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# Aiding and Abetting: Human Rights INGOs and Domestic Protest

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## **Aiding and Abetting: Human Rights INGOs and Domestic Protest**

### **1. Statement of the Question**

Human rights international non-governmental organizations (human rights INGOs, or, more commonly, HROs) are active across the globe, often taking center stage with their campaigns to reduce human rights violations.<sup>1</sup> Amnesty International received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977; other HROs and INGOs have won the prize at least ten times in the last twenty years. This increase in attention has been accompanied by an exponential increase in numbers: in the last twenty years, over 50 countries have seen increases of over 500% in the number of HROs active within their borders (UIA 2008/2009).

Staggering numbers and visible presence aside, HROs are widely viewed as the critical link in improving a state's human rights performance. HRO activities direct international media attention towards a targeted state, encouraging external pressure to improve its human rights record (Keck and Sikkink 1998). They also provide the tools, attention, and support domestic populations need to protest against a repressive state themselves (Risse and Ropp 1999). HROs often train and inform domestic populations of the utility of non-violent protest strategies, encouraging individuals to drop their arms and protest peacefully (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). Despite this classic theoretical view of the importance of HROs, very few empirical studies systematically examine the impact of these organizations on state-dissident relations. In this paper, we map out the effects of

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<sup>1</sup>An NGO is minimally defined as any non-profit, non-governmental, legal, voluntary organization (*Yearbook of International Organizations*, a standard NGO reference). For the purposes of this project, we focus on international NGOs (INGOs) with active members in at least 3 states and an expressed interest in human rights (UIA 2008/2009).

HROs on violent and nonviolent protest by citizens against their government.<sup>2</sup> Establishing the link between HROs and domestic protest is a crucial component in understanding any subsequent effect of HRO activity on states' human rights records. We ask three related questions. First, do the activities of HROs have a direct influence on a domestic population's non-violent actions against their government? Secondly, do HROs have a direct influence on a domestic population's violent protest activities? Finally, does the type of HRO activity matter?

Consistent with existing scholarship, we argue that increased HRO activities expand resources for new and existing protest movements, leading to higher levels of domestic non-violent protest. In addition, we argue that increases in HRO activities initiate diffusion mechanisms that also lead to higher levels of violent domestic protest against a state. Further, we hypothesize that the impact of HROs on domestic protest varies by the type of activities the organizations are conducting within a state. These activities, such as criticizing a repressive regime or setting up a permanent office structure, signify varying levels of commitment to a domestic population. When HROs have a permanent presence within a state, the greatest level of commitment, they have the most salient impact on domestic protest. This is in comparison to circumstances where HROs have some local volunteers within the target state or where they only remotely target the state (“naming and shaming” or “shaming and blaming”) from abroad.

Utilizing two new datasets, one on nonviolent and violent anti-government protest and one on the activities of over 400 HROs throughout the world, we test these propositions quantitatively. We find that increases in some HRO activities have a positive impact on domestic non-violent

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<sup>2</sup> Following convention in the literature, we define domestic protest as active, organized claims, violent or nonviolent in nature, which a domestic group makes against state actors (Gupta et al. 1993).

protest behavior. This is a heretofore unexamined link that flows from Keck and Sikkink's (1998) transnational advocacy network framework. Moreover, we find strong support for our hypothesized linkage between increases in certain high commitment HRO activities and greater levels of domestic violent protest.

This paper makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, we present a highly nuanced picture of HRO motivations and activities. We highlight the varying levels of commitment inherent in these different HRO activities and their disparate consequences for domestic politics, adding to the growing cross-disciplinary literature on HROs/INGOs. We bridge the literatures on HRO activity and political protest, presenting unique theoretical explanations for the effects of HRO activity across violent and nonviolent forms of protest.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, we present the relevant literature and our central argument connecting HRO activity with violent and nonviolent political protest. Next, we outline our research design and methodology. We then discuss the empirical results and the substantive significance of these results. Finally, we conclude with the implications of these findings for existing theory and future work on HROs/INGOs and political protest.

## **2. Background & Theory**

### **2.1 The Dominant Theoretical Framework on HROs/INGOs**

The transnational advocacy network (hereafter TAN) framework centers on the role that HROs and other INGOs play in strengthening advocacy attempts and pressuring states to change behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Ropp 1999). As Keck and Sikkink (1998) find, "initial research suggests that international and domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a central role in most advocacy networks" (92). Within an advocacy network, INGOs are viewed as potential allies for domestic groups seeking changes in state policy and conduct. If state actors are

unresponsive to a domestic group's demands, the domestic group seeks out INGOs to petition the state from abroad. In TAN terminology, this is referred to as sending out a “boomerang” (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

INGOs provide connections, funds, and information to support domestic groups in their efforts to organize and pressure the state. INGOs can also increase global awareness of the plight of these groups, encouraging the international community, including private foundations, the media in Western democracies, churches, intellectuals, intergovernmental organizations, and third party state governments, to influence the repressive state as well. Thus, the state is spurred to change its policies as a result of pressure from both below and above, completing what looks like a “boomerang pattern” of advocacy behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998:12).

## **2.2 Critiques to the Dominant Framework on HROs/INGOs**

Though the TAN framework is useful at understanding the process by which INGOs aid overall advocacy attempts, the assumptions underlying the TAN framework have been criticized on many fronts (Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Carpenter 2007; Murdie 2009). Most strikingly, according to the TAN framework, INGOs are assumed to be motivated by “values rather than material concerns” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). This is a strong assumption, as much of political science assumes that all actors are self-interested and not wholly altruistic (Fearon 1995). Moreover, the pure altruism assumption contradicts many accounts of what INGOs are actually doing on the ground (Clark et al. 2006; Sundstrom 2006; Berkovitch and Gordon 2008).

Instead of trying to assist all domestic populations in their struggles against an obdurate regime, there is often a “donor dominance” that occurs with INGOs, where these organizations are motivated by material motives, prioritizing the concerns and interests of their Western donors above mission-related altruistic motives (Grant and Keohane 2005; Murdie 2009). A broader strain of

literature finds that INGOs may not be responsive to all calls for help by domestic populations, as some domestic movements may be less effective in garnering donor support and attention (Klees 1998; Bob 2005).

### **2.3 Developing a Theory of the Impact of HROs on Domestic Protest**

We use these critiques of the TAN's altruism assumption as a springboard from which to examine the impact of HROs on domestic protest. We view both HROs and domestic groups as strategic and self-interested, looking to maximize their gains at the least cost possible. While we concentrate on the direct relationship between domestic groups and HROs, we recognize that this interaction takes place in a larger, more complex political setting that includes the state and its decision making calculus.

#### **2.3.1. HROs and Domestic Protest Groups: What do they do?**

Domestic groups and HROs typically share a common goal: change in a state's policy or behavior. Domestic protest groups seek to influence state behavior across a gamut of issue areas, ranging from the protection of civil liberties or wage related concerns to demanding greater autonomy from the state. In the pursuit of these goals, they employ two main types of strategies: nonviolent protest and violent protest. Nonviolent domestic protest includes all claims made by domestic groups against a government in an organized, active manner, without the threat or use of force (Schock 2005; Bhasin 2008). These actions would include activities such as strikes, demonstrations and rallies. Conversely, violent domestic protest includes the threat or use of force directed at state offices or agents, such as a physical assault against a government official or the bombing of a government office. We argue that domestic groups seek to maximize their utility and choose the strategy best suited to achieve these goals.

HROs too have different strategies with which they attempt to influence state behavior. HROs themselves, however, have “no direct ability to change policy” or behavior (Schepers 2006: 283). Instead, as mentioned, HROs have to work with other actors, such as the international community and domestic groups, to cause governmental actors to alter behavior. HROs work to educate individuals and groups, mediate between local and global centers of power, attract international media attention, and, most importantly, try to gain local and international respect as experts on an advocacy issue. We discuss three different types of strategies by HROs below, in increasing order of commitment made by the HRO to a domestic population.

Most commonly, HROs use a strategy of careful targeting of state actors, often termed “shaming and blaming” or “naming and shaming” (Schmitz 2002). Through these tactics, HROs attempt to influence third party states and intergovernmental organizations (hereafter IGOs) to assist in pressuring a target-state from above (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Ropp 1999). This tactic can occur both from within a state and, more frequently, remotely from beyond the targeted state. For example, Amnesty International often targets repressive states with news releases issued from either its London or New York City based locations (Hopgood 2006; Murdie 2009). This strategy, utilizing *remote shaming and blaming*, reflects the lowest level of commitment from the HROs towards the affected domestic population in the target state. Since “shaming and blaming” is typically completely external, it can be essential in getting IGOs and third-party states involved but might not even be known to the repressed domestic population.

A second strategy, involving some direct engagement with local populations in the target state, occurs when the HRO sends volunteers to a country or works to build a *local membership* base (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Through locally-based volunteers or members, HROs work to change domestic attitudes, gather and provide information, and increase domestic pressure on a

regime (Korey 1998). These local representatives serve as conduits for resources provided by HROs, including the latest information about government atrocities and assistance to local groups already engaged in pressuring their governments for better protection of human rights.

The highest level of commitment to a domestic population is reflected in another common strategy of HROs: setting up of a *permanent office* within a state. The permanent office often comes with the commitment of a number of full-time staff and volunteers who are designated resources by the HRO to be used in the country (Okafor 2006). The HRO office serves as a central point for distributing information, education, and training resources to local groups. The HRO may also be central to the building and expanding of networks of local groups, across issue areas, within a state (Bartley 2007). By setting up a permanent office, the HRO is best able to establish long term partnerships with domestic groups, start educational programs, and influence policy making (Hopgood 2006; Okafor 2006).

HROs and domestic protest groups often rely on each other's support. For domestic populations and protest groups on the ground, HROs are repositories with resources of great value. These may include direct funding to help the domestic protest group in expanding its organizational capabilities and access to media attention and the "brand name" of the HRO, potentially softening the state's repressive response in the protest group's favor (Bob 2005). Additional resources include training of local activists and increasing their contact to other groups and advocacy actors within a specific network. HROs may inform domestic groups of additional protest tactics that have proved effective against repressive states in other circumstances.

On the other hand, HROs with offices in foreign locations and those without extensive local experience may lack legitimacy in the eyes of the domestic population (Sundstrom 2006; Murdie 2009). Partnering with domestic protest groups provides HROs legitimacy on the ground and can



aid in enhancing the HRO's image and influence on a regime's policies and behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998). This symbiotic relationship between HROs and domestic protest groups was identified as critical to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa: HROs provided international attention, skills and resources to domestic protest groups, who aided in expanding the legitimacy and place for HROs within the state (Taylor 2002). Further, as the practitioner literature has highlighted, HROs often depend on the support of domestic groups to justify and attract greater funding from international donors (Clark et al. 2006).

### **2.3.2 HRO Activity -Effects on Nonviolent and Violent Protest**

Our theoretical argument builds on an existing literature that links broader civil society actions to ethnic group protests (Olzak and Tsutsui 1998; Tsutsui 2004; Olzak 2006). This scholarship contends that the diffusion of protective global norms by transnational actors (including INGOs) has a positive influence on the mobilization of new groups, particularly new ethnic movements, at the local level. By improving human rights conditions within a state, INGOs also lead to increased competition between ethnic groups and, subsequently, higher levels of violent and nonviolent ethnic protest. Thus, increased violent and nonviolent ethnic protests are the indirect and unintended consequences of broad INGO activity.

Our argument is different from the above studies in several important ways. While this literature focuses on broad INGO membership, our theoretical and empirical focus, as mentioned, is particularly on *human rights* INGOs (HROs). Therefore, we are not interested in any tenuous connection between one of the many professional or leisure organizations categorized as an INGO, such as the World Association of Seaweed Processors or Starfleet – the International Star Trek

Association, and domestic anti-government protest.<sup>3</sup> Further, our theoretical focus is not on the impact of global civil society on ethnic protest alone but in the specific impact of HROs on domestic protest activities against a state. We also broaden this existing literature by contending that HROs have both direct intended and unintended effects on domestic mobilization across a broad spectrum of local groups, not just groups based on ethnic identities. In this regard, we diverge from the existing literature and examine the particular impact of HROs on state-dissident relations.

Below, we highlight different causal mechanisms linking HRO activity to nonviolent protest than those between HRO activity and violent protest. First, increases in some HRO activities provide resources to domestic nonviolent protest groups that have *direct and intended* consequences, resulting in increased levels of nonviolent protest. Additionally, we delineate the strong *direct* and yet often *unintended* consequences of increased HRO activity that lead to greater levels of violent protest. We outline these casual mechanisms and their testable implications in the following section.

### **HRO Activity and Resource Based Mobilization of Nonviolent Protest Groups**

HROs direct greater resources to moderate groups adopting nonviolent strategies than more radical groups, particularly those utilizing violent strategies. This selective process of support is called the *radical flank effect*, first highlighted in Herbert Haines' (1984) work on the civil rights movement in the United States. Haines (1984) and others since have found that foundations and INGOs looking to support grassroots movements were selective in their support of domestic groups, supporting only those they saw as legitimate. This led to greater support for moderate groups, who were encouraged to dominate the movement, over radical groups (Oliver and Myers 2002; Haines

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<sup>3</sup> Both of these INGOs would have been included in previous theoretical and empirical studies which focus on all INGOs (UIA 2008/2009).

2006). As a result, moderate groups pursuing nonviolent strategies garner greater resources due to their selective support from larger organizations. This finding applies well to the realm of human rights. As highlighted before, foundations and donors control the agenda and strategies of HROs. Self-interested HROs, looking to maintain a stable flow of resources, are constrained by the concerns of large Western donors and, by extension, their preferences for supporting groups using nonviolent means. Thus HROs would seek to distance themselves from more radical and violent groups.

Further, both HROs and domestic protest groups share material concerns: to maintain and increase resources to best achieve their shared goals. Domestic groups are made aware of these concerns and socialized by HROs to use nonviolent protest tactics and abstain from the use of violent activities. Within the institutionalized realm of politics, these nonviolent groups are not seen as threats to the stability of the target state and its political institutions (Oliver and Myers 2002; Berkovitch and Gordon 2008). Nonviolent campaigns against governments may also be more successful at reaching political goals (Stephen and Chenoweth 2008). As a result, HROs direct greater resources towards nonviolent groups.

This increased HRO support comes in the form of information regarding the location of government violations, training in nonviolent protest tactics, and provision of material resources. Domestic protest groups function in a competitive environment; groups with a stable flow of resources are better able to attract new volunteers and remain viable. The availability of these resources from HROs can also be exploited by a host of new nonviolent groups looking to support the political cause. Thus, all of these resources, in accordance with the *resource mobilization* literature, help existing domestic nonviolent protest groups to mobilize their supporters as well as encourage new nonviolent groups to form (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983).

Case studies on domestic protest highlight a similar HRO-domestic non-violent protest link (Taylor 2002; Schock 2005). For example, Schock (2005) points to HRO activities aiding domestic non-violent protest in the Philippines in the early 1980s by providing space and attention to repressed groups in the country (182). Similarly, the nonviolent movement in South Africa, as mentioned above, was aided by HRO training, resources, and attention (Taylor 2002). Even the recent non-violent Orange Revolution within Ukraine has been linked to assistance provided by HROs and other types of INGOs. In the latter, in particular, cell phones provided by HROs to domestic protesters helped them maintain better communication with each other. This increased networking, within the larger movement, led to more effective action and, one could argue, a greater level of nonviolent protest activity (Wallander 2005; Wilson 2006). Within all of these examples, increased HRO activities provided greater resources that led to *direct and intended* mobilization for both existing domestic groups as well as new groups choosing to protest non-violently against their government.

Based on the above theoretical argument, we posit the following hypothesis:

**HYPOTHESIS 1: Increases in HRO activity are associated with greater levels of domestic, anti-state, non-violent protest.**

### **HRO Activity and Diffusion Based Mobilization of Violent Protest Groups**

At the outset, the causal relationship between increased HRO activity and violent domestic protest is more complex. On one hand, as described above, domestic protest groups are encouraged to switch their strategies from violent to nonviolent ones based on fears of disruption in funding and the new promise of support provided from HROs encouraging nonviolent tactics (Berkovitch and Gordon 2008). While this would lead us to believe that increased HRO activities would lead to an

overall decrease in the use of domestic violent protest, more recent accounts of broader social movements, including the civil rights movement (Haines 2006) and the environmental movement (Bartley 2007) question this narrow view of INGO activity aiding institutional, professionalized and nonviolent forms of domestic protest alone.

Several recent studies find that INGOs, including HROs, while disavowing disruptive strategies and distancing themselves from groups using violent means, on the ground often work within advocacy movements that include actors using both violent and nonviolent strategies (Haines 2006; Bartley 2007). Haines (2006) finds that members of Amnesty International in the United States, while not always in their official capacity as representatives, participated in a variety of protests, some more disruptive and violent than others; the differentiation at the donors' and HRO's end between domestic violent and nonviolent protest groups is a false dichotomy on the ground.

One explanation for the blurring of lines is the use of nonviolent and violent strategies by the same domestic groups at different times (Oliver and Myers 2002; Haines 2006; Bartley 2007). For example, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa grew out of a violent movement. In another issue area, environmental INGOs have often protested violently against governments and multinational corporations (McCormick 1999).

A more compelling explanation for the positive effects of HRO activities on violent protest, however relies on *protest diffusion* mechanisms (Haines 1984). As highlighted above, violent and nonviolent protest groups operate in the same political arena and often share the same political goals. There is value in recognizing the self-interested desire for nonviolent groups to distinguish themselves as more effective (Schock 2005) and more legitimate to attract greater funding (Haines 1986). However, diffusion-based mobilization processes on the ground do not depend on selective resources made available by HROs to nonviolent groups alone. Instead, the resources provided by

HROs diffuse from nonviolent protest groups to a variety of other actors, including those utilizing violence. Two types of diffusion processes are especially important in their effects on violent protests: *local media attention* and *field-building* (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Bartley 2007).

Scholars studying the effects of local media coverage on protest mobilization point to links between greater local attention and a greater number of protest events, (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Bartley 2007) particularly violent protest events (Myers 2000; Koopmans and Olzak 2004). Domestic groups, through paying attention to information on protest events initiated in nearby cities or districts, are likely to be inspired to initiate protest actions themselves. Kern (2008) finds that international news coverage has no significant effect on local domestic protest mobilization in East Germany; instead, it is the *local* attention to protest activities that leads to increased domestic protest events.

Connecting these processes, we argue that the working of the local media attention diffusion process, described above, hinges upon the HRO having some local presence in the target state. This local diffusion process would not work through remote shaming and blaming activities of HROs. International shaming and blaming in foreign locations may or may not reach domestic groups involved in protest activities on the ground; this attention is often closely controlled domestically by target states with less than positive human rights records (Kern 2008).

HROs with some local presence, however, are likely to have two advantages that affect local diffusion processes. First, they are likely to have more detailed and reliable information about recent protest activities by domestic groups and repressive actions taken by target governments, one of the key services HROs provide (Haines 2006). Second, HROs with some local presence are in the unique position to utilize their international “brand name” (Bob 2005) and ties to local advocacy

networks to disseminate information and mobilize new violent protest events through this local media attention diffusion mechanism.

The second diffusion mechanism relies on a related and potentially more important causal link between HROs and violent protest: *field-building* activities. Field-building activities include any action taken within a local context to connect the large “field” of relevant advocacy movement actors (Bartley 2007). Field-building activities of INGOs connect a wide network of actors on the ground, across issue areas, ideologies, and preferences for strategy, all united for a common cause. This implies that HROs, while perhaps preferring to support nonviolent groups over violent ones, would be realistically engaging in activities that support a wide range of actors and strategies, not just those relegated to the institutionalized or nonviolent realm alone (Haines 2006; Bartley 2007).

As Clarke (1998) highlights, HROs and other international NGOs “often mobilize sectors already organized and politically active” (208). In the *field-building* literature, the emphasis is on INGOs, including HROs, increasing interaction between domestic groups on the ground, creating more complex and dense networks of actors who adhere to a variety of principles and strategies (Haines 2006; Bartley 2007). It follows that the informational and material resources provided by HROs could be used by any organized domestic group, even groups that use violent protest strategies. Thus, increases in HRO activities may lead to *direct and unintended* positive effects on levels of domestic violent protests.

Finally, HROs may also have *direct intended* effects on violent protest. Specifically, HROs are often concerned with gaining international donations and appearing effective to donors. Therefore, in some cases, HROs may support violent domestic protest simply because the attention that violent protests can bring are effective for completing a “boomerang” pattern of international advocacy. In addition, these HROs may recognize violent protest as an effective strategy for

gaining greater world media attention and their own self-motivated financial goals (Bob 2005). Willetts (2002) clearly points to evidence highlighting that a “small number of NGOs may be associated with violent political protests” (1). Thus, HROs may have a *direct intended* or *unintended* positive effect on violent protest.

These arguments support our second hypothesis:

**HYPOTHESIS 2: Increases in HRO activity are associated with greater levels of domestic violent anti-state protest.**

### **Varying Levels of HRO Commitment and Domestic Nonviolent and Violent Protest**

The causal connections between HROs and domestic anti-governmental protest depend, as outlined above, on the radical plank effect and resource mobilization, for nonviolent protest, and local media attention and field-building diffusion processes, for violent protest. Further, we argue that these processes are not present in all HRO activities; instead, these causal processes depend on HRO activities that reflect a high level of commitment to the local population.

While practitioners have recognized a variety of strategies employed by HROs, there is limited theoretical attention paid to how these activities differ in their effects on domestic politics. We argue that the common strategies of HROs (remote shaming and blaming, local membership base, and permanent office location) reflect varying levels of commitment to the local population and, thus, have different levels of influence on domestic protest, both violent and nonviolent. As mentioned, domestic protest groups utilize many resources from HROs, including funding, information, protest training, and increased network contacts with other actors in the field. However, these resources are unlikely to be provided through remote shaming and blaming, activities at the lowest level of HRO commitment, which applies international pressure from abroad



(Risse and Ropp 1999). Although remote shaming and blaming may indirectly benefit domestic protest groups through later improved human rights records, it does not have the radical plank and resource mobilization effects necessary at the domestic level to lead to direct increases in domestic nonviolent protest against a state.

As argued above, local media attention and field-building are crucial in mobilizing domestic protest groups, leading to a diffusion effect from nonviolent to violent protest. Because remote shaming and blaming activities are geared towards international media attention, it follows that they do not provide the local information transmission necessary for an effect on violent domestic protest. Likewise, without a local presence, it is unlikely that remote shaming and blaming will provide any field-building effects. Therefore, remote shaming and blaming activities by HROs are posited to have no direct influence on domestic nonviolent or violent protest.

Conversely, we argue that increases in HRO activities with greater levels of commitment to the domestic population, reflected either through a local membership base or through a permanent office location, have direct effects on domestic nonviolent and violent protest. A local presence can be crucial in providing the resources necessary for the direct mobilization of domestic nonviolent protest groups. A local membership or volunteer base is also likely to catalyze the protest diffusion mechanisms necessary for effects on violent protest. Therefore, increases in HRO local membership bases are likely to be associated with more violent and nonviolent protest activities.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Worth noting, however, a local membership base of an HRO varies in its organizational capacity. Some states may have just a handful of volunteers or members of the HRO that only meet once a year; others might have a large and resource-rich membership base (Boli and Thomas 1999; UIA 2008/2009). If weak, any effect of a local membership base on domestic protest may be diminished.

Finally, the greatest level of commitment demonstrated by HROs is in the establishment of permanent office locations within the state. These offices are best situated to interact and expand local networks of actors (Okafor 2006; Murdie 2009). Offices provide a steady level of support, a gathering place for local volunteer members, information, and financial and training resource transmission, all necessary for the resource mobilization, local media attention, and field-building mechanisms. Permanent locations are thus intricately linked to the direct intended and unintended effects of HROs on domestic nonviolent and violent anti-state protest.

Based on these arguments, we present the following two hypotheses:

**HYPOTHESIS 3a: The type of HRO activity matters for its impact on domestic protest. Increased HRO *permanent locations* are associated with the greatest positive influence on domestic nonviolent and violent protest activities, as compared to increased *local membership* and *remote shaming and blaming* activities.**

**HYPOTHESIS 3b: Increased *local membership* bases by HROs are likely to be associated with greater positive effects on levels of domestic nonviolent protest and violent protest, as compared to *remote shaming and blaming* activities.**

### **3. Empirical Analysis**

To examine the validity of the hypotheses outlined above, concerning the effects of HROs on domestic protest activities, we use new panel data on the various activities of over 400 HROs and a nuanced dataset on domestic anti-state protest activities from 1990 to 2004. This is the available time period in the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) framework that informs

both the HRO and protest data utilized in this study (Bond et al 2003). When our new data was combined with necessary controls, we had a sample of roughly 130 states for a total of around 1400 country-year observations.<sup>5</sup> In this section, we outline the novel ways in which we capture the activities of domestic protest groups and HROs and the model specifications used to test each hypothesis.

### **3.1 Data on Protest Activities**

The dependent variables needed for each hypothesis must capture domestic protest activities against a state and these must be separated into nonviolent and violent subcategories. To measure these concepts, we rely on count variables of all *Nonviolent Protest* and *Violent Protest* events by domestic groups or individuals against any state offices or officials. We test our hypotheses on new measures of domestic anti-government protest events created by Bhasin (2008) as well as comparable measures from the widely utilized Cross-National Time Series Archive (Banks 2008).

To create the new measures, we relied on the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) framework (Bond et al 2003). IDEA is a dataset of all daily events in Reuters Global News Service. This data is organized in a “who” did “what” to “whom” manner for each particular event, over 10 million events in the complete dataset (King and Lowe 2003).

For our variables, we isolated events where a domestic group or individual is the 'who,' the 'what' is either violent or nonviolent protest, and the 'whom' is either a state agent or a state physical office. As mentioned earlier, violent protests are protests with the threat or use of force. Attacking a government official or office, destroying government property, or a bombing of a government

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<sup>5</sup> We include all available countries in our dataset, reflecting the idea that our theoretical argument is not restricted to either developed or developing countries. Our results, however, are comparable when we exclude from the sample Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries with perfect or near perfect human rights records (see Online Appendix).

official's home are all examples of violent protest. Conversely, protest marches, demonstrations, boycotts, and sit-ins are some of the many examples of nonviolent protest.<sup>6</sup> Our procedure identified over 50,000 violent and 20,000 nonviolent protest events from 1991 to 2004.<sup>7</sup>

Because of the nature of our key independent variables and necessary controls, we aggregated this data to the country-year. Two measures were thus created: a total sum of all *IDEA Nonviolent Protest* and *IDEA Violent Protest* events for every country-year.

We contend these new measures have several advantages over existing measures of domestic protest (Nam 2004), including the widely used Banks (2008) data. First, the IDEA-based measures are based on news reports from Reuters Global News Service whereas the Banks (2008) data is gleaned from only *New York Times* reports. In comparison to the *New York Times* with 26 overseas bureaus, Reuters has news offices in over 200 locations.<sup>8</sup> This gives the IDEA-based measures an advantage in accessing news, giving us greater and more accurate coverage of the

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<sup>6</sup> Tables of all the types of events included as either violent or nonviolent protest and summary statistics are in an online appendix.

<sup>7</sup> A possible explanation for the high number of domestic violent protest events, as compared to nonviolent protest events, is due to news media focusing on violent events (Earl et. al 2004). This bias towards more violent events in the dataset does not influence the conclusions drawn from this research for a variety of reasons. First, we examine the effects on both violent and nonviolent protest events separately. Second, we control for both overall country coverage in the dataset and for the alternative type of protest, as discussed below. Finally, our results are consistent with findings using alternative measures of the dependent variable, including Banks (2008) data. It is worth noting, however, that the Banks (2008) protest data which is also based on a news source, the *New York Times*, also has a higher number of total violent protest events than nonviolent events during the time period used in this study.

<sup>8</sup> The numbers for international bureaus retrieved December 18<sup>th</sup> 2009.  
[http://www.nytco.com/company/business\\_units/new\\_york\\_times\\_media\\_group.html](http://www.nytco.com/company/business_units/new_york_times_media_group.html)  
[http://thomsonreuters.com/products\\_services/media/media\\_products/news\\_agency/newswires/](http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/media/media_products/news_agency/newswires/)

countries in this study. For example, Banks (2008) only identifies 3 anti-government demonstrations within India in 2002 whereas the IDEA dataset captures 34 anti-government demonstrations, a number much closer to the actual numbers of organized protests that took place in India's large democratic system in 2002 (Bhasin 2008). This addresses Nam (2004)'s principle concern regarding the Banks (2008) data and its reliance on a limited pool of sources.

Secondly, the Banks (2008) dataset uses arbitrary numbers of people as thresholds to count an event as a strike, a riot, or a demonstration. The IDEA dataset does not set any arbitrary thresholds (Bond et al 2003). Banks (2008)'s arbitrary thresholds exclude a large number of events that would be considered protests by our definition. Further, through the IDEA-based measures, we are able to isolate events directed specifically at the state, essential to our focus on anti-state. While strikes and demonstrations in the Banks (2008) data are targeting national policies, riots in Banks (2008) are a much broader measure capturing any violence on the ground involving over a hundred people, including ethnic clashes that may not be directed at the state at all.

An additional advantage of using IDEA-based measures is seen in its ability to capture greater types of protest activities, in addition to a greater number of protest activities, than Banks (2008). This is useful in capturing the variety of ways that HROs could theoretically impact protest. For example, the only variables that could be classified as nonviolent anti-government protests from Banks (2008) would be anti-government demonstrations and strikes. In the IDEA-based measures, however, we are able to isolate many additional subcategories of nonviolent protest, including peaceful sit-ins as well as formal written petition drives against a domestic state actor.

Despite the advantages we contend the IDEA-based measures offer in comparison to previous data sources, as a robustness check, we conduct the same analysis using protest measures

from Banks (2008). To reflect the distinction between nonviolent and violent protest, we created two summary measures: *Banks (2008) Nonviolent Protest*, which is a count of all anti-government demonstrations and general strikes for every country-year, and *Banks (2008) Violent Protest*, which is a count of all assassinations, guerilla warfare, riots, and revolutions for every country-year. The coding of these variables broadly follows Schatzman (2005).

### **3.2 Data on HRO Activities**

Though conceptually it is clear that the activities of HROs are important for a variety of political outcomes, empirical proxies for HRO activities have been scant. Most global studies either focused on the activities of one HRO or used a general proxy concerning the numbers of all types of INGOs with a local membership base (Landman 2005; Neumayer 2005; Hafner-Burton 2008).

Given our theoretical argument, we restrict our attention to only INGOs with a human rights focus (HROs). However, we still capture the activities of more than just one HRO. Further, we argue above that not all activities of HROs have the same effect on protest. To capture these differences in activities, we rely on newly created data on the three common types of HRO activities: *HRO Events*, *HRO Memberships/Volunteers*, and *HRO Permanent Locations*.

#### **3.2.1 HRO Events**

Our first measure of HRO activity, *HRO Events*, captures the *remote shaming and blaming* activities that define HROs in the existing literature. For this, we utilize newly created data from the IDEA project on 432 human rights-specific HROs identified in the *Yearbook of International Organizations*. To create this data, Murdie and Davis (2008) first produced a dictionary of the names, in English as well as in any other language identified by the HRO, and common acronyms

of the INGOs in the *Yearbook* that have mainly a human rights-focus and were active during any time between 1990 and 2004.<sup>9</sup>

Virtual Research Associates, using the same IDEA framework discussed above, isolated all events from Reuters that includes these HROs between 1990 and 2004. The dataset was restricted to focus only on events where the HRO was the source and a state government or agent was the target. This procedure produced around 10,000 distinct events, aggregated at the country-year level.

### **3.2.2 HRO Membership / Volunteer**

*HRO Memberships / Volunteers* captures the number of human rights-specific INGOs that have a membership or volunteer base within a country. This data was provided by Smith and Wiest (2005). Drawing on a similar procedure used to capture Murdie and Davis (2008)'s 432 HROs, Smith and Wiest (2005) create a country-year variable for the number of human rights INGOs that report volunteers or members in a country in a given year. This data was collected from hard-copies of the *Yearbook of International Organizations* at 2-3 year intervals; linear interpolation was utilized to fill in the years not coded. This variable captures the concept of *local membership* base.

### **3.2.3 HRO Permanent Locations**

*HRO Permanent Locations*, coded by Murdie (2009), is the count of permanent offices, often termed secretariats or permanent headquarters, that the 432 HROs identified by Murdie and Davis (2008) have in a country in a given year. This data was also compiled from the *Yearbook of International Organizations*. Permanent office location data is distinct from the *Yearbook's* membership data, which only captures whether the INGO has a member or volunteer within a state. For example, in 1998, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom reported that it had members in over 40 states but only reported permanent office locations in 3 states.

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<sup>9</sup> A list of these HROs is found in an online appendix.

Finally, for each of these variables on HRO activities, reflecting the concepts central to our causal mechanisms, we utilize annual change in HRO activities and not raw levels as the key independent variables in our analyses.<sup>10</sup> Using annual change in these counts allows us to capture the theoretical idea that increases in the levels of HRO activity, not the levels of activity themselves, lead to higher levels of domestic protest. In other words, it reflects the idea of campaigning efforts by HROs (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hopgood 2006). As mentioned in the theoretical section, HROs are connected to domestic protest through resource mobilization and protest diffusion mechanisms; concentrated increases in HRO activity would be needed to set off these mechanisms. By utilizing annual change, our measures of HRO activities account for this dynamic.

### **3.3 Statistical Controls**

Previous research has shown a wide variety of factors that could have a confounding influence with HRO activity and need to be controlled for in all statistical models. First, we use *Lagged* values of the dependent variables to account for any time-dependency. Second, we control for the natural log of *Population*, accounting for any impact a larger population has on domestic protest levels (WDI 2008). Reflecting the idea that it isn't the total population that influences protest levels as much as it is the politically active segment of the population, we also include as a control the percentage of the *Population from 15-64* (WDI 2008). Economic development has also

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<sup>10</sup> Main results as to HRO events are robust if levels of HRO activities are used instead of annual change; results as to HRO membership /volunteers are close to accepted levels of statistical level and in the expected direction. Worth noting, raw levels cannot be used on the HRO permanent location variable due to nonstationarity; using annual change does make this variable stationary and suitable for statistical analysis. Results using raw levels are reported in the Online Appendix.



been linked to protest activities (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). Therefore, we include as a control the natural log of *GDP per Capita*, in constant US dollars (WDI 2008).

Human rights performance within the state has strong theoretical linkages to both protest and HRO activities (Carey 2006; Bhasin 2008; Murdie and Davis 2008, Murdie 2009). Therefore, we include Cingranelli and Richards (2008) *Physical Integrity Rights Index* as a control in all models.

There are also many studies linking consolidated democracy to repression and protest (Poe and Tate 1994; Cingranelli and Richards 1999). Given this established relationship, we include a binary control for whether a country is a *Democracy*, defined as an annual Polity democracy score of 6 or greater (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). Other studies have found connections between protest and democratization; many contend that “anocracies” are more likely than democracies or dictatorships to have protest activities (Schock 1996; Allen 2008). To account for the effect of democratization, therefore, we included as a control a measure of *Consolidated Institutions*, calculated as the square of the state’s annual Polity score (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). We account for the relationship between protest and war by including a dichotomous variable for the presence of civil or international *War* within the state. This variable was taken from the by UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Databank (2008).

To account for any disparity due to varying news coverage of countries, we explicitly control for the *Total Coverage in IDEA (ln)*, a count of total domestic events reported in the IDEA database for the country in that year, in all statistical models where the protest dependent variables are from IDEA. Finally, in all models, we account for whether the existence of nonviolent protest

encourages violent protest and for whether the existence of violent protest encourages nonviolent protest by including the *Alternative Protest Count* as a control.<sup>11</sup>

### 3.4 Empirical Models

Our hypotheses imply that the impact of HRO activities on domestic protest will vary as a function of the type of HRO activity. We also suggest different causal mechanisms linking increased HRO activity with violent versus nonviolent protest. Therefore, there are three statistical models, one for each type of HRO activity – remote shaming and blaming, local membership and permanent locations:

1. Model 1: The impact of *HRO Events (annual change)*
2. Model 2: The impact of *HRO Memberships/Volunteers (annual change)*
3. Model 3: The impact of *HRO Permanent Locations (annual change)*

Each of the three models is tested on the four separate measures of the total count of domestic violent and nonviolent protest: *IDEA Nonviolent Protest*, *IDEA Violent Protest*, *Banks (2008) Nonviolent Protest*, and *Banks (2008) Violent Protest*. As mentioned, we see the IDEA-based measures as more accurate in capturing the concepts necessary for our dependent variable but utilize the Banks (2008) measures as robustness checks.

Because of the count nature of the dependent variables, it is necessary to use methods appropriate for event-count data. Due to the evidence of positive contagion, we utilize a negative binomial model with robust standard errors (King 1989).<sup>12</sup> Additionally, because we focus

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<sup>11</sup> In the IDEA-based models, we include the alternate IDEA protest variable as a control. In the Banks (2008) based models, we include the alternate Banks (2008) protest variable as the control.

<sup>12</sup> As an additional robustness check, we also ran first differenced models, in line with Wooldridge (2002). Substantive and statistical significance as to the key independent variable remains the same in the first differenced models but the overall model fit was greatly diminished. In addition, we used

theoretically on the impact of increasing HRO activity on improving the ability of protest groups to protest in the future, we measure the dependent variable at  $t+1$  and the independent variables at  $t$ . In other words, the statistical models utilize lagged independent variables or can be thought of as measuring the impact of increasing HRO activities in the previous year on domestic protest activities in the current year. This operationalization reflects other recent work on domestic protest (Iqbal and Zorn 2008; Inclan 2009) and HROs (Hafner-Burton 2008; Murdie 2009). We omit the statistical outliers of the United States and France, when focusing on nonviolent protest, and the United States and Iraq, when focusing on violent protest. These statistical outliers have far more instances of violent and nonviolent protest than the rest of the sample. Our results are robust, however, to their inclusion in the statistical models.

Further, HROs and domestic groups appear to be in a symbiotic relationship, both encouraging the activities of the other. Because our research questions revolve around the impact of HROs on domestic protest, we devote careful attention to potential reverse causality. First, we measure our independent variables one year prior to our dependent variable, ensuring that HRO activity (cause) precedes changes in protest (effect). Second, we explicitly tested for endogeneity using instruments from sociology on the spread of INGOs. Importantly, our key independent variable specifications did not emerge as endogenous to domestic protest activities.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, we are confident in our findings

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a hurdle negative binomial model with robust standard errors. These results were in line statistically and substantively with the results provided here and can be found in an Online Appendix.

<sup>13</sup> This is determined by an augmented Durbin-Wu-Hausman test ( $P > 0.10$ ), using instruments identified as important for HRO and INGO presence in Smith and Wiest (2005) and Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004), as discussed at length in Murdie (2009). These instruments are not only

#### 4. Results and Analysis

Our hypotheses are supported in the analyses, as show in Tables 1-3. Taken together, the results indicate that:

1. Simple *remote shaming and blaming* activities by HROs, reflecting the lowest level of commitment made by HROs to a local population, have no significant impact on domestic protest activities, either nonviolent or violent.
2. Increases in HRO activities with some local presence, indicative of higher levels of commitment to domestic populations (*local membership* and *permanent locations*), lead to greater numbers of nonviolent and violent protests. These findings support Hypotheses 1-2. Moreover, increases in the number of HROs that have *permanent locations* within states, the highest level of commitment made, has the most consistent positive influence across violent and nonviolent forms of protest and the different measures of the same. These results are particularly supportive of our Hypotheses 3a and 3b.

Below, we outline these results and discuss the substantive effects of our findings. We divide this discussion into two parts, the first part outlines the effects of HRO activities reflecting a low level of commitment (remote shaming and blaming in Model 1) on nonviolent and violent protest events and the second section discusses how increases in HRO activities reflecting a higher level of commitment (local membership in Model 2 and permanent locations in Model 3) have on nonviolent and violent protest events.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

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theoretically exogenous to protests yet still causally linked to increases in HRO activities, but are statistically established as such using conventional tests (Woolridge 2002).

#### 4.1 Empirical Results Concerning Low Levels of HRO Commitment

Table 1 outlines the results when *HRO Events (annual change in remote shaming and blaming activities)* is used as the key independent variable. The results for *HRO Events*, from left to right, highlight the effects of increased remote shaming and blaming activities on nonviolent and violent protest as measured by the *IDEA* and *Banks (2008)* measures. As expected, an increase in the annual change of *HRO Events* has no statistically significant impact on the number of domestic nonviolent or violent protest events; this is consistent across all the various measures of nonviolent and violent protest.

This supports our general argument that these *remote* shaming and blaming activities, because they do not result in resource mobilization at the domestic level, have little impact on local domestic protest groups. These “shaming and blaming” activities, while frequently emphasized in the HRO literature, demonstrate a low level of commitment to the domestic population. Any leverage gained through international media attention has been argued to have little impact on domestic protest activities (Kern 2008). The lack of local presence implies weak links to the local community and limited or no provision of the direct resources that we highlight in the resource mobilization and protest diffusion casual mechanisms. These results highlight the limitations of remote shaming and blaming by HROs and donors (An-Na'im 2002; Hafner-Burton 2008). Though there are some conditions where these tactics can work to decrease repression, as shown in Murdie (2009), they do not work to empower domestic nonviolent and violent protest groups to protest against their state.

Across Model 1, all consistently significant control variables are in the expected direction. Specifically, the *Lagged* dependent variable, being a *Democracy*, and having larger *Population* levels are associated with increased levels of both nonviolent and violent domestic protest. Also, as

expected, each type of protest positively influences the other type which follows from the broader diffusion mechanisms literature. This finding has also been highlighted in the recent example of violent and nonviolent protests against the 2009 Iranian Presidential election results.<sup>14</sup> Also as expected, greater coverage of IDEA events for the country (*Total country coverage in IDEAs*) is associated with greater levels of both violent and nonviolent events.<sup>15</sup> The presence of *War* is associated with greater levels of violent protest and countries with *Consolidated Institutions* witness fewer violent protests. Finally, higher levels of human rights protection, captured by the control for *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights*, are associated with lower counts of domestic nonviolent protest.

[Insert Table 2 Here]

[Insert Table 3 Here]

#### **4.2 Empirical Results Concerning Higher Levels of HRO Commitment**

The type of commitment matters for levels of domestic violent and nonviolent protest. As highlighted in Table 1, increases in remote shaming and blaming had no influence on domestic protest activities. In comparison, we find that increases in the local presence of HROs do matter for both violent and nonviolent protest. Table 2 highlights the effects of *HRO Memberships / Volunteers (annual change in local membership)* on violent and nonviolent protest activities. Here, increases in the local membership base of HROs are associated with positive effects on violent and nonviolent protests (Hypothesis 1 and 2), though these results are not significant across all measures of the dependent variables. The positive significant influence is noted in the *IDEA*

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<sup>14</sup> We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this example.

<sup>15</sup> The significance of this variable implies to us that a similar control for newspaper coverage in the *New York Times* needs to be included in future studies which focus only on Banks (2008) protest measures.

*Nonviolent Protest* measure and the *Banks (2008) Violent* measure. This provides us with some support for Hypothesis 3b, comparing local membership to remote shaming and blaming activities.

Our theoretical argument also highlighted that HRO local membership may consist entirely of local volunteers and may not provide all the resources necessary for mobilization or protest diffusion. The lack of robust and consistent results across the various protest measures in Model 2 is in line with this argument: *HRO Memberships / Volunteers (annual change in local membership)* does matter for domestic protest but its impact may be less reliable, depending on the source of local membership and its impact on the HRO-local population linkage.

Finally, the greatest level of commitment to a domestic population, seen in an increase in *HRO permanent locations*, was argued to have the strongest theoretical link with increases in nonviolent and violent protest activities (Hypothesis 3a). This is very well supported by the results of Model 3, seen in Table 3, where *HRO Permanent Location (annual change)* is the key independent variable. As seen, this variable is significant and in the positive direction for both violent and nonviolent protest, regardless if captured by the IDEA dataset or Banks (2008). This is consistent with our underlying argument that the level of commitment matters for the impact HRO activities have on domestic protest. Further, it demonstrates the logic of our causal mechanisms that information, training and financial resources provided by HROs (resource mobilization and local media attention) are best distributed through these permanent offices. These permanent offices are also best equipped to provide network contacts and organizational help (field-building) to domestic groups that benefit both domestic violent and nonviolent protest activities, a significant departure from the dominant HRO literature that stresses the influence of HROs on domestic nonviolent protest alone.

Statistically significant control variables are also in the expected direction when violent protest measures are used as the dependent variables. Specifically, we find a consistently positive impact of the *Lagged* dependent variable, *War*, the alternative *Nonviolent Protest*, and *Total Coverage in IDEA* and a negative impact of *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights*.

Substantively, these results indicate how influential certain HRO activities on a domestic population's likelihood to use nonviolent and violent protest. With all controls at their mean, or median if dichotomous, as the key independent variable, *HRO Memberships / Volunteers (annual change)*, moves from its minimum score in the dataset to the maximum score, *IDEA Nonviolent Protest* is expected to increase by over 3 events (3.55 increase with a 95% confidence interval from 0.96 to 7.12).<sup>16</sup> The impact of a similar change in *HRO Permanent Location (annual change)* on levels of nonviolent protest is comparable (3.66 increase with a 95% confidence interval from 0.34 to 7.73).

Similarly, the effect of increases in *HRO Permanent Location* on *IDEA Violent Protest* is also very large. As this variable goes from its minimum to maximum in the dataset, with all other variables at their mean/median, it is simulated that there will be over 8 additional violent protests (8.89 with a 95% confidence interval from 0.47 to 22.36). This effect is greater than even the effect of undergoing a civil or international *War* (3.31 with 95% confidence interval from 0.30 to 7.15). When the *Banks (2008) Violent Protest* measure is used as the dependent variable, the effect of increasing *HRO Permanent Location (annual change)* from its minimum to its mean is similarly high (2.32 with a 95% confidence interval from 0.12 to 8.06) as compared to adding a *War* (0.27 with a 95% confidence interval from 0.09 to 0.49).

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<sup>16</sup> These substantive effects were created using CLARIFY, which works with the conventional negative binomial model (Tomz et al. 2003).



These substantively large and robust results support our hypotheses regarding positive effects of increases in the local presence of HROs on violent and nonviolent protests (Hypothesis 1-2, 3b) with the strongest impact being associated with increases in HRO permanent office locations (Hypothesis 3a), reflecting the highest level of commitment, on nonviolent and violent domestic protest.

## **5. Conclusion**

This study was theoretically motivated by the scant attention paid to the influence HROs have on domestic actors, particularly those involved in domestic violent and nonviolent anti-government protest. While HROs, like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have undergone increased global presence in the last two decades, scholarship on their influence on domestic politics has been relatively scarce. Much of the existing literature views HROs as distinct from for-profit or state actors in that they are motivated solely by altruistic principles and values, not interested in material or self-interested goals. We make a significant break with this literature as we demonstrate that HROs are organizations are also motivated by material goals and have direct intended and unintended effects on violent and nonviolent protest activities. These organizations provide information, training, financial and organizational resources that are utilized by both violent and non-violent domestic groups on the ground.

There are several important theoretical and empirical contributions made by this paper. Theoretically, we present causal mechanisms that directly link HRO activity to both nonviolent and violent forms of protest, the latter is a unique expectation, counterintuitive to the existing views of HRO behavior and borne out by our strong empirical results.

Our most significant theoretical innovation is in highlighting that the type of HRO activity matters for domestic violent and nonviolent protest activities. We argue that HRO activities

involving some local presence signify greater levels of commitment to a local population than those activities carried out remotely from foreign offices. These activities involving local membership and permanent locations have the strongest links to domestic populations, providing direct resources and sparking protest diffusion mechanisms that result in higher levels of violent and nonviolent domestic protest against a state. We find strong empirical support for this theoretical innovation: the type of HRO activity has a bearing on its impact on domestic protest. Future work that differentiates between various types of HRO/INGO activity seems necessary. These findings also support calls by human rights advocates for HROs to move beyond simply “shaming and blaming” and use more “people-centered” approaches (An-Na'im 2002). This would entail HROs establishing more long term relationships with domestic populations and working with them to better serve local needs.

Empirically, we utilize new events-based data on HRO activity and domestic nonviolent and violent protest against a state. These measures, created by the authors, allow us to capture our theoretical concepts with much greater accuracy than the previously utilized proxies. The protest activities data are employed alongside the well established Banks (2008) data and provide similar results. Future research studying HRO activities or domestic protest events will be well-served to utilize these new and more accurate events-based measures.

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Table 1: The Impact of HRO Events on Nonviolent and Violent Protest, Negative Binomial Model with Robust Standard Errors, 1991-2004

VARIABLES	IDEA Nonviolent Protest	IDEA Violent Protest	Banks Nonviolent Protest	Banks Violent Protest
HRO Events (annual change)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Lagged DVAR	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.04)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)
Population (ln)	0.21*** (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.24*** (0.05)	0.11*** (0.04)
Percentage of Population 15-64	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.03 (0.04)	0.09 (0.06)	0.16** (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)
War	-0.13 (0.14)	0.44*** (0.14)	-0.67** (0.26)	0.33** (0.14)
Democracy	0.20*** (0.08)	0.18 (0.15)	0.92*** (0.16)	0.40*** (0.12)
Consolidated Institutions	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)
IDEA Coverage (ln)	0.41*** (0.04)	0.29*** (0.05)	- -	- -
Alternative Type of Protest	0.01* (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	0.08** (0.04)
Constant	-5.40*** (0.63)	-0.46 (0.85)	-4.64*** (0.80)	-0.32 (0.73)
ln alpha	-0.70*** (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.79*** (0.11)	0.12 (0.04)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-3177.56	-4177.28	-1483.54	-1517.15
Chi-Squared (DF)	1755.44***(11)	1066.78***(11)	296.18***(10)	533.90***(10)
Observations	1333	1341	1612	1612

Coefficients listed first, followed by robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 (two-tailed)

All independent variables lagged one year (*it-1*)

Table 2: The Impact of HRO Membership/Volunteers on Nonviolent and Violent Protest, Negative Binomial Model with Robust Standard Errors, 1991-2004

VARIABLES	IDEA Nonviolent Protest	IDEA Violent Protest	Banks Nonviolent Protest	Banks Violent Protest
HRO Membership/Volunteers (annual change)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
Lagged DVAR	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.19*** (0.03)
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.20*** (0.02)	-0.15*** (0.03)	-0.25*** (0.03)
Population (ln)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.11** (0.04)	0.25*** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.04)
Percentage of Population 15-64	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03*** (0.01)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.06* (0.03)	0.12** (0.05)	0.11* (0.06)	0.09* (0.05)
War	-0.18 (0.12)	0.29** (0.13)	-0.87*** (0.26)	0.38*** (0.13)
Democracy	0.12* (0.07)	0.05 (0.12)	0.92*** (0.16)	0.51*** (0.13)
Consolidated Institutions	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.01)
IDEA Coverage (ln)	0.39*** (0.04)	0.28*** (0.05)	- -	- -
Alternative Type of Protest	0.01** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.05* (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
Constant	-5.69*** (0.55)	-1.02 (0.79)	-4.41*** (0.72)	-0.62 (0.71)
ln alpha	-0.80*** (0.08)	-0.13* (0.07)	0.71*** (0.10)	0.05 (0.13)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-3464.95	-4595.69	-1598.41	-1610.51
Chi-Squared (DF)	1972.21***(11)	1187.19***(11)	286.60***(10)	587.89***(10)
Observations	1445	1455	1598	1598

Coefficients listed first, followed by robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 (two-tailed)

All independent variables lagged one year (*it-1*)

Table 3: The Impact of HRO Permanent Location on Nonviolent and Violent Protest, Negative Binomial Model with Robust Standard Errors, 1991-2004

VARIABLES	IDEA Nonviolent Protest	IDEA Violent Protest	Banks Nonviolent Protest	Banks Violent Protest
HRO Permanent Location (annual change)	0.14** (0.06)	0.16** (0.07)	0.21* (0.12)	0.30** (0.13)
Lagged DVAR	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.24*** (0.03)	
CIRI Physical Integrity Rights	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.17*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.03)
Population (ln)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.12** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)
Percentage of Population 15-64	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.06* (0.03)	0.09 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)
War	-0.20 (0.12)	0.28** (0.13)	-0.83*** (0.26)	0.41*** (0.14)
Democracy	0.06 (0.08)	0.02 (0.15)	0.91*** (0.15)	0.37*** (0.13)
Consolidated Institutions	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)
IDEA Coverage (ln)	0.37*** (0.04)	0.24*** (0.06)	- -	- -
Alternative Type of Protest	0.01** (0.01)	0.01*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
Constant	-5.79*** (0.57)	-1.53* (0.79)	-3.35*** (0.74)	-0.57 (0.74)
ln alpha	-0.96*** (0.08)	-0.18* (0.10)	0.63*** (0.10)	0.03 (0.12)
Log Pseudolikelihood	-3113.00	-4109.94	-1551.60	-1472.02
Chi - Squared (DF)	1961.59***(11)	1096.69***(11)	300.48***(10)	522.82***(10)
Observations	1231	1241	1473	1472

Coefficients listed first, followed by robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1 (two-tailed)

All independent variables lagged one year (*it-1*)