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Gender and Performance: Evidence from School Assignment by Randomized Lottery

By JUSTINE S. HASTINGS, THOMAS J. KANE, AND DOUGLAS O. STAIGER*

School choice programs are intended to improve student achievement, by allowing for better matches between students and schools. It is not clear, however, that academic achievement will improve if parents make school choice decisions over both academic and nonacademic school attributes (Justine S. Hastings et al., 2005, 2006). Indeed, many randomized studies of impacts of school choice find little or no effect of school choice on academic outcomes. For example, initial evaluations of randomized voucher experiments in Milwaukee and New York City found modest academic impacts on eligible students (John F. Witte et al., 1995; Daniel P. Mayer et al., 2002).¹ More recently, evaluations of public school choice lotteries in Chicago and Charlotte have found no difference between the average lottery winner and loser in academic outcomes such as test scores (Julie Cullen et al., 2003; Hastings et al., 2006). When parents are choosing schools for academic and nonacademic reasons, school choice may increase utility but not necessarily improve academic outcomes.

There is growing evidence that educational interventions may have heterogeneous treatment effects by gender. Analysis of the Moving To Opportunity demonstration, in which parents were randomly given the opportunity to move to nonpoverty neighborhoods, found improvements in education, mental health, and criminal

behavior for females, but negative effects on males (Jeffrey R. Kling and Jeffrey B. Liebman, 2004). Similarly, Michael Anderson (2005) re-analyzed data from three randomized trials of early childhood education and found that all of the long-term benefits accrued to girls and not to boys.

We use data from a public school choice program, with school assignment by lottery, to estimate the impacts on academic outcomes by race and gender of attending a first-choice school. Our data come from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district (CMS) in North Carolina, which introduced district-wide public school choice in the fall of 2002 after a race-based busing plan was terminated by the courts. The data include students' choices, lottery numbers, school assignments, demographics, and academic achievement for the years surrounding implementation of school choice.

We compare outcomes for those making similar choices, whose school assignment was determined solely by lottery number. Overall, there was no gain in academic achievement for those winning the lottery. White females did experience significant improvements in test scores when randomized into their first choice school, however. White females were also more likely to choose academically focused magnets and, among those who won the lottery, reported significant increases in time spent on homework. Our evidence suggests that school choice programs may have heterogeneous treatment effects by gender, which are related to differences in the factors driving parental choices.

I. The CMS Choice Plan

Prior to the fall of 2002, CMS operated under a racial desegregation order for three decades. In September 2001, the district was declared "unitary" by the courts and ordered to dismantle the race-based student assignment. The school board subsequently voted to approve a district-wide public school choice plan. In the spring of

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¹ Subsequent analyses of those programs accounting for attrition found no impacts (Cecilia Rouse, 1998; Alan B. Krueger and Pei Zhu, 2003).

2002, parents were asked to submit their top three choices of school programs for each child. Each student was assigned a nearby “home school” and was guaranteed admission to this school if she was not admitted to any of her top three choices. Admission to nonguaranteed schools was determined by lottery.

Our analysis focuses on students whose admission to their first-choice school was determined solely by lottery number. Since those listing their home school first were guaranteed admission, we dropped these observations.² Remaining students were assigned to priority groups, and admission within priority group was determined by a random number. The priority groups were:

- Priority 1: Student attended the school in the prior year.
- Priority 2: Free-lunch eligible student applying to school where less than half the students were free-lunch eligible.
- Priority 3: Student applying to a school within her geographic choice zone.³

Slots were first assigned to those in the home school zone listing their home school first. The remaining slots were then assigned by priority group and lottery number.⁴ If a school was not filled by those who listed it as a first choice, the lottery process repeated with those listing the school as a second choice, using the same priority groups as above. For most schools, seats were filled by the time the second choices came up.⁵

II. Data

We began with the choice forms submitted by 105,706 students. We dropped students with

² See Hastings et al. (2005) for a detailed description of the student choice data.

³ The county was split into four geographic Choice Zones. A student could choose any school; however, busing would be provided only within the student’s Choice Zone.

⁴ The random number was assigned using a computer algorithm that we verified with CMS programmers. Parents do not know their lottery numbers at the time of submitting their choices. Once any sibling was admitted to a school, other siblings could choose to attend the school. We dropped those who were admitted to a school because of a sibling preference.

⁵ See Hastings et al. (2005) for a discussion of potential strategies in school choices.

special needs, those admitted due to siblings, those who listed a guaranteed school first, and those who belonged to a priority group for which 100 percent of students in that group were either admitted or denied admission to the chosen school. We were left with 6,931 students in “marginal priority groups,” that is, those priority groups within the school/grade choices where admission was determined by random number alone.

We had administrative data on demographics, school attended, absences, suspensions, and grade retention for both the 2001–2002 (baseline) and 2002–2003 school years. North Carolina End of Grade reading scores were available for students in grades three through nine and math scores for students in grades three through eight. We standardized the test scores by grade level and year to have mean zero and a standard deviation of one, and averaged the math and reading score to create a composite test score. In addition, the testing data in North Carolina also included student self-reports on the number of hours spent on homework each week.

III. Results

There were substantial differences by race and gender in both baseline academic performance and in the schools chosen, with white females having the highest baseline test scores and choosing more academic-oriented schools. Table 1 describes the characteristics of the randomized group. Overall, these students were less likely to be white than students in the district as a whole (44 percent white), reflecting the higher fraction of white students who listed their home school first.⁶ White students had higher baseline test scores than nonwhites, were less likely to receive lunch subsidies, had lower suspension rates, and were assigned to higher-scoring home schools. In addition, white students, and white females in particular, tended to choose higher-scoring schools, were more likely to choose academic-oriented magnet programs (International Baccalaureate, Learning Immersion), and were less likely to choose non-academic magnets.

⁶ See Hastings et al. (2005) for a detailed discussion of student choices.

TABLE 1—CHARACTERISTICS OF STUDENTS IN LOTTERY BY GENDER AND RACE

Variable	All students	White female	White male	Nonwhite female	Nonwhite male
<i>Student demographics</i>					
White	34.8%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Female	50.1%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%
Free or reduced lunch	39.4%	9.2%	8.8%	58.6%	52.4%
<i>Students' baseline performance</i>					
Test score	-0.122	0.473	0.371	-0.318	-0.444
Absent > 18 days	12.4%	9.7%	9.8%	13.2%	14.5%
Suspended	15.2%	3.2%	9.7%	14.6%	25.1%
<i>Choice school characteristics</i>					
Average test scores	0.045	0.264	0.199	-0.051	-0.056
Academic magnet	9.9%	16.1%	12.7%	8.5%	6.7%
Nonacademic magnet	45.8%	24.9%	32.0%	54.7%	55.2%
<i>Home school characteristics</i>					
Average test scores	-0.224	0.013	-0.012	-0.356	-0.331
<i>N</i>	6,739	1,114	1,233	2,265	2,127

TABLE 2—DIFFERENCE IN BASELINE CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN LOTTERY WINNERS AND LOSERS

Variable	All students	White female	White male	Nonwhite female	Nonwhite male
<i>Students' baseline performance</i>					
Test score	0.010 (0.026)	-0.003 (0.047)	-0.018 (0.067)	0.085* (0.037)	-0.054 (0.055)
Absent > 18 days	-0.011 (0.010)	0.024 (0.021)	-0.013 (0.022)	-0.002 (0.022)	-0.034* (0.014)
Suspended	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.020)	-0.010 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.018)
<i>Home school characteristics</i>					
Average test scores	0.019 (0.012)	0.044* (0.020)	0.041* (0.020)	0.032 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.016)

Notes: The differences are regression estimates controlling for lottery fixed effects. Standard errors adjust for clustering by first-choice school. Significance indicated by * ($p < 0.05$), ** ($p < 0.01$), and *** ($p < 0.001$).

Table 2 reports the difference in baseline characteristics between lottery winners and losers, controlling for lottery fixed effects, as a validity check of the randomization. There were no significant differences in baseline characteristics between lottery winners and losers overall. There were some differences that were significant at the 5-percent level once the data were broken down by gender and race, but the point estimates were small in magnitude, not jointly significant, and did not display any obvious pattern.

Table 3 reports the estimated impact of winning the lottery on the characteristics of the school attended and academic outcomes. Each

estimate is from a separate OLS regression that controls for student baseline characteristics (X_i) and choice-grade (lottery) fixed effects (δ_j), based on the following equation:

$$Y_{ij} = X_i\beta + \gamma WonLottery_{ij} + \delta_j + \varepsilon_{ij}.$$

The first row of estimates shows that differential attrition of lottery winners was small and insignificant. Among all students, lottery winners were 1.4 percentage points less likely to leave the district by the fall of 2002 with a standard error of 0.9. The second through fifth rows of estimates show that winning the lottery did have a significant effect on the school that a

TABLE 3—IMPACT OF WINNING THE SCHOOL-CHOICE LOTTERY

Student outcome	All students	White female	White male	Nonwhite female	Nonwhite male
<i>Attrition</i>					
Not in district, fall 2002	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.023 (0.022)	-0.038 (0.027)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.012)
<i>Characteristics of school attended</i>					
First-choice school	0.521*** (0.036)	0.452*** (0.048)	0.534*** (0.038)	0.512*** (0.047)	0.577*** (0.050)
Average test scores	0.099*** (0.026)	0.108** (0.036)	0.075 (0.039)	0.114*** (0.030)	0.106** (0.035)
Academic magnet	0.020 (0.020)	0.079 (0.044)	0.013 (0.021)	0.014 (0.023)	0.016 (0.019)
Nonacademic magnet	0.211*** (0.042)	0.119* (0.051)	0.181*** (0.049)	0.243*** (0.048)	0.240*** (0.055)
<i>Student performance</i>					
Test score	-0.012 (0.020)	0.151*** (0.037)	-0.044 (0.047)	-0.053* (0.026)	-0.042 (0.032)
>3 hrs. homework/week	0.044* (0.021)	0.173*** (0.041)	-0.021 (0.059)	0.002 (0.028)	0.041 (0.024)
Unexcused absence > 5 days	-0.038* (0.019)	-0.059 (0.032)	-0.008 (0.046)	-0.058* (0.023)	-0.027 (0.030)
Suspended	-0.020 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.016)	0.013 (0.019)	-0.029 (0.021)	-0.036 (0.027)
Retained	-0.015* (0.006)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.017 (0.012)

Notes: Each entry is from a separate OLS regression of the given outcome on lottery outcomes. Regressions included lottery fixed effects, baseline characteristics (race, gender, free lunch, ESL status, absences, suspensions, and retentions). The regressions for student test scores and homework also controlled for baseline test score. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the first-choice school level. Significance indicated by * ($p < 0.05$), ** ($p < 0.01$), and *** ($p < 0.001$).

student attended in the subsequent year. Lottery winners were 52 percentage points more likely to attend their first-choice school and attended schools with average test scores about one-tenth of a standard deviation higher. Lottery winners were significantly more likely to attend a non-academic magnet, but this effect was weakest for white females. In contrast, winning the lottery had the largest effect on attending an academic magnet school for white females.

Overall, we find some impacts of winning the lottery on outcomes other than test scores. For example, lottery winners were more likely to report doing more than three hours of homework (4.4 percent, base of 30 percent), less likely to have five or more unexcused absences (3.8 percent, base of 34 percent), and less likely to have been retained (1.5 percent, base of 3.9 percent). There was no impact overall on any of the test score measures, however.

As reported in columns 2 through 5, the overall impacts mask important differences

by gender and race. The results for white females are strikingly different from the other groups. White females experience significant gains in test scores as a result of winning the lottery. If anything, winning the lottery appears to have a negative effect on test scores for all other subgroups.

The differing impacts reflected important differences in choices. White girls seemed to choose slightly better schools than their male counterparts and were the most likely to choose academically challenging magnets. In addition, the increase in the self-reported fraction of students doing more than three hours of homework per week is driven completely by the white female subcategory. They experience a roughly 50-percent increase in homework. These results suggest that white females chose academically focused schools, expended more effort on academics when randomized into those schools, and experienced significant gains in test scores as a result.

In addition, decreases in unexcused absences as a result of winning the lottery are driven by decreases among females. Columns 2 and 4 show that females experienced a roughly 6-percentage-point decline in having five or more unexcused absences. This result is significant only among nonwhite females, although the point estimates are the same across white and nonwhite females. In contrast, there are no significant effects on any of the outcomes for males.

IV. Conclusion

A number of recent evaluations of educational interventions have reported differing impacts by gender and race. Without a theory to account for those differing subgroup impacts, such differences could simply be due to chance. When we examine choices made by students in the CMS school choice lottery, we find evidence of heterogeneous preferences. Different subgroups of students chose different types of schools: white females were more likely to choose academically rigorous magnets, while nonwhite students were more likely to choose nonacademically focused magnet options. More generally, Hastings et al. (2005) show in a mixed-logit demand framework that preferences over school characteristics vary greatly across and within race and free-lunch recipient students. Parents face trade-offs between school characteristics such as location, academics, and racial composition. Different parents place different weights on each of these objectives. Giving parents more choices may improve utility but may have little effect on academic achievement overall if parents also have nonacademic objectives.

The results presented here seem consistent with this hypothesis. On average there is no significant impact of school choice on student test scores. Among white females in particular, however, there were significant gains in test scores as a result of winning the lottery. There is suggestive evidence that this may be a result of both the choices they made and personal effort. White girls were more likely to choose academic magnet schools and were the only group that reported significant increases in hours devoted to homework as a result of winning the lottery. Perhaps both the preferences that drive choice decisions and the reaction by students to their lottery outcomes may determine academic outcomes in a school-choice setting.

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