

RATIFICATION OF SEANWFZ: ORIGIN OF THE COMMON IDEA AND ITS CONSISTENCY

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ABSTRACT

Nuclear as a weapon of mass destruction cannot be separated from the world political agenda. Various international agreements as a control mechanism on this issue are followed by the establishment of some security regimes for nuclear weapons-free areas. One of them is South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in Southeast Asia. Established in 1995, the treaty was finally ratified by ten ASEAN member states. This paper examines the political history of why ASEAN member states were willing to ratify SEANWFZ. By using the constructivism approach, the study underlines that the aspects of ideas and shared concerns on regional security have become vision in encouraging the ratification of the treaty. Moreover, understanding the political history could give the explanation of contemporary significance of the treaty, mainly it is in line with the idea to prevent military exercise by great powers in the region.

Keywords: SEANWFZ, constructivism, nuclear weapons-free zone, international law, political history

Background

In international politics, the issue of nuclear proliferation is a very prominent issue. The development and dissemination of both quality and quantity and capabilities as weapons of mass destruction make nuclear a concern in the global security agenda. Understanding the dangers of nuclear weapons, as in the events of Hiroshima - Nagasaki, has been encouraging countries in the world to establish a control mechanism through various regimes and security agreements. Approval of control and elimination of weapons such as Non-Proliferation Treaties, for example, is the real form of the agreement. The treaties are the result of very tough negotiations between participating countries due to the complexity of the problem regarding the negotiated aspect. For example, in this circumstance is regarding to technical aspects and political aspects in determining

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agreement limits. This is understandable considering that nuclear has various advantages militarily, economically and politically. However, fear of its use remains a tremendous consideration (Winarno, 2011, p. 251).

Globalization of world politics seems to affect the attention of developing countries in terms of security, including for Southeast Asian countries. In 1971, five member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) met in Kuala Lumpur and signed a declaration on the ASEAN Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality or ZOPFAN (Frontroll, 2013). ZOPFAN declaration consisted of two main parts, introduction and two main paragraphs. The first paragraph stated that ASEAN states were committed to ensuring recognition and respect for Southeast Asia as a peaceful, neutral and free region from any interference of outside forces. The second paragraph stated the desire to expand the field of cooperation to foster strength, solidarity and closer relations among Southeast Asian countries (ICNL, 1971). Essentially, this declaration was a manifestation of the desire of ASEAN member states to maintain peace and stability, not only among ASEAN member states, but also in the Southeast Asia region in the spirit of peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding.

In terms of regional stability, a sense of concern on increasing ownership and dissemination of nuclear weapons prompted some ASEAN member states to include the idea that the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Southeast Asia was an important component of ZOPFAN. This was considered as a crucial meaning to strengthen the security and peace in the region. However due to some unfavorable regional political situations at the time, the official proposal for the establishment of the nuclear-free zone was delayed. Not all participating countries of ZOPFAN agreed the proposal. This happened partly because of differences in perceptions among the countries in interpreting the concept of national security towards regional security (Siregar, 2010).

The agreement had been difficult to achieve for several years. After negotiation and drafting in ZOPFAN forum, on December 15, 1995 in Bangkok, the proposal for a nuclear-free zone in a new form, namely the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty, was finally agreed. The treaty which was the previous delayed

proposal was signed and ratified by ten Southeast Asian countries (Federation of American Scientists, 1995).

Conceptually in general, the nature of a state to engage in an international law is voluntary. Therefore a state will only be bound by the agreement when ratifying it. As explained earlier, ASEAN member states had previously postponed the SEANWFZ proposal. Accordingly, in 1995 all of the states ratified SEANWFZ simultaneously. When joining in an international treaty is basically voluntary, the question is why were ASEAN member states willing to ratify the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty? Through the aspect political history, this paper aims to elaborate the ASEAN states common idea and how this continues consistently to present.

Discussion

Ratification from Constructivism Perspective

The existent of a state in the world cannot be separated from the interaction with other states. In international relations, every state has its own national interests. To expedite the interests, international relations are characterized by various phenomena, both in the form of conflict and cooperation. Thus, diplomacy is important as a tool to achieve goals. In these circumstances, relations between states often encounter an agreement in various matters, including economy, politics, and security. The need for cooperation is actually an effect of globalization in which interdependence cannot be avoided by every state. Widespread of some issues are often followed by the inability of the state to deal with it on its own. The control mechanism is then one of the important instruments.

In this circumstance, constructivists see that world politics is socially constructed. Relations between states yield their preference toward others as well as the international environment. As the constructivists call this idea, whether the world system is full of anarchy or peace depends on how they make relations and subsequently how they regard and behave toward it (Wendt, 1992). While the international system leads the states behavior, domestic factor could also contribute to a state's foreign policy. This so called holistic constructivism, considering international system and domestic realm as factors in

forming a state identity, is important in international relations (Reus-Smit, 2013). In short, it determines the state behavior and foreign policy whether to cooperate or to have conflict with other states.

Recently, many states have been engaging into various international agreements by ratifying it. Ratification is the stage of a state to bind legally to an international law or agreement. Through this stage, the international law will be adopted into the national law of the state domestically. The reason for a state to ratify international law can be understood by the theory of state behavior. Constructivism is one of the approaches in understanding state behavior. Again, constructivism approach explains that state behavior is influenced by normative aspects by exploring how norms and identities play roles. In general, constructivism has four main characteristics (Oberdorster, 2008). First, it emphasizes the role of ideas in forming or constructing social changes in state behavior. Ideas are individual beliefs about right or wrong which then form the norm. Meanwhile, the norm determines a habit pattern that raises normative expectations about what should be done and what should not. When ideas develop into norms, they will influence the state behavior. Second, constructivism presupposes that agents have subjective characteristics in decision making. Therefore, actors can be persuaded by normative arguments. Persuasion is an active attempt to build norms through persuasion / invitation to internalize new norms and define their interests and identities. Thus, when state actors are convinced of the truth, validity and suitability of a norm, they will change their interests and behavior.

Third, constructivism focuses on the holistic nature of the social environment. Existing social systems shape the interests of the state through norms, identity, knowledge and culture. State interests are formed through interaction with other states. This is because social structures can limit or develop their interests. In this case, shared understandings form the social environment itself. Subsequently, transnational networks become important in influencing behavior because a state's interests can change when the interests of other states change as well. Fourth, constructivism adopts a constitutive approach rather than a causal approach in understanding state behavior. In short, the

desire of the state depends on its own identity. The identity of a state depends on the network of social relations rather than on the recognition of characteristics. In other words, it is influenced by how other states behave.

Through transnational networks, norms can spread and be socialized to other states using normative arguments. These domestic and international political networks depend on the power of information, ideas and strategies to persuade states to ratify. When there is an internalization of the distributed norm, ratification of an agreement that has been promoted will be more likely conducted.

In the process of ratification, the constructivism approach provides several important views. A state ratifies an agreement because of its commitment to the existing norms and ideas. In addition, the efforts of international organizations to link normative ideas with material objectives can also encourage states to ratify.

Background of SEANWFZ

The human civilization, and of course their knowledge, has made progress in life. People create and develop many technologies including war technologies. This very rapid progress has changed a political-military strategy from conventional to non-conventional involving nuclear weapons. The rising trend of nuclear weapons has made the international community more worried about its presence. The incident of Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave awareness of how dangerous the weapons were. Responding to this, in addition to trying to achieve the overall goal of disarmament, the international community also seeks to guarantee these objectives through political and legal domains so that concerns on nuclear weapons attacks will not occur.

In an effort to disarm nuclear weapons, there are two types of restriction on developing the weapon. The first is vertical restrictions, committing restrictions in terms of quality and capability of nuclear weapons. The second is horizontal restrictions which limit the amount or quantity of ownership of these weapons. Horizontal restrictions are more visible in the formation of anti-nuclear regimes. One of them is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT has a position as 'a parent' of other anti-nuclear

agreements. Article VII of the NPT becomes the basis for the emergence of various regional-based nuclear weapons-free agreements (Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional, 1997).

The South East Asia Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty signed on December 15, 1995 in Bangkok has great significance for countries in the Southeast Asia region. For the first time all countries in the Southeast Asia region jointly drafted and signed the agreement to improve peace and stability in the Southeast Asia region. Those Southeast Asian countries were Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

Before the formation of SEANWFZ, ASEAN member states² had initiated ZOPFAN (The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) in Kuala Lumpur on November 27, 1971. Based on the historical experience of Japanese colonialism and occupation, ZOPFAN was actually an effort to anticipate the apprehension of some ASEAN member states (Emmers, 2003, p. 17). None of these countries have nuclear weapons, and most of them condemn nuclear weapons (Cornellier, 2003, p.244).

The establishment of SEANWFZ is a major initiative of ZOPFAN to respond to the concerns of military bases and weapons transit from the five nuclear weapon states (NWS)³, through both sea and air in the Southeast Asia region. At that time, ASEAN noticed the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone formed in Latin America and the Caribbean and also the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. Yet, various conflicts in Southeast Asia caused difficulties for the ZOPFAN initiative. ASEAN suspended the initiative after Vietnam's invasion, which was an ally of the Soviet Union and China, over Cambodia in 1979. Due to the threats from Vietnam, ASEAN requested strategic support from the United States and China. When trying to negotiate the settlement of the Cambodian conflict, ASEAN focused on isolating Vietnam. This caused tensions between ASEAN and Vietnam. Despite the unfavorable political environment, ASEAN saw the idea of

² At the time, the member of ASEAN only consisted of five countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand.

³ NWS consists of the US, the UK, France, China, and Soviet Union. In the Cold War setting, the world politics constituted bipolarity, a state when the five powers formed into two powerful alliances. China and Soviet Union set Eastern Bloc while the UK and France tended to the US as Western Bloc.

nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in Southeast Asia as the main tool to realize ZOPFAN (Cornellier, 2003, p. 246).

More unfavorably, the idea of NWFZ in the region faced controversy among ASEAN member states. This is related to the existence or role of external forces in the region (Emmers, 2003, p. 17). Malaysia was worried about China as a great power because of ethnic conflicts between Malay and Chinese in the domestic level. Meanwhile, according to Indonesia, the Southeast Asian region needed neutrality from several great powers such as the United States (US), the Soviet Union and China. On the other hand other countries such as Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines were actually pragmatic. They assumed that Western powers, in this case the US, were main elements to realize national and regional security. Both concerns and the assumption of dependence on the great powers could not be separated from the possession of nuclear weapons by them. While Malaysia worried about China, Thailand and Singapore insisted on their opinions to depend on the US. In addition, the two countries were pessimistic about Vietnam as a regional partner. Meanwhile Indonesia wanted neutrality from outside influences by building independence. This different perception caused ZOPFAN aspiration to create a nuclear-free zone delayed long enough. The agreement did occur. Yet the ambiguity, level of legal binding, and lack of reciprocity and obligations made ZOPFAN far from a clear control mechanism. The nuclear-free zone proposal eventually remained unclear (Acharya, 2001, pp. 55–56).

After the end of Cold War, Southeast Asia became more conducive and some conflicts in the region were mostly resolved. The Cambodian conflict that had been the most problematic issue finally ended with the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in 1991. The desire of ASEAN member states to build NWFZ again emerged. Vietnam-ASEAN relations increased favorably as a result of the Cambodian peace agreement. This was very important in continuing the initiative for NWFZ in the Southeast Asia region. When the NWS closed their military bases in the Southeast Asia, the region became more politically established (NTI, 2018).

With the increase of such favorable political climate, on 15th of December 1995, ASEAN Fifth Summit established the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). The Treaty, also known as The Bangkok Treaty, was signed and ratified by the six heads of ASEAN member states (except the Philippines). Meanwhile, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar signed in the position as ASEAN non-member observers at that time (Boutin & Acharya, 1998).

The Rules of the Treaty

The SEANWFZ treaty entered into force on March 28, 1997. It was stated clearly at the opening of The Bangkok Treaty that the treaty was not limited to denuclearization in Southeast Asia. It also determined to take concrete action that would contribute to the progress of complete nuclear weapons disarmament.⁴ The treaty consists of 22 articles. Overall, this treaty has several important rules, including the geographical zones, prohibitions, uses, regulatory bodies, and dispute resolution (DPR-RI, 1997).

The zone covered in SEANWFZ is the entire land area, inland waters, archipelagic sea, territorial sea, continental shelf, and the exclusive economic zone of Southeast Asian countries. The ban of nuclear proliferation is aimed firmly at all Southeast Asian countries. Article 3 SEANWFZ mentions restrictions including making, possessing, controlling, deploying, transporting, testing, or using nuclear weapons anywhere. In addition, the countries are also prohibited from disposing of radioactive materials on land, sea or releasing it into the air to protect against the dangers of radioactive material pollution.

Article 4 and 5 explain the provisions in the use of nuclear power. Nuclear used for peace can be permitted only if the concerned country has an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards. Disposal of radioactive material or nuclear waste is only permitted if it complies with the requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In addition, Southeast Asian countries are also

⁴ See the Preamble of SEANWFZ treaty.

required to become parties to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.

To enforce the SEANWFZ treaty provisions, the Commission is established as a regulatory body to ensure compliance and the Executive Committee as its subsidiary body. As stated in article 9, the Executive Committee is given the right to act swiftly if there is a suspicion of a violation of SEANWFZ provisions. In this case, the committee may, for example, send a fact-finding mission to investigate. Meanwhile, in the case of dispute settlement, disputes due to the interpretation of provisions must be resolved through peaceful means. If it cannot be completed within one month, each concerned party, with prior approval from the other party, can request arbitration or submit the matter to the International Court of Justice. Provisions concerning the dispute settlement are explained in article 21 (IAEA, 1998).

Common Goals in forming SEANWFZ

The establishment of SEANWFZ was the desire of ASEAN member states to create regional security. On December 15, 1995, SEANWFZ was ratified by nine countries in the Southeast Asia region and came into force on March 28, 1997. Some of these countries were Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.⁵

To see how the Southeast Asian countries ratify SEANWFZ according to the concept of constructivism, we need to know the 'ties' of these countries at that time. It should be noticed that at that time, ASEAN consisted of 6 countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore. Meanwhile, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar had not joined ASEAN membership.

In the early 1990s, the international security situation changed rapidly. The end of the Cold War marked by the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a new episode of world politics. Meanwhile in the realm of the Southeast Asia region, the Cambodian conflict also tended to decline. The Paris Conference on Cambodia in 1991 paved the way for

⁵ The Philippines only signed it and then just ratified it on 21 June, 2001.

normalization of politics in Cambodia. In this regard, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos, whose territory bordered Cambodia, sought to prevent their territory from any form of military assistance to Cambodian parties. ASEAN leaders saw the importance of holding consultations with the countries. Taking into account the changing world situation, the Fourth ASEAN Summit held in January 1992 was the right momentum (Abad Jr, 2005).

The proximity within ASEAN explains that it would be easy for countries to reach consensus on the formation of NWFZ in Southeast Asia. The interaction in ASEAN membership and common identity as Southeast Asian nations provided a loose space after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War provided fresh air that tensions could be reduced. With the closure of various military bases of great powers such as the US in the region, the view of the concerns and alignments that had originally been the debate became less and less. Withdrawal of the intervention of the great powers over Southeast Asia reinforced a shared idea that they were countries that have their own authority over their territory.

Thus, to accelerate the vision of regional security that had been delayed, the Working Group on ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ was formed in June 1992 to compile the drafts. Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi from Malaysia and Ali Alatas from Indonesia asked ASEAN member states to take the opportunity in the momentum of the end of the cold war to realize the vision of nuclear non-proliferation in the region. This working group held continuous negotiations for the next three years to exercise the second drafts (Abad Jr, 2005).

The decision made by ASEAN in 1992 to get involved in regional security issues allowed the process of forming NWFZ to move forward. Although there was no danger of nuclear proliferation in Southeast Asia at that time, ASEAN was concerned that China's nuclear weapons were expanding with territorial disputes in the South China Sea, involving Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines. Other concerns also arose over North Korea's nuclear program which could influence Japan to develop nuclear weapons. NWFZ covering Southeast Asian land and maritime zones was considered a tool to guarantee regional security issues in a long-term agenda. At the

ASEAN ministerial level meeting in Singapore in 1993, the ASEAN Foreign Minister reaffirmed their commitment to ZOPFAN and decided to establish NWFZ in the region.

For the first time, face-to-face consultations with the NWS representations were held from 16 to 18 November 1995 in Jakarta. Based on NWS comments, this preparation would take time and considerable concessions before the SEANWFZ treaty could be signed by them. However, at that time, ASEAN had decided the drafts were ready to be made into a treaty or protocol. Thus, the 1995 ASEAN Summit was a very historic moment because for the first time all ten leaders of Southeast Asian countries gathered for signing the SEANWFZ. To be understood, five months before Vietnam had joined ASEAN. Meanwhile, even though Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar were not yet members of ASEAN, they had been consulted two months before the signing (Abad Jr, 2005).

From the perspective of constructivism, it can be said that interests of the states in the region were the outcomes constructed during the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union led Vietnam to consider reducing their aggressive behavior. Meeting and consultation with ASEAN had influenced Vietnam to be more approachable. Thus, there was no reason to respect the idea of NWFZ in Southeast Asia since there was no more powerful ally.

Indonesia and Malaysia, in other side, had been considering the influence of China's communism in the region. The decline of Cambodian conflict could mean the downturn of China's interferences in Indochina. Establishing NWFZ would prevent another influence. This had been followed by the action of Laos and Thailand that they controlled their border tightly from any military purpose. In other hand, Myanmar might not have direct advantages. Yet, complying a non-proliferation nuclear weapon zone could assure its security in the future. Again, the countries' decision involving in the ratification of SEANWFZ was a result of constructive consolidation among the Southeast Asian countries.

During the ratification of SEANWFZ, the role of norms for regional security was an important point. The success of the regime or security cooperation depended on the

existence of a dominant power. The role of campaign or persuasion in building awareness was seen by the role of Malaysia and Indonesia. With its area, population, strategic location and the experience of struggle for independence, Indonesia had and has been recognized by other members as a natural leader in ASEAN. The country is expected to be the main manager of the regional order. However, this does not mean that Indonesia has been a hegemon in the ASEAN. Since the ZOPFAN negotiations, Indonesia had always argued for the establishment of an autonomous regional order that is free from external intervention or interference.⁶ This preference was shown in the Bangkok Declaration, ZOPFAN and later in SEANWFZ. Indonesia proposed its ideas through the principles of national and regional security, which have informally been adopted as a common security doctrine among member states (Emmers, 2003, p.157). This addressed a mutual agreement on the idea. Due to the shared identity as Southeast Asian nations and their closed interaction in dealing with the security issue in the region, SEANWFZ was more able to be received simultaneously by countries.

Contemporary Development: ASEAN Consistency

Under the SEANWFZ, states parties are bound not to develop, produce, acquire or have control of nuclear weapons; station or transporting nuclear weapons in any way; test or use nuclear weapons; and allow in the territory of each other country to carry out this action. They also cannot dispose of at sea or dump into the atmosphere in the zone, including in the form of any radioactive material. The scope of the zone in this treaty covers all regions of ASEAN territories, both land and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Consequently, if the NWS deployed a number of nuclear weapons in the zone, for instance placing a nuclear ballistic missile submarine in the ASEAN's EEZ, then it is

⁶ In the 16th ASEAN Foreign Ministerial meeting in June 1983, Indonesia Foreign Ministry, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, proposed the concept of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone as an element in line with the ZOPFAN concept. Indonesia's support for ZOPFAN was primarily based on the principle of neutrality in the sense of nonalignment including not allowing the existence of foreign military bases in the region. As the concept of national security, security is about self-trust. Maintaining regional security was an effort to integrate all sectors or aspects of regional life so that it becomes a dynamic and resilient force to uphold national sovereignty. Thus the application of national jurisdiction in the region itself can be more legally guaranteed. See Siregar, p. 4-5.

highly prohibited. This is considered as hard consideration for the NWS to ratify SEANWFZ because they will not be allowed to use any form of nuclear weapons in the region (Zhao, 2017).

Until now, none of the five NWS ratifies the treaty. China and America, for example, have very strong interests. The South China Sea conflict cannot be separated in this matter. Ratifying SEANWFZ means that it will hinder China's interests in claiming sea territory that believably has abundant natural wealth. The existence of a US military base in the Philippines is certainly a separate consideration for the US not to ratify the treaty. UK, Russia and France on the other hand also assume that this treaty has shortcomings needed to be examined. This shows that every member of the NWS seeks to expand every opportunity in the future. Thus, ratifying would mean having no more flexible military movement.

However, many arguments emphasize the importance of ratifying SEANWFZ. In order for the NWS to ratify, it is believed that ASEAN needs to promote additional methods to reduce nuclear hazards, including by supporting the steps of non-proliferation and creative weapons control which have recently developed (Parthemore, 2017). Moreover, the recent development of military technology allows a country to act more flexibly. There should be no serious obstacles for the NWS to ratify if they are willing to carry out political flexibility (Zhao, 2017). Meanwhile, security threats from non-state actors are also a concern for ASEAN. One example is the terrorism group in the southern part of the Philippines which has forced Indonesia to deal with it. Thus, in addition to preventing the region from domination of the big powers, SEANWFZ can be a platform for cooperation against terrorism in the 21st century (Dalpino, 2014).

The ASEAN itself has been tremendously maintaining the vision. The SEANWFZ Commission consisting of the 10 foreign ministers of the ASEAN is attempting to get the ratification from the NWS. Although the attempt has no result yet, it seems that ASEAN has strong willingness that idea to uphold the non-proliferation zone in the region is a common value among them.

This could be related to the long history and recent conflict in the South China Sea. The dispute involves Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, and the Philippines. China may be regarded as a common threat considering the fact that the East Asian giant may exercise nuclear weapon in the sea. In other hand, the US naval may also be another threat for some, in not all, ASEAN member states. Singapore and the Philippines in some circumstance may have close relations with the US. Nevertheless, the common idea of maintaining security in the region is likely the first priority among the member states. The present development of North Korea may also constitute another consideration.⁷ Yet the shared idea blowing up among the ASEAN member states mainly related to the great powers. How the goal is maintained is through the role of the Commission. The foreign ministers in the body have strong influence in constructing and prolonging the idea to have the secure region.

Conclusion

The issue of nuclear proliferation encourages countries in the world to establish a control mechanism through various regimes and security agreements. As an area that is vulnerable to the effects of nuclear weapons due to the experience of regional conflicts involving the intervention of the great powers, Southeast Asian countries declared the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). This idea was initially just an idea of some ASEAN member states. The increase of positive political climate after the cold war led to flattering ties among the countries to communicate the idea. Leadership in the forum has an important role in campaigning for the idea of the nuclear-free region. Construction of identity and shared concerns were inevitable in the ratification of SEANWFZ.

The vision to establish a secure region particularly from the great powers had become common goal since the end of the Cold War and Cambodian conflict. In addition, through the closeness in the ASEAN forum and the common identity as Southeast Asian

⁷ Although in June 2018 Kim Jong Un expressed his intension for denuclearization in North Korea, it seems that in the subsequent months Kim does not show his consistency. See (Klug & Kim, 2018)

nations, the idea of a nuclear-free region could finally be realized. As the recent development shows that NWS reluctant to ratify the treaty, ASEAN seems to have consistency in extend the idea of the nuclear weapon free zone. At this point, the awareness of great powers influence in the recent time still assertively becomes the basic common idea.

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