



THE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN ACTORS IN ETHNO - POLITICAL CONFLICT: CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CENTRAL AFRICA

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Abstract:

The Central African Republic is an extremely impoverished country that has seen little development since its independence from France in 1960. It is ranked 180 out of 186 countries on the U.N. Human Development Index (report 2016) and is in the Fund for Peace's top 10 failed states, next to Haiti and Afghanistan. The latest surge of violence in the country began when the Séléka rebels captured power in March 2013. They were responsible for mass killings, sexual violence, and looting. This paper critically analyses the factors that led to the outbreak of that conflict one of which the role that played by the foreign actors in this conflict. The research found that there are four main elements that caused the conflict in the CAR including exclusion, repression, and competition over resources and foreign involvement. One of the important reasons behind that conflict is an economic factor which is the struggle for power and resources among political elites. The paper also found the repression combined with exclusion policies adopted by the Bozize and the precedent regimes also contributed to the outbreak of violence in CAR finally, the empirical evidence showed that there was a deep economic crisis behind the conflict, with the withdrawal of foreign investors the Commercial crops such as cotton, coffee, also have deteriorated as well as the exploitation of forest income has declined.

Keywords:

Ethno-Political Conflict, Competition over Resources, Seleka, Anti-Balaka, Francois Bozize, Michel Djotodia

1. Introduction

Ethnic conflict can be defined as any episode of sustained violent conflict in which national ethnic and religious or other communal minorities challenge government or other ethnic groups to seek major change in status (Bates 2003). An ethnic conflict between two contending ethnic groups, while the source of the conflict may be political, social or economic. The individuals in the conflict must expressly fight for their ethnic group's position within society. This final criterion differentiates ethnic conflict from other form of struggle. In Central African Republic (CAR), even though the Sango (local language) is the national language spoken by the majority of Central Africans, CAR still one of the deep diverse countries both ethnically and culturally. It hosts a diverse range of ethnic groups. According to 2003 census, CAR has population of about 4.3 million from which the Christian constitute 80 % of the total population. The Muslim constitutes only 15 % of the population (Agger 2014). The latest surge of violence in the country began when the Séléka rebels (mostly Muslims) captured power in March 2013 and committed atrocities against civilians. As a reaction to that violence self-defences groups named Anti-balaka emerged. This latter was responsible for mass killings, sexual violence, and looting too. (Anderson, MB, Brown 2013)

This paper examines the economic aspect based on theory of competition over resources as cause of conflict to find out how competition over natural resources of CAR by both internal and external actors led to the outbreak of sectarian violence. Furthermore, the paper reviews the foreign interference into the conflict in CAR.

2. Literature review

The human experience with the conflict dates back to the emergence of the first human race (Robyn short 2000). To understand the phenomenon of ethnic conflict many scholars started before anything else by figuring out its causes. Number of researchers including economist sheds light that ethnic conflict are mostly economic interest

driven conflict. The promoters of this approach tend to associate the competition over resources as the main factor or direct element that causes violence. Struggle engaged by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition, acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation.

Another group of researchers demonstrate that conflict is driven by a factor that called "Elite manipulation". These scholars argue that ethnic conflict is merely elite driven clashes. Because leaders incite ethno-nationalism to secure their own hold on power (nationalism studies project 2008). According to these scholars the mass can be easily manipulated by political leaders seeking to mobilize social group ethnically distinct group especially when a society going through socio-economic difficulties (Gellener 1983).

The structuralisms (international system) propose that there are structural factors as element that causes violence. Willet Susan and Ayoob Mhammed claims that there are long term factors (structural) elements which are interconnected political social and economic factors that causes conflict in many parts of the world. For instance, the population pressure, distributional injustice and the depletion of natural resources are encouraging element for violence.

Another group mainly of international relation analyst argues that the territory's intrinsic value attached by a group of people to a specific land is one of the main driven factors of conflict. According to them the parties of the conflict attach some identity-based to territory; therefore, they are willing to use force to secure a valuable territory. According to theories of extreme ethnic violence or the post-soviet ethnic violent conflict is the essentialism approach that called sometime ancient ethnic hatred or primordial antagonism as the trigger of ethnic violence. Scholar's falling under this category argues that the presence of ancient mutual hostility mixed with differences such as religion and culture can lead to a conflict.

Finally, another group of researchers suggest the rational choice approach to explain ethnic violence. According this perspective ethnic violence can be merely explained by the outcome of rational choice or decision that made by individual to accomplish potential target. Because human beings are strategic calculators and goal-oriented creators, they choose whatever means sometime violence to achieve a given goal. Moreover, this group of scholar incorporated some realist ideas from international relation theories to draw conclusion of the rationality of ethnic violence. They believe that ethnic violence accrues when there is not going to be a change in the status-quo because "when a leader sees the costs of war are less than the expected costs of further decline" (Christoph 2014).

3. Economic Causes Of The Conflict


Most of the data that issued by formal institution shows not good stand of socio-economic development in CAR the poverty index report of 2018 indicates that 80 % of the CAR's population earn less than 2 \$ a day. These facts might go worth in the rural era where there is no public transportation facility. Hence, the human development index of 2103 indicated that CAR ranked 185 out of 187 countries. These figures show the bad performance of economy in CAR. This economic and political turmoil and constant state of insecurity that ravaged the CAR did not start up with the arrival of the Rebels to Bangui and overthrown of the regime by SELEKA militias, but it began before the SELEKA alliance come to power in March 2013. According to many observers this crisis is the direct outcome of political instability which lasted more than 10 years which is caused by previous social and economic crisis (UNDP 2014) Is the combination of the economic "degeneration" that installed in the country since 1980 s , add to that the failed democratization process in the late 1990s a process from which a there three military personnel have ruled the country as well as the structural mismanagement that lasted for decades . Therefore, it is important to examine the economic aspect of this crisis.

3.1 Deep economic crisis

After the Golden age of CAR's economy which is associated with the collective memory of the ex-formal president BOKASSA, the CAR's economy has stagnated gradually. From the end of late 1990s to the present days, the number of companies operating in the country has decreased from 521 to 52, (Jean Christoph victor 2018) for instance on the wake of the crisis in 2015 Only one metal establishment survived, and this company was looted during the invasion of SELEKA these criminal attitudes has forced its owners to stop all their activities which were limited to exploitation. Yet, the leaders of Central Africa have always been proud of mineral wealth of the country, a real metal sector as it never existed as a specific industrial field of metals; including gold and diamonds. For example, they are shaded in a traditional way which is very modest compared to other producers in the African

continent and most of their activity remains outside the control of the state. Another element that influenced the CAR's economy is that the commercial crops such as cotton and coffee, also have deteriorated and have not yet reached the level of old production and only agriculture (Keenan, M. and A. Giffen 2014). However, basic cereals and vegetables have enabled the majority of the rural population to survive and other extractive activities as companies (human security report 2013) the exploitation of forests no longer exceeds the fingers of one hand and the cost of financing which made it very difficult in terms of competitiveness in the international market especially with the withdrawal of investors. The following chart showing the economic output of CAR since 1980 to 2012.

Figure: 3.1. Economic Output of CAR since 1980 to 2012.



Source: Aljazeera report 2013

In general, the chart shows that there has been a rise in GDP in CAR in the 1980s till 2000. So, we can see from the chart that the highest level of GDP has been achieved in 1980. However, the chart indicates that just the following years the country witnessed a dramatic decrease in GDP till 2012. Furthermore, it is clear evident that the chart shows the similar pattern of decrease till 2012. (Aljazeera report March, 2013).

3.2 Competition over Resources

It has been well known that the cost of an armed conflict is very high, because it requires enormous financial support to pay the acquisition of military equipment including weapons, ammunition, military uniform, food, medicine, vehicles, telecommunication equipment and wealth. The natural resources such as forest, hydrocarbons and mines are appreciated by many powers and businessmen because the control of these sources is essential and core financial base of an armed resistance. (Paulin Jaban Kabka 2015) This money must come from somewhere, mostly from the country's resources, the overall natural resources including forest, hydrocarbons and mining are sources of attraction of businessmen as well as the military and political actors that involved in an armed conflict. Because such sources are essential for an armed resistance, in fact, the armed group that loses the ability of acquiring and controlling natural resources could naturally lose the war because the group will not be able to preserve and continue in the war effort.

3.3 Withdrawal of Foreign Investors from CAR

In addition the Investments from the International companies which mostly French capital dominates the economy but the Central African Republic has tried since independence to attract capital and development monies from other countries, including Libya, Taiwan, China, Germany, and Japan. However, due to the drop of timber prices that sector did not witness a big improvement.

France	24,70%
U.S	9,80%
Netherlands	8,70%
China	6,90%
Cameroon	6,30%
Other	43,60%

Figure: 3.2

Sources: TOMOLYA János and Jean-François: AARMS and Grenoble ESG, 2014.

The Seleka militias financed their actions by exporting diamond and exporting timber to the neighboring countries meanwhile Anti-balaka, mostly founded its troops through the control the hydrocarbons and timbers (UNHCR 2018). The national army is financed by the state budget that remains. Therefore, this competition over country's resources led to a deep economic crisis. This deep economic crisis was managed for few years by a huge dependence on foreign aid (UNDP 2014). For instance, the salary of the civil servant paid by foreign aid. despite of that difficulties the regime of Bozize was able to pay the civil servant an army from the that collected from various sources including world bank, African development bank, European union etc. these donors granted in somehow the civil and military servant s salary at least at least in the capital city Bangui. Therefore, one of main cause led to that crisis is corruption combined with mismanagement. For instance, some companies gave financial support to the rebels in the middle of the civil war so that they can pursue wood cutting and exporting it. This situation refers to what is called the Resource Curse or the Dutch disease which denote the paradoxicality or the difficulty for ensuring social and economic development when there is an abundant natural resource (Paul collier). In the contrary, the presence of resources attracts suffering from everywhere. Many studies reveled that countries with huge natural resources are often fall prey to civil war, because their potential wealth is main factor that keep getting them into trouble. In our case even the neighboring countries are benefiting from CAR resources because wood, oil and diamonds are exported through Cameroon, Chad, the DRC that one of the reasons why especially these three countries heavily involved in this conflict. Like the other African countries, in the region the contribution and participation of the exploitation of the natural resources helped to the sustainability and longevity of armed conflict. For instance, the NGOS Global witness accused operators mostly (French Lebanese Chinese) foresters of complicity in crime in the conflict in CAR, because they thought that the companies made a profit in the middle of the civil war by funding rebels. (Aljazeera report 2013)

4. Political Causes Of The Conflict

4.1 Weak state

Conflict can emerge when a government fails to address the condition that might create tension .in fact; there are symptoms that can indicate government weaknesses including the emergence of criminal organization, war lord, corruption, epidemic (Agger 2014). One of the main elements that caused the outbreak of the conflict in CAR is that a weak state that deliberately engaged in applying policy of planed exclusion. In order to stay in power as long

as possible the formal president Bozize developed a tactic which was the weakening of the governmental institutions particularly the national army (FACCA). He reduced the national army to presidential guard. (Jean Christoph victor 2018) the reason behind this tactic is to avoid of being overthrown by either by the national army or the police body , in other word He implemented this Machiavellian tactic which consist of weakening of the army out of fear of potential coup (Paulin Iban kabka 2015) in such condition some citizens (politicians and military leaders) developed the believe that violence is the only way to conquer power in country as the Global security report of 2006 outlined that since the independence CAR has experienced five subsequent military coups which some succeeded on overthrow of the central government. As result of this political turmoil and generalized insecurity result into two disastrous consequences which are the central government led by Bozize was not able to maintain peace and security and courting urgencies. Second: the police were not able to control the integrity of the territory (Report 1, September 2016).

4.2 Failed Democratization Process

One of the issues that considered being common causes of conflict in African politics is the lack of democratization. “the western style of democracy in great difficulties to take root in African state “(CLE 2018) many African tend to choose a representatives (parliament, president) not based on what they can do for the society or their ability to perform rather they choose a leader because He or She merely belong to their ethnic groups. The attitude that generally do not allow to some especially the minority one to come to power through election. The lack of democratization considered to be one of the major elements of the conflict in CAR (Binoua J. 2005). many observers of this conflict argued that such conflict can be avoided or at least minimized by holding a free and fair election that encourage the active participation of ordinary citizen in economic and social life , because any attempt to exclude any ordinary citizen from these right due to its ethnic , religious belonging will automatically create a sentiment of resentment and hostility against the central government (UNDP 2014). In the era of the formal president BOZIZE the basic citizen need is denied especially those who are living in rural area. As retaliatory action to these unjust policies the marginalized citizens has no option than take up an arm in order to make his voice heard and claims its rights. This act of taking guns tend to provokes a protracted social conflict in most of the cases (Nehemiah 2004).

Furthermore, the long-lasting unresolved conflict have been used by the entrepreneurs of violence to manipulate some population, that what lead to what is called by an observer “social disorganization especially in the absence of clear social norms to settle differences. Because the traditional systems of dispute settlement has been neglected by the government for many years (Kolek P. 1971). finally , The internal geopolitical crisis of Central Africa is the cause of the current violence, Historically, the Muslim population has had a minority Northern governorates .The arrival of "silica" armed Muslim militias, to power shock broke the rules of a political game was controlled She was in control A political class representing ethnic groups in the west and center of the country and orbiting the military government The reaction against Silica also falls within the scope The clash of cultures between coastal populations and forest dwellers (Global center for the responsibility to protect 2014).

4.3 Lack of Rule of Law

One of the commonly experienced problems in African politic is the lack of accountability particularly for political and military elites. This goes for the CAR s political situation this impunity. The situation of lack of trial and persecution of the responsible for violence especially those who carried out massive human wright abuses lead to cycle of violence. Because activist and victim from both sides will be motivated by a deep desire for revanche which will definitely lead to a new cycle of tension. Both The previous and the Bozize regime are undermined the legal system of CAR by creating a system that make impossible accountable of their act which encourage them to commit further crime.

Another situation which is created by the lack of rule of law which is that an increase level of risk of outbreaking of a conflict between an armed and unarmed groups especially the one that target minority due to the competition over resources and to confiscate goods land and some rare resources . Even though the Bangui forum provided an opportunity for the creation of special criminal court and a trust justice reparation and reconciliation commission because of the current situation which undermines the rule of law the procedure of peace building will be challenging.

5. The Involvement of Foreign Actors

The regional and international attention to the crisis in Central Africa, particularly those of Chad and France have been closely noticed by observers. due to the fact that both of them has military forces in the country the French military presence did not stop since the independence even . If the size varies from one period to another, meanwhile, Chad's military presence dates back to the late 1990s. in this section we will analyses the nature of these relations and the motives of these foreign actors to interfere in this conflict:

Zelesa argued that any attempt to cope with a conflict in Africa has to take into consideration the root causes of the ongoing problems which are according to her mostly linked to the ancient colonial era. In their book "the root of African conflict: the cause and the cost" Zelesa and Nehema conceded that before anything else the cause of these conflict has its origin in the colonial era when the European imperialist scrambled for Africa, they shared among them the continent without taking into consideration the ethnical make-up of the local population. therefore the result of that policies, particularly after the decolonization , African states are bunch of "polyglot " a mixture of cultural and linguistic groups which create a situation described by many as "incohesive nations ", in other word the inhabitants are not able to create a society based on harmony and solidarity based on national loyalty rather they tend to develop solidarity based on micro-ethnic customs and values that tend to be loyal to an ethnic group. (Ayoob Mahammad 2001).

Secondly, the direct or indirect interference of regional actors while pursuing their political, economic, influence, security interest has contributed to the conflict in CAR. According to (GANSON B) the neighboring countries generally tend to interfere in other armed conflict either due to the one of following reasons fist : to protect themselves against the risk that might be caused by a neighboring conflict second : to support some actors that they considered worthy of their support , therefore It is worth to note that the regional and international power game is one of the factors that some conflict last longer than others .

To be more precise for instance Chad supported Muslim dominated rebels and other southern neighbors being close to the Christian militias Anti-balaka. (Boche 2013). Hence, the religious character is served as identity reference to the both movement which helped in a way or another to gain financial support from the neighboring countries as well from the international level. these political consideration with religious connotation of the countries of the sub-region have effected even on some organization for instance the(MISCA) the international mission to maintain peace in CAR during the operation of this mission Chadian soldiers were accused of providing intelligence and weapon to Muslim seleka fighters the reason why Chadian government was forced to withdraw its troops even though there is no guarantee that Chad dose not continue to provide logistic and intelligence support to the northern army branch .

Even though there is a strong French and Chadian military presence in CAR The objectives differ: French and Chadian regarding their military presence in Central Africa; For Chad, it means defending security interests and economic priority. the formal president of Chad Idriss Deby does not want the Central African Republic to turn into a base for armed opposition and he is keen to use grazing land Central Africa, the livestock of its citizens during the summer. As for France, the act of sending troop was as a response to pressure from the humanitarian lobby in the country most of NGOS in CAR are French In the year were French organizations And appeals to some countries in the region.

5.1 The Rationale Behind Chadian Intervention

It has been noticed that before and during the crisis in CAR There was a very close relationship between the Chadian central government and the SELEKA militias members particularly with their leaders, from historical background, the root of this relation date back to 1990 s and described by observers as especial relation which made almost necessary for Chadian government to fallow up and pay close attention to the recent development of the situation in CAR. to indicate how fare this relation gone for instance, Due to the pressure from the Chadian president in January 2014, the interim president of CAR Michel Djotadia has resigned during the summit of economic community of central African states which held in the Chadian Capita Ndjamena. Hence, under the (MISCA) united nation mission to bring peace in CAR, Chad has deployed 5.500 in CAR in order maintain peace there.

The direct answer to the question why the Chadians care about this conflict is that according to the human right activist report , the current Chadian regime has experience of Robel attack which used the CAR s soil as camps for

preparation and training of their troops this is exactly the case of the prominent Chadian opposition leader Baba Lady who used the border line of CAR as save heaven to protect himself from potential Chadian counter Attack . therefore, there are two main interest for Chadian government to interfere into that conflict. firstly , security interest which consist of break the common habit of Chadian rebels and armed opposition to gather and train in CAR soil , to do so , the formal Chadian president Idriss Deby supported directly or indirectly some SELEKA leaders by thinking that bringing an ally to power can help to secure Chadian border and not allows further development of Chadian rebel by cutting them the road that would prevent to Chadian armed opposition to use CAR soil as save heaven to prosper .

Secondly, there are enormous economic interests that ties strongly Chadian government with CAR s authority, many interviews reveled that the main reason of the Chadian government s support to SELEKA is to create a favorable environment to the Chadian businessman mostly (Gold and Dimond traders) to keep their advantageous position so that can continue making profit even if the regime Change in CAR. Moreover, the Chadian government believed that by supporting SELEKA they can they can mage to contain the conflict and to prevent it from affecting the Chadian oil field in the Sothern borderline of Chad with CAR, in fact the motive was interfering to prevent potential instability that might damage the operating Chadian oil field. on top of that there was another speculation about Chadian rational behind intervention which is to avoid sharing CAR s authority the (the cross-border oil reservoir) especially after the discovery of that reservoir by Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) recently.

5.2 The Rationale Behind France Intervention

There are many actors involved in political crisis in CAR. The anarchic structure of world politics stimulates many actors to influence political, economic and social dynamics of the other country (John Mearsheimer 2014). For example, France was a colonial power of many African and CAR until 1960, having taken particular interest in the region at the Berlin Conference of 1884. The French influence in CAR takes its root since from the colonial era where the European imperialist scrambled for African land from 1881 to the first world war. As a consequence of that decision bunch of African countries become a French protected land from which the CAR part of it. after the wave of independence of 1960s, France still continue to play a critical political and economic with its ancient colonies. this ties with its colonies illustrated with the presence of French military contingent in many places in some French speaking African countries. Hence, one of the most important French foreign policy in Africa is that France aims to bring a political leader in power who will be working with France very closely to serve and protect French interests in place. According to some analyst of African governance and politic for France, it is not about special security and economic interests that motivated France to intervene in those countries. The French military presence in the region has two points (Libreville and N'Djamena), and the few French institutions that still exist in the country no longer have a significant business figure That the number of members of the French community is very limited, but the French intervention comes as a response to the pressure of the lobby because most of the international non-governmental organizations in Central Africa in 2005 were French organizations), and anonymous appeals to some States in the region. Despite their relations with some field of operations, French forces do not work harmoniously in Bangui;

However, unlike that period there have been a demographic and structure change in CAR which have affected clearly the French influence when the political crisis began in the CAR in 2013. because it has been realized that t in the beginning of the crisis Francois Holland government distant himself far away from the conflict. for instance, President Holland refused to respond to president Bozize call for assistance. the French military representative stated that they are here only to protect French national and airport. however, the France position changed when they realized that there is an imminent to many civilian lives and there were grave human right abuses carried out by SELEKA members. this situation obliged France to address the united nation to initiate intervention in order to prevent further abuses and bring peace. Hence the French diplomatic representative stated in his interview accorded to BBC “We knew that there was some inter sectarian violence so we called for resolution the we deployed 900 troops (Le monde 2014).

5.3 The Rational Behind Sudanese And Cameroonians Involvement Into The Conflict

Sudanese and Chadian influence to Bangui date back to more than two decades ago, the Nor- east of CAR regularly has been used by both Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries and warlord as training camps before and during the

Darfur conflict (Lombard 2014). this has influenced the instability of the region particularly within CAR. in 2016 Campbell stated that because of that influence the military personnel of SELEKA mostly dominated by Chadian and Sudanese. they are consisting of 80 % of SELEKA in 2014 (FIDH 2014). Meanwhile the Cameroonian government had different consideration unlike the Chadians and Sudanese, according to some national observers the consideration that motivated the Cameroonian government to support the Bozize regime are primarily economic as well as security concerns. the economic survey Magazine reveled that export and transit of Goods from and to CAR has decreased since the beginning of the tension in 2013, the trade volume decrease estimated by 49 % in mid of 2013 which was the real reason why the Cameroonian authority felt the necessity to support the Bozize regime to bring stability and to avoid more negative impact on Cameroonian economy. In addition to the economic, there was another concern which motivated the formal president of Cameroon felt the necessity to act in support of the central governance is the presence of both SELEKA members and some (FACA) National army of republic of central Africa members in the Cameroonian soil which led to many incursions in refugee camps that established in the eastern borderline with Cameroon (Dunkhan 2016). so, the support was to prevent further incursion in the refugee camps sated up in Cameroon. Meanwhile the Sudanese authority s concern was looking for new allies which will add to the Sudan influence in the rejoin if they manage to find a new ally like SELEKA leaders as well as the Sudanese opposition can not use the borderline between the two countries as heaven to prepare and cause suffer to Sudanese people.

5.3 Conclusion

Chad and France share both military forces in Central Africa, and the French military presence has not ceased. The country has been independent since its independence, although its size varies from one period to the next. Chad's military presence dates back to the late 1990s. And to Chad A presence in the African Union (MICIVIH), and another military presence outside Forces, and there are some Chadian forces in north-eastern Central Africa in the province of Vagaka years ago based on An agreement with Bangui, and some of them without legal cover after the deportation of Chadian citizens France has been published To secure Bangui airport during the Seleka victory, and then decided to carry out a disarmament operation that began in early December is now composed of 2,000 soldiers.

6. Conclusion

This research found that there are four elements that caused the conflict in the CAR including exclusion, repression, and competition over resources and foreign involvement. One of the important reasons of the conflict is the struggle for power and resources among political elites. Both side the rebels and the central government used the fragmentation that already exist in the social and political level in the CAR to acquire power and resources.

The research highlight that the repression combined with exclusion policies adopted by the Bozize and the precedent regimes also contributed to the outbreak of violence in CAR. Bozize appointed in his government civil and military mostly from his own ethnic groups and his relatives especially in some position that he considered to be strategic from political and economic point of view. This irresponsible attitude provokes sentiment of “grievance “or having the feeling of being deprived from his or her right. As result several armed groups appeared including SELEK, Anti-balaka, many leaders of this later s armed groups thought that the only option left on the table to get their rights which is active participation in political and economic and social life is to take arms particular the failure of the peace agreement which was the peaceful approach to secure their rights.

The research found that the main reason behind the failure of the peace agreement is the lack of mutual trust between political leaders. This materialized when Bozize did not did not keep his promises regarding to the peace agreement and he did not want to share the power with some leaders of these armed groups. Again, the Bozize attitude damages the trust between the main political leaders. Finally, regional and international actors interfered into this conflict basically to secure their geo-political interest especially the republic of Chad which has direct social and economic connection with the CAR nation in almost all levels. Moreover, president Bozize decision to shift allies from the conventional one which are Chad and France to new regional and international powers such as China and South Africa. To punish Bozize for his unwillingness to implement the peace agreement and turning to new allies the economic community of central African states (ECCAS) cut its financial support to the Bozize regime. Similarly, Chad and France stopped basking the regime even though they are the one who broth him to the power, due to these reasons they did not protected the regime from rebel attack.

The research highlights some challenges that will be faced by both the local authorities and international community. These challenges can be illustrated in the following point: -the first one: international community has to make these partnership work better what we believe is important here is really about information and analysis. if we want a shared objectives which we are going to need to have a shared solutions we really need to have the same analysis of the problem that we face and we think the big problem that we have seen in why the united nation and African union and others sometime disagree is that they do not share the same analysis of the problem or they put different problem as in different level of priority. So is very important that they should try and share as much information and analysis as possible so that they can come up with the same diagnoses of the problem, the same priority of the issues and hence the give the researchers a chance of coming up with shared solution.

Second, there is a big challenge for exit strategies because they tend to do not think hard enough about the entry strategies and we think what we need to do better going forward is to be very honest about themselves to know what are the situation where peace operation ca help and what are the situation where ca not. In a situation like Central African Republic the ongoing war none of the parties are really serious about peace. The most important things to know in such a conflict what peacekeepers can do? Of course they can help facilitate humanitarian assistance they can put a lid on very worst negative consequences of warfare but they cannot solve a war when the belligerent want to fight a war, therefore they should think very carefully about what are the circumstances where it's just wrong choice of instrument to deploy a peace keeping mission. -Third, is about the financial fund. The funding problem for African mission there can be no ownership a no leadership of the peace and security architecture in Africa unless there is more of slice of the funds come from the African continent. The point to start is there is with Oba Sanja report but also to persuade government and head of the state on the continent that these are problem that are worth investing in even if its investing in this is expensive but it's going to be more expensive and more costly if we do invest in these peace mechanism.

7. Recommendations

As the Secretary-General of the United Nations pointed out in his latest report, there will be no quick solution to the Central African crisis; The roots of the crisis explain the impossibility of overcoming them in a short time; first of all, the security crisis must be contained so that it can be restored The establishment of state structures and the construction of an economy capable of providing employment opportunities. The biggest bet now in Central Africa is empowerment Economic cycle that allows most people to earn a living fairly. This requires refraining from ready-made constructs and to use critical thinking to understand the causes of the failure of development assistance to the country. If partnership of peace keeping is going to be really the way forward we cannot have solution just coming out of Africa alone, Africa in challenge which is very important the best thing could be done is a coming in hybrid international sense. So in that spirit we offer some recommendations of what we can do better.

7.1 To The CAR Authorities

A number of objectives have been identified as a critical in addressing causes of insecurity and violence:

- Objective 1: protection of the civilian population through the fallowing steps:

First: condemning publicly and systematically all the human right violation committed by SELEKA members.

Second: establishing a national army force and engaging with regional and international force in a comprehensive join process to contain SELEKA troops as first step to disarm them.

Third: strengthening the CAR security and defense force through extensive training that will allow them to know how to deal with unconventional human right violation such as collective rape.

Fourth: restoring the authority of state particularly the defense and security forces justice and the basic service such as schools, Hospitals on the whole CAR s territory without seclusion of any region or community.

Fifth: to facilitate and support the work of national and international activists in place including journalist NGOs and humanitarian workers throughout the country.

- Objective 2 : fighting against impunity by talking the following phenomenon :
- Fighting against impunity especially the perpetrators of serious humanitarian and human right violations.
- To persecute SELEKA members who have been accused of committing war crime and violation of human right.

- Supporting the national committee of inquiry in a way that will allow them to establish facts concerning the responsible of crimes committed by SELEKA members and Civilians before and after the crisis. Establishment of a hybrid tribunal composed from national and international persecutors to try the responsible of those crimes that established by the fact-finding mission of the united nation commission of human right.
- Raising a fund with the support of the international community to compensate the victims of looting.
- Legislate a specific law to fight against sexual violence and create a different mechanism that would facilitate women's access to justice.
- To cooperate with the (ICC) with the accordance of the principle of complementarity as mentioned in Rome statute.

7.2 Objective 3: Administration of Justice

There is a need to take all necessary means to ensure that the arrestation and detention are conducted in accordance with CAR's criminal code procedures and the other provision of law including the international human right.

-to release immediately anyone arrested or detained arbitrarily.

To take all possible measures to stop the act of torture inhuman degrading treatment and punishment that carried out by the official in the detention center against any person accused of having committed crimes.

- To close all without distinction the illegal detention center
- To establish an action plan to strengthening the CAR's legal system with the support of the international community.
- To abolish the death penalty to comply with resolution of commission on Human and people's right.

7.3 Objective 4 : Social and Economic Right

- To pay regularly the civil servants
- To take all necessary measures to fight against corruption.
- Wrestling against illegal exploitation of all kind of natural resources including Diamond and Gold.
- Monopolization by the central authority the right of exploitation of natural resources.

In order to ratify the African charter of on democracy election , governance as the protocol of African charter on the African court of human and people's right (a charter that designed to give right to NGOs to sue in African courts in case their right is violated). Furthermore to ratify the convention against torture and inhuman degrading treatment and punishment. Also to ratify the optional protocol on the right of Child and the involvement of Children in armed conflict.

7.4 To The Un Security Council And African Union S Council For Peace And Security

- To condemn all violation of international humanitarian law and human right law perpetrated in the country.

In order to supporting the staff of "MISCA" the international mission support for CAR must to ensure the protection of the population throughout the CAR territory. Also to support the MISCA to implement a mandate that will enable the following major points:

- guarantee the protection of human right activist and the journalist;
- Establishing several Garrison especially in the province and the main cities of the countries;
- Increase the surveillance in a wide range around the garrisons to prevent all act of violence against civilian;
- Implementation of Libreville agreement containing and disarming SELEKA rebels; and
- Granting the security and protection of national and international representative by providing them means to leave the country. And ensuring the security and working condition of the humanitarian activist throughout the country.

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