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Furor as Failed *Pietas*: Roman Poetic Constructions of Madness through the Time of Virgil

> *nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forensibus neque domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio potest, in eoque et colendo sita vitae est honestas omnis et neglegendo turpitudo.*
>
> (Cic. *off.* 1.2.4)

> *religionem eam quae in metu et caerimonia deorum sit appellant, pietatem quae erga patriam aut parentes aut alios sanguine coniunctos officium conservare moneat.*
>
> (Cic. *inv.* 2.22.66)

In Catullus's Attis poem, 'perhaps the most remarkable poem in Latin', a mythic acolyte of Cybele castrates himself in a religious frenzy, *stimulatus ibi furenti rabie, vagus animis* (Cat. 63.4)[1]. Returned briefly to sanity, he laments in an apostrophe to his fatherland (*patria o mei creatrix, patria o mea genetrix* [Cat. 63.50]) all he has lost as a result of his mad action: *patria, bonis, amicis, genitoribus abero? / abero foro, palaestra, stadio et gyminasiis? / miser a miser, querendum est etiam atque etiam* (Cat. 63.59 f.). This catalogue of Attis's losses makes clear the enormity of his situation: in his *furor*, he has not suffered a simple personal catastrophe but has outcast himself from the benefits and protections of normal society, emblematized most pointedly here by the emotionally fraught icons, *patria* and *genitores*[2]. In his crazed act of devotion to the mother goddess, he has, in Roman terms, cut himself off from the sober nexus of *officia* (child *erga patrem* and *propinquos*, citizen *erga patriam*) that underlie and constitute the proper balance between the individual and his society.

In a roughly contemporaneous description of the Mother Goddess's cult, after presenting an arresting mythological tableau of Cybele's powers over and within nature, Lucretius adds two euhemerizing glosses. Cybele is characteristically accompanied by lions, he explains, to convey the moral that *quamvis effera proles / officiis debet molliri victa parentum* (Lucr. 2.604 f.). Translation of these lines will vary depending on whether one construes *parentum* as a subjective or objective genitive: 'However fierce the offspring, it should be subdued and tamed …' [subjective genitive] 'by the "gentle care" of its parents (Leonard – Smith 1942, *ad l.*)', as opposed to [objective genitive] 'by obligations to its parents'. The former interpretation would stress the gentling of the lions through Cybele's maternal fostering, while the latter would ascribe the gentling effect to the lions' sense of duty toward their divine mistress. The syntactical ambiguity highlights the standard mutuality of relations based on *officium*: 'However fierce the offspring, it should be subdued and tamed by care given both by and to parents' – in other words, 'by the mutual obligatedness of parents and children'. The second gloss attributes the

[1] Quinn 1973, 282, echoing Sellar 1905, 461.
[2] Cf. Sellar 1905, 461.

connection of eunuch priests with the fertility goddess's cult to a considered societal calculation that *numen qui violarint / matris et ingrati genitoribus inventi sint, / significare volunt indignos esse putandos, / vivam progeniem qui in oras luminis edant* (Lucr. 2.614-7). Again the mutual obligation of parents and children is stressed: those who have shown insufficient honor to mother goddess and to parents should be barred from bringing children into the world. Both euhemerisms are anthropologically naïve – most notable, perhaps, for their anomalous injection into the ecstatic Phrygian religious landscape of the concept of *pietas*.

In another context, Lucretius alludes to the *furor* and *rabies* of erotic madness, which he conceives as a very bodily phenomenon:

> *tandem ubi se erupit nervis collecta cupido,*
> *parva fit ardoris violenti pausa parumper.*
> *inde redit rabies eadem et furor ille revisit,*
> *cum sibi quid cupiant ipsi contingere quaerunt,*
> *nec reperire malum id possunt quae machina vincat ...*
> (Lucr. 4.1115-9)

The compulsion is material (*nervis collecta cupido*), biologically-rooted, animalistic, and deeply disruptive of the serene rationality prized by the author. Orgasm brings only a brief respite (*parva…pausa*) from insanity, before the *cupido* collects itself again and returns, in an endless cycle of bouts of *furor/rabies*. Escapable only through diversion of the mind to philosophical contemplation, this lust reduces the one in its grip to a condition in which *languent officia atque aegrotat fama vacillans* (Lucr. 4.1124). The inverse connection between *furor* and *officia* is again evident: when no *machina* can be found to turn men's eyes away from their hormonally-triggered personal desires (*quid cupiant*), their *officia* – as embodied in the nexus of social obligations that relies on their focusing their attentions outward, rather than inward – are bound to suffer.

Before Lucretius's time, Caecilius, the 2nd century BC comic poet, had similarly described the plight of the unfortunate man under the sway of erotic *furor*: *hic amet, familiae fame pereant, ager autem stet sentibus* (Pall. 218-19R[3] = 208W): the families of those overcome by love will perish of hunger, their fields bristling with briars. Again we may note the characteristic turn of the Roman mind to the harm inflicted on social order (as embodied in family, economic productivity, and *officia*) by the self-absorption associated with erotic passion[3].

There is significant parallelism between the morning-after return to lucidity of Catullus's Attis and the moment in Book 12 of the *Aeneid* when Turnus at last begins to break free of the effects of the firebrand of madness hurled at him by the Fury Allecto in Book 7[4]:

> *obstipuit varia confusus imagine rerum*

[3] The topic appears again in *Eclogue* 2, where an enamored shepherd chides himself for similarly mad inattention to duty: *a Corydon, Corydon, quae te dementia cepit? / semiputata tibi frondosa vitis in ulmo est* (Verg. *ecl.* 2.69 f.).

[4] Hershkowitz 1998, 68-75.

> *Turnus et obtutu tacito stetit; aestuat ingens*
> *uno in corde pudor mixtoque insania luctu*
> *et furiis agitatus amor et conscia virtus.*
> *ut primum discussae umbrae et lux reddita menti,*
> *ardentis oculorum orbis ad moenia torsit*
> *turbidus eque rotis magnam respexit ad urbem.*
> (Verg. *Aen.* 12.665-71)

The hero is pictured here groping from the fog of madness – *toward* sanity, but still confused, conflicted, and dissociated from reality. A chiastic mix of passions battles for his heart: *pudor* versus *insania*, enraged love versus a rational conception of self-virtue[5]. Hershkowitz explicates Turnus's awakening both psychologically and in relation to its literary forebears. Here, I stress simply that Turnus's first act when the light returns to his mind (*Aen.* 12.669) is to twist his gaze to the walls (*moenia)*, to look back at the great city (*magnam…urbem*). The mention of walls and city are not casual markers of Turnus's physical location at the moment his sanity returns. They are, rather, earnest and powerful emblems for the proper direction of Roman attention. Indeed, "to return one's gaze to the state" could (set in fictive capital letters) be taken as a symbolic aphorism expressive of *pietas* – the title of a Roman morality play[6].

Taken together, these assorted passages suggest that an opposition of madness, viewed as an *ipso facto* self-absorbed condition, and sanity, which duly fixes its gaze outside of itself, on parents, forebears, and the walls of state, is at the very core of Roman poetic portrayals of mad characters. Critics often observe that an opposition of *furor* and *pietas* is central to the themes of Virgil's *Aeneid* (see below, especially pp. 222-3), but examination of the works of Virgil's poetic predecessors reveals that they too work from a deeply-rooted cultural schema that conceptualizes *furor* less as what a modern sensibility would label insanity or mental illness than as a passion-fueled state antithetical to social order, able to be held in check only by rigorous adherence to the duty-oriented cultural code of *pietas*.

An early 20th-century study of madness in ancient literature set the tone for much analysis of the Roman poets' portrayals of madness, focusing prejudicially on what they do *not* do:

> It will be seen that the Roman tragedians were not interested in inquiring into the nature of madness for the sheer interest of the speculation, nor did they try, as the three great Greeks seem to have done, to fit the phenomena of madness into the scheme of a conception of the world as a whole. The Romans simply presented the surface of things, and even the details of this surface do not vary greatly from their Greek models. We shall find this in general fairly true of all the presentations of madness henceforth;

[5] Cf. Hershkowitz 1998, 85 s.

[6] Hershkowitz 1998, 83, n. 35, points out further that the verb *respicio* itself may connote a 'return to duty' (LS s.v. *respicio*, II.B.2). Throughout the epic, of course, Virgil uses *moenia* as a metonymy for city or state, especially in the contexts of the city's founding or defense. See, e.g. Schork 1986, 264-6.

> they are rather recombinations of surface detail than organic structures formed, by speculation on the nature of madness, from within[7].

There is truth here, but it fails to get to the heart of what the Roman poets *did* stress about madness. O'Brien-Moore falls into the trap described by Garrison in another context as «criticizing the poets for not doing what they never intended to do in the first place»[8]. As a general rule, although Republican and early Augustan Roman poets were obviously aware of a variety of medical types of insanity or mental disturbances, they were not concerned in their poetry to plumb these conditions' aetiology or symptomology[9]. Instead, they focused on a social effect common to them all – that the disturbed person dissociates to a greater or lesser extent from others and, in the self-centered state resulting from that dissociation, becomes incapable of the outward direction demanded by the social compact. In Freudian terms, one might say they saw madness as a forcible separation from the superego, a malign spiral into an *id*-like state antithetical to the key Roman values of *pietas* and *gravitas*. And, *pace* O'Brien-Moore, in this sense, they very definitely did «fit the phenomena of madness into the scheme of a conception of the world as a whole».

In converse, from this negative argument – that madness impairs one's ability to maintain a proper relationship with those outside of oneself (family, state) through the nexus of obligation embodied by *pietas* – one can construct a positive (if general) definition of *sanity*: that sanity is the ability to maintain a healthy balance, heavily weighted toward social *desiderata*, between one's own individual desires (Lucretius's *quid cupiant*) and one's obligations to others.

It may seem inane, when abnormal psychology by definition means that the mad deviate from social norms, to find special significance in Roman poetic images of the mad deviating from social norms. However, the poets' resolutely moralized 'reading' of madness in terms of a *pietas-impietas* construct explains a great deal both about what is missing from Roman poetic descriptions of the phenomenon and about what is stressed in them. In broad summation, those whom a modern sensibility would label as clinically or intractably mentally ill do not compel the poets' interest, because their illness exempts them in a sense from moral strictures; what is more interesting to the poets is the line between the normal and the abnormal – the point at which a normal human tendency to excess, passion, self-indulgence and egoism breaks loose of all normal human controls, where *id* overwhelms both

[7] O'Brien-Moore 1924, 162.

[8] Garrison 1978, 14.

[9] O'Brien-Moore 1924, 20-66, has a still-valuable discussion on medical conceptions of madness in both Greek and Roman societies, as well as their appearance especially in comic texts. He notes the general belief that madness, like physical illness, was caused by an imbalance among the humors (especially an excess of black bile) and that its treatment was based on purgation (especially through the aid of the drug hellebore) and goes on to comment, sensibly, that the confinement of this conception to «literature of the lower order» is understandable, given that «the spectacle of a man afflicted with a superfluity of black bile does not arouse emotions of pity and terror. To be heroic, madness must be awful, and the awful demands an awful cause. This [sc. possession by a supernatural power] … elevated literature supplied. But that which derogates from the dignity of man is the very substance of Comedy...», 38.

ego and superego, leading to the kind of unharnessed flight achieved when *nous* drops the reins, and the horses run wild.

In this essay, my primary critical approach is to focus on what has been called «the *poetics* of madness, … the meaning created *by* madness in the texts under investigation», rather than on the «*meaning* of madness»[10]; my analyses will also necessarily draw from a historicist fount, as I make the case that the 'sanity' that the poets counterpose to the *furor / insania* they delineate is the very culturally-specific notion of Roman *pietas*. Discussions will end with Virgil for two reasons: because, literarily, as O'Brien-Moore and others have noted, once the *Aeneid* was written, Roman poetic descriptions of madness seem in large part to have been in conversation with it, rather than to have drawn spontaneously from a later poet's personal experience or conceptions of madness; and because the theory put forward here is conditioned on notions of *pietas* grounded specifically in the cultural values and sociopolitical assumptions of Republican Rome. All would become more complicated when the societal factors that gave rise to that notion underwent sea change in a post-Augustan era. Discussion here will also focus on higher forms of poetry, to the exclusion of comedy or satire, from a sense (as outlined above, note 9) that the vernacular view of madness in those genres is different in kind from that in higher genres: more reflective of every-day, prosaic assumptions concerning medical conceptions of mental illness; less integrated with the thematic concerns of the poems they appear in.

Moralized Madness.

A first corollary to an assertion that the Roman poets read madness as a pathological descent into egoism is that they concomitantly laid more emphasis on characters being *maddened* than on their being *mad*[11]. They viewed madness, this is to say, as a «surrender to emotional forces, following inner conflict» – a state that any sane person may devolve into, given the right (or wrong) circumstances[12].

Because this madness is open to all, it is in turn subject to moral judgment:

> This kind of madness is not the 'raving' insanity, involving fundamental changes in physical state and perception, that is a recurrent feature of, for instance, Greek tragedy, but a more fully psychologised, and moralised, madness[13].

The morality at play has affinities to Roman Stoic philosophy but should more properly be affiliated to Roman Republican vernacular thought, which privileged the duty-oriented virtues of *gravitas* and *pietas* and preached resistance to the passions in their role as likely disrupters of or distractors from those virtues. Poets are not

[10] Hershkowitz 1998, 14-6.

[11] I am not thinking here of the common trope of the onslaught of mantic inspiration. Although every Roman epic poet from Virgil on pulled out all virtuoso stops to pictorialize the violent physical symptoms associated with that type of possession, these descriptions are effectively set-pieces.

[12] Gill 1997b, 213.

[13] Gill 1997b, 213 f.

philosophers; their thought-world is likely to partake eclectically of a variety of philosophical theories[14]. More precisely, perhaps, we should view vernacular thought as an amalgam that can accommodate a multitude of diverse theoretical constructs and at any given point and for any given poetic purpose draw inconsonant, even clashing, elements from the mass without blinking an eye. Put another way, and with the question of interplay between vernacular thought and philosophy perhaps turned the right way round, Romans seem generally to have privileged *gravitas* and dutifulness and to have recognized the danger to those values posed by strong passions. After philosophers undertook to analyze and abstract these cultural propensities in order to construct theoretical creeds concerning right living, some people validated their preference for a life based on rationality and moderation by turning to Stoic doctrine, some by adopting tenets of Epicureanism; most undoubtedly maintained their cultural attitudes without conscious reference to any philosophic dogma, and with significantly more complexity and contradiction than any philosophy could take account of.

Erotic Furor.

A second vital corollary to a conception of madness as a form of egoism is that *erotic* madness is not just a metaphorical by-path for the Roman poets. Literary commentators tend to speak of erotic madness in terms of metaphor, or a common 'rhetorical exaggeration' – as if applying the concept of madness to love is (or was in the first place) but a figure of speech, a flourish born of an artful switch from one semantic field to another, insanity to insane love[15]. Cairns puts the case like this: «The point of both the erotic and the philosophical comparisons [love to madness] was to stress the seriousness of what was in fact a non-pathological state of mind by equating it with mental conditions actually requiring medical attention»[16]. Certainly in a given text the metaphor might have the effect Cairns formulates here, but in origin the conception of love as madness arises less from a comparison of love to clinical mental illness than from stress on the hormonal and accordingly anti-rational character of desire, which has similar social effects as clinical mental illness: it robs its victim of the outward focus demanded by the social compact. The concept of

[14] For a sensitive account of the *caveats* to be observed by critics who seek to analyze poetry by reference to contemporary philosophical views, see Gill 1997b, 230-4, 240 n. 102; see also Galinsky 1988, 328. Roman vernacular thought obviously shares much with the tenets of Stoic philosophy, but Gill 1997a, 5, notes interplay in the *Aeneid* between the Aristotelian approach, which 'graded' emotions as «good or bad according to their appropriateness to the situation», and the Stoic view, which was that «*all* emotions (as normally understood) are bad; they are all 'passions', in the sense of being affective states which overwhelm and disrupt human rationality». Gill also points out that «both the Stoic and Epicurean theories present intense, violent emotions as a product of misguided beliefs about the proper goals of a human life» (10). As a critic whose training focuses much more heavily on the reading of poetry than on philosophy, my personal tendency is to pick out 'cultural information' from the texts rather than identifying 'philosophical influences' on them.

[15] The quoted phrase is from O'Brien-Moore 1924, 8.

[16] Cairns 1974, 102.

erotic madness is thus every bit as primary, or 'original', as a conception of madness as clinical mental illness[17].

Most fundamentally, Cairns's assumption that love is a 'non-pathological state of mind' should be recognized as a false tenet, in the poets' thought-world. Rather, they viewed erotic desire as an *Ur*-madness – and as an easily appreciable conceptual model against which other forms of madness could be measured.

Lucretius's picturing of sexual passion as an overpowering physiological force that effectively robs a man of his deliberative faculties makes it apparent that the Romans, like the Greeks, remained persistently conscious of «the love which destroys»[18]. In this, they are essentially unlike post-romantic readers of poetry, who, «as inhabitants of an emotionally more regulated civilization … are likely to find the convulsive potency of such love difficult to identify with their own experience, and to accept instead more readily digestible formulations»[19]. In other words, while modern Western readers of love poetry are likely to tout love's delights in a context of romance, courtesy, and privileging of individual personal experience, classical poets more fundamentally feared its consuming anti-social power. This difference should never be underestimated – and as modern readers of Roman poetry we should always be alert to ways in which we tend to 'hear' the classical authors' statements on love in a manner that is fundamentally anachronistic.

The pre-sentimentalized classical notion that *amor* is, at base, an animalistic urge with intense destructive potential accounts for the consensus among all the major Hellenistic philosophical traditions (Stoicism, Epicureanism, Cynicism) that this passion is a disruption to be avoided at all costs[20]. The hormonal and uncontrollable madness it brings is in no way a pretty or romantic conceit. Rather, it is extra-rational and pre-civilized – the very typology from which poetic conceptions of other kinds of madness are drawn – and an equal-opportunity bestower of the essentially antisocial experience of *furor*.

Modern science will inform us that hormones' effects on the human body include sexual arousal and control of the reproductive cycle generally, as well as 'fight or flight' reactions. The Roman poets did not have access to this scientific formulation, but they did share in a common-sense understanding that there were involuntary physiological forces that impelled human behavior and posed an essential threat to *ratio* and *consilium*. They conceptualized these as 'passions' (things suffered) and in poetic renditions normally externalized them as arising from outside the human being, attributable to the arbitrary or quixotic intercession of a variety of divine

[17] In a different context, Kennedy 1993, 52, argues against making a distinction between the literal and the metaphorical that «suggests that some uses of language are somehow more basic than others, that where the 'same' word can be used in two different contexts, for example love and war, one of these, the one that gets called the 'literal' use, must be in some way prior or more important; it becomes the 'normal' usage, against which all other usages of the word are 'secondary', 'figurative' or 'metaphorical'». This caution may at times be overplayed but is especially well placed in considering the equation, love = madness.

[18] Garrison 1978, 1.

[19] Garrison 1978, 1.

[20] Garrison 1978, 2, 4-7. Cf. Gill (above, n. 14).

agents (most notably Venus or Cupid for sexual desire, Mars for male aggression)[21]. These forces are the essence of *furor*, which is cast by the poets in large part as irrational capitulation to universal, biological/divine forces that resist human control and are antithetical to *pietas*.

In other words, *pace* Cairns and others, the Roman poets do not start from an image of a mental pathology such as schizophrenic or paranoid delusions and argue that the person in love is as *amens* as the person who suffers from one of those abnormal mental conditions. Rather, they start from an image of a universal drive to orgasm and argue that going mad is like surrendering completely, disastrously, and in all contexts to that egoistic drive, arriving at an ultimate point where the kind of amoral and antisocial effects on one's life described by Caecilius (above, page 192) become irreducible.

This hypothesis is supported by elements of the Latin vocabulary that intrinsically connect animal 'heat' to human madness. Indeed, though the figure *ignes amoris* (along with any of the multiple words or phrases shared between the semantic fields of 'love' and 'heat') is so commonplace today as to count as almost a dead metaphor, in and of itself it evokes violent (destructive and self-destructive) physical as well as mental symptoms associated with hormonally-based sexual arousal. Pre-prettification – and the prettification obviously began as soon as 'love poets', whether Greek or Roman, put pen to paper – this figure implies estrus or rut more fundamentally than it does 'love'[22]. In the human realm, these fires can connote not just passionate emotional attachment to a lover, but also the kind of sociopathic impulsiveness ascribed by Accius to the mythic Thracian king, Tereus:

> *Tereus indomito more atque animo barbaro*
> *conspexit in eam; amore vecors flammeo,*
> *depositus, facinus pessimum ex dementia*
> *confingit.* (Accius 639-42W)

The madness (*vecordia*, *dementia*) and fires of love (*amor flammeus*) that impel this rapist to his *facinus pessimum* are hormonal and unthinking – reflective of an animalistic, instinctual, extra-rational urge to procreation, and in essential tension with the prescripts of human civilization.

[21] When in 1905 Ernest Henry Starling, an English physiologist, discovered secretin, he coined its generic name, 'hormone', one may presume, through deliberate analogy to the Stoic term *hormê* ('a rushing upon', or 'assault'), which designated appetition, or impulse to action (whether voluntary or involuntary). By a wonderful concatenation of ancient and modern philosophy / biology / etymology, Starling's discovery can be retroactively applied back to the philosophy from which he drew its name, in order to elucidate the nature of the passions the Stoics sought to understand.

[22] Sappho (130LP) and Catullus c. 51 provide images of the hormonal effects of love that in a sense start the prettification process rolling and have been justly approved by romantics throughout the ages. Nonetheless, as noted by Carson 1986, 4, the hormonal love described by Sappho is a hostile onslaught in conflict with reason or will: «Eros moves or creeps upon its victim from somewhere outside her: *orpeton*. No battle avails to fight off that advance: *amachanon*. Desire, then, is neither inhabitant nor ally of the desirer. Foreign to her will, it forces itself irresistibly upon her from without».

A technical term for animal heat in females, strictly (and perhaps etymologically) applied to pigs (*sues*), was *subo / -are*. Though this technical term sits more comfortably in the sphere of prose, it does appear twice in poetry – once referring literally to animal heat in Lucretius, once transferred maliciously to a human female in Horace's X-rated twelfth epode[23].

In the former locus, *subo/subare* references the season in which female animals welcome male mounting (*nec ratione alia volucres armenta feraeque / et pecudes et equae maribus subsidere possent, / si non, ipsa quod illarum subat ardet abundans / natura et Venerem salientum laeta retractat* [Lucr. 4.1197-1200]). By pairing the technical prosaic term (*subat*) with a term from the semantic field of high temperature (*ardet*) that sits equally comfortably in the spheres of both prose and poetry, Lucretius stresses the physical heat or 'fire' generated by sexual arousal.

In Horace's unkind epode, the notion of animal heat is transferred into the human sphere. A less than youthful woman is excoriated for her unappealing physical attributes and repulsive strainings toward orgasm after her partner has already gone limp: *qui sudor vietis et quam malus undique membris / crescit odor, cum pene soluto / indomitam properat rabiem sedare; neque illi / iam manet umida creta colorque / stercore fucatus crocodili, iamque subando / tenta cubilia tectaque rumpit!* (Hor. *epod.* 12.7-12). The satirized woman is viewed as so violently in heat (*subando*) that the *indomita rabies* of her approach to orgasm causes her to break her bed. The image of her pointedly and paradoxically 'playing the pig' amid *tenta cubilia tectaque* (rather than in a sty) clearly affiliates her particular *rabies* with reversion to animalism and a concomitant loss of the human capacity for *mens*[24]. Indeed, *Epodes* 12 is marked by an extraordinary zoological plenitude: eleven more animals (besides the pig etymologically implicit in *subando*) are metaphorically in bed with the poet and his sweating partner: the *nigri barri* he considers her worthy of, a *polypus* and a *gravis hircus* he has scented in her armpits more surely than a *canis acer* can sniff out a *sus*, *stercus crocodile* used as make-up and dripping off her sweating face, a *taurus* (well, actually the *taurus* is *not* in the bed – the woman just wishes the poet were more like one), and an *agna* and *capreae* who flee *lupos* and *leones* no less strenuously than the fastidious poet flees this particular bedmate. All in all, the effect of both the imagery and the woman's own libidinous behavior is to stress that her erotic *rabies* is conceived by the poet as a base reversion to animalism and particularly to an instinctual, hormonal urge. Indeed, this snapshot of the supremely egoistic moment leading up to orgasm can be taken as more generally iconic for the abeyance of mind that characterizes *furor* and *rabies*.

[23] *OLD*, *s.v.*, connects *subo* as well to Greek *sybax* ('swinish') and *sybas* ('lustful'). A parallel verb, *surio / -ire*, also related to *sus* (see *OLD*, *ad l.)*, describes male sexual excitement. Grassman 1966, 79, suggests that the word originally referred to the rutting of female animals, and the connection to *sus* was made later through folk-etymology. Beyond the Lucretian and Horatian uses, the word appears at Plin. *nat.* 10.181 and in a number of late sources.

[24] Grassmann 1966, 79 s., declares that Horace's transferral of *subando* to a human subject «bleibt … ohne Parallel», as only in Horace does the topic extend beyond an assertion of general libidinousness to «tollwütiges und gefährliches Benehmen, wie es Plinius bei den brünstigen Schweinen beschreibt»; he further notes a possible recall of this passage at Petron. 2.3.5 (though *subo* does not appear in the latter).

Even when prosaic technical terms for animal heat are missing, that biological topic is evoked by clusterings of words suggestive of high temperature, burning, and insanity. Both female and male compulsion toward sex is described poetically through terms such as *ardeo*, *caleo, flagro, furo*, and *rabio,* terms that affiliate this compulsion not only with physical warmth but with irresistible biological or cosmic forces and madness, as well as (in converse) with lack of the rational and moral faculty that distinguishes the 'better' side of human nature. Virgil pairs fire and madness in his description of animal heat in the *Georgics*: *omne adeo genus in terris hominumque ferarumque / et genus aequoreum, pecudes pictaeque volucres, / in furias ignemque ruunt: amor omnibus idem (geo.* 3.242-4 [the full description extends to line 283]). In Horace's *carm.*1.25.13 f., a toned-down poetic treatment of the topic of *Epodes* 12, terms for heat and animal madness pile one on another in the poet's description of the time in a courtesan's life when youthful beauty has faded, and she has become notable only for her unbridled libido – when *flagrans amor et libido, / quae solet matres furiare equorum, / saeviet circa iecur ulcerosum* (Hor. *carm.*1.25.13-5). Pliny applies the concept of madness to the sexual drive of male animals when he describes the substance hippomanes as impelling *mares equos ad rabiem coitus* (*nat.* 28.181) and again shortly after that when he refers to *rabiem hircorum* (*nat*. 28.198).

These and similar linguistic groupings of terms for madness with terms that denote an animalistic procreative impulse support, at the level of basic vocabulary, a conclusion that for the Romans the metaphor of the fires of love triggered schemata concerning animal "heat" or mating season more fundamentally than they evoked a sentimentalized *ardor mentis*. As a result, identification of the hormonal, mindless, and anti-rational character of sexual compulsion was one of the basic conceptual springboards from which the Romans, in turn, would conceptualize *non*-erotic madness.

The Vocabulary of Madness.

Beyond the connections between the vocabularies of madness and animal season just discussed, a brief etymological examination of a variety of terms for madness in Latin may be useful. *Sanus* and its cognates are the chief terms relating to sanity or insanity as a condition of human health[25]. Two other sets of terms for mental instability (*amens / amentia / demens / dementia* and *vecors / vecordia*) focus on what the mad person *lacks*: to wit, the particular human moral qualities of rationality and discretion – the qualities that differentiate humankind from mineral, vegetable,

[25] S*anus* refers primarily to physical soundness and health and secondarily to soundness of mind – probably reflecting an original lack of differentiation between the two spheres. *Mens sana in corpore sano*: while a modern sensibility may hear in Juvenal's famous phrase a marriage of two separate spheres (physical, mental), etymologically and temporally it seems to emerge from a time before those two spheres were fully differentiated. The negatives of *sanus* (*insanus/insania/insanire, vesanus/vesania/vesanire*), on the other hand, early on specialized to the mental sphere, referring specifically to mental incapacity, rather than to general ill health (Paschall 1939, 70). Nonetheless, the semantic field for Latin "insanity" was significantly broader than a simple clinical application, connoting not only unsoundness of mind, dementia, mania, and delusion, but also moral failings like imprudence, extravagance and excessive desire.

and the rest of the animal world[26]. A third set of Latin terms for madness (including, most notably, *furor* and *rabies* and their cognates) is etymologically distinguishable in making an affirmative case for what the mad person is *like*: a wild animal, a raging storm. Regrettably, tracing this last set of terms to their Indo-European origins is a complex and conjectural process. It seems safe to say, however, that *rabies* implies ravening qualities shared with wild animals, while *furor* connects human behavior either to wild animals or to untamed forces of nature[27]. At any rate, the affirmative case made by these terms comes to the same point as the negative terms (e.g. *amens*, *vecors*), as both pull the mad person away from the sphere of normal human society and its prescripts for civilized behavior: either he is lacking in *mens* or *cor*, or he resembles something non-human and is therefore exempt from human moral prescripts. It was perhaps a sense of the non-humanity etymologically intrinsic to the word *furor* that led to its use as a technical legal term for madness: because the *furiosus* had lost *mens* or *cor* to such an intractable point as to be more like a tempest or other uncontrollable natural phenomenon – because he had lost capacity to draw on human moral power to conform to social expectations – his situation in society could be recouped only by appointment of a guardian to manage his human affairs[28].

Until such point as a person came so irreducibly under the sway of raging impulses as to be deemed legally *furiosus*, however, affliction with *furor* seems to have been generally conceptualized as surrender to a non-permanent, passion-driven condition. Korpanty applies this premise in arguing that Virgilian *furor* points less to basic unsoundness of mind (*Unzurechnungsfähigkeit*), than to more temporary lapses of control (*einen momentanen Zustand unbeherrschter Leidenschaft*) that overwhelm will and reason[29], but the principle does not apply to Virgil alone. It is

[26] To be 'without *mens* (mind)' or 'without *cor* (heart)' was essentially to act unreasonably or uncontrollably: the *mens* was (per *LS*, *ad l.*) not only the seat of the intellectual faculties, but also the locus for conscience, discretion, and rationality; similarly, the *cor* was considered (per *LS*, *ad l.*) not only 'the chief source of blood circulation', but also the 'seat of wisdom, heart, mind, judgment'. For a special connection between *amentia* and the passions, see note 89 below.

[27] *Rabies/rabidus/rabiosus* (connected to proto-Indo-European *labh* [cf. Greek *lambanein*] or *rep* II (cf. Latin *rabere/rapere*) are most commonly taken as referring fundamentally to animal rapaciousness or savagery and to emphasizing the animalistic qualities of human beings to whom they are applied. The etymology of *furor* and its cognates is significantly (and frustratingly) more obscure: *OLD* connects it to Norwegian *bûre*, 'bellow', and Old Church Slavonic *burja* ('tempest'), while *LS* cites a possible connection to Greek *thêr* and Latin *fera*; alternately, Shipley 1984, 70, connects it to the proto-Indo-European root *dheu* I ('smoke', 'dust'), relating it to the Greek *thuos* and the Latin *fumus*, and positing an etymological connection to «excesses after inhaling incense at sacrificial festivals, as of the Bacchants». See respective discussions in Walde 1938 and Walde 1954, s.v.

[28] Legal uses go back as far as the Twelve Tables (V.7) – *Si furiosus escit, adgnatum gentiliumque in eo pecuniaque eius potestas esto* – and continue through classical and later law (Paschall 1939, 44 s.).

[29] Korpanty 1985, 251. Padel 1995, 30 and *passim*, argues that Greek tragic madness is also by nature 'temporary': «Like emotion, madness comes in from outside: divine, malign, autonomous … It is not a long-term attribute, but temporary activity in which innards move, change, wander, twist, are goaded and filled with blackness». Nonetheless, there is qualitative difference between onslaughts of madness in Greek tragedy and those in Roman poetry, with the former weighted toward the clinical, the latter toward the moral. An informal way to capture some of the essential

integrally intertwined with the Roman poets' moralized conception of passion-triggered madness.

Tragic Fragments.

It is a shame that the fragmentary nature of early Roman poetry precludes any but the most tentative conjectures about archaic uses of the topic of madness. Manuwald says of Roman tragedy that its «general 'Roman perspective'» dictated plot selection because the tragedians «dealt with fundamental moral, social or political issues pertinent to Roman society....»[30]. She adds that «tragedies presented stories that paradigmatically showed Roman moral values such as virtue, justice, piety and gratitude»[31]. In this context, it is certainly notable that titles within the Roman tragic corpus reveal strong recurrent interest in Greek stories of mad characters: O'Brien-Moore cites eleven plays «in which madness probably or surely occurred»[32].

Among these, it is notable that a passage from Ennius's *Alcumeo* suggests interest in clinical madness (*sed mihi ne utiquam cor consentit cum oculorum / aspectu* [frag. 37W]), but even as it does, its first-person cast focuses attention on the characteristic Roman absorption with the moment of maddening (or, conversely, the moment of emergence from madness, a moment common to the narratives of Attis and Turnus) – that is, on the fluid intersection between sanity and insanity.

Also of interest is Ennius's characterization of Cassandra as an inhibited Roman *virgo* ashamed of the effects of her peculiar mantic capacity on her mother, father, and peers: *virgines vereor aequalis, patris mei meum factum pudet / optumi viri. Mea mater, tui me miseret, mei piget* (Ennius, *Alexander*, 62-63W). As O'Brien-Moore has remarked, «the Roman ideals of gravitas and pudor made it difficult to deal with a frenzied priestess»[33]. The Romans' tendency to moralize madness is clearly reflected in Cassandra's embarrassment.

Most suggestive, perhaps, are the five tragedies (Naevius, *Lycurgus*; Accius, *Bacchae*; Pacuvius, *Pentheus*; two versions of *Athamas,* by Ennius and Accius) that focus on the episodic frenzy associated with orgiastic ecstasy and the essential social disruptiveness of maenadism. The Roman Senate banned Bacchic rites, alarmed by them and what they perceived as 'an accompanying crime wave', in 186 BC, seventeen years before Ennius's death and sixteen before Accius's birth[34]. The

difference between Greek and Roman approaches to madness might be to say that, while a modern reader may set down Euripides's *Heracles* and begin a series of musings about which DSM-classified mental illness the hero was afflicted with, and the precise nature of the delusions under which he murdered his children, the reader of Catullus's Attis poem or of Dido's or Turnus's madness in the *Aeneid* will leave the text struck, rather, by the vulnerability of all humankind to the excesses and deranged behaviors born of orgiastic enthusiasms, of desire, whether erotic or political, or of anger.

30 Manuwald 2011, 135.

31 Manuwald 2011, 135.

32 O'Brien-Moore 1924, 155: Livius Andronicus, *Aiax Mastigoferus*; Naevius, *Lycurgus*; Ennius, *Aiax*, *Alcumeo, Alexander*, *Athamas*, *Eumenides*; Pacuvius, *Pentheus*; Accius, *Alcimeo*, *Athamas*, *Bacchae*.

33 O'Brien-Moore 1924, 161.

34 *OLD*, s.v. *Bacchanalia*.

Senate's edict effectively outlawed congregations of more than five people (two men and/or three women) for religious rites, making transgressions a *rem caputalem*[35]. Neither this estop order nor the associated persecutions prevented the tragedians from presenting the myths on stage.

Although, as O'Brien-Moore points out, extant tragic fragments are not sufficient to tell us whether «the Romans would have regarded the bacchic ecstasy in itself, unaccompanied by other acts of obvious madness – as when Agave and Athamas kill their children – as mad or simply foreign», the frequency with which the tragedians turn to this topic attests to its fascination for them[36]. Feder points out both that tales of Dionysiac frenzy and rites are «…an expression of an emerging stage in human mental history, marked by an increasing consciousness of self-regulation and social responsibility…» and that «…Dionysus or his prototype is clearly a projection of both wish and prohibition»[37]. In this context, one can readily conjecture that Greek tales on the theme of individuals reacting against social pressures – where, for example, *omnis stirpe cum incluta Cadmeide / vagant matronae percitatae insania* (Accius, *Bacchae*, 201-202W) – would pique Roman interest and absorb both authors and audiences in negotiating the psychosocial ground between id and superego, between desire and obligation, between individualism and social restrictions. It is somewhat harder to imagine that anything from Roman tragedy would have prepared the Roman audience for either the theme of self-castration or its auto-allegorical applications in Catullus 63.

Catullus.

Gill remarks on the "striking" general absence of the language of madness from Catullus's presentation of his obsessive and 'akratic' love for Lesbia[38]. This is an interesting observation but bears further examination. Indeed, as a number of previous critics have demonstrated, a major purpose of c. 63 and others of the 'long poems' is to graft the topic of erotic madness (and specifically akratic erotic madness) onto the poet's experience of his love for his mistress. A less recognized aspect of Catullus's work is the care he takes to set this akratic madness into contrast with orthodox Republican conceptions of *pietas*.

In one of the 'kiss poems' ascribable to the rosiest stage of his relationship with Lesbia, the poet describes himself as *vesanus* (Cat. 7.10). The epithet is specifically connected to and connotative of sexual insatiability: only an infinite number of kisses (likened in two *adynata* to the enumeration of grains of sand in the desert and of the stars in heaven) could satiate his desire: *tam te basia multa basiare / vesano satis et super Catullo est* (Cat. 7.9-10). Though this madness is vaunted here as a badge of pride, the topic of insatiability clearly affiliates it to the ever-recurring

[35] *CIL* 1.196; *ILS* 18. Liv. 39.8.3-39.9.1, gives a detailed and graphic account of the incident, which resulted in the executions of thousands of men and women. See Gruen 1990, 34-78, for discussion.

[36] O'Brien-Moore 1924, 157.

[37] Feder 1980, 48, 54, respectively.

[38] Gill 1997b, 221. Elsewhere (213 n. 2) he defines 'akratic' as referring to «that which is done against the agent's better judgement».

rabies et furor denigrated by Lucretius (see above) as afflicting lovers *cum sibi quid cupiant ipsi contingere quaerunt*.

Gill perhaps overhastily disassociates this self-diagnosed *vesania* from Catullus's akratic love, noting that it is «not linked with the inner conflict prominent in [c. 8, 72, 75, 85]», which he sees as especially expressive of the poet's inability to rid himself of a love that his better judgment tells him to let go (*quod vides perisse perditum ducas* [Cat. 8.2])[39]. But there is an intrinsic link between akratic love and the overpowering sexual drive ascribed here to *vesano Catullo*: it is exactly because mind and judgment are so readily overpowered by hormonally-induced *amentia* and *vesania* that lovers like Catullus find themselves in an akratic plight in the first place. Put conversely, the opposed sides in an akratic erotic situation are, precisely, *mens* and hormonally-induced *amentia*. Thus, Catullus's self-description as *vesanus* in this early poem is the fundamental starting-point from which the devolution of his affair from euphoric onset to the ambivalence of a love-hate relationship, and thence to self-loathing, will proceed[40].

Beyond this single reference to biologically-based *amentia*, the absence of the vocabulary of madness from the poems that portray the poet's love for Lesbia, pre-disillusionment, is readily explicable in that, at that early point in his relationship, Catullus was busy asserting that love was *not* madness, but true sanity[41]. Indeed, he effectively avers in these early snapshots of his affair, life should be led by an alternative life principle of *otium* and *facetiae* (i.e. *levitas*), rather than by the orthodoxy of *gravitas*[42]. This philosophical challenge is encapsulated in the paired 'kiss poems' (cc. 5 and 7). When Catullus adjures Lesbia to live and love (Cat. 5.1) and to discount the grumblings of the *senum severiorum* (the Stoically-inclined Establishment thinkers of his day [Cat. 5.2]), he espouses a Live-for-the-Day philosophy (*nobis cum semel occidit brevis lux, / nox est perpetuua una dormienda* [Cat. 5.5-6]) that runs counter to vernacular belief in an afterlife that will reward the dutiful[43]. However gracefully-expressed, this is a militant credo: through these

[39] Gill 1997b, 221 n. 23.

[40] C. Segal 1968, 294, notes of Catullus's self-description as *vesanus* that, «much of the power of this poem lies … between the certainty of passionate commitment and a lightning-flash illumination of the abyss over which he stands». That abyss is loss of self through capitulation to the hormonal *amentia* evoked by the topic of sexual insatiability.

[41] The only other place where Catullus directly applies the concept of madness to his love is at c. 100.7, where he refers to a *past* time when *vesana meas torreret flamma medullas*. Here, the poet retrospectively describes himself as having been hormonally insane in the early stages of the relationship. One could thus credibly argue that these two appearances of the epithet *vesanus* pointedly bookend the course of the affair. Catullus attributes hormonal *vesania* to Lesbia as well at the start of their relationship, when he states, contrafactually: *si nostri oblita taceret, / sana esset* (Cat. 83.3 f.).

[42] Explications by both Pucci 1961 and C. Segal 1970 of the counterposing of *otium* and *negotium* in c. 50 clearly illustrate Catullus's «visione anti-conformistica … che rifiuta 'scandalosamente' la morale quiritaria ed accetta polemicamente il modo di vita suburraneo» (Pucci 1961, 256) and «the distance between the poem [50] and the conventional morality of Catullus' respectable fellow citizens» (C. Segal 1970, 26).

[43] Although strict Stoicism did not normally allow for the survival of the soul after death, vernacular belief in some form of after-life was 'almost universal' (*OCD*^{2}, s.v. *after-life*). Both Orphism and the highly influential Stoic Posidonius (himself influenced by Platonic eschatology) contributed to

words, the poet has countered vernacular Roman moralism by substituting a pleasure principle for a duty principle. This philosophical challenge is, in turn, intricately intertwined throughout the Catullan corpus with the poetic challenge (living for art) posed as part of his neoteric poetic program[44].

After his love relationship has failed, the poet works through its collapse in two very different ways – directly, in alternately bitter and doleful polymetric or epigrammatic poems (most notably cc. 11, 58, and 76); indirectly and allusively through his corpus of long poems. A seminal study by Michael Putnam in 1961 limned Catullus's self-identification with both the seduced and abandoned Ariadne of c. 64 and the maddened and emasculated Attis of c. 63:

> The writing of both *63* and *64* appears detached because the stories center upon remote mythology. But in fact they are the heightened imaginative efforts of a poet who left his mark on every line and who, though deliberately disavowing actual participation in the story, tells his reader by no less obvious means than in the lyrics that these are writings of the most personal sort[45].

Ross 1975 makes a similar comparison between c. 64 and c. 68: «Poems 64 and 68 present more than ideas or generalized human emotions; the figures from myth in these poems respond to the emotions and conflicts of the poet himself»[46]. It is consequently no coincidence that the language of erotic madness cited by Gill as generally absent from poems that explicitly treat the poet's love for Lesbia pervades cc. 63 and 64. *Furor* and *rabies* (and their verbal and adjectival cognates) appear 12 times in c. 63 and 6 more in c. 64 (one of the latter in conjunction with *amens*), seven of these directly connected to Attis or Ariadne[47]. For both mythological figures, erotic *furor* is explicitly stated to have been 'gifted' by divine agents: Attis's by Cybele, Ariadne's by Cupid and Venus (*sancte puer, curis hominum qui gaudia misces / quaeque regis Golgos quaeque Idalium frondosum* [Cat. 64.95 f.]). Thus, with 'the present disguised under symbolic forms', and biology disguised as divinity, the poet implicitly ascribes erotic *furor* to himself by ascribing it to

a major upsurge in interest in first-century B.C. Rome in the idea of an after-life that rewards the virtuous (*OCD*^{2}, s.v. *afterlife*).

44 See both Pucci 1961 and C. Segal 1970 for detailed discussion of this credo; cf. also Ross 1969, 104-12, for further discussion of the vocabulary of *urbanitas*.

45 Putnam 1961, 166. Other critics too have noted the poet's concern with marriage in c. 63 and (to varying extents) his turn to 'auto-allegory' when the block-busting first-person closing of the poem (*dea, magna dea, Cybebe, dea domina Dindymi, / procul a mea tuos sit furor omnis, era, domo: / alios age incitatos, alios age rabidos* [Cat. 63.91-93]) invites precipitous reevaluation of its seemingly objective narrative. See especially Harkins 1959, Wiseman 1969, Genovese 1970, Forsyth 1970, Sandy 1971, Glenn 1973, and Rubino 1975. Rubino 1974 surprisingly dismisses the possibility of auto-allegorical interpretations of c. 63, even as his explication of the poem as centered on a Lévi-Straussian 'male-female polarity' of castrated male and castrating female deity (171) seems (at least to me) to lead right to the brink of just such conclusions.

46 Ross 1975, 17.

47 *Furor / furo:* 63.4, 38, 78, 79, 92; 64.54, 94, 124, 197, 254, 405 (opposed to *pietas*); *furibundus:* 63.31, 54; *rabies:* 63.4, 44, 57; *rabidus:* 63.38, [85 var.; *rapidus* in *OCT*], 93. Instances outside 63 and 64 include *furor / furo:* 15.14 (addressed abusively to Aurelius), 46.2 (meteorological context), 50.11 (quasi-erotic / poetic context, to Licinius), 68.129 (erotic context).

Ariadne; he implicitly ascribes religious/erotic *furor* to himself by ascribing it to Attis[48].

Fundamentally, Catullus is like Ariadne in having been seduced and abandoned, victim of a careless lover and of his/her own naïve trust in the seducer's honorable intentions. Similarly, he is like Attis in having voluntarily but akratically subjugated himself to a female 'deity' who deprives him of his selfhood:

> Nevertheless the Catullus who, disguised in the form of Ariadne, proposes herself as servant for Theseus, is the same Catullus who, transformed imaginatively into Attis, will be the perpetual devotee of the Magna Mater. In other words the mistress/servant feeling, here experienced by Ariadne, finds its heightened and extreme expression in the emasculation of Attis[49].

As a result of this madness, like both the mythological figures he empathizes with, the poet has been reduced to a life out of his own control, lived at the margins of his society.

In three other long poems, cc. 61, 62, and 68, Catullus again processes his love experience allusively, but to reverse effect – for in these poems he pictures himself influenced by the opposite of *furor.* That opposite, he makes clear, is *pietas*.

As the poet pulls himself from the morbid love graphically described in c. 76, he simultaneously 'corrects' his philosophical heterodoxy, reverting to seeing the world through more normal societal constructions: he retroactively reappraises his love in terms of a duty-principle, applies the language of *pietas* to it, and finds it sadly wanting. Ross aptly notes that throughout the epigrams Catullus applies 'the language of political alliance' to his relationship with Lesbia[50]. This pervasive topic is especially noticeable in that oh-so-unromantic line that always confounds students: *dilexi tum te non tantum ut vulgus amicam, / sed pater ut gnatos diligit et generos* (Cat. 72.3 f.). 'I loved you then not only as ordinary people love a mistress, but as a father cherishes his sons and sons-in-law': the poet's anomalous insertion into a male-female erotic relationship of a father and his male line (and through them the concept of familial *pietas*) tells the story. *He* had been willing to throw over conventional prescriptions to marry, raise a family, assume his due role as *paterfamilias*, in order to live and love with a scandalous older *matrona*. *He* had been willing to cherish her and only her, to live by an alternative life principle from that he grew up in. But now retroactive reconceptualization is at work: in Rubino's phrasing, the poet is «compelled to reinvoke many of the Roman cultural forms that he is supposed to have rejected – things like *pietas*, *fides*, and *foedus*»[51]. Rejected, he reassesses his failed relationship in terms of political *amicitia* and decides that his own *benevolentia* – the urge to treat others with respect and maintain due obligations, as defined by *pietas* – has not been reciprocated. Betrayed by *levitas*, he turns for solace to *gravitas*.

[48] Putnam 1961, 167.
[49] Putnam 1961, 178.
[50] Ross 1969, 80-95.
[51] Rubino 1975, 293.

The failed 'treaty' or *amicitia* by which Catullus has voluntarily foregone marriage and assumption of his due role as *paterfamilias* for love of Lesbia underlies his fixation on marriage throughout the corpus of his 'long poems'. This group of poems begins with two marriage hymns, cc. 61 and 62, both extolling the institution (personified as the god Hymen, to whom the hymns are sung) as the cornerstone of societal order and parsing its value in terms of its utility to both *parentes* and *patria*:

> *nil potest sine te Venus,*
> *fama quod bona comprobet,*
> *commodi capere, at potest*
> *te volente. quis huic deo*
> *compararier ausit?*
> *nulla quit sine te domus*
> *liberos dare, nec parens*
> *stirpe nitier; at potest*
> *te volente. quis huic deo*
> *compararier ausit?*
> *quae tuis careat sacris,*
> *non queat dare praesides*
> *terra finibus: at queat*
> *te volente. quis huic deo*
> *compararier ausit?*
> (Cat. 61.61-75)

The first stanza stresses the utility of marriage as a social construct (love without marriage can achieve *nil...commodi*); the posited utility is qualified immediately in moral terms (*fama quod bona comprobet*). The second and third stanzas clarify *whose* utility is at question: parents' in the second, state's in the third. The notion of parents relying on their children *(...nec parens / stirpe nitier*) glances pointedly at the utility of children to support their aging parents but also activates more general schemata suggestive of parents' strivings to improve their own socioeconomic circumstances through their daughter's marriage. This same topic accounts for the closing lines of c. 62, where the bride is cautioned that her *pietas* rests in recognizing that only a third of her virginity belongs to her, two thirds to her parents (*ex parte parentum est, / tertia pars patrist, pars est data tertia matri* [Cat. 62.62 f.]). In an easy transition from familial *pietas* to the *officia* owed to the state, the bearing of children is next conceptualized as provision of future *praesides ... finibus* (Cat. 61.72 f.). The *levitas* principle of cc. 5 and 7 is nowhere to be found in these lines, and many a romantic has responded to Catullus's words here with quiet disappointment, as if he were letting down the side or, at the very least, tailoring his 'real' opinions to fit the occasion of this occasional poem.

Yet just a little later in the poem, the language of *levitas* does intrude, delicately but surely, through consciously inverted reminiscences of Lesbia poems from the rosiest era of the romance. First, the poet asserts the primacy of the kind of love that is openly, publicly declared through legitimate marriage:

bona te Venus
iuverit, quoniam palam
quod cupis cupis, et bonum
non abscondis amorem.
(Cat. 61.195-8)

A situation in which one can openly want what he wants (*palam quod cupis cupis*), rather than hiding his love – where erotic and conjugal love join into one, and the id's impulses (*quid cupiant*) have been raised to a status approvable even by the superego – contrasts baldly with Catullus's own affair with Lesbia, which has to be kept secret from her husband (see especially c. 83), and where marriage is out of the question. Any doubt that these lines are intended to point a contrast to the poet's own love is immediately erased as the poet turns in the next lines to counting kisses: just as, in c. 7, Catullus's and Lesbia's *basiationes* were likened in number to the grains of *Libyssae harenae* (Cat. 7.3) or of the stars (*quam sidera multa, cum tacet nox, / furtivos hominum vident amores* [Cat. 7.7 f.]), in the wedding hymn a similar accounting is recommended for the passionate lovemaking of bride and groom:

ille pulveris Africi
siderumque micantium
subducat numerum prius,
qui vestri numerare volt
multa milia ludi.
(Cat. 61.199-203)

The equally passionate love-making of the two pairs of lovers, however, is quickly differentiated when the poet turns to description of the due outcome of the marriage hymn's societally acceptable sex 'play':

ludite ut lubet, et brevi
liberos date. non decet
tam vetus sine liberis
nomen esse, sed indidem
semper ingenerari.
(Cat. 61.204-8)

The 'fitting' outcome of the bride and groom's sexual enjoyment is the birth of children to perpetuate the husband's family line (*vetus…nomen*). The inversion here of the poet's own relationship with Lesbia (from hidden to public, from fruitless to useful) is sealed when he prays that the married couple's offspring, *Torquatus … parvulus*, may *dulce rideat ad patrem* (Cat. 61.209, 212). The phrase *dulce rideat* clearly recalls c. 51, where the poet is first mesmerized by a Lesbia whom he describes as *dulce ridentem* (Cat. 51.5). But the context in the wedding hymn is no longer erotic: the image of a male infant smiling *ad patrem* invokes the broader

nexus of *domus*, *parentes*, *patria* and counterpoises an *exemplum* of *gravitas* against the *levitas* of unsanctioned love[52].

Catullus's sub-collection of 'long poems' thus begins with emphatic description of the kind of socially-sanctioned love *fama quod bona comprobet.* It will end seven poems later with an elegy, c. 68, on Catullus's own *un*sanctioned love, which (unlike the loves of the marriage hymns) will result in the establishment of no *domus* and the assumption by the poet of no family *officia*. The plot of the poem involves the poet's response to his friend Manlius's request to send him poems of consolation for lost love. Cast into grief and depression by his brother's death in Troy, Catullus declines. Shortly, though (on the assumption that c. 68A and c. 68B are indeed one poem), his original demurral phases into consent, as he proceeds to thank an Allius (perhaps or perhaps not the same person as the Manlius/Mallius of c. 68A) for lending him a *domus* (68.34, 68, 144, 156) where he might rendezvous with his lover to pursue their *communes amores* (68.69) and exchange *furtiva ... munuscula* (68.145). The poem intertwines in "an experiment in complex structure" the poet's illicit love, his brother's death, and a mythological *exemplum* involving Laodamia grieving over her new husband, Protesilaus, the first Greek to die in the Trojan War[53].

Quinn says of c. 68, «Themes blend into one another, to form a sequence in which the unity is psychological rather than logical: Allius – Lesbia – Laodamia – Troy – the grave – Troy – Laodamia – Lesbia – Allius»[54]. The psychological unity revolves around the word *domus* – first mentioned, affectingly, in the context of the burial of Catullus's *domus* along with his brother in Troy[55]:

> *...o misero frater adempte mihi,*
> *tu mea tu moriens fregisti commoda, frater,*
> *tecum una tota est nostra sepulta domus,*
> *omnia tecum una perierunt gaudia nostra,*
> *quae tuus in vita dulcis alebat amor.*
> (Cat. 68.20-4 – repeated with some modification at 68.92-6)

With Catullus's brother, his family (his *domus*) dies too, especially because the poet cannot marry Lesbia and cannot imagine himself marrying anyone else – and that leads to the poem's first thematic transition. Catullus's only *domus*, thanks to the illicit love he has committed himself to, will be a *borrowed* one[56]. The borrowed

[52] Panoussi 2007, 284, notes these parallels but sees their effect (conversely to me) as hinting that «… this type of love may be as pleasurable in adultery, as in the case of our poet and his Lesbia».

[53] Quinn 1973, 373.

[54] Quinn 1973, 373.

[55] The word *domus* occurs 32 times in Catullus – all but 7 of which are in long poems treating themes of marriage.

[56] Newman 1977, 511, impressively encapsulates the themes of c. 68 into a single paragraph of a review of a Catullan edition, when he says «[Catullus] begins from the double meaning of *domina*, mistress of a house and home, and mistress of a lover. His infatuation with a *domina* in the second sense has drawn him into a situation where he can never hope for a normal Roman family life (*domus*). His *domus* can only be borrowed, his *domina* can only be mistress for him of a house which must be surrendered … Now, with his brother's death, all hope of a Roman

house, as Lyne notes, «had allowed the Catullan fancy of marriage to take shape: Catullus was the *dominus* awaiting the arrival of a beloved *domina*»[57]. Poignantly, the illusion will not endure.

The corpus of long poems, then, is opened and closed by poems featuring themes of marriage (or lack thereof), of the Roman *domus* (or lack thereof), of love in concert with or conflict with *pietas*[58]. Between these bookends, there are more poems that touch either centrally or tangentially on the topic of marriage, with clear autobiographical overtones. Most significantly for the purposes of this study, c. 63 casts Attis's self-castration in worship of Cybele as a perverse marriage to the goddess, and the masterwork and centerpiece, epyllion c. 64, encloses the tale of the unsanctified and doomed love of Ariadne for Theseus within the story of the legitimate marriage of Peleus and Thetis. In both poems, the mythic protagonists – and, by association, the poet's own *persona* – are portrayed as victims of erotic *furor*. This is where Gill is proven wrong (or only partially right), because Catullus's entire corpus of Lesbia poems and long poems is built from a deliberate contrast of the social sanity embodied in the custom of marriage and the antisocial *furor* of unsanctioned loves like his for Lesbia and Ariadne's for Theseus.

The final sections of c. 64 further substantiate the *furor-pietas* opposition. As Peleus and Thetis's wedding hymn, the Parcae sing *veridicos cantus* (64.306) predicting grim glory for the child to be born from this union (Achilles). At the close of the hymn, the poet presents a Hesiodically-gloomy contrast between the happy age of the epyllion's dramatic time (when the gods *praesentes ... ante domos invisere castas / heroum, et sese mortali ostendere coetu* [64.384 f.]) and a deteriorated present age characterized by a variety of familial perversions (brothers spilling each other's blood, children rejoicing in their parents' deaths, fathers coveting their sons' nubile wives [cf. c. 67], impious mothers befouling the Penates by seducing innocent sons [64.399-404]). Unlike the felicitous earlier age, Catullus's own is an era of spurned *pietas* (*spreta pietate* [64.386]) and madness (*furor*) that confuses *fanda* with *nefanda*:

> *... ignaro mater substernens se <u>impia</u> nato*
> *<u>impia</u> non verita est divos scelerare penates.*
> *omnia fanda nefanda malo permixta <u>furore</u>*
> *iustificam nobis mentem avertere deorum.*
> (64.403-6)

The epithet *impia* is emphatically repeated, then pointedly coupled with *furore* by the two words' arrangement in the emphatic first and last positions of consecutive lines. The effect is to stress that the *furor* evoked here is not just an accompaniment

posterity has disappeared not only for Catullus himself, but for his entire house (*tecum una tota est nostra sepulta domus*)».

57 Lyne 1980, 56.

58 There is, of course, some doubt about whether the long poems can appropriately be thought of as a 'collection' at all. See Skinner 2007, 35-53 («Authorial Arrangement of the Collection: Debate Past and Present»), who suggests they were originally circulated as individual poems and compiled later by unknown hand.

to crime, but the very definition of criminality. This impious age of *furor* has been ushered in *postquam tellus scelere est imbuta nefando / iustititiamque omnes cupida de mente fugarunt* (64.397 f.). Where there is *pietas*, there is no *furor* – for the populace duly look beyond their own *cupidae mentes* to respect time-honored family *officia*. Where there is *furor*, *iustitia* has been driven from their minds, they focus inwardly on *quid cupiant* (Lucr. 4.1118) to the exclusion of those *officia*, and free rein is given to *scelus nefandum*.

Propertius.

The elegists are unrepentant champions of the fires of love. They follow early Catullus in asserting that life should be led by an alternative code – a pleasure-principle rather than a duty-principle, *levitas* instead of *gravitas*, erotic fixation and *furor* rather than reasoned moderation. Propertius in particular, in Commager's words, «[inverted] the traditional hierarchy of values in a manner as strident as it was unremitting»[59]. This elegiac stance is made immediately evident in Propertius's programmatic declaration that his *amor* for Cynthia (which he will equate three lines later with *furor*) has taught him to *nullo vivere consilio* (Prop. 1.1.4-6). This declaration is a doctrinaire contradiction of the more sober prescripts of Stoically-inclined thinkers like Cicero, who insist that life should be led in accordance with *ratio*, *modus*, and *consilium*, and that *perturbationes* arising from the passions (and very particularly the passion of love) are destructive of happiness and even sanity. So Cicero opines that:

> *[Perturbationibus] autem vacuus animus perfecte atque absolute beatos efficit, idemque concitatus et abstractus ab integra certaque ratione non constantiam solum amittit verum etiam sanitatem.*
>
> (Cic. *Tusc.* 4.17.38)

His statement is a virtual tautology, in that of course sanity will be lost along with constancy, since sanity is defined fundamentally as a moral quality *identifiable* with constancy; it is the ability to maintain the *gravitas* that will allow an outward focus on *officia*, rather than an inward focus on *quid cupiant*.

Propertius's promotion of a life without *consilium* or sanity recalls (as commentators frequently note) – and probably consciously – a syllogistic musing in Terence's *Eunuchus* on the essential irrationality of love:

> *quae res in se neque consilium neque modum*
> *habet ullum, eam consilio regere non potes.*
> *in amore haec omnia insunt vitia: iniuriae,*
> *suspiciones, inimicitiae, indutiae,*
> *bellum, pax rursum: incerta haec si tu postules*
> *ratione certa facere, nihilo plus agas*
> *quam si des operam ut cum ratione insanias.*
> (Ter. *Eun.* 57-63)

[59] Commager 1974, 38.

By aligning himself with this erotic *topos* from comedy (a genre that has itself been described as providing a 'holiday for the superego'), Propertius further stresses that his fall into *furor* is a falling away from the life-path approved by the vernacularly Stoic thinkers of Rome[60].

It is equally evident from Propertius's programmatic first elegy that the kind of erotic *furor* that afflicts him is precisely (and unapologetically) the unruly hormonal variety. Before Cynthia, he had been free of the taint of desire (*contactum nullis ante cupidinibus* [Prop.1.1.2]), but now he has been inflamed, and his arousal has been continuous for a year (*mihi iam toto furor hic non deficit anno* [Prop. 1.1.7]). It is not, as critics used to suggest, that he has been denied Cynthia's favors – that is a misinterpretation of his frustration[61]. His problem rests not in failure to consummate his passion, but in less than regular access to his mistress and agonizing awareness that she will not be faithful to him[62]. To put his quandary into Lucretian terms, the *parva ... ardoris violenti pausa* occasioned by intercourse has been so prolonged by Cynthia's sporadic accessibility that the elegist is left in a perpetual state of unrelieved *rabies* and *furor*.

Lucretius had advised young men to release sexual tension through intercourse with women who do not inspire the kind of *curam certumque dolorem* (Lucr. 4.1067) that he sees as intrinsically disruptive of *ataraxia*[63]. Propertius issues a direct contradiction to this Epicurean directive when he declares, counter-didactically, after a blissful (*candida*) night of rough sex:

> *errat qui finem vesani quaerit amoris:*
> *verus amor nullum novit habere modum.*
> (Prop. 2.15.29 f.)

Indisputably, the kind of *amor* labelled 'true' here is the physical, hormonal type, not a romanticized ideal, nor one that prizes the kind of affection that may lead to the model of harmony and fidelity cited toward the end of this very poem: *vos remanete, quibus facili deus annuit aure, / sitis et in tuto semper amore pare*s (Prop. 1.1.31 f.). Propertius's invocation of this conjugal model as a seeming ideal, in contrast with his own *noctes ... amaras* (Prop. 1.1.33), is, of course, purely

[60] The quotation is from Kris 1952, 182, as quoted by E. Segal 1968, 13.

[61] See, e.g., Sullivan 1961, 111; Alessi 1989, 221, n. 22.

[62] Sullivan 1961, 98-99, citing Freud 1925, 192-202, assigns Propertius to a male psychological type inexorably drawn to 'fallen' women (Freud dubs the phenomenon *Dirnenliebe*, or love of a harlot).

[63] His description of this preemptive sex as *vulgivaga Venus* (Lucr. 4.1071) suggests that he is thinking of prostitutes here, but sex with any available 'non-lover' would do as well. Brown 1987, 124, suggests that Lucretius is thinking here of women «whose status lay somewhere between that of slaves or street prostitutes and respectable upper-class 'matrons' – freedwomen, courtesans and «'emancipated' women» of the upper classes – «in other words, the kind of women who are celebrated in lyric and elegiac poetry of the late Republican and Augustan periods». The clear potential of the very group recommended to enchant and obsess (as attested by Roman comedy and Propertius himself) suggests that Lucretius's advice is essentially fruitless.

disingenuous; in fact, throughout this poem and his collections he polemically declares his preference for the violent vicissitudes of erotic madness[64].

The same preference is stated crystal-clearly in c. 3.8, where he posits *dulcis rixa* as both the goal and epitome of love[65]. In this poem, Cynthia's rage toward him sequentially elicits the epithets *insana* (of Cynthia's voice, 3.8.2, and of her hand, 3.8.4), *furibunda* (of Cynthia herself, 3.8.3), and *rabida* (of the abusive tongue of the generalized woman in love, 3.8.11). *Dolor* and its cognates appear four times (3.8.10, 23 *bis*, 35 – see especially the dazzlingly unchivalrous declaration, *aut in amore dolere volo aut audire dolentem*), *irata* once (3.8.28); *flamma* and *ignis* appear once each (3.8.7 and 29 respectively). Among the lover's prayers is that he will always bear visible marks inflicted by his mistress: *in morso aequales videant mea vulnera collo: / me doceat livor mecum habuisse meam* (3.8.21 f.). When we see Cynthia drunkenly shoving tables and hurling cups full of wine at her lover's head (3.8.3 f.), or when we hear Propertius threaten *quin etiam, si me ulterius provexerit ira, / ostendes matri bracchia laesa tuae* (Prop. 2.15.19 f.), it is obvious that Terence's description of love as *bellum, pax rursum* could be taken as a motto for Propertius's favored amatory mode.

Propertius's conscious and unwavering preference for turbulent erotic love also helps document, at both macro- and micro-levels, the fundamental opposition in the Roman mind between *furor* and *pietas*. At the macro-level, of course, sits the elegists' rebellion (following in the tradition of Catullus and Roman comedy) away from *gravitas* and *pietas* and toward erotic madness, as discussed above. But smaller details of expression in Propertius's poems also reveal that he vaunts his *grand amour* as an antithesis to *pietas*.

At several points in his elegies, following Catullus, and perhaps even at times engaging in conscious conversation with him, Propertius pushes the contrast between the type of love he touts and the Roman societal ideal of marriage. This theme is sounded, delicately but surely, in the second sentence of his programmatic first elegy. Now that he is caught by the contagion of desire, he says there, he has learned two lessons from *improbus Amor*. The second of these (*nullo vivere consilio*) has been discussed above as a clarion call against the moral advice proffered by the grumbling, Stoically-inclined *patres familias* of Rome (cf. Cat. 5.2). The other lesson learned from Unapproved Love has been to *castas odisse puellas* (Prop. 1.1.5)[66]. This three-word phrase has been subjected to continual and involuted debate but in this critic's view quite clearly signals a contrast between the kind of girls (like Cynthia) who can inspire supremely unchaste desire and the kind whom

[64] Reading Propertius as 'choosing' the pain and madness of lust (explicitly as his *persona*'s lifestyle, implicitly as a poetic program) sets me in a very different critical mode from those who read him as recording utter, sincere, personal devastation; most extreme among the latter may be Connor 1972, 52, who stresses the «all-pervading…atmosphere of chill and emptiness» of c. 1.1.

[65] See Alessi 1989, 225 f.

[66] Translating *improbus* as 'unapproved' emphasizes the definition that appears first in *OLD*: «(of persons or things) Not satisfying official standards in some way». *Improbus amor* is precisely the kind that will not meet the standards of a *pietas*-minded *pater familias* or of Catullus's *senes severiores* more generally.

one's *pater familias* might approve[67]. Indeed, the most nuanced translation for *castas* here might be 'marriageable'. Thus Propertius begins his first poem with a nod (but an unrepentant rather than regretful one) to Catullus's focus in his long poems on forfeited marriage prospects: his captivation by Cynthia (like Catullus's by Lesbia) has disqualified him from a traditional life course aimed at marriage to marriageable (*castas*) girls, thus derailing him from an 'approved' (*probus*) personal trajectory.

This interpretation falls roughly within the second critical category described by Stahl («*Cynthia incesta*: His love for Cynthia, the courtesan, has led him to dislike women of his own class»)[68]. Stahl himself responds with incredulity to the 'consequences' of this reading (which he accurately notes «rejects the approved Roman woman» in line 5 and «the approved career for a young Roman man» in line 6), objecting that «these consequences shift the focus of the given context from the young lover to a young rebel against society». There is, however, no shift in focus at all here. It is the *essence* of Propertian elegy (as of Catullus's proto-elegiac love poetry) to rebel against a traditional social injunction to prioritize *gravitas* and life in tune with one's due *officia*.

In several other passing references, Propertius locates his erotic *furor* in direct opposition to the dictates of *pietas*, whether *erga parentes* or *erga patriam*. He agrees with Caecilius and Virgil's Corydon (above, page 192 and page 192, note 3) that the egoistic, inward focus of *amor* can detract from a family's economic prosperity when he points to property (*magna bona*) lost to failed *gravitas*: *Quicumque ille fuit, puerum qui pinxit Amorem, / nonne putas miras hunc habuisse manus? / is primum vidit sine sensu vivere amantis, / et levibus curis magna perire bona* (Prop. 2.12.1-4). He proclaims proudly that his passion for Cynthia has supplanted traditional obligations *erga parentes*: *an mihi nunc maior carae custodia matris? / aut sine te vitae cura sit ulla meae? / tu mihi sola domus, tu, Cynthia, sola parentes*... (Prop. 1.11.21-3). The inversion of the norm described here is so fundamental that Cynthia has *become* his home and family. In a later poem, he applies a similar exchange of roles to Cynthia's natal family: *cum tibi nec frater nec sit tibi filius ullus, / frater ego et tibi sim filius unus ego* (Prop. 2.18.33 f.). These are both pledges of *pietas*, playfully perverse in the context of the erotic relationship at hand. In the first passage, the poet plays suggestively on three different meanings of *cura* (though the word itself appears in only one): protective care for his mother, called *custodia*, lack of care/concern (*cura*) for his own life (suicide is implied) if his loved one (implicitly his *cura* or beloved) does not care sufficiently for him. In the second instance, he offers himself to Cynthia by implication in the role of male guardian, tracing the agnate line (*frater*, *filius*) along which *tutela* would pass

[67] Stahl 1985, 36-41, gives an exhaustive analysis of each of the interpretations of the phrase posed by critics over time; the debate fundamentally rings changes on the question of whether the *castae puellae* are girls *like* Cynthia (see especially Allen 1950) or girls *unlike* Cynthia. Alessi 1989, 217 n. 6, hits the nail on the head when he says, «*Castae puellae* are the kind of girls a young, upperclass Roman would be expected to introduce to his parents and to marry» – though there is a whiff of anachronism in his seeming assumption that marriage patterns in Roman antiquity followed a dating model independent of parents.

[68] Stahl 1985, 37.

successively (if she were of the appropriate social class) upon death of the *paterfamilias*. This is clearly a tongue-in-cheek offer, coming as it does from an inflamed lover who embodies the precise opposite of the prudence expected from the ideal *tutor*.

In these two loci, then, Propertius and Cynthia are said to owe familial *officia* not to their natal families, but only to each other[69]. And, where Catullus had played *dominus-domina* with Lesbia in a borrowed house, Cynthia has *become* Propertius's house (*tu mihi sola domus*), as well as the only family line he has now or ever will – for in another poem he declares freely that he will sire no children. C. 2.7 presents the pair of lovers as rejoicing at the repeal of Augustan marriage legislation that would require men, as well as women, to marry within a given timeframe. What a relief, the poet sighs, that he will not be put in the position of having to pass by Cynthia's closed door, *respiciens udis ... luminibus* (Prop. 2.7.10) because he has held the torches of a bridegroom with another woman, to whom he now owes fidelity. He then declares polemically (if a polemic can be anti-*polemos*) and to the potential consternation of the *magnus Caesar* invoked in the poem's fifth line: *unde mihi Parthis natos praebere triumphis? / nullus de nostro sanguine miles erit* (2.7.13 f.). By foreswearing progeny, he definitively spurns the dictates of familial *pietas*. Even more pointedly, he declines the role laid on Manlius in Catullus's first marriage hymn by *pietas erga patriam* (and certainly approved by the *princeps*) that he should father children as *praesides / ... finibus* (Cat. 61.72 f.). In a further inversion of Manlius's approved life path, Propertius makes it clear that his obsession with Cynthia will assure that no *Propertius parvulus* will stretch out little hands and smile sweetly at his father as Manlius's imagined child does at Catullus 61.209-13; rather, Propertius declares, *tu mihi sola places: placeam tibi, Cynthia, solus: / hic erit et patrio nomine pluris amor* (Prop. 2.7.19 f.). He owes familial duty to Cynthia alone. For Cynthia, he has forfeited the name of father: like Catullus, he will see his family line *sepulta*, because erotic *furor* has buried his *pietas*.

Horace.

Horace is the most varied and eclectic of the Roman poets. Whereas Virgil's changes in poetic focus from pastoral to agricultural to epic can be plotted as a diachronic generic development, Horace not only moves from one genre to another throughout his career (*Epodes*, *Satires*, *Odes*, *Epistles*), but also flits from flower to flower in his higher poetic forms (*Odes*, *Epodes*) like the Matine bee he compares himself to at *carm.* 4.2.27, darting from the obscenity of *epod.* 8 and 12 to heartfelt laments of civil discord, from romantic confections to hymns to the gods, from the grave Stoicism of the Roman Odes to avowals of sympotic or agrarian ideals that present him as the *Epicuri de grege porcum* of *epist.* 1.4.16.

The vocabulary of madness is especially noticeable in Horace's *Satires*, where he is at pains to point out the foibles and follies of humankind. *Insanus* and its cognates

[69] In a possible echo of Catullus 76.2, where the earlier poet views himself (paradoxically) as having been *pius*, at least within the confines of his erotic relationship, Propertius declares: *atque utinam, si forte pios eduximus annos, / ille vir in medio fiat amore lapis!* (Prop. 2.9.47 f.).

appear 54 times in his works as a whole, 41 of these in the *Satires*[70]. Among the latter, many are applied to people: five, for example, are vocative addresses to interlocutors or straw men for his musings on the human comedy, roughly equivalent to 'Dolt' or some such mild insult; others appear in adages or quasi-proverbial sayings: *in silvam non ligna feras insanius* (*sat.* 1.10.34), for instance, or *insanos qui inter vereare insanus haberi* (*sat.* 2.3.40). These usages suit the homey tone of the *Satires* and are reminiscent of comedy in their essentially colloquial tone.

When, by contrast, Horace turns to description of human madness in his higher genres (*Odes*, *Epodes*), his terms of choice are *furor* and its cognates and (to a lesser extent) *rabies* and its cognates. He generally scrubs *insanus / vesanus* and their cognates from *Odes* and *Epodes*, allowing only eight instances (*none* referencing human madness), seven applied metaphorically to animals or things rather than to people (a lion, Epicurean philosophy, *amor*, poetic inspiration, two stars, the Bosporus), while the eighth appears in infinitive form (*insanire iuvat*) and refers to unrestrained drinking[71].

This change in usage surely reflects on the one hand a concern by the poet to modulate his diction to fit his genre: he evidently felt that to label a person *insanus* evoked the intrinsically colloquial/comic tone O'Brien-Moore describes above (note 9). On the other hand, his usage in the *Odes* and *Epodes* also reflects focus on the particular type of madness that can be viewed as hormonally triggered.

Almost all the references to madness in the *Epodes* or *Odes* (regardless of the terms chosen to denote that madness) fit one of four somewhat overlapping types: (a) the kind of metaphorical/personified epithets modifying *things* (especially forces of nature or wild animals) referred to in note 71[72]; (b) references to erotic (hormonal) madness; (c) references to sympotic contexts that stress substance-induced loss of reason; (d) references to war and / or politics that introduce a second hormonal element (that of male aggression) to the discourse of madness[73].

Horace's love poems are cast in a non-elegiac mode. Whereas Catullus and the Roman elegists tend to focus single-mindedly on their emotions in the present moment, Horace (student of the human comedy at heart) is inclined to sit back and visualize any given relationship in the sweep of time: If I burn for *X* today, well, I burned for *Y* before, and soon I will transfer my affections to *Z*. It is his objective satirist's eye that perhaps most distinguishes his love poetry from others'. It is *not* the case, however, as many admirers of this proponent of a philosophical *auream ... mediocritatem* (*carm.* 2.10.5) have been drawn into thinking, that his love poetry is

[70] In turn, 27 of the appearances of *insanus*, *et al.*, in the *Satires* issue from the single poem, *sat.* 2.3, where he undertakes to prove, tongue-in-cheek, the Stoic paradox that *pan aphrôn mainetai*. These 27 are joined in the same poem by 1 *vesanus*, 4 *amens/demens et al.*, 2 *furor et al.*, and 1 *rabies* – in other words, 35 (more than a third) of the poet's total 102 references to madness in a single satire.

[71] *Carm.* 1.16.15, 1.34.2, 3.4.6, 3.4.30, 3.7.6, 3.19.18, 3.21.3, 3.29.19.

[72] Add to these *carm.* 1.3.14 (*rabiem Noti*) and 3.29.18 (*iam Procyon furit*).

[73] The only two exceptions to this 'rule' in *Odes* and *Epodes* are two passages from the *Epodes* relating to the witch Canidia: *epod.* 5.92, where the witch's young victim swears he will return after death as a vengeful *nocturnus Furor* (a metonymy for *Furia*); and *epod.* 17.45, where the narrator prays to be freed from some unspecified madness laid upon him in a spell by Canidia (*et tu, potes nam, solve me dementia*).

exempt from the fiery hormonality of a Catullus or Propertius. Those who would read him this way must surely brush *Epodes* 8 and 12 completely under the rug. They also have to remain blind to the graphic comparison of Lydia to a mare in heat at *carm.* 1.25.13-15 and wink at the rapaciousness skirting around the edges of his likening of the juvenile Chloe to a fawn[74]. Indeed, the hormonal fires of love are very much in evidence in both *Epodes* and *Odes*, whether applied to the poet himself or to others, and not just as pretty figures of speech[75].

Horace cites the effects of love's fires in particular as hindrances to his poetic craft – absorbing his attention and centering it on *quid cupiat*, rather than on the meticulous *labor* of composition he espouses. This is a trope he turns to twice in his earliest work. *Epodes* 11 opens with a lament that the wound of love has robbed him of the pleasure of composing verses (*nihil me sicut antea iuvat /scribere versiculos amore percussum gravi* (*epod.* 11.1 f.). Similarly, he complains to Maecenas that love for a *libertina neque uno / contenta Phryne* (*epod.* 14.15) has sapped his strength and prevented him from completing his first collection of poems: *deus, deus nam me vetat / inceptos, olim promissum carmen, iambos / ad umbilicum adducere* (*epod.* 14.6-8)[76].

In a related motif, Horace builds his first *recusatio* in the *Odes* (addressed to Agrippa) from the notion that the fires of love – and love poetry – prevent him from the *officium* of singing that general's exploits:

> *nos convivia, nos proelia virginum*
> *sectis in iuvenes unguibus acrium*
> *cantamus vacui, sive quid urimur*
> *non praeter solitum leves.*
> (*carm.* 1.6.16-20)

Implicitly, through this trope, one could say that he opposes the egoistic effects of love to a poet's *pietas* – i.e. to the craftsman's ability to summon sufficient *gravitas* to perform his professional duty.

As for love's *madness*, Horace invokes it much more sparingly than Propertius, but he does invoke it – even in one instance counterposing it significantly to *pietas*. At *epod.* 11.6, he uses the verb *furere* as a virtual synonym for *amare* (*ex quo destiti / Inachia furere*). At *carm.* 1.13.9-12, he notes jealously the trumping of his own

[74] *Carm.* 1.23.9-12: *atqui non ego te tigris ut aspera / Gaetulusve leo frangere persequor: / tandem desine matrem /tempestiva sequi viro.* See Ancona 1995, 71-4, on the predatory undercurrent that results from the poem's word choices and symbolism (even though the sentence's negative cast explicitly disclaims predation). Although Ancona can push too hard in some places, her interpretations of the poems highlight a palpable hormonal egoism in Horace's love poetry that critics have tended to overlook.

[75] See, for example, *carm.* 1.13.8; 1.27.14-6, 20; 3.7.11; 3.19.28; *epod.* 11.4; 14.9, 13 f. These are only some of many examples that could be cited.

[76] McDermott 1982, 220 and 200 n. 15, notes the characteristic oxymoron by which the poet compares Maecenas's mistress to the flame that burnt Troy (Helen), then modestly and paradoxically adopts the verb *macero* ('to soak, sap one's strength') to describe his own erotic sufferings.

lenti ignes by the hormonal *furor* of a rival, who bruises his lover's lips in the bellicose amatory mode championed by Propertius:

> *uror, seu tibi candidos*
> *turparunt umeros immodicae mero*
> *rixae, sive puer furens*
> *impressit memorem dente labris notam.*

At *carm.* 1.16.24 f. (a palinode to the former mistress whom he dubs *matre pulchra filia pulchior*), he seeks to be forgiven for the *fervor* that had years before sent him *in celeris iambos / ... furentem*. At *epod.* 12.9 and *carm.* 1.25.14 (discussed above), he attributes the *rabies* or *furor* of animal heat to his human erotic partners. Most interestingly, perhaps, in one of his narrative odes he positions *furor* and *pietas* as antonyms by having Europa open an Ariadne-like lament that, in her sexual submission to the bull that was Jupiter in disguise, she has abandoned her *patrios Penatis* (*carm.* 3.27.49) with a triple apostrophe to *pater*, *relictum / filiae nomen*, and *pietas ... victa furore* (*carm.* 3.27.34-6).

Three more references to madness in the *Odes* are essentially sympotic, emphasizing the loss of rationality that comes from drunkenness. At *carm.* 3.19.18, in a poetic / sympotic context, the poet declares *insanire iuvat* and goes on to pray that his grouchy neighbor Lycus will hear the *dementem strepitum* from the party (*carm.* 3.19.23). Two more references to sympotic madness occur in *carm.* 2.7, where the poet welcomes his friend Pompeius back to Rome (and back into the ranks of Quirites) after the latter's service in the Civil War under Brutus. As celebration, he proposes a night of insane, unrestrained drinking: *nec / parce cadis tibi destinatis* (*carm.* 2.7.19 f.); *non ego sanius / bacchabor Edonis: recepto / dulce mihi furere est amico* (*carm.* 2.7.26-8). Obviously, the mind-altered state induced by alcohol – though not hormonally induced – is intrinsically inimical to the *gravitas* that is a necessary pre-condition for *pietas*. Yet this particular call to drunkenness also overlaps with the political category to be discussed next, since the urge to rage with drink, occasioned by the poet's desire to welcome home a fellow combatant in the army of Brutus with *oblivioso ... Massico* (*carm.* 2.7.21), evokes with delicate nostalgia the call to *pietas* associated with that Republican icon and so may be taken to hint at lingering political ambivalence on the poet's part, vis-à-vis Octavian[77].

Horace's most notable contribution to the discourse of madness in Roman poetry lies in his political applications of the concept. Twice he casually adduces the topic of 'war madness' – an assumption that in the heat of battle the soldier loses rationality and is impelled to hormonally-heightened insanity: first when he pictures Diomedes raging in Iliadic *aristeia* at *carm.* 1.15.27 f. (*ecce furit te reperire atrox / Tydides*), then when he names bellicosity as the national character of Thrace at *carm.* 2.16.5 (*bello furiosa Thrace*). More significantly, his description of Cleopatra

[77] Nisbet-Hubbard 1978, 107, estimate the date of the poem's composition as 30 B.C., taking *oblivioso* as a reference to the amnesty of that year. More pointedly, though, the epithet *oblivioso* suggests that, to resume their lives as Quirites in Rome, both Horace (a few years earlier) and Pompeius (now) must consciously tamp down residual Republican sentiments and leanings. See McDermott 1978, 234 f.

in the first half of *carm.* 1.37 (*Nunc est bibendum*), blends madness (*dementis ruinas / ...parabat*; *sed minuit furorem / vix una sospes navis*… [*carm.* 1.37.7 f., 12 f.]), disease (*contaminato cum grege turpium / morbo virorum* [*carm.* 1.37.9 f.]), and drunkenness (*fortunaque dulci / ebria*; *mentemque lymphatam Mareotico* [*carm.* 1.37.11 f., 14]) into one emotional whole, significantly placed in contrast with sober-sided Roman *fas*, as invoked by references to the Capitoline Hill, Roman *imperium*, Caesar, and Caecuban wine stowed discreetly in *cellis avitis* till the political crisis should pass[78]. In the *furor* of her crazed ambition – *quidlibet impotens / sperare* (*carm.* 1.37.10 f.) – Cleopatra (and implicitly Antony) is a poster child for the egoistic *impietas* that looks always inward, to *quid cupiat*, rather than outward, to *officia*.

In *epod.* 7, Horace introduces a highly affecting identification of *furor* and civil war that crystallizes the political *Angst* of the years immediately before and after Actium and was to influence Virgil in the *Aeneid.* Following (but modifying) a Republican prose tradition (see below, p. 222 f.) of characterizing one's political opponents as *furentes*, he measures the kind of inner-directed, self-advancing 'madness' of civil war against an implicitly virtuous, outer-directed ideal of *pietas*[79].

After a passionate opening apostrophe to the Roman *populus* suggestive of precipitate, senseless motion – *Quo, quo scelesti ruitis?* (*epod.* 7.1) – the poet laments the fitting of swords to Roman hands not for the purpose of thwarting a foreign enemy, but so that the city may die of self-inflicted wounds (*sua / urbs haec periret dextera* [*epod.* 7.9 f.]). Even wild beasts, he notes, do not fight thus among themselves (*neque hic lupis mos nec fuit leonibus / umquam nisi in dispar feris* [*epod.* 7.11 f.]), before expostulating, *furorne caecus, an rapit vis acrior, / an culpa?* (*epod.* 7.13 f.)[80]. The reader watches as the crowd stops stunned and answerless (*mentes ... perculsae stupent* [*epod.* 7.16]). The epode closes with an assertion that Romulus's murder of his brother Remus has tainted the city with the original sin (*scelus*) of fraternal strife: *ut immerentis fluxit in terram Remi / sacer nepotibus cruor* (*epod.* 7.19 f.). The message is clear. The curse on the Romans is the kind of *furor* that makes them prey to personal ambition over duty – that makes them wilder even than wild beasts – that not only overwhelms *pietas* but argues the virtual unattainability of that civilized ideal.

Over a decade later, in the final ode of his late fourth book, the poet will return to this topic from his first published collection. Taking the place of the outrage and despair of the epode, however, will be calm satisfaction that Augustus has set right the tribulations of that earlier time, writing *finis* to the threat of civil war. The poet here congratulates the *princeps* on having restored fertility to Italian fields and the standards at Carrhae to *nostro ... Iovi*, on having closed the gates of war in the

[78] By the end of the ode, of course, as commentators regularly note, the ultimate message has been problematized by the crazed queen's evolution into a Stoic heroine, *non humilis mulier*, able to look on her fall *vultu sereno* and bravely *asperas / tractare serpentis* rather than be made a spectacle in a triumphal parade (*carm.* 1.37.21-32).

[79] Korpanty 1985, 248.

[80] The appeal to the authority of the natural order is actually specious, since male animals definitely do battle one another for dominance – a type of competititon that provides an especially fitting analogue for civil war. Notwithstanding, as Shorey 1919, *ad l.*, notes, this thought became 'a commonplace'.

temple of Janus, and on having set a bridle on *ordinem / rectum evaganti ... licentiae* and spread the glory of Roman *imperium* to the far limits of East and West (*carm.* 4.15.4-16). He then proclaims:

> *custode rerum Caesare non furor*
> *civilis aut vis exiget otium,*
> *non ira, quae procudit ensis*
> *et miseras inimicat urbis.*
> (*carm.* 4.15.17-20)

Under Augustus, both civil war *(furor civilis aut vis)* and war-lust *(ira, quae procudit ensis*) have ceased to threaten[81]. Reminiscences of *epod.* 7 are strong: *non furor civilis* (17 f.) recalls (and negates) the *furor caecus* of *epod.* 7.13; *non ... vis exiget otium* (18) echoes (and negates) *an rapit vis acrior* (*epod.* 7.13); and the *culpa* posited at *epod.* 7.14 and elaborated as the curse of Remus in the last lines of the epode is called to mind again, only to note Augustus's eradication of it (*emovit ... culpas / et veteres revocavit artis, / per quas Latinum nomen et Italae / crevere vires* [*carm.* 4.15.11-4]); the Parthian threat invoked at *epod.* 7.9 is annulled by Augustus's restoration of the standards to Rome[82]. The ode thus emphatically answers – and refutes – the epode, laying the earlier poem's distress definitively to rest in a tableau of 'simple loveliness' that serves as a paean to restored *pietas*: *cum prole matronisque nostris, / rite deos prius apprecati, / virtute functos more patrum duces / ... Troiamque et Anchisen et almae / progeniem Veneris canemus* (*carm.* 4.15.27-32)[83]. Thus Horace closes his *Odes* with a reassurance that, under Augustus's rule, the Roman citizenry has relearned and reengaged in proper relations *erga propinquos* and *erga patriam*; the narrative of the ancestral curse of Romulus and Remus has been supplanted by the founding narrative of *pius Aeneas*[84].

Virgil.

Madness makes nine cameo appearances in the *Eclogues*: 2 *furor* and cognates, 4 *insania* and cognates, 3 *dementia* and cognates (*amentia* and *rabies* and their cognates do not appear)[85]; of the seven of these that appear in amatory contexts, four

[81] Horace's reference to *ira, quae procudit ensis / et miseras inimicat urbis* (*carm.* 4.15.17-20) seems to recall pointedly Virgil's emphatic trope, *Furor arma ministrat*, discussed below, p. 230 *et passi*

[82] Thomas 2011, *ad* lines 17-20, briefly notes the glance back at *epod*. 7: «The end of civil discord is characterized by the absence of *furor*, *vis* and *ira*, qualities present in H.'s earliest treatment of internecine strife: *Epod*. 7.13-14...»

[83] The quoted phrase is from Fraenkel 1957, 452.

[84] Duckworth 1956, 291, notes that Horace views Romulus positively at *carm.* 3.3.15 f. and argues that this reminiscence constitutes a 'rehabilitation' propelled by Verg. *geo.* 1.498-502.

[85] My word counts in this section are taken from Warwick 1975; I have not been able to bring them into full agreement with those made by Dion 1993, 317, in a study of the passions in Virgil that provides a wealth of such counts. Dion takes account of total appearances of *demens / amens*, *insanus*, and *furor* (and their respective cognates) – though not of *rabies / rabidus*, *vesanus*, *male sanus*. For the *Eclogues* we agree in finding a total of 9 (7 of which we both attribute to amatory

are referred specifically to Gallus's *sollicitos…amores* in *Eclogues* 10, serving as obvious precursors (given Gallus's position as father of Roman elegy) to the vaunting of erotic *furor* as a definitional point for that genre[86]. In the *Georgics*, nine instances of *furor* and its cognates occur, referred, respectively, to raging Centaurs, a river's rage, an aged horse's frustrated attempts to perform at stud, meteorological phenomena, animal 'heat' (2), the effects of disease or plague afflicting the herds (2), and (the only one applied to a human being) the mindless *furor* that causes Orpheus to look back at his trailing wife. Also found in the *Georgics* are two occurrences of *insanus* and two of *rabies/rabidus* (*vesanus*, *male sanus*, *amens*, *demens* do not appear)[87]. Five of the total of 13 appear in sexual contexts – three of them specifically in relation to the animal mating drive.

In the *Aeneid*, by contrast, we find 94 instances of *furor* and its cognates (the poet's clear favorite), 12 *insania / insanus*, 1 *male sanus*, 3 *vesanus*, 13 *amentia / amens*, 16 *dementia / demens*, and 12 *rabies / rabidus*. Even given the *Aeneid*'s disproportionate length, as compared with his earlier works, these 151 references to madness constitute a mini-explosion of the trope[88]. There is significant qualitative change as well, especially in the epic's proliferation of extended descriptions of maddened characters and mad outbreaks of hostilities[89].

contexts); for the *Georgics* Dion finds 10 (to my 11, excluding *rabies / rabidus*; we agree that 5 of these are amatory), for the *Aeneid* she finds 135 (of which she deems 43 amatory); I find 136 (plus 16 more from among words she does not count). Oddly, the *percentages* in this chart of Dion's and at least one other in the book (307) seem riddled with typos (e.g. that 7/9 = 84%, 5/10 = 22%, and 43/134 = 43%, none of which is consistent with basic arithmetic).

86 *Furor*: *ecl.* 10.38 and 10.60. *Insania*: 10.22 (*Galle, quid insanis?*) and 10.44, where it pointedly transfers the burden of insanity from erotic love to *insanus amor duri…Martis*. *Demens/dementia*: *ecl.* 2.60, 2.69, 6.47, all in erotic contexts. The two references to *insania* that are in non-erotic contexts parallel Horatian usages: *insanus* applied metaphorically to a natural phenomenon (*fluctus*) at *ecl.* 9.43; the infinitive *insanire* in a sympotic context (*insanire libet quoniam tibi*) at *ecl.* 3.36.

87 *Furor* and cognates: *geo*. 2.455, 3.37, 3.100, 3.150, 3.244, 3.266, 3.458, 3.511, 4.495. *Insanus*: *geo.* 1.481, 2.502 (note that both of these fit Horace's pattern of modifying a force of nature or other thing, but both also phase into his political category: *insano…vertice* at 1.481 (of the flooding Po River taken as iconic for the perversity of civil war); *insanum forum* at 2.502. *Rabies / rabidus* (both relating to wild animals): *geo.* 2.151, 3.496.

88 References to madness occur once in every 92 lines in the *Eclogues*, only once in every 168 lines in the *Georgics*, but once in every 65 lines in the *Aeneid*.

89 Whereas Horace's references to madness in his higher genres fell heavily into erotic, sympotic, and political categories, Virgil's most frequent category for vocabulary of madness is one that Horace shies away from in *Odes* and *Epodes* – that is, imputations to particular people of insanity or unreason, in either a clinical or hyperbolized sense. All 13 of his uses of *amentia/amens* refer to clinically-altered states of mind (loss of reason, senselessness) caused by one of the passions: fear (7), anger (2), war-lust (1), grief (2), shame (1); Turnus is the most frequent target (5 in total: 1 from war-lust [*Aen.* 7.460], 3 from fear [*Aen.* 12.622, 742, 776], 1 from shame [*Aen.* 10.681]), but Aeneas runs a close second with 3 (1 from anger/despair [*Aen.* 2.314], 1 from grief [*Aen.* 2.745], 1 from fear/horror [*Aen.* 4.279]). All 22 uses of *dementia / demens* are also applied to people, but in ways slightly distinguishable from *amentia / amens*; in broad generalization, *demens* seems to imply clinical madness or hyperbolized faulty judgment; it is frequently cast as an insult, as from one warrior to another. Virgil's use of *insanus* is a little different. Of 6 instances, one is applied to a person (the Sibyl), while the other 5 attach to abstract nouns (*cupido* [*Aen.* 9.760], *Martis* [*Aen.* 7.550], *amore* [*Aen.* 2.343], *dolori* [*Aen.* 2.776], *labori* [*Aen.* 6.135]);

It is also in the *Aeneid* that a moralized opposition of madness and dutifulness becomes especially prominent thematically, as critics regularly note. Alessi, for example, in the context of discussion of Propertius's erotic *furor*, alludes to the *Aeneid*'s «direct thematic contrast between *pietas* – the ideal value of the Augustan period – and its converse, *furor* – the uncivilized element that ought to be eradicated from the new Roman society»[90]. Spence examines the Dido-episode in terms of «the implied analogy between good and bad, *pietas* and *furor*»[91]. Lyne says, «the *Aeneid* encourages us to see a simple polar opposition between the typical and essential Roman virtue of 'pietas' on the one hand and mad passion, 'furor,' on the other...»[92]. Korpanty agrees: «furor *einen Gegensatz zu* pietas … *darstellt*»[93]. After a brief sketch of Republican-era applications of the term *furor* to political misbehavior (especially among the *Populares*, in the eyes of the *Optimates*), the latter focuses his attention on the workings of the *furor-pietas* contrast in the *Aeneid*, «wodurch ihre Bedeutung für die Gesamtkonzeption des Epos zusätzlich betont würde»[94].

On one small but significant point, however, Korpanty's analysis seems short-sighted. He sees discontinuity between the Optimates' political attribution of *furor* to the rabble-rousing popular party and Virgil's construction of the *furor-pietas* contrast: «in der Augusteischen Zeit büsst *furor* den politischen Bedeutungsaspekt ein»[95]. In actuality, there is only continuity here: although the specific points of applicability of a Roman *furor-pietas* antithesis will certainly shift over time in accordance with the political, moral, and cultural perspectives of those who invoke it, its essence remains constant. That abiding essence transcends the boundaries *political / non-political* that Korpanty would impose on it. Rather, it rests in the broader assumption that the person deemed 'mad' is so self-absorbed or self-interested as to lose sight of the common good and his/her appropriate role in maintaining that good. The appearance of this antithesis not only in the Republican prose authors cited by Korpanty (including Cicero, Sallust, Livy), but also, as argued above, in the poetry of Catullus, Propertius, and Horace demonstrates that it constitutes a conceptual schema concerning sanity versus insanity that is fundamental to Roman thought.

Putnam notes the centrality of the passions to Virgil's construction of this opposition: «We have … been taught from the beginning of the epic that *pietas* is

in this Virgil seems to share Horace's preference for transferring *insanus* to an entity, rather than to a person. By contrast, all 6 appearances of the noun *insania* attribute clinical or hyperbolized madness to personal subjects (*Aen.* 2.42, 4.595 [duplicated by 12.37], 10.871 [duplicated by 12.667], and 7.461, where Turnus is afflicted with *scelerata insania belli, / ira super*). *Rabies / rabidus* differ from the other terms in normally being attached to animals or other "wild" entities, thus stubbornly retaining their primary etymological force: dogs/wolves (4), Cerberus (1), Scylla (1), the Sibyl (3), Allecto (1), the sea (1), and war fever (1: *belli rabies et amor ... habendi* [*Aen.* 8.327]).

90 Alessi 1989, 230.

91 Spence 1999, 94. She summarizes: «Book 4 grants voice to the cause of *furor* but, more than that, to the degree that it enlists sympathy for Dido, it engages us as audience on the side of difference and against the cause of empire, even if temporarily» (Spence 1999, 95).

92 Lyne 1987, 28 n. 55.

93 Korpanty 1985, 248.

94 Korpanty 1985, 251.

95 Korpanty 1985, 248.

antonymous to a series of negative abstractions including *ira*, *dolor*, *saevitia*, and various manifestations of *furor*»[96]. Indeed, throughout the epic Virgil rings changes on the havoc caused when *ratio* and *consilium* are overrun and suppressed by a variety of hormonal reactions (to his mind, all forms of *furor*): sexual desire, anger, male aggression, war fever, female hysteria. All of these are passions decried by Stoics and other philosophical schools. They are of supreme interest to an acute psychological observer like Virgil.

Of Virgil's protracted depictions of madness, the one that most elaborately puts forward the *furor-pietas* opposition is the devolution of Queen Dido, seized by the *caeco…igni* of love (Verg. *Aen.* 4.2), from 'paradigm of rationality' serially to wounded deer (Verg. *Aen.* 4.68-73), then to raging bacchant (Verg. *Aen.* 4.300-3), whirling wildly through the city that at the beginning of the epic she has presided over coolly and competently[97]. But the opposition of egoistic madness and proper concern for the dictates of *pietas* is infused throughout the epic. It underlies the contrasting characterizations of *saeva* and ever so egoistic Juno and judicious, fate-dealing Jupiter and surfaces in multiple public/political contexts throughout the poem: the torching of Aeneas's ships by the Trojan women at the end of Book 5, Allecto's tripartite arousal of war lust in Book 7, the opposed characterizations of Aeneas and Turnus, and, of course, the much-debated final stroke of the epic, when Aeneas buries his sword in Turnus's chest, *furiis accensus et ira / terribilis* (*Aen.* 12.946 f.).

Before Aeneas's arrival into her fledgling society in Carthage, Dido is a character notable for independence and ability to lead as if she were a man: *dux femina facti* (*Aen.* 1.364). Like Aeneas, she has guided a band of refugees across the sea to a new continent and established a new settlement. She readily and empathetically welcomes the shipwrecked Trojans to Carthage as either guests or co-colonists: *non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco* (*Aen.* 1.630). For his part, Aeneas is immediately struck with jealousy for the progress the pioneers are making. Watching from his mantle of cloud as the Tyrians eagerly work to piece together rock walls with their hands, to build homes, to dig out ports, construct theaters and establish *iura magistratusque … sanctumque senatum* (*Aen*. 1.422-9), he cries wistfully, *o fortunati, quorum iam moenia surgunt!* (*Aen.* 1.437). His yearning for walls is metonymically expressive of his quest to found his new city. One can readily imagine his admiring and emulous emotional responses as the queen *iura dabat legesque viris, operumque laborem / partibus aequabat iustis aut sorte trahebat…* (*Aen.* 1.507 f.). He has, after all, just made two abortive attempts at laying walls during his travels in Book 3: first in Thrace, where he plotted out *moenia prima* and named the fledgling city *Aeneadae* (*Aen.* 3.16-8) before monstrous portents forced him out to sea again; next in Crete, where he again laid walls and gave his city a nostalgic name (*avidus muros optatos molior urbis / Pergameamque voco* [*Aen.* 3.132 f.]). Just as he again turned to law-giving (*iura domosque dabam* [*Aen.* 3.137]), however, a plague hit, necessitating another

[96] Putnam 1995, 202, in his essay titled "Wrathful Aeneas and the Tactics of *Pietas* in Virgil, Ovid, and Lucan".

[97] The quoted phrase is from Hershkowitz 1998, 28.

transplantation. How bittersweet for him then to arrive in a strange land and find the same scene being played out by Dido, while he continues to be buffeted from one shore to another.

When Aeneas and Dido come together in the cave with all of Juno's trappings of symbolic marriage (*Aen.* 4.166-8), it is, as the author explicitly foreshadows, a fateful event: *ille dies primus leti primusque malorum / causa fuit* (*Aen.* 169 f.). Virgil's tale of Dido as a woman seduced and abandoned, with literary affinities to both Medea's ensnarement by Jason and Ariadne's by Theseus, is a virtuoso rendition of the ravages of love. From the time that Cupid sits on Dido's lap in the guise of the young boy Ascanius, setting the queen's 'biological clock' ticking and awakening her *iam pridem resides animos desuetaque corda* (*Aen.* 1.722), it is clear that her vow of fidelity to Sychaeus will not withstand for long the charms of this living love (*vivo…amore* [*Aen.* 1.721]). In deteriorating contrast to her controlled and godlike bearing in Book 1 (see especially the stately *incessit* of *Aen.* 1.497 and the extensive simile likening her to Diana [*Aen.* 1.498-506]), Dido first throws over her *pudorem* (*Aen.* 4.55) in response to the case pled by her sister that she deserves a normal life as wife and mother, then is inflamed, maddened, and set into swirling, crazed motion by her passion:

> *est mollis flamma medullas*
> *interea et tacitum vivit sub pectore vulnus.*
> *uritur infelix Dido totaque vagatur*
> *urbe furens….*
> (*Aen.* 4.66-9)

Once *impia Fama* apprises her (already *furenti*, and proleptically about to become more so [*Aen.* 4.298]) that Aeneas is secretly rigging his ships to leave Carthage, her madness is redoubled, as is her frenetic, uncontrolled, Maenadic motion through the city: *saevit inops animi totamque incensa per urbem / bacchatur* (*Aen.* 4.300 f.). When her attempts to persuade Aeneas to stay or at least tarry in Carthage have utterly failed, her madness again escalates, to the point that she is compared to delusional or clinically mad tragic characters, Pentheus and Orestes (*Aen.* 4.469-73). Dido's unraveling is very personal and complete, emphatically illustrative of Virgil's capping apothegm, *improbe Amor, quid non mortalia pectora cogis!* (*Aen.* 4.412).

Nonetheless, the tragedy of Dido in the *Aeneid* is not simply a masterful variation on the theme of erotic *furor*: it is also a carefully wrought, cautionary tale of failed civic *pietas*[98]. This civic counterpoint to a personal theme makes it transparently clear that erotic *furor* is constructed by the author as a plunge into selfishness that disrupts one's appropriate attention to due *officia*.

As previously noted, the fundamental opposition of *furor* and *pietas* constructed by Roman poets proceeds from their opposite foci: inward and self-centered for

[98] Monti builds his study of the Dido-episode from a similar proposition: that «emphasis has been placed on Dido as a sentimental heroine at the expense of a fact obvious to every reader of the poem, namely that Vergil also presents her as a political woman, the ruler of a city destined to be the rival of Rome» (Monti 1981, 1).

furor; outward and other-directed for *pietas*. Upon arriving in Carthage, *pius Aeneas* is struck by the rising walls of Dido's new city. In their respective *pietas*, both he and Dido duly turn their gaze to the walls of their cities – Dido to the actual walls rising in Carthage and the giving of laws, Aeneas (in his imagination) to the walls he will raise when he reaches Hesperia. Yet, when love strikes, each one's outer-directedness succumbs to its fires. Even before they consummate their relationship, Dido's civic focus falls prey to her erotic *ignis*:

> *non coeptae adsurgunt turres, non arma iuventus*
> *exercet portusve aut propugnacula bello*
> *tuta parant: pendent opera interrupta minaeque*
> *murorum ingentes aequataque machina caelo.*
> (*Aen.* 4.86-9)

The queen's appropriate concentration on her people and her fledgling city falls victim, inevitably, to her new enthrallment (to paraphrase Lucretius) to *quid cupiat*. This change in focus will fatally sabotage her effectiveness as a leader.

Indeed, Dido's ability to function in the capacity of founder and law-giver is dependent on her having declared herself *univira* (one-man woman) to her murdered husband, Sychaeus (*ille meos, primus qui me sibi iunxit, amores / abstulit; ille habeat secum servetque sepulcro* [*Aen.* 4.28 f.]). In so doing, she has availed herself (anachronistically) of the extraordinary "escape clause" invoked by Roman women of the 2nd to 1st centuries B.C. to exempt themselves from the social obligation to remarry expeditiously upon loss of a husband to death or divorce[99]. She has thus achieved an essentially unnatural status by which – by remaining sexless – a woman may rise above the general societal assumption that she needs male guidance and protection to survive. Because she is dominated by men neither sexually nor emotionally, she may be considered tenuously able to function with manlike status within society. Once this balance is tipped – once the *veteris vestigia flammae* (*Aen.* 4.23) redirect her focus inward (even despite the fact that Dido's surrender to love is motivated at least partially by a rational politicodynastic calculation that marriage to Aeneas would strengthen her reign against her African neighbors), she has effectively betrayed her Tyrian subjects[100]. It is this betrayal that prompts her

[99] Rudd 1990, 154-61, gives an extended discussion of the social value of remaining *univira* (as Cornelia famously pronounced herself after the death of Scipio); he argues that ancient praise of this state reflected distaste for divorce more than for remarriage by a widow. *Pace* Bowra 1933, 12, who alludes to «the deep and ancient belief that a woman should only be married once», and those referred to by Nuttall 1998, 94, as assuming that Virgil's original readership «detested the very idea of a widow remarrying», the usual Roman social expectation was for serial marriage by women. Augustus's legislation requiring women to remarry swiftly was not an attempt to introduce a *new* cultural pattern, but to revert to a traditional one that supported control of women by men. To remain *univira* was an exception that at one and the same time, paradoxically, made an admirable show of loyalty to one's deceased husband and offered a woman a pragmatic way to maintain a greater measure of independence than would be likely in case of remarriage.

[100] Anna is the first to introduce the notion of potential politicodynastic benefits from a marriage alliance with Aeneas (*Aen.* 4.39-49). Later we see loss of this prospect contributing heavily to the hopelessness that impels Dido to suicide (as well as to her poignant wish that she might have

nightmares of separation from her people (*semper…relinqui / sola sibi, semper longam incomitata videtur / ire viam et Tyrios deserta quaerere terra…* [*Aen.* 4.466-8]). In her dreams, Dido recognizes that she has undertaken to walk her own solitary road, *incomitata*, losing sight of her Tyrian charges. In capitulating to erotic *furor*, she has not only been mired (as if by definition) in *impietas*, but she has also doomed her young city to conquest by Iarbas and the other African kings she has spurned as *univira*; her suicide reflects not just a personal unraveling, but also recognition that, through compromised *pietas*, she has irrevocably undermined any possibility of recouping her role as *dux facti*. Through her capitulation to erotic *furor*, she has forsaken the dictates of civic *pietas* that bind a founder[101].

Pius Aeneas too strays from his focus on *officia* during his time with Dido. Word of the affair between him and the Tyrian queen spreads quickly through Carthage and the neighboring cities, bruited by *Fama foeda* (*Aen.* 4.195) in the most prejudicial terms possible:

> *nunc hiemem inter se luxu, quam longa, fovere*
> *regnorum immemores turpique cupidine captos.*
> (*Aen.* 4.193 f.)

The two contrasting adjectival phrases of line 194, rhetorically disposed on either side of the caesura, significantly encapsulate the *furor-pietas* opposition: the first, *regnorum immemores*, highlights the protagonists' retreat from due concentration on civic obligations; the second, *turpique cupidine captos*, pinpoints the genesis of their joint failure of *pietas*: their mutual capitulation to selfish, inner-directed, erotic focus.

When even Jupiter's attention is drawn to the lovers by Iarbas's angry prayer to him for redress, he twists his eyes to the walls of the city (*oculos…ad moenia torsit / regia* [*Aen.* 4.220] – cf. Turnus's reawakening to duty in Book 12) and catches the lovers red-handed in oblivion to their *officia* (*oblitos famae melioris* [*Aen.* 4.221]). The god responds by dispatching wing-footed Mercury posthaste to recall to proper dutiful attitudes an Aeneas who misguidedly *fatis…datas non respicit urbes* (*Aen.* 4.225)[102]. Mercury finds the hero *fundantem arces ac tecta novantem* (*Aen.* 4.260). He has evidently turned himself again to the tasks of a founder – but for the *wrong* citadels and buildings:

> *'tu nunc Karthaginis altae*
> *fundamenta locas pulchramque uxorius urbem*
> *exstruis? heu, regni rerumque oblite tuarum!'*
> (*Aen.* 4.265-7)

borne a son by Aeneas before his departure: the birth of a male heir would have strengthened her position against those who would encroach upon her queendom). Cf. Monti 1981, 30-6.

[101] Dido's rapid disintegration, of course, very clearly reflects gender assumptions common both to classical and modern times – that women are intrinsically inner-directed, so only men can achieve genuine, outer-directed *pietas*. See below, n. 106.

[102] Note especially *respicit*, the same word connoting a return to duty that will appear in Turnus's reawakening from *furor* in Book 12 (see n. 6).

Pius Aeneas has become «oblivious to the 'cities given by fate'»[103].

The poet never, naturally enough, ascribes actual *furor* to Aeneas with regard to either this lapse of *pietas* or to his amatory relationship – that would be just too contradictory of his standard epithet and jarring with his general characterization as dutiful, if sometimes reluctant, Stoic[104]. But the hero is very obviously indicted here for un-Stoic failures of *pietas*. The single scornfully-tossed epithet *uxorius* emphatically ascribes these failures to his surrender to the egoistic fires of love.

What distinguishes Aeneas from Dido is the swiftness with which he is recalled to other-directedness, while Dido continues to spiral into egoism:

> *At vero Aeneas aspectu obmutuit amens,*
> *arrectaeque horrore comae et vox faucibus haesit.*
> *ardet abire fuga dulcisque relinquere terras,*
> *attonitus tanto monitu imperioque deorum.*
> (*Aen.* 4.279-82)

He is no longer *amens* from love, but from shock at the warning he has received; he burns (*ardet*), but no longer erotically – rather to flee from sweet Dido and her alluring lands (*dulcis ... terras*). While Dido continues her downward trajectory, Aeneas at great pain suppresses his emotions:

> *At pius Aeneas, quamquam lenire dolentem*
> *solando cupit et dictis avertere curas,*
> *multa gemens magnoque animum labefactus amore*
> *iussa tamen divum exsequitur classemque revisit.*
> (*Aen.* 4.393-6)

It is obviously neither by coincidence nor through metrically convenient application of an out-of-context epic formula that the hero is described as *pius* at the beginning of a sentence in which he will be pictured squashing his deeply-felt concern for his lover (*multa gemens magnoque animum labefactus amore*) under the compulsion of the god's directives. The understatement of these lines should in no way distract readers from their powerful revelation of this reluctant Stoic's emotions. Romantics who would indict Aeneas for unfeeling betrayal of Dido should re-read them two or three times.

[103] Commager 1980, 107.

[104] In his *pietas*, Aeneas generally suppresses *quid cupiat* in favor of his divinely-appointed mission; one of the most affecting aspects of the epic is its unremitting spotlight on the personal labors and losses the hero is subjected to. Parry 1963, 79, importantly notes the distinction between what Aeneas wants and what he gets: «We hear two distinct voices in the *Aeneid*, a public voice of triumph, and a private voice of regret. The private voice, the personal emotions of a man, is never allowed to motivate action. But it is nonetheless everywhere present». For Aeneas's literary forebear, Odysseus, mission (to go home) coincides with desire; for Aeneas, in bald contrast, mission (*Romanam condere gentem*) is foisted on him from outside and runs against his recurrent wish to found a New Troy as quickly and as close to the old one as possible.

Aeneas's fateful journey almost comes to an abrupt halt when, at the end of Book 5, a group of inflamed Trojan women sets fire to the ships that would take them away from the Sicilian seat of their kinsman Acestes. These are tired women, not bad ones, weary and motivated by longing for security and a stable home. Torn between staying where they are (*miserum inter amorem / praesentis terrae*) and resuming their hazardous journey toward *fatis vocantia regna* (*Aen.* 5.655 f.), they are agitated to their rebellious act by a disguised agent of Juno. Seduced from civic *pietas* through a deceptive rhetorical appeal to that very value (*quis prohibet muros iacere et dare civibus urbem? / o patria et rapti nequiquam ex hoste penates, / nullane iam Troiae dicentur moenia?* [*Aen.* 5.631-3]), they fall into a hysterical madness matched by the rage of their weapon itself: *tum vero attonitae monstris actaeque furore / conclamant, rapiuntque focis penetralibus ignem / ... furit immissis Volcanus habenis ...* (*Aen.* 5.659-62).

Their *furor* evaporates – this is temporary insanity only – after Ascanius arrives on horseback, castigating them for irrationality (*'quis furor iste novus? quo nunc, quo tenditis' inquit, / 'heu, miserae cives? non hostem inimicaque castra / Argivum, vestras spes uritis'* [*Aen.* 5.670-2]). Guiltily, they slink into hiding (*piget incepti lucisque, suosque / mutatae agnoscunt excussaque pectore Iuno est* [*Aen.* 5.678 f.]) as Aeneas takes the reins again, reverting to a more standard, male-determined definition of *pietas* and successfully enjoining Jupiter in its name (*pietas antiqua* [*Aen.* 5.688]) to save the fleet and extract *tenuis Teucrum res ... leto* (*Aen.* 5.690).

The incident highlights the gendered lens through which Virgil contrasts passions and *pietas*. Starting from the epic's broadest thematic level, where the male Jupiter represents order and rationality, in opposition to the disorder and passion-based partisanship of Juno (and later the baleful chaos brought by her infernal henchwoman Allecto), it is obvious that Virgil works from common typologies portraying men as rational, while women are viewed as proceeding rather from emotionality. Such a dichotomization is further apparent in the oppositions he establishes between Aeneas and Dido, Latinus and Amata, where both women (typologically) are pragmatists who prize personal relations in a present-day reality, as contrasted with male visionaries adhering to an ideal that becomes for them a divinely-driven imperative. Although the poet throws moral weight behind the latter – and the retrospective Fate or Destiny with which he infuses the epic assures the reader from its first lines that, in this story at least, the male vision will be fully realized – he at the same time presents the alternate 'female' position vividly enough, and with sufficient equanimity, to problematize the dichotomy he himself establishes. This is especially true of the Dido episode, which over the centuries has inspired sympathy for mission-driven Aeneas and passion-driven Dido in relatively equal measure.

In the case of the ship-burning episode, the reader is presented with a graphic image of an every-day populace longing to seize the day rather than continue to follow a vague and chimeric prophecy of coming greatness. Typologically, such pragmatists are more likely to be female, while men are more able to focus on an ideal or mission. The resulting female *furor* is indeed opposed to *pietas*, but it is venial – and Aeneas in effect pardons it when he separates out and leaves behind in Sicily the portion of his followers who have tired of his *magni incepti*, the

longaevosque senes ac fessas aequore matres / et quidquid tecum invalidum metuensque pericli est… (*Aen.* 5.714-6)[105]. At the same time, the cast of the narrative, by which Aeneas effectively legitimates the women's protest by acceding to their wishes, insidiously hints that the *pietas* violated by the women's actions is a narrowly male-defined one, and that the ship-burning has been impelled by application by the women of an alternate, female-defined interpretation of *pietas* with at least a modicum of validity[106].

As an Augustan, Virgil was writing in an era deeply affected by a century of rupture of civic *pietas* by selfishly motivated power grabs and of periodic outbreaks of active civil war. In this context, his decision to craft Books 7-12 on an Iliadic model created an intrinsic tension between his Augustan sensibility and the literary conventions within which he composed. He thus became a moral modernist working in the confines of an archaic mode and posed himself the major challenge of stretching the *Iliad*'s personal-honor-based heroic code to accommodate his own conception of just *versus* unjust war.

[105] Nugent 1992 presents a comprehensive reading of the ship-burning incident as a transitional point both within Book 5 and between Books 4 and 6. Her reading of the tone of the incident is more pessimistic than mine, emphasizing the silencing of the women's voices rather than the investment of the women's case with secondary legitimacy – though she does note that Aeneas's sympathetic reaction to the women threatens their status as the 'quintessential Other' (Nugent 1992, 267, 269 s.). I would suggest that, from the level of plot (setting aside for the moment symbolic schemes that critics may impose upon the epic action), far from having their voices silenced, the women are given exactly what they have demanded – to be allowed to stay in Sicily.

[106] Feminist studies of the *Aeneid* regularly examine aspects of the epic's gendered lens. As Hardie 1998, 86, has averred: «The cries of grief in the poem demand a hearing as well as the songs of triumph». For relevant citations, see Hardie 1998, 86 n. 139, as well as Ganiban *et al.* 2012, 19, n. 68. Quartarone 2002 and 2006, representing a theoretic approach self-styled 'ecofeminism', posits an opposition between male *pietas* and female *furor* in the epic that highlights real symbolic tensions in the poem but can become overly schematic in viewing them always along gender lines. Ecofeminism, in asserting an identification of the female with the land, fertility, and Furies, follows in a critical tradition initiated in the mid-20th century that identifies tension/opposition between imperial Rome and Italian landscape. See, for instance, Parry 1963, 68: «The explicit message of the *Aeneid* claims that Rome was a happy reconciliation of the natural virtues of the local Italian peoples and the civilized might of the Trojans who came to found the new city. But the tragic movement of the last books of the poem carries a different suggestion: that the formation of Rome's empire involved the loss of the pristine purity of Italy». The symbolic opposition of rational Olympian male deities and irrational chthonic female deities had, further, been rife in Greek tragedy. It would have been very familiar and convenient for Virgil (Hardie 1998, 62, calls the influence of tragedy on Virgil «arguably the single most important factor in Virgil's successful revitalization of the genre of epic») as he set up thematic oppositions by which «the contrast between the two highest divinities is symbolic of the ambivalence in history and human nature» (Pöschl 1962, 18). Although primary moral weight in the epic is clearly thrown behind the forces of rationality and order by Virgil's ferocious characterizations of Juno and Allecto as spiteful forces of discord (the seamy underside of human nature), nonetheless the sympathy he inspires for female characters and other 'losers', as well as for the values of an agrarian past, are some of the most interesting elements in the epic, providing critical leavening from stories that might have been written – but have not been – as unidimensional, patriarchal, imperial propaganda.

Virgil is too Roman to be in any global sense 'anti-war'. He accepts that Roman greatness (*imperium sine fine* [*Aen.* 1.279]) rests on a martial base; he has Jupiter console Venus for Aeneas's continuing tribulations in Book I by promising her that the hero's ascension to the stars will be achieved by conquering Hesperia (*bellum ingens geret Italia populosque ferocis / contundet* [*Aen.* 1.263 f.]). He accepts war as a basic, approved (*probus*) expectation of Roman life. But when at *Aeneid* 6.851-3 he has Anchises prophesy to his son that the Roman people's particular aptitude for empire (*tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento / [hae tibi erunt artes]*) will be to *debellare superbos*, he is fundamentally conceptualizing war as a means for imposing *paci ... morem*. He accordingly balances his instruction to battle down the proud with another – to spare the subjected – and thus lays down tenets for the rational and just conduct of war.

Nonetheless, he remains acutely attuned to the fragility of any concept of just war, in light of the vulnerability of human *ratio* and *consilium* to unreasoning passion. It is not conquest itself that Virgil decries, but the kind of irrational aggression and war-lust that disrupt good-faith efforts at peace and just conduct. Unreasoning war-fever is one of the passions so suspect to the Stoics, sometimes identified by Virgil with *furor*, sometimes with *ira*, sometimes with *insanus Mars* himself. It is also the special province of the hormonally-driven, glory-seeking young, while older and wiser men mistrust it and do their best to avoid it.

The theme is sounded early, in the epic's first extended simile. In an artful inversion of the norm by which a poet explicates something in the human world by comparison to something in the natural world, the poet here likens Neptune calming the tempest let loose on the seas by Aeolus to a Roman statesman calming an unruly mob:

> *ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta est*
> *seditio saevitque animis ignobile vulgus*
> *iam faces et saxa volant, furor arma ministrat;*
> *tum, pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem*
> *conspexere, silent arrectisque auribus astant;*
> *ille regit dictis animos et pectora mulcet ....*
> (*Aen.* 1.148-53)

Furor arma ministrat: the topic, which will recur at various significant points throughout the epic, is iconic for the defeat of rational human negotiations and strivings for peace by a sudden onslaught of senseless passion. The counterbalancing force to this *furor* is posited in the subsequent line: it is the man *pietate [gravis] ac meritis* who is able to placate the aroused crowd through rational persuasion. *Furor* and *pietas* stand here as counterpoised antonyms. In this inverted simile, the god efficaciously takes the side of *pietas*, swiftly (*dicto citius*) calming the *tumida aequora* (*Aen.* 1.142). It is perhaps the principal tragedy of Books 7-12 that such a man cannot, in fact, be found within the human sphere, as time after time attempts at peaceful coalescence of Italians and Trojans are foiled by insurgent *furor / ira*[107].

[107] See Pöschl 1962, 20 f., on the possibility that a reference is encoded in this simile to a similar calming of the populace in 54 B.C. by Cato Uticensis. Note that if etymological connection

When the Trojans finally make landfall in Italy, Latinus's laudable initial judgment that his and Aeneas's peoples should join together on equal terms (*paribus … auspiciis* [*Aen.* 7. 256 f.]) quickly falls prey to *luctifica* Allecto's tripartite arousal of *furor:* her snakes of madness take possession of Amata, body and soul, driving her to a state of whirling Bacchic frenzy that far exceeds Dido's in Book 4. The queen rages wildly (*furit lymphata* [*Aen.* 7.377]) through the city, likened to a top set in motion by boys at play (*torto volitans sub verbere turbo* [*Aen.* 7.378-84])[108]. She arouses the Latin women to join her in her frenzy, in the name of an alternative maternal *pietas* reminiscent of the female *pietas* invoked by Iris/Beroe in the ship-burning episode of Book 5, but limited strictly to the personal rather than civic sphere: si *qua piis animis manet infelicis Amatae / gratia, si iuris materni cura remordet* ... (*Aen.* 7.401 f.). The vocabulary of heat and madness abounds throughout the incident's 65 lines, with Amata by turns described as *ardens*, *furibunda*, *furens*, *excita*, *maiorem orsa furorem*, and *fervida* (*Aen.* 7.345, 348, 350, 386, 397, respectively), her body and mind overtaken by *ignis* and *flamma* (*Aen.* 7.355, 356, respectively). In her rapid and complete capitulation to unreasoning passion, and especially in her willful blindness to any consideration of civic *pietas*, she loses whatever claim to due other-directedness that her motherly affection might originally have justified. Indeed, her egoistic focus on *quid cupiat* (Turnus as son-in-law) can seem so unbalanced and strangely independent of what her daughter might desire (which is never addressed) that some critics have experienced it as suggesting incestuous sexual emotions on her part[109].

Once Allecto is satisfied that she has *satis primos acuisse furores* in the house of Latinus (*Aen.* 7.406), she moves on to showcase her *mille nocendi artes* (*Aen.* 7.338) again in Rutulia. She seeks out Turnus in his palace and hurls a firebrand into his breast, bringing him precipitously under the sway of war-mongering frenzy (*arma amens fremit, arma toro tectisque requirit; / saevit amor ferri et scelerata insania belli, / ira super* [*Aen.* 7.460-2]). The resulting 'madness' – more precisely, perhaps, his resulting capitulation to hormonal forces of anger, jealousy, male aggression, war-lust – is described (like that of his would-be mother-in-law) in an extended simile. Where she is a top, he is a cauldron of boiling water (*Aen.* 7.462-6; see especially *furit* at 7.464).

As for Turnus's characterization: he is youthful and strong, the chief bulwark of the Italian military cause, with the charisma and nobility to inspire his countrymen to join his cause, as well as a proven track record in war (*hunc decus egregium formae movet atque iuventae, / hunc atavi reges, hunc claris dextera factis* [*Aen.*

between *furor* and storms is accepted, this connection adds to the artistry of this inverted simile: the blowing / raging *furor* of the literal, physical storm is explicated by comparison to the etymologically-related rampaging *furor* of the angry crowd.

108 See Rabel 1981.

109 Anderson 1957, 22, says of Lavinia, «Vergil permits her to speak neither in this book [sc. Book 7] nor in any other, with the result that she remains a fascinating enigma even today...» On sexual Amata: see, e.g. Lyne 1987, 116: «her feelings for Turnus appear to be rather more than is normal for a possible future mother-in-law. In the light of our analysis of Allecto's assault on her…, we can define them: they are – in part – erotic»; for a comparison of Amata to Phaedra, see Mitchell 1991, 231. Fantham 1998, 146 f., grants Amata's «obsessive dependence on Turnus» but resists the imputation of incestuous desire.

7.473 f.]). He is a head taller than all others described in the catalogue of heroes that closes Book 7: *ipse inter primos praestanti corpore Turnus / vertitur arma tenens et toto vertice supra est* (*Aen.* 7.783 f.]) and intrepid enough to burst into the Trojan stronghold and stand isolated against their entire host like an *immanem ... pecora inter inertia tigrim* (*Aen.* 9.730). He is caught, however, in the essentially ironic situation described by Commager that, being *nescius fati*, he lacks the retrospective recognition of where true virtue lies that the author and his readers are privileged to share. He is thus cast in the unenviable position of opposing the «perceived dictates of history»[110]. To play a role as antagonist, he must take on negative characteristics; to serve as antagonist to Aeneas in particular, he must be somehow deficient in *pietas*. This deficiency takes the form of a capitulation to inner-directed, self-serving *furor* that leads him to engulf Italians and Trojans in devastating general war for the sake of his own marriage and personal politicodynastic claims[111].

Having maddened the two principals, Allecto moves to a third stratagem, designed to rouse the *ignobile vulgus* against their king's plan for peaceful coalescence. A glory-seeking Ascanius provides the proximate catalyst to war when he inadvertently slays a herdsman's tame deer while out hunting. The sister of the family calls out for help to her fellow country folk, and *olli ... / improvisi adsunt, hic torre armatus obusto, / stipitis hic gravidi nodis; quod cuique repertum / rimanti telum ira facit* (*Aen.* 7.505-8). Afflicted by *ira*, the previously unwarlike folk snatch up impromptu weapons, and war begins: again, *Furor arma ministrat*. Latinus and Aeneas's first attempted truce fails, undone by arousal of unthinking mob war-fever (a form of madness as hormonal and anti-rational as the drive to orgasm).

After three books devoted to the ensuing battle between Latins and Trojans, Virgil circles back emphatically to the theme of unjust war, with Turnus heading the forces of *furor*. The Rutulian's hot-headed youth is the chief impetus to his failures of *pietas*. *Saevit iuventus / effera*, Virgil proclaims of Turnus's forces as war breaks out (*Aen.* 8.5 f.); these lines could stand as a universalized maxim for the quandary posed throughout the epic – that young men rush to war, while its older and more experienced survivors dread it. Aeneas, as prime *exemplum*, with heavy heart (*tristi turbatus pectora bello* [*Aen.* 8.29]) steels himself to meet the eager Turnus and will recurrently offer himself in single combat to stave off any further piling up of bodies (*confusae ... ingentem caedis acervum* [*Aen.* 11.207]). In contrast with the protagonist's gnawing concern for the devastation of war, Turnus's fomenting of it for the sake of his personal claim to Lavinia's hand – coupled pointedly with his repeated ducking of the single combat that would shield his people from widespread death – affiliate him with inner-directed *furor* and strip him of the outer-directed

[110] Commager 1980, 108. Mackie 1990, 79: «The second half of the *Aeneid* is anchored to Turnus' delusion that he is on a fated path to victory, that Jupiter is beside him in the fight against invading foreigners».

[111] Van Nortwick 1980, 303, notes that the identification of Turnus as a new Achilles in the Sibyl's prophecy at *Aen*. 6.89 f. «is supported in Book 7 by the picture of Turnus as a fiery young warrior angry over the loss of a woman who he thought had been promised to him by a superior». Achilles's inner-directed insistence on personal honor (and concomitant willingness to withdraw from the war to his co-combatants' detriment) sets him at the opposite pole in this regard to *pius Aeneas*, the ultimate outer-directed hero. Casting Turnus as an Achilles, then, emphasizes his heroic stature but at the same time his failure of Roman *pietas*.

pietas that would make him a properly-motivated Roman hero.[112] His 'crime' is not that he hangs the gory heads of two minor victims, *rorantia sanguine*, from his chariot rail (*Aen.* 12.512) (though this has won him characterization by one critic as a 'thug')[113], but his selfish sacrifice of thousands of lives for personal gain.

Fresh from tendance of thousands of corpses, the Latins turn their voices against the one who has impelled such widespread loss:

> *hic matres miseraeque nurus, hic cara sororum*
> *pectora maerentum puerique parentibus orbi*
> *dirum exsecrantur bellum Turnique hymenaeos;*
> *ipsum armis ipsumque iubent decernere ferro,*
> *qui regnum Italiae et primos sibi poscat honores.*
> (*Aen.* 11.215-9)

When further confronted with the news that Diomedes has declined their plea for reinforcements, Latinus is recalled to his original resolve to welcome the Trojans as friends and allies: *et foederis aequas / dicamus leges sociosque in regna vocemus* (*Aen.* 11.321 f.). Turnus's inveterate foe Drances spitefully calls for Latinus to seal the pact by marrying Lavinia to Aeneas; Turnus replies with a jingoistic speech equating appeasement with cowardice, war with glory. Suddenly news comes that Aeneas's force is on the move again, and the passions of the crowd of rash youths are reignited, to the dismay of their elders:

> *extemplo turbati animi concussaque vulgi*
> *pectora et arrectae stimulis haud mollibus irae.*
> *arma manu trepidi poscunt, fremit arma iuventus,*
> *flent maesti mussantque patres.*
> (*Aen.* 11.451-4)

Turnus seizes the moment (*arrepto tempore* [*Aen.* 11.459]) and orders his battalions to arms. This second failure by Latinus to treat peacefully with the Trojan band compounds the pessimistic theme that *consilium* and *ratio* will ever be defeated by voices of unreason and hormonal forces of disorder. Turnus is chief human representative of these negative forces in the Iliadic half of the epic; his behavior fits precisely the moralized definition of poetic *furor* – that he loses the capacity for *pietas* through relentless, passion-driven egoism.

In Book 12, the two kings make yet another attempt at peaceful assimilation, entering into a pact to decide the case through single combat between Turnus and Aeneas. Both sides, bathed in sunlight and invoking all due powers of heaven, earth and netherworld, commit themselves and their people to abiding by the truce, confirming the treaty *inter se ... / conspectu in medio procerum* (*Aen.* 12.212 f.). Scarcely have they finished their high-minded oaths, however, when the Rutulians, agitated by Juturna, begin to mutter against the pact. In quick succession, lust for war is resparked, a spear is cast, one of nine Arcadian brothers falls, and all

[112] See Fowler 1919, 43-4.
[113] Willcock 1983, 94.

descends again to unreasoning aggression (*omnis amor unus habet decernere ferro* [*Aen.* 12. 282]). Yet again, *Furor arma ministrat*, as a *tempestas telorum ac ferreus … imber* (*Aen.* 12.284) darken the sky. Latinus flees, Penates in hand, leaving only *pius Aeneas* (a frustrated *pietate gravem ac meritis* [*Aen*. 1.151]) to rail vainly, unarmed and unarmored, against the mob, in a «deeply Roman appeal against wrath and on behalf of law»[114]: *"quo ruitis? quaeve ista repens discordia surgit? / o cohibete iras!"* (*Aen.* 12.313 f.).

Aeneas's plea here for cessation to a proleptically civil war between Trojans and Italians (the two peoples destined to assimilate as Romans) recalls the throbbing indignation voiced by Horace against civil war in his seventh Epode (*quo, quo scelesti ruitis?*). Indeed, Virgil all but explicitly labels the conflict between Trojans and Italians a 'civil' war when, in an inescapable evocation of the conflict between Caesar and Pompey, he has Juno apply the slogan *socer generque* to the commingling of Italians and Trojans:

> *hac gener atque socer coeant mercede suorum:*
> *sanguine Troiano et Rutulo dotabere, virgo,*
> *et Bellona manet te pronuba.*
> (*Aen.* 7.317-9)

The two races will 'come together' – not through peaceful coalescence but at great cost to 'their own'; Lavinia's dowry will be the blood of both stocks from which the Roman state will be born.

Civil war is never justifiable. Its essential impiety is first featured in the *Aeneid* in Jupiter's famous prophecy of a golden age in Book I, when Romulus and Remus will reign in brotherly concord, the gates of war will be closed, and *Furor* will be restrained inside the temple in chains:

> *cana Fides et Vesta, Remo cum fratre Quirinus*
> *iura dabunt; dirae ferro et compagibus artis*
> *claudentur Belli portae; Furor impius intus*
> *saeva sedens super arma et centum vinctus aënis*
> *post tergum nodis fremet horridus ore cruento*[115].
> (*Aen.* 1.292-6)

Furor impius: the phrase is an effective tautology, since *furor* in its failure of other-directedness is by definition *impius*. Ganiban *et al.* 2012 suggest that «the adjective *impius* describes something monstrous, and is especially used by the Roman poets when speaking of civil war, because it is a violation of the laws of nature»[116]. In invoking the laws of nature the editors are, one assumes, thinking of the Horatian view that only human beings attack their own kind (see above, page 219 and 219 note 80), but the laws broken by impiety are more strictly, and indeed by definition,

[114] Gransden 1984, 199.

[115] As critics regularly note, the image is a disturbing one, since *Furor* is not dead, only restrained – and that without any sense of finality. Pöschl 1962, 19, for example, describes the image as «still trembling with the bloody events of the civil wars».

[116] Ganiban *et al.* 2012, *ad* 1.294-6.

laws of *men*. The real crime in the Romans' propensity to civil war was not that it was unnatural, but that it was *all too natural*. It resulted from *id*-like concentration on personal desire and ambition, and a concomitant failure to live up to the cultural code by which citizens were asked to suppress *quid cupiant*, in service of the *officia* they owed to the state.

Assessing the moral valuation placed on Aeneas's killing of Turnus in the epic's final lines has been the most vexed issue in Virgilian scholarship over the past century. The essential questions: does Aeneas's stated motivation by *furiae* and *ira* as he plunges the sword implicate him in inappropriate surrender to unreasoning passion, and does the killing of Turnus constitute a violation of Anchises's instruction to his son in Book 6 to *parcere subiectis*[117]? It would be convenient to be able to respond to these questions, given the case argued throughout this study, that, since *furor* and *pietas* are opposites, in capitulating to *furor*, Aeneas is violating *pietas*: Q.E.D. Unfortunately, the case is more complicated than that.

It is in analyzing this final act in the epic that the tensions between Iliadic battle and Virgil's view of war come most pointedly to the fore. Although it is not feasible in this study to address the questions surrounding the death of Turnus with any comprehensiveness (or with significant attention to the massive bibliography it has generated), I put forth three intertwined propositions:

1. *In analyzing Virgil's attitudes toward the passions, the hormonally-aroused state of battle-rage (*furor*) – a phenomenon universally recognized throughout the ages but especially pertinent to the trope of the Iliadic* aristeia *– must be disaggregated from the others. In brief, raging is a necessary pre-condition for*

[117] Useful annotated accounts of the varied arguments on these questions appear in Burnell 1987, Potz-Graz 1991 (see esp. 248 n. 2 on literature since 1975), Horsfall 1995, and Schmidt 2001, 145-63. *ANRW* II.31.1, Abt. D XII 2, Abt. C XII 2, Abt. C XI 4, supplies exhaustive bibliography pre-dating 1975. Putnam (see, e.g., Putnam 1999a and 1999b and most recently Putnam 2011) is a prominent proponent of the "pessimistic" school that sees Virgil as expressing dubiety about Rome's future under Augustus: "It is the sadness of Meliboeus and the indignation of Turnus, of those who must suffer the constraints of Rome, that round to completion the Mantuan's magisterial art" (Putnam 1999a, 230). Tarrant 2012, 16-30 *et passim*, provides a clear summary of many of the relevant issues and schools of thought on the final scene, and, 9-16, how the scene's interpretation is wrapped up with assessment of the opposed characterizations of Aeneas and Turnus. Bowra 1933 gives a reading that stands up remarkably well today. Cairns 1989, 83 f., and Thomas 1991, 261, duel on whether a semantic distinction (positive/neutral vs. negative) can be made between *furiae/furo/furens* and *furor/furibundus*. Van Nortwick 1980 and Anderson 1990 are among those who give detailed analyses of Virgil's use/adaptation of Homeric topics, Galinsky 1988 and 1994 and Gill 1997b and 2003 among those who do the same for philosophical backgrounds. Both Galinsky 1988 and Bowra 1933 point to ways that practical attitudes toward anger and vengeance in Rome differed from Stoic belief: Galinsky 1988, 326-28, presents a useful discussion of pertinent Roman judicial prescripts concerning the due role of anger in assessing penalties. Bowra, 18 f., suggests a parallel between Aeneas's vengeful responses to Pallas's death and Octavian's to the assassination of Julius Caesar. Galinsky 1988, Gransden 1984, and Putnam 1999b are among those who assert that Aeneas's hesitation before he kills Turnus is more surprising and significant than *that* he kills him. The bulk of the pertinent literature is stunning, yet the appetite for rehearsing the arguments, in hopes of forging new ground, is apparently limitless. The susceptibility of the debates to polemicism is amply illustrated by Galinsky 2003.

survival in combat. An author who chooses to present his hero within this literary convention, then, must for the duration of the ensuing battles substantially exempt him from any sort of philosophical or cultural prescripts to suppress passion to live a virtuous life.

Of the 94 appearances of *furor* and its cognates in the *Aeneid*, a plurality (30) refer to some form of battle-rage, the adrenalin-fired state of body and mind amply attested in the *Iliad* and generally understood over the ages as a universal, hormonally-triggered, self-preservation tactic of battle[118]. These are associated with a broad spectrum of heroes and heroines: Aeneas and Turnus in approximately equal measure (8 and 6, respectively – with Aeneas's extra two referring in flashback to his previous war, the fall of Troy), war horses next with 4, and a variety of other heroes (e.g., Hercules, Neoptolemus, Coroebus) coming in at 1 each (2 for Camilla).

This type of anger-induced rage is a conventional element of Iliadic battle. It is clearly not presented by the poet as an intrinsically negative phenomenon, so that succumbing to it must be placed in a different category from everyday, peacetime failures to maintain Stoic *ratio*, Epicurean *ataraxia*, or the prescripts of *pietas*:

> This considered entry into a state of rage and its subsequent enhancement is the way in which the warrior acquires the impetus to engage in the horror of battle. It is, as such, a survival mechanism, and is not necessarily reprehensible in itself, given the need for defence against attack[119].

In point of fact, 'succumbing' may be the wrong word: at one point we see Aeneas quite deliberately rousing himself to this state, 'psyching himself up', in preparation for his coming contest with Turnus: *maternis saevus in armis / Aeneas acuit Martem et se suscitat ira* (*Aen.* 12.107 f.)[120]. Whereas *ira* and *violentia* seem native to Turnus's personality (he is the only person in the *Aeneid* to whom *violentia* is attributed), they come less naturally to Aeneas[121].

2. *This exemption, however, picks out the tension between Homeric conventions and Augustan-era ethical perspectives, creating a conundrum that problematizes not only the death of Turnus but also the epic battle scenes of Books 10-12 more generally. If, on the one hand, Aeneas is to lead the Trojans and their allies to victory, he ultimately has to prove superior in might to Turnus. Yet in stressing*

[118] By a rough categorization, 30 appearances of *furor* and its cognates refer to those under the sway of battle rage, 1 to a parallel state induced by competition in the games of Book 5, another 2 to war fever; 16 are connected to Dido's erotic madness; 16 suggest clinical madness/mental disorder; 13 are applied to raging natural forces; 5 describe mantic inspiration; 4 are applied to the Furies, 4 to Juno; 3 to desire for just vengeance.

[119] Wright 1997, 178. Wright argues that Virgil's focus on both the «psychology and physiology of anger» (Wright 1997, 169), especially this form of righteous battle-anger, aligns him more with an Aristotelian view of anger than a Stoic one.

[120] Wright 1997, 178, aptly comments on this passage: «The deliberate arousal of anger as a stimulus to action is, after all, a standard aspect of military training (and sports coaching)».

[121] See *violentaque pectora Turni* (*Aen.* 10.51), *violentia Turni* or *Turno* (*Aen.* 11.376, 12.9, 12.45) and a generalized *ullius violentia* voiced by Drances at *Aen.* 11.354 and in all but name pointing to Turnus.

Aeneas's ferocity under the sway of battle-rage (preparing the way for him to overmaster Turnus in single combat), the poet also assimilates him to Turnus ethically. He thus undermines his own careful presentation of the hero as a pastor populi *and antitype to ambitious seekers after power for personal ends.*

Throughout Aeneas's anger-fueled *aristeia* after Pallas's death in Book 10 he is notably pitiless to all he subjects, taking four sons of Sulmo and four of Ufens to offer in human sacrifice at Pallas's grave (*inferias quos immolet umbris / captivoque rogi profundat sanguine flammas* [*Aen.* 10.519 f.]), taunting others bitterly and finishing them off with no qualms or backward glances at his father's prescript to *parcere subiectis*. He fits perfectly Shay's description of the person afflicted by battle rage as a Berserker "cut off from all human community when he is in this state"[122]. His sloughing off of his more humane attitudes in service of this battle-rage is further stressed by a summary simile comparing him to amoral ragings within nature: *talia per campos edebat funera ductor / Dardanius torrentis aquae vel turbinis atri / more furens (Aen.* 10.602-4). With the battle over, reverting to *pietas* (and assuming again the mantle of the poet's Augustan-era sensibility), Aeneas will assure the Italians who come to him seeking a truce to bury the dead that he is interested only in peace: *pacem me exanimis et Martis sorte peremptis / oratis? equidem et vivis concedere vellem* (*Aen.* 11.110 f.). This is the 'authentic' Aeneas again, in place of the mind-altered one. Battle-*furor* is a necessary element of combat, but it can recede after the battle is over, as long as it is not imprinted in the form of war-lust on a man's abiding character: «Indeed, because Aeneas' *furor*… is in the service of *pietas*, he has seemed to some to be the only character in the *Aeneid* who, once possessed by *furor*, is not destroyed by it»[123]. Nonetheless, the reader may be pardoned a raised eyebrow, in memory of Magus, Haemonides, Anxur, Tarquitus, Lucagus and his brother Liger, to name just a few of the inconsequential surrogates for Turnus massacred by Aeneas as they begged for mercy. If *pius Aeneas* and Turnus are the same on the battlefield, what may that say about the possibility of just war? At minimum that, even when one is determined to fight with *pietas*, war can neither be disentangled from the fury of hormonal passion nor governed by consistent ethical principles.

3. *Throughout the* Aeneid*, Virgil further problematizes his Homeric conventions by systematically exploiting a motif of the "unfair fight." Over and over in the epic, he sets up conflicts where the outcome is a foregone conclusion because of a palpable mismatch in the strength and experience of the two combatants*[124]*. After the heightened pathos of these unfair fights, which further the author's lament for the waste of life generated by avoidable wars, there is a certain relief in coming finally to the fairly-matched (if fatefully predetermined) contest between Aeneas and Turnus, protagonist and antagonist.*

[122] Shay 1994, 86.

[123] Van Nortwick 1980, 310. It is intriguing to read this comment of Van Nortwick's in the context of Shay 1994's suggestions that "berserk physiology" may effect "lifelong psychological and physiological injury" in veterans (91-9).

[124] McDermott 1980, 154.

The aged Priam casts his spear feebly at Pyrrhus in Book 2 and in return is savagely slaughtered. Silvia's unsuspecting tame deer falls to the glory-seeking boy Ascanius and his *rabidae canes*. The youthful Nisus and his even younger comrade Euryalus perish miserably while trying to recreate the night-raid of the Iliadic veterans Odysseus and Diomedes[125]. Most pointedly, and with a flick of metafictionality, Virgil first sets the stage for Lausus and Pallas to come together in a fair match, youthful valor against youthful valor, callow inexperience against callow inexperience (*hinc Pallas instat et urget, / hinc contra Lausus, nec multum discrepat aetas* [*Aen.* 10.433 f.]), only to introduce a *clinamen* by which each will end up falling *maiore sub hoste* – Pallas at Turnus's hands, Lausus at Aeneas's: «the tragic potential of these two egregious mismatches is irresistible to the poet»[126]. Again seepage of a post-civil-war moral sensibility into the poet's Iliadic conventions undercuts the glory of war.

Virgil could, of course, have ended the *Aeneid* in any number of ways. He could have chosen to have Aeneas spare Turnus; he could have broken loose of what may retrospectively seem an inescapable convention and ended the epic without a final single combat between protagonist and antagonist at all; he could have let Aeneas kill Turnus but added a protracted dénouement (as Homer does in the *Iliad*) featuring some form of reconciliation and underlying humanity[127]. What he *has* done is choose an ending that fits Iliadic combat expectations but at the same time problematizes them with hints that the conventions are too archaic to be fully pertinent in his own era of moral / ethical complication. These hints pervade the whole second half of the *Aeneid*, not just the death of Turnus.

I am, with some ambivalence, willing to accept both that Aeneas's sending of Turnus's soul *indignata sub umbras* (*Aen.* 12.952) was a fully ethical choice – almost an imperative – *in the context of the literary conventions within which it appears*, and that indeed it would have been more ethically suspect, given (a) the author's thematic emphasis throughout Books 7-12 on the injustice of sacrificing multitudes for individuals' egoistic ambitions and (b) the heightened pathos he has aroused by focusing on the essential unfairness of battle, for him to spare Turnus. After we watch Aeneas slaughter multiple surrogates for Turnus, after we watch Pallas killed on his first day of battle and Lausus sacrificed for filial piety (*fallit te incautum pietas tua* [*Aen.* 10.812]), could we wholeheartedly endorse the survival of a leader who has fomented this grim war out of *furor*, for his own personal ends?

Aeneas, who has been recurrently afflicted throughout the Iliadic half of the *Aeneid* with the kind of battle-*furor* that is a necessary precondition for fighting and winning a war, never gives up his fundamental outer-directedness. He is and remains (despite that bloody final stroke) *pius Aeneas*. Unlike him, Turnus is not simply subject to battle-*furor*; he is temperamentally disposed to *violentia* and war-lust. Most significantly, from the moment that Allecto infects him with the inner-directed egoism that taints his actions throughout Books 7-12, he forfeits all claim to *pietas*,

[125] As Prof. A.K.L. Michels first impressed upon me when I was an undergraduate student in her Virgil class, these are «boys sent to do a man's job». They are sent by another boy playing king, Ascanius, who goes so far in his puerile enthusiasm as to promise them a plethora of prizes if they succeed, culminating in Turnus's horse and twelve *lectissima matrum / corpora* (*Aen.* 9.272 f.).

[126] McDermott 1980, 154.

[127] Putnam 1999b, 415, describes the unsettling effect on the reader of Virgil's lack of dénouement.

affiliated by the author instead to Homer's *timê*-driven Achilles, to the egoistic combatants in every round of Roman civil wars, and to universal forces of *furor*, in opposition to *pietas*.

Conclusion.

Virgil has built his *Aeneid*, critics widely agree, from a thematic opposition of *pietas*, the key cultural code that enjoined Romans to maintain focus on proper relations to others within both familial and civic social fabrics, and *furor*, broadly conceived as encompassing the forces of personal, collective, and universal / divine disorder. In this study, I have argued that the basis for this Virgilian thematic scheme rests in an essential cultural assumption by Romans of the Republican and early Augustan eras that *furor* is in essence a malign spiral into egoism, a headlong antisocial surrender to an innate human tendency to look inward to personal desires (*quid cupiant*) – what Kaster calls «too much 'me, ME, ME'»[128] – and to act on those desires to the detriment of the common good. The seeds of Virgil's antithesis are putatively apparent in Roman tragic negotiations of the territory between «wish and prohibition» (see above, page 203); they definitely play themselves out in the texts of Catullus, Propertius, and Horace, even at times when the poets explicitly profess themselves as proponents of *levitas*, rather than *gravitas*.

This poetic conception of madness is 'moralized', in that it assesses people as sane or insane in terms of their degree of adherence to or departure from human moral prescripts for social behavior. Even by a modern medical model, we speak of the mentally disturbed as 'dissociating' from the world around them. The etymology elucidates the phenomenon: by turning inward, the dissociater becomes increasingly self-absorbed, progressively more uncoupled from *socii* and *societas*.

In portraying madness in terms of failures of *pietas*, the Roman poets concentrate primarily on *effects* rather than on the cause or course of a mental condition. Yet one particular cause, erotic fixation, looms large as an *Ur*-model for disruption of mental balance and consequent failures of *pietas*. Ariadne, Attis, Catullus and Propertius's poetic *personae*, Dido all fall to this hormonally-triggered condition, this assault (*hormê*) as if from outside. Horace and Virgil, acutely attuned to the ego-driven political behaviors that had set the Roman Republic areel with civil war, affectingly portray the similarly baleful effects on society of other hormonal forces, particularly male aggression and war-lust.

Pietas, of course, is a cultural value that rests on an assumption that *consilium* and *ratio* can prevail in human interactions. The underbelly of human behavior resides in the passions – those irrational (a-rational) human emotions resistant to self-control. In an epic context, Virgil externalizes and mythologizes these innate biological forces as divine assaults on innocent victims (Juno and Venus conspiring against Dido, Allecto inflaming Turnus and Amata). As epic poet he thus paradoxically acquits the characters to some extent of moral responsibility for their actions even as he adopts a moralized conception of madness. Catullus does the same for Ariadne and Attis – and the love poets go so far as to assert that erotic

[128] Kaster 2005, 3.

madness should be prioritized over *pietas*. The result is (at the most optimistic) a recognition that a permanent tension between reason and unreason is biologically/divinely resident in human nature; (at the most pessimistic) a hint that *ratio* and *consilium* can never prevail, because human irrationality, embodied in unreasoning erotic passion, female hysteria, anger, male aggression and war-lust, has as much divine *imprimatur* as they do. *Furor impius* (*Aen.* 1.291-296) can be chained but not eradicated. Yet neither can *furor* prevail, if Romans follow the model of *pius Aeneas* in sanely dedicating (or rededicating) themselves socially and politically to Cicero's prescript, quoted in the epigraph above, that no part of life can be exempt from duty.

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***Abstract*:** Roman poetic portrayals of mad characters through the time of Virgil construct a fundamental opposition between madness, an *ipso facto* self-absorbed or egoistic condition, and sanity, which duly fixes its gaze outside of itself, on parents, forebears, and the walls of state. The poets conceptualize *furor* less as what a modern sensibility would label insanity or mental illness than as a passion-fueled state antithetical to social order, able to be held in check only by rigorous adherence to the duty-oriented cultural code of *pietas*. In this moralized conception of madness, erotic *furor* is not a metaphorical by-path but a primary model for the hormonal and accordingly anti-rational forces that rob their victims of the outward focus demanded by the social compact.

***Keywords*:** madness, erotic madness, furor, pietas, passions, latin poetry.