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The Palestinian Shahid and the development of the model 21st century Islamic terrorist

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THE PALESTINIAN SHAHID AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF

THE MODEL 21ST CENTURY ISLAMIC TERRORIST

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A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of

California State University,

San Bernardino

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In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

National Security Studies

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by

Benjamin Timothy Acosta

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A Thesis

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ABSTRACT

Since the early 1990s, Palestinian organizations have drawn from many sources and incrementally refined the process of suicide terrorism. By making the *modus operandi* socially acceptable and even fashionable, Palestinian organizations have normalized the deployment of suicide-homicide bombers. These organizations have optimized the progress individuals take from reasoning and justifying to rationalizing and actually committing suicide terrorism. Palestinian organizations have not only developed a strategic weapon for their war with Israel, but also provided Islamist-terror organizations, such as those within the global al-Qaeda network, with the model 21st Century terrorist, as well as efficient methods to produce such individuals. By mobilizing mass support in the Sunni world and empowering the individual through the concepts of *jihad* and *istishhad*, the *shahid*, as epitomized by Palestinians during *al-Aqsa intifada*, secured suicide terrorism's growing organizational partiality, ensured lethality, decreasing targeting discrimination, and frequency in the international arena. Thus, the phenomenon of the Palestinian *shahid* has become a driving force behind the increasing spread of suicide terrorism worldwide.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For Sabina and those who suffer as she does...

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NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION

Translating and transliterating a Semitic language to a Germanic one is like trying to replicate a brilliant painting using a sculptor's tools. That both Arabic and English maintain a richness that increases the amount of meanings words have contextually further complicates matters. Each Arabic root-word has various forms that lead to any number of representations. Regional dialects make translation even harder. So for the purposes of this work, translations refer to a word's common use within the context of the topic at hand. Transliterations simply reflect an attempt to minimize confusion. Arabic and other foreign words are italicized throughout the text unless the word's English equivalent is identical (e.g. Sunni) or similar (al-Qaeda versus *al-Qa'eda*). Silent Arabic letters, such as the *ta'marbuta* and *haa'*, are not written, unless a word's English equivalent is the identical; for example, instead of *shahadah*, just *shahada* is written, but *Allah* is written as it commonly is in English. Oftentimes translations denote Arabic letters that have no English equivalent with numbers. Avoiding such confusing methods, apostrophes signify these unique letters. For example,

depending on the vowel within the word, either 'a, 'e or 'u

denotes the Arabic letter 'ayn.

Words are transliterated to English from *Fousha*
(Modern Standard Arabic); however, proper nouns defer to an
'Ammiyya (Spoken Arabic) transliteration, in order to
represent the colloquial form of Arabic that relates to the
individual or organization. For example, the Palestine
Liberation Organization's Arabic name, *Munazzmat al-Tahrir
al-Filastiniyya*, employs the Arabic letter *dHaa'* to sound
like a "z"--reflecting the Levantine dialect. Similarly, as
an Egyptian, Ayman al-Zawahiri uses the Egyptian dialect
for his name, which turns the *dHaa'* into a "zh" sound.
Words like Hezballah, which have numerous spellings in
English, defer to the spelling that has the simplest
English pronunciation; for example, although Hezballah
represents two Arabic words, *Hezb-Allah* (Party of God), and
the organization itself has at times spelled its name in
English as Hezbollah and Hizballah, it is written as
Hezballah throughout the text. Oftentimes one sees *al-
Qa'eda* written as al-Qaida; to increase the
transliterations' consistency, this work reserves the "i"
for words requiring an "ee" sound. As a result *shahid* is

written with an "i," although its English pronunciation more closely resembles "sha'heed."

For Hebrew proper nouns, all spoken Hebrew letters are given an English equivalent in order to maintain the integrity of the transliteration. For example, the letter *khet* maintains a "kh" denotation. Oftentimes one sees place names such as *Mekhola* spelled Mehola. As with the Arabic transliterations, however, the silent Hebrew *heh* is not identified; so *Herzliya* is written rather than Herzliyah. However, in words with an identical English equivalent the *heh* is maintained. *A'a* denotes the Hebrew letter *ayn*.

GLOSSARY

Arabic

'amalyya istishhadiyya: "martyrdom operation"

al-'ard: "female sexual honor"

da'awa: literally "calling"--meaning "proselytizing"

dar al-harb: literally "dwelling of war"

dar al-Islam: literally "dwelling of submission"

fard ayn: "individual obligation (to *jihad*)"

fard kafiya: "collective obligation (to *jihad*)"

fatwa: "(Islamic) edict" or "decree"

feda'i: literally "self-sacrificer"--meaning "one who risks his or her life"

fedayin: "self-sacrificers"--meaning "those who risk their lives"

hamula: "clan"

houriyyat al-ayn: "virgin maidens"

hudna: "armistice"

intifada: literally "shaking off"--meaning "uprising"

intihar: "suicide"

'irhab: "terror"

Islam: "submission"

istishhad: literally "martyrdom"--meaning "self-sacrifice for Allah's sake"

istishhadi: literally "martyr"--meaning "one who intentionally commits martyrdom"

jannat al-firdaous: "heavenly gardens"

jahiliyya: "ignorance"--meaning "darkness without Allah"

jihad: literally "struggle"--meaning "holy war"

kafir: literally "infidel"--meaning "one who hides the truth"

Khalifa: literally "successor"--meaning "Islam's highest living authority"

kufr: literally "blasphemer"--meaning "one who conceals revelation"

madrassa: "(Islamic) school"

mufti: "(Islamic law) functionary"

mujahid: literally "struggler"--meaning "one who wages holy war"

mujahedin: literally "strugglers"--meaning "those who wage holy war"

al-Naqba: "the Catastrophe"

qadiyya: "a greater cause"

qowmiyya: "(Arab) nationalism"

sahwa: "awakening"

al-salaf al-salihin: literally "pious ancestors"--meaning "Mohammed's immediate successors"

salafi: "(one who follows the ways of the) immediate successors"

Salafiyya: "Salafism"

sammid: "one who practices steadfastness"

sammud: "steadfastness" or "perseverance"

shahada: literally "witness"--meaning "professing one's submission to Allah" or "death for Allah's sake"

shahid: literally "(male) witness"--meaning "martyr"

shahida: literally "(female) witness"--meaning "martyr"

al-shahid al-hai: "the living martyr"

shari'a: "(Islamic) law"

sharif: literally "noble"--meaning "descendant of Mohammed (through his daughter)"

sheikh: "(local) leader"

Shi'a: "partisan"

shirk: "polytheism"

shuhada: literally "witnesses"—meaning "martyrs"

Sunni: "orthodox"

tawhid: literally "oneness"--meaning "monotheism"

'ulema: "(Islamic) scholars"

um'ma: "(global) Islamic community"

'urf: "(Arab) customary law"

waqf: "(Islamic) endowment"

Hebrew

Yesha: refers collectively to "Judea, Samaria and Gaza"

Yishuv: "(Jewish) community"

ABBREVIATIONS

AHC: Arab Higher Committee

AMB: Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade

AQI: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers)

DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

DOP: Declaration of Principles

ICT: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism

IDC: Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya

IDF: Israel Defense Force

IRGC: Islamic (Iranian) Revolutionary Guard Corps

ISA: Israel Security Agency

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute

MFA: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PA: Palestinian Authority

PIJ: Palestinian Islamic Jihad

PKK: Kurdish Workers' Party

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization

PRC: Popular Resistance Committees

PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

SLA: Southern Lebanese Army

SSNP: Syrian Socialist-National Party

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION: SHAHID FASHIONS

When Israel routed a coalition of Arab armies in the

1967 Six-Day War, some in the Arab world realized that they

could not defeat the Jewish state in a conventional land

war. Palestinian Arabs, however, sought to lead the way in

a different type of warfare against Israel. In 1968,

Palestinian terrorist groups under the structural umbrella

of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)[1] began using

a myriad of different terror tactics against Israeli and

Jewish targets in and outside the Middle East.[2] These groups

ushered in the era of modern terrorism by launching

spectacular attacks (e.g. symbolic airline hijackings),[3]

which were only made possible by assailants' willingness to

sacrifice their lives. With the success of these shocking

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[1] Established in January 1964 at a summit of Arab states,
Munazzmat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (the Palestine Liberation
Organization) or PLO did not find widespread acclaim by
Palestinians until its cooptation by Yasser Arafat's militant
group Fatah. Meaning "conquest" in Arabic, *Fatah* is the inversion
of the acronym *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filistini* (the
Palestine National Liberation Movement).
[2] Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab
Conflict 1881-2001* (New York: Vintage, 2001), 373-379.
[3] Bruce Hoffman, "Modern Terrorism Trends: Reevaluation after
9/11," in *Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future
Threats*, ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House,
2005), 40.

attacks, the PLO learned that operations using *fedayin* (self-sacrificers) had utility well beyond their apparent tactical advantages.

The PLO accordingly incorporated self-sacrificing operations into its overall political strategy. The new approach resulted in such romanticized creations as the Black September Organization, which with its horrific massacre of 11 Israeli Olympians at the 1972 Munich Games brought about the contemporary symbiosis between terrorism and the media. Garnering the spotlight of worldwide media attention, the PLO succeeded in arousing international sympathy and support for the Palestinian movement. These early Palestinian groups, however, neither truly harnessed nor exploited the strategic potential of suicide terrorism. Despite sending their *fedayin* on high-risk operations, which usually projected certain death, Palestinian leadership did not begin to promote laying down one's life intentionally as an end unto itself until years later.

Between the mid-1970s and early-1990s, a number of events affecting the Arab and Islamic worlds drastically changed the political atmosphere in the Middle East. A Sunni-Muslim *sahwa* (awakening) swept across Arab countries; Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led an Islamic revolution

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in Iran, overthrowing Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's pro-Western government; the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan; sectarian strife ravaged Lebanon in a bloody civil war; the Cold War's end, the first Palestinian *intifada* (uprising),[4] and the Gulf War all fostered vast political and social change. Accordingly, as identities formed and new viewpoints took effect politically and socially, the manner in which organizations employed violence also fluctuated. As a by-product of the Iran-Iraq War and Hezballah's[5] guerrilla campaigns in Lebanon against the United States (U.S.), France and Israel, the Shi'a-Muslim world catapulted the concept of the *shahid* (martyr) to the forefront of militants' imaginations.

By framing the Iran-Iraq War as a "re-enactment"[6] of the historic battle of Karbala in 860 between Hussein the leader of *Shi'at Ali* (Faction of Ali)[7] and Yazid the Umayyad

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[4] In Arabic *intifada* literally means "shaking-off." In the case of the two Palestinian uprisings, it refers to shaking off the "occupiers."

[5] *Hezb'ollah* stands for the "Party of God" in Arabic. Although not officially founded until February 16, 1985, Iranian Pasdaran operatives set up Hezballah in 1982, and operated it under the cover name Islamic Jihad Organization.

[6] *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber*, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006; Ronnie Scheib, "The Cult of the Suicide Bomber," *Daily Variety*, 5 June 2006.

[7] Initially, the Shi'a were simply a political faction that supported Mohammad's son-in-law and cousin Ali. The battle in 860

Caliph, Iran's Supreme Leader Khomeini directly shaped the

way Iranian soldiers approached warfare against the

advancing Iraqi army. Because the battle in 860 left

Hussein dead and thus heralded by Shi'a Muslims as a great

Islamic "martyr," Khomeini's framing invoked many Iranians

to seek death on the modern battlefield, so they too might

reap the benefits of martyrdom as articulated in Shi'a

tradition. Indeed, in 1980, amid a fire fight with Iraqi

troops, a 13-year old Iranian named Hussein Fahmideh

gathered explosives, attached them to himself, charged an

Iraqi tank and detonated the explosives--disabling the tank

while killing himself. Like that of his namesake, Hussein's

act of self-sacrifice found widespread praise among Shi'a

Muslims. Soon after, the Iranian government plastered his

picture on billboards across Tehran; Hussein's martyrdom,

like that of the Shi'a patriarch's, inspired countless

others. By 1982, Khomeini harnessed the power of the Shi'a

narrative of martyrdom, and began employing "human wave

attacks," which regularly consisted of thousands of Iranian

youth simultaneously rushing Iraqi positions, oftentimes

protected by surrounding minefields; armed usually with

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helped to "[transform] the Shi'a from a party to a sect." Bernard
Lewis, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam* (New York: Basic
Books, 2003), 22.

nothing more than clinched fists and a plastic key around their necks, which ensured their post-martyrdom entrance through the gates of paradise, Khomeini's "mine jumpers" helped turn the tide of the war.[8]

With significant success on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian Pasdaran,[9] or Revolutionary Guard, sought to export Khomeini's martyrdom strategy to Lebanon. Engulfed in an overlapping sectarian-divided civil war and Israel-PLO war, Lebanon became the testing ground for suicide-homicide attacks as a tool of guerrilla warfare. In an ultimately successful effort to expel Western peacekeeping forces, the Pasdaran's Lebanese creation, Hezballah, repeatedly attacked U.S. and French targets using suicide-homicide bombers. Hezballah's campaign reached its zenith with the 1983 suicide-homicide attack on the U.S. Marines barracks, which left 241 American servicemen dead, and convinced U.S. President Ronald Reagan to "redeploy" U.S. forces from Lebanon.[10]

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[8] Christoph Reuter, *My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 33-51.

[9] Meaning "Guards" in Persian, *Pasdaran* is short for *Sepah-i Pasdaran-i Enqelab-i Islami* (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) or IRGC.

[10] Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 71.

Continuing to advance the tactic in its campaigns against

the Southern Lebanese Army and Israel Defense Force

throughout the 1980s, Hezballah inspired numerous pro-

Syrian Lebanese groups to use suicide-homicide bombers.[11]

Deeming suicide-homicide attacks "martyrdom operations,"

the Pasdaran and Hezballah effectively convinced many that

the *modus operandi* held legitimacy, particularly regarding

Shi'a tradition.[12] Moreover, by concurrently galvanizing the

Lebanese Shi'a population and expelling foreign militaries

from Lebanon, Hezballah made the symbolic and strategic

utility of suicide-homicide attacks clear to its enemies

and other militant organizations alike.

By 1986, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)[13] began

flirting with the idea of employing "exceptional martyrdom

operations" against civilian Israeli targets.[14] In 1989,

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[11] These groups included: Amal, the Syrian Social-Nationalist
Party, the Syrian *Ba'ath* (Renaissance) Party, and the Syrian
Socialist-Nasserite Party.
[12] Not only does the Shi'a martyrdom narrative and Ashura holiday
derive from the story of Hussein and his 72 faithful followers,
who died with him, but the 12th Century Assassins also contribute
to the tradition of Shi'a self-sacrifice, as they used daggers in
suicidal assassination missions.
[13] Some refer to *al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin* (The Islamic Jihad
in Palestine) simply as *Jihad Islami* (Islamic Jihad). Others call
it *Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini* (The Palestinian
Islamic Jihad Movement), and Palestinian Islamic Jihad or PIJ.
[14] Notes from International Institute for Counter-Terrorism
seminar on "The Global Jihad," given by Reuven Paz, in Herzliya,
Israel (21 June 2005); Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide

Hamas[15] similarly accepted the idea of using suicide-

homicide attackers[16]; however, not seeing a strategic

opportunity to carry out such "martyrdom operations" amid

the first Palestinian *intifada* (December 1987 to early

1993), PIJ and its Islamist-counterpart[17] Hamas refrained

from deploying suicide-homicide attackers. However, as a

rebuke to the PLO's participation in negotiations with

Israel,[18] Hamas and PIJ carried out eight suicide-homicide

attacks in 1993 alone.[19] By the mid-1990s, some Palestinians

hoped for the success of the Oslo peace process, but many

others put their faith in the continuation of violent

Terrorism," *Science* 299, issue 5612 (7 March 2003): 1534-1539;
Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, revised and expanded ed. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 151.
[15] Meaning "zeal" and "courage" in Arabic, the acronym *Hamas*
stands for *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic
Resistance Movement).
[16] Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism* (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press,
2005), 55.
[17] "Islamist" refers to an individual or organization that
subscribes to a political ideology based on the fundamental
tenets of Islam. Furthermore, just as various interpretations of
those tenets spawned a variety of Islamic sects, nearly an
equally number of versions of Islamism or political Islam exist--
whether, Salafi, revolutionary Shi'a, or otherwise. One could
understand a "hardline Islamist" as an Islamic supremacist, who
views political Islam as the only viable and righteous political
ideology. An "Islamic fanatic" demonstrates a willingness to
sacrifice his or her self-interest for a collective cause.
[18] Rapprochement publicly commenced in October 1991 at the Madrid
Conference, and began showing progress with the signing of the
Declaration of Principles in September 1993, in which Israel and
the PLO recognized one another diplomatically.
[19] For a complete list of Palestinian suicide-homicide attacks
carried out against Israeli targets from April 1993 to April
2008, see Appendix A.

resistance, as predominately carried on by Hamas and PIJ's

shahids. From 1994 to 2000, the two Palestinian Islamist

organizations carried out 25 suicide-homicide bombings

against Israeli targets. As a result of political Islam's

return to the forefront of Palestinian politics and the

emergence of a complementary culture of martyrdom in

Palestinian society, the *shahid* rose as the Palestinian

movement's new icon--in effect replacing the *feda'i* (self-

sacrificer), and making suicide-homicide bombings the

operational mode of choice. With the failure of the Oslo

peace process, Fatah sought to maintain popularity by

joining the Islamist-Palestinian organizations in the

suicide-terror industry and established al-Aqsa Martyrs'

Brigade.[20] The early 2000s, thus, saw massive waves of

suicide-homicide bombers targeting Israeli civilians in the

joint terror effort of *al-Aqsa intifada*.[21] From September

2000 to December 2005, Palestinian organizations

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[20] Fatah created *Kataeb Shuhada al-Aqsa* (al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade)
or AMB. However, the majority of its members come from *Tanzim*
(meaning "squad" in Arabic), which operates Fatah's grassroots
following. Furthermore, members of Force 17, Fatah's elite
Presidential guard, often organize and conduct AMB's attacks.
[21] Commentators also commonly refer to *al-Aqsa intifada* simply as
the second *intifada*.

successfully carried out 155 suicide-homicide bombings and launched at least 525.[22]

Effectively convincing their own constituencies of the Islamic justifications for suicide-homicide attacks, Islamist organizations, particularly Hamas, gained widespread support within Palestinian society for carrying out such operations. Moreover, by targeting civilians *en masse*, Palestinian organizations transitioned suicide-homicide operations from a guerrilla tactic, as previously used on a wide scale first by Hezballah and later by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, to a weapon of terror. Additionally, by demonstrating that participation in a "martyrdom operation" marked the fulfillment of a personal goal, the Palestinian *shahid*/suicide-homicide bomber captivated mass media and sympathetic populations alike, especially in the Arab and Islamic worlds--eventually having effects stretching far beyond the pales of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Today, posters glorifying the latest *shahid* litter the walls of Palestinian cities, villages and "refugee camps"

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[22] See Appendix A; and Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, *Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends* (March 2007): 51-55; accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org.il>.

in the disputed territories[23] of the West Bank,[24] Gaza and

East Jerusalem. Everyone from corner shop owners and cab

drivers to the 20-something year olds drinking coffee at

the local café extol past Palestinian terror leaders such

as Chairman Yasser Arafat, Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi, Sheik Ahmad

Yassin and Dr. Abdul Aziz al-Rantissi, along with the

heinous terrorist acts they spent their days sponsoring. In

Bethlehem, children argue in the street over whose turn it

is to play the *shahid* in their casual game of a mock

suicide-bomb attack. These sentiments expressed on the Arab

streets of the disputed territories represent a popular

culture of martyrdom,[25] which has gained and continues to

strengthen a stranglehold on Palestinian society.

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[23] The term "disputed territories" is used because the listed
areas do not qualify as "occupied territories," considering there
has never been a "Palestinian" state. From the years 1967 to 1979
and 1967 to 1994, it could have been argued that the territories
in question were "occupied Egypt" and "occupied Jordan,"
respectively, since these were the nation-states that Israel
captured the territories from during the Six-Day War; however,
both the Egyptian and Jordanian governments have since
relinquished all claims to the territories. Thus, they are not
"occupied," but, indeed, rather "disputed" between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority--especially since the failure of the Oslo
peace process has left a final status agreement on the
territories indefinitely unresolved.
[24] A term coined during the British Mandate, "West Bank"
collectively refers to the areas of Judea and Samaria.
[25] First used in explaining Palestinian society's support for
suicide-homicide bombers sometime after the initiation of the
second *intifada*, a number of researchers, scholars and political
analysts have since elaborated on the concept "culture of

Identifiable by *shahid* worship and praise for terrorism, Palestinian society, however, no longer exclusively exhibits this culture of martyrdom. Cities from Jakarta to Baghdad and London have witnessed the fruits of this terror-breeding culture. Similarly, the rapid diffusion of suicide terrorism, geographically and across ideological lines, exemplifies how terror organizations have garnered the strategic utility of employing "martyrdom operations." Furthermore, Palestinian developments in the evolution of suicide-homicide attacks have functioned as alerts of these various strategic components. Moreover, by setting a precedent among Sunni Muslims, and gaining legitimacy for attacking civilians from prominent Islamic authorities within the Sunni world, the Palestinian *shahid*/suicide-homicide bomber precipitated its own duplication in numerous other conflicts. Thus, to fully

martyrdom" and its variations. See David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not just a Means but an End," *The Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 6 (June 2002): 18-20; Mohammed M. Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2006); Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, *The Road to Martyrs' Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Barbara Victor, *Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers* (Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003); Nat Hentoff, "The Poisonous Cult of Martyrdom; Palestinians with Legitimate Grievances Are Infected," *The Washington Times* (8 April 2002); and Reuter, 79-114.

appreciate the implications of the Palestinian culture of martyrdom and *shahid*, one needs to understand the former's social development, the latter's doctrinal roots, and the influence the pair have had on terror campaigns outside the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Since the early 1990s, Palestinian terror organizations have drawn from many sources and incrementally refined the process of suicide terrorism. By making the *modus operandi* socially acceptable and at times even fashionable, Palestinian terror organizations have normalized the deployment of suicide-homicide bombers. In doing so, the progress individuals take from reasoning and justifying to rationalizing and actually committing suicide terrorism has been eerily optimized.[26] Consequently, Palestinian terror organizations have not only developed an extremely successful, if not strategic, weapon for their war with Israel, but also provided Islamist-terror organizations such as those within the global al-Qaeda[27]

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[26] Optimization refers to the fact that one finds no shortage in Palestinian society of individuals willing to carry out suicide-homicide operations; potential shahids have become a sort of Palestinian natural resource, which terror organizations can extract from society at any given time.
[27] Literally "the Base" in Arabic, *al-Qa'eda* additionally means "the Vanguard." Abdallah Azzam established the organization in 1988 building off the well-established *Mektab al-Khadimat* (Office

network with the model 21st Century terrorist, as well as
efficient methods to produce such individuals. By
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the individual through the concepts of *jihad* and martyrdom,
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Palestinian *shahid* has become a driving force behind the
increasing spread of suicide terrorism worldwide.

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of Services), which served as a logistics base for *mujahedin*
(holy warriors) in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW: APPROACHING RESEARCH

ON SUICIDE-HOMICIDE ATTACKS

Since the onslaught of the second Palestinian *intifada*

and the September 11, 2001 attacks shortly thereafter,

numerous scholars, analysts, journalists and filmmakers

have attempted to understand and explain the suicide-

terrorism phenomenon. Studies on suicide terrorism in

general and in particular contexts, as well as those on

specific organizations or campaigns, have sprung up in the

form of books, journal, magazine and newspaper articles, as

well as documentaries. More often than not, identifying the

motivations behind suicide terrorism lies at the heart of

research.[1]

Terrorism experts generally agree that most terrorists

are "ordinary people,"[2] without a particular profile or

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[1] For example, see Diego Gambetta, ed., *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, expanded and updated ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), vii; and Ami Pedahzur, ed., *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom* (New York: Routledge, 2007).

[2] Marc Sageman cited in Ariel Merari, "The Profile of the Modern Terrorist," in *Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats*, ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 2005), 109-111; Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work': Palestinian Suicide Bombers as

common characteristic that links them.[3] One leading expert

explains how he is

> ...always struck by how disturbingly "normal"
> most terrorists seem when one actually sits down
> and talks to them. Rather than the wild-eyed
> fanatics or crazed killers that we have been
> conditioned to expect, many are in fact highly
> articulate and extremely thoughtful individuals
> for whom terrorism is (or was) an entirely
> rational choice, often reluctantly embraced and
> then only after considerable reflection and
> debate.[4]

So, what possesses such "ordinary" or "normal" people to

perpetrate acts of terror? Moreover, what motivates suicide

terrorists to take their own lives so that they might

murder others? Within the literary and documentary

collection on suicide terrorism, one finds various schools

of thought that provide answers to these important

questions.

Victimizers and Victims," *Violence and Victims* 20, no. 6
(December 2005): 603-623; Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*
(Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 122.

[3] One study, however, argues that proper "psychological
autopsies" have not been performed on any suicide-homicide
bombers, so it is premature to suggest that they are not suicidal
and that a psychological profile does not exist; the study
concludes: "the absence of such studies should not lead us to
possible erroneous assertions such as those claiming that the
suicide bombers are not suicidal or that there are no
psychological profiles applicable to them." David Lester, Bijou
Yang and Mark Lindsey, "Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological
Profiles Possible?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27 (1 July
2004): 293.

[4] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, revised and expanded ed. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), xv.

Definitional and Investigative Differences

Disparate findings in the fairly new academic field of terrorism studies tend to arise from the varying approaches. Most trends in suicide terrorism research accordingly divide along lines drawn by definition and scope. Failing to distinguish between terror and guerrilla campaigns, many notable works lump together all episodes of suicide-homicide operations.[5] Others sidestep this important issue of targeting by refraining from employing the term "suicide terrorism," and commonly replacing it with "suicide attacks." Both terms represent attacks dependent on the perpetrator's death for the operation's success[6]; however, the previous specifies a civilian target, whereas the latter maintains ambiguity. Expanding the investigative range, some studies focus on "suicide missions," which denotes a larger variety of attacks as the term includes

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[5] For example see Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," *Foreign Policy* 120 (September/October 2000): 66-73; Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," *Science* 299, issue 5612 (7 March 2003): 1534-1539; Christoph Reuter, *My Life Is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005); Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); and Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*.

[6] Boaz Ganor, "Suicide Attacks in Israel," in *Countering Suicide Terrorism* (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism [ICT], 2002), 140-141; and Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 132.

"any operation that is designed in such a way that the terrorist does not expect to survive it, even if he or she is actually killed by police or other defenders."[7] Another study views attacks, in which self-inflicted death is not a requirement for operational success, as a "high-risk mission."[8] This collection of works, edited by Oxford scholar Diego Gambetta, defines "suicide missions" similarly to how other researchers define "suicide attacks," wherein self-inflicted death is "strictly essential for [the operation's] success."[9]

Under the terminological umbrella of suicide terrorism sits "suicide bombing." Researcher Assaf Moghadam notes, "[a]ll suicide bombings are suicide attacks, but not all suicide attacks are suicide bombings. Strictly speaking, the 9/11 attacks were not suicide bombings, since no conventional explosive device was used... They were, however, suicide attacks."[10] Still yet, a myriad of similar terms exist, including "homicide bombing" and "martyrdom operation." Mostly meaning the same thing, such terms

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[7] Pape, 10.
[8] Gambetta, vii.
[9] Gambetta, vi.
[10] Assaf Moghadam, "Defining Suicide Terrorism," in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2007), 16.

express opposing viewpoints relating to the legitimacy of the acts they represent. To avoid using "highly charged, normative terms that do not aid in the effort to analyze and explain this deadly phenomenon," scholar Mohammed M. Hafez promotes the terms "suicide bomber" and "human bomb," both of which he defines as "an individual who willingly uses his or her body to carry or deliver explosive materials to attack, kill, or maim others."[11] His terminology is a direct response to the dialogue often spun in the media. Hafez notes:

> Those who support these acts of violence prefer to call them "martyrdom operations," and their perpetrators "heroes" and "freedom fighters." Those who oppose them prefer to call them "homicide bombers," "suicide terrorists," or "suicidal murderers."[12]

Within the same controversy, as Hafez recognizes above, some have replaced "suicide bomber," with the term "homicide bomber," placing emphasis on the target rather than the perpetrator, but still leaving the term somewhat incomplete; Moghadam contends, "the term fails to describe the particularity of this type of bombing--namely the death

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[11] Mohammed M. Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers* (Washington D.C.: United States [U.S.] Institute for Peace Press, 2006), 4.
[12] Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*, 4.

of the perpetrator as an integral part of the attack."[13]

Still, others who emphasize the martyrdom component of

suicide-homicide attacks, such as scholar Rafael Israeli

argue, "it [is] a fallacy to dub these people 'suicide

bombers', because their primary concern [is] to kill their

enemies...though they [are] ready to sacrifice themselves

in the process."[14] Within the literature, nomenclature

stands as far as it could from universal consistency. Thus,

in any study on terrorism, clearly it has become imperative

to illustrate definitions, rather than simply articulate a

term.

Levels of Analysis

Usually due to the disciplinary backgrounds of the

researchers conducting them, studies on suicide terrorism

tend to focus on a single level of analysis: usually either

the individual, organizational or environmental level.

While at times studies traverse multiple levels of

analysis, most rely heavily on one. In recent years, the

most common trend has placed emphasis on the organizational

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[13] Moghadam, "Defining Suicide Terrorism," 16.
[14] Rafael Israeli, "A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism,"
Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 23.

level--leaving many scholars to view it as the sole level of importance.

At the organizational level, a significant amount of research has found strategies to sit at the forefront of suicide terrorism's growing employment. The late scholar Ehud Sprinzak noted that strategic utility of suicide-homicide attacks has driven its use since Hezballah first began carrying out attacks as the central component of its coercive campaigns against foreign militaries.[15] While most scholars agree that organizational strategy marks the most influential component in propelling suicide terrorism, a heated debate exists over the most important audience of that strategy. Some argue the defined enemy marks the primary audience, others the domestic population or rival organizations.

Spearheading one of these trends, University of Chicago professor Robert Pape contends, "what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland."[16] This represents the

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[15] Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics."
[16] Pape, 4.

"suicide terrorism is a secular response to occupation"

argument, which disregards the employment of cultural and

religious narratives in the mobilization of suicide-

homicide attackers outright. University of Georgia

professor Mia Bloom, offers a rebuttal to this notion that

the defined enemy always represents the primary reason for

organizations employing suicide terrorism. Bloom states:

> Although Pape's explanation is useful for
> understanding how suicide bombing is directed
> against the external enemy, it glosses over the
> domestic political dynamics and organizational
> motivations for outbidding. Pape's model...does
> not fully explain why religious groups (with
> goals beyond territorial demands) might use
> [suicide terrorism].[17]

Concerning the Palestinian context, Bloom asserts that

competition between rivals lies at the core of suicide

terrorism's increase in frequency.[18] Similarly, the director

of RAND Corporation in Washington D.C. Bruce Hoffman

recognizes that organizations such as the Liberation Tigers

of Tamil Eelam and Hamas began employing suicide-homicide

attacks as a way to distinguish themselves from rival

groups, in order to gain notoriety/increase popularity

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[17] Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 84.
[18] Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support,
Market Share, and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly* 119,
no. 1 (2004).

within their domestic populations.[19] Pape, Bloom and

Hoffman, while not always in agreement on why organizations

employ suicide terrorists, indeed agree that organizational

strategies dictate when, where and why suicide terrorism

erupts.

Considering the motivations of individuals,

researchers have overwhelmingly posited that suicide

terrorists often carry out attacks for purposes of

revenge.[20] Scholars have also found that individuals pursue

"martyrdom," as commonly connected with suicide-terror

attacks, for personal reasons, whether religious, cultural

or otherwise.[21] Hafez notes: "at the individual level,

religious and nationalist appeals that equate self-

sacrifice with martyrdom and national salvation are

instrumental in producing volunteers for suicide attacks."[22]

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[19] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 137-168.

[20] For example, see Eyad El Sarraj, "Wounds and Madness: Why We've Become Suicide Bombers," *Peacework* (May 2002); John Rosenberger, "Discerning the Behavior of the Suicide Bomber: The Role of Vengeance," *Journal of Religion and Health* 42, no. 1 (Spring 2003); and Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 135-151.

[21] Berko and Erez, 603-623; Barbara Victor, *Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers* (Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003); and Yoram Schweitzer ed., "Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality?" *Memorandum No. 84* (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 2006).

[22] Mohammed M. Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism," in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 76; Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 134-145.

In this sense, desire for revenge and self-sacrifice

converge to motivate individuals. Scholar Ami Pedahzur

argues that either "commitment" or "crisis" motivate

suicide terrorists.[23] In Pedahzur's first type, suicide

terrorists seek "to fulfill their duty as devout members of

their organizations."[24] His second type of suicide terrorist

acts in response to "the intensification of both personal

and community crisis situations."[25] In researching

individuals' impetuses for self-sacrifice, many scholars

have applied sociologist Émile Durkheim's typologies of

suicide. Commonly, scholars have arranged his model of

"altruistic suicide"[26] as a basis for furthering research on

suicide terrorism.[27]

   At the social level, researchers have recognized the

importance that death cultures play in promoting and

sustaining suicide terrorism.[28] Moghadam recognizes: "a

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[23] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 151-154.
[24] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 153.
[25] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 153.
[26] See Ivan Strenski, "Sacrifice, Gift and the Social Logic of
Muslim 'Human Bombers,'" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, no.
3 (Autumn 2003); Pape; Berko and Erez; and Ami Pedahzur and Arie
Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social
Network Perspective," *Social Forces* 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987-
2008.
[27] Chapter Six further explores this idea.
[28] Reuter, 79-114; Strenski; David Brooks, "The Culture of
Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not just a Means but an
End," *The Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 6 (June 2002): 18-20.

phenomenon that is not only present in most conflicts where

suicide attacks are widely used, but that also appears to

be the distinguishing characteristic between suicide

terrorism and ordinary terrorism is what is known as the

culture of martyrdom."[29] Pedahzur adds:

> In certain societies that perceive themselves as
> weak and who feel hopeless and oppressed by a
> powerful enemy, suicide terrorism, with its
> potential to cause considerable pain, damage and
> confusion to the aggressor, can empower that
> society. It may even offer hope that things will
> eventually change; it may at least ensure that
> the aggressor suffers... [P]erception of the
> enemy as evil and dehumanized makes it easier for
> people to support acts in which not only soldiers
> and politicians but also innocent civilians and
> children are killed.[30]

Hafez identifies the "[convergence of] three conditions"

that makes suicide terrorism possible:

> (1) prevailing cultural norms encompass belief
> systems, symbolic narratives, and historical
> traditions that justify and celebrate martyrdom;
> (2) legitimate authorities promote or acquiesce
> to extreme violence; and (3) communities feel
> victimized and threatened by external enemies in
> the course of political conflict.[31]

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[29] Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal
Approach," in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization
of Martyrdom*, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 98.
[30] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 159.
[31] Mohammed M. Hafez, "Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the
Making of Suicide Bombers: A Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis
and Illustrative Case Study," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29
(2006): 166.

In a groundbreaking 2002 article, researcher David Brooks noted, "the best resource [Palestinian] terrorists have is the culture of martyrdom."[32] Accordingly, scores of studies have acknowledged the important roles social conditions play in propelling suicide terrorism.[33]

Superceding or at least tangling together the organizational and social levels, some researchers view social networks as central to the suicide terrorism phenomenon.[34] Similarly, scholars Anat Berko and Edna Erez contend that "individual motivation (internally or externally induced) to self-sacrifice combined with access to or support of an organization are necessary conditions in suicide bombing."[35] Oftentimes scholars make links between various levels of analysis in passing and without clear articulation.

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[32] Brooks, 20.

[33] See Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, *The Road to Martyrs' Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber*, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD; *Female Suicide Bombers: Dying to Kill*, prod. Neil Barrett, Scott Bronstein and Clare Nolan, dir. Cara Biega, 52 min., National Geographic Explorer, 2004. M4V.

[34] Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective." *Social Forces* 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987-2008.

[35] Berko and Erez, 607.

Recognizing the disparate but important findings that these approaches produce, Moghadam designed a "multi-causal approach to the study of suicide terrorism." In it he acknowledges the respective utility of "individual/ psychological," "organizational/strategic" and "environmental/structural" approaches.[36] Accordingly, Moghadam's framework seeks to show how the three levels "interact with each other, and at times are thoroughly intertwined, resulting in synergetic effects."[37] Similarly, in 2006, Hafez published a study on Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers, which used a combination of analyses at a similar three levels: "organizational strategies, individual motivations, and societal conflicts."[38] Hafez asserts that

> Social movement approaches have a distinct
> advantage over purely political, psychological,
> or cultural approaches because they are
> interdisciplinary and multipronged. They analyze
> relationships among political environments,
> organizational dynamics, and cultural frameworks.
> Above all, they seek to explain collective action
> at three levels of analysis: individual

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[36] Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach," Unpublished paper presented for the Harrington Workshop on the Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism, University of Texas at Austin (12-13 May 2005): 7.
[37] Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism," in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism*, 88.
[38] Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*, 15.

involvement, organizational strategies, and
sociopolitical facilitators of activism.[39]

Importantly, Moghadam and Hafez have seemingly slowed the

debate over approaches to suicide terrorism for the time

being. They show that integrating the three approaches

works to provide a comprehensive analytical method.

Context, however, still dictates the importance one level

might take over another at a given time and/or place.[40]

The Palestinian Context

Generally in studies on suicide terrorism, one notices

an analysis of the "root causes." Within this discussion

relating to the Palestinian context, academic literature

provides a spectrum ranging from studies that solely blame

the aggressor to those which only find culpability with the

targeted. Numerous studies pinning the blame of Palestinian

suicide terrorism on its Israeli victims suggest that the

phenomenon epitomizes the desperation of a people.

Palestinian Psychiatrist Eyad El Sarraj promotes this type

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[39] Mohammed M. Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace Press, 2007), 16-17.
[40] Note the differences in Hafez's own findings on his independent studies of suicide terrorism on the Palestinians and in Iraq. See Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*; and Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq*.

of reasoning, as he suggests, "[t]he hopelessness that comes from a situation that keeps getting worse, a despair where living becomes no different from dying...It propels people to actions or solutions that previously would have been unthinkable."[41] Also commonly found within the general suicide terrorism literature, El Sarraj's statement summarizes the "they made me do it" explanation that seeks to the credit harsh conditions imposed by an opposing nation or group for the desperate realities a people might face, in which an act of suicide-vengeance offers the optimal escape. Along similar lines, some scholars also view "humiliation" as a primary impetus for Palestinian suicide terrorism.[42]

Unsurprisingly, Israeli academics and analysts offer the most thorough research on Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers. Particularly, the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) sits at the top of this expertise. Headed by scholar Boaz Ganor, ICT offers a profusion of

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[41] Eyad El Sarraj, interview by Linda Butler, "Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 4 (Summer 2002): 72.

[42] Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003); Jon Elster, "Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions," in *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, expanded and updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 245-246 and 251; Lester, Yang and Lindsey, "Suicide Bombers," 286.

quality studies on varying aspects of Palestinian suicide
terrorism.[43] ICT scholars Shaul Shay[44] and Ely Karmon,[45] Tel
Aviv University professor Ariel Merari,[46] Project for the
Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) director Reuven
Paz,[47] University of Texas-Austin professor Ami Pedahzur,[48]
Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies researcher Yoram
Schweitzer,[49] Hebrew University professor Raphael Israeli,[50]
Palestinian Media Watch director Itamar Marcus,[51] and Global
Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center director
Barry Rubin,[52] to name a few, additionally provide in-depth

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[43] See Boaz Ganor ed., *Countering Suicide Terrorism*, updated ed.
(Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007); Boaz Ganor ed., *Post-Modern
Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats* (Herzliya,
Israel: Publishing House, 2005); Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-
Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers* (Piscataway, N.J.:
Transaction, 2005); also see ICT's collection of articles at
<www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org>.
[44] See Shaul Shay, *The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks* (London:
Transaction Publishers, 2004).
[45] See collection of articles at <www.instituteforcounter
terrorism.org>.
[46] See Ariel Merari ed., *On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism*
(Fredrick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1985);
and Ariel Merari and Shlomi Elad, *The International Dimension of
Palestinian Terrorism* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post Press, 1986).
[47] See a collection of Paz's work at <www.e-prism.org>.
[48] See Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*.
[49] See Yoram Schweitzer ed., "Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for
Equality?" *Memorandum No. 84* (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for
Strategic Studies, 2006).
[50] Rafael Israeli, *Islamikaze* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
[51] See a comprehensive documentation of the Palestinian culture of
martyrdom, overseen by Marcus at <www.pmw.org.il>.
[52] See a collection of Rubin's articles at <www.gloriacenter.org>.

research and analysis that displays expertise derived from years of frontline research.

Many Israeli scholars draw from and build on the work of the late Dean of the Lauder School of Diplomacy and Strategy[53] at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)[54] in Herzliya, Ehud Sprinzak, who initially brought attention to suicide-homicide attacks' rational/strategic component. This tradition implies that Palestinian suicide terrorism represents a tactical by-product of organizations matching means to an end--in this case, the destruction of the state of Israel. However, a new trend in Israeli scholarship on Palestinian suicide terrorism has recently made findings contrasting the strictly organization-centric model summarized by Ganor's contention that Palestinian suicide terrorists do not volunteer but are recruited.[55] The newer trend identifies more closely the social forces that work as a corollary to organizational models. Indeed, Pedahzur and Arie Perliger have worked to shed light on suicide-terror attacks launched at the intra-organizational and

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[53] Formerly the Lauder School of Government
[54] IDC also houses ICT, as well as Rubin's GLORIA and Paz's PRISM.
[55] Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics."

inter-organizational levels.[56] ICT research fellow Jonathan

Fine argues for the necessity "to assess culture, ideology,

and motivation," on a case-by-case basis.[57] ICT scholar Anat

Berko additionally highlights the importance of individual

motivations,[58] playing off another tradition in Israeli

scholarship pioneered by Sprinzak: "to maintain contact

with terrorists, and talk to them, in order to understand

them"[59]; or as another scholar summarized: "[Sprinzak] had

this elegantly simple notion, that the best way to find out

what leads people...to be willing to kill in the name of

their cause, is--to ask them!"[60] Holding true to all levels

of analysis, Sprinzak's simple, yet "elegant" notion can

help elucidate why not only individuals but also

organizations and large portions of a society might support

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[56] See Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger and Leonard Weinberg, "Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists," *Deviant Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 24 (2003): 405-423; and Pedahzur and Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks."

[57] Jonathan Fine, "Contrasting Secular and Religious Terrorism," *Middle East Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (Winter 2008): accessed at <www.meforum.org/article/1826>.

[58] Anat Berko, *The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers*, trans. Elizabeth Yuval (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007).

[59] Merari, "The Profile of the Modern Terrorist," 107.

[60] Remarks from a memorial service printed in Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita M. Denny, "The Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 15, no. 1 (March 2003): 171.

suicide terrorism. Taken together, the scholarly literature concludes that in most contexts, including the Palestinian one, society, organizations and individuals work as one in launching and sustaining suicide-terror campaigns. So, it makes sense to look at the words and deeds of those individuals, organizations and social forces perpetrating Palestinian suicide terrorism to determine why it has emerged and remains a problem of the utmost consequence.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY: DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS

AND THE RELATION BETWEEN IDENTITY

AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE[1]

Purpose of Study

From Thucydides to Carl Von Clausewitz to Donald

Kagan, Kenneth Waltz and Joseph Nye, insightful observers

of warfare have recognized that war erupts from multiple

causes and at a number of levels, whether international,

state, individual or a combination.[2] Likewise, as recent

scholarship determines, gaining a comprehensive

understanding of terrorism and more specifically suicide

terrorism requires a multilayered approach.[3] In the

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[1] Here the use of "political violence," a somewhat controversial
term, refers to any form of violent conflict designed for
political purposes. In this sense, political violence functions
as an umbrella term for war, asymmetrical warfare, guerrilla
warfare and terrorism.
[2] See Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Steven Lattimore
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998); Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (New
York: Everyman's Library, 1993); Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of
War and the Preservation of Peace* (New York: Anchor Books, 1995);
Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1965); and Joseph S. Nye
Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to
Theory and History*, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 2004).
[3] While there have been many excellent contributions to the study
on suicide terrorism that look at a specific cause or use a
single level of analysis, many of these studies miss the "big
picture." See Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism,"

Palestinian context, suicide terrorism revolves around the

phenomenon of the *shahid*, which acts on behalf of a popular

culture of martyrdom that represents decades of influence

on society from a variety of terrorist and other militant

political organizations. Accordingly, the following

research seeks to uncover the relationship between the

political objectives of the primary Palestinian political

entities, the methods used by those entities to pursue

their goals, and the socio-cultural fluctuation vis-à-vis

the acceptability of, and participation in, suicide

terrorism that has occurred as a result. Clausewitz

recognizes that war is a product of a "trinity" made up of

the people, their government and its army. Similarly, one

can view contemporary terror campaigns through the lens of

a people who identify with one another and have a set of

common goals (i.e. a collective), their representative

organizations, and the armed fighters of those

organizations or affiliated social networks.[4] As a

Unpublished paper presented for the Harrington Workshop on the
Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism.
[4] For an understanding of the contemporary importance of
Clausewitz's theory on war, see Mark T. Clark, "The Continuing
Relevance of Clausewitz," *Strategic Review* 26, no. 1 (Winter
1998): 54-61; also Mark T. Clark, "Does Clausewitz Apply to
Criminal-States and Gangs?" *Global Crime* 7, issue 3 & 4 (August
2006): 407-427.

supplement to the multi-layered approach, the following

study analyzes the development and evolution of Palestinian

suicide terrorism using the "trinity" model as a socio-

political gauge for shifts in the Palestinian collective

identity--viewed here as the primary source behind

Palestinians' employment of suicide terrorism.

Any lasting solutions to suicide terrorism lie within

the exposure of its ideological, as well as tactical and

operational, sources. Furthermore, detecting the

motivations that propel suicide terrorism's continued use

can create a starting point for establishing a suitable

counter-terrorism policy. This is not, however, a study on

counter-terrorism methods, but rather an analysis of the

motivations of individuals, entities and a society that

participate in a particular terror *modus operandi*, so as to

open the door for a better understanding of how one might

best deter, preempt or prevent participation in such acts

in the future. Surely, the rational allures to committing

acts of suicide terrorism provide inherent *rational*

deterrents.[5] And there is no better context to review

suicide-homicide attacks than the Palestinian one, wherein

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[5] The "rational" actor is defined here as one who operates with
reason.

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the *modus operandi* has had significant comparative success politically and in turn inspired numerous other campaigns internationally. Indeed, the Palestinian organizations that have used suicide terrorism represent the *host* to the spread of the larger suicide-terror epidemic. Often identifying and understanding the host to a disease marks the first advancement toward finding a cure for it. The same logic applies here.

Thus, the following study has three purposes: first, to determine how certain Palestinian terror organizations developed an efficient process to deploy suicide-homicide bombers; second, to display how a specific-terror supporting culture has influenced international terror campaigns; or, to decode the effects that the Palestinian *shahid* phenomenon has had outside its own context in order to provide insight into the learning process that allows the global-terror community to evolve various *modi operandi* and strategies; last, and most importantly, to provide a thorough understanding of the motivations behind the *shahid*/suicide-homicide bomber phenomenon. Two methods central to this last part include: eradicating "mirror

imaging"[6] from analysis by understanding the specifics of

the socio-cultural environment from which the phenomenon

under study arises, and, as stated above, by using various

levels of analysis, which can elucidate the connections

between the three components within the trinity model.

Accordingly, the four following questions warrant further

research than that which is readily available: first, what

effect has Palestinian organizations' accommodating *da'awa*

infrastructures and/or supportive political/governmental

institutions had on the process of creating suicide-

homicide bombers? Second, what effect has the Palestinian

culture of martyrdom had on suicide terrorism in the

disputed territories as well as in the international arena?

Three, what political victories have Palestinian terror

organizations gained by employing suicide-homicide bombers,

and how have these lessons-learned affected international

terror campaigns? Four, how do rationality and culture play

into Palestinian suicide-homicide operations for the

perpetrating individual, deploying terror organization,

sanctioning society, and nation-state that seeks to deter

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[6] Oftentimes, deterrence policies suffer a problem of "mirror-
imaging," in which the deterring nation-state assumes that a foe
maintains a similar worldview that arrives them to identical
cost/benefit analyses.

such actions? This work contends that the answers to the
questions above also answer questions posed by scholars
pondering the general suicide-terror phenomenon. Bloom
articulates:

> The almost daily occurrences of suicide attacks
> in Iraq, the July 25 attack in Sharm el Sheikh in
> Egypt...coupled with the July 7 and 21 attacks
> against the London Tube and buses, the first such
> instance of suicide terror from homegrown cells
> in the West, raise the question of why a once
> occasional mode of attack increasingly appears to
> be the terrorists' weapon of choice. The increase
> in the number of attacks throughout the
> world...and the increasing lethality of the
> improvised explosive devices themselves require
> further investigation and understanding.[7]

Terrorism trends spiral, from an inner core to the outer

periphery--from local conflicts to global campaigns;

fashionable tactics adapt and evolve to new environments

and accordingly embed themselves into varying strategies.

Like a product of the fashion industry, a terror *modus*

operandi such as suicide-homicide bombing snags onto a wave

of popularity. That which is new, shocking and often

brilliantly devised captures the attention of youthful

masses. The following study seeks to decipher the *shahid*

fashion, by identifying its chief designers, producers and

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[7] Mia Bloom, "Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism,"
in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of
Martyrdom*, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 25.

their methods, in order to help prevent further imitation and adaptation.

Definitions

Clausewitz states "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."[8] War in perhaps its most rugged and callous incarnation takes on the form of terrorism. Often today, so brutal are the tactics and vile the choice of targets that acts of terrorism lose their ability to provoke an understanding of the political pursuits, which drive the employment of such acts. One can easily forget that behind an act of terror lays a political goal, driven by an organizational ideology that a collective identity empowers. It is far easier to understand terrorists as "crazy," "insane," "deranged," "mentally ill," or possessing other pathological states of mind that explain their actions with a simple psychotic diagnosis. For some, suicide terrorism exacerbates this issue of comprehension. But despite the intuition to write off acts of terrorism and specifically suicide-homicide attacks as crazy, such acts stand far from anything of the

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[8] Clausewitz, 99.

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sort. Terrorism and suicide-homicide attacks have found their place as strategy and tactic in the pursuit of political goals; they are just as much "the extension of politics by other means," as are other forms and acts of warfare. Whether they are legitimate or not is another question--one that definitions can only answer.

In any discussion on warfare of any kind and particularly on terrorism, maintaining clarity requires a brief explanation of general terms and their intended usage. First and foremost, it is necessary to define "terrorism." *Terrorism is the use of violence by a non-state actor against civilians and/or non-combatants for the purpose of political gain.* Three parts, all equally important, make up the definition. First, by removing "non-state actor," the wording simply defines war in its modern sense as between nation-states. Second, if one replaces "civilians and/or non-combatants" with soldiers and/or their commanding-civilian officials, then the wording defines guerrilla warfare and not terrorism; if a specific attack targets a mixture of the two types of victims, then the definition reverts to the aggressor: that is, if a state actor perpetrates the attack then it is an act of war, whereas if a non-state actor perpetrates the attack

then it is an act of terrorism. The distinction might seem
esoteric to some. Nevertheless it is important to recognize
that governments of nation-states are the only legitimate
facilitators of coercive force, as they represent the only
entities responsible for citizenry and to the potential
negative responses of foreign entities, which could be
detrimental to the nation as a whole.[9] Third, by taking out
"political gain," the wording defines violent crime.
Furthermore, when executed without some type of attached
political purpose, emotional acts or "revenge" acts
constitute crimes and not terrorism--although in many
instances a specific political act might have instigated a
perpetrator's desire for vengeance.

"Suicide[10] terrorism" for all intents and purposes
refers to an act of terrorism, in which the perpetrator
kills oneself while initiating the attack. Furthermore,
operational success, whether tactically, symbolically or
both, requires the perpetrator to take his or her own

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[9] A guerrilla war carried on after the fall of the particular
nation-state's government maintains legitimacy to the effort's
end; a nation-state after all is deemed "successful" or not by
its ability to own a monopoly on the use of coercive force, as a
state's monopoly allows for its nation's stability and security,
as well as maximizes the potential for securing against external
threats.
[10] "Suicide" is defined here simply as one committing the
premeditated, or intentional, killing of oneself.

life.[11] "Suicide-homicide bomber" represents an individual that detonates explosives either strapped to his or her person, directly carried, or contained within a vehicle for the purpose of carrying out a suicide-homicide attack. Importantly, *suicide-homicide* bomber, rather than "suicide bomber" or "homicide bomber," explicitly expresses the two separate, albeit simultaneous, acts that such an attacker intends to commit while carrying out his or her operation-- i.e. suicide and murder.

"Political Islam," or "Islamism," simply refers to a political ideology based on the fundamental tenets of Islam. Furthermore, just as various interpretations of those tenets have spawned a variety of Islamic sects, nearly an equal number of versions of Islamism exist--such as Sunni, Shi'a and others, including a variety of sub-sect offshoots and juxtapositions like Salafi and revolutionary Shi'a. One could understand "hardline Islamism" simply as Islamic supremacism, or the viewpoint that political Islam offers the only viable and righteous political ideology. "Islamic fanaticism" represents those ideas and individuals

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[11] Boaz Ganor, "The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon," in *Countering Suicide Terrorism*, updated ed. (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism [ICT], 2007); also Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, revised and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 132.

within Islamist movements that promote a willingness to
sacrifice individual self-interest for the collective
cause.[12]

Literally "struggle," but meaning "holy war," *jihad*
has functioned differently throughout Islamic history. The
primary Islamic texts, Qur'an and Hadith, complement *jihad*
with the notions of *dar al-Islam* (dwelling of submission)
and *dar al-harb* (dwelling of war); when infidels, i.e. non-
Muslims, invade *dar al-Islam*, Muslims have a *fard ayn*
(individual obligation) to physically defend their sacred
territory. *Dar al-harb* denotes territory that still
requires Islamic conquest; accordingly, during such Islamic
expansions, Muslims have a *fard kifaya* (collective
obligation) to *jihad*, meaning able-bodied individuals may
opt to participate through means other than physical
combat. The additional notion of *dar al-sulh* (dwelling of
armistice) represents those territories where non-Muslims
have signed an armistice with Muslims and agreed to pay a
tribute.[13] The Shaffi school of Islam[14] adds the category of

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[12] For an explanation of the term "fanatic," see Lee Harris, *The
Suicide of Reason: Radical's Islam's Threat to the West* (New
York: Basic Books, 2007), xx.
[13] Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs*,
trans. David Macey (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Pluto Press, 2005), 13.

dar al-ahd (dwelling of agreement), in which a territory

receives a neutral designation.[15] Furthermore, *Sufi* or

mystic Muslims promote the idea of breaking *jihad* down into

general two forms: *jihad al-nafs* (spiritual holy war)

refers to a Muslim's spiritual struggle within oneself,

whereas *jihad bil-saif* (holy war of the sword) stands for a

physical struggle against the enemies of Islam.[16] Unless

otherwise noted, the traditional definition is how the work

uses the term throughout, as "Islamic thinkers [on the

whole] reject the quietist and mystical version."[17]

The next two definitions, in their verb, gerund and

noun forms, often cause some confusion for non-Arabic

speakers, as they hold similar connotations, yet with

subtle differences, and are commonly used interchangeably

in colloquial discourse. *Shahada* literally stands for

"witness"--however, depending on context, it either means

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[14] Sunni Islam has four schools, including Hanafi, Maliki, Shaffi
and Hanbali.
[15] Khosrokhavar, 13.
[16] See Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the
Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," *Studies
in Conflict & Terrorism* 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 70; Walter
Laqueur, *New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass
Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 130; and
Khosrokhavar, 14.
[17] Khosrokhavar, 15.

the "affirmation of one's submission to Allah,"[18] or "death

for Allah's sake." *Istishhad* literally stands for

"martyrdom"--although, meaning "self-sacrifice for Allah's

sake." *Shahada* refers to incidental death during *jihad*,

whereas *istishhad* indicates deliberate death during *jihad*.

Regarding where each relates to suicide terrorism, the

former connotes a "willingness to die" and the latter an

explicit "eagerness to die"--thus leaving only *istishhad* in

the realm of suicide terrorism.[19]

Concepts

Similarly to definitions and the key distinctions they

make, concepts and their explanations work to increase the

level of lucidity. The following research contains

discussions on four concepts in particular. Each has a

distinct function in the Palestinian suicide terror

phenomenon.

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[18] In this sense, *shahada* also refers to the first pillar of
Islam--confirming one's affirmation as a Muslim by declaring
loyalty to Allah.
[19] One scholar explores the importance of making distinctions
between these two types of self-sacrificial acts. See Jon Elster,
"Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions," in *Making Sense of
Suicide Missions*, expanded and updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 237-238.

First and foremost, "Palestinian shahid" refers

primarily to the Palestinian perpetrators of suicide-

homicide attacks beginning in 1993; the concept secondarily

represents those deemed "shahids" in Palestinian society,

whether participants in suicide-homicide bombings or

otherwise. Palestinian society views both the *shahid* and

the *istishhadi* as martyrs who deserve the rewards of

paradise.[20] Indeed, colloquially, as noted above,

Palestinians speak about both the *istishhadi* (one who

intentionally commits martyrdom during *jihad*) and the

shahid (one who incidentally attains martyrdom during

jihad) as shahids.[21] To confuse matters further, when

discussing a suicide-homicide attacker and/or a suicide-

homicide attack, Palestinians (as other Arab Muslims)

usually use *shahid* in referring to the suicide-homicide

attacker and *istishhad* in describing the act. However, as

one researcher points out, Palestinians frequently say

things like: "Before the *istish'hadi*, there were *shuhada*

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[20] Yasser Mahmoud Ali Abu Bakar cited in Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center, *Suicide bombing terrorism during
the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict: September 2000-December
2005* (1 January 2006), 7-8; accessed at.
[21] Additionally, one should not confuse the *shahid/istishhadi* with
the *feda'i* or *mujahid*, both of whom display a willingness to
sacrifice their lives for Islam, but usually seek to fight as
long as circumstances permit.

[martyrs]"[22]--such a statement refers to the specific tactical change, from dying while throwing rocks at soldiers to blowing oneself up on a civilian bus, that occurred between the first *intifada* and *al-Aqsa intifada*. The social blurring of these terms oftentimes creates analytical difficulties. Simply put, one could think of it as all istishhadis are shahids, but not vice versa, and therefore the more encompassing term usually wins out in the layman's everyday usage. Thus, for purposes of this work, although *istishhadi*, or one who "intentionally commits martyrdom," might represent a more precise denotation of a suicide terrorist, *shahid* is used throughout as Palestinians more commonly use the term colloquially to define one who has participated in an *'amalyya istishhadiyya* (martyrdom operation)--i.e. suicide-terror attack.

Second, "culture of martyrdom" represents the forces in Palestinian society that accommodate participation in terrorism; moreover, it is the socio-cultural fabric that often instigates participation in suicide-homicide bombings and other such "martyrdom operations." Furthermore, the

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[22] See Nichole Argo, "The Role of Social Context in Terrorist Attacks," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 13 January 2006.

culture of martyrdom stands for the components of the *shahid*/suicide-homicide bomber phenomenon not necessarily affiliated with a particular organization, as it collectively signifies the elements in Palestinian society, such as music videos, popular poems, educational texts books, mass rallies, memorabilia, etc. that support ideas of, and sanction beliefs in, *jihad*, *shahada* and *istishhad* or commemorate a past *shahid*. Additionally, it represents less tangible components that accommodate suicide terrorism, such as popular acceptance and praise of shahids, as well as scarce condemnation by authority figures and other forms of tacit consent.

Third, "terror machine" signifies the established social apparatuses as well as the political institutions that support, from time to time, one or more organizations, including Hamas's al-Qassam Brigades, Palestinian Islamic Jihad's al-Quds Brigades, Fatah's al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, and others. An organization's "terror machine" refers to the actual components of an infrastructure behind the process of deploying suicide-homicide bombers, such as the bombmakers and dispatchers, inspirational sermons, videos of previous shahids, etc.

Fourth, the Palestinian notion of *sammud* (steadfastness) or national perseverance refers to "staying on the land despite immense Israeli pressure to leave."[23] *Sammud* symbolizes a daily "form of resistance activism."[24] Moreover, *sammud* represents Palestinian Arabs' conceptual response to the narrative of *al-Naqba* (the Catastrophe), which signifies the establishment of a Jewish state on sacred Islamic land. Containing deep a "religious sensibility,"[25] which shapes the national consciousness in the form of Islamic concepts and promotes maximalist goals, *sammud* accordingly encourages Palestinians to reject any proposal compromising the prospects of establishing an Arab/Islamic state over the old territory of Mandatory Palestine. Furthermore, *sammud* has played a central role in the "development of Palestinian society," and the shahid's popularization.[26]

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[23] See Mark Levine, "Chaos, Globalization, and the Public Sphere: Political Struggle in Iraq and Palestine," *The Middle East Journal* 60, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 473.

[24] Iris Jean-Klein, "Palestinian Martyrdom Revisited: Critical Reflections on Topical Cultures," *Cornell Law School East Asian Law and Culture Conference Series* 5 (2002): 3.

[25] Levine, 473.

[26] Notes from discussion with Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) Director Mahdi Abdul Hadi, in Jerusalem, Israel (19 December 2005).

Key to understanding all four concepts is gathering how they developed overtime through the interplay and fluctuation between a Palestinian collective identity, its related political goals, organizational strategies on obtaining those goals, the corresponding tactics employed, and the mobilization of individuals to carry out tactical operations. Particular identities, for purposes of this study, are extremely important as their attached narratives lend varying levels of support and legitimacy to any number of types of violence, including suicide terrorism.

Identity Construction and Fluctuation in Pursuit of a Nation-State

Two central parts compose the modern nation-state: the nation, which reflects a collective identity, and the state, which governs the people who embody the collective. The legitimacy of a specific nation-state, as understood in international relations, derives from the fulfillment of three areas: (1) building a *nation*--or group of people in agreement with one another on a common identity and civic culture or social contract (i.e. the establishment of non-violent means for the resolution of civil necessities); (2) erecting a *state*--or governmental monopoly on the use of

physical coercion; and, (3) recognition by a world power of the previous two[27]--that is, the nation/collective and the state/government. Accordingly, realizing a nation marks an imperative first step, not only to legitimizing a state but also making one function at an acceptable level to the population that it governs. For decades, various Palestinian movements have sought to simultaneously construct a national identity, establish a state and garner international support for recognizing the fulfillment of the previous two.

A group's realization that it comprises a separate and distinguishable nation, whether contrived after the formation of a state, sought after the dismemberment of an empire or otherwise, acts as the source of the "nation's" staying power. A historical narrative operates as one of the pillars that holds up the social and political cohesion of a nation. Narratives tell a historical story, describe the present, and imagine a future. Narratives help define a collective identity and accentuate it politically and

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[27] While debatably an imperative to a nation-state's legitimacy, the importance of a nascent *revolutionary* nation-state seeking and securing support from world powers goes back to the efforts of the emerging United States, which dispatched Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay across Europe to secure recognition of America's legitimate establishment of self-determination.

culturally.[28] The "imagined future" accordingly lends itself

to those articulating common goals for the collective.

Supplemented with cultural values and beliefs, and personal

attitudes, common goals pave the way for collective

behavior.

It comes as no surprise then that the manner in which

Palestinian Arabs have viewed themselves since the Ottoman

Empire has shaped their political behavior--including how

they have employed violence. Palestinian Arabs, like most

people across the globe and throughout time, have ascribed

and subscribed to multiple identities simultaneously.

Whether religious, ethnic, national, tribal, clan, family,

occupational, gender, age, etc., individuals find

themselves in a continuous negotiation of a "hierarchy of

identities"; scholars Michael Barnett and Shibley Telhami

explain, within such a hierarchy "one [identity]

constitutes the core and others…are 'activated' during

certain social situations and do not undermine the

pillar."[29] Nations find themselves in a similar negotiation

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[28] Michael Barnett, "The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process:
Re/creating the Un/thinkable," in *Identity and Foreign Policy in
the Middle East*, ed. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002), 66.
[29] The "hierarchy of identities" notion is also referred to as a
"menu of choices." See Michael Barnett and Shibley Telhami,

that is occasionally swayed by a charismatic leader,

religious resurgence, social reformation, *en vogue*

political ideology or other collective-identity altering

phenomena. Scholar Samuel P. Huntington explains,

> Identity is an individual's or a group's sense of
> self. It is a product of self-consciousness, that
> I or we possess distinct qualities as an entity
> that differentiates me from you and us from them...
> Identities are important because they shape the
> behavior of people.[30]

Maintaining a collective (e.g. national) identity can

at times be taxing on a populace and/or governing body.

This is particularly the case when a group finds itself

geo-politically dislocated from others with whom it has a

common identity.[31] Palestinian Arabs after World War I (WWI)

exemplify such a case; during this period, they found

themselves, most of whom self-identified as "Southern

Syrians,"[32] under British rule in Mandatory Palestine, and

"Introduction," in *Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle
East*, ed. Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 2002), 13-16.

[30] Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's
National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 21-22.

[31] An identity's strength is usually determined by the amount of
people, influential elites and/or community leaders who ascribe
or subscribe to it as an important signifier of their overall
hierarchy of identities. Newly established political boundaries,
however, oftentimes function as a political *tabula rasa*.

[32] Don Peretz, "The Historical Background of Arab Nationalism in
Palestine," in *The Palestine State: A Rational Approach*, ed.
Richard J. Ward, Don Peretz, and Evan M. Wilson (London: National
University Publications, 1977), 3-23; see also Tom Segev, *One*

separated from the newly carved-out protectorates of Syria

and Transjordan. Many Palestinian Arabs had viewed Islam as

their most important identity prior to WWI, but with the

Ottoman Empire and Caliphate dissolved, Arab ethno-

linguistic identity arose as the natural and pragmatic

alternative.[33] The Arab world, however, found itself

superficially divided by British and French imperial

design. Accordingly new, constructed, national identities

crept to the forefront of many Middle Eastern peoples'

hierarchy of identities.

Often collective identity is just as much about the

"them" as the "us." In the decades preceding WWI, the

arrival of waves of Zionists in Ottoman Palestine

heightened the sensitivities of Arab nationalism. Thus, a

key catalyst to Arab nationalism in the Levant and

Palestine proved to be the "us"-versus-"them" scenarios

that played themselves out in confrontations between the

Yishuv (Jewish settlement)[34] and the local Arab population,

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first during Ottoman rule, followed later by the British
and U.N. Mandates and lastly after the state of Israel's
establishment in 1948. The fluctuation of the Palestinian
Arab population's collective identity often resulted in a
reshaping of how leading political bodies viewed and
approached the political situation. Throughout the Zionist-
Arab, Israeli-Arab, and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts,[35]
these changes have significantly affected how Palestinian
Arab organizations have utilized political violence.

By no coincidence, Palestinian political violence
strategies and tactics have progressively obtained higher
levels of brutality as the primary objectives of the
Palestinian populace have remained untenable over the
decades. At times organizations have attempted to negotiate
away various objectives, only to be met with popular
rejection.[36] A combination of the apparent permanence of the
state of Israel, coupled with a Palestinian collective
identity that increasingly attaches identifiable components

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[35] The varying "conflicts" do not refer to those between different
groups per se, but rather signify different time periods of the
century-long conflict between Jews and Arabs over the territory
of Ottoman Palestine, British Mandatory Palestine, and lastly the
State of Israel.
[36] When asked why he did not agree to a final status in 2000 with
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's offer of 90 percent of the
disputed territories on the table, Arafat remarked: "[the rest]
is not mine to give."

(e.g. victimhood, glorification of martyrdom, hatred of Israel[37]) that distinguish it as the pure antithesis to Israel, has exacerbated the "us" versus "them" mentality. Therefore, while identity has served as a primary device to maintain social cohesion amid the Palestinian nation absent a state, it has also functioned as the narrating source to the virulent ideologies that have waged a continuous and escalating war first against the *Yishuv* and later against Israel.

Whether during 1929 riots,[38] the Arab revolt from 1936 to 1939, the Jewish-Arab Civil War from late 1947 to May 1948, the PLO's decades-long terror campaign, the first *intifada* from December 1987 to early 1993, or the more recent *al-Aqsa intifada* from September 2000 to late 2005, Palestinian Arabs have demonstrated that organized political violence serves at the request of a supportive constituency. By identifying some kind of common ground and goals as a collective foundation, groups sustain cohesion. While constituencies might disagree from time to time over the means, the broader collective identity remains unified

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[37] Notes from ICT seminar on "The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle," given by Boaz Ganor, in Herzliya, Israel (19 June 2005).
[38] The riots are also known as the "disturbances," which was a term preferred by the British in order to deceptively insinuate minimal severity to its own population.

on the ends. For nearly 80 years, whether through the death

squads of the Arab Higher Committee,[39] PLO *fedayin* or Hamas

shuhada, Palestinian Arabs have demonstrated how a society,

an organization and empowered individuals can operate as

one in pursuit of a state, all while attempting to

construct and maintain a nation, and fight the ever-

important "other."

Producing the Contemporary Shahid

Various rationales and attractions draw individuals

into the world of terrorism. More often than not, however,

personal and collective identity and ideology-infused

organizations play key roles in highlighting the allures

and *duties* of participating in political violence. Identity

shapes one's desires at varying levels of human

interaction--political, social and so forth. Moreover,

one's hierarchy of identities, as dominated by the

negotiated spearhead, often directs or indirectly arrives

the individual during his or her lifetime to a

corresponding ideology, which focuses his or her

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[39] Yehoshua Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929-1939: From Riots to Rebellion* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 295-303; see also Chuck Morse, *The Nazi Connection to Islamic Terrorism: Adolf Hitler and Haj Amin al-Husseini* (New York: Universe, 2003).

"[political] view of the present and vision of the

future,"[40] and simultaneously buttresses his or her

identity. Thus, whether consciously or subconsciously, the

symbiotic relationship between identity and ideology mark

the starting line of an individual's race to political

action.[41] Terrorists are by definition political actors. For

religion, revolution, rebellion or otherwise, terrorists

act in pursuit of political change. The actions terrorists

take represent the pursuit of an end goal, which a specific

ideology usually defines. But, ideological attractions do

not seduce individuals in the sense of hypnotization--

lacking coercion, they must play directly into the one's

natural sense of a cost/benefit analysis, as constituted by

his or her cultural mindset, in order to result in the

individual taking action.

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[40] Leon P. Baradat, *Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact*, 9th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), 8.
[41] Central characteristics of terrorism, and terror organizations, have drastically changed over the last 30 years. Whereas the terrorism of the late 1960s and 1970s reflected more elitist ideological campaigns (i.e. generally Marxist-Leninist), today's terror organizations predominately pursue identity-based goals (i.e. usually religious or ethno-nationalist). Nevertheless, both identity and ideology play key roles in the overwhelming majority of modern terror campaigns. For extensive studies on the evolution of modern terrorism, see Laqueur, *New Terrorism*; and Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*.

Values, beliefs and attitudes produce behavior.[42]

Culture, unlike anything else, has the ability to develop,

condition and refine one's mindset, as it shapes how

knowledge, or in the case of terrorism, how one receives

and understands a doctrine. Culture, ultimately, acts as a

filter for behavior's three primary instigating factors.

Scholar Ernest Gellner explains culture as "a system of

ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and

communication."[43] Huntington adds, "[culture] refers to a

people's language, religious beliefs, social and political

values, assumptions as to what is right and wrong,

appropriate and inappropriate, and to the objective

institutions and behavioral patterns that reflect these

subjective elements."[44] Culture thus enables rationales,

which sanction specific behavior--leaving individuals with

an understanding of the world around them, as well as with

direction for the choices that lay before them. Philosopher

Lee Harris notes:

> Our culture trains us. It teaches us what to be
> ashamed of, what is permissible to do in front of
> other people and what is not. It teaches us how

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[42] Notes from lecture on "Government and Politics of Japan," given by Ray Geigle, in Bakersfield, California (January 2003).

[43] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 7.

[44] Huntington, *Who Are We?*, 30.

> to show respect and deference, how to indicate
> that we have a peaceful intent, how to assert
> ourselves without offending others, and in
> general how to behave 'properly' with others in
> our interactions with them.[45]

Culture, nonetheless, works as the individual's gauge for socially acceptable behavior, as well as an organization's guidelines for that which a given collective deems permissible.

Today, when an individual Palestinian volunteers, prepares and lastly becomes a suicide-homicide bomber, he or she does not merely fulfill some shadowy cult's religious ritual or an honorary duty. Rather, he or she acts on an individual finding of a cost/benefit analysis, as weighed through social norms, expectations, bonds and personal interests. This "weighing procedure" marks the final step in a larger process, wherein the individual initially receives exposure to a framing of a problem, secondly gets introduced to potential solutions to the problem, subsequently finds justifications and legitimacy for the proposed solutions, and lastly considers the prospects of acting in pursuit of the solutions. Thus, the act of killing oneself to murder others, while certainly

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[45] Lee Harris, *Civilization and Its Enemies* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 162.

considered a religious duty or maintenance of ethno-cultural honor for some, ultimately marks the final product of a lengthy process that incorporates the functions of identity, ideology and culture, the institutions of socialization, and the psychology of a sane individual. Therefore, a pair of cooperative relationships, one between the individual's identity and subscribed ideology, and another between one's reasoning and specific cognitive boundaries placed on it by his or her socio-cultural milieu, determine one's participation in political activism, including acts of terrorism.

CHAPTER FOUR

RAISING THE SHAHID WITH IDENTITY AND IDEOLOGY:

PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, ORGANIZATIONS AND THE

DEVELOPMENT OF A CULTURE OF MARTYRDOM

> Palestine, with the boundaries it had
> during the British Mandate, is an
> indivisible territorial unit.[1]
> -Palestinian National Charter, 1968

> There is no solution to the Palestinian
> problem except by Jihad.[2]
> -Hamas Charter, 1988

> We will murder them all;
> we won't leave a single Jew.[3]
> -Palestinian girl on PA Television,
> October 22, 2000

During the initial-era of "Palestinian" nationalism,

from the early 1920s to the establishment of Israel in

1948,[4] the Arabs of Palestine looked predominantly to

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[1] An excerpt of the amended Palestinian National Charter of the Palestinian National Council, representative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization. See Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai, *Terrorism: The PLO Connection* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1989), 198.

[2] Hamas charter in Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 183.

[3] Remarks made by a young Palestinian girl on PA television. See Palestinian Media Watch, "Topic III: Children as Combatants in PA Ideology," *TV Archives/Video Library* (2002): accessed at <www.pmw.org.il> on 28 October 2007.

[4] See Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1918-1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974); Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict*

religion for guidance in the political arena. With the

Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini[5] in place as

the Palestinian-Arab population's undisputed leader,

religious overtones saturated the Zionist-Arab conflict

over these years.[6] The 1949 armistice between Israel and

Arab states brought about a relatively dormant period in

Palestinian nationalism, as Arabs in the West Bank formed

part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Gazan Arabs

1881-2001 (New York: First Vintage Books, 2001), 99; Tom Segev, *One Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate* (New York: Owl Books, 2001).

[5] Hajj Amin al-Husseini arrived to the national stage, when he helped lead the 1920 riots and was subsequently convicted of his involvement in absentia by the Mandatory government. See Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 95 and 98; Chuck Morse, *The Nazi Connection to Islamic Terrorism: Adolf Hitler and Haj Amin al-Husseini* (New York: IUniverse, 2003), 17. A year later in 1921, Arabs again resorted to "pogrom"-like violence against Jews; yet, this time rather than sentence him to another ten years in prison for his role in inciting the violent episodes, the British decided to install Amin al-Husseini as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, which made him the highest Islamic authority in Palestine. Amin al-Husseini's grandfather, father, and elder brother had previously held the position of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, and his appointment displayed the political and religious clout his clan, the Husseinis, continued to enjoy among the Palestinian Arab population. Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, 159-160; also Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 100. Aside from being the "preeminent Palestinian nationalist leader," Amin al-Husseini was also a local leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. See Ziad Abu-Amar, "Hamas: A Historical and Political Background," *The Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 6.

[6] Yehoshua Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement 1929-1939: From Riots to Rebellion* (London: Frank Cass, 1977); Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 106-204; and Morse, 12-84.

came under Egyptian rule.[7] This era saw Palestinian

nationalism lapse into inertia, as Jordan and Egypt's

leaders promoted the status quo--keeping the notion of

Palestinian self-determination frozen.[8] Palestinian

nationalism however found a new source of life with the

creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),

and its subsequent cooptation by Yasser Arafat and his

outfit of Fatah *fedayin*.[9] The defeat of Egypt, Syria and

Jordan in the 1967 Six-Day War not only initiated the

sounding of pan-Arabism's death knell, but also left a

majority of the Palestinian population under Israeli rule,

disconnected from an Arab state, and once again left to

reformulate a collective identity.

From the mid-1960s until the first *intifada* in

December 1987, the PLO, an umbrella for numerous

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[7] Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: Penguin Books, 2000); Morris, *Righteous Victims*; Samih K. Farsoun, "Whither Palestine and the Palestinians?" *The Contemporary Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Westview Press, 2006); and William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber and Ann Moseley Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973).

[8] Eric Rozenman, "Au Revoir, Palestine," *The Journal of International Security Affairs* no. 13 (Fall 2007): 78.

[9] The PLO was created in January 1964 during a summit of Arab states at the behest of Egypt's President Gemal Abd'ul Nasser. Its first leader, Ahmad Shuqari, was a known Nasserite and pan-Arabist. After Arafat's takeover, the PLO readjusted its affiliation with the Arab League, Nasser and pan-Arabism in general. See Alexander and Sinai, *Terrorism: The PLO Connection*.

nationalist-terrorist groups, held a virtual monopoly on

the Palestinian movement for self-determination. As Arafat

and the PLO sought to maintain a staunch "secular-

nationalist" timbre that fit well against the backdrop of

the Cold War,[10] political Islam remained largely in the

Palestinian underground. But, by the mid-1980s, a

collection of Palestinian organizations affiliated with the

Muslim Brotherhood[11] began to mechanize participation in

"resistance."[12] With the PLO's leadership, including Arafat,

mostly exiled in Tunisia the organization lacked a dominant

command and control over the first Palestinian *intifada*--

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[10] As a primary backer of the PLO, the Soviet Union expected
maintenance of some ideological solidarity with the entities it
supported. See Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, *Terrorism: The
Soviet Connection* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1984).
[11] Established by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, as an Islamist rebuke
of Egyptian King Farouk al-Awwal, *Jamiat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*
(the Muslim Brotherhood) became a mainstay in Arab and Islamic
political circles when one of its members, Sayyid Qutb called for
an active *jihad* against secular-Arab governments and the West.
See Seyyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Damascus, Syria: Dar al-Ilm, [no
date] obtained in 2005). As the Muslim Brotherhood spread
throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, it established a
Palestinian branch in 1945, but respective Jordanian and Egyptian
politics dominated most of the organization's operations. For an
extensive study on the formative decades of the Muslim
Brotherhood, see Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim
Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
[12] A popular euphemism used in Palestinian society, as well as
throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, "resistance" refers to
political activism, including terror and guerrilla acts, against
an "occupying" force. Accordingly, the terms resistance and
occupation go hand in hand in the popular Palestinian lexicon.

allowing for the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza[13] to gain a

share of the political benefits afforded by the uprising.[14]

As the influence of Islamic organizations spread,

competition with the PLO for popular support soared. The

intense rivalry between these two main Palestinian

political factions, one doctrinally Islamic and the other

nationalistic, precipitated a vast mobilization of

political participation within Palestinian society. As

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) rose to

prominence, political Islam reaffirmed its role in

Palestinian politics--ultimately emerging as the primary

alternative to the PLO.

Eventually, in the 1990s, competition between the two

sides over which best represented the Palestinian political

movement led to a social synthesis of the two political

movements' ideologies, *qowmiyya* (Arab nationalism) and

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[13] In the 1970s the different groupings of the Muslim Brotherhood
in the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan united as "The Muslim
Brotherhood in Jordan and Palestine"; however, the Gaza component
of the organization held the most power as it oversaw al-Mujamma
and the Islamic University in Gaza.
[14] There is some debate over which organization, if any,
"controlled" the first *intifada*. Some argue the PLO did under the
Fatah-led *al-Qaeda al-Wataniyya al-Muwahhada li-Intifada* (Unified
National Leadership of the Uprising) or UNLU; see Mohammed M.
Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian
Suicide Bombers* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for
Peace Press, 2006). Others argue Hamas had more of an edge; see
Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*.

Islamiyya (political Islam). The notion of regaining the

Islamic *waqf* (endowment) of "Palestine" matched the

nationalist cry against "colonial occupation." Political

Islam's reappearance alongside the traditional PLO line, as

instituted in the Palestinian Authority (PA), forced the

Fatah-led body to look for ways to reacquire popular

support. Thus the grassroots elements within the Muslim

Brotherhood's Gaza branch that initially provoked

sustained-resistance at the beginning of the *intifada* in

1987, had by the end of *al-Aqsa intifada* in 2005, spawned a

highly efficient terror apparatus, which operates to date

at the behest of Hamas. The return of political Islam to

prominence in the Palestinian political arena precipitated

competition over political leadership, social direction

and, most importantly, violent resistance. Consequently, a

popular culture of martyrdom based on Islamic concepts

developed in Palestinian society and directly led to the

shahid/suicide-homicide bomber phenomenon.

Terror Organizations as the Voice of
the Palestinians

In the Palestinian context, collective identity is

inextricably linked to political violence strategies and

tactics employed by representative organizations. The

phenomenon of the suicide-homicide bomber demonstrates this

interrelation in full-force, as it mandates connectivity

between a motivated political organization and willing

individuals and an accommodating society, which provides an

impetus for both.[15] Distinguished terrorism expert Bruce

Hoffman notes, "[t]he resilience of [terrorist] groups is

doubtless a product of the relative ease with which they

are able to draw sustenance and support from an existing

constituency."[16] Organizations rely on their constituencies

for accommodation and momentum, and in return

constituencies expect organizations to provide political

representation. Ultimately they form a symbiosis.

More often than not, two factors primarily determine

if and how political entities use violence against an

enemy--or in this case, when and how Palestinian

organizations target the state of Israel and its interests.

First, whether the destruction of Israel and in its stead

the establishment of a Palestinian state, the creation of a

Palestinian state alongside Israel, or the establishment of

an Islamic empire constituting all the lands of *dar al-*

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[15] See Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*.
[16] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, revised and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 242.

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Islam, organizations' political goals guide their

strategies. Various means usually exist for a given

setting. Strategy, thus, additionally determines the timing

of violence, as well as whether restraint or negotiation

might offer better options. Second, the population

represented must sanction the type of violence used in

order for the organization to maintain support over the

long-run.[17] Just as the population at hand oftentimes reaps

the benefits of an organization's success, the population,

along with the organization, also pays the consequences.[18]

Both factors underline the necessary relationship between

organizations and the population they attempt or claim to

represent.

The evolution of the PLO exemplifies the importance of

an organization's interaction with its constituency.

Effectively representing the Palestinian population during

the 1960s and 1970s, the PLO maintained political stances

that offered little compromise--thus reflecting the views

of the Palestinian populace. By following a "strategy of

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[17] Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism* (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 25-26 and 29.
[18] Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

protracted struggle,"[19] i.e. a variant of the Maoist three-stage guerrilla model, the PLO had to constantly keep media attention focused on itself. As a result, the PLO's *fedayin*[20] attained utmost importance within the organization's strategy. *Fedayin* provided a romanticized icon for the Palestinian struggle, and as their international terror attacks brought the Palestinian issue to the world stage, the PLO's ability to use a mixture of violence and diplomacy to further the Palestinian cause increased.[21] The PLO, its *fedayin*, and the Palestinian population worked together, like Clausewitz's "trinity" of war model suggests, furthering their collective goals

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[19] Aharon Yariv, "A Strategy to Counter Palestinian Terrorism," in *On Terrorism and Combating Terrorism*, ed. Ariel Merari (Fredrick, Mary.: University Publications of America, 1985), 2. In 1974, Arafat officially adopted the phase strategy at the Palestinian National Congress. See Ely Karmon, "Arafat's Strategy: Lebanonization and Entanglement," *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism [ICT]: Articles* (No Date): accessed at <www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org> on 10 October 2007.

[20] The *feda'i* traces it roots far before the creation of the PLO, Fatah and Arafat. The foundation of the *feda'i* is Islamic but its expression owes more to Arab-tribal culture. For decades, the PLO employed *fedayin* as its most trusted operatives. The Palestinian National Charter of the PLO declares: "[Fedayin] action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war." See in Yonah Alexander and Joshua Sinai, *Terrorism: The PLO Connection* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1989), 6-7 and 198.

[21] By the late 1970s, more nation-states had recognized the PLO than the state of Israel. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 70.

against their defined enemy.[22] Accordingly, when the PLO

became more responsive to international calls for peace and

therefore less representative of the Palestinian population

in the disputed territories, the patience of those same

Palestinians wore thin.[23] Arafat and his *fedayin* eventually

found themselves outflanked during the *intifada* on the

domestic-resistance front by kids armed with nothing more

than stones and slingshots. The will of Palestinian youth

to throw rocks at Israeli tanks captured the media

attention that for so long the PLO had solely enjoyed. The

PLO lost connection with the population it claimed to

represent, and as a result other organizations filled the

gap and made the moves the Palestinian population

demanded--chiefly, the continuation of violent resistance.

But, more importantly, the shift of the PLO's strategy away

from its icon, the *feda'i*, and onto sources that brought

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[22] For an example of how the model works, see Mark T. Clark, "The Continuing Relevance of Clausewitz," *Strategic Review* 26, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 54-61; also Mark T. Clark, "Does Clausewitz Apply to Criminal-States and Gangs?" *Global Crime* 7, issue 3 & 4 (August 2006): 407-427.

[23] The PLO's long-time official number two in charge, Salah Khalaf, aka Abu Iyad, as early as 1981, admitted: "What we feared most of all…has happened. Our movement has become bureaucratized. What it gained in respectability it lost in militancy. We have acquired a taste for dealing with governments and men of power." Quoted in Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 80.

the organization and Arafat international legitimacy,[24]

signaled to the Palestinian populace that it needed a new

representative.

By seizing parts of the PLO's following, Islamist-

Palestinian organizations significantly expanded their own

constituencies. Accordingly, as Hamas and PIJ consolidated

power within Palestinian society, they sought to capitalize

on it politically. The first *intifada* provided them with a

prime opportunity to flex their political muscles. The re-

elevation of political Islam within the Palestinian

collective identity opened the door to changes in the

population's views on legitimate political violence tactics

and targeting, and consequently led to the employment of

new *modi operandi*.

Suicide-homicide bombings made their mark in the 1990s

as one such *modus operandi*. Islamist-Palestinian

organizations, and particularly Hamas, utilized suicide

terrorism to distinguish themselves from the PLO/PA,[25]

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[24] In 1988, Arafat banned PLO terror operations outside of Israel.
Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 80.
[25] Reuven Paz, "The Islamic Legitimacy of Palestinian Suicide
Terrorism," in *Countering Suicide Terrorism*, updated ed., ed.
Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007), 61; and Hoffman, *Inside
Terrorism*, 146-154.

disrupt the Israeli-PA peace process,[26] and reshape the

national consciousness.[27] Hamas learned that suicide

terrorism provided new moves in an extremely lethal yet

stagnant political bout. Once discovering its signature

mode of operation, Hamas realized just how to spend the

social capital it had accumulated over nearly two decades.

The Hamas Terror Machine: Organizing Da'awa
and Mechanizing Jihad

Hamas's version of resistance, which relies heavily on

the Islamic concepts of *jihad* (struggle) and *istishhad*

(martyrdom), resonates quite differently with Palestinians

than the PLO's campaign for self-determination. This has as

much to do with Hamas's use of violence as it does with the

terror organization's intimate relationship with the

Palestinian populace in the disputed territories and

particularly in Gaza. Although the *jihad* operations of

Hamas and its cousin organization PIJ brought notoriety to

political Islam, the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood's *da'awa*

(Islamic calling) or proselytizing institutions, set up in

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[26] Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 263-296; Shay, 52-64.
[27] Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), 107.

the years preceding the *intifada*, deserve more of the

credit for political Islam's revival in Palestinian

society.[28] In the 1970s and 1980s, with Arafat in one exile

after another, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations

seized the opportunity to set up social services, such

health clinics, education facilities, Islamic centers, as

well as to provide a wide range of other social services

that were sure to win the loyalties of local populations.

Founded in 1973, al-Mujamma[29] operated as a *da'awa* and

administrative base for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza

Strip.[30] Its leaders would eventually lead the *intifada* in

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[28] During the 1970s, as the political shortcomings of pan-Arabism, secular-Arab nationalism, and Nasserism became evident, an Islamic *sahwa* (awakening) spread across the Sunni-Arab world. See Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*, 34-35, etc. Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini led a similar Shi'a revival at the end of the decade. See Shaul Shay, *Axis of Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror* (London: Transaction Publishers, 2004).

[29] Al-Mujamma's full name, *Al-Mujamm'a al-Islami*, means "the Islamic Gathering" in Arabic.

[30] In 1978, al-Mujamma registered as a non-profit organization with the Israeli authorities, marking the initial cordial relations between the Jewish state and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in the disputed territories and Jordan. After seeing its popularity stagnate due to a refusal to participate in armed resistance, the Muslim Brotherhood slowly began a change of course, culminating with its overt participation in the *intifada* and the establishment of Hamas. See Ziad Abu-Amr, "Hamas"; and Diego Baliani, "The Internecine Struggle among Palestinian Factions after Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip," *ICT: Articles* (23 October 2007): accessed at <www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org> on 28 October 2007.

1987[31]; they included most notably, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, who

had been the most prominent Muslim Brotherhood member in

Gaza since 1968, and "systematically" spread *da'awa*

operations throughout Gaza.[32] Over two decades, Yassin

successfully established an Islamic organization, which

provided vast social services to the Arab Gazan population,

and an underground infrastructure that leaders could

instantaneously activate to do the organization's bidding.

Historian Benny Morris explains, "[t]he growth of the

[Muslim] Brotherhood--and Islamic fundamentalism in

general--among Palestinians owed much to the organizational

skills of Sheikh [Yassin]."[33] He accomplished this while

arousing little attention from the PLO and minimal concern

by Israeli security services. In 1986, Yassin established

Majd,[34] which acted as al-Mujamma's internal security

force--i.e. it protected the Muslim Brotherhood's interests

from rival organizations, primarily the PLO's Fatah, and

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[31] Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, 16-19.
[32] Yassin accomplished this by dividing Gaza into five areas, which were filled with operational cells made-up of three men each. See Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, 19.
[33] Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 563.
[34] Meaning "glory" in Arabic, Majd represents the acronym of *Munazzamat al-Jihad wal-Da'awa* (the Organization of Jihad and Da'awa).

violently punished "collaborators."[35] When PIJ[36] began

drawing members from al-Mujamma's ranks due to an appealing

activist-jihadi approach,[37] Yassin, recognizing the need to

match PIJ's actions in order to maintain membership levels,

increased Majd's operations.[38] In January 1988, as the

intifada had swept across the disputed territories, the

Gaza Muslim Brotherhood/al-Mujamma established Hamas as its

official armed-wing in the disputed territories.[39]

    With the opportunity the *intifada* provided,

Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood elements turned accumulated

social capital into political action. Initially, al-Mujamma

pressured young men in Gaza to participate in the *intifada*

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[35] Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, 34-35.
[36] Although founded in the late 1970s by Dr. Fathi Shaqaqi,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad mostly lagged behind Yassin's al-
Mujamma and later Hamas in terms of social and political
influence. See Levitt, 25-28.
[37] PIJ's ideology intertwines the teachings of Qutb and Khomeini
making the organization politically right of Hamas.
[38] Boaz Ganor, *The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide For Decision
Makers* (Piscataway, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 33;
also, Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, 33-34.
[39] On December 14, 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood released its first
leaflet calling for resistance against Israel; this leaflet is
often attributed as Hamas's first communiqué. The name Hamas was
not announced however until January 1988. This suggests the
Muslim Brotherhood played it safe first before taking overt
credit for its role in the *intifada*. See Abu-Amr, "Hamas," 10.
Released in August 1988, Hamas's Covenant states in Chapter One,
Article Two: "The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine." See Mishal and Sela, *The
Palestinian Hamas*, 36 and 177.

by reminding them of their Islamic duty to do so.[40] However, over the course of the first *intifada*, Hamas transformed its social apparatus into a political action machine--that is, it learned how to maximize political participation, including acts of violence, among its growing constituency. By the second *intifada*, Hamas would daily turn away scores of individuals seeking to participate in a "martyrdom operation." Or, as one Hamas official put it, "Our biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent… It is difficult to select only a few. Those whom we turn away return again and again pestering us, pleading to be accepted."[41]

Breeding Efficiency: The Effects of Competition over Resistance

Distinguished historians of the Zionist-Arab conflict have suggested, "the intifada accomplished more in its first few months than decades of PLO terrorism had

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[40] Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill Consciousness* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 47.
[41] Quoted in Nasra Hassan, "Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of Believers," *The New Yorker*, 19 November 2001.

achieved."[42] The *intifada* brought perspective back to the

Palestinian populace regarding their political

representation. Scholars Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela

explain, "[t]he perception that the PLO was militarily and

politically bankrupt apparently induced the Mujamma'

leadership to contemplate the possibility that it could

become a political alternative."[43] Similarly, most Gazans

viewed al-Mujamma and eventually many West Bank Arabs saw

Hamas as a potential bulwark against the PLO's

totalitarianism and Arafat and Fatah's vast corruption.

Ultimately, the PLO's ability to dictate Palestinian

politics ended with the *intifada*,[44] as Hamas, and to a

lesser extent PIJ, "began to challenge the legitimacy and

leadership of the PLO and 'Arafat."[45] As a result,

competition, rivalry, and timely cooperation between the

PLO/PA and the explicitly Islamist-Palestinian terror

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[42] Yehoshua Porath paraphrased in, and agreed with by, Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 454. See also Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 562.
[43] Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, 33.
[44] William Cleveland, "Israeli-Palestinian Relations Since the Gulf War," in *The Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Karl Yambert (Cambridge, Mass.: Westview Press, 2006), 79.
[45] Samih K. Farsoun, "Whither Palestine and the Palestinians?" in *The Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Karl Yambert (Cambridge, Mass.: Westview Press, 2006), 109.

organizations manifested themselves in the political and social arenas and in approaching the conflict with Israel.

Political Culture and Irrevocable Beliefs

The competition that developed between terror organizations during and directly after the first *intifada* led to a significant increase in the brutality and frequency of political violence over the following decade. Hamas's ability to tap into the social networks established by al-Mujamma for the purposes of launching terror operations or other political actions, as well as PIJ's ability to use Islamic revolutionary allures among its support base,[46] restructured the make-up of socio-political relations in the disputed territories. Most importantly, however, the advent of the suicide-homicide bomber onto the scene, as well as the refinement of the selection and deployment process of suicide-homicide bombers, triggered a number of latent components in Palestinian Arab political culture.

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[46] Unlike Hamas in the 1990s, which had a vast array of social services to attract adherents, PIJ relied more on its ideological attractions, which Fathi Shaqaqi linked to the aura of revolutionary Iran.

Palestinian collective identity, while fluid over the decades, interacts with a political culture[47] that has remained mostly consistent as it is entrenched in the concept of *sammud* (steadfastness).[48] Representing the Palestinian Arabs' conceptual response to the narrative of *al-Naqba* (the Catastrophe), which refers to the establishment of a Jewish state on sacred Islamic land, *sammud* accordingly promotes maximalist goals relating to the establishment of an Arab/Islamic state on the former territory of Mandatory Palestine. Over the years such unwavering aims have spawned and led to the refinement of a number of practices in the Palestinian political arena, including: no compromise, violence as the choice means for pursuing political goals, and intra-group intimidation and conflict. All of the practices find their modern roots in the British Mandate period, wherein Hajj Amin al-Husseini

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[47] A specialist on political culture in the Arab world, Basheer Meibar contends, "political culture is defined by the types of belief prevalent among its members and the patterns by which beliefs are constrained in integral belief systems. The members of a political culture are classified into groups (constituencies) delineated by these two determinants." Basheer Meibar, *Political Culture, Foreign Policy and Conflict: The Palestine Area Conflict System* (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), 23.

[48] Also translated as "perseverance," Palestinian *sammud* refers to the concept of "staying on the land despite immense Israeli pressure to leave." See Mark Levine, "Chaos, Globalization, and the Public Sphere," *The Middle East Journal* 60, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 473.

socially codified them into Palestinian political culture.[49]

Diluted by two decades of PLO dominance, the dormant

traditions in Palestinian political culture, systemically

reliant on competing tribal forces,[50] returned to full

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[49] During the 1920s, the Husseini clan, spearheaded by Haj Amin, used Islam and incitement against Jews to out-maneuver their political/tribal rivals, the Nashashibis--ultimately gaining control of the leadership of the Arabs of Palestine as a result. See Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 100-110. During the revolt from 1936 to 1939, along with propelling a tradition of violence as the choice means to an end, the Arabs of Palestine, set a precedent among their popular political culture--that being, accepting the violent domination of a specific leader who systematically targeted his dissenters. Hajj Amin al-Husseini, even while in exile for the majority of the revolt (similarly to Yasser Arafat decades later), used terror, not only against his enemies, but also against Palestinian Arabs. Amin al-Husseini biographer, Chuck Morse notes: "Arabs assassinated by al-Husseini inspired death squads during the riots of 1936-1939 would include Palestinian Arab leaders Sheikh Daoud Ansari, Imam of the Al Aqsa Mosque, Sheikh Ali Nur el-Khattib, Sheikh Nusbi Abdal Rahim, Council of Muslim Religious Court, Sheikh Abdul el-Badoui from Acre, Sheikh el-Namouri from Hebron, Nasr el-Din Nassr, Mayor of Hebron, and eleven Mukhtars, or community leaders who were murdered along with their entire families by al-Husseini's roving killers." Morse, 43-44. This deadly pattern, which finds its historical roots in Arab-tribal/*hamula* (clan) warring, continues to present day to serve as an instrumental component of Palestinians' political culture, as demonstrated by recent Hamas-Fatah fighting, as well as PLO in-fighting during the 1970s and 1980s.

[50] One scholar notes: "Studies on factionalism in the early days of the Palestinian national movement have indicated clearly that the organization of national politics around factional loyalties in patriarchal structures has been a major factor in the national movement's inability to achieve its goals. The competition between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis, as well as those groups' elitism and detachment from the needs of the common Palestinian, has prevented them from mobilizing the Palestinian public under one common and agreed upon strategy. The patterns of the pre-1948 period seem to have remained consistent, although they have taken on new forms. The familial politics of the pre-

effect once Arafat had a formidable rival in the Hamas/PIJ

confederation and its rapidly developing constituency.[51] For

the most part, Palestinian Arabs' beliefs about the world

around them have stayed stagnant since before Israel's

establishment, as have, until recent decades, the varying

Palestinian constituencies.

Consistent refusals by the Palestinian populace to

accept Israel's permanence or its Jewish identity[52]

represent core tenets of a political culture that views

compromise on this issue as unacceptable.[53] This forms the

basis of the Palestinian conflict with Israel. Also, most

Palestinians do not entertain proposed compromises over

Jerusalem or the right of "refugees" to return (to Israel

1948 period has changed into factional politics in the last
several decades." See Amal Jamal, *The Palestinian National
Movement: Politics of Contention,* 1967-2005 (Bloomington, Indi.:
Indiana University Press, 2005), xiii-xiv.

[51] In 1993, as a response to the Oslo peace process, Hamas and PIJ
"joined" the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF), which worked
out of Damascus. "Regular" collaboration however did not occur
until the second *intifada*. See Levitt, *Hamas,* 14 and 26.

[52] The Palestinian population has remained consistently opposed to
accepting a Jewish state. In 1937, the Arabs of Mandatory
Palestine rejected the British Peel Commission's suggestion of a
two-state solution, as they did again in 1948 with the U.N.'s
Partition Plan. As recent as the Annapolis meeting in December
2007, the PA maintains its refusal to accept Israel's
"Jewishness."

[53] Indeed, when Arafat arrived to the disputed territories after
the failed Camp David II talks, "he was hailed *as a victor.*" Luca
Ricolfi, "Palestinians, 1981-2003," in *Making Sense of Suicide
Missions,* expanded and updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 93.

proper), as well as other territorial issues based on the

ideas of *waqf* and *dar al-Islam* (dwelling of submission).

Moreover, when a representative body has made a movement

toward compromise on these issues, a rival organization/

faction has initiated intra-group conflict as a response.[54]

Additionally, violence as the choice means of political

pursuits, rather than negotiation, is engraved in

Palestinian Arab political culture.[55] When the PLO

recognized Israel's right to exist with the signing of the

Declaration of Principles (DOP) on September 13, 1993, it

sent the Palestinian collective identity into a "momentous

political crisis."[56] The fairly cohesive Palestinian

populace fragmented into three constituencies; some

Palestinians were "enthusiastic," many gave "conditional

approval," and others viewed the process as "potentially

fatal for Palestinian national aspirations and survival as

a people."[57] The initial period of the Israel-PA peace

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[54] Such a case occurred in 1939, when a group attempted to go against the AHC and accept British compromises. Opposition leaders were either assassinated or intimidated, so as to change their minds. See Morse, 43-44.
[55] See Morris, *Righteous Victims*; Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 148-149.
[56] Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer H. Aruri, *Palestine and the Palestinians: A Social and Political History*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westeview Press, 2006), 379.
[57] Farsoun and Aruri, 379.

process, better known as the Oslo years, ultimately served

as a testament to a consistent Palestinian political

culture that expressed itself through a fluid collective

identity. Indeed, Palestinians have not vacillated over

their goals as a people--rather, only their representative

political organizations have from time to time.[58]

Political Islam Carries on as the Palestine Liberation Organization Acquiesces

The PLO's political disconnect from sections of the

Palestinian population, along with an inability to own a

monopoly on the use of coercive force, allowed for the rise

of Hamas and its Islamist counterparts. In January 1992,

Hamas merged its West Bank militia, Abdallah Azzam

Brigades,[59] with its Gaza militia, 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam

Brigades,[60] and established the latter as the official

"military wing" of Hamas.[61] For the duration of the

intifada, the reputation of "al-Qassam Brigades" as a

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[58] One should note that a majority of Palestinians view diplomatic processes as a potential tool of warfare; accordingly, "support for the peace process" or for a peace conference does not equal "support *for* peace." For analysis, see Ricolfi, 108-110.

[59] Abdallah Azzam Brigades took its name from the founder of al-Qaeda, who hailed from a small village outside Jenin in Samaria.

[60] 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades takes its name from the Palestinian national hero and jihadi leader whose death/martyrdom "helped spark the 1936 [Arab Revolt]." See Levine, 472.

[61] Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*, 36; Although already the official "armed wing" of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, Hamas for political reasons established al-Qassam Brigades as its own "military wing." See Levitt, *Hamas*, 1-35.

formidable militant force only grew. As Hamas's appeal

swelled within the Palestinian population, the PLO's

expanded in the international community, and some in Israel

began viewing Arafat's terror organization as the lesser of

two evils.

In 1993, just as the PLO's political power seemed on

the verge of collapse, an unimaginable peace process,

announced to the world by Israel, the PLO and the United

States (U.S.), revived and empowered Arafat's terror

organization as the "legitimate" political representative

of the Palestinians. After the *intifada*, the PLO's only

move rested on relinquishing the long-held goal of

liquidating the state of Israel.[62] After losing further

influence over the Palestinian population,[63] Arafat realized

the necessity to reposition the PLO vis-à-vis the

population it claimed to represent in order to maintain

minimal functional control. Israel's signing of the DOP in

1993 not only legitimized the PLO as the PA and welcomed

Arafat back to the disputed territories but also

demonstrated that Israel, if pressed hard and long enough,

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[62] See the PLO's Palestinian National Covenant in its original
form from 1964 and its amended version from 1968.
[63] The reduction in influence resulted from a loss of legitimacy
in the sense of credibility on the Arab street.

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would give in to terrorism.[64] Furthermore, the PLO's

international legitimacy as advanced by the Oslo Accords

and peace process in the following years provided other

Palestinian terror organizations with a precedent for

justifying and legitimizing their own continued use of

terrorism against Israel. The *intifada*, signing of the DOP,

and peace process served to restructure the "official"

goals of Palestinian society, and as a result intensified

competition between the PLO (and later the PA) and Islamist

organizations, which carried on the Palestinian Arab

tradition of no compromise. Moreover, the peace process

provided Hamas and PIJ with a renewed *raison d'être*:

continued violent resistance in pursuit of "all Palestine"

and pointedly in spite of the PLO's official acquiescence.[65]

The Palestinian Suicide-Homicide Bomber

The inevitable post-*intifada* political maneuvering

between the PLO/Fatah-controlled PA and the Hamas-PIJ

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[64] Chapter Five discusses at length the strategic threat this has
posed to Israel's national security.
[65] Hamas states in its 1988 charter that "Neither a single Arab
state nor all the Arab states, neither a king nor president, not
all the kings or presidents, not any organization or all of
them…[may give up any part of Palestine] because the land of
Palestine is an Islamic Waqf." See Hamas charter in Mishal and
Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, 181.

collective,[66] marked a new era in Palestinian politics,

wherein PA leadership straddled the fence between

negotiation and continuance of the "struggle." Accordingly,

the popular Islamist organizations consistently worked to

keep the PLO off balance. The peace process posed a major

threat to Hamas and its fellow Palestinian-Islamist terror

organizations, and thus the mid-1990s saw sabotage make its

mark as a useful strategy.

On April 6, 1994, Hamas carried out its first

successful suicide-homicide attack inside Israel proper in

the Northern city of Afula, killing eight people and

wounding 34.[67] A week later on April 13, a Hamas suicide-

homicide bomber blew himself up on a bus in Hadera,

Israeli--leaving five dead and scores wounded.[68] The

entrance of suicide-homicide bombers into the center stage

of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict virtually gave Hamas

and PIJ veto power over the peace process. To disrupt

negotiations or the implementation of agreements, Hamas or

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[66] PIJ did not seek a direct conflict with the PLO or non-Islamist groups. See Abu-Amar, "Hamas"; nonetheless, PIJ participated greatly in the overall scheme of things relating to an ideological rivalry between Islamism and Arab nationalism within Palestinian society.

[67] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* 150; Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs,* 79.

[68] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Terrorism* (2007): accessed at <www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism> on 21 May 2007.

PIJ would attack Israel, and simply wait for the Israel Defense Force (IDF) to respond.

The 1990s saw the alteration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict's surficial make-up, and suicide terrorism played a major role in displaying the effects. Palestinian society became further infused with Islamic concepts that fuel conflict. Calls for *jihad* and *istishhad* drowned out voices for peace. No longer could one deny the underlying religious causes of the conflict (e.g. holy sites in Jerusalem, the notion of *dar al-Islam*, etc.). As Islamic justifications provided a basis for such attacks, incidents of suicide terrorism magnified religious issues within the conflict. Moreover, the mid-1990s saw the early development of a popular Palestinian culture that praised *shahada*, or "death for Allah's sake." Hamas bombmakers such as Yahya Ayyash and Mohammed Deif rose to superstar status. Suicide-homicide bombers and other *shuhada* (martyrs) received glorification as heroes.[69] As the Palestinian youth who threw stones during the *intifada* grew up and looked for new avenues to express themselves religiously/politically, Islamic organizations obliged them by illuminating the path

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[69] Indeed, Palestinians often refer to a martyr as a *shahid batal*, or "martyr hero." See Hassan.

to martyrdom.[70] Ultimately, Hamas and PIJ recognized that

the suicide-homicide bomber provided a prime method for

implementing their respective strategies vis-à-vis Israel

and the Palestinian population, as well as the PLO/PA.[71]

Generally, a terrorist organization designs attacks to

further serve the achievement of its political goals. Three

primary groups make up the intended audience: the

population and government of the *foreign* enemy, the

international community, and the *domestic* population as

well as rival organizations.[72] Accordingly, terrorist

organizations use different tactics for any number of

reasons. The employed tactic, like the choice of target,

represents part of the calculation an organization makes.

Both tactic and targeting reflect a political statement.

Hoffman notes, "[suicide terrorism] is seen by its

adherents as a particularly effective way to communicate a

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[70] Palestinian psychiatrist Iyad El Sarraj states: "The children who threw stones and Molotov cocktails and confronted Israeli soldiers in 1987 are the young men [and women] who are the martyrs of today." Quoted in Barbara Victor, *Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers* (Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003), 40.

[71] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 58-61.

[72] In 2004 Mia M. Bloom identified two "audiences." In 2005, she included the international community as a third audience. See Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004): 64; and Bloom, *Dying to Kill*. Another scholar separates the internal population from rival organizations within it. See Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 44.

violent message…[and such] attacks are thus conducted for the purpose of demonstrating the terrorist organization's ability and determination to use violence to achieve its political objectives."[73] In addition to terrorizing Israeli society, Hamas has utilized suicide-homicide bombers to distinguish itself within the greater Palestinian movement,[74] so as to achieve its political objectives on the "domestic" front.

As Arafat used the PA's newly acquired power to repress rival-militant groups in the mid-1990s,[75] Hamas and PIJ had to look for ways to dodge PA-imposed "political limitations."[76] Suicide-homicide attacks against Israelis worked as the perfect instrument not only to maintain resistance against Israel, but also to undermine the PA's legitimacy. When an Islamist organization launched a suicide-homicide attack against Israel, the Palestinian population's subsequent praise circumvented Arafat's political ability to reign in Hamas or PIJ leaders and other culprits who designed or participated in specific

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[73] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* 136-137.
[74] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* 137.
[75] Directly after the initiation of the Oslo peace process, Arafat "arrested over 2,000 [Hamas and PIJ] operatives, and killed twenty of their leaders." Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 66.
[76] Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*, 18.

suicide-terror attacks. Hoffman explains, "Hamas decided to challenge simultaneously the entire DOP framework, Arafat's leadership, and the PLO's authority."[77] Without the Palestinian population's support specifically for acts of suicide terrorism, Hamas could not have survived a simultaneous confrontation with the Fatah-led PA and Israel.

Terrorism is a learning process for organizations. So when a tactic works in the manner that the suicide-homicide attack worked for Hamas and PIJ, it has a tendency to take on a life of its own within the particular organization; hence the old *film noir* detective notion: 'Its their MO, so they must have done it.' The importance that certain *modi operandi* play in an organization's overall strategy encourages the organization to seek ways to ensure continued availability of individuals willing to participate in the specific types of operations. For Hamas, other Islamist-Palestinian organizations, and eventually some of the "secular" Palestinian groups represented in the PLO/PA, the ability to deploy suicide-homicide bombers reached the top of their respective priority lists. In the Palestinian context, Hamas's initial success of the *modus*

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[77] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* 149; see also Abu-Amr, "Hamas," 13.

operandi spawned widespread organizational realization of

suicide-homicide bombers' strategic value. One of PIJ's

founders, Fathi Shaqaqi, indeed articulated the idea of

using "'exceptional' martyrdom operations" as a potential

Palestinian strategy sometime in the mid-1980s.[78] And in

1986, Israel's domestic security agency, the Shin Bet,

foiled a PIJ plot to send a 19-year old girl from Bethlehem

on a suicide-homicide bombing attack into Israel.[79] Hamas

however succeeded first on April 16, 1993 in using the

modus operandi against Israeli interests.[80] Due to the

success suicide-homicide attacks brought the organization

on a variety of levels, particularly after the signing of

the DOP, Hamas sought to do everything within its power to

accentuate various elements in the Palestinian environment

and collective identity so that they conditioned

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[78] Some researchers put Shaqaqi's statement circa 1988, but an attack plotted two years earlier by PIJ suggests the organization had thought about using suicide terrorism sometime well before its leader articulated it publicly. See Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," *Science* 299, issue 5612 (7 March 2003): 1534-1539; Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs,* 17; and Hassan.
[79] Notes from ICT seminar on "The Global Jihad," given by Reuven Paz, in Herzliya, Israel (21 June 2005).
[80] In 1993, Hamas and PIJ launched a combined eight suicide-homicide bomber attacks. This debunks a popular notion in the scholarship that suggests that Palestinian organizations' initiation of suicide-homicide attacks was in response to Dr. Baruch Goldstein's small-arms attack at the Machpela Cave in Hebron on February 25, 1994, which left 29 Palestinians dead. See Shaul Shay, *The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks* (London: Transaction Publishers, 2004), 52-53.

individuals not only to accept and support suicide

terrorism but also seek to participate in launching an

attack in one way or another.

The Culture of Martyrdom and Its
Socio-Political Development

"This is not suicide; it is war," so goes one

Palestinian's explanation of why he tried to attain

"martyrdom" through an act of suicide terrorism.[81] While

complicated at the individual level,[82] the statement holds

true for Palestinian organizations. Far from organizational

suicide, the deployment of suicide-homicide bombers simply

marks an organization's calculus of its position in

relation to its end-goals.[83] Functioning as a conduit

between individuals and organizations, "the support of the

community" sustains a suicide terror campaign.[84]

Since the first *intifada* and culminating during the

second, Palestinian terror machines, such as the one headed

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[81] Interviewed in *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber*, prod. and dir.
David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films,
2006, DVD.
[82] Chapter Six explores at length individual Palestinians'
rationality in participating in suicide terrorism, particularly
concerning most suicide-homicide bombers' conditioned
understanding of suicide as "martyrdom."
[83] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 25.
[84] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 163.

by Hamas, have polished the processes of launching suicide-

homicide attacks. Palestinian terror organizations advanced

the recruitment/selection process by helping construct and

in turn feed off of a culture of martyrdom that operates as

a link between the various steps in the individual's path

to "martyrdom"--the steps of reasoning, justifying,

rationalizing and participating. The culture of martyrdom

funnels individuals through the various steps, mentally

preparing and convincing them of the legitimacy of their

actions. Scholars Anat Berko and Edna Erez explain,

> Easy access to suicide-facilitating
> organizations, beliefs in impending rewards of
> martyrs, together with ever-present communal
> exaltation of *shahids*, creates an environment
> that produces a steady supply of candidates, [and
> ultimately] emboldens… individuals to join the
> suicide industry.[85]

The Palestinian culture of martyrdom thus performs the

sanctioning component that many terrorists rely on to

legitimate their actions. Suicide-terrorism expert,

Mohammed M. Hafez notes that Palestinian terror

organizations have "promote[d] a culture of martyrdom based

on religious appeals and innovative rituals to convince the

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[85] Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work':
Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims," *Violence
and Victims* 20, no. 6 (December 2005): 616.

broader public of the value of suicide bombings."[86]

Organizations have increasingly understood that the

sustained use of suicide-homicide bombers requires a daily

interaction between its terror apparatus and the community

at large. Hamas with its *da'awa* infrastructure had a jump

on its rivals regarding an intimate social connection with

its constituents and potential operatives.

The Social Synthesis of Competing Political Ideologies: Palestinian Identity Solidified?

By 1996 the IDF viewed Hamas as the strongest

Palestinian "military" force in the disputed territories.[87]

Its "tenuous modus vivendi with the governing Palestinian

Authority," during the mid to late 1990s, facilitated

political Islam's advance further into the mainstream of

Palestinian society.[88] While putting a temporary halt on the

deployment of suicide-homicide bombers,[89] the lull in open

aggression between Hamas and the PA, allowed for the

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[86] Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs,* 32. Other explanations of the same phenomenon in Palestinian society refer to it as a "culture of suicide terrorists"; see Shaul Kimhi and Shmuel Even quoted in Levitt, *Hamas,* 108; and the "cult of the suicide bomber," see *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber,* prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD.
[87] See Israel Shahak, "Hamas and Arafat: The Balance of Power," *Middle East International* no. 486 (February 4, 1996): 17; see also Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* 152.
[88] Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism,* 152.
[89] From 1996 to September 2000, there were ten suicide-homicide bomber attacks. Refer to Appendix A.

previous to refocus its attention on its *da'awa* operations,

which had previously suffered from the PA's post-Oslo

crackdown. The rejuvenated operations also revived the Gaza

Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas's long-held goal of displaying the

PLO/PA's ineptitude to the Palestinian population.

Thus philanthropy explains a secondary motivation for

the refocusing on *da'awa*. Hamas expert Matthew Levitt

notes, "[t]he Hamas dawa serves several distinct functions

in support of the group's objectives and through which it

facilitates Hamas attacks."[90] In addition to personal

motivations derived from politics, religion, and/or other

identity-induced values and beliefs, individual suicide-

homicide bombers usually require affirmation that the

defined enemy threatens these same values and beliefs.

Accordingly, the individual's surrounding environment plays

an instrumental role.[91] In the late 1990s, Hamas refocused

on providing this necessity[92]; Levitt explains,

> ...the battery of mosques, schools, orphanages,
> summer camps, and sports leagues sponsored by
> Hamas are integral parts of an overarching

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[90] Levitt, *Hamas*, 6.

[91] Levitt, *Hamas*, 108.

[92] A central ideological component of the Muslim Brotherhood, one that often distinguishes it from its break-off organizations, remains the idea of establishing the "Other Society," i.e. an Islamic one, before *jihad* is launched against its defined enemies.

apparatus of terror…[all which] engage in incitement and radicalize society, and undertake recruitment efforts to socialize even the youngest children to aspire to die as martyrs. They provide logistical and operational support for weapons smuggling, reconnaissance, and suicide bombing…[93]

And, as with any success story in a competitive environment, organizational imitation followed.

In late September 2000, as the peace process seemed indefinitely deadlocked, Palestinians unleashed a new *intifada*,[94] which, like the first, drastically changed the landscape of Palestinian politics. As al-Mujamma, through its establishment of Hamas, gained the ability to offer a serious alternative to the PLO during the first *intifada*, the second or *al-Aqsa intifada* demonstrated a push for the 'new frontiersmen,' led by Hamas and PIJ, to begin replacing the 'old guard,' as symbolized by Fatah, which not only controlled the PA but also had demonstrated an inability, or unwillingness on Arafat's part, to reach a final status agreement with Israel.[95] The failure of the

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[93] Levitt, *Hamas*, 5.

[94] One should note, however, *al-Aqsa intifada* began "with *guerrilla* operations directed by al-Fatah and al-Fatah linked militias." See Ricolfi, 96.

[95] Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 26. A variety of books authored by involved leaders and officials provide useful insight into this historical event. For example, see Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Knopf, 2004); Dennis Ross, *Missing Peace: The Inside Story*

peace process left many Palestinians dissatisfied and a

gave them another reason to shift support to Hamas or other

Islamist organizations,[96] which made no pretensions about

pursuing peace yet offered a sense of righteousness in

continuing violent resistance.

With more Palestinians joining the ranks of the Hamas

loyal throughout the 1990s and early 2000s the Palestinian

collective identity shifted its hierarchal components. The

constant barrage of political bombshells Hamas dropped on

the PA's doorstep, and the popular support for such

actions, forced Arafat to match moves on the resistance

front in order for the PA to maintain functional legitimacy

with the Palestinian populace. Fatah members and

supporters, as well as those of other PLO groups began

massive political mobilization[97]--culminating with *al-Aqsa*

intifada, which served not only to revive the rivalry

between Hamas and the Fatah-led PA, but also worked to

amalgamate the opposing sides' methods of political

expression. For the contemporary battlefield, Hamas and PIJ

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of the *Fight for Middle East Peace* (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2004).

[96] The unpopularity of Arafat and the PA started well before the
second *intifada.* From 1996 to 2000, Arafat's approval rating
among Palestinians hovered around 27 percent. See Bloom,
"Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 69.

[97] Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*, 96-97.

provided the contextual testing of suicide-homicide

attacks. Additionally, with Islam finding an even greater

role in the Palestinian political arena, secular groups

found it imperative to relate their ideologies to some form

of Islamic message.[98]

Hamas had, as early as 1987, ideologically outflanked

all other Palestinian political organizations by adopting

nationalist rhetoric without compromising a core Islamic

message.[99] Hamas successfully fused the Palestinian national

movement's tone with the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamist

worldview, and in doing so assembled together the two most

encompassing components of Palestinian identity. Hamas

reconciled these centrifugal forces by articulating, as its

primary objective, the destruction of Israel, which

fulfills the Islamist goal of removing a *kafir* (infidel)

nation-state from the lands of *dar al-Islam*, while also

satisfying Palestinian nationalists' desire to eradicate

the Jewish state rather than negotiate with it due to a

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[98] Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 29-34; Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 64;
and Levitt, *Hamas*, 13-14.
[99] See "Leaflet No. 1" in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni,
Speaking Stones: Communiqués from the Intifada Underground,
(Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 201-203. See
also excerpt of "Introductory Memorandum" in Steven Simon and
Jonathan Stevenson, "Confronting Hamas," *The National Interest* 74
(Winter 2004/2004): 60.

perceived "colonial/imperial" foundation that lacks any

legitimacy.[100] Thus, Hamas made *holy war* the cornerstone of

its *national* struggle. As this approach appealed to more

and more Palestinians, Arafat found it harder to ignore the

Islamic identity and corresponding Islamist ideology that

slowly crept toward the top of the Palestinian collective's

hierarchy of identities. By covering its ideological bases,

and literally sticking to its guns, Hamas proved its

religious sincerity and credentials in relation to

Palestinian *sammud*, not only to the general Palestinian

populace, but also to rival organizations.

The inability of Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister

Ehud Barak to agree on a final-status solution at the Camp

David II talks, despite U.S. President Bill Clinton's

tenacious mediating efforts, marked the completion of a

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[100] The Hamas charter, Chapter Three, Article 11 proclaims,
"[Hamas] believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf
[endowment] to all Muslim generations until the day of
resurrection. It is not right to give it up or any part of it."
Chapter Three, Article 13 goes on to declare: "peaceful
solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the
Palestinian problem, are all contradictory to the beliefs of the
Islamic Resistance Movement. Indeed, giving up any part of
Palestine is tantamount to betraying Islam. The nationalism of
the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its religion, the
movement instructs its members to adhere to its principles and to
raise the banner of Allah over their homeland as they fight their
Jihad...There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by
Jihad." See Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian
Hamas*, 181 and 183.

long-failing peace process. With Israel and the PA's
arrival at a diplomatic dead end, Arafat understood the
international protection of the PA's power laid at stake.
The Fatah-controlled PA saw a single option: to attempt to
regain widespread popular support within the Palestinian
population as a means for maintaining power. Arafat,
accordingly, ordered the adjustment of Fatah's image vis-à-
vis Palestinians. He understood the only way to play ball
was to resuscitate Fatah's participation in violent
resistance.[101] As a result, the PLO/Fatah-controlled PA
joined its rivals in the suicide-homicide bomber
business.[102]

In an effort to compete with the Islamist suicide-
homicide brigades, Hamas's al-Qassam Brigades and PIJ's al-
Quds[103] Brigades, Fatah established al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade

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[101] Indeed, many Palestinians seemingly offered Arafat a second
chance by welcoming him home from the failed Camp David II talks
as a "victor." See Ricolfi, 93.
[102] One scholar notes: "in the first weeks of the [second]
intifada, it seemed that the heads of Fatah could not decide what
steps they should take. Confusion in the organization's ranks was
demonstrated in the first period of these events, when veteran
activists restricted themselves to shooting incidents aimed at
Israeli civilian and military targets and younger members took
part in heavy riots and lynching of Israeli citizens. However,
these 'small noises' of the Fatah actions got lost in the mayhem
of the multitude of suicide attacks perpetrated by Hamas and
Islamic Jihad." See Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 63.
[103] Meaning "glorification of Allah," *al-Quds* stands for Jerusalem
in Arabic.

(AMB).[104] On November 29, 2001, marking a symbolic

completion of the Palestinian collective identity's

alteration, Fatah's newly formed AMB attacked Israel using

a suicide-homicide bomber.[105] A month earlier on October 17,

2001, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

(PFLP), a long-standing Marxist/Arab-nationalist group,

deployed its first suicide-homicide bomber.[106] Soon after, a

similar organization, the Democratic Front for the

Liberation of Palestine, claimed responsibility for a

number of suicide-homicide bombers.[107] By January 2002,

Arafat openly urged children to aspire to martyrdom on PA

television.[108] Over the following year, as scholar Ami

Pedahzur notes, "[t]he new Fatah suicide squads, endorsed

by the highest echelons of Fatah and the Palestinian

Authority, performed their duty to the full... [and] became

the most active group in the initiation of suicide

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[104] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 64.
[105] Coordinated with PIJ, this attack killed three people and wounded nine. Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 82.
[106] Prior to its initial suicide-terror attack, *al-Jahba al-Shabiyya li-Tahrir Falastin* (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) or PFLP established its own Islamist suicide-terror unit: Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades.
[107] Bloom, *Dying to Kill*, 29.
[108] Palestinian Media Watch "Topic V: PA Indoctrination of Children to Seek Heroic Death for Allah – Shahada," *TV Archives/Video Library* (2002): accessed at <www.pmw.org.il> on 28 October 2007.

actions."[109] Ultimately, *al-Aqsa intifada* marked an era

wherein popular support for the leading Palestinian

political organizations, including the PA, rose and fell

according to their ability to launch successful suicide-

homicide attacks.[110]

With the major Palestinian political organizations all

now playing to the same tune, suicide-homicide bombings

attacks increased significantly.[111] By 2002, a culture of

martyrdom had consumed most Palestinian institutions of

socialization,[112] ensuring future support for suicide

terrorism. Thus, by building on established religious,

ethnic and national narratives, drawing from the Islamic

texts of the Qur'an and Hadith, and seeking to

institutionalize an aura of victimhood, Palestinian terror

organizations reinvigorated the violent Palestinian

movement for self-determination. Yet, this time arming it

with a staunch Islamic fervor, supportive popular culture

that condoned the most abhorrent violence against

innocents, and, most importantly, a strategic weapon, which

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[109] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 64.
[110] Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing," 66.
[111] See Appendix A.
[112] Itamar Marcus, "The Indoctrination of Palestinian Children to Kill the Jews and Seek Death," in *The Jerusalem Alternative*, ed. Dmitry Radyshevsky (Greenforest, Ark.: Balfour Books, 2005), 217-219.

would provide a number of verifiable victories in the years
to come.

Palestinian Political Culture and Identity:
Same Song, Different Genre

Initially, culture and society worked as a middleman
for terror organizations seeking business with individuals,
but by *al-Aqsa intifada*, the roles had reversed and terror
organizations became the middleman for Palestinian
society's handiwork on individuals. A widespread culture of
martyrdom confirmed the ideological doctrines distributed
by terror organizations, and individuals were no longer
sought by organizations to commit suicide terrorism, but
rather vice versa. The initial relationship between terror
organizations and suicide-homicide bombers changed from one
of recruitment to selection. Berko and Erez explain,
"[s]ocial structures, value systems, and the collective
memory of a group combine[d] to produce a steady supply of
motivated [suicide-homicide bomber] candidates."[113] Pedahzur
adds:

> Changing patterns of recruitment and especially
> the transition from a careful culling of

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[113] Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work':
Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims," *Violence
and Victims* 20, no. 6 (December 2005): 617.

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candidates by trained recruiters to a mass
mobilization of volunteers emphasizes the success
of the organization in planting the roots of a
'culture of death' in a society which in return
provided endless numbers of prospective bombers
in time of need.[114]

Hamas's role in manipulating these forces led other

organizations including the Fatah-led PA to adopt similar

mobilization techniques and resistance methods--leaving

Palestinian society as a reflection of the same indignant

ideologies[115] that have maintained a death grip on it.

The culture of martyrdom and mechanized terror that

one finds so properly identifiable with contemporary

Palestinian society is not, however, the result of a few

cynical organizations[116] that play off of the desperation of

a confused populace. The *shahid* phenomenon, and the

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[114] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 170.
[115] Nominally "secular" Palestinian terrorist organizations have
also contributed to the culture of martyrdom. But this is not to
say that the culture is not Islamic in nature by any means. The
leadership of Fatah, the PFLP and others might often declare
organizations secular, yet their members are rarely secular or
non-Muslims. Similarly, to provide a Western example, the U.S.
House of Representatives is technically secular, but in reality
it is made up of Protestant, Catholic, other Christians, Jews,
and a variety of Americans who hold some kind of religious
beliefs. And, it is without a doubt that the overwhelming
majority of U.S. House members seek to uphold an institution
founded on Judeo-Christian principles, while simultaneously
maintaining a secular state.
[116] One leading counter-terrorism analyst has suggested that
organizations cynically use suicide-homicide bombers. See Boaz
Ganor interview in *Suicide Killers: Paradise Is Hell*, prod. and
dir. Pierre Rehov, 1 hr. 20 min., City Lights Pictures, 2006,
DVD.

mechanized terror and culture of martyrdom that facilitate

the production of suicide-homicide bombers, all represent

products of nearly a century of the fluctuation of a

distinct national identity whose members have negotiated

components within it, while pursuing "Palestinian"

political goals. Certainly, precedents set by Palestinian

Arab organizations in pursuit of these same goals, as well

as Israeli responses to methods employed by organizations,

have aided in the establishment of the phenomena listed

above, but nothing accounts for them more than the process

of matching ends with effective means, which have some type

of justifiable employment as filtered through religion,

culture and other forms of behavior-legitimizing elements

of identity.

Today, the Palestinian movement stands as neither

entirely ethno-nationalistic nor fully Islamist. It is

both.[117] The political mobilization of the Palestinian

population through political Islam's establishment as a

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[117] Many assume that the Islamicization of the Palestinian
movement for self-determination over the last two decades is
simply a result of the PLO/PA's failure to obtain a Palestinian
state; this notion fails to recognize Palestinian Arabs history
dating back to the early 1920s and before when Islamic
authorities and political leaders were one and the same. Islam
has always played an important role in the national consciousness
of Palestinian Arabs; it just at times has not played the
dominant one.

counter to the PLO opened the Palestinian national consciousness to renewed introspection. Moreover, the development of a culture of martyrdom in Palestinian society and the anointment of the *shahid* as the national Palestinian icon demonstrate the lengths a society can take to ensure its values are maintained and goals are met. Furthermore, the Palestinian population has shown that it tenaciously holds on to its revered notion of *sammud*. Generation after generation, Palestinians have remained true to their collective standard of an appropriate final status over the old territory of Mandatory Palestine. When the PLO/PA failed to uphold these standards, it opened the door for a new Palestinian representative. Candidates emerged and precipitated an unparalleled competition with the PLO. Like all good competitions, efficiency marked the end result. Efficient representation, mobilization, and most apparently efficient uses of violence emerged at the forefront of the Palestinian movement for self-determination.

Purely erratic behavior rarely governs the pursuit of political goals. Often specific socio-cultural concepts of how to engage an enemy drives the means through which an entity, whether a nation-state, political party or terror

organization, seeks its end-goals. State and non-state

actors alike usually seek to match a capability with their

motivation--i.e. their political pursuits, yet culture

plays a key role in filtering tactics and therefore

strategy as well. As of 2007, *jihad* and *istishhad*, the main

ideological forces behind suicide-homicide bombers in the

Palestinian context, rested at the core of organizations

including Hamas, PIJ, AMB, the Popular Resistance

Committees, the al-Qaeda-linked Army of Islam, the recently

formed *Kataeb Abu-Amar* (Abu Amar Brigades), and other

Islamist-Palestinian organizations of the like. The *shahid*,

in the form of a suicide-homicide bomber, has accordingly

found a central role in these organizations. Moreover, the

Palestinian use of suicide-homicide bombers demonstrates

how terrorism can be just as much about internal political

posturing as it is about waging an external war.

Additionally, it shows, in a time of war, when an

organization strays from its army in favor of unpopular

diplomatic pursuits, it signals to the represented populace

that its interests have been replaced by those of the

organization. Ultimately, the *shahid*/suicide-homicide

bomber phenomenon confirms the necessity of the

Clausewitzian people-government-army model in waging an

effective military campaign--or in this case, a terror

campaign waged by a people, representative organizations,

and their armies of death and murder-craving bombers.

CHAPTER FIVE

A STRATEGIC TERROR WEAPON (THE SUICIDE-HOMICIDE BOMBER) AS THE PARAMOUNT TERRORIST (THE SHAHID): MATCHING CAPABILITY TO MOTIVATION

> [Hamas] advanced the Intifada from the
> stone age to suicide attacks[1]
> -IDF Brigadier General Yaakov Amidor, 1995

> We do not have tanks or rockets,
> but we have something superior--
> our exploding Islamic human bombs.
> In place of a nuclear arsenal, we
> are a proud arsenal of believers.[2]
> -Hamas Member, 2001

On October 4, 2003, Hanadi Taysir Jaradat entered the Maxim restaurant in the Northern Israeli city of Haifa, ordered a chicken kebab, sat down, ate her meal, and then walked to the middle room, stood between the tables of two families dining, smiled and detonated the 22-pound bomb strapped to her stomach. Along with taking her own life, the 27-year old lawyer/Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

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[1] Yaakov Amidor quoted in Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), 48.
[2] Quoted in Nasra Hassan, "Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of Believers," *The New Yorker*, 19 November 2001.

operative from a village outside Jenin[3] murdered 21 people

and wounded 60.[4] The two Israeli families closest to the

blast lost loved-ones spanning three generations. The Almog

family alone lost: Zeev, age 71 and his wife Ruth, age 70,

their son Moshe, age 43, his son Tomer, age 9, and another

Almog-grandson Asaf Shtayer, age 11; the family also had

four wounded.[5] This describes only one of hundreds of

suicide-homicide attacks perpetrated by Palestinian terror

organizations against Israeli civilians. It is, however,

representative of an attack that Palestinian terror

organizations deem "successful," and the type that

Palestinian society reacts to with praise; indeed,

Palestinian media heralded Jaradat as the "Bride of Haifa."[6]

Additionally, the attack on the Maxim restaurant represents

the kind of horror that caused great anxiety in Israeli

society, and eventually led the Sharon government to begin

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[3] Hanadi Jaradat hailed from Silat al-Hartiya, which is the same village where Abdallah Azzam, the founder of al-Qaeda was raised; see Yoni Fighel, "Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Female Suicide Bombers," *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT): Articles* (6 October 2003): accessed at <www.instituteforcounterterrorism.org> on 10 October 2007.
[4] Kevin Toolis, "Suicide Bomber Caught in the Act; why these girls want to be Martyrs." *Herald Sun*, 16 September 2006.
[5] John Ward Anderson and Molly Moore, "For 2 Families in Haifa, 3 Generations of Victims," *The Washington Post*, 6 October 2003.
[6] See Chapter Six for an explanation of this term.

erecting a security/separation barrier between Israel proper and the disputed territories.

In sum, the Palestinian's *al-Aqsa intifada*, from September 29, 2000 to November 2005, took the lives of 1,074 Israelis and seriously wounded another 7,520; Israelis spent a combined 11,724 days in hospitals due to injuries sustained from Palestinian terror attacks.[7] The psychological damage remains incalculable. Palestinian terrorism and more acutely suicide-homicide bombers own the responsibility of the tragedy reflected in these harrowing statistics. Furthermore, suicide-homicide bombers delivered Palestinian political and territorial gains that resulted from concessions made by the Sharon and Olmert governments.

The Palestinian *shahid* thus emerged from *al-Aqsa intifada*, marking the epitome of modern terrorism.[8] Beginning in the Oslo years, the *shahid*, who personally views the "martyrdom operation" as an end unto itself,[9] demonstrated a new capability--to strike Israel anywhere and at anytime--all while leaving security forces with

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[7] Terror Medicine International Center, *Since the Beginning of the Last Terror Wave in Israel* (November 2005): accessed at <www.terrormedicine.org/data.htm>.
[8] Notes from ICT seminar on "Modern and Post-Modern Terrorism Strategies," given by Boaz Ganor, in Herzliya, Israel (8 June 2005).
[9] See Chapter Six for a full explanation of this notion.

minimal counter-terrorism opportunities. As an increasingly

valuable weapon for their war with Israel, Palestinian

terror organizations brought together decades worth of

incitement methods to ensure continued availability of

potential shahids. Consequently, by the end of the 1990s, a

widespread culture of martyrdom had come to fruition.[10]

Palestinian terror organizations accordingly utilized this

culture of martyrdom in optimizing the production of

suicide-homicide bombers. Employing the culture of

martyrdom resulted in the normalization of Palestinian

"martyrdom operations," as displayed by the unremitting

flow of suicide-homicide bombers during *al-Aqsa intifada*.

By effectively symbolizing Palestinian *sammud*

(steadfastness), or the refusal to abandon maximalist aims

based on religious, ethnic, and nationalist components of

collective identity, the *shahid,* coupled with defeatist

responses by Israel, enabled a strategic capability within

suicide-homicide attacks. Overall, the *shahid* phenomenon

demonstrates a tenacity on the part of Palestinian society

that reverberates far beyond the political ultimatums of

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[10] By 2002, "vast segments of Palestinian culture ha[d] been given over to the creation and nurturing of suicide bombers." David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not just a Means but an End," *The Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 6 (June 2002): 19.

traditional modern terrorism, which usually provoke little

more than a military response or police action by the

targeted government and is likewise met with a rebellious

resolve on the part of the victimized society; Palestinian

suicide-homicide bombers effectively wore Israel down past

this point. Additionally, the Palestinian use of suicide-

homicide operations surpasses the simplicity of a guerrilla

tactic that exacts a victory by continuously attacking

until the targeted nation-state concedes its interests,

which are rarely, if ever, strategic in nature. Israel's

very existence lays at stake, yet Palestinian suicide-

homicide bombers still proved successful in extorting

concessions from the Jewish state. The Palestinian *shahid*

represents a society willing to do anything to destroy its

enemy, even if it means destroying itself. Unlike anything

else in the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the

Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber has precipitated the

Jewish state's reckless reaction,[11] somber reclusion[12] and,

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[11] Careless responses to terrorism have at times worked in favor
of Palestinian organizations regarding the international media
war.
[12] Israel's economy suffered greatly as production slowed in
Israeli society due to widespread anxiety caused by the suicide-
homicide bomber threat.

most costly, its territorial retreat.[13] The fruitless

conclusion of the Oslo peace process, the construction of a

security/separation barrier roughly along the 1967

greenline,[14] the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and the

fragmentation of the Likud party collectively demonstrate

that the second-intifada's *shahid* successfully delivered

the message of Palestinian *sammud* to Israel. By targeting

civilians *en masse*, and demonstrating that participation in

"martyrdom operations" represent personal end-goals,

Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers evolved their *modus*

operandi from a guerrilla tactic to a strategic terror

weapon. Ultimately, the employment of suicide-homicide

bombers provided Palestinian terror organizations and

society with a catalog of unmatched strategic victories.

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[13] Territorial gains proved beyond a doubt the shahid's political
success.
[14] If completed, Israel's security barrier will mostly follow
along the "greenline," or pre-1967 Six-Day War border, with
exceptions made for some Jewish settlements in Ariel, Efrat, and
in the greater Jerusalem area; see Israel Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, "The Anti-Terrorist Fence," *Israel in Maps* (20 February
2005): accessed at <www.mfa.gov.il/ MFA/Facts> on 8 February
2008.

Strategy Adopted and Adapted:
Fitting Goals with Means

Many think of strategic weapons as nuclear devices or weapons of mass destruction attached to inter-continental ballistic missiles that allow warheads to travel across continents, and kill large portions of a targeted populace. Such a definition derives from the Cold War-era when the use of force came predominantly from superpowers or their controllable proxies. In today's post-9/11 era paradigm, where nation-states increasingly find themselves engaged in conflict with non-state actors, warfare often develops, not from the remaining allowances of deterrence policies, but rather from the summation of warring entities' respective motivations and capabilities, or political will and military prowess.

Consequently, suicide-homicide attacks have become the weapon of choice by entities, which are significantly outgunned, yet highly motivated to attack their enemies. As "strategy provides the bridge between military means and political goals,"[15] strategists therefore seek to match capability with motivation. Weapons are not strategic, yet some are capable, insofar as the needed motivation exists,

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[15] John Baylis et al., *Strategy in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3.

of strategic employment. The suicide-homicide bomber

represents one such weapon, which at the predetermined cost

of one's life, tends to guarantee an exponential return for

the producing organization and/or sanctioning body. Indeed,

at times, the Palestinian *shahid*/suicide-homicide bomber

has seamlessly fused optimal motivation with optimum

capability--effectively functioning simultaneously as the

paramount terrorist and perfect weapon.

Suicide-homicide attacks exemplify, and regularly

maximize, the political and socio-psychological components

of terrorism. The political pressure created by suicide-

terror attacks often provides those who utilize such

operations with the capability to extort concessions from a

particular nation-state that otherwise would have been

unlikely. Given the right circumstances, suicide-homicide

bombers, who are basically mobile-thinking bombs, have the

ability to change geopolitical circumstances, which in turn

can alter a targeted nation-state's strategic environment.[16]

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[16] To date, suicide-homicide operations have significantly altered
the strategic environments of at least three Middle Eastern
nation-states: Lebanon in the 1980s, Israel during the second-
Palestinian *intifada*, and currently in Iraq. Additionally, the
9/11 attacks forced the U.S. government to rethink its entire
collection of foreign and security policies.

Guerilla groups, terrorist organizations and rogue
states alike find suicide-homicide attacks attractive for a
number of reasons.[17] First, that the perpetrators die during
the attack precludes an interrogation by security services,
and therefore provides those who deploy suicide-homicide
bombers plausible deniability and anonymity if desired (as
is usually the case with state-sponsored terrorism).
Second, suicide-homicide operations allow for significant
attack fluidity, as the perpetrators can penetrate enemy
territory often undetected and with subsequent freedom of
movement. Israeli terrorism analyst Shaul Shay explains:

> [The suicide-homicide bomber's] control over
> timing and venue enables its direction so that it
> will cause maximum damage… The suicide attacker

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[17] While this chapter and more specifically this section addresses
organizations and their use of suicide terrorism, it should be
noted that levels of subgroups' autonomy on the ability to launch
suicide-homicide attacks varies with organization and subgroup.
With a variety of research pointing to the strategic use of
suicide terrorism by Palestinian organizations, analysts have
somewhat ignored intra-organization posturing similarly as they
have inter-organization rivalries. While only a few scholars such
as Mia Bloom and Bruce Hoffman have studied extensively the
effects of inter-organizational rivalries on the suicide-terror
phenomenon, even less research has been carried out on the
effects of intra-organizational maneuvering on suicide-homicide
attacks. Scholars Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger have discovered
that suicide-homicide bombers are not always the result of a
rational pursuit at the organization level, but rather at the
hamula (clan) or "network" level. This provides some insight to
why organizations might seem more or less cohesive and effective
from time to time. See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The
Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network
Perspective," *Social Forces* 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987-2008.

> is a kind of sophisticated guided missile that
> knows how to launch the explosive charge at the
> target [and] at the optimal timing.[18]

Third, because the suicide-homicide bomber has

accessibility that likens him or her to a multi-million

dollar missile, yet is fairly inexpensive to deploy and

possibly an even more precise killing tool than a precision

bomb, makes him or her an exceptionally efficient weapon.

RAND Corporation calculates that "suicide terrorist attacks

cause four times more casualties than other types of

terror," and in Israel that number jumps to six times as

many.[19] During *al-Aqsa intifada*, suicide-homicide bombers

initiated just one percent of all the terrorist attacks,

but accounted for 50 percent of the entire murders.[20] A

highly efficient and cost-effective weapon, the suicide-

homicide bomber adds a priceless component to the arsenal

of terror organizations. Indeed, a suicide-homicide attack

represents a bottom-dollar operation that oftentimes

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[18] Shaul Shay, *The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks* (London: Transaction Publishers, 2004), 7.
[19] Bruce Hoffman, "Modern Terrorism Trends: Reevaluation after 9/11," in *Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats*, ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 2005), 41.
[20] Boaz Ganor, "The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon," in *Countering Suicide Terrorism*, updated ed. (Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007).

provides top-dollar results.[21] Fourth, some terrorist

organizations have learned how to use suicide-homicide

attacks as a recruiting tool, by fusing the *modus operandi*

with religiously and culturally sanctioned martyrdom. As a

result, these organizations have increased motivation and

in doing so extended their capability. Fifth, highlighting

its latent strategic nature, the suicide-homicide bomber

usually functions as the single weapon in an organization's

arsenal that allows it to attack an enemy at a desired

level. Last and perhaps most importantly, suicide-homicide

attacks assure media coverage--thus aiding in the central

component of terrorism and guerrilla warfare theory:

winning politically, but not necessarily through a decisive

military victory against enemy armies.

While suicide-homicide attacks have many advantages,

they do not serve as a magic bullet for each and every

organization wishing to extort political concessions. In

other words, all suicide-homicide bombers are not created

equal. Context determines a suicide-homicide attack's

strategic potential, or lack thereof. Terrorism expert

Bruce Hoffman states, "[s]uicide terror attacks are

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[21] See Bruce Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Bombers: Lessons from Israel that America Must Learn," *The Atlantic Monthly* 291, no. 5 (June 2003): 42.

rational acts undertaken as part of a deliberately

calculated and orchestrated campaign to undermine

confidence in government and leadership, crush popular

morale, and spread fear and intimidation."[22] Thus the

reception of the targeted government plays a vital role in

granting strategic capability to a suicide-terror campaign.

Over the decades, Palestinian terror organizations have

manipulated social and political variables in their favor--

ending with a weapon that best suited environmental

circumstances, as it proved to induce desired results in

the political arena. Responses from various Israeli

governments, however, have played an equally important role

in the suicide-homicide bomber's rise as a strategic

weapon.

<center>

The Pioneer and the Refiners: Hezballah
and the Palestinians
</center>

Suicide-homicide attacks, despite frequent usage in

recent years, do not constitute a new phenomenon. The

modern use of perpetrators' suicides in *modi operandi* has

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[22] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, revised and expanded ed. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 168. See also Ganor, "The
Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon."

developed mostly over the last 40 years,[23] beginning with

the "suicide missions"[24] of the Palestinian *fedayin* of the

late 1960s leading to Iran's "mine jumpers"[25] during the

1980's Iran-Iraq War and culminating with the Palestinian

shahid's suicide-terror attacks. The pioneering of modern

suicide-homicide attacks, however, lies with Hezballah.

Suicide-homicide bombers often possess a vital

characteristic that falls within traditional definitions of

strategic weapons. In explaining the genesis of the term

"strategic," Lawrence Freedman notes,

> ...fledgling air forces, after World War I, were
> anxious to demonstrate that they possessed *a
> means for getting right to the heart of the
> enemy's power and destroying it with some well-
> chosen blows*, they described this as a
> 'strategic' capability [emphasis added].[26]

Such "well-chosen blows," in the form of suicide-homicide

attacks, have been dealt to the United States (U.S.),

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[23] There are examples that predate 1968, such as the Imperial
Japanese use of *Kamikaze* pilots against the U.S. Navy during
World War II.
[24] A common definition explains "suicide missions" as those in
which "the terrorist does not expect to survive," but does not
intentionally seek death; "suicide attacks" or suicide-homicide
attacks, are those "in which the attacker kills himself
or…herself" during the operation. See Robert Pape, *Dying to Win:
The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House,
2005), 10-11.
[25] See Christoph Reuter, *My Life Is a Weapon* (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 44-47.
[26] Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), xviii.

Israel, Iraq, the United Kingdom (UK) and a number other

nation-states in attempts by organizations to directly

target an enemy's power, whether symbolic, military,

economic, political or otherwise. Over the last few

decades, a targeted nation-state's political will rather

than its sheer military might has frequently characterized

the "heart of the enemy's power." The example of U.S.

involvement in Lebanon in the early 1980s validates this

point.

In 1982, the Reagan administration dispatched U.S.

Marines to Lebanon to act as the chief contingent of an

international peacekeeping force, charged with the mission

of curtailing the ongoing civil war, and overlapping

Israel-PLO war. While Lebanon remained a fragile

environment, U.S. and French forces made headway in

marginalizing Iran and Syria--the state sponsors of the

various aggressors in the conflicts. However, the

Pasdaran's Frankenstein creation, Hezballah, along with a

federation of other Muslim groups,[27] operating under the

name Islamic Jihad Organization, set out on a suicide-

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[27] While most of the groups were Shi'a, Palestinian Fatah, which
is Sunni, did play an important role. See Robert Baer, *See No
Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on
Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2002).

homicide attack campaign with the goal of driving out U.S. and French forces, in order to establish Iranian-Syrian-PLO dominance in Lebanon and to battle Israel on favorable turf without an American presence.

On April 18, 1983, a suicide-homicide bomber drove a van into the U.S. embassy in Beirut and detonated 400 kilograms of explosives,[28] killing 63 people, including numerous CIA employees, and wounding 120 others.[29] On October 23, 1983, suicide-homicide truck bombers attacked the U.S. Marines (killing 246)[30] and French paratroopers barracks (killing 58)[31] in Beirut. After these and a few other devastating suicide-homicide attacks on its interests, the U.S. pulled the Marines out of Lebanon on February 26, 1984. For the first time in modern history, a superpower pulled out of an engagement due to the actions of an enemy, which investigators could not even identify.

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[28] Shay, *The Shahids*, 91.
[29] *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber*, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD; Shay, *The Shahids*, 91.
[30] The deaths included 220 U.S. marines, 18 sailors, three soldiers, and five Lebanese. Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 71.
[31] French paratroopers account for all 58 killed in this attack. Norton, 71.

Thus a few "well-chosen blows" against U.S. targets

convinced the Reagan administration to end America's

presence in Lebanon, rather than stay and "run the risk of

another suicide attack on the Marines," to put it in

President Ronald Reagan's words.[32] One should note that it

is highly unlikely that the attacks could have succeeded

with the level that the did had the attackers, instead of

taking their own lives, opted to try and plant the

explosives close enough to the embassy and barracks to

inflict an equal amount of casualties and damage. The

attack on the U.S. Marine barracks marked the largest

conventional explosion at the time since the end of World

War II (WWII).[33] Therefore, reason suggests that a few

suicide attackers, armed with automobiles and enough

explosives to destroy a score of buildings, altered the

security environment of a state, as well as drove out a

superpower, both of which proved to have severe

repercussions for the decades to come.

Accordingly, many accredit the suicide-homicide

bomber's advent to its successful usage in Lebanon. Since

its campaign against the U.S. in Lebanon, Hezballah has

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[32] U.S. President Ronald Reagan quoted in Pape, 65.
[33] See *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber*.

influenced and inspired Amal,[34] the Syrian Socialist-

National Party (SSNP), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, al-Qaeda,

and others in their uses of suicide-homicide attacks.

Hezballah's influence on other Muslim (both Shi'a and

Sunni) organizations, however, surpasses the importance of

the impression it left on militant groups spanning the

ideological spectrum; militarily, Hezballah directed

various Islamic organizations' attention away from suicide

missions and onto suicide-homicide attacks. In religious

and cultural terms, Hezballah shifted the focus from the

feda'i to the *shahid*. Middle East Historian, Rafael Israeli

explains the subtle but important difference between the

two notions:

> ...both shahid and fida'I are motivated by a
> profound and numbing religious fanaticism which
> pushes them to commit acts of self-sacrifice,
> which we usually refer to as 'suicide attacks'...
> However, while the shahid is a martyr in the
> sense that he is serving a cause, the fida'I
> connotes more of a devotion to a leader.[35]

Thus the focus of Islamic martyrdom shifted from the

specific to the universal. It moved away from the

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[34] Meaning "hope" in Arabic, the acronym *Amal* stands for *Afwaj al-Muqawamat al-Lubnaniyye* (Lebanese Resistance Detachments).
[35] Rafael Israeli, *Islamikaze* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 75.

established organization member to any individual who

aspired *ad hoc* to answer the call of *jihad*.[36]

One should not downplay the impact Hezballah has had

on many militant organizations around the globe. However,

its widespread usage of suicide-homicide attacks slowed in

the late 1980s, due to leaderships' concerns over its long-

term social effects.[37] Regarding the evolution of suicide-

homicide attacks, Hezballah passed the baton to the

Palestinians. As a result, Palestinian organizations hold

more of the responsibility than any others for the fine-

tuning of the *shahid*, as simultaneously a religious symbol

and ruthless-killing machine.[38]

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[36] This difference has played an important role concerning the
development of Palestinian suicide terrorism, considering most·
Palestinian shahids are not long-time members of an organization
at the time of launching their suicide-homicide attacks. Rather
Palestinian suicide terrorists are oftentimes periphery members
of a social network affiliated with an organization, and
capriciously decide to carry out an attack; see Ami Pedahzur and
Arie Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social
Network Perspective." *Social Forces* 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 1987–
2008.
[37] Hezballah's spiritual advisor, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah
issued a *fatwa* (Islamic degree) authorizing martyrdom operations
"only on special occasions" due to a fear of over "exaggerated
use [by] over-zealous youth." See Rafael Israeli, "A Manual of
Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political
Violence* 14, no. 4 (24 January 2002): 30.
[38] Perhaps, most importantly, Palestinians successfully
transferred the explicitly Shi'a version of martyrdom and the
shahid to the Sunni world. Chapter Seven reviews the significance
of this in depth.

Death by Ten Thousand Bee Stings

     In late 1992, as a response to the seemingly endless

first *intifada*, Israel's Rabin government made the

disastrous mistake of deporting the uprising's leaders and

other "Islamic Palestinian activists," including both Hamas

and PIJ members, to Southern Lebanon.[39] Under the auspices

of Hezballah and the Pasdaran, these Hamas and PIJ members

learned the functional elements of suicide-homicide

attacks, and established enduring connections with their

hosts.[40] Compounding its mistakes, the Rabin government

allowed many of the 418 deportees to return to the disputed

territories by the end of 1993.[41] It is by no coincidence

then that Hamas and PIJ attacked Israel with suicide-

homicide bombers a combined eight times during 1993.

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[39] At this time, Israel deported between 415 and 418 Palestinians
to Lebanon; see Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 148; and Scott Atran,
"Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," *Science* 299, issue 5612 (7 March
2003).
[40] Hoffman notes, "PIJ...benefited doubly, forging tighter
relations with Iran while significantly enhancing its military
capabilities under Hezbollah's tutelage." Hoffman, *Inside
Terrorism*, 148.
[41] Although Hamas is 100 percent Sunni, they were more than
willing to cooperate with the Shi'a in Lebanon, as they view
Israel as a common enemy. Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of
God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper Collins,
2003), 47.

The mid-1990s, accordingly, saw "the heyday of

[Palestinian] suicide-bombers."[42] The "heyday" that is,

until the situation worsened exponentially, when *al-Aqsa*

intifada brought daily suicide-homicide attacks on Israeli

civilians. At the height of this campaign, Israeli

Historian Benny Morris explained, "[t]he Palestinians say

they have found a strategic weapon, and suicide bombing is

it…The streets are empty. They have effectively terrorized

Israeli society. My wife won't use a bus anymore, only a

taxi."[43] The constant attacks on soft, i.e. civilian and

non-combative military, targets by Palestinian suicide-

homicide bombers paralyzed Israeli society and its once

burgeoning economy. As suicide-terror attacks began to

represent "one of Israel's gravest strategic threats"[44] and

take their toll on the Israeli civilian population, the

Israeli government, headed by a newly elected Prime

Minister Ariel Sharon, acknowledged that it had to deny

entry of terrorists from the disputed territories into

Israel proper at all costs. Scholar Ami Pedahzur notes,

"[a]bout halfway through the year 2002, Israel defined

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[42] Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 626.
[43] Hoffman, "The Logic of Suicide Bombers."
[44] Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 65.

suicide terrorism as a first-degree strategic threat and began to take great pains in dealing with it."[45] For months Israel responded with extensive military and counter-terrorism operations. But, after a two and half-year barrage of continuous suicide-terrorist attacks, the Sharon government, in order to decisively put a stop to the daily infiltration of suicide-homicide bombers, began construction of a security/separation barrier roughly along the "greenline," which demarcates Israel proper from the disputed territories.[46]

Although Israel's (partially built) security barrier has resulted in short-term tactical success,[47] the lack of a larger territorial buffer zone could very well turn out only to expose a strategic blunder in the long-term. With the barrier's construction, Israel has significantly altered its security situation in its favor regarding the prevention of suicide-terrorist attacks. However, the

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[45] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 64.
[46] Specifically, the "greenline" refers to Israel's pre-1967 Six-Day War borders; however, today many use the term as including some settlement blocs as well.
[47] In the areas where the security barrier has already been constructed, it has successfully cut off potential suicide-homicide bombers' access into Israel proper from the disputed territories. This has resulted in a reduction of suicide-homicide attacks by 90 percent in Israel; and, it has reduced terrorist attacks in general by 80 percent. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs <www.mfa.gov.il> (May 2006).

security barrier has different implications for Israel's

national military strategy, as the barrier acts as a

tourniquet, which has stopped the bleeding caused by the

second intifada's suicide-terror spree, but in doing so

forces the amputation of a vital portion of Israel's

geographical body. Ultimately, Israel's security barrier

project offers tactical pros at the expense of paying

strategic cons. Israel acted to barricade itself largely,

if not solely, in response to the suicide-homicide bomber

campaign unleashed by Hamas, PIJ, and al-Aqsa Martyrs'

Brigade (AMB). While many view the security barrier as a

counter-terrorism necessity to prevent infiltration by

suicide-homicide bombers, terror organizations that

surround Israel in the disputed territories as well as

Hezballah in Southern Lebanon, have already exploited the

Jewish state's increased territorial vulnerability; these

organizations have adapted to the barrier and capitalized

on the strategic advancements provided by suicide-homicide

attacks, as evidenced by the rocket attacks of the last few

years and the 2006 war with Hezballah that many argue

represented a response to Israel's display of weakness via

its retreat and separation policies.[48]

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[48] This debate over the effects of caving to suicide-homicide

Nearly 40 years have elapsed of the one-sided war of

attrition, and as an efficient and cost-effective weapon,

the importance for the Palestinians of the suicide

mission/suicide-homicide attack has only grown over the

years.[49] In the Palestinian movement's continuation of a

strategy to wear Israel down, the suicide-homicide bomber

found a central role in the conflict during *al-Aqsa*

intifada, in which "strategic bombardment" took on a new

meaning, as vigilant citizens had to view every person on

Israeli streets as a potential bomber. The separation

barrier, while an effective safeguard against potential

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bombers goes back to Israel's pullout from Lebanon in 2000. In
August 2002, IDF Lieutenant General Ya'alon articulated that "the
Israeli army is strong, Israel has technological superiority...
but its citizens are unwilling any longer to sacrifice lives in
order to defend their national interests and national goals.
Therefore, [as Hezballah's Nasrallah suggests,] Israel is a
spider-web society: it looks strong from the outside, but touch
it and it will fall apart," Originally published in *Ha'Aretz* and
quoted in Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 156-157. Furthermore,
Hoffman notes that the "IDF high command...does not dispute
Hezbollah's explanation for why the IDF withdrew from Lebanon, or
the influence of the 'spider-web' theory on Palestinian
thinking." Ultimately, high-ranking IDF officials and Hoffman,
the leading RAND Corporation terrorism researcher, view
Palestinian terror organizations' suicide-homicide bomber
campaign during *al-Aqsa intifada* as a result of Israel's retreat
from Lebanon. Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 157.
[49] First with the suicide mission of the *feda'i* and then with the
suicide-homicide attacks of the *shahid*, Palestinians have
consistently utilized such attacks as symbolical weapons, as well
as tactical ones.

suicide terrorists' infiltration, represents a Palestinian advancement toward its strategic ends.

As Palestinian organizations' level of violence has increased most notably since the signing of the *Declaration of Principles*, the goals of erecting a Palestinian state and driving Israel off sacred Islamic land have come closer to fulfillment. The increasing level of pressure exerted on Israel has forced the Jewish state to concede territory that it might not ever have otherwise. Pedahzur notes:

> [Suicide terrorism] succeeded where a vision of peace had failed. These attacks had brought about a substantial increase in Israeli public support for withdrawal from the territories--but this was out of a sense of resignation and not from a feeling that it was possible for Israelis and Palestinians to coexist peaceably, at least not in the near future. Therefore, it can be inferred that both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, groups that from the very beginning objected to the Oslo Accords, had realized their goals. The Israeli public was fed up with the Accords and, at the same time, was willing to accept the idea of secession from the territories without a Palestinian commitment to peace or even an end to terror.[50]

Additionally, the Sharon government's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza came without a national referendum or clear support from the majority of the Israeli populace for such a move. Nevertheless, the government saw it fit as a first

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[50] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 66.

step to getting at the "root causes" of Palestinian

terrorism—i.e. "occupation"; Sharon's use of the word in

2003, marked the first time a Likud Prime Minister accepted

the Palestinian/Arab/Islamic stance on the disputed

territories—eventually leading to the fragmentation of the

long-standing right wing Israeli party a year later.

Contextualizing Success

While the successes appear similar on the surface, a

number of differences distinguish Hezballah's usage of

suicide-homicide bombers as a tool of asymmetrical warfare

from Palestinian organizations' employment of the *modus*

operandi as a weapon of terror. Hezballah, in classic

guerrilla fashion, sought to expel a foreign enemy, which

had no vital national interest connected to Lebanon's

territory, but operated with other interests. Palestinian

organizations, on the other hand, have utilized suicide-

homicide bombers in an effort to bring about the state of

Israel's ultimate destruction. Hezballah did not claim its

attacks on U.S. and French forces, nor did the Iranian

proxy seek dialogue. Hezballah and its Iranian backers

simply pursued their goal of getting Western players out of

the Lebanon game as quickly as possible. To the contrary,

Palestinian society has used the *shahid* as dialogue—as a

message from one society to another--as an articulation of a resolute identity and collection of fervent ideologies.[51]

Although many organizations with a wide variety of political ideologies have incorporated suicide-homicide attacks, responsibility for the spread and pre-9/11 advancement of the *modus operandi* rests primarily with Hezballah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[52] Before Hezballah's use of suicide-homicide bombers, similar operations had either been used alongside conventional forces as a supporting tactic or had simply been "high-risk" missions lacking a blatantly "suicidal" element--limiting their operational capability. Thus Hezballah's method established the cornerstone of the contemporary suicide-homicide attack when it forced the U.S. out of Lebanon fives years before the *Mujahedin* expelled the Soviets from Afghanistan.

Palestinians used suicide terror to rob Israeli society of its Western normalcy and break the status quo, and in doing so ensnared the Sharon government and

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[51] This is evidenced by Palestinian organizations competing with one another over which was best suited to relay this message.
[52] These groups specifically influenced other groups to use suicide-homicide operations. The LTTE is not included because there is little evidence to suggest it has influenced groups outside its own conflict to incorporate suicide-homicide operations, with perhaps the PKK as an exception.

compelled it to isolate the Jewish state, which has resulted in, and promises to continue in the future to have, consequences of strategic proportions. The Palestinians forced territorial concessions, which were more fruitful than the entire Oslo peace process, and backed Israel into a corner, where it became vulnerable to Hamas and Hezballah rocket attacks and audacious kidnappings. Effectively, Israel now finds itself on a constant defensive on its own territory--a position the Jewish state has not faced since prior to the 1967 Six-Day War. Palestinian terrorist organizations long ago learned how to use the media to maximize the effects of a self-sacrificing or suicide-homicide attack, as initially demonstrated by choice of venue, such as the 1972 Olympics, but in the last two decades by the simple mass targeting of average civilians, which in manner and disregard was unprecedented in any terror campaign. While reprehensible, Palestinian-terrorist organizations learned to use suicide-homicide attacks in a way that provided the *modus operandi* with the political power its symbolism had always warranted--adding again to its strategic potential.

Balance of Terror?[53]

By mid-2005, *al-Aqsa intifada* had all but officially

ended, as willing bombers had lost easy access into Israel.

Hamas quickly shifted tactics, by launching homemade

"Qassam" rockets into Southern Israel from Gaza.[54] PIJ, AMB

and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) followed suit.

The suicide-homicide bomber's effects, however, remain in

place, as Qassam attacks reflect the new reality in the

armed *dialogue* between Israel and Palestinian terror

organizations--one reminiscent of military parity, despite

Israel's vast military superiority.

During *al-Aqsa intifada*, Palestinian leaders began

claiming they had struck a "balance of terror"[55] by

deploying suicide-homicide bombers. Hamas political bureau

member Azet al-Rushuq argues:

> This weapon is our winning card, which turned our
> weakness and feebleness into strength, and
> created parity never before witnessed in the
> history of struggle with the Zionist enemy. It

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[53] Initially coined by Albert Wohlstetter to refer nuclear
deterrence, Palestinians began using it once it seemed that
suicide terrorism proved its own deterrence value.
[54] During the 2006 war, Hezballah berated the Jewish state with
Kaytusha rockets to create a similar, yet far worse, situation on
Israel's more densely populated Northern cities. The attacks were
reminiscent of PLO Kaytusha attacks launched from Southern
Lebanon in the early 1980s, which prompted Israel's 1982
invasion.
[55] Others have called it a "balance of horror."

also gave our people the ability to respond,
deter, and inflict harm on the enemy.[56]

The balance of terror notion, whether genuinely believed by

Palestinian terror organizations or simply part of the

ever-existent diplomatic MacGuffin, functions the same vis-

à-vis Israeli policy. The Palestinians effectively

convinced successive Israeli governments from those led by

Prime Ministers Rabin, to Sharon and Olmert, with the

exception of the Netanyahu and Barak governments, that

military parity was and continues to be a reality--

resulting in Israel forfeiting policies vital to its

national interests.

Today, it does not matter that the security barrier

has decreased suicide-homicide bombers ability to

infiltrate Israel proper and allowed Israeli society to

revert to some form of normality. The balance of terror

notion remains in effect, due to the combination of the

Qassam rocket threat and the reality that without a

separation barrier,[57] which blocks the capability of

suicide-homicide bombers but does not dilute potential

shahids' motivation, the suicide terror threat would

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[56] Azat al-Rushuq quoted in Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*, 26.
[57] Today, the term "security barrier" is fairly a misnomer since
it does not provide security against Qassam rocket attacks.

instantaneously reemerge. Thus, the suicide-homicide
bomber, while rendered nearly combat ineffective by the
barrier, has still brought Palestinian terror
organizations, virtual deterrence, in addition to important
territorial gains and political victories.

When Organizational Means
Are Individuals' Ends

By juxtaposing organizational method with person
goals, the *shahid*/suicide-homicide bomber obfuscates a
clear delineation of means and ends, and tactic and
strategy. As a result, the *modus operandi* enjoys a
predisposition to success as its operational ambiguity
provides the foundation for a powerful mythology. Terrorism
succeeds from the fear it instills in a targeted
population, and terrorists that are impossible to
understand only add to, and accelerate, the myth-induced
fear factor. Even when a Palestinian suicide-homicide
bomber fails in the tactical component of an operation, the
act of "martyrdom" itself functions as success on the
personal level. Similarly, and more importantly for
Palestinian society and its representative organizations,
an act of suicide terrorism, even when an operational

failure, succeeds strategically; the mere deployment of

terrorists willing to kill themselves to murder their

enemies sends a powerful message. One academic explanation

contends: "[t]he rational use of terrorism can be thought

of as a signaling game in which high profile attacks are

carried out to communicate a player's ability and

determination to use violence to achieve its political

objectives."[58] An act of suicide terrorism, perhaps only

second to an attack using nuclear weapons or weapons of

mass destruction, marks the ultimate "high profile attack."

Furthermore, the deployment of a suicide-homicide bomber to

match a specific event (e.g. an election) delivers a

message that expects a particular response--effectively,

stripping a targeted population's confidence in its

government's ability to secure the nation.[59] To send a

message against the peace process, scholar Luca Ricolfi

notes, "one does not need to carry out devastating attacks,

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[58] Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, "Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, no. 4 (July 2004): 244.
[59] Some scholars place the Hamas/PIJ's 1996 suicide terrorism campaign in this category. In an attempt to derail the peace process, Hamas and PIJ launched a series of suicide-terror attacks so as to hurt the dovish Prime Minister Shimon Peres' chances of being elected to his own term. See Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 60-61; also Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 263-296.

since small-scale but 'heroic' actions carried out by suicide attackers may convey the message even more effectively than large scale ones."[60] Such political signaling games are only made possible by the shahids who are willing to carry out attacks that predetermine their deaths. Moreover, the Palestinian *shahid* represents the fearless killer who loves death and craves murder. This image, more than the actual attacks, forced Israel to rethink its policies on the disputed territories.

The evolution of martyrdom in the modern Islamic world hit a peak with the second-*intifada* Palestinian *shahid*, who embodies the intrepidity of the *mujahid*[61] yet also carries on the vitality of Arabist romanticism and the existential dedication of the revolutionary, all of which help to captivate angry-Muslim youth as well as cosmopolitan reporters. Palestinian terrorist organizations have refined the suicide-homicide bomber to near optimization; they have evolved the *modus operandi* from a guerrilla tactic to a terror strategy. In doing so, they have encouraged the strategy's spread and escalation. With a culture of

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[60] Luca Ricolfi, "Palestinians, 1981-2003," in *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, expanded and updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 89-90.
[61] *Mujahid* means Muslim holy warrior, or literally "one who wages *jihad*."

martyrdom that has eclipsed most Palestinian institutions

that shape thought,[62] Palestinian society has nearly

unanimously accepted suicide terrorism as a perfectly

legitimate political tool permitted by Islam.[63] For

Palestinians, the *shahid* embodies the highest religious

role model. By superimposing 'the *shahid* onto the suicide-

homicide bomber, suicide terrorism became an end unto

itself--serving individuals with an insured ticket to

"paradise." For terror organizations, the *shahid*/suicide-

homicide bomber provided a tactic that granted a number of

strategic victories and has put them on the path to

obtaining their overall defined political objectives.

With vast support for suicide-terror attacks, in words

and deeds, the Palestinian movement sent a message to

Israel that the Palestinian people will stop at nothing to

force political and territorial concessions, even if it

means sending their children to blow themselves up.[64] It is

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[62] Itamar Marcus, "The Indoctrination of Palestinian Children to Kill the Jews and Seek Death," in *The Jerusalem Alternative*, ed. Dmitry Radyshevsky. (Greenforest, Ark.: Balfour Books, 2005), 217-219.

[63] David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not just a Means but an End," *The Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 6 (June 2002): 18-20.

[64] Increasingly woman, children and the elderly have become shahids in the *jihad* against Israel. See Barbara Victor, *Army of*

with this show of socio-cultural tenacity, coupled with

suicide terrorism's effectiveness in stifling Israeli

society, that brought the Jewish state to drop the official

peace process altogether and adopt a policy of complete

separation between itself and the Palestinians. Israel's

security barrier, however, is a mirage. It only reflects

the inability of Israeli security forces to prevent

numerous low-intensity terror attacks plotted in the

disputed territories. On the surface, the barrier project

seems like *realpolitik* pragmatism at its best. Yet, in

pursuit of eliminating short-term threats, which are not

existential in nature, Israel has risked its long-term

ability to survive in a dangerous and unforgiving

neighborhood. Ultimately, Palestinians displayed they have

beaten Israel back and forced it to retreat into

isolation--not with a powerful coalition of skilled armies,

but rather with a confederation of terror organizations

equipped simply with bomb belts and individuals willing to

wear and detonate them.

Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers
(Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003).

CHAPTER SIX

ALLAH, "PALESTINE," AND TRIBE: MOTIVATING

INDIVIDUAL PALESTINIANS TO COMMIT MARTYRDOM

Offering a precise summary of the Palestinian suicide-

homicide bomber phenomenon, political analyst David Brooks

states:

> Suicide bombing is the crack cocaine of warfare.
> It doesn't just inflict death and terror on its
> victims; it intoxicates the people who sponsor
> it. It unleashes the deepest and most addictive
> human passions--the thirst for vengeance, the
> desire for religious purity, the longing for
> earthly glory and eternal salvation.[1]

In so many words, the succinct description captures the

motivations behind Palestinian suicide terrorism. Themes of

passion, vengeance and self-interest motivate "ordinary"

and "normal"[2] Palestinians to assume bomb-laden vests, find

a target of value, position themselves, push a detonator

button and kill themselves and as many of the defined enemy

as possible. While subtle, this type of simultaneous

murder-suicide means something different for the individual

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[1] David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing
Became not just a Means but an End," *The Atlantic Monthly* 289,
no. 6 (June 2002): 18.
[2] Ariel Merari, "The Profile of the Modern Terrorist," in *Post-
Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios, and Future Threats*, ed. Boaz
Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 2005), 109-111.

than it does for the organization that sponsors the
operation, or for the society that sanctions the attack and
the political message it sends. But as always, the devil is
in the details.

That a *people* with collective goals provides
representative organizations with ends to pursue often
leads terrorism researchers to overlook, with the exception
of leaders or pioneering tacticians, the important roles
individual terrorists play in their vicious game of
political extortion. Average individuals are central to
terror campaigns' success. They compose the people seeking
political/social change or restoration, as well as form the
body of organizations. This is especially the case in
today's era of "new terrorism,"[3] wherein organizations are
less *ideologically* elitist and more focused on religion
and/or ascriptive components of identity.

In contrast to research on general terrorism, suicide
terrorism has spawned a plethora of studies that seek to
perform a "psychological autopsy"[4] on individual suicide-

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[3] See Walter Laqueur, *New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
[4] Coined in Avery Weisman and Robert Kastenbaum, "The Psychological Autopsy," *Community Mental Health Monograph* no. 4 (New York: Behavioral Publications, 1968).

homicide operatives.[5] These studies commonly divorce the

individual terrorist from his or her organization and

collective identity. As a result, the findings paint

suicide-homicide bombers as desperate, humiliated, deprived

or possessing other characteristics that point the blame of

suicide terrorism to those who are targeted.[6] Despite

popular research that compartmentalizes motives into

varying levels,[7] terror campaigns, and particularly those

that employ the suicide-homicide *modus operandi*, require

not only organizational design and environmental

conditioning, but imperatively the mobilization of willing

individuals, who after all function as the link between the

three.

Organization, environment and the individual thus work

as one in sustaining the terror component of a political

campaign. Furthermore, suicide-homicide bombers commit two

separate, albeit simultaneous, acts while fulfilling their

terror operations: murder and suicide. One could surely

assert then that each behavior represents a distinct set of

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[5] Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), 171.
[6] For example, see El Sarraj "Wounds and Madness: Why We've Become Suicide Bombers," *Peacework* (May 2002).
[7] Equally void of a comprehensive analysis include those studies that solely look at the strategies of organizations in search of the driving forces behind suicide terrorism.

motivations--some of which might overlap but not

necessarily in every case. Accordingly, a variety of

values, beliefs and attitudes, pulled from identity and

environment, provide Palestinian *suicide-homicide* bombers

with individual sets of motivations for carrying out their

attacks.

Absent a Profile

The *shahid* video, which documents the last will and

testament of almost every Palestinian suicide-homicide

bomber, sheds light on individuals' religious motivations,

as well as their political views and usually include a

declaration calling for continued resistance. These digital

testaments generally begin in the same manner, "Praise be

to Allah… I am the living martyr…," but then take on a more

personal tone, often addressing individual family members,

specific political and religious grievances, or issuing

particular threats against Israel or Jews or warning

against supposed Zionist conspiracies.[8] Once past the

Islamic salutations there is no uniformity.

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[8] See sample in Mohammed M. Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers* (Washington D.C.: United States [U.S.] Institute for Peace Press, 2006), 87-92; also a Hamas website: <www.palestine-info.info/arabic>; a Fatah website:

Many leading researchers have concluded a profile for

Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers does not exist, other

than the fact that all of them have been Muslims, most

male, and many under the age of 25.[9] Reflecting the society

from which they emanate, Palestinian suicide-homicide

bombers have spanned the spectrum of political affiliation;

they have represented organizations from the ultra-right

Palestinian Islamic Jihad to the extreme-leftist Popular

Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Education levels

have varied from no formal education to those with graduate

or law degrees.[10] Similarly disparate, Palestinian suicide-

homicide bombers have come from every level of social

class, including two millionaires' sons.[11] Most never

married but some had full families. Many knew people or

<www.fateh.tv>; and a Palestinian Islamic Jihad website: <www.
qudsway.com>; See also *Inside the Mind of a Suicide Bomber*, prod.
Janis Klein, 50 min., The History Channel, 2002, DVD.
[9] See Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, *Suicide
Bombing Terrorism during the Current Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict: September 2000-December 2005* (1 January 2006): 7-8;
accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org.il/>.
[10] One should note, however, that in Palestinian society, the
higher the education level one has increases the likelihood he or
she holds fanatical viewpoints. See Luca Ricolfi, "Palestinians,
1981-2003," in *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, expanded and
updated ed., ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 108.
[11] Nasra Hassan, "Letter from Gaza: An Arsenal of Believers," *The
New Yorker*, 19 November 2001.

personally were affected negatively by Israeli police or military action.[12] Yet most had never met an Israeli or Jew.

Therefore one must acknowledge Islam as the foundation of suicide terrorism in the Palestinian context.[13] Palestinians not only receive justification for suicide terrorism from interpretations of Islamic texts and sermons, but Islamic tradition also provides tempting religious perks; these notably include: for the *shahid* the procurement of 72 *houriyyat al-ayn* (virgin maidens) or "black-eyed" virgins, and for the *shahida* (female martyr) a marriage to a "perfect husband" and the promise that she

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[12] Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 72.

[13] For Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers, Islam offers the spiritual impetus for taking one's life that is evident in most contexts where suicide-homicide attackers are employed, including those where a non-Islamic organization uses the *modus operandi*. In the Palestinian context, submission to Allah's will and sacrifice for the future of the *um'ma*, as well as the individual's pursuit of his or her own sanctity instills the individual with a variety of spiritual allures to kill oneself. A similar phenomenon exists in other Islamic contexts such as with Hezballah and al-Qaeda suicide terrorists. Additionally, for the LTTE and the PKK, two secular-nationalist organizations, leader worship and cultic sacrifice for the group provide a similar impetus. However, suicide terrorists from these organizations demonstrate characteristics of "fatalistic suicide," or suicide induced from coercive conditioning, i.e. "brainwashing." Jon Elster, "Motivations and Beliefs in Suicide Missions," in *Making Sense of Suicide Missions*, expanded and updated edition, ed. Diego Gambetta (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 238–241. Elster notes that the PKK and LTTE "run on dictatorial lines," which leads to forms of leader worship; see page 246.

will be the most beautiful of his wives; both *shahid* and

shahida earn exemption from painful time spent in the grave

after death, gain the ability to see the face of Allah,

receive eternal glorification, a guaranteed place in heaven

for 70 loved-ones, the permission to drink alcohol and

enjoy the pleasures of an unimaginable paradise or *jannat*

al-firdaous (heavenly gardens), wear a crown that has a

jewel worth more than all that is in the entire world, as

well as other incentives declared by various Islamic

authorities.[14] Such reasons to pursue *shahada* (incidental

martyrdom) or commit *istishhad* (deliberate martyrdom),

however, often represent secondary motivations when viewed

in the smaller, more personal, context of life in

Palestinian society. Additionally, the conflict with

Israel, because it is a Jewish, Western and non-Islamic

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[14] Some female suicide-homicide bombers are told they will be the most beautiful of the 72 virgins for a male *shahid*. See *Suicide Killers: Paradise Is Hell*. prod. and dir. Pierre Rehov, 1 hr. 20 min., City Lights Pictures, 2006, DVD; also Anat Berko and Edna Erez, "'Ordinary People' and 'Death Work': Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims," *Violence and Victims* 20, no. 6 (December 2005): 611; additionally Kevin Toolis, "Suicide Bomber Caught in the Act; Why These Girls Want to Be Martyrs," *Herald Sun* (16 September 2006). Shahids' post-temporal unions are also referred to as "weddings with eternity." See Barbara Victor, *Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers* (Emmaus, Penn.: Rodale, 2003); and Mohammed M. Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism," in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 65; Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 156.

state, provides Palestinian society, organizations and individuals with Islamic justifications for suicide terrorism. But, beyond justifying the Palestinian point of view in the Conflict, individuals rely on specific passions and desires for vengeance, as well as personal interests, in order to convince themselves that "martyrdom" offers the best future. In these details lays the variable that often tips the scale to the side of action in the individual's cost/benefit analysis. Thus, research must consider Islam, yet look past its explicit influence to reach a comprehensive explanation of individual motives.

The Semantics of "Suicide" and "Martyrdom"

Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers never consider their actions of self-induced death and killing of innocents as committing suicide or murder. Rather, they see it, as Palestinian society does, as attaining *istishhad*, or "martyrdom" through an act of self-sacrifice for Allah's sake. Moreover, Palestinian society places the *shahid* atop a hierarchy of honored Islamic fighters and warriors.[15] Accordingly, the culture of martyrdom plays a central role

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[15] The *shahid/istishhadi* enjoys even more social praise than the *feda'i* and *mujahid*.

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in buttressing these notions in the mainstream discourse on

suicide-homicide bombers within Palestinian society. For

example, when a suicide-homicide bomber detonates his or

her explosives and completes an operation, the bomber's

family does not mourn but rather celebrates the "marriage"

of its son to the 72 black-eyed virgins[16] or its daughter to

a perfect husband,[17] i.e. a *shahid*, assigned to her in

paradise. Indeed, families oftentimes do not post

obituaries in the local papers--opting instead to list

wedding announcements.[18] Thus it goes without surprise that

the social acceptance of suicide-homicide bombers as

"martyrs" rather than suicide-murderers, surpasses polled

support for "suicide terrorism."[19]

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[16] In the mythology propagated, the "black-eyed virgins" are not
only perpetual virgins but also non-human; they are some type of
cosmic being, if not angelic. This is synthesized from
discussions with numerous Palestinians and Israeli-Arabs. See
also Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 144.
[17] Some failed Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers have
articulated that they expect a "perfect husband" in paradise. See
Berko and Erez, 611.
[18] Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second
Intifada," 73.
[19] Often polls are cited in arguments to whether Palestinians
support suicide terrorism or not. Despite the polling on this
question, which has fluctuated between 15 and 75 percent since
suicide-homicide bombers first struck Israel in 1993, when a
suicide-homicide bombers does attack Palestinian society accepts
him or her as a martyr. See Gal Luft, "The Palestinian H-Bomb:
Terror's Winning Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 4
(July/August 2002). Thus, polls reflect support for the strategy

As a matter of fanciful semantics, Palestinian society

rebukes the idea that a *shahid* commits suicide.[20] Since a

suicide-homicide bomber intentionally commits an *'amalyya*

istishhadiyya (act of self-sacrifice), or "martyrdom

operation," in compliance with "Allah's will," various

authorities in Palestinian society utilize Qur'anic suras

and Hadith sayings to argue that the *shahid* does not commit

intihar (suicide), nor truly dies, but lives on as a spirit

in paradise.[21] Indeed, the Qur'an explicitly suggests it is

sinful to even state a *shahid* is dead.[22] Furthermore, the

difference between one's incidental *shahada*, or "death for

Allah's sake," and an *'amalyya istishhadiyya* by *al-shahid*

al-hai (the living martyr)[23] is subtle but important,[24] as

the latter's invocation leaves a powerful insinuation for

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at a given time—not support for the act itself, which already
enjoys deep cultural dispositions *toward acceptance of the act.*
[20] This is a pervasive belief in other Islamic societies that
deploy suicide terrorist as well. See *The Cult of the Suicide
Bomber*, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35
min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD.
[21] Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*, 37-38.
[22] Qur'an 2:154 states: "And call not those who are slain in the
way of Allah 'dead.' Nay, they are living, only ye perceive not."
Refer to Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs," 64.
[23] Palestinian society refers to an individual who an organization
has offered a specific suicide-homicide attack to as *al-shahid
al-hai*, or "the living martyr." While a chosen individual's
identity is usually kept secret for the sake of operational
integrity, the individual still takes great joy in knowing he or
she will most likely attain martyrdom.
[24] Raphael Israeli, *Islamikaze: Manifestations of Islamic
Martyrology* (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 109.

future potential shahids to feed on by providing an example

of unmatched 'heroism' and 'bravery.' The image of the

shahid intentionally sacrificing his or her life for an

Islamic/Arab/Palestinian struggle functions as an endlessly

powerful symbol. Fusing the *shahid* with the suicide-

homicide bomber works to reinforce the act of suicide

terrorism within society by framing it as an imperative to

maintain cultural honor, individual respect and fulfill

religious sanctity. Hence the importance of the suicide-

bomber's farewell videotape, the family's celebration of

his or her marriage with "eternity," and the grandiose

istishhad posters on wall after wall, street by street--all

of which symbolically eternalize the *shahid*. Additionally,

al-shahid al-hai often enjoys greater temporal benefits by

predetermining to die in an *'amalyya istishhadiyya* (versus

the *mujahid* who wages *jihad* and obtains incidental

shahada). *Al-shahid al-hai* accelerates the Faustian logic,

foregoing lasting-temporal benefits in exchange for

promises of paradise, which lie simply beyond the pushing

of a detonator button.

In effect, Palestinian society absolves suicide-homicide bombers of their suicide and murderous intent.[25] Moreover, the culture of martyrdom venerates the *shahid* with the highest religious and national honors. The stigmas of suicide and murder therefore never enter the individual's calculus; society replaces them with 'self-sacrifice for Allah's will' and 'defense of Palestine.' Like Westerners who gauge success by their 'contributions to society,' or at least their 'social status,' a Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber's willingness to commit *istishhad* reflects the desire to contribute to the betterment of the 'greater good'--i.e. the collective, as defined as the *um'ma* (global Islamic community), "Palestine" or both; furthermore, the heroic status placed on shahids in Palestinian society adds to the general motivation of individuals seeking to 'make something' of their lives.[26]

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[25] Prestigious Islamic authorities that are not Palestinians such as Sheik Yousef Qaradawi also play an important role in legitimizing Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers. See Chapter Seven for an explanation of his *fatwa* (Islamic decree) sanctioning Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers.
[26] Or simply "to do something" with their lives, which just as often demonstrates a rebuke of Arab society, as it does the conflict with Israel. See Berko and Erez, 611.

Between Altruism and Egoism

Invoking the ideas of sociologist Émile Durkheim,[27]

some researchers of suicide terrorism have explored the

suicide terrorism phenomenon from the side of "altruistic

suicide."[28] However, scholars have more or less overlooked

Durkheim's "egoistic" side of suicide, if not purposely

shunned it as an overly *suicidal* expression of suicide.[29]

But, as depicted in Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers'

own words and deeds, both altruism and self-interest play

important roles in stimulating their motivation.

Accordingly, the promoted allures of suicide terrorism,

either by accident or design, play off a concoction of

altruism and egoism.

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[27] Durkheim's typologies of suicide include: "egoistic,"
"altruistic," and "anomic." See Émile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study
in Sociology*, trans. John A. Spaulding and George Simpson (New
York: Free Press, 1966).
[28] See Pape 172-198; Ami Pedahzur, Arie Perliger and Leonard
Weinberg. "Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristics of
Palestinian Suicide Terrorists." *Deviant Behavior: An
Interdisciplinary Journal* 24 (June 2006): 405-423; Ivan Strenski,
"Sacrifice, Gift and the Social Logic of Muslim 'Human Bombers,'"
Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2003).
[29] Durkheim's notion of "anomic" suicide is also regularly
overlooked. To his credit, scholar Assaf Moghadam recognizes,
"there is no reason to assume that the shaheed's decision to
embark on a martyrdom operation is entirely selfless." Moghadam,
"Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada," 71.

The Institutionalization of "Victimhood"

Vengeance stands out as an oft-cited motive in the

literature on Palestinian suicide terrorism. Whether or not

one believes that Palestinians have a right to avenge

Israeli policy or actions of Israeli citizens is

irrelevant. For the "victim," only perception matters.

Again the culture of martyrdom's functions play a crucial

role, as they have facilitated the establishment and

maintenance of "victimhood" in Palestinian society. After

all, vengeance based on falsehoods can still effectively

produce an "avenger," who while satisfying his or her

bloodlust also implements policy. Social, Islamic and

political organizations, the Palestinian Authority (PA),

and other contributors to the culture of martyrdom have

successfully ingrained victimhood into the Palestinian

collective identity, allowing for individuals to give and

take from a widespread feeling of injustice. Frequently

articulated components of Palestinian victimhood include:

Israel's refusal[30] to allow the return of the descendants of

750,000 Arabs[31] who left the nascent Jewish state amid the

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[30] One should note that this would effectively end Israeli's
existence as a Jewish state.
[31] The leading historian in this field puts the number around
700,000, but within the debate figures have ranged from 250,000

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1947-1948 Jewish-Arab civil war or subsequent 1948-1949

Israeli War of Independence, checkpoints strategically

placed across the West Bank, Israel's separation barrier,

and Israeli control of simultaneous Jewish/Muslim holy

sites in Jerusalem and Hebron, as well as a lengthy catalog

of other complaints passed down generation after

generation.

As determined in many criminological studies, the

"victim" often grows up to victimize. Researchers who have

interviewed numerous failed Palestinian suicide-homicide

bombers in Israeli prisons report: "[t]he participants'

social identity as Palestinians, who are dispossessed,

oppressed and humiliated, was a recurrent theme in

discussing their lives."[32] In most cases such perceptions of

victimization and injustice demonstrate a clear nexus to

behavior patterns culminating in one's participation in

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to 800,000; see Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Today, the "refugee" population numbers around 4.4 million people, most of whom are scattered across the Levant; see Evelyn Gordon, "Civil Fights: The Palestinians Don't Want a State," *Jerusalem Post*, 24 October 2007; Samih K. Farsoun and Naseer H. Aruri, *Palestine and the Palestinians: A Social and Political History*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2006), 105.

[32] Berko and Erez, 609; see also Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 32-62.

suicide terrorism.[33] Islamist-Palestinian terror

organizations and the Fatah-led PA have perpetuated the

institutionalization of victimhood, in order to help

condition Palestinian society to support "martyrdom

operations" and to instigate individuals to seek

participation.[34] Playing the "martyr" first requires

accepting the role of the "victim." In Palestinian society,

"justice," victimhood and martyrdom often work as the

logical social impetus for political mobilization. If

victims deserve justice, and martyrdom operations provide

victims with a method to serve justice, then the conclusion

is simple. New York University Psychiatrist John

Rosenberger recognizes,

> One is visited by vengeance in response to one's
> being a victim… Vengeance is a strangely sweet
> feeling, accompanied by a clear and unambiguous
> sense that one is entitled to retaliate.
> Possessed of vengeance one feels exhilarated,

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[33] See Anat Berko, *The Path to Paradise: The Inner World of Suicide Bombers and Their Dispatchers*, trans. Elizabeth Yuval (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007).

[34] One should note that today Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers are not "recruited" per se, but rather are members of a social network loosely affiliated with a terrorist organization; Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers usually seek out, when they want to participate in a "martyrdom operation," terrorist dispatchers who are also connected to the social network at hand. See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective," *Social Forces* 84, no. 4 (June 2006).

empowered, almost invincible. It is a consuming
passion.[35]

Perceptions of injustice ultimately provide a sense of

righteousness to the avenger. Accordingly, collective

affirmation of victimization, coupled with religious

justifications for retribution,[36] engender individuals to

believe without a doubt that their acts of terror exemplify

justice and righteousness, if not holiness. So, if

vengeance explains the motive for mass murder, what

explains the individual's suicide?

Arab Prison, Islamic Escape: Killing to Die

"Death is...the ultimate narcissistic injury...While we

hope, and may have faith, that death is a beginning, we

know for sure that it is an ending."[37] Rosenberger's

assertion provides a useful basis for deciphering those

motives of Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers left

unarticulated. The general understanding that death brings

an end demonstrates the suicide-homicide bomber's

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[35] John Rosenberger, "Discerning the Behavior of the Suicide
Bomber: The Role of Vengeance," *Journal of Religion and Health*
42, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 15-16.
[36] Hamas and PIJ operational planners claim they reject
individuals who seek to a participate in a "martyrdom operation"
if their motive is purely based on vengeance; *shahid* candidates
must demonstrate first and foremost Islamic reasoning to be sent
on a suicide-homicide operation. See Hassan.
[37] Rosenberger, 14-15.

sacrificial/altruistic motives, but the "hope" and "faith" suggest a more egoistical line of reasoning also exists. Self-interest stands as the most overlooked element in scholarly collections on Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers' motivations. Perhaps this is the case because researchers have not delved deep enough into the contradictory world of a society that hopelessly attempts to hold on to the past, while an ever-globalizing Western culture demands to influence or clash with the societies that it meets.

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza live in a traditional society based on the principles of *'urf* (Arab customary law).[38] In such a society, the *hamula* (clan) system determines and organizes the individual's life and place in society. Far from their *bedui* (nomadic) past, contemporary Palestinians generally receive a high level of education, and Palestinian society boasts an established middle class and elite/technocrat class. Nevertheless,

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[38] Farsoun and Aruri; Eyad El Sarraj interview by Linda Butler, "Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 4 (Summer 2002): 75-76; Ibrahim Wade Ata, *The West Bank Palestinian Family* (New York: KPI, 1986); Joel S. Migdal ed., *Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980); Mark Levine, "Chaos, Globalization, and the Public Sphere: Political Struggle in Iraq and Palestine," *The Middle East Journal* 60, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 473.

tribal norms still dominate daily life among average

Palestinians. The individual lacks a substantial personal

identity in the Western sense of *individuality*.[39] As with

any traditional or conservative society, social norms and

codified law heavily guard against interaction between the

sexes. Men and women have distinct non-negotiable roles,

and the protection of females' chastity, or *al-'ard* (female

sexual honor), is of the utmost importance to the family

and its *hamula*. Guarding a woman's purity supercedes all

other functions of daily life. A *hamula* views an assault

on, or dishonoring of, one of its females as the highest

insult, which requires a violent response, usually against

the perpetrating male and involved female without regard to

her culpability or lack thereof. Additionally, without an

established income, Palestinian men cannot marry, as

families commonly demand high dowries and require that the

male prove his ability to support a woman before they

marry.[40]

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[39] Khalil Shikaki, "The Views of Palestinian Society on Suicide Terrorism," in *Countering Suicide Terrorism*, updated ed., ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism [ICT], 2007), 100.
[40] *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber*, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006, DVD.

As one example of scores of constraints that Arab

cultural traditions and social norms put on Palestinians,

it is not surprising that many failed suicide-homicide

bombers have acknowledged frustration with this way of life

as a motivation for committing murder-suicide. Anat Berko

and Edna Erez, two scholars who interviewed various failed

Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers, report:

> Quite often the interviewees restated the fact
> that they live in Arab society or are part of a
> culture that dictates various restrictions, and
> monitors gender-appropriate behavior. They
> mentioned that they cannot date or socialize
> unless the contact is for marriage purposes, is
> approved by the family and under its supervision…
> [Moreover] the social background of the
> interviewees and the cultural gender scripts that
> Arab society provides for men and women were
> reflected in the paths the participants took in
> becoming suicide bombers.[41]

Environment and culture surely dictate "what is right and

wrong, appropriate and inappropriate,"[42] and as a result

sometimes motivate individuals to seek a way out. One

failed Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber admitted:

> All that is forbidden in this world is permitted
> in the Garden of Eden…[which] has everything--
> God, Freedom, the Prophet Mohammed and my
> friends, the 'shahids'…There are 72 virgins.
> There are lots of things I can't even
> describe…I'll find everything in the Garden of

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[41] Berko and Erez, 610.

[42] Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 30.

Eden, a river of honey, a river of beer and
alcohol…[43]

The fact that Palestinians live side by side with Israel,

which promotes an open society often characterized by its

empowered military women and Mediterranean beaches filled

with scantily clad young men and women drinking alcohol and

freely interacting with one another, perhaps exacerbates

young Palestinians' sentiments of hostility[44] and

frustration, as the contrast adds a component of

incorrigible jealousy to the Conflict. Average Palestinians

oftentimes find themselves, not only caught up in the

ongoing religious/ethnic conflict that surrounds them, but

also between the stubborn traditions of Palestinian society

and the modernizing components of personal and collective

identity.

For Palestinians discontent with, or held hostage by,

their Arab identity, they elevate their Islamic identity to

a higher standing. In Arab-Islamic societies, suicide

represents the greatest moral transgression, which is

unforgivable by Allah, just as family and society abhor any

suicide attempts. Indeed, Arab-Islamic societies boast one

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[43] Quoted in Berko and Erez, 613.
[44] *Suicide Killers*.

of the lowest suicide rates across the globe.[45] But

Palestinian society, and the individuals that collectively

comprise it, view *intihar* (suicide) as extremely different,

if not the polar opposite of *istishhad* (deliberate

martyrdom). For Palestinians, *intihar* represents the worst

action an individual Arab could take under any

circumstance, but paradoxically in time of a holy struggle,

or *jihad*, *istishhad* represents the greatest achievement any

Muslim could attain. Thus, fulfilling ideological calls

from their Islamic identity allows individuals an escape

from their Arab identity, yet without explicitly or

symbolically betraying it--as might be perceived by

emigration or simple rebellion against social norms, and as

"suicide" or an attempt at suicide definitely would

demonstrate. Furthermore, martyrdom, as it provides

glorification and fame, grants the individual an eternal

Islamic escape from the daily tyranny of Arab traditions.

The idealized Islamic paradise lures individuals from the

harsh reality that marriage, and therefore heterosexual

relations, might never occur; this exponentially increases

the appeal of such martyrdom incentives as the marriage of

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[45] Pape, 181-182.

a *shahid* to 72 perpetual-virgins, or a *shahida* to her one perfect husband.

"We Love Death--It Brings Us Our 15 Minutes"

Outside the frustrations related to restrictions on male-female interaction, Arab cultural traditions and social norms also present individuals with significant deterrents against any burgeoning individuality. In an increasingly small world populated by *individuals*, the contradictions of a traditional society, based on the collective that promotes shahids as individual heroes, sparks another attraction to a Palestinian who views his or her life as monotonous, contained, predetermined or individualistically stifled in any number of manners. Attaining martyrdom provides the individual with one of only a few ways to distinguish him or herself in a society that strives on collective thought, conformity and the ostracizing of those who dissent or rebel.[46] Scholar Martha Crenshaw notes, "[f]or someone whose life otherwise has

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[46] One researcher notes that for Palestinians "achieving any degree of economic or personal 'success' may seem impossible. Becoming a martyr, on the other hand, may well present a remedy to this predicament by providing an opportunity to stand out of the crowd and become, literally, a celebrity. The shaheed is endowed with a sense of individuality that he is unlikely to achieve in any other way." Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada," 76.

little significance, transcendent fame can be a powerful motive...The individual, whose identity might otherwise fade into obscurity, has now established a legend for all time."[47]

In pursuit of fame, while an egotistical end, individuals commonly take a path paved in altruism. Palestinian terrorists, like other Islamic militants, regularly state that they love death, while their enemy only loves life--usually implying that this is how Allah intends to provide victory.[48] Importantly, Palestinian, as well as other influential Arab, Islamic authorities have declared *jihad* a *fard ayn* (individual obligation), as opposed to *fard kifaya* (collective obligation).[49] Islamic martyrdom expert Mohammed M. Hafez notes,

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[47] Martha Crenshaw, "'Suicide' Terrorism in Comparative Perspective," in *Countering Suicide Terrorism*, updated ed., ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007), 22.

[48] Indeed, during *al-Aqsa intifada*, even the highest Palestinian-Islamic authority, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Ikrama Sabri stated: "The Muslim embraces death...Look at the society of the Israelis. It is a selfish society that loves life. These are not people who are eager to die for their country and their God. The Jews will leave this land rather than die, but the Muslim is happy to die." Originally published in *The New Yorker* and quoted in Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada," 71.

[49] Scholar Rafael Israeli notes: "The duty to fight jihad is universal and perpetual until the entire world comes under Muslim dominion. However, because Muslim countries have desisted in practice, under various theological and practical considerations, from this idea, which otherwise would have permanently pitted

> Islamic scholars construe individual obligation
> to mean that it is the duty of every Muslim to
> wage jihad in the path of [Allah] in defense of
> Islam, its lands, religious institutions, people,
> property. Individual obligation usually arises
> when Muslim lands are besieged by powerful foes
> that cannot be easily repelled with a small
> force. Under these circumstances, jihad is the
> religious obligation of every Muslim capable of
> fighting, just as all Muslims are obligated to
> pray, fast, and pay alms.[50]

Accordingly, organizations present and society accepts an

individual's martyrdom firstly as a dutiful sacrifice for

the collective, and secondarily as the individual's

ascension to a higher religious status. Thus, the

individual can easily rationalize the pursuit of personal

fame and glory in the name of Allah, "Palestine," and

loved-ones. But who is to say which plays the greater role

in motivating an individual--the altruistic or the

egotistical component--especially considering the social

lines between these interests are frequently blurred.

The rituals involved in preparing and memorializing a

suicide-homicide bomber exemplify a melding of altruism and

egoism, and display how a society founded on pre-modern

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them against the rest of the world, Muslim fundamentalists have
come to take this duty as a personal one (fard 'ayn), and so have
consecrated any struggle of theirs against Unbelievers as a
pursuit of that holy duty." See Israeli, *Islamikaze*, 39-40.
[50] Mohammed M. Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of
Palestinian Suicide Bombers* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute for
Peace Press, 2006), 36.

traditions exudes tinges of postmodern marketing and
consumerism. In Palestinian shops and marketplaces, one can
easily find videos, t-shirts, key-chains and other mass-
produced *shahid* memorabilia. The walls of Palestinian towns
are dedicated to posters of shahids.[51] Imams, politicians
and TV-personalities alike promise suicide-homicide bombers
eternal glorification in paradise, and without a doubt
bombers already receive in-full everlasting fame in
Palestinian society, where the shahid's image rests as an
ubiquitous symbol. Ultimately, suicide-homicide bombers act
out of both egoism and altruism--"martyrdom operations"
offer an escape from traditionalism and an exchange of
namelessness for celebrity, yet they also represent a
prideful act of social solidarity.

Motivations in Sum

Thucydides recognized that "honor, fear and self-
interest" motivate people to fight and die for their
beliefs.[52] One could argue, today this insight holds up.

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[51] For example, see Appendix B.
[52] Paraphrased in Victor Davis Hanson, "Battles Change, Wars
Don't: From ancient Greece to modern Iraq, history shows us that
fear, honor and self-interest drive hostilities between the
states," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 October 2005; and Victor Davis
Hanson, "Old Is 'New' Warfare: Iraq conflict shares uncanny

Palestinians demonstrate a similar trend in their

expression of a most brutal form of warfare. First, the

culture of martyrdom perpetuates the idea that Palestinians

embody the truest of victims. Marking one of its greatest

impacts, the culture of martyrdom has ingrained

"victimhood" in the Palestinian collective identity--to the

extent that it has convinced the latest generation of

children to love death and hate life.[53] Ultimately, a

martyrdom operation offers restoration of the victim's

wounded honor. Second, a fear of forsaking "Palestine" and

a fear of failing to answer the call of Islam, lays the

ideological foundation for the conflict with Israel--the

Jewish, Western and "infidel" state. Third, and perhaps

most importantly for the individual, martyrdom contains a

variety of personal allures; it eternalizes the individual

as a hero or heroine in the very society that previously

inhibited him or her from developing as an individual free

to choose one's own destiny, and mature a unique identity

owned all to his or herself. On top of pardoning suicide

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likenesses with the Peloponnesian War," *National Post*, 5 November
2005.
[53] For examples of the damage the culture of martyrdom has done to
the latest generation of Palestinian children review Palestinian
Media Watch's collection on PA textbooks, PA TV programming, etc.
that help indoctrinate children with the concepts of *jihad*,
shahada, and *istishhad*; access at <www.pmw.org.il>.

and sanctioning murder, martyrdom gives the *shahid* the key

to unlock the prison cell of traditional society, as well

as the key to all the joys of paradise. Left unsatisfied by

"the gap between expectations and reality experienced"[54] the

shahid therefore determines that a better future lies in

the rewards for an act of murder-suicide.

The Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber, absolved by

culture of the stigmas of suicide and murder, socialized to

view all of Israel as illegitimate, facilitated by

political organizations and encouraged by his or her own

psyche to *right* the wrongs of victimhood, is equipped with

the necessary tools to "retaliate." In some instances, it

is likely that the perks offered by Islamic authorities are

an afterthought--or just enough to give that extra nudge

the individual needs to leap from the balcony of innate

morality. For others, the simple lack of opportunity in

Arab society to engage in heterosexual relations outside of

marriage, accentuates the sexual allures promised to

suicide-homicide bombers--both male and female. The

Palestinian collective identity's *sammud*, the culture of

martyrdom within Palestinian society, the strategies of

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[54] This Durkheimian notion is accredited to one scholar's
assessment of the social status of Palestinian shahids; see
Elster, 245.

terror organizations, and the simple calculus of individuals' cost-benefit analyses, systematically work together to make the process of producing suicide-homicide bombers virtually effortless. So seamless is the operation that the societal, organizational and individual culprits often succeed in deflecting culpability onto their targets. Furthermore, this assembly line of suicide terror turns average Palestinians into sadomasochistic suicide-homicide bombers, who seek to punish the victimizers for victimizing, and punish themselves for allowing their own victimization.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PALESTINIAN CULTURE OF MARTYRDOM AND SHAHID:

PROVIDING THE MODEL FOR 21ST

CENTURY ISLAMIC TERRORISM

In recent years, the suicide-terror phenomenon has

spread across the globe at astounding rates. With attacks

occurring everywhere from Moscow to Bali and from New York

City to Mumbai, suicide terrorism has made its mark as a

global epidemic. Most evident in its post-9/11 application

of suicide terrorism, particularly in the battle for Iraq,

al-Qaeda has incorporated *istishhad* (martyrdom) into its

grand strategy.[1] Suicide-terror attacks have dominated the

conflict in Iraq since major military operations ended

there in late 2003.[2] Indeed, in Iraq alone suicide-terror

attacks have reached levels surpassing almost all other

similar campaigns combined.[3] However, as one terrorism

expert recognizes, "clearly suicide bombing in Iraq is

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[1] Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber, "Al-Qaeda and the Internationalization of Suicide Terrorism," *Memorandum No. 78* (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, 2005), 8.
[2] See Nir Rosen, *In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq* (New York: Free Press, 2006).
[3] Mohammed M. Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007), 3.

largely an imported phenomenon."[4] Furthermore, the foreign

fighters who predominately use this *import* did not develop

it firsthand. Consistently coming from Saudi Arabia more

than anywhere else, suicide-homicide bombers in Iraq have

adapted the *modus operandi* and made it an important

component of al-Qaeda's strategy against coalition forces

and Iraq's democratic government.[5] With its operational

roots in Shi'a Iran,[6] the sectarian and ideological nemesis

of Saudi Arabia, the suicide-homicide attack went through a

lengthy evolution process before finding widespread

legitimacy in the Sunni-Muslim world. The now infamous

import thus required significant preparation before its

exportation to Iraq.

The United States (U.S.)-led War on Terror has

decreased al-Qaeda's capability to launch spectacular

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[4] See Martha Crenshaw's "Foreword," in *Suicide Bombers in Iraq*,
ix.
[5] Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, *Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters
in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records* (West Point, New
York: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007), 19; Richard A. Oppel
Jr., "Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of U.S.," *The
New York Times*, 22 November 2007; Mia Bloom, "Grim Saudi Export,"
Los Angeles Times, 17 July 2005; Susan B. Glasser, "'Martyrs' in
Iraq Mostly Saudi," *Washington Post*, 15 May 2005.
[6] The first occurrence of an assailant strapping explosives to
his chest and killing himself to kill others happened in 1980
during the Iran-Iraq War, when a 13-year old Iranian named
Hussein Fahmideh strapped explosives to himself and detonated
them while charging an Iraqi tank. Ayatollah Khomeini went on to
use "martyrs" to clear Iraqi minefields and the Iranian Pasdaran
subsequently exported the *shahid* concept to Lebanon in 1982.

attacks and forced the international network to focus more

acutely on its next structural metamorphosis in order to

continue advancing towards its long-term goals.[7] Al-Qaeda

started as a battlefront collection of "Afghan Arabs," who

in a few years transformed themselves into a global-

spanning organization that in less than a decade mutated

into an international network with countless tentacles.

But, Usama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri have not

finished transforming al-Qaeda; they have not kept

discretion about al-Qaeda's next metamorphous, either--that

being, into a "popular trend,"[8] wherein al-Qaeda would

largely rely on the world's Sunni-Muslim population to rise

up and carry out operations without direct hierarchal

command and control. So, where has al-Qaeda found a *model*

to present bin Laden's grandiose jihadi design to the

um'ma? Whom does al-Qaeda's prototype member or adherent

resemble? What qualities does he or she seek to possess?

What personal goals does he or she hope to fulfill by

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[7] Al-Qaeda's long-term goals include: reinvigorating Islam to the extent of its "golden era." For this to happen, however, al-Qaeda argues the Islamic world must come out of its new *jahiliyya* (godless dark-age) and the caliphate has to be reinstated.
[8] Ely Karmon, "Who Bombed Northern Israel? Al-Qaida and Palestine," *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT): Articles* (1 January 2006): accessed at <www.instituteforcounter terrorism.org> on 28 January 2007.

participating in al-Qaeda's "World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders?"

In short, the Palestinian *shahid*, whose glorification in the disputed territories exceeds that of a pop or movie star's in America, offers the ultimate guide. The *shahid* carries out the most *terrifying* of all terrorists' *modus operandi*: the suicide-homicide attack. As both a physical and symbolic act, the suicide-homicide attack marks an effective tool of warfare, optimal method of propaganda, and additionally fulfills a culturally defined religious duty. This makes the *shahid* the perfect weapon for al-Qaeda, which seeks to maximize the willingness of unaffiliated individuals to pursue the ideological prescripts of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. Accordingly, al-Qaeda understands that using the *shahid* minimally provides twofold utility--tactical and strategic[9]--both of which, as in the Palestinian case, effectively prod the internal and external audiences. Already, as foci of inspiration, the Palestinian culture of martyrdom and *shahid* have contributed significantly to suicide-homicide bombers enjoying a fashionable status globally among Islamic

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[9] Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 26.

fanatics.[10] Thus, by paving the way for massive Sunni

suicide terrorists, the Palestinian culture of martyrdom

and *shahid* have instrumentally aided al-Qaeda in advancing

its long-term goals.

Exporting the Palestinian Shahid

The exuberant amount of international media coverage

on the Arab-Israeli conflict allots Palestinian terror

organizations a paramount forum for their operations. Media

attention plays a central role in any guerrilla or terror

campaign, or as scholar Walter Laqueur once suggested:

"[the media is] the terrorist's best friend."[11] With terror

attacks, the media often functions as a tool for

organizations to disseminate external and internal

propaganda. Thus, when coupled with the added media

coverage suicide-homicide attacks generally receive in any

context, the sustained employment of suicide-homicide

bombers within the forum of the Israeli-Palestinian

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[10] The intended use of the term "fanatic" here is, as philosopher
Lee Harris defines, "someone willing to make a sacrifice of his
own self-interest for something outside himself." See Lee Harris,
The Suicide of Reason: Radical Islam's Threat to the West (New
York: Basic Books, 2007), xx.

[11] Walter Laqueur quoted in Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide
Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach," in *Root Causes of Suicide
Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New
York: Routledge, 2005), 95.

conflict, especially during *al-Aqsa intifada*, brought

Palestinian organizations perhaps more media attention than

any other previous terror campaign, including al-Qaeda's

pre-9/11 attacks. The media coverage of *al-Aqsa intifada*

increased the various Palestinian organizations' prestige,

notoriety and, most importantly, power vis-à-vis one

another, Israel, and within the international audience.

In combination with prime exposure, the strategic

successes provided by suicide terrorism, as demonstrated in

the political realm, gave Palestinian terror organizations

an even higher level of prestige among international terror

organizations and networks. Palestinian terror

organizations have always maintained a high, if not the

highest, level of respect in the international terror

community.[12] The efforts of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic

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[12] Regarding the Palestinian terror legacy, scholar Bruce Hoffman
contends: "Between 1968 and 1980, Palestinian terrorist groups
were indisputably the world's most active, accounting for more
international terrorist incidents than any other movement. The
success achieved by the PLO in publicizing the Palestinians'
plight through the 'internationalization' of its struggle with
Israel has since served as a model for similarly aggrieved
[identity groups]." Simply put, the Palestinians *revolutionized*
revolutionary violence. Hoffman goes on to credit the PLO not
only with "internationalizing" terrorism, but also providing
ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations with a "model," as well
as establishing the Palestinians as revolutionary terror
"mentors." Hoffman concludes, "the attention that the PLO has
received, the financial and political influence and power that it
has amassed, and the stature that it has been accorded in the

Jihad (PIJ) to derail the *Oslo peace process*, the daily

suicide-homicide bombers of *al-Aqsa intifada* and Israel's

subsequent retreat from Gaza, brought renewed praise and

admiration from those with shared values and beliefs.

Accordingly, this prestige has transitioned into imitation

of the Palestinian *shahid* (usually in the form of a

suicide-homicide bomber) and its supplementary culture of

martyrdom. Initially gaining widespread notoriety through

its use by the Shi'a Hezbollah in Lebanon, it was never a

given that suicide-homicide attacks would find acceptance

in the Sunni world. Indeed, over 11 years passed from the

time al-Da'awa 17, an Iraqi-Shi'a group, launched its first

suicide-homicide attack and Hamas's first successful

suicide-homicide bomber.[13] Ultimately, Palestinian terror

organizations evolved the *modus operandi* of suicide-

homicide bombers in two concurrent yet specific ways,

setting important precedents, that precipitated al-Qaeda's

strategy of relentless suicide terrorism in Iraq.

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international community continues to send a powerful message to
aggrieved peoples throughout the world." Bruce Hoffman, *Inside
Terrorism*, revised and expanded ed. (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006), 64 and 71-79.

[13] Hezballah launched its first suicide-homicide attack 11 months
after Da'awa 17--a group that attacked Iraqi government targets,
and most likely did so with the aid of the Pasdaran, similarly to
Hezballah in its campaigns against Western forces.

First, Palestinians legitimized suicide-homicide attacks, as "martyrdom operations," in the Sunni-Muslim world. The Palestinian cause has always functioned as a galvanizing Islamic issue particularly for Sunni-Arab countries. As a result, the Palestinian use of suicide terrorism before and during *al-Aqsa intifada* had a direct effect on the general population of the Sunni-Arab world, concerning how it viewed the "martyrdom operation." As support for martyrdom operations in Palestinian society increased, they accordingly found wide support across the Sunni-Arab world (as well as in the Islamic world in general). As of 2002, one analyst noted: "Martyrdom has replaced Palestinian independence as the main focus of the Arab media."[14] Palestinian terror organizations effectively utilized the media to spread acceptance of a *modus operandi* that had previously been used in the Islamic world exclusively by Shi'a organizations,[15] and which deployed

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[14] David Brooks, "The Culture of Martyrdom: How Suicide Bombing Became not just a Means but an End," *The Atlantic Monthly* 289, no. 6 (June 2002): 19.
[15] Moreover, martyrdom has traditionally played a much larger role in Shi'a Islam than Sunni Islam. For example, Shi'a Muslims celebrate Ashura, which commemorates the "martyrdom" of Hussein at the Battle of Karbala in 860.

suicide-homicide attackers minimally and cautiously.[16] The

Sunni world's acceptance of the Palestinian twist of

semantics that presents suicide-homicide attacks as

"martyrdom operations" directly opened the door for all

other militant-Sunni organizations' imitation.

Second, by turning suicide-homicide operations into a

weapon of terror,[17] Palestinian organizations demonstrated

the strategic pros of attacking soft targets, as well as

garnered Islamic legitimacy for doing so. Suicide-terror

attacks on Israeli civilians took the *modus operandi* to a

new level. Outdoing, on the "audacity" scale, the previous

campaigns that used suicide-homicide operations, which

specifically attacked military targets,[18] Palestinian

organizations made it overt policy to target Israeli

civilians *en masse*. Due to the religious undertones of its

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[16] In the late 1980s, Hezballah began to downplay its promotion of martyrdom within the population in Southern Lebanon. Hezballah's spiritual advisor, Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah even issued a *fatwa* (Islamic degree) authorizing martyrdom operations "only on special occasions" due to a fear of over "exaggerated use [by] over-zealous youth." See Rafael Israeli, "A Manual of Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 4 (24 January 2002): 30.

[17] Recognized by Robert Baer in *The Cult of the Suicide Bomber*, prod. and dir. David Betty and Kevin Toolis, 1 hr. 35 min., Many Rivers Films, 2006.

[18] Prior to Palestinian use of suicide terrorism, Hezballah and Amal in Lebanon and the LTTE in Sri Lanka used suicide-homicide attacks emphasizing military targets, with exceptions made for politicians.

conflict with Israel, Palestinians received approval by Islamic authorities not only for launching "martyrdom operations," but also for targeting civilians.

Support for suicide terrorism from important Islamic authorities across the Sunni-Arab world served to solidify the legitimacy of such acts in the eyes of hundreds of millions of people. Notably, the *fatwa* (Islamic decree) issued by Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, a leading Sunni cleric,[19] supporting the use of suicide-homicide attacks on civilians, worked not only to buttress the Palestinians employment of suicide-homicide bombers against Israeli civilians,[20] but also to somewhat close the debate within the greater Sunni world.[21] Recently at a conference honoring

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[19] Al-Qaradawi is the Head of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, as well as the President of the International Association of Muslim Scholars.

[20] Referring to the importance of al-Qaradawi's role in legitimizing suicide terrorism, Hamas's current leader Khaled Mash'al states: "[Qaradawi's] unequivocal fatwa, the sheikh, may Allah reward him, considered martyrdom operations to be the most noble level of jihad. That was unparalleled support for the people of Palestine, because, brothers and sisters, you cannot imagine how difficult it is psychologically for a young Palestinian man or woman to sacrifice themselves or what is most dear to them, only to encounter a conflict in their minds and hearts as to whether they are on the path of righteousness, or whether they are committing a religious violation." See Khaled Mash'al, Al-Jazeera TV on 16 July 2007, trans. in Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), *Special Dispatch Series* No. 1672 (2 August 2007): accessed at <www.memri.org>.

[21] Hafez notes: "Yussuf al-Qaradawi [has] declared jihad in Palestine as the individual obligation of every Muslim on many

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him, al-Qaradawi recalled his role in providing Islamic

legitimacy for suicide terrorism:

> I support the Palestinian cause. I support the
> resistance and the jihad. I support Hamas, the
> Islamic Jihad, and Hizbullah...I support
> martyrdom operations, and this was the straw that
> broke the camel's back... Our brothers in
> Palestine were forced to resort to martyrdom
> operations. The divine destiny is just, and so it
> gave these brothers something the enemy lacks...
> Their enemy is bombing them from above and
> below...and all they want is [to sacrifice] their
> own lives. The Palestinian man or woman booby-
> trap themselves--they turn themselves into human
> bombs--and sacrifice themselves for the sake of
> Allah, in order to strike fear in the hearts of
> their enemies.[22]

Additionally, the endorsement of suicide-homicide attacks

by countless other prestigious Islamic authorities,[23] and

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occasions during his weekly program on al-Jazeera entitled *al-Sharia wal-Haya* (Islamic Law and Life). His religious rulings regarding "martyrdom operations" aired on December 23, 2001 in a show entitled *al-Amaliyat al-Istishhadiyya fi Falastin* (Martyrdom Operations in Palestine) and on May 31, 2004 in a show entitled *al-Muslimun wal-Unf al-Siyasi* (Muslims and Political Violence). Yussuf al-Qaradawi's blessing for suicide bombings can be found in interviews with the Kuwaiti-based weekly, *Majallat al-Mujtama'a*, no. 1201 [1996] and the London-based monthly, *Falastin al-Muslima*, March 2002. In the latter, he rules that it is permissible for women to engage in suicide bombings. His religious rulings and publications can be found on his web site www.qaradawi.net." See Mohammed M. Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide Terrorism," in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 77.

[22] Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradhawi, Al-Jazeera TV on 16 July 2007, trans. in MEMRI, *Special Dispatch Series* No. 1672 (2 August 2007): accessed at <www.memri.org>.

[23] Hafez notes: "[in the book *al-Amaliyat al-Istishhadiyya fi Mizan al-Fiqhi* (Martyrdom Operations in Islamic Jurisprudence),

moreover the subsequent widespread acceptance of suicide-homicide bombers as shahids, effectively precluded other (Sunni) Islamic figures from offering any serious rebuttals. As a result, those that propel global-Islamist ideologies, particularly al-Qaeda, have taken note of the Palestinians' successes in employing suicide terrorism--regarding both strategic and political victories, as well as their greater propagandistic value among Muslims. Consequently, al-Qaeda has sought to adapt both the suicide-terror tactic and *istishhad* strategy for its own goals.

Direct Links and al-Qaeda's Palestinian Aura

Contrary to popular belief, al-Qaeda's connection to the Palestinian cause and people is nothing new.[24] After all, al-Qaeda's founder, Sheik Abdallah Azzam (al-Filastini) came from a village outside Jenin in the disputed territories. Al-Qaeda's pre-9/11 chief of

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Nawaf Hayel al-Takrouri] cites at least thirty-two religious ruling (fatwas) by Islamic scholars around the Muslim world supporting 'martyrdom operations' in Palestine." Hafez goes on to explain: "This is one of the most important books to be published on this subject...[because the author] cites historical and contemporary Islamic scholars that affirm that martyrdom is dependent on religious faith and [jihad] in the path of [Allah]. See Hafez, "Dying to Be Martyrs," 76.

[24] Many terrorism analysts frequently comment on al-Qaeda's supposed disconnect from the Palestinian issue.

operations, Abu Zubayda, who sits in U.S. custody at

Guantanamo Bay for his role in the 9/11 attacks, is

Palestinian. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pulled most of Tawhid

wal-Jihad's[25] original lieutenants from Palestinian groups

operating in the Levant.[26] Even al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born

Bedouin, claimed his *hamula* (clan) originated from the

Jerusalem area.[27] Predating al-Qaeda's founding, the first

known PIJ suicide-homicide bomber plot in 1986 called *for*

using a bomb built by an "Afghan-Alum" *mujahid*.[28] On April

30, 2003, al-Qaeda and Hamas launched a co-sponsored

suicide-terror attack against a popular Israeli pub in Tel

Aviv, killing three and wounding over 50.[29] These are just a

few examples of Palestinians involved with al-Qaeda or vice

versa. However, the connection goes beneath the surface,

and past the superficiality of individual members and

network-affiliated groups. A Palestinian aura has embedded

itself deep within the al-Qaeda ideology, organization,

network and most importantly its burgeoning movement.

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[25] Meaning "Monotheism and Holy War," *Tawhid wal-Jihad* eventually transitioned into al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers—also commonly called al-Qaeda in Iraq.
[26] Alexis Debat, "Osama bin Laden's Heir," *National Interest* 80 (Summer 2005): 155-157.
[27] Karmon, "Who Bombed Northern Israel? Al-Qaida and Palestine."
[28] Notes from ICT seminar on "The Global Jihad," given by Reuven Paz, in Herzliya, Israel (21 June 2005).
[29] See Appendix A.

Al-Qaeda intends to mimic the Palestinian experience with *jihad*, *istishhad* and ultimately strategic success, yet on a macro-global level. Al-Qaeda recognizes that making *jihad* and *istishhad* the crux of its strategy can set the foundation for realizing a durable global movement. Before 9/11, al-Qaeda saw its main purpose as training and financing like-minded Islamists to wage *jihad*.[30] Since 9/11, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have simply sought to motivate as many as possible within the general *um'ma* (global Islamic community) to participate in terrorism, if not a "martyrdom operation." Al-Qaeda expert Rohan Gunaratna summarizes: "Bin Laden directed the attack on America's most outstanding landmarks to inspire and incite the wider Muslim community and to show the way to the other Islamist movements."[31]

With its ability to strike on a spectacular scale greatly reduced, al-Qaeda's post-9/11 attacks have increasingly resembled more the *modus operandi* of the Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber than the Hezballah-inspired simultaneous and large-scale attack, which

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[30] Rohan K. Gunaratna, "The New al-Qaida: Developments in the Post-9/11 Evolution of al-Qaida," in *Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends, Scenarios and Future Threats*, ed. Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: Publishing House, 2005), 47.

[31] Gunaratna, "The New al-Qaida," 43.

characterized al-Qaeda's own style from August 1998 to early 2003.[32] The July 2005 attacks in London bore resemblance to components of both methods, as they included four simultaneous suicide-homicide bomber attacks, yet targeted common transportation systems. In Iraq, al-Qaeda's campaign has almost entirely looked Palestinian in mode-- numerous individual bombers attacking average civilians on a seemingly daily basis. Sometimes the influence is explicit. For example, on the eve of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a leader of al-Qaeda's female suicide-homicide bomber squads stated:

> We are preparing for the new strike announced by
> our leaders, and I declare that it will make
> America forget...the September 11 attacks. The
> idea came from the success of martyr operations
> carried out by young Palestinian women in the
> occupied territories.[33]

The shift in method, however, goes to the top. Bin Laden has sought to strategically redirect tactical

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[32] One should not downplay the influence Hezballah has had on al-Qaeda's style in simultaneously attacking multiple symbolic targets. The primary contention here is that Palestinian shahids paved the way for Sunni groups to target civilians using suicide-homicide attackers. Al-Qaeda's current reduced capability, however, has led it to look closer at the Palestinian model on a tactical/operational level.

[33] "Um Osama" quoted in "Bin Laden Has Set Up Female Suicide Squads: Report," *Arab News* (Dubai), 13 March 2003, cited in Mia Bloom, "Female Suicide Bombers: A Global Trend," *Dædalus* (Winter 2007): 99.

approach and return to al-Qaeda's rhetorical roots. In May
2008, bin Laden released a tape stating:

> To Western nations...this speech is to understand
> the core reason of the war between our
> civilization and your civilians. I mean *the
> Palestinian cause*...[which] is the major issue
> for my (Islamic) nation. It was an important
> element in fueling me from the beginning and the
> 19 [9/11 hijackers] with a great motive to fight
> for those subjected to injustice and the
> oppressed [emphasis added].[34]

Bin Laden's statement demonstrates a refocusing of al-
Qaeda's attention; moreover, it echoes the distant words of
Abdallah Azzam, who once stated:

> Our presence in Afghanistan today, which is the
> accomplishment of the imperative of jihad and our
> devotion to the struggle, does not mean that we
> have forgotten Palestine. Palestine is our
> beating heart, it comes even before Afghanistan
> in our minds, our hearts, our feelings and our
> faith.[35]

Marking the sixth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, bin
Laden called on righteous Muslims to participate in the
"caravan" of martyrs.[36] Playing off Azzam's pamphlet, *Join
the Caravan*, which called on Muslims to join the

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[34] "Usama bin Laden: Al Qaeda Will Continue Holy War Until
Liberation of Palestine," *Associated Press*, 16 May 2008.
[35] Quoted in Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 147, cited in
Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 3.
[36] Lee Keath, "Bin Laden Wants 'Caravan' of Martyrs," *Associated
Press*, 11 September 2007.

Mujahedin's *jihad* in Afghanistan, bin Laden's call

demonstrates al-Qaeda's commitment to a new *istishhad*-based

strategy, replacing Azzam's *jihad*-based strategy. In

effect, al-Qaeda has shifted focus from the *mujahid* to the

shahid. Reminiscent of the Palestinian movement's own shift

away from the *feda'i* to the *shahid*, al-Qaeda intends to

duplicate a major play from the Palestinian playbook. It

seeks to empower the individual.[37]

The "Occupation" of Dar al-Islam, Defensive Jihad and Fard Ayn

Today, al-Qaeda's ideology and strategy revolve around

the individual.[38] Since its founding, al-Qaeda has presented

jihad through the ideological tenet of *fard ayn* (individual

obligation). Lacking a real-world method that truly lived

up to its abstract ideation, deliberate "martyrdom," as

expressed through a suicide-homicide attack, offers such an

outlet to express the undeniable fulfillment of one's

individual obligation to an Islamic calling to *jihad*. As

researchers Yoram Schweitzer and Sari Goldstein Ferber

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[37] The *mujahid* and the *feda'i* both represent Islamic fighters who do not actively seek to die during *jihad*; the *shahid* does. Additionally, the *mujahid* and *feda'i* represent more of a participation in a group, whereas the *shahid* stands for any individual willing to answer Islam's call to *jihad*.
[38] Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 11 and 40.

note, "[t]he concept of sacrificing one's life in the name of Allah (*istishhad*) became a supreme organizational ideal within al-Qaeda and then spread to its operatives and affiliates in what might be described as a self-reproducing, self-disseminating virus."[39] Remote and mostly disconnected from the wide variety of affiliated organizations within its global "network of networks,"[40] al-Qaeda maintains a small core leadership hierarchy. Furthermore, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, most likely camped out in the tribally administered areas of North West Pakistan, do not intend on overseeing their war with the West and the secular leaders of the Islamic world to its finish. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri understand that they lead a war of patience, resolve and ultimately one that pits the will of the individual Muslim against that of various nation-states and the world's remaining superpower.

In order for individuals to receive social support for waging *jihad*, it requires establishing the necessary interpretation of Islam. Al-Qaeda has thus promoted the stance that its war with the West represents a defensive *jihad*, which makes participation in it, whether physically

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[39] Schweitzer and Goldstein Ferber, 9.
[40] CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center coined this term in the late 1990s. Gunaratna, "The New al-Qaida," 48.

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or financially, a *fard ayn* of each and every Muslim. Going

back to the teachings of al-Qaeda's founder, Abdallah

Azzam, *fard ayn* has played a central role in al-Qaeda's

temperament concerning "occupied" Islamic lands; Azzam

argued,

> ...jihad will remain an individual obligation
> until all other lands which formerly were Muslim
> come back to us and Islam reigns within them once
> again. Before us lie Palestine, Bukhara, Lebanon,
> Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, the Philippines, Burma,
> South Yemen, Tashkent, Andalusia.

Localized social reinforcement of these interpretations has

therefore become paramount to al-Qaeda effectively

executing its global strategy.

Like al-Qaeda, the Islamist-Palestinian organizations

view *jihad* as *fard ayn*.[41] While Azzam and before him Muslim

Brotherhood-ideologue Sayyid Qutb articulated the notion of

fard ayn, Hamas and PIJ more than others put the doctrine

into practice beginning in 1993 and reaching its

quintessence during *al-Aqsa intifada*. Serving as an example

of an individual's obligation to free the land of *dar al-*

Islam--further even, to one's ultimate sacrifice for the

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[41] Mohammed M. Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2006), 36.

cause--Palestinian shahids/suicide-homicide bombers opened the floor to al-Qaeda's own shahids.

Indeed, al-Qaeda did not begin employing suicide-homicide operations until its August 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Al-Qaeda's first operations inside the U.S., the assassination of popular Rabbi and former-Israeli Knesset member Meir Kahane in November 1990 and the first attempt to destroy the World Trade Center in February 1993, did not involve suicide terrorists. During the 1990s, al-Qaeda's modes of operation remained in their formative state.

The Palestinian introduction of the *shahid* as a suicide-homicide bomber to the Sunni world during the mid-1990s surely had an impact on al-Qaeda's decision to start using them in 1998. After all, at this time, most of al-Qaeda's top leadership had been in the *jihad* business either before or since the Afghan-Soviet war, yet suicide-homicide attacks did not occur during that conflict, or directly after it when al-Qaeda first began operating as an international-terror organization. Al-Qaeda designed its attacks in the late 1990s and early 2000s to shock, yet they did not occur relentlessly.

Uniting organizational strategy with the motivations

of individuals requires coordinating social forces and

securing cultural accommodation. To launch suicide-terror

attacks on a large scale, massive interaction with the

related constituency has to exist. Scholar Ami Pedahzur

contends:

> In cultural terms, suicide terrorism can thus be
> described as a result of a spiraling feedback
> process between an organization and its
> constituency. In order to sustain a suicide
> campaign, every terrorist organization needs the
> support of the community. Raising such support
> depends upon the organization's success in
> instilling ideas among members of the society
> about the importance of martyrdom and glorifying
> these notions by religious, nationalistic or
> other means.[42]

Palestinian suicide-terror campaigns against Israel

received international Sunni support for targeting Israeli

civilians. Thus al-Qaeda in its macro-scale suicide-terror

war had to gain the same type of support for targeting a

broader defined enemy.

Al-Qaeda's Adaptation of the
Culture of Martyrdom

A related culture of martyrdom rests as the sole

variable that distinguishes organizations, which employ

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[42] Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism* (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 163.

suicide-homicide attacks from those that do not.[43]

Furthermore, the social sustenance a suicide-terror

campaign receives from an affiliated culture of martyrdom

stands as a general testament to the support a constituency

gives to its representative body. The symbiosis between

organizations and individuals ultimately is communicated

through cultural symbols and by the social accommodation in

motivating and sanctioning behavior. Palestinian Media

Watch director Itamar Marcus identifies three components

imperative to motivating suicide terrorism: create an

enemy, legitimate killing the enemy, and motivate a

willingness to die while killing the enemy.[44] Concurringly,

researcher Assaf Moghadam recognizes, "two sets of motives

[must] converge...a willingness to kill...[and] a

willingness to die."[45] The Palestinian culture of martyrdom

perpetuates and ensures the function of these three

components. First, the culture of martyrdom alters the

defined 'other' to represent an explicit 'enemy.' Second,

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[43] Assaf Moghadam, "The Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A Multi-Causal Approach," in *Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom*, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2005), 98.
[44] Notes from ICT seminar on "Modern and Post-Modern Terrorism Strategies," given by Boaz Ganor and Itamar Marcus, in Herzliya, Israel (9 June 2005).
[45] Assaf Moghadam, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 26, no. 2 (March 2003): 68-69.

the culture of martyrdom legitimizes the killing of this enemy by framing its intentions as specifically threatening to the Palestinian collective identity and generally sinister in its dealings with the world. Third, the culture of martyrdom motivates and sanctions the willingness of individuals to die in the process of killing the sinister enemy.

Installed in various mosques and Islamic centers in urban areas of European cities, within underground political organizations in Middle Eastern capitals, and infested in South Asian madrassas alike, Islamic fanatics have decentralized the culture of martyrdom, just as al-Qaeda has done to its organizational structure. In contrast to the original Palestinian version, al-Qaeda's international jihadi-Salafi culture of martyrdom is less overt. Rather it operates in the shadows of Western and Islamic societies, and flourishes more as a satellite culture of martyrdom and virtual culture of martyrdom, wherein adherents can turn on an Arabic-language news outlet or enter an online Islamist chat-room to get a dose of an Islamist worldview. Indeed, global communications and media have redrawn the boundaries of cultural enclaves. No longer are cultures society-specific, but instead

oftentimes function as transnational forces in their own right.

Framing Conflict

As noted above, motivating a willingness to die while killing first entails defining the enemy and explaining why those who comprise it need to die. Thus, while political value provided by suicide-homicide attacks ultimately works as the greatest catalyst to organizations' continued use of the *modus operandi*, motivating individuals to carry out such operations requires continuous framing of "social ills." Commenting on the required preparation for launching effective campaigns, Hafez notes:

> Mobilizing collective action consists of more than calling on people to rise up or take to the streets; it involves framing social ills as threats and opportunities for action, networking among activists and their constituencies, building formal and informal organizations, forging collective identities and alliances, making claims against opponents and states, and motivating individuals to assume personal costs when the benefits of success are not readily apparent.[46]

In this regard, connecting the individual to the collective identity marks step one. Step two entails converging the individual obligation to fixing the social ills.

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[46] Hafez, *Suicide Bombers in Iraq*, 16.

Most Islamist denominations commonly frame the world

as though it teeters on the brink of an apocalyptic

struggle between the forces of Islam and a sinister

"Zionist-Crusader" alliance. Al-Qaeda's rhetoric has shaped

up no differently, often warning that Muslims must defend

their religion against Zionist-Crusader aggression. In

1998, the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and

Crusaders, an umbrella network headed by al-Qaeda, stated:

> The ruling to kill the Americans and their
> allies--civilians and military--is an obligation
> incumbent upon every Muslim who can do it and in
> any country--this until the Aqsa Mosque [in
> Jerusalem] and Holy Mosque [in Mecca] are
> liberated from their grip, and until their armies
> withdraw from all the lands of Islam, defeated,
> shattered, and unable to threaten any Muslim.
> This is in accordance with the Word of the Most
> High--"fight the pagans all together as they
> fight you all together" [Qur'an 9:36]
> and..."Fight them until there is no more tumult
> or oppression, and [all] religion belongs to
> Allah [Qur'an 8:39].[47]

Such statements from al-Qaeda's leadership, commonplace

since 9/11, clearly articulate who their enemy is, why they

are an enemy, when victory against this enemy will be

apparent, and a divine obligation for all Muslims to

participate in bringing about victory. Simply, al-Qaeda

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[47] *The World Islamic Front's Declaration to Wage Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders* in Raymond Ibrahim, ed. and trans., *The Al-Qaeda Reader* (New York: Broadway Books, 2007), 13.

seeks to energize as many individual Muslims as possible to
fight the Christian, Jewish and other non-Muslim peoples
that "threaten" Islam. Regarding the "occupation" of *dar
al-Islam*, Israel, the U.S., Spain, Russia, India, Christian
Lebanon, the Philippines and other non-Muslim nation-states
controlling "Muslim land" become the obvious targets. At
the forefront, however, sit the U.S. and Israel. Al-Qaeda
suggests that the U.S. designs its foreign policy to "serve
the Jews' petty state, [and divert] attention from its
occupation of Jerusalem and the murder of Muslims there."[48]
Islamists have elevated the supposed Jewish threat to a
more severe status. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
coupled with various Qur'an suras and Hadith sayings that
promote anti-Jewish beliefs,[49] has allowed Islamists to
frame all of the Islamic world's problems within the

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[48] In Ibrahim, 12.

[49] For example, one Hadith saying quotes Mohammed: "The last hour
would not come unless the Muslims will fight against the Jews and
the Muslims would kill them and until the Jews would hide
themselves behind a stone or a tree and a stone or tree would
say: Muslim, [oh] the servant of Allah, there is a Jew behind me;
come and kill him." In Ram Swarup, *Understanding the Hadith: The
Sacred Traditions of Islam* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002),
215. See also Qur'an 5:64 on page 202.

context of a Jewish "conspiracy," in which the U.S.

maintains a key supportive position.[50]

Islamist entities like al-Qaeda understand the

important part the "other" plays in solidifying a

collective identity--in this case, an Islamic identity as

represented by the *um'ma*. Judaism, one of Islam's earliest

foes, additionally fills this role today for Islamists. In

March 2003, bin Laden warned to his fellow Muslims:

> One of the most important objectives of the new
> Crusader attack is to pave the way and prepare
> the region, after its fragmentation, for the
> establishment of...the Greater State of Israel,
> whose border will include extensive areas of Iraq
> and Egypt, through Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, all of
> Palestine, and large parts of the Land of the Two
> Holy Places...What is happening to our people in
> Palestine is merely a model that the Zionist-
> American alliance wishes to impose upon the rest
> of the region: the killing of men, women and
> children...People [there] live in perpetual fear
> and paralyzing terror, awaiting death at any
> moment from a missile or shell that will destroy
> their homes, kill their sisters, and bury their
> babies alive...The founding of "Greater Israel"

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[50] In December 1998, bin Laden argued: "The Jews have succeeded in obligating American and British Christians to strike Iraq...all the biggest [U.S] officials are Jews--have led the Christians to clip the wings of the Islamic world." See in Ibrahim, 276. On October 18, 2003, bin Laden released a tape to al-Jazeera that stated: "[Bush] is carrying out the demands of the Zionist lobby that helped him into the White House--that is, annihilate the military might of Iraq because it is too close to the Jews in occupied Palestine...he is [also] concealing his own ambitions and the ambitions of the Zionist lobby in their desire for oil." In Ibrahim, 211.

means the surrender of the countries of the
region to the Jews...[51]

Again, Sheikh Qaradawi has lent his authority to confirming

the Islamist viewpoint; on the conflict with Judaism, he

argues:

> We do not disassociate Islam with war...We are
> fighting in the name of Islam... They fight us
> with Judaism, so we should fight them with Islam.
> They fight us with the Torah, so we should fight
> them with the Koran. If they say "the Temple," we
> should say "[the] Aqsa Mosque." If they say: "We
> glorify the Sabbath," we should say: "We glorify
> the Friday." This is how it should be. Religion
> must lead the war. This is the only way we can
> win.[52]

Referring to Islamic suicide terrorism, expert on Islamist

movements Reuven Paz contends that

> The perception of the struggle between Islam and
> Judaism is actually the main justification for
> the general use of terrorism, and particularly
> for suicide bombing... The core perception of the
> Islamist Arab groups is that they face a global
> conspiracy against the Islamic world... [A]fter
> the establishment of Israel and the renaissance
> of the Islamist groups since the [1960s] and
> [1970s] this conspiracy came to be viewed as a
> constant and perhaps eternal struggle between
> Judaism and Islam.[53]

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[51] In Ibrahim, 276-277.
[52] Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradhawi, Qatar TV on 25 February 2006,
trans. in MEMRI, *Special Dispatch Series* No. 1102 (28 February
2006): accessed at <www.memri.org>.
[53] Reuven Paz, "The Islamic Legitimacy of Palestinian Suicide
Terrorism," in *Countering Suicide Terrorism*, updated ed., ed.
Boaz Ganor (Herzliya, Israel: ICT, 2007), 61-62.

Giving credence to his conspiratorial rants among his

Muslim audience, bin Laden employs Qur'an suras to buttress

his evidence against Judaism. For example, he states:

> The Jews have lied about the Creator, and even
> more so about His creations. The Jews are
> murderers of the prophets, the violators of
> agreements...These are the Jews: usurers and
> whoremongers...Allah said of them: "Have they a
> share in [Allah's] dominion? If they have, they
> will not give up so much [of it] as would equal a
> spot on the stone of a date" [Qur'an 4:53].[54]

By designating an incorrigible enemy, whom even Allah

condemns, and consistently articulating this enemy's

sinister goals, al-Qaeda intends to create a sense of dire

urgency among Muslims to defend Islam, so that they

seriously contemplate the prospects of participating in

jihad, if not pursuing *istishhad*.

Like its role in the operational advancement and

legitimization of suicide terrorism, Palestinian

organizations and society have helped to construct the

commonly accepted anti-Jewish narrative that currently

exists in the Islamic world. For example, Hamas touts the

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[54] Usama bin Laden, "Sermon for the Feast of the Sacrifice," Al-Jazeera TV on 16 February 2003, trans. in MEMRI, *Special Dispatch Series* No. 476 (6 March 2003): accessed at <www.memri.org>. I would like to thank Dr. Richard Saccone for identifying this sura as Qur'an 4:53.

traditional anti-Semitic line in its 1988 Charter, stating

that

> [The Jews] stood behind the French Revolution,
> the Communist Revolution, and most the
> revolutions we have heard and hear about, here
> and there... [I]t has become common knowledge
> that [they caused] World War I...[and] World War
> II... [They also] inspired the formation of the
> United Nations and the Security Council instead
> of the League of Nations, in order to rule the
> world through them. No war broke out anywhere
> without [Jews'] fingerprints on it.[55]

Predating al-Qaeda's similar practice by a decade, Hamas

goes on to quote the Qur'an, citing sura 5:64: "So often as

they shall kindle a fire for war, Allah shall extinguish

it; and they shall set their minds to act corruptly in the

earth, but Allah loveth not the corrupt doers."[56] To connect

the Quranic passages to present-day, Hamas makes statements

such as: "The Nazism of the Jews includes [even] women and

children; it terrorizes everyone. These Jews ruin people's

livelihoods, steal their money, and their honor."[57] Hamas,

like al-Qaeda seeks to arouse a sense of duty among average

Muslims. Hamas declares: "jihad [in Palestine is] an

individual obligation for every Muslim. In the

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[55] Hamas charter in Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 189-190.
[56] Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, 190.
[57] Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, 188.

confrontation with the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we must raise the banner of Jihad."[58] With the massive media exposure that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict receives across the Islamic world, Hamas and Fatah's beliefs and rhetoric commonly get dispersed along with breaking news. Their views of Israel, Jews and Zionism accordingly reach countless households across the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Establishing a nexus between the potential jihadi and the 'larger than life' struggle of the *um'ma* provides an opportune way to increase the amount of new jihadis—particularly within communities already disaffected by one of the defined enemies of Islam. Furthermore, contrasting Western society with an idealized Islamic one, gives those Muslims, who might find the West disillusioning, immoral or corrupt, an additional impetus for participating in something that aims at "correcting" these ills. However, Israel's "occupation" of *al-Aqsa* Mosque in Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam, and the U.S. "occupation" of the Holy Mosque in Mecca, the holiest site in Islam, stand as the two most prominent Islamist grievances that arouse interest and motivation among nascent jihadis. Without

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[58] Hamas charter in Mishal and Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas*, 184-185.

surprise, an overwhelming majority of al-Qaeda's attacks have targeted either U.S. or Jewish/Israeli interests.[59] Ultimately, al-Qaeda has learned, from Islamist Palestinians, how to shape its arguments to best direct the individual to the decision that one must personally defend Islam at all costs--even if it means paying the price with his or her own life.

Social Networks

In both the Palestinian and jihadi-Salafi cases, social networks have played increasingly prominent roles in facilitating suicide terrorism, largely because they provide a social space for immersing individuals in the concepts of *jihad* and *istishhad*. For Palestinians, the culture of martyrdom has influenced general society to the point that organizations, since the late 1990s, no longer seek potential shahids but instead select them from a long line of willing and eager candidates. Pedahzur notes: "[today,] suicide bombers are not recruited, nor do they undergo a training process. They are peripheral figures in the network who join the ranks ad hoc from the environment

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[59] While many acknowledge the U.S. as a primary target of al-Qaeda attacks, many analysts fail to recognize that al-Qaeda has consistently targeted Jewish targets around the world (its attacks in e.g. Tunisia, Turkey, Morocco, Kenya, etc.).

close to the network, for the purpose of carrying out a suicide attack."[60] Similarly, al-Qaeda shahids are usually not recruited per se. Rather, a future *shahid* joins a social network,[61] which provides space that immerses the individual in the jihadi lifestyle--where one learns its beliefs, values, attitudes, goals, rhetoric, argumentation and puts him or her in contact with a dispatcher. Initially lured in by identity-based religious, political and social issues, the individual over time[62] accepts the ideological framing, solutions and prescriptions of those around him or her. Eventually, if needed, the individual volunteers for a martyrdom operation. The culture of martyrdom, often within the confines of a social network, succeeds in awakening the individual's *duty* to take matters into his or her own hands.

The Palestinian Legacy Today: Suicide Terrorism as a Global Phenomenon

Following the onslaught of *al-Aqsa intifada* in September 2000 and the 9/11 attacks a year later, suicide

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[60] See Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective," *Social Forces* 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 2000.

[61] Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 121-124.

[62] One should note, in the Palestinian case social networks are usually based around the *hamula* (clan).

attacks have dramatically increased. Palestinians launched

more suicide-terror attacks than any other movement[63] until

al-Qaeda in Iraq surpassed them in late 2005. Today,

organizations affiliated with al-Qaeda's global *jihad*

continue to comprise the majority of those launching such

attacks. While many credit al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks with

inspiring these affiliated organizations to continue bin

Laden's war after the U.S. began its campaign against the

core Afghan/Pakistan-based al-Qaeda organization,[64] many

fail to recognize the role Palestinians played in

highlighting the *shahid*/suicide-homicide bomber's various

utilities.

Without the precedents set by Palestinians, al-Qaeda's

global *istishhad*-based *jihad* would have required much more

preparation. Palestinian organizations perfected the

process of deploying suicide-homicide bombers, as they went

from recruiting to selecting *shahid* candidates within a

decade. Palestinian organizations convinced not only

Palestinian society, but also large portions of the greater

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[63] See Appendix A; and Intelligence and Terrorism Information
Center, *Anti-Israeli Terrorism, 2006: Data, Analysis and Trends*
(March 2007): 51-55; accessed at <www.terrorism-info.org.il>; see
also Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 327, note 33; Hafez, *Suicide
Bombers in Iraq*, 3.
[64] Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*, 116.

Sunni world, that suicide-homicide attackers truly embody "martyrs" and thus suicide-homicide attacks are really "martyrdom operations." Similarly, Palestinians garnered international support from prestigious Islamic authorities--ultimately, leading to the Sunni legitimization of suicide-homicide attacks against civilians, i.e. suicide terrorism. Furthermore, by demonizing Israelis and Jews, Palestinian society helped foster conspiracy theories, and other forms of conflict framing, that encouraged Muslims' violent response.

In formulating a unique *modus operandi*, al-Qaeda synthesized Hezballah's symbolic and simultaneous targeting with the Palestinians' mass targeting of civilians. However, one finds it highly unlikely that Hezballah has functioned as the primary organizational inspiration for Sunni suicide terrorists, considering the great disdain such individuals regularly have for Shi'a Islam--particularly the followers of al-Qaeda's movement in Iraq. Characterized by suicide-homicide bombers attacking Israeli-civilian buses, cafes, malls and other pedestrian targets, the Palestinian *shahid* became a premier icon in the Sunni world. The Palestinian *shahid*, ingrained in the mind of anyone who viewed Arabic-language satellite

television, particularly during *al-Aqsa intifada* (2000–

2005), surely offered an important inspiration on its own.

Additionally, the 9/11 attacks, which did not involve

suicide-homicide bombers, but rather suicidal hijackers and

suicide-terror pilots,[65] exemplify the grandiose-jihadi

terror attack. But, for the smaller, localized groups that

carried out most of al-Qaeda's post-9/11 operations, the

Palestinian *shahid* offered a more tenable model.

Ultimately, the Palestinian suicide-homicide bomber,

as the icon of *al-Aqsa intifada*, symbolized the Palestinian

cause and people, and in doing so produced a micro-scale

prototype for terrorist organizations such as those within

al-Qaeda's international network. Thus, the triumph of

Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers has had anything but

an isolated effect. Terrorism, and particularly suicide-

homicide attacks, stand as continuous learning processes

for the global-terror community. Accordingly, since the

early Palestinian suicide-terror campaigns in the mid-

1990s, popular Islamic concepts of martyrdom and jihadi

suicide terrorism have maintained a continuous escalation

toward a marriage of the synonymous. Already, al-Qaeda has

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[65] One could argue that only the pilots committed suicide during
the 9/11 attacks.

adopted the socio-cultural and religious lessons put into practice by Palestinians (e.g. *fard ayn*, conflict framing, etc.) and merged them with bin Laden's universal message, which has rapidly disseminated across the *um'ma* via satellite television, the internet and other means of contemporary mass communication. Al-Qaeda's shift in focus from *jihad* to *istishhad* represents a Palestinianization of the international jihadi-Salafi movement. Moreover, it signals that the advancements in suicide terrorism made by the Palestinian *shahid*/suicide-homicide bomber and its complementary culture of martyrdom will likely continue to inspire and foment imitation and therefore remain having reverberating effects for years to come.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION: SUICIDE TERRORISM AS
A FIXTURE OF THE 21ST CENTURY?

Through its reemergence as a significant force in the Islamic world, political Islam returned various concepts to the forefront of social discourse and practice, including violent ones like *jihad*, *fard ayn* and *istishhad*. These notions have notably produced violent phenomena such as suicide-homicide bombings, suicidal hijackings and beheadings. While Shi'a-Muslims initially developed the suicide-homicide *modus operandi*, and some nominally secular organizations have employed such attacks,[1] nearly forty Sunni-Muslim organizations have used suicide-homicide attacks since the Palestinians started doing so in 1993.[2] Moreover, following the precedents set by Palestinian

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[1] The Shi'a Muslim employers of suicide-homicide attacks include Iranian soldiers, the Iraqi Da'awa 17 and Hezballah and Amal in Lebanon. The "secular" employers of suicide-homicide attacks include the Syrian Socialist-National Party, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; one should note, however, all of these organizations have employed some kind of religious or cultic symbolism in attracting individuals to carry out attacks. Fatah and PFLP even set up new Islamist "brigades," to launch suicide-homicide attacks on their behalves.
[2] For a comprehensive list of suicide-homicide attacks worldwide from December 1981 to June 2005, see Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism* (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005), 241-253.

organizations, Sunni militants and terrorists today carry out the overwhelming majority of suicide-homicide attacks in an increasing number of locations and with a decreasing level of targeting discrimination. That suicide-homicide attacks originated with Shi'a Muslims and currently the Shi'a in Iraq have not resorted to suicide terrorism further demonstrates that the *modus operandi* has nearly become an exclusively Sunni phenomenon.

Indeed, without Sunni organizations, suicide terrorism would probably arouse minimal international concern. The Palestinians' *al-Aqsa intifada* would not have had the impact that it did; the wall separating Israel from the disputed territories surely would not stand, and Hamas would not enjoy the popular support that it currently does among Palestinians and other Arabs and Muslims. Al-Qaeda's embassy, USS Cole and 9/11 attacks would not have happened in the manner that they did, if at all. Iraq's reconstruction would not face the severe challenges that it does, as Sunni suicide-terror attacks (e.g. Golden-Dome Mosque attack and Ashura festival attack) have led to major sectarian clashes. The United Kingdom (UK) would not have faced the horror of British citizens killing themselves in order to murder fellows Britons. Seemingly endless, one

could go on with scores of examples, as Sunni organizations have launched numerous attacks in Indonesia, Russia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Philippines, Singapore, Croatia and elsewhere. Disregarding the work of Sunni organizations over the last 15 years, suicide-homicide attacks have struck only in Lebanon, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, India, Argentina and on the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq War.[3] With an international-Sunni culture of martyrdom shadowing the dispersal of suicide terrorism across the globe, a high likelihood exists that the *modus operandi* will continue to play a part in Islamist behavior in the foreseeable future. The Palestinian shahid's suicide terror 'MO' has made its mark, and al-Qaeda intends to duplicate it across the globe. Countering suicide terrorism therefore will require well thought-out strategies that employ a collection of responses that correspond to the varying facilitators and perpetrators of the *modus operandi*.

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[3] One can add Turkey to the list if one counts the PKK as secular, despite its solely Sunni membership.

The Three Pillars of Suicide Terrorism:
Individuals' Ends as Organizations'
Means to Collective Goals

Recently on February 4, 2008, two Palestinian suicide-homicide bombers launched an attack on a small shopping center in Dimona, Israel, killing a woman and wounding 40. A day later, *al-Hayat al-Jadida* (The New Life), the official newspaper of Palestinian Authority (PA) praised the terrorists, stating: "The perpetrators of the operation died as shahids." The two other newspapers under PA control similarly hailed the suicide terrorists as shahids, publicly bestowing upon them Islam's highest honor.[4] Considering that proponents of "peace" regularly deem PA President Mahmoud Abbas and his Fatah party the "moderates" within the Palestinian political arena, one should not expect popular Palestinan support for suicide terrorism to decrease anytime in the near future. Accordingly, Israel, like the United States (U.S.) in its fight against global jihadis, ought not patiently wait on "moderates" to correct the ills of "extremists," particularly when the two are oftentimes indistinguishable.

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[4] Yadid Berman, "PA Glorifies Dimona Terrorists," *Jerusalem Post*, 6 February 2008.

Nations-states targeted by suicide terrorism must work proactively to disable the utility of such attacks. Israel has sought to geographically disconnect itself from potential threats, yet it has done so at the cost of territory and principle, which in the long-run could have unimaginable consequences. Rather, Israel's "pre-separation Wall" counter-terrorism strategy represents a more strategically geared response to suicide terrorism: targeted assassinations of organizational leaders, dispatchers and bombmakers, demolition of the homes of suicide-terror perpetrators, and measures aimed at hindering collective support for terrorism in general and shahids/suicide-homicide bombers in particular.

Regarding the suicide-terror phenomenon, organizations function as the serial killer, individuals act as the killing instrument, and the sanctioning society/collective as the little voice that sounds off in both of their heads--encouraging them to go through with their murderous intentions. The *shahid* stands as a product of Palestinian collective identity/society, organizations/social networks, and individuals all which seek at various levels to pursue the goals of Palestinian *sammud*--namely, the destruction of the state of Israel via the return of "refugees" and the

"liberation" of the Dome of the Rock and *al-Aqsa* Mosque. Similarly, international jihadis work under leadership and with the support of a transnational community. Not unlike Palestinian fanatics, international jihadis desire a complete retreat of infidel-states that "occupy" *dar al-Islam*. They too refuse to moderate their goals even slightly, instead choosing to "resist." Palestinian shahids, in a sense, do their "death work" as performance artists in the presentation of *sammud*. Al-Qaeda-affiliated shahids do theirs in a macro-version of the same signaling game--pursuing political extortion via a war of attrition.

Employing suicide terrorism entails three imperative components: organizational strategic necessity, motivated individuals and a complementary culture of martyrdom. These multiple forces behind suicide terrorism accordingly necessitate distinct responses. Disabling the three pillars of suicide terror, both at the localized an international levels, thus requires *deterring* the collective, *preempting* organizations and *preventing* individuals from carrying out their distinct roles.

Countering Pillar One:
Preempting Terror Organizations

When dealing with terrorist organizations, negotiation never represents a forward-looking counterstrategy. Caving to terrorists' demands only "invites more attacks."[5] Furthermore, negotiating with organizations that once employed, but no longer use or advocate, terror tactics similarly sends a message that terrorism can one day provide profitable gains for those who use it. Negotiation therefore cannot exist with organizations that either currently, previously or prospectively might use terror tactics to advance their strategy. Rather, nation-states afflicted by terror tactics need a proactive preemption policy that promises to either capture or kill terror leaders prior to or directly after a terror attack. Hafez notes:

> Given that suicide bombings are a strategic choice by militant organizations aiming to coerce opponents into making concessions, it would be a mistake to grant major political concessions during a campaign of suicide attacks. Such compromise confirms the viability of this strategy....Only after Israel refused to make major concessions and escalated its counterinsurgency against the militants did

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[5] Mohammed M. Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2006), 70.

Palestinian factions begin talking about a cease-fire.[6]

But, even if a nation-state seeks a "cease-fire," any truce should not mark recognition or the initiation of normalization. Nation-states that recognize organizations that have once employed terrorism will do so only to their detriment, as well as to the disservice of other states in similar positions.

Countering Pillar Two:
Deterring Collective Support for Suicide Terrorism

As demonstrated by the Palestinians, terror organizations often work as the voice of a people. Accordingly, terror organizations rely on the support of the population in order to function. Thus, if the costs put on the sanctioning society/collective reach a high enough point to remove support for organizations that use suicide-terror attacks, then it will force organizations to recalculate the value of launching such operations. Because organizations rely on domestic support, counter-terrorism strategists need to direct deterrence policy against the accommodating population rather than the specific terror organization, whose members should be marked for termination or capture anyhow. In *Maoian* terms, the goal

[6] Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs*, 70.

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here is to make the "sea" an unwelcome environment for the "fish," while counter-terrorists simultaneously fish for the fish.

A collective punishment policy does not have to suffocate a population, but it surely needs to send a message, as well as work toward a functional goal. In the disputed territories for example, Israel usually increases security at times of heightened alert or during an ongoing suicide-homicide bombing campaign; this commonly results in added roadblocks and checkpoints that slow the daily functions of Palestinian society. A more severe punishment, and pointed message, might include measures like the cutting off of power or wide scale searches--both of which a nation-state can pointedly execute in problematic areas-- implementing a *targeted* collective punishment. A disclaimer of exactly why the society has to pay the costs of an organization's actions, however, must accompany any collective punishment, so as to prevent the loss of its message.

Nevertheless, many nation-states' security circumstances do not mirror those of Israel, which has brought suicide terrorism to near cessation by physically separating itself from the population deploying suicide-

homicide bombers. Indeed, as demonstrated by the UK's 7/7
and 7/21 bombers, sometimes a nation-state's suicidal enemy
comes from its own citizenry. Various attacks in Jordan,
Spain, Turkey, North Africa and elsewhere demonstrate
similar instances. In such cases, nation-states should make
a concerted effort with local communities to expose exactly
who and what social-networking institutions may or may not
have accommodated specific individuals in not only
launching terror attacks but also supporting them. For
example, accommodating behavior includes the glorification
of suicide terrorists as "shahids" or heroes, and nation-
states should afford individuals and institutions that
participate in such behavior zero tolerance. Nation-states
should make the monitoring of social networks likely
associated with Islamic fanaticism of utmost concern to
domestic security agencies.

Countering Pillar Three: Un-Motivating
Individuals to Commit Suicide Terrorism

Verifying one's existential worth requires the ability
to make an impact. Individuals accordingly look for any
number of ways to affect the world before them. Given the
right circumstances, terror campaigns provide individuals
with an outlet to channel their desires 'to make a

difference.' Suicide terrorists participate in terrorism for reasons identical to other terrorists: political ones; but, they commit suicide for a variety of reasons, often unrelated and customized, if not completely personal. Palestinian shahids usually seek to kill Israelis out of vengeance and a sense of religious and cultural duty, yet they kill themselves for a number of reasons, both externally and domestically provoked. For many, participation in a greater cause assuages the individual's desire to "contribute" and thus "confirms" the importance of one's existence. But, beyond pursuing glory, fame or mere recognition, adherence to Islamic duties can also obscure the betrayal of Arab social norms. Sometimes suicide terrorists just want to die, yet need a "legitimate" way to do so. Murdering others in the name of the cause, while killing oneself provides this socio-religious legitimacy. Whether for Allah, "Palestine," the *um'ma* or all three, individuals can rationalize and legitimize their escape from society via vengeance.

Thus, counter-terrorism strategies need to look at the bigger picture and attach themselves to larger foreign and domestic policies. Quelling not only the individual's motivation to kill, but also the motivation to kill oneself

over social discontentment suggests that vast social

reforms need to occur in the locales that produce suicide

terrorists. That most suicide terrorists come from

societies under the rule of authoritarian leaders or live

as second or third generation Muslim-immigrants in Western

Europe indicates that both environments require vast

reform. *Un*-motivating individuals to commit suicide-terror

attacks means thorough democratic reform in the greater

Arab and Islamic worlds, and concerted integration and

acculturation of Muslim immigrants into Western societies.

In recent years giant leaps have been made in the former,

and many have awakened to the necessity of the latter;

however, both problems lie far from resolution, and

awareness of the problems does not always translate to

progress in the right direction. Nevertheless, Western

policymakers need to remain focused on democratic

reformation in the Islamic world and acculturation of

Muslim immigrants living in Western societies.

Undercutting Istishhad with Individuality

An Old West/gunslinger adage suggests that when signs

of the end of the world appear, men react in three

different ways. The first man seeks all the worldly joy he

can muster--whiskey, prostitutes, etc. The second man heads

to the mission and prays with the priest. The third man,

however, gathers his resolve and revolvers and looks for

the way to *finish* the game--that is, on some suicidal

mission, he seeks to do his part in one last effort for a

greater cause.[7] Political Islam's promoters of martyrdom

have converged the paths of these men into one; taking the

holy man, the egotistical man, and the resolute man and

synthesizing them into the perfect confronter of the

world's end--thereby optimizing the capacity to produce

vast numbers of apocalyptic perpetrators of violence.

Ultimately, without access to alternative belief systems,

and deprived of the opportunity to participate within a

modern society based on the tenet of *individuality*, the

apocalyptic *istishhadi* ideologies will continue attracting

marginalized Muslim subjects and disaffected Muslim

immigrants. However, ideologies such as those that promote

istishhad never self-correct. Like with Nazism and Soviet

Marxist-Leninism, freedom will have to push them out of

existence.

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[7] Paraphrased from an explanation in *Young Guns II*, prod. Paul
Schiff and Irby Smith, dir. by Geoff Murphy, 1 hr. 43 min.,
Morgan Creek/Warner Bros., 1990, DVD.

Thus, acquiescing to suicide terrorism, or any form of

terrorism, for that matter, represents the most lethal

mistake any nation-state could make. Acquiescence extends

legitimacy to those who employ terrorism--granting their

causes and ideologies justifications for continued violence

and setting precedents for others to mimic. The U.S.

pullout from Lebanon in 1984, Israel's 2000 withdrawal from

its buffer zone in Southern Lebanon and its 2005 unilateral

disengagement from Gaza, all established significant

victories for the strategies of guerrilla warfare and

terrorism. Furthermore, these retreats verified the

strategic utility of suicide-homicide attacks, and

encouraged their continued utilization. More importantly,

however, the continued recognition by international powers,

including the U.S., of such organizations as the

Palestinian Fatah legitimate the terror tactics and

strategies that they have employed over the years. The U.S.

makes serious contradictions when it condemns al-Qaeda in

Iraq yet continues to fund and buttress Fatah's position

within Palestinian politics, as both organizations continue

to launch suicide-homicide attacks against civilians.

Neither the Palestinian nor the jihadi-Salafi facilitators

of suicide-terror attacks will decide to end their

campaigns in the foreseeable future, primarily because

their goals, which define their existence, remain

untenable. Organizations usually pursue their end-goals as

best to their capabilities--therefore demonstrating

rational behavior. Analysts and policymakers, however,

should not assume this rationality would transmit to these

actors moderating their end-goals. Why would they,

particularly if they refuse to even "moderate" their means?

How much reliance then can targeted nation-states put on

their enemies' more "moderate" constituencies and

representative bodies? When innocent lives are at stake,

the answer should always be "zero." It rests then on

targeted nation-states to abrasively end their foes'

suicide-terror campaigns and provide them with nothing less

than a Carthaginian peace.

APPENDIX A

PALESTINIAN SUICIDE-HOMICIDE ATTACKS IN ISRAEL

(APRIL 1993 TO APRIL 2008)

DATE	ORG	LOCATION	TARGET	MURDERED/ WOUNDED	BOMB TYPE	BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN) [Occupation]	AGE
04/16/1993	Hamas	Mekhola junction (Jordan Valley)	Two buses/ Moshav Mekhola cafeteria	1/8	Van bomb	Sahar Tamam Nabulsi	n/a
09/12/1993	Hamas/ PIJ	Gaza	Prisons Service bus	0/2	Car bomb*	Aymen Attalla	n/a
09/14/1993	Hamas	Gaza	Police station	0/0	Belt bomb*	n/a	n/a
09/26/1993	Hamas	Gaza	n/a	0/0	Car bomb	Ashraf Mahadi	19
10/04/1993	Hamas/ PIJ	Beit El/ Jerusalem-Shilo road	Bus/ Beit El headquarters	0/31	Car bomb	Suliman Zadan	n/a
10/25/1993	Hamas/ PIJ	Gaza	Civil administration convoy	0/0	Car bomb*	n/a	n/a
11/02/1993	Hamas	Singil/ Jerusalem-Shilo road	Bus	0/0	Car bomb	n/a	n/a
12/13/1993	PIJ	Sejaya intersection	IDF jeep	0/3	Red Crescent ambulance bomb	Anwar Aziz	n/a
04/06/1994	Hamas	Afula, Israel	Bus	8/51	Car bomb	Ra'id Abdallah Zakarna	19
04/13/1994	Hamas	Hadera, Israel	Bus	5/30	Belt bomb	Amar Amarna	n/a
10/19/1994	Hamas	Tel Aviv, Israel	Bus	22/48	Belt bomb	Hassan Abd al-Rahman al-Suweh	27
11/11/1994	PIJ	Netzarim junction (Gaza)	IDF officers/ Border police	3/12	Bicycle/ belt bomb	Hisham Ismail Abd al-Rahman Hamad	21
12/04/1994	Hamas/ PIJ	Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)	IDF patrol	0/0	Backpack bomb*	Mahmoud Shariff (Sheikh Radwan, Gaza City, Gaza)	26
12/25/1994	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus	0/13	Belt bomb	Ayman Kamil Radi (Khan Yunis, Gaza) [PA police officer]	21
01/22/1995	PIJ	Beit Lid junction (near Netanya, Israel)	Bus	19/69	Belt bombs	Anwar Sukkar; Salah Shakir	n/a; n/a
04/09/1995	PIJ	Kfar Darom, Gaza	Bus	8/36	Car bomb	Khaled Khatib	29
04/09/1995	Hamas	Netsarim junction (Gaza)	n/a	0/Some	Car bomb	n/a	n/a
06/25/1995	Hamas/ PIJ	Gaza	IDF Outpost	0/3	Donkey bomb	Mu'awiyya Roka	22
07/24/1995	Hamas	Ramat Gan, Israel	Bus	6/32	Belt bomb	Labib Anwar Azem	23
08/21/1995	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus	4/106	Belt bomb	Sufian Sbeih Jabarin	26
11/02/1995	PIJ	Geffen checkpoint/ Kissufim crossing (Gush Katif, Gaza)	Two buses	0/11	Car bombs	Rubhi Kahlout; Mohammed Abu Hashem	22; 18
02/25/1996	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus	26/80	Belt bomb	Majdi Abu Wardeh [student]	19
02/25/1996	Hamas	Beit Lid junction (Askelon, Israel)	Bus stop/ Hitchiking post	1/35	Belt bomb	Ibrahim Sarahneh	26
03/03/1996	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus	19/10	Belt bomb	Ra'id Sharnubi	n/a
03/04/1996	Hamas/ PIJ	Tel Aviv, Israel	Dizengoff (mall)	20/ 75-126	Belt/nail bomb	Ramez Obeid	24
03/21/1997	Hamas	Tel Aviv, Israel	Café Apropos (military)	3/48	Belt bomb	Musa Ghneimat	28
04/01/1997	PIJ	Netzarim junction (Gaza)	n/a	0/7	n/a	Abdallah al-Madhoun or Anwar al-Shabrawi	n/a
04/01/1997	PIJ	Kfar Darom, Gaza	Bus	0/0	n/a	Abdallah al-Madhoun or Anwar al-Shabrawi	n/a

DATE	ORG	LOCATION	TARGET	MURDERED/ WOUNDED	BOMB TYPE	BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN) [Occupation]	AGE
07/30/1997	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Mahane Yehuda (marketplace)	16/178	Belt bomb	Mu'awiya Jarara; Bashar Sawalha (both from Assira al-Shamalna, Nablus area)	23; 24
09/04/1997	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Ben Yehuda/ Midrahov (pedestrian mall)	8/181-210	Belt bomb	Tawfiq Yassin; Yousef Shouli; Asadi Tul (all from Assira al-Shamalna, Nablus area)	25; 22; 24
07/19/1998	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Mall	0/1	n/a	n/a	n/a
10/29/1998	Hamas	Gush Katif, Gaza	IDF jeep (schoolbus escort)	1/8	Belt bomb	Suhib Timraz	19
11/06/1998	PIJ	Jerusalem, Israel	Mahane Yehuda (marketplace)	0/24	Suitcase bombs**	Yousef Zughayer (Anata); Suleiman Dahayne (Silat al-Harithiyye, Jenin area)	21; 24
10/26/2000	PIJ	Gush Katif, Gaza	IDF outpost	0/1	Bicycle/ backpack bomb	Nabil Arair	24
11/06/2000	Hamas	Rafah, Gaza	Israeli Navy vessel	0/0	Raft bomb	n/a	n/a
12/15/2000	Hamas	Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)	Security outpost	0/0	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
12/22/2000	Hamas/ Fatah	Mekhola, Jordan Valley	Kiosk	0/3	Belt bomb	Hisham Abdallah Najar al-Faloji	24
01/01/2001	Hamas	Netanya, Israel	Bus	0/35-60	Car bomb	Hamed Saleh Abu Hajle	24
03/01/2001	Hamas	Mei-Ami junction (Wadi Ara)	Taxi	1/10	Bag bomb	n/a	
03/04/2001	Hamas	Netanya, Israel	Street	3/53-60	Bag bomb	Ahmad 'Alayyan (Nur al-Shams) [mosque muezzin]	23
03/27/2001	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus/ French Hill intersection	0/28	Backpack bomb	Dia'a Mohammed Hussein al-Tawil	21
03/28/2001	Hamas	Neve Yamin- Kfar Saba, Israel	Gas station	2/4	Belt bomb	Fadi Attalah Yousef 'Amer	23
04/22/2001	Hamas	Kfar Saba, Israel	Bus stop	1/45-60	Belt bomb	Omar Salem	22
04/29/2001	Hamas	Shavei Shomron, Samaria	School bus/ Tsir Sharif intersection	0/0	Car bomb	Jamal Abd al-Ghani Nasser (Nablus) [engineering student]	23
05/18/2001	Hamas	Netanya, Israel	HaSharon (mall)	5/86-105	Belt bomb	Mahmoud Ahmad Marmash (Tulkarem) [carpenter]	20
05/25/2001	Hamas	Netzarim junction (Gaza)	Bus	0/0	Truck bomb	Ala Hilal Abd al-Sater Sabbah; Osama Nimer Darwish	19; 21
05/25/2001	PIJ	Hadera, Israel	Central bus station	0/66	Car bomb	Yousef Suyyat; Nidal Jibali (both from Jenin) [both PA police officers]	n/a; n/a
05/29/2001	Hamas	Tapuach checkpoint (Khan Yunis, Gaza)	IDF outpost	0/2	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
06/01/2001	Hamas/ PIJ	Tel Aviv, Israel	Dolphinarium (nightclub)	22/83-120	Belt bomb	Sayyed al-Hotari	21

DATE	ORG	LOCATION	TARGET	MURDERED/ WOUNDED	BOMB TYPE	BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN) [Occupation]	AGE
06/17/2001	PIJ	Badahaniyye, Gaza	IDF outpost	0/0	Donkey-cart bomb	n/a	n/a
06/22/2001	Hamas	Alei Sinai, Gush Katif, Gaza	IDF patrol	2/1	Car bomb	Ismail al-M'asoubi	27
07/09/2001	Hamas	Kissufim crossing (Gush Katif, Gaza)	IDF vehicle	0/1	Car bomb	Nafez Ayesh al-Nader (Jabalya) or n/a	26 or n/a
07/11/2001	PIJ	Afula, Israel	n/a	0/0	Bag bomb*	Nafez Ayesh al-Nader (Jabalya) or n/a	26 or n/a
07/16/2001	PIJ	Binyamina, Israel	Bus stop/ train station	2/11	Belt bomb	Nidal Mustafa Ibrahim (Jenin)	20
07/22/2001	PIJ	Haifa, Israel	(military)	0/0	Belt bomb*	n/a	n/a
08/02/2001	Hamas/ PIJ	Beit Shean, Israel	Bus	0/0	Belt bomb*	n/a	n/a
08/04/2001	Hamas	n/a	n/a	0/0	n/a	n/a	n/a
08/08/2001	Hamas	Moshav Bekaot, Jordan Valley	IDF outpost/ checkpoint	0/1	Car bomb	n/a	n/a
08/09/2001	Hamas/ PIJ	Jerusalem, Israel	Sbarro (restaurant)	15/130	Guitar-case bomb	Izz al-Din al-Masri	23
08/12/2001	PIJ	Kiryat Mozkin, Haifa, Israel	Wall Stree Café	0/21	Belt bomb	Mahmoud Baker Nasser (Jenin) [PA police officer]	27
09/04/2001	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Pedestrians on Nevi'im Street	0/13-20	Bag bomb	Ra'id Nabil al-Barghouti	26
09/09/2001	PIJ	Beit Lid junction (near Netanya, Israel)	(military)	0/17	Car bomb	Abd al-Fatah Mohammed Muslah Rashid	25
09/09/2001	Hamas	Nahariya, Israel	Train station	3/46-95	Bag bomb	Mohammed al-Nabashi (Israeli-Arab citizen)	48
10/07/2001	PIJ	Kibbutz Shluhot, Beit Shean Valley, Israel	Kibbutz entrance	1/5	Belt/car bomb	Ahmad Abd al-Mun'em Ahmad Daraghme	17
10/17/2001	Hamas/ PFLP	Karni crossing (Nahaloz, Gaza)	IDF jeep	0/2	Bag bomb	n/a	n/a
11/08/2001	Hamas	Baka al-Sharkiye	Border police	0/2	Bag bomb	n/a	n/a
11/26/2001	Hamas	Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)	Border police	0/2	Belt bomb	Tayser Ahmad Ajrami	26
11/29/2001	Fatah/ PIJ	Hadera, Israel	Bus	3/9	Belt bombs	Abd al-Karim Abu Nafa (Jericho) [PA police officer]; Mustafa Abu Sryye	n/a; n/a
12/01/2001	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Ben Yehuda (pedestrian mall)	11/188	Bag bombs and car bomb	Osama Mohammed Abed Baher; Mohammed Nabil Jamil Abu Halabiyeh	23; 25
12/02/2001	Hamas	Haifa, Israel	Bus	15/40-61	Belt bomb	Maher Habashi	21
12/05/2001	PIJ	Jerusalem, Israel	Jaffa Gate area in Old City	0/8	Backpack bomb	Daoud Ali Ahmed (Artas)	43
12/09/2001	PIJ	Haifa, Israel	Bus stop/ hitchhiking post	0/30	Belt bomb	Nimer Yousef	20
12/12/2001	Hamas	Neve Dekalim/Ganei Tal/Gush Katif, Gaza	Two civilian vehicles	0/4	Bag bombs/ road bomb	{2 bombers} n/a; n/a	n/a; n/a
12/15/2001	Fatah/ PIJ	Tulkaram, Samaria	(military)	0/0	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
01/17/2002	Fatah	Hadera, Israel	Public hall	6/some	n/a	n/a	n/a
01/25/2002	PIJ	Tel Aviv, Israel	Café	0/23-33	Belt bomb	Safwat Abd al-Rahman Khalil	18
01/27/2002	Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	Mall entrance/ street	1/127-150	Explosives bag**	Wafa Idris^	31

DATE	ORG	LOCATION	TARGET	MURDERED/ WOUNDED	BOMB TYPE	BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN) [Occupation]	AGE
01/30/2002	Fatah	Tulkaram, Samaria	(military)	0/2	Belt bomb	Murad Abu Asal	22
02/06/2002	Hamas	Ma'ale Adumim, Judea	Bus	0/0	Belt bomb*	n/a	n/a
02/16/2002	PFLP	Karnei Shomron, Samaria	Pizzeria in shopping center	3/22-30	Belt bomb	Sadal Ahad Abd al-Haq	20
02/17/2002	Fatah	Hadera, Israel	(military)	0/2	Bomb belts	{2 bombers} n/a; n/a	n/a; n/a
02/18/2002	Fatah	Ma'ale Adumim, Judea	Police	1/2	Car bomb	Mohammed Hamuda	n/a
02/19/2002	Fatah	Mekhola junction	Bus	0/0	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
02/22/2002	Fatah	Efrat, Gush Etzion, Judea	Supermarket	0/3	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
02/27/2002	Fatah	Maccabim junction (Jerusalem-Modi'in highway)	Police	0/5	Belt bomb	Darine Abu Aisha^ [English literature student at al-Najah University]	
03/02/2002	Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	Yeshiva/ Synagogue	11/46-55	Belt bomb	Mohammed Daraghme (Bethlehem)	20
03/05/2002	PIJ	Afula, Israel	Bus/bus station	1/20	Belt bomb	Karim Takhaina	n/a
03/07/2002	PFLP	Ariel, Samaria	Eshel HaShomron (hotel)	0/15	Belt bomb	Shadi Nasser	15
03/07/2002	Hamas/ Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	Kafit (café)	0/0 or 0/10	Backpack bomb*	n/a	n/a
03/07/2002	PIJ/ Fatah	Karkur/Umm al-Fahm	(military)	0/0 or 0/10	Belt bomb/ Birdcage bomb*	n/a	n/a
03/09/2002	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Moment (café)	11/58	Belt bomb	Fouda Ismail al-Hourani	22
03/17/2002	PIJ	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus/French Hill intersection	0/25	Belt bomb	Akram Nabatiti	n/a
03/20/2002	PIJ	Wadi Ara (near Afula, Israel)	Bus	7/28-42	Belt bomb	Ra'afat Tahsin Slim Dyab	20
03/21/2002	Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	Café/ pedestrians	3/86	Belt bomb	Mohammed Hashaika	n/a
03/22/2002	Fatah	Salem/Zebub checkpoint, Jenin, Samaria	IDF checkpoint	0/1	Belt bomb	Imad Shakirat	n/a
03/26/2002	PFLP/ Fatah	Hares checkpoint, Qalqilye, Samaria	(military)	0/0	Belt bombs*	Shadi Shaker Hamamre; Khaled Yousef Dabash	22; 19
03/27/2002	Hamas	Netanya, Israel	Park Hotel (Passover party)	29/144	Belt bomb	Abed al-Basat Ode (Tulkarem)	25
03/29/2002	Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	Supermarket	2/22-30	Belt bomb	Ayat al-Akhras^	18
03/30/2002	Fatah	Tel Aviv, Israel	My Coffe Shop Café	1/29	Belt bomb	Muhanad Salahat	23
03/30/2002	Fatah	Baka al-Garbiayye/ Nazlat Issa, Samaria	Border police	1/1	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
03/31/2002	Hamas	Haifa, Israel	Matzah (restaurant)/ gas station	15/45	Belt bomb	Shadi al-Tubas	23
03/31/2002	Fatah	Efrat, Judea	Medical center	0/6	Belt bomb	Jamil Khalaf Hamid	17
04/01/2002	Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	Police roadblock	1/2	Belt bomb (detonated while in car)	Rami Mohammed Issa	19
04/02/2002	Fatah	n/a	n/a	0/0	n/a	Akram Khalifa	21
04/10/2002	Hamas/ PIJ	Yagur junction (east of Haifa, Israel)	Bus	8/22	Belt bomb	Ayman Abu Haijah	23
04/10/2002	Hamas	Haifa, Israel	Bus	7/several	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
04/11/2002	n/a	Samaria	n/a	0/several	Belt bomb*	n/a	n/a
04/12/2002	Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	Mahane Yehuda (marketplace)	6/104	Belt bomb	Andalib Takatake^ (Beit Fajar) [student]	22
04/19/2002	PIJ	Gush Katif, Gaza	IDF outpost	0/2	Car bomb*	n/a	n/a
04/20/2002	Hamas	108 Qalqilye checkpoint (Qalqilye, Samaria)	(military)	0/0	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a

DATE	ORG	LOCATION	TARGET	MURDERED/ WOUNDED	BOMB TYPE	BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN) [Occupation]	AGE
05/07/2002	Hamas	Rishon Letsion, Israel	Spiel (Billard club)	16/51-55	Belt and suitcase bomb	n/a	n/a
05/08/2002	PIJ	Megiddo junction	Bus stop	0/3	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
05/19/2002	Hamas/ PFLP	Netanya, Israel	Open air market	3/60	Backpack bomb	Usama Boshkar	19
05/20/2002	PIJ	Ta'anachim checkpoint (Afula, Israel)	Border police/ bus stop	0/0	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
05/22/2002	Fatah	Rishon Letsion, Israel	Chess Café at Rothschild Street (pedestrian mall)	2/36-41	Bag bomb	Issa Bdeir	16
05/24/2002	Fatah	Tel Aviv, Israel	Studio 49 Disco (nightclub)	0/7	Car bomb	Amar Skukani	19
05/27/2002	Fatah	Petach Tikva, Israel	Bravissimo (ice cream parlor)	2/37	Bag bomb	Jihad Titi (Balata, Nablus)	18
06/05/2002	PIJ	Megiddo junction (near Afula, Israel)	Bus/ intersection	17/42	Car bomb	Hamza Aref Hassan Samudi	18
06/11/2002	Fatah	Herzliya, Israel	Restaurant	1/15	Pipe bomb	Omar Ziada	30
06/17/2002	Fatah	Kfar Salem (near Tulkaram, Samaria)	Border police/ Separation-Wall construction workers	0/0	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
06/18/2002	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus	19/74	Bag bomb	Mohammed Hazza al-Ghoul	22
06/19/2002	Fatah/ DFLP	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus stop/ hitchhiking post/ French Hill intersection	7/39-50	Bag bomb	Sayyed Awadi	17
07/17/2002	Fatah	Tel Aviv, Israel	Theatre at Neve Sha'anan (pedestrian mall)	5/33-45	Bag bombs	Mohammed Attala; Ibrahim Najie (both from Balata)	18; 19
07/30/2002	Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	Felafel stand	0/5	Belt bomb	Mahsin Atta (Beit Jala)	17
08/04/2002	Hamas	Mt. Meron junction (Tsafet, Israel)	Bus	9/48	Belt bomb	Jihad Walid Hamada	24
08/05/2002	Fatah	Umm al-Fahm junction (Northern Israel)	Civilian car	0/1	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
09/18/2002	PIJ	Wadi Ara/ Umm al-Fahm junction	Bus stop/ Police van	1/3	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
09/19/2002	Hamas	Tel Aviv, Israel	Bus	6/58-66	Bag bomb	n/a	n/a
10/09/2002	Hamas	Ramat Gan, Israel	Bus stop	1/30-35	Belt bomb	Raifk Hamad	31
10/10/2002	n/a	Kibbutz Netzer, Samaria	Border police	0/0	Car bomb	{2 bombers} n/a; n/a	n/a; n/a
10/11/2002	Hamas	Tel Aviv, Israel	Tayelet (coffee house)	0/0	Belt bomb*	n/a	n/a
10/21/2002	PIJ	Karkur junction (Pardes Hannah, Israel)	Bus	14/48	Car bomb	Mohammed Hasnin; Ashraf al-Asmar (both from Jenin)	n/a; n/a
10/27/2002	Hamas/ Fatah	Ariel, Samaria	Gas station	3/18	Belt bomb	Mohammed al-Bastami (Nablus)	21
11/04/2002	PIJ/ Fatah/ PFLP	Kfar Saba, Israel	Arim (mall)	2/37-69	Belt bomb	Nabil Sawalhe	20
11/11/2002	PIJ	Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)	Military	0/0	n/a	n/a	n/a
11/21/2002	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus	11/51	Belt bomb	Nael Abu Hilail	23
11/22/2002	PIJ	Dabur (Gaza)	Israeli navy	0/4	Boat bomb	{2 bombers} n/a; n/a	n/a; n/a
11/28/2002	PFLP	Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)	DCO office	0/0	Car bomb	n/a	n/a
12/28/2002	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Russian Compound (pedestrian area)	0/0	Car bomb	n/a	n/a

DATE	ORG	LOCATION	TARGET	MURDERED/ WOUNDED	BOMB TYPE	BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN) [Occupation]	AGE
01/06/2003	Fatah/ PIJ	Tel Aviv, Israel	Neveh Sha'anan (pedestrian mall)	23/ 106-120	Belt bombs	Samer Nouri; Barak Khelfi	19; 20
01/17/2003	Hamas	Offshore 4 km from Dugit, Gaza	Israeli naval vessel	0/0	Explosives-laden raft	n/a	n/a
02/09/2003	PIJ	Gush Katif, Gaza	Orhan outpost	3/4	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
02/19/2003	Hamas	n/a	n/a	0/0	n/a	Karim Batron	21
03/05/2003	Hamas	Haifa, Israel	Bus	17/42-60	Belt bomb	Mahmoud al-Qawasme (Hebron)	20
03/30/2003	PIJ	Netanya, Israel	London Café	0/58	Belt bomb	Rami al-Jemeel Ranam	19
04/24/2003	Fatah/ PFLP	Kfar Saba, Israel	Train station	1/15	Belt bomb	Ahmed Khaled Khatib	18
04/30/2003	Hamas/ al-Qaeda	Tel Aviv, Israel	Mike's Place (pub)	3/62	Belt bomb Belt bomb*	Asif Mohammed Hanif (London, England) [Islamic Law Student]; Omar Khan Sharif (Darby, England)	21; 27
05/08/2003	Fatah	Gaza	IDF tank	0/0	Car bomb	n/a	n/a
05/18/2003	Hamas	Hebron, Judea	Gross Square	2/0	Belt bomb	Faud al-Qawasme (Hebron)	22
05/18/2003	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus/ French Hill Intersection	9/20	Belt bomb	Bassam Taruri	19
05/18/2003	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Ram intersection	0/0	Bag bomb	Abd'al-Fatah Ja'abari	19
05/19/2003	Hamas	al-Aram checkpoint (near Kfar Darom, Gaza)	IDF jeep	0/3	Bicycle/belt bomb	Shadi al-Nabhan	19
05/19/2003	PIJ/ Fatah	Afula, Israel	Amakim Mall	3/52-70	Bag bomb	Hiba Azzam Daraghme^ [English student]	19
06/11/2003	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus	17/104	Belt bomb	Abd'al-Muti Shabana	18
06/19/2003	PIJ	Moshav Sde Trumot, Israel	Grocery store	1/0	Belt bomb	Ahmed Abahre	20
07/07/2003	PIJ	Moshav Kfar Ya'avitz, Israel	Civilian home	1/6	Belt bomb	Ahmed Yehiye	22
08/12/2003	Fatah	Rosh HaAyin	Store at Mall	1/9-10	Belt bomb	Islam Yousef Qteishat	17
08/12/2003	Hamas	Ariel, Samaria	Bus stop	2/2-4	Belt bomb	Khamis Ghazi Gerwan	17
08/19/2003	Hamas/ PIJ	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus	24/ 104-128	Belt bomb	Ra'id Abd'al-Hamid Masq	29
09/09/2003	Hamas	Tsrifin Army Base	Bus stop/ Hitchhiking post	9/15-20	Belt bomb	Iyhab Abu Salim OR Ramiz Abu Salim	n/a
09/09/2003	Hamas	Jerusalem, Israel	Hillel Café	8/40-70	Belt bomb	Iyhab Abu Salim OR Ramiz Abu Salim	n/a
10/04/2003	PIJ	Haifa, Israel	Maxim (restaurant)	21/60	Belt bomb	Hanadi Jaradat^	27
10/09/2003	Fatah/ PIJ	Tulkaram, Samaria	DOC office	0/3	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
11/03/2003	Fatah	Azun village, Samaria	IDF patrol	0/1	Belt bomb	Sabih Abu Saud	16
11/09/2003	Fatah	Tulkaram, Samaria	(military)	0/3	n/a	n/a	n/a
12/25/2003	PFLP	Petah Tikva, Israel	Bus stop/Bne-Barak intersection	4/20	Belt bomb	Sa'ad Hanani	18
01/11/2004	n/a	n/a	n/a	0/0	n/a	Iyad al-Masri	16
01/14/2004	Hamas	Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)	Workers' terminal	4/12	Belt bomb	Rim Salah al-Riyashi^ [mother of two]	22
01/29/2004	Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus	11/44-55	Bag bomb	Ali Yusuf Jaara (Bethlehem) [PA police officier]	24
02/22/2004	Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	Bus	8/68-72	n/a	Mohammed Za'ul (Bethlehem)	23
02/27/2004	PIJ	n/a	n/a	0/0	n/a	Abed al-Hameed Khattab	21

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DATE	ORG	LOCATION	TARGET	MURDERED/ WOUNDED	BOMB TYPE	BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN) [Occupation]	AGE
03/06/2004	Fatah/ PIJ/ Hamas	Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)	Police/ IDF outpost	2/15	3 Car bombs (camflouged IDF jeeps)	{Four bombers}	n/a; n/a; n/a; n/a
03/14/2004	Hamas/ Fatah	Ashdod, Israel	Port	11/18	Belt bomb; Bag bomb	Nabil Ibrahim Masoud; Mohammed Zahil Salem	18; 18
04/17/2004	Hamas/ Fatah	Erez crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)	Border police	1/3	Belt bomb	Fadi al-Amoudi	22
04/28/2004	Hamas	Kfar Darom, Gaza	(military)	0/4	n/a	n/a	n/a
05/21/2004	PFLP	Bekaot checkpoint (Northern Jordan Valley)	n/a	0/5	n/a	n/a	n/a
07/11/2004	PIJ	Tel Aviv, Israel	Bus stop	1/40	Belt bomb	Iyad al-Masri	17
08/31/2004	Hamas	Be'er-Sheva, Israel	Two buses	16/100	Belt bombs	Ahmed al-Qawasme; Nassim Subhi Ja'abari (both from Hebron)	26; 24
09/08/2004	Fatah	Baka al-Sharkiye checkpoint	Israeli security personnel	0/0	Car bomb	n/a	n/a
09/14/2004	Fatah	Qalqilye, Samaria	IDF jeep	0/3	n/a	Yousef Ighbariye	22
09/22/2004	Fatah	Jerusalem, Israel	French Hill junction (hitchhiking post)	2/17	n/a	Zainab Abu Salem^	19
11/01/2004	PFLP	Tel Aviv, Israel	Carmel Market	3/32	n/a	Ali Amar Alfar (Askar, Nablus)	18
01/06/2005	Hamas	Ganei Tal, Gush Katif, Gaza	Civilian	1/0	n/a	n/a	n/a
01/13/2005	Hamas/ PRC/ Fatah	Karni crossing (Gaza)	(military)	6/15	n/a	n/a; n/a	n/a; n/a
01/18/2005	Hamas	Gush Katif, Gaza	ISA/IDF investigators	2/7	Belt bomb	Omar Tabash	21
02/25/2005	PIJ	Tel Aviv, Israel	Stage Club (nightclub)	5/53	Belt bomb	Abdallah Badran	21
07/12/2005	PIJ	Netanya, Israel	HaSharon Mall	5/90	Belt bomb	Ahmad Abu Khaalil (Atil village)	18
08/28/2005	Hamas	Be'er-Sheva, Israel	Central bus station	0/52	Belt bomb	n/a	n/a
10/26/2005	PIJ	Hadera, Israel	Felafel stand at marketplace	6/55	Belt bomb	Hassan Abu Zeid (Qabatiye)	20
12/05/2005	PIJ	Netanya, Israel	HaSharon Mall	5/50	Bag bomb	Lutfi Amin (Kfar Rai)	20s
12/29/2005	PIJ	Tulkaram, Samaria	Roadblock/taxi	2/10	Belt bomb	Ala al-Sadi (Jenin) [PA police officer]	23
01/12/2006	PIJ	Jenin, Samaria	Security forces	0/0	Belt bomb	Muataz Khalil	n/a
01/19/2006	PIJ	Tel Aviv, Israel	Rosh Ha'ir (restaurant)	0/31	Belt bomb*	Sami Abd al-Hafez Antar [student at al-Najah University]	20
03/30/2006	Fatah/ Hezballah	Kedumim, Samaria	Civilian vehicle	4/0	Belt bomb	Ahamd Masharka (Hebron)	24
04/17/2006	PIJ	Tel Aviv, Israel	Rosh Ha'ir (restaurant)	11/65-80	Belt bomb	Sami Hamad (al-Gharakah village, Jenin)	21
10/06/2006	PIJ	Beit Hanoun area, Gaza	IDF soldiers	0/1	Belt bomb	Mirfat Amin Masoud^ (Jabaliyye)	n/a
10/23/2006	Hamas	Jabaliyye, Gaza	IDF soldiers	0/4	Belt bomb	Fatima Omar al-Najar^ (Jabaliyye)	64
01/29/2007	PIJ/ Fatah	Eilat, Israel	Bakery	3/0	Belt bomb	Mohammed Faisal Saksak (Gaza City)	21

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DATE	ORG	LOCATION	TARGET	MURDERED/ WOUNDED	BOMB TYPE	BOMBER/S (HOMETOWN) [Occupation]	AGE
02/04/2008	Fatah/ PFLP	Dimona, Israel	Shopping center	1/40	Belt bomb; Belt bomb*	Luwi Luwani (Gaza); Mousa Arafat (Khan Younis, Gaza)	n/a; n/a
04/19/2008	Hamas	Kerem Shalom crossing (Gaza-Southern Israel)	IDF soldiers	0/8	Jeep bombs	n/a; n/a	n/a; n/a

*Indicates that explosives did not detonate as intended

^Indicates female bomber

**Indicates explosives detonated in transit

<u>Sources</u>: MFA, ICT, Jerusalem Post, Ha'aretz, Deutsche Presse-Agentur

<u>Cross-Referenced with</u>: Mohammed M. Hafez, *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Process, 2006); Ami Pedahzur, *Suicide Terrorism*. (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2005); Shaul Shay, *The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks* (London: Transaction Publishers, 2004); Human Rights Watch, *Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks against Israeli Civilians* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).

APPENDIX B

SNAPSHOTS OF THE PALESTINIAN

CULTURE OF MARTYRDOM

"The Grand Commander Martyr Usama al-'As'as (from)
the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine"

Shahid poster from "The Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah)"

A Bethlehem street dedicated to the memory of a PIJ shahid, as well as Fatah's former leader Yasser Arafat

"Martyrs Street/Shaari'a al-Shuhada" in Bethlehem

Shahid poster from "the Islamic Jihad Movement"

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