

12-1997

Cognitive Problems, Metacognition, and Philosophy of Language

Rossen I. Roussev

University of Massachusetts Boston

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/cct_capstone

Recommended Citation

Roussev, Rossen I., "Cognitive Problems, Metacognition, and Philosophy of Language" (1997). *Critical and Creative Thinking Capstones Collection*. 261.

http://scholarworks.umb.edu/cct_capstone/261

This Open Access Capstone is brought to you for free and open access by the Critical and Creative Thinking Program at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in Critical and Creative Thinking Capstones Collection by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.

This is an authorized facsimile, made from the microfilm master copy of the original dissertation or master thesis published by UMI.

The bibliographic information for this thesis is contained in UMI's Dissertation Abstracts database, the only central source for accessing almost every doctoral dissertation accepted in North America since 1861.

UMI Dissertation Services

A Bell & Howell Company

300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106-1346
1-800-521-0600 734-761-4700
<http://www.umi.com>

Printed in 1999 by digital xerographic process
on acid-free paper

DPBT

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI[®]

Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

COGNITIVE PROBLEMS, METACOGNITION, AND PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE

A Thesis Presented

by

ROSSEN I. ROUSSEV

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies, University of Massachusetts
Boston, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

December 1997

Critical and Creative Thinking Program

COGNITIVE PROBLEMS, METACOGNITION, AND PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE

A Thesis Presented

by

ROSSEN I. ROUSSEV

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies, University of Massachusetts
Boston, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

December 1997

Critical and Creative Thinking Program

© Copyright by Rossen I. Roussev 1997
All Rights Reserved

COGNITIVE PROBLEMS, METACOGNITION, AND PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE

A Thesis Presented

by

ROSSEN I. ROUSSEV


Approved as to style and content by:




Arthur Millman, Associate Professor
Chairperson of Committee



Lynne Tirrell, Associate Professor
Member



John Murray, Associate Professor
Member



Delores Gallo, Program Director
Critical and Creative Thinking Program

ABSTRACT

COGNITIVE PROBLEMS, METACOGNITION, AND PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

December 1997

Rossen I. Roussev, M.A., Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski", Sofia, Bulgaria
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston

Directed by Professor Arthur Millman

I compare the metacognitive procedures for overcoming cognitive problems (such as "low self-esteem," "permanent anxiety," "motivational deficit," "bad learning strategies," or "student-teacher conflict of values") with the procedures contemporary philosophy uses to overcome its traditional problems (such as "absolute truth," "ideal knowledge," or "adequate language"). By means of J. Habermas' concept of *philosophy as a mediating interpreter* I conceptualized the two types of problems as *problems of mediation* which remain out of the scope of science as an expert field but in the scope of philosophy as a non-expert field, and thus justified their eligibility to be overcome through the latter procedures.

Four scientific concepts were examined, including M. V. Covington's concept of *strategic thinking*, J. Lochhead's concept of the *role of verbalization in thinking*, R. Paul's concept of *conceptualization and elements of thought*, and M. Lipman's concept of the *role of philosophy in children's cognitive development*, which all consider overcoming of *cognitive problems*. Four philosophical concepts were examined.

including L. Wittgenstein's early concept of the *correct use of language*, his later concept of *language games*, J. Searle's concept of *speech acts*, and R. Rorty's concept of the *political answer to philosophical questions*, which all consider overcoming of *traditional philosophical problems*. Since both scientists and philosophers regard their problems as being epistemological in character and see their overcoming in the utilization of appropriate concepts of cognition, I attempted to delineate the scientific procedure of metacognition in terms of concepts of contemporary philosophy of language.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Arthur Millman for being my adviser, for the enviable patience with which he read the number of very “initial” drafts of this thesis, and for the procedural arrangements without which the purpose of this paper would have never been accomplished. I thank Lynne Tirrell for being my reader, for her references, and for the spirit of criticism which I enjoyed in her wonderful course. I thank Jonathan Mahoney with whom I have discussed at length many of the issues concerned in this paper. I thank Donna Guerra for editing and commenting on this paper. I thank Judith Collison for some of the literature. I thank Tom Levitan for his editorial help. I thank Svetoslav Pavlov and Victor Zagorov for the long conversations on philosophical topics through which I formed some of my current beliefs.

I thank also the bright personality of John R. Murray for his understanding and cooperation, and for his enthusiasm which came close to convincing me that learning could really be a joy. I thank also the wonderful Peggy Roldan for helping me so much in disentangling my countless administrative problems.

And, I thank all those the thought of whom hastened me onward.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
Chapter	
INTRODUCTION	1
1. COGNITIVE PROBLEMS AND THE CONCEPT OF METACOGNITION	
Overview	18
Covington's Concept of Strategic Thinking	19
Lochhead's Concept of the Role of Verbalization in Thinking	24
Paul's Notion of Conceptualization and the Elements of Thought	29
Lipman's Notion of the Role of Philosophy in Children's Early Development	35
A General Discussion of the Scientific Concepts	41
2. TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AND THE CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE	
Overview	44
Wittgenstein's Concept of the Correct Use of Language	47
Wittgenstein's Concept of Language Games	58
Searle's Concept of Speech Acts	79
Rorty's Political Answer to the Traditional Philosophical Questions	85
A General Discussion of the Philosophical Concepts	93
3. METACOGNITION IN TERMS OF A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF COGNITION	
Overview	98
Cognitive Problems and a Philosophical Understanding of Language	100
A General Discussion of the Relationship and Possible Cooperation between Science and Philosophy	120
In Summary	129
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	132

The pragmatist thinks that the tradition needs to be utilized, as one utilizes a bag of tools. Some of these tools, these 'conceptual instruments' – including some which continue to have undeserved prestige – will turn out no longer to have a use, and can just be tossed out. Others can be refurbished. Sometimes new tools may have to be invented on the spot

Richard Rorty

INTRODUCTION

Reason has split into three moments – modern science, positive law and posttraditional ethics, and autonomous art and institutionalized art criticism – but philosophy had precious little to do with this disjunction. Ignorant of sophisticated critiques of reason, the sons and daughters of modernity have progressively learned to differentiate their cultural tradition in terms of these three aspects of rationality such that they deal with issues of truth, justice, and taste discretely rather than simultaneously.

Jürgen Habermas, *Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter*

The Issue: In what follows, I try to show that negative psychological and cognitive dispositions (such as “permanent anxiety,” “motivational deficit,” “indifference to learning,” “low self-esteem,” or “inappropriate strategic approaches” (Covington 1985), which interfere with problem solving (and which I will call for convenience *cognitive problems*), are often rooted in individuals’ philosophically naive notions of how their own cognitive abilities work. I will discuss a possible relation between *cognitive problems* and problems that are said to be *traditional philosophical problems* (such as “absolute truth,” “ideal knowledge,” or “adequate language”). Then I show a relation between the *solution* of the cognitive problems as proposed in four educational views (M. V. Covington (1985), J. Lochhead (1985), R. Paul (1990), M. Lipman (1985)) and the *dissolution* of philosophical problems proposed in four philosophical views (L. Wittgenstein (1922/1963, 1953/1958), J. Searle (1986), R. Rorty (1991)).

If my argument identifies a common *conceptual content* in the main points of scientists’ and philosophers’ approaches to, respectively, cognitive and philosophical problems, it will enable me to *conceptualize* the two types of problems and the procedures for overcoming these problems *within a common terminology*. Such a conceptualization will provide a ground for justifying a

methodology of transfer of the procedure for overcoming the philosophical problems as a procedure for overcoming cognitive problems.¹ Subsequently, if I am able to *illustrate* how cognitive problems can be overcome through a philosophical procedure, I will have conveyed an argument on behalf of the contention that these problems *can be adequately treated* as still 'undisolved philosophical problems' which persist in individuals' personal views about intelligence. In this way, I will have also conveyed the argument that a specific 'extension' of individuals' philosophical backgrounds would adequately help overcome their cognitive problems.

Conceptual Content: To *conceptualize* the two types of problems and the procedures for their overcoming *within a common terminology*, I will examine and summarize the notions above mentioned in two compositional concepts², respectively, scientific and philosophical ones. The former involves M.V. Covington's concept of *strategic thinking*, J. Lochhead's concept of the *role of verbalization in problem solving*, R. Paul's concept of *critical and creative thinking*, and M. Lipman's concept of the *role of philosophy in education*. The latter involves L. Wittgenstein's early concept of the so-called *correct use of language*, his late concept of *language games*, J. Searle's concept of *speech acts*, and R. Rorty's concept of the *political answer to philosophical questions*. Such a synthesis of different concepts in compositional concepts is intended to highlight their common conceptual points rather than to neglect their conceptual differences. In my argument, what is in common to *all* these concepts is a *notion of philosophy* which they *employ* (either more explicitly or more implicitly) *in treatment* of problems that are *essentially the same*. Accordingly, I will try to show not only that these problems are conceived of as different because they

¹The distinction between method and content is itself a controversial issue in philosophy and I make it here in a conditional sense. Regarding this question, my position is in favor of the notion that method and content overlap in the accounts which are empirically insufficient and are fairly distinguishable only in the accounts which are empirically sufficient.

² I understand as 'compositional' a concept that consistently involves a few other concepts so that their points can be interpreted as complementary.

reflect different conceptual frameworks, but that as they appear in one such framework so they disappear in another. From the philosophical point of view which I will consequently adhere to, the former framework is termed *metaphysical*, while the latter one is termed *therapeutic* which could be the appropriate name of this principle of treatment, too.

In my argument, I will presuppose that scientists and philosophers treat, respectively, cognitive and philosophical problems in terms of both *explanations* of their sources and *prescriptions* for their overcoming. In these terms, my goal can be formulated as an inquiry into whether cognitive problems can be *explained in philosophical terms* and overcome through a *philosophical prescription*. I argue that the conceivable connection in the treatment of the two types of problems initially comes up as a matter of *explanation* which poses them as being *epistemological in character* since they are concerned with the *use of cognition*. Thus, as traditional philosophical problems can be *explained* as stemming from the use of *epistemological concepts* or *concepts of cognition*, so cognitive problems can be *explained* as stemming from inappropriate uses of those *epistemological concepts* which individuals spontaneously form by combining the various *epistemological points* in their views of how their own cognitive abilities work. General as this explanation is, it may be used in determining individuals' cognitive problems (which were originally detected in the scope of science) *in philosophical terms*. In an attempt to do so, I will use, on one hand, Rorty's term "set of beliefs" to signify what in the above explanation of the two types of problems was distinguished as "epistemological concept"³; and on the other, the term "language use," which is commonly associated with the philosophy of Wittgenstein, to signify

³ Here, I am using the phrase 'set of beliefs' as a *conditional* term which is a part of a *conditional* explanation that, as such, contains also a recognition that the equation of the two types of problems is only a speculative one; but, I am not using it in the sense of an atomic term being the goal of an analysis as a part of an explanation. since such a use could be legitimately criticized as aiming at an 'ultimate' explanation. Similarly, the terms 'signify' and 'specify' are used in a conditional sense, too; for, being themselves speculative, they are intended to put into light other speculative terms. If such a use has any value, it would be to build up a context of *understanding* by way of showing an interrelation of all such terms exercised.

what in the same explanation was distinguished as “use of epistemological concepts.” Thus, like the traditional philosophical concepts, individuals’ views of how their cognitive abilities work can be explained as *epistemological concepts* which consist of certain *sets of beliefs*⁴ that are formed by mediation of certain *language uses* which are philosophically unjustified (and perhaps unjustifiable) and consequently entail their cognitive problems.

Further, I *presume* that such a connection between the ‘explanations’ is a ground for relating both scientists’ and philosophers’ prescriptions for treating, respectively, cognitive and traditional philosophical *problems*, and ultimately, for justifying a *philosophical prescription* as a prescription for overcoming *cognitive problems*. In my view, what is *in common* to both *scientific* and *philosophical* procedures of treatment is that they relate the overcoming of the two types of problems to the *mediation* of a *concept of cognition* which *essentially* involves a knowledge of *how these problems come into being and how they disappear*. For example, the *common features* of the *scientific prescriptions* which I discuss in chapter one can be subsumed under the term *metacognition* which in the scientific literature signifies a mind’s problem solving activity standing for the *utilization* of one’s *knowledge of how one’s own intelligence works* in problem solving:

Metacognition is your knowledge of and awareness about cognitive processes. ... Metacognition is ... a process [in which] we use our cognitive processes to contemplate our cognitive processes. Metacognition is ... our knowledge about [how] our cognitive processes can guide us in arranging circumstances and selecting strategies to improve future cognitive performances. (M. W. Matlin p. 248)

⁴ I understand the term “belief” here to mean an “epistemological belief”. This is the sense in which Rorty uses it although, unlike Bertrand Russell, he does not find it necessary to specify. In my argument I consider as irrelevant the possibly arising questions “How does a ‘belief’ which has been initially conceived of as an epistemological phenomenon later on affect certain psychological dispositions?”, or “To what extent is a ‘belief’ an epistemological phenomenon, and to what extent is it a psychological one?”. Such questions cannot be answered by mere speculation. Rather, a psychological phenomenon could be treated by tested prescriptions which sometimes could appropriately utilize epistemological concepts (for example, the various questionnaires and interviews psychologists use in their practices can be considered as such utilized epistemological concepts). Similarly, educational scientists who treat individuals’ negative learning dispositions do not necessarily need to explain how, for example, a psychological phenomenon like “permanent anxiety” is to be overcome by mediation of metacognition which aims to utilize a typically epistemological content like “knowledge of one’s own capacities, limitations, and idiosyncrasies regarding the learning of different kinds of material” (Covington p. 402).

Similarly, philosophers whom I discuss in chapter two relate the overcoming of the *traditional philosophical problems* to an appropriate *philosophical understanding of language* which is basically a knowledge of *how mind produces beliefs by coordinating language and thinking*. However, because the philosophical procedures for overcoming philosophical problems are *not* specifically known within *common terms*, I will here subsume them under the term *methodology of dissolution*.

For the purpose of this paper, I will further specify the *twofold sense* of the procedure of metacognition as involving both an *explanation* of how one's cognitive abilities work (i.e., some sort of a personal *epistemological concept* or *concept of cognition*) and an *application* of this concept that would overcome one's cognitive problems, and will explore the possibility for such a specification of the philosophical procedure, too. In this way, throughout this paper, I will ultimately relate the scientific concept of *metacognition* as substitutable or supplementary with a *philosophical methodology of dissolution* which I will discuss here in terms of some concepts of contemporary philosophy of language. If my argument is convincing, it will show that *cognitive problems* can be both *explained in philosophical terms* and overcome by mediation of a *philosophical prescription*. Further, if the scientific *prescription of metacognition*, as an *epistemological concept*, is conceived of as a subject of a possible *acquisition*, a *philosophical understanding of language*, insofar as it is a *concept of cognition*, can be conceived of as a subject of possible *prescription* and of *acquisition*, too.⁵ In other words, as the concept of *metacognition*, as an epistemological concept, needs first to be *acquired* in order to be *applied* for overcoming problems that are of

⁵ Hereafter, I will use the terms *epistemological concept*, *concepts of cognition*, *concept of language*, *philosophical understanding of language*, and *metacognition* interchangeably. What is in common to all of them is that they stand for *concepts of cognition* which, however, are being used for different purposes and as such are differently termed. This is why, though I emphasize what they have in common, their senses will necessarily vary in the different contexts of my argument. One may notice that the term *concept of cognition* represents the sense common to both *metacognition* and *concept of language* as a matter of procedure of treatment better than the term *epistemological concept*. Conversely, the term *epistemological concept* expresses better the characteristic common to both *cognitive* and *traditional philosophical problems*. At the same time, the term *philosophical understanding of language* is more appropriate for emphasizing the attempt of the philosophical concepts to break with the epistemological problematic in philosophy.

epistemological character, so, in this terminology, the *philosophical understanding of language* could also be *acquired* and then *applied* in overcoming *such* problems. In these terms, my goal becomes *to show* that a problem solver's negative cognitive dispositions and thinking skills can be adequately *treated* through *acquisition* and *application* of an *epistemological concept* in the form of *a more sophisticated understanding* of the way philosophers approach what is known as *cognition*.

Methodology of Transfer: Now that the two types of problems and the procedures for their overcoming have been *conceptualized* within a *common terminology*, I need to *justify* the specific *methodology of transfer* of the philosophical 'methodology of dissolution' as a methodology for the solution of cognitive problems. The goal is to overcome what can be called the *major conceptual difficulty* of my interdisciplinary theoretical undertaking, namely, how to employ legitimately concepts and methods that have become customary for the theoretical exercises of fields *as different as* science and philosophy. In this case, it results from the unusual practice of using philosophical *methods*, which are substantially different from scientific ones,⁶ in treating problems that come up in the scope of science.

In my view, any *justification* which tries to overcome this difficulty should essentially involve two points: first, that the *expertise of science* is somehow *insufficient*, and second, that the *competence of philosophy* is *appropriate* for an 'adequate treatment' of the cognitive problems. I argue that the *expertise of science* can be considered *insufficient*, insofar as 'scientific explanations' of the cognitive problems were to rely on *philosophical justifications*, and insofar as 'scientific prescriptions' for overcoming those problems were to recommend the acquisition and application of *epistemological concepts*. And, I argue that the *competence of philosophy* can be considered *appropriate*, insofar as the philosophical *methodology of dissolution* can be represented in the form of the scientific prescription of metacognition, namely, as an *explanation and application*

⁶ For example, scientists usually use experimental methods, while philosophers usually do not.

of a concept of cognition.⁷ Thus, in chapter one, I will try to expose the 'insufficiency' of the *expertise of science* for treating cognitive problems and in chapter two, to represent the 'appropriateness' of the *competence of philosophy* for treating these problems.

However, these necessary steps in the overcoming of the *major conceptual difficulty* of my argument are to be accomplished in narrow contexts of understanding which are themselves constituents of a *broader context* that generally *qualifies* the *cognitive problems* for the *competence of philosophy* rather than for the expertise of science. As it will hopefully become clear, this broader context is indispensable for overcoming this difficulty, and so I need to set up its background before undertaking the accomplishment of my argument in a narrow sense. Consequently, in chapter three, I will need to illustrate the overcoming of cognitive problems *by mediation of* the philosophical *methodology of dissolution* in both narrow and broader contexts of understanding.

A Broader Context of Understanding: A critical reader would notice that a relation of the *methodology of dissolution* of philosophical problems as *methodology of the solution* of cognitive problems means not only to 'compensate' a certain scientific insufficiency regarding particular types of problems, but also to ignore the traditional *differentiation* between science and philosophy. Hence, the point I will be trying to convey here is necessarily grounded in such an *explanatory context* that concerns the

⁷ One may ask the question why I will try to represent the philosophical methodology of dissolution in the form of the scientific concept of metacognition instead of vice versa. My reply is that the philosophical concepts to be examined are analytically more indeterminate than the scientific concepts to be examined. Moreover, it is a necessary peculiarity of the 'therapeutic sense' of the former that they remain characteristically as indeterminate as possible. Thus, since the scientific procedures for overcoming cognitive problems are better established in common terms than the philosophical ones for overcoming epistemological problems, the latter are more susceptible to representation in terms of characteristic features of the former.

Another question might be that since I am trying to substitute or supplement the scientific procedure with the philosophical one, how I can avoid the disadvantages of the scientific procedure, given that I take its form in the philosophical procedure. My reply is that here I do not try to search for certain disadvantages of the form of this procedure; however, an implicit answer to such a question could be detected throughout the paper, insofar as the distinction between the metaphysical and therapeutic notions of philosophy becomes clear. And yet, the proper understanding of my argument must render that it is not about advantages and disadvantages of certain procedures, but about their better understanding. After all I am able to discuss the two procedures and play them against each other only insofar as they form an opposition.

relationship and the possible cooperation between the two fields, and ultimately, the question of their foundations.⁸ In this context, I will draw attention to *a notion of philosophy*, for I already claimed that such a notion is what scientific and philosophical concepts under consideration have *in common* as they employ it *in* treating problems which were explained as being *essentially* the same. Ultimately, it is the *conceptualization* of the two types of problems and the procedures for their overcoming within this context which will ensure the proper understanding of my argument as conveyed by the *common terminology*.

Because the eventual relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy will be a major concern throughout this paper, at this point I will adhere to a working notion of the role of philosophy in the modern world which I will modify and clarify subsequently. This is the role which Jurgen Habermas conceives of as a *mediating interpreter* that accounts for the problems remaining out of the scope of the scientific fields, given that these fields have already divided and appropriated all the opportunities for expertise, or what are known as reasonable accounts of reality (1990, p. 19; 1992, p.39). In what he calls a “division of labour,” the expert fields turn out to be in the position of needing a common medium of communication; first, between themselves, however different they are, and second, between themselves and social practices they serve. In maintaining this recurrent communication, the “linguistic medium of reason” encounters certain *problems of mediation* which, according to Habermas, are to remain in the scope of philosophy:

... [T]hese eminent trends towards compartmentalization, constituting as they do the hallmark of modernity, can do very well without philosophical justification. But they do pose problems of mediation. First, how can reason, once it has been thus sundered, go on being a unity on the level of culture? And second, how can expert cultures, which are being pushed more and more to the level of rarefied, esoteric forms, be made to stay in touch with everyday communication? To the extent to which philosophy keeps at least one eye

⁸ In my view, the necessity of this broader context of understanding would not arise in a purely scientific theoretical framework which would limit its justification of the *methodology of transfer* to the exposition of both the ‘insufficiency’ of the one type of arguments and the ‘appropriateness’ of the other. However, an interdisciplinary undertaking cannot dispense it, for it necessarily grounds its argumentation in an account of the characteristic differences of the two approaches to their common problems.

trained on the topic of rationality, that is, to the extent to which it keeps inquiring into the conditions of the unconditional, to that extent it will not dodge the demand for these two kinds of efforts at mediation. (1990, pp. 17-8)

In my interpretation, I accept that the first type of *problem of mediation* has to do with the self-justification of expert cultures (“science, technology, law and morality”(1992, p.39)), i.e., with some sort of rational *explanation* of the ‘expert knowledge’ which theoretical fields *prescribe* for the practical fields, while the second has to do with the *acquisition and application* of those cultures’ ‘expertise’ in social practices on the level of everyday communication. It is notable, that although Habermas claims that the *problems of mediation* are a work of philosophy, he confesses that the expert cultures and social practices could do quite well “without philosophical justification.” Eventually, this implies that either *the expert cultures themselves ‘solve somehow’ the ‘problems of mediation’, too*, or at least, *that they have not encountered any, yet*. In either way, this is the point on which I ground my contention that if any *philosophical justifications* or *epistemological concepts* are involved in the exchange of expertise on the levels of *expert culture* or *everyday communication*, they can be considered symptoms of *expert insufficiency* which indicate some existing *problems of mediation* on any of those two levels.

In an attempt to interpret the sense of the concept of *problems of mediation* for the purpose of this paper, i.e., in terms that I already have been using, I will accept generally that they are problems of the *utilization of concepts* in the process of *the transition of expertise* between the two levels mentioned; and more specifically, that they are problems of experts’ *explanation and prescription* of certain concepts on the level of *culture*, and of individuals’ *acquisition and application* of experts’ prescriptions on the level of *everyday communication*. Insofar as they are *generally* problems of the *transition of expertise*, i.e., of the *transfer of knowledge by mediation of concepts* which have been generated in one problematic situation and then used in another one, the *problems of mediation* can be qualified as various *problems of epistemological character* which come into

being as a result of *epistemological procedures* with these concepts. Further, as created in the transition of expertise, these problems can be viewed as taking different or *concrete* forms on its different stages. One may note that both *cognitive* and *traditional philosophical problems* fit the general pattern of problems of mediation, but that they do so at different stages of the exchange of expertise: the former at the *level of everyday communication* rather than at the level of culture; the latter at the *level of culture* rather than at the level of everyday communication.⁹ Nevertheless, in terms of the notion of "philosophy as a mediating interpreter," the two types of problems are to remain in the scope of *competence of philosophy*.

Thus, in terms of my interpretation of Habermas' view of philosophy, both *cognitive* and *philosophical problems* can be understood as *problems of mediation* which have just been actualized either in the paradigms of different expert fields on the level of *expert culture*, or in the subjective paradigms of the problem solvers on the level of *everyday communication*. Implicit in this point is the claim that if the expertise of the former level is unproblematically exchanged through the latter level, there would be no *problems of mediation*; this claim, therefore, constitutes what could be properly termed

⁹ Insofar as some of the cognitive problems ('permanent anxiety', 'motivational deficit') are also known as psychological phenomena, the question about the relationship between epistemological and psychological comes up again in terms of the notion of the exchange of expertise. Psychological phenomena are largely believed to exist on an individual's personal level rather than on an expert level. Indeed, for the products of the expert cultures, it appears to be essential that they transcend an expert's personal level and so gain an *epistemological aspect*, while the products of everyday communication practices transcend an individual's personal level only insofar as individuals are referred to as experts and so do not necessarily gain such an aspect but rather mark its disappearance in the exchange of expertise. If such an assumption is credible, then we could infer that psychological problems are based on still unsolved *epistemological problems* persisting in individuals' personal views rather than that the epistemological undertakings on the level of *culture* are just psychological undertakings.* This is why I argue that the various cognitive problems that individuals face in everyday communication practices are based on 'epistemological beliefs' which are, however, philosophically unjustified.

* The pretension of psychology to the status of science is based on such an assumption. Regarding the problem of psychology to define itself as a science see, for example, L. Miller's summary of the points of the two main sides in the debate on artificial intelligence in *Cognitive Science*, 1978, 2, 111-127. In this relation, the late philosophical writings of Wittgenstein give a variety of arguments of why psychological and other forms of private experience cannot back up concepts having transcending power. A thematic selection of these arguments can be found in A. Kenny's *The Wittgenstein Reader*, 1994, Blackwell Publishers Inc., Cambridge, MA.

the *general principle* for overcoming any such problems. Further, this principle implies that wherever these problems arise in the exchange of expertise, the problem solver who faces them would need the *competence* to overcome them. For, in both scientific and philosophical paradigms, it is the lack of competence for dealing with such problems (respectively, the lack of a good understanding of how intelligence works and of how the mind deals with language) which is conceived of as conditioning their emergence and persistence. In this way, *three conditions* can be isolated which generally qualify certain problems as *problems of mediation* and thus relegate them from the scope of science to philosophy: the problems under consideration are *of epistemological character*; the *expertise of science* proves *insufficient* for their overcoming; and the *competence of philosophy* is represented as *appropriate* for their treatment. Since the *cognitive problems* already have been *conceptualized* as being in essence *epistemological in character*, they must be eligible to be overcome by mediation of *such a methodology* that has been used in dissolving the *very epistemological problems*—the traditional philosophical problems. But since the expertise of science is insufficient for their treatment and itself appeals to the competence of philosophy, the latter already can be considered a justified, methodological alternative to the former.

To sum up, provided that the *cognitive problems* are *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*, that their overcoming necessitates appropriate expertise on the *level of culture*, that the *expertise of science* turns out to be insufficient while the *competence of philosophy* is appropriate, the latter *can* be called up on the *level of culture* to help overcome these problems in *everyday communication*. In other words, if philosophy is to 'specialize' in the field of the *problems of mediation*, we can assume that when expert cultures and social practices encounter them, they do not have the necessary 'expertise' to deal with them, while at the same time philosophy does. The stipulation here is that the 'expertise' of philosophy is an expertise only in a conditional sense in which it is conceived of *at most* as a *competence*, for philosophy is supposed to 'specialize' somehow paradoxically in a field that is

supposed to remain non-special insofar as the expert fields have already apportioned *all* the possibilities for specialized accounts of reality.

In this way, the proposed scheme of the distribution of problems of mediation¹⁰ indicates, on one hand, that there appears to be a possible division of labor in which philosophy could find its place along with the specialized fields of the *expert cultures*, and on the other, that a specific extension of individuals' philosophical background would adequately help their metacognition in *everyday communication*. The specific competence of philosophy becomes a good reason for calling it up in the role of a 'mediating interpreter' which can help elaborate an adequate *prescription* for overcoming problems that could be explained as problems of mediation. As already pointed out, such a prescription essentially involves an *epistemological concept* or a *concept of cognition* which is to be *acquired* and *applied*; in the philosophical terms I adopted here, it is *an understanding of how the mind produces 'beliefs' by coordinating language and thinking*. I will try to promote such an 'understanding' in the form of a *compositional philosophical concept* which is based on the above mentioned four contemporary philosophical concepts that will be examined in chapter two. Its central point will be a *notion of philosophy* which, in this broader context, becomes a notion of the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy, and which I will consider in chapter three.

To Resume my Argument: In this paper, I will try to show that scientists' efforts to overcome individuals' cognitive problems are attempts at solving problems of mediation, and thereby I will expose science's 'insufficiency' for

¹⁰It is important to note that, in this scheme, insofar as it is derived from Habermas' view of philosophy, the efforts of science and philosophy converge for solving 'problems of mediation' only on the level of everyday communication, i.e., their efforts converge in the solution of individuals' cognitive problems, but not in the overcoming of traditional philosophical problems. This is in relation to the question of why philosophy cannot take its scientific like variant which is known as 'metaphysics'. This question is an aspect of all the philosophical concepts which are reviewed in this paper, and thus an inevitable consideration of my argument and of the philosophical understanding which I am trying to promote as a part of any problem solver's metacognition. (I will discuss the relationship between science and philosophy in chapter three).

dealing with these types of problems. On the one hand, I will consider any *philosophical justifications* that scientists embark on in their explanations as scientific attempts at solving problems of mediation on the level of *expert culture*. On the other hand, I will consider any *philosophical concepts* that scientists recommend for utilization in their prescriptions as scientific attempts at solving problems of mediation on the level of *everyday communication*.¹¹ Conversely, I will consider that in *everyday communication practices*, individuals encounter the problems of mediation as their *cognitive problems* in the form of either negative psychological dispositions or inappropriate strategic approaches (such as “permanent anxiety” and “failure avoiding tactics”) to the problems to be solved. Further, I consider that cognitive problems stem from individuals’ own explanations of their cognitive abilities (i.e., from their views of cognition) in which they establish ‘reasonable’, ‘logical’, ‘sufficient’, ‘clear’ or ‘well-proven’ connections among those problems, their solutions, and themselves as problem solvers. Being essentially epistemological, these connections can be considered philosophically unjustified and perhaps unjustifiable, for they are made out with a reference to a presupposed level of *expert culture*, while solving *non-expert* problems on a presupposed level of *everyday communication*.

In elaborating an ‘appropriate’ epistemological concept for the treatment of cognitive problems, I will consider philosophers’ ‘competence’ for dealing with epistemological problems, in the conditional sense in which they are assumed as being ‘experts’ in dealing with these kinds of problems. This will be a consideration of the overcoming of problems of mediation in terms of knowledge *explanation* and knowledge *application* as it is in the scientific concept of metacognition. The point I will be trying to convey is that, though philosophers

¹¹ One may find that it is better to say that scientists *solve* the ‘problems of mediation’ on the level of *culture*, but that they *address* them on the level of *everyday communication*. In terms of my argument, this will be considered a *metaphysical point of view* because it somehow *presupposes* that science *can actually solve* these problems which are after all philosophical. But since in this interdisciplinary undertaking I am trying to convey a *therapeutic point* which excludes the possibility of a scientific solution of these problems, I say that science *only attempts* to solve these problems on the two levels mentioned.

traditionally address such problems more directly on the level of *expert culture* than on the level of *everyday communication*, it can be worthwhile that their concepts become subjects of *prescription* and *acquisition* and thus bridge the 'two levels' in a way that would ensure a 'smooth' transition of expertise. In my argument, this alternative *prescription* is to help problem solvers *acquire* a specific extension of their philosophical background in terms of concepts of contemporary philosophy.

However, it would be naive to believe that the concepts, which we *acquire* in order to *apply*, are mere words whose meanings we just retain and thus know, and that a simple form of inquiry, like the use of a dictionary, would easily fill up the 'blanks' of the concepts which we have need of. Indeed, in the act of those concepts' application we do not necessarily highlight the whole capacity of knowledge which entails our self-confidence to use exactly these certain words. But, as one acquires a language not through mere learning the dictionary by heart but rather through a holistic interaction with the uses of this language, i.e., through an interaction in which many *non-discursive aspects* are involved, too, so the acquisition of a certain concept is not to come simply through the mere learning of definitions, but rather through a building up of its *background* which is not discursively present in the act of this concept's application. In this sense, it also would be naive to believe that the necessary philosophical extension of individuals' views of cognition would be so easily achievable a goal as we would wish it to be. Most of the philosophical concepts are complicated and very hard to represent in a simple or easy to acquire form, and sometimes such a representation comes along with the understanding that it is just a misrepresentation of the original. In those cases, one can even expect a further complication in *applying* concepts which have been thus *acquired*, for, as it would hopefully become clear, what are here understood under the 'problems of mediation' not only need to be overcome by mediation of a procedure which utilizes concepts of cognition but also come into being by mediation of such procedures.

In this relation, it is worthwhile to note that in this broader context *the differentiation* between the *epistemological procedures* of 'explanation' of a certain concept and of 'application' through a permanent utilization of this concept results from *the differentiation* between the attempts for solving the 'problems of mediation' on the level of *expert culture* and the level of *everyday communication*. Here, this differentiation serves explanatory purposes only, and is, in this sense, just a *methodological assumption* in which the connection between the efforts of experts to *explain* and *prescribe* certain concepts and the efforts of individuals to *acquire* and *apply* those concepts could be easily represented as reversible. For instance, assuming that, as is practically the case, all individuals are also experts as well as all experts are also individuals who just happen to *utilize concepts* on different stages of the exchange of expertise, then the above pairs of terms just become interchangeable, and so, their distinction—conditional. Likewise, in the process of their elaboration, experts' 'explanation' and 'prescription' can be regarded as being at once the *acquisition* and *application* of certain concepts; conversely, individuals' 'acquisition' and 'application' can be understood as their personal *explanation* and *prescription* of concepts for solving their own cognitive problems. In this sense, the *explanation* and *prescription*, *acquisition* and *application* of certain concepts can be in no way distributed to certain *individuals* or *experts* who are, so to speak, 'in charge' in the different stages of the exchange of expertise because such a distribution (in Habermas' terms, "trends toward compartmentalization") would be the way to actually create the conditions for 'problems of mediation'. Rather, *these problems are unavoidable for all the fields and problem solvers, and their solutions inevitably go through the mediation, i.e., through a permanent utilization of some philosophical concepts on both expert and individual levels.*¹² This is, therefore, what constitutes the *major methodological difficulty* of my argument, namely, that by promoting philosophy

¹² Such a conclusion is potential to the explanation, prescription, acquisition, and application of the concept of *metacognition* in the 'exchange of expertise': for otherwise they would not rely on 'philosophical justifications', nor would they contain 'epistemological concepts'.

on the *level of culture* to help overcome the *problems of mediation* I am actually contributing to conditions for their persistence rather than for their overcoming. In the concluding chapter, I will try to explain the unavoidability of the 'problems of mediation' as a result of the necessity of *transferring 'conceptual content' generated in one problematic situation to another* (for instance, from an expert to a practical level) and to overcome the 'major methodological difficulty' in terms of the distinction between the *metaphysical* and *therapeutic* notions of philosophy.

Thus, the *problems of mediation* become problems of a certain use of concepts which is always concrete, and which is a *permanent utilization* (and in this sense, an 'undoing') of these concepts. This is why their *solutions* could take place only in a concrete situation in which 'individuals' have already become 'experts' and do not need the mediation of 'other experts' in order to solve problems. In this way, they would not need to be *philosophers in a metaphysical sense*, since they would have *already* become *philosophers in a therapeutic sense*. If that were so, there would be no 'problems of mediation', nor would individuals have any cognitive problems; they would just solve the problems to be solved and the issue of the cognitive problems would not arise. In light of the point I will be trying to convey, the *solutions* of the cognitive problems are to come as *dissolutions of the epistemological points which entail them*; at the same time, these 'dissolutions' will turn out to be aspects of the *solutions of the concrete problems* in the everyday communication practices.

Significance: The outlined approach already suggests that with respect to its significance, the justification of the issue under consideration would become clear insofar as the claim being argued is convincingly accomplished. For, only a relatively well-formed concept could understandably serve a concept-employing practice. Nevertheless, the significance of the proposed question of research is justified through the associations of some undesirable discrepancies in the mind's problem solving activity directly with the way the mind produces 'beliefs' by mediation of language and thinking. I refer to such discrepancies as the negative psychological and cognitive dispositions encountered by

educational and cognitive scientists—permanent anxiety, low self-esteem, motivational deficit, student-teacher conflict of values, failure-avoiding tactics, or indifference to learning. Thus, anticipated contributions can be made, which relate to practices involving the mind's intensive problem solving activity, in environments such as education and business. But, because language and thinking are indispensable means of communication and so, necessary in dealing with all kinds of problems, even broader extrapolations of the claim being argued may also be possible.

CHAPTER ONE

COGNITIVE PROBLEMS AND THE CONCEPT OF METACOGNITION

Although verbalizing helps to bring more of the process into view, it is a representation of the process and may involve significant alternations. The full extent to which verbalizing changes thought patterns is probably unknowable. Those of us who do research in the area feel that the changes are much less than skeptics fear.

Jack Lochhead, *Teaching Analytic Reasoning Skills through Pair Problem Solving*

Overview

In this chapter, I examine four scientific concepts in which authors treat educational learning problems such as motivational deficit, low self-esteem, permanent anxiety, indifference to learning, bad learning strategies, and student-teacher conflicts of values. For convenience, I categorize those problems as *cognitive problems* because they are concerned in one way or another with individuals' acquisition and application of *cognition*. M.V. Covington's concept of *strategic thinking*, J. Lochhead's notion of the *role of verbalization* in problem solving, and M. Lipman's *philosophy for children program* address cognitive problems in educational environments. Similarly, R. Paul's notion of *conceptualization and the elements of thought* addresses practical and philosophical aspects of cognitive problems but he conceives of it as applicable also in other than educational problem solving situations.

In the process of examining these notions, I focus on the scientists' *explanations* of and *prescriptions* for overcoming those cognitive phenomena: in their *explanations*, scientists widely rely on 'philosophical justifications', and in their *prescriptions*, they recommend *acquisition and application* of

'epistemological concepts' by mediation of the mind's problem solving activity, *metacognition*. As already pointed out, in my view scientific *explanations* and *prescriptions* which involve, respectively, 'philosophical justifications' and 'epistemological concepts' indicate a certain 'insufficiency' of the scientific accounts for an 'adequate treatment' of those problems.¹³ At the same time, the overcoming of the *cognitive problems* as a matter of *utilization* of *epistemological concepts* also indicates that these problems are of *epistemological character* which, along with scientific 'insufficiency', qualifies them as *problems of mediation* in terms of my interpretation of Habermas' concept of philosophy which I stated in the introduction.

Covington's Concept of Strategic Thinking¹⁴

Examining the causes of students' unsatisfactory performance in an educational environment, Martin V. Covington *explains* the negative cognitive dispositions "anxiety, indifference to learning and motivational deficit" (p. 389) by the lack of efficiency of their personal "thinking skills" and the existing "classroom reward system" (p. 390). He finds that reward systems encourage students to use "failure-avoiding" and "self-defeating tactics" which include various tricks for cheating (p. 392) and "post-dictive explanation (excuses) for success and failure" (p. 403). According to him, students' thinking becomes highly susceptible to similar 'strategies' which ultimately amount to a "teacher-student conflict of values" with respect to learning efforts, personal ability, and test outcomes (p. 393). At the same time, the understanding of how unlikely such 'tactics' are to

¹³ This point is implicit to Wittgenstein's early concept of the *correct use of language* which I discuss in chapter two.

¹⁴ All references to M. V. Covington in this paper are from "Strategic Thinking and the Fear of Failure". *Thinking and Learning Skills*. Ed. Segal, Chipman, and Glaser. Hillside NJ: L.Erlbaum. 1985

gain success in a new or unexpected problematic situation leads to either a lack of self-confidence, low self-esteem, a feeling of insecurity, or persisting anxiety:

Meaningless success cannot long sustain a sense of positive self-regard nor increase achievement. (p. 397)

Covington contends that those are symptoms of “bad strategic thinking” which is detectable in students either setting up easily attainable, low-effort goals, or striving for unattainable ones that “literally invite failure, but ‘failure with honor’”(p. 392). In his view, the sources of the “mind’s strategic mismanagement” are identical with the conditions which ensure effective *acquisition and application* of cognition: “the intimate relationship between memory and strategic thinking,” the “ability to retrieve material from semantic memory”, and the “knowledge of procedures for transforming this material (inferences, generalizations)” (p. 403). It is in this connection that Covington emphasizes the necessity of such specific responsiveness to “the more subtle nuances” of the functions of intelligence that is available only to “metacognitively more sophisticated individuals” (p. 404). Consequently, he addresses the *epistemological aspects* of the work of intelligence and, to conceptualize them, inevitably needs a *philosophical justification* which more or less concerns the question of the nature of intelligence:

The concept of strategic thinking firmly locates cognitive attributions as antecedent determinants of behavior. (p. 403)

... [T]o understand intelligence, it is important to make a distinction between basic abilities and the mechanisms by which abilities are translated into intelligent thought and action. (p. 409)

On the other hand, Covington’s *prescription* for the solution of these problems involves two elements which relate to their respective sources: developing and cultivating of the concept of so-called “strategic thinking” and “reconstructing of classroom reward systems” (p. 395). He defines *strategic thinking* as “the capacity to identify and analyze problems and to create and monitor plans for their solutions” (p. 390). Its more detailed representation involves three steps: (1) *problem formulation*, or explanation which is basically “a well-developed sense of the problem, or an

understanding of what makes it a problem in the first place and how it might be reformulated to reduce its difficulty"; (2) *selecting of the most effective strategy* after considering a few possible strategies; and finally, (3) *self-monitoring*, a metacognitive requirement which involves, on one hand, "knowledge of one's own capacities, limitations, and idiosyncrasies" and, on the other hand, the *permanent utilization* of this knowledge through balancing among "hard and easy-to-learn-materials," "time constraints," and "teacher standards" in the process of solving the problem (pp. 401-402). To put it in another way, Covington's concept of *strategic thinking* claims that effective dealing with problematic situations in educational environments is accompanied by *metacognition* which essentially involves an *explanation* and *application of a concept of cognition*.

Similarly, the other element of Covington's solution, the reconstruction of the classroom reward system, rests on a philosophical basis too: the cultivation of effective thinking skills necessitates a *justification of the reliability* of the "standards for intelligent behavior" (p. 398). Covington conceives of them as "well-defined," "absolute standards" which, however, must be applied with respect to "realistic goals" (p. 398) in order to suppress *students' inadequate notions* that the problems they encounter in their school performance are a matter of personal ability or inability. Indeed, he notes that systematic training in thinking skills may not affect "individual differences" in "ability" (p. 411), but he considers that its goal will be achieved if it "reduces the dependency of performance on ability and *increases the saliency of various trainable plans and rules*" which can enable individuals to "*exercise more personal control over their mental resources*" (italics added) (p. 410).

Finally, in conformity with my argument, Covington ends the justification of the two elements of his *prescription* with the philosophical conclusion that the evaluation of the mind's problem solving activity is practically relatable *to a particular problematic situation only*, and that its improvement involves both *an*

understanding of how intelligence works and a permanent utilization of this understanding in a new problematic situation:

Although the fundamental nature of intelligence will likely remain as elusive as ever, this newer approach should lead us to *a more sophisticated understanding, largely through the recognition that intelligence can be defined only in terms of the context in which it is required.* (italics added) (p. 409)

In summary, Covington's *explanation* relates the students' negative learning dispositions to both the existent reward system and the lack of a good understanding, respectively, of effective self-control of their personal thinking abilities. His *prescription* links the overcoming of those problems with the concept of *strategic thinking* which takes into consideration the two main points of his explanation. On the students' part, they need, on the one hand, to identify and correct any inadequacies in their problem solving strategies by mediation of the *metacognitive* practice of *self-monitoring*, and, on the other hand, to have this metacognitive practice supplied with a more sophisticated understanding of how their own intelligence works, i.e., with an adequate *epistemological concept*, or a concept about the nature of knowledge. Because the concept of *strategic thinking* is intended to respond to students' need of such a 'more sophisticated understanding', it takes the form of such an *epistemological concept* to be *acquired* and *applied*. At the same time, the other element of Covington's solution, the 'reconstruction of the classroom reward systems' is to ensure a coherence between subjective and objective factors of learning and thus to ensure an *effective* 'adequacy' between the individuals' epistemological notions and the standards for testing of intelligent behavior.

Because in his *explanation* of the concept of *strategic thinking* Covington uses *philosophical justifications* which concern individuals' cognitive problems (as based on the 'student-teacher conflict of values'), the 'nature of intelligence' ('as elusive as ever', but still eligible to be a subject of a 'more sophisticated understanding'), and 'the standards of intelligent behavior' (as 'absolute ones' but

depending upon the 'context' in which the knowledge is required), he may be considered to be attempting to solve 'problems of mediation' *on the level of expert culture*. At the same time, because this concept is intended to respond to the individuals' *needs of acquisition and application* of an adequate *epistemological concept* in overcoming their cognitive problems, it is also a *prescription* for overcoming the *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*. The identification of 'post-dictive explanations for failure and success' accounts for an active involvement of linguistic behavior in students' justification of inappropriate learning strategies. It is the role of 'linguistic behavior' in establishing fallible 'beliefs' concerning students' own cognitive abilities which suggests that the concept of *metacognition can be adequately delineated in terms of a philosophical understanding of how the mind deals with language*.¹⁵ In this context, the lack of a good understanding of how one coordinates language and thought opens the possibility for a *permanent sufficiency* of any post-dictive (linguistic) *explanations* which thus leaves the 'mind's strategic mismanagement' unnoticed (p. 403). At the same time, the subsequent failure in task performance is fallibly ascribed to personal 'inability' and thus retained in the form of belief in the degree of one's cognitive abilities which, *applied* as an inadequate *epistemological concept*, amounts to permanent anxiety, low-self esteem, or a lack of self-confidence. Interpreted in this way, the main points of Covington's concept of 'strategic thinking' support my argument that the negative cognitive deficiencies in question are based on fallible beliefs which are formed as a matter of inadequate *epistemological uses* of concepts that establish seemingly 'reasonable', 'tested', 'well-proven', or 'clear' connections between different problematic situations.

¹⁵ In chapter three. I will discuss the interrelation of the notions of truth, rationality, and language as an issue arising in the metaphilosophical perspective of the question of the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy.

Lochhead's Concept of the Role of Verbalization in Thinking¹⁶

Unlike Covington, Jack Lochhead regards individuals' linguistic explanations as causes rather than as effects of inappropriate thinking strategies. Consequently, he focuses directly on the role of language in the elaboration of students' views on learning. But like Covington, he first *explains* students cognitive problems in terms of both learning environments and their views of problem solving and learning, and then *prescribes* for their overcoming a *metacognitive utilization* of epistemological concepts.

In his *explanation*, Lochhead notices, on one hand, that students' adherence to the so-called "copy theory of learning" as a matter of their own epistemology conditions their passive learning attitude, and on the other, that in their task to present material "as clearly as possible," teachers often encounter problems in the *transition of information between two substantially different levels of competence*. (pp. 109-110) In his view, the "passive learning attitude" suppresses students' potentials to "generate their own knowledge" and prevents them from discovering for themselves what the teacher has explained. He argues that it is essential for the practice of teaching and learning that, along with requirement for teachers' "clear presentation," students develop an "active learning attitude" and adequate "own epistemology" (pp. 110-111).

Thus, as in Lochhead's *explanation* the cognitive problems are problems of the transition of knowledge between two levels of competence, so he *prescribes* educational techniques that "change the traditional roles of both student and teacher" (p. 111). In examining the cognitive theory behind one such technique, the so-called "pair problem solving," he promotes as its essential part a notion of the specific *role of verbalization in thinking*. This technique is intended to make easier the transition of knowledge between the two levels of competence and the

¹⁶ All the references to Lochhead in this paper are from "Teaching Analytic Reasoning Skills Through Pair Problem Solving". *Thinking and Learning Skills*. Ed. Segal, Chipman, and Glaser Hillside NJ: L. Erlbaum. 1985.

verbalization is to help overcome the epistemological difficulties arising from the unobservable aspects of teachers' thinking. For example, "analyzing complex material is an activity which is generally done inside your head" and "a beginner cannot observe how an expert thinks and solves problems"(p. 121), while "thinking aloud" is an observable verbalization of thoughts and "helps students externalize ideas and strategies so that they can examine and improve on them" (p. 122). In his view, this method can help "the development of a self-correcting feedback loop in which students can observe and modify their own cognitive behavior" in conformity with Dewey's notion that "reflective thought" is "the single most important objective of higher education" (p. 122). Lochhead goes on with a more detailed explanation of the reconstruction of thinking's 'unobservable' aspects into 'observable' terms by means of Piaget's notion of the mental procedure as a communicable representation:

Communicable representations are in consciousness not because we can relay them to other people but because we can relay them to ourselves. We may run through the steps of a procedure and observe each one in sequence. *This self-observation is awareness and thus the basis of all consciousness.* (italics added) (p. 123)

Lochhead argues that so complex an activity as 'three-ball juggling' becomes easy to acquire if all its routines are carefully verbalized. However, he notices that, once it becomes an automatic activity, juggling does not need verbalizing for its performing; rather, verbalizing in the process of performing becomes an obstacle for the performing itself (p. 124). In this way, Lochhead promotes verbalization as a matter of consciousness as the most important mechanism of learning which clarifies and conceptually shapes the material to be learned in the form of knowledge. However, he seems to relate its value to a situation of knowledge *acquisition* rather than to a situation of knowledge *application*, and so to distinguish a situation in which *this epistemological procedure* is appropriate and another in which it is inappropriate. In his view, if properly used, this procedure is conceived of as involving three subordinated

elements: (1) *precise thinking* as exercised in terms of “carefully verbalized definitions for each variable”; (2) *verbalization* as “including all the meaning of the variable”; and (3) *variable* as “meaning all the things included in its verbal definition” (p. 125). In Lochhead’s view, such precision appears to be the condition which would save the mind from what he calls “a failure to coordinate thought and language” in the process of learning (p. 125).

Another aspect of the concept of *verbalization* is the explanation of *the growth of knowledge* which Lochhead employs from Piaget’s constructivist theory, too. The main point of the constructivist concept of conceptual development represents an interrelation between perception and conception (in Piaget’s terms, *assimilation* and *accommodation*) which is comprised of the claim that “at any particular instant we can only perceive those things for which we have concepts” (pp. 125-6). At first, this may seem to be a self-contradictory postulate since an available concept is what one needs in order to have a perception that on the other hand should condition one’s formulation of a new concept. Nevertheless, the growth of knowledge is here conceived of as a gradual acquisition of new concepts whose sequence may not necessarily be precisely accounted for. To explain this unaccountability, Lochhead employs the term “mess with” to signify the child’s cognitive activity in the acquisition of a concept such as “cup” which is eventually refined through the concepts of “object” and “in.” If the child does not have any other better refined concepts to enable an effective verbalization, what could be associated with a corresponding cognitive activity here is just the child’s “messing with” the object. Similarly, a concept such as “potential energy” is acquired later on but the “messing with” is replaced by “verbalizing” which is supposed to be an already *conscious* and, in this specific sense here, *observable* process.

For Lochhead, the constraints that may prevent students’ effective learning stem from this, specifically *developmental*, cognitive problem in conceptual growth. The acquisition of a new concept often goes through another “vaguely defined concept” that can negatively affect the perception of a book’s content or

the effective teacher-student *communication* (p. 126). In this respect, Lochhead notices that the overcoming of the cognitive problems must take into consideration the tendency that students move from a preference for lecture type teaching (a view which is most likely “based on a copy theory of learning”) in the early stages of learning to a preference for a “more relativistic system in which each individual must determine the truth for himself” in the later stages of his or her education (p. 127).¹⁷ According to Lochhead, in order for this tendency not to function as a constraint in students’ conceptual growth, they need to adopt an “active learning aptitude” which is comprised of the notion of *making students aware of themselves as thinkers* (p. 127). In this case, the requirement for students’ *awareness* of how their cognitive abilities work, which is basically an awareness of how thinking in the form of *verbalized* thinking becomes *conscious* thinking, is in essence a *metacognitive* requirement.

In summary, Lochhead *explains* individuals’ cognitive problems in terms of both their inadequate views of learning and the difference in the levels of competence of the students and teachers. He points to the so-called ‘copy theory of learning’ as an example of an inadequate view of cognition which prevents students from ‘discovering the material for themselves’ and thus from ensuring an effective transition of information between the ‘two levels’ of competence.

Lochhead’s *prescription* for overcoming cognitive problems is based on his concept of ‘verbalization’ whose details are specified in terms of the constructivist concepts of communicable representation and conceptual growth. He conceives of verbalization as an externalized thinking which is thus observable and susceptible to conscious corrective manipulations. Verbalization appears to be helpful in the

¹⁷ One might interpret this students’ tendency from a ‘unquestionable acquisition’ to a ‘personally elaborated acquisition’ of concepts as projecting the twofold sense of the concept of ‘metacognition’. (respectively, availability of certain epistemological concept, and the permanent utilization of that concept) in a developmental perspective. This tendency can be associated with ‘undoing’ of the conditional differentiation between ‘individuals’ and ‘experts’ as reflecting the two presupposed levels of exchange of expertise in modernity. In this sense, the technique of ‘pair problem solving’, which Lochhead is trying to promote, is a remarkable example of the way in which the scientific *prescription* for overcoming cognitive problems attempts to undo this differentiation.

acquisition of knowledge for observable problems, but not always desirable in the *application* of this knowledge in solving these problems (as in the case of juggling). His concept is supported by the constructivist theory of conceptual growth whose requirement for a necessary concept for any possible perception represents a *developmental constraint* in the growth of knowledge in general and in the exercise of communicable mental procedures as a matter of verbalization in particular. For its overcoming, Lochhead recommends the adoption of both active learning strategies supported by careful verbalization which would keep students *aware of the specific peculiarities of their thinking* and techniques which change the traditional student-teacher roles in the educational environment.

By contrast, the view that conforms to the copy theory of learning discourages students from developing their own concepts, i. e., from 'discovering the material for themselves' since it presupposes that there is one exclusively correct point of view which only needs to be attained for gaining an insight into the material to be learned. In this sense, he contends that when "their views are *at odds with the natural functioning of the mind*, as they often are, students persist in ineffective strategies" (italics added) (p. 109). For Lochhead, the necessity of appropriate *concepts of cognition* specified in terms of an epistemological relationship between language and thought becomes crucial in the development of students' metacognitive thinking, especially in the late stage of their conceptual development when they adopt a more relativistic framework of understanding in which every newly acquired concept is to find its place in relation with the others.

Like Covington's recommendation for a more sophisticated understanding of how intelligence works, Lochhead's concept contains the metacognitive requirement for an 'awareness' of the peculiarities of individuals' thinking which takes the form of the metacognitive use of *epistemological concept*. In both cases, these concepts are *prescriptions* for overcoming of the cognitive problems which I interpret as problems of mediation on the level of *everyday communication*. The difference between the two authors appears to be in the degree of analysis which

backs up their *explanations* of the problems of mediation at the level of *expert culture*: while Covington generally relates students' cognitive problems to their inadequate learning values, Lochhead further specifies how values come into being in a developmental perspective and how they can be corrected by the mediation of a careful verbalization. For Lochhead, knowledge *acquisition* is a gradual process which is *mediated by language* and the *cognitive problems* which impede it are ultimately related to a "failure to coordinate language and thought" (p. 125).

Paul's Notion of Conceptualization and the Elements of Thought¹⁸

Like Covington and Lochhead, Paul is interested in the epistemological aspects of educational learning problems. In his concept of critical and creative thinking he regards thinking as a trainable and widely applicable problem solving tool. Insofar as it is trainable, thinking has the potential to become *good thinking* which, as such, is conceived of as susceptible to standardization. In his view, one can also distinguish an *explanation* of cognitive problems in the form of an *epistemological concept* and a *prescription* for their overcoming which essentially involves a *utilization* of this concept itself. For the purpose of this paper, I will limit my consideration of his 'explanation' to the notion of *conceptualization* and of his 'prescription' to the notion of the *elements of thought*.

Because Paul's concept appears to be more universalistic than the specifically educational ones previously examined, he subjects it to a more sophisticated philosophical *explanation* in which his notion of *conceptualization* is supplied with a notion of *rational reasoning* and, similarly to Lochhead, with the constructivist notion of *conceptual growth*, and with a notion of the epistemological interdependence between *language and thinking*. Paul contends that "there is order, regularity, and potential intelligibility in everything" (p. 201),

and that whatever the goal of our intellectual activity, all the things that are potentially intelligible can be “rationally analyzed and assessed,” if we only “*order our meanings into a system of meanings that make sense to us, and so, in that respect, have a logic*” (italics added) (p. 199). He conceives of “logic” as a “basic structure” that is being figured out in the process of “assessment” through “reasoning”; while, he conceives of “reasoning” as being both “drawing conclusions on the basis of reasons” and “the total process of figuring things out” (p. 199).

However, Paul notices that “there is much more that is implicit in reasoning than is explicit, there are more components, more “logical structures” that we do not express than those we do” and that, as a result, “in most circumstances in which we are *using* logic we are *creating* it simultaneously” (pp. 199-200).¹⁹ In a taxonomy of logic he proposes, *three logics* are involved: 1) the logic to be figured out, 2) the logic that we use to do the figuring out, and 3) the logic that we make out at the end of the figuring out. According to Paul, “what we discover about the logic of the things” is not a form of “Absolute Truth”, nor is it an exhaustive knowledge of the “ultimate nature of the things” (because “we are limited, not

¹⁸ All the references to Paul in this paper are from *Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World*. Rohnert Park CA: Sonoma State University, 1990.

¹⁹ Paul’s differentiation between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ in reasoning also can be called, respectively, ‘discursive’ and ‘non-discursive’ aspects of a concept’s acquisition. It seems that only the terms ‘implicit’ and ‘non-discursive’ could be adequately applied to the specific activity by which the child overcomes the developmental paradox of the constructivist theory of conceptual growth (and which Lochhead signifies with the verb ‘mess with’). While, the terms ‘explicit’ and ‘discursive’ can be applied to the later stages of human cognitive development when a satisfactory degree of language acquisition is present. Paul’s differentiation of ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ can be considered as accounting for the same or similar paradox of ‘discursive’ knowledge acquisition as that one present in the constructivist account of the ‘non-discursive’ knowledge acquisition. It may be worthwhile to note that this paradox becomes apparent when an *explanation* (of the knowledge acquisition and application) in the form of some sort of *epistemological concept* is related to the *empirical facts* of the process which is being explained. Such a relation seems to form something like a ‘meta-explanation’ which takes into consideration both the concept of explanation and its subject of explanation altogether (i.e., it puts them in a perspective). It is this meta-explanation which I here call a ‘philosophical justification’ of an epistemological concept. In my view, if such a point is not present in someone’s *metacognition*, any *explanation (epistemological concept)* appears to him or her as being ‘sufficient’, or highly plausible. Accordingly, the *epistemological points* in problem solvers’ views need to be ‘philosophically justified’. (It is important to note that in scientific and metaphysical frameworks this ‘meta-explanation’ is necessarily incomplete, since it gains dimensions of ‘sufficiency’ which is precisely what conditions epistemological points).

infinite, creatures, humans, not gods”), but still “to say that something has a logic is to say that it can be understood by use of our reason, that we can form concepts that accurately—though not necessarily thoroughly—characterize the nature of that thing” (p. 201). In this way, his notion of logical reasoning could be already understood in a very ordinary sense: what he calls ‘logic’, ‘concepts’, ‘reasoning’, and ‘accurate characterization of the nature of the things’ can be categorized as easily understandable thought entities, tools, or modes which do not necessarily explicitly exhaust the phenomenon they characterize or belong to, but which still form the most acceptable points for its understanding. Thus, Paul’s notion of rational reasoning becomes an atomic point in the characterization of the nature of thinking in terms of his notion of ‘conceptualization as a way of understanding’:

Only when we have conceptualized a thing in some way, and only then, can we reason through it. Since nature does not tell us how to conceptualize it, we must create conceptualization, individually or socially. Once conceptualized, a thing is integrated in a network of ideas (since no concept ever stands alone) and, as such, becomes the subject of many possible inferences. (pp. 201-2)

It seems that the ‘conceptualization’ forms the coherency of the three logics above mentioned, while the ‘concepts’ become the means and ends of the conceptualization itself. In what Paul calls the ‘logic of concepts’, the word ‘concept’ means “a generalized idea of a class of things” and ‘conceptualization’ is “a process by which the mind infers a thing to be of a certain kind, to belong properly to some given class of things” (p. 203). Like Lochhead, Paul adheres to the constructivist notion of *conceptual growth* and claims that “our minds understand any particular aspect of things in relation to generalized ideas that highlight perceived similarities and differences in our experience” (p. 203). The learning of concepts is a process that starts with learning of *natural language* through “creating of facsimiles of the concepts implicit in the language use” and later on continues in the academic disciplines through “creating specialized concepts” (pp.203-4) (these terms correspond to the terms ‘mess with’ and ‘verbalization’ used by Lochhead, p. 126).

Further, Paul argues that in the process of conceptualization we use "critical judgment" which in his view includes the two senses in which the term metacognition was above specified, and which he conceives of as essential to all acts of creating because "we not only assess what we create," but "we assess as we create" (p. 204). In this sense, one learns the logic of a discipline through creating it in one's mind:

... if a student reads a text within a discipline well, that is critically, the logic he or she creates through reading matches the logic of the text well. (p. 204)

Thus, the learning of concepts becomes most of all a personal task and only the individual alone can re-create in her or his mind the concepts of, for example, Freudian, Adlerian, and Jungian theories (p. 205). For Paul, it is language that provides the terms of the creating of concepts in learning, and those are the terms in which one exercises her or his thinking:

Many of our ideas or concepts come from the languages we have learned to speak (and in which as a matter of course we do our thinking). (p. 205)

In this way, a *notion of language*, as an abstracted concept of a starting point for further concept acquisition, gains a very significant role in what thinking is supposed to be, namely, the role of an *epistemological concept*. In Paul's view, while thinking in terms of language, we connect the words in a certain "logic of language" which depends to some extent upon the "established logic" and meaning of words and to some extent upon language use:

Though each word has an established logic, we still have to recreate that logic in our thinking, and we must base that creation on meanings we have previously created. (p. 206)

In his consideration of the role of language in thinking, Paul notices that the "creation of meaning" cannot "without confusion or error" completely ignore the established meaning of the words being used and that such an ignoring "in the context of learning the logic of language is nothing more nor less than the mis-learning of that logic" (p. 206). This is why he pleads for an "educated use" of

language and warns about the potential 'misunderstandings' which the logic of language may lead to:

It is important to recognize that in a literal sense there is no necessary virtue in "creating" meaning. Prejudices, self-delusions, distortions, misconceptions, and caricatures are all products of the mind as maker and creator. (p. 207)

According to Paul, "good thinking" needs to "move from thought which is purely associational and undisciplined, to thought which is conceptual and inferential," for "without a guiding logic, thinking is aimless and random" (p. 208). In this respect, he *prescribes* a "set of conditions," or "elements of thought," that can hopefully "shape and organize our thinking": 1) Purpose, Goal, or End in View, 2) Question at issue (or Problem to be solved), 3) Point of View or Frame of Reference, 4) The empirical dimensions, the phenomena about which we are reasoning, 5) the Conceptual Dimensions (including principles, theories, axioms, or rules), 6) Assumptions - starting points of reasoning, 7) Inferences (the steps of reasoning), 8) Implications and Consequences ("The implications of our reasoning are an implicit creation of our reasoning.") (pp. 208-210). This set of conditions can be understood as what corresponds to the *epistemological concepts* to be aware of and to be metacognitively utilized in the *prescriptions* of Covington and Lochhead. However, in Paul's view, the 'awareness' of how one's cognitive abilities work takes the form of a philosophically justified understanding of the conditions under which conceptualization is to be properly exercised in terms of thinking, language, and logic of language.²⁰

Critical thinkers, on this view, attempt to heighten their awareness of the conditions under which their self-created conceptualizations—and inferences from them—are rationally justified. (italics added) (Paul, p. 205)

In summary, in the explanation of his concept of critical and creative thinking, Paul develops a notion of the role of *conceptualization* in thinking which is supported by a concept of rational reasoning, a concept of language, and the

²⁰ Apparently, Paul sets up his understanding of the 'elements of thought' in Kantian perspective: they are only conditions for a possible 'good thinking'. See Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason*. trans. N.K. Smith, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 1929.

constructivist notion of conceptual growth. His concept of rational reasoning is based on the assumption that there is an order, regularity and intelligibility in everything which basically implies that there is something like a 'logic of the things'. There is also a logic that we use to figure out the logic of the things which consists of creating meaningful connections through reasoning. Finally, there is a logic that we create at the end of figuring out the logic of the things. According to Paul, although the final result of our logical activity may not be characterized as a form of an 'Absolute Truth' (for there is 'more implicit than explicit' in reasoning), it still characterizes the 'nature of the things'. His concept of rational reasoning underlies the adoption of the constructivist theory of *conceptual growth* which explains the accumulation of knowledge as subsumption of a certain thing to a certain concept signifying a class of things. Finally, Paul's notion of conceptualization is backed up with a *concept of language* which is conceived of as providing the basic concepts and terms in which thinking is exercised. Like Lochhead, Paul contends that the basic concepts we need are those that we learn from our natural language, while the specialized ones are those that we learn in academic disciplines.

The detailed exposition of this view involves many *philosophical justifications* which project well-known philosophical notions. For example, we elaborate logical connections through a 'conceptualization' which ends in the creation of new concepts by 'highlighting some sets of similarities and differences' that we have been given in the concepts we already know. (This is a variant of Wittgenstein's late concept of *family resemblances* which will be discussed in chapter two). Similarly, in the process of conceptualization, the 'logic of language' is being actively created by every individual, but it also depends upon the established logic and meanings of the words (including grammar rules) being used. (This can be associated with the distinction of 'intentional' and 'conventional' aspects of meaning in Searle's concept of 'speech acts' which will be discussed in *chapter two* also). At the same time, like the early Wittgenstein

(1922/1963; 3.321-3.325), Paul relates the errors and confusions in thinking to a 'misunderstanding' or 'mis-learning' of the 'logic of language' which can create inadequate meanings.

On the other hand, Paul argues that disciplined thinking is the productive thinking we need and sets down the necessary conditions (elements of thought) for its performance. This set of conditions is in essence his *prescription* for 'shaping and organizing of our thinking', and is a utilization of his systematized, epistemological notion of 'good thinking'. Like the epistemological concepts prescribed for metacognitive utilization by Covington and Lochhead, Paul's prescription involves also an *epistemological concept* which is standardized and developed through a more sophisticated philosophical justification.

In the broader context of my argument, Paul faces the 'problems of mediation' *on the level of expert culture* when in *explaining* how human cognition practically accumulates he uses philosophical justifications. He *prescribes* a set of conditions which form an *epistemological concept* available for individuals' personal *acquisition* and *application* in overcoming their cognitive problems which are here conceived of as problems of mediation on the level of *everyday communication*. One may note that such a *prescription* still takes place on the level of *expert culture* and that the actual overcoming of the problems of mediation on the level of *everyday communication* will finally depend upon individuals' appropriate *acquisition* and *application* of that *prescription*.

Lipman's Notion of the Role of Philosophy in Children's Early Development²¹

In comparison with the above summarized notions, M. Lipman's concept most directly addresses individuals' *cognitive problems* as problems of mediation

in Habermas's sense which I discussed in the introduction. He intentionally employs the term 'philosophy' as standing for what, in the concrete problem solving situations in an educational environment, is not accounted for by science. His notion further implies that if scientific accounts are insufficient, following certain standards or any other well-established formalism does not necessarily help but rather impedes our reliable understanding and practical solving of individuals' cognitive problems. Like Covington, Lochhead, and Paul, Lipman also *explains* cognitive problems in terms of both inadequate views of cognition and peculiarities of the educational environment, but unlike them, he emphasizes the latter rather than the former. The change of emphasis reflects the different stage of individual cognitive development which he addresses, and implies a specific modification of the procedure of metacognition which he *prescribes*.

In his *explanation* of cognitive problems, Lipman draws attention to the broad definition of the educational goal of cultivating good "thinking skills" which practically involve the whole "inventory of the intellectual powers of mankind":

To dream of constructing a curriculum that would nurture and sharpen such an array of skills must certainly be considered quixotic; to have an impact on no more than a token selection of such skills is something we may aspire to without realistically hoping ever to achieve. (p. 83)

According to him, no emphasis on just one set of "favorable thinking skills" will replace the need for others in problematic situations "far more complex and mysterious than we had anticipated" but rather "an educational process in which a wide spectrum of thinking skills is sharpened" could possibly "help children discover their intellectual capabilities" (p. 84).

To respond to the need above outlined, Lipman *prescribes* the so-called *philosophy for children program* which is based on the principle that "children's social impulses" can be reliably redirected to purposeful "cognitive impulses." This assumption is supported by research which accounts for children's better

²¹ All the references to Lipman in this paper are from "Thinking Skills Fostered by Philosophy for Children." *Thinking and Learning Skills*. Ed. Segal, Chipman, and Glaser. Hillsdale NJ: L. Erlbaum, 1985.

performance in “collaborative and cooperative situations” (p. 84), and contrasts with the well-established assessment practice which individuates them by means of tests for individual performance so that they cannot display their full capacity of knowledge. Thus, Lipman argues that the employment of children’s basic communal impulses for the purposes of a “community of inquiry” is possible *by mediation of a “common commitment to a method of inquiry”*. He conceives of this method as a “collection of rational procedures through which individuals can identify where they may have gone wrong in their thinking” and calls it “the method of systematic self-correction” (p. 85).

For Lipman, the introduction of this method in the early stage of individuals’ cognitive development (middle school, Grades 4 to 8) is not supposed to be reduced simply to its explanation to the children, for “even if they could understand it in outline, they would hardly grasp its relevance to themselves” (p. 85). Instead, he argues that the task of cultivating effective thinking skills should find its relevant means and ends in the values of the children’s community. In his view, children are better prepared for a specific collaborative discussion in which their cognitive impulses can be challenged by means of a novel whose unfolding would reveal the same environments, situations, or problems as theirs (p. 85). Thus, since “matters like truth and friendship, personal identity and fairness, goodness and freedom” are of greatest importance to them, the best introductory means of such a method could take, for example, a “fictional form” rather than a theoretical concept. Further, Lipman notes that children prefer to discuss their own ideas and are unwilling to accept immediately secondary sources of ideas. Like the adults, they would discuss topics “regarding truth or friendship or justice” rather than “thoughts of the Pyramids or the Counter-Reformation”:

In short, we prefer our own, immediately presented thoughts to those that are re-presentational. This is a major reason for the warm response that children give to philosophy and poetry, for philosophical and poetic ideas are directly available to us in their original form and are not copies of things in a world beyond our immediate knowledge or experience. (italics added) (p. 86)

Lipman contends that the initial learning impulses subsequently need to concentrate in a well-expressed children's thinking which is supposed to "utilize the rules of logic as criteria of legitimate inference" (p. 86). However, he points out that children's thinking also needs to remain beyond the formalism which logic could impart in educational practice, but to keep in touch with the 'important' matters discussed, for otherwise they "will jabber about trivia, or lapse into silence and apathy" (p.86). The preference for philosophy, as a carrier of the common commitment to the method of inquiry, is because it has the capacity to employ and thus to foster the mind's non-formal problem solving acts which remain beyond the scope of active exploration by science. (Lipman points out a long list of such skills (pp. 88-96).) Supporting his point, evaluation research shows that the *philosophy for children program* generally improves students' educational outcomes (pp. 101-6).

Further, Lipman explains the "frequent disparagement of philosophy" from the curricula because of its "manifest lack of answers" that are required by social practices (p. 98). However, he relates another reason for its devaluation to the usurpatory role of science:

Philosophy seems to disallow decision procedures, keeping its dialogue open-ended, and indeed, were a decision procedure to be discovered for a particular issue, that issue would quickly be banished from philosophy and assigned to science (p. 98)

In this way, Lipman directly addresses the question of the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy as a matter of the *transition of expertise* between its two levels. In the broader context of my argument, the concept of the *philosophy for children program* can be considered an attempt to overcome the problems of mediation both on the level of *culture* insofar as it is *explained* and *prescribed*, and on the level of *everyday communication*, insofar as it is being *applied*. In this case, because of the early stage of individuals' intellectual development, this concept is not prescribed for direct but for indirect *acquisition* through its being imparted in the learning environment.

In summary, Lipman *explains* children's cognitive problems as reflecting both the peculiarities of their intellectual development and the learning environment rather than children's views about intelligence. Consequently, for overcoming these problems, he *prescribes* a special educational program which is intended to help children discover their own intellectual capabilities by transforming their communal instincts into cognitive impulses. Substantially, this program conveys a *notion of philosophy* as a means which can foster the mental learning dispositions that remain unaccounted for and perhaps unaccountable for by educational science and practice. In his view, knowing the rational procedures for valid reasoning conditions well-expressed children's thinking, but at the same time, the very stimuli for intellectual collaboration are in a learning environment which is *freed* by logical formalism, and which *actualizes* the values of children's community. The environmental condition for transforming children's communal instincts into cognitive impulses is *seen* in transforming the classroom into a 'community of inquiry', while the subjective condition is a 'common commitment to a method of inquiry' which Lipman calls the 'method of systematic self-correction'. As in the other above summarized studies, here the demand for 'self-correction' relates the children to a sort of *metacognition* in the form of a *permanent utilization* of certain knowledge about their own cognitive dispositions and inclinations as they are available in their 'immediately present thoughts'. Lipman's point is that this knowledge (epistemological concept) should be taught indirectly, but a self-correction which necessitates going beyond the formalism of the established educational practice, already presupposes a certain degree of individual philosophizing about that formalism. Nevertheless, in this case children are not expected to precisely explain to themselves and thus to understand in full the peculiarities of their own thinking in terms of complicated epistemological concepts, but to develop an ability to *practically acquire and apply* similar concepts.

Insofar as Lipman develops and *explains* the *concept* of the so-called *philosophy for children program*, he may be considered as attempting to solve the *problems of mediation* on the level of *expert culture*. His *prescription* for fostering children's cognitive dispositions is the *practical realization* of this

program which is thus intended to overcome the *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*. It is important to note that the way the program envisions the fostering of children's cognitive skills (or solving of the *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*) includes deformatizing the educational practice and taking into consideration the individuals' developmental peculiarities. Here, the direct relation of the cognitive peculiarities which are unaccounted for by science to the field that has been traditionally known as 'philosophy' can be considered an indication of a certain 'insufficiency' of the scientific treatment of cognitive problems.

The main difference between Paul's insistence that individuals' cognitive achievements are an exclusively personal task and Lipman's insistence that they require a commitment to a collaborative 'community of inquiry' could be explained as a matter of the different stages of cognitive development which the two authors examine. While Paul's concept is more universalistic and is conceived of as applicable in all kinds of problematic situations, Lipman's addresses specifically the learning environments of the American middle school. Similarly, the difference between the approaches of the three authors above summarized, on one hand, and that of Lipman, on the other, is that while the former *explain* and *prescribe* a notion about training and cultivation of cognitive skills that necessitates a *thorough explication* and an active learning attitude for its *good acquisition* and *appropriate application*, the latter emphasizes that fostering of thinking skills that can be based on natural communal instincts and *may not necessarily need to be well-explained and purposefully acquired* in order to be properly *applied*. For, the former notions presuppose individuals being to a great extent capable of a sufficient understanding of certain abstract content (epistemological concept) in order to be able to *acquire* and metacognitively *apply* it, while the latter is related to the environment of cognitively less mature individuals who would *acquire* and *apply* certain skills during the process of practicing them rather than in advance. Indeed, in Lipman's concept, it is the so-called 'self-correction' that corresponds to

Covington's and Lochhead's metacognitive requirements for, respectively, 'more sophisticated understanding' and 'awareness' of the peculiarities of one's own thinking. However, in his view, it is to be practiced without ascending to an epistemological content (though using it), but through an immediate utilizing of the knowledge from experience.

A General Discussion of the Scientific Concepts

In the above summarized concepts, authors treat various educational learning problems such as permanent anxiety, indifference to learning, motivational deficit, low self-esteem, or inappropriate learning strategies which I categorized as *cognitive problems* because they concern, in one way or another, the *acquisition* and *application* of *cognition*. I explained them as based on certain *epistemological points* which persist in individuals' *personal views of how intelligence works* in the form of *fallible beliefs*, and which result from inappropriate *epistemological procedures by mediation of concepts*. I accepted that in the above examined scientific notions, the scientists treat those problems in terms of the *explanations* of their sources and the *prescriptions* for their overcoming. In their *explanations*, scientists adhere to epistemological concepts which involve 'philosophical justifications': Lochhead and Paul refer to the constructivist theory of knowledge in combination with a certain understanding of how mind coordinates language and thought in the process of conceptual growth; Covington considers the question of the 'nature of intelligence', its 'mechanism', and 'functions'; Lipman adheres to a notion of the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy.

For overcoming cognitive problems, scientists generally *prescribe* the mind's problem solving activity known as *metacognition* which involves individuals' *acquisition* and *application* of certain *epistemological concepts*. For

Covington, the “more effective personal control over one’s own mental resources” (p. 410) is backed up with a “more sophisticated understanding” of how intelligence works (p. 409); for Lochhead, the individuals’ “self-observation” (p. 123) is guided by “their concepts of nature of knowledge”, i.e., by “their own epistemology” (p. 109); for Paul, the metacognitive requirement of “awareness” which helps overcome individuals’ “prejudices, self-delusions, distortions, misconceptions” (p. 207) involves a utilization of a philosophically justified “set of conditions” which backs up the so-called “good thinking” (p. 205). For Lipman, the “method of systematic self-correction” (p. 85) is the metacognitive requirement which involves utilization of concepts of philosophy as an alternative to the scientific formalism in developing good thinking skills, though, because of the early stages of individuals’ conceptual development, he does not necessarily require a previously acquired epistemological concept as a condition for its successful application, but recommends that such a concept be imparted in the learning environment.

Because in their *explanations* scientists rely on *philosophical justification* and in their *prescriptions* require acquisition and application of *epistemological concepts*, scientific accounts of the *cognitive problems* can be considered to some extent ‘insufficient’ for an ‘adequate treatment’ of these problems. In this way, all these studies can be interpreted as treating *problems of mediation* in terms of Habermas’ notion of *philosophy as a mediating interpreter* according to which *those problems* are to remain out of the scope of scientific expertise but still in the scope of competence of philosophy. Insofar as these authors use *philosophical justifications* to *explain* their conceptual points, I consider that they attempt to solve *problems of mediation* on the level of *expert culture*; and insofar as they *prescribe* certain *philosophical concepts* for the overcoming of *cognitive problems*, I consider that those authors attempt to solve the *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*. In my argument, these attempts are regarded as *an entering into the field of philosophy*, and thus as a good reason for

considering the specific philosophers' *competence* in treating the *traditional philosophical problems*. In chapter two, I examine four philosophical concepts which are taken from the contemporary Western philosophy, and which could possibly meet the individuals' need of *philosophical competence* or adequate *concepts of cognition* for an effective *metacognition*.

CHAPTER TWO

TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS AND THE CONCEPT OF LANGUAGE

There is a conception of reality, and of the relationship between reality on the one hand and thought and language on the other, that has a long history in the Western intellectual tradition. Indeed, this conception is so fundamental that to some extent it defines that tradition.

John R. Searle, *Postmodernism and the Western Philosophical Tradition*

Overview

In order to elaborate *such* a philosophical understanding of the epistemological problems that could serve problem solvers' *metacognition*, in this chapter, I summarize a few exemplary notions coming from contemporary philosophy. Those include Wittgenstein's early concept of the *correct use of language*, his late concept of the *language games*, Searle's concept of *speech acts*, and Rorty's concept of the *political answer to philosophical questions*. Insofar as those concepts are considered 'exemplary' ones, they are not closely scrutinized in light of most recent criticism or scholarship (this would obviously remain beyond the scope of the present undertaking), but rather in terms of their *conceptual unity*.

The goal of these summaries is to show, on the one hand, a certain way in which philosophical notions under consideration can be consistently involved in a *compositional philosophical concept*; and on the other, that there is a substitutive or supplementary relationship between that concept and the compositional scientific concept which was formed in chapter one. Since I accepted that what is

in common to the two types of concepts is a *notion of philosophy* which they employ in overcoming problems that are essentially of *epistemological character*. In examining the philosophical concepts, I will draw attention generally, to the *two notions of philosophy* they consider, namely, *metaphysical* and *therapeutic*, and particularly, to the *two types of concepts of language* they are underlain by, namely, *ahistorical* and *historical*.

As already pointed out, in the broader context of my argument, the question of the relation between the scientific and philosophical concepts being examined in this paper becomes a question of the *relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy*. This latter question is crucial for overcoming the *major conceptual difficulty* of my argument, namely, the justification of the use of philosophical methods in treating problems which come up in the scope of science, and I adopted as a working basis for its consideration Habermas' notion of philosophy as *mediating interpreter*. According to my interpretation of that notion, scientists deal with what Habermas calls *problems of mediation* on the *level of culture*, while individuals face *such* problems on the *level of everyday communication*. In the scientific concepts, a *notion of philosophy* was employed in the *explanation* and *prescription* of certain concepts of how intelligence works, i.e., *concepts of cognition*, while individuals needed to *acquire* and *apply* such concepts through *metacognition*. But, insofar as the expertise of science turns out to be *insufficient* and the competence of philosophy *appropriate* for dealing with *problems of mediation*, in my argument the latter was promoted on the *level of culture* to serve the problem solving practices of *everyday communication*. Now, philosophers, in the conditional role of 'experts' in dealing with the very *epistemological problems*—the traditional philosophical problems, which were shown as 'fitting' the pattern of 'problems of mediation' on the level of culture, are to explain and prescribe such an *concept of cognition* that would adequately serve individuals' *metacognition*.

At this point, *my argument* can be already recapitulated in terms of the working notion of philosophy as *an attempt at overcoming problems of mediation*. Insofar as it addresses them on the *level of culture*, it is the *explanation* that the way in which philosophers approach traditional philosophical problems by mediation of an *understanding of how mind coordinates language and thinking* could alternatively elaborate the ways in which scientists approach *individuals' cognitive problems* by mediation of a concept of how intelligence works. Insofar as it addresses them on *everyday communication* it is the *prescription* that a specific extension of individuals' philosophical backgrounds would adequately support their need of appropriate epistemological concepts for practicing *metacognition*.²²

Now, I will represent the philosophical methodology of dissolution in the form of the scientific prescription of metacognition by contending that philosophers first *explain* certain epistemological concepts, in these cases concepts of language, and that they then *apply* these concepts in order to *dissolve* certain philosophical problems.²³ In chapter three, I will try to illustrate how a certain cognitive problem could be explained as an 'epistemological problem' and then dissolved as a 'pseudo-problem'.

²² This argument is being presently elucidated in an undertaking which I qualified as 'interdisciplinary', and which is thus resolved in the broader context of understanding concerning the relationship and the possible cooperation between science and philosophy. So far, this argument has been, so to speak, 'more scientific', and now it is to become 'more philosophical'. Indeed, its overall form is scientific, too, and a critical reader could rightly insist on a justification of what could be called a 'violation of interdisciplinarity'. I can only justify this discrepancy as a matter of pragmatics which led me on a search for a form of communication credible to a scientific audience, and which thus frees me of the necessity to set down the terms and conditions of what could be called an 'interdisciplinary form of communication between science and philosophy'. As would hopefully become clear after the consideration of the philosophical concepts, such a 'special form of communication' is not necessary, for it cannot be apodictically affirmed. Yet, I insist upon the 'interdisciplinary character' of this undertaking since it necessarily and equally presupposes two participants in a conversation which is purported to be fruitful.

²³ In examining the philosophical notions, I will not use the terms *prescription* and *acquisition* too often, for in this case the authors appear to treat the so-called 'problems of mediation', on the level of expert culture only. The treatment of the 'problems of mediation' on the level of everyday communication by mediation of 'philosophical concepts' is just a possibility under investigation in this paper. On the basis of this assumption, I also conditionally assume that *all* of the examined philosophical notions dissolve certain philosophical problems.

Wittgenstein's Concept of the Correct Use of Language

In his early work *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* (1922-1963), philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein made an exemplary and in a sense 'expert' attempt at *dissolving* the traditional philosophical problems in terms of his concept of the so-called *correct use of language*. For the purpose of this paper, I posit that he develops this concept in order to *explain* how the philosophical problems (such as 'sense of the world', 'ideal knowledge', 'good', 'sense of life') come into being as a result of inappropriate uses of language, and that then he *applies* this concept to those problems so that in its light those problems are already understood (or dissolved) as pseudo-problems. In the overall sense of my argument, Wittgenstein's view will be an instance of *using an epistemological concept* in overcoming what could be called 'problems of mediation' on the *level of culture*. Subsequently, according to the *general principle* for overcoming 'problems of mediation', the philosophical competence demonstrated in this concept would have to be effectively exchanged through the level of *everyday communication*.²⁴

²⁴ The precise reader of philosophical texts could find the frequent use of the expressions 'concept explanation' or 'concept application' as symptomatic of a simplistic interpretation. Such a simplification appears to be an unavoidable characteristic of any interdisciplinary undertaking which attempts to bridge two different types or levels of competence. The proper explanation of this phenomenon is that it is itself a 'problem of mediation' which can be hopefully overcome, if the problem solver who faces it is capable of resolving the two frameworks which condition its persistence *altogether into* a philosophical sense which conditions its disappearance. In my argument, this philosophical sense is being conveyed, in a broader sense, by mediation of a *notion of philosophy* which conditions the exchange of expertise between both expert fields on the level of *culture* and the expert fields and problem solvers on the level of *everyday communication*, and in a narrow sense, by a philosophical concept of cognition, or a concept of language.

As already stated, this philosophical sense necessarily involves a *conceptualization* of both *scientific* and *philosophical frameworks* within a *common terminology* in narrow and broader context of understanding. So far, the sense of the scientific framework has been considered in a narrow sense in its own terminology and *resolved* in a broader sense into the *common terminology*, and now a consideration of Wittgenstein's early philosophy is to introduce in a narrow sense the terminology of a philosophical framework of understanding which is to be then *resolved* in a broader sense into the *common terms*, too.

It is important to note, that the *conceptualization* of these two frameworks within common terms is meaningfully possible only in a broader context of understanding which concern the relationship and possible co-operation between science and philosophy. Thus, the philosophical terms, despite being unusual for an unprejudiced reader, should ultimately resume their meanings *from* the concepts to be now examined *into* the point being conveyed by the *common terminology* within this *broader context of understanding*.

A. The Correct Use of Language

In my interpretation, I accept that Wittgenstein *explains* the so-called 'correct use of language' in three steps which convey, respectively, its three points. *a) ontological* in which he *explains* a general notion of how the *world* relates to *reality* in terms of *facts*; *b) representational* which *explains* how 'reality' is being *represented* in the 'world' by mediation of *pictures* in terms of the so-called 'picture theory'; and *c) epistemological* which *explains* the pictures' representation of reality in terms of *language* and *thinking*. Because the distinction of these points is only speculative, in my discussion I will consider each of them as being conditioned by the other two. Finally, I will focus on what can be called the *scope* of the 'correct use of language' as determined by these three points.

a) Ontological Point: the Relation between the World and the Reality

The beginning of the *Tractatus* is a manifestation of Wittgenstein's method which aims at simple descriptions of what is under examination. Throughout the text, these 'descriptions' become simply 'assertions' in terms of propositions, for it becomes clear that they 'describe' nothing. He numbers these propositions to indicate their "logical importance" (p.7) which then becomes 'unimportant', since, on his view, the "logical forms are without number" 4.128)²⁵ and, in this sense, "there are no privileged numbers in logic" (4.128; 5.552) but "all propositions are of equal value" (6.4). In this way, the traditional search for an apodictic starting-point of philosophical inquiry (which is so distinctive of, for example, Descartes), for Wittgenstein, just conditionally ends in a proposition number '1': "the world is

²⁵ In the quotations from *Tractatus*, I will use Wittgenstein's numbering. In the next subsection, I will use the section numbers when I quote from the first part and the page numbers when I quote from the second part of his book *Philosophical Investigations*

all that is the case". In my interpretation, I accept that the first fundamental differentiation which Wittgenstein poses is the one between 'world' and 'reality', and that it constitutes what I call his *ontological point*. Being gradually specified, it grounds, structures, and ultimately determines the epistemic sense of the concept of the 'correct use of language'.

Wittgenstein conceives of the *world* as "the totality of facts"(1.1) that are in the so-called "logical space" (1.13). In this context, a "fact is what is the case, and is the existence of states of affairs" (2) which are in turn "combinations of objects" (2.01). Thus, the world, as the "totality of existing states of affairs" (2.04), is ultimately composed of "combinations of objects."

On the other hand, *reality*, as "the existence and non-existence of states of affairs"(2.06), is independent of the world and is *present* in the latter only in terms of 'facts' which, as already pointed out, are "existence of states of affairs." Reality, however, involves also the "non-existence of states of affairs" which appears to be what is *not* present in the world. Thus, the world, as "the sum-total of reality" (2.063), can be interpreted as combinations of objects grasped in terms of facts, or as a *represented reality*.

The *epistemological condition* of the *ontological point*, can be seen in the argument that "it is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs" (2.011), i.e., that it is *essential to things to be in the world*. In other words, because the world "is pervaded by logic" (5.61), and because in the logical space "nothing is accidental" (2.012), whatever appears in it gains *essence*. Thus, it is arguable that what is called 'essence' or 'essentialness' comes into being in the world as a matter of 'logic'. Accordingly, the *representational condition* of the *ontological point* appears to be the *possibility* that the things be *factually presented* in the 'logical space'.

b) Representational Point: the so-called 'Picture Theory'

Through what he calls *pictures*, Wittgenstein explains how the 'world' represents 'reality', i.e., how the things which are *factually presented* in the logical space can be, as facts, *logically represented* in the world. He conceives of a "picture as fact" (2.141) which "can depict any reality whose form it has" (2.171) and thus can "present a situation in logical space" (2.11). In other words, "we picture facts to ourselves" (2.1) and the 'facts' enter 'logical space' in the form of 'pictures' which, as being "models of reality" (2.12), constitute the 'world' as a 'pictured reality'. Thus, in the core of Wittgenstein's representational point is a peculiarity which enables pictures to be the media between the world and reality:

2.18 What any picture, of whatever form, must have *in common* with reality, in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any way at all, *is logical form, that is the form of reality.* (italics added)

In this way, the connection between world and reality becomes the 'logical form' of the 'pictures' which is *also* a 'form of reality'.

In terms of the *representational point*, the *ontological condition*, namely, the differentiation between 'world' and 'reality' can be construed as follows: 'pictures' *present* the 'reality', but they *depict* the 'world'; as they 'depict' the 'world', they *represent* the 'reality', but while the reality's representation is either 'correct' or 'incorrect', the world's 'depicting' is *always* 'logically correct', since the latter appears to happen in the 'logical space' where 'nothing is accidental'. Thus, in Wittgenstein's view, the 'depicted world' is basically a *logically represented reality*.

On the other hand, the *epistemological condition* of Wittgenstein's *representational point* takes the form of a *condition for sense* of reality's-representation-in-the-world. Precisely, this condition consists of the *correspondence* between the elements of the picture and the objects in the reality (2.13) which must be such that "what a picture represents is its sense" (2.225). Consequently, it is the *correspondence* that relates the *sense* of pictures

representation' to the epistemological terms 'truth', 'falsity', and 'possibility': "a picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false" (2.21) but its truth or falsity cannot be determined *a priori* (2.225).

c) Epistemological Point: the Interrelation between Language and Thought

The *epistemological point* of the concept of the 'correct use of language', which is to determine a *pictorial representation* in terms of *sense*, is ultimately specified as a matter of an interrelation between *language* and *thinking*. For Wittgenstein, "a logical picture of facts is a thought" (3) which in a proposition "finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses"(3.1), and which is ultimately "a proposition with a sense"(4). Thus, as a matter of its specification in terms of language and thinking, any pictorial representation of reality in the world must be both *logical* and *sensical*. It must be *logical* insofar as a "thought can never be of anything illogical" (3.2), and it must be *sensical* insofar as there must be a correspondence of "propositional signs" and "objects of thought" (3.2).

These two aspects of Wittgenstein's *epistemological point* are inseparable and can be recognized as being, respectively, its *representational* and *ontological conditions*. Essentially, this point is a correspondence theory of meaning whose core is that "in a proposition a name is the representative of an object" (3.22), "means an object, and the object is its meaning" (3.203). According to its *representational condition*, "only propositions have sense and only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have a meaning" (3.3); according to its *ontological condition*, the availability of corresponding 'objects' to the 'names' of a *proposition* is the ultimate condition for its 'sense', as well as, for the 'meanings' of its names.

d) *The Scope of the 'Correct Use of Language'*

The three points examined above predetermine what *can be sensically said* in language and so constitute the *scope* of its correct use which must be such in their *three perspectives* at the same time. In the *ontological perspective*, the requirement for *sense*, which was initially broadly defined as a presentation of reality in the world, is limited to a *correspondence between the elements of a proposition (names) and the state of affairs (objects)* it represents:

3.221 Objects can only be *named*. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak *about* them: I cannot *put them into words*. Propositions can only say *how* the things are, not *what* they are.

In other words, the objects are just not names; they can only be named and meant while one speaks *about* them. Speaking about them is just speaking *about* them, not *speaking them*. Accordingly, a proposition has 'sense' by speaking *about* objects, while the 'sense' is what a proposition can say about reality, namely, "how things stand if it is true" (4.022).

In the *representational perspective*, the 'correct use of language' is limited not only to its agreement or disagreement with reality, but also to the extent to which it *can* account for such an agreement or disagreement in terms of "its truth-conditions" (4.431). Wittgenstein points out "two extreme cases," namely, the tautology and contradiction, in which propositions lack sense: in the former "the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions"; in the latter "the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities" (4.46). Thus, just because "a tautology has no truth-condition, since it is unconditionally true", while a "contradiction is true on no condition", they both *lack sense* (4.461, 5.142-3). They "are not pictures of the reality" and "do not represent any possible situations"(4.462); they are just "the limiting cases - indeed the disintegration - of the combination of signs" (4.466). In Wittgenstein's taxonomy, the only proposition that *can* convey *sense* and thus logically build up the world as a truly

represented reality is the one whose "truth is possible" (4.464) which is also the one that is important in an epistemological perspective.

The *epistemological perspective* of the 'correct use of language' is already limited by both ontological and representational perspectives. a proposition whose truth 'is possible' must have a *sense* as a matter of 'agreement or disagreement with the reality' and must be able to convey it most obviously and least questionably:

4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts an existence of a state of affairs.

4.25 If an elementary proposition is true, the state of affairs exists: if an elementary proposition is false, the state of affairs does not exist.

For Wittgenstein, the *elementary propositions* cannot contradict each other (4.211), nor can they "be deduced from one another" (5.134); instead, the "analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions which consist of names in immediate combination" (4.221). In this way, the possible aim of any *correct use of language* would be, by providing "all true elementary propositions", to furnish "a complete description of the world" (4.26).

However, this aim cannot be accomplished *a priori*, and so it *cannot* become an 'epistemological aim'. For, if "*the limits of my language* mean the limits of my world" (5.6), "the only necessity" that could possibly build up the world is a merely "logical necessity" (6.375) which can in *no way logically* transcend the world (i.e., the limits of my language) in order to *necessarily* "assert an existence of a state of affairs" in reality (4.21).

5.5571 If I cannot give *a priori* a list of elementary propositions, then the attempt to give one must lead to obvious nonsense.

In other words, the *correct use of language* takes place *only* where 'reality' is grasped by the 'world' in terms of propositions whose *names* have *meanings* or *corresponding objects*, namely, in *terms* of the *elementary propositions*. But, because the 'elementary propositions' in no way can be given a

priori, they cannot be the propositions of philosophy but must be ones of natural science (6.53).

B. The 'Correct Use of Language' and 'Philosophical Problems'

Having his concept of language thus *explained*, Wittgenstein *applies* it to *traditional philosophical problems*. In this subsection, I will consider this *application* in terms of two points: the demonstration of the *dissolution* of these problems, and the *notion of philosophy* which underlies this dissolution.

a) *The Dissolution of Philosophical Problems*

For the early Wittgenstein, the philosophical problems come into being as a result of philosophers' being *unaware* of the peculiarities of the logico-pictorial interplay in language. In the broader sense of my argument, this means that philosophers have used language in a way that produces fundamental confusions on the *level of culture* and that, similarly, *individuals* have used 'fallible beliefs' in a way that produces their cognitive confusions in *everyday communication*:

4.002 Man possesses the ability to construct languages *capable of expressing any sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is* - just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.

Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.

It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from what the logic of language is.

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body but for entirely different purposes.

(italics added)

In other words, because the linguistic representations in the world are *only* logical representations in the logic of language, i.e., representations which can be drawn even from false propositions (4.023), thinking, which is linguistically trying to represent a logically true world, *must correct* itself through whether or not its propositions agree with reality. It is in this sense that “most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical” (4.003); they are not false insofar as they are penetrated by and justified through the logic of language which ascribes some sort of ‘essentialness’ to whatever enters ‘logical space’, but they are *nonsensical* insofar as their names have no corresponding objects in reality. For Wittgenstein, the philosophical questions “arise from *our failure to understand the logic of language*” (italics added), and only an appropriate understanding of this logic uncovers that “the deepest problems are in fact *not* problems at all” (4.003) but need to be understood and thus *dissolved* as pseudo-problems.

Wittgenstein himself *illustrates* how his concept *dissolves* some *traditional philosophical problems*. The question about the *immortality of the human soul* cannot be solved by finding out that we eventually can “survive for ever,” but rather disappears when we find out that the “eternal life” is “as much of a riddle as our present life” (6.4312). Further, the so-called *sense of the world* must lie outside the world and so cannot be expressed in *language*, because in the world everything is “accidental” and if this “sense” appears in it, it would be accidental itself (6.41) which would thus contradict the *presumably unconditional*, or ‘non-accidental’ character of what is meant by ‘the sense of the world’. Similarly, the *good* “cannot be put into words”(6.421) and still remain ‘unconditional’, for if “all propositions are of equal value”(6.41), they “can express nothing that is higher” (6.420) but any eventual expression of such a ‘higher value’ would have no value at all (6.41). Likewise, the *theory of knowledge* turns out to be “philosophy of psychology” (4.1121) since there can be no theory of causality that would underlie

its *necessary* explanation, i.e., since “the only necessity that exists is logical necessity” (6.37) which cannot transcend the world.

In other words, in light of the concept of the *correct use of language*, the philosophical problems turn out to be unreal problems, for the names of the propositions that formulate them have no corresponding objects in reality. The philosophical problems remain in the ‘limits of the world’ and result from an ‘incorrect use’ of language which represents the ‘reality’ in a logically necessary way, but cannot convey sense epistemologically.

b) The Role and Purpose of Philosophy

For the early Wittgenstein, the *dissolution* of philosophical problems implies a *notion of philosophy* whose *role* and *purpose* would arise from taking into consideration the possibility for ‘incorrect uses’ of language; it must give up any epistemological attainments and limit its role to the ‘clarification of thoughts’:

- 4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical *clarification of thoughts*.
Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an *activity*.
A philosophical work consists essentially of *elucidations*.
Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the *clarification of propositions*.
Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: *its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries*.
(italics added)

Thus, though the role of philosophy is to clarify thoughts, which are basically propositions with a *sense*, by means of the logic of language, which is inevitably embedded in those propositions, it must also pull away from this logic. For it cannot end in *the* elementary philosophical propositions as it does not have its own subject of investigation within reality and so *cannot* become a *metaphysics* which would have been the science that is in a position to provide *all* elementary propositions *a priori*. There appears to be a paradox in the role of philosophy

which tries to rebut itself as a metaphysics in an obviously metaphysical manner (promoting the 'only strictly correct method'). On this point, it is as if Wittgenstein looks at his method from the point of view of the natural sciences, but then his point becomes a paradox, for none of the natural sciences is a philosophy, nor can a philosophy become one of the natural sciences in order to legitimately proclaim such a method. *Only* philosophy, and *only* in the role of a 'clarifying activity', can point such a method out; but it must go through the *awareness* that it is an 'activity' which is exercised in nonsensical propositions and as such cannot provide solutions to its traditional problems. Rather, these problems cannot and need not be a subject of the *correct use of language*, but need to be understood and thus *dissolved* as 'pseudo-problems'. For, philosophy cannot go beyond the limits of language by means of language, and therefore, it cannot go any further in its consideration, nor be any clearer in its explanation of these problems. For Wittgenstein, what is beyond "my world" ("the limits of my language") is just not expressible in language; it remains for "me" as what is "mystical", i.e., as what simply *cannot be* a subject of any evaluative determinations:

7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

In summary, for the early Wittgenstein, the *traditional philosophical problems*, including those related to what is known as 'cognition', the so-called *epistemological problems*, stem from one's 'failure to understand the logic of language' and in light of a *good understanding* of the 'correct use of language' turn out to be just 'pseudo problems'. To convey this point, he *explained* the concept of the *correct use of language* which delineated the *scope* of its employment in terms of *sense*, and then he *applied* that concept to the *traditional philosophical problems* and *dissolved* them as problems being formulated in nonsensical propositions. According to him, the *correct use of language* takes place only in the propositions which have corresponding objects in *reality*, which can logically express a possible truth, and which are thus in the position to convey

'sense' that can meaningfully build up a world as a truly represented reality. For the early Wittgenstein, only the elementary propositions of natural science can build up meaningfully the world since their names have corresponding objects in reality. By contrast, philosophy *cannot* amount to 'elementary philosophical propositions' since the names of its propositions have *no* corresponding objects in reality; rather, its *mere attempts* to provide such propositions have created its traditional problems.

Consequently, Wittgenstein adheres to a notion of *philosophy as an activity* which logically clarifies thoughts without ending in elementary philosophical propositions, i.e., without becoming a *metaphysics*. Indeed, his early concept has been criticized as attaining metaphysical dimensions because it promoted one 'only strictly correct method' in philosophy. However, it is also a well-known *example* of an attempt at breaking with the notion of *philosophy as metaphysics* which came close to the notion of *philosophy as a therapy* that he himself will develop later on. In my argument, the former notion is conceived of as underlying the epistemological uses of language which amount to philosophical problems, while the latter as conditioning a possible 'undoing' of those uses and thus overcoming of these problems.

Wittgenstein's Concept of Language Games

As Wittgenstein's early work *Tractatus* promoted the concept of the *correct use of language* which *dissolved* the *traditional philosophical problems*, so his late work *Philosophical Investigations* promoted a notion of the so-called *language games* which *dissolved* the *notion of correctness* that had seemingly become a 'new' problem of philosophy. On his late view, language cannot be conceptualized in terms of its 'correct use', but rather, its 'correctness' is to be resolved in the multiplicity of its 'uses'.

In the broader context of my argument, I will consider that Wittgenstein thus tried to overcome the *very last* ‘problem of mediation’ on the *level of culture*, namely, the possibility of one ‘only strictly correct method’ in philosophy. He *explains* this problem in the concept of *language games*, and that then he *applies* this concept to dissolve this problem. Consequently, Wittgenstein elaborates both a specific notion of *philosophy as a therapy* which I conceive of as underlying the overcoming of the *problems of mediation* on the level of *culture* and an alternative understanding of *teaching-learning practice* which I regard as his most direct addressing of the *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*.

A. The Language Games

I argue that Wittgenstein’s *explanation* of the notion of *language games* is substantially representable in the following points: a consideration of some *traditional notions of language* in which he points out their inadequacy with respect to certain language uses; the concept of the *multiplicity of language uses* on the basis of which he develops the notion of ‘language games’; and finally, the concept of the so-called *family resemblances* in which he explains how the ‘multiplicity of language uses’ is possible in the ‘same language’

a) *The Traditional Notions of Language*

Wittgenstein’s *explanation* of the concept of *language games* begins with a consideration of a few popular concepts of language which he represents as being ‘inadequate explanations’ of certain language uses. In Augustine’s *Confessions* (1,8), he finds an example of an ostensive way of language acquisition where the student is supposed to “grasp” that “a thing is called by an uttered sound”, or a

“name”. Wittgenstein’s objection here is that “the names of certain actions”, the “difference between kinds of words”, and the use of words like “five” or “red” remain out of the scope of validity of this concept (1).

Similarly, in Plato’s *Theaetetus* (46), Wittgenstein focuses on a notion of language which consists of names that name what Socrates calls “primary elements” so that the latter need no other definitions than their “names” themselves. On this view, the ‘primary elements’ are conceived of as composing “complexes” whose names in turn are to result from the ‘names’ of the primary elements which are for this purpose “being compounded together” in the form of a “descriptive language”. Thus, what Socrates understands as the “essence of speech” is the mere “composition of names” (46) which implies that “any complexity is essentially composite”. Here, Wittgenstein’s objection is that a further analysis of the word “composite” would uncover the parts of a certain “complexity” as being just other “complexities”, and that to be able to make sense of calling a certain complexity “composite” we somehow must already know what is meant by “composite”(47).

Ultimately, Wittgenstein’s point is that Plato and Augustine adhere to the same principle of *correspondence* between names and objects that he himself promoted in *Tractatus* to be applied for determining the *correctness* of the use of language (46). In ‘determining this correctness’ these concepts turn out to be themselves ‘incorrect’ uses of language, since they *could not explain* the language use in its *multiplicity*. Thus, what can be concluded is that for the late Wittgenstein the epistemological use of language *cannot and ought not to be* rejected by means of another epistemological use.

b) The Multiplicity of Language Use and its Conceptualization

In his late concept of language, Wittgenstein conveys the point that if an explanatory concept is to take into consideration the multiplicity of language uses, it faces the impossibility of an 'essential' explanation. For, the notion of an "essence" already presupposes a general characteristic that could be found in any possible language use, while at the same time any attempts for its 'description' pose it as "appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region" (3). In his view, the notion of "essence" of language is based on a "philosophical concept of meaning" which ultimately underlies a "language more primitive than ours" (2). Thus, any account of the 'complexity' of language which is to take into consideration the whole multiplicity of language uses ought to simply *dissolve* the notion of 'essence' since the latter cannot explain these uses. Rather, what remains in its place is a redefined problem ("explanations come to an end somewhere") which is already "How a word is used?" (1).

For Wittgenstein, this problem could only be considered in a *terminology* that would enable what could be called a 'non-essential explanation'. This terminology should be flexible enough to explain something like a 'conditional essence' of language such that, while encompassing the 'multiplicity' of the 'ordinary language', it has lost its metaphysical characteristics (like pretensions for absoluteness). This terminology should also come from our ordinary language where the words we use do not require any special, complicated, or abstract definitions which condition misunderstanding, but where the comprehensiveness comes as a result of common references to these words' ordinary meanings. In this ordinary sense, any 'processes resembling language' and meeting the 'non-essentialist' requirements are eligible to take the role of explanatory metaphors; consequently, Wittgenstein sees such a resemblance in what in ordinary language is known as a *game*.

Since any possible definition of 'game' which is to meet the 'non-essentialist' or 'anti-metaphysical' explanatory condition would encounter the 'multiplicity' problem, too, Wittgenstein's 'game' cannot be a 'certain game' defined in 'certain terms', for it would thus exclude certain language uses from its 'definition':

It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules..." - and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. *You can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games.* (italics added) (3)

We can also think of the whole process of using words ... as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games "language games" and I will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language game. And the process of naming the stones and repeating words after someone might also be called language games. ... I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the action into which it is woven, the "language-games." (7)

Thus, the term 'language games' comes to explain the *multiplicity of language uses* in a way that is, so to speak, 'least metaphysical', for it has resolved Wittgenstein's early *essentialist notion of meaning* in the particular language uses and so has *dissolved* this notion as a *philosophical problem*. As a result, the *use of language* is *correctly* present only in terms of the particular *language game*; for the language games have *no* constant rules for *sense* to be followed in order to become 'language games' but rather their *conditional* rules are being constituted simultaneously with the game itself:

Here the term "language games" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (23)

Thus, a possible 'explanation' of what a *language game* is becomes itself a particular 'language game' which is to reach clarity in terms of the ordinary references in which one simultaneously involves the words being used in this particular 'language game'. Because the ordinary references are not usually objects of explanation, this concept should not apodictically determine the 'correctness' of the language game of this explanation. Rather, *its correctness* is

to be determined by *its use* itself. In this way, *Tractatus*' notion of 'correspondence', as a condition for 'sense', is no longer a requirement which is itself difficult for verification; in the *Investigations*, its metaphysical dimension has been resolved, and thus dissolved, into the particular language uses.

c) *The 'Family Resemblances'*

The concept of *language games* explains language use as 'part of an activity', but in the activities that are quite different and define quite different contexts of understanding, the ordinary references of the words involved would not be possible without a way of maintaining this recurrent referentiality. Some relationships among the different contexts are necessary to ensure the particular exercises of the same words in different language games, and yet for the late Wittgenstein even such an assumption already sounds metaphysical:

Don't say: "There must be something common or they would not be called 'games'" ... for you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. (66)

Such a specification also needs to be *named* at least in the 'language game' of a verbal explanation, though, in the sense of the concept, it should not be *pointed* out, but just *seen*; thus Wittgenstein calls those relationships of similarity *family resemblances*:

I can think no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances of a family: build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. - And I shall say: 'games' form a family. (67)

The maintenance of a particular 'language-game' that exercises the same words in different ways for the purpose of an always different 'use' is possible by means of these 'family resemblances'. In the language game of a verbal *explanation* which involves just *one particular use* of certain terms, the anti-metaphysical condition requires that references being used do not go beyond their just being references. That

they give the meanings of the words exercised does not mean that they can give the rules of giving meaning or of what a 'correct' language game is supposed to be. The use of references does not lead toward certain definitions, nor is such a 'referential' explanation itself a 'definitive' one, respectively, nor is the understanding itself an understanding of a definition:

And this is just how one might explain to someone what a game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. - I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples the common thing which I - for some reason - was unable to express; but that he is now to *employ* those examples in a particular way. (71)

But, "here giving of examples is not an *indirect* means of explaining – in default of a better" because, if it were, it might have been inappropriately used for accomplishing a "general definition" which as such "can be misunderstood" (71) Only could "*seeing* what is in common" accompany any explanation which, as a matter of a particular language use, is what an *already* understood definition is (72). In this way, here 'definition' is such in a conditional sense only, and is certainly not a 'general definition' insofar as what *cannot be pointed* to for the purpose of its 'general explanation'. To put it in another way, that 'explanations come to an end somewhere' does not mean that this is *the end*, nor that this is *the only end* they should come to. This is why a 'general definition' of a 'language game' is not possible and so here Wittgenstein's "point" is just

... *this* is how we play the game. (I mean the language-game with the word "game"). (71)

B. 'Language Games' and 'Epistemological Questions'

In this subsection, I will consider what can be called Wittgenstein's *application* of the concept of *language games* in dissolving, so to speak, the 'last philosophical problem', namely, the *conceptualization of language in terms of its correct use*. Generally, I will represent it in terms of a certain interpretation of the

so-called 'duck-rabbit illustration' which must shed light on both how *epistemological points* come into being in the interactions between language and thinking, and how they can disappear in light of a *good philosophical understanding* of how the mind deals with language. Then, I will focus directly on his notion of *philosophy as a therapy* which in my argument is conceived of as underlying the overcoming of the *problems of mediation* on the *level of culture* (i.e., the concept of the *correct use of language* which was conceived of as the *only strictly correct method* of *philosophy as clarifying activity*). And finally, I will focus on his alternative understanding of *teaching-learning practice* which can be considered an adaptation of his late notion of philosophy for overcoming the *problems of mediation* in *everyday communication* (i.e., individuals' *cognitive problems*).

a) The 'Duck-rabbit Illustration'

In examining the so-called 'duck-rabbit' example, Wittgenstein puts the concept of *language games* in the perspective of a specific *theory of interpretation* which *explains* the details of how *epistemological points* appear in the actual interplay between language and thinking, as well as, of how they can disappear in light of an *appropriate philosophical understanding* of how the mind deals with language. In my examination of Wittgenstein's theory of interpretation, I will emphasize his distinction between both the *continuous aspect* (the "continuous seeing" of an aspect) and the *constant change of aspects* (or "dawning of an aspect") (p.194).

The 'duck-rabbit illustration' represents a figure which "can be seen as a rabbit's or as duck's head"; on the question "What do you see here?", Wittgenstein points out two types of answers, acceptable and unacceptable. His acceptable answer is:

"A picture-rabbit". If I had further been asked what it is, I should have explained by pointing to all sorts of pictures of rabbits, should perhaps have pointed to real rabbits, or given an imitation of them. (p. 194)

On the other hand, an unacceptable answer is “Now I am seeing it as a picture-rabbit” (p. 194). The difference is that in the first case a ‘continuous’ aspect is reported which is most likely to be related to a *particular language use*, while in the second a ‘dawning’ aspect is reported which is most likely to be related to a *philosophizing over language use*. As a part of any particular language use, an involved aspect which plays a particular role associated with a particular meaning is seen as a ‘continuous’ one. For the sake of philosophy, however, “we can also *see* the illustration now as one thing now as another”; in other words, “we interpret it, and *see* it as we *interpret* it” (p. 193).

In a certain sense, a good answer, which does not compromise the ambiguity of the figure, would be just “It’s a duck-rabbit” (p. 195). This would be a “report of perception” as the answer “It’s a rabbit” would be such, too, though both reports and both perceptions are different. However, the answer “*Now* it’s a rabbit” would not be a report of perception (p. 195), for it does not escape the ambiguity of the figure in an authentic manner; it “*has the form of a report of a new perception*”(p. 196), but is rather a ‘report of an alternation’(italics added). The report of alternation (or of ‘dawning aspect’) conveys the possibilities of *other* reports of perception (or of ‘continuous aspects’) in a way which is *quite the same and quite definite* in terms of a linguistic expression (as a ‘report’). In my interpretation, this is only to say the distinction between the two types of reports is very subtle, that *any use of language* also promotes aspects other than the ones which it ‘grasps’ in itself, and that the former aspects project a possible language use which *already* ‘misfits’ the *particular* use constituted by the latter aspects. In other words, the propositions of the particular language uses grasp only *certain aspects*, not the *constant change of aspects* though they convey such a possibility. That is why an ‘exact explanation’ is actually never an ‘exact’ one; it only promotes the *possibility* for such an ‘exact explanation’ in an *epistemological form*:

My visual impression has changed; - what was it like before and what is it like now? - If I represent it by means of an *exact copy - and isn't that a good representation of it? - no change is shewn.* (italics added) (p. 196)

Such a point can be interpreted on behalf of Habermas' notion, since it shows both that the linguistic practices are in a certain sense limited to particular language uses and that whenever they try to transcend these uses they become to a great extent 'philosophical practices'. Supposedly, in these cases they face the *problems of mediation* and both the 'expertise' of science and the individuals 'own epistemology' appear to be inadequate for their overcoming. Assuming that in these very cases scientific 'expertise' is considered 'adequate' for the treatment of these problems, it would attain the dimensions of what in the Western philosophical tradition has been known as 'metaphysics'. For the *problems of mediation* as such remain *out of the scope* of the 'expert fields' but are only problems of the *exchange* of expertise by means of concepts. At the same time, this point does not necessarily imply that the solutions of those problems of the use of expert knowledge are some sort of 'philosophical solutions'. For a philosophical treatment would make relative any 'particular organization' or *continuous aspect* and focus on a *constant change of aspects* which, in problem solving, is simply *not* relevant because then one uses a particular or *continuous aspect* only. This is why the specific 'philosophical treatment' rather results in *undoing* of 'philosophy as a clarifying activity' which is to give up its role of distributing 'correctness' to the particular language uses and to disappear *into* a *particular use of continuous aspects*:

It is necessary to get down to the application, and then the concept finds a different place, one which, so to speak, one never dreamed of. (p. 201)

In other words, while the practice dissolves the epistemological aspects of the perception in certain applicable definitenesses, including linguistic ones, philosophizing specifies them in terms of language and thinking and dissolves their metaphysical dimensions by mediation of an appropriate understanding of how mind deals with language. In the subtle interactions between language and thinking, the "looking at" through "expression" becomes a "thinking out", while

the "expression" itself is *an already thought out* expression which is either used or interpreted:

If you are looking at the object, you need not think; but if you are having the visual experience expressed by the exclamation, you are thinking of what you see. (p. 197)

Do I really see something different each time, or do I only interpret what I see in a different way? I *am inclined* to say the former. But why? - *To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing is a state.* (p. 213)

For the late Wittgenstein, the possible confusions in language use appear in the very transition from 'seeing' to 'interpreting', i.e., from, so to speak, a *pre-thinking* to a *linguistically treated and later so expressed thinking*. This is a transition which turns out to be intangible and as such unaccountable. Even if it is believed that it is 'accountable' and so at some point becomes 'believably' accounted, it would be again in terms of language. In all events the 'philosophical treatment' must *dissolve* this account, e.g., in terms of Wittgenstein's early view, it will be categorized under 'what cannot be said', while in terms of his late view, which does not point to what 'cannot be said', it will be required to *stop* the philosophizing that fallaciously reduces one term to another for the sake of a useless explanation:

Now it is easy to recognize cases in which we are *interpreting*. When we interpret we form hypotheses, which may prove false (p. 213)

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. - The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question. (133)

To sum up, in his two concepts, Wittgenstein ultimately specifies the philosophical questions in terms of concepts of the interrelation between language and thinking which pose the 'thought' as finally being shaped by its linguistic expression; but while in *Tractatus* this expression is either 'true' or 'false', in the *Investigations* it is either practically used or epistemologically fallible. In his late view, the epistemological points ought to completely disappear from the use of

language; respectively, the notion of 'correctness' ought to be resolved in the multiplicity of ordinary uses of language:

Only do not think you knew in advance what the "state of seeing" means here!
Let the use *teach* you the meaning. (p. 213)

As pointed in the *Introduction*, the dissolution of the philosophical problems is to come as a matter of an application of a concept of cognition which *essentially involves how they come into being and how they disappear*. In terms of my interpretation of the 'duck-rabbit illustration', the *dissolution* of the epistemological points in any language use is to come through focusing on its *continuous aspect*, and that any out-of-use conceptualization of language (such as the notion of its *correct use*) would be an attempt for representing a possible *constant change of aspects*.

b) *The Role of Philosophy*

Because Wittgenstein himself suggests that his late view "could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of his old way of thinking" (1953/1958, vi), now I proceed with a comparative analysis which poses his *late* notion of philosophy as evolving from the *perspective* of his *early one*. Thus, I accept that, in his late thought, he considers two types of philosophizing; *metaphysical* and *therapeutic*, of which the former, as relating to his early view of philosophy, is to help explain the latter as constituting his late view of philosophy. Hereafter, I will interpret his late notion of philosophy in terms of this analytic distinction and argue that Wittgenstein *uses metaphysical philosophizing* to *explain* how epistemological problems come into being in language, while he uses the *therapeutic one* as a *prescription* for how they can be dissolved. Consequently, his *metaphysical philosophizing* focuses on the epistemological (constant change of) aspects of the language use and *problematizes* it in terms of

a *notion of correctness*, while his *therapeutic philosophizing* focuses on its practical (or continuous) aspects and *dissolves* the 'notion of correctness' in terms of the *use*. The result is that the *metaphysical philosophizing* in fact *cannot explain* the language in its *multiplicity* because it can *only* amount to an explanation of its 'correct use'; while, the *therapeutic philosophizing* in fact *is not a philosophizing* in a traditional sense at all because it appears to *prescribe* a good understanding of language without, so to speak, making the 'prescription' (which would have been then a prescription for its 'correct use', too). Ultimately, Wittgenstein adheres to the *therapeutic philosophizing* because, in the specific sense of his concept, the *explanation* has been somehow accomplished (though it has been only attempted), and thus what remains is just the *application* to be performed. The conclusion is that *philosophy as a therapy* cannot be sufficiently *explained* but rather sufficiently *applied*. Accordingly, in this subsection I focus, on one hand, on what his *late view* has *in common* with his *early one*, i.e., the *rejection of philosophy as metaphysics*, and on the other hand, on what his *late view* has *in distinction* from his *early one*, i.e., *therapeutic rejection of the metaphysical rejection of the metaphysics*.

Thus, in Wittgenstein's early view, the metaphysics results from misusing the *logic of language* in such a way that it produces *nonsensical* propositions which have no corresponding objects in reality, while in his late view, the *multiplicity* of concrete language uses disallows *such* a language use that would constitute the metaphysical explanation of its correctness as validly applying to the whole of this 'multiplicity'. As a result, in the two concepts, *philosophy as a metaphysics* has been proved impossible, but in terms of the late one, *it* cannot be even a particular *language game* that takes a part in the multiplicity of other language games since *it* cannot point out or refer to *something* that "is common to all games" (66) and so cannot ensure an understanding in such a game. In contrast, the very *awareness of the multiplicity* of language uses is the necessary

condition that can prevent us from getting involved in *such* a language game, i.e., from getting involved in a *metaphysical explanation* of how language works:

If you do not keep multiplicity of language games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions like: "What is a question?". (24)

Thus, as the author of *Tractatus* saw the role of philosophy in its being a 'clarifying activity' which 'does not result in philosophical propositions', but rather in dissolving of all philosophical problems; so the author of the *Investigations* conceived of philosophy as a 'therapy' which *treats* the particular language uses by undoing their pre-established 'correctness'. Consequently, because philosophy can be in neither case a metaphysics, it cannot legitimately *prescribe* any 'correct' rules for its own practice, for they would thus form a metaphysical prescription. This is why, in *Tractatus*, a metaphysical way of *explaining* the 'only strictly correct method' of philosophy ended with a paradoxical self-repudiation of the 'explanation' (6.54), while in the *Investigations*, the philosophical treatment denied the metaphysical concepts even as indirect or guiding notions in the use of language:

... in philosophy we often *compare* the use of words with games and calculi which have fixed rules, but cannot say that someone that is using language *must* play such a game. - But if you say that our languages only *approximate* to such calculi you are standing on the very brink of misunderstanding. For then it may look as if what we were talking about were an *ideal* language. As if our logic were, so to speak, a logic for a vacuum. - Whereas logic does not treat of language - or of thought in the sense in which a natural science *treats* of a natural phenomenon, and the most that can be said is that we *construct* ideal languages. But here the word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages were better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took the logician to shew people at last what a proper sentence looks like. (81)

For the late Wittgenstein, *philosophy as therapy* avoids the employment of 'ideal' properties for purposes of its own because they can be justified only psychologically:

As if we were talking about shades of meaning and all *that* were in question were to find words to hit the correct nuance. That is in question in philosophy only where we have to give a psychologically exact account of the temptation to use a particular kind of expression. (254)

In other words, philosophy cannot take on the means of investigation or expression of the natural sciences, nor can it become a specialized activity which accompanies the sciences, for if it does, it would thus attain metaphysical dimensions (254). What philosophy does is just a 'treatment' which is in no way identical with any scientific one, which exercises itself while refining any possible metaphysical aspects in the questions under investigation, and which is thus an undoing of itself as a treatment:

The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. (255)

Here, 'treatment' is not a directing (or 'correcting') of the natural sciences, as the physician's treatment is not just a directing of the patient. Rather, the physician virtually *cures* an illness through, in a certain sense, 'undoing of the directing' which is useless when the patient is already sick; *not* defining or re-defining the illness, but the very *therapy* would cure the patient:

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. - *Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.* (italics added)(126)

For Wittgenstein, what remains for philosophy to 'treat' are any possible attempts to impose pre-established, 'correct' meanings in the language use that would only 'disguise' what 'lies open to view' and so would complicate the particular language uses. This is why he declares that "our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language" (130), nor is "our aim to refine a complete system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways" (133). Rather,

We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not *the* order. (132)

... we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a *single* problem. There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (133)

On Wittgenstein's late view, the problems that are being solved are after all the practical problems, not the *single* problem of *philosophy* which would have thus been a *metaphysics*. In contrast, *philosophy as a therapy* has neither a certain problem, nor even a certain method; for if there were *only one* philosophical method or therapy, as the author of *Tractatus* thought, it would have become philosophy's *only* problem.

Thus, in relation to his early view of philosophy, it is as if Wittgenstein just 'changed the aspect' and looked at the 'same thing' from a different perspective in which it is 'seen in a new way':

... not only can you give a new kind of description of it, but noticing the second figure is a new visual experience. (p. 199)

The *new experience of the same thing* indicates a *family resemblance* in the roles which philosophy plays in his two concepts; the early one denied philosophy as a metaphysics by means of a metaphysical method, the late one not only denied philosophy as a metaphysics but also the metaphysical method of denying metaphysics. Indeed, the 'change of aspects' does not necessarily imply any sort of subordination between the two experiences in the perception of the same thing, nor does it suggest that the very practice of 'changing of aspects' is to be a prescription for a proper examination of the issues under search; however, for Wittgenstein himself such a practice resulted in reconsidering his old view on language and elaborating a new one. What he did in both cases was philosophy, and indeed, on his view, the 'change of aspects' is a phenomenon that one notices only when she or he is doing philosophy. But, though it is the work of philosophy to discover the complex situation of the epistemological interactions between language and thought, ultimately it is to adhere to a good, *therapeutic* understanding about their possible uses. Generally, this is an understanding of how philosophy would prevent itself from dealing with language in the manner in which sciences do, i.e., epistemologically. In the broader context of my argument, it is precisely this understanding which is to compensate the scientific *insufficiency* for dealing with *problems of mediation* on the level of *expert culture*; it is this

understanding which is to be unproblematically exchanged through *everyday communication* to treat individuals' *naive beliefs* that practical problems can be solved metaphysically. For, a grasped 'aspect', as a thought expressed in language, conveys also the *possibility* for grasping the 'constant change of aspects' which, when altered, could be realized as a fallible use of language, if one does not realize that by its 'altering' she or he is just doing philosophy. By contrast, this fallibilism only disappears when language grasps the 'aspects' as a part of a certain 'use' in which the grasping of the 'constant change of aspects' is simply irrelevant. To repeat, in the former case the philosophizing is *metaphysical*, while in the latter *therapeutic*.

c) '*Learning*' and '*Teaching*'

In my argument, Wittgenstein's concept of *language games* has been promoted on the level of *culture* to respond to the *scientific insufficiency* for dealing with problems that can be represented as *problems of mediation*, as well as to individuals' *need* for adequate epistemological concepts for effective *metacognition*, i.e., for overcoming *such problems* on the level of *everyday communication*. So far, his late philosophy has been considered as addressing problems of mediation *exclusively* on the level of *culture* (which is generally true of all the philosophical concepts examined in this paper); now, I argue that in his specific concept of *teaching-learning practice* (which is based on his *notion of philosophy*) Wittgenstein *most directly* addresses the *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*. It could be noticed that the notion of *philosophy as a therapy* which is to treat the epistemological confusions through a *permanent utilization* of the 'awareness of the multiplicity of language uses' *resembles* very much the educational researchers' *prescription of metacognition*

which is to treat individuals' cognitive problems through a *permanent utilization* of individuals' 'awareness of how their intelligence works':

All this, however, can only appear in the right light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules. (italics added) (81)²⁶

For Wittgenstein, the 'greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning and thinking' does not take the form of a certain or indispensable *epistemological concept*, but rather, it takes the form of an *appropriate philosophical understanding of the use of language*. In this sense, its *acquisition* is to go through the *awareness* of one's predispositions to put a certain concept (of 'definite rules') of *knowledge acquisition* into a metaphysical form, and so to understand it as *the very concept* (of the very rules) of knowledge acquisition. At the same time, the genuine *application* of such an understanding in *dissolving* certain 'epistemological problems' turns out to be just an aspect of *solving* the practical problems, i.e., it is *neither an application* of a notion of the *correct use of language*, *nor* an 'operating a calculus according to definite rules'. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein affirms a qualitative interdependence between both *knowledge acquisition* and its *application*, respectively, the importance of an *effective* exchange of expertise between the levels of culture and everyday communication. But, if am not mistaken, his point is that the problem solvers are *not* to concentrate on the *ideal means* for dealing with the *problems* of 'knowledge acquisition and application', but rather *on solving* the practical problems to be solved. In my view, this means that the *very* overcoming of the *problems of mediation* is *not* to take place on the level of culture but *on the level of everyday communication*:

Correct prognoses will generally issue from the *judgments* of those with better knowledge of mankind.

Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through '*experience*'. - Can someone else be a man's teacher

²⁶ In the original passage only the words *means* and *understands* (in the second sentence) are italicized.

in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right *tip*. - This is what 'learning' and 'teaching' are like here. - *What one acquires is not a technique; one learns correct judgments*. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and *only experienced people can apply them right*. Unlike calculating-rules. (italics added) (p. 227)²⁷

Thus, for Wittgenstein, purposeful learning appears to be a process of knowledge acquisition, which *does not end* in grasping of an 'ideal system of knowledge' or an 'ideal way of learning'; for such things do not exist, but are *only* forms of possible contents. Rather, learning begins with *such* a 'good understanding' of *how* one deals with words, rules, meaning, thinking, and knowledge that undoes itself in the continuous learning from experience. In this sense, 'learning' cannot have a particular end but can only start. In the primordial learning phenomena, the *interpretations of aspects* in experience, one subjects one's own *knowledge acquisition* to the *mediation* of the interplay between language and thought and, *in lack* of a 'good understanding' of the possible outcomes of this interplay, one could grasp a *constant change of aspects* and so arrive at a 'correct epistemological concept' which as such is a condition for its future *fallible applications*. Indeed, a 'good knowledge' is a condition for a 'right application', but neither 'knowledge acquisition' nor 'knowledge application' operates according to 'calculating rules'. This is why 'knowledge acquisition' cannot rely exclusively on 'teaching', but is to be *mediated* 'by experience' which is *an immediate knowledge*, i.e., a knowledge which is *not present (or mediated) systematically*. For the late Wittgenstein, there are no 'ideal systems' of knowledge, nor are there 'ideal methods' of knowledge acquisition (learning) and application (e.g., teaching, or problem solving). There is only an interdependence between 'better knowledge' and 'right application' which is in no way epistemologically mediated, but is rather immediate. As such, this interdependence is to be 'mediated' *at most* by a mind's philosophical effort which is supplied with

²⁷ In the original passage only the words *experience* (in the fourth sentence) and *tip* (in the seventh sentence) are italicized.

a *good philosophical understanding of the use of language*, and which somehow paradoxically, while mediating, undoes the mediation itself:

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (109)

In summary, I accepted that the late Wittgenstein *explained* what can be called the 'only undissolved problem of philosophy', *the possibility of a method of the correct use of language*, in terms of the concept of *language games*, and that then he *applied* this concept in *dissolving* this problem. In the *explanation* of the concept of language games, he specified the 'correctness' of language uses in terms of their particular contexts, and *regarded* the confusions in them as stemming from the linguistic transfer of epistemological aspects from one language use to another, i.e., as stemming from the attempts for grasping and making use of the 'constant change of aspects' in the interpretation of the 'same thing'. As a matter of *application* of his concept, he elaborated a *non-explicit* notion of *philosophy as a therapy* according to which philosophy is to treat the metaphysical residues of any particular language use. In a subsequent *application* of the notion of philosophy to *teaching-learning practice*, Wittgenstein supports the interdependence between the 'good knowledge' and its 'right application', but suggests that they are more properly mediated by experience than by systematic methods.

In light of the concept of *language games*, the *problems of mediation* do not turn out to be 'real problems'; they come into being only when one makes a reference to the level of *expert culture*, while failing to undo it as a *metaphysical philosophizing*. In this sense, the *very overcoming* of the *problems of mediation* is to take place on the level of *everyday communication*, and is to come through a *therapeutic undoing* of the *expertise* in the mere solving of the *concrete problems* ("...*speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life." (24)). Because the *problems of mediation* are *not* certain, or 'special problems', they cannot be overcome by mediation of a 'specialized', or 'expert' treatment which

has clearly determinate dimensions on the *different stages* of the *exchange of expertise*, but only by mediation of the *non-expert competence* of philosophy. In light of Wittgenstein's view, this means that the 'mediating function' of philosophy can be only *conditionally* systematized in the form of an *explanation* and *prescription* of an *epistemological concept* to be *acquired* and *applied*, and that this concept can *at most* take the form of what can be called a 'good philosophical understanding of the use of language' which in his own words is a "*greater clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking*" (italics added) (81). By contrast, if the *mediating function* of philosophy were systematized even to some degree *unconditionally*,²⁸ it would have taken the form of a 'correct explanation', 'correct prescription', 'correct acquisition', and 'correct application' of a *concept of the only strictly correct method of the use of language*. But, had philosophy had such a method, it would have qualified as a 'specialized field' which has its own, certain, or 'special' portion in the 'compartmentalization of modernity'²⁹ (the expert culture or everyday communication), and would have thus contributed to the creating rather than to the overcoming of the *problems of*

²⁸ Even if an *unconditional systematization* were such to some degree only, it still would have remained an *absolutely unconditional one* since we cannot determine its 'degree' in order to make use of it. For, in this context, 'degree' stands for *nothing*; it is *only* a form of a possible content. And, though one may object that in an ordinary use of language its sense is perfectly possible, he or she will have troubles in justifying that 'philosophizing' is such an ordinary use of language.

²⁹ The *compartmentalization of modernity* must be distinguished from its *institutional departmentalization*: the former is an abstract term which relates to a theoretical argumentation on the level of *culture*, while the latter has concrete dimensions which relate to a practical realization on *everyday communication*. In this sense, R. Rorty's leaving of the department of philosophy has been a *practical realization of a theoretical argumentation*, while his still being known as a 'philosopher' only indicates that, unlike the other fields, the *institutional departmentalization* of philosophy neither projects, nor ensures its *specialized compartmentalization*. Rather, the relation of philosophy to these two forms of *modernity* only shows how *unestablished* its role in the *exchange of expertise* is; and yet, the former relates it to the level of *everyday communication*, while the latter – to the level of *culture*.

Thus, the fact that some 'qualified' philosophers teach in other than 'departments of philosophy' only proves the *cross-cultural role* of the field known as 'philosophy' and indicates for the persistence of *problems of mediation* as well as for the *insufficiency* of the *specialized expertise* to deal with them. As already pointed out, these problems are *not* 'real problems' and do not require a 'specialized' approach for their 'solutions'. They just disappear in light of a 'good philosophical understanding' of the medium of the *exchange of expertise*. It is precisely this 'understanding' which is the form of philosophy that the expert fields and everyday communication practices have a need of; and it is precisely the *non-expert field* of philosophy which has the *competence* (not the 'expertise') to provide them with such an understanding.

mediation. Instead, in light of Wittgenstein's late concept, the problems of mediation can be *explained* only as 'still undissolved epistemological problems', while the *mediating function* of philosophy is to be *applied* to the phenomena of philosophizing in such a self-reflective way that undoes its metaphysical aspects in the particular language uses and transforms it into a successful *therapy*.

Searle's Concept of Speech Acts

In relation to Wittgenstein's later view, John Searle's concept of *speech acts* can be considered a specification of a *particular language use* in terms of the necessary and sufficient conditions for its performance. In this case, it is entirely conditional to talk about dissolving of certain philosophical problems since the 'last one', the conceptualization of the 'correct use of language', can be considered already dissolved. But, because Wittgenstein, so to speak, 'distributed' the notion of *correctness* in the multiplicity of everyday language uses, Searle found it necessary to *investigate* how *any concrete language use* becomes sufficient, or correct by itself. To follow the *common terminology* of my argument, now I accept that Searle first *explains* the *concept of speech acts* as a concept of cognition and that then he *applies* this concept in setting down the *semantical rules* which constitute a *particular type of language use*, the *speech act of promising*. Here, the *concept of speech act* can be considered an *epistemological one* since the terms of its explanation are in essence formal conditions of any act of linguistic communication, while *setting down the semantical rules* for the use of a *particular speech act* can be regarded as a *dissolving* of the conditional philosophical problem 'What is a speech act?' since they basically constitute its conceptualization in *non-philosophical* terms.

In his *explanation* of the concept of speech acts, Searle attempts to "provide a basis for definition" of the "basic unit of linguistic communication"

which he refers to as what “in a typical speech situation involving a speaker, a hearer, and an utterance”, J.L. Austin calls an *illocutionary act*:

It is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol or word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol or word or sentence, which is the unit of linguistic communication, but rather it is the *production* of the token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication... more precisely, the production of the sentence token under certain conditions is the illocutionary act, and the illocutionary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication. (p. 60)

Thus, for Searle, not only the explication of the notion of an ‘illocutionary act’ is *essential* for the explanation of his philosophical concept of *speech acts*, but it becomes *possible* by “stating of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions” for its performance. These conditions are conceived of as a basis for extracting “a set of semantical rules” for its use which in turn will “mark the utterance as an illocutionary act of that kind” (p. 61). Searle identifies the semantical features of an illocutionary act in terms of its *rules, propositions, and meaning* (pp. 60-1) which are usually attributable to the language uses.

He conceives of the *rules* as principles of explication and emphasizes as important the distinction between two types: the *regulative ones* which regulate forms of behavior existing independently from these rules themselves, and *constitutive ones* which not only “regulate but also create or define new forms of behavior”(p. 61). In his view, a failure to understand this difference may lead philosophers to ask questions like: “How can a promise create obligation?” and “How can a touchdown create six points?” which arise when one’s understanding of the rules is limited to their being regulative ones only. Searle argues that although constitutive rules “are almost tautological in character” (because they sometimes appear as ‘rules’ and sometimes as ‘analytical truths’ which stem from the very fact of “their being constitutive rules”), rather they are those which underlie the “speech acts” (p. 62) given that “to perform illocutionary act is to engage in a rule-governed form of behavior” (p. 61). In this sense, he believes that

a possible formulating of "a set of constitutive rules for a certain kind of speech act" can be considered a "test" of this "hypothesis" (p. 62).

On the other hand, what Searle calls a *proposition* is the common content which a few different illocutionary acts marked by different sentences have while referring to the same subject and predicating the same act of this subject (pp. 62-3). On this point, he appears to make the distinction between a "sentence" and a "proposition" which is that "in the utterance of the sentences the speaker expresses a proposition" which is thus different from its "assertion or statement" (p. 63). This is a distinction between an "illocutionary act" and its "propositional content" which, in semantical terms, becomes a distinction between what Searle calls a "function-indicating device" (showing "how a proposition is to be taken, or what an illocutionary force the utterance is to have") and a "proposition-indicating element" (p. 63). Thus, an illocutionary act is determined, generally, through the way in which a certain proposition is exercised, and more specifically, (i.e., in terms of semantics) through the specific 'illocutionary force' that a certain 'propositional indicator' gains in such an exercise. In addition, Searle (perhaps altering a notion of the interdependence between semantics and syntax) notes that "recent developments in transformational grammar" support similar distinctions in terms of syntax, too (p. 63).

In much the same way, in terms of characteristic distinctions, Searle approaches the question of *meaning*: there is an important difference between just uttering sounds or making marks and performing a speech act. On the one hand, "the sounds or marks one makes in the performance of the speech act are characteristically said to *have meaning*", and on other hand, "one is characteristically said to *mean something* by those sounds or marks" (p. 64). Thus, in his concept of speech acts Searle adopts the notion of *meaning* as characteristically having a twofold sense. In clarifying this sense, he points out counter-examples to the view that relates the notion of *meaning* exclusively to a

“speaker’s intention” which is to be recognized by the hearer and argues that there are some limits in what one can mean by certain words because,
... what we can mean is a function of what we are saying. Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also a matter of convention (pp. 64-5).

He concludes accordingly that a possible analysis of an illocutionary act would have to take into consideration the combination of these two components of meaning (p. 65).

Given this understanding of the constitutive rules, proposition, and meaning in the formation of a general concept of language, Searle undertakes its *application* in stating the necessary and sufficient conditions of the *speech act of promising*. In his view, the ‘answer’ of the question *How to promise* must take the form of a “set of propositions such that the conjunction of the members of the set entails the proposition that a speaker made a promise, and the proposition that the speaker made a promise entails this conjunction” (p. 65). However, he stipulates that it is not possible to exhaust such a set of conditions “that will exactly mirror the ordinary use of the word ‘promise’” and that a good end will be a grasping of “the center of the concept and ignoring the fringe, borderline and partially defective cases” (p. 66).

As stated in terms of propositions, the set of conditions which ‘entails’ the ‘conjunction’ of ‘promising’ became a basis for extracting its respective set of *constitutive rules* which Searle subsequently determines as *propositional-content rule, preparatory rules, sincerity rule, and essential rule* (p. 69). A similar extract avoids the verification principle because the set of propositions, in which the conditions of the speech act are stated, is not necessarily connected with a certain illocutionary act (p. 66), and thus is not to be supported by any concrete examples (though it possibly entails some illocutionary acts). For, in his view, a proposition alone is not a concrete content (though it may have such), but an *exercised-in-illocutionary-act* content. To put it in terms of truth, a proposition is assumed not as something that expresses a concrete truth, but rather as something that

expresses an exercised or exercisable truth. In this way, in his understanding and use of the term 'proposition', Searle combines elements of Wittgenstein's two concepts: on the one hand, the verifiability of the propositions which are conceived of as constitutive rules of a certain speech act cannot be anticipated because the question of their truthfulness cannot be raised out of their use; and on the other, the sense of a proposition, as related to sentence, comes essentially from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*:

3.318 Like Frege and Russell I construe a proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it.

Eventually, the 'assertion' of a proposition in a sentence as participating in an illocutionary act could be in some way verified since in this way the proposition appears to be involved in a certain use which takes the form of a certain spoken or written sentence.

Thus, Searle's notion of speech acts becomes an example of a *supplementary* employment of both Wittgenstein's early and late concept of language. However, by figuring out the constitutive rules of a particular speech act as a way of explanation of that speech act, despite all the stipulations in advance, Searle goes beyond the frames of Wittgenstein's two concepts. The specific understanding of the rules as being *constitutive* ones still conveys the metaphysical sense of a notion of the 'correct use of language'. For, despite the conditionality of their propositional statement, these rules may be interpreted as a directing, or guiding formalism to the ordinary language which, after all, is very much independent. Indeed, Searle qualifies them as "semantical rules for the use of any function-indicating device" for a certain "speech act" (p. 69), and in this way, he ascribes them to the *non-philosophical field* of linguistics. But, similar rules are supposed to form explicitly and exclusively such a *background* for constitution of meaning that is most likely tangible (to the degree that is possible) in a concrete illocutionary situation but that is hardly reflexively extractable without fallacy out of such a situation. This is the background of hidden

interactions between language and thought which may result in the expression of a thought in terms of language, and which Searle specified in terms of semantics and grammar (syntax).

In summary, Searle regards his concept of the so-called 'speech acts' as an attempt to provide a basis for definition of the basic unit of linguistic communication. In my argument, I accepted that first he *explained* this concept in terms of the preliminary notions of *rules*, *proposition*, and *meaning*, and that then he *applied* it in setting down what he calls *the necessary and sufficient conditions* of the speech act of promising. On the basis of those conditions, he extracted the *rules* which he conceives of as being *constitutive* for the performance of that speech act.

In my argument, I regard the *explication* of a *particular speech act* in terms of the *specialized field* of linguistics (semantics and grammar) as a 'conditional dissolving' of the *conditional* philosophical problem *What is a speech act?*. In this sense, insofar as Searle *explains* and *applies* a certain organized concept of knowledge to a certain problem, setting down the 'constitutive rules' of the 'speech act of promising', he may be considered as attempting to solve some *problems of mediation* on the level of *expert culture*. However, as he confesses, this set of rules for the use of a particular speech act cannot exhaust the variety of its ordinary uses, and so it *cannot be immediately* 'prescribed' for *acquisition* and *application* on the level of *everyday communication*. Rather, Searle's view can be properly understood as indicating the persistence of some *problems of mediation* between these two levels, and so its permanent utilization is to be *mediated* by a 'good' philosophical understanding of its being only a *conditional* set of constitutive rules.

Rorty's Political Answer to the Traditional Philosophical Questions

In relation to the late Wittgenstein, who dissolved the last philosophical illusions for an ahistorical concept of language and promoted a notion of *philosophy as therapy* with practically no epistemological functions, Rorty can be regarded as attempting to alternatively conceptualize the therapeutic role of philosophy in historical terms. In his view, if all the philosophical problems have been dissolved, the question that gains significance is “how we should conceive of our relation to Western philosophical tradition” (p. 9). Consequently, he elaborates the concept of the so-called *political answer* whose main point is that philosophers need to redirect their efforts toward the realization of values which are historically proven and which as such are opposed to those that are ahistorically proven.

For the purpose of this paper, I will accept that Rorty's concept of the 'political answer' consists of both an *explanation* of what has still remained to be the concern of the philosophical tradition—the “availability of an adequate language”, i.e., a concept of language, and an *application* of this concept in elaborating a particular notion of the *role of philosophy* in the modern world. But since the common terminology of my argument, because of its ahistorical character, could only very conditionally convey the historical sense of this philosophical notion, prior to the examination of Rorty's concept of language, I will try to set up the metaphilosophical perspective of what can be called the 'historical background' against which his view would have been properly understood in its entirety. And, since he himself finds it necessary to introduce such a perspective, now I will briefly consider it in his own terms.

Thus, Rorty argues that the philosophical tradition itself has by now given “three answers” to the above pointed question: *scientific* (Husserlian), *poetic* (Heideggerian), and *political* (pragmatist). According to him, the so-called *scientific answer* shares “the traditional Platonic hope to ascend to a point of view

from which the interconnections between everything can be seen" clearly, and proclaims that "the aim of philosophy is to develop a formal scheme within which every area of culture can be placed" (p. 11). On the other hand, the so-called *poetic answer* results from the Heideggerian criticism of this type of philosophical foundationalism (i.e., the scientific answer), and contends that not only the "roots of the crisis" are "in a misguided rationalism" (as it is in the Husserlian notion), but also that the very "demand for foundations" appears to be a "symptom" of this "misguided rationalism" itself (p. 11). Finally, according to the *political answer* which Rorty himself supports, "the task of philosophy is to break the crust of convention" in a way that can "help achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number by facilitating the *replacement of language, customs, and institutions* which impede that happiness" (italics added) (p. 11; p. 20). In my view, the political answer concept can be interpreted as pleading, in a narrowly intellectual sense, for an understanding of the *flexible use* of language and, in a broadly social sense, for the realization of certain humanistic ideals.³⁰ Respectively, those are the two aspects which I will consider under the conditional terms *explanation* and *application* of a concept of language.

Like Wittgenstein and Searle, Rorty bases his philosophical views on a *concept of language* (which appears to be very basic for contemporary philosophy). He *explains* language as "our way of dividing up the realm of possibility" which is, in this sense, an epistemological phenomenon that has the potential to "reweave the fabric of our beliefs and desires" (p. 12). For him, this "reweaving" appears to be the most important function of language and he argues that "there are three ways in which a new belief can be added to our previous beliefs -- perception, inference and metaphor" (p. 12). *Perception and inference* can only "alter the truth-values of sentences, but not the repertoire of sentences" and thus cannot change the language, but can only "map out all possible logical

³⁰ One may notice that this analytic distinction in Rorty's view represents very well the goals of what Habermas differentiates as the levels of, respectively, *expert culture* and *everyday communication*.

space” and linguistically register the possibilities contained in it (p. 12). Regarding this point, Rorty’s concern is that an unchanged and unreplaced language may enhance the fallible belief of its own ‘adequacy’ which would make its use depend upon its ‘correct’ exercise and thus limit the reweaving function of language. In his view, the ‘scientific answer’ (Husserlian phenomenology and analytic philosophy) dwells within the limits set up by such a concept of language, and thus cannot go beyond the early Wittgenstein’s notion that “philosophizing consists in clarification of thoughts” (p. 12).

To go beyond early Wittgenstein’s point that ‘the limits of the language are the limits of the world’, Rorty introduces in his concept of language some of the points of the so-called ‘poetic answer’. Specifically, he elaborates a notion of the role of *metaphor* in language which can be in no way compensated by perception and inference:

... to think of metaphor as a third source of beliefs, and thus a third motive for reweaving our networks of beliefs and desires, is to think of language, logical space, and the realm of possibility, as open-ended. It is to abandon the idea that the aim of thought is the attainment of a God’s eye view. (p. 12)

Indeed, early Wittgenstein also denied such an aim of the use of language by way of repudiating as ‘nonsensical’ the propositions of the metaphysical philosophy, but Rorty’s concern here is that the very method of this denying presupposes a ‘God’s eye standpoint’ and that this denying itself still has been exercised in terms of that ‘logical space’ of that language which in this sense has remained unchanged. In his view, this is the metaphor that could ensure the necessary ‘change’ and ‘open-endedness’ because it would undermine the dependence of language use upon the logic of language:

A metaphor is, so to speak, a voice outside of logical space, rather than an empirical filling-up of a portion of that space, or a logico-philosophical clarification of the structure of that space. It is a call to change one’s language and one’s life, rather than a proposal about how to systematize either. (p. 13)

For Rorty, the metaphor becomes a “growing point of language” (p. 12) which as such should find its place in the linguistic practices, along with perception and inference. Its function in language is in no way privileged, nor is it merely “heuristic” or “ornamental.” Rather, metaphors are “forerunners of new uses of language, which may eclipse and erase old uses” (p. 14), and which thus not only ensure a self-generating and self-replacing capacity of language from inside, but also undermine the notion of language as ‘the limits of my world’ which he conceives of as ‘scientific’. In his view, if language sustained its metaphorical uses, it could eventually regain its historical dimension which, according to the ‘poetic answer’, already has been lost.

For Rorty, the promotion of metaphors as “growing points of language” to an equal linguistic exchange along with perception and inference, which are ‘ahistorical points’ in language, also means a promotion of the ‘historical aspect’ of language on a par with its ‘ahistorical aspect’. Thus, by undermining any relationship of priority between the *ahistorical uses of perceptions and inferences* and the *historical exchange of metaphors* in language, his concept unproblematically adopts the early Heideggerian aim in philosophy which is “to remind us” that *any* philosophy is to take into account its *historical contingency* (p. 16). But, while Heidegger thinks that philosophers should remind us of the “historical contingency” by recovering the lost force of the metaphors which “had been leveled down into literal truths”, and in this sense, by neglecting the new metaphors, Rorty assigns a different task to the philosophers aware of the “historical contingency”:

... whereas Heidegger thinks that the task of exploring these newly suggested paths of thought is banalistic, something which can be left to hacks, the pragmatist thinks that such exploration is the pay-off from the philosopher’s work. He thinks of the thinker as serving the community, and of his thinking as futile unless it is followed up by a reweaving of the community’s web of beliefs. That reweaving will assimilate, by gradually literalizing, the new metaphors which the thinker has provided. The proper honor to pay to new, vibrantly alive metaphors, is to help them become dead metaphors as quickly as possible, to rapidly reduce them to the status of tools of social progress. The glory of philosopher’s thought is not that it initially makes everything more difficult (though that is, of course, true), but that in the end it makes things easier for everybody. (p. 17)

Thus, Rorty's concept of language, as it can be seen through the role which Rorty assigns to the philosophers, involves a redistribution of "truth-values among familiar sentences", invention of "further unfamiliar sentences" (p. 14), and a specific "helping" of every "challenging metaphor" to become gradually a "dead metaphor" (p. 18). This last feature characterizes its historical dimension and makes it go beyond its being merely an ahistorical concept; so to speak, it leaves 'logical space' and enters 'social space' where it needs some sort of *historical* rather than logical or ahistorical justification. In this sense, his 'hope' for 'literalizing' 'every new metaphor' in language ultimately becomes a 'social hope' whose sense Rorty adopts from the philosophy of the classic pragmatist John Dewey (p. 18).

In my argument, I accept that Rorty *applies* his concept of language in elaborating a specific notion of the *role of philosophy* in modernity. This notion has been already suggested by the role of philosopher in the historical exchange of metaphors in language but is to be shaped finally by his specific understanding of the term *political*. The sense in which Rorty uses the term 'political' is based on the way he views Western democratic societies. On one hand, he regards them as "already organized around the need" of a permanent criticism and thus as not needing a "radical criticism" (p. 25), and on other hand, he argues that

a democratic society can get along without the sort of reassurance provided by the thought that it has "adequate philosophical foundations" or that it is "grounded" in "human reason." (pp. 18-19).

In this way, though Western political systems are somehow and to some degree (eventually 'historically') justified, they still should not be conceived of as being already *rationaly justified*; for then, this would have been an ahistorical justification which would be, so to speak, 'historically fallible'. Perhaps for this reason, when explaining his 'political answer', Rorty uses negative rather than ahistorical terms: it is not justified through its eventual "penetrating to" and testing by a socially available "reality behind contemporary appearances", nor does its meaning come from the sense of *socially justified political practice*. His

“conception of language and inquiry” excludes the possibility that “someday we shall penetrate to the true, natural, ahistorical matrix of all possible language and knowledge” (p. 25). Indeed, he conceives of language as having the potential to “reweave the community’s fabric of beliefs”, but, according to him, this reweaving cannot “be done systematically”, nor can it come as a matter of a “research program” (p. 18). Rather, the overcoming of the fallibilism of any ahistorical justification is to come as some sort of ‘historical justification’ which is based on ‘historical’ rather than on ‘logical clarification’. In this sense, the term ‘political’ is intended, on one hand, to limit the radicalism of a ‘logically justified’ critical attitude toward a society that is to some degree adequately organized, and on the other, to protect an alternative, ‘historical’ criticism which would help accomplish what still needs to be done. To summarize this point, the *political* role of the philosopher in this *historical justification* becomes to uncover those *historical arguments* and values which are *historically necessary* in the *historical solving* of the *historical problems*. Yet, this statement, even though it mentions ‘historical’ six times, is itself an ahistorical one and somehow misrepresents Rorty’s view. For, he argues that the philosopher, while ‘reweaving community’s fabric of beliefs’, should deny any point which centers on language uses in an ahistorical fashion. Instead, the philosopher should rehear language’s ‘growing points’ as a matter of their ‘historical contingency’ in order to *politically* actualize their ‘historical greatness’ and thus help or enable their *historical self-sacrifice*.

Very much as for Heidegger, for Rorty such a ‘rehearing’ appeals for an actualizing of the “ideals of the French Revolution” whose “historical voice”, he contends, already has become “clearly visible in the course of the last two centuries’ attempt to realize” them (p. 25):

For Dewey as for Hegel, the point of individual human greatness is its contribution to social freedom, where this is conceived of in the terms we inherit from the French Revolution. (p. 18)

For Rorty, the ‘historical voice’ of the ideas of the French Revolution reveals another “relevant ‘reality’—human suffering and oppression” which, in

turn, sets forward another task for the philosopher, namely, to *expose* them (p. 25). Thus, Rorty argues that only some of the metaphors which Heidegger pronounced 'dead' are really *historically dead* in language, while others still need to die:

... "progress, the happiness of the greatest number, culture, civilization" do not belong to the same list as "the suprasensory world, the Ideas, God, the moral law, the authority of reason." The latter are dead metaphors which pragmatists can no longer find uses for. The former still have a point. (p. 20)

As already pointed out, in order to die, to be replaced in language, the former metaphors need to be *politically* actualized as a matter of their 'historical contingency' so that they reveal their 'historical greatness' and find their 'historical death' in language. The task of the philosopher to 'expose' them aims *only* at a 'reweaving of the community's web of beliefs' which would *thus* help literalize them in language. Rorty conceives of this "literalizing" as a "gradual", "historical" process which practically comes after solutions have been made with the help of "the poets and the engineers, the people who produce startling *new* projects for achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (p. 26). This is the way in which philosophers help the solutions of the problems of the new 'relevant reality', and this is the sense in which those metaphors' deaths are to be 'historical', and not 'scientific' or 'logical'.

Thus, with respect to the philosophical question of language, Rorty's concept of the *political answer* pleads for 'literalizing' the meanings of the newly born metaphors against the priority of ahistorical language uses, while with respect to the role of philosophy in modernity, it stands behind Dewey's 'social hope' for *exposing* and *vindicating* 'human suffering and oppression'. So interpreted, his view 'fits' the role which Habermas envisions for philosophy on the two levels of *expert culture* and *everyday communication*. And yet as for Habermas, so for Rorty, philosophy is *not* one of the expert cultures, nor does it exchange any expert authority in the problem solving practices of everyday communication. Rather, while being neither an 'expert field', nor a 'specialized

practice', its role is only to *condition* (by 'mediating' or 'exposing') the *exchange of expertise* between the assumed two levels of modernity.

In summary, in what can be called the conditional *explanation* of the concept of the 'political answer', Rorty synthesizes what he calls 'scientific' and 'poetic' answers to the question of our relation to Western philosophical tradition and elaborates a concept of language in historical terms as opposed to ahistorical ones. By introducing the 'poetic' notion of 'metaphor' into the 'scientific' notion of language he actualizes language's 'historical' dimension which is conceived of as preventing the flexibility of language from the logic of language. In this way, Rorty demeans ahistorical uses of language on behalf of its historical exchange of metaphors. Consequently, his historical point uncovers the historical significance of certain humanistic ideals which clearly have become articulate in the 'voice of history' and which he 'rehears' as the 'ideas of the French Revolution'.

Rorty *applies* his concept of language in elaborating a specific notion of the role of philosophy in the modern world which he sees in *exposing* the different forms of 'human suffering and oppression' and thus in helping achieve their 'historical' rather than 'logical' death. For him, this 'exposing' is the *very way* in which philosophers help 'literalize the new metaphors' in language and thus realize the 'historical ideals' of the French Revolution.

In Rorty's concept, the involvement of the historical dimension of language in conceptualization of the problems, role, and purpose of philosophy is not intended to produce just another conceptualization, but to actualize them on a theoretical level in a way that would produce an effective utilization on a social level. In this way, it comes to an agreement with Habermas' concept in which philosophy is also seen to 'mediate' the culture's "rarefied, esoteric forms" so that they "stay in touch with everyday communication" (1990, pp. 17-8). In both cases, the philosopher, as 'exposer' or 'mediating interpreter', is to help 'vindicate' the different forms of 'human suffering and oppression' which come into being in the 'social space', and which also qualify as different 'problems of mediation' on

the different levels of exchange of expertise. Indeed, on Habermas' view, philosophy is to find its place in the 'compartmentalization' of human reason along with the different ahistorical forms of expertise, while in Rorty's version, philosophy cannot have such a place in this 'compartmentalization'³¹ but is to focus on any historically significant trend which has become 'clearly visible' in the 'historical exchange of metaphors' in language. However, Habermas also rejects the scientific variant of philosophy and contends that philosophy is to specialize somehow paradoxically in a 'non-special' field where it is an 'expertise' rather in the conditional sense of 'competence'. Likewise, the two notions are consistent and supplementary in supporting a utilized form of philosophy which would reconcile expert theory and social practice in such a way that through overcoming the various problems of mediation it can help achieving 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'.

A General Discussion of Philosophical Concepts

These philosophical notions are conceived of as dissolving the traditional problems of philosophy, and thus as solving some authentic, purely epistemological variants of the so-called 'problems of mediation' on a level of culture. In their examination, I accepted that philosophers first *explain* certain concepts which concern the epistemological aspects of the relationship between language and

³¹ That philosophy cannot have a *certain* place in the compartmentalization of human reason somehow coheres with the view that it cannot have such a place in an institutional departmentalization, either. In this sense, Rorty's view adequately reflects his decision to leave the department of philosophy and to enter the department of humanities. For, as a matter of *institutional departmentalization*, the sense of 'humanity' is 'less specialized' than the one of 'philosophy' insofar as the latter is a subdivision of the former; while, as a matter of a *specialized compartmentalization*, the sense of 'humanity' is somehow 'more specialized' than the one of 'philosophy' insofar as the latter has not always been restricted within the former only. For example, while 'humanities' are typically distinguished from 'sciences', philosophy has emerged and developed as a field in relation to the *possibility* of its being a 'science'. Besides, though the majority of philosophers nowadays agree that philosophy is *not* one of the 'sciences', there are still some, as Rorty's metaphilosophical account suggests, who reluctantly concede this view.

thought, and that they *apply* those concepts in order to show how the philosophical problems are to be overcome. Early Wittgenstein *explained* the epistemological interactions between language and thinking in terms of the concept of the *correct use of language*, and then he *applied* that concept to *dissolve* the 'traditional philosophical problems' as pseudo-problems which stem from a misunderstanding of the 'logic of language'. Late Wittgenstein *explained* the epistemological aspects of language in terms of the concept of *language games*, and then he *applied* that concept to *dissolve* the concept of the 'correct use of language' which seemingly became the only undissolved problem of philosophy. Searle *explained* the particular language uses in terms of his concept of *speech acts*, and then he *applied* this concept in *defining* the *speech act* of promising in non-philosophical terms (which is basically a *dissolving* of the conditional epistemological problem *What is a speech act?*). Rorty *explained* his concept of language in terms of an understanding of the 'historical exchange of metaphors', and then he *applied* this concept in developing a historical notion of the role of philosophy in the form of a specific *political answer* to the philosophical questions (which is basically a *dissolving* the ahistorical notions of philosophy).³² While the

³² Here is the place to explain, to the degree it is possible, why my argument, as being exercised in ahistorical terms, somehow misrepresents Rorty's view. One may note that, the term of its conditional title 'political answer' becomes clear after (and is in fact a title of the conceptual outcomes of) the *application* of his concept of language, while the conditional titles of the preceding three concepts become clear after (and are in fact titles of the conceptual outcomes of) the *explanations* of their concepts of language. To fit the pattern of the three preceding concepts, I could have examined Rorty's view under the title "Rorty's concept of the historical exchange of metaphors in language". However, I would have thus inappropriately put the stress in his view on the concept of language rather than on his notion of philosophy, and so, I would have given a better example of how an ahistorical representation misrepresents the historical tendency (which Rorty is trying to draw attention to) of denying philosophy any ahistorical means and ends. Yet, my ahistorical representation of this concept can be partly compensated for by emphasizing (as he does) the outcomes of the 'application' (the role of philosophy) rather than of the 'explanation' (his mere concept of language) which is precisely why my ahistorical representation is more properly given its present title.

On the other hand, if I examined Wittgenstein's views under the titles, respectively, "Wittgenstein's concept of the philosophy as a clarifying activity" and "Wittgenstein's concept of the philosophy as a therapy", then Searle's view would not be fitting the new pattern since it does not offer an explicit notion of philosophy, but emphasizes the concept of language. However, in this second pattern, I would have missed the emphasis on the *very (epistemological) relationship* (which is after all substantial for my argument) between the two types of problems as well as between the procedures for their overcoming since I would have thus taken a *metaphilosophical point* of view from which the detailed explication of this

two conceptual frameworks offered by Wittgenstein can be considered as dissolving all the problems of philosophy, Searle and Rorty can be considered as offering two alternative approaches to the work that eventually remains for philosophers to do. Thus, Searle developed an ahistorical conceptualization of language in which he used the terms of the non-philosophical fields of semantics and grammar, and thus he actually left the traditional field of philosophy and entered science; while, Rorty developed a historical concept in which he used the non-scientific terms of the metaphors and thus remained in philosophy but pleads for an end to philosophizing from ahistorical points of view.³³ These four philosophical notions are consistent in that they deny the existence of any concrete philosophical problems, as well as the *possibility* of philosophy as an 'expertise' to epistemologically attribute 'correctness' from one language use to another. They seem to *dissolve* any possible philosophical problems in terms of certain concepts of the relationship between language and thinking, and they also can be interpreted as forming a *compositional philosophical concept* which represents a synthesized variant of the *philosophical methodology of dissolution*, and which poses two alternative developments of the role of philosophy—scientific and non-scientific. Here, the terms 'scientific' and 'non-scientific' should be understood as such only conditionally, for, like the early Wittgenstein, the two 'alternatives' reject the scientific model of *philosophy as a metaphysics*; while, like the late Wittgenstein,

relationship would have been disregarded as unimportant. By contrast, the scientific concepts take a *metaphysical point* from which they do not go on explicating the details of the relation of the cognitive problems to a more sophisticated philosophical understanding of cognition since, in a scientific framework, an *explanation* by means of *philosophical justifications* and a *prescription* of *epistemological concepts* seem to be self-sufficient, though it only conveys the illusion that the *problems of mediation* on the level of *culture* as if have been solved. This is why I take an *interdisciplinary point* which is no way privileged one but at least has the advantage to give a detailed account of the relationship under investigation, while denying any notion of self-sufficiency. In this sense, the change of emphasis from the concept of language to the notion of philosophy not only mirrors the inadequate representing a historical tendency in an ahistorical form but also makes my ahistorical argument somehow less self-sufficient.

³³ In my argument, Rorty's 'qualification' as philosopher is as a matter of a specialized compartmentalization rather than as a matter of an institutional departmentalization, while, Searle's is as a matter of an institutional departmentalization rather than as a matter of a specialized compartmentalization.

they still leave some 'work' for philosophy to do: in Searle's model, this is a 'conditional' way of explanation, in Rorty's, this is a 'political' way of utilization of similar 'explanations'. It is precisely the awareness of this conditionality on which I ground the generalization that the role which these notions assign to philosophy is a *therapeutic one* which is to be distinguished from a *metaphysical one*.³⁴

The *general conclusion* that I draw from the examination of these philosophical notions is that philosophical problems can be *explained* as coming into being as a result of inappropriate epistemological attributions of 'correctness' from one language use to another, and that a 'good understanding' of how the mind produces 'beliefs' by coordinating language and thought can be *applied* in helping the mind overcome these problems. In this way, the *compositional philosophical concept* is shown to project the main points of the *compositional scientific concept*: an 'epistemological concept' and a 'permanent utilization' of that concept. Eventually, such a philosophical concept could be *acquired* and *applied* by the problem solvers in overcoming their cognitive problems on the level of *everyday communication* since it is basically a philosophically more sophisticated variant of the *epistemological concepts* which educational scientists *explain* and *prescribe* as metacognition on the level of *culture*.

It may be worthwhile to note that all philosophers discussed (though Searle less directly) find it necessary, as a part of the application of their concepts of language, to address a *notion of the specific role of philosophy* – 'mediating', 'clarifying', 'therapeutic', 'conditionally explaining', 'politically exposing'. Reciprocally, all scientists discussed (though Lipman more directly) find it necessary, as a part of their prescriptions, to address a utilized role of philosophy

³⁴ One may object that this generalization applies with a different degree of validity to the four different philosophical concepts. Indeed, early Wittgenstein's and Searle's concepts, though they reject metaphysical content of philosophy, still share its metaphysical form. Yet, I will not go on a further discussion of the differentiation between form and content in philosophy, for what I draw attention in my argument to is rather the *tendency* of rejecting any metaphysical entities in philosophy which (tendency) is reflected differently in the different concepts in which it is actualized.

in the form of *metacognition*. One could easily imagine all terms which signify philosophers' views of the role of philosophy, which essentially represent the *philosophical methodology of dissolution*, as signifying the scientific prescription of *metacognition* which essentially represents scientists' view of the role of philosophy, too.

CHAPTER THREE
METACOGNITION IN TERMS OF A PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF
COGNITION

What is your aim in philosophy? -
To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.

Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*

Overview

My goal is to show that individuals' *cognitive problems* are based on philosophically unjustified beliefs about the work of intelligence and that they can be adequately treated as *philosophical problems* with the help of a *philosophical concept of cognition*. In the framework of my argument this means to show that scientific *prescription* of metacognition, as it consists of an *explanation* and *application* of an *epistemological concept*, can be substituted or supplied with the philosophical *methodology of dissolution* as applied to the traditional philosophical problems. In the *Introduction*, I *conceptualized* the cognitive and traditional philosophical problems both as being *epistemological* in character insofar as they result from the transfer of knowledge by mediation of concepts and as being treated by mediation of procedures which are *essentially the same* insofar as the philosophical *methodology of dissolution* could be convincingly represented in terms of an *explanation* and *application* of a *concept of cognition* or *epistemological concept*, too. At the same time, I justified the specific *methodology of transfer* of a 'philosophical prescription' for treating of problems which come up in the scope of science by means of an interpretation of Habermas' notion of philosophy in terms of which the cognitive problems were qualified as

problems of mediation that remain out of the scope of the specialized fields, but in the one of 'philosophy in the role of a mediating interpreter'. Subsequently, I proposed a scheme of the distribution of the *problems of mediation* in which they were specified as *problems of explanation and prescription of certain knowledge on the level of expert culture, and as problems of individuals' acquisition and application of expert knowledge on the level of everyday communication.*

In chapter one, I showed that scientists' use of *philosophical justifications* in the explanations and of *epistemological concepts* in the prescriptions for treating cognitive problems indicated a certain *insufficiency* of the scientific expertise to deal with these problems. Then, in chapter two, I showed that the *philosophical methodology of the dissolution is appropriate* for dealing with cognitive problems, insofar as, like the scientific prescription of *metacognition*, it was represented in terms of both an *explanation* of the *traditional philosophical problems* in terms of certain *concepts of cognition* or *philosophical concepts of language* and an *application* of these concepts in *dissolving* these problems as pseudo-problems. In my argument, this became a reason that the *competence of philosophy* is promoted on the *level of culture* in order to be, according to what I called the *general principle* for overcoming any possible problems of mediation, unproblematically exchanged through the *level of everyday communication*. Thus, the *philosophical problems* were given status of *problems of mediation* on the former level, while the *cognitive problems*—of *such problems* on the latter level which means that they are both eligible to be overcome by mediation of what can be conditionally called a 'philosophical prescription'.

At this point, it must have already become clear that insofar as scientists *explain* cognitive problems by means of *philosophical justifications*, they try to overcome *problems of mediation* on the level of *culture*; while insofar as they *prescribe epistemological concepts* to be acquired and applied, they address *such problems* on the level of *everyday communication*. Now, since my argument is intended to respond to the scientific insufficiency, in what follows, I will first

consider the possibility that the *cognitive problems* can be overcome by mediation of the philosophical *methodology of dissolution* which will be the way I will address the *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*. Then, I will discuss the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy in the broader context of my argument in which I will address the *problems of mediation* on the level of *culture*.

Cognitive Problems and a Philosophical Understanding of Language

In this subsection, I will try to provide a conceptual framework for a possible overcoming of individuals' negative cognitive dispositions by mediation of a philosophical understanding of how the mind produces 'beliefs' through coordinating language and thought. More specifically, I will try to show how the scientific prescription of *metacognition* can be exercised in terms of the philosophical *methodology of dissolution*, namely, in the sequence of an *explanation* of a *cognitive problem* in terms of a *philosophical concept of cognition* and an *application* of this concept in *dissolving the epistemological points* which entail this problem.

As already pointed out, I consider that what scientific and philosophical concepts have in common is a *notion of philosophy* which they employ in one way or another in overcoming problems that are essentially the same, and that in everyday communication practices individuals also employ such notions in a way that amounts to their cognitive problems. Likewise, I argue that it is the *notion of philosophy* which is supposed to be exchanged by mediation of *epistemological concepts* or *concepts of cognition* from the level of culture through the level of everyday communication, and that it is in this exchange where it takes the form of *epistemological concepts* which are *explained, prescribed, acquired, or applied*. Thus, before I undertake an illustration of the overcoming of a *cognitive problem*

in terms of the *philosophical methodology of dissolution*, I will briefly consider the sense of the *therapeutic notion* of philosophy which is conceived of as underlying the *compositional philosophical concept of language* that was examined in chapter two. I argue that it is the *therapeutic notion* of philosophy which conditions the overcoming of the *cognitive* and any other *problems of mediation*, while it is the *metaphysical one* which conditions their persistence.

A. The Therapeutic Notion of Philosophy

In chapter two, I synthesized an understanding of the *therapeutic notion of philosophy* which is based in the most part on Wittgenstein's late concept of *language games*. As he himself recommends (1953, p. vi), I approached his late philosophical views in relation to his early concept of the *correct use of language*. In addition, I also included two more recent concepts of language which, I believe, further develop certain aspects of Wittgenstein's late view: Searle's concept of the *speech acts*, and Rorty's notion of the *political answer* to philosophical questions. As already pointed out, I conceive of this philosophical understanding as involving the above mentioned philosophical notions (however different they are) in a way in which they are compatible. I regard Wittgenstein's concept of language games as a general concept for dealing with epistemological problems which further develop from his early notion of the correct use of language, while I regard Searle's and Rorty's concepts as specifying this 'dealing' in two alternative ways, respectively, in *ahistorical* and in *historical terms*. Since the philosophical notions involved in this compositional concept were examined as a matter of their being possible 'prescriptions' (which consist of an 'explanation' and 'application' of certain concepts of cognition that are in this case concepts of language), all of them can be independently used for overcoming any epistemological problems. Yet, the specific philosophical sense which I am trying

to convey as important here is not that one can chose *one* of these concepts in order to have taken care of her or his metacognition, but that one gets some sense about the multiplicity of philosophical thought as opposed to the presence of any notion of 'correctness' in it.

The employment of Wittgenstein's early and late concepts can be considered as relevant because in both cases he attempted in-depth examinations of the traditional philosophical problems (the *problems of mediation* on the level of *culture*): in his early work, he *explained* a concept of the 'correct use of language', and then he *applied* this concept in order to *dissolve* the traditional epistemological problems as pseudo-problems stemming from a misunderstanding of the 'logic of language'; in his late period, he *explained* the so-called 'language games' concept, and then he *applied* this concept in dissolving any possible notion of 'correct use of language', which seemingly became a newly promoted problem of philosophy. In his late view, the epistemological phenomenon—*language* cannot be conceptualized in terms of its 'correct use', but rather its 'correctness' is to be sought in terms of its 'use'. In this case, the reference to his view as a 'concept of language games' is entirely conditional, for it leaves no room for such a 'game' as an out-of-use, or an ahistorical conceptualization of language. For the late Wittgenstein, there can be no *single* problem in philosophy, nor can there be a *single* conception of the correct use of language, but only a treatment of *different* problems in terms of *different* language uses. Philosophy is no longer a certain 'activity' which results in the 'clarification of thoughts', for it does not even have a 'correct method' to follow. Rather, philosophy is a *therapy* which is directed toward *undoing* of any residues of *metaphysical singleness* which come into being in the multiplicity of language uses (133). Here, 'therapy' is conceived of as a *particular* therapy which is directed to any *particular* problem as the physician's therapy is directed to any particular patient.

I interpret Searle's concept of speech acts as consistent with Wittgenstein's late concept insofar as Searle attempts to propositionally set down the explanatory

'conditions' and 'rules' which, so to speak, 'constitute' a particular language use as self-sufficient and correct in itself. Although Searle's 'explanation' is basically an *ahistorical explanation* of what he calls the 'basic unit of linguistic communication', he conceives of it as a 'conditional explanation' whose *application* as an 'epistemological concept' does not necessarily exhaust the variety of ordinary language uses of a certain type of speech act. To avoid the epistemological fallibilism of his ahistorical conceptualization, Searle used the terms of semantics and grammar and thus, practically left the field of philosophy. Having no more philosophical problems to dissolve, he developed a concept whose value can be considered practical rather than epistemological; he conceives of it as enabling a good understanding of a particular language use without attributing 'correctness' to any other such uses.

On the other hand, Rorty's concept reflects the therapeutic sense of Wittgenstein's late view in *historical terms* which are conceived of as an alternative to the *ahistorical ones* insofar as the latter potentially convey epistemologically fallible uses of language. Like late Wittgenstein, Rorty *explains* the epistemological uses of language as resulting from inappropriate attributions of correctness from one language use to another. However, Rorty finds it necessary to actualize such a dimension of language which is not only ahistorically conditional upon its particular uses but is also contingent upon its 'historical exchange of metaphors'. In his view, those are the 'newly introduced metaphors' which, as 'voices from outside logical space', could possibly undermine the ahistorical points being produced by the 'logic of language'; while, it is the 'metaphorical change of language' rather than its ahistorical change which becomes a sign for a 'historical change in life'. *Applying* his concept of language, Rorty elaborates a specific notion of the 'political role of philosophy' which aims at 'exposing' and *thus* at helping overcome the problems to be solved; for, the latter are ultimately 'historical problems' which need to be solved 'historically' and in accordance with 'historical standards' rather than ahistorically and in accordance

with 'ahistorical standards'. In this way, Rorty extended Wittgenstein's contextual specification of the 'correctness' of the use of language to what can be called its 'historical specification' which as such is to be distinguished from Searle's ahistorical specification.

In light of this *compositional philosophical understanding*, which is intended to offer a complex, synthesized reflection of the way the *philosophical methodology of dissolution* exercises the *therapeutic notion of philosophy*, any problem which can be represented as an *epistemological problem* (such as a *cognitive or traditional philosophical one*) also must be eligible to be *dissolved* as a variant of 'pseudo-problem'. Accordingly, I will try to illustrate the overcoming of the *cognitive problems* by mediation of this *philosophical understanding of cognition*. In a narrow sense, it will take the form of a philosophical *concept of language* that treats these problems as *epistemological ones*, while in a broader sense, it will take the form of a *notion of philosophy* that treats them as *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*. If I accomplish this task convincingly, I will have conveyed the argument that such a *philosophical concept of cognition* possibly could be *prescribed* and *acquired* in order to be *metacognitively utilized* in overcoming these types of problems.

B. Cognitive Problems as Epistemological Problems

Now, since the philosophical *methodology of dissolution* was construed in the form of the scientific concept of *metacognition*, what follows is an illustration of both an *explanation* of a *cognitive problem* in terms of the philosophical *concept of cognition* and an *application* of this concept in *dissolving* the *epistemological points* which entail this problem. However, I will be able to illustrate the 'overcoming of the cognitive problems' in terms of this notion at best within the level of culture and thus its eventual use on the level of everyday

communication will at this point remain simply hypothesis. Yet, though this indicates the limitations of my argument, it should be more properly understood as an indication, on one hand, of the inevitable persistence of some *problems of mediation* in the *exchange of expertise*, and on other hand, of the *indispensability* of an *appropriate philosophical background* for the overcoming of these problems.

a) An 'Explanation' of a 'Cognitive Problem' in terms of a 'Philosophical Concept of Language'

The cognitive problem 'low self-esteem' can be *explained* as based on a certain 'belief' in the degree of one's ability or inability to do something. According to Covington, such a 'belief' has come into being in a learning environment in which the situations of "success and failure become psychologically remote from one another" and thus form a basis for an "exaggerated importance" of their "semantic distinction" (p. 391). In the alternative view, this 'belief' has come into being by way of accumulation of certain epistemological points in the form of a philosophically naïve *argument* which inappropriately attributes 'correctness' from one problematic situation to another, or from one language use to another.

To put it in another way, when one conceives of a certain 'set of beliefs', as a 'sufficient', 'ahistorical', or in a sense 'ideal knowledge', he or she may neglect its epistemological fallibilism with respect to its practical uses. Consequently, he or she can continuously reproduce and persistently adhere to certain 'beliefs' which may seem 'reasonable', 'logical', or 'clear', but which are backed up with irrelevant arguments or inappropriate reasons which can only amount to philosophical pseudo-problems that in turn entail cognitive problems. For, the 'relevance' of the argumentation is to be ultimately determined by the

particularity of any problematic situation, and so, is not to be epistemologically subordinated to any pre-established uses of language.

This is why a necessary part of such an argumentation is an 'awareness' of the *epistemological fallibilism* of any 'set of beliefs' which is being reproduced by mediation of language. Only could such an 'awareness' enable a problem solver to overcome this fallibilism that is supplied with a 'good or appropriate philosophical understanding' (I cannot find a better term) of the possible epistemological relations which his or her knowledge capacity may amount to. The ahistorical application of 'our sets of beliefs' needs to be 'well-understood', when it 'goes beyond' or epistemologically transcends any particular problematic situation or language use. Any particular language use could be 'well-understood' in terms of the specific conditions under which it has been performed, while the understanding of the epistemological 'insufficiency' of any conditionally explained language use could be also extended to an understanding of its 'historical contingency'.

b) An 'Application' of the 'Philosophical Concept of Language' in Overcoming Cognitive Problems

'One's belief in his or her own inability' can be dissolved by mediation of an understanding that one cannot philosophically justify as 'necessary' any *epistemological* relation of one language use to another, respectively, of one's 'real results' to one's 'real abilities', or of any current results to eventual future performances. Even if a 'philosophical justification' of the 'reasonableness' of such a relation has been somehow made, it could not be verified until one 'fails again' and, as such, it would have been paradoxically an 'unjustified justification'. For, one can make 'valid' *epistemological attributions* no further than the context of their origin, no further than any particular language use, i.e., *one cannot make valid epistemological attributions*.

What this means is that if a problem solver propositionally sets down the conditions under which this 'belief' has come into being in his or her mind in order to extract the 'rules' which 'validly' or 'sufficiently' constitute its 'truthfulness', he or she also must be aware, first, that knowing a set of rules and conditions does not necessarily authorize imposing truth-values to contexts other than the one of origin of this particular belief, and second, that insofar as knowing the conditions and rules under which certain 'beliefs' have come into the being is worthwhile, its value must be properly understood as a practical rather than as an epistemological one. This is the sense in which Searle points out that setting down the conditions of an illocutionary act cannot exhaust the variety of ordinary language uses of a certain speech act, but rather provides information about the "centre of the concept" of that speech act (p. 66). That is, one cannot *immediately* relate certain 'good explanations' to certain 'good applications'; rather, one needs to 'understand well' these explanations *in order to apply* them 'well'. This is why any 'good understanding' of the conditions which 'entail' one's 'low self-esteem' (as an epistemological belief in the degree of one's abilities) involves also the 'conditionality' of this understanding upon any particular, say, 'act of prediction' or 'act of reference'. In other words, a necessary part of this understanding is an awareness that the semantical and syntactical rules for constituting 'beliefs' (to which one can turn when analyzing the conditions) are *not* epistemological rules for transcending beliefs in language.

Rather, a problem solver needs to 'understand well' his or her current 'set of beliefs' as *ahistorical points* which are based on *particular acts* of knowledge acquisition that are in an *epistemologically fallible relation* to any *act of this knowledge's application*. In this way, she or he would also understand the 'set of beliefs' which 'entails' her or his 'low self-esteem' as a set of epistemologically fallible beliefs. The function of the 'philosophical understanding' is to *constantly remind* one about this fallibilism and thus to keep one capable of 'appropriately mediating' or 'reweaving the fabric of one's beliefs' in any new problematic

situation. This is an understanding of how this 'reweaving' or 'mediating' is possible by mediation of the epistemological phenomenon *language*. In terms of Rorty's concept, one's belief concerning her or his abilities would remain on the level of simple 'perception' and 'inference' that could exhaust the 'logical space' without 'changing language or life' which, in this specific sense, is the condition for overcoming the ahistorical points that the 'logic of language' creates. For Rorty, such a permanent 'change' can be provided by 'new metaphors' which are conceived of as changing language from 'outside the logical space', and which need to become in turn 'dead metaphors', not 'logically' (i.e., ahistorically), but 'historically'. What this means is that one cannot 'dissolve' the ahistorical 'set of beliefs' which entails his or her cognitive problems by *just* redefining them in 'historical' terms, for such a 'redefining' would produce another ahistorical 'set of beliefs'. Rather, one would 'expose' one's beliefs not only as being contingent upon a certain use of language, but also as being contingent upon the historical exchange of metaphors in language. In this way, one would dissolve the 'set of beliefs' which entails his or her cognitive problems by 'historically' helping them become 'dead metaphors'. In the context of my argument, this means that the cognitive problems cannot be 'solved ahistorically', since they need to be 'solved historically', or (in more commonsensical terms) practically.

There is a sense in which the 'conditionality' of Searle's concept can be interpreted as conforming to the 'historical contingency' of Rorty's concept. On one hand, one cannot infallibly contend ahistorical, or epistemological beliefs, insofar as the meanings of the terms she or he currently employs in the language use of establishing those 'beliefs' as epistemological phenomena (or some sort of 'absolute truths') are just conditional upon *this* language use, and are thus in *epistemologically fallible* relation to any other language use. In this way, the *fallibilism* appears to be a phenomenon of the *utilization of ahistorical, or epistemological ideals*. On the other hand, for *overcoming* this fallibilism, Rorty recommends, or *prescribes the application of historical ideals* which would finally

mark the 'historical' rather than 'logical death' of the cognitive problems. Thus, the dissolving of individuals' cognitive problems is not a verbal, or a speculative solving, but the very solving of those problems. In this sense, Rorty's 'historical contingency' can be interpreted also as conforming to the late Wittgenstein's concept of teaching-learning practice according to which learning is ultimately a learning by experience, i.e., learning which is least mediated by the systematic function of language.

*c) A Discussion of Delineation of the Concept of 'Metacognition'
in terms of the 'Philosophical Methodology of dissolution'*

It may seem that something is missing in this problem solving process as interpreted in terms of Wittgenstein's, Searle's and Rorty's concepts, something that is supposed to mediate between the knowledge of the problem solver and the overcoming of the cognitive problem. I tried to refer to it as explanation and application of certain concepts of cognition, but it does not seem that any further terminological chains, which could be attached to these terms eventually to make them clearer or more comprehensive, would compensate for what is missing. In my view, if there is no such thing, the explanatory chains are also unnecessary; they would only complicate and thus hinder the problem solving process as in Lochhead's example with juggling. Rather, I consider that individuals' cognitive problems are in their essence based on such explanatory chains whose therapeutic undoing will result in overcoming these problems.

If I have succeeded in relating a philosophical understanding of cognition to the overcoming of individuals' cognitive problems on the *level of culture*, individuals could also relate such an understanding to their metacognition on the level of *everyday communication*. In this sense, such a 'good philosophical understanding' could be *prescribed* and *acquired* in order to be *applied* in

overcoming any cognitive problems which, after the dissolution of the epistemological points which entail them, appear to be just pseudo-problems. Indeed, a certain aspect of my argument may improperly suggest that individuals' *philosophical understanding* would be in anyway a 'less expert', or more precisely 'less competent' understanding insofar as it may not involve such a complicated exercise of concepts in dealing with all the problems of mediation which persist between explanation and prescription, prescription and acquisition, acquisition and application of a concept of cognition. But, what is more important than this mere dogmatic point is that individuals would be capable of what can be called 'more expert' *application* of such an understanding, insofar as they are in a better position to overcome the cognitive problems they personally face, i.e., insofar as the epistemological fallibilism of such an understanding disappears in the 'historical solution' (or therapeutic dissolution) of these problems. In the next subsection, I will discuss this dogmatic aspect of my argument in the broader context of understanding in which the cognitive problems were qualified as *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*.

C. Cognitive Problems as Problems of Mediation

In the preceding subsection, the *cognitive problems* were *dissolved* as *epistemological problems* in the narrow context of my argument. In this subsection, I will discuss them in a broader context which concerns the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy. In my argument, this latter context reflected the overcoming of the *cognitive problems* by mediation of the *philosophical competence* in terms of two major difficulties. What I called the *major conceptual difficulty* resulted from the need for justification of the use of philosophical methods for treating problems which come up in the scope of science and was initially resolved through the qualification of the cognitive problems as

problems of mediation on the level of *everyday communication*. At the same time, the resolution of the 'major conceptual difficulty' resulted in what was termed the *major methodological difficulty* which was implied by the paradox that the *promotion* of the philosophy on the level of *culture* to treat the *problems of mediation* in *everyday communication* actually affirmed the conditions for their persistence. In my view, the proper understanding of these *two difficulties* is that they are themselves *problems of mediation* which I faced on the level of *culture* while investigating the possibility for overcoming the *cognitive problems* by mediation of an exchange of a *philosophical competence*. They are implied, respectively, by the *interdisciplinary character* of my argument whose adequate accomplishment needed an appropriate *common terminology* and by the *limited standpoint* of the level of *culture* from which I attempt to represent but am in the position *at best* to *explain* the possible exchange of this competence through the level of *everyday communication*. Thus, in this broader context of understanding, my discussion on the overcoming of *cognitive problems* as *problems of mediation on the level of everyday communication* necessarily becomes an illustration of the overcoming of these *two difficulties* as *problems of mediation on the level of culture*.

On the other hand, since I already illustrated the overcoming of *cognitive problems* by mediation of the *philosophical methodology of dissolution* in a narrow sense, my argument must have somehow displayed the 'two difficulties', so to speak, 'in practice'. This is why, in this broader context of understanding, the discussion on the overcoming of the *cognitive problems* as *problems of mediation on the level of everyday communication* must also shed light on how they have reflected on the *perception* of my argument as it was already accomplished in its narrow context.

a) *A Discussion of the Reflection and Overcoming of the 'Major Conceptual Difficulty' in my Argument*³⁵

This 'difficulty' stems from the *interdisciplinary character* of my argument and is itself a problem of mediation which, as coming up in the broader context of understanding, must be dissolved in terms of an appropriate *understanding of the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy*. This is why its dissolution must essentially illustrate, on one hand, how the scientific framework conditions its persistence and displays it, and, on the other hand, how the philosophical framework conditions its disappearance and undoes it. In other words, this discussion must show how the *common terminology* of my argument *mediates* between the *scientific and philosophical terminologies* of representation of the two types of problems in order to relate the *philosophical competence* for treating the *cognitive problems* in this broader context of understanding.

In this context, the *common terminology* initially represented the cognitive problems as 'problems-of-exchange-of-expertise-in-modernity' which as such remain out of the scope of science but in the scope of philosophy. As already pointed out, the terms of representation of the exchange of *expertise*, namely, experts' *explanation* and *prescription* of certain concepts on the level culture and of individuals' *acquisition* and *application* of these concepts on the level of everyday communication are only conditional ones and stand for its *permanent utilization* on the different stages of its *exchange*. In this sense, I also noted that these terms can be interpreted as interchangeable and that their distinction serves

³⁵ Although the two major difficulties were recognized as *problems of mediation*, in my discussion, I will not use the terms 'explanation' and 'application' as signifying the conditional stages of their *dissolution*. This is because in this broader context they will be at the same time put in the perspective of my investigation which may thus become very difficult to follow. However, the reader will be able to recognize them in (the stages of) my approach to these particular 'problems of mediation' which themselves will be *dissolved* in terms of the *broader sense* of my argument (as it is itself a 'concept of cognition'). The discussion on the 'difficulties' must also clarify why this 'inconsistency' in my argument is *unimportant* by way of showing how terms such as 'explanation', 'application', 'metacognition', 'science', 'philosophy', 'metaphysics', and 'therapy' are interrelated.

explanatory purposes *only*. Now, I argue that this lack of a constant 'conceptual content' in my *common terminology* reflects differently in scientific and philosophical frameworks and conditions, respectively, the persistence and disappearance of what was called the *major conceptual difficulty* of my argument.

In a *scientific framework*, it must have made difficult, so to speak, 'keeping the same meanings of the same terms', and thus the establishing of comprehensive, or 'logically clear', connections between the *terminologies* of representation of both the cognitive and traditional philosophical problems. In this way, it must have also made difficult the following of the very illustration or *explanation* of the *adequacy* of a 'philosophical prescription' for the treatment of the cognitive problems. For, if the different terminologies of representation of the 'two types of problems', at least seemingly, stand for their customary, or constant 'conceptual contents', they 'necessarily' make these problems different and eventually their representation in the common terminology somehow 'inadequate'.

By contrast, in a *philosophical framework*, these *common terms* are only 'forms' of possible 'conceptual contents' which could be different in different conceptual frameworks. Thus, a philosophically competent problem solver *cannot say* that the *cognitive problems*, which were initially represented as based on 'sets of beliefs' that individuals spontaneously form by combining certain epistemological points in their views of intelligence, are 'better represented' as *epistemological problems* which result from inappropriate attributions of 'correctness' from one 'language use' to another or from one problematic situation to another. Obviously, such a representation would have been as philosophically inadequate as the one that would say that individuals have not known that they have been using language to get into their cognitive confusions and that what they need now is just to learn to use it 'correctly'. (This would contradict the *therapeutic notion of philosophy* which I am trying to convey by mediation of the compositional philosophical understanding of language, and which dissolves as philosophically unjustified or as *metaphysical* any form of attributing 'correctness')

from one language use to another).³⁶ Rather, if the representation of the cognitive problems in the philosophical terminology has been somehow 'at odds', it must have been properly understood as indicating some unavoidable *problems of mediation* which have come into being as a result of transferring of concepts ('competence') from one problematic situation to another, from one field of knowledge to another. From a philosophical point of view, it is the *common epistemological character* of these problems rather than their 'authentic' terminology of representation which is at stake in the investigation, and it is precisely the *lack of a philosophical competence* which leaves this character unnoticed and makes them seemingly *different problems* on the different stages of the exchange of expertise.

Accordingly, the *major conceptual difficulty* of my argument can be explained, on one hand, as appearing insofar as the *problems of mediation* and the *procedures for their treatment* are represented as being (to use Searle's terminology) *conventionally different but intentionally the same*, and on other hand, as disappearing insofar as they are represented as being *essentially the same*.

In my argument, it is an *appropriate philosophical understanding* which in a broader sense, as an understanding of the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy, would uncover them as *problems of mediation* that remain in the scope of philosophy, and which in a narrow sense, as an understanding of how the mind produces beliefs by coordinating language and thought, would uncover them as *epistemological problems* and dissolve them as pseudo-problems.

³⁶ One may object: "But if Wittgenstein's concept of the 'correct use of language' takes a part in the compositional philosophical understanding that is supposed to convey the therapeutic notion of philosophy, how can it be *therapeutic* and *metaphysical* at the same time?" This question is a good example of how an ahistorical approach to the use of language creates epistemological problems. In my argument, the 'therapeutic sense' of Wittgenstein's early view is, on one hand, *contextually* (i.e., as a matter of a particular language use) defined, and on other hand, it is *historically* defined (i.e., as a matter of its historical significance). Similarly, the qualification of Searle's view as 'therapeutic' is exclusively contextual and historical: for, from an ahistorical point of view, it qualifies quite well as an example of what Habermas calls a 'turn to metaphysics' in contemporary philosophy.

b) *A Discussion of the Reflection and Overcoming of the 'Major Methodological Difficulty' in my Argument*

This discussion must essentially suggest how the *philosophical competence* can, according to the *general principle* for overcoming of problems of mediation, be unproblematically exchanged through the level of *everyday communication*, given that the promotion of philosophy on the level of *culture* actually affirms the *conditions* for persistence of these problems which in this broader context can be seen in the existence of *these two levels themselves*. In other words, not only must this discussion uncover how paradoxical the role of philosophy in the exchange of expertise is, but also how indispensable its competence is in modernity.

As already shown, the 'major methodological difficulty' stems from the *limited standpoint* of the level of culture and is itself also a *problem of mediation* which, as coming up in the broader context of my argument, must be dissolved in terms of an understanding of the *relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy*, too. However, since it results from the promotion of philosophy on the level of *culture* to treat the *problems of mediation* on *everyday communication*, its dissolution must consider both the *possibility* and *impossibility* of philosophy's becoming one of the expert cultures. In my argument, the former reflects a possibility of its becoming a *metaphysics*, while the latter -- a possibility of its being a *therapy* for these problems. Since I already pointed out that it is the *metaphysical notion* of philosophy which contributes to the persistence of *problems of mediation* and that it is the *therapeutic one* which conditions their overcoming, what follows is an illustration of how the former creates the conditions for these problems and is not in a position to solve them, and how the latter undoes these conditions and dissolves these problems as pseudo-problems.

In my argument, the *metaphysical approach* can be illustrated with the scheme of the distribution of the *problems of mediation* which relates the

explanation and *application* of a concept of cognition to the levels of, respectively, *expert culture* and *everyday communication*. In this scheme, the 'two levels' must be mediated by the *philosophical understanding of cognition* which, as represented in the form of the scientific prescription of *metacognition*, becomes a *philosophical methodology of dissolution* that essentially involves a sequence of its *explanation* and *application*. From a metaphysical point of view, given the 'scheme of distribution', the 'general principle' for overcoming problems of mediation, and the 'limited standpoints' of the 'two levels', we can conclude that the *experts* are in a better position to illustrate an *explanation* of the problems of mediation in terms of a *philosophical concept of cognition* on the level of *culture*, while they could illustrate an *application* of this concept as a matter of *metacognition* which dissolves the epistemological points of a *cognitive problem* at most on a *presupposed* level of *everyday communication*. By the same token, *individuals* are in a better position to exemplify an *application* of a philosophical concept for overcoming problems of mediation on the level of *everyday communication*, while they could exemplify an *explanation* of those problems as a matter of *philosophical competence* in terms of this concept at most on a *presupposed* level of *expert culture*. And since, in both cases the sequence of 'explanation' and 'application' of a 'philosophical concept' as a matter of *exchange of expertise* necessarily involves these two *different* levels, while trying to transcend their *limited standpoints*, both experts and individuals embark on those points of deficit which potentially condition the emergence of *problems of mediation*, which no 'expertise' can account for, and which they try to compensate for by mediation of concepts of *metacognition*. Coincidentally, it is the *philosophical competence* in the form of *metacognition* which stands for what both experts and individuals cannot account for but have a need of in order to 'bridge' the two 'levels' and ensure the exchange of expertise. Accordingly, the *metaphysical approach* poses the *philosophical competence, metacognition*, as standing for both an *explanation of a concept of cognition on a presupposed level*

of expert culture and application of this concept on a presupposed level of everyday communication.

Hereafter, from a metaphysical point of view, I must have illustrated the overcoming of a *cognitive problem* by mediation of a *philosophical understanding of cognition* as a matter of *metacognition* on both a *presupposed* level of expert culture and a *presupposed* level of everyday communication at the same time. For the metaphysical standpoint *presupposes* that the way in which certain problems are being overcome on an expert level is the way they should be overcome on a practical level. Indeed, if that were so, then what is necessary for the overcoming of these problems can be 'simply' identified in terms of the explanation, prescription, acquisition, and application of this 'way of overcoming'. But, this is precisely how the metaphysical differentiation of the 'two levels' suggests that as if there is such an 'expertise' which is 'philosophical', and which only needs to be explained and prescribed in order to be acquired and 'correctly' applied in overcoming all problems of mediation. While, a reference to this 'eventual expertise' (such as the one made in chapter two of this paper) uncovers it as contradicting itself, insofar as it denies philosophy any possibility of associating itself with some sort of 'expertise'. Accordingly, in my illustration of the overcoming of the *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication*, I must have affirmed the *existence* of the 'two levels', which *as a matter of fact* condition the persistence of these problems, since I have thus posed their *necessary transcendence* as being such only in a *possibility* which I ultimately deny. In other words, not only is the *metaphysical approach* unable to effectively treat the *problems of mediation* because it does not have an 'adequate expertise', but also, by promoting philosophy to status of *expert culture*, it actually *creates the conditions* for their persistence.

On the other hand, the *therapeutic approach* uncovers and undoes the distinction between the two specified levels of the exchange of expertise, as well as between *experts* and *individuals*, as conditioning the persistence of the so-called *problems of mediation*, as being an entirely speculative one, and as being justified through an overemphasized interdependence between a 'good knowledge' and a

'right application'. In a therapeutic philosophical framework, there is a stipulation that the capability of a problem solver to differentiate the 'two levels' within her or his own *philosophical background* puts her or him in a position not only to overcome the epistemological fallibilism of her or his knowledge with respect to its permanent utilization, but also to amount somehow 'sufficiently' and 'unnoticedly' to philosophically unjustified beliefs which entail *cognitive problems*. I contend that it is the *metaphysical philosophical background* against which this differentiation would have conditioned the persistence of problems of mediation, while it is the *therapeutic philosophical background* which would have conditioned the 'undoing' of this differentiation and so the overcoming of these problems.

In my view, one could say that by 'undoing the differentiation' between the two presupposed levels of exchange of expertise, a problem solver could take the position of an *expert* capable of both a 'more sophisticated understanding' of his or her cognitive abilities and of its representing in the form of an *explanation and application* of a *philosophical concept of cognition on a presupposed level of culture*. At the same time, one could say that she or he could also take the position of an *individual* capable of an effective 'permanent utilization' of this understanding in the form of an *explanation and application on a presupposed level of everyday communication*. One could also say that in the former case the problem solver would be attaining points of view similar to those examined in the philosophical concepts, while in the latter case, points of view similar to those which scientists associated with 'metacognitively more sophisticated individuals'. However, one would also need to realize that this would have been a merely speculative attempt for an illustration of the 'therapeutic undoing of the two levels' which a *notion of philosophy* could condition. For, the *therapeutic notion of philosophy* itself excludes such an explanation but only suggests that both philosophers and individuals somehow have the *same type of competence* which only has been exercised in different terminologies perhaps because it has been

needed under different conditions, i.e., in different problematic situations. Further, this notion suggests that because this 'competence' has been acquired in different problematic situations, it *cannot be immediately*, i.e., *unproblematically* exchanged between them. Instead, it *can be unproblematically exchanged only by mediation of its permanent utilization* which in this sense is opposed to and so undoes the dogmatic stages of explanation, prescription, acquisition, and application which in a metaphysical sense stand for different problematic situations.

This is why the *therapeutic undoing of the differentiation* between the 'two levels' is to come through the understanding that *philosophers are not experts* in any sense and that the 'expertise' to be utilized in the case of overcoming the cognitive problems is *at most a philosophical competence* where 'competence' is not the 'very term' for substituting 'expertise', but is only the term which, while conceived of as being in its opposition, is to signify its 'undoing' *in the specific context of my argument*. However, in this context, this is *not* to say that because we do not have a 'sufficient expertise' for treating the cognitive problems, they are always very hard to overcome; rather, this is to say that because of their *epistemological character*, we can overcome these problems *only* by mediation of an *appropriate philosophical competence*.

Thus, what I called *major methodological difficulty* can be explained as appearing insofar as the *therapeutic* and *metaphysical notions* of philosophy are conceived of as *conventionally the same* but *intentionally different*, and as disappearing insofar as they are shown to be *essentially different*. Now, though the *delineation* of the concept of *metacognition* in terms of a *philosophical understanding of language* was intended to promote the *therapeutic methodology of the dissolution* for dealing with cognitive problems, its 'better understanding' on a 'presupposed level of expert culture' must pose its representation here as still being a 'metaphysical delineation' as far as the distinction between the two levels of modernity is taken for granted. Thus, only can the *therapeutic undoing of this distinction* (in the specific sense which I tried to convey in this paper) condition

the overcoming of the *problems of mediation*, not 'better explanations', nor 'better abilities'; only can *all* 'individuals' be 'experts', not 'chosen individuals', nor 'more capable individuals'. Virtually, all the *problems of the 'exchange of expertise'* (not only the philosophical ones) would have disappeared after the therapeutic undoing' of this distinction, but indeed this is only a possibility.

A General Discussion of the Relationship and Possible Cooperation between Science and Philosophy

In the previous section, I examined the *problems of mediation* on the level of *everyday communication* in the narrow and broader contexts of their dissolution. In this section, I will discuss the *problems of mediation* on the level of *culture* but *only* in the broader context of my argument, for in a narrow sense, they have been already examined in chapter two. As in the case of the *problems of mediation* on everyday communication, in this broader context, I will put these problems and the procedures for their overcoming in such a perspective that not only ensures their appropriate 'philosophical understanding' but also therapeutically undoes them. More specifically, I will discuss them in a metaphilosophical perspective which actualizes the question of the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy with respect to the issues that appear in the scopes of both of them.

a) The Notions of Truth, Rationality, and Language

Traditionally, science and philosophy have been considered different forms of knowledge. But, because philosophy, in its long tradition, has denied the exclusive rights of any possible subject-matter, method, or goal in the scope of its

occupations, the characterization of the two fields can point out positively what science is, but only negatively what philosophy 'is not'. And yet, what science is could be a basis for considering what philosophy 'is not' insofar as the view that the two fields are clearly distinguishable already presupposes a certain kind of relationship as a basis for their differentiation.

According to Richard Paul, the scientific fields realize "the possibility of specialization and joint work within a highly defined shared frame of reference", while philosophy remains "an individualistic venture wherein participants agree only in the broadest sense on the range and the nature of issues they will consider" (p. 436). More specifically, the characteristic features of science involve a strong demand for empirical justification and a widespread use of experimental methods, while philosophy does not necessarily justify its products empirically and not only does not use experimental methods, but even rejects the possibility of its own method. A further analysis of the sciences' 'common frame of reference' shows that the *common point* on which they all convene is a *notion of truth* which is classical for the Western philosophical tradition and which as such could eventually become a basis for consideration of the question of the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy with respect to the issues that appear in the scopes of both of them. As Searle points out, the 'notion of truth' is at present taken for granted by scientists and is justified through the principle of correspondence with reality:

In the simplest conception of science, the aim of the science is to get a set of true sentences, ideally in the form of precise theories, that are true because they correspond, at least approximately, to an independently existing reality. (1995, p. 29)

At the same time, contemporary philosophy adopts the 'notion of truth' in terms of the *notion of rationality* which, according to him, integrates two *essential* points for science:

... the presupposition of an independently existing reality, and the presupposition that language, at least on occasion, conforms to that reality. (1995, p. 30)

Likewise, Habermas contends that “examples of a successful cooperative integration of philosophy and science can be seen in the development of a theory of rationality” (1990, p. 16). Nevertheless, the two fields appear to adopt this common point with different degrees of reluctance. In modern sciences the exercise of the *notion of truth*, as justified through the ‘principle of correspondence’, has become ‘sufficient’ for their self-justification and self-assertion. By contrast, in modern philosophy, this notion, as resolved in the ‘concept of rationality’, has become a point of an inexhaustive controversy. One reflection of this differentiation of human reason can be found in the *actualization of the notions of truth and rationality* in terms of the issue of the *language of modernity*. According to Habermas, this very characteristic trend in the discourse of modernity, on the one hand, places the “notion of truth” in the “linguistic medium of reason”, and on the other, redefines the differentiation between science and philosophy on the basis of the way in which they use this “common medium” (1992, pp. 134-5). Thus, the ‘linguistic medium’ ensures the compatibility between science and philosophy through a necessary employment of human ‘reason’ in their self-identification and self-justification, but a necessary conditionality persists in the way in which either of them employs, so to speak, the ‘same reason’:

. . . nothing would stand in the way of the concept of *one* reason today if philosophy and science were able to reach through the thicket of natural languages to the logical grammar of a single language that describes the world, or could at least come close to this ideal in a promising way. In contrast, if even the reflexive activity of mind always remained caught in the grammatical limits of various particular worlds that were linguistically constituted, reason would necessarily disintegrate kaleidoscopically into a multiplicity of incommensurable embodiments (Habermas 1992, pp. 134-5)

This conditionality ensures the independence of science and philosophy which appears to be the condition that prevents either of them from appropriating the characteristic features of the other. For, such an appropriation would resemble what, in the philosophical tradition, has been known as ‘metaphysics’. This conditionality also

implies, on one hand, that although scientific and philosophical inquiries overlap in certain points, they should not necessarily coincide, and on the other hand, that the very notion of their 'distinction' is not supplied with a 'certain border' which would, so to speak, 'legitimize' this distinction. For Habermas, even if a relatively clear and widely accepted border between the two fields would impose characteristically different and thus fairly distinguishable mental practices and procedures, there still would be *some remaining problems* which concern these fields' rights to employ the 'linguistic medium of reason' in the ways they do for accomplishing their goals. As already pointed out, he calls them *problems of mediation* and assigns them to philosophy in the role of *mediating interpreter* (1990, pp. 17-19; 1992, p. 39). It seems that sciences face those problems only when their accounts turn out to be 'insufficient' for dealing with the issues they examine. That is, in the cases where the experimental methods cannot provide adequate solutions, scientists search for reliable interpretations and thus enter the field of philosophy. In my argument, such a scientific 'insufficiency' became a reason for employing a few exemplary notions from contemporary philosophy in the conditional role of 'expertise' for the overcoming of those classes of *problems of mediation* which I subsumed under *cognitive problems*.

On the other hand, the view that philosophy can play such a compensatory role is no less problematic and could encounter late Wittgenstein's requirement for a fairly exhaustive account of references in which the term 'philosophy' has been exercised throughout its history. To respond to such a requirement, Habermas examines the history of philosophical ideas as a transition from metaphysical to postmetaphysical thinking (1992, pp. 28-51). In his view, this transition has been guided by a constantly "self-situating reason" which in the wake of metaphysics finds its current loci in the intersubjective linguistic practices aiming at participants' mutual understanding. The reason which situates itself in the intersubjective linguistic practices rediscovers its "medium of communication," the language, as opening "the horizons of the specific worlds in which socialized individuals" dwell (1992, p. 43). Thus, individuals "always find themselves already

in a linguistically structured and disclosed world; live off grammatically projected interconnections of meaning”, while, “the linguistically disclosed and structured lifeworld finds its footing only in the practices of reaching understanding within a linguistic community”(1992, p. 43). But, while metaphysical philosophical thinking regards language as a relatively “glassy medium without properties” (1992, p. 161) which has no significant influence on a reason situating itself, the postmetaphysical thinking encounters and problematizes language as world-disclosing and meaning-creating medium of communication.

Likewise, contemporary science regards language as the most important human cognitive achievement (M.W. Matlin p. 261), too, but unlike postmetaphysical thinking and like metaphysical thinking, it uses the ‘linguistic medium of reason’ without needing to problematize it. Insofar as cognitive science problematizes this ‘achievement’, it approaches it as some sort of a natural rather than epistemological phenomenon and concentrates exclusively on its empirical explication by means and notions which are possibly least abstract and ultimately conform to the methodology of natural sciences. Consequently, drawing on its proven success in social practices, science somehow ‘naturally’ challenges even the traditional philosophical problems. For example, Howard Gardner defines “cognitive science” as a “contemporary, empirically based effort to answer long-standing epistemological questions—particularly those concerned with the nature of knowledge, its components, its sources, its development, and its deployment” (p. 6). In my view, this means that science *just* uses language epistemologically, while this attempt to appropriate and solve philosophical problems can be associated with the attempt of what in the history of philosophy is known as ‘metaphysics’ to provide humankind with some sort of ‘universal knowledge’:

I am interested in whether questions that intrigued our philosophical ancestors can be decisively answered, instructively reformulated, or permanently scuttled. Today cognitive science holds the key to whether they can be. (Gardner p. 6)

Thus, while in contemporary philosophy the metaphysical problems of philosophy have been dissolved as problems that come into being as a matter of an incorrect use of language, contemporary science, which does not problematize language epistemologically, seems to revitalize these problems on the basis of its success in the well-established social practices. Indeed, this success is remarkable, but in the appropriation of problems that philosophy itself has repudiated as pseudo-problems, science is not immune to metaphysical claims only because these problems have been now 'reformulated' by mediation of its expertise which has been 'elsewhere' proven. To put it in another way, though expert cultures have attained the authority to provide with solutions any practical and expert problems, in the case of the *problems of mediation*, they turn out in the position of authorizing philosophically inadequate solutions. For, as already investigated, there is no 'tested expertise' for philosophical problems. Instead, it is arguable that the 'world disclosing' and 'meaning creating' function of the 'linguistic medium of reason' may remain unnoticed in both the paradigm of science on the level of culture and the subjective paradigms of individuals on everyday communication and may amount to some *problems of mediation*. Conversely, if noticed, the world disclosing and meaning creating function of language would easily recognize these problems as contingent upon the "grammatical limits of the various particular worlds that are linguistically constituted" and "would necessarily disintegrate kaleidoscopically into a multiplicity of incommensurable embodiments" (Habermas 1992, pp. 134-5).

To sum up, not only are there important issues that are common to both philosophy and science, but also there is a specific freedom within philosophy to cope with them in a manner that is not shared by science. Presumably, the outcomes of such an independent 'coping' are at the least curious, particularly with respect to problems which appear within the scopes of the two fields and for whose 'adequate treatment' scientific accounts are in a certain sense 'insufficient'. In my view, as a non-expert field participating in a 'division of labour' which has

assigned to it the so-called 'problems of mediation', philosophy *could* respond to this scientific 'insufficiency' insofar as it still "keeps an eye trained on the topic of rationality" (Habermas 1990, p. 18). The necessary condition which is to accompany this specific role of philosophy is an awareness that the philosophical 'expertise' is an 'expertise' in a 'non-expert' field and is an 'expertise' in the very conditional and paradoxical sense of 'competence'.

b) Philosophy and the Problems of Mediation

In my argument, I accepted Habermas' view that the *problems of mediation*, as problems of the exchange of expertise, are to remain in the scope of philosophy as a non-expert field. But, implied by the compositional philosophical concept is that if these problems are considered *philosophical problems* on the different levels of modernity, no certain field can 'sufficiently' account for them. That is to say, even philosophy *does not* have and *cannot* have the exclusive rights for solving the *problems of mediation*, but only possesses a *specific competence* to deal with them.

As already pointed out, this 'competence' is conceived of as an understanding of how these problems come into being and how they disappear. In the broader context of my argument, they come into being as a matter of inappropriate exchange of expertise by mediation of concepts and disappear as a matter of a 'therapeutic undoing' the expertise to be exchanged. On the level of everyday communication, their solutions result from the *particular applications* of certain *well-understood knowledge* in solving *particular problems*; on the level of expert culture, those solutions become *well-understood justifications* of experts' own *explanations* and *prescriptions*.

It is in this sense that the epistemological concepts to be applied in the mind's problem solving activity of *metacognition* can find a specification in terms

of some exemplary notions of contemporary philosophy. Though such a specification initially appears to be rather an extended and in a certain sense unnecessary abstraction, as philosophical knowledge, it is conceived of as fostering problem solvers' 'awareness' of the dogmatic postulates in their thinking, which can turn out any previously acquired or spontaneously formed epistemological concepts that are to be applied in a certain problematic situation. This is an 'awareness' that any specification of one's own epistemology ought not to be understood as *the* specification of *the* peculiarities of her or his mind's problem solving activity, but that the permanent rationalization of one's own experience, knowledge, and capacity needs to be always a 'well-understood rationalization', like a well-understood relativism, but not like a *promotion* of the relativism. In this way, one would understand that her or his belief, for instance, in her or his *already proven inability* is just a fallible belief insofar as it is being rationalized in the form of an epistemological concept available for future applications; respectively, that one's *low self-esteem* or *motivational deficit* stems from a *misunderstanding* of one's 'reasonable' accounts of one's 'failure' which 'so obviously' demonstrate the 'true limits' of one's cognitive capacity.

Thus, given that the fallibilism of one's knowledge could hopefully disappear in an application that results in the mere solving of the problems to be solved, some implications could be made for the practices involving intensive mind's problem solving activity. For instance, in teaching one would need to have taught, in addition to what she or he has already taught, that in a new problematic situation the knowledge to be applied needs to be accordingly modified and that in this sense there is not an 'ideal knowledge'. Since the relation of the teaching ('explaining' and 'prescribing') of thinking skills to the applying of those 'already acquired skills' appears to be an epistemologically fallible relation, *the overcoming of this fallibilism becomes essential for the practice of teaching*. Only this overcoming could go through the 'understanding' that a teacher's work can never be completely done, that there is a persisting infiniteness in the social practice of

teaching and learning that exempts neither teachers nor students from fallible relegation of their teaching-learning responsibilities. Rather, one needs to understand that *in* and *after* the teaching-learning process he or she is still in the very beginning of becoming a 'good thinker', and that she or he would always need to modify his or her knowledge in any new problematic situation in order to turn out to be a 'good problem solver', too. But, to be able to modify such knowledge, one still needs to have it. (In this sense, the problems are being solved as a matter of expertise, not as a matter of philosophy; the philosophical understanding is needed only to undo the conceptual fallibilism of our knowledge with respect to its practical applications).

In conclusion, this broader context of understanding of my argument was supposed to give the sense of the *therapeutic notion of philosophy* in the perspective of its relationship and possible cooperation with expert cultures and everyday communication practices of modernity. As I must have already shown, philosophy cannot provide problem solving practices with an account of the degree to which certain previously acquired concepts influence the epistemological attributions of thinking in order to prevent those practices from eventual negative consequences of such attributions. What philosophy can contribute is only to *remind* that the language in which expert cultures and everyday communication practices exercise their propositions and form their practical rules needs to be finally modified according to any particular problem solving situation. This 'reminding' must somehow involve a particular understanding (in its respectively modified form) that since philosophy has already rejected its 'expert' or epistemological function to be a part of its 'therapeutic repertoire', its role in the exchange of expertise is somehow paradoxical. It 'keeps one eye trained' but trained on nothing specific; it is a 'therapy' but actually undoes itself as a therapy; it 'explains' but explains 'conditionally'; it 'reminds', 'exposes', or 'hopes', but does not 'prescribe'. Indeed, its competence can be conditionally explained on a presupposed level of culture and thus prescribed for a presupposed level of

everyday communication. However, its 'right application' would depend not only upon its 'good acquisition' but also upon its *therapeutic undoing* which as such is an indeterminate aspect of the solutions of the real problems. For, the *therapeutic role* of philosophy is only to condition the exchange of expertise by undermining any (*not* by offering a 'new' or 'unique') possibility for *epistemological attributions* of 'correctness' from one language use to another. This is why its specification in language can only 'conditionally' reflect as either an 'activity' or a 'hope' insofar as the latter are conceived of as being mere 'oppositions' to any recurrent phenomenon of 'metaphysics' in the discourse of modernity:

More specifically, this is the hope that what Dewey calls "the crust of convention" will be as superficial as possible, that the social glue which holds society together - the language in which we state our shared beliefs and hopes - will be as flexible as possible. (Rorty p. 18)

In Summary

In this paper, I have employed *scientific* and *philosophical* notions in an exercise that was intended to illuminate *the claim that negative cognitive dispositions and inappropriate problem solving strategies are rooted in individuals' philosophically naïve views of how their own intelligence works*. In the specified sense here, this claim became that the *scientific prescription* for treating these cognitive problems, *metacognition*, can be supplied or substituted with a *philosophical understanding of how the mind coordinates language and thought*.

I have generally assumed that the scientific accounts of *cognitive problems* and the philosophical accounts of the *traditional philosophical problems* converge in a point which poses the two types of problems both as being *epistemological in character* and as being treated by procedures that are *essentially the same* insofar as they relate the overcoming of these problems to the *mediation of a concept of cognition*. For me, this became a reason that *cognitive problems* be explained in

terms of a *philosophical concept of cognition* and treated by mediation of the philosophical procedure for overcoming the traditional philosophical problems which I called the *philosophical methodology of dissolution*. To justify this methodology of transfer, I needed to show, on one hand, that the *scientific account* of the cognitive problems is somehow *insufficient*, and on the other hand, that philosophical competence for dealing with epistemological problems is somehow *appropriate* for overcoming the cognitive problems. In my argument, the scientific accounts of cognitive problems qualified as *insufficient*, insofar as scientists' *explanations* of the cognitive problems relied on *philosophical justifications*, and insofar as scientists' *prescriptions* for overcoming these problems contained *epistemological concepts*. On the other hand, *philosophical competence* has been shown to be *appropriate* for dealing with cognitive problems insofar as the *philosophical methodology of dissolution* was represented in the form of the scientific prescription *metacognition* as an *explanation* and *application* of a *concept of cognition* which in this case was a *philosophical concept of language*. Subsequently, I needed a *broader context of understanding* concerning the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy in order to justify the use of philosophical methods for treating problems which come up in the scope of science, insofar as the two fields are considered as using *characteristically different* forms of inquiry. In this context, in terms of a certain interpretation of Habermas' notion of philosophy, *cognitive* and *traditional philosophical problems* were qualified as *problems of mediation*, respectively, on the levels *everyday communication* and *expert culture*. Thus, according to what I called the *general principle* for overcoming problems of mediation, the *competence* used for overcoming of the *philosophical problems* on the level of *culture* was supposed to be unproblematically exchanged through the level of *everyday communication* in overcoming the *cognitive problems*. In my argument, the *competence* under consideration is conceived of as a *notion of philosophy* in the philosophical sense of a *therapy* as opposed to 'metaphysics', which I derived from the examination of the philosophical concepts.

Consequently, I illustrated the overcoming of the *cognitive problems* by mediation of a *philosophical concept of cognition* which was to convey a notion of *philosophy as therapy*; in a narrow sense, it became a 'therapeutic undoing' of the *epistemological points* which entail these problems, while in a broader sense – a 'therapeutic undoing' of the two *presupposed levels* of modernity. By way of conclusion, I discussed the *problems of mediation* on the *level of culture* in the metaphilosophical perspective of the question of the relationship and possible cooperation between science and philosophy with respect to the issues that are common to both. In the metaphilosophical sense of my argument, science is conceived of as ineligible to solve epistemological problems, even though they have been redefined by mediation of its 'well-proven expertise'; by contrast, philosophy is conceived of as ineligible to solve any scientific or practical problems, but as still eligible to dissolve epistemological problems.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Covington, M.V. (1985). "Strategic Thinking and the Fear of Failure." *Thinking and Learning Skills*. Ed. J. W. Segal, S. F. Chipman, and R. Glaser. Hillside NJ: L.Erlbaum. (pp. 389-416).
- Ericsson, K.A. & Simon, H.A. (1980). "Verbal Reports as Data." *Psychological Review*. May. Vol. 87 (3). (pp. 215-251).
- Gardner, H. (1985). *The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution*. New York: BasicBooks.
- Geach, P. (1992). *Mental Acts*. Bristol UK: Thoemmes Press.
- Habermas, J. (1990). *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
- Habermas, J. (1992). *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*. Cambridge MA; London, England: MIT Press.
- Lipman, M. (1985). "Thinking Skills Fostered by Philosophy for Children." *Thinking and Learning Skills*. Ed. Segal, Chipman, and Glaser. Hillside NJ: L. Erlbaum. (pp. 83-108).
- Lochhead, J. (1985). "Teaching Analytic Reasoning Skills Through Pair Problem Solving." *Thinking and Learning Skills*. Ed. Segal, Chipman, and Glaser. Hillside NJ: L. Erlbaum. (pp. 109-131).
- Matlin, M.W. (1994). *Cognition*. Geneseo NY: Harcourt Brace Publishers.
- Paul, R. (1990). *Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs to Survive in a Rapidly Changing World*. Rohnert Park CA: Sonoma State University.
- Rorty, R. (1991). *Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers*. Vol. 2. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Searle, J.R. (1995). "Postmodernism and the Western Rationalist Tradition." *Campus Wars*. Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Ed. J. Arthur & A. Shapiro. (pp. 28-48)

- Searle, J.R. (1986). "What is a speech act?" *Critical Theory since 1965*.
Ed. Adams, H. and Searle, L.. Tallahassee: Florida State University
Press. (pp. 60-70).
- Schroeder, S. (1995). "Is Thinking a Kind of Speaking?"
Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 4. (pp. 139-150).
- Wittgenstein, L. (1963). *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. trans. Pears, D.F.
& McGuiness, B.F.. London: Routledge & Keagan Paul;
New York: Humanities Press.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1967). *Philosophical Investigations*.
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: B. Blackwell & Mott, Ltd.