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## Archival Security: A Personal and Circumstantial View

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*ARCHIVAL SECURITY*  
*A PERSONAL AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL VIEW*

Edmund Berkeley, Jr.

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I find my involvement in archival security most ironical, since my chief "background and training" in the subject has been to be the head of an archival agency which suffered a major theft. Had I been given a choice, I should have chosen almost any other method of learning more about this important and complex subject. Certainly I do not recommend my "training program" in archival security to anyone else! As a training method, its chief recommendation is that the subject captures your almost total attention for months and is never far out of your consciousness thereafter. Living for over two years with the ramifications of our theft also has made me intensely aware of the major national problem with archival theft.

Archivists, of course, have been concerned from ancient times with security, since preservation of the materials in their charge is their most important duty. In the not-so-ancient times of the early 1960s when I joined the profession, as a member of the Archives Division of the Virginia State Library, I and my colleagues were taught a good deal about our responsibility to protect and preserve the materials in our care. Perhaps more emphasis was placed on protection from theft than on other kinds of preservation in my on-the-job training, for the Barrow Restoration Shop was adjacent to the staff workroom. The Shop handled the other sorts of preservation problems for us. The late

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Mr. Berkeley is Curator of Manuscripts and University Archivist at the University of Virginia. In addition he serves as Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Security Program of the Society of American Archivists. This paper is adapted from his talk at the Society of Georgia Archivists' Workshop, November 21, 1975.

William J. Van Schreeven, then the state archivist, constantly reminded the junior archivists who had charge of the reading room that we must always be alert to the possibility of theft. I remember several occasions upon which he told the staff of a person or persons suspected of having stolen things from other institutions; very often he had a description of the suspects, and once, a sketch provided by an artistically-talented archivist.

Nevertheless, none of these warnings or stories seemed real to me then. The known thefts had all happened far away from Virginia, and somehow we seemed safe and secure. Most of our patrons were ladies and gentlemen, and genealogists over-impressed with the importance of their family lineage were a much more immediate problem.

Now it is 1975. Two Virginia institutions--one of them my own, and the other the institution for which I formerly worked--have been victims of thefts. The Virginia State Library has been fortunate in apprehending, prosecuting, and convicting its thief. Sadly, the University of Virginia Library has no solid leads to its thief or thieves after two years of investigation. These stories are not unique and can be matched or overshadowed in any gathering of archivists or curators.

The theft from the University of Virginia Library is interesting, perhaps, in that it apparently was an "inside job," that is, one in which there were no visible signs of breaking and entering. We were not aware that we had been robbed for a very long time, and this made the work of the police extremely difficult. Reviewing the circumstances, I find that the first "incident" of importance was the casual discovery by a member of the departmental faculty that one major item was not in its proper filing location when she went to get it to show to some visitors. She reported the fact, and we began a routine search for the document.

I use the word "routine" advisedly because we were in no way alarmed. We do misfile and misplace things occasionally; with more than 9,100,000 items in 12,000 separate collections, we should be insufferable paragons if we did not. Thus, when one item was reported missing, it was considered misfiled and a routine happenstance. Because the item was an historically important one, we did make a number of searches for it, and I mentioned to the university

librarian that we could not locate it. Various staff members conducted searches over a period of some weeks. When they failed to find the item, I decided I should look myself. Hunting through the vault filing area where the missing item should have been, I realized that at least one and possibly two other items were missing as well.

Mental alarm bells began to ring, because never have we misfiled more than one item from the same filing area. But we faced a serious problem in trying to determine whether we had misfiled the items or another cause accounted for their absence.

We never have had in our department what librarians would call a shelf list--a card file or list of the items that should be found upon inspection of a particular shelf or filing area. Such lists were not compiled because they could not materially improve our very good control systems for locating material. We sincerely regretted not having a shelf list of the contents of the vault, a rather large area of more than 900 square feet on two levels. Our department houses a considerable quantity of material in the vault, which it shares with the Rare Book Department of the Library. In this special area are kept our collection of over 3,000 Jefferson papers, the William Faulkner manuscripts, and many valuable literary manuscripts from the Barrett Library of American Literature. In addition it holds materials requiring security but which have no intrinsic value, such as student records from the registrar's office and minutes of the Board of Visitors.

Without describing our existing control arrangements in detail, suffice it to say that we do have a good working system for locating material in our custody, and that from the folders comprising this system we were able to prepare a shelf list of the manuscripts that should have been found in the vault. Compiling this list occupied the majority of the members of the faculty and staff for several days and the clerical staff for nearly a week of typing.

Once this shelf list had been typed onto three-by-five-inch cards, we began a systematic check of the contents of the vault. Some members of the faculty labored at the task every day. But we soon discovered that such work cannot be done for more than a few hours at a time, because the worker becomes sleepy, inattentive, and vocally bored. This careful search proceeded for several weeks. I kept the

librarian informed of our activity, but even at this time, I felt there was no evidence of anything more than our own carelessness.

Several weeks later, a patron requested a photocopy of a George Washington letter which he had placed in the department on deposit. A staff member went to the vault to retrieve the letter, could not find it, and immediately notified me. I in turn at once ordered the entire departmental faculty and some of the library assistants to join the searching in the vault. By late afternoon we had discovered the major disappearance of materials from the autograph collection, whence the majority of items were stolen. I reported the loss to my superior, together with my opinion that a theft had indeed occurred. That night, I wrote out the details of all of the incidents and our actions in response.

The unhappy news of the many missing items was reported to the university president. One of the first things we were asked to do before the police were contacted was to search *all* of our collections to be sure that we had not misfiled the missing materials elsewhere. A principal reason for ordering such a massive search was the discovery that our insurance policy stated that the company was not obligated if the only indication of a loss was an "inventory shortage." Since we had no evidence of breaking and entering, the company has steadfastly maintained the position of its policy, and the question may have to be resolved in court. (I urge archivists to read carefully the insurance policies that protect them in cases of loss and be knowledgeable to what extent they are covered.)

The order to make the extensive search of our entire holdings was no blithe one issued by an administrator unaware of what the command entailed for us. The university president's executive assistant spent some twenty-five years in the position I now hold. Thus he knew exactly what was involved and how things could be misfiled.

As I look back on the accomplishments of the faculty and staff in response to that administrative order, I am still impressed. Each person was given a copy of the list of missing materials, a list which ran to over four pages and which had virtually to be memorized. All of the members of the departmental faculty, and most of the library assistants--nine people in all--were relieved of other duties and assigned to

searching teams. We left a small staff for the reading room. All departmental leave, other than sick leave (none was taken), was cancelled. The searchers opened and checked every Hollinger box, oversized box, records center box, package, and other carton on more than two miles of shelving, as well as every map tray, file drawer, and other storage container in our charge.

This was in no sense an "inventory" as an insurance company uses that word. There was no attempt to check systematically the contents item by item of each container against a container or shelf list. We do have many such lists, but we could not take the time to carry on a search of that depth. Instead, we attempted to spot the file units--daguerreotype case and folders--which disappeared with the missing letters.

I felt certain, as I told the librarians, that we would find none of the missing items during this search. While we certainly do make mistakes and misfile items, our control system is a good one and adhered to by the staff. There were no flags in place of any of the missing items as there should have been had the items been withdrawn legitimately and subsequently misfiled. The massive search confirmed the effectiveness of the control system. We found very few materials out of place, and almost every instance represented an error made years ago.

During the period that we were checking the manuscript collections, our colleagues in the Rare Book Department conducted a shelf-list reading of the books kept in the vault. This search would have revealed eventually that two books by university alumnus Edgar Allen Poe--*Tamerlane* and *Al Aaraaf, Tamerlane and Minor Poems*--were missing, but a patron's request for them before the shelf readers reached their filing location revealed this additional theft.

All employees of the two departments, twenty-two persons, knew that we probably had been robbed. We asked them to keep the news quiet while we carried on our searches, and they responded beautifully. No word of the loss left the two departments for the several months of searching and other actions preceding the public announcement in early December, 1973. Looking back on this period, I think one of the best actions that we took was to keep the personnel of the two departments as fully informed as possible. While much stress and apprehension existed, openness helped to alleviate these problems to some extent.

The completion of our fruitless searches in the Manuscripts Department, coupled with the discovery of the loss from the Rare Book Department of the two extremely rare Poe books, left the University no alternative but to accept the fact that we had been robbed. The university police thereupon were summoned to investigate the case. They were highly critical of the fact that we had delayed so long in bringing them into the case. Knowing something of police work, I appreciate this attitude. But an inside job is insidious. One is unsure that a theft has occurred, as there always is the possibility of a filing error. Another possible explanation of the missing material is that a disgruntled staff member may have hidden them to cause trouble and grief. And if there has been a theft, the likely suspects are those persons with whom you work every day. That one of them has stolen materials is an awful prospect to contemplate, especially if you have hired many of them and worked with the others for years, as I had.

By the nature of our work, the head of an archival agency must have implicit faith in the integrity of the staff of his agency. In no other way can the agency be run without almost insurmountable administrative problems. While I do believe that candidates for archival positions must be investigated, particularly by speaking with former employers and the persons listed as references, the truth of the matter is that even a full field investigation by the F.B.I. would not guarantee that someone might not later steal material. The Daniel Ellsberg-Pentagon Papers case might be cited among others; trusted employees, whose motives are said to be "higher" in such cases, presumably are the ones who keep columnists Jack Anderson and Les Whitten on the pages of our daily newspapers.

The psychological effects of an apparent inside theft are great. The personnel of our two departments inevitably wondered about each other, and the resulting tensions hurt morale. The request, early in the new year, that we all submit to polygraph (lie detector) examination brought the nadir of this tension. Persons who work in libraries and archives rarely are acquainted with police methods and with the polygraph. I was, as I have a brother who has been a policeman. Still the request came as a shock.

I say "request" because it was exactly that. We each had the theoretical right to refuse to take the test,

but as you can imagine, the pressure to submit to it was compelling. So many questions about the test came to me and my colleague in charge of the Rare Book Department that we ran out of answers and appealed to the university administration for help. The head of the university police, a former F.B.I. agent, was sent to meet with both staffs. He was only partially successful in alleviating fears, for a few of the staff vented their frustrations on him with antagonistic and skillful questioning.

Several persons consulted lawyers who advised their clients not to take the test. One staff member, married to a law student, spent hours in the law library reading everything she could find on the polygraph and the law. Ultimately, I believe almost everyone submitted to the test, even some who at first had refused. The pressure to do so was enormous.

It took many months for morale to recover. But when no one was arrested, the staff began to relax. Moreover, as rumors circled the two departments after visits from the police, it became apparent that there was at least one way in which the inside job could have been committed by an outsider. Once this was known, and since the police had not solved the crime, things slowly returned to normal.

If it is true that librarians and archivists rarely are acquainted with police and their procedures, the reverse is equally so. We had to educate the police in our methods and approaches before they really could conduct a thorough investigation. And often thereafter as I conversed with various officers, I realized they did not yet understand rather basic archival procedures, and I would have to begin again. After this experience, I suggest that archivists, curators, and librarians attempt to educate their local police by inviting them to tour the archival agency. Many police departments have public relations programs and will be glad to send officers to the agency as consultants on security. Such consultations provide good opportunities for the education of the police.

Since our theft, we have made several changes in our security arrangements, some of which originated with the police, some of which we thought of ourselves, and others of which were joint efforts. Many of these are simple adjustments, not at all costly for the benefits they bring.



Before the theft, all members of the faculty and sta holding library assistant rank were allowed access to the vault. Faculty members knew the combination since they occasionally needed to open the vault after field trips or when working on Saturday. The police were highly critical of this generous access policy, and we were ordered by the administration to limit severely the number of persons having the vault combination and access. We reduced the number having the combination to two in each department, and this has worked well in practice. One of us always seems to be around to open the vault in the morning. During the day, the inner doors, which open with a key, remain locked, and only those persons with access privileges may obtain the key and go in and out. We regularly change the vault combination--which we now know how to do ourselves--and always after one of the combination holders leaves the faculty.

Originally we tried to confine access to the vault to the same four persons who had the combination, but this proved impractical. As the four persons who have the combination are the curators of the departments and their chief deputies, I and my opposite number soon found that we were spending considerable time as vault "go-fers." Eventually, we persuaded the administration to adopt our present policy of permitting vault privileges to all faculty members of the two departments with at least three years service on our staff.

A second criticism made by the police was that we had no record of vault entry. We now maintain a book near the vault door and log each visit: its purpose, times of entrance and egress, and the name of the person making the visit. I am afraid that none of us see the benefit of the log since it is so easily falsified, but it makes the police happy.

Another change has been refinement of the shelf list of the manuscripts kept in the vault. To enable us to identify these items as ours should any question arise, our cataloger has prepared careful and complete descriptions of all the bound manuscripts and slip cases. We pursued the check of materials there, performing item-by-item inventories of large collections such as the Faulkner and Jefferson papers. This took months, but was worth the time for the peace of mind resulting. We found nothing else unaccounted for.

The general security of the areas of the library building we occupy has been strengthened by reassessment of the system of locks. In the two special collections departments, there are a total of fifty-one doors with locks. All staff and student assistants have access to the key that works the regular locks. They cannot move about the departments without it. We have added to each of the critical entrance-exit doors, as well as to certain others, an extra--a dead bolt--lock. Not only have the dead bolt locks been obtained from a different company than our regular locks, but the key which works them is issued to but four faculty in each department and to the librarian and associate librarian. We would prefer to constrict this number, but in case of an emergency, such as a fire, we must be able to get into our areas quickly. We also re-key this special set of locks routinely every six months.

Our reading room has received a great deal of security attention, for we realize that we are more likely to be "hit" in it than in any other area of our operation. We are fortunate that the room has but one exterior door, by which all visitors must enter and leave, because this makes for good security. The door is located in the middle of one long wall of the thirty-by-ninety-foot room. A large control desk, some ten feet long, faced the patron upon entering the room. Because a series of large structural columns run the length of the room on the wall opposite the door, readers' tables for years had been located in one long row along the wall with the door. A reader at the far table could be forty feet from the chief security person. Worse, when the clerk was at one end of the room, ample opportunity existed for a thief at the other end to slip a manuscript under a shirt or skirt.

To combat this weakness in our layout, we rearranged the room concentrating all the readers' tables in one end. We moved the large control desk next to the entrance to the room and turned it ninety degrees so that the person sitting at it faces the readers. The size and length of this desk either forces anyone entering the room to stop at it or channels them to a new control desk we have created with a table-desk combination. We added a staff desk in the readers' end of the reading room, but man it only when we are so busy that the control desk attendant cannot see all the readers. Staff activities formerly conducted between the structural columns are now concentrated in the end of the room opposite the

readers, removing the noise of staff enterprise from the patrons.

Our next step was to control entrance and egress from the area of readers' tables. Originally a length of chain I picked up at Sears sufficed, but this has been replaced with a theatre rope. Readers may enter or leave the research area only with permission.

We have eliminated one possible way of removing manuscripts by requiring that all brief cases, handbags, packages, portfolios, and the like, as well as coats, be checked before the patron enters the research area. We would prefer not to operate a check service, but we did not have the funds to buy, or the floor space to install, lockers with keys.

One suggestion of the police reinforced an idea of our own. For some time we had wished to learn more about our patrons and their projects. Our registration book of many years had space only for name, permanent address, local address, and a word or two about the project. We drew up a form which requires much more information about the patron and which enables us to accumulate some useful statistical information about the use of the collections. The police suggested that in addition we request personal identification, such as a driver's license or a student identification card, which we now do, recording the numbers from the cards on the registration form. Our rules and regulations, which the patron is asked to read and sign to indicate his willingness to comply, are printed on the recto.

Another novelty for us is requiring patrons leaving the research area to submit all paper for inspection by the staff. If someone absolutely insists on taking a briefcase or a handbag to the table, we permit it only with the understanding that we will search the bag thoroughly before the person leaves. (We have granted such a request in but one or two instances.)

Our final innovation affecting readers is a limitation upon the amount of material they may have at a research table. Formerly, we might bring out a book truck full of material and park it beside the research table for the convenience of the patron. Now we limit to two the number of (Hollinger) boxes at a table, and we no longer leave book trucks in the readers' end of the room. Readers must turn

in the two boxes to the desk attendant to obtain two more. I still have reservations about allowing two boxes, for it is possible to erect a barricade with them behind which a reader may hide considerable activity. But reducing the limit would mean too much "running and fetching" for the reading room staff, and one must compromise at some point.

Possibly the only perfect system for a manuscripts reading room would insist that each researcher strip to the skin, wear into the room a sheet furnished by the institution, use paper and pencil similarly provided to take his notes, use one piece of manuscript at a time, each one of which would be checked out and in individually, surrender all notes for inspection upon leaving the room, and submit to a body search when returning the sheet in the dressing room. Any system less than this will involve a certain amount of security risk for archivists and curators if they are to fulfill the charge of their profession to see that the materials in their charge are as widely used as their institutional regulations will permit.

Archivists should see that their superiors understand these necessary risks. Then, should a theft occur, the report of it will meet with more understanding. Our situation at the University of Virginia was easier administratively because the librarian has taken an active interest in manuscripts during his professional career and has encouraged the growth of our department during his tenure at the university. It has been of benefit to us also that one of the university president's major advisers is a former curator of manuscripts, and that the president himself is a Tennyson scholar who makes use of our facilities in his own work. Invite your superiors into your areas at every opportunity. Have coffee with them, lunch with them, and lobby them unmercifully. Send them copies of articles on manuscripts, rare books, and the special problems of both. But be sure they develop an appreciation of the concerns peculiar to the administration and security of archives and manuscripts.

Attention has to be devoted, too, to special training for personnel who staff reading room desks. These persons must be the chief defense against theft, and they need instruction in procedures to follow should they observe, or suspect, a concealment of materials leading to a theft.

Virginia State Archivist William Van Schreeven, who trained me, was one of those large men who have the knack of

moving quietly. On many occasions I have heard a question issuing from the empty air behind my right ear and jumped to find Van Schreeven standing there, a smile upon his face. He was particularly fond of pulling this stunt on those of us who manned the main desk in the reading room. While he expected us to take work to the desk, he insisted we learn to work with one eye on the readers in the room. His "sneak attacks" were one way of reminding us of our primary responsibilities of service and security.

I think we must do more to train our public service personnel to develop this technique of double vision. It is almost a cliché of manuscript work that our staffs are far too small to accomplish all that needs to be done. We expect our employees to write letters and perform other functions while working in our reading rooms. We must, I believe, lessen these administrative demands. When weighed against the security responsibilities of these persons, the routine work should be secondary. Of course, the employees need to have enough work to accomplish so that they do not fall asleep like the guards in some reading rooms I have visited.

For many years a clerical employee, backed by a faculty member, manned our main control desk in the reading room. This arrangement was adequate in a time when reader use was not particularly heavy and reader's questions uncomplicated. The clerk could handle our accessioning as well as the public service. But our reader use, climbing steadily, has increased seventy percent during the past four years. Combining the greater demands for service with the need for improved security, we found it desirable to rearrange job descriptions so that a library assistant is stationed at the main desk and assigned public service duties only. The person has the support of the public services archivist in the room, as well as the stack supervisor. Also available in the staff end of the room are another faculty member and clerk, though their desks do not permit them to observe the readers. The library assistant is our main security person in the reading room, and for this reason, late last fall I asked the university's legal adviser to visit the room to review the security and to give us advice about the legal problems involved with accusing someone of removing material from the room.

The attorney looked over the situation and immediately suggested that we post large and prominent signs forbidding

the removal of library material from the room. Such a statement appears in our rules and regulations, but it is one of many paragraphs on a legal-sized sheet with lots of small type. The attorney felt someone could maintain that he did not read "all that stuff." We now have two large signs. One hangs prominently over the control desk facing the readers at their tables; the other is displayed on the inside of the doors through which one must pass to leave the room.

Several days after this visit, the attorney sent us a sheet of suggestions and procedures for dealing with a person that we might see, or suspect of, concealing something.

Conduct yourself with utmost courtesy and deference to the individual's right of privacy and free movement. . . . If one strongly suspects an item has been slipped inside the clothing, the individual should be delayed until the University Department of Police has been called. Do not push, touch, or otherwise physically interfere with the suspect. If you see the item or actually saw him conceal it, you should attempt to delay him by blocking his path as discreetly as possible. *Politely* ask him to wait a moment until a police officer arrives. If the individual becomes obstreperous or violent, you may not fight with him or physically stop him without being in danger of infringing upon his rights or getting hurt yourself. You may only actually arrest him if you have a reasonable suspicion that a felony has been committed in your presence. You should exercise this common law right and duty to arrest only in the most compelling of circumstances. Note the name and address of the suspect and the time of the incident. If you confront or detain a library user, have a witness (another employee) there with you.

At my request, the attorney also had one of his assistants review the *Code of Virginia* to see what laws were applicable in case we detained someone who was proven innocent after a search. I had nightmares of one of us being sued for false arrest, and feared a staff member would be reluctant to confront someone suspected of theft if the staff member knew he was personally liable in a case of false arrest.

The check of the *Code* revealed that there were no applicable laws in the Commonwealth which offered to librarians and archivists the protection granted to merchants detaining someone suspected of shoplifting. The university attorney immediately drafted legislation to cover this situation, and sent it to us for our review. I went over the proposed legislation with my faculty, and we submitted a number of changes to the attorney, chiefly to the definition of library materials. The old definition in the *Code* was useless, as it did not mention many types of materials commonly held in libraries today. The bill was polished up and returned to me with the suggestion that I ask a delegate to introduce it. The University had a number of other bills in which it was interested and did not wish to spread its influence too far.

With some trepidation, I sent the bill and a letter of explanation to our local representative. He was most cooperative. We got the bill into the hopper just ahead of the deadline for submission to the 1975 annual session of the General Assembly, and were fortunate to have it pass both houses and be signed by the governor. The bill makes concealment of library property a crime. As "proof of the willful concealment . . . shall be prima facie evidence of intent to commit larceny thereof." More important from our point of view is the section entitled "Exemption from liability for arrest of suspected person."

A library or agent or employee of the library causing the arrest of any person pursuant to the provisions of §42.1-73 [the section on concealment] shall not be held civilly liable for unlawful detention, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, or assault and battery of the person so arrested . . . provided that, in causing the arrest of such person, the library or agent or employee of the Library had at the time of such arrest probable cause to believe that the person committed willful concealment of books or other library property. [The full text of the bill appears on pages 18 and 19.]

We feel that we are rather well protected in dealing with a reader concealing something prior to leaving with it. The bill does not make a confrontation situation easier, but it does give the staff some confidence that in such a situation they have support for their actions, provided they proceed carefully.

The topic of publicity of a theft from an institution is an important and difficult one. Although our staff for several months had concealed the news of the theft and the searches being conducted, it seemed inevitable that word would get out and reach the press. We believed we should be in a far stronger position to control the story if we released it ourselves, and released it rather than waiting to be confronted. In most respects, I think we were right. Virginians were stunned to realize we had manuscripts and rare books so valuable that someone would wish to steal \$125,000 worth. By and large, press reaction was sympathetic. There were a few critical reports aimed at our apparent lack of security, which we fueled by letting slip through in our press release one statement that was easily misinterpreted.

For many years, libraries and archives have not wished to publicize thefts because it was felt that knowledge of a theft would cause potential donors to withhold their gifts. In some instances, institutions have been unwilling to prosecute thieves because the publicity of a trial would have revealed the theft. This attitude has eased the work of thieves. Without public announcement of missing materials, dealers sometimes purchased stolen materials unwittingly. A dishonest collector was willing to purchase materials that he might have shied from were it well known they had been stolen from an institution.

At this time, I do not know of a single collection that we have failed to acquire because the potential donor felt our security was not good enough. Of course, there may be some who have not told us. Other donors did ask about the theft in the months after our announcement, but their questions were sympathetic ones resulting from curiosity. I am convinced that the publicity of the theft did have positive benefits for our collecting program. We gained public consciousness of our repository as no report of an accession ever had, or probably ever will.

The worst risk run by publicizing a theft, in my opinion, is that the thief may feel the publicity has destroyed his market for the stolen property, leaving him no alternative but destruction of the material. This was a major concern of the University of Virginia in making the decision to publicize our theft as widely as possible. Since we have not to this date recovered any of our stolen material, it is possible that the thief or thieves did



destroy it. We may never know. But we felt that the benefits of publicity outweighed the risk.

Breaking with the old tradition of concealment of a theft was an important step. More honesty about theft from archives and libraries is needed. The country is in the midst of a major crime wave involving archives and libraries, but only archivists and librarians seem to be aware of it. Publicity will help, for the more responsible people who are aware of our security problem, the more assistance we shall receive in dealing with it. One excellent sign of support is the \$90,000 grant to the Society of American Archivists from the National Endowment for the Humanities to fund a number of proposals for specific programs on archival security.

My involvement with archival security has not been a pleasant one. It has been instructive but not in ways that I should have preferred to mark my career. I am glad to be involved in archival security from a more objective and useful perspective, and I hope and expect that the next paper that I write on this subject will not have to carry the qualifying phrase of this one in its title.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:

1. That §§ 42.1-72 and 42.1-73 of the Code of Virginia are amended and reenacted and the Code of Virginia is amended by adding sections numbered 42.1-73.1 and 42.1-74.1 as follows:

§ 42.1-72. Injuring or destroying books and other property of libraries. —Any person who willfully, maliciously or wantonly writes upon, injures, defaces, tears, cuts, mutilates, or destroys any book or other library property belonging to or in the custody of any public, county or regional library, the State Library, other repository of public records, museums or any library or collection belonging to or in the custody of any educational, eleemosynary, benevolent, hereditary, historical library or patriotic institution, organization or society, shall be guilty of a class 1 misdemeanor.

§ 42.1-73. Concealment of book or other property while on premises of library; removal of book or other property from library. —Whoever, without authority, with the intention of converting to his own or another's use, willfully conceals a book or other library property, while still on the premises of such library, or willfully or without authority removes any book or other property from any of the above libraries or collections shall be deemed guilty of larceny thereof, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished as provided by law. Proof of the willful concealment of such book or other library property while still on the premises of such library shall be prima facie evidence of intent to commit larceny thereof.

§ 42.1-73.1 Exemption from liability for arrest of suspected person. —A library or agent or employee of the library causing the arrest of any person pursuant to the provisions of § 42.1-73, shall not be held civilly liable for unlawful detention, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, or assault and battery of the person so arrested, whether such arrest takes place on the premises of the library or after close pursuit from such premises by such agent or employee; provided that, in causing the arrest of such person, the library or agent or employee of the library had at the time of such arrest probable cause to believe that the person committed willful concealment of books or other library property.

§ 42.1-74.1 "Book or other library property" defined. The terms "book or other library property" as used in this chapter shall include any book, plate, picture, photograph, engraving, painting, drawing, map, newspaper, magazine, pamphlet, broadside, manuscript, document, letter, public record, microform, sound recording, audiovisual materials in any format, magnetic or other tapes, electronic data processing records, artifacts, or other documentary, written, or printed material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, belonging to, on loan to, or otherwise in the custody of any library, museum, repository of public or other records institution as specified in § 42.1-72.