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RESEARCH ARTICLE/SPECIAL SECTION

WELFARE INSTITUTIONS, RESOURCES, AND POLITICAL LEARNING

Interacting with the State as an Incentive for the Political Participation of Long-Term Unemployed Youth*

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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the impact of interactions with welfare institutions on the political participation of long-term unemployed youth in two cities. We assess the role of resource redistribution and of political learning on engagement in protest activities. We use a unique dataset of long-term unemployed youth to predict the probability that long-term unemployed youth participate in protest activities and become politically alienated as a result of their interactions with the state. Our study suggests that the impact of staid aid on political participation comes from providing services through the unemployment office and the social aid office rather than from direct payments. However, we do not find strong evidence revealing a process of political learning, as political alienation does not seem to mediate the effect of interactions with

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the state on protest. The most important finding of our study is that the connection between welfare institutions and political learning is context-dependent. We find a differential effect of interactions with the unemployment office and with the social aid office across cities.

KEYWORDS: Political participation, protest activities, welfare institutions, political learning, political alienation

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1. Introduction

Research on political participation has traditionally looked at the impact of individual-level factors such as socio-demographic characteristics, socio-economic status, education, political attitudes, and so forth (Nie et al., 1979; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1995). There is an important missing actor in this literature: the state. The role of the state is seldom looked at in studies of political participation. Franklin (1996, 2004), for example, has done so for electoral participation. Students of social movements, in contrast, have paid much attention to the role of the state as encouraging or discouraging collective action. Political opportunity theorists, in particular, have put that as a key issue on their research agenda (see Kriesi, 2004; Meyer, 2004: for reviews). In both cases, however, the state is taken as a general context that may change the conditions under which people get involved in politics or moderate the effect of some individual-level characteristics on their propensity to participate.

In this paper we examine the role of the state by focusing on a more specific aspect: how welfare institutions contribute to political learning, therefore ultimately leading to an increased (or decreased) engagement in politics. More specifically, we look at how interacting with the state may work as an incentive (or disincentive) for long-term unemployed youth to get involved in protest activities. We expect that interactions diminish the political alienation of unemployed youth when they obtain the services they are entitled to because they learn that they can successfully enforce a demand on the state and that the state is responsive to their demands. Thus, in this case, interactions with the state should positively contribute to their overall involvement in politics and to their political participation in protest. Protest is a non-targeted voice-based form of participation (Teorell et al., 2007), which is particularly interesting when looking at the political

behavior of young people, as they are more attracted to this form of participation than other cohorts (Dalton, 1996; Henn et al., 2002).

Especially in times of crisis like the ones in which we conducted our study, the welfare state has a buffering effect on the situation of resource-poor groups which comes from money transfers (Anderson and Hecht, 2014). The unemployed, and even more so young long-term unemployed, are one such groups. This effect also manifests itself on political participation. Previous research has focused on the impact of resources, especially economic ones, on the political participation of unemployed people (Burden and Wichowsky 2012; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979; Schlozman and Verba 1979). Examining how the interactions between them and certain state institutions may encourage or discourage their political engagement is another way – much understudied so far – to study the complex relation between political behavior and its institutional context.

We link our main argument to the literature on political learning (Soss, 1999; Mettler, 2002; Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014; Campbell, 2012). In this regard, we argue that the impact of the welfare state is not so much due to direct money transfers, but depends mainly on interactions with street-level bureaucrats and on obtaining or not social services and benefits. In these interactions, individuals learn, firstly, whether the state is responsive and, secondly, whether they can obtain something from it. People then infer about the role of the state based on such interactions. Furthermore, we investigate the role of these learned political attitudes for political participation. More specifically we examine whether political efficacy and cynicism, which have been shown in previous research to be strong predictors of low levels of political engagement (Almond and Verba, 1963; Pateman, 1970; Bandura, 1997), mediate the relationship between interactions with welfare institutions and, more generally, with the state and political participation, most notably the use of protest activities. These are two key components of political alienation, which has often been attributed to both the youngsters and the unemployed, and even more so to young unemployed. We focus on protest – a non-targeted voice-based form of participation (Teorell et al., 2007) – as it is a particularly important form of participation when looking at the political behavior of young people, as they are more attracted to this form of participation than other cohorts (Dalton, 1996; Henn et al., 2002).¹

¹ Teorell et al. (2007) distinguishing between five main forms of political participation according to three criteria: voting activities (exit-based and representational), consumer participation (exit-based and non-representational), party activities (non-targeted, voice-based, and representational), protest activities (targeted, voice-based, and non-representational, and contacting activities (targeted and voice-based).

To be sure, similar arguments have been advanced in the literature. However, previous research in this field has done so by comparing different resource-poor populations, such as single mothers or disabled (Soss, 1999; Soss, 2004). Moreover, most existing studies deal with the U.S. (Campbell, 2003; Lawless and Fox, 2001; Mettler, 2002; Soss, 1999). We compare a single population in two cities and their interactions with two state agencies. The two cities – Cologne and Geneva – belong to the same unemployment regimes, but in their latest reforms they have taken different paths, Germany introducing more workfare measures and Switzerland developing measures aiming at both professional and social inclusion. The two different kinds of welfare institutions – the unemployment office and the social aid office – allow us to compare social policies that are insurance based or means-tested an important difference highlighted in previous studies (Mettler and Stonecash, 2008; Swartz et al., 2009). Our analysis is based on data from a random sample of long-term unemployed youth in the two cities retrieved in an EU-funded project.

2. Welfare institutions and long-term unemployment

Changes in the labor market over the last 20 years have affected the ability of unemployment policies to offer protection to certain workers. In particular in the case of youth, these policies appear as inadequate when they limit access to outsiders, that is, when they fail to take into account the increased flexibility of the labor market. The welfare state and, more specifically, unemployment regulations face a number of challenges in reaching outsiders and offering them employment protection (Clegg, 2007). The atypical employment – most frequent among youth, women, and low-qualified workers – limits access to unemployment benefits because of a failure to fulfilling the access criteria (Bonoli, 2009; Clasen and Clegg, 2006).

Moreover, a central aspect of our analysis relates to the reforms of unemployment policies, which have started a process of re-commodification characterized by less benefits and more obligations related to the provision of unemployment benefits (Arcanjo, 2012). Access to unemployment benefits has become more limited and the duration of benefits was shortened. This allows to reduce the cost of the welfare state, but also to address the neoliberal claim that unemployment benefits create disincentives to work. In this respect, these changes are not a mere downsizing of the existing unemployment

benefits, but they represent a change of paradigm, shifting away from a conception of social protection offered by the welfare state and the idea of employment as “socialized work” to the new standard of “employable individual” (Zimmermann, 2006). While in the former the state offers protection against temporary or permanent incapacity to work (due to ageing, illness, accidents, or job loss) based on solidarity and collective protection of workers against the odds inherent to a paid labor society, in the latter its major role is to ensure that people go back to work and, if needed, enhance their employability through active measures while providing short-term financial support. Furthermore, the ideal of the “employable individual” focuses on reinforcing individuals’ work ethic through workfare measures that force individuals into job, be they underpaid or below working standards (Bonvin, 2008).

In this new conception of the role of the state, unemployment represents a highly stigmatizing status (Zimmermann, 2006). This change can be related to the discussion of conditionality in the British context (Dwyer and Ellison, 2009) and the emergence of new paternalism in the American context (Mead, 1998). In this view, the state is conditioning the provision of resources to the compliance of the beneficiaries with expected behaviors, in the case of unemployed youth enhancing their employability or agreeing with the ethic of work. The literature on political learning draws from this view to assess the extent to which the state is telling the beneficiaries of social measures how to live or to decide what is best for them (Campbell, 2012; Mettler, 2002; Soss, 2004).

3. Social policies, political learning, and political participation

Since the precursory work by Skocpol (1992), research on policy feedback analyzes the effects of public policies on political processes. As part of this research, some researchers work more specifically on the effects of public policies on citizens’ political participation with the assumption that “[p]olicies impact citizenship because they encourage and facilitate participation by some, but discourage or exclude participation by others” (Schneider and Ingram, 2005: 27). Research working on the effect of policy design on citizens’ political participation is more limited and mainly focused on the American context with the notable exception of a recently published edited volume on the impact of welfare policies for citizens’ democratic participation in Europe (Kumlin and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014).

Our study contributes to the literature by adding to the research working on policy feedback in relation to the European welfare state and, more specifically, by offering an in-depth comparison of policy feedback in the Swiss and the German unemployment

regimes. Thus, this allows us to test the effect of targeted public policies on similar populations, namely long-term unemployed youth living in a European city. In fact, in our views the main drawback of the literature working on policy feedback and political participation is the comparison of often very different populations targeted by specific public policies, for instance in the oft cited research by Soss (1999; 2004) the comparison confronts 'welfare mothers' and 'disabled workers'. In a latter work, the question of self-selection is addressed by comparing poor citizens benefitting from three means-tested measures two of which target families and one based on public housing assistance (Bruch et al., 2010). But still we think ruling out the self-selection effect can be improved by working on a single population. In fact, poverty among families may be related to lone parenthood – in particular to single mothers, while housing assistance may cover a broader range of poor citizens and this, in turn may affect the outcomes found in terms of political participation.

According to research on policy feedback, the design of social policy affects beneficiaries' relationship to the state as well as the way they perceive their capacity to act politically (Mettler and Stonecash, 2008; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Soss, 2004). In this vein, Schneider and Ingram (1993: 340) note that "[p]olicy teaches lessons about the type of groups people belong to, what they deserve from government, and what is expected of them. [...] Citizens encounter and internalize the messages not only through observation of politics and media coverage but also through their direct, personal experiences with public policy." In this perspective, social policies vary with regard to conditions for entitlement and in the way users, clients, or customers are treated by public institutions, in turn, contribute to beneficiaries' political learning (Kumlin, 2002). In this perspective, political learning is a process of attitude formation in relation to interactions with the welfare state. In other words, it is part of adult political socialization.

Among those who have studied how social policies contribute to shaping political voices, Soss (1999; 2004) shows how social policies' designs convey messages to beneficiaries in terms of deservingness and undeservingness through encounters with social workers and procedures of access, control, and demand-making. The policy design "establish baseline terms of power and voice for interactions between clients and officials that, ultimately, unfold through an open-ended, political process" (Soss, 2004: : 302). Clients, through their interactions with state officials, engage in a process of political learning and come to perceive themselves as legitimate claimants or not, in addition to acquiring resources (money in particular): "[e]xperiences in welfare programs provide

individuals with cognitive resources that they use to make sense of government as a whole and to evaluate the effectiveness of political participation in general” (Soss 2004: 308). Moreover, contacts within this specific state agency are perceived as representative, and since beneficiaries tend to see the state as “one big entity” these experiences shape their relationship to the state and contribute to their feeling of political efficacy. In brief, these experiences with the welfare state contribute to political participation through political learning and socialization.

A number of further works have put forward similar arguments. For example, Lawless and Fox (2001) have studied both economic hardship and contacts with government agents of urban poor, showing that experiences with public policies and public agents affect turnout at the poll. The authors argue that urban poor’s understanding of how the government works and the state perceived political responsiveness are affected by confrontations with social workers. Moreover, concerning the specific design of public policies, Swartz et al. (2009) have shown that youth who receive means-tested benefits are less likely to vote, whereas youth receiving universal benefits are not less likely to vote than other youngsters. Yet, the authors have found that the design of public policies affect their voting behaviors, but not their engagement in voluntary associations. Bruch et al. (2010) have compared beneficiaries of three means-tested programs and found that the effects of means-tested programs vary across policy designs. Empowering means-tested programs can have a positive effect on civic engagement, although they do not have the expected positive effect on political participation, while paternalist programs have the expected detrimental effect on both civic and political participation. Lastly, neutral programs have no effect. However, these studies compare social groups that may differ also with regard to socioeconomic resources and political attitudes. This may produce biased findings, as stressed in a recent literature review by Campbell (2012). Including a number of controls in the analyses does not rule out the possibility of omitted variable bias, leading to selection effects instead of public policy effects. By comparing the same group – namely, long-term unemployed youth – interacting with the welfare state in two different cities, we believe that we reduce the self-selection. Although one may argue that youth unemployment is not structurally similar in the two contexts, we think that we offer an improvement to existing research comparing different groups.

Mettler (2002) distinguishes the effects of payments and services from those of rules and procedures. Her model includes two causal mechanisms. On the one hand, payments and services contribute to resources that enhance the capacity to act (referred to as civic capacity). On the other hand, both payments/services and rules/procedure have

interpretative effects on political attitudes (called civic predispositions). In terms of resources, public policies create incentives for participation related to the defense of benefits, while they offer a venue for political learning through the evaluation of the government responsiveness and the effectiveness of participation (Mettler and Soss, 2004). Furthermore, these rules are enacted by the civil servants and perceived by beneficiaries during encounters with social workers, thus, affecting both internal and external political efficacy (Soss, 1999). On the one hand, obtaining services raises internal political efficacy (which we call here simply political efficacy) since it offers clues on citizens' capacity to influence the state. On the other hand, placing demands that are not fulfilled informs citizens about the responsiveness of the state or, rather, the lack thereof in this regard it reduces external political efficacy (which we call here political cynicism).

We examine whether public institutions in charge of implementing unemployment policies contribute to engagement in politics through a process of political learning. The existing research shows that welfare institutions that deal with the provision of job search or financial assistance are among the less empowering public institutions (Kumlin, 2002). Clients of these institutions have no or few possibilities of exiting and turning to alternative agencies to fulfill their needs and they usually depend on a discretionary decision to obtain the services they demand. Yet, the degree of discretionary power depends on how public policies shape the civil servant-client relationship and how precise they are in determining under which conditions one may obtain specific services. In the case of unemployment, the provision of financial assistance is often strictly defined by law, but street-level bureaucrats may have some margin of action with regards to sanctioning. In other words, they may cut or reduce financial assistance for non-compliance with obligations, but the access to other services such as active measures may be prone to more discretionary power. Previous studies show that civil servants working in unemployment offices operate a screening of unemployed persons (Dingeldey, 2007; Ehrler and Sager, 2011). In particular, they evaluate the employability of unemployed persons and may assign them either to measures aiming at enhancing qualifications or at controlling the work ethic.

We therefore assume that long-term unemployed youth experience different interactions with the state depending on the discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats. We test the discretionary power of bureaucrats by analyzing long-term unemployed youth accounts of receiving or not services they think they were entitled. We expect that

these experiences, which are related to obtaining or not the services from welfare institutions, contribute to their political learning by telling unemployed youth whether they may have an influence on the state (political efficacy) and whether the latter is responsive to their demands (political cynicism). Ultimately, these attitudes learned through the interaction with the state should contribute to political participation (Campbell, 2003; Lawless and Fox, 2001; Mettler, 2002; Soss, 1999).

Unlike previous research, which has looked at political participation in general or focused on voting activities, we examine the impact of welfare institutions on protest activities. According to Verba et al. (1995) protesting requires limited resources and permits the transmission of more specific messages related to dissatisfaction with one's personal situation. Thus, it is an important mean of participation for the less well-off. We therefore focus on protest activities, which are a non-targeted voice-based form of participation (Teorell et al., 2007), and study the impact of welfare institutions on the engagement of long-term unemployed youth in this important form of political participation. We look at whether and to what extent their engagement in protest activities is related to state payments and services. More specifically, inspired by the works mentioned earlier, we advance two hypotheses: a first one concerning the direct impact of payments and a second one referring to the indirect impact of services.

Firstly, concerning the role of payments, we examine the (direct) effect of financial resources for the political participation of unemployed youth. We expect that receiving financial aid from the state as a main source of income increases political participation, net of the effect of other socio-economic resources such as education and of socio-demographic characteristics.

Secondly, concerning the role of services, we look at their interpretative (indirect) effects by analyzing the process of political learning. If we are confronted with a process of political learning, not obtaining services to which one is entitled or believes to have right to should affect political participation via its impact on political attitudes. More specifically, we expect that not obtaining services from the unemployment office or from the social aid office drives political alienation, as visible in lower levels of political efficacy and higher levels of political cynicism. This, in turn, should lead to lower levels of political engagement, as we expect that lower political efficacy and higher political cynicism hinder engagement in protest activities.

4. Unemployment policies in Germany and Switzerland

Since we are comparing two cities which, moreover, belong to federal countries, much of what is going on concerning state aid to unemployed and unemployment policies takes place at the local level. However, even in federal countries, local policies are influenced by the broader national context and regulations. Therefore we need to describe such a broader context in Germany and Switzerland, which define how welfare institutions in Cologne and Geneva deal with long-term unemployed youth.

The unemployment system was reformed in Germany during the early 2000s under what has been referred to as the Hartz reforms (see Dingeldey, 2011a; Dingeldey, 2011b; Fleckenstein, 2012; Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2006: for discussions of the Hartz reforms). These reforms resulted in the merging of the long-term unemployment benefits with the social aid. Thus, unemployment is handled through a two-tier system, the so-called unemployment insurance I and II. The former represents unemployment benefits, while the latter is merged with social aid. The former tier focuses on short-term unemployed and their reinsertion in the labor market, while the latter aims to reinforce the ethic to work and force unemployed citizens to accept any work offered, be it below minimal wage, a one-euro-job to complement social benefits, or community work (Dingeldey, 2011a; Fleckenstein, 2012; Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2006). Moreover, while unemployment insurance I is based on contributions and provides a replacement rate of 60 percent (67 percent in case of dependent children), unemployment insurance II is means-tested and financed through taxes, and beneficiaries receive a flat-rate of 359 euros. As a result of the merging of long-term unemployment insurance and social aid, this second tier has become the dominant scheme in the provision of assistance and services to unemployed in Germany (Dingeldey, 2011b). It focuses on control and discipline, and introduce a recommodification and workfare for long-term unemployed in Germany (Fleckenstein, 2012).

The unemployment insurance was introduced later in Switzerland than in European countries (in 1982, as compared to 1927 in Germany). The latest reform reduced access to unemployment benefits and the duration of unemployment benefits for certain groups, but it did not integrate the different institutions providing assistance to unemployed persons (see Champion, 2011; Ehrler and Sager, 2011; Perret et al., 2007: for presentation of the Swiss unemployment regime). There is a multi-tier unemployment system, whereby the unemployment insurance is located at the national level and the

social aid at the local level (Ehrler and Sager, 2011). More specifically, it is built around three main instruments. Firstly, the unemployment insurance is built around two dimensions: an inclusion and control (Perret et al., 2007). It includes generous passive measures with a high replacement rate for unemployment benefits (between 70 and 80 percent of former wage), but also a tight control and sanctioning procedure to impose compliance with job-search requirements. Moreover, it provides for active measures in order to enhance the skills and acquire further training of jobless people. Secondly, social aid, which is means-tested, offers minimal income, and active measures are often not used, although they formally exist (Champion, 2011). When they are used, they are discussed and agreed upon between social aid beneficiaries and social workers (Ehrler and Sager, 2011). Thus, social aid beneficiaries are seldom forced to participate in any measure related to activation policies and a third of them are active in the labor market but earn very low wages complemented by social aid (Ehrler and Sager, 2011). Thirdly, the invalidity insurance offers a minimal income to persons who are deemed unable to work.

Thus, we are comparing two welfare states belonging to the continental type, but which have taken different paths in the last decades. On the one hand, the reforms of the German welfare state, which used to be the ideal-typical case of income protection and employment-centered unemployment benefits (Gallie and Paugam, 2000), complied with the OECD recommendations: the Hartz reforms have limited passive transfers and enforced drastic activation measures imposing work-for-welfare measures (Kemmerling and Bruttel, 2006). On the other hand, the Swiss unemployment regime, which used to be largely underdeveloped until the 1990s due to the low unemployment rate (Ehrler and Sager, 2011) and the use of working permits to reduce foreign workers in times of crisis (Bonoli and Mach, 2001), increased the integration dimension of unemployment policies through the development of active measures, particularly in Geneva, so that the unemployment offices favor integration over control, which are the two strongholds of the Swiss unemployment regime (Perret et al., 2007). Moreover, Cinalli and Giugni's (2013) typology of youth unemployment regimes accounts for the specific position of Cologne and Geneva with regard to the dimension of unemployment regulations.² Specifically, they situate Cologne in the exclusive camp, while Geneva falls close to the inclusive pole.

² Cinalli and Giugni (2013; see further Cinalli and Giugni 2010, Giugni et al. 2009) distinguish between two main dimensions of unemployment regimes: an unemployment regulations dimension referring to specific conditions of access to rights for the unemployed as well as to the obligations attached to full enjoyment of these rights (which may be either inclusive or exclusive), and a labor market regulations dimension referring to state intervention in the labor market (which may be either flexible or rigid).

The two cities, therefore, display different approaches in the ways local authorities deal with youth unemployment, as reflected in their position in this typology.

Given the characteristics of the two unemployment regimes, we expect that the comparison of Cologne and Geneva will result in more political alienation in Cologne than in Geneva. More specifically, interactions with the social aid office in Cologne should result in unemployed youth learning that they cannot obtain services from the state and that the state is unresponsive to their demands due to the importance of workfare policies. This, in turn, should result in a more limited engagement in protest activities in Cologne.

5. Data and methods

Our analysis is based on a telephone survey on representative samples of long-term unemployed youth aged between 18 and 34 conducted in the context of the EU-funded project “Youth, Unemployment, and Exclusion in Europe: A Multidimensional Approach to Understanding the Conditions and Prospects for Social and Political Integration of Young Unemployed” (YOUNEX). The survey was conducted in seven cities: Cologne (Germany), Geneva (Switzerland), Karlstad (Sweden), Kielce (Poland), Lisbon (Portugal), Lyon (France), and Turin (Italy).³ In this paper, however, we only use data on Cologne and Geneva. The interviews were conducted between October and December 2009 in Cologne and between March and October 2010 in Geneva.

Next we describe the operationalization of the variables included in the analyses. Protest activities – our dependent variable – are measured as having taken part in street demonstrations during the 12 months prior to the interview. It is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for respondents who have participated in demonstrations and 0 otherwise.

Regarding the independent variables, related to the welfare state and public institutions, we measure state financial aid with a dichotomous variable based on a question asking for the main source of income of respondents. When the main source of income is either unemployment benefits or social aid the variable is coded 1, otherwise it is coded 0. Receiving due services at the unemployment office or at the social aid office is a three state categorical variable distinguishing, first, those who did not have contacts with the institution, the reference category (coded 0), and then those who received the

³ The study in Portugal was financed with own means.

services (coded 1) from those who did not receive services that they believe to be entitled to (coded 2).

Political efficacy and political cynicism are our intermediary variables. They are meant to capture the overarching concept of political alienation. Unlike other usages of this concept in the literature, which sees it as a multidimensional concept (Finifter, 1970; Olsen, 1969), we confine it to two attitudinal aspects: internal and external political efficacy, and call the former more straightforwardly political efficacy and the latter political cynicism. Political efficacy is measured through a question asking whether persons like themselves have an influence on politics, responses are totally disagree, disagree, agree, and totally agree. We recoded the latter two as 1 and the former two as 0. Political cynicism is based on a question asking whether political parties are only interested in their votes, not in their opinions. Responses include the same four options and were coded as 1 when respondents agreed or totally agreed and 0 when they disagreed or totally disagreed.

We include in the models a number of control relating to civic skills and political attitudes, which have been found in previous research to impact on political participation (Verba et al., 1995): political interest, associational membership, and left-right self-placement. Political interest is a dichotomous variable based on a subjective measure asking to what extent the respondent is interested in politics. Possible answers range from not at all to very interested. We then created a dummy variable, whereby 1 indicates political interest and 0 no political interest. Associational membership is measured through a question asking whether the respondent is a member of a number of organizations (trade unions, religious organization, cooperatives, social movement organizations, or other civil society organizations). We coded 1 respondents who are members of at least one of these associations and 0 all those who are not members of any association. Left-right self-placement is measured through a categorical variable based on a self-anchoring scale ranging from 0 to 10. We coded as left those who place themselves from 0 to 4, as right those who place themselves from 6 to 10, and as center or no placement those who placed themselves on 5 or do not know where to place themselves.

We also control for variables related to socio-demographic characteristics of respondents that influence resources for political participation: sex, nationality, age, and education. Sex and nationality are dichotomous variables; sex is coded 1 for female and 0 for male, while nationality is coded 1 for national citizens and 0 for foreigners. Age is a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 35 rescaled to 0-1 for the logistic regression. Lastly, we measure education through a categorical variable coded 0 for those having achieved below secondary education, 1 for those with a secondary education, and 2 for those with a tertiary education.

The analysis proceeds in three steps. Firstly, we compare the situation of unemployed youth in the two cities with respect to three key aspects for our main argument: their financial situation, their interactions with the state at the unemployment office and at the social aid office, and the perceived discrimination related to the status of unemployed. Secondly, we run four logistic regression models assessing the effects of our variables of interest on protest activities. The four logistic regression models aimed to assess the effect of interactions with the state, political efficacy, and political cynicism on protest activities. The first two models imply similar mechanisms in the two cities, with or without the control of the two intervening variables. The last two models include interaction terms between welfare institutions and city: one for the unemployment office and one for the social aid office. In all four variables Cologne is coded 1. These interaction terms allow us to compare the two cities, as we expect the effect of welfare institutions to vary across cities, given their different institutional setting. We will show the results of this analysis in the forms of predicted probabilities and the full models are presented in appendix 2. Thirdly, we will examine if and to what extent the probability for young unemployed to be engaged in protest activities change depending on the interactions with the two types of welfare institutions, both in Cologne and Geneva. This should allow us to test our hypotheses about the impact of state aid on the political participation of unemployed youth, specifically in protest activities.

6. Findings

We first examine whether the features of the welfare systems in the two countries and cities reflect on the specific situation of unemployed youth. Table 1 compares their situation in the two cities with respect to three key aspects: financial situation and difficulties, interactions with the state at the unemployment office, interactions with the state at the unemployment office, and perceived discrimination related to unemployment. Of course, unemployment policies and welfare regimes do not fully explain the personal situation of unemployment, which also depends on other factors. However, it has been shown that the former are an important determinant of the latter (Gallie and Paugam, 2000).

As we can see, there are important differences across the two cities. We observe in particular significant differences on three counts. Firstly, concerning the financial situation, young unemployed who do not receive state aid are significantly more numerous in Geneva than in Cologne, although the percentages are rather low in both cities. However, many more people in Cologne have said that they find it hard to cope on present income, most likely a result of the high replacement rate applied in Switzerland and the introduction of the means-tested unemployment insurance for long-term unemployed in Germany. At the same time, young unemployed in Cologne are much more likely to live on unemployment benefits, while for a substantial share in Geneva the main income comes from elsewhere. Secondly, significantly more young unemployed in Cologne did not receive services from the unemployment office, while the share of those who had no contact with it is higher in Geneva. Thirdly, similar differences can be seen with regard to interactions with the state at the social aid office. Again, the number of people (in relative terms) who did not get the services from the office is significantly higher in Cologne, while the proportion of those who did not have contacts with is higher in Geneva. In this case, however, we also observe a significant difference for those who received the services, who are more numerous in Cologne. We should also note that in both cities only a minority of people have had contacts with the social aid office. This might contrast with some other countries which display higher levels of unemployment and are not so well endowed in terms of social protection.

Finally, no statistically significant differences can be seen concerning the experience of discrimination due to unemployment. In both cities the number of young unemployed feeling they have been discriminated is relatively low (somewhat higher in Cologne). However, in Cologne the average degree of perceived social stigma attached to unemployment is significantly stronger.⁴

⁴ We also tested for differences related to sociodemographic characteristics that may account for differences in receiving state aid or having contacts with the state (results available upon demand). We find that the probability of receiving state financial aid increases with age in both cities. In relation to this, the younger ones are less likely to have contacts with the unemployment office, but no age difference is found for contacts with social aid. The age differences that we find may be related to the fact that the younger ones may not register at the unemployment office because they are not entitled to unemployment benefits. More interesting for us is the fact that educational differences account for contacts with the state. Surprisingly, the more educated (tertiary education) are less likely to have contacts with the state in Cologne, while in Geneva it is the less educated and the foreigners that are less likely to have contacts with the state. In Cologne, the more educated are also less likely to have contacts with the social aid, whereas in Geneva the Swiss citizens are less likely to have these contacts. This may be related to the social stigma related to social aid that prevent specific group of the population from entering a relationship with the institution.

Table 1 - The situation of unemployed youth in Cologne and Geneva (percentages)

	Cologne	Geneva
<i>Financial situation</i>		
Not receiving state aid	10.82	16.73
Finding it hard to cope on present income	65.25	37.72
<i>Main income</i>		
Unemployment benefits	79.80	53.74
Social aid	5.96	6.05
Family aid	5.63	9.25
Other	8.61	30.96
<i>Interactions with the state at the unemployment office</i>		
No contact with it	11.48	22.06
Received the services	50.16	48.40
Did not receive the services	38.36	29.54
<i>Interactions with the state at the social aid office</i>		
No contact with it	62.62	78.29
Received the services	21.64	11.74
Did not receive the services	15.74	9.96
<i>Discrimination related to unemployment</i>		
Experienced discrimination related to unemployment	15.41	10.68
Perceived social stigma related to with unemployment	7.55	6.64

Notes: Significant differences based on adjusted residuals (95% confidence intervals) are shown in bold. Perceived social stigma associated with unemployment is expressed as means (scale ranging from 0 to 12) and the difference is based on a t-test.

Overall, the situation is slightly more negative in Cologne, where there is more financial hardship and more social stigma related to the status of unemployment. Regarding the relation to the state, long-term unemployed youth tend to be more in contact with state agency in Cologne, be it the unemployment office or the social aid. However, they also report more frequently that they did not obtain the services they think they were entitled to, and this holds for both the unemployment office and the social aid office.

Turning to our focus on the impact of welfare institutions on the political participation of long-term unemployed youth, our first hypothesis links the political engagement of long-term unemployed youth to state financial aid. The findings concerning the effect of

financial state aid are straightforward: contrary to our expectation, engagement in protest activities is not significantly related to receiving financial aid from the state. Table 2 shows that the predicted probability of engaging in protest of those who receive or not state financial aid are not significantly different, both in Cologne and in Geneva.

What about the other two variables referring to unemployed youth interacting with the state? Unlike for state financial aid, here we observe a statistically significant effect when we look at interactions with the unemployment office. We can get a grasp on differences across cities by looking again at table 2, which also shows the probability of engaging in protest activities depending on the kind of interaction with the state, in each of the two cities, based on model 4 shown in table 2. We can see that the two welfare institutions play a different role in the two cities. More specifically, the unemployment office matters in Geneva, while the social aid office matters in Cologne. In both cases, the probability of engaging in protest activities are higher when one feels he or she has not received the services one is entitled to from the respective state office. This is true in Cologne these respondents are compared to those who had no contact and those who did receive the services, and in Geneva when we compare them to those who had no contact. In addition, in the latter city, the probability to engage in protest activities is also significantly higher for those who did receive the services from the unemployment office, as compared to those who did not have any contact. In brief, interacting with welfare institutions and, more specifically, not getting what one has right to from those institutions leads long-term unemployed youth to become more engaged in protest activities. However, this also depends on which kind of institution we are talking about: the social aid office in Cologne and the unemployment office in Geneva.

Next we turn to the role of the two intervening variables, namely political efficacy and political cynicism. Our second hypothesis links the political engagement of long-term unemployed youth to the services provided by welfare institutions such as the unemployment office and the social aid office, via the intervening role of political alienation (lower political efficacy and higher political cynicism). Tables 3 and 4 show the probability of displaying high political efficacy, respectively high political cynicism, depending on the kind of interaction with the state, in each of the two cities. The two variables behave differently: political efficacy seems to be at least in part affected by interactions with welfare institutions (table 3), while political cynicism does not display any statistically significant differences in predicted probabilities (table 4). Concerning the former, it appears that those who did not receive the services from welfare institutions have a lower political efficacy – that is, they are more political alienated – than those who did get them (and also in part from those who had no contact). This is consistent with the existing literature discussed earlier (Soss, 1999; 2004).

Table 2 - Probability of engaging in protest activities depending on interactions with the state (95% confidence intervals in brackets)

	Cologne		Geneva	
Financial aid				
Received	14.8	[.11, .19]	17.6	[.13, .22]
Not received	13.2	[.05, .21]	15.9	[.06, .25]
Unemployment office				
No contact	14.8	[.13, .24]	6.4	[-.01, .13]
Received services	12.6	[.03, .26]	16.8 ^a	[.11, .23]
Did not receive the services	17.0	[.02, .28]	22.5 ^b	[.14, .31]
Social aid office				
No contact	13.3	[.09, .18]	18.6	[.03, .27]
Received the services	10.3	[.02, .19]	14.1	[.07, .18]
Did not receive the services	26.9 ^c	[.14, .40]	14.8	[.10, .24]

Notes: Based on Appendix 2 (model 4).

^a The predicted probability for those who received services from the unemployment office in Geneva is significantly different from that of those who had no contact ($p = 0.0285$).

^a The predicted probability for those who did not receive services from the unemployment office in Geneva is significantly different from that of those who had no contact ($p = 0.0035$).

^c The predicted probability for those who did not receive services from social aid in Cologne is significantly different from that of those who had no contact ($p = 0.0485$) and from those who received the services ($p = 0.0373$).

Table 3 - Probability of high political efficacy depending on interactions with the state (95% confidence intervals in brackets)

	Cologne		Geneva	
Unemployment office				
No contact	36.2	[20.5, 52.0]	27.2	[15.9, 38.3]
Received the services	26.4	[18.9, 33.9]	39.2 ^a	[30.5, 47.9]
Did not receive the services	24.8	[16.4, 33.1]	31.2	[20.8, 41.6]
Social aid office				
No contact	25.0	[18.7, 31.3]	32.0	[25.5, 38.4]
Received the services	42.9 ^b	[30.1, 55.7]	40.5	[23.6, 57.5]
Did not receive the services	21.8	[9.7, 34.0]	39.1	[21.0, 57.3]

Notes: Based on a logistic regression model with political efficacy as dependent variable, controlling for sex, nationality, age, education, financial difficulties, political interest, associational membership, left-right self-positioning, and city. The model also includes an interaction term between city and contacts with welfare institutions.

^a The predicted probability for those who received services from the unemployment office in Geneva is significantly

different from that of those who had no contact ($p = .0885$).

^b The predicted probability for those who received services from social aid in Cologne is significantly different from that of those who had no contact ($p = .0132$) and from those who did not receive the services ($p = .0201$).

Table 4 - Probability of high political cynicism depending on interactions with the state (95% confidence intervals in brackets)

	Cologne		Geneva	
Unemployment office	82.7	[45.5, 71.1]	58.3	[70.1, 95.3]
No contact	76.6	[54.5, 71.4]	62.9	[69.3, 84.0]
Received the services	76.1	[56.4, 77.0]	66.7	[67.5, 84.7]
Did not receive the services				
Social aid office	77.7	[71.6, 83.8]	63.6	[57.1, 70.1]
No contact	78.1	[67.4, 88.9]	61.2	[44.7, 77.6]
Received the services	75.3	[62.5, 88.2]	65.7	[48.0, 83.5]
Did not receive the services	82.7	[45.5, 71.1]	58.3	[70.1, 95.3]

Notes: Based on a logistic regression model with political cynicism as dependent variable, controlling for sex, nationality, age, education, financial difficulties, political interest, associational membership, left-right self-positioning, and city. The model also includes an interaction term between city and contacts with welfare institutions. There are no significant differences across groups.

However, we observe different effects in the two cities, once again attesting to the important role played by the context for the phenomenon at hand. The results are most consistent with our expectations in the case of Cologne. Here the probability of high political efficacy is significantly lower for those who did not obtain services from the social aid office than for those who did so and also for those who did not have contact. In contrast, there are no significant differences when looking at the unemployment office. In the case of Geneva, we observe an impact of interactions with the unemployed office, while the social aid office does not seem to matter. More specifically, the probability of high political efficacy is significantly lower for those who did not obtain services from the unemployment office than for those who did not have contact. It should be noted, however, that in this case the difference between those who received services and those who did not is not statistically significant, hence somewhat weakening our findings. Moreover, the observed difference is significant, but only at the 10% level.

Table 5 shows the predicted probabilities of engaging in protest depending on political efficacy and political cynicism. We see that, neither in Cologne nor in Geneva, these two measures of political alienation contribute to protest of long-term unemployed youth. If we now, as a last step of our analysis, put together the results concerning the impact of interactions with the two welfare institutions (tables 3 and 4), on the one hand, and that of political efficacy and cynicism on political participation (table 5), on the other hand, we can conclude that we do not observe an indirect – that is, interpretative – effect of

interactions with the state on the political participation of long-term unemployed youth. To be sure, not receiving the services one is entitled to matter – namely in the case of the social aid office in Cologne and of the unemployment office in Geneva, but we do not observe a statistically significant effect of political alienation on engagement in protest activities. So the circle is not closed.

Table 5 - Probability of engaging in protest activities depending on intervening variables related to political learning (95% confidence intervals in brackets)

	Cologne		Geneva	
Political efficacy				
Low	14.2	[10.0, 18.3]	16.9	[11.9, 21.9]
High	15.5	[9.5, 21.4]	18.4	[11.9, 24.8]
Political cynicism				
Low	16.3	[10.0, 22.5]	19.3	[12.8, 25.8]
High	13.8	[9.8, 17.8]	16.6	[11.6, 21.6]

Notes: Based on Appendix 2 (model 4). There are no statistically significant differences in the predicted probabilities of engaging in protest between low and high political efficacy or between low and high political cynicism.

This is perhaps more clearly seen in table 6, which shows the changes in predicted probabilities of engaging in protest activities depending on the kind of interaction with the state, in each of the two cities, based on models 3 and 4 shown in appendix 2. This in a way summarizes the whole analysis concerning our second hypothesis. For each city, it compares the changes in predicted probabilities when we do not include the two intervening variables (model 3 in appendix 2) and when we include them (model 4 in appendix 2). As we can see, the changes in predicted probabilities are nearly the same for both variables across models. This means that no effect is mediated by the intervening variables represented by the two indicators of political alienation. Thus, we could not provide evidence supporting the argument that interactions with the state – in particular, with welfare institutions such as the unemployment office and the social aid office – lead long-term unemployed youth to political learning. Their impact on political participation is rather a direct one. In addition, we find that interactions with the social aid office contribute to unemployed youth political participation in Cologne, while in Geneva this occurs through interactions with the unemployment office. Quite surprisingly, in Ge-

neva both receiving or not the service at the unemployment office increases engagement in protest activities by 10 to 15 percent, whereas in Cologne not receiving the service from the social aid office increases it by roughly 14 percent.

Table 6 - Changes in the probability of engaging in protest activities depending on interactions with the state

	Cologne		Geneva	
	No intervening variables	With intervening variables	No intervening variables	With intervening variables
Unemployment office (ref.: no contact)				
Received the services	- 2.34	- 2.23	+ 10.37*	+ 10.32*
Did not receive the services	+ 2.11	+ 2.15	+ 15.94**	+ 16.10**
Social aid office (ref.: no contact)				
Received the services	- 2.77	- 3.05	- 4.48	- 4.51
Did not receive the services	+ 13.43*	+ 13.53*	- 3.76	- 3.82

Notes: Based on table 2 (models 2 and 3). Changes in the probability that indicate statistically significant differences between the category predicted and the reference category are shown in bold.

* $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

7. Discussion and conclusion

Our study aimed to establish a connection between state aid and the political participation of long-term unemployed youth. Such an aid may be of two kinds: payments through financial aid and services through interactions with welfare institutions such as the unemployed office and the social aid office. We started from the assumption that the latter are more important, as people enter a process of political learning through interacting with street-level bureaucrats. Furthermore, we assumed that, from these interactions, young unemployed cannot only learn whether the state is responsive or not, but also whether they can get something out of it. This, in turn, should positively or negatively affect their propensity to engage in protest activities. In addition, we suggested that such a connection between the state – in particular, welfare institutions – and political engagement is mediated in two ways: by the effect of political alienation (as measured through political efficacy and cynicism) has on young unemployed, on the one hand, and by the impact of the different contexts in terms of unemployment policies and welfare regimes, on the other.

Our analysis, based on survey data, leads us to conclude, firstly, that state financial aid and payments have no effect. Secondly, we found that interactions and services matter. Interacting with welfare institutions and especially not obtaining the services from them lead long-term unemployed youth to become more engaged in protest activities. However, this does not seem to be related to a process of political learning, as we found no mediating effect of political alienation. Furthermore, while in Cologne not receiving the services from the social aid office is associated with higher levels of political participation, as compared to both receiving the services and having no interactions with welfare institutions, in Geneva what matters is the distinction between having and not having such interactions. In Cologne, not receiving the services fosters engagement in protest activities. This could be related to increased grievances as we did not find any evidence of political learning. In Geneva, our finding could be due to the fact that the unemployed youth there experienced the discretionary power of the bureaucrats and feel that receiving or not the services is random and highly dependent on the civil servant to which they are confronted (see Lorenzini, 2013 for a discussion of how unemployed youth perceive the attribution of active measures by unemployment office civil servants). In this case, it could be that receiving or not the service is not the important aspect, but rather the experience of the power imbalance in favor of the street-level bureaucrat who can decide whether or not to provide the service. Indeed, the concept of institutionalized citizen empowerment posits that the balance of power between citizens and public institutions shape the interaction and the political learning that results from it (Kumlin, 2002). In particular, the presence or absence of discretionary power and the existence of exit options are important. Unemployment and social aid offer limited exit options – unless one is willing to live with no state resources. Yet, unemployment policies may vary in the degree of discretionary power that bureaucrats have in handling unemployed persons and this may affect the interactions with the state. However, we cannot interpret more this finding since it is hard to confront the degree of discretionary power across the two cases we compare.

We believe that our study contributes to research on policy feedback by questioning the process of political learning. We find that interactions with the state have a limited effect on political learning. Long-term unemployed youth feel slightly more efficacious when they obtain services. However they are not more cynical when they do not obtain them. This finding contradicts previous research conducted in the U.S. (Soss, 1999;

2004). We interpret it in the light of the more comprehensive welfare state in the European context, which offers more developed welfare states. In this context, the learning process one can get from the state may be less dependent on single interactions with it, as in a more extensive welfare state citizens may have more contacts with multiple institutions. Thus, the interactions with one single institution provide less leverage on the overall evaluation of one's ability to influence it and of the state's responsiveness. Nonetheless, we find that the interactions of long-term unemployed youth with the state affect their engagement in protest activities. However, we cannot conclude whether this occurs through a direct effect or is mediated by political attitudes that are learned through a cumulative learning process taking place through interactions with different state agencies. Indeed, previous research shows that interactions with different institutions contribute differently to political trust (Kumlin 2002). Future research should combine a focus on a given social group with the study of multiple interactions with the state in order to test whether political learning is a cumulative process.

In addition, our study questions the importance of distinguishing means tested and contributory social programs as we find that interactions with the unemployment office (contributory) and with the social aid office (means-tested) similarly affect protest activities when focusing on a single social group, the long-term unemployed youth, in two different unemployment regimes, Cologne and Geneva. This result suggests that differences across types of measures found in previous research (Swartz et al., 2009; Bruch et al., 2010) may rather depend on the degree of social stigma attached to the group targeted by public policy. This does not mean that the design of the public policy may not contribute to political participation (Soss, 1999; 2004). We are not questioning the implications of public policies in terms of empowerment (Kumlin, 2002), conditionality (Dwyer and Ellis 2009), or paternalism (Mead, 1998), but rather suggesting to refining how we handle the issue of self-selection. Taking into account the social stigma related to different population that depend on social assistance allow us to grasp more precisely the effects of the design of specific policies on citizens' democratic involvement.

In the end, perhaps the most important finding of our study is that the impact of welfare institutions on the political participation of long-term unemployed youth is dependent on the context. We found that in Cologne interactions with the social aid office matter, while in Geneva this role is played by the unemployed office. In addition, the impact of state aid on political alienation – specifically, on political efficacy – also vary across city. We found that the latter is enhanced by receiving the services from the social aid office in Cologne and from the unemployment office in Geneva. Thus, in brief, the connection between welfare institutions, resources, and political learning seems to be strongly context-dependent.

Our analysis must be contextualized and qualified in at least two ways. Firstly, we have focused on a specific and quite peculiar form of political participation, namely engagement in protest activities. Further research should examine the role welfare institutions, resources, and political learning for engagement in other form of participation such as contacting activities and most importantly voting, as well as for political participation in general. Secondly, we compared to specific contexts, represented by the cities of Cologne and Geneva. These are two cities that share a number of characteristics, but are also different in many respects. In particular, they both belong to the continental type of welfare regime, but at the same time the ways in which unemployment is dealt with have followed different tracks in the two cities. Again, further research should expand the analysis to other cities and contexts, so as to test for the robustness of our findings.

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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics

	Geneva		Cologne		Range	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
<i>Dependent variable</i>						
Protest activities	0.17	0.38	0.15	0.36	0	1
<i>Independent variables</i>						
Financial difficulties	0.38	0.49	0.65	0.48	0	1
No state financial aid	0.17	0.37	0.11	0.31	0	1
Contacts with unemployment office	0.78	0.42	0.89	0.32	0	1
No service at the unemployment office	0.38	0.49	0.43	0.50	0	1
Contacts with social aid	0.22	0.41	0.37	0.48	0	1
No service at the social aid	0.46	0.50	0.42	0.50	0	1
<i>Intermediary variables</i>						
Political efficacy	0.34	0.48	0.28	0.45	0	1
Political cynicism	0.60	0.49	0.79	0.41	0	1
<i>Controls</i>						
Female	0.50	0.50	0.44	0.50	0	1
National citizens	0.49	0.50	0.70	0.46	0	1
Age	28.31	4.45	28.84	4.04	18	34

Primary education	0.24	0.43	0.44	0.50	0	1
Secondary education	0.54	0.50	0.50	0.50	0	1
Tertiary education	0.21	0.41	0.05	0.22	0	1
Political interest	0.42	0.49	0.38	0.49	0	1
Associational membership	0.44	0.50	0.60	0.49	0	1
Left self-placement	0.33	0.47	0.36	0.48	0	1
Right self-placement	0.21	0.41	0.12	0.33	0	1
No self-placement	0.46	0.50	0.51	0.50	0	1
Experienced discrimination related to unemployment	0.11	0.31	0.15	0.36	0	1
Perceived social stigma related to unemployment	6.64	2.55	7.55	2.18	0	12
N	281		305			

Appendix 2: Effect of interactions with the state, political efficacy, and political cynicism on protest activities (odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses)

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
<i>Interactions with the state</i>								
State financial aid	1.128	(0.461)	1.125	(0.461)	1.158	(.477)	1.156	(.478)
Unemployment office (ref.: no contact)								
Received the services	1.690	(0.272)	1.721	(0.782)	3.164*	(2.110)	3.226*	(2.158)
Did not receive the services	2.582*	(0.583)	2.645*	(1.194)	4.728*	(3.203)	4.912*	(3.339)
Social aid office (ref.: no contact)								
Received the services	.691	(0.765)	0.676	(0.269)	.687	(.400)	.682	(.398)
Did not receive the services	1.678	(1.159)	1.665	(0.579)	.733	(.462)	.727	(.459)
<i>Intervening variables</i>								
Political efficacy			0.817	(0.219)			1.122	(.307)

Political cynicism			1.128	(0.305)			.803	(.217)
<i>Control variables</i>								
Woman	.640 ⁺	(0.165)	0.628 ⁺	(0.163)	.623 ⁺	(.163)	.611 ⁺	(.161)
National citizen	.884	(0.240)	0.889	(0.242)	.849	(.232)	.855	(.234)
Age	.965	(0.032)	0.966	(0.0325)	.966	(.033)	.966	(.033)
Education level (ref.: below secondary)								
Secondary education	2.188 [*]	(0.694)	2.189 [*]	(0.695)	2.222 [*]	(.714)	2.216 [*]	(.713)
Tertiary education	1.904	(0.864)	1.832	(0.836)	1.897	(.871)	1.816	(.840)
Financial difficulties	1.056	(0.282)	1.067	(0.288)	1.079	(.294)	1.089	(.298)
Political interest	2.246 ^{**}	(0.579)	2.179 ^{**}	(0.568)	2.212 ^{**}	(.576)	2.145 ^{**}	(.566)
Associational membership	1.614 ⁺	(0.417)	1.623 ⁺	(0.419)	1.617 ⁺	(.421)	1.628 ⁺	(.425)
Left-right self-placement (ref.: no placement)								
Left	2.695 ^{***}	(0.744)	2.679 ^{***}	(0.740)	2.785 ^{***}	(.796)	2.761 ^{***}	(.790)
Right	.755	(0.321)	0.746	(0.317)	.805	(.343)	.790	(.338)
Cologne	.743	(0.203)	0.767	(0.212)	2.115	(1.741)	2.236	(1.857)
<i>Interactions</i>								
Received social aid services*Cologne					1.083	(.868)	1.059	(.852)
Not received social aid services*Cologne					3.701 ⁺	(2.870)	3.731 ⁺	(2.897)
Received unemployment					.252	(.225)	.250	(.225)

services*Co- logne								
Not received unemploy- ment ser- vice*Cologne					.254	(.228)	.245	(.221)
Chi2 (df)	70.86 (16)		71.63 (18)		76.86 (20)		77.70 (22)	
Pseudo R2	0.139		0.140		.151		.152	
Observations	580		580		580		580	

+ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$