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The Catholic Church and the Desegregation of Boston's Public Schools

James E. Glinski

Recent studies of Boston's desegregation crisis, most notably J. Anthony Lukas's Common Ground, have been highly critical of the Catholic church and its local leader, Humberto Cardinal Medeiros, archbishop of Boston. Their criticisms have been that the church, guided by the ineffective leadership of Cardinal Medeiros in an effort to save its own schools, allowed its schools to become havens for those Bostonians attempting to escape busing. This article is an account of the church's effort to develop a desegregation policy that would allow it to preserve its own schools but not at the expense of court-ordered desegregation and its attempt to implement that policy in the face of strong opposition. In assessing the success of the church's effort, this article also raises the question of what is the proper role of the church in the construction and implementation of public policy.

As a result of Judge W. Arthur Garrity's desegregation ruling in June 1974, Boston was a city marked by a struggle between citizens who supported the desegregation of Boston's public schools and those who did not. The struggle involved all of the city's institutions and their leaders, including the archdiocese of Boston.

In a city that was 70 percent Catholic, it was expected that the church would play an influential role in the effort to implement the court's order. However, the church was facing many problems of its own at that time, including an enrollment crisis in its own schools, a multimillion-dollar debt, and an adjustment to a new archbishop, Humberto Cardinal Medeiros, who had been appointed in 1970 following the death of Richard Cardinal Cushing. These problems combined to make it difficult for the church to fulfill expectations that it play a major role in Boston's attempt to desegregate its schools. This article examines the desegregation policy developed by the church and assesses its effect on the implementation of court-ordered school desegregation in Boston.

To truly understand the activities of the church during this period one must put them in the context of a long struggle by church reformers to convince the church to develop an effective policy for dealing with a changing inner city and of the paradigm of policymaking that the church had established to deal with major issues. Although the policies and

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practices of the archdiocese of Boston on social and moral issues would in large part be determined by its archbishop, they were also the result of a complicated and intricate process involving a large cast of characters, both lay and religious.

Cardinal Medeiros, like his predecessor Cardinal Cushing, would be pressured by reform-minded individuals and groups, such as the Catholic Interracial Council, the Commission on Human Rights, the Association of Boston Urban Priests, and the Association of Urban Sisters, to make the church more responsive to the changing environment of Boston. These reformers attempted to convince the archbishop to develop a cohesive urban policy, administered by an effective church agency, that could unify the efforts of the various reformers within the church. Many reformers also emphasized the role that parochial schools could play as the bridge between Boston's white and minority communities. Not surprisingly, however, these reformers encountered considerable resistance, both bureaucratic and philosophical, from the church.

The Cardinal

A complex person, Cardinal Medeiros exhibited a leadership style and personal characteristics that would be very influential in determining the effectiveness of the church during the desegregation crisis. Many of those who supported the selection of Medeiros as archbishop hoped that he would bring to Boston the same commitment to the underprivileged that he had demonstrated in his efforts for the farm workers in his diocese in Texas. In Boston a commitment to the underprivileged meant using the prestige and power of the church to help resolve the city's intensifying racial crisis.

Perhaps because they set their expectations too high or had envisioned the new archbishop to be someone he was not, his progressive supporters were concerned over Medeiros's inactivity on moral and social issues during his first year as archbishop. In contrast to Cardinal Cushing, who made his own decisions and took action, Medeiros listened to his advisers' recommendations and made carefully reasoned decisions that were often compromises between conflicting advice. In addition, Medeiros, unlike Cushing, felt that the church should not be involved in political activity. It soon became clear that Medeiros would often need to be pressured to act, sometimes with impressive results.

Under Medeiros the church continued to support the state's Racial Imbalance Act (RIA) against attempts to repeal or weaken it. Passed in 1965, this law stated that any school in Massachusetts with more than a 50 percent nonwhite enrollment was imbalanced. If a school system did not redress the imbalance the state Department of Education had the power to approve corrective measures or to impose punitive action, such as the withdrawal of state funding, until the school system complied with the law. However, two court actions would force the church and its archbishop to increase their commitment to racially balanced schools. In 1972, Federal District Judge W. Arthur Garrity began hearing preliminary motions on *Morgan v. Hennigan*,¹ the attempt by black parents to desegregate Boston's public schools. In 1973, the state Supreme Judicial Court ordered the state Department of Education to prepare a plan for the implementation of the RIA in Boston, effective September 1974.

In his public statements and writings, such as his impressive pastoral letter "Man's Cities and God's Poor," Medeiros repeated his support for the RIA and also endorsed busing as one way to break the "habit" of segregation. In response to opposition to the planned busing of public school students in the fall of 1973, he asked "every Catholic to examine his conscience as to the extent of his contribution to the present tension and frus-

tration” and repeated his position that integrated education was a moral issue and “that hatred of a brother or sister and disdain for legitimate authority and law are immoral!”² In addition, in response to pleas for an increase in his personal involvement in support of the RIA and in reaction to the massive efforts by its opponents for its repeal, on April 4, 1974, Cardinal Medeiros personally appeared before the Joint Committee on Education to voice his support for the RIA.

Some observers feel that the personal testimony of Medeiros saved the RIA. The archbishop of Boston was still the most influential religious leader in Massachusetts and there was some doubt whether other religious leaders, such as Episcopal Bishop Burgess, would have testified or would have been as effective if Cardinal Medeiros had not. In addition, in an act rare for Cardinal Medeiros, he telephoned several influential legislators to emphasize his support for the RIA.³ Action in the federal courtroom would also give the cardinal an opportunity to demonstrate his support for integration, because on June 21, 1974, Judge Garrity ordered the Boston School Committee to comply with the RIA.

Announcing his support for Garrity’s decision, Cardinal Medeiros noted that the School Committee had had nine years to comply with the law but had done nothing. He also told reporters that although “busing may not be the most desirable way to integrate,” it is “all we have right now” and is “only the beginning of the fight.”⁴ However, the biggest test of the cardinal’s support for integration would be the determination of a policy for the archdiocese’s troubled school system, which if allowed to become a haven for refugees from busing, as many Catholics wanted it to be, could have increased its enrollment at the expense of desegregation.

The Problems Facing Catholic Education in the 1970s

In 1972 Catholic schools in the United States were closing at a rate of more than one per day as enrollments dropped 18 percent over the previous three years, with a drop of 42 percent projected by 1980.⁵ The archdiocese of Boston was no exception to these trends. Its 345 schools with 153,344 students in 1964 had shrunk by 1974 to 248 schools with 81,540 students (see Table 1).⁶ Even the usually optimistic Cardinal Cushing had commented in 1970 that parochial schools would be extinct by 1980.⁷ It was little wonder that Cardinal Medeiros would give the archdiocese’s Board of Education a lot of his time.

Aside from a decrease in enrollment, a variety of other problems faced the archdiocesan schools. There was a growing lack of confidence in Catholic education resulting from the publicity given to some of the crash closings, which created fear among parents, teachers, and pastors that their school would be next. Rising maintenance and payroll expenses were beginning to cause a financial crisis for many schools. The educational budget of the archdiocese showed a \$2 million deficit for the school year 1972–73. A lack of planning hid from some parishes danger signals that, if discovered earlier, might have made it possible to take steps to keep some schools open. The diminishing number of vocations to the religious communities created multiple problems. First, many pastors thought of their schools as “sister schools” and felt that a school was not Catholic unless it was staffed by religious women. Second, many schools could not afford to remain open if they had to pay lay teachers, who necessarily received higher salaries, instead of religious.⁸

The importance of the religious communities to the schools was dramatically demonstrated in December 1972 when the two largest orders of teaching nuns in the archdio-

Table 1

**History of Enrollment in School System of
Archdiocese of Boston, 1954–1980**

Year	Number of Schools			Enrollment		
	Elementary	Secondary	Total	Elementary	Secondary	Total
1954–55	224	93	317	107,027	24,120	131,147
1955–56	227	92	319	108,957	25,090	134,047
1956–57	231	93	324	109,898	26,295	136,193
1957–58	235	94	329	111,588	27,914	139,502
1958–59	242	96	338	114,798	29,170	143,968
1959–60	243	98	341	117,768	30,205	147,973
1960–61	245	98	343	118,847	31,496	150,343
1961–62	243	99	342	118,637	32,708	151,345
1962–63	243	99	342	118,540	33,489	152,029
1963–64	245	101	346	118,876	34,297	153,173
1964–65	246	99	345	119,635	33,709	153,344
1965–66	251	99	350	118,140	33,422	151,562
1966–67	246	96	342	115,141	33,514	148,655
1967–68	245	93	338	110,216	33,521	143,737
1968–69	242	91	333	103,259	32,532	135,791
1969–70	235	86	321	93,176	31,420	124,596
1970–71	221	76	297	81,705	28,124	109,829
1971–72	210	67	277	73,999	26,596	100,595
1972–73	202	65	267	66,702	26,535	93,237
1973–74	185	60	245	58,935	25,834	84,769
1974–75*	187	61	248	55,617	25,923	81,540
1975–76	177	59	236	54,492	25,636	80,128
1976–77	177	59	236	52,263	25,246	77,509
1977–78	171	59	230	50,003	24,981	74,984
1978–79	167	58	225	47,585	24,431	72,016
1979–80	165	56	221	46,936	24,556	71,492

*First year of desegregation and mandatory busing.

cese, the Sisters of St. Joseph and the Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur, announced that they would withdraw from dozens of schools in the archdiocese by 1975. Although these communities made their decision to stabilize the schools of the archdiocese, especially those in the inner-city parishes, their action led to the closing of eighteen schools in June 1973 and left many parents feeling bitter.⁹

Cardinal Medeiros and the archdiocesan Board of Education were not unaware of the plans of the sisters and had been formulating a policy of their own, which in part supported the decision made by the two religious communities. In a series of ten regional meetings between October 11 and November 7, 1972, the board had presented its program to the leaders of the parishes and religious communities. Included in this program were the establishment of individual boards for the parish schools and guidelines for school closings. It was also clear that other solutions and strategies were being promoted by the board, including the consolidation of schools and faculty in areas where too many schools competed with one another for students; intercommunity staffing, whereby religious from various orders would teach in the same school; the identification of certain schools as higher priorities for remaining open; and the acceptance of increased involvement of lay teachers and parental involvement in planning.¹⁰ However, those operating Catholic schools had to face the overriding question Was the amount of time, energy, and money expended to keep the schools open worth it?

The answer for most archdiocesan educators was found in the Vatican Council II philosophy, which supported the belief that the Christian must play a role in society relative to the questions of race, population, poverty, justice, and peace. The Catholic school retained its immense importance because it contributed “so substantially to fulfilling the mission of God’s people” and could “further the dialogue between the Church and the family of man,” in the words of one Vatican II document.¹¹ In 1972, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops reinforced those beliefs in a pastoral message that regarded Catholic schools as the best instrument to communicate doctrine, to build community, and to serve others. The schools should not only prepare students to make a living, the bishops said, but also teach them “how to live with one another, how to make a life.”¹²

One expression of this philosophy was the effort made by the archdiocese during these difficult times to make the survival of its inner-city schools a priority. Despite its financial problems, the archdiocese heavily subsidized the schools of parishes in the predominantly black neighborhood of Roxbury. For example, in 1973 the archdiocese contributed \$58,644, or more than 50 percent, to the \$116,169 budget of the St. Francis de Sales school in Roxbury.¹³ In addition, the archdiocese was fortunate to have several priests and nuns who dedicated themselves to aiding minorities in the inner city, sometimes spending thousands of dollars of their own personal funds to keep schools going. Many of these church activists were, however, pressing the cardinal to take a more active role in supporting minority issues, especially the racial balancing of Boston’s public schools.

The Church’s Policy

Judge Garrity’s June 1974 order to implement the first phase of the court’s desegregation plan at the beginning of the 1974–75 school year created an enormous dilemma for an archdiocese struggling to keep its schools open but at the same time attempting to remain true to its teachings on social justice and to its cardinal’s support for integration. Consistent with his consensus style of leadership and in anticipation of the court order, Cardinal Medeiros made a decision earlier in 1974 to shut the doors of parochial schools to refugees from the busing plan only after extensive consultation with his advisers.

One of the most important factors he had to consider was the strong opposition to busing by large numbers of Catholic parents. Although there were no exact figures, it was the opinion of church leaders that among those opposed to busing, the overwhelming majority were Catholics.¹⁴ How the church’s pro-busing stance would affect the receipts of the annual archdiocesan-wide stewardship appeal, the most important source of revenue to pay off the church’s \$25 million debt, was another practical consideration. The obvious fact that the Catholic schools were predominantly *de facto* segregated also caused the cardinal some difficulty in formulating his decision on busing policy. If the church supported busing, then why did it not do more to integrate its own schools? If, on the other hand, it remained silent on busing it opened itself to a charge of ducking a moral issue. In addition, the decision not to allow open enrollment in parochial schools at a time when declining enrollments were forcing the closing of many Catholic schools was questioned by a number of parents and school administrators.

Although the cardinal received input from several church officials, it appears that the major influence on his decision to support the desegregation order by not allowing open enrollment came from Patricia Goler, head of the archdiocese’s Commission on Human Rights. Goler had a long history of involvement in the church’s work in the inner city and was highly respected by church officials as deeply and unselfishly committed to minority

rights. She and state Superior Court Judge David Nelson served as the liaison between the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other inner-city organizations, such as Freedom House, and the cardinal. Goler pressured Cardinal Medeiros to testify at the State House in April 1974.¹⁵ It was clear that the cardinal's decision to support racially balanced schools was also the result of his personal convictions and his commitment to following the law even though he might have had doubts about the specifics.

Once the decision was made to support the desegregation order it was necessary for the archdiocesan Board of Education to formulate a policy that would meet with the cardinal's approval. The board needed to come up with a policy that would help the city of Boston implement the court order but at the same time preserve Catholic schools.

Competition from parochial schools had long been a central problem for Boston's public schools. Many parents were unwilling to sacrifice their children to the present Boston schools as long as parochial schools provided a better alternative and some believed that "the closing of the parochial schools would probably be the best thing that ever happened to the Boston public schools. Then the parents, who can now afford to send their children to private and parochial schools, might take a greater interest in the city system."¹⁶ Another drastic solution, aside from closing the parochial schools, would have been to include the parochial schools in the busing order. Meetings did in fact take place between representatives of the Boston Public Schools and the archdiocesan School Office to discuss the possibility of increasing minority enrollment in the Catholic schools. However, the suggestion of Catholic school representatives that an opinion be requested from the state attorney general on the availability of funds ended discussion of this option.¹⁷ The archdiocesan Board of Education was also aware that to allow open enrollment in Catholic schools would increase their enrollment by as much as 300 percent and kill the desegregation order: a tempting option that would have temporarily solved the Catholic schools' enrollment crisis and also made the church popular with the antibusing forces.

When Brother Bartholomew Varden, the archdiocesan school superintendent, began receiving calls in December 1973 and January 1974 from distraught pastors warning that people were "lining up" to enroll their children in the parish school for the upcoming school year, the Board of Education decided that it had to make a policy decision soon.¹⁸ Taking into consideration the personal beliefs of Cardinal Medeiros, the strong pressure from Goler and other representatives of the city's minority community, and the views expressed by Vatican II and the National Conference of Bishops, the board decided at its January 25, 1974, meeting not to allow the schools of the archdiocese to become havens for those trying to escape school desegregation.

On March 1, 1974, the Board of Education made public its guidelines on school imbalance. After promising its wholehearted cooperation with public officials and its support for a community effort for improved education, the board presented a five-point procedural plan governing the transfer of public school students to Catholic schools. Any applicant for transfer from public schools would not be accepted unless (1) the acceptance would improve the racial balance in the school to which the child was applying; (2) the application was due to a change in family address; (3) the family already had other children in the school; (4) the number of students accepted conformed to the average number of acceptances of previous years; and (5) the acceptance was consistent with the principles of social justice as enunciated in the official teachings of the church.¹⁹ The problem now facing the church was to get support for this policy.

Reaction to the Church Policy

When the first court order was issued by Judge Garrity in late June 1974 the church recognized the polarization it created in the community and the danger that students might become pawns in the various plans to remedy the situation. Nonetheless the archdiocese stressed compliance with the order.²⁰ Yet within the church, support for compliance with the court order and for busing in general was far from unanimous.

The Catholic Press

A review of the national Catholic press of the period reflects the diversity of positions Catholics held on this issue. Maurice DeG. Ford, in several *Commonweal* articles, defended court-ordered busing as constitutional and symbolically necessary. Other proponents of busing portrayed busing as a last resort, “not a solution itself, but a means by which the city may eventually be brought to recognize a serious problem in public education and work collectively and politically to solve it.” The editors of *America* reminded their readers that in 1972 the U.S. Catholic Conference identified the issue of race relations as a moral one that included “the right of all children to equal educational opportunity” and that “busing, while certainly not a total solution, may in some instances be a helpful and indeed necessary instrument.”²¹

The antibusing criticism of church policy by conservative Catholic writers was summarized by Philip Zucchi’s *Triumph* article in which he stated:

The Cardinal’s directive invites criticism on several counts. First, it uniformly casts upon the parents of children who are attempting to avoid forced busing the gloomy suspicion of racial bigotry. Secondly, it fails to lend support to the very real concerns of parents who think that parental jurisdiction over their children’s education supersedes that of the government, and that busing their children into high-crime districts is unsafe. Thirdly, it at least implicitly minimizes the importance of obtaining a Catholic education as opposed to a secular one. And lastly, it assures the continued decline of the Catholic school system.²²

The Catholic writer and critic Michael Novak also argued that “busing . . . was an immoral policy” that went against the “basic social principles of American life, against family, neighborhood, class, ethnic, and even educational realities” and was “unfair to working people, was supported by only a small minority of blacks and whites, and was unconstitutional.”²³ This divergence of opinion in the Catholic press was also shared by many of its readers, including the clergy of the archdiocese of Boston.

The Clergy

The clergy of the archdiocese at the time of court-ordered busing was roughly divided into three groups. One faction was a small but highly visible group of activist priests who pushed for a strong position by the church on minority issues and who felt strongly that the church could do more than it was doing to support desegregation. Many of these priests had worked and lived in the inner city and actively participated in projects to improve the plight of the city’s poor, such as Tent City and the Pine Street Inn. A second group, the majority of the clergy, were sympathetic to the conditions of the poor and supportive of efforts to improve their lives but felt, as did Cardinal Medeiros, that it was

primarily the responsibility of public institutions and officials to resolve these problems when they fell outside the sphere of moral issues. Finally, there was a group of conservative clergy who did not understand what the big rush for minority rights was all about and who opposed the church's stance on desegregation. They felt that since other groups had bided their time and eventually received equal opportunity, so should Boston's blacks and other minorities.²⁴ Further complicating matters for the church was that sometimes a single parish had priests representing all three positions. As troublesome as this division among the clergy might be, however, it was mild compared with the diverse reactions of the laity.

The Laity

Although the division of opinion among the laity resembled closely that among the clergy, the majority of the opponents to the court order were probably Catholic. Certainly the majority of the antibusing leadership — Louise Day Hicks, Raymond Flynn, Pixie Paladino, and William Bulger — were Catholic. Many Catholics felt that the church's support for the court order was further evidence that it had abandoned them. "I've been fighting with the priests in my parish because they don't represent the community," said one opponent of desegregation. "They haven't done nothing against the issue, but by the same token they haven't defended the people in their community."²⁵ Antibusing Catholics were particularly upset with the stringent antisegregation guidelines for the parochial schools. In addition to public protests, such as those outside his residence, Cardinal Medeiros also received numerous letters from angry laypeople who reminded him that many Catholic schools "were built by Catholic immigrants for the express purpose of providing an alternative to public school education" and that "these schools are there today not for [the] priests or bishops but for Catholic children."²⁶

Much of the opposition to the church's school policy focused on the rights of parents over their children. ROAR (Restore Our Alien Rights) and other antibusing groups were especially fond of quoting the following statement from Vatican II:

Parents, who have the first and the inalienable duty and right to educate their children, should enjoy true freedom in their choice of schools. Consequently, public authority, which has the obligation to oversee and defend the liberties of citizens, ought to see to it, out of a concern for distributive justice, that public subsidies are allocated in such a way that, when selecting schools for their children, parents are genuinely free to follow their consciences.²⁷

Many Catholics also found it hard to support church leaders who told them to oppose abortion laws even though they were the law of the land but to support busing because it was the law of the land.

The opposition to the church's desegregation policies by working-class whites in neighborhoods such as South Boston, Hyde Park, and Charlestown created for Cardinal Medeiros a dilemma that contributed to his inability to reach an understanding with these people. The cardinal felt deeply the problems and pain of the poor. He understood that many of the people of South Boston and similar neighborhoods were the "employed poor," people who worked hard but remained relatively poor. He understood that these people could not afford to move to a suburb or to send their children to private schools to escape their problems. He also believed that these people got a "raw deal" and were the victims of decisions in which they had no say. This was especially true when it became clear that the court order would not involve communities in the surrounding area in Bos-

ton's busing plan.²⁸ However, two other beliefs of the cardinal would prevent him from giving the opponents of desegregation his support.

The first was his strongly held belief in obeying the law. In many letters he wrote to people who criticized his position on the court order, the cardinal stated: "I am fully aware of the opposition of a great many people to the Federal court order which resulted in forced busing. My efforts continue to be bent toward making a positive contribution to helping those people who are directly affected by the decision. I must act, however, in accordance with the law, and I must help them do the same."²⁹ The second was his strong commitment to the minority communities of the inner city, who appeared to be supporting busing as a last resort to end segregation in Boston. In short, Medeiros, although he understood the suffering of the working-class people of South Boston, Hyde Park, and Charlestown, was not willing to oppose a federal court order or to withdraw his support for a major objective of the city's minority community.

Other obstacles also prevented the cardinal from reaching an understanding with Boston's opponents to the church's desegregation policy. One of these was the cardinal's ethnicity. From the moment he arrived in Boston, Medeiros, a Portuguese-American, was met with resentment among many Bostonians who could not accept an archbishop who was neither a Bostonian nor, perhaps more important, Irish. As Boston School Committee member John Kerrigan bluntly put it, "I think it would be better if Medeiros wasn't from Texas and spoke English. . . . He just doesn't know Boston."³⁰

This problem was compounded by a lack of understanding among the cardinal's advisers of the feelings in Boston's white working-class neighborhoods. Almost all the cardinal's top advisers on social issues and education — Father John Boles, Father Michael Groden, Brother Varden, Patricia Goler — were outsiders or people who had spent much of their time in the inner city rather than the surrounding white working-class neighborhoods. Although John Kerrigan's analysis that the situation was the result of "flaming-ass liberals who are giving advice to a holy man who doesn't know the practicalities of the situation"³¹ was a bit harsh, it does explain the cardinal's remarks at a 1974 news conference that he was "a bit surprised" with the opposition to forced busing and "frankly did not expect this strong opposition."³²

The Effectiveness of Church Policy

Despite such strong opposition, when busing was implemented in September 1974 the church's policy was clear: it would support the court order by closing the doors of its schools to refugees from busing. However, the strong opposition to this policy, the lack of a cohesive urban policy and an effective church agency to implement it, and the autonomy of local pastors would make it difficult for the church to successfully implement its policy.

Both opponents and supporters of the church's desegregation policy were critical of its initial implementation. Parent groups in white working-class neighborhoods believed that the policy violated the natural right of Catholic parents to send their children to Catholic schools. Desegregation supporters, citing newspaper reports based on interviews with students and teachers at Catholic schools, believed that many Boston public school students had managed to transfer to Catholic schools. Afraid that such transfers would only resegregate Boston's schools, they accused church officials of strengthening the Catholic school system at the expense of court-ordered desegregation. However, the vehement protests of parents unable to enroll their children in Catholic schools and the enrollment figures of archdiocesan schools made their fears appear exaggerated.

The archdiocesan School Office kept a close eye on the enrollments of parochial schools within the city for several reasons: it was sensitive to charges that it was taking advantage of busing to save its own schools; it was getting daily calls from Boston school officials checking on missing students; and it was scheduled to testify at Civil Rights Commission hearings in June 1975. In the fall of 1974, Father Boles, the archdiocesan director of education, compiled enrollment figures for the schools within the city and compared enrollment figures for the beginning of the school year 1973–74 with those for 1974–75, the first year of busing. What Boles discovered was that instead of an increase in enrollment in parochial schools in the city of Boston, there had been a decrease of 908 students in the first year of desegregation, 1974–75 (see Table 2).³³ There were at most four schools in the city that were apparent violators of archdiocesan policy (see Table 3).³⁴ The question was, however, where all the archdiocesan students and the thousands who were leaving Boston's public schools were going.

Although the majority of the archdiocese's schools followed its enrollment policies, enrollments of several schools bordering Boston had significant increases (see Table 3). Schools that had noticeable increases in enrollment, such as Mt. Alvernia Academy in Newton (+101), St. Mary's in Brookline (+52), St. Catherine's in Norwood (+59), and Sacred Heart in Weymouth (+88), clearly benefited from busing. It was clear that during the first year of busing, students fleeing busing found some refuge in the parochial schools bordering the city. One should remember, however, that increases in enrollments were possible to achieve without violating archdiocesan policy. While the policy asked schools to be strict about transfer students, it did not place restrictions on students entering at the normal entry points, the first and ninth grades, since there was no way of identifying the motives of those who were enrolling. In addition, the girls in many families were already attending a parochial school, and with a little extra sacrifice enough money was raised to send the boys to the same school.³⁵ This did not violate archdiocesan policy, which allowed students who had brothers or sisters in a school to transfer to that school. As Dr. Louis Perullo, director of attendance for the Boston Public Schools, noted, there was also not much the archdiocese could do about families who used suburban addresses as a ploy to gain admittance to a parochial school.³⁶

In response to enrollment increases during the first year of desegregation, the archdiocesan Board of Education attempted to tighten its transfer policy by keeping a closer eye on suburban schools. However, it also allowed schools to accept transfers to replace students who had dropped out or transferred to other schools. There was concern that this new policy was easily subject to abuse or misinterpretation. For example, a school now had the right to fill a vacancy, but was it a vacancy from last year or five years ago? Indeed, this new transfer policy and the implementation of phase II of busing (in school year 1975–76), which increased the number of citizens affected by busing, did lead to an increase in the number of schools that opened their doors to students escaping busing, most significantly in Boston.

Although the total population of archdiocesan schools decreased 1,412 from 1974–75 to 1975–76 (see Table 1), in the city of Boston a dozen archdiocesan schools had significant increases in enrollment (see Table 3), and total enrollment for Boston's parochial schools increased by 28 students. This increase was achieved by admitting 1,207 transfer students from Boston's public schools, mostly into grades 2 through 6 (see Table 2), which would imply that parents were attempting to protect younger children from the perceived dangers of being bused to schools in unfamiliar neighborhoods. However, because schools were allowed to replace dropouts or transfers, which numbered 1,209, and

Table 2

**Archdiocese of Boston School Enrollment by Grade,
1973-1976**

City of Boston

Elementary	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76
Grade K	406	486	475
1	1,810	1,839	1,906
2	1,896	1,773	1,866
3	2,031	1,866	1,911
4	2,079	1,970	1,957
5	2,204	2,009	2,051
6	2,123	2,188	2,093
7	1,812	2,072	2,075
8	2,353	1,719	2,028
Ungraded	0	132	48
Total	16,813	16,051	16,410
Secondary	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76
Grade 9	2,345	2,250	1,988
10	2,304	2,336	2,218
11	2,244	2,143	2,274
12	2,120	2,139	2,057
Ungraded	1	0	0
Total	9,014	8,868	8,537
Total, All Grades	25,827	24,919	24,947

Outside of Boston

Elementary	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76
Grade K	1,767	2,157	2,270
1	4,143	3,953	3,920
2	4,204	4,153	3,954
3	4,751	4,218	4,224
4	4,994	4,698	4,260
5	5,311	4,866	4,670
6	5,497	5,266	4,906
7	5,177	4,788	4,614
8	5,257	5,002	4,619
Ungraded	827	465	645
Total	42,122	39,566	38,082
Secondary	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76
Grade 7	261	244	281
8	309	263	253
9	4,456	4,622	4,417
10	4,124	4,139	4,419
11	4,124	3,973	3,894
12	3,765	3,813	3,835
Ungraded	3	1	0
Total	16,820	17,055	17,099
Total, All Grades	58,942	56,621	55,181

Table 3

Enrollment of Archdiocesan Schools with Significant Increases in Enrollment or Transfers, 1973-1977

School	1973-74	1974-75 (Phase I)	1975-76 (Phase II)	1976-77
Boston, Elementary				
1. St. Brigid, South Boston	315 (-46)*	297 (-18)	347 (+50)	353 (+6)
2. St. Anthony, North End	292 (-26)	266 (-26)	290 (+24)	279 (-11)
3. St. John, North End	281 (+24)	273 (-8)	293 (+20)	285 (-8)
4. St. Anthony, Allston	401 (-6)	376 (-25)	416 (+40)	388 (-28)
5. Our Lady of Presentation, Brighton	477 (-49)	455 (-22)	528 (+73)	496 (-32)
6. St. Lazarus, East Boston	250 (+10)	248 (-2)	282 (+34)	282
7. St. Mary, East Boston	264 (-39)	251 (-13)	270 (+19)	269 (-1)
8. St. Francis de Sales, Roxbury	115 (-56)	132 (+17)	149 (+17)	142 (-7)
9. St. Peter, South Boston	258 (+18)	257 (-1)	285 (+28)	282 (-3)
10. Holy Name, West Roxbury	751 (+11)	713 (-38)	768 (+55)	771 (+3)
Boston, Secondary				
11. Cardinal Cushing, South Boston	586 (-124)	595 (+9)	595	535 (-60)
12. St. Dominic Savio, East Boston	349 (-8)	345 (-4)	382 (+37)	423 (+40)
13. Boston College High, Dorchester	1103 (-4)	1145 (+42)	1177 (+32)	1258 (+81)
14. Don Bosco, Boston	931 (+89)	983 (+52)	926 (-57)	823 (-103)
Outside of Boston, Elementary				
1. St. James, Arlington	213 (+23)	213	228 (+15)	230 (+2)
2. St. Francis of Assisi, Braintree	317 (-62)	268 (-49)	296 (+28)	248 (-48)
3. St. Mary, Brookline	420 (-54)	472 (+52)	486 (+14)	491 (+5)
4. St. Rose, Chelsea	463 (-13)	495 (+32)	478 (-17)	458 (-20)
5. St. Stanislaus, Chelsea	180 (-4)	171 (-9)	245 (+74)	237 (-8)
6. Our Lady, Everett	244 (-22)	244	241 (-3)	218 (-23)
7. St. Anthony, Everett	250 (+48)	304 (+54)	340 (+36)	312 (-28)
8. Cheverus, Malden	321 (-16)	339 (+18)	338 (-1)	310 (-28)
9. Immaculate Conception, Malden	534 (-71)	501 (-33)	563 (+62)	502 (-61)
10. St. Joseph, Needham	428 (+57)	411 (-17)	467 (+56)	427 (-40)
11. Mt. Alvernia Academy, Newton	202 (-8)	303 (+101)	302 (-1)	295 (-7)
12. Newton Catholic, Newton	424 (+47)	388 (-36)	433 (+45)	393 (-40)
13. St. John, Newton	173 (-8)	146 (-27)	171 (+25)	156 (-15)
14. St. Catherine, Norwood	704 (-105)	763 (+59)	828 (+65)	803 (-25)
15. St. Mary, Quincy	259 (-18)	276 (+17)	275 (-1)	257 (-10)
16. St. Joseph, Quincy	215 (-18)	198 (-17)	219 (+18)	234 (+15)
17. Little Flower, Somerville	404 (-23)	401 (-3)	489 (+88)	434 (-55)
18. St. Ann, Somerville	369 (-82)	336 (-33)	381 (+45)	365 (-16)
19. St. Anthony, Somerville	231 (-17)	207 (-24)	248 (+41)	241 (-7)
20. St. Polycarp, Somerville	228 (-16)	225 (-3)	254 (+29)	246 (-8)
21. Blessed Sacrament, Walpole	402 (+12)	389 (-13)	423 (+34)	421 (-2)
22. Rosary Academy, Watertown	132 (-57)	167 (+35)	235 (+68)	202 (-33)
23. St. Patrick, Watertown	315 (-27)	262 (-53)	300 (+38)	288 (-12)
24. St. John, Wellesley	137 (-10)	138 (+1)	159 (+21)	158 (-1)
25. St. Paul, Wellesley	194 (-20)	219 (+25)	237 (+18)	243 (+6)
26. Sacred Heart, Weymouth	536 (+11)	569 (+33)	568 (-1)	557 (-11)
Outside of Boston, Secondary				
27. St. Mary, Brookline	330 (+20)	359 (+29)	339 (-20)	311 (-28)
28. Matignon, Cambridge	608 (-19)	631 (+23)	674 (+43)	683 (+9)
29. North Cambridge Catholic, Cambridge	230 (-32)	252 (+22)	242 (-10)	236 (-6)
30. Ursuline Academy, Dedham	340 (-1)	358 (+18)	385 (+27)	391 (+6)
31. Academy of Notre Dame, Hingham	305 (+36)	319 (+14)	387 (+68)	403 (+16)
32. Immaculate Conception, Malden	230 (+8)	246 (+16)	266 (+20)	253 (-13)
33. Sacred Heart, Weymouth	283 (+39)	338 (+55)	376 (+38)	376

* Figures in parentheses are differences in enrollment from the previous school year.

to accept minority students, who composed 20 percent of the transfers from Boston's public schools, most schools had adhered closely to archdiocesan policy.³⁷ In schools outside of the city, there was a total decrease of 1,440 students between 1974 and 1975. However, as many as 25 schools in Boston's near suburbs experienced significant enrollment increases, which also appeared to come in large part from Boston transfers, perhaps as many as 1,100.³⁸ Yet, there were 181 archdiocesan schools in Boston and its near suburbs and in 1974-75 only 16, or 8.8 percent, appeared to take advantage of busing to enhance their enrollments significantly. Although the number of schools in Boston and its near suburbs with significant increases in enrollments rose to 35, or 19.3 percent, in 1975-76, it appeared that adherence to archdiocesan policy, rather than avoidance, was the norm.

However, there were enough violations of the transfer policy to warrant Cardinal Medeiros's sending a letter to several schools informing them of their violation and ordering them to cease. The fact that Medeiros could not take any punitive action underscored one of the major problems he faced in attempting to implement his desegregation policy: the independence of the parishes. As Medeiros told the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, each of Boston's parishes was autonomous and he had "no coercive powers, only moral powers" over them.³⁹

The number of obvious violations of school policy decreased dramatically in 1976, with many schools losing a significant number of students (see Table 3), and the figures for 1976 showed a continuing decrease in archdiocesan enrollments, with a total loss of 2,619 students (see Table 1). The new archdiocesan school superintendent, Father Eugene Sullivan, also noted a decline in applications for transfers compared with the previous years during busing, an indication that the issue was dying.⁴⁰

Although there was no doubt that a few schools did stabilize their enrollments by accepting transfers from Boston's public schools and that there was some underreporting of the number of Boston residents by suburban parochial schools, other significant factors led to a stabilization of parochial school enrollments.⁴¹ These factors included an increase in professional planning, which made clearer the responsibilities of the various educational agencies of the archdiocese; the acceptance that schools could be staffed mostly by lay teachers and remain Catholic; and the increasing affluence of Catholics, which made them better able to support schools with lay staffs. Many schools also launched aggressive enrollment campaigns, which in several instances led to significant increases in enrollment. The most successful example, Central Catholic High School in Lawrence (unaffected by the Boston situation), increased its enrollment by 161 students between 1973 and 1975. Several school closings increased the enrollments of neighboring schools, since close to 50 percent of students affected by the closings transferred to other Catholic schools.⁴² Before, during, and after the court-ordered desegregation of Boston's public schools, the number one priority of Catholic educators was to keep their schools open. By 1976 their efforts appeared to be showing positive results.

The degree of adherence to the church's school policy was of the utmost importance to the success or failure of the desegregation of Boston's public schools. Much of the criticism of mandatory busing focused on its potential to cause white flight from the beleaguered schools, which would only result in the resegregation of the cities. An important element in white flight was the extent of pupil transfers to private schools during the first years of desegregation.

In Boston the potential for white flight was quite high because many of the ingredients for it were present: a large, urban public school district with a significant proportion of

minority students (42 percent), a high proportion of Catholics among the white population, overwhelmingly white suburban school districts, a desegregation plan limited to the central city, a significant proportion of white students assigned to the busing program, and an archdiocesan school system in the midst of a ten-year period of decline.⁴³ It is, however, very difficult to determine the exact effect that parochial schools had on the implementation of school desegregation in Boston because of the questionable accuracy of enrollment and transfer figures, especially for the Boston public schools.

While it can be determined that from 1974 to 1976 close to 2,500 white students transferred to parochial schools from Boston's public schools, it is impossible to get an accurate figure of the total number of white students who left the Boston public schools during the first three years of busing. Official figures indicate a loss of 9,929 white students from 1974 to 1976. But some of those closely involved in the desegregation process maintain that enrollment figures prior to 1975 were inflated and that the loss of white students may have been as low as 5,000.⁴⁴ In other words, Boston's parochial schools absorbed between 25 and 50 percent of the white students who fled busing. A recent study of white residents in a sample of Boston neighborhoods who withdrew their children from Boston's public schools because of busing found that 55 percent transferred their children to parochial schools and remained residents of Boston, while 45 percent moved to the suburbs to escape busing.⁴⁵ While these figures would tend to support the position that Catholic schools absorbed a high percentage of white students fleeing busing, they also imply that parochial schools were retardants to residential relocation.

The Church and Desegregation

Aside from enrollment and transfer policies, archdiocesan school officials and church activists were also concerned about the lack of minority students and teachers in parochial schools, which in 1974–75 had 4,029 minority students or 4.9 percent of their total enrollment.⁴⁶ It was very difficult for the church not to appear hypocritical in its support for the desegregation of Boston's public schools if its own schools were *de facto* segregated. Accordingly, in February 1975, the archdiocesan Board of Education launched a campaign to explore the possibility of further integrating parochial schools. As part of this campaign, Superintendent Varden sent a survey to all archdiocesan schools in an attempt to discover where there were empty seats, how much it would cost to fill them with minority students, and, by requiring the signature of both the pastor and principal, where there was support for such an effort. Although archdiocesan schools were far from integrated, some notable successes, such as St. Gregory's in Dorchester, resulted from this effort.

Ironically, the church's support for black community parish schools in Roxbury created a potentially embarrassing situation. These schools attracted black students from all areas of the city, were close to 100 percent nonwhite, and fostered a black nationalist philosophy that opposed integration. In January 1976, Patricia Goler warned Father Boles that the existence of such schools was "an apparent dichotomy of the cardinal's support for integrated public schools" and could be used against the cardinal if it became public knowledge. She also suggested that "carrots" be offered to black schools to encourage them to integrate.⁴⁷ At the time, Father Boles decided to maintain the status quo and gamble, correctly as it turned out, that this would not become an issue.

It was, however, not clear at the time of busing whether Catholic schools should be integrated if they were not already. Several black community leaders, such as state Representative Melvin King, supported an increase in the number of black students attending

Catholic schools. Others, however, were asking questions such as Were Catholic schools inherently unequal if they were segregated? Was the best way to serve the black community through the integration of Catholic schools, most of which had few black students who were Catholic and most of which were located in the inner city? Would the meager integration of Catholic schools, because of the small number of black students in them, take away blacks' control of their own future and destiny? Rather than waste energy attempting to integrate schools artificially, it seemed more fruitful to expend energy to demonstrate that an all-black school could be as fine as any other school of high quality.

The church, faced with a variety of external and internal pressures, achieved mixed results in its attempt to implement its transfer policy and to integrate its schools. There is no doubt that some diocesan schools took advantage of court-ordered desegregation to stabilize their enrollments and that there was not much Cardinal Medeiros or other church officials could do to stop them. It was also true that archdiocesan schools remained segregated, not only because there had never been a sincere effort to desegregate them but also because there was no consensus in the minority community or the church hierarchy that integrated Catholic schools were desirable.

On the other hand, the large majority of Catholic schools adhered to the church's transfer policy. It was, one could argue, surprising and laudable that so many schools resisted temptation and supported the policy, despite intense criticism of the policy within their church communities, their own enrollment problems, and the reality that the cardinal could not force them to do so. Although the church was devoted to keeping Catholic schools open, it would not be at the expense of the effort to desegregate Boston's public schools. It is clear that recent studies of Boston's desegregation crisis, including J. Anthony Lukas's *Common Ground*, which have criticized the church for allowing its schools to become havens for those Bostonians attempting to escape busing, have been oversimplifications of a very complex picture.

The Church's Failure to Play a Major Role

Many people involved in the process of desegregating Boston's schools expected that the church would play a larger role in the process. An examination of the reasons why it did not requires a discussion both of the manner in which the church makes and implements its policy decisions and of the role the church can realistically be expected to play in implementing major public policy.

Simply stated, the major reason the church would not be a major player in achieving the desegregation of Boston's schools, before or after court-ordered busing, was that it was unable to develop a coordinated and consistent urban policy.⁴⁸ The absence of an effective urban policy was caused in large part by the church's inability to make its social teachings appreciated as fundamental. If the teachings of the church on social justice had been taught and received, the problems caused by desegregation would not have been as great.

Some of the blame for the church's failure to convey its message on social justice must fall on Cardinal Medeiros. While he should be commended for his concern for the poor and his belief in racial, social, and economic justice, Medeiros was simply unable to get his views across to many who needed to learn from his teachings. Burdened with the misfortune of having to succeed the extremely popular Cardinal Cushing, Medeiros was also, because of his ethnic background, a victim of racism. Yet Cardinal Medeiros was to become in some observers' opinions the minorities' cardinal and may have been able to use his support among minority groups as a power base.⁴⁹ However, his consensus style of

leadership, in combination with the policymaking structure of the church, would most likely have made it impossible for him to use this power base effectively even if he knew how to do so.

One of Medeiros's major goals was to reorganize the archdiocesan government by introducing a cabinet system that would divide the administration of the archdiocese into offices headed by directors. He was, however, unable to overcome the strong resistance to his plan by the bishops and was able to create only an Office of Education. While it is uncertain that any archbishop could accomplish such far-reaching change, Medeiros's consensus style of leadership was the primary reason for his failure to reorganize the archdiocese. This meant that the church would face the desegregation issue with the same highly centralized policymaking structure and highly decentralized policy-implementation structure it had used for decades. Medeiros was therefore severely hampered by the decentralization structure, in which local priests had significant power to decide how to implement official diocesan policy or whether to implement it at all.⁵⁰

If the large majority of the archdiocese's clergy and religious had been in agreement with Cardinal Medeiros's position on desegregation, the autonomy of the parishes would not have been a major obstacle to the implementation of his policy. However, with a church divided in its support for desegregation, it was impossible to achieve the consensus that Medeiros felt he needed to make and implement major policy decisions.

One could also criticize the church and Medeiros for their political inactivity. During the attempt to implement the court orders, the political campaigns of many local politicians centered on their antibusing stance as a way to win office. Influenced by the belief of Medeiros and his advisers that it was not the role of the church to get involved in politics, the church remained silent instead of supporting those candidates who reflected its own position on desegregation and opposing those who did not. The sincerity of this position was also subject to some doubt considering the political involvement of the church in other issues it opposed, such as birth control and abortion. Many church members felt that the cardinal's plea for the support of busing because it was the law of the land, at the same time he asked them not to support abortion even though it was the law of the land, did not make sense.

The Church and Public Policy

The recent efforts to desegregate Boston's public housing have once again raised questions about the proper role the church should play in controversial public issues and the ability of its current archbishop, Bernard Cardinal Law, to implement church policy. Yet, while there are numerous similarities in the church's actions today and during the busing crisis, there are also some signs of change within the church that may make it more effective in dealing with social issues now.

Similar to the expectations surrounding the arrival of Medeiros, expectations were high when Law was appointed that he would begin a new and healing chapter in Boston's troubled history of race relations. Also similar has been the disappointment expressed by activists who would like to see Cardinal Law play a more active role to foster understanding and unity on racial issues. Like Cardinal Medeiros, Law has, in his public statements and through the archdiocesan weekly newspaper, *The Pilot*, made his position on the issue clear. He believes that public housing must be made accessible to all and that the question is not whether Boston's housing projects should be integrated but how that should be achieved.⁵¹ Law is also receiving harsh criticism from some political leaders and laity in

South Boston, although not on the scale Medeiros experienced during the busing crisis. Law is also finding that some of the pastors in South Boston are not in complete agreement with his position on the housing issue. However, there are some indications that Law has the benefit of leading a church that has, since the busing crisis, improved its ability to deal with urban issues.

Cardinal Law recently made the far-reaching decision to establish the Office of Black Catholics to recognize and nurture this minority and immigrant groups, which have often been neglected by the church. And although the effectiveness of this office and the Black Catholic Advisory Committee in giving minorities an important voice in church policy on issues that affect them cannot yet be determined, the establishment of these organizations appears to have accomplished one of the long-standing goals of church activists.

In another action, which supports the belief stated by longtime church activist Father Walter Waldron that “when we engage in anything that improves race relations we don’t have to look over our shoulders . . . to question if we’re going too far,”⁵² Cardinal Law recently named the Rev. Roberto Gonzales as the first Hispanic bishop of the archdiocese of Boston. Gonzales’s appointment was the result of a study of the Hispanic apostolate of the archdiocese, which has recommended, among other suggestions, that the church appoint a full-time director for Hispanic ministry to coordinate the efforts of other archdiocesan offices that deal with Hispanic issues. It appears that after decades of neglect the archdiocese of Boston is adjusting to the changing city that it serves.

It is clear, however, from court-ordered busing, recent plans to desegregate Boston’s public housing, and other major public policy decisions that the church has little if any voice in the formation and implementation of policy and that perhaps Cardinal Medeiros was correct in his belief that the proper role of the church is not a political one, but a moral one. If this is in fact the case, judgments about the effectiveness of the church in dealing with major social issues should be made not on secular standards but on spiritual ones; and perhaps the most effective role the church can play in Boston is to build “bridges” that foster understanding and unity among all its diverse peoples, something it was unable to do during Boston’s school desegregation crisis. ❧

Notes

1. *Morgan v. Hennigan*, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), *aff’d sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan*, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), *cert. denied*, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
2. “Cardinal’s Statement on Schools,” *The Pilot*, 23 November 1973, 14.
3. Interview, 1 July 1987, with Dr. Patricia A. Goler, chairwoman of the Commission on Human Rights, 1971–1976, and former member of archdiocesan Board of Education.
4. Nick King and John B. Wood, “Cardinal Says Garrity Ruling Fulfills His Hopes,” *Boston Globe*, 1 July 1974, 4.
5. Rhoda Goldstein, “Enrollment: Facts and Forecast,” *Momentum* 8, no. 2 (May 1977): 4; Rev. Francis J. Rimkus, “The Future of the Archdiocesan School System,” *The Pilot*, 19 August 1972, Back-to-School section, 2.
6. James T. Hannon, “The Influence of Catholic Schools on the Desegregation of Public School Systems: A Case Study of White Flight in Boston,” *Population Research and Policy Review* 3 (1984): 221.
7. John Deedy, “News and Views,” *Commonweal* (6 December 1974): 226.

8. Directives to Central High Schools, Director of Education file, 1972–1973, Archives of the Archdiocese of Boston (AABO).
9. Rev. John Boles to School Board, April 30, 1973, and May 7, 1973, Director of Education file, 1972–1973, AABO.
10. Interview, 31 July 1986, with Brother Bartholomew Varden, C.F.X., Superintendent of Schools, 1972–1976; Rimkus, 2.
11. Walter M. Abbott, S.J., ed., *The Documents of Vatican II* (New York: Guild Press, 1966), 643.
12. "School Policies," *The Pilot*, 4 March 1974, 4; Varden interview.
13. 1973 budget review, St. Francis de Sales, Roxbury, parish file, AABO.
14. Kay Longcope, "The Cardinal and Desegregation," *Boston Evening Globe*, 9 July 1974, 29.
15. Goler interview.
16. Michael True, "The Last Resort in Boston," *Commonweal* (25 October 1974): 77.
17. Minutes of Board of Education meeting, 3 March 1975, Boston School Integration Problems file, AABO.
18. Varden interview.
19. "Board of Education Publishes Guidelines on School Imbalance," *The Pilot*, 1 March 1974, 1.
20. "The Court's Order," *The Pilot*, 28 June 1974, 4.
21. Maurice DeG. Ford, "Busing in Boston," *Commonweal* (10 October 1975): 456–60; John C. Cort, "Black and White in Boston," *Commonweal* (31 January 1975): 355–57; "Busing Is Part of the Answer," *America* (24 January 1976): 45.
22. Philip F. Zucchi, "South Boston: What Hath Busing Wrought?" *Triumph* (December 1974): 12.
23. James Carroll, "Busing and Novak," *National Catholic Reporter* (5 September 1975): 13; Michael Novak, "Busing: Immoral?" *National Catholic Reporter* (26 September 1975): 16.
24. Interview, 13 August 1986, with Msgr. Francis J. Lally, one of Cardinal Cushing's closest aides and late member of the U.S. Catholic Conference.
25. Rick Casey, "Boston Order Splits Catholics," *National Catholic Reporter* (21 February 1975): 1.
26. Antibusing letter to Humberto Cardinal Medeiros, 20 September 1975, Busing file, AABO.
27. Mock criminal complaint against Cardinal Medeiros by ROAR, 2 February 1976, Desegregation Boston Schools file, AABO.
28. Interview, 6 August 1986, with Rev. John Boles, Director of Education, 1972–1976.
29. Cardinal Medeiros in response to antibusing letter, 20 September 1975, Busing file, AABO.
30. Casey, 6.
31. Casey, 6.
32. "Cardinal Backs Principles in Racial Balance Plan"; and Lally interview. Lally believed Medeiros was not given good advice on how to handle South Boston and, according to Dr. Goler, made two trips from Washington, D.C., to meet with Goler and Medeiros to discuss church desegregation policy.
33. Figures in Table 2 are taken from summaries of the annual survey done by the Boston archdiocese for the National Catholic Education Association (NCEA). My thanks to School Office statistician Diane Ferrick for making them available. One can get some indication of the number of transfers to Catholic schools by comparing enrollments in each grade with those of the grade below it for the preceding year.
34. Figures in Table 3 are also from the annual NCEA survey. There are three ways to identify schools that took advantage of busing to enhance their enrollments. One, used by the archdiocese, was a

- 5 percent increase in enrollment over a one-year period. A second method is to identify schools that had large increases in a specific class from one year to the next. For example, although the enrollment of Cardinal Cushing High School increased by only 9 students in 1974, the tenth grade class had 22 more students than the previous year's ninth grade, the eleventh grade an additional 21. A third indicator is a large decrease in enrollment the year after a sudden increase, which most likely resulted from students dropping out after using the parochial school as a temporary haven from busing.
35. Varden interview. According to Varden, in 1973, 42 percent of families with a student enrolled in a parochial school also had a child in public school.
 36. Tom Sheehan, "Parochial Schools: Who's Transferring — and to Where?" *Boston Phoenix*, 14 October 1975, 32.
 37. "Catholic Schools Adhere to Enrollment Guidelines," *The Pilot*, 11 November 1975, 1, 8. In this article Varden cited figures that would put the number of transfers from Boston public schools to archdiocesan schools for 1975 at 2,258. Deducting approximately 250 minority transfer students, this would put the number of white transfer students at 2,000.
 38. Hannon, 228. Hannon, in contrast to Varden, estimated that the number of white transfers from Boston public schools for both 1974 and 1975 was 2,000. Since there appear to have been close to 500 transfers in 1974 alone and the archdiocese cited transfers of close to 2,000 for 1975, it would appear that close to 2,500 white students transferred from Boston's public schools to archdiocesan schools in 1974 and 1975.
 39. Arthur Jones, "Clergymen Promise to Take Greater Role in Desegregation," *Boston Globe*, 18 June 1975, 8.
 40. "School Statistics for 1976–77 Show General Decrease," *The Pilot*, 3 December 1976, 1.
 41. Goldstein, 4. A study done by the NCEA in 1977 found that the rate of decline in Catholic school enrollment nationwide had slowed to 0.9 percent in 1976–77. The stabilization of enrollments in many schools of the Boston archdiocese was, in part, a reflection of this nationwide trend.
 42. "Conference Examines Future Role and Needs of Schools," *The Pilot*, 21 November 1975, 8; Boles interview; Varden interview; Joseph Berger, "Being Catholic in America," *New York Times Magazine* (23 August 1987): 64.
 43. Hannon, 220–21.
 44. Christine H. Rossell, "Boston's Desegregation and White Flight," *Integrated Education* (January/February 1977): 36–39. Rossell notes that court-appointed expert Robert Dentler maintained that enrollment was inflated prior to 1975 and that the loss in that year may be mainly due to the difference between inflated enrollment in the prior year and real enrollment in 1975.
 45. Christine H. Rossell, "Desegregation Plans, Racial Isolation, White Flight, and Community Response," in Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley, eds., *The Consequences of School Desegregation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), 24.
 46. Bro. Bartholomew Varden, C.F.X., to Colleagues, 28 February 1975, Superintendent of Schools file, 1972–1975, AABo.
 47. Boles interview.
 48. For an in-depth analysis of the reasons behind the church's failure to develop an urban policy in the 1960s and 1970s, see James E. Glinski, "Church in Crisis: The Role of the Archdiocese of Boston in the Effort to Desegregate Boston's Schools," unpublished master's thesis, University of Massachusetts, Boston, December 1987.
 49. Interview, 20 August 1987, with Rev. Walter J. Waldron, pastor of St. Patrick's, Roxbury, and veteran church activist. Father Waldron observed that Medeiros's wake and funeral were better attended than Cardinal Cushing's and especially noticeable was the large number of minorities, who were almost nonexistent at Cushing's wake and funeral.

50. Laura Shana Kohl, "The Response of the Catholic Church to the Desegregation of Boston Public Schools 1973-76," unpublished undergraduate thesis, Harvard University, 1986, AABO.
51. James L. Franklin, "Catholic Paper Gives Flynn Some Backing on BHA Plan," *Boston Globe*, 2 July 1988, 19.
52. Joanne Ball, "Cardinal 'Emerging' on Racial Issues," *Boston Globe*, 22 May 1988, 1, 11.