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Two Approaches to Internationalizing the Curriculum: Some Comments

Mathias W. Reimann*

One might say that there are two basic approaches to internationalizing the first year curriculum: one may be called the integration model, the other the separation model. Both have advantages and disadvantages.

The first approach introduces a “global” perspective in the first-year curriculum by presenting occasional comparative, international or transnational perspectives in all (or at least most of) the courses in a piecemeal fashion. This forces (first-year) law students to become conscious of the legal world beyond the domestic orbit. In a sense, this is an ideal approach because it teaches them to think beyond U.S.-boundaries at the most formative stage of their legal education, i.e., at a time when they can easily learn to accept foreign and international law as a normal part of their professional toolkit. The problem is that this approach is relatively difficult to implement. In order to pursue it in an organized fashion, the whole first-year faculty must be on board, and that tends to be a relatively large and heterogeneous group. At least some of its members will have no particular interest in, not to mention knowledge of, global perspectives and will thus cooperate at best reluctantly. Unless the dean is strong (or outright overbearing), keeping this group together can be like herding cats and requires constant vigilance against open or clandestine defection. This approach also requires a set of materials which present comparative or international perspectives in up to half-a-dozen different contexts. These materials need to be coordinated in order to avoid redundancies and, ideally, to provide a variety of complementary perspectives. At least in this regard, the start-up costs are high. Finally, such an approach inevitably remains fragmentary in the sense that it does not convey any coherent picture—neither of foreign legal systems and cultures nor of the international order. Students learn a little bit of this and little bit of that and, arguably, nothing in any depth or

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breadth. Still, as a consciousness-raising enterprise, it can be a very effective way to show students how comparative and international perspectives can matter in virtually every context, particularly where students would never have expected them to come into play.

The second approach, which we have pursued at Michigan, is to create a separate introductory course which provides an overview of the world legal order, and then to make such a course mandatory. This allows the students to see the larger picture, to recognize connections, patterns, and general features of transnational law. It is easier to implement because it counts only on the international component of the faculty which has more expertise and can be expected to engage with conviction, if not enthusiasm, in such an enterprise. In other words, it makes it relatively simple to round up the usual suspects. Fewer players also ensure fewer coordination problems, and once the course is instituted, it can run almost on auto-pilot (as it does now at Michigan). In addition, it requires only one set of teaching materials, and once they are created, they can be used by all teachers and over long periods of time, provided they are updated at regular intervals. Yet, this model has two major downsides. First, it separates the comparative and international materials from the rest of the course-work; to be sure, there will be plenty of interplay with domestic and foreign or international legal materials and issues, but global perspectives still appear in a separate course, i.e., outside the more standard topics. Second, it is difficult to avoid sliding into teaching simply a watered-down version of the traditional (public) international law course. As a result, one must make every effort to include private international and comparative law materials. After all, most of our graduates do not work for the State Department but in private practice. They need basic knowledge not about treaty making, the UN Security Council or the laws of war and peace but about international business transactions, litigation, and trade.

The two models also differ as to when they best fit into the curriculum. The integration model is ideally suited for the first year although it need not be limited to it. Upper-class courses can (and should) also contain comparative and international perspectives, and in some areas, such as corporations, antitrust, or intellectual property, limiting the syllabus strictly to domestic materials borders on educational malpractice under modern conditions. Still, students best absorb comparative and international law thinking when they are fully engaged in learning the ropes in the traditional subject matter areas of the first year—discussing procedural regimes without civil juries makes the greatest impression when the American jury is under consideration, and international human rights come into sharpest relief when compared to the Bill of Rights jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. The

separation model, however, is not necessarily best realized in the first year. At Michigan, the course is mandatory but can be taken any time before graduation. After more than five years of experience with it, we tend to think that students may be better off to take it in the first semester of their second year. This is mainly because learning about the world legal order is easier, and makes more sense, on the basis of a somewhat deeper understanding of one's own legal system. Even here, the learning experience is (inevitably) comparative but it is so in a much broader fashion, e.g., by comparing the domestic legal order to the international one, a treaty to a statute, or the role of judicial decisions in international versus domestic law, and first-year students mostly lack sufficient background knowledge and understanding effectively to make such broad comparisons. In addition, first-year students already have their hands (and heads) full with the traditional courses, and forcing them to keep yet another ball in the air runs the risk that they will drop it. Thus, we now encourage students to take the mandatory Transnational Law course after the first year unless they have some background in international studies or are sure that they want to make comparative and international law the main focus of their legal education. Currently, about half of our students take the course as their first-year elective, the other half enroll in it later. Of course, one problem with that situation is the challenge of teaching the course to a mixture of first-year and upper-class students with different levels of sophistication and background knowledge.

In pursuing either model, we must be sensitive to the students' capacity to absorb new material. The first year is certainly very full as it is and adding comparative and international perspectives becomes counterproductive if students experience it as an unreasonable burden. In a similar fashion, adding a mandatory course entails the risk that they feel overwhelmed and thus resentful. It is true that we can sell global perspectives to today's students more easily than in the past and that we should do so openly and with conviction but we should make every effort to minimize the cost. Plainly, something has to give, be it the traditional coverage of the first-year courses or the freedom of choice in the upper-class curriculum. We must also never forget that, at least for the time being, our primary responsibility is to train American lawyers in American law. Comparative and international perspectives are a necessary ingredient in today's legal education but they should not take center-stage and push domestic law to the margin. The (domestic as well as foreign) market still mostly requires American lawyers with a global understanding rather than global lawyers with some American law background.

While the choice between the two models mentioned (or hybrids or

other alternatives, like the Georgetown “Week One” approach) must be well-considered, it is ultimately of secondary importance. The most important thing is to take action. After many AALS meetings in the last decade, at which we have discussed these matters ad nauseam, we must actually do something in the classroom. Fortunately, actual progress is finally being made as at least a handful of law schools are adding mandatory global perspectives to their curriculum, and there is reason to believe that others will soon follow their lead.

Let me add one final consideration. I often hear from colleagues that they feel too unsure of their own expertise and skill to plunge into foreign or international law. This is understandable, and I do not want to belittle such concerns. Yet, doubts about one’s own proper training and arguments against superficiality often ring hollow and sound like mere excuses. Let us admit it: we rarely have scruples of that sort in other contexts. Torts professors dabble in economic analysis of law without a Ph.D. in economics and discuss efficiency goals merely on the basis of having read some Calabresi and Posner; constitutional law teachers wax eloquent on political theories which they rarely understand more than superficially; and criminal law instructors discuss problems of moral responsibility without any erudition in moral philosophy. To be sure, comparative and international law are full of pitfalls, but they are not rocket science, and with a little help from their foreign-trained and internationally-oriented friends on the faculty (and elsewhere), most academic teachers will be able to do a reasonably good job. A professor must, of course, be honest about his or her limits but often the best teaching results from exploring new terrain jointly with the students. Here, as elsewhere, he or she will learn from experience, and that includes from mistakes, both one’s own and those of others. Nor is it an excuse for inertia that we want to avoid merely superficial understanding on the part of our students. It is true, of course, that a little knowledge is dangerous thing but it is even more true that complete ignorance is worse.