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### Kennesaw State University

College of Computing and Software Engineering

Information Technology Department

# The Paradox of Social Media Security: A Study of IT Students' Perceptions versus Behavior on Using Facebook

# **Thesis Paper**

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Master of Science in Information Technology

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**Abstract** 

Social media plays an essential role in the modern society, enabling people to be better connected

to each other and creating new opportunities for businesses. At the same time, social networking

sites have become major targets for cyber-security attacks due to their massive user base. Many

studies investigated the security vulnerabilities and privacy issues of social networking sites and

made recommendations on how to mitigate security risks. Users are an integral part of any security

mix. In this thesis, we explore the relationship between users' security perceptions and their actual

behavior on social networking sites. Protection motivation theory (PMT), initially developed to

study fear appeals, has been widely used to examine people's behavior in information security

domains. We propose that PMT theory can also be adapted to explain and predict social media

users' behaviors that have security implications. We use a web-based survey to measure users'

security awareness on social networking sites and collect data on their actual behavior.

**Keywords**: Social media, protection motivation theory, security, vulnerability, user's behavior,

awareness, threats, IT students, Facebook.

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#### **Chapter 1. Introduction**

Social media plays a major role in people's daily activities and social life. As part of people's "online lives," social networking sites offer many benefits, ranging from keeping everyone connected to others anywhere and anytime, to being an outlet for the latest information on breaking news and trends, to creating new business opportunities for individuals and organizations.

Along with the benefits, social media also introduces risks to our community. Social media sites, as part of the World Wide Web, are inherently subject to security vulnerability imposed by the Web. User privacy is another important part of social network security management (Oehri & Teufel, 2012). People are constantly posting messages, updating their status, liking, or disliking other postings, and sharing photos and videos. What individuals post or share could potentially violate their privacy and security on the Web. Thus, it is critical for the users to be aware of the vulnerabilities of social networking sites, and act with caution.

Many studies have been conducted on the security vulnerabilities of social networks. For example, Fokes and Li (Fokes & Li, 2014) surveyed the common security threats to Facebook and made some suggestions on how to stay safe on Facebook. Oehri and Teufel (Oehri & Teufel, 2012) discussed how to form a security culture in the social networks. Nemati et al. (Nemati, Wall, & Chow, 2014) investigated the differences in a number of privacy issues among American and Chinese social media users, and explored these issues among users with different levels of Internet addiction and different online identity perceptions. However, those studies were mainly on the vulnerabilities of the system and recommendations to the users; little research investigated users' behavior related to their security awareness on the social networking sites.

In this thesis, we explore the relationship of users' security perceptions and their actual behavior on the social networking sites. Protection motivation theory (PMT) initially was developed to study fear appeals, and has been widely used to examine people's behavior in information security domains. We propose that PMT theory can also be adapted to explain and predict social media users' behaviors that have security implications. We plan to use a web-based survey to measure users' security awareness on social networking sites and collect data on their actual behavior.

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: chapter two introduces the emergence of social media and presents current literature on social media security vulnerabilities and mitigation techniques, chapter three examines the relationship between users' perceptions and behavior, which includes the technology acceptance model, protection motivation theory, communication privacy management, and social cognitive theory. Whereas chapter four presents our research questions and hypothesis, chapter five introduces our research design and methodology, chapter six presents the research results that includes pilot and formal study sections, and finally, chapter seven presents the discussion and conclusion which includes the limitations and future work.

#### Chapter 2. Social Media Security Vulnerabilities

Since the 1980's when the use of the Internet began spreading, people experiences a whole new life. Personal life styles also transformed as new innovative devices and systems became essentials in our daily lives. Laptops, tablets, smartphones; all affect our lives and open a wide door to many new technologies and tools. Social media networking sites take a big share among these inventions.

Social media has been a vital research area many researchers and scientists have investigated and studied, and hundreds of statistical reports have been published. Social media affects almost each and every part of our society; like individuals, businesses, governments. Unfortunately, some of these affects have negative impacts and bring new versions of violations and crimes.

This chapter investigates social media security vulnerabilities through two main sections; proliferation of social media, and social media security threats and mitigation techniques. The proliferation of social media section defines what social media means, its main characteristics, categories, and examples. It also presents statistical findings related to the use of social media websites, with Facebook as one of the most popular social media websites, and using social media in business. Section two, social media security threats and mitigation techniques, explores the risks and vulnerabilities of social media. This section highlights number of report findings related to social media as a "criminal aspect" in a way or another. Moreover, this section handles the security threats of social media in three main categories: (1) platform related, (2) user related, and (3) cyberattacks (Fokes & Li, 2014).

#### 2.1 Proliferation of the Social Media

Social media, social networking sites, and social media platforms all refer to the same concept, which many researchers agreed on; that social media includes web-based services that allow individuals to communicate with each other via the Internet. Boyd and Ellison (Boyd & Ellison, 2007) defined social network sites as "web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system". Furthermore, Kaplan and Haenlein (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010) defined social media as "a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and allow the creation and exchange of user generated content".

Social media can be assorted into number of groups, including: collaborative projects (e.g. Wikipedia), blogs and microblogs (e.g. Twitter), social networking sites (e.g. Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace), content communities (e.g. YouTube, Flickr), virtual social worlds (e.g. Second Life) (Boyd & Ellison, 2007; Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010), and virtual game worlds (e.g. C.O.D, "World of Warcraft", Sony's EverQuest) (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010). In this thesis, we focus on the security issues of social networking sites.

Based on the statistics released by Internet World Stats in 2015, the number of global Internet users has reached 3,366,261,156 worldwide; this shows a total growth of 832.5% since 2000 (Internet World Stats, 2015). Almost two-thirds of American adults (65%) use social networking web sites, up from 7% (Figure 2.1) when the Pew Research Center began systematically tracking social media usage in 2005 (Perrin, 2015). Pew Research published a number of reports that have

documented in detail how social media usage has been growing and affecting people's everyday activities concerning schools, businesses, politics, and global communication, as well as how people share information about their daily life, news, and relationships (Perrin, 2015).




Figure 2.1 Percentage of all American adults and internet-using adults who use at least one social networking site (Perrin, 2015)

The Pew Research Center (Duggan, Ellison, Lampe, Lenhart, & Madden, 2015) has found that Facebook still the most popular social media site that used by American adults in 2014. Whereas the growth is slow, the user engagement with Facebook has increased. Other platforms usage, like Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest and LinkedIn, has sharply increased over the past year (Figure 2.2) (Duggan et al., 2015).




Figure 2.2 Percentage of online adults who use social media websites, 2012-2014 (Duggan et al., 2015)

Other research conducted by the Pew Research Center (Hampton, Goulet, Rainie, & Purcell, 2011) on the number of social media users found that on an average day Facebook users are quite active.

- 15% of Facebook users update their own status.
- 22% comment on another's post or status.
- 20% comment on another user's photos.
- 26% "like" another user's content.
- 10% send another user a private message

Number of studies have also been conducted to investigate the current usage of social media in corporate sectors and how it affects the processes of daily work, as well the benefit of using such tools for businesses. Social media has become an important tool for organizational communication processes; it is capable to preserve behaviors that were difficult to obtain before having such tools in the workplace (Treem & Leonardi, 2013).

In 2014, LinkedIn conducted an investigative study to understand how small businesses are using social media sites, and whether it is worth the investment or not. The study found that 94% of survey respondents used social media for marketing, while 60% stated social media solves the business challenge of attracting new customers (Schneider, 2014).

Social Media Examiner, in their 7th annual study, surveyed over 3700 marketers to understand how they are using social media to grow and promote their businesses. The study found that 92% of marketers stated social media was important to their businesses, while 66% of marketers' plan to increase their use of these social networks. At least 91% of marketers wanted to know the most effective social tactics and the best ways to engage their audience with social media and 88%

wanted to know how to measure their return on investment for social media activities (Stelzner, 2015).

#### 2.2 Social Media Security Threats and Mitigation Techniques

As with any other technology, social media has its own drawbacks and risks. Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) complaint data showed 12% of the complaints submitted in 2014 contained a social media aspect. Complaints involving social media have quadrupled since 2009 (Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2014). In most cases, social engineering, or hacked accounts invaded victims' privacy. In 2010, an estimated 2,322 arrests for Internet sex crimes against minors involved social media sites in some way, including an estimated 503 arrests in cases involving identified victims and the use of social media by offenders (Mitchell, Finkelhor, Jones, & Wolak, 2010).

A report published by the Guardian (Press Association, 2012) reported that social networking crime was comparatively minor in 2008 with 556 reports made to police, according to the statistics released by 29 police forces in England, Scotland and Wales under the Freedom of Information Act. However, in 2011, the number of reports has dramatically increased to 4,908 incidents in which Facebook and Twitter were a factor. This demonstrates an increase by 780% in four years, resulting in approximately 650 people being charged in 2011.

According to the Get Safe Online awareness initiative and the City of London police's National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, at least £5.2m (around \$6 million) was lost to ticket fraud in 2015 in the United Kingdom – up from £3.35m (around \$3.8 million) in 2014, an increase of 55% in 2015 since 2014, as criminals increasingly made use of social media to defraud music and sports fans

(Jones, 2016). More than a fifth of the crimes were instigated via Facebook, with Twitter accounting for a further 6% (Jones, 2016).

The National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) provides a list of crimes linked to social media; it includes: burglary, phishing & social engineering, malware, identity theft, and cyberstalking (National White Collar Crime Center, 2013). According to the National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA) in 2011, 15% of Americans had never checked their social networking privacy and security account settings (National Cyber Security Alliance, 2011), while 49% of social media users had changed their passwords once or more in 2012, with 6% changing passwords weekly, and at the same time, 42% had never changed their social media passwords (National Cyber Security Alliance, 2012).

Per the Cisco 2013 Annual Security Report, social media sites belong to the main types of sites with very high concentrations of online security threats. The report illustrated that online advertisements are 182 times more likely to deliver malicious content than pornography sites (Ashford, 2013).

Based on the literature reviews, we divided the security threats of social media into three main categories: (1) platform related, (2) user related, and (3) cyber-attacks (Fokes & Li, 2014). Platform related threats include the network information social media sites provide, privacy and security policies, vulnerabilities such as verification options, authentication processes, and data breaches. User related threats present vulnerable practices by social media users, including information sharing, privacy coping behavior, the preventable user, user's privacy settings, and lack of privacy awareness. Finally, cyber-attack threats talked about number of dangers such as user's awareness of social media risks for example spoofing and clickjacking, and attacks of malwares and Trojans.

#### 2.2.1 Platform Related Threats

When using social media platform, the user decides how much private data he or she is willing to share with others. These sites allow users to adjust privacy settings for public visibility (Wueest, 2010). Zhao and Zhao (Zhao & Zhao, 2015) evaluated the security and vulnerability of 50 social media sites in terms of (a) privacy and security policies and their implementation, (b) network information availability of social media sites, and (c) computer network system vulnerability to cyber intrusions and attacks. The research found that most social media sites provided links to their privacy policy, child-protection policy, no-liability statement, security policy, and proper-use guidelines on their home page. Using SSL encryption for data transmission has been included in most of the security policies, while only a few of the sites stated clearly the execution of the key security measures: authentication, anti-password guessing, monitoring, investigation, and auditing. Furthermore, the research found that social media sites' network information was publicly available through a Google search, and this could lead to cyber intrusions and attacks. The research found that social media sites had most of their ports closed, filtered, or behind firewalls; only very few ports were detected as open: Port 80/TCP and Port 443/TCP, and that American-based social media sites had more policies and measures than other country's counterparts in six aspects: privacy policy, security policy, child-protection policy, SSL encryption, proper use statement, and no-liability statement.

On a Facebook survey study, Fokes and Li (Fokes & Li, 2014) found number of platform related vulnerabilities, which should be addressed by Facebook Inc., including: SMS verification weaknesses, social authentication, vulnerabilities from applications, and puppetnets. In late November 2012, CNN reported that hackers had stolen usernames and passwords for over two million accounts at Facebook, Google, Twitter, Yahoo, and other similar websites. Researchers at

Trustwave stated that "the massive data breach was a result of keylogging software maliciously installed on an untold number of computers around the world". The virus tracked log-in details of key websites for over a month and sent this information to a server controlled by the hackers (Pagliery, 2013). Several months later, Twitter reported "We discovered one live attack and were able to shut it down in process moments later. However, our investigations have thus far indicated that the attackers may have had access to limited user information – usernames, email addresses, session tokens and encrypted/salted versions of passwords – for approximately 250,000 users" (Lord, 2013).

#### 2.2.2 User Related Threats

Nemati et al. (Nemati et al., 2014) investigated the differences among privacy issues for social media users in the United States and China, and explored these issues affecting users with different levels of Internet addiction and different online identity perceptions. The study survey measured three variables related to information sharing and privacy coping behavior: (1) users' comfort with sharing information with different groups of people (e.g., family, friends, and strangers), (2) users' breadth of online self-disclosure (e.g., sharing birthdates, addresses, phone numbers, personal interests, etc.), and (3) users' willingness to engage in privacy coping behaviors. According to the study, American and Chinese users behaved differently when it comes to their privacy coping and sharing information with others; Chinese respondents were less stringent when sharing information with others than American respondents. Also, Chinese respondents were more likely to share with diverse sets of people than American users, which may put them at a higher risk for privacy violations.

Preventable user related vulnerabilities include: fake profiles, Sybil attack, identity theft, and account access (Fokes & Li, 2014). Usually, social media users have limited awareness of the security vulnerabilities which can lead to a serious threat to themselves and to their friends on the site. Gundecha et al. (Gundecha, Barbier, & Liu, 2011) stated that three measures can be taken to minimize a user's vulnerability; (1) the user's privacy settings are effectively set to protect personal information, (2) the user has adequate means to protect friends, (3) the user's friends must have intentions to protect the user. The study proposed a methodology and measures for evaluating the vulnerable user and how to adjust a user's network to best deal with threats presented by vulnerable friends (Gundecha et al., 2011).

Liu and Maes (Liu & Maes, 2005) addressed lack of privacy awareness and how people disclose themselves in social media. This fact strengthens the need for vulnerability research on a social networking site to make users aware of privacy risks. Social media networks also affect business environments. Social media provides both opportunities and risks for organizations; thus, from a survey conducted to determine social media guidelines, Oehri and Teufel (Oehri & Teufel, 2012) developed a management model for creating, monitoring and controlling social media security culture.

#### 2.2.3 Cyber-Attacks Threats

Researchers at Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Romania, conducted a study on 628 students from the Faculty of Economy and Business Administration and 200 students specializing in Accounting and Information Systems. The purpose of the study was to analyze the students' awareness of social media risks that they expose themselves to, and to actually measure security when using social media (Popescul & Georgescu, 2015). The main findings were: most of the students did not

have the knowledge and were not aware of some dangers, such as spoofing, clickjacking, tagjacking, and phishing, whereas those familiar with such attacks agree that Facebook is a favorable
medium for their appearances. In addition, the results showed that more than half of the students
were aware that Facebook could use their data without their knowledge, and that they could easily
be manipulated on Facebook. Finally, the study found that most of the students set their privacy
controls to choose who can access their profile information, and these students were cautious when
posting or sharing on social media sites.

In 2011, a survey of nearly 4,000 social network users in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia found that the number of people affected by Koobface and other malware in social media sites had reached 18%, compared with 13% in 2010 and 8% in 2009 (Whitney, 2011). A popular example of this is FarmVille, an application game on Facebook with more than 60 million active users per month (Wueest, 2010). The game allows users to buy, using a credit card, game coins to purchase cattle or equipment. For users who do not want to spend real money, many websites offer cheating tools for the game. Often, these tools turns to be Trojans, used to steal the user username, password, and any other information (Wueest, 2010).

#### Chapter 3. Users' Perception and Behavior

The relationship between users' perceptions and behavior lay down many questions without answers, and highlight conflicted viewpoints from researchers. Scholars from different perspectives have devoted huge efforts to examine consequential human behaviors and established many theories to study, analyze, and predict these behaviors.

Technology and information security has explored and developed number of theories to help researchers from IT backgrounds, and other fields investigate if and how the technologies affect users and how users behave while using such technology. This paper explores four theories that have been established for such purposes; the technology acceptance model, protection motivation theory, communication privacy management theory, and social cognitive theory.

This chapter explores several theories related to human acceptance and behavior toward information technology (IT) and security. The related theories section discusses: the technology acceptance model which presents a predictive framework for user acceptance of technologies, the communication privacy management theory explaining how people believe they own their private information yet miss the fact they are vulnerable when disclosing such information, the social cognitive theory showing how people learn by observing others, and the protection motivation theory which originally was created to help clarify fear appeals and understand and predict the adoption of protective technologies. In addition, this chapter highlights user's perception of security vulnerability and threats; it explores factors and models that effect user's behavior.

#### 3.1 Related Theories and Models

#### 3.1.1 Technology Acceptance Model

Studies have verified the ability of the technology acceptance model (TAM) framework to predict user acceptance of novel technologies. The TAM, which was first introduced by Davis (Fred D. Davis, 1986) in the 1980s, has been shown to be highly predictive of IT adoption and use (Choi & Chung, 2013; Venkatesh & Bala, 2008) and has been very useful in investigating the adoption of social media technologies (Kwon, Park, & Kim, 2014; Rauniar, Rawski, Yang, & Johnson, 2014). Perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEOU) are the primary factors in adoption (Fred D. Davis, 1986; Sago, 2015). Attitude (ATT), and intention to use (IU) are also two factors of TAM that determine adoption of a technology (Fred D. Davis, 1986; Kwon et al., 2014). Both PU and PEOU are important factors making the TAM a very effective research model to understand and explain IT usage (Chau, 2001; Sago, 2015). Davis (F. D. Davis, 1989) defined PU as "the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would enhance his or her job performance" and PEOU as "the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would be free of effort".

Sago (Sago, 2015) examined user perceptions and frequency of use related to social media networks (Facebook, Twitter, and Pinterest) and found that there are positive relationships between frequency of use and multiple uses for social media in both females and males, and between frequency of use of social media and the uses of social media as well. The research also found positive relationships between PU and social media uses. PU had a relationship in 39.02% of the entire samples; however, PEOU had limited impact on the uses of social media among both genders. However, as few as 2.44% of social media uses had a relationship with PEOU.

Choi and Chung (Choi & Chung, 2013) explored a number of graduate students' acceptance of social media networks. The researchers extended a new version of TAM – which they used as the main theoretical framework – with two variables; subjective norm and perceived social capital, aiming to have better understanding of social media acceptance and usage. The study focused on Facebook, Myspace, and Twitter, and showed that PU and PEOU had huge effects on the intention to use social media. In addition, the research explained how subjective norm and perceived social capital had also impacts as predictors of both PU and PEOU and the importance of including these two variables as potential variables to extend the TAM.

Rauniar et al. (Rauniar et al., 2014) studied user's adoption behavior of Facebook based on the TAM. The study validated the attitude-intent-behavior relationship in Facebook, examined, and introduced additional elements to the original TAM; user's critical mass (CM), social networking site capability (CP), and perceived playfulness (PP).

#### 3.1.2 Communication Privacy Management Theory

Communication privacy management (CPM) theory, also known as information boundary theory, developed by Sandra Petronio in 1991 (Petronio, 1991) and suggested that "individuals believe they own their private information and have a right to control whether the information is disclosed as well as to whom it is disclosed" (Kennedy-Lightsey, Martin, Thompson, Himes, & Clingerman, 2012; Petronio, 1991, 2004).

CPM theory explains how people believe in the ownership of their private information and how they usually miss the part that disclosing any information to others could vulnerable them in a way or another. Petronio (Petronio, 2004) explains the importance of controlling our private information and that once we share such information with others we don't really own the

information anymore and can't decide what happens to the information then, "when people disclose to each other, they essentially link others into a privacy boundary" (Petronio, 2004). However, the theory also shows how people tempted to develop their own privacy rules based on five criteria, which are: "(1) culture, (2) gendered, (3) motivations that people have concerning privacy, (4) contextual constraints, and (5) risk—benefit ratio" (Petronio, 2004).

CPM theory has been used as a framework on number of research studies related to IT and social media sites. Chen et al. (Chen, Ping, Xu, & Tan, 2009) pointed out the importance of privacy concerns on social media sites and used the CPM theory to study the privacy concerns about peer's disclosure among social media users. The study used Facebook as research platform, found that Facebook user can reduce his/her privacy concerns about peer's disclosure through decisional control, and suggested pragmatic strategies for social media sites in order to mitigate members' privacy concerns.

Another survey study done by Frampton and Child (Frampton & Child, 2013) investigated how working professionals respond to co-worker friend requests on Facebook using the CPM theory framework. Researchers found that most working professionals accepted coworker Facebook friend requests, and that working professionals did not find it necessary to change their privacy settings and did not feel vulnerable when receiving such request.

Based on a complementary application of both the uses and gratifications and CPM theory; Child et al. (Child, Haridakis, & Petronio, 2012) studied how people think of blogging and how they set up their privacy settings. The research found that users influenced by two main factors when managing their privacy setting for blogs; which are blogging privacy rule orientations and gender functioned.

Number of researchers has used CPM theory to investigate user's privacy concerns when disclosing private information, and how users develop their own privacy rules in IT research area. CPM theory has been also used to study the privacy concerns about peer's disclosure among Facebook users (Chen et al., 2009).

Social media users interact with each other's and share several types of information (public and private). Examining how social media users encouraged in building their own privacy boundaries and rules and to whom they disclose their privacy information will help us in understanding the users' behaviors while using social media.

#### 3.1.3 Social Cognitive Theory

Social cognitive theory (SCT) developed by the psychologist Albert Bandura in 1986 based on general on how people learn by observing others. The theory used in number of sectors like psychology, education, business, health communication, and information security. SCT "founded in an agentic perspective" to provide full understanding on how human psychosocial works according to three reciprocal factors; which are: (1) cognitive (personal), (2) behavioral, and (3) environmental factors (Bandura, 1991, 2001). Based on SCT, observation – which individuals learn through - consists of four processes: (1) attentional, (2) retention, (3) production, and (4) motivational (Bandura, 2001), and that the individual's ability of observation proportionally correlates with the individual's level of self-efficacy (Bandura, 2001; Chai, Bagchi-Sen, Rao, Upadhyaya, & Morrell, 2009). Bandura (Bandura, 1997) defined self-efficacy as "the belief in one's capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to manage prospective situations".

SCT has been used by Chai et al. (Chai et al., 2009) as a theoretical background to study and understand users' private information sharing behavior over the internet; researchers conducted a research framework – using both PMT and SCT - explaining an internet user's information privacy protection behavior, and found that internet users' information privacy behaviors can be affected by two factors: (1) users' perceived importance of information privacy and (2) information privacy self-efficacy. Researchers also found that the value of online information privacy assented by users. Their findings showed that the educational and knowledge level, and surrounding groups of family and friends, can essentially affect the internet users' behavior when dealing with online and security privacy.

Yao et al. (Yao, Rice, & Wallis, 2007) investigated influences of online privacy concerns and developed a model that include gender, generalized self-efficacy, psychological need for privacy, Internet use experience, Internet use fluency, and beliefs in privacy rights. Research main results showed that main influences on online privacy concerns are psychological need for privacy and beliefs in privacy rights, and that self-efficacy has positive correlation to Internet use diversity and fluency; "individuals with high self-efficacy reported lower levels of need for privacy" (Yao et al., 2007).

LaRose et al. (LaRose, Mastro, & Eastin, 2001) studied Internet usage using variables from SCT; self-efficacy and self-disparagement were used to explain the domain of Internet behavior. The study also included Internet addiction as a deficient self-regulation within the framework of SCT. The study found that Internet self-efficacy and perceived Internet addiction were directly related to Internet usage, and that self-disparagement and self-slighting were negatively related to Internet usage.

Lee and Ma (Lee & Ma, 2012) investigated news sharing intentions in social media platforms and the factors that influence it using Uses and Gratifications (U&G) theory and SCT.

Based on SCT; Compeau et al. (Compeau, Higgins, & Huff, 1999) developed a model to examine the impact of computer self-efficacy, outcome expectations, affect, and anxiety on computer usage. Researchers found that computer self-efficacy and outcome expectations have remarkable relationships, as well as, between self-efficacy and affect and anxiety and use. The results showed that individual's affective and behavioral reactions to IT could be affected by self-efficacy and outcome expectations.

Many researches depended on SCT to study and explain how people learn by observing others. SCT used in many IT related research areas including: users' private information sharing behavior over the internet (Chai et al., 2009), influences of online privacy concerns (Yao et al., 2007), Internet usage (LaRose et al., 2001), and news sharing intentions in social media (Lee & Ma, 2012).

SCT has not been used to study the social media user's behaviors, we believe that it provides a theoretical framework that can be used to examine how social media users can learn and improve their behavior when experience any vulnerable event while using social media sites.

#### 3.1.4 Protection Motivation Theory

Protection motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975) was originally created to help clarify fear appeals; it provides a conceptual framework to study individuals' fear appeal and behavioral change (Chai et al., 2009; Li, 2012). According to Rogers (Rogers, 1975), "an individual's intention to protect him or herself depends on four factors: (1) the perceived severity of a threatening event; (2) the perceived probability of the occurrence; (3) the efficacy of the

recommended preventive behavior that an individual expects to carry out; and (4) the individual's perceived self-efficacy" (Chai et al., 2009; Rogers, 1975).

The PMT underlines two processes to predict and mediate protection motivation: threat appraisals and coping appraisals (Tsai et al., 2016). (Kaspar, 2015) Threat appraisal evaluates the severity level of an activity/situation and examines how serious it is (Kaspar, 2015; Rogers, 1983). Coping appraisal evaluates the self-confidence level and response- efficacy of adapting a protection behavior (Kaspar, 2015), where efficacy is "the individual's expectancy that carrying out recommendations can remove the threat, and self-efficacy is the belief in one's ability to execute the recommended courses of action successfully" (Rogers, 1983).

Using different applications and tools via the Internet allow users to experience a variety of online security threats that require them to enact safety precautions. PMT has been used as a powerful model to understand and predict the adoption of protective technologies, and one of the main theoretical foundations in the information security research field, which helps users avoid harm from a growing number of negative technologies by practicing healthier behaviors when dealing with security issues (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody, & Polak, 2015; Chenoweth, Minch, & Gattiker, 2009). This study uses PMT to understand online safety behaviors in the context of social media use.

#### **PMT Applications in Security Fields**

In an investigative study of the influence of fear appeals on the compliance of end users, Johnston and Warkentin (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010) pointed out the effect of fear appeals in the end user behavior when responding to a recommended act of security. It has been evaluated along with perceptions of self-efficacy, response efficacy, threat severity, and social influence. During

innovative research, Jenkins et al. (Jenkins, Grimes, Proudfoot, & Lowry, 2014) provided two solutions to limit password reuse through detection and mitigation, based on PMT. The researchers hypothesized that introducing just-in-time fear appeals when a violation is detected will likely decrease password reuse. The study found significant results, including 88.41% of users who received a fear appeal subsequently created unique passwords, whereas only 4.45% of users who did not receive a fear appeal created unique passwords (Jenkins et al., 2014).

Chenoweth et al. (Chenoweth et al., 2009) tested a model designed to explain behavioral intention to adopt a relevant form of protective technology, anti-spyware software. The research showed that perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, response efficacy, and response cost positively affect user behavior implementing anti-spyware software as a protective technology.

Tsai et al. (Tsai et al., 2016) developed a survey of Amazon Mechanical Turk users in order to explore the impact of new PMT factors in predicting security behaviors. Researchers found that threat severity had big impact, and coping appraisal also had measurable relationships to the online safety intentions, namely: habit strength, response efficacy, and personal responsibility factors.

Based on an evaluation of the effect of organizational commitment on employee security compliance intentions, Herath and Rao (Herath & Rao, 2009) suggested that "(a) threat perceptions about the severity of breaches and response perceptions of response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs are likely to affect policy attitudes; (b) organizational commitment and social influence have a significant impact on compliance intentions; and (c) resource availability is a significant factor in enhancing self-efficacy, which in turn, is a significant predictor of policy compliance intentions".

As previously discussed, another survey study by Chai et al. (Chai et al., 2009) conducted a research framework – using both PMT and SCT - explaining an internet user's information privacy protection behavior, and found that internet users' information privacy behaviors can be affected by two factors: (1) users' perceived importance of information privacy and (2) information privacy self-efficacy. Researchers also found that the value of online information privacy assented by users. Their findings showed that the educational and knowledge level, and surrounding groups of family and friends, can essentially affect the internet users' behavior when dealing with online and security privacy.

To date, the correlation between social media users' awareness of security and their actual online behavior has yet to be investigated. Several studies have captured social media networks users' behavior by modeling it as computational units of processing information. Darmon et al. (Darmon, Sylvester, Girvan, & Rand, 2013) applied two contrasting modeling paradigms: computational mechanics and echo state networks, to evaluate activity patterns of groups of Twitter users to be able to predict their behavior by modeling representations of their previous states as computational processes. The researchers found that most users showed limited potential of behavioral processing.

#### 3.2 User's Perception on Security Vulnerability and Threats

A research study done by Kwon et al. (Kwon et al., 2014) used the TAM and identified perceived security along with five other factors - perceived mobility, perceived system quality, perceived connectedness, perceived usefulness, and flow experience - as motivational factors of social media use. The researchers developed a theoretical model to explain the users' adoption of Facebook and Twitter. The main findings were that perceived connectedness, usefulness, security, and system

and service quality evenly contributed to shaping attitudes when using Twitter, and the effects of perceived security in Facebook adoption were stronger than for Twitter, which may answer why users consider Facebook more private than Twitter as a social media site.

Xu et al. (Xu, Zhang, Wu, & Yang, 2012) implemented a mixture model to study user posting behavior on Twitter. The study proposed three factors that could influence a user post on Twitter: (1) breaking news happening at that moment, (2) posts recently published by a user's friends, (3) user intrinsic interest.

Li (Li, 2012) reviewed fifteen established theories in online information privacy research and developed an integrated framework highlighting the privacy calculus ("i.e., the trade-off between expected benefits and privacy risks") and the risk calculus ("i.e., the trade-off between privacy risks and efficacy of coping mechanisms").

Based on a literature review; Pierson (Pierson, 2012) investigated the relationship between online consumer privacy in the new technologies and the changes of people vulnerability. The research discussed the concepts of mass self-communication, empowerment and privacy, and highlighted the consumers' privacy while using social media, as well as how their vulnerability changes from an external and internal perspective.

#### **Chapter 4. Research Questions and Hypotheses**

This thesis aims to examine the relationship between users' security awareness and their actual activities on social networking sites. We are interested in measuring the social media users' awareness of security and dimensions of such perceptions. The application of PMT in security field shows that people's behavior can be impacted by their perceptions.

We are interested in studying the people's perception and behavior in social media. We collected data on users' behaviors on social networking sites and studied how users' behavior is impacted by their perception of security. The leads to following research questions:

**RQ1:** What is the users' level of awareness on security vulnerabilities in the social networking sites and how do we measure such awareness?

**RQ2:** How do the users behave in the social networking sites when their activities have security implications?

**RQ3:** What is the correlation between users' perceptions and their actual behavior on social networking sites?

Many studies investigated users' perceptions and behaviors. The technology acceptance model (TAM) (F. D. Davis, 1989) and its extension models were extensively used to predict users' acceptance of technology based on their perceptions. Social cognitive theory (SCT) was used to investigate and understand users' private information sharing behavior. In the security domain, communication privacy management (CPM) (Petronio, 1991) theory was used widely to study users' privacy concerns on IT related platforms. Protection motivation theory (PMT) (Rogers, 1975) has been first applied - directly or indirectly - to many related topics, for example, personal

physical health, such as cancer prevention, AIDS prevention, smoking, exercise/diet/healthy lifestyle, alcohol consumption, and adherence to medical-treatment regimens (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). PMT was also widely adopted by researchers to explain users' behaviors related to information security: examination of the users' intentions to adopt anti-spyware software (Chenoweth et al., 2009), enforcement of security compliance in organizations (Herath & Rao, 2009; Siponen, Pahnila, & Mahmood, 2006), reduction of password reuse among users (Jenkins et al., 2014), information security behaviors (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010), and improvement of web users' online privacy and safety (Tsai et al., 2016; Youn, 2005).

PMT provides an understanding for some of the observed behaviors, why unhealthy behaviors are practiced, and offer some suggestions on how to overcome such behaviors. As we mentioned earlier, PMT proposes that cyber security is based on four factors: (1) the perceived severity of a threatening event (threat severity); (2) the perceived probability of the occurrence (threat vulnerability); (3) the efficacy of the recommended preventive behavior that an individual expects to carry out (response efficacy); and (4) the individuals perceived self-efficacy (self-efficacy).

As we explored the PMT in section 3.1.4, PMT has been applied by number of researchers in the security field; like the effect of fear appeals in the end user behavior when responding to a recommended act of security (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010), solutions to limit password reuse through detection and mitigation (Jenkins et al., 2014), explain behavioral intention to adopt antispyware software (Chenoweth et al., 2009), the effect of organizational commitment on employee security compliance intentions (Herath & Rao, 2009), as well as the internet user's information privacy protection behavior (Chai et al., 2009).

While PMT hasn't been used to study users' security related behaviors on social networking sites, we believe it provides a sound theoretical framework to do so given its success in information security research. Social networking sites are part of the World Wide Web. Social media users share many common characteristics as the users of other websites or information systems. We argue that the four dimensions of PMT, including threat severity, threat vulnerability, response efficacy, and self-efficacy hold similar predicting power to explain users' behavior in social networking sites. Based on our literature review and discussion, this leads to following hypotheses.

The effect of a high level of education or/and awareness of the security threats and vulnerabilities of social media sites is one of the most highly influential factors on the individual's self-efficacy and behavior, which affect user's daily social media activity.

H1. The users' level of perception of security severity will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites.

**H2.** The users' level of perception of self-efficacy in information security will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites.

Experiencing a similar occurrence of an incident more than once or hearing about an incident several times from others, raises the user's awareness of such threats and affect user's behavior on social media.

H3. The users' level of perception of the probability of an occurrence of security threats will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites.

Practicing healthy behaviors while using social media, or associating with people who do so, improves a user's perception of the efficacy of healthy and preventive behavior, which will affect the user daily activity on social media.

**H4.** The users' perception of the level of difficulty on the response efficacy of security threats will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites.

Based on our hypotheses, we set number of measurements to help in measure and understand social media users' perceptions and behaviors, that are explained in the following chapter.

#### Chapter 5. Research Design and Methodology

In this thesis, web-based survey has been used as the main research method. We used Facebook as the social media platform as it is one of most popular social networking sites (Duggan et al., 2015). Undergraduate and graduate students from Kennesaw State University were recruited as research subjects. College students are a valid and reliable representation of social media users. Targeting college students as our research subjects reduced the cost and efforts of targeting other classifications of subjects; and required focused, incentive-based advertisements for successful survey completion.

To investigate our hypotheses, and find answers to our research questions, we developed a survey questionnaire to gather and analyze the needed data. We explored the relationship between social media users' security awareness and their actual behavior while using these social media tools. Developing an online survey is relatively simple nowadays; reliable tools are available over the Internet, offering many options for different purposes, such as: Askia, LimeSurvey, SurveyMonkey, and Zoho Survey (Keiser, 2016).

The web-based survey was conducted through a pilot study. We chose a pilot study to "develop, adapt, or check the feasibility of techniques" and be able to test the survey questions and measurements, and estimate the needed number of participants for the final sample with the desired accuracy (Foster, 2013; Hopkins, 2000). Using pilot studies allow researchers to test and evaluate their proposed methods or techniques on small scale groups without the need to undertake large intensive groups that could waste efforts and resources (Foster, 2013).

The survey questionnaire was developed to collect data in three categories: users' demographic or background information, users' perception of social media security vulnerabilities and security

awareness in general, and users' behavior while using social networking sites. The survey instrument has been tested on a small group of students in the pilot study. The survey then was modified based on the findings of the pilot study. The revised questionnaire was administrated to a large group of students. The survey results were analyzed to test the research hypothesis stated in the previous section. The measurements of users' perceptions and behavior are based on protection motivation theory.

Based on our hypotheses, we set number of measurements to help in measure and understand social media users' perceptions and behaviors, Figure 5.1 clarify the research theoretical model, where the user's behavior variables divided into two groups to measure user's perception on an activity or action with security implications, and the likelihood of performing that action. The variables presented in this theoretical model were derived from the PMT factors that we explored earlier.




Figure 5.1 Research theoretical model

#### **Mapping of Research Model and Survey Instruments**

To investigate our research hypotheses, we designed a scenario based questions to test Facebook users' perceptions of certain action and the likelihood that they will perform that action. Here is clarification of mapping both independent and dependent variables to each of our research hypothesis. Questions from the formal study have been used in the mapping.

H1. The users' level of perception of security severity will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites.

- Independent variable: IV1. Perceived security severity of the activity. Measured by Q3.3
   (In your opinion, how severe the consequence is if those posted photos were hacked? / X2).
- Dependent variable: DV1. Likelihood of performing the activity. Measured by Q3.5 (Knowing the geotags attached to those pictures you took, what's likelihood that you will post them on your Facebook account? / Y2).

**H2.** The users' level of perception of self-efficacy in information security will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites.

- Independent variable: IV2. Perceived self-efficiency on security. Measured by statements 1 4 from Q2.4 (Facebook can be used for spoofing, Clickjacking or Tag-jacking can occur on Facebook, Facebook is source of spams or/and viruses, Identity theft can happen in Facebook / X).
- Dependent variable: DV1. Likelihood of performing the activity. Measured by Q3.4 (If your friend told you there is a software/app that can remove the geotags from the pictures,

what's the likelihood of you would install this software/app and use it to remove the geotags from these pictures? / Y3).

- **H3.** The users' level of perception of the probability of an occurrence of security threats will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites.
  - Independent variable: IV3. Perceived possibilities of security breach. Measured by Q3.2 (After taking the pictures, one of your friend told you that she noticed that your pictures are geotagged, which means that those pictures could reveal your home location on Facebook if you post them. Given this information, in your opinion how likely is it these photos will be used maliciously by hackers if you post them on your Facebook account? / X1).
  - Dependent variable: DV1. Likelihood of performing the activity. Measured by Q3.4 (If your friend told you there is a software/app that can remove the geotags from the pictures, what's the likelihood of you would install this software/app and use it to remove the geotags from these pictures? / Y3).
- **H4.** The users' perception of the level of difficulty on the response efficacy of security threats will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites.
  - Independent variable: IV4. Perceived self-efficacy of the preventive behavior. Measured by Q3.2 (After taking the pictures, one of your friend told you that she noticed that your pictures are geotagged, which means that those pictures could reveal your home location on Facebook if you post them. Given this information, in your opinion how likely is it these photos will be used maliciously by hackers if you post them on your Facebook account? / X1).

Dependent variable: DV1. Likelihood of performing the activity. Measured by Q3.6 (If geotag is removed from those pictures, what's likelihood that you would post those pictures on your Facebook account? / Y4).

Table 5.1 provides a matrix to clarify the mapping between the PMT factors and the research hypotheses, as well as the theoretical model variables and the corresponding question from the survey instrument. The questions presented in this matrix located from the formal study.

Table 5.1 Mapping hypotheses and instrument questions matrix

PMT Factor	Hypothesis	Model IV	Instrument Q(X)	Model DV	Instrument Q (Y)
Threat severity	H1	IV1	Q3.3 (X2)	DV1	Q3.5 (Y2)
Response efficacy	H2	IV2	Q2.4 (X) Statements 1-4	DV1	Q3.4 (Y3)
Threat vulnerability	НЗ	IV3	Q3.1 (X1)	DV1	Q3.4 (Y3)
self-efficacy	H4	IV4	Q3.1 (X1)	DV1	Q3.6 (Y4)

#### Chapter 6. Research Results

As discussed in the research design chapter, the research used students from the Information Technology department as subjects to conduct a pilot study. The survey instrument was tested on a small group of students as part of the pilot study. The survey instrument has been modified in the formal study based on initial results and input from the research committee members.

This chapter presents in its first section the pilot study results and the analysis tests that have been run on data to understand the results. The second section presents the formal study results as well as the analysis tests too.

### 6.1 Pilot Study

The initial survey was distributed among 60 undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate students from the Information Technology Department of the College of Computing and Software Engineering as a first test for the pilot study (PS). We received 59 responses; only 30 responses were valid. Valid responses exclude any response with missing answers to one or more questions. No forced response option was used in this pilot study.

The first two parts of the survey collected data about the participants' demographic information, and their perception of social media security vulnerabilities and security awareness in general. More than 50% of respondents were between 26 and 35-years-old, around 56% were married, and 40% never married. Most of the participants were graduate students, and 66% were male and 33% were female. The survey asked the participants to describe their knowledge in cyber security; around 46% considered their cyber security knowledge as intermediate, 20% as professional, and around 26% as amateur. Table 6.1 describes the demographic questions.

Table 6.1 PS Responses to demographic questions

Item	Percent	Count	Item	Percent	Count
Age			Gender		
Under 18	0.0%	0	Male	66.7%	20
18 - 25	16.7%	5	Female	33.3%	10
26 - 35	53.3%	16	Prefer not to answer	0.0%	0
36 - 45	16.7%	5			
46 - 55	6.7%	2	Education level		
56+	6.7%	2	Undergraduate	13.3%	4
			Graduate	83.3%	25
Marital status			Postgraduate	3.3%	1
Single (never married)	40.0%	12			
Married	56.7%	17	Knowledge in cyber se	curity	
Separated	0.0%	0	Beginner	6.7%	2
Widowed	0.0%	0	Amateur	26.7%	8
Divorced	3.3%	1	Intermediate	46.7%	14
Prefer not to answer	0.0%	0	Professional	20.0%	6
			Expert	0.0%	0

The participants were asked to check all social networking sites that they login to at least once a month. More than 70% of the participants use YouTube, 70% use Facebook, and more than 55% use LinkedIn. 3% added Steemit as another networking site. Figure 6.1 displays all results.




Figure 6.1 PS Login at least once a month to any of these social networking sites

Among the 30 valid respondents, only 21 were using Facebook as one of the social networking sites (login at least once a month). More than 50% of these respondents choose Facebook as the most frequently used among the social networking sites, where only 19% choose YouTube and less than 10% choose LinkedIn. See Figure 6.2.




Figure 6.2 PS The social networking site that most frequently use

Among the Facebook participant users, only 1 student (4%) read the terms and conditions agreement of Facebook, whereas less than 50% either read fewer than 10 lines or none. More than 65% set their Facebook account profile as private and 28% as public. The results show that at least 47% of the participants change their Facebook account password once a year, whereas 14% change their password once every several months, 9% change their password once every two to three years, and around 19% never changed their passwords. See Figure 6.3. Furthermore, the participants were asked to indicate their opinion on statements regarding the security of Facebook; the statements and results are illustrated in Figure 6.4. The results show that around 50% agree that spoofing, click-jacking and tag-jacking can occur on Facebook, 57% agree that identity theft can happen in Facebook, and interestingly, 52% disagree that Facebook is a safe community.




Figure 6.3 PS How often do you change your Facebook account password




Figure 6.4 PS Participant opinion on statements regarding Facebook

The third part of the survey aimed to collect data to measure the participants' behavior while using Facebook. The answers scaled from extremely likely to extremely unlikely including neutral (on scale of five). Per the research theoretical model Figure 5.1, the questions designed to measure two aspects, as we call dependent and independent variables. Table 6.2 list the questions and the analysis assumptions:

Table 6.2 PS part 3 questions, users' behavior while using social networking sites

	Question	Analysis Assumption
Q3.1	Imagine that you have a group of friends who like to share pictures of their homemade food on Facebook.	Y1 (Dependent)
	You just made an elegant dish and took a few pictures of the dish. What's the likelihood you'll post those pictures on your Facebook account?	
Q3.2	After taking the pictures, you find out the pictures are geotagged, which means that those pictures could publish your home location on Facebook if you post them. Given this information, please indicate your opinion on the questions below. In your opinion, how likely is it these photos will exploited by malicious people if they are posted to your Facebook account?	X1 (Independent)
Q3.3	What do you think of the severity of consequence if those pictures were posted to your Facebook account and exploited by the malicious people?	X2 (Independent)
Q3.4	Knowing the geotag issue, what's likelihood that you will post those pictures on your Facebook account?	Y2 (Dependent)
Q3.5	If you were told there is a software/app that can remove the geotags, what's the likelihood of you would download and install this software/app on your computer or smartphone?	Y3 (Dependent)
Q3.6	If the geotag removal software/app is already installed on your computer/smart phone, what's likelihood you would use the software/app to remove the geotag on the pictures?	Y4 (Dependent)
Q3.7	If geotag is removed from the pictures, what's likelihood that you would post those pictures on your Facebook account?	Y5 (Dependent)

Results show that there is no significant correlation between the users' perceptions of an activity with security implications and the likelihood of performing that activity. Regression analysis has been run to investigate the research hypothesis and find answers to its questions.

The first hypothesis stated: *The users' level of perception of security severity will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites*. Though, according to the scenario that has been tested in the survey, results show that this hypothesis is not supported due to the very low relationship (R Square = 0.024) between the users' perceptions of the severity of consequence if the pictures were posted to their Facebook account and exploited by the malicious people, and the likelihood that they will post the geotagged pictures to their Facebook account.




Figure 6.5 PS Testing hypothesis 1

For the second hypothesis: *The users' level of perception of self-efficacy in information security* will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites, results show there is no significant correlation (R Square = 0.109) between the users' opinion on how likely it is that malicious people will exploit the photos if they are posted to their Facebook account as well as

their perceptions of the severity of consequence if the pictures were posted to their Facebook account and exploited by the malicious people, and the likelihood that they will download and install the geotags removal software/app on their computer or smartphone.




Figure 6.6 PS Testing hypothesis 2

The third hypothesis stated: *The users' level of perception of the probability of an occurrence of security threats will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites.* And per the survey results, there is a very low relationship (R Square = 0.103) between the users' opinion on how likely it is that malicious people will exploit the photos if they are posted to their Facebook account and the likelihood that they will download and install the geotags removal software/app on their computer or smartphone. This concludes that this hypothesis is not supported.




Figure 6.7 PS Testing hypothesis 3

Fourth hypothesis: *The users' perception of the level of difficulty on the response efficacy of security threats will negatively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking* sites. Results show a low relationship (R Square =0.038) between the users' opinion on how likely it is that malicious people will exploit the photos if they are posted to their Facebook account and the likelihood that they would post the pictures on their Facebook account if a geotag is removed from the pictures, which also led to the same conclusion; this hypothesis is not supported.




Figure 6.8 PS Testing hypothesis 4

For better understanding the users' correspondence of their perceptions, T-Test has been run to explore the users' perceptions on posting pictures they took on Facebook (Q3.2, Y1), their perception on posting those pictures after knowing the geotag issue (Q3.4, Y2), and their perception on posting those pictures if the geotag is removed (Q3.7, Y5). Our results show that respondents' perceived likelihood of posting pictures after knowing the geotag issue is significantly different than before knowing the geotag issue (with P value = 0.02). This clarifies that Facebook users are less likely to post the pictures once they know the geotag issue. See Table 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 for details.

Table 6.3 PS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.4 (Y1, Y2)

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.142857143	3.761904762
Variance	2.128571429	1.19047619
Observations	21	21
Pearson Correlation	0.493582983	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
Df	20	
t Stat	-2.145904153	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.022167268	

t Critical one-tail	1.724718243
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.044334535
t Critical two-tail	2.085963447

Table 6.4 PS t-Test, Q3.4, Q3.7 (Y2, Y5)

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.761904762	2.714285714
Variance	1.19047619	1.514285714
Observations	21	21
Pearson Correlation	0.54263508	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	20	
t Stat	4.298055658	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.000175226	
t Critical one-tail	1.724718243	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.000350453	
t Critical two-tail	2.085963447	

Table 6.5 PS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.7 (Y1, Y5)

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.142857143	2.714285714
Variance	2.128571429	1.514285714
Observations	21	21
Pearson Correlation	0.553017326	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	20	
t Stat	1.525642883	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.071378926	
t Critical one-tail	1.724718243	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.142757852	
t Critical two-tail	2.085963447	

# **6.2 Formal Study**

Based on the pilot study survey results, a number of questions have been modified and some have been removed from the formal study (FS); the main purpose was to reduce the time that first and second parts of the survey require so participants could focus on the third part. The formal study distributed among graduate and undergraduate students from the Information Technology

Department of the College of Computing and Software Engineering, who share almost similar background; from the pilot survey, Q1.4 (asked about the education level) and Q1.5 (asked to describe knowledge in cyber security) have been removed. Two statements from Q2.4 were combined into one statement (Clickjacking or Tag-jacking can occur on Facebook). More modifications have been done to the last section of the survey, based on results from the pilot study as well as the input from the committee members. Trying to include Facebook users with different interests and background, Q3.1 has been updated to include more situations in addition to the homemade food scenario. We simplify the language used in both Q3.2 and Q3.3, and two questions (Q3.5, Q3.6) have been updated into one question (Q3.4 in FS) to clarify the idea and reduce time. In addition, we also made changes to the wording of the answer choices to the third part questions, scaling the answer choice "extremely" and replacing it with "very". It is important to note that the order of the analysis assumptions for some of the variables has been changed compared to the assumptions order used in the pilot study; the order of two questions changed to improve the participants' engagement with the flow of the scenario questions.

Respondents for the final survey were recruited from the Information Technology department at Kennesaw State University; all were graduate students. A total of 142 responses were received, with 138 valid responses. A consent form was added as a first step of the survey, and a forced response option has been applied to all questions to ensure that participants do not miss any questions. Valid responses exclude any responses with missing answers to one or more questions. Only one responder did not agree to the consent form contents, and three responses were not completed. Adding the forced response validation option has remarkable effects on the percentage of valid responses compared to the pilot study.

Most of the participants were young, between 18 and 35-years-old, and 22% were mature, 36-years-old or more. 72% of participants were male and 27% were female. 37% of the participants were married and 56% were single (never married). Table 6.6 shows detailed demographic data for the respondents.

Table 6.6 FS Responses to demographic questions

Item	Percent	Count	Item	Percent	Count
Age			Marital status		
Under 18	0.0%	0	Single (never married)	56.5%	78
18 - 25	42.8%	59	Married	37.0%	51
26 - 35	35.5%	49	Separated	0.0%	0
36 - 45	11.6%	16	Widowed	0.7%	1
46 - 55	8.0%	11	Divorced	5.1%	7
56+	2.2%	3	Prefer not to answer	0.7%	1
Gender					
Male	72.5%	100			
Female	26.8%	37			
Prefer not to answer	0.7%	1			

The participants were asked to check all social networking sites that they login to at least once a month. The survey showed that around 75% of the participants use Facebook, 75% use YouTube, and more than 44% use LinkedIn, almost 40% use Instagram and more than 35% use Snapchat. 9% added other social networking sites, include Reddit, WhatsApp, IMO, Viber, Tumbler, Tinder, and Discord. Only those who chose Facebook as one of social networking sites continue to the remaining of the survey. See Figure 6.9. Among those who login at least once a month to Facebook (104 participants, 75.4%); more than 62% choose Facebook as the most frequent social networking site that they use, and 12.5% choose YouTube. See Figure 6.10.




Figure 6.9 FS Login at least once a month to any of these social networking sites





Figure 6.10 FS The social networking site that most frequently use

The second part of the survey aimed to study the participants' security awareness while using Facebook. Among the Facebook users' participants, 17% read the terms and conditions agreement of Facebook; almost 27% read less than 10 lines, and 56% did not read any. However, 73% set their Facebook profile as private, and only 20% as public. (Figure 6.11, Figure 6.12).






Figure 6.11 FS Read terms & conditions

Figure 6.12 FS Profile type

At least 27% of the participants change their Facebook account password once a year, 24% change their password once every several months, 18% change their password once every two to three years, and around 27% never changed their passwords.




Figure 6.13 Frequent of changing Facebook account password

In a question asking the participants to indicate their opinion on the number of statements related to Facebook security awareness, between 48% to almost 29% showed good awareness toward the security vulnerabilities and risks that the statements clarify. Moreover, only 6% and 2% agreed and strongly agreed, respectively, that Facebook is a safe community and nothing dangerous is going to happen. See Figure 6.14.




Figure 6.14 FS Participant opinion on statements regarding Facebook

As the initial survey; the third part of the survey collected data to measure the participants' behavior while using Facebook. The answers scaled from very likely to very unlikely including neutral (on scale of five). Per the research theoretical model (Figure 4.1), questions were designed to measure two aspects, dependent and independent variables. The questions have been modified as mentioned earlier, Table 6.7 lists the questions and the analysis assumptions:

Table 6.7 FS part 3 questions, users' behavior while using social networking sites

	Question	Analysis Assumption
Q3.1	Imagine that you have a group of friends who like to share pictures on Facebook, and you just took few pictures of your backyard, food you just made, or furniture you just assembled.	Y1 (Dependent)
	What's the likelihood you will post those pictures on your Facebook account?	
Q3.2	After taking the pictures, one of your friend told you that she noticed that your pictures are geotagged, which means that those pictures could reveal your home location on Facebook if you post them. Given this information, in your opinion how likely is it these photos will be used maliciously by hackers if you post them on your Facebook account?	X1 (Independent)
Q3.3	In your opinion, how severe the consequence is if those posted photos were hacked?	X2 (Independent)
Q3.4	If your friend told you there is a software/app that can remove the geotags from the pictures, what's the likelihood of you would install this software/app and use it to remove the geotags from these pictures?	Y3 (Dependent)
Q3.5	Knowing the geotags attached to those pictures you took, what's likelihood that you will post them on your Facebook account?	Y2 (Dependent)
Q3.6	If geotag is removed from those pictures, what's likelihood that you would post those pictures on your Facebook account?	Y4 (Dependent)

Results from the formal study were almost the same as the results from the pilot study. The analysis shows that there is no significant correlation between the users' perceptions of an activity with security implications and the likelihood of performing that activity.

Testing the first hypothesis: *The users' level of perception of security severity will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites*, shows that there is no significant correlation between the users' perceptions of the severity of consequence if the posted pictures were hacked, and the likelihood that they will post the geotagged pictures on their Facebook account (R Square = 0.004), and this confirm that first hypothesis is not supported.




Figure 6.15 FS Testing hypothesis 1

The second hypothesis stated: *The users' level of perception of self-efficacy in information security* will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites. The study surveyed the users' level of knowledge and awareness of several statements with security implications related to Facebook, refer to Q2.4, Figure 6.14. The average on how each participant responded to the first four statements has been calculated. Results show that there is a very low relationship (R Square = 0.016) between the users' perceptions of statements with security implications related to Facebook and the likelihood that they will install and use a geotag removal software/app on their computer or smartphone. This concludes that the second hypothesis is not supported.




Figure 6.16 FS Testing hypothesis 2

For hypothesis three: *The users' level of perception of the probability of an occurrence of security threats will positively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites*, the relationship was also low (R Square = 0.089) between the users' opinion on how likely it is that malicious people will exploit the posted photos, and the likelihood that they would install and use geotag removal software/app to remove the geotag from these pictures. The conclusion is this hypothesis is not supported.




Figure 6.17 FS Testing hypothesis 3

Lastly, testing the fourth hypothesis: *The users' perception of the level of difficulty on the response efficacy of security threats will negatively correlate to the users' safe behavior on social networking sites*, shows that there is almost no correlation (R Square = 0.003) between the users' opinion on how likely it is that malicious people will exploit the posted photos, and the likelihood that they would post the pictures on their Facebook account if the geotag is removed from the pictures. Consequently, the fourth hypothesis is not supported.




Figure 6.18 FS Testing hypothesis 4

Responses data were analyzed as well to investigate participants' perceptions on posting pictures they took on Facebook (Q3.2, Y1), their perception on posting those pictures after knowing the geotag issue (Q3.5, Y2), and their perception on posting those pictures if the geotag is removed (Q3.6, Y4). The results show that respondents' perceived likelihood of posting pictures after knowing the geotag issue is significantly different than before knowing the geotag issue (P value = 0.006). This clarifies that Facebook users are less likely to post the pictures once they know the geotag issue, although, we find interesting differences between male and female perceptions of posting pictures for the same scenarios. Results indicate that women (with P = 0.001) are more conservative than men (P = 0.145) when posting pictures after knowing that the pictures are geotagged. Likewise, results for mature participants, 36-years-old or more, also show that they are more conservative (P = 0.094) than young participants, P = 0.0180 for same scenarios. However, there was no significant differences among married and unmarried (single, divorced, widowed) participants. Detailed results in Appendix B.

#### **Chapter 7. Discussion and Conclusion**

Our research explores social media user's awareness and behaviors while using Facebook among students from the Information Technology Department of the College of Computing and Software Engineering. The research conducted a literature review that explored the emergence of social media and the social media security vulnerabilities and mitigation techniques, along with studying four theories and models to examine the relationship between users' perceptions and behavior. We investigated Facebook users' awareness regarding number of security threats related to Facebook. We studied the users' perceptions and behaviors using specific scenarios that we believe it can measure users' behaviors based on the theoretical model explained earlier in chapter 5. The hypotheses presented in this research were found to be not supported. Human behavior is hard to predict and explain.

#### **Limitations and Future Work**

As any research study, our study has a number of limitations. First, this research attempted to investigate human behavior and perceptions while humans are hard to predict. Second, data were collected from the Information Technology Department of the College of Computing and Software Engineering, and all participants were graduate and undergraduate students; therefore, claims of various academic backgrounds and skills were limited. On the other hand, choosing the geotag scenario may not have been the best choice to test the users' perceptions and behavior. The study was simulated using online surveys, and no real environment was used. Furthermore, the language of some questions, like Q3.2 (... Given this information, in your opinion how likely is it these photos will be used maliciously by hackers if you post them on your Facebook account?) need to be modified to use more specific terms. In addition, the relatedly of the survey to the factors that

needed to be measured requires higher validity. Factors or framework of other related theories, like TAM, CPM, and SCT that the literature review explored, could be integrated with current measurements factors.

All these limitations represent directions for future work and research. We believe that our research provides respectable indications that the perceived activity with security implications has no significant correlation to the likelihood of performing the activity within Facebook users form the IT department of Kennesaw State University. More input from researchers with specialized backgrounds in psychology and behavioral science can improve the quality of the study instrument and provide deeper understanding of results.

Developing the survey measurements need to be enhanced by incorporating other factors and/or criteria from other related theories to deliver more solid base for the study. On the other hand, the survey could be improved using a real environment or using techniques like attention filters or reverse wording of questions to ensure higher levels of validation. Investigating more users' background details, like area of employment, number of children, owning a pet, or number of years as Facebook user, as well as including more scenarios and investigating users' security awareness and perception through a greater number of questions could yield a more comprehensive study with more valid results.

#### **Conclusion**

While playing an essential role in connecting people in the modern society, social networking sites have become major targets for cyber-attacks due to their massive user base. In this paper, we analyze the security threats on social media and mitigation techniques. We argue that studying the connection between users' awareness of security threats and their corresponding behavior is a vital

component in social media security. Protection motivation theory (PMT) has been widely used to examine people's behavior in information security domain. We proposed that PMT theory can also be adapted to explain and predict social media users' behaviors that have security implications. This paper extended the application of PMT to the social media domain, presents a resource in user behavior research in the social media security field, and build a strong base to promote safe user behavior on social networking sites.

This research investigates the relationship of users' security perceptions and their actual behavior on the social networking sites using Facebook as our survey platform. The study found that users' perceptions on activity with security implications has no significant correlation with the likelihood of performing that activity. Exploring behaviors that have security implication on social media networks should be considered by more researchers. Protecting people from threats is very needed, especially concerning massive use of social media networks.

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## **Appendix A: Formal Study Instrument**

Q1.1 You are being invited to take part in a research study, The Paradox of Social Media Security: Users' Perceptions versus Behavior, conducted by Zahra Alqubaiti of Kennesaw State University. Zahra can be reached at zalqubai@students.kennesaw.edu. Before you decide to participate in this study, you should read this form and ask questions about anything that you do not understand. The purpose of the study is to investigate the relationship between the social media users' security awareness and their actual behavior while using social media. You are asked to complete an online survey and your participation will require approximately 10 to 15 minutes. There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this survey. Your input will help the researchers to better understand the students' behavior while using social media (Facebook). Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. Participants who complete the survey will receive 5 extra points as class credit. Use the link at the end of survey to submit your name and class number to receive your extra points. If you don't want to take part of the survey, please contact your instructor of the class for alternative extra point assignment. Your responses will be kept strictly confidential, and digital data will be stored in secure computer files. Any report of this research that is made available to the public will only include aggregated data. You must be 18 years of age or older to participate in this study. The IP address will be automatically recorded by the online survey software. But it won't be used either for identification purpose or data analysis process. Research at Kennesaw State University that involves human participants is carried out under the oversight of an Institutional Review Board. Questions or problems regarding these activities should be addressed to the Institutional Review Board, Kennesaw State University, 585 Cobb Avenue, KH3403, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591, (470) 578-PLEASE PRINT A COPY OF THIS CONSENT DOCUMENT FOR YOUR RECORDS, OR IF 2268. YOU DO NOT HAVE PRINT CAPABILITIES. YOU MAY CONTACT THE RESEARCHER TO **OBTAIN A COPY** 

- O I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project. I understand that participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time without penalty. (4)
- O I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the questions. (5)

If I do not agree to participate... Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey

- Q1.2 How old are you?
- O Under 18
- O 18 25
- **Q** 26 35
- **Q** 36 45
- **Q** 46 55
- **O** 56+

Q1	.3 What is your marital status?
$\mathbf{O}$	Single (never married)
0	Married
$\mathbf{O}$	Separated
O	Widowed
0	Divorced
0	Prefer not to answer
Q1	.4 What is your gender?
0	Male
0	Female
O	Prefer not to answer
Q1	.5 Do you login at least once a month to any of the following social networking sites? (check all
app	olicable)
	Facebook
	Twitter
	LinkedIn
	Google +
	YouTube
	Pinterest
	Instagram
	Snapchat
	Others; please specify:
If I	Facebook Is Not Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey
Q1	.6 What is the social networking site that you use most frequently?
0	Facebook
O	Twitter
0	LinkedIn
0	Google +
O	YouTube
	Pinterest
	Instagram
	Snapchat
0	Others; please specify:
Q2	.1 Have you ever read the terms and condition agreement of Facebook?
0	Yes
0	Less than 10 lines
0	No

ic?							
O Private							
O Public							
O I don't know							
Q2.3 On average, how often do you change your Facebook account password?							
Once every several months							
O Once a year							
O Once every 2 - 3 years ago Never							
owing state	ements:						
Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	I don't know		
0	0	0	0	0	0		
<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>	0	O	<b>O</b>	0		
<b>O</b>	O .	O	O .	O	<b>O</b>		
•	O .	O	O .	O .	O		
•	0	0	0	<b>O</b>	0		
	_						
end told vo	u that she	noticed th	at vour pict	ures are			
ould reveal	your hom	e location	on Faceboo	k if you po			
	owing state  Strongly agree  O  S who like to made, or function.  Count?	owing statements:  Strongly agree  O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O	owing statements:  Strongly agree Neutral O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O	owing statements:    Strongly   Agree   Neutral   Disagree	owing statements:    Strongly agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly disagree		

Q3.3 In your opinion, how severe the consequence is if those posted photos were hacked?
O Very severe
O Severe
O Neutral
O Not Severe
O Not very severe
Q3.4 If your friend told you there is a software/app that can remove the geotags from the pictures, what's the likelihood of you would install this software/app and use it to remove the geotags from these pictures?
O Very likely
O Likely
O Neutral
O Unlikely
O Very unlikely
Q3.5 Knowing the geotags attached to those pictures you took, what's likelihood that you will post them on your Facebook account?
O Very likely
O Likely
O Neutral
O Unlikely
O Very unlikely
Q3.6 If geotag is removed from those pictures, what's likelihood that you would post those pictures on your Facebook account?
•
<ul><li>Very likely</li><li>Likely</li></ul>
O Neutral
O Unlikely
O Very unlikely
Very uninkery
Q3.7 Thank you for your input! Please use the link below to claim your extra credits. The link will be opened in a new window. Please submit this survey, then go to the new window to claim your extra credits. Click here to claim your extra credits

# **Appendix B: Formal Study - Analysis Tests**

Table B.1 FS Regression analysis - Testing Hypothesis 1, Q3.3 (X2), Q3.5 (Y2)

Regression S	Statistics		
Multiple R	iple R 0.064080511		
R Square	0.004106312		
Adjusted R Square	-0.005657352		
Standard Error	1.008239848		
Observations	104		
ANOVA	_		
	df	SS	MS
Regression	1	0.427530244	0.427530244
Residual	102	103.6878544	1.016547592

Total	103	104.1153846		
	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value
Intercept	3.788570576	0.257160873	14.73229787	5.25717E-27
X Variable 1	-0.057594748	0.088810296	-0.648514309	0.518109721
	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	3.278493204	4.298647948	3.278493204	4.298647948
X Variable 1	-0.233749549	0.118560053	-0.233749549	0.118560053

Table B.2 FS Regression analysis - Testing Hypothesis 2, Q3.2 \* Q3.3 (X1, X2), Q3.4 (Y3)

Regression S	tatistics				
Multiple R	0.300528606				
R Square	0.090317443				
Adjusted R Square	0.072303927				
Standard Error	1.061996529				
Observations	104				
ANOVA					
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	0.427530244	0.427530244	0.420570809	0.518109721
Residual	102	103.6878544	1.016547592		
Total	103	104.1153846			
	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	
Intercept	1.749234555	0.308424795	5.671510798	1.35266E-07	
X Variable 1	0.283334809	0.109335098	2.591435098	0.010972472	
X Variable 2	0.037035514	0.106738929	0.346972884	0.729333601	
	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>	
Intercept	1.137402727	2.361066383	1.137402727	2.361066383	
X Variable 1	0.066443387	0.500226232	0.066443387	0.500226232	
X Variable 2	-0.17470581	0.248776837	-0.17470581	0.248776837	

Significance F

0.518109721

0.420570809

Table B.3 FS Regression analysis - Testing Hypothesis 3, Q3.2 (X1), Q3.4 (Y3)

Regression S	tatistics				
Multiple R	0.298719129				
R Square	0.089233118				
Adjusted R Square	0.080304031				
Standard Error	1.057407484				
Observations	104				
ANOVA					
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	11.173874	11.17387	9.993532	0.002068751
Residual	102	114.0472798	1.118111		
Total	103	125.2211538			
	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	
Intercept	1.800626223	0.269363776	6.684738	1.25E-09	
X Variable 1	0.301604697	0.095406639	3.161255	0.002069	
	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>	
Intercept	1.266344452	2.334907995	1.266344452	2.334907995	
X Variable 1	0.112366081	0.490843312	0.112366081	0.490843312	

Table B.4 FS Regression analysis - Testing Hypothesis 4, Q3.2 (X1), Q3.6 (Y4)

Regression Statistics

	Sterristres	_			
Multiple R	0.054921385	-			
R Square	0.003016359				
Adjusted R Square	-0.006757991				
Standard Error	1.082277322				
Observations	104	_			
ANOVA					
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	0.361469968	0.361469968	0.308599419	0.579757302
Residual	102	119.4750685	1.171324201		
Total	103	119.8365385			
	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	_
Intercept	2.752876712	0.275699113	9.985076415	8.7866E-17	
X Variable 1	0.054246575	0.097650568	0.555517254	0.579757302	_
	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>	-
Intercept	2.206028829	3.299724596	2.206028829	3.299724596	-
X Variable 1	-0.139442863	0.247936014	-0.139442863	0.247936014	<u>.</u>

Table B.5 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.5 (Y1, Y2)

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.365384615	3.634615
Variance	1.535100822	1.010829
Observations	104	104
Pearson Correlation	0.552468434	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	103	
t Stat	-2.53884257	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.006308799	
t Critical one-tail	1.659782273	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.012617597	
t Critical two-tail	1.983264145	

Table B.6 FS t-Test, Q3.5, Q3.6 (Y2, Y4)

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.63461538	2.894231
Variance	1.01082898	1.163462
Observations	104	104
Pearson Correlation	0.51012455	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	103	
t Stat	7.30659958	
P(T<=t) one-tail	3.0133E-11	
t Critical one-tail	1.65978227	
P(T<=t) two-tail	6.0266E-11	
t Critical two-tail	1.98326414	

Table B.7 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.6 (Y2, Y4)

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.365385	2.894231
Variance	1.535101	1.163462
Observations	104	104
Pearson Correlation	0.581317	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	103	
t Stat	4.490724	
P(T<=t) one-tail	9.29E-06	
t Critical one-tail	1.659782	
P(T<=t) two-tail	1.86E-05	
t Critical two-tail	1.983264	

Table B.8 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.5 (Y1, Y2) - Male

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.527027	3.662162
Variance	1.403369	1.10348
Observations	74	74
Pearson Correlation	0.530318	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	73	
t Stat	-1.067	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.144744	
t Critical one-tail	1.665996	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.289488	
t Critical two-tail	1.992997	

Table B.9 FS t-Test, Q3.5, Q3.6 (Y2, Y4) - Male

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.662162	2.918919
Variance	1.10348	1.144021
Observations	74	74
Pearson Correlation	0.52393	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	73	
t Stat	6.180486	
P(T<=t) one-tail	1.65E-08	
t Critical one-tail	1.665996	
P(T<=t) two-tail	3.3E-08	
t Critical two-tail	1.992997	

Table B.10 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.6 (Y1, Y4) - Male

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.527027	2.918919
Variance	1.403369	1.144021
Observations	74	74
Pearson Correlation	0.531502	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	73	
t Stat	4.774402	
P(T<=t) one-tail	4.52E-06	
t Critical one-tail	1.665996	
P(T<=t) two-tail	9.03E-06	
t Critical two-tail	1.992997	

Table B.11 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.5 (Y1, Y2) - Female

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	2.931034	3.551724
Variance	1.70936	0.827586
Observations	29	29
Pearson Correlation	0.633683	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	28	
t Stat	-3.29419	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.00134	
t Critical one-tail	1.701131	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.00268	
t Critical two-tail	2.048407	

Table B.12 FS t-Test, Q3.5, Q3.6 (Y2, Y4) - Female

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.551724	2.862069
Variance	0.827586	1.26601
Observations	29	29
Pearson Correlation	0.495697	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	28	
t Stat	3.575666	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.000647	
t Critical one-tail	1.701131	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.001294	
t Critical two-tail	2.048407	

Table B.13 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.6 (Y1, Y4) - Female

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	2.931034	2.862069
Variance	1.70936	1.26601
Observations	29	29
Pearson Correlation	0.74591	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	28	
t Stat	0.420305	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.338735	
t Critical one-tail	1.701131	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.677471	
t Critical two-tail	2.048407	

Table B.14 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.5 (Y1, Y2) - Married

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.458333	3.458333
Variance	1.563406	1.21558
Observations	24	24
Pearson Correlation	0.282535	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	23	
t Stat	0	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.5	
t Critical one-tail	1.713872	
P(T<=t) two-tail	1	
t Critical two-tail	2.068658	

Table B.15 FS t-Test, Q3.5, Q3.6 (Y2, Y4) - Married

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.458333	2.791667
Variance	1.21558	1.21558
Observations	24	24
Pearson Correlation	0.582712	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	23	
t Stat	3.242574	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.001797	
t Critical one-tail	1.713872	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.003593	
t Critical two-tail	2.068658	

Table B.16 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.6 (Y1, Y4) - Married

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.458333	2.791667
Variance	1.563406	1.21558
Observations	24	24
Pearson Correlation	0.450741	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	23	
t Stat	2.635032	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.0074	
t Critical one-tail	1.713872	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.014799	
t Critical two-tail	2.068658	

Table B.17 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.5 (Y1, Y2) - Unmarried

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.395349	3.767442
Variance	1.197121	0.849391
Observations	43	43
Pearson Correlation	0.565583	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	42	
t Stat	-2.56362	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.007014	
t Critical one-tail	1.681952	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.014028	
t Critical two-tail	2.018082	

Table B.18 FS t-Test, Q3.5, Q3.6 (Y2, Y4) - Unmarried

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.767442	2.930233
Variance	0.849391	1.066445
Observations	43	43
Pearson Correlation	0.332778	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	42	
t Stat	4.847947	
P(T<=t) one-tail	8.71E-06	
t Critical one-tail	1.681952	
P(T<=t) two-tail	1.74E-05	
t Critical two-tail	2.018082	

Table B.19 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.6 (Y1, Y4) - Unmarried

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.395349	2.930233
Variance	1.197121	1.066445
Observations	43	43
Pearson Correlation	0.467512	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	42	
t Stat	2.776044	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.004092	
t Critical one-tail	1.681952	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.008183	
t Critical two-tail	2.018082	

Table B.20 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.5 (Y1, Y2) - Young

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.345679	3.592593
Variance	1.579012	1.044444
Observations	81	81
Pearson Correlation	0.597717	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	80	
t Stat	-2.13019	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.018114	
t Critical one-tail	1.664125	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.036228	
t Critical two-tail	1.990063	

Table B.21 FS t-Test, Q3.5, Q3.6 (Y2, Y4) - Young

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.592593	2.864198
Variance	1.044444	1.168827
Observations	81	81
Pearson Correlation	0.492341	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	80	
t Stat	6.179789	
P(T<=t) one-tail	1.27E-08	
t Critical one-tail	1.664125	
P(T<=t) two-tail	2.54E-08	
t Critical two-tail	1.990063	

Table B.22 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.6 (Y1, Y4) - Young

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.345679	2.864198
Variance	1.579012	1.168827
Observations	81	81
Pearson Correlation	0.623861	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	80	
t Stat	4.223318	
P(T<=t) one-tail	3.16E-05	
t Critical one-tail	1.664125	
P(T<=t) two-tail	6.32E-05	
t Critical two-tail	1.990063	

Table B.23 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.5 (Y1, Y2) - Mature

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.434783	3.782609
Variance	1.438735	0.905138
Observations	23	23
Pearson Correlation	0.365413	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	22	
t Stat	-1.35755	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.094186	
t Critical one-tail	1.717144	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.188371	
t Critical two-tail	2.073873	

Table B.24 FS t-Test, Q3.5, Q3.6 (Y2, Y4) - Mature

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.782609	3
Variance	0.905138	1.181818
Observations	23	23
Pearson Correlation	0.571331	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	22	
t Stat	3.945037	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.000345	
t Critical one-tail	1.717144	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.00069	
t Critical two-tail	2.073873	

Table B.25 FS t-Test, Q3.1, Q3.6 (Y1, Y4) - Mature

	Variable 1	Variable 2
Mean	3.434783	3
Variance	1.438735	1.181818
Observations	23	23
Pearson Correlation	0.418305	
Hypothesized Mean Difference	0	
df	22	
t Stat	1.685935	
P(T<=t) one-tail	0.05297	
t Critical one-tail	1.717144	
P(T<=t) two-tail	0.105941	
t Critical two-tail	2.073873	

## **Appendix C: Pilot Study Instrument**

Q1	.1 How old are you?
O	Under 18
	18 - 25
	26 - 35
	36 - 45
	46 - 55
0	56+
Q1	.2 What is your marital status?
0	Single (never married)
0	Married
0	Separated
	Widowed
	Divorced
0	Prefer not to answer
Q1	.3 What is your gender?
$\mathbf{O}$	Male
$\mathbf{O}$	Female
O	Prefer not to answer
Q1	.4 What is your current education level?
0	Undergraduate
	Graduate
O	Postgraduate
Q1	.5 How would you describe your knowledge in cyber security?
O	Beginner
$\mathbf{O}$	Amateur
$\mathbf{O}$	Intermediate
0	Professional
	Expert
O	I don't know
Q1	.6 Do you login at least once a month to any of the following social networking sites? (check all
app	olicable)
	Facebook
	Twitter
	LinkedIn
	Google +
	YouTube
	Pinterest

	Instagram
	Snapchat
	Others; please specify:
If F	Facebook Is Not Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey
Q1	.7 What is the social networking site that you use most frequently?
0	Facebook
0	Twitter
0	LinkedIn
0	Google +
	YouTube
$\mathbf{O}$	Pinterest
$\mathbf{O}$	Instagram
$\mathbf{O}$	Snapchat
$\mathbf{O}$	Others; please specify:
Ω2	.1 Have you ever read the terms and condition agreement of Facebook?
	Yes
	Less than 10 lines
	No
•	
Q2	.2 Is your Facebook profile private or public?
$\mathbf{O}$	Private
O	Public
O	I don't know
Q2	.3 On average, how often do you change your Facebook account password?
$\mathbf{O}$	Once every several months
$\mathbf{O}$	Once a year
$\mathbf{O}$	Once every 2 - 3 years ago
$\mathbf{O}$	Never
$\mathbf{O}$	I don't know

Q2.4 Please indicate your opinions on the following statements:

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	I don't know
Facebook can be used for spoofing	•	•	•	•	<b>O</b>	O
Clickjacking can occur on Facebook	•	<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>	•	<b>O</b>	O
Tag-jacking can occur on Facebook	•	<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>	•	<b>O</b>	O
Facebook is source of spams or/and viruses	•	<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>	<b>O</b>	O
Identity theft can happen in Facebook	•	<b>O</b>	•	•	<b>O</b>	O
Facebook is a safe community; nothing bad is going to happen	<b>O</b>	•	•	0	•	O

Face you o	I Imagine that you have a group of friends who like to share pictures of their homemade food on bebook. You just made an elegant dish and took a few pictures of the dish. What's the likelihood a'll post those pictures on your Facebook account?  Extremely likely  Likely  Neutral  Unlikely  Extremely unlikely
you mail	2.2 After taking the pictures, you find out the pictures are geotagged, which means that those pictures ald publish your home location on Facebook if you post them. Given this information, please indicate or opinion on the questions below. In your opinion, how likely is it these photos will exploited by dicious people if they are posted to your Facebook account?  Extremely likely  Likely  Neutral  Unlikely  Extremely unlikely
acc O O O	.3 What do you think of the severity of consequence if those pictures were posted to your Facebook ount and exploited by the malicious people?  Extremely severe  Severe  Neutral  Not Severe  Extremely not severe
acc O O O	.4 Knowing the geotag issue, what's likelihood that you will post those pictures on your Facebook ount?  Extremely likely  Likely  Neutral  Unlikely  Extremely unlikely
wor O O O	.5 If you were told there is a software/app that can remove the geotags, what's the likelihood of you uld download and install this software/app on your computer or smartphone?  Extremely likely  Likely  Neutral  Unlikely  Extremely unlikely

Q3	.6 If the geotag removal software/app is already installed on your computer/smart phone, what's
like	elihood you would use the software/app to remove the geotag on the pictures?
$\mathbf{O}$	Extremely likely
$\mathbf{O}$	Likely
$\mathbf{O}$	Neutral
$\mathbf{O}$	Unlikely
O	Extremely unlikely
	.7 If geotag is removed from the pictures, what's likelihood that you would post those pictures on your pebook account?
0	Extremely likely
	Likely
0	Neutral
$\mathbf{O}$	Unlikely
0	Extremely unlikely

Q3.8 Your input is greatly appreciated! Please use the link below to claim your extra credit.  $\label{link} $$ $ $ MKX37rVHL $$ $ MKX37rVHL$ 

## Appendix D: Pilot Study - Analysis Tests

Table D.1 PS Regression analysis - Testing Hypothesis 1, Q3.3 (X2), Q3.4 (Y2)

Regression Statistics					
Multiple R	0.155563				
R Square	0.0242				
Adjusted R Square	-0.02716				
Standard Error	1.105806				
Observations	21				

## **ANOVA**

71110 171					
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	0.57619	0.57619	0.471203	0.500726451
Residual	19	23.23333	1.222807		
Total	20	23.80952			
	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	_
Intercept	4.233333	0.727931	5.815572	1.33E-05	
X Variable 1	-0.18333	0.267078	-0.68644	0.500726	
	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>	_
Intercept	2.709757	5.75691	2.709757	5.75691	-
X Variable 1	-0.74233	0.375666	-0.74233	0.375666	

Table D.2 PS Regression analysis - Testing Hypothesis 2, Q3.2 \* Q3.3 (X1, X2), Q3.4 (Y3)

Regression Statistics					
Multiple R	0.330364221				
R Square	0.109140518				
Adjusted R Square	0.010156132				
Standard Error	1.271512873				
Observations	21				
ANOVA	<del>-</del>				

	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	2	3.565256935	1.782628	1.102603	0.353413276
Residual	18	29.10140973	1.616745		

Total	20	32.66666667		
	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value
Intercept	3.721236926	1.254632347	2.965998	0.008275
Q3.2	-0.381991814	0.25723461	-1.48499	0.154848
Q3.3	-0.108231014	0.31562965	-0.34291	0.735642
	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>
Intercept	1.085352	6.357122	1.085352	6.357122
Q3.2	-0.92242	0.158438	-0.92242	0.158438
Q3.3	-0.77134	0.554882	-0.77134	0.554882

Table D.3 PS Regression analysis - Testing Hypothesis 3, Q3.2 (X1), Q3.5 (Y3)

Regression S	Statistics	•			
Multiple R	0.321435893				
R Square	0.103321033				
Adjusted R Square	0.056127403				
Standard Error	1.241635443				
Observations	21				
ANOVA					
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	3.375153752	3.375153752	2.1893	0.15536271
Residual	19	29.29151292	1.541658574		
Total	20	32.66666667			
	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	
Intercept	3.383763838	0.759875561	4.453049961	0.000273	
X Variable 1	-0.361623616	0.244401634	-1.47962847	0.155363	_
	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>	
Intercept	1.79332601	4.974201665	1.79332601	4.974201665	
X Variable 1	-0.873162116	0.149914883	-0.873162116	0.149914883	_

Table D.4 PS Regression analysis - Testing Hypothesis 4, Q3.2 (X1), Q3.7 (Y5)

Regression Statistics

Multiple R	0.19416755				
R Square	0.037701037				
Adjusted R Square	-0.012946276				
Standard Error	1.238503159				
Observations	21				
ANOVA					
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F
Regression	1	1.141802847	1.141802847	0.74438375	0.399019997
Residual	19	29.14391144	1.533890076		
Total	20	30.28571429			
	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	
Intercept	2.103321033	0.757958617	2.774981361	0.012062774	
X Variable 1	0.210332103	0.24378508	0.862776767	0.399019997	_
	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%	<i>Upper 95.0%</i>	_
Intercept	0.516895416	3.68974665	0.516895416	3.68974665	
X Variable 1	-0.299915934	0.72058014	-0.299915934	0.72058014	