

intergenerational transmission of working-class and/or oppositional consciousness as younger workers found employment in the auto and service industries that now dominate the Youngstown area? Given the high profile struggles of autoworker and electrical workers at GM (Lordstown) and Packard Electric, and the widespread organization of professional and service employees in the area, there is a good bit of evidence that oppositional consciousness continues to exist among both the working and middle class in Youngstown. Regardless, it is certainly worthy of additional study and could be an important sequel to this book.

Overall, despite its flaws, *Steelworker Alley* is an important contribution to new working-class studies. Not only is it worker-centered, but it attempts to deal with the contradictory expressions of class in America. The book should be of interest to labour historians and educators, social scientists, and cultural geographers. Further, it can be easily used in a variety of classroom settings to facilitate discussions of class in both the workplace and community.

John Russo
Center for Work-Class Studies
Youngstown State University

Nicole Hahn Rafter, *Creating Born Criminals* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1997).

Coinciding with a number of contemporary entanglements – particularly debates over IQ testing, welfare policies and applied genetics – a large body of critical work on early twentieth-century eugenic discourse has surfaced in the last two decades, addressing and undermining our familiar distinctions between “nature” and “nurture.” While eugenics typically evokes a pallid legacy of sterilization laws and genocide, the historical trek of “the wellborn science” has influenced the logic and practice of more institutions than we might care to acknowledge. As such, the most worthwhile accounts of twentieth century eugenics refuse the lure of posing it as a disqualified field of knowledge against which contemporary science and public policy have been thoroughly inoculated.¹ Instead, certain varieties of eugenic thinking were folded into to the ideological mainstream of Progressive social science, which crafted an ideal of “artificial selection” to slice between the chaotic abandon of *laissez-faire* economics and the roaming perils of mass democracy. While the full flourish of old-school eugenics no longer registers to the degree it did nearly a century ago, its unpleasant echoes remain as both warning and invitation. Noting, for instance, the continuing appeal of biological theories of crime – and the dearth of literature on the legacy of “eugenic criminology” – Nicole Hahn Rafter warns that “if we demonize turn-of-the-century eugenicists, or dismiss them as

crackpots, we cannot learn from them. We need to look closely at America's previous involvement with eugenic experimentation, including crime-control efforts, to prepare ourselves for developments ahead" (240). Rafter supplies a welcome tool for the task.

Creating Born Criminals excavates the birth of modern criminology from roughly 1875-1930. Specifically, the book tracks two concurrent processes: (1) the professionalization of medical officers, asylum superintendents, psychologists and psychiatrists, all of whom claimed varying degrees of privileged insight into the nature of criminality; and (2) the development of asylums, training schools, reformatories and prisons charged with the restraint of "moral imbeciles," the "feeble-minded," "psychopaths" or "defective delinquents." Following an argument made familiar by Steven Jay Gould's *Mismeasure of Man*, Rafter contends that biological theories of misbehavior – far from being momentary detours along the royal road to an authentic and disinterested criminology – actually served as foundational moments in which middle-class experts solidified professional boundaries and articulated their worth to the project of national fitness. In doing so, Rafter makes significant contributions not only to the history of criminology (which sorely needs this book), but to the critical historiography of prisons and the law as well as psychology, psychiatry, and mental retardation.²

Creating Born Criminals demonstrates that eugenics should be regarded as "social work" in the broadest and least affectionate sense of the term. Eugenic criminology in particular, and the human sciences more generally, crafted a social vision in which the treatment and punishment of individual miscreants required the classification and screening of vast populations for signs of impending corruption and hereditary taint. Against the "classical" school of criminology, which regarded crime as an individual (and willful) act, "scientific" criminology staked out its disciplinary claims by casting the individual offender as a helpless (though no less vicious) incarnation of one among many innately deficient human types loping across the landscape. Eugenic criminologists in particular, Rafter explains, viewed criminality "as not a loss but as a lack, not an acquired condition but an innate one, a form not of insanity but mental retardation" (7). By World War I, Rafter suggests, criminality came to be identified with an amorphous class of thieves and perverts whose legal transgressions were equaled only by their *hereditary* weakness and, thus, the reproductive peril they appeared to pose. During this period superintendents and medical officers abandoned the paternalistic goals of universal education and training and restigmatized the "feeble-minded" as hapless, licentious paupers whose own health (and that of the wider society) demanded a program of permanent segregation and eugenic surveillance. The significance of this shift is not simply that modern criminology explained crime by reference to the offender (thus blotting out any sense that social and economic arrangements might be implicated); instead, Rafter describes how the roots of

criminality were envisioned at ever-deeper points in the “nature” of the defective individual.

The first phase of this process was arguably its most spectacular. Aligning themselves with the field of “criminal anthropology” (made famous by Cesare Lombroso, the Italian arch-theorist of “criminal man”) late-nineteenth century Americans such as Arthur MacDonal, G. Frank Lydston, Eugene Talbot, and August Drähms proposed that a distinct and *visible* criminal class, unique and dangerous in its physical and psychological make-up, existed apart from (though too close for comfort to) “normal” humanity. Not surprisingly, the literature of criminal anthropology was replete with descriptions of “born criminals” as evolutionary throwbacks in the midst of civilization. As a result, moral condemnation of criminal behavior and unfavorable observations of the criminal body were cross-hatched with patterns of scientific racism that emphasized the physical inferiority of Africans, Native Americans and other subject peoples around the globe. Criminologists such as Lydston and Talbot enumerated the “racial” features of the born criminal (gargantuan jawbones, misshapen and asymmetrical crania, dangling arms, pendulous ear lobes, and so on) in order to contrast them implicitly if not directly with the gold standard of a symmetrical Anglo-Saxon beauty. Via criminal anthropology and other “degenerationist” discourses, Rafter explains, “many Americans now perceived their nation as a vast organism, its parts interconnected by the hidden currents of blood and heredity. If one part grew ill, its poisons might secretly infect the whole” (128). By articulating criminal stigmata with prevailing ideas of race, disease and national vitality, criminal anthropology helped institutionalize a logic that was duplicated elsewhere in the form of miscegenation laws, segregation, and colonialism.

As Rafter indicates, however, the observations of criminal anthropologists did not readily translate into coherent managerial policies. Moreover, criminal anthropologists were hardly unanimous on the topic of what should be done with “born criminals” once they had been exposed. Some writers argued for “asexualization” and even euthanasia to correct the most extreme criminal types, while others merely advocated the foundation of permanent colonies for the isolation of America’s least wanted. Prison officials, for their part, were somewhat skeptical of the vague categories and lack of diagnostic consensus exhibited by criminal anthropologists. It was unclear, for example, how to classify prison populations on the basis of anthropological data. Were hefty-jawed offenders to be segregated from those with freakish ears? Were oxycephalics (those with narrow, “sugar-loaf” heads) to be given more vigorous employment than the brachycephalics (those with rounder heads)? Should the “born criminal” be segregated from the mere “habitual criminal” (who might possibly be steered towards more respectable conduct)?

Here, Rafter argues that the professionalization of psychology – measured by its growing distance from philosophy and its turn to empirical work at the end

of the nineteenth century – offered a more satisfactory alternative. Whereas criminal anthropologists lacked a decisive mechanism for identifying the potential offender, psychologists such as H. H. Goddard deployed intelligence testing to detect the hereditary mental incompetence that he viewed as the fundamental source of criminality. Hired in 1901 by the Vineland (New Jersey) Training School for Feeble-Minded Boys and Girls, Goddard adopted a version of the Binet-Simon scale. From this preliminary work, Goddard concluded that the vast majority of criminals and delinquents were drawn from the ranks of the so-called “high-grade” feeble-minded, whose mental age hovered between nine and twelve. Goddard argued that feeble-minded delinquents were left undetected in the general population because they appeared capable of acquiring useful skills and leading average lives. “The public,” he wrote, “is entirely ignorant of this particular group. Our public school systems are full of them, and yet superintendents and boards of education are struggling to make normal people out of them” (138). These “morons” – and we have Goddard to thank for this epithet – were especially dangerous not only because they seemed “normal” but also because their mental development had stalled at “primitive” levels. Criminal imbeciles owned none of the moral restraints needed to choke off their most heinous impulses; even if they had not yet transgressed the law, it was only a matter of time. Thus, in *The Criminal Imbecile* (1915), Goddard suggested that the feeble-minded be understood as “criminals without crimes” – a population of rancorous, dim-witted souls who wandered undetected throughout the national landscape.

Penal reformers utilized the work of Goddard and other eugenic researchers to propose legislation tailored specifically to the menace of the moron, the “criminal imbecile,” or (as they were increasingly tagged) the “defective delinquent.” This portion of Rafter’s book is especially strong, mainly because it elaborates more fully upon the gender and class biases that sustained emerging policies of “indeterminate sentencing” in American criminal justice. Rafter’s 1990 study, *Partial Justice: Women, Prisons and Social Control*, offers a more detailed exploration of this trend, but here she argues persuasively that “defective delinquency” was a thoroughly-gendered discourse that constituted women as sex offenders and men as undisciplined workers. Although the rate of incarceration for women was comparatively small, the sexuality of defective women was perhaps the central problematic for eugenic criminologists who regarded their bodies as “profoundly and pervasively deviant.” The image of “lascivious, hyperfecund mothers of criminals and other degenerates” allowed criminologists and public officials to scrutinize the lives of poor women in ways that were not duplicated for male offenders (159).

For the better part of a decade, and especially between 1912 and 1915 (the dates of Goddard’s studies of *The Kallikaks* and *The Criminal Imbecile*), theories of defective delinquency and criminal imbecility provided the discipline of psychology with the means to exert hegemony over American

criminology and prison management. By World War I, however, psychiatrists began to offer their own competing narratives about the intellectual competence of the average offender. Led by Bernard Gleuck, William Healy and Edith Spaulding among others, the “new psychiatry” salvaged its professional standing by leaving the chronic insane behind in the asylums and turning its attention to more prevalent, “borderline” mental illnesses in the surrounding community. Intelligence testing, psychiatrists claimed, could not detect the more widespread problem of “psychopathy,” which was less an *intellectual* deficit than an *emotional* illness that generated impulsive, unbalanced, maladjusted, disruptive and deceitful behavior.

Against the use of intelligence testing to measure vast populations at once, psychiatrists counterpoised the individual case study, or “dossier,” and established their own court clinics, prison laboratories and community programs for the maintenance of “mental hygiene.” In collecting longitudinal “life histories” of delinquents, psychiatrists argued that criminality was a great deal more complicated than intelligence testing and eugenic genealogies alone could ascertain. The concept of psychopathology, then, served not only as the crowbar with which psychiatry pried institutional hegemony away from psychology, but it served as a bridge for the transfer of “born criminal” theory from one discipline to another. Psychiatrists offered fewer eugenic claims than did the psychologists, but nevertheless continued to suppose that criminal dispositions (now figured as psychopathologies rather than a general feeble-mindedness) were in-born and for the most part incurable. Thus, they were able to recommend similar measures of confinement – indeterminate sentences at specialized institutions – without relying on hereditarian arguments that were gradually falling out of favour. In this way, the legacy of eugenic criminology remained even as eugenics itself retreated into the background of the human sciences.

Throughout *Creating Born Criminals*, we are alerted to the manner in which eugenic criminology supplied a *different* vision of the criminal – or, to put it another way, supplied a vision of the criminal *as difference*. This vision extended new forms of disciplinary power not only over inmates themselves (in the form of indeterminate sentencing and “defective delinquent” prisons, for example), but over the population as a whole (through IQ testing, the “mental hygiene” movement, and so on). Consequently, ordinary citizens were encouraged to recognize themselves (and those around them) along a continuum of normality/abnormality crafted by the “psy” sciences.³ In a manner of speaking, eugenic criminology replaced the burglar, the sodomite, or the arsonist (categories that summarized discrete *acts*) with a more properly scientific taxonomy of “the feeble-minded,” the “defective delinquent,” or the “psychopath” (categories that relied upon the intervention of physicians, psychologists, and other trained experts who surveyed and evaluated the craven *essence* of the criminal being). The project of merely correcting law-breakers

retreated in many respects as the nineteenth century drew to a close and new fields of expert knowledge submitted an ever-expanding catalogue of faulty souls to its altruistic scrutiny.

As such, eugenic criminology provided scientific validation for a nascent professional class who regarded “deviant” others – blacks and Asians, immigrant workers, the rural poor, prostitutes, the disabled, and so on – as threats to national vitality. In certain respects, though, *Creating Born Criminals* suffers by incompletely contextualizing the important issue of nationalism and racial identity. In emphasizing the micro-politics of specific institutions, reconstructing the rich genealogy of terms such as the “moral imbecile” or the “defective delinquent,” and describing the professional alliances that congealed around the image of the unfit during the early twentieth century, this wonderfully executed book leaves several problems up for grabs. It would be especially valuable, for example, to set Rafter’s evidence in the context of more recent work on the political history of whiteness, especially Matthew Frye Jacobson’s *Whiteness of a Different Color* (1999). Heavily laden with the anthropological rhetoric of savagery and the anxieties over race-mixing embodied in miscegenation statutes, the biological discourse on crime – as with eugenics more broadly – was nevertheless largely an extended conversation about the unequal gradations within the white race (an observation that Rafter herself makes in the introduction to *White Trash* but leaves in the background of this text). Whereas the presumptive depravity of Asian and African Americans was remarked upon and accepted almost unanimously in the literature on “born criminality,” eugenicists such as Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, and others spend much more time noodling over the “inferiority” of certain white populations. Although *Creating Born Criminals* takes note of race, immigration and xenophobia as conditioning factors in this discourse, it leaves open several questions that subsequent scholarship would be wise to consider. Is it possible, for instance, that eugenic criminology may have been shaped or even injured by the discourse of “ethnic pluralism,” which also emerged from the social sciences in the 1920’s and assumed a more powerful ideological position in the next few decades? How did scientific theories of innate criminality respond (if obliquely or indirectly) to the reconfiguration of democracy and citizenship in the latter part of the twentieth century?

I suspect that these sorts of queries would enhance rather than dislodge the central arguments in *Creating Born Criminals*, which must now be counted as an obligatory starting point for any thorough understanding of science, crime and ideology in America. In Rafter’s text, it is not difficult to find the embryonic structures of racial profiling, the abhorrent solitude of “supermax” facilities, and the Constitutional atrocities of sex-offender notification statutes. Although we do not need to locate their undesirable, eugenic ancestors to detest these practices, Nicole Rafter has shown us how to look.

David Hoogland Noon
University of Minnesota

¹ See, for example, Marouf A Hasian, Jr., *The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought* (Athens, Ga. 1996); Stephan Kuhl, *The Nazi Connection: Eugenics, Racism, and German National Socialism* (New York 1994); Philip R. Reilly, *The Surgical Solution: A History of Involuntary Sterilization in the United States* (Baltimore 1991); Leila Zenderland, *Measuring Minds: Henry Herbert Goddard and the Origins of American Intelligence Testing* (New York 1998); Evelyn Fox Keller, "Nature, Nurture, and the Human Genome Project," in Daniel Kevles and Leroy Hood, eds., *The Code of Codes* (Cambridge, Ma. 1992); Ruth Hubbard and Elijah Wald, *Exploding the Gene Myth* (Boston 1993); Troy Duster, *Backdoor to Eugenics* (New York 1990); and Richard Lewontin, *Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA* (New York 1993).

² For compatible historical accounts of criminology, see Piers Beirne, *Inventing Criminology: Essays on the Rise of Homo Criminalis* (Albany 1993); Robert Nye, *Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline* (Princeton 1984); and Marie-Christine Leps, *Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of Deviance in Nineteenth-Century Discourse* (Durham 1992). On mental retardation, see James Trent, *Inventing the Feeble Mind: A History of Mental Retardation in the United States* (Berkeley 1994).

³ See, for example, Nikolas Rose, *Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood* (New York 1996) and *Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self* (New York 1990).

Alain Grosrichard, *The Sultan's Court: European Fantasies of the East*, trans. Liz Heron (London: Verso, 1998).

Both Grosrichard's work and its late 1970s companion, Edward Said's landmark *Orientalism* (1978) appeared within a year of each other, and both ostensibly share similar preoccupations: the dismantling and interrogation of Western "conceptions" of the Orient. Whilst *Orientalism* became internationally recognized, Grosrichard's *Structure de serail* (1979) "acquired only a limited – albeit enthusiastic – group of admirers"¹: this highly readable translation should justifiably extend its readership. Whilst Said's work examines the foundations of a modern Orientalist discourse, the way in which the West constructs and conceives of the (particularly Arab) Orient in a bewildering variety of ways in order to dominate it, Grosrichard focuses his critical gaze on the fictions that created a Western European political and sexual sense of the Ottoman Turkish empire at a time when it still represented a substantial threat. Recently, many critics have questioned the validity of an orientalist discourse in the early modern period, when the Ottoman Turks posed such a substantial threat to the rest of Europe that the Western dominance upon which such a constrictive discourse is based simply did not, and could not exist.² Furthermore, it has been suggested that rather than a mutual exclusivity, the powers of East and West