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The Demography of New England: Policy Issues for the Balance of this Century

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New England's rapidly aging population, its traditionally low fertility rate, and the fact that net migration from other regions and abroad should continue to be close to zero means that only very slow population growth will characterize the region for the balance of this century. Nevertheless, New England's demographic metabolism is exceptionally dynamic: (1) the numbers of different age groups are growing at very different rates; (2) a redistribution of population is occurring from the southern to northern tier states; (3) within each state population is dispersing into nonmetropolitan areas; and (4) metropolitan areas, both central and suburban, are quickly changing their demographic composition. Each of these trends has different public policy implications.

Between 1970 and 1980 the population in the six-state New England region increased by slightly more than 4 percent. This was a relatively poor performance compared with the almost 13 percent increase in population experienced by the region during each of the two previous decades, and poorer still compared with population growth rates that were five times as large during the 1970s in the South and West (Table 1). The Census Bureau estimates that New England will approach zero population growth by the year 2000. New England's rapidly aging population, its traditionally low fertility rate, and the fact that net migration from other regions and abroad should continue to be close to zero are the reasons that slow growth should prevail for the region as a whole for the remainder of this century and beyond. Slow growth, however, should not be interpreted as a sign of demographic stagnation. On the contrary, New England's population is exceptionally dynamic.

Four aspects of New England's demographic metabolism deserve special attention because of their general implications for public policy:

New England has *an extremely uneven age structure*. Over time, an uneven age structure results in a poor matchup between people and classrooms, jobs, housing, hospital beds, recreation facilities, etc. One aspect of the changing age structure in New England worthy of special attention is the projected decline in the size of the entry-level labor force and the rapid aging of those currently employed.

Within the six-state region there are sharp differences between demographic processes in the northern tier states (Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont) and the southernmost tier states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut). This variability is resulting in a *redistribution of population* among the New England states.

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Between 1970 and 1980 nonmetropolitan areas grew at rates that were more than 50 percent higher than metropolitan growth rates, resulting in a continuing shift in population to outlying suburbs and small towns. A continued *dispersion of population* should be expected for the remainder of this century, and it will place constant strain on existing infrastructure, whereas areas experiencing population decline will have fewer resources available for the maintenance of existing infrastructure.

Within metropolitan areas, where the majority of New England's residents still live, *changes in the demographic structure of both central cities and the suburbs* will continue to alter their socio-demographic profiles. These changes include the aging of the suburban populations, decline in the dominance of the traditional nuclear family, and the continued prevalence of poverty endemic to certain categories of single-parent, single-person and single-earner households.

These changes will lead to a New England in the year 2000 that will contain approximately the same number of people as in 1980, but which will be significantly different in its demographic composition. These changes will call for increased awareness and appropriate responses on the part of both the public and private sectors. Some responses may actually influence the demographic trends. For the most part, however, we need to see the changes as inevitable constraints and opportunities for planning and management decisions.

Table 1

Population of U.S. Census Regions, 1950-1980

Census Region	Population (thousands)			
	1950	1960	1970	1980
Total U.S.	151,375	179,322	203,296	226,502
New England	9,315	10,509	11,848	12,349
Ratio: New England/ Total U.S.	.062	.059	.058	.055
Me.	914	969	994	1,125
N.H.	533	607	738	921
Vt.	378	390	445	511
Mass.	4,691	5,149	5,689	5,737
R.I.	792	859	950	947
Ct.	2,007	2,535	3,032	3,108
Northeast (*Me., N.H., Vt., Mass., R.I., Ct., N.Y., N.J., Pa.*)	39,478	44,677	49,057	49,137
North Central (*Ohio, Ind., Ill., Mich., Wis., Minn., Iowa, Mo., N.D., S.D. Kans., Neb.*)	44,462	51,619	56,585	58,851
South (*Del., Md., D.C., Va., W. Va., N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla., Ky., Tenn., Ala., Miss., Ark., La., Okla., Tex.*)	47,244	54,973	62,812	75,348
West (*Mont., Ida., Wyo., Colo., N.M., Ariz., Utah, Nev., Wash., Oreg., Cal., Alas., Hi.*)	20,191	28,053	34,842	43,166

Table 1 (continued from previous page)

Population of U.S. Census Regions, 1950-1980

Census Region	Rate of Growth over Decade (%)		
	1950-60	1960-70	1970-80
Total U.S.	18.5	13.4	11.4
New England	12.8	12.7	4.2
Ratio: New England/			
Total U.S.	.692	.947	.368
Me.	6.0	2.5	13.2
N.H.	13.9	21.6	24.8
Vt.	3.2	14.1	14.8
Mass.	9.8	10.5	0.8
R.I.	8.5	10.5	−0.3
Ct.	26.3	19.6	2.5
Northeast (*Me., N.H., Vt., Mass., R.I., Ct., N.Y., N.J., Pa.*)	13.2	9.8	0.2
North Central (*Ohio, Ind., Ill., Mich., Wis., Minn., Iowa, Mo., N.D., S.D. Kans., Neb.*)	16.1	9.6	4.0
South (*Del., Md., D.C., Va., W. Va., N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla., Ky., Tenn., Ala., Miss., Ark., La., Okla., Tex.*)	16.4	14.3	20.0
West (*Mont., Ida., Wyo., Colo., N.M., Ariz., Utah, Nev., Wash., Oreg., Cal., Alas., Hi.*)	38.9	24.2	23.9

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970; Advanced Reports* 1980 Census of Population and Housing.

Uneven Age Structure

Probably the most important demographic event of the twentieth century has been the post-World War II "baby boom" and subsequently the "baby bust." New England has been especially hard hit by the fertility rate swing because its pre-World War II fertility levels were already extremely low, second only to the Mid-Atlantic region (New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania), and its boom took fertility rates to just above the national average in 1960. By 1980, New England's fertility rate fell to 87 percent of the national average. And statistics suggest there has been little change in New England's relative position during the first half of the 1980s. New England women continue to bear their children later and have smaller families compared with women in the rest of the country.

The twentieth century fertility swing has resulted in a population in which at any given time, the numbers of different age groups are growing at very different rates. Table 2 compares growth in eight age groups for the decade 1970-80 with that projected by the Bureau of Census for the last two decades of this century. We see that the 15-24, 25-34 and 35-44 age groups are expected to experience especially sharp declines during the next decade for the region as a whole and for each New England state as well. On

Table 2

Percentage Change in Population in Different Age Groups for New England States, 1970-2000

Age Group and State	1970-1980 Observed	1980-1990 Projected[a]	1990-2000 Projected[a]
Under 15	%	%	%
New England	− 21.5	− 6.5	− 3.6
Me.	− 10.1	0.6	0.2
N.H.	− 3.3	15.0	15.7
Vt.	− 11.2	5.6	3.7
Mass.	− 25.2	− 10.7	− 7.7
R.I.	− 23.1	− 9.8	− 6.7
Ct.	− 24.2	− 9.6	− 6.6
15-24			
New England	15.4	− 22.5	− 14.4
Me.	21.2	− 15.4	− 5.5
N.H.	32.6	− 5.7	4.6
Vt.	24.1	− 16.0	− 2.5
Mass.	12.4	− 25.6	19.2
R.I.	3.3	− 24.4	− 18.3
Ct.	13.5	− 24.9	− 17.2
25-34			
New England	43.0	12.9	− 28.4
Me.	62.4	16.6	− 15.7
N.H.	76.3	31.6	− 5.8
Vt.	65.3	17.1	− 16.1
Mass.	40.2	9.7	− 25.9
R.I.	36.4	11.6	− 24.7
Ct.	31.0	10.6	− 25.1
35-44			
New England	4.1	43.9	10.8
Me.	12.6	58.2	14.3
N.H.	31.3	74.2	29.1
Vt.	22.9	60.8	14.5
Mass.	− 0.1	42.1	7.3
R.I.	− 5.0	44.3	9.1
Ct.	3.7	30.5	8.4
45-54			
New England	− 9.0	6.4	41.3
Me.	2.0	11.1	55.4
N.H.	10.7	31.7	70.4
Vt.	3.0	24.1	57.0
Mass.	− 12.6	1.8	38.0
R.I.	− 15.7	− 0.3	41.4
Ct.	− 11.3	5.6	28.0

(continued on next page)

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Table 2 (continued from previous page)

Percentage Change in Population in Different Age Groups for New England States, 1970-2000

Age Group and State	1970-1980 Observed	1980-1990 Projected[a]	1990-2000 Projected[a]
55-64	%	%	%
New England	12.2	− 9.9	7.2
Me.	13.4	− 1.0	11.0
N.H.	25.6	9.5	31.7
Vt.	12.4	2.2	24.2
Mass.	8.3	− 13.1	2.2
R.I.	12.2	− 15.8	0.3
Ct.	18.4	− 11.7	6.2
65+			
New England	19.6	17.5	2.4
Me.	23.5	17.0	7.2
N.H.	31.9	30.3	10.3
Vt.	23.0	17.5	9.4
Mass.	14.7	12.8	− 1.6
R.I.	22.3	17.8	− 1.3
Ct.	26.9	23.4	3.3
All Ages			
New England	4.3	3.1	0.3
Me.	13.2	9.3	6.4
N.H.	24.8	23.7	19.7
Vt.	14.8	12.3	3.7
Mass.	0.3	− 0.6	− 3.7
R.I.	− 0.3	0.4	− 2.6
Ct.	2.5	0.9	− 2.3

Source: 1970 Census of Population, *General Characteristics;* 1980 Census of Population, *Supplementary Reports,* PC80-51-1 (May 1981); *Current Population Reports,* P-25, No. 937 (August 1983).

[a]Census Bureau mid-series projections assuming 1970-80 migration patterns.

Note: Observed change 1970-80 from April 1 to April 1; projected change 1980-1990 from April 1 to July 1; projected change 1990-2000 from July 1 to July 1.

the other hand, for New England as a whole, and within each state, only the number of those over age 65 is expected to increase over the next decade at a rate close to the rate of increase observed from 1970 to 1980.

Another way of looking at this process, termed *disorderly cohort succession,* is presented in Figure 1. Reading from left to right, we follow the size of ten-year birth cohorts as they age between 1970 and 2000. Such decennial cohorts born before 1945 in New England numbered from between 1.25 and 1.5 million and, because of their approximately equal numbers, succeeded one another in the age structure in quite an orderly fashion. Cohorts born between 1946 and 1965, however, totaled between 2.0 and 2.3 million. These cohorts have put a strain on the orderly process of cohort suc-

Figure 1

Disorderly Cohort Succession
New England States, 1970-2000

**Cohort
Size**

2,500,000

C.1956-65

2,000,000

C.1946-55

C.1966-75

C.1976-85

1,500,000

C.1936-45

C.1916-25

Legend: Year

C.1926-35

x 1970

● 1980

■ 1990

▲ 2000

1,000,000

500,000   x————● Observed   x

●·········■········▲ Projected

0

| 5-14 | 15-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 45-54 | 55-64 | 65-74 | 75+ |

Age

Source: See Table 3.

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cession. The problem has been one of society trying to accommodate too many people with too few slots in the social structure. Over the past three decades, these slots have been sequentially: maternity beds, elementary schools, college admissions, entry-level jobs, and rental apartments. For the balance of this century, the slots in short supply will be single-family-owned housing, job promotions, accommodations for leisure activities, and increasingly, social welfare programs benefiting the elderly.

The down side of disorderly cohort succession has occurred as the number of cohorts born since 1965 has dropped quickly to almost "normal" size. This decline is not without shrinking pains. We have already witnessed the closing of neighborhood elementary schools, and have begun to experience shortages in the entry-level work force, particularly in retail sales.

Youth unemployment is expected to decline dramatically, and when it does occur during the remainder of this century, unemployment will be more a product of poor match-up between skill levels and job requirements than a poor ratio of new jobs to new job seekers. Crime rates will likewise fall in the future, both because there will be fewer teenagers and young adults to commit crimes, and because this group will be more likely to have jobs that pay reasonable wages (assuming entry-level wage levels will rise to help regulate imbalances in supply and demand).

Higher education will face new challenges because of the shrinking numbers in the traditional student age population, but new opportunities will be found in the need to retrain those in the older baby-boom cohorts when job security and promotions are blocked by their own large numbers. And should the smaller number of cohorts born during the 1965-80 period have small families themselves (as did their parents' generation), the echo of the baby bust, due to be set in motion in the late 1990s, would truly create new dimensions to the problem of shrinking cohort size.

For the next ten to fifteen years, however, the major consequences of disorderly cohort succession will be felt by those who are already adults. The reversal in the strong positive growth of student and entry-level labor force ages will pose serious problems for those colleges and employers who have become accustomed to the excess demand created by the baby boom glut. At colleges and in the work place, *re*cruitment, *re*training and *re*tention will become the three Rs. The old strategy of selecting only the "best" of the young applicants and then treating them shabbily will no longer work as it did when an overabundance of well-educated baby boomers dominated the entry pools.

With a healthy economy and a growing shortage of young adults, New England will need to husband its student and young adult labor force with far greater care. Primary and secondary school students, a growing percentage of whom are minorities in many communities, will need to receive the best education in basic reading, writing, and math skills. The current crop of high school dropouts and graduates with less than adequate formal education will need remedial programs. Linking remedial training to definite job opportunities will help ensure lower dropout rates, so the involvement of employers in training programs will be beneficial. If the reward is not only a job, but a well-paying job with clear opportunities for career mobility, remedial training programs could become much more successful than those of the past.

Sometimes it is not a poor match-up between job requirements and employee skills that stands in the way of hiring and promotion. Attitudes, prejudices and expectations on the part of both employers and workers play an equally important role. Three groups

who have been relatively undervalued human resources will take on new importance in the decades ahead. These are minorities, women (particularly married women and mothers), and middle-aged and older persons, of all social and demographic characteristics. Here, the programs and policies will be a lot less concrete than in the case of the three Rs. Sensitivity to the special needs of working mothers, handicapped persons, and minorities with language problems must be balanced with a recognition that such workers must be treated in most ways like any others. Otherwise, prejudice will maintain the cultural barriers to full employment that have been erected over the years.

Nor is it exclusively in the realms of educational initiatives or employer/employee contracts that policies can help to offset the effects of a shrinking labor force. Long, stressful, or expensive commutes to and from work take their toll on the ability to recruit workers and on their productivity at the work place. The proximity of housing and day care to the workers' jobs, the cost and quality of public transportation, and the maintenance of highway and parking facilities all figure prominently in the goal of achieving a better match-up between people and jobs, and their greater productivity.

Mobility Patterns

Transportation and job location policies will take on more significance because of two additional and unalterable facts about the future of New England's labor force: it will get older and it will be less mobile. The projected rapid growth of the 35- to 44-year-old and 45- to 54-year-old segments of the population will mean that the median age of the labor force will increase by over five years by the end of the century.[1]

The sifting and sorting that normally takes place among people and jobs is greatly enhanced when the labor force is young because young adults are more willing to relocate to where the job opportunities are to be found. In contrast, older workers are much less geographically mobile. Table 3 presents the percentage of residents in three age categories who did not change residence between 1975 and 1980. The three groups span the age range through which the baby-boom workers will pass during the next two decades. Whereas only 22 percent of all 25- to 29-year-olds in the United States were living in the same house after five years, fully two-thirds of all 45- to 49-year-olds had not moved. In New England, almost three-quarters of 45- to 49-year-olds had not moved after five years, reflecting the greater immobility of New Englanders of all ages.

The differences between mobility rates in the Northeast and those in the West are especially striking. When workers do change jobs in the future, fewer changes will involve residential moves as well. Thus, job changes that do not also involve a change in residence will tend to increase the burden placed on all levels of the transportation system.

Since before World War II, net migration from outside New England has not been much of a major factor in the growth pattern of the region as a whole. Net migration was close to zero in both the 1950-60 and 1970-80 decades and was only 3 percent in the 1960s. Zero net migration can result from a large amount of migration into the region (counterbalanced by a large outmigration), as well as by small gross migration flows in and out. Focusing only on immigrants from other states, the data reveal a slightly lower rate into New England than the national average, with 9.1 percent of all 1980 residents over the age of five having lived in another state in 1975 (Table 4). Moreover, the vast majority of immigrants from other states came to New England from other Northeast states (63.7 percent), whereas a majority of interstate immigrants living in other regions in 1980 came from states outside the region in which they now

Table 3

**Percentage of Residents Living in Same House in both 1975 and 1980
in Selected Age Groups for Regions and New England States**

		Age Group		
	All Ages Over 5	25-29	35-39	45-49
	%	%	%	%
Total U.S.	56.9	22.0	49.5	68.4
New England	59.1	24.0	54.9	73.9
Me.	56.9	24.0	56.4	71.9
N.H.	51.6	18.6	50.2	66.6
Vt.	54.4	20.7	54.9	71.3
Mass.	61.0	25.1	57.3	76.7
R.I.	60.4	26.6	55.1	73.7
Ct.	59.0	23.2	51.8	72.4
Northeast	61.7	27.4	57.3	75.3
North Central	55.4	21.3	52.6	71.7
South	52.4	23.4	48.5	66.5
West	43.8	15.3	38.7	58.6

Source: 1980 Census of Population, Detailed Characteristics.

reside. In New Hampshire, the New England state having the highest share of its population coming from outside of the state (18.5 percent, twice the New England average), 76 percent came from other states in the Northeast. Even among the highly mobile 25-29 age group, where 32 percent of New Hampshire's 1980 residents were recent interstate immigrants, percentage from within the Northeast holds firm. State-to-state migration flows between 1975 and 1980 have not yet been released by the Bureau of the Census, but if findings from the 1970 census are any indication, we can estimate that the vast majority of interstate immigrants from the Northeast living in New England continue to come from within the region itself.

It is therefore clear that state boundaries within the region are a good deal more permeable than state boundaries that define the region. In other words, demographic flows among New England states appear to supplement and reinforce cultural and economic ties and help give greater definition to the region.

The combination of New England's changing age structure and already low mobility rates leads to an important consequence for human resource policy. The vast majority of what will be New England's labor force in the year 2000 already lives and works in the region today. As this labor force ages and becomes even less mobile, maintaining a good match-up between workers' capabilities and job requirements will mean that all of the principal actors (employers, higher education, labor unions, government, etc.) think more in terms of what present workers can offer. Lynn Browne has shown that New England workers already have quite a lot to offer.[2] They are attached to their jobs (higher participation rates, less time lost from strikes), are well educated, intelligent, and highly skilled. Strangely, in spite of these qualifications, they also appear to be willing to work for relatively low wages.[3] These are all characteristics which make further investment in New England's workers an attractive allocation of resources with prospects of good payoffs. While many fear that an aging and relatively immobile work-

Table 4

Percentage of 1980 Residents Age 5 and Older Living in Another State in 1975 by Region of Residence in 1975

Region of Residence in 1980	All Interstate Moves as a Percent of Total	Region of Residence in 1975 of Interstate Migrants			
		Northeast	North Central	South	West
	%	%	%	%	%
Total U.S.	9.7	22.5	25.6	31.4	20.5
New England	9.1	63.7	10.3	17.2	8.8
Me.	10.7	63.1	8.8	18.0	10.1
N.H.	18.5	76.1	6.1	11.4	6.4
Vt.	14.3	72.6	7.1	12.9	7.4
Mass.	7.0	59.5	12.2	18.6	9.7
R.I.	8.7	67.8	7.9	16.8	7.5
Ct.	9.3	59.4	12.2	19.4	9.0
Northeast	6.1	54.5	12.8	23.4	9.3
North Central	7.0	12.2	44.4	26.9	16.5
South	11.9	21.7	22.4	43.5	12.4
West	13.4	14.6	23.6	19.9	41.9

Source: 1980 Census of Population: *Detailed Characteristics,* various state volumes.

force will increase the incentives for employers to automate and invest in machines instead of people, such policies are perhaps less likely to displace existing workers. Instead, high technology might well address problems that arise from the anticipated shortage of new entry-level workers; that is, automation of repetitive, low-level jobs could reduce the need for these employees. And at the same time, the new technological solution in the work place may depend on the older, experienced existing workers for their implementation.

Redistribution of Population

During the post-World War II period, there has been a swing in migration among the New England states—first from north to south, then from south to north. During the 1950s the fastest growing state was Connecticut, its growth fueled by high natural increase (the baby boom) and high net migration. The latter factor is significant for the entire region in that much of the outmigration experienced by Maine and Vermont in the 1950s was into the southern tier (including southern New Hampshire). By 1980, however, the population flows had reversed: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut all experiencing net outmigration, and Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont experiencing strong gains (Table 5). This general growth pattern is expected to continue into the next decade, resulting in a shift of population northward.

The symbiosis of population movements among the six states in the region is important to underscore. Part of the explanation for what might appear as migratory provincialism within New England can be accounted for by the great diversity that exists within the region. During the great rural depopulation of the 1950s, migrants from Vermont, Maine, and New Hampshire needed to go only as far as Connecticut to find a burgeoning economy in aerospace, insurance, and light manufacturing. During the high-

Table 5

Components of Growth in New England States: 1950-1980

| | 1950-1960 | | |
	Natural Increase	Net Migration	Total Growth
	%	%	%
New England	12.6	0.2	12.8
Me.	12.1	− 6.1	6.0
N.H.	11.5	2.4	13.9
Vt.	13.2	− 10.0	3.2
Mass.	9.8	0.0	9.8
R.I.	11.8	− 3.3	8.5
Ct.	14.6	11.7	26.3

| | 1960-1970 | | |
	Natural Increase	Net Migration	Total Growth
	%	%	%
New England	9.7	3.0	12.7
Me.	9.6	− 7.1	2.5
N.H.	10.2	11.4	21.6
Vt.	10.3	3.8	14.1
Mass.	9.1	1.4	10.5
R.I.	9.0	1.5	10.5
Ct.	11.2	8.4	19.6

| | 1970-1980 | | |
	Natural Increase	Net Migration	Total Growth
	%	%	%
New England	4.1	0.1	4.2
Me.	5.1	8.1	13.2
N.H.	6.1	18.7	24.8
Vt.	5.8	9.0	14.8
Mass.	3.5	− 2.7	0.8
R.I.	3.6	− 3.9	− 0.3
Ct.	4.2	− 1.7	2.5

Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1961, 1972; Advance Report,
1980 Census of Population and Housing, PHC 80, various state volumes;
Monthly Vital Statistics Reports, various issues, 1972-1980.

technology revolution of the late 1970s, the magnet for the young was the area along the Massachusetts/New Hampshire border. Cape Cod has continued (as it has throughout the post-World War II period) to attract retirement migrants from within the region, and Boston has continued to attract students. When the nonmetropolitan revival began, the northern tier states were well positioned to lay claim to those metropolitan migrants in search of a slower pace of life. For those seeking low taxes, New Hampshire was just the place; for others more willing to pay for good public services, Massachusetts was their destination. It appears that a normal reluctance to move on the part of New England residents is complemented by a tendency on the part of those who do move to be largely satisfied with the alternatives offered close at hand. And the alternatives are legion.

Dispersion of Population

One important dimension of the recent shift in population from south to north has been the propensity on the part of those who do not move to favor residence outside metropolitan areas. Indeed, this shift in migration favoring nonmetropolitan growth has been a nationwide phenomenon.[4] In New England, this trend has been manifest since 1950, but during the early part of the post-World War II period, it took place mostly in the southern tier states. For example, during the past decade Massachusetts experienced the most significant growth of its nonmetropolitan population, which increased by 36 percent, compared to a 9 percent increase in Connecticut and a 14 percent loss in Rhode Island. During the same ten-year period, the nonmetropolitan population in the three northern tier states grew by between 14 and 21 percent.[5]

It is clear that rejuvenated nonmetropolitan growth is a powerful force shaping the distribution of population throughout the United States. One important component is simply the spillover of metropolitan population into adjacent nonmetropolitan areas. These are often places to which jobs as well as people are moving. Growth in other areas is exclusively residential, a process of "suburbanization" which has been occurring for many decades. What is new is the revived growth of the more remote nonmetropolitan areas. Many of these nonadjacent, nonmetropolitan destinations appear to offer less in the way of economic opportunities than do metropolitan locations. This has led many analysts to conclude that factors other than employment opportunities, perhaps involving lifestyle choices, are important in the new migration patterns. The interstate highway system allowing easier access to metropolitan centers, the shift toward less dependence on earned income, and the re-emerging importance of home-based employment could support those lifestyle choices and contribute to the new growth pattern.

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In some cases, nonmetropolitan areas are offering unusually attractive economic opportunities, such as occurs when a large new employer locates in the area. The most dramatic example of such growth in New England is in the countryside around Danbury, Connecticut, where Union Carbide has moved its corporate headquarters from New York City. In other cases, an attractive balance among economic, family, community, and leisure activities appears to be the drawing card. Still other areas are attractive simply because of their remoteness: those people frustrated with urban social problems will endure significant economic, cultural and social deprivation, if only for short periods, in order to "get away." It should be concluded that because nonmetropolitan growth appears to be driven by so many engines, it is likely to be sustained for the remainder of this century and beyond. Such a trend will place new challenges before us, since many of the decisions made during the early post-World War II period concerning the location of government services, health care institutions, educational facilities, and housing were premised upon a continuing growth of metropolitan population.

The impact of the gradual shift in population from metropolitan to nonmetropolitan areas often has a dramatic impact at the local level. Small nonmetropolitan communities who find their populations suddenly growing by 50 percent or more in the course of one decade, and then growing slowly or not at all the next, find planning for growth exasperating. The impact on large metropolitan areas is less dramatic but more inexorable.

Changes within Metropolitan Areas

During the 1970s, 86 percent of metropolitan central cities in the Northeast lost population, as did many of their inner suburbs. Since three-quarters of New England's popu-

lation live in its twenty-nine Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA)[6] (about the same fraction as for the United States as a whole), we need to take a closer look at the dimensions of metropolitan area population change. In addition to loss of population, other demographic shifts in cities and suburbs include racial turnover, the "graying" of the suburbs and consequent decline in the presence of children, the growth of nonfamily households, the increase in family households headed by women, the growth of single-person households, and the increasing proportion of the population living in poverty. All of these trends are interrelated, a fact that partly explains their inexorable qualities. All have important implications for public policy.

Trends and differentials in population growth and changes in age structure for cities and suburbs are even more extreme than state or regional averages because of the effects of age selectivity on migration. (See Tables 3 and 4.) Most demographic changes taking place in metropolitan areas today were set in motion during the 1950s, when young married couples, who were to become parents in the baby boom, left the cities and settled the suburbs. Age structures in cities became rapidly skewed toward the older ages as young adults and children moved out, while suburban population growth from in-migration was further enhanced by the younger age structure, which produced many births and few deaths. The vacated urban neighborhoods were gradually repopulated by other groups, often nonwhite and Hispanic immigrants and their children and later by the children of the original suburbanites. Thus, cities have swung back toward younger age composition over the past two decades. Suburbs, on the other hand, began to grow older as they stopped growing: the baby boomers moved away to college or a job, while their parents, by and large, stayed put. By 1980, the gap between the age structures of cities and suburbs had narrowed considerably, with suburbs of most SMSAs in New England having only a slightly higher percentage of population under the age of nineteen compared with core cities, and cities a slightly higher percentage of their population over the age of 65 compared with suburbs (Appendix A). Soon the majority of senior citizens will live in the inner suburbs, and many cities will look youthful and energetic by comparison. With more suburban families entering the "empty nest" period, and few young couples able to afford close-in suburban housing, there is little in the demographic equation to help counterbalance the aging of their populations through migration or natural increase. With aging populations, suburban growth should turn negative in many areas, as has already occurred in the suburbs of Boston and Pittsfield, Massachusetts, and Stamford, Connecticut (Appendix A).

The prognosis for population growth and age structure change in central cities is a bit more uncertain. If the baby-boom cohorts living in cities continue to forego marriage and childbearing and do not move out as rapidly when they approach middle age as did their predecessors, the size of cities that have been losing population will tend to stabilize over the balance of this century. If, on the other hand, the long-term trend toward out-migration of those in their thirties and forties is sustained, cities will continue to lose population. Future population loss in cities seems almost to be guaranteed for a variety of other reasons as well. The baby-bust cohorts will not be in large enough numbers to replace the baby boom cohorts as the generations succeed one another. Furthermore, if minorities in cities like Boston or Hartford (which contain sizeable black and Hispanic populations) are gradually able to overcome economic and social barriers and move out to the suburbs, further central city population loss will be registered. Moreover, if nonmetropolitan areas and fast growth regions in the South and West exercise a

strong pull on young adults who might otherwise gravitate toward New England cities, the consequence will be even greater population decline than is now projected. Finally, if the trend toward the formation of smaller and smaller households persists, urban population will likewise tend to decline. Since opportunities to increase the housing stock in cities are limited, smaller households translate into fewer people overall. This latter point is not well understood by many who have interpreted recent population losses in central cities purely in economic terms.[7]

Already the number of households made up of only one person is between 25 and 30 percent in most core cities of New England metropolitan areas (Appendix A). This could increase to 35 percent or more in the future. Boston's one-person households totalled almost 37 percent in 1980. Smaller household sizes will translate into fewer people when the number of households (occupied housing units) remains static or declines. Because of the high cost of expanding the housing stock in central cities, we can look forward to little new central city housing. On the other hand, demolition and abandonment will likely persist and thereby remove housing from the existing stock.

The issue of population loss in central cities is such a vital one because shrinking tax bases and reduced shares of federal funds allocated on the basis of population are not generally offset by lower operating budgets for police, fire, garbage collection, road maintenance and municipal employee pensions. A shrinking population base also means less political clout within state legislatures and consequently less leverage in lobbying for state funds as well.

For the most part, cities have tried to bolster their demographic well-being through policies aimed at creating new jobs or keeping the jobs they have. As necessary as such efforts are, housing, parking, school, and safety issues count heavily in whether new jobs translate into new residents. Moreover, holding on to the baby boomers who now live in cities, and who will be turning 40 over the remainder of this century, will become increasingly difficult unless these quality of life issues are addressed. Cities responsive to the needs and interests of this diverse group of baby-boom urbanites (gays, singles, upwardly mobile minorities, single parents and dual-career couples) will enter the next century in a stronger demographic position.

To a lesser extent the suburbs also will need to address the concerns of an increasingly diverse population base. We have already mentioned that the elderly are a rapidly growing constituency in most suburbs. Appendix A shows that nonfamily households in the suburbs of most New England SMSAs now account for between 15 and 25 percent of the total, with female-headed families approaching 10 percent. While the majority of suburban households are still composed of married couples, only about half of them have young children under the age of eighteen. Thus, the suburban stereotype of families made up of husband, wife and children now accounts for only between one-quarter to one-half of households in most metropolitan suburbs. Add to this the fact that more and more wives and mothers are in the labor force, and the dynamics of suburban life have shifted even further from what dominated in the 1950s and 1960s. There are attendant security issues: with fewer women at home during the day, houses are vulnerable to burglary, and children are increasingly left unsupervised at home after school. Nonfamily households are viewed with suspicion by the neighbors. Widows who cannot find alternative housing in their neighborhoods continue to occupy their large single-family residences while the house and yard begin to deteriorate around them. The lack of public transportation, which was never much of a problem for two car/one wife-

chauffeur families, hits hard those who do not have use of an automobile. There is opposition at zoning board hearings when someone wants to start a business in his home or convert an unused part of his house to a rental apartment. Developers who would like to develop empty land or demolish existing structures to build smaller, less expensive cluster housing to meet the needs and budgets of nonfamily households are vigorously opposed by abutting property owners. With the growing diversity of house-holds and lifestyles, the suburbs are rapidly moving away from a politics of consensus toward a politics of interest-group conflict and, ultimately, a politics of compromise.

One dimension of diversity that has yet to really emerge in New England suburbs is racial diversity. While the City of Boston was 22.4 percent black and 6.4 percent Hispanic in 1980, the balance of the SMSA was only 1.6 and 1.4 percent black and Hispanic, respectively. In Hartford, blacks totalled 33.9 percent in the central city, with 20.5 percent Hispanic. Hartford suburbs, however, were made up of only 2.7 percent black and 1.1 percent Hispanic according to the 1980 Census (Appendix A).

The increase in the nonwhite and Hispanic populations in places like Boston and Hartford was initially caused by immigration, particularly in the late 1950s and 1960s. Over the last decade, immigration of blacks has slowed dramatically, yet they continue to increase in the total population because of an excess of births over deaths. Because nonwhites and Hispanics are recent arrivals, there are relatively few elderly in these groups, and, therefore, relatively few deaths. There are many more births, not so much because of a large number of births per woman, but because there are many women in the prime childbearing ages. Whites, on the other hand, often have more deaths than births (e.g., in Boston) because of a higher fraction of the white population that is elderly *and* because white women living in central cities have extremely low fertility rates, less than half the level necessary for replacement. Because of the differences in age structures and fertility rates between whites and nonwhites, we can expect contin-ued racial turnover in central cities arising simply from differences in natural increase.

Racial turnover in suburbs remains dependent upon future patterns of migration, which in turn will depend upon the ability of minorities to overcome the economic and social barriers that have prevented them from taking up residence there in the past. In a few metropolitan areas, such as Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and Chicago, the non-white working and middle classes have dramatically increased their representation in the suburbs in recent years. Such a trend could be seen in those metropolitan areas in New England where nonwhites and Hispanics are a significant percentage of central city pop-ulations. However, as can be seen from the data in Appendix A, those areas are few in number.

The poor relative economic position of minorities is reflected partly in the statistics on the change in the poverty rates between 1969 and 1979 (Appendix A). However, since the vast majority of SMSA central cities showed large increases in poverty rates over the 1970s decade, more important than racial turnover has been the effect on pov-erty rates of changes in household structure. Persons living in single-person households, elderly households, and female-headed family households are all overrepresented in the poverty index. For example, the central city portion of the Lawrence/Haverhill, Massa-chusetts SMSA increased its share of persons in poverty by almost 50 percent over the ten years of the 1970s, yet its minority population was still under 1 percent of the total in 1980. Nonfamily and female-headed family households in Lawrence/Haverhill, how-

ever, had risen to 46.6 percent of the total by 1980. Where suburban areas have also increased their poverty rates, the underlying cause has been primarily the same shift in household structures.

Another factor in the increase in poverty rates is purely definitional. Because in-kind transfers such as housing allowances, food stamps, Medicaid, school lunches, Meals on Wheels, and subsidized transportation services are not counted when calculating poverty statistics, "pure income" tends to overstate the poverty of many who receive this aid. Another problem arises when unrelated individuals share a household and household expenses. Their incomes are not pooled when calculating the poverty index, as are the incomes of family members. Finally, the poverty statistic measures only income and not wealth. Many elderly households show up pretty poorly on the income scale, yet their members live quite comfortably in mortgage-free housing and draw from their savings. Therefore, we must be careful not to take the crude poverty index literally when interpreting the relative well-being of households and persons in different cities and suburbs.

Yet, in a place like Danbury, Connecticut, which was economically "reborn" over the 1970s, greater economic well-being was clearly reflected in a decline in the poverty rate. Such good fortune must be considered a relatively rare experience for metropolitan areas in New England. More characteristically, we should expect poverty rates to continue to creep upward because of changing household structures and the growing role of transfers of goods and services (including barter and intergenerational transfers) in household economies.

Because more diversified household structures mean a growing share of female-headed households, and because women work fewer hours and earn less per hour than do men, the income distribution of households has become more dispersed. Dual-income professional households claim the upper-income bracket, while no-earner and one-earner female-headed households fall into the lower. When these two groups are pitted against each other in the marketplace, the poorer households simply cannot compete. Housing is a good example of a scarce resource that is increasingly being placed outside the reach of poor households. College education for one's children appears to be another. Health care could very well become a third as employers begin to reduce health-care benefits and insurers raise the co-pay share.

While the implications of a growing gap between the haves and have-nots seem clear, the solutions are not. Affirmative action to upgrade job access and remuneration for women and minorities would certainly help close the gap. But recent experience has shown how slowly such changes take effect. Greater concern about the growth of dead-end service-sector jobs and who gets trapped into such jobs is undoubtedly called for. But many of the high-growth jobs, such as security guards, janitors, copy machine operators, food service employees, and hospital orderlies will likely remain decidedly dead-end. Highly subsidized child-care services that allow women to work more hours and to keep more of what they earn would also be a step in the right direction. However, subsidized child care means that employers and upper income workers would get to keep less of what they earn, a proposal that runs counter to the Reagan administration's economic policies. Ultimately, women may opt out of childbearing, as they already appear to have done to some extent. When women stop having children, the short-term economic well-being of their households is improved, but the long-term economic well-being of the community is threatened, and the eventual burden placed on the government to care for childless individuals in sickness and in old age is increased.

Conclusion

This brief review of the demography of New England has proceeded from the macro to the micro. We have contrasted the slow population growth projected for the region as a whole with the significant changes taking place in age structure, geographic mobility, residential location, household structure, racial composition and economic well-being in individual cities and suburbs. Some of these demographic trends are universal, such as the shifts in age structure. Others, such as racial turnover, are salient only in particular areas. As we shift our focus from regional or state demographic trends down to local levels, generalizations are increasingly difficult to make. Yet, it could easily be argued that demographic trends at the local level are more extreme and therefore become more important in informing public policy. The demographic history and future of each of New England's towns and cities are highly variable. How the local scene stacks up to the broader trends described in this paper should be a question foremost in the minds of all planners and policymakers. Fortunately, it is a question that can be answered with wise and timely planning decisions.

Appendix A

Selected Demographic Characteristics of New England Metropolitan Areas by Central City and Suburbs

					1980 Population	
	1980 Population	1970-80 Change	Black	Spanish Origin	Under 18	Over 65
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Me.	**1,125,000**	**+13.2**	**0.3**	**0.4**	**34.9**	**12.5**
Bangor SMSA	83,919	+5.0	0.3	0.4	25.0	10.6
Central City Part	31,643	−4.6	0.5	0.4	23.8	13.1
Suburban Part	52,276	+10.8	0.1	0.3	25.9	9.1
Lewiston-Auburn SMSA	72,378	−0.1	0.3	0.5	27.5	14.2
Central City Part	63,609	−3.5	0.4	0.4	26.6	15.0
Suburban Part	8,769	+24.6	0.1	1.2	34.0	8.4
Portland SMSA	183,625	+8.0	0.4	0.5	26.2	13.2
Central City Part	61,572	−5.4	0.9	0.6	23.0	16.6
Suburban Part	122,053	+14.8	0.2	0.4	27.9	11.5
N.H.	**921,000**	**+24.8**	**0.4**	**0.6**	**28.1**	**11.2**
Manchester SMSA	160,767	+21.3	0.3	0.8	28.0	11.1
Central City Part	90,936	+3.6	0.4	1.1	25.7	13.4
Suburban Part	69,831	+44.3	0.3	0.5	31.1	8.0
Nashua SMSA	114,221	+32.4	0.8	0.8	31.2	8.0
Central City Part	67,865	+21.6	1.0	1.1	28.5	9.5
Suburban Part	46,356	+48.2	0.5	0.4	35.3	6.0
Portsmouth-Dover-Rochester SMSA	163,880	+15.2	0.9	0.7	26.2	10.8
Central City Part	70,191	+9.3	1.6	0.9	26.9	11.7
Suburban Part	93,689	+19.6	0.4	0.6	25.7	10.1
Vt.	**511,000**	**+14.8**	**0.2**	**0.6**	**28.4**	**11.4**
Burlington SMSA	114,070	+16.0	0.4	0.8	27.5	7.7
Central City Part	37,712	−2.4	0.6	0.8	19.5	10.8
Suburban Part	76,358	+25.1	0.3	0.8	31.4	6.1

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Selected Demographic Characteristics of New England Metropolitan Areas by Central City and Suburbs

	1980 Population	1970-80 Change	Black	Spanish Origin	1980 Population Under 18	Over 65
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Mass.	**5,737,000**	**+0.8**	**3.9**	**2.5**	**26.0**	**12.7**
Boston SMSA	2,763,357	−4.7	5.8	2.4	24.3	12.5
Central City Part	562,994	−12.2	22.4	6.4	21.6	12.7
Suburban Part	2,200,363	−2.8	1.6	1.4	25.0	12.4
Brockton SMSA	169,374	+12.6	3.4	1.6	30.0	10.7
Central City Part	95,172	+6.9	5.2	2.3	30.2	11.9
Suburban Part	74,202	+19.9	1.1	0.7	29.8	9.2
Fall River SMSA	176,831	+4.3	0.4	1.7	28.0	13.8
Central City Part	92,574	−4.5	0.5	2.4	26.9	16.6
Suburban Part	84,257	+14.0	0.3	0.9	29.3	10.8
Fitchburg-Leominster SMSA	99,957	+2.9	1.5	2.7	27.5	11.8
Central City Part	74,088	−2.4	1.5	3.3	26.3	13.2
Suburban Part	25,869	+18.1	1.6	0.9	31.0	7.9
Lawrence-Haverhill SMSA	281,981	+9.1	0.9	4.4	28.9	12.3
Central City Part	110,040	−2.5	1.8	10.0	28.0	15.4
Suburban Part	171,941	+16.5	0.3	0.8	29.5	10.3
Lowell SMSA	233,410	+6.9	0.8	2.3	30.9	9.3
Central City Part	92,418	−1.9	1.3	5.0	27.7	13.0
Suburban Part	140,992	+12.7	0.4	0.6	33.0	6.8
New Bedford SMSA	169,425	+5.0	1.8	3.1	26.7	14.6
Central City Part	98,478	−3.2	2.7	4.6	26.2	16.2
Suburban Part	70,947	+16.4	0.6	1.0	27.1	12.4
Pittsfield SMSA	90,505	−6.5	1.5	0.5	26.4	14.2
Central City Part	51,974	−8.8	2.4	0.5	27.0	14.1
Suburban Part	38,531	−3.4	0.3	0.4	25.7	14.2
Springfield-Chicopee-Holyoke SMSA	530,668	−2.0	5.4	4.5	26.4	12.3
Central City Part	252,109	−10.0	10.5	8.3	26.8	14.1
Suburban Part	278,559	+5.2	0.8	1.1	26.0	10.7
Worcester SMSA	372,940	+0.2	1.4	2.2	26.5	13.4
Central City Part	161,799	−8.4	2.9	4.3	23.6	16.3
Suburban Part	211,141	+6.8	0.4	0.5	28.8	11.3
R.I.	**947,000**	**−0.3**	**2.9**	**2.1**	**25.7**	**13.4**
Providence-Warwick-Pawtucket SMSA	919,216	+1.1	2.7	2.1	25.7	13.4
Central City Part	315,131	−6.8	6.3	3.8	24.4	14.9
Suburban Part	604,085	+5.2	0.8	1.2	26.4	12.6
Ct.	**3,108,000**	**+2.5**	**7.0**	**4.0**	**26.5**	**11.7**
Bridgeport SMSA	395,455	+1.6	8.8	7.7	26.7	12.2
Central City Part	142,546	−8.9	21.0	18.7	27.9	13.4
Suburban Part	252,909	+7.5	2.0	1.5	26.0	11.6
Bristol SMSA	73,762	+5.6	1.4	1.5	27.9	10.3
Central City Part	57,370	+3.4	1.6	1.7	27.1	10.9
Suburban Part	16,392	+13.3	0.6	0.9	30.7	8.2

Appendix A *(continued from previous page)*

Selected Demographic Characteristics of New England Metropolitan Areas by Central City and Suburbs

	1980 Population %	1970-80 Change %	Black %	Spanish Origin %	1980 Population Under 18 %	Over 65 %
Danbury SMSA	146,405	+26.7	2.9	2.1	30.1	9.3
Central City Part	60,470	+19.1	5.7	3.3	27.3	10.7
Suburban Part	85,935	+32.0	0.9	1.2	32.1	8.4
Hartford SMSA	726,114	+0.8	8.5	4.7	26.6	11.4
Central City Part	136,392	-13.7	33.9	20.5	29.0	11.4
Suburban Part	589,722	+4.2	2.7	1.1	26.1	11.4
Meriden SMSA	57,118	+2.1	3.4	8.2	26.5	12.7
Central City Part	57,118	+2.1	3.4	8.2	26.5	12.7
Suburban Part	—	—	—	—	—	—
New Britain SMSA	142,241	-2.1	3.4	5.0	24.3	12.4
Central City Part	73,840	-11.5	5.8	8.7	21.3	14.4
Suburban Part	68,401	+8.0	0.9	1.0	27.4	10.2
New Haven- West Haven SMSA	417,592	+1.5	12.0	3.2	25.4	12.3
Central City Part	179,293	-5.7	25.2	6.0	24.6	13.0
Suburban Part	238,299	+6.9	2.1	1.1	26.0	11.8
New London- Norwich SMSA	248,554	+2.8	3.6	1.9	27.3	10.8
Central City Part	66,916	-8.8	8.2	3.5	24.3	13.2
Suburban Part	181,638	+7.1	1.9	1.3	28.4	9.9
Norwalk SMSA	126,692	+0.7	8.9	4.1	26.6	9.9
Central City Part	77,767	-1.9	13.9	5.8	25.4	10.8
Suburban Part	48,925	+4.8	0.8	1.3	28.6	8.4
Stamford SMSA	198,854	-3.6	8.4	3.7	25.0	12.4
Central City Part	102,453	-5.8	15.0	5.6	24.5	12.0
Suburban Part	96,401	-1.3	1.4	1.7	25.5	12.7
Waterbury SMSA	228,178	+5.2	5.8	3.6	27.0	13.8
Central City Part	103,260	-4.4	11.6	6.7	25.8	15.5
Suburban Part	124,912	+3.6	1.0	1.0	28.0	12.4

| | 1980 Households | | | Persons in Poverty | | |
	Non- Family %	Female Family %	Single Person %	1979 %	1969 %	Change Poverty Rate %
Me.	**34.4**	**12.2**	**28.6**	**13.0**	**13.2**	**+5.3**
Bangor SMSA	29.2	10.3	21.8	12.4	NA	—
Central City Part	37.0	11.8	28.4	14.6	14.7	-0.7
Suburban Part	23.7	8.5	17.1	11.1	NA	—
Lewiston-Auburn SMSA	28.8	11.2	25.0	12.9	12.1	+6.6
Central City Part	30.8	11.3	26.8	15.7	12.4	+26.6
Suburban Part	14.3	10.5	11.9	7.4	7.9	-6.3
Portland SMSA	30.5	10.5	24.6	10.5	10.3	+1.9
Central City Part	42.6	12.5	34.1	15.4	14.5	+6.2
Suburban Part	23.3	9.3	19.0	8.0	6.6	+21.2
N.H.	**26.3**	**8.4**	**21.4**	**8.5**	**8.8**	**-3.4**
Manchester SMSA	27.5	9.7	22.6	7.9	9.9	-20.2
Central City Part	32.3	11.6	26.9	10.4	10.1	+3.0
Suburban Part	20.3	6.8	16.1	4.6	8.9	-48.3

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Selected Demographic Characteristics of New England Metropolitan Areas by Central City and Suburbs

	1980 Households			Persons in Poverty		
	Non-Family	Female Family	Single Person	1979	1969	Change Poverty Rate
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Nashua SMSA	23.8	8.7	19.0	5.3	6.3	−15.9
Central City Part	28.1	9.6	22.6	6.5	6.4	+1.6
Suburban Part	16.4	6.5	12.8	3.5	7.7	−54.5
Portsmouth-Dover-Rochester SMSA	28.4	8.9	21.8	9.5	NA	—
Central City Part	31.4	10.0	24.7	9.4	NA	—
Suburban Part	26.2	8.0	19.6	9.6	NA	—
Vt.	**28.1**	**9.0**	**21.9**	**12.1**	**11.6**	**+4.3**
Burlington SMSA	30.7	8.8	21.3	10.2	NA	—
Central City Part	45.5	10.1	30.7	16.2	11.8	+37.3
Suburban Part	22.9	8.1	16.4	7.2	NA	—
Mass.	**29.2**	**11.5**	**24.4**	**9.6**	**8.3**	**+15.7**
Boston SMSA	32.5	11.7	26.3	9.4	8.5	+10.6
Central City Part	46.7	16.2	36.8	20.2	15.4	+31.2
Suburban Part	28.5	10.4	23.3	6.6	6.3	+4.8
Brockton SMSA	25.1	12.2	21.7	9.7	7.2	+34.7
Central City Part	28.4	14.6	24.8	12.6	8.6	+46.5
Suburban Part	20.3	8.6	17.2	6.0	5.9	+1.7
Fall River SMSA	23.8	11.1	21.9	11.1	11.2	−0.9
Central City Part	28.9	13.6	27.3	14.8	13.6	+8.8
Suburban Part	17.5	8.1	15.2	7.0	6.7	+4.5
Fitchburg-Leominster SMSA	26.2	10.6	22.5	9.5	8.0	+18.8
Central City Part	28.9	11.5	24.7	11.2	8.7	+28.7
Suburban Part	17.8	8.0	15.6	4.6	5.2	−11.5
Lawrence-Haverhill SMSA	25.3	11.7	22.4	10.8	7.7	+40.3
Central City Part	31.2	15.4	28.0	15.5	10.4	+49.0
Suburban Part	21.1	9.0	18.4	7.8	5.1	+52.9
Lowell SMSA	21.0	11.3	18.6	8.2	7.8	+5.1
Central City Part	31.1	15.3	26.8	13.5	11.3	+19.5
Suburban Part	13.1	8.2	12.2	4.7	4.9	−4.1
New Bedford SMSA	25.7	12.2	23.4	12.2	13.0	−6.2
Central City Part	29.2	14.7	26.8	16.2	15.1	+7.3
Suburban Part	20.3	8.3	18.1	6.6	8.6	−23.3
Pittsfield SMSA	26.9	10.8	23.9	9.0	7.2	+25.0
Central City Part	27.9	12.2	24.8	10.3	7.4	+39.2
Suburban Part	25.5	8.7	22.6	7.2	6.7	+7.5
Springfield-Chicopee-Holyoke SMSA	26.9	12.2	23.4	11.3	9.0	+25.6
Central City Part	29.8	15.9	26.6	16.1	11.5	+40.0
Suburban Part	24.5	9.1	20.7	7.0	6.0	+16.7
Worcester SMSA	26.8	11.0	23.2	9.6	7.7	+24.7
Central City Part	33.4	14.0	28.5	14.4	10.0	+44.0
Suburban Part	21.4	8.5	18.9	5.9	5.1	+15.7

Appendix A *(continued from previous page)*

Selected Demographic Characteristics of New England Metropolitan Areas by Central City and Suburbs

	1980 Households			Persons in Poverty		
	Non-Family	Female Family	Single Person	1979	1969	Change Poverty Rate
	%	%	%	%	%	%
R.I.	**27.4**	**11.2**	**23.9**	**10.3**	**10.5**	**−1.9**
Providence-Warwick-						
Pawtucket SMSA	27.4	11.2	23.9	10.5	10.2	+2.9
Central City Part	33.4	13.6	29.2	14.6	13.8	+5.8
Suburban Part	23.9	9.8	20.9	8.4	8.0	+5.0
Ct.	**25.6**	**10.8**	**21.6**	**8.0**	**7.0**	**+14.3**
Bridgeport SMSA	23.7	12.6	20.6	9.9	7.1	+39.4
Central City Part	31.7	18.9	28.1	20.4	11.5	+77.4
Suburban Part	18.8	8.8	16.0	4.0	4.1	−2.4
Bristol SMSA	23.4	9.9	20.3	5.4	5.0	+8.0
Central City Part	24.1	10.5	21.0	5.9	4.8	+22.9
Suburban Part	20.7	7.5	17.6	3.7	6.1	−39.3
Danbury SMSA	21.7	8.4	18.0	4.6	6.0	−23.3
Central City Part	26.9	10.0	22.4	6.7	7.1	−5.6
Suburban Part	17.7	7.1	14.6	3.1	3.9	−20.5
Hartford SMSA	26.5	11.1	21.9	7.9	6.9	+14.5
Central City Part	40.9	21.9	34.7	25.2	16.4	+53.7
Suburban Part	22.9	8.4	18.7	3.9	3.9	0.0
Meriden SMSA	27.0	11.0	24.1	7.4	6.7	+10.4
Central City Part	27.0	11.0	24.1	7.4	6.7	+10.4
Suburban Part	—	—	—	—	—	—
New Britain SMSA	27.2	10.4	22.9	7.7	6.6	+16.7
Central City Part	33.6	12.3	27.9	11.8	8.5	+38.8
Suburban Part	19.4	8.0	16.8	3.3	3.9	−15.4
New Haven-						
West Haven SMSA	28.2	12.0	23.6	10.5	9.8	+7.1
Central City Part	36.7	16.9	30.4	19.1	14.0	+36.4
Suburban Part	21.3	8.1	18.1	4.0	7.0	−42.9
New London-						
Norwich SMSA	25.3	9.7	20.9	8.6	10.1	−14.9
Central City Part	33.7	12.9	31.1	14.5	10.9	+33.0
Suburban Part	21.9	8.4	16.7	6.4	9.6	−33.3
Norwalk SMSA	23.8	9.9	19.3	5.3	5.7	−7.0
Central City Part	27.2	11.4	22.4	7.0	6.5	+7.7
Suburban Part	17.9	7.3	13.9	2.6	4.8	−45.8
Stamford SMSA	25.5	10.3	21.6	5.4	5.4	0.0
Central City Part	28.7	12.0	24.6	7.7	7.0	+10.0
Suburban Part	21.9	8.3	18.2	3.0	3.6	−16.7
Waterbury SMSA	24.2	11.0	21.7	8.9	7.2	+23.6
Central City Part	28.8	14.5	26.2	14.1	9.5	+48.4
Suburban Part	20.0	7.9	17.6	4.6	4.7	−2.1

Sources: 1970 Census of Population, Supplementary Report, "Poverty Status in 1969 and 1959 of Persons and Families, for States, SMSA's, Central Cities and Counties," 1970 and 1960 PC(51)-105; *1980 Census of Population and Housing, Summary Characteristics for Governmental Units and Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas,* PHC80-3; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1977;* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1982;* U.S. Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book, 1983.*

Notes

1. George S. Masnick, "The Expected Rapid Aging of New England's Vital Resource, Its Labor Force: Context and Consequence." Paper presented at Regional Public Policy Conference on the Retraining Needs of Mid-Career Workers in New England, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, December 1, 1983.

2. Lynn E. Browne, "A Quality Labor Supply," in John C. Hoy and Melvin H. Bernstein, eds., *New England's Vital Resource: The Labor Force* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1982), pp. 65-95.

3. Masnick, "Expected Rapid Aging."

4. Larry H. Long, "Population Redistribution in the U.S.: Issues for the 1980's," *Population Trends and Public Policy,* March 1983.

5. George S. Masnick, "Demographic Influences on the Labor Force in New England," in Hoy and Bernstein, *New England's Vital Resource,* pp. 36-64.

6. The general concept of a metropolitan area is one of a large population nucleus together with adjacent communities that have a high degree of economic and social integration with the nucleus. Such population agglomerations encompass major cities and their suburbs. The classification defining Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) is a statistical tool developed for use by federal agencies in the production, analysis, and publication of data on metropolitan areas. Nationwide, there are now 323 such areas, with 29 in the New England region. They may straddle state lines, as do several in New England. The SMSA concept provides a convenient way to examine the demographic structure of both core cities and suburbs.

7. Katharine L. Bradbury, "Urban Decline and Distress: An Update," *New England Economic Review,* July/August 1984, pp. 39-55.