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Corruption in Uganda: A Comparative Study of Citizens' and Public Officials' Perceptions

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Abstract: *The findings of this study into the complex problem of corruption in Uganda dispel the pervasive and popular view that corruption in East Africa's third largest economy is an exclusive behavior monopolized by public officials. This study finds that corruption is engendered by an unholy alliance between citizens desperate to access services and public officials eager to exact a price on services they are obliged to freely provide. This study determined that corruption in Uganda largely depends upon collaboration by citizens and public officials, hence changing the simplest meaning of corruption from the abuse of public office to an act that benefits the community. Using the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD), the primary purpose of this quantitative comparative study was to examine to what extent citizens and public officials differed in levels of their perception of corruption and the degree of the forms of corruption in Uganda. Using a survey of 12,000 citizens and 670 public officials, we found that citizens and public officials were slightly different in their perception of corruption, but corruption is a collaborative endeavor involving many behaviors that are discussed in detail. Key recommendations are to adopt technological inter-faces, reduce work incentives, and subject potential candidates to prove suitability before working in public service. Future research agendas are also discussed.*

Keywords: Corruption in Uganda, perception of corruption, differences in corruption, unholy alliance, collaborative endeavor

Introduction

The popular view that corruption in Uganda is exclusively originated, orchestrated, and practiced by public officials working for public institutions is very corrosive. While the popular view that corruption in Uganda exclusively benefits public officials working for public institutions remains pervasive and to some extent authentic, it does not address the nuances associated with corruption as a complex social problem.

This groundbreaking study applies a proven research framework, the Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD), to determine that corruption in Uganda is highly dependent on collaboration by citizens and public officials. This finding reverses the previously simplistic but popular view and understanding of corruption as a unidirectional social scourge. Whereas collaborative corruption maintains social relations, it complicates moral issues related to corruption, reduces individual sense of responsibility, and hinders interventions to combat corruption in Uganda (Bukuluki, 2013).

Conducting a comparative analysis of citizens and public officials regarding corruption is important, not only to contribute to understanding corruption, but to reveal valuable insights to guide strategies and policy frameworks to mitigate corruption (Dong et al., 2012; Persson et al., 2013). Therefore, the primary purpose of this quantitative comparative study is to examine to what extent citizens and public officials differ in levels of their perception of corruption and the degree of corruption forms in Uganda. This purpose is addressed by two critical questions in the study: (1) to what extent do differences in levels of perception of corruption exist between the citizens and public officials in Uganda?; (2) to what extent do differences in perception of the

degree of corruption forms (i.e., bribes, extortion, fraud, diversion of funds, favoritism, and embezzlement) exist between the citizens and public officials in Uganda?

Background

Frequent news reports, commission of inquiry reports, public perception of corruption surveys, and court trials involving corrupt individuals in public institutions found in many low developing countries are a cause for concern. The concern suggests three issues. First, the perception of corruption in public institutions has increased across different populations in many developing countries, which suggests an increased awareness of corruption (Persson et al., 2013; Truex, 2011). Second, the existence of corruption in public institutions is significantly felt across different sections of society (Dong et al., 2012; Persson et al., 2013; Truex, 2011). At the same time, the existence of corruption is dynamic and complex in nature because the behavior evolves over time (Inspectorate of Government Report, 2008; Mishra, 2006; Truex, 2011). Third, the increase in awareness of corruption across different sections of society suggests that the behavior has been accommodated as a cultural norm in those societies because it is loved, talked about, complained about, and its negative consequences are largely known (Mishra, 2006; Persson et al., 2013).

A 2013 national governance baseline survey by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBS) points out that Uganda, one of the least developed countries, lost up to \$66.4 million annually to bribes alone, and citizens both in rural and urban areas spent on average \$50.80 on bribes to receive services; while an estimated \$300 million meant for the distribution of services was lost to corruption annually (New Vision 29, 2014; Niringiye, 2012).

Recently, the Uganda Judicial Service Commission (JSC) revealed 15 ways (i.e., bribery, stealing bail money, misuse of cash deposits, sexual abuse, abuse of judicial power, rudeness, delayed judgment, charging fees to visit crime scenes, ex-parte communication, insubordination, absenteeism, drunkenness, extortion of money from crime victims, fraud, and intentional misplace of criminal files) judicial officers engage in corruption with the public while dispensing justice (Daily Monitor, 13, 2014). Therefore, without assuming that citizens are trapped in corrupt situations and are the victims of corruption in low developing countries (Ostrom, 2010; 2011), it can be asserted that their collective efforts to engage public officials in corrupt actions are evident in the way they perceive corruption and the degree of how they feel about the existence of certain corruption forms in public institutions; because those corruption forms represent how corrupt actors engage in corruption (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011; Ostrom, 2010; 2011). Ostensibly, as population censuses are conducted every 10 years in many countries, the need for studies focusing on the evolution of corruption in some societies is critical to initiate policies to remedy the behavior (Mishra, 2006; Osei-Tutu et al., 2009).

Historical Perspectives on Collaborative Corruption in Uganda

Collaborative corruption in Uganda can be traced from her historical contexts. Uganda was a British protectorate from 1894 to 1962; and during this period the British colonialists were more concerned with economic exploitation and domination at all levels of administrative institutions (Vyas-Doorgapersad, Lukamba-Muhiya, & Ababio, 2013). In 1900, the new British commissioner Sir Harry H. Johnson was tasked to establish an efficient administration to levy taxes in the country (Vyas-Doorgapersad et al., 2013). This was only possible by approaching the chiefs of Buganda kingdom with job offers in the colonial administration in return for their

collaboration – a form of corruption (Vyas-Doorgapersad et al., 2013). The 1900 Buganda agreement between Johnson and the chiefs of Buganda imposed taxes on huts and guns; and the chiefs acted as tax collectors (Vyas-Doorgapersad et al., 2013). Other agreements were signed in Toro (1900), Ankole (1901), and Bunyoro (1933), while ignoring smaller chiefdoms in Busoga (Vyas-Doorgapersad et al., 2013).

After the country gained independence in 1962, the indigenous governments that followed were more preoccupied with state power and the use of force without building democratic institutions – a situation that promoted the current corruption (Vyas-Doorgapersad et al., 2013). These governments over the years have created situations of giving “free things” to the citizens (Bukuluki, 2013). These “free offers” have crippled creativity, created a state of complacency, and undermined morals across levels of the population in the country to the extent that some government civil servants only perform tasks after they are certain of some individual gains (i.e., “what is in it for me” mentality) out of the tasks (Bukuluki, 2013; Persson et al., 2013).

This investigative study on Uganda is critical on two fronts: First, the country benefited substantially from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) monetary assistance in the 1990s, which aimed at pushing for major economic structural reforms in an attempt to promote African economic recovery as well as better state governance. Second, although the aid was significant, it failed to facilitate the establishment of institutions that could sustain economic growth and set the nations that benefited into prosperity (Tangri & Mwenda, 2006). In the case of Uganda, the aid created and enlarged administrative and military structures, whose establishment concurred with the IFIs mandates. In addition, the IFIs failed to pay much attention to how the Ugandan political leadership implemented the aid (Tangri & Mwenda, 2006).

The Significance of Research on Corruption on the African Continent

Research on corruption has continued to attract interest across a variety of disciplines. A large body of research in economics, business, political science, and other social sciences overwhelmingly suggest that public officials who abuse their public official role to achieve individual interests manifest corruption (Dong et al., 2012; Persson et al., 2013). Although extensive reforms have been employed to fight corruption in most least-developed countries, the reforms have largely failed (Lawson, 2009; Rothstein, 2011). The findings by Transparency International from 1998 to 2009 have indicated that the average corruption perception index (CPI) for Africa reduced from 3.6 to 2.9, with 10 representing no corruption and 0 representing highly corrupt countries. Consequently, corruption has persisted and become tragic on the African continent (Persson, Ruthstein, & Teorell, 2010). The reforms to mitigate corruption have largely focused on establishing institutional reforms, like accountability and democratic governance, to eliminate corruption in public institutions (Persson, 2013; Rothstein, 2011). While these reforms have worked in other countries, they have largely failed in most least-developed countries, especially in Africa, because they were developed based on grand corruption behaviors like fraud, embezzlement, extortion, and bribes, generally blamed on public officials (Dong & Torgler, 2012; Truex, 2011).

The persistence of corruption in most least-developed countries is because corrupt actions are occurring through different but acceptable forms (Bukuluki, 2013; Persson et al., 2013), involving citizens who are motivated by their need for services and public officials by greed. They collaborate in corruption for mutually beneficial but mixed outcomes, whose understanding has not been effectively examined (Bukuluki, 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). Data

comprising collaborative corruption involving citizens and public officials are not largely featured in research because they are associated with petty corrupt behaviors (i.e., petty gift giving, nepotism, exchange for favors, and quid pro quo bribes) which are strongly perceived as acceptable norms in certain countries (Clarke, 2010; Rothstein, 2011; Truex, 2011). Research interest exists especially in least-developed countries because when perception of corruption spreads across public institutions, the spillover effects are beyond the behaviors of public officials, since corruption is an acceptable tradition in that society (Dong et al., 2012; Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2010).


Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework in this study employs a broader theory that has dominated the analysis of diverse human behaviors (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982; E. Ostrom, 2005; & 2011; V. Ostrom, 1975). The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is used to understand how humans interact to achieve outcomes in diverse situations (Ostrom, 2005; 2010; 2011). The IAD framework has guided the understanding of corruption in Uganda, specifically, to understanding how public institutional structures in Uganda have not only failed to reduce corruption, but have promoted collaborative efforts between citizens and public officials to engage in corruption (Clarke, 2011; Lawson, 2009; Levy, 2008; Mishra, 2006; Persson et al., 2013; Rothstein & Eek, 2009; Truex, 2011). While the simplest meaning of corruption has been the abuse of public office by a public official to achieve individual interests (Dong et al., 2012; Persson et al., 2013), in a collective environment the citizen (i.e., family member, friend, spouse etc.) has changed the context of corruption to an act that benefits the rest of the community (Bukuluki, 2013). These acts of corruption are not detected by anti-corruption policies, or they are ignored, because they occur in the interest of citizens who collaborate with public officials to engage in corruption. Given this background, the IAD framework effectively explains outcomes when the action situations and interactions within the framework are created in conformity with certain conditions that sustain corrupt actions by citizens and public officials through collaboration (Ostrom, 2005; 2010; 2011; Persson et al., 2013).

The first condition is that collaborative choice arrangements exist in Uganda to encourage corruption by citizens, who engage in corruption because they are motivated by the need for services, and public officials motivated by greed, both of whom view their corrupt actions as mutually beneficial (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). The environment in which corruption takes place enables actors to modify the way they engage in corruption by normalizing corrupt practices as acceptable (Bukuluki, 2013; Ostrom, 2011; Persson et al., 2013). The second condition is that corrupt citizens or public officials have clear and locally acceptable boundaries to know when to engage in corruption (Ostrom, 2010; 2011). This condition is facilitated by the collective culture in Uganda, where individual corrupt actions by either citizens or public officials are bounded within acceptable parameters of benefit or loss to the actors (Bukuluki, 2013; Ostrom, 2011; Persson et al., 2013).

Furthermore, the level of perception of corruption and the degree of each corruption form in a public institution by either a citizen or public official explains the extent to which a collective culture to engage in corruption has made corruption a complex issue to mitigate, mostly in the low-developing countries (Bukuluki, 2013; Dong et al., 2012; Persson et al., 2013). In addition, when citizens and public officials act as external variables in the IAD framework, they form action situations demonstrated by collaborations to encourage interactions that result in outcomes which are evaluated as shown in Figure 1 (Ostrom, 2005; Persson et al., 2013).

Figure 2: Figure of IAD Framework. Illustrating Corruption Action Situations, Interactions, and Outcomes by Citizens and Public Officials in the IAD Framework. Adapted from Ostrom, E. (2005, p. 15). *Understanding institutional diversity*. Princeton, NJ University




The basis for collaboration by citizens and public officials to form action situations is evident in how they perceive corruption and the degree of corruption forms, because these corrupt forms act as the means for interaction to engage or disengage in corruption (Ostrom, 2010; 2011; Persson et al., 2013). Collective interests advance the interactions (i.e., degree of corruption forms) where individuals form corrupt actions as a way of promoting social interests (Bukuluki, 2013). The outcome or reaction by both citizens and public officials to evaluate corruption in public institutions is indicated by their level of perception of corruption and the degree of corruption forms, whether real or imaginary, depending on how each individual associates the costs and benefits of engaging in corrupt actions and whether the actions satisfy individual or community interests (Bukuluki, 2013; Razafindrakoto & Roubaud, 2010), as shown in Figure 2.

While citizens and public officials are bound in pursuing corrupt actions, they choose to engage in corruption since they expect no action to be taken, and because the benefits for engaging in corruption are viewed in the interest of the entire society (Bukuluki, 2013; Persson et al., 2010; Persson et al., 2013). Therefore, without assuming that citizens are trapped in corrupt situations (Ostrom, 2010; 2011), it is asserted that their collective efforts to engage public officials in corrupt actions are evident in the way they perceive corruption and the degree of corruption forms in public institutions, with respect to both collective choice and boundary rules that guide corrupt actors. Furthermore, while action situations could change over time in view of changes in costs and benefits (Bukuluki, 2013; Ostrom, 2010; 2011; Persson et al., 2010; Persson et al., 2013), perceptions of corruption and strategies or forms to engage in corrupt acts can also change, demanding constant evaluations by policy makers (Cox & Ostrom, 2010). The changes can occur as a way of accepting new information processing capabilities to internalize

mechanisms that are acceptable to all other actors and act as strategies to continue engaging in corrupt actions (Ostrom, 2010; 2011).

Figure 3: *How Collaborative Choice and Boundary Rules might Influence Action Situations and Interactions to Influence Perception of Corruption in the IAD Framework. Adapted from Ostrom, E. (2005, p. 189). Understanding institutional diversity. Princeton, NJ University Press.*



The basis for evaluation of how citizens and public officials perceive corruption in public institutions is that smaller variations in the differences between the two groups suggest that their perceptions of corruption are relatively the same, and that collaborative efforts to engage in corruption exist (Hunt, 2010; Hunt & Laszlo, 2012). Contrarily, larger variations in the differences between the two groups are significant in suggesting explanations to determine which group is more engaged or disengaged in corrupt actions; and which one is not. Greater levels in perception of corruption by citizens indicates that they are significantly affected because they use significant amounts of their incomes to engage in corruption in order to access public services, or because they are disengaged and are unable to collaborate with public officials to engage in corruption to access public services (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012; Sims et al., 2012). The larger variations for citizens indicate that public officials are motivated by greed to engage in corruption to satisfy their self-interests because their actions carry fewer costs than the benefits, and the benefits are not viewed in a collective nature (Bukuluki, 2013; Lawson, 2009; Rothstein & Eek, 2009; Truex, 2011). Furthermore, any differences between citizens' and public officials' perception of corruption forms can guide a clearer understanding of which group in Uganda is more likely to detect the common corruption forms. Empirical results suggesting a narrow difference between the two groups indicate that the form(s) of corruption are the basis for

collaboration/interaction and are the least-cost method(s) for citizens and public officials to engage in corruption.

Explaining IAD Framework in Collaborative Corruption

Collaborative corruption refers to the cooperation between a public-sector employee and a willing public service user to exchange unlawful bribes to gain access to needed public services and or to save time (Persson et al., 2013). Public officials engage in corruption due to greed, while citizens are motivated by the need for services (Hunt, 2010; Hunt & Laszlo, 2012). Ostrom (2005, 2010, 2011) formulated the basis for collaboration as fundamentally linked to rules that force external parties to create action situations to engage in corruption as shown in Figure 3. Thus, any action situations and interactions, whether short term or long term, can only occur when actors use their positions to engage in actions that are based on information gathered, how capable they are to control the actions, and the evaluation of the costs and benefits of the actions before understanding the actual outcomes of the actions (Ostrom, 2011). The IAD framework is effective in explaining outcomes when the action situations occur in conditions that sustain corrupt actions and interactions of citizens and public officials through collaboration (Ostrom, 2005; 2010; 2011; Persson et al., 2013). Furthermore, the action situations and interactions to engage in corrupt actions take place in environments where the expected costs and benefits have been evaluated (Ostrom, 2010; 2011; Persson et al., 2013).

Given this background, the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework effectively explains outcomes when the action situations and interactions within the framework are created in conformity with seven rules established to sustain corrupt actions and interactions of the actors to collaborate (Ostrom, 2005; 2010; 2011). While there are several conditions (i.e., boundary rules, information rules, aggregation rules, scope rules, payoff rules, choice rules, and position rules) that allow action situations and interaction, this study focuses in detail on two—boundary rules and choice rules—as the basis for citizens and public officials to collaborate and engage in corruption, as illustrated in Figure 3. The other rules are discussed briefly in Table 1 in the context of collaborative corruption.

Methodology

The key questions addressed in this study are:

- Q1.** To what extent do differences in levels of perception of corruption exist between the citizens and public officials in Uganda?
- Q2.** To what extent do differences in perception of the degree of corruption forms (i.e., bribes, extortion, fraud, diversion of funds, favoritism, and embezzlement) exist between the citizens and public officials in Uganda?
- H1.** There is a statistically significant difference in levels of perception of corruption between the citizens and public officials in Uganda.
- H2.** There is a statistically significant difference in levels of perception of the degree of corruption forms (i.e., bribes, extortion, fraud, diversion of funds, favoritism, and embezzlement) between the citizens and public officials in Uganda.

The study analyzed secondary data consisting of 12,000 citizens and 670 public officials within the 80 districts of Uganda on their perception of corruption and the degree of corruption forms in the Ugandan public institutions (Inspectorate of Government Report, 2008). The data were

analyzed using factorial analysis of variance and factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) statistical procedures. Because question one investigated the extent of differences between citizens and public officials in their perception of corruption, factorial analysis of variance was the appropriate test because of its ability to examine specific differences between and within groups when there was only one dependent variable and an independent variable with two or more levels (Dommer et al., 2013).

Question 2 investigated the extent of differences in perception of the degree of corruption forms between the citizens and public officials in Uganda. Factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was the appropriate test for question two because of its ability to examine specific differences between and within groups, when there was more than one dependent variable (i.e., six corruption forms – bribery, extortion, fraud, favoritism, diversion of funds, and embezzlement) with one independent variable containing two or more levels (Ralston et al., 2009; Tjemkes et al., 2012; Zehir et al., 2012).

Figure 4: *Rules as Exogenous Variables Directly Affecting the Elements of an Action Situation.* Source: Adapted from Ostrom, E. (2005, p. 189). *Understanding institutional diversity.* Princeton, NJ University Press.




Table 1: Brief Description of Rules in the IAD Framework

Rule	Brief description	Citations
Position rules	Hierarchies within institutional structures that support the delivery system of what the institution offers. In order to support actions and interactions, the positions established can work both internally and externally to deliver services. The use of both internal and external influences by public officials in their positions to engage in corruption makes it very hard for a regular citizen to survive without engaging in corruption.	Ostrom, 2011; Mutula & Wamukoya, 2009
Information rules	Collaborative corruption is fostered by asymmetrical information – where public officials hide public information from the citizen to affect their rational decision-making process. In order to gain public services in an environment where information is lacking, public officials release only information based on certain terms – pay a bribe to access information or a needed public service.	Bukuluki, 2013; Mutula & Wamukoya, 2009; Persson et al., 2013
Aggregation rules	Understanding of the different rules that exist and affect one's choices. In corrupt environments with the existence of position rules, public officials can form patrimonialistic influences within public institutions to limit access to public services – especially when allegiance to one's position is not respected.	Ostrom, 2011; Persson et al., 2013; Truex, 2011
Scope rules	Understanding of the dos and don'ts. In societies where social values are critical and family is the most important pillar of all social hierarchies, the community only expects that people help others with what they have and not through illicit behaviors. Self-interested individuals have in the recent past eroded this social cohesion to the extent that only a political mechanism, not a social or cultural resource, can eliminate corruption in society.	Ostrom, 2011; Bukuluki, 2013; Bukuluki, 2013; Persson et al., 2013
Payoff rules	Sanctions imposed if the other rules are broken. The conformance to rules monitored and responsibility to sanctioning non-conformers is enforced. Corrupt actors work against individuals who are not corrupt. Since social ties are involved when engaging in corruption, corrupt actors seek protection from prosecution by well-established formal courts of law. Corrupt actors only monitor payoffs for the good of everyone, protect their own interests, and discard what is against those interests at any time.	Ostrom, 2011; Bukuluki, 2013; Persson et al., 2013
Boundary rules	Limitations faced by actors in the formation of actions (i.e., ethnicity, race, gender or family structure); including individuals who are from a certain class and exercise the willingness to pay the necessary costs needed in the action situations. Clear and locally acceptable boundaries are exercised by citizens and public officials whose willingness to engage in corruption is based on costs and benefits of the action situation.	Ostrom, 2010; 2011; Persson et al., 2013; Hunt and Laszlo (2012)
Choice rules	The understanding of the necessary tools needed by actors to form action situations to enforce interactions. Collaborative choice arrangements exist to encourage corruption by citizens who are motivated to engage in corruption by the need for services, to save time, and through desperation; and public officials by greed and the different pressures around them to provide. Thus, both citizens and public officials view their corrupt actions as mutually beneficial.	Ostrom, 2010, 2011; Hunt & Laszlo, 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011; Bukuluki, 2013; Persson et al., 2013

Results

The total sample for the survey group was 12,670. The valid results for the main independent variable (i.e., survey group) was 11,757 ($M = 1.060$, $SD = .232$), where citizens include 11,087 (94.3%), and public officials were 670 (100%). The dependent variable (i.e., average perception of corruption) was 11,756 ($M = 1.845$, $SD = .664$). The other dependent variables include degree of bribery ($M = 2.74$, $SD = .502$), degree of embezzlement ($M = 2.58$, $SD = .584$), degree of extortion ($M = 2.23$, $SD = .682$), degree of fraud ($M = 2.11$, $SD = .676$), degree of favoritism ($M = 2.38$, $SD = .657$), and degree of diversion of funds ($M = 2.36$, $SD = .661$).

Perception of corruption by the survey group across 18 public institutions in Uganda were measured as interval variables on a Likert-type scale with values from one to three (i.e., 1 = dishonest, 2 = no opinion, and 3 = honest). An average perception of corruption for the survey group was computed. Similarly, perception of the degree of corruption forms in the 18 public institutions (i.e., bribery, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, favoritism, and diversion of funds) was also measured as interval variables on Likert-type scale with values from one to three, where 1 = low, 2 = no opinion, and 3 = high. The distributions of the dependent variables are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Descriptive Analysis of all Dependent Variables

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>
Average perception of corruption	1.00	3.00	2.36	0.66	11757
Bribery	1.00	3.00	2.74	0.66	11293
Embezzlement	1.00	3.00	2.58	0.66	11046
Extortion	1.00	3.00	2.23	0.66	10981
Fraud	1.00	3.00	2.11	0.66	10740
Favoritism	1.00	3.00	2.38	0.66	10930
Diversion of funds	1.00	3.00	2.36	0.66	10772

Despite the data being six years old, they remained the most recent and are assumed to be a fair representation of current attitudes about corruption in Uganda. In addition, the survey had no published findings as to validity and reliability. However, since the government had used the same survey on three occasions, it was assumed that the survey was valid for study purposes. On the other hand, while dependent data (i.e., forms of corruption) and perception of corruption involved selecting one of three responses, they were effectively treated as interval data on a Likert scale. While a deeper understanding of the data collected had not been published, this study was designed to seek that deeper understanding. In addition, the threat to the statistical analysis was that the set of data did not meet normal distribution assumptions. However, the use of ANOVA and MANOVA statistical methods was significant because the tests were very robust against the violation of normality assumptions. Because the number of cases far exceeded the number required for statistical power, any outliers were removed to allow the data to achieve normal assumptions while maintaining a sufficient number of cases for statistical power. Furthermore, the Levene's test was also used to test for the assumptions of homogeneity of variances. However, when data were transformed using a square root function, non-significant values were achieved on embezzlement $p > .05$, extortion $p > .05$, and diversion of funds $p > .05$ to meet the Levene's test for normality, but not for bribery $p < .05$, fraud $p < .05$, and favoritism $p < .05$, thus failing to meet the Levene's test for normality. Average perception of corruption

$p < .001$ also did not meet the Levene's test for normality, partly because of the large sample size (Field, 2009). Please see Table 3.

Table 3: Levene's Tests of Homogeneity of Variance Based on Mean

Dependent variable	<i>p.</i>
Bribery	.000***
Embezzlement	.378
Extortion	.241
Fraud	.000***
Favoritism	.000***
Diversion of funds	.840

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

For research question one, the descriptive statistics are that, compared to the citizens, the mean differences with the public officials in the first analysis was that public officials perceived corruption slightly higher than the citizens in public institutions. The data were also evaluated using factorial analysis of variance to determine whether differences in perception of corruption exist in the survey group. The survey group variable was entered as the independent variable and average perception of corruption as the dependent variable.

Factorial analysis of variance for the survey group on average perception of corruption was not significant; consequently, the null hypothesis was not rejected. Therefore, the results for the first question were that citizens and public officials were not statistically different in the way they perceive corruption in the public institutions of Uganda. The decision not to reject the null hypothesis could be caused by the assumptions that the test of the survey group on average perception of corruption had lost variance, and average perception of corruption had not met the normality assumptions for the Levene's test (Field, 2009). (See Table 4 for the results). On the other hand, because of the slight mean differences between the citizens and public officials, the survey group was slightly different in the way they perceived corruption in the public institutions of Uganda.

Table 4: Factorial ANOVA Results of Survey Group on Average Perception of Corruption
Dependent variable: Average Perception of Corruption

Variable	<i>Mean</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p.</i>
Survey group		1	3.155	.076
Citizen	1.842			
Public official	1.889			

Note: $N = 11,755$, $p > .05$

For research question two, the mean differences for the survey group revealed that citizens perceived bribery slightly higher than public officials did. On perceptions of embezzlement, extortion, fraud, favoritism, and diversion of funds, public officials were slightly higher than citizens in perceiving those corruption forms in public institutions. The data was also evaluated using factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the different corruption forms as the dependent variables and survey group as the independent variable.

Table 5: MANOVA Results of Survey Group on Corruption Forms (Dependent Variable Corruption Forms)

Variable:	Bribery	Embezzlement	Extortion	Fraud	Favoritism	Diversion of Funds
Survey group						
<i>p.</i>	.000***	.696	.001**	.000***	.000***	.002**
<i>F</i>	21.334	.153	11.500	147.632	51.45	79.752
<i>df</i>	1	1	1	1	1	1
<i>Mean</i>						
Citizen	2.750	2.581	2.213	2.095	2.372	2.356
Public official	2.656	2.590	2.308	2.429	2.565	2.440

Note: $N = 10,396$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Factorial multivariate analysis of variance tests on the survey group was significant on bribery, extortion, fraud, favoritism, and diversion of funds. The result for embezzlement was not significant. Therefore, because five of the six corruption forms were statistically significant, the null hypothesis was rejected. Significant statistical differences existed in the way the survey group perceived the different forms of corruption in the Ugandan public institutions. Please see Table 5 for the results.

Limitations

A limitation of the study was that the data used were collected in 2008 and remained the only available data for the study of this magnitude. However, as recent published literature confirmed (Bukuluki, 2013; Clarke, 2011; Dong & Torgler, 2013; New Vision 29, 2014; Niringiye, 2012; Persson et al., 2010; Persson et al., 2013; Ufere et al., 2012), perceptions of corruption indicated that corruption was getting worse since the secondary data were collected. Yet, a deeper understanding of the data collected had not been published. This study was designed to seek that deeper understanding. A threat to the statistical analysis was that the set of data might have not met normal distribution assumptions. Since the number of cases far exceeded the number required for statistical power, any outliers had been removed to allow the data to achieve normal assumptions while maintaining a sufficient number of cases for statistical power. The use of ANOVA and MANOVA statistical procedures that are robust against the violation of normality was also an added safeguard.

The current study does not exhaust all factors that may be related to perceptions of corruption. An understanding of perception of corruption between the two groups while considering their demographics was critical. Relevant demographics include the income level of a citizen and public official (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012; Ufere et al., 2012), the knowledge of the different forms of corruption (Dong & Torgler, 2013), knowledge of how and where to report corruption, family size, and source of family income (Inspectorate of Government Report, 2008). These constructs and other demographic variables were omitted from this study because including them would make the overall analysis unmanageable. Whether, these constructs influenced the level of perception of corruption, and consequently, changed the collaborative efforts of a citizen with a public official to engage in corruption was left to future researchers to investigate. Future research opportunities also exist by transforming the data used in this study to understand how citizens and public officials collaborated to engage in corruption when the 18 institutions were grouped as representative, law enforcement, service, and public funds

institutions. Furthermore, no predictor variables were manipulated in this study, and cause and effect was not determined. Identifying a potential cause-and-effect relationship was not within the scope of this research. It is left to future researchers to develop experimental designs to determine whether collaborative corruption in public institutions could cause improvements for innovation and sustainable strategies to combat corruption.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The primary conclusion from this study is that citizens and public officials were not very different in the way they perceive corruption and the degree of corruption forms in public institutions; hence, they collaborated to engage in corruption. The basis for collaborative corruption in public institutions was bribery, embezzlement, extortion, fraud, favoritism, and diversion of funds. These corruption forms occurred in different frequencies in the collaborative efforts to engage in corruption. Based on the conclusions, we developed seven recommendations for practical and immediate adoption.

First, the need to appreciate the role of technology that would connect both public officials and citizens in Uganda's public institutions existed. Second, working in public service should be made less attractive by emphasizing private sector investments where the majority of individuals could find employment. Third, aggressive measures were needed to reduce government partial crowding out of the private sector through contracts, and zero crowding out for certain government functions so that the private sector could grow and act as a source for employment for the majority of the population. Fourth, in order to eliminate patronage, another source for collaborative corruption, government hiring should go through the inspectorate of government for clearance. The clearance should be made tedious, lengthy, and the burden of proof for eligibility/suitability for the job placed on the candidate. Fifth, when an individual finds interest in working in public service – whether as a politician or a civil servant, they should desist from engaging in activities that put them at the forefront of conflict of interest. Sixth, the culture of data generation, manipulation, synthesis, and generalization should be the basis for decision-making to avoid mistakes that diminish citizen trust in government functions. Seventh, government decisions must be made based on research findings, and the promotion of research should be prioritized through institutions of higher learning, research centers, think tanks, and symposiums.

On the other hand, we provide three recommendations for future researchers who will conduct studies to extend knowledge from this study. First, future researchers need to use qualitative methods or mixed methods to further understand the effects of perception of corruption in collective environments. Second, future researchers should consider the integration of internally collected data, especially data collected from citizens and other stakeholders who reside in different locations, to represent the true sample while drawing conclusions for their findings. Third, future researchers should use additional factors, especially demographic variables, to further understand corruption across populations.

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