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The Principles and Rhetoric of Autarky:
Debate and Decision-making in Early Colonial Kenya

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Thesis submitted to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences
at West Virginia University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
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ABSTRACT

The Principles and Rhetoric of Autarky: Debate and Decision-making in Early Colonial Kenya

Ian Ferguson

This study seeks to understand the decision-making process of the colonial government of the East Africa Protectorate by articulating the principles of autarky: financial independence, development, and effective occupation. The principles of autarky, which are both goal and process for the colonial government, strove to bring that government to a state of self-sufficiency, or autarky. These principles created their own rhetoric within official correspondence which dominated the decision-making process. By looking at three different periods, Foreign Office control, the transition to Colonial Office responsibility, and the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919, the importance of the principles and rhetoric of autarky in debate and decision-making is made clear.

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Establishing the Model

The history of the East Africa Protectorate (EAP) was filled with critical decisions. It was these decisions that both shaped the controversial history of Kenya and haunted colonial administrators until independence in 1963. In the latter case, Colonial Office (CO) officials were quickly aware of the dangers inherent in poor decision-making; time and again they felt the pressure of precedent in the territory and feared aggravating existing issues. All the same, they persisted in making decisions that were both controversial and problematic, in some cases doing so even before they were made and debate between officials was ongoing! Whether it was the policy of settling Europeans in the White Highlands, or restricting Indian and African veterans of the First World War from the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919, it is difficult to understand the rationale behind such decisions. To put it simply, why did CO officials reach the decisions that they did?

The Principles and Rhetoric of Autarky

To answer this question, I propose a new model through which we can understand decision-making in early colonial Kenya: the principles and rhetoric of autarky. Put simply, the rhetoric of autarky is the self-sustaining mode of conversation among individuals centered on the concept of autarky. Autarky is the conceptual sum of three interrelated constituent ideas: effective occupation, development, and financial independence.¹ These ideas, the principles of autarky, must in turn be explained.

Effective occupation is the principle of effective use of occupied land. The basic concept is that land should be in the hands of those who can make the most use of it. This idea can be

¹ A full explanation of why “autarky” was chosen as the name for this concept is given later.

found in classical philosophy and earlier British imperial history,² but in the East African context, effective occupation took different forms. For example, it took the form of European settlers, mostly aristocrats, with large amounts of private capital to invest in the land they would be granted. It was hoped that these occupants would effectively develop and farm the land on an estate model as yeomen farmers for the production of marketable commodities. In practice, this principle took many different forms of debate in the selection of potential settlers: land speculation, minimum capital requirements, applicant health, and complex lottery strategies to name only a few.³ The principle of effective occupation is a critical component of autarky and is directly linked to development and financial independence.

Development, which has a complex conceptual history, needs to be defined in more detail than either effective occupation or financial independence. As Joseph Hodge and Gerald Hödl note, the definition of development often changes according to the scholar using the term and the context of its use. For example, they use the distinctions of development as process or product, as raising productivity or living standards, or as immanent or planned course of action.⁴ All of these distinctions of development are valid, and indeed they are valid as a principle of autarky insofar as they relate to and support the other principles of autarky.⁵ However, using these distinctions, the development component of autarky commonly found in this study is the planned product, such as agricultural and infrastructural improvements, aimed at raising productivity. This leads to another critical distinction: the one between state and private development. While

² David Armitage *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 49-51. The history of the principles of autarky, a short glimpse of which Armitage notes in this citation, will be given shortly.

³ These examples are merely illustrative of the principle of effective occupation and not exhaustive.

⁴ Joseph M. Hodge and Gerald Hödl, introduction to *Developing Africa: Concepts and Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism*, eds. Joseph M. Hodge, Gerald Hödl and Martina Kopf (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 3-4.

⁵ In other words, if a definition of development used in a specific context promotes effective occupation and financial independence then it is valid as a principle of autarky.

state development had its place, particularly after 1940 in Kenya, this study looks more closely at the colonial government's attempts to mobilize private capital for development purposes.⁶

This leads to the third principle of autarky, financial independence. Financial independence is understood in this study in two senses: direct independence of action from the oversight of another government agency, namely the British Treasury; and the ability to enact policies independent of financial restriction.⁷ The former sense is especially prominent in the early administration of the EAP. The grants-in-aid awarded to the protectorate to pay for its administration required the CO to pass along decisions as to using that money to the Treasury for final approval. Such a situation resulted in government-by-Treasury where even relative minutiae, like the appointment of minor civil servants in the colony, needed Treasury approval.⁸ Sir Charles Jeffries, a long-serving senior CO official, superbly described the principle of financial independence as it related to the relationship between CO and Treasury:

The Colonies were expected to pay their own way, and to cut their coat according to their cloth. If they were prosperous, they were free to go ahead with whatever economic and social developments the local authorities wished. Most of them, however, were far from prosperous, and could afford little from their own resources beyond the bare minimum needed to preserve law and order and to provide for the administration of justice and the collection of revenue. . . . Some could not even afford this minimum; and in these cases the United Kingdom Exchequer was prepared to make grants in aid, though this was always considered as a temporary expedient, and the finances of any territory 'on the dole' were subject to strict control by the Treasury.⁹

However, even after the end of this government-by-Treasury in 1913, the colonial government and the CO were still restricted by financial limitations. Large-scale infrastructure projects aimed at increasing colonial revenue still needed loan approval from the Treasury. To govern

⁶ These qualifications are useful distinctions rather than polarities or dichotomies that are mutually exclusive. The documents show that officials thought of state and private development as complimentary to each other.

⁷ "Financial independence" is used rather than "financial self-sufficiency" to put the emphasis on the independence of action. There are possible situations where a colonial government could have the independence of financial action without achieving financial self-sufficiency.

⁸ The CO's desire to hire more surveyors and an assistant Crown Advocate in the second chapter is an example of this.

⁹ Sir Charles Jeffries, *The Colonial Office* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), 106.

the colony as they saw fit, CO officials needed to enact policies that would lead to financial independence.

Autarky, the sum of these three principles, was the unspoken paradigm around which official debate centered. The desire for financial independence could be achieved, it was believed, through the export of marketable commodities by effective European settlers who could also help to develop the land with their private capital. Although this is a radically simplified example of the model, it is representative of the interconnected nature of the principles of autarky. All aspects of the official correspondence (dispatch letters, enclosures, minutes, and technical reports of every stripe) were structured with reference to the model.

A Concise Genesis of Autarky

The concept of autarky as a governing principle has a long history. Indeed, the use of “autarky” stems from the classical Greek term *autarkeia*, which Plato defined as “self-sufficiency: perfect possession of good things; the state in respect of which those who have it are masters of themselves.”¹⁰ Plato’s definition, however, was focused on the moral importance of autarky rather than the political. This moral focus is exemplified in two cases. First, explicitly in the *Lysis*, where Plato, through the character Socrates, argued in the form of a question that “a good person, insofar as he is good, [is] sufficient to himself.”¹¹ Second, in the beginning of the *Republic*, the former definition of a good person was given a specific example. The character Cephalus, an elderly and wealthy man, explained how his financial independence¹² allowed him to lead a good life: “I would say the possession of wealth is most valuable, not for every man, but for a good and orderly one. Not cheating someone even unintentionally, not lying to him, not

¹⁰ Plato, *Definitions*, ed. John Cooper, trans. D.S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 412b.

¹¹ Plato, *Lysis*, ed. John Cooper, trans. Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 215a.

¹² This example also gives a clear moral desire to the principles of autarky. A financially independent colonial government might be less likely to commit evils against its subject population for the same reasons as Cephalus gave.

owing a sacrifice to some god or money to a person, and as a result departing from that place in fear – the possession of wealth makes no small contribution to this. It has many other uses, too, but putting one thing against the other, Socrates, I would say that for a man with any sense, that is how wealth is most useful.”¹³

With reference to the political aspect of Plato’s thought, material autarky was still secondary to the moral imperative. In Book V of his *Laws*, Plato gave an early example of the autarkic principles of effective occupation and development when pronouncing the best way to distribute land to the citizens of a city. He wrote that the Legislator “must allocate to each division of citizens a god or spirit or perhaps a hero, and when he divides up the territory he must give these priority by setting aside plots of land for them, endowed with all the appropriate resources. Thus when the different divisions gather together at fixed times they will have an opportunity of satisfying their various needs, and the citizens will recognize and greet each other at the sacrifices in mutual friendship – and there will be no greater benefit for a state than that the citizens should be well-known one to another.”¹⁴

Where Plato saw autarky as a means to a moral end, Aristotle saw autarky as the end itself, but in two different senses: the individual and the political sense. Like Plato, Aristotle’s autarky for the individual was a moral object, but contrary to Plato, it was the absolute end for the individual.¹⁵ Since happiness, *eudaimonia*, is complete without qualification, or pursued for its own sake rather than for something else, and self-sufficiency (*autarkeia*) lacks nothing, they

¹³ Plato, *Republic*, trans. C.D.C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 331a-b.

¹⁴ Plato, *Laws*, ed. John Cooper, trans. Trevor Saunders (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 5. 738d-e.

¹⁵ It can, and should, be argued that the Platonic ideal of the self-sufficient good person was also an end, the critical difference between the two was that Plato saw that end as impossible to achieve, while Aristotle saw the end as achievable. Therefore, Plato’s end was a goal for an indefinite process and Aristotle’s end was a true achievable end.

were the end of the individual.¹⁶ Just as self-sufficiency was the mark of Aristotle's conception of happiness, in the political sense self-sufficiency was the mark of the city, or *polis*.¹⁷ To achieve autarky, a city must manage its population, territory, and social structure. A city's population cannot be too small or too large; if it is too small it will not be able to provide for its own needs and if it is too large it will be ungovernable.¹⁸ The territory should be one that "ensures the maximum of self-sufficiency."¹⁹ The social structure of the city should be such that it has all of those groups that can provide for the city's needs: "a body of farmers to produce the necessary food; craftsmen; a military force; a propertied class; priests; and those who decide necessary issues and determine what is the public interest."²⁰

These Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of autarky found their way into British imperial thought in the 16th century through the works of Richard Hakluyt. This was accomplished principally through two works: "Discourse of Western Planting" and "*Analysis, seu resolutio perpetua in octo libros Politicorum Aristotelis.*" The "Analysis," a critical Latin examination of Aristotle's *Politics*, gave the English government a guide for the nature of the best state, which was self-sufficient as Aristotle argued, and how to achieve it. Hakluyt's "Discourse" was the call for colonies in North America to satisfy the economic needs of England in the form of outlets for overpopulation and a market for English products, as well as a way to secure commodities not grown in England. Like Aristotle and Plato, Hakluyt's ultimate goal was happiness, or *eudaimonia*, which he hoped to achieve through the spread of Christian, Protestant religion.²¹

¹⁶ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), 1.7.1097a36-1097b22. It is interesting that the principles of autarky are also pursued for their own sake, as is argued in the Conclusion.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Politics*, ed. R. F. Stalley, trans. Ernest Baker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1.2.1252b27-1253a1.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.4.1326a25-1326b6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7.5.1326b27-1326b30.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.8.1328b2-1328b23.

²¹ Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*, 70-76.

Why “Autarky”

While Hakluyt’s concepts of autarky were not wholly original, his application and pursuit of those concepts with English colonialism was. Likewise, this study takes preexisting ideas, the underlying definitions of the principles of autarky, and crafts them into an original paradigm. This paradigm uses the term “autarky” rather than simple “self-sufficiency” for two reasons. First, to link the paradigm of the principles and rhetoric of autarky to the intellectual genesis of the concept of autarky. And second, to highlight the emphasis placed on the goal of self-sufficiency with specific reference to good governance. Plato, Aristotle, and Hakluyt all argued the pursuit of autarky, not only as an end in itself, but as a necessary compliment to that which was best for the city and its citizens; whether that was Plato’s “Good” or Aristotle and Hakluyt’s *eudaimonia*. Autarky, therefore, is used to denote both that link to its history and the moral, self-fulfilling component to self-sufficiency.

Methodology and Chapter Structure

The principles and rhetoric of autarky can only be supported by a close reading of official communication related to the administration of the EAP in a variety of situations. To that end, each of the next three chapters employs a different methodological approach to show that the model is not limited in any way to either period or approach.

The second chapter follows the earliest British administration of the EAP by the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) and the Foreign Office (FO). By examining different episodes from this period (1885-1905), like the transfer from the IBEAC to the FO or the Parliamentary debate over funding of the Uganda Railway, the precedent of the principles and rhetoric of autarky in decision-making is established. This chapter uses a combination of secondary and primary sources to give a broad account of the principles and rhetoric of autarky in a variety of situations over time.

Chapter three, “The ‘Prime Mover’ of Policy,” argues that the principles of autarky were the “prime mover” of policy rather than the traditional answers the historiography gives: the personalities of individual officials, institutional practices, and precedent. The chapter does this by examining how some orthodox historical accounts perceive the continuity or discontinuity in policy in the transition from FO responsibility of the EAP to CO responsibility in 1905. To effectively argue that the principles of autarky were the prime mover of policy, this chapter uses the official 533 series of CO correspondence to closely examine three different policy discussions immediately after the transfer of responsibility to the CO in 1905. In contrast to the first chapter, which gives a more general approach to the principles of autarky, this chapter gives a highly focused account in a limited time period.

In chapter four, “The Language of Policy: The East African Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919,” the soldier settlement scheme is followed from its proposal in 1916 to its implementation in 1919. The chapter shows how the principles and rhetoric of autarky form the “language of policy” whereby the official debate over the existence and execution of the scheme is conducted. Methodologically, it is both similar and dissimilar to the previous chapter; similar in its close examination of the 533 series of CO correspondence, and dissimilar in that it follows a single policy debate from proposal to implementation. The latter point is critical in that it shows the omnipresence of the principles and rhetoric of autarky in a policy discussion beyond any one time or aspect of a discussion, as could be argued of the examples given in the first or second chapters.

A final methodological point remains; the narratives presented are written in such a way as to try to show the omnipresence of the principles and rhetoric of autarky without substantively changing the sources that inform those narratives. This style intentionally leaves many conclusions intentionally undrawn. Those conclusions that are explicitly stated are illustrative of

the model. There are two reasons why every possible conclusion is not drawn. First, if every aspect of the principles and rhetoric of autarky in these narratives is explicitly stated, that would result in a repetition, and more, of the narratives presented. Such an exhaustive approach loses the momentum of the narratives and the interest of the reader while not providing reciprocal support for the paradigm. Second, it allows the reader to actively engage in the narrative arguments and draw their own connections to the paradigm. Doing so, it is hoped, leads the reader to a stronger understanding of the principles and rhetoric of autarky.

Historiographical Comparisons

With the paradigm established, it is necessary to show how it is different from a few select other models of administrative decision-making in Kenyan history. The historiographical groundwork for examining the early history of colonial Kenya was laid in the 1960s with the foundational works of George Bennett, G. H. Mungeam, and M.P.K Sorrenson.²² Mungeam and Sorrenson made extensive use of FO and CO sources to establish their narratives, similar to this approach, but the focus of their works were not to investigate why decisions were made, or agreed to by these departments. Rather, Mungeam was concerned with how the establishment and expansion of British administration impacted local Africans, with only limited arguments for decision-making that focused on the confusion within the FO and CO as well as precedent. Sorrenson, in examining how European settlers came to settle in Kenya, used aspects of the principles of autarky to explain the beginning of that settlement under commissioner Sir Charles Eliot, but then places the expansion and focus of this program on the political activism of the settlers.

²² George Bennett, *Kenya, A Political History: The Colonial Period* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); G. H. Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); M.P.K. Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement in Kenya* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1968).

The two works that come closest to this study's approach are Stephen Constantine's *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940* and Robert Maxon's *Struggle for Kenya: The Loss and Reassertion of Imperial Initiative, 1912-1923*.²³ Like this study, Constantine focused on the decision-making in the CO related to development and how those decisions came to be. However, he placed the reasons for those decisions on the surface issues of precedent, institutional practice, and the personalities of individual officials.²⁴ Maxon's book is also similar in its close examination of the CO correspondence, but it is different from this study in its conclusions. While Maxon argued that during the First World War and under the settler-friendly governorships of Sir Henry Conway Belfield (1912-1917) and Sir Edward Northey (1919-1922) the CO lost its policy initiative, this study deviates from this analysis by arguing that the CO willingly yielded policy initiative to settler-influenced governors because the policy they espoused was in relative alignment with the principles of autarky.²⁵

However, other paradigms of colonial decision-making and state formation, like those of Richard Wolff and Bruce Berman, need to be considered and compared to the autarkic model. In *The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870-1930*, Wolff applied the dependency paradigm of a capitalist metropole that sought to accumulate surplus from the colonial periphery.²⁶ Berman took this paradigm further in *Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination*.²⁷ He paired Marxist theory with a rich narrative of the colonial state to

²³ Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1984); Robert Maxon, *Struggle for Kenya: The Loss and Reassertion of Imperial Initiative, 1912-1923* (London: Associated University Presses, 1993).

²⁴ Chapter three answers this criticism of Constantine's book, but does not explicitly refer to it. This is because the narrative focus of that chapter is on the transfer of responsibility from FO to CO, which Constantine does not address.

²⁵ Chapter four addresses this point through the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919 and the governorships of Belfield and Northey.

²⁶ Richard Wolff, *The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870-1930* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

²⁷ Bruce Berman, *Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: The Dialectic of Domination* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990).

understand the dynamic process of control and exploitation. The autarkic model deviates from these analyses methodologically. Rather than using existing paradigms to explain decision-making, this study uses the primary evidence to create a paradigm that explains decision-making. With the model introduced, methods explained, and historiographical comparisons drawn, it is necessary to turn to the FO administration of the EAP.

Chapter 2

“Into an Entirely New and Different Country:” The Principles of Autarky and Foreign Office Administration

The short, ten-year tenure of FO administration of the EAP was a critical juncture in Kenyan history, where the precedents that shaped and supported subsequent policies were decided by administrators and politicians that were new to colonial administration. This relative inexperience with both colonial administration and of the land to be administered created a unique historical moment; a moment where administrative policy was created “from the ground up” and with little to no specific precedents for decision-making. What, then, were the motivating factors behind the choices which would shape the destiny of the territory?

This chapter will show that the principles of autarky can be seen to govern the decision-making process during the FO administration of the EAP through a clearly defined rhetoric based on those principles: the rhetoric of autarky. The rhetoric of autarky dominated the debates surrounding critical decisions that established what would be long-held precedents within the territory. Even those individuals that disagreed with the direction of policy, couched their arguments with reference to the principles of autarky. To show the ever-presence of the rhetoric of autarky in critical moments, this chapter will examine the established historical narrative of FO administration through that lens. By reexamining the transfer of administration to the FO from a private chartered company, the debate over continued funding of the Uganda Railway, and the choice of settlement policy, the ubiquity of the rhetoric of autarky and the precedents it set become apparent.

The Failure of IBEAC Administration

Before the proclamation of the EAP in 1895, the territory of much of modern Uganda and Kenya were administered by a British chartered company, IBEAC. The IBEAC was a compromise among British policymakers who wanted to simultaneously avoid the trappings of

new colonial possessions in East Africa and to prevent other European powers, particularly Germany, France, and Italy, from expanding into the area. This interest in the region stemmed from the strategic concern over the security of the Nile River. It was theorized that if a rival power were to control any part of the river, they could endanger the British position in Egypt by damming or diverting it and thus creating an economic or ecological crisis. If the British hold over Egypt was compromised, then the Suez Canal, the vital lifeline to India, would also be compromised. Although the idea of expanding British influence in the region was defended with religious and economic rhetoric, the primary motivation was strategic.¹

The creation of the IBEAC gave the FO the compromise that it sought: control over the headwaters of the Nile that the Nile Valley Imperative demanded and turn the responsibility of administration over to a private company. The Company was created on 18 April 1888 with an initial capital of £250,000 and the founding goals of the acquisition of territory from native chiefs in the British sphere of influence and elsewhere by treaty, purchase or otherwise, and the exercise of all rights pertaining to sovereignty over acquired districts, such as the enforcement of laws and the levying of taxes.² This strong mandate for control quickly came into conflict with the physical and economic realities of the territory. The Company's capitalization and the territory's economic prospects proved unequal to the costs of its effective administration.

¹ Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism* (London: Macmillan and Co, 1961), 283-306. This is a highly contentious point in the historiography. While Robinson and Gallagher's thesis has been used by East African historians like G. H. Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya*, 6-8; and M.P.K. Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement*, 9-12; it has a wide array of opponents with competing theses. Richard Wolff, *The Economics of Colonialism*, 3-5; G.N. Uzoigwe, "The Victorians and East Africa, 1882-1900: The Robinson-Gallagher Thesis Revisited," *Transafrican Journal of History* 5, no. 2 (1976): 32-65; John Darwin, "Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion," *The English Historical Review* 112, no. 447 (Jun., 1997): 614-642; and most recently Jonas Fossli Gjerset, "The Scramble for East Africa: British Motives Reconsidered, 1884-95," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 43, no. 5 (2015): 831-860; are all examples of different approaches to British territorial acquisition in East Africa. However, whether the British came for commercial, humanitarian, strategic, diplomatic, or some combination of these reasons to the area is ultimately immaterial to this study as the effect is the same. These were all imperial reasons for occupation and led to the financial strain and collapse of the IBEAC.

² Founders Agreement, April 18, 1888 in P.L. McDermott, *British East Africa or IBEA: A History of the Formation and Work of the Imperial British East Africa Company* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1893), 276-281, Appendix 2.

Minerals, the godsend of South Africa, were not present in East Africa. Commodity production and trade were little better. Ivory was one of the only marketable goods in the area, and its trade was already controlled by the coastal Swahili and Indian traders. Import and export trade in the interior between the kingdom of Buganda and the coast was unprofitable for the Company. The pastoral and subsistence modes of production practiced by Africans produced little that was worth exporting and the Africans disinterest in British manufactured goods forestalled their importation. The greatest prospect for profit came from Buganda, which the British perceived as having a sophisticated societal structure. Even though the possibilities for profitable trade between Buganda and the IBEAC were stymied by the Kingdom's relative self-sufficiency, the real challenge was transportation.³

Transportation costs were the overwhelming culprit in the eventual demise of the IBEAC. All transportation of goods and communications between IBEAC outposts and administrative centers had to be conducted by caravan and portage, which was prohibitively expensive. For example, it cost the IBEAC £250 to transport one ton of goods the 700 miles from their post in Uganda to the coast.⁴ While this kind of expenditure was obviously unsustainable for a private company that did not have the necessary revenue, the IBEAC's only real response, the construction of a railway, was also untenable. The construction would be a massive investment of capital that the Company did not have. Therefore, IBEAC directors asked the British government to guarantee the interest on the capital required to build a railway from Mombasa on the coast to the eastern shore of Lake Victoria.⁵ Sir William Mackinnon, the founder and president of the IBEAC, attempted to persuade Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (SoSFA), of the efficacy of the guarantee by appealing to the FO reasons for instituting

³ G. H. Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya*, 12, 15; John Galbraith, *Mackinnon and East Africa, 1878-1895: A Study in the 'New Imperialism'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 163-165, 199-202.

⁴ W. McGregor Ross, *Kenya from Within: A Short Political History* (London: Routledge, 1927), 35.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 36; Galbraith, *Mackinnon and East Africa*, 200-223.

the Company. Mackinnon argued that the Company gave the FO the control of the headwaters of the Nile and also saved the British Treasury the cost of direct administration. Although Lord Salisbury was convinced, the Treasury rejected the proposal and instead proposed that the government would pay for a portion of the costs, not more than £20,000, of a preliminary survey for the railroad. The House of Commons, in turn, rejected the more limited proposal. This outright rejection of the Company's railroad proposal, combined with the annual cost of £40,000 for the upkeep of administration in Uganda, led the IBEAC to propose withdrawing from that territory on 16 July 1891.⁶

The IBEAC's determination to withdraw from Uganda caused a scandal in Great Britain. The Company, it was argued, was the representative of Great Britain in Uganda. If the Company were to withdraw, it would be a dramatic loss of international prestige and a potential reversal of the British anti-slavery and missionary activities there. The fear provoked by the latter point prompted the Church Missionary Society (CMS) to donate £16,000 to the IBEAC in order to delay their proposed withdrawal. Although this was a sizeable private grant, it was not enough to keep the IBEAC from collapsing under the financial strain of its responsibilities. In fact, the strain was so severe that Mackinnon rejected a proposal in November 1892 by the FO to continue IBEAC administration with government assistance. On 18 June 1893 the Uganda Protectorate was declared and the IBEAC officially withdrew. A little over two years later, with their financial position continuing to decline, the IBEAC charter was bought out for £250,000.⁷

The period of IBEAC administration in East Africa make the importance of the principles of autarky abundantly clear. Financial independence was necessary for the survival of the IBEAC and the accomplishment of its goals. Its dependence on insufficient outside sources of funding forced it to take actions it did not want to, like the evacuation of Uganda and officials

⁶ Galbraith, *Mackinnon and East Africa*, 200-223.

⁷ Ross, *Kenya From Within*, 36-38; Galbraith, *Mackinnon and East Africa*, 229-235

forcing local peoples to provide food and porters,⁸ and ultimately led to its demise. One of the only ways for the Company to achieve financial independence was to overcome the transportation costs that plagued it through the development of a railroad. Development was inseparable from financial independence for the IBEAC. With limited funding provided by private institutions, like the CMS, and the government, the financial dependence of the Company made the construction of the railroad an impossibility.

The other way to achieve financial independence and development was through effective occupation. Effective occupants would be able to produce marketable agricultural goods and raise revenue, a perpetual problem for the IBEAC. The Company considered both European and Indian settlement as a way to bring in effective occupants. The former was limited to only a few individual settlers and a single failed settlement scheme organized by the radical socialist Freeland Association.⁹ In fact, only a single European settler, Stuart Watt, settled permanently during the IBEAC period because of transportation and communication problems.¹⁰ Indian settlement was merely discussed and not a part of any official settlement schemes during the Company period,¹¹ although there was some limited unofficial Indian settlement in the interior.¹²

The limited nature of early European and Indian settlement with no official support from the IBEAC illustrates how trying to attract effective occupants to the territory is linked with the other two principles of autarky: development and financial independence. The transportation and communication challenges that European and Indian settlers faced from the lack of development prevented many from seeking opportunities in East Africa. Even most that did

⁸ Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya*, 10-12.

⁹ Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement*, 32-33. The failure of the Freeland Association settlement scheme was as much the result of IBEAC and FO intransigence as it was the result transportation and communication problems.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 34-37.

¹² Robert Wiesbord, *African Zion: The Attempt to Establish A Jewish Colony in the East Africa Protectorate, 1903-1905* (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1968), 19.

attempt to settle the land, like those Europeans that tried to settle the highlands under the IBEAC, were obliged to give up. It was clear the Company could not get out of its bind. Effective occupants, which were supposed to raise revenue and bring financial independence, would not arrive or even be effective unless there was sufficient development, which in turn could not be provided because of the IBEAC's financial dependence.

However, even more so than the simple importance of the principles of autarky, the IBEAC period highlights one of the first examples of the significance of the rhetoric of autarky in British East Africa. As was mentioned previously, the primary concern of the FO in the region was the Nile Valley Imperative, control of the headwaters of the Nile and rebuffing the expansion of rival continental powers, coupled with limited expenditure for administration of the region. Mackinnon argued that the IBEAC accomplished both of those objectives for the FO when he appealed to Lord Salisbury for funding for the proposed railway. Although this rhetoric was successful in convincing the SoS, it did not convince the House of Commons, which, along with the Treasury, had an entrenched dislike of colonial expenditure.¹³ The rhetoric of FO objectives obviously proved effective with the FO, but it was powerless with the bodies concerned primarily with spending. In point of fact, the Treasury hesitated to even bring its trimmed railroad proposal before the House of Commons.¹⁴ Both bodies did not want to be involved in new arrangements that would need, it appeared, perpetual financial assistance. The period of IBEAC administration therefore makes two points clear: one of the principles of autarky must give way for self-sufficiency to be attained, and a rhetoric that appeals to the principles of autarky is needed in order to effect policy.

“A Railway with Two Ends and No Middle”

¹³ Robert Kubicek, *The Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969), 70-71; Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1984), 12-15.

¹⁴ Ross, *Kenya From Within*, 36.

When Sir Arthur Hardinge, the simultaneous Consul-General of Zanzibar and first Commissioner of the EAP, proclaimed the creation of the protectorate on 1 July 1895, he was confronted with the same harsh reality that the IBEAC had faced.¹⁵ The administration of the interior was still threadbare, and the communication and transportation problems that plagued the IBEAC plagued the new protectorate. However, the assumption of control by the British government afforded Hardinge access to capital that the IBEAC could only dream of, as the prestige of the British Empire was now irrevocably linked to the successful administration of the territory. Construction of the railway was finally begun thanks to two considerations: first, the FO's overriding need to rapidly exert control over Uganda and the headwaters of the Nile,¹⁶ and an 1894 report by the special commissioner for Uganda, Sir Gerald Portal, that emphasized the necessity of a railroad to answer "the all-important and overshadowing question of transport and communications."¹⁷ In December 1895 the first railway construction crews arrived in Mombasa,¹⁸ and £3,000,000 was initially granted by the House of Commons for its construction.¹⁹

However, the initial allocation of capital was not the end of the business. By 1899 it was clear that the cost of construction of the railway would go well beyond the initial £3,000,000. The FO was forced to go before the House of Commons to argue for additional expenditure. The debate took place on 30 April 1900 and was opened by the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, William Broderick. Broderick began by telling the House that it was only realized within the last fifteen months that the money would run out. He stressed that the miscalculation was "not, as far as I can judge, to be attributed to any want of foresight or assiduity in the

¹⁵ Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya*, 9.

¹⁶ Bennett, *Kenya*, 4.

¹⁷ Quoted in Ross, *Kenya From Within*, 39-40.

¹⁸ Bennett, *Kenya*, 4.

¹⁹ Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (Commons), 4th Series, 82 (April 30, 1900): 289.

forecast of those responsible for the inception of the railway.”²⁰ Rather, the initial estimates were imperfect as “practically no survey had been made at all” of the 580 miles that the railway was to cross.²¹ While a party of “engineer officers” was dispatched to survey the land, the hostile nature of the land and people occasioned it to be anything but accurate, and most of the amounts of materials estimated were drastically underestimated. Broderick highlighted this by pointing out that “in regard to bridges, surveys had been made at the dry period of the year, and at that time it was impossible to tell from the appearance of the stream what would be necessary in bridge building to meet the requirements in time of flood.”²² The problems arising from inadequate survey naturally led to an increase in expenditure, but, Broderick argued, there were “two main causes” that necessitated the extra sum other than surveys: a change in the nature of the railway itself, and the change in costs of carriage and materials.

The change in the nature of the railway required a major increase in cost. Broderick made it clear to the Commons that the original conception of the railway was no longer feasible. As he reminded the members, “the original project accepted by Parliament was that, seeing that there would be but a moderate amount of traffic on this line of railway, in the first instance there should be no attempt at elaborate construction with all the appurtenances of a complete railway, a full equipment of locomotives, or anything elaborate in the way of railway stations, that there should be no attempt to do more than was done with the Egyptian railway, to carry the line as rapidly as possible across the desert.”²³ This “unfinished line,” Broderick continued, “was absolutely impracticable and would have been false economy.”²⁴ This kind of railway was not

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., 290.

²³ Ibid., 290-291. The “Egyptian railway” that Broderick alluded to is Horatio Kitchener’s famous Sudan Military Railway.

²⁴ Ibid.

suiting to the conditions of the territory.²⁵ The labor situation also changed with the kind of railway. It was originally envisioned that cheap local African labor could be procured for the “unfinished line,” but the new demands on labor made Africans resistant to employment on the line. Therefore, the FO was forced to bring in Indian laborers from the subcontinent in order to make up for the labor shortage. Broderick emphasized that “whereas it was estimated that actual natives would provide something like half the labor required, the remainder being obtained from India, in practice it has been found that of 16,000 men employed 14,000 had been obtained from India.”²⁶ The hefty wage difference between Indian and African laborers, combined with the cost of transporting them to the railway and maintaining them, was one of the chief sources of unforeseen outlay.²⁷

The second major cause of cost was the difference in expected transportation. Construction, Broderick told the Commons, was carried out by using “the telescopic method, by which the line as constructed carried its own supplies day by day.”²⁸ This system was estimated to cost 1d. per ton, but, crucially, it also assumed that the locomotives would be able to use the water of the region for their operation. Unfortunately, owing to the inadequate initial survey, it was found that the local water “had in it chemical properties which made it impossible to use for the purposes of locomotion.”²⁹ Suitable water therefore had to be brought in from the coast along with the rest of the supplies and more than doubled the cost of transportation from 1d. per ton to 2¼d. per ton.³⁰ This, along with the increase in the market price of materials like rails, locomotives, and ballast, formed the second major contributor to greater expenditure.³¹

²⁵ Broderick cited ballast and bridge construction for the change in railway structure.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 291-292.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 292.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 292-293.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 293.

³¹ *Ibid.*

However, the FO minister finished his case by noting that not all news from the railway was bad. It was already drastically reducing the cost of transportation within the EAP. The difference in cost of transportation between the railway and portage was 2¼ d. to 7s. 4d. per ton per mile respectively. Broderick underscored the difference by applying it to the amount of material transported in the EAP in 1899, 4,900 tons. He argued that the material difference between £39,000 and £294,000 in transportation costs, along with the additional safety of the cargo, justified the railway in itself.³² Even so, there was still the proposition of revenue the railway would accrue from trade. Based on a report from Sir Harry Johnston, the railway could expect to receive at a minimum £120,000 in revenue per annum when it is finished. Broderick reminded the House that this was almost double the £61,000 that was anticipated five years ago when the railway was approved, and so it was more than reasonable to expect even more revenue than currently projected.³³ With all of the causes of expenditure and the benefits of the railway laid out, he moved that £1,930,000 be allocated to the construction.³⁴

After the motion was proposed, Broderick's arguments were viciously attacked. The first attacks came from Henry Labouchere, the Member for Northampton. He began by calling the competence of the FO into question. Flipping Broderick's contention that the FO was perfectly capable of building railroads, Labouchere said, "It seems to me that we could not have a more clear case made out that if we ever intend again to make a railroad in any part of Africa the very last men we should put at the head of it is a committee of Foreign Office clerks. In almost every single instance the estimates have been wrong."³⁵ He then argued how the initial reason for the construction of the railway was to curb the slave trade and economize by reduction the East African slave squadron, but it was not reduced by a single ship. Beyond that, the FO produced

³² Ibid., 295-296.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 297.

³⁵ Ibid., 297.

their estimates based, not on any actual survey, but a “reconnaissance survey.” Labouchere put the incompetence succinctly: “Major Macdonald was at the head of that survey, and when he arrived at the mountains he did not survey any further but put upon his survey “mountains,” and so there was practically no survey. This was the state of things in 1895. Then a bright idea occurred to Her Majesty’s Government. They determined to have a committee of Foreign Office clerks to look into the matter to settle how the railway was to be made and what it was going to cost.”³⁶ This resulted in a series of total estimates that were artificially low,³⁷ he argued, so as to convince Parliament that it was a worthy venture. Only after it was agreed upon by the House of Commons did the estimate of £3,000,000 arise.³⁸ But now the £3,000,000 was spent and 362 miles of the railroad were constructed with 221 miles left.³⁹

While Labouchere had painted a vivid picture of FO incompetence, his argument that caught the most traction with the other Members of the House of Commons was that he could not see how the Uganda Railway was ever going to pay for itself. The construction was now estimated to cost a total of £5,000,000 “and possible a good deal more.”⁴⁰ Would it eventually pay for itself, or will it be a continued strain on government finances? Labouchere hit directly at the problem as he saw it: “[Broderick] said he would not tell us specifically what we shall gain by this railway. The fact is he could not tell us. When I ask what we will gain by Uganda⁴¹ I am answered, in that vague sort of way which does duty in connection with African affairs, ‘Oh, the natives can grow wheat and coffee, which they can exchange for your cotton goods.’ I do not

³⁶ Ibid., 298-299.

³⁷ Ibid., 299. These low estimates were £2,240,000 and £1,755,000.

³⁸ Ibid., 298-299.

³⁹ Ibid., 299. In a show of rhetorical brilliance, Labouchere incorrectly reported the mileage left to be constructed at 183 miles thereby forcing Broderick to correct him with the larger 221 miles. This gave the audience the double impression that the FO is misleading it, and that the project is in a worse state than is assumed.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 301.

⁴¹ Throughout the debate “Uganda” is used as a catchall term for the territory of both the EAP and Uganda Protectorate.

believe Uganda will ever grow wheat or coffee.”⁴² He used the most brutally racist language to justify his assertion that Ugandans would not produce marketable goods. They were, in his words, “without exception the laziest of that laziest race in the whole world, the African negro.”⁴³ Although he admitted that there was a certain amount of trade that could be expected from the area, it was “not enough to make it worthwhile to build a railway 600 miles long.”⁴⁴ Even the report from Undersecretary Broderick that the railway was beginning to pay for itself, Labouchere continued, should be called into question. The passenger and goods traffic that was bringing in revenue was either related to the construction of the railway itself or provisioning the British garrison in the territory.⁴⁵ With the limited prospects of trade and utility of the railroad, he summarized the logic of the project as he saw it: “I have no doubt that if you make a railroad costing £5,000,000 you will reduce the cost of carrying up provisions from the coast for the garrison, but I have never yet heard any practical man say that it was a reasonable thing to build a railroad 600 miles long in order to send up at a cheaper rate the amount of goods required by a garrison of 2,000 men.”⁴⁶

Labouchere’s argument about the dim financial prospects of the Uganda railway were carried on by several other members of the House of Commons. James Bryce, the Member for Aberdeen South, pressed Broderick for both the estimates of probable traffic and the working expenses of the railroad in order to have a better view of “the financial aspect of the question, and how the old debt is to be covered.”⁴⁷ Sir Robert Perks, the Member for Louth, repeated the call for clear estimates and receipts after roundly condemning the administrative failings of the

⁴² Ibid., 301-302.

⁴³ Ibid., 302.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 302-303. Labouchere gave the example of Indian laborers going to the coast for holiday from the worksites as the reason for the inflated passenger traffic.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 303.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 308.

FO.⁴⁸ However, as the debate moved towards the condition and wages of railroad laborers, Thomas Gibson Bowles, the Member for King's Lynn, drew it back to the question of whether the British taxpayer could ever hope to recoup the cost of the railway. In fact, the costs of it might be much more than explicitly stated from the construction estimates. If there is little to no trade and revenue from the running of the railway, the British Treasury will be forced to continue providing funds for it. Gibson Bowles drew upon Labouchere's criticism of Ugandans, as well as the relative emptiness of the interior of the EAP, to support his point. When the construction is finally done, he reasoned, "It will be a railway with two ends and no middle. There is no possible traffic along the route. The whole of the traffic will be between the two ends, and for that traffic we are dependent on the probability of Uganda beginning to grow wheat, which it does not grow now, and beginning to want cotton goods, which it does not want now. In fact we are dependent on the transformation of Uganda from its present position into an entirely new and different country."⁴⁹ If the proposition of making back the money spent on the construction was dependent on the complete transformation of an African society, Gibson Bowles concluded, it was not a venture worth spending an additional £2,000,000.⁵⁰

However, the debate was not singularly against the railroad and its prospects for making it pay. Sir William Allan, the Member for Gateshead, advised a long-term view of its potential. All railways are risky ventures more or less, and why should this one be any different? While the line certainly had no immediate prospect of paying its own way, that precluded its potential at a later date. Appealing to "the good guidance and enlightenment of British influence," the railway should be seen as a tool that could bring tremendous potential to the region, including transforming the local population along economic lines. Allan concluded his argument by

⁴⁸ Ibid., 312-313.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 314.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

combining his long-term view with sound business sense: “To leave £3,000,000 lying there without any return would be an unbusiness-like action, and I shall support the proposal to advance the rest of the money to complete the line, leaving the future to prove who were right and who were wrong as to the prospects of the railway.”⁵¹ Allan’s argument, combined with Undersecretary Broderick’s tepid allusion to a report by the Special Commissioner of the Uganda Protectorate, Sir Harry Johnston, that stated his “impressions are exceedingly favorable” as to the prospects of the territory, formed the whole of the response in support of the new railway expenditure.⁵² Despite the heavy opposition in debate, the additional funding passed by a vote of 185 “ayes” to only 40 “noes.”⁵³

While much of the debate was centered on the specifics of FO incompetence, like how the construction estimates were based on an impossibly incomplete flying survey, and the wages and conditions of African and Indian laborers, the principles of autarky formed the backbone of the discussion of policy direction. It was only when the points related to the potential for financial independence, development, and effective occupation were raised that the very completion of the railway, and not just the allocation of additional money, was brought into question. The contrast between the opening speech by Broderick and the autarkic opposition arguments raised by Labouchere and Gibson Bowles makes it clear that the FO was not prepared to defend its practices within the bounds of a rhetoric of autarky. Indeed, the diplomatic rhetoric used by the FO to get the initial funding was wholly absent from the debate excepting Broderick’s opening speech. The terms of the debate had shifted decisively to the rhetoric of autarky.

⁵¹ Ibid., 322.

⁵² Ibid., 330.

⁵³ Ibid., 334.

As the debate shifted, the interconnectedness of the principles of autarky was continually maintained by those members of the House of Commons that utilized that rhetoric. The financial prospects of the railway were dependent on the development of the territory into wheat and coffee growing areas with a local population that had both the knowledge and inclination to grow them. Both Labouchere and Gibson Bowles argued that if the railway was to pay for itself, the territory must be “transformed” along the lines of development and effective occupation. The core of their argument was that such a transformation did not appear to be evident at the time. Only Sir William Allan contended that it would be unreasonable to preclude that possibility and stop the construction short of Lake Victoria, but he also conceded to Labouchere and Gibson Bowles’s central point that a transformation was needed.

The extent of the change in the terms of the debate was exemplified in 1902 when the FO was forced to go back to the House of Commons to request more money. As with the request in 1900, Lord Cranborne, Broderick’s successor as Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the son of Lord Salisbury, placed the blame of overspending on inadequate surveys made in 1900 and the change in the market values of materials, like coal for the locomotives.⁵⁴ However, unlike Broderick, Lord Cranborne made reference to the principles of autarky in his opening speech and dispensed entirely with the original strategic concerns of the FO. He did not “make any promise as to the prospects of the line,” but he did try to stress the real possibility of the transformation discussed in 1900. Drawing on the reports of notable experts of Africa and the changes of the past two years, he emphasized the principles of autarky in his own way:

Trade there is now in its infancy, but the country is a very fertile one, and capitalists in England are showing a willingness to venture considerable sums in concessions which we are granting for trade. But I may say that the opinions of Sir George Goldie and Sir Harry Johnston are again favourable, the former saying he has not a shadow of doubt that ultimately the line will prove a sound commercial speculation, and the latter predicting that in ten years’ time the railway will be returning a handsome profit on working

⁵⁴ *Parl. Deb. (Commons)*, 4th Ser., 116 (December 9, 1902): 503-505.

expenses, which may enable the Government to pay back to the nation the original cost of its construction. The value of the railway, moreover, is not to be calculated only by its promise of a direct return. There is a considerable indirect economy, because all that is required for the development of the country is now so much more cheaply introduced.⁵⁵ . . . In the progress of administration and in the comfort of the people the railway will be an unexampled blessing. The journey from London to the capital of Uganda can now be made, according to Sir Harry Johnston, in twenty-four days, as compared with four months in former times, and the natives will be able to avail themselves of these great advantages when they go in quest of more profitable employment on the coast, or when they seek to sell their products. In fact, from the native point of view, the commercial advantage of the railway can not be over-estimated.⁵⁶

Interestingly, besides the simple appeals to the principles of autarky to pay off the costs of the railway, Lord Cranborne made a new argument on behalf of the railway. By advocating the “indirect economy” of the railway, he placed development as the end in itself over the simple recovery of construction costs. The rhetoric of autarky therefore appears to change not just the style and substance of the debate, but also the end goals of such debate. The experiences of requesting money for the construction of the Uganda Railway had changed the way the FO viewed its administration of East Africa. International grand strategy was no longer the motivating force in FO policy discussion; the principles of autarky had taken over.

The Search for Effective Occupants

In no other guise was the shift to the principles of autarky more noticeable than in the FO drive for settlement. Indeed, it is easy to see from the arguments over the railway that effective occupation was an overriding concern. The arguments of Labouchere and Gibson Bowles centered on their contention that the local African population would not make effective use of the natural wealth of the land nor engage in trade if the railway was completed. Gibson Bowles pressed the idea further when he gave the imagery of the railway as having two ends but no middle. In all of these arguments, the simple response appeared to be the settlement of a

⁵⁵ Supra, 10. Here Lord Cranborne explained the material difference in the cost of transportation by portage and railway. The same rates of transportation that William Broderick used were cited.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 505-506.

population that would make effective use of the natural wealth of the land, like the Utopians of Saint Thomas More.⁵⁷ The inevitable questions for the FO became *who* would be the most effective occupant and *where* would they be most effective. They would be answered in the several settlement schemes tried by the FO.

The natural settlement scheme for the tropical EAP appeared to be Indian settlement. Prior to the construction of the railway, most of the traders in the Protectorate were Indian, the penal code was borrowed from India, the currency was Indian, and most soldiers and laborers on the railway were Indian.⁵⁸ Sir John Kirk, the Consul at Zanzibar from 1873 to 1889, even used to refer to East Africa as “India’s America.”⁵⁹ This obvious connection was picked up at the FO by Sir Clement Hill, the Superintendent of the African Protectorates Department. He noted in a minute on a dispatch that the FO was “rather looking to India for our East African system and for development,”⁶⁰ and even proposed asking the Treasury for £1,000 to assist prospective Indian settlers.⁶¹

Despite the seeming logic of Hill’s proposal, it was opposed by Sir Charles Eliot, the successor to Sir Arthur Hardinge and second Commissioner for the EAP. He objected on the grounds that Indian settlement should be restricted to the tropical lowlands, with the temperate highlands of the interior reserved for Europeans. Eliot used the rhetoric of autarky to defend his claims:

though Indians are ready to seek new markets, they do not really settle in foreign countries. They trade there, but they desire to return to India; and it is to India that they send their money, instead of spending it in the land of their residence. Still, Indian cultivators would be welcome on the shores of Lake Victoria and on the coast, where it is not likely that more white men will live than those who are required for the general supervision of estates and business. The style of cultivation practiced near Vanga, and about the mouth of the Tana, is suitable to their aptitudes, as is also trade with the

⁵⁷ Thomas More, *Utopia* (Simon and Brown, 2010), 45-46.

⁵⁸ Norman Leys, *Kenya*, 4th ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1973), 92-93.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁶⁰ Minute on Eliot to Lansdowne, 5 Jan. 1902, FO 2/569, quoted in Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement*, 36.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

natives; and, as the Arab element does not seem to be on the increase, there is room for them. . . . It may be doubted if the Highlands are really congenial to Indians. The coolness of the climate is not appreciated by them, and the agriculture is not of the class to which they are most accustomed. But they are keenly alive to the advantage of acquiring valuable property, and the example of Zanzibar, where large numbers of plantations belonging to impoverished Arabs have passed into the hands of Indians, shows that as landowners on a large scale they are not a blessing to the country, inasmuch as they do not spend money on improving their estates, but merely bleed them in order to send it to India.⁶²

Eliot reasoned that development and effective occupation could be achieved by restricting Indian access to land in the highlands. History had shown that Indians did not have a vested interest in developing and investing in the estates they settle in foreign countries. If this was the case, they would certainly not be the kind of settler that the EAP needed; they even had the potential to be dangerous, as was already seen in Zanzibar. Yet, Eliot was not against all Indian settlement. In fact, he argued that it could be advantageous in the tropical lowlands and in towns. Eliot's position was simply one that tried to put the settler that would make the most of the land where they would be most effective.⁶³ This is further supported by his focus on the business habits of Indians rather than his argument of environmental suitability. He reasoned that even if Indians wanted to settle in the highlands it would, as history has shown, result in land speculation rather than the desired development and agriculture.⁶⁴ Clement Hill accepted Eliot's arguments because they promoted both Indian and European settlement, although in different regions of the territory.⁶⁵

⁶² Charles Eliot, *The East Africa Protectorate*, 3rd ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), 178-179. Although this book was first published in 1905, three years after the discussion of Indian restriction in the highlands, it gives a succinct account of Eliot's arguments in his own words.

⁶³ This should not be read as an endorsement of Eliot's racist policies, but rather a new way to examine how he arrived at them. For a fuller examination of the relationship between racism and the principles of autarky and possible objections to the latter, see the concluding chapter.

⁶⁴ Eliot's unsound racist reasoning is evident by the long history of the fear of European land speculation in East Africa by administrators in both the FO and Colonial Office (CO). See chapters two and three for specific examples of the fear of speculation affecting policy.

⁶⁵ Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement*, 37.

FO acceptance of European settlement in the White Highlands, as they came to be called, did not necessarily mean that a purely racial logic was applied to settlement. The principles of autarky were equally applied to Europeans. In other words, a European had to be the “right kind of settler” to have access to the land. This kind of thinking was clearly illustrated in the FO’s abortive Jewish Settlement scheme. Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1895 to 1903, proposed the scheme to the FO and the leader of the Zionist movement Theodor Herzl as a response to a new wave of violent anti-Semitic pogroms in Eastern Europe in 1902. The scheme never received support from either Commissioner Eliot nor Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the time. They both objected on the grounds that Jews did not make good agriculturalists; just the kind of settler that was needed to promote the principles of autarky. Lord Lansdowne was particularly hostile in his assessment writing in one instance that “even if the Jews had a garden of Eden to go to, they would . . . probably fail if they were set down in it by themselves to knock a living out of the soil.”⁶⁶ He repeated this sentiment in a dispatch to Eliot in October, 1903 when he noted, “these people do not as a rule make good agriculturalists. Our experience all over the world is that they take to ‘les petits metiers’ but not to farming.”⁶⁷ The combination of official hostility to the scheme and the division in Zionist circles as to the virtues of the scheme led to its eventual demise.⁶⁸

The Jewish Settlement scheme was a clear example of the rhetoric of autarky in policy decision-making. This was a scheme that, if the conventional knowledge of a racist British policy in the White Highlands is applied, should have been officially encouraged. A willing group of Europeans wanted to make a permanent home in the EAP. Yet, this was not the case. The Jews were not seen as good potential farmers, and therefore not effective occupants that

⁶⁶ Quoted in Weisbord, *African Zion*, 139

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement*, 39-40.

would further the goals of development and financial independence. It is a testament to the versatility of the rhetoric of autarky that both the rejection of Indian and Jewish settlement in the Highlands, could be successfully argued from two different perspectives while simultaneously appealing to the same principles. In other words, the rhetoric of autarky can adapt to the given circumstances and conform the debate to its principles.

Adopting and Adapting

This was the case in all of the examples raised in this chapter. The harsh economic reality of the territory forced the IBEAC to think of their administrative policy in terms of the principles of autarky, and when they used the rhetoric of FO grand strategy they did not convince the Treasury and House of Commons to grant them aid and collapsed. The debate over continued funding for the construction of the Uganda Railway forced the FO to learn the rhetorical lesson they did not with the IBEAC's requests for funding. Using a rhetoric purpose-built for their internal needs, the FO was excoriated on the floor of the House of Commons in terms alien to its normal functions.⁶⁹ This shock forced the FO to change its approach both to administration in the EAP and how it constructed its arguments requesting more money. The change in administration to better correspond to the principles of autarky is evident in the arguments for restricting Indian and Jewish settlement in the White Highlands as official policy.

Beyond showing the versatility of the rhetoric of autarky, the examples of it in action set important precedents for later administration of the EAP. The FO learned the lessons of the IBEAC period of administration and used the principles of autarky to guide their policy while also using its rhetoric to get its way with the House of Commons. The precedent set by Eliot and

⁶⁹ Sir Robert Perks, the Member for Louth, made a similar point in condemning the state of construction affairs managed by the FO. He posited that the members of the FO were not mere clerks, but gentlemen who were expert in all things diplomatic; an upbringing that made them naturally poor construction managers. The logic is identical in claiming that a corps of diplomats would be poorly versed in the intricacies of finance and administration. *Parl. Deb. (Commons)*, 4th Ser., 82 (April 30, 1900): 308-309.

the FO in White Highlands settlement would be maintained for decades and use the same principles to uphold it in the face of ever-growing opposition. With these precedents established, it is necessary to examine the ubiquity of the rhetoric of autarky in a variety of different administrative contexts and under the auspices of an entirely different governmental department, the CO.

Chapter 3

The “Prime Mover” of Policy

The Historiography of a Department Transfer

The administration of the East Africa Protectorate (EAP) was transferred from the Foreign Office (FO) to the Colonial Office (CO) on 1 April 1905. The transfer was significant for a variety of reasons. First, the organization of the CO was significantly different from the FO with respect to colonial administration. The African territories entrusted to the care of the FO were run, ostensibly, by a single man, Sir Clement Hill, who led the Africa Department therein. While Hill frequently sought the advice of other departments for experience and precedents, like the CO for land and legal issues, the India Office for Indian experience, and the War Office for help with the military expeditions in the EAP, he struggled with the practical running of the territory.¹ This largely stemmed from the operational and rhetorical focus of the FO on diplomatic concerns, as stated in the previous chapter,² as well as the limited staff he had at his disposal. By contrast, the CO had a larger, specialized staff that had a wealth of previous practical colonial experience.³ It was hoped by some, especially settlers and colonial officials who had grievances with the FO policy regime, that the transfer would mark a change in policy direction for their benefit. The European settlers in particular thought that the experience of the CO with other settler colonies would mark the easing of land regulations in the EAP and the progress of the territory to Crown Colony status and eventually responsible self-government.⁴

¹ Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya*, 16-17.

² This is clearly shown in the diplomatic focus and rhetoric used by the FO during the IBEAC period and the early half of its administration of the EAP. It was that focus that led to the problems of administration prior to the utilization of the principles of autarky as expressed in the previous chapter.

³ Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya*, 136-137.

⁴ Elspeth Huxley, *White Man's Country: Lord Delamere and the Making of Kenya* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1935): I. 193.

Nevertheless, the hopes many had that the transfer would mean a decisive shift in East African policy, either more pro-settler or pro-African interests, were soon dashed. A general continuity of policy from the FO to the CO was maintained with reference to the “broad strokes” of land, development, and finance; European settlers continued to come into the EAP to demand land, the colonial government sought ways to develop the land, and bringing in capital to make the colony pay was still a priority. Historians have attributed this to a variety of causes. Elspeth Huxley argues that the change in government in London and the personalities at the head of the CO were to blame.⁵ Thinking of the broad responsibility of the CO, George Bennett posits the moderated policy stemmed from the CO trying to model the EAP on West African experience, while also understanding that Eliot’s decision to alienate land to European settlers was “fundamental and irreversible.”⁶ M. P. K. Sorrenson and G. H. Mungeam both approach the continuity of policy in personal terms, but in different ways. Sorrenson argues that the institutional practices of the CO allowed the agency of junior officials to significantly impact decision-making. He uses the example of the first-class clerk W. D. Ellis⁷ and his personal views having a disproportionate effect on the direction of the EAP, while the political heads, like Lyttelton, Elgin, and Churchill, did little to effect change beyond small interjections.⁸ Mungeam, likewise, places much responsibility for continuity at the top of both the CO and in the EAP itself with commissioners like Sir Donald Stewart and Sir James Hayes Sadler. The lack of leadership from these men, along with inheriting the precedent of policy confusion from the FO, Mungeam

⁵ Ibid., 193-195. While it can be argued that Huxley is not a historian properly understood, her arguments are included because she gives a valid account of the transition.

⁶ Bennett, *Kenya*, 19-20.

⁷ William Mercer, *The Colonial Office List for 1905* (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1905), 504. Like most CO officials he studied the Classics at Oxford and was appointed a clerk at the CO in 1895. In 1899, he was made a first-class clerk after serving as private secretary to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Selbourne, in 1897.

⁸ Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement*, 83-87.

argues, led to concerns for African interests being limited to minutes in dispatches rather than an active change in policy.⁹

Still other historians argue that the handover of responsibility led to a real shift in policy. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, for example, imply a change in policy when they write that the transfer “brought the Protectorate under the control of a department actively concerned with tropical development for metropolitan needs.”¹⁰ This position is maintained by the difference of institutional policy focuses between the FO and the CO. The synoptic view of that difference shows the FO concerned with the extension of government control, and the CO concerned with development as evidenced by the agenda started under the secretaryship of Joseph Chamberlain and continued by his immediate successors, Alfred Lyttelton and Lord Elgin.¹¹

Interestingly, every one of these accounts of the continuity or discontinuity of policy from FO control to CO control is valid in its own way. This leads to the stimulating thought that they cannot contradict each other so long as they are not true in the same sense at the same time. Upon reinspection, one will notice that they do not, in fact, contradict each other, although these accounts do give different angles and perspectives thus giving the appearance of contradiction. The clearest example of the appearance of contradiction in the examples presented will prove the point: the argument by Berman and Lonsdale, that the transfer did cause a change in policy, versus the others, that there was no real change in policy. The contradiction appears clear; they cannot both be true in the same sense and at the same time. However, they are not true at the same time. There was a shift in policy, but it did not come from the institutional change from the

⁹ Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya*, 136-141.

¹⁰ Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa: State and Class* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1993), 86.

¹¹ For an account of Joseph Chamberlain’s impact on the developmental focus of the CO, see Robert Kubicek, *The Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969), chapters 4, 6-8. For an account of Lord Elgin’s developmental policies, see Ronald Hyam, *Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908: The Watershed of the Empire-Commonwealth* (London: Macmillan, 1968), chapter 12.

FO to the CO in 1905. As the previous chapter demonstrated through the examination of the parliamentary debate surrounding the Uganda Railway and the EAP, the shift to “tropical development for metropolitan” from diplomatic concerns came from within the FO in 1901 and 1902. Indeed, Berman and Lonsdale are correct that a shift to administrative focus on development had occurred, but not at the time and in the way they argue.

The same can be said of the other historians’ accounts of the period and official decision-making. The personalities of officials, the institutional practices of the CO,¹² and the power of precedent all impacted the apparent broad continuity of FO policy by the CO. Actually, these accounts not only avoid contradiction, but also support each other. One only needs to look at the different broad reasons for continuity of policy to see the validity of this claim: the institutional practices of the CO enabled the personalities of officials to affect policy to the extent that they did, precedent was promoted as an institutional practice, and precedent allowed the personalities of officials to affect policy long after their time in office.¹³ If all of these accounts support each other in one way or another, it is impossible for one of them to be the “prime mover” of decision-making. They are simply surface examinations of a deeper system that operated through the personalities of officials, institutional practices, and precedent to achieve its goals.¹⁴

This chapter will show that the principles and rhetoric of autarky are the “prime mover” of policy in the EAP. This will be done by examining three different policy discussions in the months immediately following the transfer of the EAP to CO responsibility. By looking at the intricate relationship between different individual officials within the framework of institutional

¹² Institutional practices here are defined as the practices used by the CO to keep its operations and decision-making going. This includes, but is not limited to, dispatch writing and official minuting, the hierarchy of officials, requests for advice from other departments, and so on.

¹³ These are just a few of the many potential broad examples that can be formed and are purely illustrating the validity of the claim.

¹⁴ The analogy of doctors diagnosing the symptoms of a disease rather than the disease itself is apt. However, the obvious negative reference to the principles of autarky as a disease would necessarily give a moral judgement to this system that is beyond the scope and purpose of this work.

practice at the CO and the power of precedent over a variety of distinctive discussions, two points will be made clear. First, that the principles and rhetoric of autarky operate within and even co-opt the three factors of individual personalities, institutional practice, and precedent to further the goal of autarky. Second, that the principles and rhetoric of autarky are not limited to a few specific policy discussions but found in a variety of seemingly unrelated discussions.¹⁵ With the parameters of the chapter set, it is time to turn to the first account, the case of deporting undesirables¹⁶ from the protectorate and one unfortunate man in particular.

The Unfortunate Mr. Fooks

On 4 May, just a month after the transfer of responsibility, the CO requested that the commissioner of the EAP, Sir Donald Stewart, send a report “on the difficulties experienced in deporting undesirables from the Protectorate.”¹⁷ Stewart promptly responded with a dispatch on 5 June. In that report, he briefly covered the legal measures afforded to the EAP and the problems it faced. The subject of deportation was covered in a 1902 Order in Council that established two essential points. First, that the place of deportation “shall be a place in some part (if any) of His Majesty’s dominions to which the person belongs, or the Government of which consents to the reception of persons deported under this Order, or to some place under the Protection of His Majesty.”¹⁸ And second, that all the associated costs of deportation should be covered as the Secretary of State for the Colonies (SoSC) directs. Stewart continued that the first problem of deportation facing the EAP was finding places willing to take in the potential

¹⁵ Inevitably, a chapter structured around identifying and examining relatively unrelated policy discussions will not have a traditional historical narrative flow. While there will be a degree of continuity from one discussion or dispatch to the next, the purpose of this chapter is not to give a complete account of each discussion. Some of the policy issues under debate would not be settled until many years later, and to follow each to their conclusion would belabor the point. The next chapter will follow a single policy, the East African Soldier Settlement Scheme, from its proposal in 1916 to its conclusion in 1921.

¹⁶ Undesirables was a catch-all term for criminals and others who were “dangerous to peace and good order.”

¹⁷ Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2. The 4 May request was fully referred to in this dispatch, and I could not find the original request dispatch in the 533 series.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

deportees. He noted that the number of undesirables had increased in the wake of the Boer War and many territories refused deportees to land.¹⁹ Stewart put the problem succinctly, “It has thus become practically impossible to find a part of H.M. dominions the Government of which will consent to receive undesirable bad characters, a considerable number of whom are, I regret to say, resident in East Africa.”²⁰ With no governments voluntarily taking them in, Stewart placed the burden on the CO and the SoSC. He wrote to the SoSC, “The only alternative that remains is to return them to their place of origin, which, if the place of origin is England, would be a costly proceeding. I have the honour to request your instructions as to how this cost should be defrayed.”²¹ Stewart continued by telling Lyttelton he intended to deport undesirables who finished their jail sentences in the EAP and that he proposed “taking steps shortly to prevent as far as possible undesirables from landing in East Africa.”²²

To give substance to his concerns with the undesirables, Stewart gave a specific example of the type of person “likely to be dangerous to peace and good order.”²³ He picked out a single man, Arthur Pelham Fooks, and attached a sworn statement by Robert William Hamilton, a judge of the high court, attesting to his criminal record and character. The short statement read: “That Arthur Pelham Fooks was in June 1900 convicted in Mombasa of theft and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment since that date he has been twice convicted of vagrancy in Mombasa. In February 1905 he was convicted in Mombasa of forgery for the purpose of cheating. He is in my opinion a bad character and his remaining here would be dangerous to the good order of the

¹⁹ Stewart made specific reference to the South African Colonies and Aden. Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

Protectorate.”²⁴ Stewart told the CO that Fooks was “an instance of the kind of person frequently met with here.”²⁵

A month later on 7 July, W. D. Ellis, a first-class clerk, began the discussion within the CO. He minuted that the provisions of the Order in Council that commissioner Stewart had cited “were not meant to meet the case of ordinary thieves and rogues such as the persons referred to in his dispatch.”²⁶ These types of persons must be dealt with by imprisonment.²⁷ Additionally, this principle, if accepted, would lead to ill will between the different parts of the empire as they would engage in a competition of shunting their undesirables on each other. Ellis also wanted to make clear to Stewart that the power of transfer for the purpose of imprisonment was different than the power of deportation and the latter “should only be used for political offenders.”²⁸ He concluded by noting that “there is no objection in principle to legislation for the exclusion of undesirables. We shall be glad to see the draft of what he proposes.”²⁹ Herbert Read, the principal clerk of the newly formed East African Department of the CO, merely added that they send a copy of FO correspondence about excluding undesirables from immigrating to Zanzibar to assist Stewart’s legal advisors in preparing a draft ordinance.³⁰ On 16 August, Lyttelton sent the CO’s response, a combination of the sentiments in Ellis’s and Read’s minutes, to Stewart and also sent a copy of the whole correspondence to the FO for review.³¹

²⁴ Sworn statement by R.W. Hamilton, 20 February 1905, enclosed in Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

²⁵ Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

²⁶ Minute by Ellis, 7 July 1905, on Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

²⁷ Ellis’s original minute stated that these persons must be dealt with by imprisonment in the protectorate, but Reginald Antrobus, an assistant undersecretary, commented in the column that “in the protectorate” should be omitted from any response to the commissioner because the Order in Council allowed for sentences of imprisonment to be carried out elsewhere. Ibid.

²⁸ Minute by Ellis, 7 July 1905, on Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Minute by Read, 8 July 1905, on Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

³¹ Lyttelton to Stewart, 16 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/2; Cox to Lansdowne, 16 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

Here in the opening months of CO administration of the EAP the prominence of the principles of autarky is clear. Stewart's request to remove people deemed "dangerous to the good order of the Protectorate" is an attempt to foster effective occupation, development, and even financial independence. Using the character assessment of Fooks as an example, he sought to convince the officials in the CO that undesirables of that sort impede the development of the EAP. To remove this impediment to development, Stewart tried to remove those undesirables that were already in the jails of the EAP and to prevent others from entering the protectorate. This proposed control of the "kind of person" who enters the protectorate invoked the principle of effective occupation. And finally, by attempting to put the cost of the proposed deportations on the CO, Stewart was keeping the financial independence of the EAP in mind.

The power of using a rhetoric steeped in the principles of autarky is obvious when examining the CO's response to Stewart's dispatch. No official raised an objection *in principle* to the commissioner's proposals to deport those undesirables already in the EAP and refusing others to enter. Instead, there were two serious reasons for objecting to deportation that made it a nonnegotiable point. First, the CO was bound by the legal technicality that the 1902 Order in Council only allowed deportations of political enemies and not common criminals. Second, even if this could be circumvented, deporting criminals to other territories would lead to a competition among all the different territories to send their criminals to each other and make management of the myriad parts of the empire difficult for the CO. It is important to note that the cost of potential deportations to England was not discussed by CO officials, giving the impression, along with the complete absence of objections in principle to criminal deportations, that the CO might have accepted them absent the two reasons they discussed.³² This is further supported by the CO's willingness to entertain an ordinance to exclude undesirables. Going above and beyond

³² Stewart to Lyttelton, 5 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

simple acquiescence, the CO sent a copy of FO correspondence on the subject of the restriction of immigrants into Zanzibar to assist Stewart's legal advisors in crafting a workable ordinance and concluded by noting they "shall be glad to see the Ordinance in draft form before it is enacted."³³ Using the rhetoric of autarky, Stewart was able to get as favorable a response from the CO as he could in the face of nonnegotiable objections.

A Dentist's Appeal to Autarky

The rhetoric of autarky was also used by private individuals. Five days after sending the dispatch on undesirables, commissioner Stewart sent a dispatch on 10 June to the CO requesting the approval of a lease of land for a South African dentist, Dr. Frederick E. Doering from Transvaal.³⁴ The lease of land to Dr. Doering had been under consideration by the FO for almost two years prior, and the current dispatch was a continuation of that correspondence. Stewart attached a copy of a draft of the lease that was approved by both himself and Dr. Doering's local legal representative, Neil MacGregor, along with a letter of stated intentions by MacGregor. The commissioner argued his position succinctly:

Dr. Doering is willing to invest more capital than any other farmer in the country, and I think his application should be entertained. It will cost him with imported sheep, houses, fencing, kraals, etc., not less than £25,000 in the first three years, and he is quite agreeable to spend that amount if he is granted the area he asks for. He proposes to breed sheep on a large scale or not at all and from all I can find out about him he is a man of large means and can provide the money. The Protectorate is urgently in need of men with capital to help in its development, and I sincerely hope you will see your way to sanction Dr. Doering's application.³⁵

Stewart was "most anxious" to get a speedy response and requested a telegram if the CO agreed with him as Dr. Doering was beginning to look into investing in Argentina.³⁶

³³ Lyttelton to Stewart, 16 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

³⁴ Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

The draft lease attached to the dispatch provided support for commissioner Stewart's argument. The draft lease gave Dr. Doering 25,000 acres in the Rift Valley for a period of 99 years and provided protections for the interests of the EAP. To make certain that the land would be developed as argued, the lease made two binding covenants with the lessee. First, it explicitly required the doctor to "use the said land for the purposes of stock raising and agriculture, and will within three years from the date [of the signing of the lease] import stock on the said land not less than five thousand sheep from New Zealand or Australia." Second, it prevented Dr. Doering from subletting "or otherwise part with the possession of the said land or any part thereof without the previous consent of the Commissioner in writing thereto."³⁷ Neil MacGregor signed the draft lease to show the government that it had both his and Dr. Doering's approval.³⁸

To give further evidence of Dr. Doering's intentions to develop his proposed lease, Stewart included a letter from MacGregor that outlined his plans and expected difficulties. He wrote that Dr. Doering intended to import the 5,000 merino sheep stipulated in the lease which he estimated to bring "not less than £18,000" into the protectorate. The primary idea behind the sheep was to cross stud rams with the local ewes "to develop a merino sheep producing a wool fit to compete in the London markets."³⁹ MacGregor highlighted the possibilities, "the establishment of such an industry on a large scale must be of incalculable benefit to the country, whilst a successful cross with the native sheep opens up a wide field for enterprise."⁴⁰ He also underlined the difficulties inherent in such a project: constructing fences, yards, and shearing sheds; continued expenditure for three or even five years without a return; disastrous local stock diseases; and the dangers to the stock of long and hazardous transportation. In addition to sheep, Dr. Doering planned to experiment with horses, ostriches, and goats, and he even had "a scheme

³⁷ Draft Indenture, 22 May 1905, enclosed in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Letter by Neil MacGregor, 26 May 1905, enclosed in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

to erect an electric plant on the Gilgil River, provided that stream is strong enough to generate sufficient power to justify the erection of cold storage works.”⁴¹ With a specific plan for development laid out, it was left to the CO to determine approval of the lease.

In a long minute, Herbert Read addressed the concerns of the CO and the precedent established by the FO. The FO had requested advice from the CO on the subject of Dr. Doering’s proposed grant of land back in March 1905. Read began his minute by quoting the CO response at length:

With regard to the area of the proposed grant it appears to Mr. Lyttelton that, if 10,000 acres is the normal maximum and if 20,000 acres and 18,000 acres were only leased to Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Flemmer respectively because they had been led by Sir Charles Eliot to expect much larger grants, it may be difficult to justify a lease of 25,000 acres to Dr. Doering. It will also be remembered that certain general arguments against land grants on a large scale were used by the FO in the correspondence with Sir Charles Eliot on the subject of the grants to Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Flemmer. But if the Marquess of Lansdowne is of opinion that the action of the government can nevertheless be justified in the present instance, Mr. Lyttelton does not desire to raise any objection to the proposed lease on these grounds.⁴²

Here Read was referring to the earlier scandal surrounding the previous commissioner of the EAP, Sir Charles Eliot, where he promised large grants of land to two South Africans who promoted land grants in the protectorate without reference to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Lansdowne.⁴³ To maintain a continuity of policy, the approval of Dr. Doering’s lease needed to match with previous arguments and opinions. The CO response brought up several potential objections to approving the lease, but it left the decision to Lord Lansdowne at the FO. However, as Read noted immediately after the quote. “the FO did not commit

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Minute by Read, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2. Most of the names and longer words were handwritten in shorthand, but are transcribed here at length.

⁴³ Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement*, 74-76. Eliot was forced to resign his commissionership over his actions.

themselves to any expression of opinion on the subject . . . we have therefore to decide the question for ourselves.”⁴⁴

Read continued to look at arguments mentioned by the FO to decide the question of the lease. Again, Read quoted a section from a dispatch of Lord Lansdowne from October 1903 to give the FO’s general argument against large grants of land. Lansdowne argued that with the large land projects of the East Africa Syndicate⁴⁵ and the Jewish Settlement Scheme underway at the time, large personal grants should be postponed.⁴⁶ However, Read pointed out that the newspapers “of two or three days ago” reported that the Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland voted to reject the Settlement Scheme. Therefore, he argued, Dr. Doering’s proposed grant did not need to be rejected along the same lines.⁴⁷

The next point Read considered was whether Dr. Doering’s grant would give Chamberlain and Flemmer “any just cause of complaint of unequal treatment.”⁴⁸ He made two different arguments as to why they should have no complaint. First, their draft leases needed to be sanctioned by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he offered them smaller grants of land which they accepted. These grants of large concessions, Read continued, “must be decided on their respective merits and the SoSC is perfectly justified in making a larger grant to Dr. Doering than to Mr. Chamberlain or Mr. Flemmer if he considers that the special [circumstances] of the case warrant it.”⁴⁹ Second, Dr. Doering’s draft lease was not more liberal in its requirements than those of Chamberlain and Flemmer. Chamberlain would have 20,000 acres

⁴⁴ Minute by Read, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

⁴⁵ The East Africa Syndicate was an early capitalist venture that was granted a 500 square mile lease in the Rift Valley by the FO in December 1903. Mungeam, *British Rule in Kenya*, 104, 113.

⁴⁶ Minute by Read, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2. The Jewish Settlement Scheme had not yet been finally decided in official circles.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* It is important to note that the decision to approve large grants of land over 10,000 acres was left to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs while the FO was responsible for the EAP and by the Secretary of State for the Colonies after the CO assumed responsibility.

leased for 99 years at a rent of ½ anna per acre with £3,125 to be spent in development for the first five years. Flemmer, likewise, would lease at ½ anna per acre for 99 years, but would have 18,000 acres and spend £2,812 in development for the first five years. However, Dr Doering's draft lease had important differences. He would lease 25,000 acres for 99 years at rent of 1 anna per acre and spend not less than £18,000 in development in the first 3 years.⁵⁰ Read was therefore justified in concluding that "on the whole Dr. Doering's grant appears to be much less favorable than the grants to the other two."⁵¹ In the margin, Lyttelton agreed with Read, but noted that the CO must have a "good window into Dr. Doering's financial standing" to proceed.⁵² Read finished his minute by reasoning that the requirements of the draft lease to import sheep and spend a set amount in development, along with the provisions of the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 such as the reservation of minerals on the property, were sufficient safeguards of the government's interests.⁵³

In a minute responding directly to Read, Sir Montagu Ommaney, the Permanent Undersecretary of State for the Colonies,⁵⁴ stated that he agreed with his assessments, but wanted three clarifications. First, as a legal formality, Ommaney wanted the lease to include the price and requirements for converting leased land into freehold so that it was the same as the other large grants. Second, he was "not clear as to the clause relating to placing sheep on the land; if it is a mere obligation to import it covers very little. Aught it not to be 'import and maintain on the land'?"⁵⁵ Third, Ommaney repeated Lyttelton's marginal question about Dr. Doering's finances pointedly: "Has anyone ever obtained any evidence as to Dr. Doering's alleged wealth?"⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Minute by Lyttelton, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

⁵³ Minute by Read, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

⁵⁴ A former private secretary to the SoSC the Earl of Carnarvon from 1874 to 1877 and a commissioned crown agent afterward, Ommaney was made Permanent SoSC in 1900 and resigned in 1907. William Mercer, *The Colonial Office List for 1905* (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1905), 555.

⁵⁵ Minute by Ommaney, 2 August 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 10 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

Finally, in a minute addressed to Lyttelton, Ommaney thought that the lease should be approved so long as the change to the importation clause be implemented and Dr. Doering furnish “a satisfactory reference to his bankers.”⁵⁷ Only two days after Read and Ommaney’s minutes, the CO sent a telegram to Stewart approving the lease subject to Dr. Doering providing evidence of his wealth, the clause about importing sheep was changed to “import and maintain on said land,” and the option of converting land to freehold be included in the lease like those offered to Chamberlain and Flemmer.⁵⁸

From this debate over approving the land grant to Dr. Doering, we can draw three conclusions: first, that the principles of autarky played a prominent role in the argument for the lease, second, the resulting rhetoric of autarky was effective, and, third, that the principles of autarky were the prime mover of policy. With reference to the first conclusion, all three principles of autarky are well-represented in the argument. It was argued Dr. Doering satisfied the idea of an effective occupant who would aid development of the EAP. He covenanted with the government to spend at least £18,000 of his personal capital to develop his property, and the letter by his local representative, Neil MacGregor, clearly showed this intention. Commissioner Stewart himself even argued this point in his dispatch when he told the CO that the EAP needed men like him; men with capital to develop the protectorate. Dr. Doering would not only make a personally effective occupant who would develop his private property, but also contribute to the overall development of the protectorate. MacGregor reasoned that Dr. Doering would be invaluable to the EAP through his personal efforts to cross foreign and local stock to create a type of wool that would be competitive with the London markets. The development of such an internationally competitive product and an estate capable of producing it would be instrumental

⁵⁷ Ibid. This was still the same minute, but Ommaney divided it into two parts: his general comments above, and this, his recommended action.

⁵⁸ Lyttelton to Stewart, telegram, 4 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

in advancing the financial independence of the EAP. This is only further supported by the fact that the EAP would pay nothing for these developments.⁵⁹ In the dispatch by Stewart, the letter by MacGregor, and even in the draft lease itself, the principles of autarky formed the rhetorical foundation of the argument for approving the lease.

The second conclusion, that the rhetoric of autarky used was effective, is clear in both dispatch from Stewart and minutes by CO officials. Commissioner Stewart was so thoroughly convinced that he even employed the same rhetoric while trying to convince Lyttelton and the CO in his dispatch. He argued that Dr. Doering's lease be approved and if it was, fast-tracked by way of telegram, an expensive form of administrative communication normally reserved for important and sensitive directives. Stewart highlighted this sense of immediacy by remarking that Dr. Doering was starting to seek a land grant from Argentina. It is easy to see the same conviction in Herbert Read's long minute. He endeavored to show other CO officials that a large land grant could be approved by giving a lengthy genealogy of opinions given by both the FO and CO on the issue of large grants in the EAP. For example, Read pointed out in the CO's original opinion on the matter to the FO, Lyttelton understood the general arguments against and restrictions on large grants but left it to Lord Lansdowne to decide. When the FO did not give a definite opinion, he argued it was up to the CO to determine whether it should be approved. Then, Read showed that the original general arguments no longer applied to the situation, like the land experiment of Jewish settlement. At every point, Read attempted to push towards approval of the grant; even when he gave opposition arguments, they were only raised to show

⁵⁹ While it can be argued that it would cost the protectorate in potential rent if another or several lessees were willing to pay more, the protectorate would not have to actively spend money to develop that land or experiment in crossing breeds of sheep.

how they no longer were valid. Ommaney, too, only challenged the draft lease on small issues that, when changed, made the rhetoric of autarky in the draft lease even stronger.⁶⁰

The final conclusion drawn from the approval of Dr. Doering's grant is that the principles and rhetoric of autarky were the prime mover of policy. This was best shown by illustrating how the rhetoric of autarky uses and even contorts the traditionally argued movers of policy: the personalities of officials, institutional practices, and precedent. In this instance, the rhetoric of autarky convinced the personalities of Stewart, Read, Ommaney, and Lyttelton to approve the grant. Their personalities were not the instigating force of policy, but rather they coopted the rhetoric of autarky. Institutional practice and precedent were also coopted by the rhetoric of autarky. By showing how past opinions and policy directives no longer held the same weight as circumstances changed, precedent and the institutional practice of respecting the opinions of other departments was effectively circumvented. In fact, Read even used the precedent of Chamberlain and Flemmer's respective grants as points of comparison to Dr. Doering's draft lease to show how it ensured he would be an effective occupant helping to develop the EAP with his own capital. In short, Dr. Doering would be promoting the principles of autarky. With the principles and rhetoric of autarky identified as the prime mover of policy in a specific debate over approval of a land grant, it is necessary to next turn to a debate establishing general policy and how the principles and rhetoric of autarky were again the prime mover.

Land Policy Reconsidered

However, the principles and rhetoric of autarky directed general policy direction as well as specific issues like the Dr. Doering lease. On 14 August, Sir Donald Stewart sent a long dispatch responding to the recommendations of the Land Commission established in November 1904, which had only recently concluded in June 1905, to consider land complaints lodged by

⁶⁰ This refers to the change in the lease, "import and maintain on said land," that strengthened its development requirements.

settlers.⁶¹ Before giving his opinion point by point,⁶² he began by noting that the report of the Land Commission embodied the views of the settlers that gave evidence before it. It was, therefore, representative of settler views and interests. Stewart also remarked generally on the settler dissatisfaction with the lease requirements enumerated in the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, the law by which leases were considered and granted. There was, he argued, “much to be said on both sides.”⁶³ The largest complaint was against the restriction of the free transfer of land. Stewart laid out the situation in the EAP as he saw it:

Free transfer would bring in capital and increase speculation. The first comers who have perhaps bought land merely as a speculation and have done no work on it would receive a large profit by selling, and it is doubtful if the purchasers would do any more work than their predecessors. They might simply remain in possession of the land and wait for an opportunity to sell again at a profit. In the meantime, though money is circulated by this method, the land itself is not developed. As the law stands at present, a man before obtaining a transfer must show that he has done some legitimate work, and if after a certain period no attempt is made to develop the property, the land reverts to Government.⁶⁴

Neither the prospect of free transfer and speculation nor the law as it stood were desirable.

Stewart offered a solution to this dilemma to the CO in the form of a proposal from John Ainsworth, the Sub-Commissioner for Ukamba Province at the time. Ainsworth wrote a letter to Stewart that explained his thinking and Stewart enclosed it in his dispatch. Ainsworth started his letter by noting he was originally in favor of the EAP’s standing land laws. He wrote, “At a previous point of the country’s development I was personally in favour of restricting dealings in land, my idea being to prevent speculation and so enforce development. I was of opinion at the time that if Government compelled a man to occupy his land under certain rules he would

⁶¹ Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3; Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement*, 84. Stewart sent the report of the Land Commission to the CO in a 23 June dispatch but did not offer comments as he stated he did not have adequate time to respond in full. Stewart to Lyttelton, 23 June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

⁶² It is more efficient to start this debate with Stewart’s dispatch than with a full account of the report of the Land Commission itself. Stewart opines on the relevant recommendations of the report and to give both would be a mere repetition of the relevant points and the inclusion of many that are irrelevant. The full report can be found enclosed in Stewart to Lyttelton, 23, June 1905, BNA: CO 533/2.

⁶³ Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

necessarily develop it, or at the end of the period prescribed by the rules, the land, failing development, would revert to the Crown.”⁶⁵ However, Ainsworth posited that the existing regulations did not “assist in the development we all desire.” The real value of a country, he suggested, was from the produce of the soil not the soil itself, and, in fact, the procedure used to allot land was actually keeping the EAP in an undeveloped state. Ainsworth gave the following example to highlight the bureaucratic inefficiency of the situation:

A would-be settler arrives in the country, he obtains a homestead of 160 acres and pre-empts a further area of 480 acres. He is obliged to show the Land Officer that he has £300, but he is not bound in any way to spend a penny of it on the land. In six months – more or less – he finds he can do very little with the land, but he maintains his option over the land for three years, and during all of that time the land would, under the present rules, remain undeveloped. This means that one man who is possibly not in a position to develop ten acres “blocks” a square mile. If this man desires to “unload” any of the land he can only, generally speaking, do so by surrendering to the Crown, in preference to which he retains his option for the three years.⁶⁶

His solution was simple: allow settlers to freely transfer land in freehold and exact a land tax on all unproductive or unoccupied land. While it was simply “bad policy to keep a poor man bound” to a block of land, the free transfer of land would allow a person to sell what parts of the land he does not want or the whole lot to a person able to develop it.⁶⁷

With a possible solution to the question of land transfer proposed, commissioner Stewart gave his opinion on certain important points raised by the Land Commission. The first set of points he considered were the Commission’s negative assessment of several of the articles of the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, the first of which was article 9.⁶⁸ Stewart agreed that the article was too stringent and recommended that it be modified so that the lessee would be returned the whole or a part of what they originally paid for the land.⁶⁹ After that, however, he

⁶⁵ Ainsworth to Stewart, 21 July 1905, enclosed in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Article 9 related to land not occupied for eighteen months would be forfeited to the government. “The East Africa Protectorate Crown Lands Ordinance,” *British and Foreign State Papers*, 95 (September 27, 1902): 528-535.

⁶⁹ Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

only mentioned his objections to the suggested changes to the ordinance. Stewart saw no reason to change the article stating that all buildings on leased land should pass to the government without compensation, because a settler that did good work on the land was “never likely” to be withheld from renewing the lease and most leases were for 99 years. He also objected to removing the commissioner’s consent to assign any part of a lease to another on the grounds that it enabled “the Government to keep a check on the class of men that may come into the country.”⁷⁰ The remainder of Stewart’s objections were against removing any articles that allowed for the public use of leased land, like traveling through the land.⁷¹

Yet while Stewart disagreed with most of the Land Commission’s recommendations regarding the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, he agreed with many of its other general suggestions; four of which were particularly important. First, he agreed that the capital requirement to obtain a lease, a measure hotly objected to by the settlers, was not particularly useful. He wrote that though it perhaps kept out some poor who sought leases, “there is no doubt that on several occasions the necessary money has been borrowed for a few hours to enable people to qualify.”⁷² Such a loophole rendered the requirement toothless and should be abolished. In its stead, Stewart suggested, “A statement signed by two land owners to the effect that an applicant is respectable and a fit person to take up land would doubtless answer the purpose quite well.”⁷³ Second, Stewart argued alongside the commission that, whatever was decided with respect to transfers of land, “they ought to be absolutely barred to Indians or natives in the districts suitable to European colonization.” He reasoned, “Owing to the insanitary habits of Asiatics and Africans, they are not fit persons to take up land as neighbors of Europeans.

⁷⁰ Ibid. The principle of commissioner’s consent for transfers of lease was linked to both racial and capital restrictions, as will be seen shortly.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

There are enormous tracts of land in the Protectorate perfectly suitable for Indians to develop without encroaching on the comparatively small area suitable for European settlement.”⁷⁴ Even so, he noted that the existing small gardens and plots in the area were acceptable as they could be “easily controlled.” Third, Stewart agreed that rate payers should be allowed to elect their own members of the Municipal Committee by vote, but he had a problem with the suggestion of the commission that such voting be restricted to Europeans. “As long as Indians and natives pay taxes,” he wrote, “they ought to have a vote for their representative but the white rate payers wish to monopolize the right of voting, and I fail to see how this could be countenanced by Government.”⁷⁵

And finally, the fourth major point of agreement with the commission, was that the staff of the EAP government needed to be expanded. Several new posts, like a Commissioner of Native Affairs, a Land Board constituted of official and non-official members, and an Assistant Crown Advocate, were all argued as necessary. The Land Board in particular, Stewart argued, would “be a boon to the country, as many points that still form the subject of discussion could be dealt with more speedily and with greater satisfaction to the settlers than is at present the case.”⁷⁶ The primary argument against such a scheme was that it would incur a larger expense. He countered that, “By arranging for a quicker settlement there would be an introduction of fresh capital, and therefore a rising revenue, which in a very short time would repay any extra expense that may be incurred.”⁷⁷ The same argument for the speed of settlement was made for the Assistant Crown Advocate, along with the “moral impossibility for one officer to conduct all prosecutions, draft ordinances and title deeds, and advise on legal questions of every nature.”⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Stewart concluded by asking for a telegraphic reply if any of the suggested appointments were approved.

Learning from Australasian Mistakes

Stewart's dispatch covered so many different points of substantial importance, that W. D. Ellis at the CO produced a long typed memorandum, alongside the usual short handwritten minute summarizing his opinion, to adequately address all of his concerns. In the handwritten minute, Ellis summarized the dispatch and Land Commission Report as he saw it: "Speaking generally the Committee's bark is worse than its bite – I mean that while . . . they appear to advocate free transfer with a view to a land boom and land speculation like that which took place in the early days of Australasia, their actual proposals are of a much more moderate character."⁷⁹ He therefore had a strong reaction to the idea of free transfer of land, but did not think the other points were as radical. To counter the arguments of Stewart and Ainsworth, Ellis turned to the historical example of free transfer in Australia and New Zealand.

Ellis's Australasian example was fully fleshed out in his memorandum. He began by noting that the report of the Land Commission showed "an entire ignorance of the history of legislation on these subjects in other new countries such as Australia and New Zealand."⁸⁰ The desire to grant the free transfer of land was a natural one, but not, Ellis posited, necessarily right. "It was against this desire," he continued, "that the much abused Colonial Office of the forties and fifties of last century fought in vain."⁸¹ The land grabbers triumphed with results that are regretted, I think, by every one in Australasia to-day, except of course the heirs of the successful

⁷⁹ Minute by Ellis, 6 October 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3. Different officials separately refer to the "land committee" or "land commission." To avoid confusion, "commission" is used in all cases except for direct quotations that use "committee."

⁸⁰ Memorandum by Ellis, 6 October 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

⁸¹ The 1840s and 1850s.

grabbers.”⁸² Ellis highlighted this point by providing three examples of the failure of free transfer to promote development. First, in New South Wales in 1891, “42 million acres had been alienated in freehold with 22 millions of which, equivalent to about 2/3rds of the area of England and Wales, was in the hands of 677 persons. Only 2 percent of the 42 millions and 1/10th percent of the 22 millions were cultivated.”⁸³ Prospective settlers to the area, seeing that the land was held in the hands of people who did not use it, settled in urban areas leaving rural growth stagnant. Similarly, in New Zealand in 1891, it was found that 8 ½ million acres were held by only 337 people. And finally, Ellis used the example of Tasmania, observing “that whereas in 1860 with a population of 87,775, 153,000 acres were under crops, in 1891, with a population of 145,000 the area under crops had only increased to 157,000 acres, though more than 4 ½ millions had been alienated from the Crown.”⁸⁴ This arrested development over more than thirty years, he remarked, showed “the cost of selling land without guarantees for satisfactory development.”⁸⁵

While these examples showed undesirable results from the CO’s perspective, Ellis supplemented his argument with the resultant real negative conditions in Australia and New Zealand. He summarized the problems: “It is facts like these, directly traceable to bad systems of Crown Lands Legislation, which explain most of the worst features in Australasian life – the slow growth of the population, the rapid growth of the towns, reproducing in the midst of vast vacant lands the worst evils of old civilizations in the way of sweating and overcrowding, the ever increasing debt, and the rise of a Socialist party which is led by the experience of such abuses of the rights of property to endeavor to destroy the very institution of private

⁸² Ibid. Reginald Antrobus seconded this sentiment as he wrote in the margin, “And we must fight now.” Minute by Antrobus, 27 November 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

⁸³ Memorandum by Ellis, 6 October 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

ownership.”⁸⁶ The CO of the 1840s and 1850s tried to counteract the wholesale alienation of land by raising the auction upset price for agricultural land and granting leases of pastoral land for only limited periods of time, but this attempt at control was overturned by the Australasian settlers’ vociferous support for the “three F’s,” Fixed tenure, Fixed rents, and Free sales of rights.⁸⁷

Ellis drew five conclusions from this history to inform land legislation in the EAP. First, land should be surveyed before it was offered for sale or lease. If this was not done, then the settlers could take more land than they paid for and lead to abuses like obstruction of waterways, roads, and railroads. Second, with the land surveyed, it should be classified and priced accordingly. Third, strict conditions for development and cultivation of the land should be enforced. Fourth, grants of land should not be made in freehold as a rule. Instead, settlers should have a lease in perpetuity, or 999 years, with periodic reappraisal of rent. And finally, restrictions should be placed on alienating land to prevent any one person from accumulating too much land.⁸⁸ With his historically informed opinion on the free transfer of land complete, Ellis turned to the Land Commission and Stewart’s recommendations.

Ellis began by commenting on the suggested changes to the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 proposed by the commission and commissioner Stewart. First, he agreed with Stewart’s recommendation that if land is reverted to the government after being unoccupied, the landholder should receive some compensation; either half of the original amount paid or half the average value of the land at the time of resumption. Next, Ellis disagreed with Stewart’s assessment that there should be no compensation for improvements on land resumed by the government. Stewart’s argument that there would be no trouble renewing leases for those who showed that

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid. Ellis used the example in New Zealand where no person with more than 2000 acres can obtain any further portion of Crown Lands.

they “had done good work” on their property,⁸⁹ was insufficient. Although there might be no difficulty in renewing a lease, the principle of compensation was admitted in previous legislation⁹⁰ and, Ellis argued, should be applied in the EAP.⁹¹ Finally, he rejected the last major recommended change to the ordinance, that lessees could not give portions of their land to others without the consent of the commissioner of the EAP. Where Stewart argued against it by noting how it would be an effective tool to control the “class of men” coming into the protectorate, Ellis argued that it would prevent the accumulation of land in the hands of a few persons, like in Australia and New Zealand.⁹²

Beyond the recommended changes to the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, Ellis agreed with Stewart on the four⁹³ general suggestions he supported alongside the Land Commission. First, he concurred that potential settlers could so easily avoid the £300 requirement to receive a grant that it should be replaced, as Stewart suggested, by a “certificate of fitness” signed by two landowners. Next, the question of reserving the highlands of the EAP for only Europeans at the expense of Africans and Indians was, Ellis mused, “one of some difficulty and delicacy.”⁹⁴ He gave a succinct account of the issue from both sides: “Indian traders were established at the coast before any Europeans were there, Indian labour made the railway, and Indian soldiers aided in the conquest of the country. At the same time, I think that in view of the large amount of country which will in any case be left open to Indians and which is not suitable for European colonization the restriction should be imposed.”⁹⁵ With respect to allowing Indian rate payers to

⁸⁹ Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

⁹⁰ Ellis cited the Agricultural Holdings Act but did not note where the Act was applied.

⁹¹ Memorandum by Ellis, 6 October 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3. Ellis admitted that the specifics of compensation would need to be figured out at a later date; specifically, whether specious improvements would be honored and how developments that diminish value would be approached.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ There were more than four suggestions, but these suggestions are the most significant and relevant. Suggestions on regulations of fencing, irrigation, and timber rights can be safely omitted.

⁹⁴ Memorandum by Ellis, 6 October 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* Read and Ommaney both wrote that the restriction was justified in the margin, although they did not provide any further arguments.

vote in municipal elections, Ellis differed with the positions of the Land Commission, which wanted the vote exclusively for Europeans, and Commissioner Stewart, who wanted all rate payers to be allowed to vote. He agreed with Stewart that Indians could not be excluded from voting, but with the potential conflict with the settler population in mind Ellis recommended that the matter be left alone. And finally, Ellis agreed with Stewart and the commission that the expansion of EAP staff; especially the Land Board led by a competent Land Officer, and an Assistant Crown Advocate to quicken the pace of settling legal issues, would ease the problems of survey and law that plagued potential settlers.⁹⁶

Ellis's memorandum was well received by the other officials of the CO. Herbert Read began his minute by noting that he had "very little to add to Mr. Ellis's full and interesting minute, with which I agree generally."⁹⁷ His primary concern was with the expansion of the staff. "It is impossible to read this report and the evidence attached to it," Read minuted, "without seeing that we have a very big job before us, and if it is to be successfully carried through we shall require very capable and experienced men . . . and must be prepared to pay such salaries as will attract the right sort of men."⁹⁸ For Read, the three most urgent matters before the CO were related to the expansion of the staff for better and faster surveys of land, the acquisition of an Assistant Crown Advocate, and the appointment of a competent Commissioner for Land. On all three issues, he recommended getting Treasury approval of an expanded budget to acquire them. The recommended changes to the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 and general

⁹⁶ Ibid. Potential settlers often had to wait months before they received their grants of land and could begin development. In the meantime, they expended their private capital waiting for the EAP government to approve or reject their grant. As was seen earlier, Dr. Doering waited almost two years before his grant was approved and spent, according to his representative, large sums waiting for a favorable response.

⁹⁷ Minute by Read, 30 October 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

suggestions of the Land Commission, Read minuted, had been addressed by Stewart and Ellis and those matters could be left to the SoSC.⁹⁹

Indeed, the discussion among CO officials was dominated by the question of who should take the position of Commissioner for Land. Reginald Antrobus agreed that they “should certainly endeavor to profit by the experience of Australia and New Zealand” by creating a dispatch embodying Ellis’s remarks “wording it, of course, so as not to hurt Australian feeling,” and pursue a Commissioner for Lands with experience with settlement in either Canada or Australia.¹⁰⁰ Montagu Ommaney minuted that he preferred a candidate from Canada than Australia or New Zealand, but he also proposed an English barrister as a possibility.¹⁰¹ The ultimate decision lay with the SoSC. Yet by the time the discussion passed through the CO to the SoSC in mid-December 1905, there was a new occupant of the post. A new Liberal ministry led by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had appointed Lord Elgin to replace Alfred Lyttelton. Lord Elgin had previously served as the Viceroy of India from 1894 to 1899, and he immediately brought that experience to bear.¹⁰² He agreed that the appointments of new staff should be approved, and surmised that a land officer from India with knowledge of settlement issues there would be the best possible candidate.¹⁰³ With the general land issues of the Land Commission postponed and the staff question settled, the CO telegraphed approval of the new appointments and expansion of staff to the EAP,¹⁰⁴ and also sent a dispatch to the Treasury explaining the expansion of the EAP budget.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Minute by Antrobus, 27 November 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

¹⁰¹ Minute by Ommaney, 28 November 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

¹⁰² For a favorable account of Lord Elgin’s tenure as the SoSC, see Ronald Hyam, *Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908: The Watershed of the Empire-Commonwealth* (London: Macmillan, 1968).

¹⁰³ Minute by Elgin, 13 December 1905, in Stewart to Lyttelton, 14 August 1905, BNA: CO 533/3.

¹⁰⁴ Elgin to Sadler, telegram, 17 January 1906, BNA: CO 533/3. On 12 December 1905 Colonel James Hayes Sadler had replaced Donald Stewart as Commissioner of the EAP; the latter having passed from pneumonia on 1 October.

¹⁰⁵ Elgin to the Secretary to the Treasury, 20 February 1906, BNA: CO 533/3.

Like the debate over Dr. Doering's lease, the same three conclusions can be drawn in the debate over the report of the Land Commission: the principles and rhetoric of autarky dominated the debate, the rhetoric of autarky was effective, and the principles of autarky were the prime mover of policy. With respect to the first conclusion, the principles of autarky were appealed to at almost every point. In the debate over free transfer, for example, Stewart, Ainsworth, and Ellis all used the principles of autarky to argue both for and against it. Stewart and Ainsworth argued that free transfer would promote effective occupation and development as owners who could not afford to develop a whole grant could sell off those portions they could not to others who were capitalized to do so. Furthermore, their plan would promote financial independence as free transfer would bring capital into the EAP in the form of speculation and taxing lands not under crops. Ellis used the same rhetoric of autarky in his historical example of Australia and New Zealand to argue against free transfer. Free transfer led to rampant land speculation that, in turn, led to horrendously ineffective occupation and underdeveloped land; a fate the CO was seeking to avoid.

Even the other topics under discussion were framed with the promotion of the goals of effective occupation, development, and financial independence in mind. A few examples will show the general rule. The restriction of selling portions of land without the commissioner's consent was rejected on the grounds that the government wanted to control the "class of men" entering the EAP, and also to prevent land accumulating in a few hands. The racial restriction to settlement in the White Highlands, too, was also argued via effective occupation; if European settlement was only possible in a relatively small area, let only Europeans settle there. Similarly, the expansion of the EAP staff to include more experienced, and therefore expensive, officers was argued with the rhetoric of autarky. Settling land laws and disputes, and faster surveys would promote faster settlement and therefore larger revenues at a later date leading to financial

independence. The CO even used this reasoning when asking the Treasury for an expanded budget for staff.¹⁰⁶

The prevalence of the principles of autarky in the discussion underlines its effectiveness. Indeed, the only position argued without using the rhetoric of autarky, limiting the municipal franchise to Europeans, was rejected by both Commissioner Stewart and the CO. The other positions, all argued as ways to promote the principles of autarky, were either accepted or, in the case of free transfer, a more effective autarkic argument was presented. To be sure, the fact that the discussion among CO officials was limited to who specifically would take the post of land officer is a clear sign that Ellis had argued definitively for his positions.

And finally, the discussion of the report of the Land Commission shows that the principles of autarky were the prime movers of policy. The effectiveness and use of the principles of autarky in the debate clearly demonstrates this. To draw on an alternative example, Sorrenson made the argument that junior officials, like Ellis, had inordinate control over the direction of policy.¹⁰⁷ However, as has been shown, this is only true that Ellis influenced the CO insofar as he argued for and promoted the principles of autarky.

This chapter, using three different, largely unrelated, discussions in the months following the CO assumption of responsibility of the EAP, maintained three points: the principles of rhetoric were ever-present, the rhetoric of autarky was effective, and the principles of autarky were the prime mover of policy. However, methodological questions can be raised. Are these points limited to the specific period under examination? The three discussions, for example, all have the same officials present: commissioner Stewart, W. D. Ellis, Herbert Read, Montagu Ommaney, and Alfred Lyttelton.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, these discussions were not followed to their

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Sorrenson, *Origins of European Settlement*, 83-87.

¹⁰⁸ While it can be argued that Stewart was replaced by Sadler and Lyttelton by Elgin by the end of the discussion of the Land Commission's report, they had arrived so late in the discussion that they had no real demonstrable impact.

ends.¹⁰⁹ Do the principles and rhetoric of autarky follow a discussion at every point, from suggestion to final implementation? Chapter four answers these questions by following the debate surrounding the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919 within the CO.

¹⁰⁹ The report of the Land Commission, for example, started a debate that culminated in the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915.

Chapter 4

The Language of Policy: The East African Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919

While chapter two followed the articulation of the principles and rhetoric of autarky during the IBEAC and FO periods of the EAP in a general sense, and chapter three followed it in three specific discussions immediately following the transition to CO responsibility, this chapter will fill the methodological gap by following the discussion of a policy from its proposal to its implementation across several years and through different CO and EAP administrations. That policy, the East African Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919, was decisive in establishing the paramountcy of European settler interests in the EAP and what would be Kenya Colony. It put the attention and financial resources of both the colonial government and the CO at the service of the European settlers with little to no regard for the majority African population. With this in mind, the Soldier Settlement Scheme has been framed in several different ways: as a defensive measure against a potential African rising, an opportunity for restless and jobless ex-servicemen;¹ a political move to strengthen the settler position;² a critical event in determining the aristocratic shape of the settler community;³ and an abandonment of policy initiative from the CO to the colonial governor, and by proxy, the settlers.⁴ These reasons and frames of reference, in and of themselves, were either thoroughly objectionable to the CO or based on unsound premises questioned by officials within the CO. Why, then, did the CO go along with a land program whose premises it rejected? By examining the correspondence between the colonial

¹ Huxley, *White Man's Country*, 2: 54-55.

² Bennett, *Kenya*, 38; E. A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change 1919—1939* (New York: NOK Publishers, 1973), 176-177.

³ Dane Kennedy, *Islands of White: Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), 53; C. J. Duder, "'Men of the Officer Class': The Participants of the 1919 Soldier Settlement Scheme in Kenya," *African Affairs* 92, no. 366 (Jan., 1993): 69-87. Duder provides excellent analysis of the aristocratic composition of the soldier settlers, but does not explain why it took that shape.

⁴ Maxon, *Struggle for Kenya*, 144-145.

government in Nairobi and the CO in London, one can see that the principles and rhetoric of autarky framed and directed the course of policy.

The precedent of soldier settlement began with the Romans. The practice of giving grants of land to veterans of military campaigns was seen as a solution to several different problems. Foremost, the state's responsibility to its soldiers could be satisfied with grants of land, as well as being a sweetener to encourage enlistment. This was also a way for the Roman state to avoid giving cash payment to soldiers. Soldier settlement also conferred military and political benefits to the state. By giving soldiers grants of land in the territory that was recently conquered, the state rid itself of politically discontented ex-soldiers, and created a friendly landed class that would be willing to defend their position in the event of a revolt or rebellion by a hostile population. Finally, the damage that war caused the agricultural sector could be avoided by having landowners invested in the development of the land.⁵ The colonial government and the settler dominated War Council would use these same basic arguments for soldier settlement, and they will form key aspects of the debate in the Kenyan case.

A Modest Proposal

In fact, it would be the War Council that would instigate the idea of soldier settlement in the EAP. The War Council was an advisory body to the governor of the EAP that consisted of civil officials, military officers, and unofficial settler members. The purpose of the War Council was to assist the governor and give advice on how to better coordinate protectorate resources with the military during the First World War. In reality, the council was an opening for the settlers to voice their political opinions and have a say in government. Not insignificantly, it

⁵ John D. Black and Charles D. Hyson, "Postwar Soldier Settlement," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 59, no. 1 (Nov., 1944): 2-3.

paved the way for elected representation of European unofficials.⁶ This new political power prompted the War Council to press for what would be the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919.

The proposal for a soldier settlement scheme was first broached in a confidential dispatch to the CO on 8 January 1916. Enclosed in this dispatch was a memorandum of the unanimous opinion of the War Council on a potential soldier settlement scheme. The principal concern of the council was the security of British colonists in a massive swath of land encompassing Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, the EAP, the Uganda Protectorate, and German East Africa, which was to come under British administration after the cessation of hostilities. The War Council suggested that security would be best obtained by “granting to each British Volunteer or soldier taking part in the East African campaign a block of land not exceeding 320 acres agricultural or 1,000 acres pastoral within the area specified above.”⁷ As to the terms of the grants, they recommended that the land “be granted on a 999 years lease at an initial rental of 10 cents per acre but without any capital charge or stand premium.”⁸

Their reason for these bold proposals rested on their fears of an African rising in the wake of their wartime experience. African soldiers who killed Europeans would, it was argued; see that they are not as inferior in combat as they presumed. The War Council stressed that African troops proved themselves to be able soldiers and, in some cases, “even vastly superior to some of the other units of the Force.” These were facts, the War Council argued, that Africans “will not be slow to realize.” The new influx of European soldier settlers would have a pacifying effect on the African population and help to simplify the “new conditions” of postwar East Africa. Since the memorandum was merely a simple summary, the War Council requested that if their scheme was not rejected outright, that a special commission be appointed to examine the details of how it

⁶ Maxon, *Struggle for Kenya*, 91-92; Huxley, *White Man's Country*, 2: 21-22; Ross, *Kenya from Within*, 80.

⁷ War Council memorandum in Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 8 January 1916, BNA: CO 533/166.

⁸ *Ibid.*

might be implemented. They closed their memorandum with the note that “as the proposed lessees would be drawn from many parts of the Empire a great Imperial purpose would be served by focusing such widespread attention on the Territory concerned.”⁹

The governor, Sir Henry Conway Belfield, noted his general approval of the War Council’s memorandum and the arguments employed in favor of the scheme. Belfield’s assent to the settlers’ position was characteristic of his governorship, despite the fact that he was appointed to curb settler advances on African land rights.¹⁰ Although he agreed on the general principles outlined by the War Council, he tempered some of the more grandiose claims. The immense area that the council recommended for the soldier settlement scheme, “between the Zambezi and the Abyssinian Frontier and between the Indian Ocean and the Congo border,”¹¹ was well outside of its authority and that of the governor. Belfield was quick to point this out to the CO, and refused to speak to anything outside the EAP.¹² Within the protectorate, however, he agreed with the War Council that the war experience “must have impressed upon the African native a sense of his value as fighting material when opposed to Europeans.”¹³ While Belfield did not imagine that an African rising was an inevitability given these new postwar conditions, he posited that a sizeable increase in the European settler population would help to nullify the possibility of a revolt, and “should be encouraged on that account irrespective of the advantage which would accrue to the country from a further flow of white immigration.”¹⁴

The last point that Belfield commented on the War Council memorandum was the expansion of the potential grantees from those volunteers and soldiers in the East African campaign to all servicemen. He noted that he did not know why the War Council restricted the

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Maxon, *Struggle for Kenya*, 44, 280.

¹¹ War Council memorandum in Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 8 January 1916, BNA: CO 533/166.

¹² Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 8 January 1916, BNA: CO 533/166.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

scheme to those serving in East Africa.¹⁵ Such a restriction, he argued, would be a tremendous missed opportunity to the detriment of the protectorate. Belfield proclaimed himself a firm believer that there would be a considerable portion of soldiers that would not want to go back to their “indoor life and to sedentary occupations” after the excitement and experience of the First World War. These men would be inclined to go, as Belfield put it, “to those parts of our Colonial Empire which can offer the inducements of temperate climate, outdoor occupation, and profitable enterprise.”¹⁶ The soldier settlement scheme had the potential of drawing these emigrants to the EAP rather than the better-known dominions, like Canada and Australia. In closing his dispatch, Belfield recommended to the CO that the scheme be open to “all men of British nationality” who served in the war, and that these men “are in a position to occupy and develop the area granted and are not endeavoring to acquire it merely for purposes of speculation and sale.”¹⁷

It is significant that the initial arguments of both the War Council and Governor Belfield for a soldier settlement scheme prominently refer to the principles of autarky, particularly development and effective occupation. Tellingly, the War Council’s memorandum lists the acreage of agricultural and pastoral land grants, rental fee and lease terms before bothering to explain the postwar security challenge that the settlement scheme was supposed to counteract! Governor Belfield attempted to highlight the security concerns behind the scheme when he noted that it should be encouraged on that merit alone, but he betrayed his autarkic stance when he admitted such immigration would bring benefits to the protectorate. Even his recommendation to expand the scheme to include all men of British nationality was couched in autarkic rhetoric.

¹⁵ Perhaps like the Romans, the War Council wanted to reward those veterans who played a part in pacifying the country they would work. However, this is merely conjecture.

¹⁶ Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 8 January 1916, BNA: CO 533/166.

¹⁷ Ibid.

He argued that to do so would bring greater attention to the EAP and attract men who would develop the land and have the capital to do so.

When the CO received the governor's dispatch over a month later, it was met with only practical concerns by the CO officials. W. C. Bottomley, a first-class clerk in the East Africa Department of the CO, minuted that he agreed with Belfield that the man fighting in Europe should be given the same consideration as the man fighting in East Africa. His primary concern, however, was the careful interpretation of what the governor termed "profitable enterprise." He wrote, "Men who go to East Africa must either possess money enough to tide over some years of unproductive labour or must be assisted."¹⁸ T. C. Macnaghten, another first-class clerk and eventual member on the committee of ex-soldier settlement,¹⁹ drew attention to the soldier settlement schemes of other colonies and self-governing dominions. He posited that their efforts would be invested in finding solutions for their problems and would not be able to do much for the servicemen from the United Kingdom proper, "at any rate until they have arranged for their own men."²⁰ Turning to the EAP itself, Macnaghten questioned whether British emigrants could thrive permanently in the East African climate. When he noted that no one knew if a British population could "retain its vigour after fifty or a hundred years" in such a climate, Herbert Read opined in the margin that it was "very doubtful."²¹ In a subsequent minute, Read commented on the security question; the supposed reason for the soldier settlement scheme. He reminded the other officials that the colonial government exercised strict control of the traffic of arms and that within the EAP there were few firearms in the hands of Africans, except those who serve in the

¹⁸ Minute by Bottomley, 17 February 1916, on Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 8 January 1916, BNA: CO 533/166.

¹⁹ Sir William Mercer, *The Colonial Office List for 1917* (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1917), 626.

²⁰ Minute by Macnaghten, 18 February 1916, on Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 8 January 1916, BNA: CO 533/166.

²¹ *Ibid.*

local armed forces. This control made the question of an African rising a relative non-issue.²² Like the War Council memorandum, it is significant that the issue of an African rising was only approached after four days of discussion in the CO, while concerns of a potential influx of settlers and their ability to thrive were immediately voiced.

The SoSC, Andrew Bonar Law, sent Belfield a response on 2 March. While he noted that a definite decision on the soldier settlement scheme could not possibly be decided at the moment, he agreed with the governor that if the scheme were to be implemented it could not be restricted to soldiers who had taken part in the East African campaign. Since no decision could be reached, Bonar Law instructed Belfield to prepare a memorandum similar to the one recommended by the War Council. It was to set out in detail the amount of available land in the protectorate, the amount of capital estimated to be required for the purchase and development of a land grant. As he closed his dispatch, Bonar Law repeated that the CO had not made any decision on the issue, “and should rumours as to land grants to those who have taken part in the campaign gain credence in the Protectorate it would probably be well that the position in this respect should be made clear.”²³ The clarification that expectations of land grants should be subdued was almost certainly an attempt to avoid the land grant troubles of Commissioner Sir Charles Eliot and Governor Sir Percy Girouard.²⁴ However, the CO may have already come to a decision, as the original clarification on potential rumors had a line drawn through it and read that rumors “should be officially denied.”²⁵

The Scheme Considered

²² Minute by Read, 21 February 1916, on Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 8 January 1916, BNA: CO 533/166.

²³ Bonar Law to Belfield, confidential, 2 March 1916, BNA: CO 533/166.

²⁴ Eliot and Girouard were both ignominiously removed from their posts for promising land grants to settlers without the express permission of the FO or CO and lying about doing so.

²⁵ Bonar Law to Belfield, confidential, 2 March 1916, BNA: CO 533/166.

On 16 August, Governor Belfield sent a lengthy dispatch to the CO with the report of the committee to examine the details of soldier settlement. The committee was composed of three prominent Protectorate officials, Barton Wright, the Land Officer and chair of the committee, A. C. MacDonald, the Director of Agriculture, and William McGregor Ross, the Director of Public Works. In accordance with Bonar Law's request, the committee enclosed statements of estimated expenditure for different land holding sizes, the potential cost of farm buildings and diagrams of them, and cost estimates for infrastructural improvements necessary to adequately accommodate new settlers.

Beyond the raw facts and figures they provided, the committee made several policy recommendations based on their examination. The first recommendation was to reduce the size of the proposed land grants. The War Council's figures of 320-acre agricultural and 1,000-acre pastoral grants were "unnecessarily large."²⁶ The Director of Agriculture advocated 160-acre farms for mixed and specialized farming and 240-acre plots for ordinary mixed farming. He justified the change in grant size by comparing the costs of developing the different sizes with their expected returns. The Director of Public Works, McGregor Ross, disagreed with the size of the minimum grant and posited that grants as small as 40 acres could be made viable. He argued that this was possible in areas that required limited development outlay, particularly with regard to available water and proximity to existing infrastructure. This was not the only point on which McGregor Ross disagreed with the rest of the committee, as we shall see.²⁷

The second recommendation of the committee was a substantial capital requirement. While the need for private capital had been addressed previously in general terms, the committee put the figure concretely at £700. The requirement assumed, first, that the grantee would provide

²⁶ Memorandum on Close Settlement in the East Africa Protectorate in Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 16 August 1916, BNA: CO 533/169.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

for his own buildings and would not receive government aid. It also took into account the estimated period of time until the farm could be self-sustaining, and left a margin for “unforeseen contingencies” like building maintenance. McGregor Ross opposed the capital requirement figure on the grounds that housing alone would cost £600 in favorable conditions over the first seven years.²⁸

Yet McGregor Ross’s greatest departure from the committee was on the purchase of land for soldier settlement. The committee introduced the idea of the colonial government purchasing suitable land for soldier settlers from existing settlers who owned undeveloped land and African and other reserves. The committee’s argument was that purchasing such land conferred benefits to the prospective settler in the form of neighbors that could give advice and help with starting up a new farm, and preexisting infrastructure. Another argument was that the spread of infrastructure and support in these existing settler areas would allow for the subdivision of land that was previously slated by the government as useful only for pastoral purposes into smaller mixed farming plots. This would increase the effective development and value of the land. Although the committee acknowledged that this plan would add yet another cost to the settlement scheme, they wanted to stress its potential advantages.²⁹

McGregor Ross created an entire appendix to the committee’s report to give voice to his objection. He first protested the idea of buying undeveloped land from settlers. By doing so, the colonial government would be complicit in the land speculation that it abhorred, beyond the massive £450,000 cost. Ross proposed that the government levy a tax of one shilling an acre on undeveloped land. This would furnish, he estimated, £100,000 of revenue and promote development of land previously untouched. The revenue would go a long way to help allay the costs of infrastructural improvements to accommodate the new soldier settlers. The proposed

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

reduction of African reserves was objected to on the lines of the cost and the lack of evidence that the reserves were “excessive for the requirements of the native population.”³⁰

One point on which McGregor Ross agreed with the rest of the committee was the proposition that the land be developed. The committee stated their objective clearly, “A further point which the Committee wish to bring forward is that provision should be made to secure the end sought for by Government, namely, to settle men on the land, and not to make presents of areas which can be immediately sold or transferred.”³¹ To this purpose, the committee suggested that personal occupation of the land granted be a requirement, and that the lease be withheld until the grantee fulfilled the development and occupation requirements. To further prevent the possibility of land speculation, the grantee would not be allowed to transfer land until the lease was awarded. Additionally, the committee put a premium on the personal quality of the potential grantees. To ensure the proper quality was attained for the scheme, they recommended two selection boards be established to screen candidates, one in England and one in the EAP.³²

The War Council reviewed the report by the committee and their opinions were included in the dispatch to the CO as a separate memorandum. They attacked all of McGregor Ross’s positions in as direct a manner as permissible. The controversial issue of purchasing land in the reserves was tactfully sidestepped. Seeing the issue as too controversial, the War Council requested that it be tabled so as to not “complicate and delay the issue.” Therefore, the sections of the report considering the issue should not be considered, including Ross’s opposition appendix. The War Council continued, “in any case this Appendix raises a question which in the

³⁰ Appendix to Memorandum on Close Settlement in the East Africa Protectorate in Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 16 August 1916, BNA: CO 533/169. McGregor Ross served on the Legislative Council from 1916-1920 and found himself frequently at odds with its settler members. His antagonism of the settlers eventually led to his forced resignation in 1923.

³¹ Memorandum on Close Settlement in the East Africa Protectorate in Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 16 August 1916, BNA: CO 533/169.

³² Ibid.

opinion of the War Council has no bearing on a close settlement scheme but is a matter of general policy.”³³ It then took Ross’s building estimates in its sights. They posited that the Director of Agriculture’s estimates were “adequate” and that Ross’s appendix on farm buildings and cost “should be ignored.”³⁴

McGregor Ross was no friend to the European settlers, especially the War Council.³⁵ This fact sheds light on not only the hostile reception of his views by the council, but also his disagreement to several of the points suggested by the committee. These disagreements are clearly oppositional to the scheme itself and the settlers generally, rather than simple developmental and cost concerns. His suggestion that the minimum grant be set at 40 acres would curb the large-scale alienation of land to Europeans. The estimate that building costs alone would be near £600 had the potential to scuttle the scheme because of unreasonable capital requirements. His objection to buying land from African reserves was the first example of official concern for Africans with reference to the scheme beyond the fear of a potential rising. It is significant that Ross couched his positions in autarkic terms. Although governor Belfield would make no mention of his dissenting opinions to the CO, it plainly shows the importance placed on the principles of autarky in official decision-making within the protectorate.

The governor’s commentary on the committee’s report and the War Council’s memorandum was centered on two concerns: the capital requirement and the inaccessibility of the land to be granted. As to the former, Belfield stated that he was “bound to come to the conclusion that, unless financial assistance is provided, the success of any close settlement scheme must necessarily presuppose the possession by the settlers of a small capital.”³⁶

However, he also entertained the suggestion of the War Council “that a limited number of farms

³³ War Council memorandum in Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 16 August 1916, BNA: CO 533/169.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ross, *Kenya From Within*, 186-188.

³⁶ Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 16 August 1916, BNA: CO 533/169.

should be earmarked for alienation to potential settlers who are not possessed of the requisite capital but who may nevertheless desire to take up small holdings after two or three years residence in the country.”³⁷ This plan would expand the European population immediately after the war and provide the supposed security that was the original reason for the scheme. The governor’s latter concern of land inaccessibility was divided into road and railway estimates. He placed the road estimate at £334,000, but wrote, with a tinge of uncertainty, “that a comparatively small expenditure of say £50,000 would probably suffice in the first instance.”³⁸ Railroads were a greater concern to Belfield than roads. He wrote, “Until therefore Government is able to embark on the expenditure necessary for the construction of railways it is not possible to say that a close settlement scheme would be a complete success.”³⁹

When the CO received the dispatch, F. G. A. Butler, the private secretary to Bonar Law,⁴⁰ took ten days to compose a thorough minute. After outlining the contents of the dispatch, he concluded that the EAP government could not afford the massive costs entailed in a large settlement scheme, and that “any experiment that is tried must clearly be on a much less ambitious scale.”⁴¹ This smaller scale necessitated, according to Butler, the limitation of potential applicants to those men “who have actually served in the East African campaign.” While he did not feel justified in making a general decision at the moment, he proclaimed, “we must do something for the double purpose of shewing some appreciation of the services of the white men who have fought for us in the arduous East African campaign, and of endeavoring to increase the white population of the Protectorate in face of the overwhelming native

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Mercer, *The Colonial Office List for 1917*, 531.

⁴¹ Minute by Butler, 29 September 1916, on Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 16 August 1916, BNA: CO 533/169.

population.”⁴² With rationalizations for the scheme, Butler went on to list potential guidelines for another commission of inquiry in the EAP, and sent his minute on for review.⁴³

Macnaghten voiced the same doubts he had in February about the viability of a permanent British settler population. He argued that if “expert medical opinion” advised that a British population could not thrive in East Africa, then “any scheme for facilitating the settlement of the ordinary British soldier in British East Africa would in my opinion be purely harmful.”⁴⁴ Beyond mere health concerns, Macnaghten drew on the famous imperial writer H. Rider Haggard’s commentary on South Africa. Macnaghten wrote, “Sir H. Rider Haggard said of South Africa that the conditions there ‘rule out the Union at any rate at present as a place where the British ex-working man or ex-private soldier should seek a home save in exceptional cases’ but commended the country for half-pay and retired officers and persons with capital at command. Do not these views apply with even greater force to British East Africa?”⁴⁵ In the margin alongside a narrative he wrote of the potential hardship of the “poor ex-soldier,” an official wrote, “the position of a well-to-do settler or a retired ex-officer is quite different.”⁴⁶

Herbert Read agreed with Butler that a “big scheme was out of the question,” but he had several other concerns.⁴⁷ His first apprehension was that a commission composed of official and unofficial representatives might raise expectations “which we may be unable to satisfy.” He pointed to the possibility of the protectorate not being self-supporting, or, if it was, not able to foot the massive bill to improve infrastructure. Second, Read objected to Butler’s reasons for pursuing the scheme. He suggested that soldiers engaged in “not less arduous campaigns in

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Minute by Macnaghten, 3 October 1916, on Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 16 August 1916, BNA: CO 533/169.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Minute by Read, 6 October 1916, on Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 16 August 1916, BNA: CO 533/169.

other parts of the world” should not be excluded. As to the prospect of an African uprising, Read noted that there would still be a large military presence in East Africa at the end of hostilities and that, barring the Northern Frontier District, the Africans had no firearms and were “unwarlike.” He concluded his minute by asking if it might not be better to delay the scheme until the end of the war.⁴⁸ Sir George Fiddes, the permanent undersecretary of state, agreed with Read’s suggestion to delay, and reminded the other officials that the shortage of labor “had already become acute” before the war.⁴⁹

Almost two weeks later, Arthur Steel-Maitland, the undersecretary of state for the colonies,⁵⁰ minuted that he agreed with Butler’s suggestion for a commission in the EAP to consider the details of a potential scheme. In agreeing with Butler, Steel-Maitland disagreed with Read that such a commission would raise expectations. “They are raised already,” he stated.⁵¹ The CO, he argued, would be in a “very false” position if they denied the governor’s suggestion for a local commission. However, he did agree with Read on one point, “To hold the matter over to the end of the war is wise in many cases but peculiarly unassailable in this, as the end of the war is just the location to meet which steps should be taken if at all.”⁵² On 3 November, Bonar Law sent a response to Belfield consenting to his formation of a commission with official and unofficial members. He told Belfield that the body that would be the Land Settlement Commission, should be restricted in considering a capital requirement for applicants, and that the CO would not provide funding for either individual settlers or infrastructure.⁵³ Just

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Minute by Fiddes, 9 October 1916, on Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 16 August 1916, BNA: CO 533/169.

⁵⁰ Mercer, *The Colonial Office List for 1917*, 678. An Eldon scholar with a First in Classics from Balliol College, Oxford, Steel-Maitland was an M.P. for East Birmingham from 1910 and chairman of the Unionist Party in 1911. He was made parliamentary undersecretary of state for the colonies on May 31, 1915.

⁵¹ Minute by Steel-Maitland, 25 October 1916, on Belfield to Bonar Law, confidential, 16 August 1916, BNA: CO 533/169.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Bonar Law to Belfield, confidential, 3 November 1916, BNA: CO 533/169.

as Read proposed, Bonar Law's dispatch marked the cessation of serious consideration of the soldier settlement scheme until the end of the First World War.⁵⁴

The correspondence of 1916 set the stage for the establishment of the Soldier Settlement Scheme of 1919, and the decisive arguments considered by both officials in the CO and the EAP were linked to the principles and rhetoric of autarky. McGregor Ross, the voice of opposition to the scheme in the protectorate, carefully framed his arguments in terms of effective occupation, development, and financial independence. In his separate appendix, Ross protested that the proposed plan to buy undeveloped land from settlers would make the government complicit in land speculation and cost a staggering £450,000. These two points clearly show an undermining of effective occupation and financial independence. Within the CO, Macnaghten argued against a large and general plan by raising the question of whether the common European could thrive in the East African climate. He noted that it could only work if the "well-to-do settler" or "retired ex-officer" settled in the country, not the "poor ex-soldier." These arguments were countered or nullified by the committee's commitment to developing and settling the land by recommending personal occupation, capital requirements, and selection boards.⁵⁵ However, the debate over the scheme would be tabled until after the end of fighting in the First World War.

At the very end of 1918, discussion of the soldier settlement scheme resumed with a telegram from acting governor Sir C. C. Bowring⁵⁶ that outlined the recommendations of the Land Settlement Commission that was created in 1916. There were several departures from the

⁵⁴ The reason for this was not because of the policy agreed upon in the CO, but because the commission to examine the scheme did not write their report until after the war.

⁵⁵ It is important to note that Ross, as a member of the committee, conceded that the land should be settled; and that the capital requirements and selection boards would ensure that the "well-to-do" settler of Macnaghten's objection would be approved.

⁵⁶ Sir Charles Calvert Bowring served as the chief secretary of the EAP from 1911 to 1924, during which time he intermittently served as the acting governor. In this instance, Bowring had assumed the role of acting governor after Belfield left the EAP in April 1917 on home leave to England and would serve in that capacity until February 1919. Belfield retired while still on leave in 1918. Robert Maxon and Thomas Ofcansky, *Historical Dictionary of Kenya* (Blue Ridge Summit: Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2014), 29, 321-322.

original committee recommendations. The commission advocated a capital requirement of £500, much less than the original estimate, and, perhaps more importantly, the addition of 83,000 acres from Kikuyu reserves and 53,000 acres from forest reserves for small farms. However, Bowring admitted his hesitancy as to the practicability of taking this land at the present moment. The commission agreed with the original committee that an occupation requirement would be imposed for six months before title was issued. It also followed the CO's original instructions and set limited funding for infrastructure and none for direct assistance to individual settlers. The last major point that the commission stressed was that "the present labour supply is not organized to cope with any large and immediate influx of settlers."⁵⁷

The CO's response was a telegram on 13 February 1919 asking for the new governor, Sir Edward Northey's, considered opinion with regard to the commission's report.⁵⁸ Governor Northey, a supporter of European settlers,⁵⁹ would engage in what Robert Maxon terms "government by telegraph;" the deliberate use of telegraph messaging to keep policy initiative out of the CO's hands.⁶⁰ He showed this tendency immediately with his rapid and short telegrams to the CO. On 17 February he told the CO that while the report was ready, it was effectively useless without the supporting evidence, which was not.⁶¹

Debate, Decision-making, and Telegrams

Five days later, on 22 February, Northey wired a summary of his views to the CO. While he noted that he had only just received the Land Settlement Commission's report and could not

⁵⁷ Bowring to Long, telegram, 30 December 1918, BNA: CO 533/199.

⁵⁸ Milner to Northey, telegram, 13 February 1919, BNA: CO 533/199.

⁵⁹ Huxley, *White Man's Country*, 52; Maxon and Ofcansky, *Historical Dictionary of Kenya*, 228-229. Major General Sir Edward Northey was educated at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and had a diverse military career. He served in the North West Frontier Operations (1891), the Boer War (1899-1902), and during the First World War as a brigade commander in France and Belgium before becoming the commander of the Nyasaland/Rhodesia Field Force in 1916. Northey's military education and career, distinct from the classical and scholarly educations of CO officials, may explain the speedy and results-driven approach he took to his term as governor of the EAP.

⁶⁰ Maxon, *Struggle for Kenya*, 140.

⁶¹ Northey to Milner, telegram, 17 February 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

give his “final opinion” yet, he repeated some of the recommendations that had been outlined by Bowring. Northey drew particular attention to the personal quality of the potential applicant, and the unavailability of African labor. He ended the telegram with the assumption, “Feel sure that you wish me go ahead with details without reference to you. Meanwhile am willing receive applications posted me here from ex-soldiers for registration.”⁶² This assumption was all the more bold as he admitted that he did not have the time to “formulate definite proposals.” Lord Milner, the new SoSC, quickly responded to Northey with a few points. The product of a meeting with Macnaghten and Leopold Amery, the new undersecretary to Milner, this telegram proposed to issue a public notice of the scheme with specific reference to the £500 capital requirement, the African labor shortage, the nature of the farms, and the experience the colonial government expected of potential applicants. Beyond this, Milner stressed his reluctance to Northey’s speed and autonomy, “Like you I am anxious to make progress but consider that definite principles should be agreed upon. Please state what principles you have in mind.”⁶³

On 8 March, the “Indian Question,” a contemporaneous debate about the position of Indians⁶⁴ within the EAP, figured itself into the soldier settlement scheme. A delegation of Indians met with Amery at the CO at the end of February to discuss the potential inclusion of Indian soldiers who served in East Africa in the settlement scheme. They proposed to Amery, “For the scheme to be a success it would be necessary to make it clear that it was one for the settlement of Indian farmers of a good class, for their own benefit and as a reward for their services to the Empire, and not for the provision of Indian labour for European planters.”⁶⁵

Northey telegraphed his opinion clearly to the CO. He stated, “I consider that any land available

⁶² Northey to Milner, telegram, 22 February 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

⁶³ Milner to Northey, telegram, 5 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

⁶⁴ To avoid confusion and continually switching terms between Indian and Asian with regard to quotations, Indian will be used in all cases.

⁶⁵ Enclosure in Northey to Milner, telegram, 8 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207. This enclosure was not sent by Northey to Milner, but attached to the telegram to give it context as the telegram was a response to it.

for settlement in this Protectorate other than that required for British European soldiers should be given to Somalis, Arabs and other African natives of this Protectorate who have served the King loyally in this war.” However, this was merely a gesture. He continued with his real policy vision, “Moreover I am satisfied that all the available land will and should come under cultivation in due course under European supervision with greater advantage to the Protectorate itself and to the local natives than by the importation from another portion of the Empire of immigrants of another race.”⁶⁶

The response within the CO to Northey’s telegram was mixed. Bottomley first noted that Northey had indeed said “a great deal” in a short telegram. His recommendations were framed by his view that the goal of the colonial government should be “the development of the African, so that he can in the future take a proper share of his own country.”⁶⁷ Bottomley stressed his fear of potentially restricting African development by actively importing Indian immigrants, and pointed to the service of the Carrier Corps and King’s African Rifles as just as worthy of reward with land. Northey’s position on European settlement was just as susceptible to Bottomley’s development objection. He minuted, “The weak point is the difficulty of getting the land back from the Europeans, so that the native can have it for himself when he is capable of making full use of it.”⁶⁸

Amery’s answer to Bottomley was direct, “Africa for the Africans is a policy which can hardly come into consideration for East Africa in any case. We are committed to a policy of white settlement in the highlands; there is already a considerable Indian community, mainly traders; the Arabs and Somalis, whom the Governor would favor, are also Asiatics or at any rate just as alien to the natives as the Indians.”⁶⁹ He went on to rationalize this position in autarkic

⁶⁶ Northey to Milner, telegram, 8 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

⁶⁷ Minute by Bottomley, 11 March 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 8 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Minute by Amery, 18 March 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 8 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

terms, “The real question in a relatively thinly peopled and new country like East Africa is how to secure the maximum development for the resources of the territory for the benefit of all its inhabitants present and prospective, including any immigrants who can do well there and contribute to the general prosperity.”⁷⁰ Even with this strong pronouncement, Amery was guardedly open to the idea of the settlement of a “really good type of Indian agriculturalist.” However, these questions were seen as a matter of general policy that did not concern only the EAP, “and one on which the general policy must come from this office and not from the local Governors.”⁷¹ While Milner advised waiting to hear from the Indian government before making a policy decision,⁷² the principle of European soldier settlement was certain.

The Indian Question brought up the topic of African welfare in relation to the soldier settlement scheme for the first time in the CO. Although McGregor Ross had indirectly defended it, African welfare had not formed as the subject of a debate among CO officials. It is important to see that when it did arise, it was consumed by concerns for effective occupation and development. British ideological concepts of empire, like the trusteeship of African interests espoused by Bottomley, were either thrust aside or ignored.

Yet there was little time to dwell on these heavy policy pronouncements. On 14 March, Northey finally sent the telegram the CO originally requested. He disagreed with the report on several different points and proposed changes. His first major deviation was the capital requirement. Where the commission recommended £500, Northey recommended £1,000. This massive increase prompted him to propose dividing the potential applicants into two different classes, Class A applicants would have less than £1,000 and take up wage labor in the protectorate while developing their holding, and Class B applicants would have the required

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Minute by Milner, 2 April 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 8 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

capital and pay a premium for the farm “at a fair valuation.”⁷³ With his suggestions sent, he finished by telling the CO that he was ready to start selecting local candidates.

Bottomley, as the head of the East Africa Department, was again the first official within the CO to comment on Northey’s telegram. His first concern was that the premium price that Northey recommended would “materially reduce the attractiveness of the scheme.” Second, he worried that the governor was rushing the application process. As Northey had recommended allotment of land to take place in person in the EAP and he wanted to start these allotments in July, Bottomley recalled the difficulty of transporting applicants to the EAP and advised telling the governor to limit the initial allotments to 500,000 acres in an attempt to give applicants from abroad an equal chance as those already within the protectorate.⁷⁴ Macnaghten agreed with Northey that there should be a purchase price as that was the standard used in similar schemes elsewhere.⁷⁵ Amery was in agreement with both officials and proposed a compromise where the purchase price would be accepted, but fixed “substantially below the value.”⁷⁶ Milner was in agreement and wired Northey instructions to set the price low and limit initial allotment to 500,000 acres.⁷⁷

Yet Northey sent another telegram to the CO before receiving Milner’s instructions. His first of several new recommendations was that “three members with East African experience” be appointed to the selection board in London. Northey recommended Sir Northrup McMillan, Captain Ewart Grogan,⁷⁸ and P.H. Clarke, all of whom were, conveniently, already on their way

⁷³ Northey to Milner, telegram, 14 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

⁷⁴ Minute by Bottomley, 24 March 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 14 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

⁷⁵ Minute by Macnaghten, 26 March 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 14 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

⁷⁶ Minute by Amery, 28 March 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 14 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

⁷⁷ Milner to Northey, telegram, 29 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

⁷⁸ Captain Ewart Grogan was famous internationally for his 1896 “Cape to Cairo” expedition to win the approval of his father-in-law. In Kenya, Grogan was infamous for publicly whipping three African rickshaw operators for supposedly insulting two European women, one of whom was his sister. He was only fined £34 and sentenced to a month in prison, but since there were no European prison he served his sentence in a government bungalow. Maxon and Ofcansky, *Historical Dictionary of Kenya*, 108-109.

to England. Second, he told the CO that he was prepared to allot up to 800 farms to Class B applicants on the 1 July allotment. Although he had not yet received word from Milner, he justified his haste by arguing that any delay might cause these Class B applicants, the men with significant capital, to look to other parts of the empire for opportunities for investment. He also presented a representative scheme that would allow applicants in England to hire representatives within the EAP to select the farms that they want. This eliminated the need for applicants in England to be in the protectorate in person and the delay of allotment. Finally, Northey laid out his timetable; applications for the first allotment would stop by 14 June, the names of applicants approved by the selection boards would be drawn by lottery for 1 July allotment, a one month grace period for grantees to exchange titles for contiguous farms, and finally the titles would be published on 1 August. He closed his telegram by telling the CO that he had drawn up conditions of payment, development, and residence for the grantees, but would send them after he had received approval of the “scheme as outlined.”⁷⁹

“The Lottery Part of the Affair”

Upon receipt of Northey’s telegram, the CO was consumed by questions surrounding the proposed lottery system. Bottomley immediately expressed clear concern, “The lottery arrangements are obscure to me.”⁸⁰ He noted that if applicants were already selected by the board and have chosen their farms, there would be no need for the exchange period for contiguous farms as they would already be so. However, if the lottery were implemented along the lines of two drawings, one for an applicant and one for a random farm, “a particular applicant may find himself with a farm quite unsuitable to his particular purpose and 200 miles away from that of his friends with whom he wished to work.” In this case, the exchange of titles would be absolutely necessary. He stated that he did not object to the lottery in principle, and that while he

⁷⁹ Northey to Milner, telegram, 25 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

⁸⁰ Minute by Bottomley, 31 March 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 25 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

preferred to have those approved by the board be guaranteed a farm, it might be helpful in the possible situation of more applicants than farms, at which point the selection would favor those who applied first.⁸¹ Macnaghten was entirely against the idea of a lottery, and agreeing with Bottomley's preference for selection "in all cases." To avoid the problem of too many applicants, he proposed the selection of applicants "by installments of so many hundreds at a time."⁸² Fiddes surmised that in the case of applicants outnumbering farms there were only two systems that would avoid discontent, "lottery or 'first come, first served.'" Like Bottomley and Macnaghten, he preferred the latter, but it would be unfair to those soldiers who would be demobilized at a later date.⁸³ With no clear answer, the CO merely requested that Northey send details of the lottery proposal.⁸⁴

Characteristic of his "government by telegram," Northey's fast responses caused an overlap in communication, normally avoided in dispatch writing. His 6 April telegram was a long, in-depth response to Milner's request for details of the soldier settlement scheme.⁸⁵ Interestingly, whether by design or by chance, several points of the telegram were garbled and rendered unintelligible. Even so, several important aspects of the scheme were laid out as well as smaller details, such as the location of the selection board in Nairobi. Perhaps most importantly, Northey simplified the size classifications of land grants into two classes, Class A farms of less than 160 acres and Class B farms of more than 160 acres. These new classes would correspond to the class A and B capital requirements of potential applicants. Since the Class A applicant would have less than the required £1,000, Northey proposed that they not be subjected to the initial purchase price that Class B, with the requisite capital, would be. He agreed with

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Minute by Macnaghten, 1 April 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 25 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

⁸³ Minute by Fiddes, 1 April 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 25 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

⁸⁴ Milner to Northey, telegram, 4 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

⁸⁵ Milner to Northey, telegram, 29 March 1919, BNA: CO 533/207.

Milner's recommendation that only 500,000 acres be allotted in the first instance, and to that end he told the CO that he was prepared to allot 250 class A farms and 800 class B. Only applicants of "purely European extraction engaged in active service" were to be considered, as well as nurses. Personal occupancy and development requirements were established along the lines of the CO. The lottery was mentioned as a part of the allotment process, but no details were included.⁸⁶

The sole comment on the telegram came from Bottomley and expressed both extreme pressure and confusion. He first noted that the governor's telegram was the basis for a press announcement and official statement from the CO as to the soldier settlement scheme. These public statements were desperately needed as the CO was besieged by requests for information on the scheme. Beyond the corruptions from transmission, Bottomley stressed that the telegram was "difficult to understand." He was "as much in the dark about the lottery part of the affair as ever," and it was a matter of serious importance that the CO be able to tell potential applicants where they stood to receive land as early as possible.⁸⁷

Bottomley highlighted the latter point with two examples. The first example was a man who had served in the EAP for twelve years and resigned on account of his deafness and prospects for promotion. He had war service and was eligible for the scheme, but was eating into his capital waiting for the scheme to be implemented and demanded to know whether he would definitely be allotted land or not. The man reminded Bottomley that the colonial government was definitely allotting land to certain schemes, and pointed to the disabled officers colony.⁸⁸ When told that it was a special circumstance for disabled officers, he said he "was (through his deafness) quite as much disabled in the public service as anybody who had lost a leg

⁸⁶ Northey to Milner, telegram, 6 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

⁸⁷ Minute by Bottomley, 11 April 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 6 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

⁸⁸ This was a scheme for disabled officers to work a flax farm.

in the war.” The other example was of “an officer of an excellent type who has to find employment in order to keep himself going before he can have a farm allotted to him.” When asked if he could seek employment and still be considered for the scheme, Bottomley replied in the affirmative. Bottomley told the CO that these cases illustrated “the sort of questions which we will have to answer by the hundred when the scheme is announced.”⁸⁹ He closed his minute with the note that the draft telegram was proposed under “extreme pressure” and wished that it “be got off at once.”⁹⁰ His request was heeded and with no further comments by the other officials at the CO, Milner sent a telegram asking Northey for clarification of the lottery and the corrupted portions of the telegram.⁹¹

On 14 April, governor Northey finally sent his clarification of the lottery alongside the final detailed plan of the soldier settlement scheme. The plan was of almost no account to the officials of the CO; they gave minor marginal changes almost exclusively in the character of wording and grammar. The principles of the scheme, which remained unchanged from the previous telegram, had already been agreed to. Northey’s explanation of the lottery was the final missing piece to the CO’s vision of the overall scheme. He explained that the names of applicants selected by the selection boards in Nairobi and London would be drawn against numbers denoting the order in which they could choose their plot of land. The applicants would then be able to select the plot that he desires that has not been allotted to those before him or her in the order of selection. If there were to be more plots than applicants, the lottery would merely determine order of selection. However, if there were more applicants than plots of land, those applicants that drew blanks during the lottery would be excluded.⁹²

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Milner to Northey, telegram, 16 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

⁹² Northey to Milner, telegram, 14 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

The CO gave little in the way of opinions on the scheme as laid out by Northey. Bottomley summarized his thoughts on the scheme as it stood: “If we are not to give anyone a definite promise of land this arrangement is as good as can be devised.”⁹³ With no other opinion, he asked that the drafts of the official statement and press announcement be examined by the other officials before publication.⁹⁴ George Grindle, the assistant undersecretary of state for the colonies,⁹⁵ was only concerned with the practical considerations facing the CO. He recommended the hiring of a special staff to “deal with the applications which will pour in as soon as the press notice appears.”⁹⁶ With no serious concerns from other officials, Milner merely wired Northey the presumption that those applicants that drew blanks in the lottery would be placed in the second allotment.⁹⁷

Although governor Northey’s “government by telegram” led to confusion and appeared to be rushed, the CO never lost control nor were they challenged in any meaningful way in establishing how the soldier settlement scheme would take shape in the EAP. The confusion surrounding the lottery and circumstances of individual cases were cleared up by Northey in a satisfactory way so as to not merit continued discussion by officials. When the CO voiced major developmental, financial, and occupation concerns, such as the lowering of the premium price or limiting the initial allotment to 500,000 acres, Northey adopted the recommendations without protest. Indeed, even the speed with which Northey pushed the program appeared to be in line with Bottomley’s anxiety to let potential applicants know where they stood to receive land as soon as possible. While the general principles were agreed to with little problem, execution would be a different matter.

⁹³ Minute by Bottomley, 22 April 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 14 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Sir William Mercer, *The Colonial Office List for 1919* (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1919), 615.

⁹⁶ Minute by Grindle, 26 April 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 14 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

⁹⁷ Milner to Northey, telegram, 26 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/208.

Problems of execution arose quickly. The requirement that applicants selecting farms for allotment had to be in the EAP, either personally or by representative, created complications that the CO sought to address. Moreover, these problems necessitated information that the CO had hitherto not considered. Milner sent a telegram to Northey on 1 May with suggestions and requests for information. He first noted that the reproduction of maps and catalogues in London for selection of land grants would leave “no chance of completion of statement of choice by June 14,” the deadline of the first allotment. Milner therefore suggested that the deadline for London applicants be postponed for a month. Additionally, he requested to know the number of Class A and B farms assigned for London applicants and how many altogether.⁹⁸

Northey quickly sent a response telegram three days later. In response to Milner’s request to postpone the deadline for selection in London, he told the CO that he anticipated that “the majority of London applicants will prefer to make choice of farms through agents here with extensive local experience.” Even so, Northey expected to have the catalogues and maps necessary for selection in London sent in time to allow a full month before the deadline without postponement. He stressed the latter point by stating that any delay of allotment would cause the “greatest dissatisfaction here as date has been definitely advertised and many applicants have been waiting months in this country,” presumably spending their development capital on maintaining themselves in the protectorate. To Milner’s question about the number of Class A and B farms allotted, Northey had 260 and 1,080 total farms respectively, but he did not discriminate between farms assigned to London applicants and local applicants. He closed his telegram to the CO with a stern message: “I trust that Your Lordship will instruct Home Selection Board to hustle. I am hustling here to get things done and not to further postpone matters but if Your Lordship decides that allotments for home applicants must be postponed then

⁹⁸ Milner to Northey, telegram, 1 May 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

please authorise me to allot up to the 500,000 acres to local applicants on the dates already advertised.”⁹⁹

Northey’s telegram was received with increasing anxiety and discomfort at the CO. Charles Jeffries, a second-class clerk and member of the Home Selection Board,¹⁰⁰ made these feelings quite clear by stating that the governor’s telegram showed that he “under-estimated our difficulties.” The time by which the maps and catalogues would reach London would not give the CO enough time, only four days. Jeffries insisted, “We must clearly have the month’s grace which we have asked for.” Given this need, he saw no reason that Northey could not allot the initial 500,000 acres as long as the interests of London applicants were protected against applicants in the protectorate taking all the best land. While Northey insisted that London applicants would not need maps and catalogues if they were aided by representatives, Jeffries maintained, “even those who know nothing of the country will want to know how they stand and what farms are available.” Clearly frustrated, he could not help but note, “some hint of the difficulties caused by the premature publication of the scheme in E.A. seems called for also.”¹⁰¹ George Grindle repeated Bottomley’s fears, “We cannot afford to be rushed into a fiasco over a business of such importance, and must insist on being given time to organize it properly. As it is I am very much afraid the allotment will go wrong.”¹⁰² In his response telegram, Milner told Northey that the CO required the month’s grace requested earlier. In order to prevent discontent in the protectorate, Milner allowed Northey to allot the 500,000 acres locally before London applicants provided that those acres be drawn by lot from the whole area to be alienated to protect London applicant interests.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Northey to Milner, telegram, 4 May 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

¹⁰⁰ Sir William Mercer, *The Colonial Office List for 1920* (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1920), 667.

¹⁰¹ Minute by Jeffries, 6 May 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 4 May 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

¹⁰² Minute by Grindle, 6 May 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 4 May 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

¹⁰³ Milner to Northey, telegram, 7 May 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

Despite governor Northey's admonition that the Home Selection Board act quickly, it was still reviewing the conditions of the scheme at a preliminary meeting on 12 May. The meeting, consisting of three prominent settlers, the previous governor Henry Conway Belfield, and Bottomley, felt the rush of time as acutely as the CO. Lord Cranworth, one of the settlers on the selection board, and Belfield both considered that there would not be enough time to complete the selection process by the proposed date. They suggested an additional two months, but did not press the issue. However, the most important suggestion again came from Lord Cranworth. He proposed that the London lottery be a simple ballot that would draw names of applicants against the catalogue of farms.¹⁰⁴

The CO jumped on Lord Cranworth's suggestion of a lottery by ballot. Jeffries, in an exceptionally long minute, laid out the strengths and weaknesses of such a plan. He began with the obvious problem that the plan would give the applicants no choice in selecting their farms, except for the period of exchange after initial allotment. However, he posited that the majority of applicants under the current system would not get much choice either. Since most of the London applicants would be relying on the same representatives in the EAP for farm selection, most applicants would select the same plots and the first to choose would get all the best land with the remainder having no choice. This would lead to reshuffling just like in Cranworth's lottery plan. Jeffries put it simply, "if the principle of Lord Cranworth's suggestion be accepted, a considerable amount of expense could be saved."¹⁰⁵ Bottomley concurred and noted the approval of the whole selection board for the plan.¹⁰⁶ Milner quickly asked Northey if the new lottery plan was acceptable.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Minutes of preliminary meeting of the East Africa Land Settlement Selection Board, 12 May 1919, on Northey to Milner, 17 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

¹⁰⁵ Minute by Jeffries, 13 May 1919, on Northey to Milner, 17 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

¹⁰⁶ Minute by Bottomley, 13 May 1919, on Northey to Milner, 17 April 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

¹⁰⁷ Milner to Northey, telegram, 15 May 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

The CO's problems were not lessened on the receipt of Northey's next telegram in reply to Milner's request for the number of Class A and B farms assigned for local and London applicants. He told the CO that he assigned 200 Class A farms for local applicants, but only 53 for those in London. His argument was direct; it was better to "accommodate the poor men now in East Africa Protectorate before importing more."¹⁰⁸ In the CO, Charles Jeffries was quick to point out that the governor was right to reserve 200 farms locally. However, he envisioned public discontent among London applicants for Class A farms. With a large number of applicants expected and only 53 farms to allot, almost all of the applicants would be rejected out of hand. Jeffries drew the conclusion that it would be better to limit allotment of Class A farms to the Nairobi selection board. This would save the London board time, effort, and the ire of rejected applicants.¹⁰⁹ Bottomley and Grindle both agreed without any serious concerns.¹¹⁰

Execution Despite Everything

Even so, the CO had trouble establishing the particulars of executing the soldier settlement scheme. Much of this trouble lay with Northey and his desire to allot farms by 14 June at all cost and without regard for the CO's difficulties in launching their selection board in London. Indeed, Charles Jeffries was right to place the blame for this rush on Northey's premature publication of the scheme in the EAP and raising expectations. Yet, the only serious disagreement with Northey from the CO was his handling of the affair; issues of general principle were accepted out of hand as they conformed to the promotion of the principles of autarky. In truth, the level of cooperation between the colonial government and the CO was remarkable considering the difficulties of Northey's style of communication and official

¹⁰⁸ Northey to Milner, telegram, 14 May 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

¹⁰⁹ Minute by Jeffries, 16 May 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 14 May 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

¹¹⁰ Minute by Bottomley, 17 May 1919, on Ibid; Minute by Grindle, 17 May 1919, on Northey to Milner, telegram, 14 May 1919, BNA: CO 533/209.

frustration with it.¹¹¹ The CO voiced their need for more time to screen applicants to the governor in terms of their desire to see the scheme succeed and place applicants of means in the EAP. This latter point was best illustrated in the CO's lack of concern at being allotted only 53 Class A farms so as to address the poor settlers already there.

While the soldier settlement scheme would go on to be a bugbear for both the CO and the colonial government, its establishment clearly showed the supremacy of using the rhetoric and principles of autarky in affecting colonial policy, especially in the face of policies and actions that the CO found objectionable. When it was first discussed in 1916, issues of security and African welfare were superseded by policy arguments expressed by the principles of autarky. Opponents of the scheme, like McGregor Ross and T. C. Macnaghten, couched their objections in ways to show that it would either not succeed in its autarkic aims or impede them. This is critical as it showed that despite the fact security and particularly African welfare were of grave importance to the CO, they were not effective in themselves to sway officials in the CO or the EAP.

The power of the rhetoric of autarky goes even further. These principles also proved to be an effective screen to racist and controversial policies, like the exclusion of Indian and African soldiers from the scheme, which would otherwise open the CO to political and humanitarian criticism. Such criticisms were anathema to the CO, and while it could be argued that Amery, the voice of these policies, could set policy by virtue of his position of authority, it does not account for the fact that there was no criticism or advice to the contrary from the permanent officials of the CO after he appealed to the principles of autarky. Even the longstanding institutional practice of dispatch writing was thrust aside, much to the displeasure

¹¹¹ This is perhaps an even stronger example of the principles of autarky operating as a prime mover of policy. Northey threw aside institutional practice, precedent, and the personal issues of individual CO officials in all cases when they were pressed for in their own right, but he also fell in line with the CO when it argued along the lines of effective occupation, development, and financial independence.

of the CO, when the impact of delay on attracting effective occupants to the EAP was argued.

Truly, the rhetoric of autarky was the language of policy.

Chapter 5

Conclusion: An Adaptive Model

This study has shown that the principles and rhetoric of autarky were the decisive factors in decision-making in early colonial Kenya in a variety of ways. Chapter two followed the earliest British administration of the EAP by the IBEAC and the FO. By examining the transfer of responsibility from the IBEAC to the FO, the Parliamentary debate over funding the Uganda Railway, and articulation of settlement policy by the FO, the prevalence of the principles of autarky in determining policy was established. Chapter three showed, through the close study of three different policy discussions after the EAP's transfer of responsibility from the FO to the CO and using the transfer as a historiographical focal point, that the principles of autarky were the "prime mover" of policy rather than the traditional explanations of the personalities of individual officials, institutional practices, and precedent. And finally, chapter four charted the course of the soldier settlement scheme of 1919 from its proposal to implementation to argue that the principles and rhetoric of autarky formed the "language of policy" that determined how the scheme would come into existence; even if it contained elements the CO found objectionable. Each of these chapters used a different approach to the primary and secondary sources to illustrate how this model is not limited to a particular methodological approach. However, some historiographical and philosophical questions about the nature of the principles and rhetoric of autarky remain. With the evidence for the model well documented, it is time to answer these questions.

Ideology? Or Something More?

David Armitage defines ideology in two senses, "first, in the programmatic sense of a systematic model of how society functions and second, as a world-view which is perceived as

contestable by those who do not share it.”¹ In both of these senses, the principles of autarky can be understood as an ideology. They assume, in the first instance, a systematic model of how society functions and seek to employ policies that best satisfy that assumption. In the second instance, the principles of autarky, particularly the principle of effective occupation, can be contested by others.² Ideology, and therefore the principles of autarky,³ are classified as an object that is aspired to and contested.

However, like Cowen and Shenton’s grappling with the definition of “development” as both process and object,⁴ the principles of autarky should likewise be viewed as both. Uniquely, the principles of autarky are a process that lead to themselves. While this appears to be a paradox on the surface, the interconnected nature of the principles clearly shows how this is the case. Effective occupation leads to development in the form of private capital and tax revenue for financial independence. Development brings in effective occupants and also allows for an increase in trade, both of which lead to revenues for financial independence. And financial independence allows the government to develop the territory and attract effective occupants.⁵ Each of the principles of autarky, therefore, are a process leading to the other.

The character of the principles of autarky as both object and recursive process shows that they can be defined as both ideology and something more. As process, the principles of autarky have the ability to effectively coopt other ideologies to achieve its ends.⁶ The ideological concept of difference noted by Thomas Metcalf, for example, allowed for an ordering of people

¹ Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*, 4.

² The ideological sense of contestation was best illustrated in the third chapter by the rejection of Indians from the soldier settlement scheme.

³ That is to say in this instance “ideology” and “the principles of autarky” share definitions. I do not mean to take the principles of autarky as the whole of ideology.

⁴ M. P. Cowen and R. W. Shenton, *Doctrines of Development* (London: Routledge, 1996), 3-4, 438-439, 444-445.

⁵ This point has been made in both chapter one and two. Likewise, this combination of relationships between them is not exhaustive, but illustrative.

⁶ A parallel can be drawn with the principles of autarky coopting the traditional movers of policy (personalities of officials, precedent, and institutional practice) identified in the second chapter.

based on so-called scientific principles and observations.⁷ Such an ideology of difference allowed the British to justify placing European effective occupants on the land over locals that, because they were different culturally, socially, and economically, would prove, officials argued, to be ineffective occupants. This point was effectively argued in the first chapter in the guise of the idea of European settlement as claimed by commissioner Sir Charles Eliot. However, the examination of the nature of the principles of autarky as ideology raises another important question, the question of race.

The Role of Race

Race, although of paramount importance in the African context, has not been a central theme in this study. Indeed, the only mentions of race were incidental.⁸ This speaks to the incidental nature of race as related to the principles of autarky. In other words, the principles of autarky do not inherently deal with race, and if they do, it is only contextual to the situation. To use the capital requirements of the soldier settlement scheme as an example, the primary motivation was to bring in effective occupants with capital. To that end, both poor whites and Indians and Africans were largely excluded from the scheme.

However, this simple example is open to several potential objections on the basis of race. First, some poor whites were figured into the soldier settlement scheme in the form of the smaller “Class A” farms with little to no capital requirement. If even poor Europeans without capital were allotted farms in the scheme, it follows that race, and not the capital requirement, was the decisive factor in who was allowed into the scheme. Second, building on the previous conclusion, the capital requirement could be an administrative smokescreen for racial rejection

⁷ Thomas Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 45-47, 114-115. Metcalf's example of the rebellion of the Oudh peasantry in support of the taluqdari system and the reinstatement of that system is a sterling example of this point.

⁸ The exclusion of Africans and Indians from the White Highlands, as well as from the soldier settlement scheme, are examples of race as an incidental theme.

from the scheme. Third, the stated original reason for the scheme was to bring in more Europeans to prevent a possible uprising of Africans. And finally, the racial principle of exclusive European settlement in the White Highlands had been established prior to the proposal of the scheme.

These objections have to ignore the principles and rhetoric of autarky in the official correspondence, and do not hold up under scrutiny. While there were the Class A farms set aside for poor Europeans in the scheme, this class of farm was continually reduced in size and objected to by many officials, except in the case of governor Northey's argument that they could help the poor Europeans already in the EAP. Next, if the capital requirement was a simple smokescreen to allow for a racist policy, there would not be the level of contention and debate over many years and administrations surrounding such a requirement and its particulars. Additionally, the third chapter demonstrated how the original reason to bring in Europeans was in fact a smokescreen for advancing the principles of autarky! And the final objection was addressed in the first chapter, advancing the principles of autarky was the deciding factor, but it was informed by racist concepts, particularly by individuals like commissioner Sir Charles Eliot. These refutations support the critical distinction raised at the beginning of this section: the principles of autarky do not inherently deal with concepts of race but can be informed by them. With the principles and rhetoric of autarky avoiding simple definition as an ideology or manifestation of concepts of race, a final point remains: the principles of autarky can be applied to historical contexts beyond early colonial Kenya.

Moving Forward

This study had an acute focus on early colonial Kenyan decision-making, but the principles of autarky can be applied to a variety of other historical contexts. Within this study, the relevance to other areas has been made clear. The rough genealogy of the principles of

autarky in the introduction illustrates that it can be applied to political and administrative thought anywhere from Classical Greece to the British Raj. Even the officials in this study knew its broad relevance in other colonial contexts, such as T.C. Macnaghten and W.D. Ellis giving historical examples of South Africa and Australasia respectively to reinforce their arguments.

Yet the chief argument in favor of the broad applicability of the principles of autarky comes from its nature as an adaptive paradigm. Put simply, the answer to the questions ‘what is effective occupation,’ ‘what is development,’ ‘what is financial independence,’ will change from context to context. For example, the answer to the first question changed across all three chapters, but it did not change the intensity of its effect.⁹ This adaptability has many historiographical applications beyond the new perspective on colonial Kenyan history. To use a specific example to illustrate the point, the French concepts of the *mission civilisatrice* and *mise en valeur* were the way in which French imperial ideology announced its pursuit of the principles of autarky.¹⁰ And finally, the model provides insights for administrative history in general: how powerful, unspoken conceptual forces, like the rhetoric of autarky, shape and control administrative policy discussions.

⁹ In other words, what qualified someone as an ‘effective occupant’ changed continuously in the form of capital requirements, development requirements on the leased property, personal occupation, etc. However, these changes did not alter the impact of the principle of effective occupation.

¹⁰ See Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 4-7. Interestingly, Conklin’s introductory explanation of French imperial ideology as either “mastery” or “freedom from tyranny,” both primarily in a physical sense, mirrors the central concept of autarky. What is a better way to live “mastery” or “freedom from tyranny,” than to be self-sufficient?

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