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Parrēsia in the Pauline Epistles.

David E. Fredrickson
Luther Seminary, dfredric@luthersem.edu

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ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ IN THE PAULINE EPISTLES

DAVID E. FREDRICKSON

Introduction

A study of Paul's παρρησία promises to relate his letters to a key concept shared by ancient politics, rhetoric, and philosophy. Abraham Malherbe has shown how a number of texts in Paul's letters, Acts and the Pastoral Epistles are illumined by philosophic παρρησία in particular.¹ Other scholars, however, have argued that Paul shows little interest in ancient traditions concerning free speech.² Following Malherbe's lead, the present study aims to deepen appreciation for Paul's engagement with his world of thought and to clarify some of his arguments by placing his references to free speech in Phlm 8-9, 1 Thess 2:1-12, Phil 1:12-20, and 2 Cor 1-7 in a philosophic context.

Before turning to these passages and their philosophic background, a misconception which has hindered modern treatments of Paul's παρρησία must be addressed. In contrast to an ancient definition which understood παρρησία to be boldness in words (τὸ ἐν λόγοις θαρρεῖν),³ modern exegetes have emphasized the apostle's boldness nearly to the exclusion of his words.⁴ For example, the phrase πολλῆ παρρησία χρώμεθα in 2 Cor 3:12 is frequently translated "we have much

¹ See his "'Gentle as a Nurse': The Cynic Background to I Thess ii," *NovT* 12 (1970) 208-17; *Paul and the Thessalonians: The Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care* (Fortress: Philadelphia, 1987) 81-94; "'Pastoral Care' in the Thessalonian Church," *NTS* 36 (1990) 375-91; "Antisthenes and Odysseus, and Paul at War," *HTR* 76 (1983) 156-62. For the "philosophic" Paul in Acts, see "'Not in a Corner': Early Christian Apologetic in Acts 26:26," *The Second Century* 5 (1985-1986) 193-210. For παρρησία in moral admonition, see "Medical Imagery in the Pastoral Epistles," in *Texts and Testaments: Critical Essays on the Bible and Early Church Fathers* (ed. W. E. March; San Antonio, TX: Trinity University Press, 1980) 24-31 and "'In Season and Out of Season': 2 Timothy 4:2," *JBL* 103 (1984) 235-43.

² S. Marrow, "Parrhēsia and the New Testament," *CBQ* 44 (1982) 439, 446.

³ *Lex. Vind.* Π 100 (A. Nauck, *Lexicon vindobonense* [Petersburg, 1867; reprint. Hildesheim: Olms, 1965] 152). The definition does mention, however, a metaphorical sense.

⁴ H. Schlier, "Παρρησία, παρρησιάζομαι," *TDNT* 5 (1967) 883. For the beginning of a course correction, see W. C. van Unnik, "The Christian's Freedom of Speech," *Sparsa Collecta: The Collected Essays of W. C. van Unnik* (NovTSup 29-31; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973-83) 2.276. He is not consistent on this point, however;

boldness" or "we are very confident" rather than "we use much bold speech."⁵ 2 Cor 7:4 is translated in a similar fashion; πολλή μοι παρρησία πρὸς ὑμᾶς is rendered "great is my confidence in you" rather than "great is my bold speech toward you."⁶

A brief review of the phrase παρρησία χρῆσθαι warns against equating Paul's παρρησία with confidence and also indicates his familiarity with a commonplace expression for rhetorical activity. Demosthenes, according to Caecilius Calactinus, was "accustomed to use bold speech (παρρησία χρῆσθαι)."⁷ Centuries later Philostratus' description of Menippus shows that the phrase refers to a manner of speaking: "he was by now a qualified disputant and remarkably outspoken (παρρησία χρῆσθαι δεινὸς ἦν)."⁸ The phrase frequently occurs in discussions of the proper method of moral admonition. While Epicurus thought the proclamation of his views on nature was a use of free speech beneficial to the human race,⁹ his followers broadened παρρησία to moral exhortation in general.¹⁰ Just as the physician uses medical

see his "The Semitic Background of ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ in the New Testament," in *Sparsa Collecta*, 2.296-305.

⁵ A. Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians* (ICC; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915) 215; H. Holstein, "La parrésia dans le Nouveau Testament," *BVC* 11 (1963) 51; G. Scarpata, *Parrhesia: Storia del termine e delle sue traduzioni in latino* (Brescia: Paideia, 1964) 79; V. Furnish, *II Corinthians* (AB 32A; Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1984) 231. Bultmann's assertion that παρρησία is equivalent to πεποιθήσις succinctly states the misconception I am seeking to identify (*The Second Letter to the Corinthians* [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1985] 85).

⁶ G. F. C. Heinrici rejected "freedom of speech" advocated by Beza, Luther, and others (*Der zweite Brief an die Korinther* [MeyerK; 7th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1890] 216). He has persuaded most subsequent interpreters. See Plummer, *The Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians*, 215; Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief* (MeyerK; 9th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924) 223; Holstein, "La parrésia dans le Nouveau Testament," 45-46; D. Smolders "L'audace de l'apôtre selon saint Paul: Le thème de la parrésia," *Collectanea mechliniensia* 43 (1958) 125. Lexical evidence strongly supports the "bold speech toward" translation. See Dio Chrys. *Or.* 43.7: ἐγὼ δὲ ἔχω παρρησίαν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅσην οὐδεὶς. Note the equivalence of ἔχειν παρρησίαν and χρῆσθαι παρρησία in Plut. *De exil.* 606B-C. For further examples of παρρησία πρὸς τινά, see Eur. *El.* 1056; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 8.74.3; Plut. *Prac. ger. trip.* 805B; Joseph. *AJ* 2.52; *Acts Jo.* 33; *Lib. Or.* 15.12.

⁷ Caecilius Calactinus, frg. 139 (E. Ofenloch, *Caecilii Calactini fragmenta* [Leipzig: Teubner, 1907; repr. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1967] 122). Cf. Ps.-Lucian, *Dem. Enc.* 36. See further Pl. *Ep.* 8.354A; *Isoc. Or.* 9.39; Demades, frg. 97; Plut. *Lys.* 22.1; *Reg. et imp. ap.* 190F; *Ap. Lac.* 229C.

⁸ Philostr. *VA* 5.43. Cf. Dion. Hal. *Rhet.* 9.15. For the speaker's desire to benefit the state through his use of free speech, see Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.32.7; 10.13.6; 11.56.5; Polyb. 2.8.9; Aristid. *Rhetor, Or.* 3.118.

⁹ Epicur. *SV* 29.

¹⁰ Phld. *Lib.* frg. 7.

instruments to treat disease, so the Epicurean leader used *παρρησία* to treat moral failure.¹¹ Likewise, Plutarch associates the use of bold words with the treatment of disease.¹² *Παρρησία*, like a drug employed too frequently, can be entirely used up.¹³ The phrase is synonymous with *νουθετεῖν*, *ἐπιτιμῶν*, *ἐλέγχειν* and other terms denoting moral reproof.¹⁴ Using *παρρησία* is a matter of speaking the truth in order to treat spiritual ailments.¹⁵

These passages suggest that the proper way to understand Pauline *παρρησία* is not to focus on the apostle's consciousness but to describe the character and legitimation of his ministry as a public, rhetorical activity. To do this we must orient ourselves within the philosophic tradition which took very seriously, as Paul did, the *ἐν λόγοις* aspect of *παρρησία*.

Free Speech, Freedom, and Friendship

By the time of the Pauline epistles, the nature of free speech was a controversial matter. Was it simply the verbal expression of the sage's freedom or was it also an art to be employed for the improvement of others? As we will see, this tension between expression and art plays a major role in Paul's treatment of his own *παρρησία*.

The grounding of *παρρησία* in *ἐλευθερία* originates in Athens' decision to grant free speech to all of its freeborn, male citizens.¹⁶ As a rule, aliens and slaves were not permitted to speak freely.¹⁷ Loss of

¹¹ Phld. *Lib. frags.* 64–65; col. VA. The phrase *προσφέρειν παρρησίαν* also alludes to medical practice. See Phld. *Lib. frag.* 3; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 77/78.45.

¹² Plut. *Adulator* 71D: *θεραπευτικῶς χρῆσθαι τῇ παρρησίᾳ*. For a full discussion of this treatise by Plutarch, see Troels Engberg-Pedersen's essay in this volume (Chapter Three).

¹³ Plut. *Adulator* 73A–B.

¹⁴ Plut. *De aud.* 47A–B; *Adulator* 66A; *Coniug. praec.* 139F; *De exil.* 606C; *Quaest. conv.* 617F; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 51.4; Philo, *Her.* 19; Julian, *Or.* 6.201A–C; *Suda* Π 636.

¹⁵ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 33.7.

¹⁶ For *παρρησία* in Athenian democracy, see E. Peterson, "Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte von *Παρρησία*," *Reinhold Seeberg Festschrift* (ed. W. Koepf; 2 vols.; Leipzig: D. W. Scholl, 1929) 1.283–84; Schlier, "*Παρρησία, παρρησιάζομαι*," 871–72. Scarpat's treatment is superior, since he includes synonyms of *παρρησία* (*Parrhesia*, 11–45). For a rare instance of women claiming this civic right, see Plut. *Com. Lyc. et Num.* 3.5.

¹⁷ Lucian, *Iupp. Trag.* 32. Nevertheless, cities sometimes relaxed the rule. See Dem. *Or.* 9.3; 58.68; Isoc. *Or.* 6.97–98. Greek drama provides evidence that the lack of free speech was the most serious disadvantage of slaves and aliens. See Eur. *Ion* 670–75; *Phoen.* 393; Aesch. *Supp.* 197–203; Stob. *Flor.* 3.13.2, 16, 30.

free speech was considered a grievous misfortune by the freeborn.¹⁸ Euripides has Polyneices put deprivation of free speech at the top of the list of hardships brought about by exile, since without it one was reduced to the lot of a slave.¹⁹ Subjection to a tyrant meant the loss of free speech; rid of him, the citizens regained *παρρησία*.²⁰

Philosophers took the position that the basis of free speech was moral, not civic, freedom. The popular story of the sale of Diogenes portrays the sage whose competence (*δύναμις, ικανότης*) to rule himself gives him the right to rule others.²¹ Similarly, Plutarch argued against Polyneices' view that the most vexing aspect of exile was the loss of free speech.²² Plutarch asserts that baseness alone makes one speak like a slave.²³ The Cynic's self-confident use of *παρρησία* is an extreme development of this pattern of legitimation.²⁴ The wise man's absolute moral superiority to a society convulsed with vice and discord accounts for the intensity and self-confidence of Cynic free speech.²⁵ Although the literature sometimes mentions the cure of human ills as the Cynic's motivation, more often the utterance of bold words aimed at displaying true freedom.²⁶

Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom rejected the Cynic view that self-confidence is sufficient authority for bold speech. They proposed that the divine order of the universe is the source of the wise man's free speech.²⁷ This point Epictetus stresses in his highly Stoicized

¹⁸ Dem., frg. 21; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 7.31.2; Lib. *Or.* 15.57.

¹⁹ Eur. *Phoen.* 390–92. See also Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 19.18.3–4.

²⁰ For this theme in Herodotus, see V. Ehrenberg, "Origins of Democracy," *Historia* 1 (1950) 526–27. See also Dem. *Or.* 7.1; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.42.5; 4.46.4; Diod. Sic. 32.26.2; Plut. *Dion* 34.4; *Tim.* 37.3; *An virt. doc. poss.* 240B.

²¹ See K. Joël, *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates* (2 vols.; Berlin: R. Gaertners Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1893–1901) 2.520–22, 1053–98; G. Giannantoni, *Socraticorum reliquiae* (4 vols.; Rome: Edizioni dell'Atheneo, 1983–85) 2.439–48; 3.405–11. Beyond the Diogenes tradition, see Teles, frg. III; Philo, *Prob.* 29–31; Epict. *Diss.* 3.22.49, 72–73.

²² Eur. *Phoen.* 390–92.

²³ Plut. *De exil.* 606D. See also Mus. Ruf., frg. IX.

²⁴ Although Stoics and Cynics both advocated the notion of freedom as autonomy, their views are not identical. For the greater weight in Cynicism on action and alteration of life style in comparison with the Stoic emphasis on reason, see J. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) 62–63.

²⁵ For vicious society and the virtuous Cynic sage, see Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 7; Ps.-Diog. *Ep.* 28; Ps.-Heraclit. *Ep.* 2, 7, 9; Ps.-Hippocrates, *Ep.* 17.25–56; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 33.14–15. See G. A. Gerhard, *Phoinix von Kolophon: Texte und Untersuchungen* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1909) 67–68.

²⁶ A. J. Malherbe, "Self-Definition among Epicureans and Cynics," in *Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World*, vol. 3 of *Jewish and Christian Self-Definition* (3 vols.; ed. B. F. Meyer and E. P. Sanders; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982) 54.

²⁷ This is not simply a reaction against the voluntarism present in the Cynic view

description of the ideal Cynic. Unlike the false Cynic, who finds itinerancy convenient and the role of moral critic a pretext for self-assertion,²⁸ the true Cynic does not begin his mission without God.²⁹ Having God as his guide, the philosopher avoids the charge of arbitrarily setting off upon the course of improving others.³⁰ Dio Chrysostom also placed the philosopher's bold speech in the context of a divine commission.³¹ He compares his mission to that of Socrates who acted in obedience to the command of God (τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόσταγμα).³²

So far we have examined the pattern of legitimation of free speech. We turn now to the issues of motives and benefits. Free speech was the cornerstone of Athenian democracy, the goad compelling citizens to do their duty, and the most effective means of preserving the city's freedom and safety.³³ To preserve and improve the city,³⁴ the orator must hide nothing,³⁵ open his mouth,³⁶ and proclaim the truth.³⁷ Demosthenes' concluding remark in *Or.* 4 points to the value of free speech:

For my own part, I have never yet chosen to court your favor (πρὸς χάριν εἰλόμην λέγειν) by saying anything that I was not quite convinced would be to your advantage; and to-day, keeping nothing back (ὑποστειλάμενος), I have given free utterance (πεπαρησίασμαι) to my plain sentiments.³⁸

of philosophic mission but reflects the fundamental Stoic teaching that the freedom of the wise man depends on subordination to divine will. See K. Deissner, "Das Sendungsbewusstsein der Urchristenheit," *ZST* 7 (1930) 781-87.

²⁸ Epict. *Diss.* 3.22.9-12, 50; 4.8.34. For the condemnation of the use of bold speech for self-glorification, see Phld. *Lib.* frg. 72; col. 1B; Ps.-Diog. *Ep.* 4; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.11; Philo, *Somn.* 2.83-89; Plut. *Pomp.* 60.4; *Dion* 8.1; Lucian, *Demon.* 48; *Icar.* 30-31; *Vit. Auct.* 10; *Pisc.* 31; *Peregr.* 18; Aristid. Rhetor, *Or.* 3.668; Chrys. *Pan. Bab.* 2 37, 45-48 (*PG* 50.543, 545-46).

²⁹ Epict. *Diss.* 3.22.2, 8, 52.

³⁰ Epict. *Diss.* 3.21.11-12. See also 3.22.95-97. This is the main point of Ps.-Socrates, *Ep.* 1.7-12. See M. Imhof, "Sokrates und Archelaos: Zum 1. Sokratesbrief," *MH* 41 (1984) 1-8.

³¹ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 77/78.38.

³² Dio Chrys. *Or.* 33.9.

³³ Dem. *Or.* 13.15; 60.25-26; Plut. *Phoc.* 2.3; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.27. For the Roman counterpart, see Plut. *Adulator* 60C.

³⁴ Plut. *Dem.* 12.3; 14.3; *Adulator* 60C; Lucian, *Deor. Conc.* 2-4, 14; Stob. *Flor.* 3.13.24.

³⁵ For ἀποκρύπτειν, see Xen. *Ages.* 11.5; Dem. *Or.* 6.31-32; Isoc. *Or.* 8.62; 15.43-44; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.72.5; 10.13.6; Lib. *Prog.* 6.2.14. For ὑποστελλεῖν, see Dem. *Or.* 19.237; Isoc. *Or.* 9.39; Aeschin. *Fals. Leg.* 70; Lib. *Decl.* 15.1.39. Cf. Acts 20:20, 27. Note the numerous synonyms in Lucian, *Deor. Conc.* 2.

³⁶ Isoc. *Or.* 12.96.

³⁷ For παρησία making ἀλήθεια manifest, see Dem. *Or.* 6.31-32; 11.17; 23.204; 37.55; 60.26; Isoc. *Ep.* 4.6. In the philosophers, see Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.7; Eus. *Mynd.*, frg. 21.

³⁸ Dem. *Or.* 4.51. See also *Or.* 10.76. For other accounts of Demosthenes' παρησία,

Isocrates, too, was adept at portraying the benefits of his *παρρησία*.³⁹ He contrasts himself with flattering orators who speak for the pleasure but not the benefit of their hearers.⁴⁰ Distinguishing his free speech from *λοιδορία* on the basis of the benefit intended,⁴¹ he hides nothing and speaks painful words for the public's well-being.⁴² The speaker's claim to benefit his audience became a standard rhetorical device to make vexing words less offensive.⁴³

Philosophers also emphasized the benefits of free speech uttered in friendly concern. Demonax used free speech, but his goal was always to improve others and foster friendship.⁴⁴ Demonax also exemplifies the civic responsibility which characterized free speech in Athenian democracy.⁴⁵ He claims that his bold speech is motivated by philanthropy.⁴⁶ As Dio Chrysostom put it, the sage "does not hide his thoughts (*οὐκ ἀποκρυπτόμενος*) from others," especially his "fellow citizens and friends and kinsmen."⁴⁷ It is the duty of the philosopher to benefit (*ὠφελεῖν*) others, even if this requires a painful dose of *παρρησία*.⁴⁸ Dio claims that his own bold words of reproof are tolerable because they are beneficial and motivated by good will (*εὐνοία*).⁴⁹

Bold speech was not limited to the improvement of public morals but was also an important feature of exhortation among friends.⁵⁰

see Caecilius Calactinus, frg. 141; Plut. *Dem.* 9.1-2; 12.3; Aristid. *Rhetor, Or.* 2.186-87; *Lib. Decl.* 22.1.14; *Arg. D.* 7.4; Ps.-Lucian, *Dem. Enc.* 41-42.

³⁹ Isoc. *Or.* 8.5, 10.

⁴⁰ Isoc. *Or.* 8.3-5.

⁴¹ Isoc. *Or.* 8.72-73. Cf. Isoc. *Or.* 4.130-31. For other instances of this distinction, see Phld. *Lib.* frg. 60; Caecilius Calactinus, frg. 139; Plut. *Adulator* 66A; 70E; Bas., *Ep.* 203.2; 204.4; Them. *Or.* 22.277A-C; Eus. Mynd., frg. 21.

⁴² Isoc. *Or.* 8.38-41. Orators in later periods also saw the apologetic value of labeling their discourse *παρρησία* and pointing out its benefits. See Dio Chrys. *Or.* 38.4-5, 7; Aristid. *Rhetor, Or.* 23.4-5; Lucian, *Merc. Cond.* 4; *Lib. Or.* 15.12-13; 16.3,16; 30.30; 48.1; Gr. Naz. *Or.* 17.8 (*PG* 35.976); *Or.* 18.37 (*PG* 35.1036); *Or.* 33.1 (*PG* 36.216). In epistolary contexts, see Alciph. *Ep.* 2.39.3; Bas., *Ep.* 58; 204.2; Gr. Naz. *Ep.* 17.2-3. For *παρρησία* as a figure of thought, see *Rhet. Her.* 4.36.48-37.50; cf. Quintilian's objections (*Inst.* 9.2.27; 9.3.99).

⁴³ *Dem. Or.* 3.3; 8.32; 9.3-4; Isoc. *Or.* 5.72; 8.72-73; Anaximenes (*Rh. Al.* 18.2) treats the speaker's claim of *παρρησία* as an instance of anticipation (*προκατάληψις*).

⁴⁴ Lucian, *Demon.* 7, 10.

⁴⁵ Lucian, *Demon.* 11. Cf. Philo, *Spec.* 1.319-23.

⁴⁶ Lucian, *Demon.* 11. Cf. Epict. *Diss.* 3.22.81-82, 96. For the importance of *κηδεμονία* in the administration of *παρρησία*, see Phld. *Lib.* frg. 26; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.11; 51.4; 77/78.39; Plut. *Adulator* 55B; 66D.

⁴⁷ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 77/78.42; cf. *Or.* 13.15.

⁴⁸ Epict. *Diss.* 3.1.10-11.

⁴⁹ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.5, 7, 11. Cf. Lucian, *Hermot.* 51.

⁵⁰ Plut. *Adulator* 55B-C; Max. Tyr. *Or.* 14.6C; 19.4C; Cic. *Amic.* 13.44; 18.65;

Isocrates mentions the bold speech of friends as a traditional means of moral development.⁵¹ According to Plutarch, *παρρησία* is the language of friendship,⁵² and only the friend can hurt another with salutary results.⁵³ Rather than simply the verbal expression of freedom,⁵⁴ bold speech for Plutarch is a "fine art (*φιλοτεχνεῖν*), inasmuch as it is the greatest and most potent medicine in friendship, always needing, however, all care to hit the right occasion (*καιροῦ*), and a tempering with moderation (*μέτρον*)."⁵⁵ To observe the *καιρός* meant to adapt words to the circumstances of the hearer.⁵⁶ To find the mean (*μέτρον*) in bold speech meant to steer between flattery and excessive severity.⁵⁷

Friendship was a presupposition for the administration of *παρρησία* in Epicurean groups. Philodemus exhorted the older members to teach the duties of friendship to recent converts. The chief duty was to speak candidly about one another's faults.⁵⁸ The leader of the cell was to be regarded as the most eminent of friends from whom no secrets should or could be kept.⁵⁹ Furthermore, new members were to be reminded repeatedly about the moral improvement which resulted from *παρρησία*.⁶⁰ Philodemus thought that this instruction secured a positive reception of criticism given by the leader as well as

24.88–90; Sen. *Ep.* 25.1; Stob. *Flor.* 3.13.44; Ael. *VH* 8.12; Gr. *Naz. Ep.* 206.1. See G. Bohnenblust, *Beiträge zum Topos ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΙΑΣ* (Berlin: Gustav Schade [Otto Francke], 1905) 35–36, 38–39; Scarpat, *Parrhesia*, 58–61. Most helpful are the following treatments: M. Gigante, "Philodème: Sur la liberté de parole," *Association Guillaume Budé: Actes du VIIIe Congrès* (Paris: Société d'Édition <Les Belles Lettres>, 1969) 196–98, 202–14, and I. Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie 13; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969) 63–66.

⁵¹ Isoc. *Or.* 2.3. Cf. Plut. *Adulator* 74C; *De prof. in virt.* 82A; *De cap. ex in. ut.* 89B.

⁵² Plut. *Adulator* 51C. Cf. Philo, *Her.* 21.

⁵³ Plut. *Adulator* 55C; 59D.

⁵⁴ Plut. *Adulator* 59E.

⁵⁵ Plut. *Adulator* 74D. See also Sen. *Ep.* 29.1–3. For the administration of *παρρησία* as a *τέχνη*, see Gigante, "Philodème: Sur la liberté de parole," 202–11; Malherbe, "In Season and Out of Season," 236–40.

⁵⁶ Plut. *Adulator* 66B; 68D–70B. Cf. Phld. *Lib.* frg. 7.

⁵⁷ Plut. *Adulator* 66E. For *τέχνη* in the Epicurean search for the mean between constant severity and indulgence, see Phld. *Lib.* frg. 20; col. IIIB.

⁵⁸ Phld. *Lib.* frgs. 11, 15, 25. This duty was derived from the example of Epicurus himself. See Phld. *Lib.* frgs. 6, 20, 49 and W. Schmid, "Contribio und 'ultima linea rerum' in neuen epikureischen Texten," *RhM* 100 (1957) 303–14. For a full discussion of Philodemus' treatment of *παρρησία*, see the essay by Clarence E. Glad in this volume (Chapter Two).

⁵⁹ Phld. *Lib.* frg. 41.

⁶⁰ Phld. *Lib.* frgs. 26, 28, 36, 39–41, 49–50.

by fellow students.⁶¹ Experience taught that if a new convert forgot the benefits of bold speech he would react in confusion and anger.⁶² Indeed, the main source of anger was the convert's belief that he was being treated insincerely.⁶³ If, however, the indoctrination was successful, he would be grateful for the candor and look upon the stinging words as an expression of friendship.⁶⁴

Free Speech in the Pauline Epistles

Having reviewed the importance of legitimation and friendship in ancient discussions of *παρρησία*, we are now ready to investigate the term in the Pauline epistles. Paul makes a single but significant reference to his free speech in Phlm 8–9: "Although I have much free speech in Christ (*πολλὴν ἐν Χριστῷ παρρησίαν*) to command to you what is fitting, rather, on account of love, I exhort." The issue of legitimation is present in the phrase "in Christ." As we will see, Paul consistently locates his bold speech in Christ or in God. This has a formal parallel in the relationship between freedom and bold speech in the philosophers and especially the demand by Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus that the philosophic missionary seek divine approval. Obviously, the "in Christ" is a different legitimation than the Stoic view of providence and may even be understood as the apostle's attempt to distinguish the basis of his speech from philosophic legitimation.

We also find here the common association of *παρρησία* and friendship. Paul points out that on account of love he adapts his speech to Philemon. He exhorts (*παρακαλεῖν*) him as a friend rather than commanding (*ἐπιτάσσειν*) him as an inferior. This contrast is reminiscent of the debate between the harsh Cynics, whose *παρρησία* was often described in terms of tyranny,⁶⁵ and the mild Cynics and other philosophers who emphasized friendship and adaptability. At the heart

⁶¹ Phld. *Lib.* frg. 12.

⁶² Phld. *Lib.* col. XXIA.

⁶³ Phld. *Lib.* col. XVIB.

⁶⁴ Phld. *Lib.* frgs. 25 and 36; cols. VIIIB, XB, and XIVB. See N. De Witt, "Organization and Procedure in Epicurean Groups," *CP* 31 (1936) 207; A. T. Guerra, "Filodemo sulla gratitudine," *CErc* 7 (1977) 105–06.

⁶⁵ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 9.11–13; Ps.-Diog. *Ep.* 46; Ps.-Heraclit. *Ep.* 4.3; 7.4; Epict. *Diss.* 2.12.24; 4.8.26–29; Lucian, *Fug.* 12, 17.

of the debate was the philosopher's freedom.⁶⁶ Since *παρρησία*, the verbal expression of freedom, was the Cynic's highest value,⁶⁷ the issue was whether the philosopher could accommodate his words to the needs and circumstances of his hearers and still maintain his integrity.⁶⁸ Harsh Cynics, from whose perspective accommodation smacked of flattery and ruined freedom,⁶⁹ criticized Antisthenes and his characterization of Odysseus for weakness.⁷⁰ The significance of Phlm 8–9 is to be found in the context of this debate. Paul identifies himself with the position which found no contradiction between freedom and adaptability. He avoids causing shame to Philemon, and at the same time strategically maintains his *παρρησία* by appealing to the tradition which viewed free speech as a fine art best employed by a caring friend.

Another passage in which free speech plays an important role is 1 Thess 2:1–12. Abraham Malherbe has argued that here Paul portrays his ministry in commonplaces concerning the philosopher's demeanor and free speech.⁷¹ I will make a few comments which support this position. Just as in Phlm 8–9, Paul claims the right to free speech but avoids the harsh Cynic connotations by stressing that his speech is hortatory, even comforting. Indeed, as Malherbe has pointed out, the capacity for weightiness to which Paul alludes in 2:7—only immediately to reject—evokes the stereotype of the harsh Cynic's *παρρησία*. Similarly, Paul's denial of seeking glory contrasts with the criticism made about Cynics whose free speech aimed at enhancing their own reputations for freedom.⁷²

Remarkable also is the link between *παρρησία* and friendship in this passage. The hardships in Philippi and the phrase *ἐν πολλῶ ἀγῶνι* underscore the price Paul pays for his bold speech. The sage's endurance of hardships demonstrated his love of humanity, as we see from Antisthenes to Dio Chrysostom.⁷³ Furthermore, Paul's nurse-like quality, his desire to impart his very self, and his labor all demonstrate that his *παρρησία* is an expression of friendship.

⁶⁶ R. Hock, "Simon the Shoemaker as an Ideal Cynic," *GRBS* 17 (1976) 48–53.

⁶⁷ See Diog. Laert. 6.69.

⁶⁸ Dio Chrysostom has no doubt that he could (*Or.* 77/78.38).

⁶⁹ Ps.-Diog. *Ep.* 29.3, 5.

⁷⁰ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 8.2; Ps.-Crates, *Ep.* 19.

⁷¹ "Gentle as a Nurse," 208–17.

⁷² See above note 28.

⁷³ See R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King: Studies in the Cynic Conception of Man* (Lund: Carl Blom, 1948) 97. Cf. Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.8, 24; 33.15. For the dangers

The issue of the legitimation of free speech is also present in 1 Thess 2:1–12. Three times he calls attention to the divine origin of his speech: ἐπαρρησιασάμεθα ἐν τῷ θεῷ ἡμῶν (2:2); ἀλλὰ καθὼς δεδοκιμάσαμεθα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πιστευθῆναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον (2:4); and θεῷ τῷ δοκιμάζοντι τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν (2:4). The philosopher's consciousness of divine providence distinguished his παρρησία from self-assertion. In spite of this parallel, however, the theological legitimation of speech in Paul appears to have a different purpose. The characterization of God as one who tests hearts may help explain the force of linking his speech to God's approval. If the heart can be associated with the theme of friendship, then God's approval of Paul means approval of his use of παρρησία in the context of friendship. God sanctions Paul's adaptability in speech and his practice of taking into account the circumstances of his hearers.

We turn now to an examination of παρρησία in Paul's letter to the Philippians. The emphasis on the public character of the gospel in 1:12–20 is striking.⁷⁴ Paul refers to his own free speech in 1:20 (ἐν οὐδενὶ αἰσχυνθήσομαι ἀλλ' ἐν πάσῃ παρρησίᾳ ὡς πάντοτε καὶ νῦν μεγαλυνθήσεται Χριστὸς ἐν τῷ σώματί μου) after alluding in 1:14 to the bold speaking of the majority of the brothers (τολμᾶν ἀφόβως τὸν λόγον λαλεῖν). In both cases Paul insists that his imprisonment is not a cause for shame and silence.⁷⁵ Quite the opposite. The brothers in the Lord gain their confidence (πεποιθότας, 1:14), the psychological basis of bold speech,⁷⁶ from Paul's bonds (τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου, 1:14). What appears from a societal standpoint to inhibit free speech has actually contributed to making the gospel more public (εἰς προκοπὴν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, 1:12). This paradox of the gospel entering and shaping the public realm through the suffering and shameful position of Christ, Paul, and the church will be developed further in the first two chapters of the letter.

Paul's manner of speech is the central topic of 2 Cor 1–7. In 3:12 and 7:4 he claims that he uses much free speech. Synonyms of

faced by bold speakers, see Lucian, *Pisc.* 20; *Peregr.* 32. See Malherbe, "Gentle as a Nurse," 209.

⁷⁴ Note the other terms denoting speech in the public realm: τὸν Χριστὸν κηρύσσουν (1:15); ἀπολογία τοῦ εὐαγγελίου (1:16); τὸν Χριστὸν καταγγέλλουσιν (1:17); Χριστὸς καταγγέλεται (1:18); μεγαλυνθήσεται Χριστὸς (1:20). On Philippians and Paul's use of friendship language in that letter, see the essays in Part Two of this volume by John Reumann, Ken L. Berry, Abraham J. Malherbe, and John T. Fitzgerald.

⁷⁵ For the connection between shame and silence, see below note 116.

⁷⁶ See below notes 103–106.

παρρησία occur throughout 2 Cor 1-7 at crucial points in the argument. This raises the question why so much of 2 Cor 1-7 is devoted to the topic of Paul's speech. In 2 Cor 10:9-10 we learn that the severity of the so-called "letter of tears" proved to Paul's critics in Corinth that he was capable of παρρησία. Yet, when they compared his letters with his mild and conciliatory manner in the presence of the church, they detected a major flaw in his character. He was bold through letters but an ironic deceiver in person. Paul's speech, they said, was attenuated (ὁ λόγος ἐξουθενημένος), a judgement couched in rhetorical terminology.⁷⁷ Rhetoric provided for the attenuation of speech, which consisted of orators intentionally resembling "untrained and unskillful speakers."⁷⁸ Attenuation was employed chiefly to achieve irony.⁷⁹ One reason, then, παρρησία figures so prominently in 2 Cor 1-7 is that Paul must answer the charge that he lacks bold speech in face to face situations. Paul responds to this charge in two ways: 1) brief affirmations of straightforward speech and denials of flattery and 2) a sustained defense of his ministry in 2 Cor 3.

We may begin with the affirmations and denials. In 1:12 Paul describes his behavior in terms of straightforward speech: ἐν ἀπλότητι and ἐν εἰλικρινείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ. Chrysippus claimed that the wise man is always open (ἀπλοῦς), without disguise (ἄπλαστος) and never employs irony (τὸ εἰρωνεύεσθαι).⁸⁰ From the standpoint of rhetorical theory, speaking ἀπλῶς was the opposite of concealing one's thoughts under figures (σχηματίζειν).⁸¹ Similarly, the notion of pure (καθαρός) speech, to which Paul refers in the phrase ἐν εἰλικρινείᾳ,⁸² pointed to clear

⁷⁷ Julius Rufianus, *De figuris sententiarum et elocutionis* 6; J. C. G. Ernesti, *Lexicon technologiae Graecorum rhetoricae* (Leipzig: Fritsch, 1795) 114.

⁷⁸ Cic. *Orat.* 20.

⁷⁹ Hor. *Sat.* 1.10.11-15; Cic. *De Or.* 3.202; *Brut.* 292; Philostr. *VA* 1.17.

⁸⁰ *SVF* 3.161.3-6. Cf. Arist. *Eth. Eud.* 3.7.6. See L. Bergson, "Eiron und Eironeia," *Hermes* 99 (1971) 416. Later philosophers agreed that the person of solid character would be straightforward and conceal nothing. See R. Vischer, *Das einfache Leben: Wort- und motivgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zu einem Wertbegriff der antiken Literatur* (Studienhefte zur Altertumswissenschaft 11; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965) 10-22. For deception versus straightforwardness, see Dio Chrys. *Or.* 51.1; 52:16; Epict. *Diss.* 2.22.35; Plut. *Dion* 8.3; *Adulator* 52B; 62C; Mar. Ant. *Med.* 11.15; Clem. Al. *Str.* 7.7.44.8; Julian, *Or.* 7.214A-C.

⁸¹ Dion. Hal. *Rhet.* 8.3, 5. For the contrast between direct speaking and speech which relies upon cleverness and deception, see Antisth., frg. 51; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 35.1. See also Phld. *Lib.* frg. 10, for which the discussion provided by M. Gigante ("Philodème: Sur la liberté de parole," 208-09) is helpful.

⁸² For unambiguous speech described as εἰλικρινής see Sext. Emp. *Py.* 1.134; 1.140; 1.207.

language in contrast to the artificiality and concealment of figured speech.⁸³ Purity is the quality of unambiguous communication of the speaker's thought.⁸⁴ Paul reiterates this quality of his speech in 4:2 when he commends himself to the world by disclosing the truth (τῆ φανερώσει τῆς ἀληθείας),⁸⁵ a phrase synonymous with παρρησία.⁸⁶

In 2:17 Paul denies that he is like one of the many selling (καπηλεύοντες) the word of God. Although καπηλεύειν has an important place in criticism of sophistic rhetoric,⁸⁷ there is no notion of "mixing" in Plato's original use of the term,⁸⁸ as there is in 2 Cor 2:17. Plato's criticism falls primarily on the sale of teachings.⁸⁹ Further investigation reveals that κάπηλος generally designated the inn-keeper,⁹⁰ whose reputation for adulterating wine was widespread enough to generate a cliché about deception.⁹¹ In 2:17 Paul's association of his speech with purity (ἐξ εἰλικρινείας) stands in antithesis to the κάπηλος metaphor and thus falls in line with the ancient cliché.

⁸³ Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 5, 7, 23; *Thuc.* 5, 8, 23, 41. See C. Smiley, "Latinitas and ΕΛΛΗΝΙΣΜΟΣ," *Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin: Philology and Literature Series* 3 (1906) 219-24.

⁸⁴ See J. F. Lockwood, "The Metaphorical Vocabulary of Dionysius of Halicarnassus," *CQ* 31 (1937) 199.

⁸⁵ Ancient exegetes thought that τῆ φανερώσει τῆς ἀληθείας referred to deeds conforming to preaching (e.g., Chrys. *Hom.* 7 in 2 Cor. 1 [PG 61.454]; cf. *Hom.* 23 in 2 Cor. 3 [PG 61.557]). Modern interpreters stress fidelity to the Gospel (e.g., Plummer, *The Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians*, 112; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 246). Yet Barrett judiciously notes that "truth" here "has a much wider range of meaning than the Gospel" (*The Second Epistle to the Corinthians* [London: A. and C. Black, 1973] 129). Support for this view can be found in Basil (*Reg. Jus.* 9 [PG 31.944]).

⁸⁶ See above notes 35 and 37.

⁸⁷ H. D. Betz, *Lukian von Samosata und das Neue Testament* (TU 76; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961) 114 n. 3; S. Hafemann, *Suffering and the Spirit: An Exegetical Study of II Cor. 2:14-3:3 within the Context of the Corinthian Correspondence* (WUNT 2.19; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1986) 103-26.

⁸⁸ Hafemann (*Suffering and the Spirit*, 106-09) is justified in his criticism of Windisch's view ("καπηλεύω," *TDNT* 3 [1966] 604-05) that we can arrive at the meaning "to adulterate" on the basis of the selling of doctrines by sophists and philosophers.

⁸⁹ The κάπηλος metaphor continued to be used against rhetors and philosophers who sold their services. In addition to the parallels cited by J. J. Wettstein (*Novum Testamentum Graecum* [1751; 2 vols.; repr. Gras, Austria: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1962] 2.183), see *SVF* 3.172.28; Plut. *Præc. ger. reip.* 819E; Lucian, *Nigr.* 25; Aristid. *Rhetor.* Or. 3.664-69; Philostr. *VA* 1.13.

⁹⁰ T. Kleberg, *Hôtels, restaurants et cabarets dans l'antiquité romaine: Études historique et philologique* (Bibliotheca Ekmaliana Universitatis Regiae Upsaliensis 61; Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1957) 1-6.

⁹¹ Kleberg, *Hôtels, restaurants et cabarets*, 3-4, 111-13. For additional references, see Ar. *Thesm.* 347; Plut. *De Is. et Os.* 369C. Paul's straightforwardness (ἀπλότης) in 1:12 is thus reiterated in 2:17, since the adjectives καπηλικός and ἀπλοῦς were antonyms. See, for example, Strab. 11.4.4.1-2; 11.8.7.18.

Moreover, the explanation in the *Suda* of how καπηλικῶς came to be equivalent to πανουργικῶς demonstrates the connection between adulteration and trickiness,⁹² a theme which Paul takes up again in 4:2. Against this background, then, Paul's denial in 2:17 should be understood as a refutation of the charge that he lacked παρρησία and used the tricks of rhetoric to deceive the church.⁹³

In 4:2 the term πανουργία refers to Paul's alleged use of rhetorical figures.⁹⁴ Figures are devious, since they do not present the speaker's thought simply and openly.⁹⁵ Consequently, writers critical of sophistic rhetoric contrasted πανουργία with παρρησία.⁹⁶ The principal weapon of the flatterer (κόλαξ) and wily person (πολύτροπος) is πανουργία.⁹⁷

In 4:3 a final charge has been formulated once again in terms taken from the field of rhetoric: εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν κεκαλυμμένον τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν. The aspect of concealment suggests that the critics accused Paul of employing covert allusion (ὁ μετασηματισμός).⁹⁸ Although distinguished from irony, covert allusion, by veiling thoughts

⁹² *Suda* K 334 (ed. A. Adler, *Suda lexicon* [4 vols.; *Lexicographi Graeci* 1.1–1.4; Leipzig: Teubner, 1928–35; repr. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1967–71] 3.28): ἐπεὶ οἱ κάπηλοι ὀνθυλεύουσι τὸν οἶνον, συμμιγνύντες αὐτῷ σαπρὸν. See also Phryn. *PS* (I. Bekker, *Anecdota graeca* [3 vols.; Berlin: G. C. Nauckium, 1814–21] 1.49.9–11): κάπηλον φρόνημα: παλιμβολον καὶ οὐκ ὑγιές. ἡ μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τῶν καπήλων μὴ πιπρασκότων εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀκέρατα τὰ ὄνια.

⁹³ For the contrast between παρρησία and adulterated speech which seeks to flatter and be pleasant, see Isoc. *Or.* 2.1–3; Lucian, *Hermot.* 51; Bas., *Reg. fus.* 25.2 (*PG* 31.985). Paul's denial in 4:2 of adulterating the word of God (μηδὲ δολοῦντες τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ) is a continuation of the same theme. See Windisch, "καπηλεύω," 604–05. A connection between καπηλεύειν and δολοῦν was recognized in ancient lexicography; see *Suda* K 337.

⁹⁴ P. Marshall (*Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul's Relations with the Corinthians* [WUNT 2.23; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987] 384) also maintains that Paul's denial of using πανουργία should be understood against the background of philosophic criticism of rhetoric. He suggests, however, that Paul attacks his opponents' tricks.

⁹⁵ Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 15; Plut. *Quomodo adol.* 27F–28A; "Longinus," *Subl.* 17.1–2.

⁹⁶ Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 715F–716B; *Praec. ger. reip.* 802F; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 1.26.

⁹⁷ κόλαξ: Lucian, *Pisc.* 18; *Dial. Mort.* 15.1–2; Plut. *Adulator* 51C; 60B; *De cap. ex in. ut.* 92D. πολύτροπος: Pl. *Hp. Mi.* 365E; Plut. *Quaest. nat.* 916C; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 1.61; cf. Plut., frg. 25.

⁹⁸ For the rhetorical figure σηματοῖζειν, see Ernesti, *Lexicon*, 341–43. For veiled speech as a means of moral criticism, see F. Ahl, "The Art of Safe Criticism in Greece and Rome," *AJP* 105 (1984) 174–208. For Paul's familiarity with covert allusion, see B. Fiore, "'Covert Allusion' in 1 Corinthians 1–4," *CBQ* 47 (1985) 85–102, and John T. Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel: An Examination of the Catalogues of Hardships in the Corinthian Correspondence* (SBLDS 99; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 119–22.

under other meanings, closely resembled it.⁹⁹ Technical discussion of covert allusion in terms of hiding (κρύπτειν) one's thoughts goes back at least to Dionysius of Halicarnassus.¹⁰⁰ Hiding thoughts in figures was the opposite of παρρησία.¹⁰¹ A number of motives were given for veiled speech, including the desire not to cause offense when giving criticism with παρρησία.¹⁰²

Paul turns to the sustained defense of his ministry in 2:14–4:6. In 3:4 we discover that Paul's possession of confidence is the matter to be proved. The term πεποιθήσις has the sense of confidence or boldness¹⁰³ and is synonymous with τόλμα¹⁰⁴ and θάρσος.¹⁰⁵ It is the condition of mind which serves as the basis of παρρησία.¹⁰⁶

In 3:5 Paul distinguishes his confidence from the legitimation granted by moral virtue in the philosophic tradition: οὐχ ὅτι ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν ἱκανοί ἐσμεν λογίσασθαι τι ὡς ἐξ ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἱκανότης ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ. The first half of this verse denies that his πεποιθήσις rests on his own competence.¹⁰⁷ The second half of the verse argues that Paul does indeed have the competence, but this comes from God. By placing his boldness in the context of a divine source, Paul reflects the treatment of παρρησία in Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom, who established their philosophic mission upon the divine and thus distinguished

⁹⁹ Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.45–46, 65–66; Demetr. *Eloc.* 291.

¹⁰⁰ Dion. Hal. *Rhet.* 8.3, 8. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.76. See also *Inst.* 9.2.65; Dio Cass. 37.58.1; Plut. *Adulator* 51D; *De prof. in virt.* 85C; Ps.-Lucian, *Am.* 3; Philostr. *VS* 542; Them. *Or.* 3.45D; Lib. *Or.* 18.19.

¹⁰¹ See Ahl, "The Art of Safe Criticism," 174–75. See also Dion. Hal. *Rhet.* 8.3; Caecilius Calactinus, frg. 157; Hermog. *Inw.* 13; Them. *Or.* 3.45D. Demetrius contrasts covert allusion with straight speaking (οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας ἐροῦμεν) and Scythian speech (ἀπὸ Σκυθῶν), proverbial for παρρησία (*Eloc.* 292, 297).

¹⁰² For the motives ascribed to the use of figures, see D. M. Schenkeveld, *Studies on Demetrius on Style* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1964) 117–22; Fiore, "'Covert Allusion,'" 91–93; Ahl, "The Art of Safe Criticism," 185–96, and Fitzgerald, *Cracks in an Earthen Vessel*, 120.

¹⁰³ Joseph. *AJ* 10.16.

¹⁰⁴ Joseph. *AJ* 1.73.

¹⁰⁵ Joseph. *AJ* 3.44–45.

¹⁰⁶ Phld. *Lib.* frg. 45; Joseph. *AJ* 19.317–18; *1 Clem.* 35.2; Eph 3:12. Synonyms also refer to the psychological basis of bold speech: Pl. *Leg.* 835C; Diod. Sic. 14.65.4; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.32.7; Epict. *Diss.* 3.22.96; Philo, *Her.* 5–7, 19–21, 27–29; *Somn.* 2.83; *Ios.* 222; *Prob.* 150; Plut. *Adulator* 66A; Joseph. *AJ* 2.116; Mus. Ruf., frg. IX; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 3.13; 4.15; 11.27; 32.11; Lucian, *Demon.* 50; *Iupp. Trag.* 19; Aristid. *Rhetor.* *Or.* 28.147.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Gal 6:3, for which Betz's citations of philosophic material are pertinent for 2 Cor 3:5 (*Galatians* [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979] 301). For ἱκανότης as a moral virtue, see *SVF* 3.68.3–4.

themselves from the insistence of the Cynics to make everything depend upon themselves.

I turn now to describe the way 3:7–18 supports Paul's claim of confidence in 3:4.¹⁰⁸ Proofs based on comparison (σύγκρισις) play an important role in forensic speeches,¹⁰⁹ demonstrating inferiority, equality, or superiority.¹¹⁰ 3:7–12 is a σύγκρισις which demonstrates the superiority of the ministry of the Spirit, also called the ministry of righteousness, to the ministry of the letter. Whereas the ministry of the old covenant leads to death and condemnation, the ministry of the Spirit brings about righteousness. From this comparison, in 3:12 Paul draws the conclusion that based upon the expectation (ἔχοντες οὖν τοιαύτην ἐλπίδα) of the effects of the ministry of the Spirit in which he participates, he uses much free speech. Structurally, this argument is reminiscent of the connection between παρρησία and its benefits described above in the rhetorical and philosophical traditions. Confident use of free speech rested in knowledge of one's good intentions and the likelihood benefits would be bestowed on the hearers.

The second proof of Paul's confidence (3:13–18) consists of two examples, one negative (3:13–15) and the other positive (3:16–18). Apologies customarily employed both positive and negative examples as proofs.¹¹¹ The phrase οὐ καθάπερ regularly signals the beginning of a negative example.¹¹² The negative example using οὐ καθάπερ in a comparison is common.¹¹³ In 3:13, the negative example contrasts Moses and Paul.¹¹⁴ Moses' inability to stand up to the scrutiny of his

¹⁰⁸ If it is the case that 3:7–12 and 3:13–18 function as proofs supporting the same proposition (3:4), then Windisch's interpretation of 3:7–18 as a midrash treating the superiority of Christianity to Judaism is misguided (*Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 112).

¹⁰⁹ Cic. *Inu. Rhet.* 1.30.49; *Top.* 3.11; 4.23; 10.43; Quint. *Inst.* 5.10.86–94; *Rhet. Her.* 2.19.29; Theon, *Prog.* 1. See J. Martin, *Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode* (Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 2.3; Munich: Beck, 1974) 119–22.

¹¹⁰ F. Focke, "Synkrisis," *Hermes* 58 (1923) 336–39; 347 n. 1; see also C. Forbes, "Comparison, Self-Praise and Irony: Paul's Boasting and the Conventions of Hellenistic Rhetoric," *NTS* 32 (1986) 2–8. See Cic. *Top.* 3.11; 4.23; Hermog. *Prog.* 8.

¹¹¹ Arist. *Rh.* 1.2.8–11; 2.20.1–2, 9; *Rhet. Her.* 4.45.59; 4.49.62.

¹¹² Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 4.40.1; Plut. *Alex.* 23.2; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 31.4; Lucian, *Rh. Pr.* 26; 1 Thess 4:13; John 6:58; 1 John 3:12.

¹¹³ Plut. *Com. Thes. et Rom.* 4.1–2; *Com. Lys. et Sull.* 4.4; *Com. Dion et Brut.* 1.2.

¹¹⁴ *Rhet. Her.* 4.46.59: "For a Comparison (*similitudo*) in the form of contrast is used when we deny that something else is like the thing we are asserting to be true." See also Anaximenes, *Rh. Al.* 8; Cic. *Top.* 11.47–49; Quint. *Inst.* 5.11.5–16, 30–31; Aps. *Rhet.* 8. See B. Fiore, *The Function of Personal Example in the Socratic and Pastoral Epistles* (AnBib 105; Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1986) 26–32.

onlookers contrasts sharply with Paul's openness before the church, the world, and God in 1:12-13, 2:17b, and 4:1-2. This contrast suggests that Moses hides himself from a sense of shame,¹¹⁵ since in ancient philosophy there was a frequent connection between shame and concealment.¹¹⁶ Bad conscience requires hiding.¹¹⁷ The veil indicates Moses' shame, a result of the old covenant (τὸ τέλος τοῦ καταργουμένου) whose ministry condemns even the one who is its minister.¹¹⁸

The second example (3:16-18) is positive. Moses' unveiled face signifies an end to his shame, and he comes to exemplify freedom (ἐλευθερία). The connection between unveiled face and freedom is made intelligible by the commonplace that freedom was dependent upon a good conscience.¹¹⁹ The relevance of this proof for Paul's apology rests in the common association between παρρησία and ἐλευθερία. Bold speech finds its legitimate basis in the freedom granted by a good conscience.¹²⁰ Paul's likeness to Moses insofar as the latter

¹¹⁵ Origen (*Hom. 5 in Jer.* 8-9 [PG 13.305-08]) recognized the connection between veil and shame in 3:13. Although van Unnik ("With Unveiled Face," 202) notes the association, he does not adequately explore the philosophic tradition. He gives extensive evidence of the connection in Jewish tradition in his "The Semitic Background of ΠΑΡΡΗΣΙΑ," 294-304.

¹¹⁶ Xen. *Ages.* 9.1; Pl. *Phdr.* 243B; *SVF* 3.101.36-37; Philo, *Mut.* 198-99; Epict. *Diss.* 3.22.15-16; Plut. *Com. Lyc. et Num.* 3.2; *De prof. in virt.* 82B; *De sera* 565B; *Vit. X orat.* 845F; Ps.-Hippocrates, *Ep.* 17.48-50; Lucian, *Merc. Cond.* 2; *Pseudol.* 21; *Dial. Mort.* 20.11; Diog. Laert. 7.3; Mar. Ant. *Med.* 3.8; Petron. *Sat.* 7. Philo's polemic against Greek mystery rites (*Spec.* 1.321) offers a particularly instructive parallel to 2 Cor 3:7-18: "Let those who work mischief feel shame (αἰσχυνέσθωσαν) and seek holes and corners of the earth and profound darkness, there lie hid (ἐπικρυπτέσθωσαν) and keep the multitude of their iniquities veiled (ἐπισκιάζοντες) out of the sight of all. But let those whose actions serve the common weal use freedom of speech (παρρησία) and walk in daylight through the midst of the marketplace, ready to converse with crowded gatherings, to let the clear sunlight shine upon their own life." Here παρρησία is based upon the freedom of a good conscience and the benefits bestowed. Cf. Isoc. *Or.* 15.43-44.

¹¹⁷ Isoc. *Or.* 1.16; 3.52; Philo, *Ios.* 68; *Spec.* 3.54; 4.6; Plut., *De prof. in virt.* 85C; *Lib. Or.* 15.82-83; Sen. *Ep.* 43.3-5; 97.12-13; 105.7-8.

¹¹⁸ Against some exegetes who view τὸ τέλος as cessation of glory (e.g., Plummer, *The Second Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians*, 97; Windisch, *Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 120; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 207). Cf. Rom 6:21-22. I understand τοῦ καταργουμένου as a reference to the old covenant. In support I point to 3:11 where τὸ καταργούμενον and τὸ μένον refer to the two covenants. On this point, see Barrett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, 119.

¹¹⁹ A saying attributed to Periander (Stob. *Flor.* 3.24.12) aptly puts the relationship: Περιάνδρος ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἐστὶν ἐλευθερία, εἶπεν 'ἀγαθὴ συνείδησις'.

¹²⁰ Especially important are Epict. *Diss.* 3.22.18-19, 93-95; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.11; Philo, *Ebr.* 148-52; *Her.* 6-7; *Ios.* 67-68; *Spec.* 1.203; *Prob.* 99, 149-55. See J. F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthene* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1976) 261-63.

experiences the removal of the veil is an example of the *πεποιθήσις* before God which Paul claims for himself in 3:4.

After Paul's defense of his ministry in 2:17-4:6, there is decreasing emphasis on legitimation and greater attention given to friendship and reconciliation. Why is this so? We must return to the "letter of tears." In addition to proving to his critics that he was capable of bold speech, this letter had the effect of causing grief to its readers. This is implied in 2:4 and stated explicitly in 7:8. In order to heal this pain, Paul places his *παρρησία* in the Greco-Roman tradition of soul-care,¹²¹ which emphasized friendship in the application of free speech. Paul's task in chapters 4-7 is to weave together *παρρησία* with *φιλία* in order to reconcile the church to himself.

Paul twice alludes to his bold speech in 6:6: *ἐν ἀγάπῃ ἀνυποκρίτῳ*¹²² and *ἐν λόγῳ ἀληθείας*. Feigned friendship was routinely criticized,¹²³ particularly by those authors who praised the value of candid speech in friendship.¹²⁴ Often equated with flattery, feigned friendship was the opposite of *παρρησία*.¹²⁵ Feigned friendship is inappropriate in political leadership and moral exhortation where free speech must be balanced by kindness and good will but not hypocrisy.¹²⁶ Paul again refers to the place of bold speech in his ministry with the phrase *ἐν λόγῳ ἀληθείας*. That *παρρησία* is a matter of speaking the truth is a philosophic commonplace.¹²⁷ Reformation of the human condition requires truth and bold speech.¹²⁸

Considering the frequent association of *παρρησία* and *λύπη* in the philosophic writings, it is not surprising that Paul surrounds his bold speech with claims concerning his purity (*ἐν ἀγνότητι*), self-knowledge

¹²¹ For ancient psychagogy, in addition to the work of Hadot cited above in n. 50, see P. Rabbow, *Seelenführung: Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike* (Munich: Kösel, 1954); B. L. Hijmans, *ΑΕΚΗΕΙΣ: Notes on Epictetus' Educational System* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1959) 41-102; H. G. Ingenkamp, *Plutarchs Schriften über die Heilung der Seele* (Hypomnemata 34; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971).

¹²² This phrase appears also in Rom 12:9, where the topic is the proper method of moral exhortation. See also Jas 3:17 and 1 Pet 1:22.

¹²³ Joseph. *AJ* 16.211; *BJ* 1.318, 516; 2.587; Plut., frg. 48; Them. *Or.* 22.267B; 280A-282C; Olymp. in *Grg.* 36.2; Eus. Mynd., frg. 22.

¹²⁴ Cic. *Amic.* 18.65; 25.92.

¹²⁵ Ps.-Plut. *De lib. ed.* 13B; Philo, *Conf.* 48; *Prob.* 99; Cic. *Amic.* 25.92-94. See Bohnenblust, *Beiträge*, 16-21.

¹²⁶ Philo, *Ios.* 67.

¹²⁷ See Dem. *Or.* 6.31; 60.26; Isoc. *Or.* 15.43; Joseph. *AJ* 16.108; Lucian, *Cont.* 13; *Pisc.* 17; *Merc. Cond.* 4; *Pseudol.* 4; *Dial. Mori.* 21.4; Lib. *Or.* 30.30.

¹²⁸ Phld. *Lib.* col. XV B; Lucian, *Tim.* 36; *Vit. Auct.* 8.

(ἐν γνώσει),¹²⁹ patience (ἐν μακροθυμίᾳ),¹³⁰ kindness (ἐν χρηστότητι),¹³¹ and the power of God (ἐν δυνάμει θεοῦ).¹³² With his emphasis on patience and kindness, Paul places his παρρησία in the Greco-Roman tradition of soul-care, according to which the combination of bold speech and gentleness does not reflect inconsistency, as his critics might assume, but is the practice both of caring teachers and of friends.

In 6:11 Paul refers to his friendly use of bold speech toward the church with the phrase “our mouth has remained open toward you (τὸ στόμα ἡμῶν ἀνέφωγεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς).”¹³³ Some ancient and modern exegetes correctly note the connection between an open mouth and παρρησία.¹³⁴ Two synonyms of παρρησία help explain this connection: ἐλευθεροστομεῖν and θρασυστομεῖν.¹³⁵ Friendship is implied in the notion of an expanded, joyful heart (ἡ καρδιά ἡμῶν πεπλάτυνται).¹³⁶ The church is not restricted in his heart (οὐ στενοχωρεῖσθε ἐν ἡμῖν), even as he, as a friend, uses bold speech in moral admonition.¹³⁷

¹²⁹ In Gal 6:1 Paul associates self-knowledge (σκοπῶν σεαυτὸν) with gentleness in moral admonition.

¹³⁰ Patience was associated with the gentle treatment of sinners. See Ign. *Pol.* 6.2; *1 Clem.* 13.1–4; 19.3; 49.5, 62.2; Bas. *Ep.* 22.1; 72. See Malherbe, “Gentle as a Nurse,” 210–14.

¹³¹ For χρηστότης as kindness, see C. Spicq, “Benignité, mansuetudé, douceur, clémence,” *RB* 54 (1947) 321–24. For χρηστότης as doing good to others, see *SVF* 3.64.24, 41; 3.67.8; 3.71.31–37; Mus. Ruf., frg. XIV. According to the psychagogical tradition, frank moral admonition should aim to benefit rather than condemn. See Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.5, 11, 24; 51.4–5; Plut. *De aud.* 46F–47A; *Adulator* 71D; *1 Clem.* 56.2; Mar. Ant. *Med.* 11.13; Julian, *Or.* 7.213C; Them. *Or.* 22.277A–C; Bas. *Reg. br.* 113 (PG 31.1157).

¹³² See above for discussion of the role of the divine.

¹³³ For the equivalence to παρρησίαζεσθαι, see Isoc. *Or.* 12.96; Or. *Enarr. in Job* 3.1 (PG 17.68–69); Lib. *Decl.* 38.1.42; 47.1.30; Chrys. *Incomprehens.* 5.6 (PG 48.744); Bas. *Ep.* 29.

¹³⁴ Chrys. *Hom. 13 in 2 Cor.* 1 (PG 61.491); Barrett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, 191; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 360, 368. Yet all understand the open mouth to be the personal warmth which they perceive in this section of 2 Cor. This sentimentalizes παρρησία and ignores its sense of pointed criticism.

¹³⁵ ἐλευθεροστομεῖν: Aesch. *PV* 180; Soph. *Aj.* 1258; Eur. *Andr.* 153; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 6.72.5; Philo, *Migr.* 116; *Her.* 7; *Prob.* 99–100, 148–49; see also O. Hense, “Bion bei Philon,” *RhM* 48 (1892) 231. θρασυστομεῖν: Aesch. *Supp.* 203; *Th.* 612; *Ag.* 1399; Soph. *Phil.* 380; Eur. *Hec.* 1286; *Ion* 672–75; Lib. *Ep.* 81.1. See also *Joseph and Aseneth* 12.6; Eph 6:19–20; Acts 8:32, 35; 10:24; 18:14; *Acts Jo.* 32–33. Influence of the LXX should not be ruled out. See the parallels adduced by Wettstein (*Novum Testamentum Graecum*, 2.193) and Windisch (*Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 210).

¹³⁶ So Chrysostom, *Hom. 13 in 2 Cor.* 1 (PG 61.491).

¹³⁷ The shrinking and expanding heart is a *topos* in Stoic psychology for grief and joy: *SVF* 1.51.19–25; 3.97.36–40; 3.98.30–32; 3.116.5–8; 3.119.30–31; Plut. *De lib. et aegr.* 1; Cic. *Tusc.* 4.31.66–67; Sen. *Constant.* 9.3. Plutarch’s account of the pleasure

The topic of bold speech is indicated in 7:2-4 by the phrase πολλή μοι παρρησία πρὸς ὑμᾶς. Paul immediately refers to the salutary effect of his bold speech: πολλή μοι καύχησις ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν. Since Paul's pride and joy rest on the church's repentance (7:7, 9, 12, 15-16),¹³⁸ 7:4 suggests to the readers that his bold speech is justified on the basis of its good effect.

The theme of bold speech is developed antithetically in 7:2-4 in order to emphasize Paul's friendly motives and provide reasons why the church should make room for him in its heart. First, in a series of denials in 7:2, Paul dissociates himself from the stereotype of the self-aggrandizing enemy of social harmony and friendly relations: οὐδένα ἠδικήσαμεν, οὐδένα ἐφθείραμεν, οὐδένα ἐπλεονεκτήσαμεν.¹³⁹ In 7:3a, he denies that his speech aims to condemn his readers: πρὸς κατάκρισιν οὐ λέγω.¹⁴⁰ The uses of παρρησία for moral edification, on the one hand, and condemnation, on the other, were well known.¹⁴¹ Harsh Cynics especially were noted for their unbridled use of free speech to condemn the ills of humankind.¹⁴² They understood bold speech as punishment of human error.¹⁴³ In 7:3b he reminds the

friendly souls experience with one another may be compared with the Pauline imagery (*De sera* 564B-C).

¹³⁸ For the teacher's pride in the student's moral growth, see Sen. *Ep.* 10.3; 20.1; 34.1-2; Ps.-Diog. *Ep.* 9. Cf. 1 Thess 2:19. The expression of joy over the recipient's moral progress is a convention of the paraenetic letter. See Sen. *Ep.* 5.1; 19.1; 20.1; 34.1; 35.2-4; 59.1-4.

¹³⁹ His denials are reminiscent of the popular characterization of the harsh Cynic philosopher, who not only reviled his hearers but demanded money as well. See Epict. *Dis.* 3.22.10, 50; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 32.11; Lucian, *Fug.* 7, 13-20; *Vit. Auct.* 10-11; Aristid. Rhetor, *Or.* 3.666-671. A similar combination of denials prefaces Samuel's use of παρρησία in Joseph. *AJ* 6.86-88. See also Philo, *Spec.* 1.202-204; Acts 20:33-34; Gal 5:15. Note esp. Ps.-Heraclit. *Ep.* 7.3. The denials of 2 Cor 7:2 are similar to those in Paul's presentation of his παρρησία in 1 Thess 2:5-7. It is not the case that Paul here denies charges that have been made against him as claimed by Barrett (*The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, 203) and Furnish (*II Corinthians*, 369).

¹⁴⁰ Paul reiterates the theme of punishment in 7:9: ἵνα ἐν μηδενὶ ζημιωθῆτε ἐξ ἡμῶν. Following Windisch (*Der zweite Korintherbrief*, 221-222), commentators regard 7:3a as Paul's attempt to mitigate the severity of the previous denials (7:2), which they misinterpret as his accusations against the church (e.g., Barrett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, 203; Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 369).

¹⁴¹ Stob. *Flor.* 3.13.63; Isoc. *Or.* 4.130; 8.72; Phld. *Lib.* frags. 37-38; col. 1B; Lucian, *Pseudol.* 3; *Deor. Conc.* 2; *Icar.* 30; Ps.-Diog. *Ep.* 29.2-3; Mar. Ant. *Med.* 11.6.2. See Gerhard, *Phoenix*, 36.

¹⁴² See above notes 25-26, 65. Democritus' laughter condemns (κατακρίνει) humanity for its inconsistency (Ps.-Hippocrates, *Ep.* 17.40). Cf. Ps.-Heraclit. *Ep.* 7.2; 9.8. See also *Gnomol. Vat.* 116, 487.

¹⁴³ For παρρησία as a whip (σκῆτος, μάστιξ), see Ps.-Diog. *Ep.* 29.1, 4; Ps.-Soc. *Ep.* 12; Plut. *Vit. X orat.* 842D. Cf. λοιδορία as a whip: Diog. Laert. 5.18; Philostr.

church of the friendship in which the bold words were written. Two *topoi* on friendship are present in this verse. The first (ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν ἐστε) expresses Paul's mindfulness of the church.¹⁴⁴ The second (εἰς τὸ συναποθανεῖν καὶ συζῆν) indicates the depth of the friendship.¹⁴⁵

Finally, in 7:8–12 Paul reviews for his readers the salutary effects of the rebuke conveyed in the letter of tears. These verses fully reflect the philosophic discussion of the use of free speech in friendship for the purpose of moral reformation. The progression in 7:9–10 from the grief the letter of tears caused (ἐλυπήθητε) to repentance (ἐλυπήθητε εἰς μετάνοιαν) and then to salvation (μετάνοιαν εἰς σωτηρίαν) places Paul's characterization of his treatment of the church in the letter of tears squarely in the psychagogical tradition.¹⁴⁶

Conclusion

We may safely conclude from this study that Paul, his audiences, and his critics were well aware of the philosophic understandings of *παρηρησία*. Paul's self-presentation as a bold speaker echoes the philosophic tradition's interest in the problem of legitimation and friendship. This is not to say, however, that Paul simply repeated traditional formulas. In fact, Paul's proximity to the philosophic tradition allows us to reflect on the sharp contrast with his intellectual environment and to gain insight into the theological character of his public ministry. This theology of public ministry, powerfully defended in 2 Cor 1–7, was in part Paul's response to his critics in Corinth, themselves most likely in sympathy with the harsh Cynic views on free speech, and who were no doubt irked by what they perceived to be Paul's inconsistency, lack of confidence, and adulteration of the word of God.

VS 487. The notion of the philosopher's rebuke of sin as the guilty verdict in a legal proceeding is found in Cynic self-description. See Ps.-Diog. *Ep.* 28.5. For the Cynic's task of punishing (κολάζειν) sinful humanity, see Ps.-Diog. *Ep.* 29.4; Ps.-Heraclit. *Ep.* 7.4; 9.3; Epict. *Diss.* 3.22.94, 97–98; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 9.8.

¹⁴⁴ The notion that friends are two bodies with one soul stands behind this formulation. See Bohnenblust, *Beiträge*, 39–40.

¹⁴⁵ For the *topos* that a friend is willing to die for a friend, see the texts cited at Furnish, *II Corinthians*, 367. For further examples, see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 9.8.9; Diog. Laert. 10.120; Cic. *Amic.* 7.24; Sen. *Ep.* 9.10; Lucian, *Tox.* 6, 36–37. Cf. Rom 5:7; 2 Cor 5:14–15; Phil 2:30.

¹⁴⁶ See above for discussion of the role of frank criticism in psychagogy.

In opposition to the philosophic tradition, in which the issues of legitimation and friendship were conceptualized either separately or opposed to one another, Paul consistently and conspicuously brings them together. The Paul who uses much free speech (2 Cor 3:12 and 7:4) is the same Paul who places that speech in the context of extreme expressions of friendship (7:2-7). We have seen this union of freedom of speech and friendship in Phlm 8-9, 1 Thess 2:1-12, and especially in 2 Cor 3 where the Spirit both frees Paul from shame (cf. Phil 1:12-20) and empowers him to participate in the ministry of righteousness. Paul is simultaneously free to speak his mind and bound to speak for his hearers' good. This paradox lies at the heart of παρρησία in the Pauline epistles.