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Lifting the Veil of Violence: The October Crisis, 1970.

Cover Page Footnote

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Introduction

In October of 1970, Canada stood still as terror and civil unrest directly challenged the unity of the country. *Le Front du Liberation du Québec* (FLQ), a Marxist terrorist group had strayed from their usual tactic of bombings and robberies to the kidnapping of public officials. Their goal was nothing less than the overthrow of the Canadian federal government and the establishment of a new Québécois independent state. On 5 October 1970, James Cross, trade commissioner to the British Government, was taken from his residence at gunpoint. Five days later Pierre Laporte, Minister of Labor in the Liberal provincial government, was taken from his front lawn by FLQ operatives. What followed was an intense period of governmental and social maneuvers that changed the very fabric of Canada and Québec forever.¹

The October Crisis is an event that means different things to Francophone and Anglophone Canadians. For the Francophone community, the October Crisis still plays an important role in political sub-consciousness. For the rest of Canada, the Crisis is rarely openly approached or discussed, and when it is, it is a difficult reminder of the contradictions present in the Canadian national experiment. English Canadians are introduced to the subject only in whispers and English scholarship of the October Crisis typically takes a defensive stance over the implementation of the *War Measures Act* (or *Act*). In Francophone scholarship explorations of the Crisis are mainly concerned with the effects and the injustices under the *Act* and typically avoid direct examinations of the actions of the terrorists. On the whole, the *War Measures Act* receives a disproportionate amount of the attention in current scholarship. It is not uncommon for historical discussions to focus solely on the *Act* alone, as if the implementation of it existed on a plane separate from the overall context of the other events that transpired. Unfortunately, these approaches to the October Crisis fail to advance our understanding of the event and how it affected the dynamics between two different, but utterly linked cultures and communities. The realities of geography, time and space, and an inter-connected late-modern economy do not afford historians the luxury inquiries defined only in the language of nationalism. While it is very difficult to examine the October Crisis in the midst of a political debate that is in essence still occurring, there exists an opening in which to wedge in a new approach to the event. History could be better served if historians examine the

¹ For a more detailed synopsis of the October Crisis see appendix #1. The reader is also referred to the film *Action: The October Crisis, 1970*, available at http://www.nfb.ca/film/action_the_october_crisis_of_1970. Also see *CBC Digital Archives*. <http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/civil-unrest/the-october-crisis-civil-liberties-suspended>.

subject with new emphasis on objectivity and a set of terms that are not typical of the current approaches; one that focuses on the rather deep connections that occurred as a result of the violence.

In draw attention to the daylight between the current camps of historiography, the examination herein will attempt to 'get down in the mud', as it were, in order to understand how violence² was utilized by the FLQ³ and the federal government. Within the conversation that the FLQ engaged in with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Québec Premier Robert Bourassa, and the respective agencies of the federal and provincial governments, violence played a central role in the amplification and interpretation of how one entity interacted with the other. The observers of this violent interaction, the respective communities of Québec and the rest of Canada were modified by the events as well.

The October Crisis is an event that plays a very active role in Canadian and Québécois identity formation. The violence of the event still punctuates the debate over the powers of government and the exercise of democracy. Therefore, it is essential that Canadians and Québécois alike re-approach the event now that it is beginning to fade into our past. As the separation in time and distance begins to grow, the cultural place of the October Crisis grows clearer. This thesis will reassess the critical views of the event from both English and French sources in order to inquire how the event transpired, what were the intentions of the terrorists, how English and French culture viewed the event, and how the event can be examined from a culturally neutral position. The primary goal of this thesis is two-fold; firstly, it seeks to find space for a new historiographical approach, one that will hopefully reconcile the current dichotomy between French and English sources; and

² This work accepts that the violence during this time was not solely utilized by the FLQ. The government of Canada, on both provincial and federal levels engaged in violence against the FLQ and the wider Canadian population. The powers granted to the federal and provincial governments under the *War Measures Act*, such as the suspension of *habeas corpus* for up to 90 days, arrest without warrant, seizure of property and the suppression of speech, were acts of violence. By using violence the federal government engaged directly with the FLQ on their terms. For the purposes of this work, violence is defined as any action, physical, or mental, that is intended to force the will of one party upon another. Examples, of this include, but are not limited to, killing, kidnapping, bombing, robbery, arrest, confinement, deportation, suspension of liberties, threats of aforementioned actions, and softer forms of violence such as taxation, legislation and general governmental policies. Violence within the dialogue of the October Crisis is best described in the Clausewitzian terms as "*War [or violence] is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will*" Clausewitz, Carl von, and Beatrice Heuser. *On War*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 13. Emphasis in original.

³ While separate cells of the FLQ operated independently as the crisis transpired, the use of terrorism by a political movement as a tool of engagement is the primary focus and not in so much the actions of individuals working in these cells. For the sake of simplicity and brevity the FLQ will be treated as one entity, as these cells possessed the same common goal and agreed to tactics.

secondly, this work will apply a new approach to the October crisis in hopes of breaking new ground. While there is no ignoring the manifested nationalism that is evident in the conflict between the parties, there is a way to reinterpret the event by applying new techniques that will reveal new common grounds for exploration by historians on both sides of the equation.

Literature Review

The historical placement of the October Crisis of 1970 within Canadian and the Québécois culture is dependent upon more factors than just the provincial boundaries. Self-described Québécois and Canadians exist in very different cultural spaces and it is understandable that each population would interpret the October Crisis differently. Up to this point linguistic barriers have colored most of the scholarship related to the period. The majority of historical assessments of the October Crisis do not examine the cultural interactions between Anglophones, Francophones, and bilingual peoples affected by the incident. Like the continuing political dispute between a provincial French Québécois identity and an English Canadian identity, secondary historical interpretations are divided along semi-permanent linguistic lines.⁴ French scholarship tends to interpret the events in terms of linguistic-rights and Quebec historical legacy, while ignoring the broader political and social crisis within Quebec and Canada, and areas of potential agreement. At times, English scholarship tends to ‘Orientalize’⁵ and downplay the legitimate agency of the Québec peoples and fails to recognize its own legacy of colonial attitudes. English scholarship is overwhelmingly preoccupied with justifying the use of the *War Measures Act* in response to the Crisis and fails to properly interpret the meaning of the political violence. Neither of these approaches fully explains the cultural significance of the October Crisis.⁶

What is most troubling about the state of current scholarship is the lack of recognition of a cross-border, cross-lingual common culture, no matter how minute. The literature fails to directly explore the cross-cultural reshaping that was taking place and ultimately solidifies the discussion around a national identity based solely on language and assumed geographic locations. Current provincial

⁴ See Figure 1 - The Division of Views on the October Crisis. It should be stated that there are of course exceptions to these tendencies that focus on macro-level issues; however, research has revealed a paucity of direct examinations in this regard to the October Crisis itself.

⁵ As defined in Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. (New York: Random House, 1979); “My contention is that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient’s difference with its weakness....As a cultural apparatus Orientalism is all aggression, activity, judgment, will-to-truth, and knowledge” (Said, 204).

⁶ See Tetley, William. *The October Crisis, 1970: an insider's view*. (Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007).

map lines are not adequate to describe the millions of people who live on opposite sides of that border. While the lingual structures of Canada are constantly changing,⁷ French and English influences have had a lasting impact on both cultures and populations on both sides of the border. Creolized languages (i.e. 'fringlish'), cuisine, music, sport and art are in constant exchange both inside and outside of cultural centers;⁸ centers such as the cities of Montréal and Ottawa, and a common northern Ontarian and Québécois culture.

Among the recent attempts at approaching the October Crisis is Dominique Clément's *The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses Under the War Measures Act* as published in the *Journal of Canadian Studies* stands out as an example of the historiographical conflict that surrounds the October Crisis. Clément writes that the implementation of the *War Measures Act* was "responsible, directly or indirectly, for extensive human right abuses across the country".⁹ Clément describes a situation in which public and political fear was unleashed by the powers contained in the Act. She outlines the many incidents of government intervention in the lives of suspected supporters and confirmed supporters of the FLQ not just in Québec but also throughout Canada. She ultimately concludes that "the federal government continues to reserve the power to restrict human rights severely"¹⁰ even under the reformed *War Measures Act* (i.e. the *Emergencies Act*) and the 1982 *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.

Clément does not recognize the actions of the Quebec provincial government with regards to the implementation of the *War Measures Act*. This omission is curious and fails provide balance to the work. Clément's work is critical of federalism and therefore the participation of the provincial Québec government in the machinations of the October Crisis do not buttress her thesis.¹¹ As well, while arguing against federalism, she invokes a federal cultural connection. Clément states, "I argue that the crisis was not limited to Quebec and Ottawa... I suggest that the *War Measures Act* was responsible, directly or indirectly, for extensive human rights abuses across the country".¹² Clément could have recognized that her critique of the actions of the federal government was an

⁷ As evidenced in studies such as Kaplan, David H. "Two nations in search of a state: Canada's ambivalent spatial identities". *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. (1994) Vol. 84.

⁸ Cultural spaces as described in Dib, K., I. Donaldson, and B. Turcotte. "Integration and Identity in Canada: The Importance of Multicultural Common Spaces". *Canadian Ethnic Studies*. (2008) 40, no. 1: 161-188.

⁹ Clément D. "The October Crisis of 1970: Human Rights Abuses Under the War Measures Act". *Journal of Canadian Studies*. (2008) 42, no. 2: 161.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 178.

¹¹ See Tetley.

¹² Clément, 161.

illustration of a consciousness that crosses the political-linguistic divide. This non-recognition of a larger narrative is a missed opportunity. Clément could have gone beyond the simple mechanics of the event and talked about how the October Crisis joined all Canadians, including the Québécois in a common endeavor, namely the protection of human rights.

The goal of this thesis is not to target specific historians. However, it is important to examine specific examples in order to understand why Canadian and Québécois historiography has not evolved around the October Crisis. It is approaches like Clément's that provide the impetus for a new methodology.¹³ Canadian and Québécois historiography would be better served by an approach that can provide answers to what really happened to the cultures of Canada and Québec during the October Crisis. Typically, as the span of time increases from a historical event the event is placed in a historical context with greater ease.¹⁴ The tactical considerations of an event become less important and the strategic level considerations become ascendant. Yet, the October Crisis defies this paradigm and it is not easily understandable why. The *War Measures Act* is given the bulk of the analysis and this is usually done in terms that have more to do with current political debates than reasoned and dispassionate reflection.

Other broader cultural studies, which are not aimed specifically at the October Crisis, have attempted to reconcile the conflict between Québec and the rest of Canada with increasing success. These studies approach the tension from many useful disciplines, such as political science, psychology, linguistics and more. Most of these studies focus on the overarching context of a time of social strife and how the dynamics between Canada and Québec were altered. These studies are helpful, but macro theories can render micro events irrelevant and can obfuscate specific instances that could lead to a greater understanding. However, these indirect cultural approaches provide the framework for a focused discussion into a specific event, such as the October Crisis.

David Kaplan describes as "Spatial Identities and Spatial Ideologies"¹⁵ that nationalist and linguistic identification of territory is the source of conflict when those boundaries are undefined. Kaplan's study is very useful in understanding the major shifts in populations and thus the political flashpoints of conflict. However, his paper does not explore the changes in cultural context that these conflicts take place in and the terms of the culture. The lingual status ignores the other factors that can illuminate the conflict within the culture. Jan Erk explores the

¹³ Another example of a *War Measures Act* focused approach see Bouthillier, Guy, and Edouard Cloutier. *Trudeau's Darkest Hour: War Measures in Time of Peace, October 1970*. Montréal: Baraka Books, 2010.

¹⁴ See Figure 2 - Distance in Time and Historiography, Appendix 1.

¹⁵ Kaplan, 585.

permanency political ideology as related to nationalist positions. Erk posits that Québec's left-leaning culture is a result of two synchronized factors: "(1) the critical juncture during which change occurs, and (2) mechanisms of continuity ensuring the consistency of the party position".¹⁶ For Erk, the Quiet Revolution and the *Parti Québécois* (PQ) form the basis for the Québec sub-nation nationalism. This model merits further application with regard to the October Crisis and how the perceptions on the ground were affected. Paul Zanazanian points to the historical consciousness of Québécois history teachers and rightly observes that "Rather than transmitting a shared vision of Quebec's past that integrated both Francophone and Anglophone viewpoints, as well as those of other minority groups, these initiatives preserved a historical narrative that mostly configured the collective identity of the Francophone majority".¹⁷ Zanazanian highlights the lack of a cohesive cultural narrative and how that affects continued cultural conflict, something that becomes apparent in the general Québécois response to the Crisis. Similarly, Sylvia Söderlind in *Ghost-National Arguments* outlines the problems that nationalism injects into cultural understanding. She aptly illuminates the frustrations that cultural consciousness experiences with respect to national identities. She argues "there is something fundamentally missing when - in an age when the concept of nation is more than ever at issue - one writes a history in which 'nation' is the structuring principle without mentioning the role Quebec has played in English-Canadian thinking about nation".¹⁸ Söderlind's discomfort stems from the contradiction that nationalistic politics creates. This uneasiness is especially prevalent with nations as geographically intertwined as Québec and Canada. Jean-Philippe Warren and Eric Ronis address the links between social movements and emotion by studying the 1995 Québec unity rally.¹⁹ Complimenting Warren and Ronis is James Cameron and John Berry's survey of two thousand Canadians that explores the factors related to the psychological attachment of nationalism. Cameron and Berry identify the factors related to "Canadian identity and patriotism".²⁰ The issues they focus on are "the sources and structure of patriotism [and] the predictors of patriotism, with a focus on

¹⁶ Erk J. "Is Nationalism Left or Right? Critical Junctures in Québécois Nationalism". *Nations and Nationalism*. (2010) 16, no. 3: 423.

¹⁷ Zanazanian, Paul. "Historical Consciousness and the 'French-English' Divide Among Quebec History Teachers". *Canadian Ethnic Studies*. (2011) 40, no. 3: 110.

¹⁸ Soderlind, Sylvia. "Ghost-National Arguments". *University of Toronto Quarterly*. (2006) 75, no. 2: 674.

¹⁹ Warren J. P., and Ronis E. "The Politics of Love: The 1995 Montreal Unity Rally and Canadian Affection". (2011) *Journal of Canadian Studies*. 45, no. 1: 5-32.

²⁰ Cameron, James E., and John W. Berry. "True Patriot Love: Structure and Predictors of Canadian Pride". *Canadian Ethnic Studies*. (2011) 40, no. 3: 18

whether various sources of diversity (e.g., region, ethnicity) have a bearing on Canadian national pride”.²¹ The data is useful for understanding the *modus operandi* of nationalism in the Canadian/Québécois dynamic. Hudson Meadwell explores the Québec nationalism movement and its unique ability to mobilize support for political change.²² His exploration is useful to understanding the political interactions between the Québec and Canadian governments and the political support for the PQ. Meadwell’s analysis downplays the impact of class economics and suggests that “the problem of economic viability provides a compelling interpretation”²³ of Québec’s political mobilization.

Maurice Pinard and Richard Hamilton posit that “factors other than independence account for the PQ electoral success in 1976 and that the independence issue limited, rather than increased, the recruitment of new mass support”.²⁴ Their theory illustrates the political reasoning behind issue voting and applies their research to the 1976 election in which the PQ came to power on a platform of independence. They note that “for many Quebec voters, independence was not even an immediate issue in 1976”.²⁵ Thus, the political expressions of independence were not even aligned with the desires of the population. Their research raises questions about how political and cultural expressions associated with independence are linked.

Brad Kent offers a comparative analysis of positions adopted by leaders in two divided states: Ireland and Canada. Irish publisher Sean O’Faolain and Canada’s Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau are held up for comparison in relation to their critiques of the role that nationalism plays in the politics in their respective countries. Kent states that O’Faolain attempted to convince the Irish politicians that local nationalistic concerns are single-minded and damaging to the interests of their people.²⁶ Likewise, Kent describes Trudeau’s criticism of nationalism in terms of the Quiet Revolution and the required social reforms, “French Canadian nationalists and the church had created a culture of fear in which the people had come to believe that they were under siege, attacked on all sides by free thinkers, Anglo-Canadians, Jews, imperialists, and communists”.²⁷ Kent showcases Trudeau

²¹ Ibid., 18-19.

²² Meadwell, Hudson. “The Politics of Nationalism in Quebec”. *World Politics*. (1993) 45, no. 2: 204.

²³ Meadwell, 241.

²⁴ Pinard, Maurice, and Richard Hamilton. “The Parti Québécois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election”. *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique*. (1978) 11, no. 4: 740.

²⁵ Ibid., 741.

²⁶ Kent, Brad. “Sean O’Faolain and Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s Midcentury Critiques of Nationalism”. *New Hibernia Review*. (2008) 12, no. 1: 128.

²⁷ Ibid., 139.

as a leftist leader that rejects Québec nationalism and favors much-needed social reform, who then has the issue turned around on him, finding himself on the other side of nationalism and painted as a conservative by his rivals. Kent concludes his article by aligning Trudeau with Frantz Fanon and “Like Fanon, Trudeau viewed nationalism as but a step on the road to full liberation. Trudeau was therefore critical of nationalism’s tendency to be abused as a tool of bourgeois hegemonic rule. As a lawyer and a socialist, his approach was a blend of constitutional reform and Marxist thought voiced through a socio-economic critique”.²⁸ Kent therefore discredits the much held onto pairing of Québec nationalism and leftist social policies. By creating doubt as to the sincerities of Québec sovereignty, Kent opens up discussion on whether or not it was done in the spirit of the Quiet Revolution cultural and social objectives.²⁹

²⁸ Ibid., 144.

²⁹ Other useful studies include Auger, Martin F. “On the Brink of Civil War: The Canadian Government and the Suppression of the 1918 Quebec Easter Riots”. *Canadian Historical Review*. (2008) 89, no. 4: 503-540. Vacante J. “The Posthumous Lives of René Lévesque”. *Journal of Canadian Studies*. (2011) 45, no. 2: 5-30. Beyond these indirect discussion on Québécois culture and politics there are several studies that exist in ‘satellite-range’ to the issue. These studies are useful for supplementing the indirect sources by providing anecdotal or broad discussions about essential facets of Canadian society (i.e. multiculturalism, federalism, linguistics and pedagogy). While not directly related to the October Crisis, the views that these studies present facilitate engaging the topic in unorthodox ways and may be of interest to the researcher: Hugh Forbes explores the effects of immigration and migration on Canadian multiculturalism and cites the growth of distinct ethnic groups as a source of ethnic tension, Forbes, Hugh Donald. “Canada: From Bilingualism to Multiculturalism”. *Journal of Democracy*, (1993) 4, no. 4, October: 69-84; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones examine, albeit in brief, the composition of the FLQ as a functional terrorist network, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni M., and Jones C. “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why Al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think”. *International Security*. (2008) 33, no. 2: 7-44.; Bourhis, Montreuil, Helly, and Jantzen examine discriminatory practices of minorities and disabled persons in Québec, Bourhis, Richard Y., Annie Montreuil, Denise Helly, and Lorna Jantzen. “Discrimination et linguicisme au Québec: Enquête sur la diversité ethnique au Canada”. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*. (2008) 39, no. 1-2: 31-49.; Karim H. Karim explores multicultural perspectives expressed in English language newspapers in an attempt to gauge how English Canada feels about immigration and Québec relations, Karim, K.H. “Press, Public Sphere and Pluralism: Multiculturalism Debates in Canadian English-Language Newspapers”. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*. (2008) 40, no. 1: 57-78.; Dib, Donaldson and Turcotte examine the importance of “multicultural common spaces” (Dib, 161) and their importance in developing collective experiences and a shared identity Dib, K., I. Donaldson, and B. Turcotte. “Integration and Identity in Canada: The Importance of Multicultural Common Spaces”. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*. (2008) 40, no. 1: 161-188.; Brook Thomas provides a general discussion on the exercise of multiculturalism in a broader global context and within Québec, Thomas, Brook. “Civic Multiculturalism and the Myth of Liberal Consent: A Comparative Analysis”. *CR: The New Centennial Review*. (2003) 1, no. 3: 1-35.; Chedly Belkhodja explores a recent resurgence in Québécois conservatism, Belkhodja, C. “Le discours de la <Nouvelle sensibilité conservatrice> au Québec”. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*. 2008. 40, no. 1: 79-100.;

Unfortunately, none of the above studies directly examine violence and the October Crisis. This gap in Canadian scholarship bears witness to the fact that Canadians and Québécois have not learned how to intellectually deal with this episode of violence. For many people of older generations, the October Crisis can still reach out to them over forty years of happier memories. This dark time in Canadian history is quickly shunned and deliberately forgotten. This disassociation also illustrates the long-term cost that the use of ‘political violence’ accrues. Violence and its accompanying response is a bitter pill to swallow for any democratic constitutional nation.³⁰ While it is not surprising that the secondary literature on the October Crisis falls along pre-determined national and linguistic lines, it is surprising that the context in which the October Crisis is examined ignores the role played by violence. The violence itself is either ignored or dismissed. Interpretations of the event are either sympathetic to the actions of the federal government and Ottawa, or against them. Some approaches ignore the FLQ’s part in the affair altogether. The result of this historical disconnect is a disjointed and incomplete understanding of the October Crisis as an important cultural event. In order to rectify this shortcoming a new methodology must stare directly into the darkness of the violence.

Violence and the October Crisis

Violence has always challenged historians. A natural aberrance to violence is an appropriate human reaction. Our difficulties with violence speak to our collective desire to live in peace and avoid pain and suffering. This approach is a noble and worthy undertaking and is fine for politics, but troublesome for history. Violence, in a historical perspective, could be viewed as a form of communication. Violence, which does not cross into genocide, serves to impose the will of one

Joseph Garcea draws into question the utility of multiculturalism, Garcea, Joseph. “Postulations on the Fragmentary Effects of Multiculturalism in Canada”. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*. (2009) 40, no. 1: 141-160.; Jean-Marie Salien illustrates several pedagogical perspectives on the Québécois language, Salien, Jean-Marie. “Quebec French: Attitudes and Pedagogical Perspectives”. *Modern Language Journal*. (1998) 82, no. 1: 95-102.; Barbara Dickson responds to Salien’s arguments and emphasizes the value of Québec French as a regional dialect, Dickson, Barbara. “Quebec French: A Canadian Response”. *Modern Language Journal*. (1999) 83, no. 3: 413-416.; and Dianne E. Sears highlights the tension between new Québécois French and older linguistic traditions, Sears, Dianne E. “Défense de parler: Language on Trial in Michèle Lalonde’s “La deffence et illustration de la langue Québécoise” and “Outrage au tribunal”. *French Review*. (1995) 68, no. 6: 1015-1021. These studies vary in usage but enhance exploration of the tensions that encompass the Québec/Canada relationship.

³⁰ This is understandable since unapproved and unregulated violence is antithetical to the objectives of forming a stable nation.

group over another and is inherently communicative in nature.³¹ The desired end-state of violence is a change in the understanding of rules of governance and the conception of the state of affairs. In short, in a perfectly just society violence is exclusively used to maintain control over the powers of self-determination.

Different cultures use violence for different objectives. Violence in the western world is used primarily to reformulate political systems, capture or exploit resources, or to eliminate opposing groups.³² The western way of violence has been used primarily to reform or change fundamental governmental policies both internally and externally within states. Revolutionary violence has always been conducted with this objective. The French Revolution, the American War of Independence and the Russian Revolution all utilized violence almost exclusively to reform government. In terms of nationalism, violence is an essential component.

Thus, in the western mind the sole conception of political violence is in terms of governmental change and the utility of this violence is enigmatic to historians. Many philosophical and intellectual historians grapple with the western concept of violence; “The assumption that gradual and piecemeal reform had demonstrated its superiority over violent revolution as a way to advance human freedom is so pervasive that even to question such an assumption seems strange”.³³ Barrington Moore acknowledges that a natural revulsion towards violence presents a complication for historiographical views on times of violence and conflict. Furthermore, Moore reluctantly recognizes a utility in violence in affecting positive change “...the costs of moderation have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a great deal more”.³⁴ For Moore, violence can occur in the moment or over time and he tacitly implies that less violence is better. However, this dichotomy presents Moore with a fundamental historiography paradox. How can a historian write a history about a time of violence, in which governments were improved (i.e. represented its people and this prevented greater violence) and deal with the issue of violence? The paradigm is akin to removing a Band-Aid. Should it be removed fast or slow? What is worse? It is difficult for a group to reconcile revolutionary violence against the backdrop of forming a peaceful and just society.

This is as much a moral assessment as it is a historiographical one. Moore is not incorrect in listening to his personal views on violence while iterating historical viewpoints. However, while western historiography struggles with

³¹ See Clausewitz, *On War*.

³² The concept of violence within this work is almost exclusively discussed separate from non-political criminal violence. Political criminal violence, such as the FLQ proclivity to fund their operations via bank robbery or other such crimes is understood to be a part of this discussion.

³³ Moore, Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966): 505.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 505.

violence, as evidenced in the case of Clément's critique on the *War Measures Act*, historians are missing an opportunity to find a greater understanding of our politics and history. Historians, like Clément, human in their reactions to violence, could potentially miss the larger opportunity to infer greater meaning into the defining moments of our history. A new approach to the October Crisis could be found if Canadian historiography was willing to side-step its reaction to violence, if only just for a moment, and evaluate the underlying issues.

In the case of Québec, there is an argument to be made that violence was a natural progression of Québec modernization and was, in fact, inevitable and necessary. The Quiet Revolution, non-violent in nature, set in motion ideas that were in opposition to the constraints of the old regime.

Two sets of structural constraints must be overcome by the nationalist movement to expand its social base [i.e. having the new middle-class assert its authority]. The first set of constraints stems from the nature of colonial rule and the local groups which have a vested interest in the persistence of the status quo. The constraint is that these groups, politically established or supported by the state, control the means of violence in the country. The other set of constraints stems from the preindustrial character of the local culture and its traditional commanding institutions. While they accommodate with the status quo, they are marginal to, if not resentful of, the ongoing social changes.³⁵

Québec was in a state of flux at the time of the October Crisis. The province was moving out of a period of industrialization into a modern state with a thriving middle class. Traditional institutions, like the church, were being rejected for more liberal institutions that promised better access to wealth and decision-making. The cultural movement modified institutions like unions, media, and more (institutions that that did not have the barriers to access like government or the clergy) to facilitate the desired changes. Institutions like government, the Catholic Church, and large industrial companies were left to maintain the industrialization project; a project that was willingly accepted by all concerned, "The attack up on the legitimation of colonial rule as well as traditional social structure is centered on the positive acceptance of industrialization".³⁶ Something else, not the industrial innovations of the colonizers, was responsible for the perceived inequality in Québec. Therefore, it was the nature of the old regime institutions and their legitimacy as cultural artifacts that brought them into direct conflict with the

³⁵ Guindon, Hubert, Roberta Hamilton, and John L. McMullan. *Quebec Society: Tradition, Modernity, and Nationhood*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988): 42-43.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

revolutionary cultural changes. In essence the FLQ and those in Québec who supported them, outright or not, could no longer tolerate the concept of an illegitimate government that was not born of the reconstituted Québec culture.

The Quiet Revolution was a cultural revolution that was in hyper-drive, as a result of Québec's apprehensive progress in the early 20th century. It was almost inevitable that the right to commit violence held by the state would be challenged by the rising anxieties in Québec's culture. In the classical western treatment of violence, the violence in Québec is viewed in these revolutionary terms. Yet, terrorism and smaller scale violence that cannot present a conventional challenge to the modern state is not well understood within the context of this model. In order to understand more clearly the interplay between culture, violence and governance, it would now be beneficial to examine an alternative example of statehood and institutionalized violence that is far removed from the trappings of the west.

The Aztec Empire is a long way off, in both time and space, from the shores of Québec. However, this distance presents an opportunity to analyze violence in a primitive state. The Aztecs were a violent society. Violence occupied a special place within their society in spiritual and political matters. Among their most alien practices the Aztecs fought *Flower Wars* in which the objective was to capture, not kill, your opponent in order to hold them for a violent sacrifice, which often involved gruesome scenes of violence. Violence and human bloodshed was central to the communicative language that the Aztecs utilized. Their society would present a challenge to even the most disciplined western historian to interpret. Igna Clendinnen recognizes this undertaking and opens her book on the Aztecs stating

My concern is to discover how ordinary people understood 'human sacrifice': their inescapable intimacy with victims' bodies, living and dead; how that intimacy was rendered tolerable; what meanings were attached to it... My interest is not in belief at this formal level, but in sensibility: the emotional, moral and aesthetic nexus through which thought comes to be expressed in action, and so made public, visible, and accessible to our observation.³⁷

The same could be said about those who are comfortable with political violence in western cultures. In Clendinnen's view, Aztec violence operated in a manner similar to a language between close relations. These actions expressed emotions, feelings and objectives that verbal or even written language cannot. Aztec violence

³⁷ Clendinnen, Inga. *Aztecs: An Interpretation*. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 5.

was so developed that it continued in a cyclical, unaltered, and stable form that it only finally changed at the beginning of the colonial period with the invasion of European powers onto their land. Now a reader may question what these two seemingly separate societies, Québec and Aztec, could possibly have in common. The correct answer would be very little and this is to the historian's advantage. Clendinnen's approach to the language of violence raises possibilities to readdress how western societies, specifically Québec, utilize violence for the purposes of political communication and/or control. This is the very essence and efficacy of the terrorism that the FLQ utilized.

At the most basic level violence is an instinctive action with which all individuals are born. One of our first acts of communication is crying. These violent and uncomfortable outbursts are designed to bring attention and remedy to the most basic of problems. This is stated not to indicate that the FLQ were crying children, far from it, but rather as humans there is an inherent understanding that violence equals pain and pain equals behavior modification. It is our most innate ability that we use to affect our environment, "Crying is not only the earliest mood-signal we give, it is also the most basic".³⁸ It is a mode of communication that is understandable across all cultures and linguistic backgrounds. It is no wonder that when all other channels of communication or petition (i.e. parliamentary elections, peaceful protest, etc.) have failed, violence, which is always readily available, is utilized.

As a person ages they increase their ability to communicate in a more sophisticated manner. The ability to express violence increases as well. The Aztecs (or Mexica) possessed a high level of sophistication when utilizing violence to control their populations, "...the Mexica ceremonial extravaganzas staged in the main temples were dramatizations of a state ideology: exercises in hegemonic control which had more to do with the politics of terror than with service to the gods".³⁹ Human suffering conveys a very clear message. The Aztecs were well aware that to display power was to perform the ability to inflict pain and suffering and use this to promote governmental efficacy. As will be explored below in more detail, the infliction of suffering on the part of the FLQ was intended to undermine governmental legitimacy.

By these abstract expressions of violence the Aztecs held license over the very nature of violence. There were even sects within Aztec society that specialized in the art of pain and violence, "Mexica priests were athletes of self-mortification".⁴⁰ These priests brought violence to its full utility in the name of state goals. If you

³⁸ Morris, Desmond. *The Naked Ape*. (Random House: UK. Kindle Edition. 2010): 1706.

³⁹ Clendinnen, 68.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 128.

wish to do violence, it must serve a political or spiritual benefit to the state. The implications of this imperative are obvious, however, it is useful to restate them to serve this intellectual exploration; non-criminal violence will be tolerated by the whole of a society only if it serves the goals of that society. If a society's goals become divergent, then violence is an acceptable expression outside of the power of the state to a minority or majority group within that society. Similar to how the Aztecs would forbid unauthorized acts of dancing or spiritual violence, acts of terrorism are likewise forbidden; invoking violence is invoking the power of the state. In short, violence is the universally accepted means of maintaining and constructing the state. This aspect of Aztec society is not absent in the western conception of violence and societies.

The FLQ Manifesto

In the case of the October crisis, the terrorism of the event had some very clear reformatory objectives. Shortly after the kidnapping of James Cross the FLQ released a manifesto that detailed seven conditions that must be met in order to secure his release.⁴¹ As part of their demands, the FLQ terrorists sought to have their manifesto read on national television. While Trudeau downplayed the importance of reading the *FLQ Manifesto* on Radio-Canada, there was disagreement as to its impact, "Deliberate or unwitting, [the decision to read the manifesto] proved to be a major blunder... the manifesto's impact on the people of Quebec was impressive. While they overwhelmingly disapproved of the FLQ's methods, they vehemently approved [sic] of their aims".⁴² The *FLQ Manifesto* was a successful effort to create a milieu of violence and political purpose. In this respect the terrorists had achieved one of their greatest aims; namely that of utilizing violence to rally the people of Québec to their goals, "Revolutionary violence is nothing but the organized and conscious violence of a people, a class, a national or multinational collectivity [sic]...".⁴³ This success would not have been possible without the FLQ's act of violence. Through violence the legitimacy of the federal government was, at least ideologically, drawn into question.

Lacking any formal power and the possibility of widespread political success under the normal channels of government, violence became the only vehicle of communication available to the FLQ. However, this use of violence did not come without a tactical price. Going forward the FLQ would have to justify their violent mode of communication. The *Manifesto* detailed that the use of violence was

⁴¹ Bélanger, Damien-Claude Editor. 2007. *FLQ Manifesto, 1970*. Trent University.

⁴² Guindon, 151.

⁴³ Vallières, Pierre. *White Niggers of America; The Precocious Autobiography of a Quebec 'Terrorist'*. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); 224.

justified as a response to repressive violence of a colonial regime.⁴⁴ In this way the FLQ was equating themselves to the governments of Québec and Canada and characterizing their action as ‘responsive’ in nature justified their existence in their supporters in the citizenship of Québec. Their violence was justified since it concerned directly matters of the state and self-determination.

Throughout the *Manifesto* the images of violence are present, “The Front de libération du Québec wants total independence for Quebecers, united in a free society and purged for good of the clique of voracious sharks, the patronizing ‘big bosses’ and their henchmen who have made Quebec their private hunting ground for ‘cheap labor’ and unscrupulous exploitation”.⁴⁵ Sharks, henchmen and hunting grounds are all nouns that set the tone for the rest of the document. It can be discerned from this passage that the FLQ sees their actions as a reaction or a defense against predators who have thrown the first assault. They even state so explicitly, “The Front de libération du Québec is not an aggressive movement, but rather a response to the aggression perpetrated by high finance through the puppet governments in Ottawa and Québec”.⁴⁶ By the use of this language the FLQ has indicated how they see the operation of their surroundings and what constitutes their standard of violence.⁴⁷ It is worth noting that the original aim of the FLQ was the worker state and not necessarily separation. The push for language rights comes later and could be viewed as a tool tapping into larger Québec frustration over language and federal interference. When this becomes part of their goal the FLQ gained more prominence and support.

Like most Marxists, the FLQ sees violence in the economic actions of the capitalists. But the violence that the FLQ sees cannot be remedied by any traditional action that existed. The FLQ was heartened by the gains that the PQ made during the election, “but the Liberal victory clearly demonstrates that what we call democracy in Quebec has always been, and still is, a ‘democracy’ of the rich”.⁴⁸ Note that the FLQ does not criticize the fundamental concept of democracy, but they do not wholly embrace it either. The authors of the *Manifesto* tacitly state that democracy is a legitimate system of government (or at the very least

⁴⁴ As can be inferred by some of their vocabulary, the FLQ was heavily influenced by the examples of Carl Marx, Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, and others. The October Crisis was an event that took place within the period of worldwide decolonization and is interpreted by contemporaries of the era as such. Yet, Québec’s situation differs in many material respects from the Algerian, or Cuban examples; the most obvious being that the Québécois are a western people with a legacy inherited directly from another colonial power with a tradition of colonialism and democratic institutions. There exists further room for research on this obvious dissonance.

⁴⁵ Bélanger, 2007.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ As defined earlier, violence can be economic in nature, the FLQ echo that sentiment here.

⁴⁸ Bélanger, 2007.

they do not deny it). Their grievance is that this so-called 'democracy' has been overcome by corruption and influence. It was the "election riggers"⁴⁹ that won the election for the Liberal Party, and therefore the self-determination of the Québécois had not been honored. In a sense the FLQ is seeking to delegitimize the will of the majority in an effort to justify their will. Though this is obvious, this paradigm is also not as simple as it sounds. The FLQ disregards those French-Canadians who are active participants in the provincial democratic process and while simultaneously seeking to represent the same people. At the time in Québec, and even currently, there exists a large contingent of Francophones who wish to remain in Confederation. Trudeau, Bourassa, and more recently Jean Charest typify these Canadians. It was not unusual for the FLQ to dehumanize this section of Québec society in an effort to dismiss this group as an abhorration, "In FLQ circles of the late 1960s, it was not uncommon to denounce Trudeau publicly by naming him a 'fairy' or a 'faggot'".⁵⁰ Even more ironic was the fact that Pierre Vallières and Trudeau worked together against the Duplessis Regime in their association through *Cité Libre*.⁵¹

More to the point, the FLQ wished to reject the traditional Canadian-British style of democracy as a wholly foreign entity, "we have washed our hands clean of the British parliamentary system and the Front de libération du Québec will never allow itself to be distracted by the electoral crumbs that the Anglo-Saxon capitalists toss Quebec's way every four years".⁵² The criticism of the British parliamentary system is of prime interest within this argument. One cannot help but wonder what the FLQ's position on the parliamentary system would have been if the PQ had won the 1970 provincial election. The implication the *Manifesto's* authors André Roy and Jacques Lanctôt⁵³ wish to convey is that there is a fundamental and cultural difference between that which is just and that which is not. The embodiment of justice in Québec is that which is Québécois, and that must be so within every facet of Québécois life. As such, 'token' gestures by the Québec government such as Québec's first language law Bill 63, socialized medicine

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Palmer, Bryan Douglas. *Canada's 1960s*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009): 549.

⁵¹ See Cloutier, Normand, Tom Daly, and Robin Spry. *Action: The October Crisis of 1970*. (Montréal: National Film Board of Canada, 2006): 4:50, and Vallières, 204. As well, Trudeau's involvement with the paper may have indirectly bolstered the rise of Québec Nationalism, "No surprise then that the search was on, so to speak, for a new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together. Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, than print-capitalism, which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways" Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (London: "Verso", 2006): 38.

⁵² Bélanger, 2007.

⁵³ Tetley, 32.

and more became not just inadequate choices in governance but anti-cultural actions that were specifically designed to destroy Québec culture even though these actions, especially healthcare, leaned sharply to the left. The FLQ formulated their response around these cultural differences and sought to reject these forms of oppression, as they perceived it. Their ideology became so rigid and absolute that violence became a permissible step.

This segue into violence begs a fundamental question about the *Manifesto* that needs to be answered is: Could the grievances of the FLQ and the larger francophone population be remedied in a means that did not require terrorism or violence? For argument's sake, suppose that the PQ had accomplished their objective in the election of 1968 that Québec be declared a free and independent nation.⁵⁴ This outcome would prove to be problematic for the theoretical force behind the FLQ. If the rejection of all things British is fundamental to the ideology of the FLQ then how can they move forward in a system of power that they have rejected? For the FLQ, the problem was not the semantics of government, it was government. The FLQ's decision to forego the democratic process thus leaves the violent overthrow of government as the only option.

'Crossing the Rubicon' in regards to violence may be an anti-democratic action, but it is not an anti-nationalist action. It can even be stated that violence is a necessary action for the FLQ if they seek to accomplish their aim of creating a free and independent state.

No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers... Yet void as these tombs are of identifiable mortal remains or immortal souls, they are nonetheless saturated with ghostly national imaginings. (This is why so many different nations have such tombs without feeling any need to specify the nationality of their absent occupants. What else could they be but Germans, Americans, Argentinians . . . ?⁵⁵

The concept of nationalism demands a new spiritual basis upon which to build a nation. If the nation of Québec is ever to come into being then martyrs, as a point of reference, are required. This necessitates that the revolutionary be unknown, or next to unknown, committed, and to have no other option remaining. At the end of his work, FLQ's Vallières echoes this sentiment, "My dreams are 'measureless,' and yet I am an ordinary man, I think. I cannot 'live my life' without working to

⁵⁴ As described above, there are already indications that the anti-Duplessis movement had begun to splinter after the Liberals came to power.

⁵⁵ Anderson, 9-10.

make the revolution, and it seems to me that it is pretty much the same for you”.⁵⁶ As a Marxist, Vallières rejects the traditional Catholic religion and modifies his noun and adjective selections to convey a similar level of devotion and urgency; ‘ordinary’, ‘dreams’, and ‘measureless’, all accomplish this spiritual goal.⁵⁷ Vallières is aware that violent action has a specific utility and if he wishes to destroy the old regime it must be utilized in a populous and ordinary fashion. This approach may be useful in obtaining the new nation state the FLQ so desperately desires, but does little to advance the nation after the revolutionary process.

As sometimes happens within revolutionary or nihilistic ideologies, there is a movement and justification to destroy the current system but have nothing to replace it.⁵⁸ The FLQ was no different in this respect. Nowhere in the *Manifesto*, short of the mention of Marxism, are there suggested tactical remedies to the problems of governance in Québec. The FLQ expose this dissonance in the *Manifesto* as well, “And the Montreal policemen, those strong-arms of the system, should understand these reasons – they should have been able to see that we live in a terrorized society because, without their force, without their violence, everything fell apart on October 7!”⁵⁹ (Bélanger). The treatment of the police within this passage presents problems for the FLQ. They recognize that the police are both the terrorizer and the terrorized. The FLQ is at the same time appealing to the consciousness of the police while assailing it at the same time.⁶⁰ There is little doubt that the FLQ would have accepted and even encouraged an insurrection among the police. Such access to violence could not be declined but leaves the FLQ in a difficult position. This contradiction indicates that there existed some uncomfortable ideological problems for the FLQ, many of which were put aside until their primary goals could be achieved through the necessary violence.

In addressing the Montréal Police in this manner the FLQ admit that their desired society will need and should utilize violence; it is the direction of that violence that is of primary concern. For the FLQ there is no way to govern sans violence; there is no way to oppose without violence. Ultimately, the FLQ can neither throw the grenade nor put the pin back in, “On October 7, 1969, Montreal’s police officers and firefighters staged an illegal strike. The city was

⁵⁶ Vallières, 254.

⁵⁷ Again, there is a parallel to the Aztec culture of violence and spiritualism. The FLQ needs to associate just violence with the only aspect that can truly separate the Québécois from the rest of Canada, language. Going forward language will be held as sacrosanct in Québec.

⁵⁸ See *Fathers and Sons* by Ivan Turgenev. Turgenev explores the social frustration of the youth in pre-Bolshevik Russia. Turgenev surmises that the difficulties of governance are not remedied by the impetus to destroy a broken system.

⁵⁹ Bélanger 2007.

⁶⁰ Again, the FLQ presents a paradoxical relationship with the majority of Québec.

rocked by several hours of violence and mayhem”.⁶¹ The police and firefighters utilized a language that the FLQ clearly understood; agree with our position or find uncontrolled violence upon you. While the mode of the coercion is not so different than the *modus operandi* of the FLQ, the primary concern is the motivation behind the violence and the degree to which a level of violence serves the objective. If the illegal strike of the Montréal police had continued on for a longer period, their message would have changed. The strike would have ceased to be a labor relations dispute and would have become revolutionary in nature. This potential for escalation belies the nuances that violence, as a language, can convey. Even though the respective spoken languages may indicate differently what is actually occurring in a particular incident, the violence conveys its own meaning. Violence in this case is a language that is basic enough to be understood by all participants, yet so unique that no words can match its meaning.

The *Manifesto* terminates with four lines or slogans that were synonymous with the October Crisis and the greater separatist movement, “Long live free Quebec!! Long live our imprisoned political comrades! Long live the Quebec revolution!! Long live the Front de libération du Québec!”.⁶² Here the FLQ specifically links their struggle to the earlier calls for Québec independence such as Charles De Gaulle’s infamous speech in 1967 in which he followed up calls of ‘Long live Montréal’ and ‘Long live Québec’ with “Vive le Québec libre!”.⁶³ De Gaulle’s proclamation created an international rift between Canada and France, and propelled the separatist movement into the international spotlight. This step was vital to the authorization of violence associated with the separatist movement. The struggle the FLQ undertook was not just a struggle between Canada and Québec but was also a part of a much larger narrative of nationalism.⁶⁴ While this context may be out of the scope of this exploration, it is useful to say that De Gaulle’s statement brought to light the concept of Québec as a nation. The

⁶¹ Belanger, 2007.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Société Radio-Canada. Vive le Québec libre!, *Les Archives de Radio-Canada*. Dernière mise à jour: 24 juillet 2008. http://archives.radio-canada.ca/politique/provincial_territorial/clips/1048/, [Page consultée le 19 décembre 2012.]

⁶⁴ This international (and unsolicited) recognition vaulted the concept of Québec as an imagined community to the foreground, “The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations” (Anderson, 8). De Gaulle, without even realizing it, was projecting the international conception of nationhood to his Québécois audience in. For De Gaulle, who may have been mildly confused, France was elsewhere and his surroundings, familiar in language only, had to be that of another nation. In his mind, if Québec is defined as French-speaking and does not exist in the national borders of France then this must be an independent nation unto itself and De Gaulle acted as such.

violence that followed was an indirect result of that nationalistic endorsement. An independent Québec is an expression of nationalism; nationalism and the social change that it demands are either facilitated in moderation or through the rapid actions of violence, as Moore describes. Nationalism is a language of violence all on its own and a nation cannot exist without the aid of those who hold the capacity for violence (i.e. police and soldiers). De Gaulle, a soldier himself, helped to solidify these motivations in the hearts and minds of the Québécois with a single word: 'libre' (free) and brought the advance modern conception of nation into a collision course with an anachronism of the early 20th century that was extant in the legal framework of Canada.

The War Measures Act

It would be unavoidable and irresponsible to analyze the October Crisis and not include any reflection on the *War Measures Act*. However, it would be equally irresponsible to speak of the *Act* without putting the actions of the government into the proper context. The period leading up to the October Crisis was one of social change and turbulence throughout North America and the world.

Canada was faced with two serious 'political' crimes, however they had not simply appeared out of nowhere. Other countries faced even greater turmoil. May '68 had literally shattered the foundations of France... combined with spectacular political assassinations—John F. and Robert Kennedy, Malcolm X, and Martin Luther King Jr...On May 4, 1970, the United States National Guard opened fire on a demonstration at Ohio's Kent State University and left four students dead. All this happened in the run-up to Canada's crisis in 1970 and the people of Canada were fully aware of these events that were taking place in other countries.⁶⁵

Arguably the world had entered into a new phase of social dialogue. Social strife and transformation were occurring all over the globe, violently in many instances. As is typical with changes in the social structure of any society there is a lag in the systems of government and the societies they govern. Indeed, these lags are often the causes of revolutions (i.e. the rise of the bureaucratic class in pre-revolutionary France, or the lack of representation of the American colonies in the British parliament). The implication of these lags in the systems of government is that the tools that governments have to deal with new social challenges are anachronistic in nature. This paradigm is akin to the phenomena of modern industrialized

⁶⁵ Bouthillier, 13.

militaries always being ready to fight the ‘last’ war. Such is the case with the *War Measures Act* as its genesis indicates.

Prior to the October Crisis, Canada invoked the War Measures Act on only two other occasions. The first use was between August 4, 1914 and January 10, 1920. ‘The occasion of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917 was the cause of the passage of a number of regulations and orders under which membership in certain organizations was proscribed and individuals were interned.’ The Act was used a second time during the period from August 25, 1939 until 1945”.⁶⁶

The *War Measures Act* was gestated in a very different time than the 1970s. The primary purpose of the Act was to enable the executive branch of the federal government to deal with the perceived threats to sovereignty of the early 20th century, specifically the rise of communism and other revolutionary ideologies.⁶⁷ This alone is evidence of a lag in the utility of the *War Measures Act*. Historical scholarship should point out injustices and abuses that occurred under the Act with the qualification that governments are, by their very nature, reactive in nature and always prepared for events in hindsight. The *War Measures Act* was tailored to another threat and another time. Unfortunately, it was the only all-encompassing executive power that was available to deal with the unique situation that was presented to Trudeau and Bourassa in 1970.

Due to the lack of limits on executive power contained within the Act, it is a reach to expect that the Act could have been used with the requisite temperance and responsibility that the October Crisis demanded. Trudeau and Bourassa used the Act, as imperfect as it was, to calm the crisis and these powers were deactivated when the crisis abated. There is justification to argue that the Act was not deactivated soon enough, as it was officially ended in April 1971. The replacement of the *War Measures Act* with the *Emergencies Act*⁶⁸ (albeit 10 years later; again a reactionary action) reflects this criticism, wherein the *Emergencies Act* will expire

⁶⁶ Palframan, Krista. “Emergency Powers in Canada; Revisiting the War Measures Act”. (Toronto: York University, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2012): 4.

⁶⁷ Since the evolution and changes to the Act are out of scope for the primary purpose of the discussion contained herein, the Act will not be examined in excruciating detail. In summary, the Act was enacted and subsequently modified to allow the federal government to control the internal political climate in Canada. The main objective of the Act was silencing ideas and undesired political dialogue that the government perceived as a threat. The *War Measures Act* was analogous to the U.S. *Alien Enemy Act* (1798). See *War Measures Act*, 1914 (2nd session), c.2.

⁶⁸ See the *Emergencies Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. 22 (4th Supp.), <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/E-4.5/index.html>

automatically after 30, 60, 90 and 120 days (depending on the type of emergency) without the approval of Parliament.

The *War Measures Act* garnered the federal and provincial governments extraordinary powers that included

- (a) censorship, and the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication;
- (b) arrest, detention exclusion and deportation;
- (d) transportation by land, air, or water and the control of the transport of persons and things;
- (f) appropriation, control, forfeiture and disposition of property and of the use thereof.⁶⁹

Suffice to say the Act is and should be considered an act of violence even if that violence does not constitute physical harm. Imprisonment, seizure of property and censoring of speech can be viewed as acts of violence. The police were granted these new powers under the Act they quickly moved to utilize these new powers.

Within hours, the police mobilized to arrest and detain suspected terrorists and their supporters. The police conducted over 3,000 searches and 497 people were detained... The average detainee spent a week in jail; yet the vast majority of them (87%) were later released and never charged with a crime. Sixty-two people were charged by January 1971. Within a month, half of them were released and the charges were dropped. In the end, only 18 people were convicted of a crime arising from the crisis.⁷⁰

It is important to note that beyond the powers of arrest, the government was not authorized to inflict bodily harm and outside the civil unrest seen in the streets, no citizen in Québec or Canada was killed or severely impaired. Conversely, the FLQ made no effort to abdicate the power of bodily harm and utilized it often. Between 1963 and June 1970 the FLQ killed six civilians in a series of bombings, raids and robberies that, sadly, some scholars often fail to mention.

It may also be that there is an uncomfortable acceptance of the violence perpetrated by the FLQ. During a 1970 call into the English-speaking radio program *Double Take* on CBC Radio, a Francophone caller (she remains unidentified) summarizes the discomfort and her struggle with the use of violence by the FLQ.⁷¹ She commences her call in a calm manner describing her every day

⁶⁹ Bélanger, Claude. 1999. Proclamation of the War Measures Act, October 16, 1970. Marianopolis College.

<http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/docs/october/wm-act.htm> [accessed 21 December 2012]

⁷⁰ Clément, 167.

⁷¹ See appendix 2 for full transcription.

experiences and frustrations under the linguistic hegemony of English within Québec. She condemns the violence of the FLQ, but supports the contents of the *Manifesto*. There is a chilling moment during the call when she admits, that while she has never been violent in her life, the violence she sees on the streets may be a good thing, “maybe it is going to shake something up. And maybe the government, they think ahead the next time they do something”.⁷² It is an astonishing evolution of her personal view that takes the listener through a transformational moment. She has weighed the costs and benefits of the violence against her observed level of social inequality and her eventual acceptance of violence indicates that social inequality in Québec is too great to tolerate. This insight illustrates just how important the concept of language is to the Québécois and may explain why violence, depending on the source and magnitude, is not always viewed with equal measure. Yet, this case proved to be the exception and not the rule.

While it may appear that an individual’s perspective of the *War Measures Act* is universally determined by one’s language, the reality at the time was very different “In a Gallup Poll published on 12 December 1970, 89 per cent of English-speaking Canadians approved of the federal government’s action in adopting the War Measures Act Regulations, while 6 percent disapproved and 5 per cent were undecided. Among French-speaking Canadians, 86 per cent approved, 9 per cent disapproved, and 5 per cent were undecided”.⁷³ This support for the actions of the federal government may have waned as the crisis receded into memory. Also the criticisms of the Act were taken more seriously since the *Emergencies Act* replaced it. This poll is more indicative of the fact that French and English Canada, two societies of the western tradition, while diametrically opposed in their opinions on the fate of Québec’s institutions, were near universally united in their rejection of the types of violence in accomplishing these aims. The legacy of the October Crisis in this respect was a “sad and costly loss of innocence”⁷⁴, brought on by the killing of Pierre Laporte, an action that still taints the politics around the quest for sovereignty.

Why Pierre Laporte Had to Die

On 10 October 1970, Pierre Laporte was kidnapped from his home in Saint-Lambert, Québec by members of the FLQ. On Friday, 16 October 1970 at 3

⁷² Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 1970. “Francophone caller supports FLQ manifesto”. *CBC Digital Archives*. <http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/civil-unrest/the-october-crisis-civil-liberties-suspended/francophone-caller-supports-flq-manifesto.html> [accessed December 21, 2012].

⁷³ Tetley, 103; Trudeau, Pierre Elliott. *Memoirs*. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993): 143; and Cloutier, 80:45 (who cites a “vast majority”).

⁷⁴ Cloutier, 86:17.

a.m. “letters from the government of Quebec and the city of Montreal, requesting the application of the Regulations under the War Measures Act, are received in Ottawa by the Federal government. The War Measures Act Regulations are put in force at 4 a.m. Police throughout Quebec round up more than 250 suspects by evening [sic]”.⁷⁵ On Saturday, 17 October 1970, “[an] FLQ note is found at 9:30 p.m. saying that Laporte had been ‘executed’ at 6:18 p.m.”.⁷⁶⁷⁷

By taking a step back and regarding the sequence of these events in an objective fashion a pattern emerges. The respective actions of the FLQ and the governments involved in the crisis appear similar to a conversation. Each respective action is tactical in nature. However, beyond their immediate effects these actions can be construed as argumentative in nature. One tactic leads to another and each is designed to persuade and/or convince the opposition of their dominance; which in turn is followed by a counter response or a desired capitulation. The overall strategic conversation can be construed in terms of social change and larger socio-political movements. These individual acts of violence deserve greater scrutiny.

The violent acts described above can be isolated as follows: (1) Pierre Laporte is kidnapped; (2) the *War Measures Act* is put into effect; and (3) Pierre Laporte is murdered.⁷⁸ Each step is a provocation of the last. Pierre Laporte’s kidnapping is an escalation of an earlier state of affairs. The implementation of violence during the Crisis was of great concern to all involved, especially to the FLQ. The death of Pierre Laporte was especially troubling for the FLQ going forward and recent attempts at revisionism concerning this fact confirm this. Former FLQ members are claiming that the death of Laporte was accidental.

Le gouvernement Bourassa le savait parce que la police a illégalement enregistré les confidences faites en prison par Jacques Rose à son avocat Robert Lemieux. M. Rose y raconte que son frère Paul, pourtant condamné pour le meurtre, ne se trouvait même pas à la maison de Saint-Hubert lorsque le drame s'est produit. Les ravisseurs étaient sur le point d'évacuer Laporte vers un lieu plus sûr lorsqu'il s'est mis à crier et qu'il est mort, étranglé dans une

⁷⁵Tetley, 207.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 208. Emphasis added.

⁷⁷ The entire note read, “Face à l’arrogance du GV fédéral et son valet Bourassa, face à leur mauvaise foi évidente, le FLQ a donc décidé de passer aux actes. Pierre Laporte, ministre de chômage et de l’assimilation a été exécuté par la Cellule Dieppe (Royal 22^{ème})”. See Cloutier, 61:51.

⁷⁸ It is fully recognized here that these actions are an editing of a larger narrative. The selection of Pierre Laporte’s kidnapping as the first step to be examined is by no means intended to give the reader the indication that the FLQ took the first steps towards engaging in violence, whatever that reality may be.

bousculade [The Bourassa government knew (he was killed accidentally) because the police illegally recorded statements made in prison by Jacques Rose's lawyer Robert Lemieux. Mr. Rose tells his brother Paul, however, convicted of the murder, was not even in the house of Saint-Hubert when the tragedy occurred. The abductors were about to evacuate Laporte to a safer place when he started screaming 'he died', strangled in a physical struggle].⁷⁹

In retrospect it is more than likely that this account of Laporte's death is correct. The account explains the presence of a pillow in the trunk of the car that Laporte was found in. It is also supported by the evidence laid out by the coroner's report, "[Laporte] succumbed to acute asphyxiation after having been choked by a chain that he wore around his neck".⁸⁰ While it is highly unlikely that any court would rule that the FLQ were not responsible for the death of Laporte, this account neglects to explain the note that the FLQ sent to police stating that they had 'executed' Laporte. In that note the FLQ describe Laporte as "Minister of unemployment and assimilation" saying that he "was executed... [and] the exploiters of the Quebec have only to behave themselves [sic]".⁸¹ Thus, the semantics of how Laporte died are nuanced and even more important to this exploration. If Laporte was killed as the revisionists state, then why was a note stating he was executed sent? Why didn't the FLQ describe the death as accidental? While the answers to these questions may never be known, there is room to speculate. The FLQ may have been trying to save face. Announcing that they accidentally murdered their hostage would make them appear bumbling and reckless, losing them support in the process. It may also have been that from their immediate perspective the death of Laporte worked in their favor. His death could have been spun as a response to the *War Measures Act* and the dialogue of violence could continue.

The FLQ had killed before, so the attempts at revisionism were not to cast them as some kind of peace warriors. The violence of killing remained in their toolbox. This reinterpretation indicates that while violence is a useful language that can be utilized to amplify political desires, the language of violence is unsophisticated and clumsy. In this instance, the FLQ escalated beyond their means. The execution of Laporte was too much for most Québécois to swallow and they lost support. As evidenced by the attempts at revisionism and parsing related to the execution of Laporte, the FLQ acknowledges that they crossed a line

⁷⁹ Gendron, Guy. "Revelations sur la mort de Pierre Laporte". *Radio-Canada*. <http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/Politique/2010/09/23/006-flq-mort-laporte.shtml>, [Page consultée le 20 décembre 2012.] My translation.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 141.

⁸¹ Tetley, 142.

that would be detrimental to their cause. It could also be that the prior deaths were perpetrated remotely, by bombings, this tactic depersonalized their victims to the general public; these victims were simply unlucky and not intentionally killed. It is one thing to kill a nameless government employee, it is a very different action to kill while looking into a helpless victims eyes. This time they actually had blood directly on their hands and it may be that the members of the FLQ and the public couldn't reconcile that distinction.

In another respect, assuming it was an intentional act, the killing of Laporte shows how the supply of resources required to commit violence can have an impact on the conversation. The FLQ had a limited number of means with which to commit acts of violence. They were limited to bombing, kidnapping and murder, and up to the time before the murder of Laporte, all but the latter had been attempted. Conversely, the federal government had at its disposal any number of tactics with which to pressure the FLQ. Arrests, seizure of property, soldiers on the street, military assets and police raids, unfettered access to the media and much more were available to federal and provincial governments. It is possible that the FLQ surmised that since the federal government had changed tactics, more bombings and kidnappings were not going to advance the conversation. With limited means and no new way to respond to the implementation of the *War Measures Act*, the FLQ may simply have run out of options and thus so did Pierre Laporte.

Cross-Lingual Messaging Model

It is quite possible that, in spite of themselves, the FLQ accelerated a process that would ultimately bring about their worst nightmare. The FLQ's use of violence may have been the exact ingredient required to deny them the sovereignty they so ardently sought. After the social and cultural strife of the 60s and 70s, the cultural concepts of self and identity fundamentally changed in Canada. English Canada began to take interest in how Québec fit into the conception of the Canadian identity. During the October Crisis, the FLQ found that their violence gave them a new voice and illuminated a group in Canada that had rarely taken the national stage before then.

Before the Quiet Revolution there is a clear dominance of English cultural messaging⁸² over French. The lack of language laws, the dominance of English in public spaces and the teaching of English in the public school system all contribute

⁸² Cultural messaging is defined as cross-lingual transmission of thoughts or ideas that originated in one linguistic party and intended for the other, on a conscious level or not. 'Francophone caller supports FLQ manifesto' is an example of this kind of messaging. This messaging can also include literature, the arts, political speech, movies, music and other forms of entertainment.

to this dominance.⁸³ During the period prior to the October Crisis, but post-Quiet Revolution, the amount of cultural messaging that was being transmitted and received by the English from French sources remained stable. English Canada was not listening any more or less to French sources prior to the Crisis.

The revolutionary period was internal in nature and did not engage external groups outside of the Francophone community in Québec. The Francophone consciousness had come alive during the Quiet Revolution and limited its consumption of English cultural media, as evidenced by the increases in French media sources and popular music (i.e. *Cité Libré*, artists such as Gilles Vigneault, and Félix Leclerc). As indicated in Appendix #1, Figure 3, the Quiet Revolution served more to blunt the reception of English sources by the French population than increase the amount of reception by the English of French cultural knowledge.

The actions of the FLQ affected both English and French populations in ways that had never existed before. The weight of cross-lingual cultural messaging shifted dramatically before and after the October Crisis and the beginning of the Quiet Revolution.⁸⁴ The English language overwhelmingly dominated cultural messaging before the Quiet Revolution. This dominance is evidenced by the growth of English language instruction present in the public education system and the lack of French language protections. Lack of language protection was the main grievance of the Québécois population, as indicated by the Francophone caller, “just one thing so simple as to have French for the province of Québec, officially French like the other provinces have English”.⁸⁵ The fact that she chose to call into an English radio station and speak in a language that she was not terribly comfortable in is extraordinary. She clearly intends that an English audience receive her message. Just by the very action of her call shows that something has changed within the context of the dialogue between the French and English Canada; this may very well have been the entry of violence into the conversation.

Her selection of verbs and adjectives is also quite revealing. Among them ‘shake’, ‘participation’, and ‘listen’, all indicate that the violence is intended to engage an English observer to their problems. As appendix #1, figure 3 indicates, the amount of cultural messaging during the Crisis increased dramatically. The violence had an effect. English Canada was listening to the grievances of the

⁸³ See Pinard, Maurice, and Richard Hamilton. “The Parti Québécois Comes to Power: An Analysis of the 1976 Quebec Election”. *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue Canadienne De Science Politique*. (1978. 11, no. 4): 756; and Coleman, William D. “From Bill 22 to Bill 101: The Politics of Language under the Parti Québécois”, *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique*, (Sep., 1981. Vol. 14, No. 3): 467; Kaplan; and Dib.

⁸⁴ See Appendix #1, Fig. 3.

⁸⁵ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 1970. “Francophone caller supports FLQ manifesto”.

Québécois, whether they wanted to or not. If the FLQ had accomplished anything through their violence it was to underline the social inequalities that existed in Québec. It is important to note that the issue that took precedence in the debate between Canada and Québec was not the Marxist-Leninist objectives of some of the members of the FLQ, but the language and cultural concerns of the francophone population. While Marxist doctrine may have provided an impetus for members of the FLQ it was not that doctrine that breached the gap between English and French Canada.

After the crisis had abated the state of relations between French and English Canada had been permanently altered. The violence of the *War Measures Act* may have also served to create this parity. The injustices that were felt in Québec were extended beyond those provincial borders into other parts of Canada, “In Toronto, a local school board considered a motion to ban teachers from speaking about the FLQ in their classrooms”⁸⁶ and “Premier [of British Columbia] W.A.C. Bennett, in a perplexing moment of extremism, declared that the provincial cabinet had approved a regulation banning any teachers in the province, including college and university professors, from expressing sympathy with the FLQ”.⁸⁷ While Clément labels these actions human rights abuses (they are more appropriately called civil liberty violations), they indicate that there is a shared experience that occurred during the October Crisis. Not only did the rest of English Canada, as far away as British Columbia, become aware of the social conflict in Québec, there was now the very real possibility that it would affect them personally.

In a way, the *War Measures Act* gathered the Canadian population around the federal mission and started the conversation about how Québec and the rest of Canada see their identity. This realization aided in bringing the respective weights of cultural messaging closer to a state of parity.

Conclusion

Violence is central to the October Crisis and is the main reason it continues to hold sway in the Canadian consciousness. In societies where the primary objective of their continuation is the reduction of violence, violence can amplify minority positions, engage the larger political discourse, and if utilized correctly, affect change in favor of the originator. There is also a spiritual power to violence that can captivate, mystify and, transfix the attention of an audience. There is little doubt that the FLQ was able to broadcast their position, force the larger political consciousness to engage with their ideas, and affect some kind of change in

⁸⁶ Clément, 169.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 170.

Québec. The only question that remains is whether that change was a positive one and moved the FLQ closer to their goals.

If the originator of violence is to be successful in achieving their goals they must possess a wide capacity for violence.⁸⁸ Greater access to a larger variety of means for violence, translates into more versatility while engaged with an adversary. However, access to a greater set of means for violence is expensive and difficult to implement. Police, armies and government-like bodies cost a great deal in terms of resources. The FLQ did not possess the resources, manpower, or the might of a military. The FLQ could not compete with the federal government's greater vocabulary in regards to violence. Also, at the outset of the October Crisis the FLQ had more options for violence than at the end. As the crisis went on the federal government was able to maneuver their resources and stymie the FLQ's ability to use more legitimate forms of violence (i.e. popular uprisings). The deployment of soldiers and increased arrest powers meant that the FLQ could not destroy property or kidnap officials with the relative ease that had existed before. Only harder forms of violence (i.e. the murder of Laporte or Cross) were available to the FLQ. While these means were easier to implement, they carried great risks. However, harder forms of violence threaten to delegitimize the originator and are antithetical to their ultimate goals. Both the federal government and the FLQ sought to assert their legitimacy as representatives of the people of Québec through violence. In the eyes of the Québécois and the rest of Canada, acts of violence are only viewed as legitimate if they are done on behalf of the will of the majority, and then only if they are executed in the softest possible manner; in this case, both progenitors of violence were guilty of violating the latter. While it could be argued that the FLQ was acting in the best interests of the majority of Québécois, it was the manner of their violence that ultimately led to their undoing. In Québec the ends do not always justify the means. In the eyes of many in the Québec population, the FLQ had a legitimate goal, but they simply lacked the appropriate capacity to support that goal.

Conversely, the federal government was acting on behalf of two legitimate yet increasingly opposed societies, the Québécois and the rest of Canada. Their greater capacity for violence allowed Trudeau to maneuver around this dichotomy and support his vision for a unified Canada under a powerful and centralized federal government. As a result of the October Crisis, the federal government was also in danger of being delegitimized. After the crisis had subsided, members of opposition parties (i.e. Tommy Douglas and John Diefenbaker) were concerned with the wide reaching powers the government possessed under the *War Measures Act*. Many members saw this free access to means of violence as not just a threat to

⁸⁸ See Figure 4 - The Range of Capacity for Violence

personal freedom, but a threat to Canadian federal legitimacy and subsequently replaced the *War Measures Act* with the *Emergencies Act*. This is why the *Act* features so prominently in scholarly works that are focused on questioning the power of the federal government; the *War Measures Act* is utilized as a foil to delegitimize the federal government because of the violence that it grants. This assertion is also buttressed by the above-discussed attempts of revisionism. The murder of Pierre Laporte by the FLQ, in the cold manner in which it was executed, proved too much for the majority of the Québécois and ultimately served to delegitimize the separatist movement.

The October Crisis left the Québec separatist movement divided and hobbled. The fact that 86% of the Québec population supported the actions of the federal government⁸⁹ and just ten years later 40% of the same population supported sovereignty⁹⁰ is evidence of this division among separatists. The federal government was also not left unscathed as there were serious questions remaining about the legitimacy of the federalist project. In all, the October Crisis can be viewed as a conversation over legitimacy, using a language based on violence, set against a backdrop two unique cultures that sought the most peaceful means of obtaining their independent objectives.

Political violence was and will continue to be a reality in Québec politics. During the most recent Québec election, the PQ victory rally was interrupted by gunfire, while the assailant “[a] crié «les Anglais se réveillent, les Anglais se réveillent» [cried ‘The English are waking up’]”.⁹¹ While there is a justifiable urge to dismiss a lone-gunman out of hand, the violence that was displayed is a part of a larger conversation and should not be ignored. It is the violence with which Henry Bain chose to speak that is most disconcerting. If anything, his attack on the PQ coupled with his cries in French (important to note since Bain is Anglophone), is an amplified scream that is in the same syntax as the October Crisis. Additionally, in the run up to the recent provincial elections, the student tuition crisis also had a violent component and the Québec government invoked emergency powers in response to it.⁹² As is true about most things in Québec, what is often heard is not often understood. Likewise, the violence of the October Crisis has much more to say if historians are willing to listen.

⁸⁹ Tetley, 103; Trudeau, 143; and Cloutier, 80:45

⁹⁰ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. 1980: 'Non' to sovereignty in Quebec referendum. CBC *Digital Archives*.

⁹¹ Boivin, Mathieu. 5 septembre 2012. Attentat durant le discours de Marois: une victime succombe. *La Soleil*.

⁹² Radio-Canada. “Manifestations contre la loi special”, <http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/societe/2012/05/18/002-manifestation-etudiants-vendredi.shtml> [accessed 21 February 2012].

Appendix #1 – Figures and Illustrations

Figure 1 – The Division of Views on the October Crisis

The Division of Views on the October Crisis




Figure 2 – Distance in Time and Historiography




Figure 3 - Cross-Lingual Exchanges Between English and French Culture in Canada





Figure 4 - The Range of Capacity for Violence



Appendix #2 – Timeline of the October Crisis and the FLQ

February 1963 - Le front de libération du Québec (FLQ) is founded
March 1963 - The FLQ bombs three Canadian Army barracks
April 1963 - The first FLQ manifesto is written
April 1963 - FLQ bomb kills night watchman Wilfred O'Neil, first fatal attack
August 1964 to June 1970 - Four more people are killed by FLQ bombs
5 October 1970 - James Cross (British Trade Commissioner) is kidnapped
8 October 1970 - FLQ Manifesto is read on Radio-Canada television
10 October 1970 - Pierre Laporte (Québec Minister of Labour) is kidnapped
12 October 1970 - The army begins patrol operations in the Ottawa region
15 October 1970 - The army is called into Québec
16 October 1970 - The *War Measures Act* is put into effect
17 October 1970 - Pierre Laporte is murdered by his kidnappers
3 December 1970 - James Cross is released and his kidnappers are flown to Cuba

Appendix #3 – Transcription of “Francophone caller supports FLQ manifesto”⁹³

I have a lot of frustrations with [English people] ... there are some basic needs here... and I think that I should be able to live my whole day in French... I work in French... when I answer the phone, like many other people, I answer in French... the English people that call them there, they are aware that they are in the province of Québec that it is French here. They hear the operator answer in French, they hear me answer back in French and they still talk to me in English. I insist very much. I get offense because I find to my surprise that about eight persons out of ten do have some notions of French... but they don't use it... I am sick of having to ask all the time of [for] a menu in French... service in French... if the English listen to the French radio station... they are going [to be surprised] because most of the population here do not approve of the FLQ, the way that they are doing it. But they approve of what is in the [manifesto], they approve of the ideas that they are brining forward... I hear English people they always talking of law and order and democracy. Well that makes me sick, because I vote once in four years and I want participation I don't just want a vote. And the participation I want, all that is left to me is to go down in the street once in a while because the people don't listen. And if I go down to the street like all the people did for the bill this week... have just one thing so simple as to have French for the province of Québec, officially French like the other provinces have English. Well, this was

⁹³ For complete audio see <http://www.cbc.ca/archives/categories/politics/civil-unrest/the-october-crisis-civil-liberties-suspended/francophone-caller-supports-flq-manifesto.html>

refused to me by my government, you know? And I have never been violent in my life, but now in the bottom of me I think that maybe it is a good thing, what's happening, maybe it is going to shake something up. And maybe the government, they think ahead the next time they do something.

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