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Ihekwoaba D. Onwudiwe
Texas Southern University

Lucy Tsado
Texas Southern University

Kingsley U. Ejiogu
University of Maryland Eastern Shore

Rochelle E. McGee-Cobbs
Mississippi Valley State University

Ifeoma Okoye
Texas Southern University

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In Defense of the Nigerian Homeland

Ihekwoaba Declan Onwudiwe

Texas Southern University

Lucy Tsado

Texas Southern University

Kingsley U. Ejiogu

University of Maryland Eastern Shore

Rochelle E. McGee-Cobbs

Mississippi Valley State University

Ifeoma Okoye

Texas Southern University

Abstract: *Recently, Nigeria has experienced various acts of domestic terrorism and kidnapping that may be rooted in many forms of motivations and agitations. These aggressions have resulted in homegrown bloodshed, émigré aggression, or even organized international network assaults against the population. The scourge of these terrorist activities has continued to weaken the Nigerian character or moral fiber. While the government is trying to combat these offenses caused by extremist activities, there are still remedies that have not been implemented prudently or applied properly. In this article, we propose various forms of the repertoire of actions which the government can use to effectively fight and combat terrorism in a democratic Nigeria.*

Introduction

While, historically, West African countries have not cuddled with the kind of terrorism that surround Nigeria today (Onwudiwe 2001) in the face of the new contours of terrorism confronting the Nigerian nation and the ensuing insecurities in the country, it may be faultily deduced that Nigeria has failed to safeguard its internal security and therefore poses a danger for the rest of the African continent. This article takes a different view and rejects any attempt to tag Nigeria as a failed state, rather, it underscores the need to put forward a multi-dimensional remedies that constitute the parameters for archiving and maintaining the security of the country. Nigeria's insecurity is a reality with the glaring evidence that stems from the Boko Haram's infirmity. Acts of kidnapping, aside from terrorism and other criminalities, are also raging in Nigeria. These acts of terrorism and other ills have escalated since after the bombings of the World Trade Center in the United States on September 11, 2001 and the election of President Good Luck Jonathan in April 2011. Based on these trends, Nigeria's insecurity dilemma demands different levels of explanations. Nigeria is no longer immune from domestic and émigré terrorists. Nigeria is vulnerable like other countries that Al-Qaida terror network targets. The insecurities in the country have grown even beyond the corridors of terrorism, defined as acts of violence rooted in political, social, religious, and cultural objectives. Today, Nigeria, especially, northern Nigerians dwell in

fear of kidnappings—and women and children—suffer the consequences the most. The mission of this article is to articulate strategic security measures that Nigeria needs to slow the tidal wave of terrorism and kidnapping without engaging in explaining and defining terrorism as such attempts have been properly documented (Onwudiwe 2001, White 2009).

Below, workable practical solutions are provided that have been used in other places to fight terrorism. For instance, in the United States, most domestic terrorists have been prosecuted out of existence and have also been denied funding needed to carry out terrorist objectives (Smith 1994). In Britain, they have, historically, used CCTV and other technological innovations to control Irish Republican Army's (IRA) mayhem and pandemonium caused by the use of terrorism to fight for political liberation on the English soil (White 2013). The yearning of the French authorities to control terrorism stems from hard-won-lesson (Shapiro and Benedite 2003). With its long history of terrorism, dating back to the French revolution, France has always been on the “bleeding edge” of terrorism. But in order to prevent terrorism and defend the homeland, the French government, unlike the United States, Britain, and Germany, embarked on and developed a different repertoire of actions to fight terrorism (Shapiro and Benedite 2003). This article examines the schemes adopted by these societies that have suffered terrorism longer than Nigeria. It is hoped that the strategic analysis that will be offered can be applied and be used for the security interest of Nigeria. However, it is important to try to ascertain the genesis of the problem that caused the sudden interests of some Nigerians to behave in un-Nigerian ways. There must be some explanations for the rising trend of violence in the form of kidnapping and terrorism in Nigeria.

Methods and the Framing of Terrorism

Criminological theories, properly framed, can provide the context for explaining terrorism in Nigeria. We begin with this contextual approach because understanding the causes of crime may provide the social and intellectual bedrock to recognize the bane of terrorism. Robert Agnew's (2010) General Strain Theory (GST) of terrorism provides an apt elucidation of terrorism, which can be applied to the situation in Nigeria. Agnew (2010) insists that the GST is appropriate for understanding the causes of terrorism, because in GST, “strain” the main premise of the theory, or “grievances” that perpetrators of terrorism feel, are the main basis of terrorism. Agnew, however, stated that the definitional problems of terrorism are likely to affect the way that the strain theory is used to explain the causes of terrorism. He argues that it is important to isolate the particular type of strain that actually causes terrorism. In addition, he reiterates that only a small portion of those affected by strain actually resort to terrorism. While other strain theories fail to isolate the particular type of strain that leads to terrorism, GST does (Agnew 2010).

According to Agnew (2010), current strain theories of terrorism attribute terrorist acts to various grievances associated with relative material deprivation, religious and socio-cultural issues relating to modernization and globalization; resentment over cultural, economic and military domination by the United States and other Western cultures; territorial ethnic and religious disputes resulting from postcolonial efforts at nation building; economic, political and racial/ethnic discrimination; denial of basic human rights as well as political rights and personal security rights; harsh state repression, hence widespread violence towards certain groups; severe challenges to group identity (Post 2007); displacement or loss of land or home; military occupation of certain types. Basically, terrorist groups identify with one or more of the aforementioned grievances and sometimes ascribe their group names to these. When applying Agnew's GST to the issue of

terrorism in Nigeria, it is apparent that previous and current acts of terrorism have been perpetuated by “collective groups” as described by Agnew. Strains that are most likely to contribute to terrorism are those felt by members of an identified, collective group, that is, groups bound by race/ethnicity, religion, political affiliations or territory (Agnew, 2012). Agnew (2012) maintains that the strain individual members of these terrorist groups feel lead them to terrorism as a way of coping with the strain they experience. Additionally, the strain that individuals feel reduces the effects of social control and ties on the prevention of terrorism because the causes of the strain often evokes feelings of sympathy, tolerance and support. In essence, individuals commonly have loose ties with the source of their strain (Agnew, 2012).

Agnew rightly states that GST is not an absolute explanation of terrorism; he lays emphasis that there are other social contributing factors to the developments of strain. He suggests that a more complete explanation would have to include a range of theories and the complex relationships between them to explain the psychological contributing factors that lead to terrorism. GST, therefore, isolates only one of the causes of terrorism, that is, the type of terrorism caused by collective strain.

In retrospect, counter-terrorism measures can be applied to terrorism caused by collective strain by changing policies that will have long term effects on communities that harbor the individuals that react to the strain they feel. In line with this, Agnew argues that collective strain that leads to terrorism has serious policy implications, such as attempting to reduce the causes of collective strain by targeting “intervening mechanisms that link collective strains to terrorism” (Agnew 2012, 148).

One other measure is by providing intervening legal channels of addressing grievances. Other counter-terrorism measures can be applied after examining what has been done before in other countries in countering terrorism caused by strain. Therefore, just as America needed new laws to deal with the occurrences of September 11, 2001, so also, Nigeria needs to revisit the public policy arena that will provide solutions for the current spate of terrorist attacks occurring in the country, especially those that have been identified as being caused by collective strain, such as that being carried out by Boko Haram.

Tracy (2012) states that the events of September 11 placed the decision to respond to terrorism in order to keep the homeland safe inadvertently in the hands of the government and public policy arena and became the area by which the government responded. Generally, a policy that will attempt to respond to the issues of terrorism in Nigeria will have to affect environmental and structural issues like the preparedness of local police response as it relates to the structure of policing the community (Tracy 2012). This is just one of the ways to counter-terrorism.

In fact, theoretical frameworks with which to explain the security systems in many sub-Saharan African States are almost non-existent in the securitization policy literature. What can be inferred are evidence of historical colonial para-military systems for subduing and controlling resistance within the pre-independence indigent communities. Though in many of the more promising states like Nigeria and Ghana, these systems have received elaborate burnishing to reflect contemporary Western ideals of State security. Mabe (2009) notes quite correctly that security is a political principle that affects all aspects of human existence. He states that “security represents a principle underlying all national actions, which pursues the goal of promoting economic and political development.” While it may be difficult to identify the universal appeal for security due to the reality of a vast difference in the unique needs of the world’s multicultural

spatial settings, in historical African anthologies, as can be identified within some of its contemporary societies, securitization policies are often founded on the basis of group bonding, material wealth, as well as on spiritual fortification. Mabe further identified that in Africa the existence and belief in the concept of transcendental forces with immense power to secure individual and group existence and their material accumulations also possess elements of rational realities.

General securitization principles of traditional African societies established the requirement for old age security, personal and physical security, communal/home security, soil security, and food security. Oral traditional African concept of security differentiates between the need for security based on fear, isolation, mourning and other emotive occurrences or expectations and security based on a reasoned consciousness for the preservation of human life (Mabe 2009). These dual expressions of security reflect the theories of securitization based on superstition, and the other that is based on rational thought. It is evident that traditional African forms of security elaborated the comprehensive needs of the individual members of the society to bind them to a form of a communal securitization agenda. These same security principles can be found in the provision of welfare packages that act as buffers for the socioeconomic welfare of citizens in contemporary Western democratic societies. However, most security principles advanced in the practice of sub-Saharan African governance is wholly based on physical life and material security. Mabe (2009) states that most forms of security arrangements in African states emanate from political and religious persecution, social inequality, racial and sexual discrimination, hunger and poverty, and hatred, envy and war.

Thus, it is possible that some of the major security problems apparent in African societies today, such as, terrorism can be traced to ill-informed approaches of governments in the region towards fulfilling the desires of their citizens (Mabe 2009). This line of argument agrees with Ekanem and Simon (2012) assertions that conflicts in African states are generally a result of the struggle for power, values, and scarce resources.

For Mabe (2009), security in modern African States is rooted on the governance of intimidation by the few without winning the reasoned support of the citizens. This, indeed, was the case with the governance of apartheid South Africa, where the minority population ruled without the consent of the governed (see Onwudiwe 2001). Furthermore, as Mabe insists, in spite of measures adopted for an establishment of a democratic culture, sub-Saharan African States often rule by caveats without popular and agreed plebiscites. Thus, leaving a gap of unpopular acceptance that could easily be leveraged by the lawless to foment trouble for the entire society. It must be underscored that Robert Agnew's explanation of crime due to elements of societal strain can be established from these ill-developed principles of security upon which modern African States secure and guide their nations. In some form, it can be seen as a part abdication of the social contract between the State and its citizens. Thus, strain, emanates out of the crucible of the yearning to reach the goals of this contract for the innovative few among the citizenry and acts as a platform to retrieve the right to create and live within their own individual/group rules. Finally, Mabe (2009) submits that a theoretical framework for security in Africa must begin with the realization that security has a direct relationship to "dignity, liberty, and well-being." The influence of totalitarian ideologies in postcolonial Africa seems to limit the realization of this ideal. Mabe aligns this with the decreasing level of ethical considerations in the governance of African states.

Tedheke and Tedheke (2012) study of the problem with the engagement of Nigerian forces

in global peace support operations (PSO) reveals that inadequate attention is given to develop and understand the theoretical foundations of those problems before formal engagement. For instance, Nigeria has tended to associate such peace support problems with ethnic, cultural, and sectional differences more than the major causal functions of structural hemorrhages due to the demands of Western global economy.

In the determination of a theoretical foundation for Nigerian security against issues of violent resistance and social upheavals, it is important to identify the enabling routes of violence in a society. According to Tedheke and Tedheke (2012), Johan Galtung, a foundational authority of the concept of structural violence listed three primary types of violence that would enable the manifestation of social upheavals: “(i) direct violence -physical, emotional and psychological violence; (ii) structural violence -deliberate policies and structures that cause human sufferings, death and harm, and (iii) cultural violence -cultural norms and practices that create discriminations, injustices and human sufferings.”

Each of these three forms of violence is undeniably related to the contemporary situation of sectarian and terrorist violence in Nigeria. But the type most misunderstood by Nigerian security policy-makers and long denied by governments in Nigeria is structural violence. The theoretical foundation of such security policies is not unrelated to the remnants of imperial trade policies and the system of postcolonial Western trade hegemony, which creates sub-conscious resistance to its structural destabilizing effects on the poorer nations of the global South. Tedheke and Tedheke relate the rise of poverty and social upheavals in the southern region of the world to the need to adapt to Western economic philosophies and structure that has been imposed on the rest of the world. This includes the economic disparities created by trade between the powerful and wealthier nations of the world, and the poorer nations, on the one hand, and the economic disparities between the elites and the masses within the poorer nations. Although colonialism had played its role in the leadership cerebral attitudes of African leaders, we caution quietly that imperialism can no longer be blamed for the 21st Century African problems anymore.

The need to adapt to the socioeconomic and political strains of these disparities has often resulted in violent resistance even with negative innovations such as terrorism, and kidnaping as currently evident in Nigeria. This pattern of PSO understanding of security is a manifestation of one major angle from which Nigerian authorities approach issues of internal security. Nigeria's sub-imperial roles in the PSO as argued by Tedheke and Tedheke is equally operative within her national security governance structure. In this sense, the continuous misinterpretation of the fundamental situations of Nigeria security is a major problem for the development of a functional and enduring securitization policy for the nation. Arguably, structural economy is only a part of the misunderstood dynamics of violent upheavals in Nigeria as it is difficult to deny the influence of sectional religious indoctrination that leads to the proclivity for terrorist attacks in the Nigerian historical context.

Genesis of Terrorism in Nigeria

We argue that Nigerian policy-makers must understand the sources of terrorism without being a-historical. Historical facts about terrorism are important if there is any hope of countering modern brutal nature of terrorism. Some terrorism observers have noted the importance of comprehending the history of a terrorist group, individual terrorists and the conditions that spawned them (Simonsen and Spindlove 2004). If violence leads to terrorism, then history is

replete with many cases of terrorism all over the globe. Terrorism seen in this context has become part of recorded history (Simonsen and Spindlove 2004; Parry 1976). Indeed, knowing the history of the evolution and contemporary forms of terrorism is a vital tool in an all-inclusive investigation of acts of terrorism. Without a focus on in-depth historical studies of terrorism, the Nigerian government can only provide a military solution to the barbaric acts of terrorism in the country.

The history of religion and religious radicals in all the regions as well as the political and economic protest groups of the country must be studied. Moreover, Nigeria has a rich history of northern patterns of religious violence. The recent surge of the Boko Haram terror is in sync with the historical evolution of violence with a determined base on the principles of sacramental acts (Hutchinson 2001; Hickey 1984; Onwudiwe 2011). Therefore, within balance and reason, an understanding of the history of terrorism, not only would aid policy-makers to know the genesis of the issue, but also would oblige the Nigerian thinkers to formulate counter approaches to the problem of terrorism and the defense of the Nigerian homeland. Certainly, knowing the historical roots of terrorism will benefit societies and their intellectual thinkers to be aware of the chronological episodes and practices and tactics of terrorists all over the world in order to have an unadulterated exposure to the laboratory of terrorists' behavior and explanations of that behavior (Gagnon 1989).

Indeed, historically, Africa has witnessed violence in the form of religion (political Islam/Christianity), leading to butchery or the annihilation of numerous living or lifeless objects, all in the context of religion (Longman 2001; Gettleman 2006). The methods of violence are rooted in various clichés, most notably crusades in Nigerian history, civil wars in Sudan and Darfur, and genocide in Rwanda. Another *modus operandi* may take the form of terrorism, martyrdoms, and sacrifices. While there are other religions that may cause human havoc in the world today, such as Buddhism and Hinduism in Sri Lanka, Africa generally is confronted by two major religions, Christianity and Islam. Sudan, however, presents a different scenario, in which there is a confrontation between Islam, sometimes Christianity, and African traditional religions. Christianity and Islam are religions rooted in sacred writings and can be used to serve and justify religious killings and oppressions. In various parts of the world today, religion is in one way or another associated with warfare, and Africa is not alone in this regard. Indeed, most religious zealots believe that their actions are approved by their gods, and are willing to kill and die for their political causes (Dickson 2012). The attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, which claimed about 3,000 lives, was religiously motivated, and two countries in East Africa have experienced similar catastrophic havoc based on political Islam. David Dickson, in his 2005 special report for the United States Institute of Peace points to the impartiality of Islamism and argues that it involves a desire for the recruitment of followers in order to achieve certain ideological objectives such as the defeat of imperialism. However, one author cautions against the demonization of Arabs and Muslims in the war against terrorism (Onwudiwe 2005).

With the rise of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, one wonders if this terror group is not actively recruiting despondent youths as ardent supporters and active cohorts with a strong focus on indoctrination. The Boko Haram must have been supported directly and indirectly by some elitist groups to have such an impact on Nigeria after the democratic election of President Goodluck Jonathan. One must then try to identify the causes of the motivations of this religious adherent sect with the ability to carry out horrific acts of terrorism against the Nigerian population. Does the Boko Haram borrow their political acts from the Nigerian historical past? Although it is

easy to blame radical religion, it may also be a truism that the same system to system factors (unemployment, economic marginalization, lack of equal opportunity, injustice, inadequate education, political corruption, pollution, inadequate electric power and good roads etc.) motivate groups like Boko Haram and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). This is evident from the following charts where the acts of terrorism by numbers of incidents seem to escalate as the years' progress. In Charts I, II, and III adapted from the Global Terrorism Database, we have identified various agitational groups that have perpetrated acts of terrorism against Nigeria, breaking the charts into the following timelines 1991- 2000 (10 years); 2001-2010 (10 years); and 2011-2013 (3 years). Charts IV–VI depict fatalities by these perpetrators using the same timeline. The last six charts show the number of incidents by type of attacks and weapons of attacks using the same timelines for each group. The Global Terrorism Database (GTB) has collected data on world terrorism and has statistics from 1970. It is important to note, however, that there was only one recorded incident between 1970 and 1980, and 5 incidences between 1981 and 1990 for Nigeria; therefore those statistics are not included in this paper.

Chart I: Perpetrator of Attacks by Number of incidents 10 years: 1991-2000




Chart II: Perpetrator of Attacks by Number of Incidents 10 years: 2001-2010




Chart III: Perpetrator of Attacks by Number of Incidents 3 years: 2011-2013




Chart IV: Perpetrators by No of Fatalities 10 years: 1991-2000




Chart V: Perpetrators by No of Fatalities, 10 years: 2001-2010




Chart VI: Perpetrators by No of Fatalities, 3 years: 2011-2013




Chart VII: Number of Incidents by Type of Attacks 10 years: 1991-2000




Chart VIII: Number of Incidents by Type of Attack: 10 years: 2001-2010




Chart IX: Number of Incidents by Type of Attacks, 3 years: 2011-2013




Chart X: Number of Incidents by Weapon Type, 10 years: 1991-2000




Chart XI: Number of Incidents by Weapon Type, 10 years: 2001-2010





Chart XII: Number of Incidents by Weapon Type, 3 years: 2011-2013



The data illustrate that the three years 2011 to 2013 showed the highest numbers in terms of almost all the statistics. For example, the number of terrorist incidents recorded for Boko Haram was 0, 27 and 776 for the three timelines 1991-2000, 2001-2010 and 2011-2013, respectively; while the number of fatalities by the same group recorded higher numbers: 0, 376 and 3267, respectively for the same timeline. These numbers clearly show an escalation in the activities and fatalities by Boko Haram over the past thirteen years.

Having made that clarity, religious turbulence in Nigeria is usually between Muslims and Christians, sometimes between moderate Muslims and radical Muslims with roots in Sufism and the Wahhabi ideologies of Saudi Arabia (Schwartz 2003). The 1980 and 1982–1983 Maitatsine uprisings in northern Nigeria occurred between a wing of Muslim militants and the Nigerian police and posed a major threat to Nigerian security. This instability has its origins in traditional Islam, a northern state religion that began in the fifteenth century. During that era, most Hausa rulers in the North of Nigeria were converted Muslims. Between 1804 and 1808, Nigeria experienced the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio of Sokoto Caliphate. Usman Dan Fodio was a devout Fulani philosopher, a venerated Islamic scholar, and an avant-garde reformer. During his era, he was very popular and had a large following, and his jihad, unlike the religious uprising of Maitatsine, was aimed at the purification of Islam, not the killing of unbelievers. As a religious and political leader, he created a new Muslim state in northern Nigeria, known as the Fulani Empire, which was grounded in Islamic law. The Fulani Empire stretched across most of northern Nigeria and wielded great political power and influence in Nigeria and over the colonial administrators (Hickey 1984).

After Nigerian independence in 1960, the powerful northern Muslim elites still controlled

political, military, and economic power in the country. In 1966, Sir Ahmadu Bello, former premier of the region and the Saraduna of Sokoto, who was a devoted Muslim leader with genealogical affiliation to Usman Dan Fodio, was assassinated in a military coup. That assassination and the subsequent military rule in the nation set in motion the events that resulted in the 1980 and 1982 religious riots. The powers of the Muslim elites were reduced, and a devout Christian General Yakubu Gowon became the military leader following the crisis of 1966. Moreover, the new constitution provided for the freedom of religion. This did not augur well with some Muslim prophets in the North who wanted to establish a firm Islamic state in the country. Alhaji Muhammadu Maroua, popularly known as Maitatsine (“He who curses others” in Hausa), stimulated his Isala faction to perpetrate acts of violence in Kano. This ultimately led to his death and also claimed the lives of 5,000 of his supporters in 1980 (Hickey 1984). It took the combined efforts of the Nigerian army and the air force to quell the violence. Subsequently, in 1982, in Maiduguri, Nigeria, the police and the disciples of Maitatsine once again engaged in a ferocious battle when police tried to arrest the disciples and the remaining leaders of the Maitatsine movement.

This bloody encounter led to the death of hundreds of the Maitatsine supporters. The Maitatsine movement still poses a serious threat in Nigeria and must not be ignored, because adherents of the uprising not only resist political changes in the country, but also are eager to use violence against moderate Muslims. In short, they dislike Western education, technological advancements in Nigeria, and the contamination of Islam in a worldly Nigeria. These two accounts, of the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio and the religious violence of Maitatsine and his cohorts, demonstrate that Nigeria is still a volatile society, as also evidenced by recent acts of religious violence in Africa’s most populated nation. In our view, the Boko Haram ideology must be traced to this brief history. We will argue below that using the military may not be the democratic means to prevent these religious violent formations. Both Sharia and Christian values can function simultaneously in Nigeria without sporadic killings of human beings. The separation of Church and State has worked well in Western societies and Nigeria must be wise enough to address the Sharia matter once and for all (Hickey 1984).

The Sharia Issue

Today, Sharia (Islamic law) has been introduced in more than eleven states of the thirty-six states of Nigeria. Additionally, Sharia also has been made part of the Nigerian constitution, which now permits a Sharia Court of Appeals in the Nigerian polity. The spread of Sharia in Nigeria may be a product of Nigerian Muslims’ desire to reassert their political power in response to neo-southern Christian political ascendancy. On the other hand, the Christians and mixed religious states view Sharia as an alien religion and cultural imposition. Although Sharia exists in twelve states, its strongest adherents will not rest until it has engulfed the whole of Nigeria and beyond. The angry resistance to the spread of Sharia in Nigeria is a major cause of tension and violence in the country (Mahmood 1993).

In February and May of 2000, communal religious violence claimed the lives of 2,000 Nigerians in Kaduna City. In 2002, a newspaper article considered to be offensive to the Prophet Muhammad led to another round of violence in Kaduna, which claimed the lives of 200 people. Christian opposition to Sharia practices in the North will continue to elevate tensions in Nigeria. Sharia may be an excuse, however, and not the root problem in an oil-rich nation with severe

economic disasters and massive unemployment among the youth. Nigeria will continue to experience violence, whether from Islamic militants or from Christian fanatics, as long as there is growing economic marginalization of the masses and continued presence of massive poverty.

Violence on the scale of terrorism may also escalate in Nigeria as a result of the infusion of radical religious ideologies in the minds of depressed citizens. This reality ought to worry not only Nigeria, but also the international community. Christianity and Islam can work hand in hand, without constant threats and violence, although the Nigerian population is equally divided between the two religions. Such is not the case in Senegal, a country of 11 million people in West Africa.

Indeed, 94 percent of the Senegalese population are Muslims, and the country has in place a proper equilibrium between Islam, a material state, and modernization. As is true for their African counterparts, the conviviality between politicians and Muslim leaders has its origins in colonial administration. If Senegal can maintain peace and tranquility among its people, Nigeria, should set a better example. Nigerians deserve to live in peace without constant fear of violence regardless of where it originates. However, since the problem is now endemic, it behooves the Nigerian intellectuals to provide proven social scientific solutions to unravel the turbulence of terrorism in Nigeria. Below, we suggest various forms of the repertoire of actions for counter-terrorism and counter kidnapping measures to control violence and killings in Nigeria.

Counter-terrorism Measures, Justice and Security in Nigeria

It is crucial to note that terrorism, unfortunately, as we know it today, has reached Nigerian shores and we must, therefore, find strategic security measures to prevent it. This means that Nigeria is as vulnerable to terrorism as other countries in the West and the Middle East. In order to control terrorism, it is vital to first ascertain what is known about terrorists. What are their motives and objectives? Why has Nigeria suddenly become a domestic terrorist paradise? Are émigré terrorists penetrating the Nigerian porous borders, and if that is the case, what can the authorities do about it? Based on the extant literature, it is obvious that Boko Haram terrorists are motivated by religion. Although Herman (1983) in the *Terror Networks* insisted that state terrorism is the most dangerous form of terrorism, it is surmised in this article that religious motivated terrorists in Nigeria pose the greatest danger to the Nigerian polity and population. This is because, as observed by Hoffman (1993), religious terrorists perform their terrorist operations for the grace of the deity and they believe that their actions are sacramental acts with forthcoming reward from divine providence.

If Boko Haram and other groups in the South have demonstrated the ability to actually embark on the adoption of violence against the government and the population to force behavioral modification (Dyson 2012), law enforcement at all levels of government must have the immediate duty to investigate such law violations. Terrorists are criminals, their actions are rooted in an ideology of violence and destruction, and violent suicide and political and economic actions are designed to instill fear and frighten Nigerians. It has been reported in various Nigerian Newspapers and Magazines that Nigerian terrorists have used bombing tactics, kidnapping of other human beings, physical threats and assassinations in Nigeria. These actions and tactics are all violations of the Nigerian law.

Government has the responsibility to protect its citizens. The Nigerian government through its intelligence and law enforcement sectors must know that some terrorists have outside financial funding and also supported by internal wealthy financiers. Some engage in illegal activities, such

as kidnapping for ransom, white collar crimes, robbery of banks and armored vehicles and extortions to raise funds. Others, it has been demonstrated, also engage in the business of illegal importation of firearms and collusion with other illicit crime groups in order to generate funds. Funding is crucial for the survival of a terrorist organization. These brief tactics have been properly documented in the literature on terrorism (White 2009; Dyson 2012; Poland 1988) therefore, law enforcement officials must be familiar with them to begin to address ways to combat terrorism in Nigeria.

Nigeria, like the rest of the sub-Saharan Africa, experiences turbulent violent revolutions primarily due to tattered economic development. Any reasonable countermeasures to prevent terrorism must consider seriously the stabilization of the economy. Generally, Africa suffers from violent revolutions and insurgencies because of the extreme poverty of the masses. Scholars believe that negative economic development; struggle for scarce resources, inadequate health-care facilities, starvation of the children, tribal violence, and massive unemployment of the youth may create conditions ripe for terrorism (Barnett 2004; Sachs et al. 2004; White 2009). To put it in another context, Bell (1975) used the aphorism “endemic terrorism” in his explanation of terrorism in Africa. He describes terrorism in Africa as involving artificial divisions of tribes, and ethnic groups. With the situation in Nigeria today -Boko Haram menace in the North and the groups in the South agitating for a greater share of the nation’s resources, it is evident that Bell’s observation may have some roots in ethnic pursuit for reasonable distribution of resources and power.

Just recently, the Odua People’s Congress, Odua People’s Congress (OPC)(another major ethnically motivated group in the country), admonished members of the terror Islamic sect, Boko Haram, to stay away from the South-West. Dr. Frederick Fasehun, its leader, advised the federal government to stop the senseless violence in the country. He insisted that the Yoruba people (ethnic group) cannot be suppressed as if the Yoruba is an inferior ethnic group in the nation even though the Yoruba, he insisted, fought gallantly for the Nigerian independence (Sun Times 2011). The president of the OPC is right on the mark on the issue. It may take regional ethnic groups to come out with strategic security plans to stop these sects and others from harassing and killing Nigerians.

Moreover, the US State Department’s Annual Country Assessments of Global Terrorism stated in April 2006 that:

‘Though it is unclear to what extent terrorist groups’ were present and operating in west and central Africa, the fund raising, terrorist recruiting, and other support activities of al-Qaeda and affiliated persons and groups in Algeria, the Maghreb, Nigeria, and across the trans-Sahara region remained a serious concern (U.S. Department of State 2012).

The report lists terrorist incidents of either apprehension or collaboration in 16 African countries, including arrests of terrorist suspects and disruption of alleged terrorist operations in Kenya to recruitment activities by known al-Qaeda affiliates in Nigeria, as well as the abuse of travel documentation by foreigners in South Africa on US and UK terrorist alert lists. Basically, the information provided by the U.S. Department indicates that terrorism is not just a western problem. In essence, Nigeria with its large Muslim population and Christian citizens must play a major role in maintaining security within and beyond its boundaries.

Developing a capacity for counter-terrorism in Nigeria and Africa as a whole requires cooperation among states externally and communities internally for the country to develop the capacity to protect its citizens from the havoc of terrorism. Factual and practical cooperation is

essential in the war against terrorism within and among agencies of social control in Nigeria. Indeed, the U.S. departments report noted and recognized the African Union (AU) as one of the “essential elements” in a common front against transnational terrorism (Shillinger 2006). Nigeria as a major voice should not be taken by surprise after the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and subsequent incidents in East African nations of Kenya and Tanzania. The Nigerian government must encourage counter-terrorism cooperation among all levels of governments and security agencies and the incorporation of all ethnic groups in dialogues about preventing terrorism.

In our repertoire of actions, we will argue cogently that the people can provide the native intelligence needed to stop Boko Haram. These repertoires of actions, the core of this essay are framed below. The goal is to demonstrate that contrary to the view that nothing can be done effectively to control the spate of violence that has characterized Nigeria today, various proven criminological actions exist to address the terrorism quandary.

Counter-Terrorism Measure I: Law Enforcement, Detection, and Investigation

Counter terrorism can be defined as the sum of actions and practices adopted by states and various nations against perceived threats and terrorist activities (Crank and Gregor 2005). In the case of Nigeria, these actions may be carried out by émigré and domestic terrorist agitators. The Nigerian police must be the primary control mechanism in the detection and discovery of terrorist activities. The force must be equipped with the latest technology and manpower needed to detect and investigate terrorists. This could be done by methodological aggressive involvement of the citizens. Unlike previous beliefs that terrorists are not well-informed, recent accounts remind us that they are intelligent and some are equipped with college education (Onwudiwe 2007). Detection and observation of terrorists are important in that detection serves as the link between observation and investigation. Every terrorist network operates in three phases: RESEARCH, PLANNING, AND EXECUTION. Terrorist research can be thwarted by detection, planning by discovery and execution by observation, detection and discovery (O’Connor 2009).

The Nigerian police must be adequately trained in the detection response plan, which may include vigilance by local government to local government arrangements, house to house basis, and state by state basis. But this could only be done properly and effectively if the police are closer to the people that they police. This is why one of the author’s called for the decentralization of the Nigerian police (Onwudiwe, 2001), and local police formations (Onwudiwe 2009). The police and the people must work together, and this is important for any peacekeeping operations. Once the people are friendly with their police, they are more amenable to provide the police with the information needed to apprehend terrorists before they strike.

Recently, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) of the U.S. Department of Defense organized a small number of scholars from Europe and American academy to consult and suggest ways to improve African security (Perry and Borchard 2010). It was suggested that proper use of community policing frame will aid in maintaining African security. The same principles articulated by the team of scholars will work well in Nigeria as presented below.

The team of scholars observed that certain principle-level lessons learned about community policing from other contexts (i.e. what approaches worked and what did not) can be applied to the Nigerian contexts. Some principles that are the foundation of other’s community policing (CP) approaches (China, Belgium, United Kingdom, USA) which might strengthen Nigerian CP include

the implementation of a police training component to improve and maintain professionalism and helping them be co-producers of justice with the community in order to prevent crime, terrorism, and kidnapping. As many of these problems manifest in Africa, and Nigeria, in particular, there may be a potential to consider what other non-African countries have done to address these issues through CP approaches and tailor them to the Nigerian situation (Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009). Fundamentally, CP is based on the recognition that citizens are co-producers of crime prevention and that good police-citizens are required to do this. The information they provide to the police is the foundation of solving crimes, arresting offenders, preventing disorder, and, in some cases, countering terrorism and kidnapping. Given the primacy of good relations and effective information exchange in ensuring successful CP, the CP approach minimizes the use of force by the military.

Four problems identified in counter-terrorism operations that rely on the use of the military in the West are:

1. Western democracies carry an aversion to military forces used to deal with domestic problems. The use of the military in a police role in the U.S. is a violation of federal law.
2. The use of the military power to deal with terrorism has frequently been associated with the rise of repressive regimes, particularly across the Americas. Often, the repressive regimes linger long after the terrorist threat has subsided.
3. Military units may employ specialized tactical units who engage in anticipatory and retaliatory strikes. Yet, many argue that such strikes lead to a cycle of violence, in which terror is meted out by both sides in never-ending conflict.
4. The debate over the proper use of the military in civilian affairs is often rancorous. The debate particularly focuses on the use of unconventional military tactics aimed at terrorist groups, and the 'fair play' implications of those tactics (White 2009).

In Africa, however, many states still rely on their militaries to provide their internal security. In addition to African militaries being political tools of the state and protectors of the regime and its political interests (a situation that is true with Nigeria), militaries more generally provide internal security within the state as they are, more often than not, the only available tool for this purpose. Given this situation, one needs to understand the central role and relatively high status of African militaries when examining the ways in which and the degree to which such militaries might consider their force options to maintain internal security within their respective territories as well as possible implications on African governments' decisions to disband and/or eliminate their militaries and develop less-lethal security forces to serve this purpose.

African militaries are the only means by which most African governments can maintain internal state security. In the African context, the question of whether the military is the most effective tool with which to maintain internal security is not asked because it is the only tool available. Even though training is lacking in Africa in comparison to the West, African militaries are usually the only security forces in Africa that receive any training and therefore are the most capable entities in providing security through lethal and/or non/less-than-lethal means. But regardless of the use of the military to stop terrorist and insurgent groups in Nigeria, sporadic killings of Nigerians continue unabated. While White did not reject totally the use of the military in troubled situations, he suggested that governments should be cautionary and use the army only discretely (White 2002).

Austin Turk (2002) on the other hand, is supportive of the use of the military force in

counter-terrorism. Turk suggests that there are three options in counter-terrorism such as the application of individual justice against terror networks, treating terror networks as if they were a nation and apply globally recognized rule of law, and believing that the enemy is a special danger that requires extraordinary military measures. Turk favors the last option for the treatment of terrorists. This reality calls for reforms. The following recommendations will help to address the insecurities in Nigeria without reliance on the military:

- a. Develop criminological and security institutes, a form of think-tank across the nations' colleges and universities based on competitive funding announcements. These institutes will conduct research and propose strategies to ameliorate the problems of insecurities in the country.
- b. Encourage and fund Nigerian scholars to develop terrorism research institutes that will focus on counter domestic, émigré, and international terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, and kidnappings in the country.
- c. Expand security agencies to admit and recruit fresh students and youths into their ranks. Expansion of the military population, police, and other security agencies and personnel will create more gainful job opportunities for our people.
- d. Decentralize the Nigerian Police and encourage local police formations that still are answerable to the center.
- e. Create rules that will mandate the Nigerian police to develop and establish community policing units that will be closer to the people and for intelligence purposes without undermining the cultures of the land.
- f. Pass laws that will make it illegal to expropriate Nigerian resources abroad and focus on hiring Nigerian consultants rather than relying on Euro, Asian, and American Experts.
- g. Fund and mandate Nigerian universities to establish criminological and criminal justice academic programs as was done in other developed nations such as the United States in the 1960s.

It is our fervent belief that the Nigerian police, if properly funded and trained, will, indeed, work hand in hand with the people to slow the tidal wave of terrorism. Nigerians are good people and suicide terrorist bombings may not be the part of the hallmark of the Nigerian character. In a situation where the police officer is underpaid or the department has limited resources to operate, things will continue to be bad and the citizens will continue to suffer the scourge of terrorism. Nigerians do not deserve to be unsafe. It is the social contract responsibility of the government to keep the people safe. The government cannot afford to fail in this remarkable responsibility due to lack of the development of localized intelligence organizations.

Counter-Terrorism Measure II: Intelligence and Law Enforcement

In this sphere of our second remedy, we must underscore that good intelligence is the most important repertoire of action in the fight against terrorism. Good intelligence comes from good policing that recognizes the integration of the philosophy and principles of community policing frame. Good intelligence is the best weapon against terrorism (O'Connor 2009). This means that understanding the tenets of community policing is crucial in the war against terrorism since CP focuses on pro-action rather re-action in police work. This analysis means that for law enforcement

and the citizens alike, it is better to prevent terrorism than to investigate it. For law enforcement agencies that are well funded, intelligence is the initial level in the fight against domestic terrorism. The integration of the human factor is crucial in the protection of Nigerians and the Nigerian visitors such as the foreign business personnel and guests of the Nigerian nation. In this way, counter-terrorism intelligence by the Nigerian police must entail more than covert intelligence gathering and prevention. This necessitates that it must be broadened to encompass activities such as covert and overt detection, interruption of plots, intelligence risk analysis, target hardening, community enlistment, protection of persons and infrastructure, emergency assistance to the people, order-maintenance during and after an attack, easing of damage, and professional investigation of incidents (O'Connor 2009; White 2002).

For Nigeria to be effective in preventing internal insurgencies in its desire to wipe out low intensity warfare, she must be willing to expend with resources directed to hiring freshly minted graduates from Nigerian universities, recruitment of top quality professionals in Nigeria including Nigerians in the Diaspora for the gathering and maintenance of intelligence data. The enforcement agencies need resources to hire top trained intelligence analysts that will maintain both covert and overt collection of data. The development of police strategy in Nigeria must center on police intelligence skills that will enable the force to effectively anticipate or deal with the devastating events of domestic terrorism. Police efforts must include the ability to develop knowledge about probable future events and rapidly respond to surprises. In the contemporary technological age, societies are dealing with increasingly more complex environments. If an organization is to effectively use intelligence to prepare for the discontinuities of terrorism, it must take a long look at the role of the intelligence function (Underwood 2002). With an increasing world of Sufism and terror networks with capacities to spread terror messages, the police cannot afford to conduct business as usual.

Frank Gregory (2005) states that intelligence in counter-terrorism programs must include three fundamental factors: (1) its role in pre-emption and disruption of terrorist activity; (2) its role in post-incident investigations; and (3) its contribution to preventive/protective security measures. In his examination of the British counter-terrorism strategies, Gregory observes that the UK should focus on (Gregory 2005):

- (1) *Prevention* – addressing underlying causes of terrorism here and overseas. That means, among other things, ensuring that Muslim citizens enjoy the full protection of the law and are able to participate to the full in British society.
- (2) *Pursuit* – using intelligence effectively to disrupt and apprehend the terrorists. The UK has increased joint working and intelligence-sharing between governments and law enforcement agencies across the world. At home, the government aims to make UK borders more secure, to make identity theft harder and to curb terrorist access to financial sources.
- (3) *Protection* – ensuring that reasonable security precautions, including those needed to meet a CBRN threat, are in place, ranging from physical measures at airports to establishing Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) in each police force.
- (4) *Preparedness* – making sure that the UK has the people and resources in place to respond effectively to the consequences of a terrorist attack.

Nigeria can equally use these parameters of security identified by Gregory (2005) above for preventing terrorism in the UK (Gregory 2005). Particularly, it is crucial for Nigeria to deny terrorists the funding necessary to fuel their terrorist missions.

Counter-Terrorism Measure III: Information Sharing and Financial Intelligence

Hapsburg General Raimondo Montecuccoli once asserted in the seventeenth century that a country needed three items to wage war: money, money, and more money (White 2009). This adage is applicable to terrorism as terrorists cannot survive today and be successful with terror campaigns without adequate financial resources. Organized political suicide missions cannot be sustained without money. Modernity has changed the face of terrorism in that terrorists can now conduct their operations faster than they have done in the past due to technological innovations (Black 2004). The manner in which technology aids modernity is the same way it affects the network operations of terrorists. In short, money transfers by terrorists and the movement of funds and effective communication systems have transfigured the financial world.

This analysis applies to the domestic terrorists in Nigeria. The government must therefore close any loopholes that exist to make it difficult for Nigerian terror networks to get funding. This can be done by first monitoring domestic activities of the suspected financiers of Nigerian terrorists. The banks must be integrated in this effort. In this case, information sharing becomes absolutely necessary. The Nigerian intelligence and all arms of the national security apparatus must be mandated to share information. This has been done in America after the horrors of September 11, 2001. The government reorganized the American National Security under the umbrella of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The CIA, FBI, the state police, and indeed, all the arms of the security and intelligence are required to share information. Since then, although one author stated that America is still vulnerable to terrorism (Flynn 2004), the fact remains that the American homeland is better defended today than prior September 2001 (White 2009).

But it will be naivety to expect and assume that Nigerian terrorists are only sponsored by Nigerian financiers. Efforts also must be made to monitor and investigate the activities of foreign governments, groups, businesses, religious institutions, and charitable organizations. To protect Nigeria from organized sponsors of insecurities, the government must work boldly and integrate individuals that will advise the State to fight the battle and to win it. This is a vital and cardinal responsibility of the State. Given the reality that Nigerians are now willing to kill other Nigerians and foreigners (bombing of the UN office in Abuja, for example) the government has no choice but to place the defense of the Nigerian Homeland in the hands of a massive national security establishment that will integrate citizen trust in order to keep a round- the- clock vigilance of the country. There is an obvious clear and present danger facing our country and all hands of the law and citizenship must be on deck to fight terror.

We conclude this frame of counter financial measure against terrorism by mentioning briefly some criminological examples in the literature. The federal government must be vigilant about the creation of new banks in the country. Adams (1986) insists that the most effective method to stop terrorism was to stop the flow of money. Adams focused on banking and organized crime to illustrate his view. He pointed out that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) ran its own banking system. He also indicated that the IRA made a “Capone discovery,” in which it established organized crime syndicates to finance operations. Other scholars pointed to the establishment of grocery stores to fund operations (Kushner and Jacobson 1998); transfer of illegal contrabands (Hinnen 2004), and illegal business laundering millions of dollars (Navis 2002). Noting these research reports, it is important to know that tracing the movement of funds is an

essential component of counter-terrorism measure. The Nigerian federation must reject the approval and bogus establishment of new banks and must be willing to watch the emergence of new businesses and organized crime networks through efficient and effective forensic accounting techniques and use of legal prosecution.

Counter-Terrorism Measure IV: Prosecution of Terrorists and Civil Law Actions

Our final approach to the control of terrorism in Nigeria is through the legal prosecution of Nigerian terrorists and their sponsors. We argue that a determined Nigeria shall prosecute out of existence the terrorists and their financial patrons. It is noteworthy that civil action by private citizens has been effective against domestic terrorism (Smith 1994; O'Connor 2009). In *Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams*, Smith (1994) demonstrated how the U.S. attorneys successfully prosecuted leaders of domestic terrorists with the maximum imprisonment permitted by law (Smith 1994). In addition, because the networks and their leaders were civilly held responsible, they were prosecuted to oblivion financially. Imagine a situation where Nigerian citizens affected by the spate of terrorism were allowed to prosecute these terrorists and their sponsors. Monetary awards to the victims of terrorism will lead to the bankruptcy of the networks and their investors. As we aforementioned, without money, they cannot operate. Therefore, criminal and civil prosecution of terrorists in Nigeria will be an effective countermeasure with the desire to prevent terrorism and save Nigerian lives. Nigeria must be willing to seize the assets and all wealth belonging to the terrorists and their benefactors. Foreign sponsor's assets and money must also be seized. Their lucrative business holdings must be sold and the proceeds should be distributed to compensate the Nigerian victims and their families. Nigeria must fight fire with fire.

On the international front, Nigeria should consider a possible severance of diplomatic relations with foreign nations that support terrorism on its soil. Smith reported that President Reagan retaliated against Libya when there was a "smoking gun" that Libya authorized a strike against American servicemen in West Germany on April 5, 1986 that claimed two American lives. Because of this, the U.S. launched a retaliatory strike against Libyan targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. We mention this one incident just to illustrate the extent to which a country can act when the lives of its citizens are threatened and destroyed by the covert activities of other sovereign nations. Nigerians must take the same bold steps otherwise the Nigeria we know will never be safe again and certainly will become a safe haven for terrorist radical sects' and émigré terrorists, that is, foreign born terrorist's resident in Nigeria.

Discussion

As Flynn (2004) rightfully noted that America is still vulnerable to terrorism, Nigeria with its own infinite might is also vulnerable to determined terrorist acts against the Nigerian people (Flynn 2004). What remains in the face of this obvious reality is what is to be done by the government and the people to stem the tidal wave of the scourge of terrorism. We have articulated in this brief treatise the repertoire of actions necessary to combat terrorism and senseless violence and kidnapping in Nigeria. We opine that in order to prevent terrorism, Nigeria must take bold actions without hesitation using the instruments of the government, particularly, the intelligence machinery of the government to control terrorism. It is our view that to successfully control domestic and émigré terrorism in Nigeria that the police must be at the forefront of the fight. The Nigerian police units must be well funded to integrate the communities within their various

jurisdictions to detect and capture Nigerian terrorists. Intelligence gathering through citizen cooperation has been found to work well in countries such as Japan that have scrupulously integrated its citizens in their police work.

In a situation where citizens are made part of security participants, intelligence will follow naturally for the police and the police will build trust with the polity. The use of the military is not the answer to counter-terrorism alone without active participants of the communities and police work. Assuredly, we also propose that the government should fund and encourage the development of security and criminologically focused research institutes at various Nigerian universities. These institutes will have a mandate to be co-producers of justice like the members of the ordinary citizens. In addition, the Nigerian federal government must encourage the development of criminal justice preprograms, police institutes, and fund the Nigerian police for the development of more police training programs. Most important, the Nigerian government must open the military and other security agencies such as the police to recruit and employ more graduates from Nigerian universities and abroad. Unless the youths can regain their consciousness through gainful employment, they will continue to be vulnerable to brainwashing by radical terrorist adherents. Employment opportunities are a major key to the fight against domestic terrorism whether it stems from the North or from the South.

While one can find skirmishes of these ideas in this piece, we articulated clearly four repertoires of actions that we believe if adhered to will help Nigeria control the menace of terrorism. Given more than 20 years of experience in writing and studying terrorism, it is our view that we have provided ideas that are popular and that have been proven to work. Community policing, decentralization of the Nigerian police and authentic local security formations, whether formal or informal (Onwudiwe 2007; Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009) will, indeed, bring the police closer to the citizens than they are today. It will help bring terrorists to justice and once again will make Nigeria safe for its populations.

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These actions will include, but are not limited to, traditional criminal investigations and discovery techniques in law enforcement, the role of intelligence and smart policing with an emphasis on good community policing frames, information sharing among agencies of social control and financial intelligence, and the ultimate goal of prosecuting domestic terrorists using the dictates of the law. It is proposed that through these strategies and techniques, the Nigerian

terrorists can be prosecuted out of existence if the government could deplete their pecuniary capital. Finally, while it is good to use these law enforcement strategies to defend the homeland, we argue throughout the paper for a system to understand the root causes of terrorism, kidnappings and various forms of agitations in Nigeria. Without addressing the fundamental problems of unemployment of the youth and an understanding of the causes of historical insecurities in various regions of the country, the future of security in Nigeria will remain oblique. Tables and diagrams are introduced based on data collected by the World Terrorism data base to illustrate the distribution of terrorism in Nigeria.

Dr. Ihekwoaba Declan Onwudiwe received his PhD degree from the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida State University. Currently, he is Professor of Administration of Justice in the Barbara Jordan-Mickey Leland School of Public Affairs at Texas Southern University. His research has focused primarily on terrorism, policing, strategic security, and African criminology. He is the author of *the Globalization of Terrorism*, and a co-author of the *International Patterns of Community Policing*.

Lucy Tsado has just defended her dissertation successfully in the Department of Administration at Texas Southern University. She obtained a Bachelor's degree in Accounting and a Master of Science in the Management of Information Systems. Her interest in cyber security originates from a background in information systems and the consequent security issues that pose challenges to law enforcement. She has jointly published papers in the area of information technology and organizational operations. Lucy's other interests include cybercrime, crime mapping and geographic information systems, cyber bullying, juvenile justice and terrorism.

Dr. Kingsley Ejioogu is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice, University of Maryland Eastern Shore. He has interdisciplinary training in Biology, Biotechnology, Environmental Control, Geographic Information Systems, and Administration Justice. He teaching and research interests include Quantitative and Research Methods, International Justice Governance, Conflicts Management, and Security Management in sub-Saharan Africa.

Rochelle E. McGee-Cobbs is the Undergraduate Coordinator and Assistant Professor of the Department of Criminal Justice at the Mississippi Valley State University. She received her PhD in Juvenile Justice at Prairie View A&M University in 2015. She has approximately ten years of experience as a criminal justice practitioner serving in various capacities, including as Chief of Police in two Mississippi municipalities. In addition, she has published scholarly articles/papers in some of the professional academic journals and anthologies. Her research interests include Program Implementation and Assessment; Restorative and Community Justice; Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice; Community Policing; Rural Policing; Use of Force; Terrorism; Risk Assessment; White Collar Crime; Race and Crime; Gender and Crime; and Applied Quantitative Methods and Measurements.

Dr. Ifeoma E. Okoye received her first degree in Law (LLB) from Imo State University, Owerri, Nigeria in 1998 and a professional law degree from Nigerian Law School Bwari, Abuja, Nigeria

in 2000. As an attorney, she worked with E&E Law firm, Nwabu Okoye & Co Law firm, and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. Subsequently, she received her Master's in Business Administration from American Intercontinental University, Houston, Texas and her PhD in Administration of Justice from Texas Southern University, Houston, Texas. Since 2011, she has been working at Texas Southern University as both a Research Assistant and as an Adjunct Professor.