of historical and demographic changes, Tunisia has been Arabized and the country served, for a time, as the headquarters of the Arab League.

migrants from Africa has been steadily rising. Estimates of Africa-born persons in the United States from 2006 to 2008 are presented in Table 1. The data show an increase from approximately 1.38 million in 2006 to 1.42 million in 2007, and 1.44 million in 2008. The table also confirms that a consistently high proportion of these immigrants came from Nigeria, Egypt, and Ethiopia.

Other indicators of this immigrant population are presented in Tables 2-5. Table 2 shows the number of Africa-born persons naturalized in the United States between 2000 and 2009. This number increased from 25,792 in 2000 to 60,383 in 2009. Again, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Egypt had the biggest numbers. Table 3 reveals a similar trend. With minor fluctuations, the number of Africans who secured permanent resident status (a.k.a. Green Card) almost tripled from 44,534 in 2000 to 127,050 in 2009. Ethiopia has a slight edge over Nigeria, followed closely by Kenya, Egypt, and Ghana in 2009. Table 4 reveals much about the pipeline: a visit might create the opportunity to stay permanently, and legal permanent residence might lead to naturalization in five years. Whereas there were more visits by South Africans than Nigerians, fewer South Africans than Nigerians proceeded to permanent residence status. Still, visits from Nigeria rank high despite the tales of visa denials. In 2009, there were almost half a million visits from Africa, with 107,238 from South Africa and 88,473 from Nigeria.

While the number of emigrants was quite high and significant for Africa as a whole as well as for individual countries, it represents only a small slice of the pie. The evidence for this can be seen in the following charts. Figure 1 shows the relative importance of immigrant labor in the U.S. economy. The share of immigrants in the U.S. population increased three-fold from 5.3% in 1970 to 15.7% in 2008. In the same period, the proportion of immigrants in the civilian labor force almost tripled from 4.8% in 1970 to 12.5% in 2008. Despite these, the proportion of African immigrants was very small indeed. Figure 2 is a pie chart showing the top ten countries of immigration to the United States in 2008. No African country was on that chart. Figure 3 is a histogram and it shows vividly the percentage distribution of immigrants by region of origin. Africa consistently had a small share, from 0.2 million in 1980 to 0.4 million in 1990, 0.9 million in 2000, and rising finally to 1.4 million in 2008. A similar trend is shown in the new millennium. Table 5, for instance, shows the number of persons naturalized by world region. Africa represents a small but increasing part of the total: rising from 25,792 in 2000 to 60,383 in 2009.

As we have indicated above, the New African Diaspora is the result of these migratory streams. At this point in the paper, we can ask a few questions. What were the main reasons for emigration out of Africa? What has been the pattern of settlement in the United States and with what degree of success have migrants integrated into the host society? What were the impacts and implications of emigration for Africa? In particular, what is brain drain and how has it affected Africa?

Let's address the reasons for emigrations first. One major reason for emigration is political instability that engulfed many African countries shortly after independence. Refugees from civil wars, or displaced persons from political thuggery, military coups and assassinations, and religious violence were offered asylum in many Western nations. In fact, refugees from the Nigerian Civil War were among the earliest Nigerian immigrants in the United States and many of them still identified themselves—sometimes jokingly, sometimes seriously—as Biafrans. Thousands of immigrants from Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia, DR Congo, etc. have been admitted to the United States and offered asylum. Similarly, thousands of Nigerians fled the country in the dark days of the Babangida/Abacha dictatorship.

In addition to political crises, economic and social factors also contributed to the emigration from Africa. According to Amadu Kaba, in the last two decades many sought migration as a result of “low salaries,” “frustrated career goals,” “lack of quality of life, high levels of crime, social pressure,” and “poor social services” (Kaba, 2009, pp. 115-119). Individuals have their reasons but altogether these have been the accepted push-and-pull factors, which have also been called endogenous and exogenous factors (Oberoi & Lin, 2006, p. 117). Sola Akinrinade and Olukoya Ogen, in their recent study, submitted that “unemployment, violence, environmental degradation, lack of an enabling social infrastructure, political repression and extreme poverty” pushed many Nigerians to the industrialized countries of the West (2010, p. 7).

The settlement pattern in the United States varies widely. The data published by the Migration Policy Institute (see Table 6) for the year 2000 indicate that New York had the highest number of Africans (116,936 or 13.3%), followed by California (12.9%), Texas (7.3%), and Maryland (7.1%). This spread is different for migrants from different African countries. For example, the settlement pattern for Nigeria (see other part of Table 6) shows that in 2000 most Nigerians settled in Texas (20,927 or 15.5%), followed by New York (14.0%),

Maryland (11.2%), California (10.3%), and Georgia (6.5%). Incidentally, Nigerian Consulates are in New York City and Atlanta, Georgia, to the displeasure of Nigerians residing in Texas.

It is not clear why people choose to settle in one state rather than the other. Climate, especially preference for warm weather, is definitely a factor. Chain migration is another important factor; the success of many pioneer migrants typically attracted others from their village, clan, or ethnic group. Another consideration is potential for success, especially availability of good schools for career changes and children's education. Other important factors are associated with the reputation of the region/state of the United States: standard of living, job and career opportunities, and reputation or openness of the state for diversity.

Table 6: States with the Largest Africa-Born and Nigeria-Born Population in 2000

Africa-Born	Number	Percent	Nigeria-Born	Number	Percent
United States	881,300	100.0	United States	134,940	100.0
New York	116,936	13.3	Texas	20,927	15.5
California	113,255	12.9	New York	18,889	14.0
Texas	64,470	7.3	Maryland	15,071	11.2
Maryland	62,688	7.1	California	13,939	10.3
New Jersey	59,917	6.8	Georgia	8,740	6.5
Massachusetts	47,770	5.4	New Jersey	8,389	6.2
Virginia	42,509	4.8	Illinois	7,161	5.3
Georgia	40,423	4.6	Florida	3,812	2.8
Florida	34,495	3.9	Massachusetts	3,374	2.5
Minnesota	34,469	3.9	North Carolina	3,123	2.3

Source: Compiled from Migration Policy Institute, Retrieved August 11, 2010 from <http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/whosresults.cfm>

All available evidence suggests that African elite migrants settled quite well in the United States. At least they achieved career success. Amadu Kaba cites a 2001 U.S. Census Bureau report that “shows that of the 400,000 African immigrant workers aged 16 and over in the United States in March 2000, 36.5% were in managerial and professional specialties (compared to 30.9% of native workers), the highest ranks of job categories in the nation” (Kaba, 2009, p. 116). This group represents the cream of the crop, the elite of the elites. As will be shown in the next section, success stories are relative. Career success does not always translate into quality of life, especially for first generation migrants.

Commitments and obligations to family and relations back home, addressed through remittances and other financial transfers, take a decent proportion of immigrants' household expenditures.

Forming a diaspora requires creating a community, and African migrants in the United States have done quite well in this regard. Typical evidence of community includes the following, among others:

- Grocery stores that distribute African foods, restaurants that serve African cuisines, catering for special events, slaughter slabs for halal meat;
- Diaspora national, ethnic, professional, hometown, alumni, and other associations;
- Tailoring, boutiques, hairdressing, and other beauty salons;
- Communication, news and information dissemination setups like TV/radio stations, Internet news sites, newspapers, weblogs, and discussion groups;
- Shipping agencies that connect home businesses with the Diaspora;
- Churches (large and small), Islamic jamaa, traditional religious shrines;
- Saturday language schools to teach African children African languages and cultures;
- Art shops, museums, entertainers (musicians, drummers, etc.) for special events

As for success defined in terms of satisfaction, that too is relative. And we probably need to distinguish between job satisfaction and complete, wholesome satisfaction—most have the former but not the latter. Whether they are elite or lower-class, most migrants have experienced moments of emptiness, the feeling of a void. *The New African Diaspora*, especially the essays in Part Three of the book, calls attention to these feelings. These essays deal with the plight of Africa's migrants, including the following: migrants dealing with a myriad of immigration laws, ill health and bereavement, and profiling and criminalization of immigrants (as part of the War on Terror).⁵ In addition, migrants wrestle with questions of identity and self esteem, psychological issues, child disobedience or rebellion, financial pressures, etc.

As a result, and perhaps to seem to fulfill the high expectations of relatives and friends from the home country (that money abounds on the streets of America, or that the streets are paved in gold!), a number of migrants turned to crime. Table 7 shows the number of persons removed from the United States and deported back to their countries of origin for various offenses from 2000 to 2008. African deportees represent a very small proportion of the total deported annually. Looking at the 2008 figures, for example, only about 1,999 of the

⁵See chapters 6-14.

358,886 deportees were Africans, but the figures fluctuated annually and, overall, had been declining: from 2,706 in 2003 to 2,112 in 2007 and to 1,999 in 2008. However, the news is not so good for Nigeria: 435 of the 1,999 Africans deported (21.8%) were Nigerians. The number was also much higher in 2003 (640 or 23.7%) and 2004 (557 or 20.9%).⁶

The Brain Drain Phenomenon

Obviously, one of the major consequences of the creation of the New African Diaspora is the brain drain. As a term and as an idiomatic expression, brain drain originated in the 1960s when European professionals emigrated to the United States in search of better pay. It has been applied to the “departure of educated or talented persons” from a developing country to the industrialized nations in search of better pay and better condition of service. In this regard, brain drain is presented in terms of a loss, a drain, of “skilled intellectual and technical labor through the movement of such labor to more favorable geographic, economic, or professional environments” (Answers.com, 2010).

A more technical term is “human capital flight,” but the alias has gained more currency. Obviously, not all migrants fall into this category. Usually, the discourse on brain drain focuses on highly trained professionals such as doctors, engineers, university teachers, and strategic professionals such as nurses, computer scientists, and business managers. These are migrants with the most significant impact on the home countries. Unlike migration from other regions of the world, which typically comprises laborers, a significant number of professionals, “brains,” come from Africa. The brain drain discourse does not include prostitutes, farm workers, and persons engaged in menial labor in the destination countries, for example. By the same token, the discourse often does not include the internal diasporas created within Africa by, for example, the migration of Nigerian or Ghanaian professionals to South Africa. Since they are within Africa, such migrations have been considered as regional or transnational.

In an earlier paper on the subject, I called attention to the need to rethink the negative connotation typically attached to migration in general and to brain drain in particular. History of diasporas has taught us that migrations laid the foundation for the rise and development of new centers of civilizations and

⁶ The situation has not abated. A staff of the Consulate General of Nigeria commented that over 800 cases are in the process of being finalized for deportation over the next few months.

power. The history of the Middle East and North Africa would be incomplete without the post-Islamic Arab diasporas created in the seventh through the tenth centuries. Along the same lines, the history of the United States, Australia, and Latin America would be incomplete without the European diasporas. Indeed, the term “diaspora” would probably not have emerged without the spread of the Jews from Palestine to Europe other parts of the world. Equally important is the role that the United States, a product of largely European diaspora, has continued to play in the affairs of Europe. Although the long-term effects of the brain drain on Africa are still in the future, in the short run, however, there has been a “drain.”

The drain can be demonstrated, but the numbers are as unreliable as they are astonishing. No one has accurate records of African migrants in the United States; not the U.S. government and agencies, and certainly not the respective African embassies and consulates.⁷ Instead, scholars draw conclusions from small samples. Case studies are extrapolated to make generalizations. The following statistics are adapted from Amadu Kaba’s chapter in *The New African Diaspora* (Kaba, 2009, pp. 110-115).

- Anver Versi: an estimated 5 million African entrepreneurs and possibly 40% of high-level managers are living in the Diaspora (2003, p. 11).
- Farah Khan: the number of highly qualified Africans (doctors, university lecturers, engineers) who left the continent: 1960-1975, 27,000; 1975-1984, 40,000; 1985-1990, 60,000 (2003, p. 1).
- Barry Sautman: in 2000, 3.6% of Africans, but 31.4% of Africa’s emigrants, had a tertiary education; by 2005, between 300,000 and 500,000 professionals had left Africa, including 30,000 doctoral degree holders, averaging \$185,000 loss to Africa per person (2007, pp. 75-114).
- John Logan and Glenn Deane: average educational attainment of African immigrants (14.0 years) is higher than that of Afro-Caribbeans (12.6 years) and African Americans (12.4 years) (n.d.).
- Eilish McAuliffe and Malcolm MacLachlan: nearly half of doctors trained to work in Africa emigrate to the West. Hence, the average doctor-patient ratio in Africa was much lower than it would have been. The numbers for Africa were 17.1 doctors per 100,000 patients and 89.7 nurses per 100,000 patients while for industrialized countries the numbers were 303.7 doctors and 723.6 nurses per 100,000 (2005, pp.231-242).

⁷ At a reception held in Atlanta for His Excellency the Ambassador of Nigeria to the U.S. on August 14, 2010, the Nigerian Consul-General in Atlanta admitted that the Consulate does not have an accurate number of Nigerians in the country. He however stated that the compilation of the data for the Southeastern United States is almost completed.

- Ted Schrecker and Ronald Labonte: because of the brain drain, vacancy rates for physicians in public health services were 26% in Namibia, 36.3% in Malawi, and 42.6% in Ghana (2004, pp. 409-415).
- Michael Clemens and Gunilla Pettersson: in a 2000 study, tracked by name African-born physicians and nurses in nine Western countries, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States. They found the following (2006):

	In all Africa	In the West	%	In Sub-Saharan Africa	In the West	%
Physicians	280,808	64,941	19	96,405	36,653	28
Nurses	758,698	69,589	8	414,605	53,298	11

A lot more such data can be presented, but the point is already made that brain drain is bad for Africa's countries and other developing countries. The challenge is how to stop the hemorrhaging, reverse the trend, and promote not only the retention of Africa's professionals in Africa but also the development of a healthy business and technical environment for these professionals to thrive. This question is addressed in the next section of the paper on brain gain.

The Brain Gain Proposal

The literature on brain gain is wide and varied. Brain gain means different things to different people in different contexts. To the United States, for instance, brain gain is what the country gained from immigration of the best talents from all over the globe. A Brookings Institution study by Darrell West published this year under the title *Brain Gain: Rethinking US Immigration Policy*, documents these gains immigration brought to U.S. society and corporations, and recommends immigration reform and strategic policy that ensure and enhance brain gain (2010). A blurb for the book from Jeb Bush, former Governor of Florida, praises the study as follows: "To deal with our fiscal and debt challenges, we need higher, sustained economic growth. A key element in a high growth economic strategy is changing our immigration policies to enhance productivity and innovation. *Brain Gain* provides a roadmap to do just that."⁸

A similar view of brain gain pervades the field of international program administration, especially international student recruitment and admission by top U.S. universities. Indeed, several graduate programs in the U.S. would not survive if the stream of international student enrollment suddenly dries up. This much was admitted by the Migration Policy Institute in a study conducted by

⁸ See <http://www.brookings.edu/press/Books/2010/braingain.aspx?p=1>.

Jeanne Batalova (2007). The study cites NAFSA: Association of International Educators' findings and maintains that "foreign students and their dependents contributed more than \$13 billion to the US economy in 2004-2005" (Batalova, 2007) through direct and indirect expenditures on tuition and fees, books, transportation, accommodation, food, and other incidentals. Despite the anti-immigration outlook of some states, smart city and municipal governments in the United States are advised to roll out the welcome mat to attract⁹ international students and migrants. This is the context of brain gain in the United States.

On the other hand, this paper is interested in a different kind of brain gain. Also regarded as "the brain drain hypothesis" by Uwe Hunger, this brain gain is predicated on the idea that "intellectual and technical elites from the Third World who emigrated to an industrialized country represent a potential resource for the socioeconomic development of their home country" (2002, p.1). In other words, through brain gain the negative effects of brain drain are reversed, rolled back, and turned into great advantage. Resource loss under brain drain "can be converted into a long-term resource profit ('brain gain') for the developing country. Thus, 'brain drain' is not seen as the (dead) end of a negative development that intensifies the economic and social crises of developing countries" (Hunger, 2002, p.1).

According to Hunger, brain gain is based on two major theoretical assumptions, each of which has three dimensions hypotheses. These assumptions and dimensions are summarized below.

1. Emigrated elites are able to play an important role in the development of their home country.
 - a. While the emigration of the brightest brains has a negative impact on the home country's socio-economic development, the return (or remigration) of the brightest brains lead to an increase in the human capital stock [the human capital dimension of brain gain].
 - b. Well-educated migrants are able to attain high positions and accumulate capital in industrialized societies, and are able to transfer financial capital to the home country [the financial capital dimension, also often considered along with remittances].

⁹ See a recent article on the impact of immigration on Michigan. Klementina X. Sula, "Brain Gain: Immigration key to future prosperity," *DomeMagazine.com* (May 16, 2010), accessed August 12, 2010, <http://domemagazine.com/features/cov0510>.

- c. Elite migrants have established extensive social and professional contacts which they are able to make available to the home country [the social capital dimension].
2. Emigrated elites can be attracted by their home countries and reintegrated and incorporated into the development process.
 - a. Although differences in standard of living and quality of life in developing and industrialized countries may result in pull-and-push factors, incentives can be developed in the home countries to encourage return (remigration) by emigrated elites [the infrastructure-incentive dimension].
 - b. Elite migrants have retained and will continue to maintain contacts with family and friends [the relational dimension].
 - c. Elite immigrants maintain and expand professional contacts with and perform consulting works for home country governments and businesses as well as international development agencies [the transnational network dimension] (Hunger, 2002, pp. 2-6).

The above model—two assumptions and six dimensions—help to capture the main theoretical positions on the brain gain. The assumptions are not all on the same level; each would find expression at different places and at different times. Moreover, as a conceptual framework, the model does not explain everything. It does encapsulate the essence of brain gain and why governments and international organizations are betting the future of Africa’s development on it. We will not go over all the dimensions here but it is pertinent to discuss one of these: financial capital.

There is no doubt that African elite migrants have accumulated some wealth that can be harnessed for economic and social development back home. In an earlier paper, I have discussed the issue of financial remittances (Adebayo, 2010).¹⁰ In its 2005 report entitled *Global Development Finance 2005*, the World Bank observed that “workers’ remittances provide valuable financial resources to developing countries, particularly the poorest”¹¹ (World Bank, “Global,” YEAR). As these remittances continued to trend upward, the Bank launched the African Diaspora Program in September 2007 focusing on three main areas:

¹⁰The next few paragraphs come from Akanmu Adebayo, “Brain Drain-Brain Gain: Leveraging the Nigerian Diaspora for the Revitalization of Nigerian Higher Education,” (paper presented at the 25th Conference of the Association of Vice Chancellors of Nigerian Universities, Osun State University, Osogbo, April 19-22, 2010).

¹¹ “Global World Finance 2005,” World Bank, accessed August 16, 2010, <http://www.africaDiaspora.com/2005/events/ag/index.php>.

- i. diaspora policy formulation and development;
- ii. finance, the leveraging of remittances for development; and
- iii. human capital utilization, known as “brain drain-brain gain” programs.

By way of implementing this program in 2008-2009, the World Bank placed emphasis on three main areas: establishing a strong partnership with the AU on Diaspora development; working with and supporting governments to enable them engage with the Diasporas, and directly engaging with Diaspora organizations and professional networks to implement human capital development projects. In particular, the World Bank partnered with the AU through an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant for which it provided \$480,000 to support the AU’s Representational Office in the United States to strengthen its outreach to members of the African Diaspora in the Americas. The main objective of the World Bank has been, through these initiatives, to enable the Diasporas to contribute to higher education and health institutions in Africa—hence “reversing and building on brain-drain constraints to become brain-gain opportunities” (Auma, 2009). The short Tables 8 through 10 provide a glimpse into the volume and significance of diaspora remittances to African countries.

Table 8: Remittances to African Countries in 2005

Countries	\$ million	% of GDP
Egypt	5,017	5
Morocco	4,589	9
Nigeria	3,329	4
Kenya	524	3

Source: World Bank; Maureen Kimani-Lucas, CAPafrique, October 2007, Retrieved from <http://www.capafrique.org> February 22, 2010

Table 9: Remittances to African Countries, 2007

Countries	Estimated Amount
Nigeria	\$3.3 billion
Kenya	\$1.3 billion
Senegal	\$0.9 billion

Table 10: Proportion of Remittances to ODA in Nigeria

Years	Amount \$ billion	Percent of ODA
1995	3.1	80
2007	18.5	750

Source: Taipei Times, January 30, 2010, p. 9

Equally, diaspora human and social capitals are, potentially, a major gain to African countries. Potentially, too, they constitute significant social remittances from the Diaspora to the home countries. According to Peggy Levitt, there are three types of social remittances: normative structure, systems of practice, and social capital. Discussing this further, the North-South Center opined that “normative structures are ideas, values and beliefs...systems of practice are the actions created by normative structures...and social capital consists of social networks and associated norms that have an effect on the productivity of a community” (North-South Center, n.d., pp. 7-8). According to brain drain theory, elite migrants (doctors, nurses, engineers, university professors, and other professionals) constitute a loss to the developing countries’ human capital stock. Their return would increase the quality of that human capital stock, thus having a value-added effect on the economy. In general, also, Africans are a friendly people; wherever they live, they form connections and networks that could be tapped as a resource. Normative values are values that immigrants consciously or unconsciously pick up from their host culture, such as work ethic, friendly customer service, forward planning, volunteerism, giving, practical application of knowledge (not just theory), etc. The assumption in brain gain theory is that through remigration the diaspora transfers these networks and values back to the home country.

The six dimensions are visible in African elite migrants’ relationship with their home countries. However, Asian countries have already shown that migration, brain drain, remigration, and subsequent brain gain are possible. India especially provides us examples of how the six dimensions can be combined and how home country governments can tap into the rich resources of the Diaspora. According to Hunger, “although it is still a developing country and worldwide one of the biggest recipients of international development aid, India is one of the most attractive and dynamic development centers of technology products in the world” (2002, p. 7). The key growth has been in the software development sector. Here, Hunger provides a beautiful case study summarized thus:

On a closer look at the Indian software sector it can be seen, that the key positions of this line are to a large portion filled by Non-Resident Indians who left the country and emigrated (mainly to the USA) in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (former “brain drain” Indians). Many of these elites returned to their home country at the beginning of the 1990s after the introduction of the economic liberalization policy. Based on the arisen economic competitive advantage in India these elites have helped to build up the Indian software sector. 10 of the 20 most successful software enterprises in India (which represent more than 40% of the total turnover of the line) were set up by former Non-Resident Indians returning from the USA and/or are managed by them. (Hunger, 2002, p. 10)

Many Asian and Latin American countries, especially India, China, Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico, have experienced postcolonial brain drain a lot sooner and a lot longer than many African countries. It was these Asian case studies that convinced the World Bank and IMF (World Bank, 2007), as well as United Nations, to encourage the mobilization of the Diaspora by African governments for their economic and political development agendas. There is no reason to doubt that, like India and China, African countries could also reap the benefits of brain gain from their vast diasporas. The questions are “when” and “how?”

Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Recommendations

From serious researchers at the World Bank to casual commentators at the street corners, everyone wants an immediate answer to the question: When and how would the brain drain convert to brain gain for affected African countries? And everyone seems to have answers, even if they were improbable, simplistic, or romantic. One thing is clear: turning brain drain to brain gain will not be cheap, but it must be done if desired results were to be obtained. Although many issues tend to be mixed up in the discourse, there are at least two simultaneous propositions: the first proposition is that elite migrants should return home to directly contribute to the development process; the second proposition is that elite migrants who do not return home should contribute indirectly to the development of Africa. The first proposition requires remigration while the second proposition only requires that migrants place their expertise, talents, experiences, and wealth at the disposal of their home countries. All conversations

between the Diaspora and the home governments, and all discussions moderated by the World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank, USAID, and other agencies and organizations, have emphasized elements of these two propositions.

Surprisingly, the World Bank has been a good resource in this conversation. Having seen the results of Diaspora engagements with Asian and Latin American countries, the World Bank has pushed a similar philosophy and promoted the mobilization of the African Diaspora for Africa's development. In September 2007, for instance, the Bank developed a "concept note" entitled "Mobilizing the African Diaspora for Development." Subsequently, the Bank and the AU entered into a partnership and, in February 2010, the Bank again hosted the Second African Diaspora Open House in Washington, D.C. This was a high-powered meeting of some "400 members of the African Diaspora, representatives from 19 countries and 137 associations." The agenda for the meeting was extensive; it covered such matters as the following:

- Diaspora Engagement Policy: What can governments do to encourage and facilitate Diaspora participation?
- Remittances: How can remittances be leveraged for development?
- Brain Gain: How can African Diaspora Professional Networks and organizations contribute to brain gain in home countries?
- Hometown Associations: How can Hometown Associations' contributions be mainstreamed with the development priorities of the government?
(World Bank, "Hosts," 2010)

The Open House deliberated on these matters and others, and came up with several plans and recommendations, including many frank statements about the need for improved governance, accountability, openness, and inclusiveness. According to a published report of the discussions,

During the event, participants emphasized the need to devote sustained and additional resources to improving governance. This included facilitating the Diaspora's participation in policy making and investment by encouraging African governments to take advantage of the Diaspora's intellectual and financial resources as well as members' patriotic motivation. Participants also raised the need to improve channels for remittances. Remittances should be linked to financial products and services such as pensions and micro insurance, they said. Capacity building for women on business development activities was also recommended. As part of the discussions, strategies to improve health services based on the MDGs were debated, including strengthening health systems, and Diaspora engagement through human resources for health,

including training of doctors and nurses. On education, the group noted that Diaspora engagement can be catalytic in the transfer of knowledge. Participants encouraged the Bank to facilitate the process. They also encouraged the contribution of African Diaspora professional networks and organizations to brain gain in home countries. (World Bank, "Africans," 2010)

In other words, well-meaning policy makers and patriotic Africans have pondered the question of turning brain drain into brain gain. The following sets of recommendations follow from existing research, conference proceedings, and interviews I conducted.

1. **Strengthening Diaspora Networks:** Members of the African Diaspora have established many networks, including professional, ethnic, hometown, and alumni networks. Experience shows that Diaspora networks need to be strengthened to promote development. Home country governments need to establish formal channels of communication and engagement with diaspora organizations and members. See Figure 4 for a model of Diaspora-Home Government network and relationship. Until recently, national networks were rare. But times have changed; national organizations have now emerged of African diaspora from Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, and Nigeria, to name a few. Like other African leaders, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria recognized the need to mobilize the Diaspora for development. In 2002, he stimulated the formation of the Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) with large regional bases in North America and Europe. His administration also created a formal link to the government by appointing a Special Assistant to the President on Nigerians in the Diaspora. Nigerian embassies and consulates were also charged with continued engagement with the Diaspora and to strengthen these links. Subsequently, the Obasanjo administration declared July 25 as Nigerian Diaspora Day. The first was celebrated in 2006. The engagement with the Diaspora also extended to the inauguration of another initiative, the Nigerian National Volunteer Service, in 2004 (Ajayi, 2004). While NIDO has made some progress, its leadership has also been scuttled by irreverent ideological, ethnic, and personality conflicts.¹²

In addition to official, national networks, many members of the Diaspora have found it profitable to engage in other kinds of linkages. Individually or collectively, many professors in the Diaspora have worked through their

¹²See NIDO Americas website for more information. <http://www.nidoamericas.org/>.

institutions' international engagement to improve the curriculum, linkages, and academic conditions of African universities. Many of these activities have been undertaken along the professors' international teaching, research, and professional service channels. Examples of such initiatives include book collection and donation to African universities, summer teaching, collaborative research and publishing, joint conferences, and international scholar exchanges. A specific example is the links program between Kennesaw State University (KSU) and four Nigerian universities, initiated by Akanmu Adebayo while serving as executive director of KSU's Institute for Global Initiatives in 2003-2009. Similar individual passion and energy need to be harnessed for national development.




Figure 4 : A Model of Diaspora-Home Government Network and Relationship

2. Providing Enabling Environment for Business and Investment Opportunities: Although the government is currently the biggest “corporation” in Africa, ultimately the key to Africa’s economic development is the private sector. African governments should promote the growth of the private sector by simultaneously providing an enabling environment for its diasporas’ investments. In 2006, for instance, KSU co-organized and co-hosted an international conference on “The Role of the Kenyan Diaspora in Kenya’s Development.” Two Kenyan banks participated in the conference, opening accounts for members of the Diaspora desiring a Kenyan account into which they may transfer funds for family and friends and for real estate and other investments. The World Bank recognizes the need for African Diaspora investments and, in its concept note on mobilizing African diaspora for Africa’s development, recommends that the Bank and African governments should “increase the quality of design and implementation of Diaspora-led investment initiatives...” It further provides the following examples of ways of implementing this:

- a. facilitating business and investment promotion networks through mechanisms for Diaspora and home country partners to access development funds, e.g., organizing Development Marketplace competitions;
- b. facilitating knowledge exchange between [the World Bank’s] Africa Region (AFR) and the Latin America and Caribbean Region (LAC) on business development, e.g., renewable energy systems such as bio-fuels linked to Brazil’s expanding business interests in the Southern Africa region, Caribbean agribusiness export sector practices, and lessons of [Inter-American Development Bank] IADB and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in helping Latin America to leverage remittances for development;
- c. working with the [African Development Bank] AfDB to support a Diaspora Investment Fund based on global initiatives that exploit the benefits of Diaspora remittances;
- d. engaging Diaspora professionals in the implementation of Bank-assisted projects;
- e. assessing the potential of establishing Diaspora business investment, management, and service centers in target countries. Currently, the Diaspora rely on family and friends in business identification and implementation with varied results as these local actors are untrained; often funds get diverted and misused;

- f. facilitating a home country banking sector to develop appropriate loan and credit schemes for Diaspora entrepreneurs; and
- g. identifying business development assistance instruments for services to be rendered to Diaspora entrepreneurs, e.g., business identification, global/local market survey, preparation of business plan, starting a business, business capitalization, etc. (World Bank, 2007)

Several other ideas have been proposed in relation to business and investments. One of them is a proposal that home country governments should float a Diaspora Bond into which members of the Diaspora and others at home may contribute.

3. Jobs and Recruitment: Job creation has been recognized as a panacea for the brain drain. It has the potential of “brain retain” as well as an attractive option for remigration. African governments will need to work with transnational businesses, international organizations, and diaspora networks. The kind of job creation proposed here will, in the words of Philip Emeagwali, require “that we create one million high-tech jobs in Africa. It requires that we move one million high-tech jobs from the United States to Africa” (Emeagwali, 2003, pp. 8-10). As a start, Emeagwali proposes the transfer of call center and customer service/help desk jobs from the United States to African countries. He further opines that Africa has competitive advantage over India or China. We know, of course, that there is more to high-tech jobs than maintenance and customer service. A concept note developed by the World Bank in 2007 envisaged the creation of jobs in small business development and in agribusiness, especially “food processing, packaging, storage, and market-chain extension” (World Bank, 2007). Related to job creation is recruitment. Home country governments, universities, businesses, banks, industries, etc. should actively and deliberately recruit qualified and seasoned members of the Diaspora who are willing to relocate. Many banks and universities are already doing this. The hiring of such skilled and experienced technicians and top-level managers should not be left to chance.

4. Infrastructure: One thing is to recruit, but providing an enabling environment for returnees to succeed is another thing entirely. Of course, there is a need to close the huge gap that currently exists in standard of living and quality of life between African countries and Western industrialized countries. Not everyone in Nigeria would be able to live in posh places such as Victoria Island, Abuja, and Lekki, but the government can replicate infrastructure in these parts for the rest of the country. Moreover, those who live in Lekki have to work and make a living elsewhere. “Home” needs to be attractive enough to spark

remigration. African elite migrants will need to be assured that their quality of life would not diminish significantly. Besides these, the infrastructure needs to be improved across the board to specifically stimulate remigration and also to forestall continued emigration. Anecdotal evidence indicates that for every one member of the Diaspora that relocates home, ten or more arrive in the West by air and boat.

5. Participation in Elections: If their money is important for national development, then, too, should their votes count in selecting the countries' leaders, especially the president. Africans in the Diaspora are as passionate about their home countries' political development, democracy, and stability as they are about the countries' economic development. They want to be engaged and involved. At the least, they want to be able to have a say in the election of the leaders. A few candidates have visited the Diaspora to mobilize fundraising for their campaigns. However, not many countries have extended the ballot to their overseas nationals. There are many advantages to this proposal. In the process of generating a voters' list, the embassies and consulates would also be able to improve on the registration of their nationals—a task that many have given up on. The proposal here is that African countries like Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Egypt, and Ethiopia should ensure that their large Diasporas are not politically disenfranchised.

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Table 1: Foreign-Born Population by Country of Birth, 2006-2008

Place of Birth	2006		2007		2008	
	Estimate	Margin of Error	Estimate	Margin of Error	Estimate	Margin of Error
Total	37,547,315	+/-125,604	38,059,555	+/-119,486	37,960,773	+/-122,987
Africa	1,375,676	+/-29,935	1,419,317	+/-33,778	1,435,996	+/-31,982
<i>Eastern Africa</i>	<i>360,829</i>	<i>+/-15,443</i>	<i>386,225</i>	<i>+/-19,357</i>	<i>386,996</i>	<i>+/-15,969</i>
Ethiopia	126,748	+/-10,628	134,547	+/-11,108	137,012	+/-9,845
Kenya	79,111	+/-7,323	80,595	+/-8,259	83,489	+/-7,862
Other Eastern Africa	154,970	+/-9,435	171,083	+/-11,864	166,495	+/-9,935
<i>Middle Africa</i>	<i>54,437</i>	<i>+/-6,633</i>	<i>56,056</i>	<i>+/-6,827</i>	<i>55,317</i>	<i>+/-7,156</i>
<i>Northern Africa</i>	<i>261,469</i>	<i>+/-14,397</i>	<i>274,951</i>	<i>+/-13,416</i>	<i>255,942</i>	<i>+/-13,054</i>
Egypt	136,931	+/-9,603	136,648	+/-9,051	129,970	+/-7,764
Other Northern Africa	124,538	+/-9,846	138,303	+/-9,547	125,972	+/-9,665
<i>Southern Africa</i>	<i>81,236</i>	<i>+/-5,223</i>	<i>81,595</i>	<i>+/-6,919</i>	<i>81,698</i>	<i>+/-6,200</i>
South Africa	79,472	+/-5,051	78,571	+/-6,685	79,585	+/-6,200
Other Southern Africa	1,764	+/-641	3,024	+/-1,491	2,113	+/-943
<i>Western Africa</i>	<i>490,263</i>	<i>+/-16,790</i>	<i>505,619</i>	<i>+/-18,255</i>	<i>535,192</i>	<i>+/-24,209</i>
Ghana	103,051	+/-9,139	104,842	+/-7,842	108,802	+/-8,394
Liberia	64,100	+/-6,562	72,125	+/-8,397	65,373	+/-6,903
Nigeria	197,489	+/-11,721	185,787	+/-11,722	206,604	+/-13,728
Other Western Africa	125,623	+/-8,501	142,865	+/-9,149	154,413	+/-12,580
<i>Africa, not elsewhere classified</i>	<i>127,442</i>	<i>+/-10,228</i>	<i>114,871</i>	<i>+/-8,228</i>	<i>120,851</i>	<i>+/-8,841</i>

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, accessed August 4, 2010, <http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm>.

Table 2: Persons Naturalized by Country of Origin, 2000-2009

Region and country of birth	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
REGION										
Total	886,026	606,259	572,646	462,435	537,151	604,280	702,589	660,477	1,046,539	743,715
Africa	25,792	24,255	31,489	28,529	34,531	38,830	50,397	41,652	54,420	60,383
COUNTRY										
Nigeria	4,128	4,349	6,412	5,691	6,470	6,894	8,652	6,582	8,597	9,298
Ethiopia	2,758	2,756	3,892	3,820	4,255	4,621	5,397	5,165	7,160	8,698
Egypt	3,486	3,779	3,698	2,922	3,726	4,061	4,271	3,231	4,165	5,224
Ghana	2,032	1,828	3,326	2,831	3,577	3,561	4,760	3,181	4,557	4,819
Morocco	1,197	1,247	1,274	1,283	1,841	2,628	3,643	2,684	3,383	4,556
Sudan	514	739	1,012	839	1,104	1,551	2,587	2,785	2,893	2,855
Liberia	1,022	778	1,047	917	1,218	1,548	2,193	1,815	2,468	2,767
Kenya	932	731	865	823	997	1,158	1,636	1,396	2,218	2,546
South Africa	1,965	1,468	1,526	1,262	1,453	1,495	2,225	2,069	2,980	2,436
Togo	58	57	113	153	204	291	536	473	673	1,132
Cameroon	285	299	461	534	575	661	771	611	967	1,098
Algeria	426	469	615	493	616	722	825	578	894	1,024
Senegal	218	250	346	274	371	401	503	386	566	640
Cote d'Ivoire	184	171	271	264	317	324	491	382	479	589
Tanzania	419	333	345	295	348	363	490	356	464	567
Uganda	429	296	321	279	327	340	477	344	541	489
Zimbabwe	274	206	231	210	225	260	322	312	413	489
Zambia	227	158	168	134	180	159	239	212	290	289
Libya	181	171	163	112	130	173	142	136	198	249
Mali	48	51	72	64	66	85	118	93	124	149
Angola	113	85	68	64	87	86	106	105	161	95
Niger	554	183	110	46	46	48	46	52	73	67
Mozambique	68	29	57	32	40	50	62	45	73	47
Chad	9	12	3	24	27	19	18	22	22	27
Namibia	13	15	13	13	13	18	17	22	38	27

Note: Based on N-400 data for persons aged 18 and over.

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, accessed August 4, 2010, <http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm>.

Table 3: Persons Obtaining Permanent Residence Status by Region and Country of Birth

Region / country of birth	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
REGION										
Total	841,00 2	1,058,90 2	1,059,35 6	703,54 2	957,88 3	1,122,25 7	1,266,12 9	1,052,41 5	1,107,12 6	1,130,81 8
Africa	44,534	53,731	60,101	48,642	66,422	85,098	117,422	94,711	105,915	127,050
COUNTRY										
Ethiopia	4,053	5,092	7,565	6,635	8,286	10,571	16,152	12,786	12,917	15,462
Nigeria	7,831	8,253	8,105	7,872	9,374	10,597	13,459	12,448	12,475	15,253
Kenya	2,197	2,501	3,199	3,209	5,335	5,347	8,779	7,030	6,998	9,880
Egypt	4,450	5,159	4,852	3,348	5,522	7,905	10,500	9,267	8,712	8,844
Ghana	4,339	4,023	4,248	4,410	5,337	6,491	9,367	7,610	8,195	8,401
Sudan	1,531	1,650	2,921	1,883	3,211	5,231	5,504	2,930	3,598	3,577
Cameroon	860	791	984	927	1,309	1,458	2,919	3,392	3,771	3,463
South Africa	2,824	4,090	3,861	2,210	3,370	4,536	3,201	2,988	2,723	3,171
Tanzania	480	476	577	554	747	829	949	832	838	2,773
Sierra Leone	1,585	1,878	2,246	1,492	1,596	2,731	3,572	1,999	2,795	2,687
Cape Verde	1,079	868	871	745	1,015	1,225	1,780	2,048	1,916	2,238
Cote d'Ivoire	439	596	629	483	666	930	2,067	1,193	1,645	2,159
Togo	386	487	935	1,187	2,041	1,523	1,720	1,565	1,661	1,680
Senegal	554	663	530	522	769	913	1,367	1,024	1,149	1,524
Burundi	28	79	120	74	100	186	320	257	255	1,505
Algeria	906	875	1,030	759	805	1,115	1,300	1,036	1,037	1,485
Uganda	418	457	575	455	721	858	1,372	1,122	1,174	1,364
Zimbabwe	322	475	484	358	628	923	1,049	1,057	953	983
Gambia	231	390	343	263	422	581	897	826	739	978
Zambia	211	295	308	280	359	499	672	576	613	704
Mauritania	88	117	124	131	170	275	720	651	844	597
Mali	109	119	105	124	163	277	408	412	523	576

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, accessed August 4, 2010, <http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm>.


Table 4: Nonimmigrant Admissions (I-94 only) by Region and Country of Citizenship, 2000-2009

Region or country of citizenship	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
REGION										
Total	33,660,320	32,824,088	27,907,139	27,849,443	30,781,330	32,003,435	33,667,328	37,149,651	39,381,928	36,231,554
Africa	447,131	465,598	387,396	371,799	384,442	395,734	394,163	426,922	474,160	452,693
COUNTRY										
South Africa	130,794	129,708	105,054	106,256	111,563	120,522	119,165	124,564	123,725	107,238
Nigeria	39,655	48,490	50,750	59,824	61,550	64,697	61,107	69,985	88,732	88,473
Egypt	60,685	61,854	37,475	31,447	32,164	34,659	38,115	43,139	47,706	49,838
Ghana	22,409	24,935	26,023	28,510	29,028	22,988	20,677	20,903	27,125	23,943
Kenya	18,210	23,755	22,769	18,527	19,636	19,244	19,607	21,843	23,186	21,443
Ethiopia	9,121	9,369	8,433	9,044	8,189	7,656	9,096	10,964	12,468	12,116
Senegal	14,544	14,845	11,349	10,262	9,350	8,235	7,360	7,696	9,437	9,582
Cameroon	6,325	7,787	8,360	8,194	7,972	7,982	8,558	9,094	9,517	9,329
Zimbabwe	10,026	9,394	7,824	7,706	8,026	7,832	7,599	7,831	7,968	7,238
Angola	4,284	4,267	4,137	4,091	4,432	4,807	5,206	6,235	6,509	7,147
Mali	4,756	5,737	3,760	3,881	2,609	2,646	3,567	4,055	4,549	4,464
Cote d'Ivoire	5,274	5,457	3,207	2,235	2,444	2,381	3,290	3,001	3,837	4,216
Libya	385	452	347	270	402	757	949	1,680	4,313	3,711
Burkina Faso	1,508	1,657	1,915	1,708	1,760	2,169	2,507	2,674	2,767	2,862
Sierra Leone	2,568	2,762	2,297	2,409	2,594	2,257	2,362	2,630	2,892	2,711
Gambia	3,823	3,178	3,840	3,509	2,854	2,749	1,969	2,022	2,014	2,394
Togo	2,029	2,565	2,341	2,293	2,201	1,779	1,563	1,689	1,855	1,765
Liberia	4,796	3,449	2,312	1,651	1,684	1,409	1,299	2,228	1,948	1,681
Niger	1,620	2,076	6,260	2,890	3,955	4,487	2,781	1,426	1,243	1,380
Chad	515	539	486	398	355	478	532	652	522	541

Note: Admissions represent counts of events, i.e., arrivals, not unique individuals. Admission totals exceed the number of nonimmigrants admitted. Also, the majority of short-term admissions from Canada and Mexico are excluded.


Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, accessed August 4, 2010, <http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm>.

Figure 1: Source Countries with the Largest Populations in the United States as Percentages of the Total Foreign-Born Population: 2008




Source: MPI Data Hub, accessed August 11, 2010, <http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/charts/10.2008.shtml>.

Figure 2: Foreign Born as a Percentage of the Total Population and of the Civilian Labor Force by State, 1970 to 2008



Source: MPI Data Hub. http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/charts/laborforce_2.shtml, retrieved August 11, 2010

Figure 3: Foreign-Born Population by Region of Birth, for the United States, 1960 to 2008 (in millions)



Source: MPI Data Hub. http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/charts/tb_1.shtml retrieved August 11, 2010

Table 5: Persons Naturalized by World Region, 2000-2009

Region and Country of citizenship	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
REGION										
Total	886,026	606,259	572,646	462,435	537,151	604,280	702,589	660,477	1,046,539	743,715
Africa	25,792	24,255	31,489	28,529	34,531	38,830	50,397	41,652	54,420	60,383
Asia	338,532	253,275	238,965	196,972	224,072	243,514	263,516	243,783	330,361	276,375
Europe	112,616	82,451	86,540	68,902	83,916	91,692	101,068	81,756	108,618	90,149
North America	345,980	200,089	169,548	130,551	151,047	180,572	223,086	241,163	462,372	250,266
Oceania	2,676	2,585	2,348	2,889	3,551	3,898	3,657	3,342	4,781	3,928
South America	57,807	42,155	42,812	33,635	38,676	44,504	59,985	48,133	84,853	61,674
Unknown	2,623	1,449	944	957	1,358	1,270	880	648	1,134	940

Note: Based on N-400 data for persons aged 18 and over.

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, accessed August 4, 2010, <http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm>.

Table 7: Aliens Removed by Criminal Status and Region/Country of Nationality, 2000-2008

Year	Criminal Status	All Countries	African Countries	Nigeria	Ghana	Egypt	Kenya	Ethiopia	South Africa	Zimbabwe
2000	All Removed	188,467	1,593	468	239	102	46	22	40	8
	Criminal	73,065	623	277	49	25	17	9	17	D
	Non-Criminal	115,402	970	191	190	77	29	13	23	D
2001	All Removed	189,026	1,532	421	227	95	50	22	32	19
	Criminal	73,545	585	246	48	17	19	13	15	3
	Non-Criminal	115,481	947	175	179	78	31	9	22	16
2002	All Removed	165,168	2,110	471	213	290	90	31	54	25
	Criminal	72,818	697	238	40	70	34	13	15	8
	Non-Criminal	92,350	1,413	233	173	220	56	18	39	17
2003	All Removed	211,098	2,706	640	306	322	118	77	74	17
	Criminal	82,822	886	341	64	52	45	27	27	4
	Non-Criminal	128,276	1,820	299	242	270	73	50	47	13
2004	All Removed	24,066	2,662	557	299	256	129	78	72	23
	Criminal	91,508	868	284	57	62	49	17	32	11
	Non-Criminal	149,157	1,794	273	242	194	80	61	40	12
2005	All Removed	264,431	2,372	480	218	233	117	94	73	34
	Criminal	91,725	770	238	76	47	33	19	23	5
	Non-Criminal	154,706	1,602	242	142	186	84	75	50	29
2006	All Removed	280,974	2,103	419	187	172	97	105	69	26
	Criminal	97,365	705	207	68	33	32	49	26	11
	Non-Criminal	183,608	1,398	211	119	139	65	56	43	15
2007	All Removed	319,382	2,112	435	231	145	126	156	45	29
	Criminal	99,924	776	235	86	25	33	79	12	D
	Non-Criminal	219,458	1,336	200	145	120	93	71	33	D
2008	All Removed	358,886	1,999	435	198	157	135	79	55	36
	Criminal	97,133	626	213	55	37	31	34	18	D
	Non-Criminal	261,753	1,373	222	145	120	104	45	37	D

D: Data withheld to limit disclosure.

Source: Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, accessed August 4, 2010, <http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm>.