

policies. Even more ominous than the “militarization of the war on drugs,” is the privatization of the war. Chouvy details the recruitment of DynCorp International to spray coca fields in Columbia and engage in forced eradication in Afghanistan where its operatives frequently “has to fight its way out of...[these] operations without achieving much by way of its suppression objectives.” (115) The role of private companies does not bode well for a future reassessment of repressive drug policies. Self-interested companies like DynCorp can employ lobbyists or otherwise impact any retrenchment in this decades-old struggle; the California state prison guard union’s current attempts to stymie marijuana legalization is but one example.

Despite an overall level of excellence, Chouvy’s research does have missteps, primarily concerning Afghanistan. Although these are mostly minor in nature (such as claiming the Badakhshan province was not a traditional opium-producing region), the most disappointing conclusion was his dismissal of allowing Afghanistan to be a legally certified opium producer. Although he presents compelling economic data to back his argument, historical precedence is ignored. During the Second World War, the US and Afghanistan entered into a short-lived but fruitful opium alliance. For the duration of the war, Washington became Kabul’s number one customer. Symbolically, the significance of the tons of opium purchased was demonstrated in its location during the war: the US Treasury Vaults.

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**Elisa Camiscioli, *Reproducing the French Race: Immigration, Intimacy, and Embodiment in the Early Twentieth Century* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2009).**

Immigration and national identity have been salient and volatile issues in French politics and society for at least the last quarter century. Certainly the rise of the far-right National Front and the emergence of myriad ethnic identity movements among immigrant communities testify to the centrality of the debate over national belonging and the rights of citizens in contemporary France. In *Reproducing the French Race* Elisa Camiscioli charts the early manifestations of these debates in the context of the Third Republic in France and colonial rule overseas from the 1890s to the 1930s. She studies the place of immigrants from Europe and France’s colonies in the metropole in the interwar period in order to interrogate how the concepts of Frenchness and citizenship were articulated amid worries over depopulation and industrial decline. Camiscioli’s central argument is that the issues of “race and reproduction were critical to the construction of French national identity” and “gender intervened in fabricating racial hierarchies which cast white

Europeans alone as assimilable.” (2) Camiscioli makes use of Michel Foucault’s concept of “biopolitics,” which links the realm of the intimate with the public domain of policy through action on actual bodies by way of regulation, analysis, public discourse, and categorization. The argument unfolds in what Camiscioli calls an examination of five “rich moments” in the history of the late Third Republic: pronatalist politics, industrial production, *métissage*, white slavery, and independent nationality for married women (16). *Reproducing the French Race* fits well within a copious body of scholarship on the history of the late Third Republic and its paradoxical legacies of universal rights, imperial expansion, and gender differentiation.

Camiscioli’s monograph treads over the now familiar ground of the seeming contraction between the French Third Republic’s universalist pretensions (extolling the fundamental rights of man, equality, etc.) while enacting a range of particularist practices and discourses that exclude a variety of categories of people from sharing in the Republic’s universal citizenship (colonial subjects, racial others, women, etc.). What emerges is a picture of a fundamentally conservative state and society that exploits the language of egalitarianism in order to restrict rights to white males who meet unstable cultural definitions of Frenchness. One of Camiscioli’s strongest arguments and most important contributions to the extant scholarship of the period is to successfully demonstrate the techniques by which the fates of French women and colonial subjects are linked, thus marginalizing both categories from full national belonging, while also “marrying” their paths to liberation or acquisition of citizenship rights (156). Interestingly, women attain the right to vote and have many of the exclusionary aspects of the civil code removed in the wake of the Second World War, roughly the same period when rights are increasingly extended to colonial subjects and the process of decolonisation is firmly set in motion. Camiscioli navigates the complex process whereby certain categories of immigrants (namely those from Italy, Spain, and Portugal) are welcomed as potentially French, albeit after a period of cultural training and reproduction with natural born French women, while colonial subjects are systematically relegated to the status of undesirable and unassimilable. In fact, French women’s liaisons with colonial subjects are cast as fundamentally threatening to Frenchness and to the virtue of French women. Thus, one of the tropes of contemporary immigration politics in France is well established by the Second World War.

*Reproducing the French Race* is well written and studiously argued. While much of the work covers established ground and confirms the conclusions of many scholars who have worked on similar subjects and the same time period since the cultural turn in historiography during the 1980s, Camiscioli’s work is worth reading and offers a cogent summary of the discursive origins of contemporary anti-immigration politics in France as well as the vitriolic debate over French national identity. At times the argument is a bit overstated especially in

Camiscioli's attempt to draw continuities between Third Republic conservatism and Vichy France (49, 77, 84, 158-159). While it is true that elements of racism, exclusionary discourses, and conservative policy were all present during the Third Republic and at times were even ascendant, it is equally valid that there were many forces within Third Republic France that resisted those tendencies and stridently fought for a more egalitarian France true to the universalist and social justice traditions of French republicanism. After all, if Vichy France had its origins in particularist elements of the Third Republic did not the Resistance also have its roots in that period as well? One of the pitfalls of an uncritical use of Foucault's ideas is a tendency to flatten complexities and subsume everything into a totalitarian and hegemonic discursive framework that precludes meaningful rupture or resistance that escapes the bounds of the dominant power/knowledge system. Despite this common affliction, I recommend Camiscioli's work as one of the more important studies of immigration and identity formation in early twentieth century France.

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**Matthew Karush and Oscar Chamosa, eds., *The New Cultural History of Peronism: Power and Identity in Mid-Twentieth-Century Argentina* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010).**

This book edited by Matthew Karush and Oscar Chamosa adds a fresh perspective to the already voluminous scholarship on Peronism. Framed by an insightful introductory theoretical essay by the editors and Mariano Plotkin's concluding reflections for future research, the book gathers seven essays by contributors who share the theoretical approach of the "new cultural history", advanced in recent decades in the Latin American field. Influenced by Gramsci, subaltern studies, and the linguistic turn, cultural history is not defined as the mere study of official cultural policies but as "as a way of studying politics" with the goal of reimagining "the encounter between the state and the masses." In this approach, individual and collective identities and political imagination, never homogeneous, are culturally constructed in the dynamic relationship between state and society relations and result from pressures from both above and below (12-13).

This approach is particularly useful to explore Peronism, whose ambiguities and contradictions have always rendered it very difficult to explain with clear-cut categories such as class. The idea that Peronism built upon as well as radically transformed pre-existing identities, language, aesthetics, and policies has already been opened by the historical and theoretical works by Juan Carlos Torre, Daniel James, Tulio Halperín Donghi, and Mariano Plotkin, among others. On the other hand, this book's novelty is that it deepens that fruitful approach and frames it