

New England Journal of Public Policy

Volume 12 | Issue 1


Article 5

9-23-1996

The Battle for City Hall: What Do We Fight Over?

Louise Simmons
University of Connecticut

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp>

 Part of the [Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons](#), [Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons](#), [Political History Commons](#), and the [Politics and Social Change Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Simmons, Louise (1996) "The Battle for City Hall: What Do We Fight Over?," *New England Journal of Public Policy*: Vol. 12: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: <http://scholarworks.umb.edu/nejpp/vol12/iss1/5>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in New England Journal of Public Policy by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.

The Battle for City Hall

What Do We Fight Over?

Louise Simmons

An important dimension of contemporary American urban politics involves the redistributive role of local government. Activism at the local level has produced electoral movements that have succeeded in electing progressive local candidates and coalitions, yet on assuming office those officials face tremendous obstacles in meeting the expectations of those who put them in office. From 1991 to 1993 in Hartford, Connecticut, an attempt at progressive governance by a multiracial coalition was fraught with difficulties. Tensions among progressives and among leadership from impoverished communities of color, responses of downtown interests and the media, fiscal crises and the unrelenting needs of the population, served to complicate or stymie redistributive efforts and led to electoral defeat. However, new mechanisms for popular participation and several other reform measures were accomplished.

In recent years, as social movements reflecting the needs of urban populations assert themselves through local politics, this activism reveals a number of dilemmas of American urban politics. A host of issues is presented when activists, variously described as urban populist or progressive regimes,¹ assume state and local public offices. Particularly in distressed cities, the combined problems of fiscal stress, tax base erosion, racial isolation, and lack of state and federal support make for a knotty collection of issues confronting new officeholders. Because cities are where huge social questions of race, class, gender, inequality, and social policy converge and many facets of struggles over the outcome of political and economic change are played out, the manner of local governing takes on increasing significance. What city governments do in such areas as education, administration of local welfare programs, treatment of indigent and marginalized populations, provision of alternatives for youth, and the tenor of police-community relations all involve choices that seriously affect the quality of everyday living. These redistributive and social consumption issues animate vital social movements in urban areas in which the local state has a significant mitigating role.

For reform-oriented or progressive regimes, especially those which attempt to advance the interests of impoverished communities of color, these issues take on large proportions and present stunning dilemmas. Officeholders face a variety of challenges ranging from holding political coalitions together, to dealing with traditional interest groups — including powerful and sometimes antagonistic downtown business interests

Louise Simmons, faculty member, University of Connecticut School of Social Work, and director of the University of Connecticut Urban Semester Program, served on the Hartford City Council from 1991 to 1993.

— to attempting whatever redistributive measures are available for local government, to managing the city's finances, to carrying out routine service delivery, and more. They must strike a balance among competing priorities, even of those constituencies to whom they feel most responsible.

Once the decision is made to participate in electoral politics — to participate in “the system” — one's expectations of the possibility of reform need to be defined or acknowledged. The problem for many progressives is whether and how to engage in such redistributive ventures as equity planning² in light of the understanding that class and race divisions are endemic to the larger social order in America. These questions are sometimes posed as either/or dilemmas:³ either one operates outside the existing political system and remains pure or within the political system that one acknowledges as inherently inequitable and thus becomes complicit in perpetuating the inequality. Yet another way to frame the problem is one in which the actual praxis evolves and reveals the opportunities for reform, creating openings for progressives to play a role.

Hartford's Background and Recent Political History

Hartford, Connecticut, is one of the most dramatic examples of modern urban misfortunes in the United States. Within its inelastic borders⁴ is a population with tremendous needs. Ranked the fourth poorest city in the country in 1980 based on percentage of population under the federal poverty line (25.2%), by 1990 it ranked as the eighth poorest city, even as the percentage of population in poverty actually increased (27.5%).⁵ While it is the capital city of the state with the consistently highest per capita income in the country, Hartford is Connecticut's poorest city. It also has the nation's second highest rate of children living in poverty, more than 39 percent.⁶ Every modern urban problem can be found in Hartford: third world-level infant mortality rates; high levels of teenage pregnancy; inadequate housing; soaring crime rate; drug trafficking; lethal gang activity; a tragically high incidence of AIDS; racial segregation and isolation within the city's educational system.

The poverty within the city combines with racial segregation to produce remarkable social cleavage in the Hartford area. Affluent suburbs with a much different composition surround Hartford. While Hartford's 1990 population was 36 percent African-American and 32 percent Hispanic, the neighboring thirty-seven towns in the Hartford Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) were more than 92 percent white. Hartford houses 18 percent of the 768,000 people who live in the metropolitan area, yet it is home to 65 percent of the area's African-American population and 76 percent of its Hispanic population.⁷ White households in the region enjoyed an average income of \$24,749 in 1980, while black household incomes averaged \$15,812 and Hispanics \$12,694.⁸ By 1990 more than 92 percent of the 27,000 public school students in Hartford were African-American, Hispanic, or other minorities and a landmark school desegregation suit was filed to address this segregation.

The capital of Connecticut has high levels of government-sector employment and is still considered a major insurance center with large concentrations of employment in this industry. Aetna, Travelers, and other insurance companies maintain significant presence in Hartford, and the defense giant United Technologies has its corporate headquarters in downtown Hartford. These industries have spawned a host of services and suppliers in the city and the larger Hartford region. While the city's business community is quite sophisticated and highly organized, there is incredible social distance between the

corporate officers who commute into these headquarters and the people who populate Hartford's neighborhoods.

Hartford's recent political history reflects both the growing political organization of the city's African-American and Puerto Rican communities and the increasing needs and claims of the population on a fragmented city government. The structure of municipal government is an odd hybrid of reform and tradition, including a nine-member city council elected at-large — with three seats reserved, per state statute, for a minority party; a city manager as the city's chief administrative officer who is selected — or dismissed — by the city council; and a popularly elected mayor whose position is visible but lacking in authority.

Registered Democrats solidly outnumber registered Republicans: Hartford voters went for Democratic presidential candidates in all presidential elections in the last several decades and voted resoundingly for Jesse Jackson in the 1984 and 1988 presidential primaries and for Jerry Brown in that of 1992. Given this intense identification with the Democratic Party within the city's population, intraparty divisions and contests are intense political battles within Hartford. Like Ira Katznelson's depiction of them in New York City, the factions of Hartford's Democratic Party tend to organize around race, ethnicity, and territoriality.⁹ These bases of organization, in turn, largely reflect the city's racial housing patterns.

Within City Hall, city council leadership and voting blocs are key to policy development in Hartford. Six Democrats are routinely elected to the council and usually control the city's policy agenda. However, the city manager, who has wide discretion in carrying out policy initiatives, particularly in budgetary matters, is the individual to whom city departments are accountable. Within this structure, there is a certain ambiguity of accountability that is quite apparent to the citizenry. Individuals and community organizations sometimes take their concerns to council members, at other times call on the city manager or go to see the mayor.

Council leadership is an important element of Hartford politics. Nicholas Carbone, celebrated as a "progressive" policy leader by Pierre Clavel,¹⁰ set the tone for Hartford's city government during the 1970s. Carbone is credited with elevating the position of deputy mayor on the council and with forging public-private partnerships in Hartford during the seventies. However, by 1979 his political hold was unraveling and Carbone was defeated in a bitter Democratic primary.

During the 1980s, the Hartford African-American community made important political gains. In 1981 Thirman Milner became the first popularly elected African-American mayor in all of New England and served until 1987. That year Carrie Saxon Perry, an African-American woman and multiterm state representative, sought election and won, drawing national attention as the first African-American woman to be elected mayor of a major city. But in 1993, a white South End political operative, Michael Peters, after losing a September Democratic primary to her, wrested the mayoralty away from Perry, winning the November election by running as an independent.

The Puerto Rican community also began to realize its political potential during the 1980s, particularly after the formation in the mid-eighties of the Puerto Rican Political Action Committee (PAC), which brought together a number of elements of leadership in the Puerto Rican community. The PAC was active in the 1987 municipal elections and in the 1988 elections for the Connecticut legislature in which Hartford's first two Puerto Rican legislators were elected.

In 1987, a new entity entered the political arena in Hartford. People for Change

(PFC) constituted itself as a combination third party and community coalition.¹¹ The group emerged from a linkage battle waged when community organizations pressed for taxation on downtown development to benefit the neighborhoods, and from dissatisfaction by labor unions over the city's response in a lengthy strike at Colt Firearms. Other key forces included the Puerto Rican PAC and women's and gay rights organizations. PFC ran a slate of three individuals for the three city council seats reserved for a minority party in the November 1987 general election and captured two seats. They hoped to forge an alliance with other council members to pursue a reform agenda and were aided in their electoral quest by disaffected Democrats and the technical assistance of the Legislative Electoral Action Program (LEAP), an organization formed in the early 1980s to provide technical assistance to progressive candidates.¹² PFC was also the inspiration for one of the successful Puerto Rican candidates for state representative in 1988.

The 1987 PFC slate included an African-American woman neighborhood leader and a Puerto Rican community activist, both of whom were elected, and a third, white, candidate who lost his bid. In 1989, after the incumbent woman decided to run with the Democratic Party slate and fell in step with a closely controlled Democratic caucus, another African-American woman, a social worker who served on the board of education and Hartford's first openly gay candidate, ran with the incumbent Eugenio Caro. Again, the two candidates of color won while the openly gay candidate lost. One lone Republican remained on the council until 1991, when the entire PFC slate, including me, successfully sought office.

In 1991, after two years of escalating tensions with the Democratic city council members, mayor Carrie Saxon Perry decided to assemble a council slate to challenge the entire set of six Democratic incumbents. It included two African-Americans, two Puerto Ricans, and two whites, a significant shift in power toward the Puerto Rican community as previous Democratic council slates had included only one Puerto Rican candidate. People for Change agreed to support her effort in a September primary in exchange for support for the three-person PFC slate in November, and an intense and emotional campaign brought her and her supporters an overwhelming victory. However, the tenuous effort at coalition politics effectively broke down during the 1991–1993 council term, resulting in a tumultuous 1993 election season.

Besides the 1993 victory of independent candidate Peters for mayor, the election produced a city council consisting of four of the six council candidates on the Perry slate and two from another slate, including Eugenio Caro, who had left PFC to seek election as a Democrat. The November election saw the emergence of a fusion slate consisting of three Republicans and the two non-Perry Democrats, who, in turn, backed Michael Peters in his independent bid for mayor. All three PFC candidates, of whom I was one, lost. The four Democrats who had run with Perry and survived the primary were also elected, but effectively became the "minority" caucus on the council. The direction of the council shifted sharply: the five-person fusion bloc elected a conservative Republican as the majority leader and Caro as deputy mayor, a role that would become largely ceremonial. Any progressive thrust of the 1991–1993 council was abruptly halted, and a new urban conservatism took hold of Hartford City Hall.

The Experience of Holding Office

At the outset of holding office, I was wary of how limited and constrained city governments are: existing literature and my own research lent credence to these arguments. I

was convinced that cities have relatively little independence in a larger political economy in which private-sector actions largely influence a local economy, a fairly economic determinist view. I envisioned my role as advocating for any reforms that could be eked out of the situation, hoped I could illuminate some of the major issues and contradictions for constituents, but did not think that many substantial improvements in people's lives could be won at the City Hall level. I was somewhat apprehensive that many questions — traffic patterns, zoning, and the like — would be uninteresting. I believed municipal government had little power at its disposal and basically functioned as flack catcher for the entire economic system and that making a more important difference is possible only at higher levels of government where more far-reaching decisions are reached. Yet I did feel that City Hall was sufficiently important to warrant my participation and was prepared to work hard in my new role.

I am now thoroughly convinced that cities have very little control over their economic destinies, but that municipal government is indeed an important arena of policy development, that it has a great deal to do with how people experience everyday life, even if its powers are greatly constrained. I offer as proof some of the policy initiatives of our successors who have a much different philosophy: redefining priorities and shifting Community Development Block Grant funds away from human services into vaguely defined economic development areas; privatizing a city-run child health clinic; supporting the privatizing of the entire school system by the board of education; opposing a soup kitchen being located in a downtown church basement and rooms being made available for recovering substance abusers in a downtown hotel — actions that would not have been contemplated by the council on which I served, however divided it might have been.

In devising and implementing local policy consistent with what Norman Krumholz and Pierre Clavel identified as the thrusts of progressive regimes¹³ — redistribution and participation — we faced enormous challenges that served to complicate or thwart our efforts: the opposing interests, particularly the business and downtown interests; internal dissension; unrelenting needs of the population; fragmented government structures; and our own mistakes. We did succeed in creating a more inclusive local government and opened new avenues of participation, thereby raising popular expectations and, in my view, encountering the types of problems associated with disappointing those expectations. Moreover, that disappointment, felt both by those of us in office who were committed to a progressive agenda and by many sectors of the population, ultimately contributed to electoral defeat.

Tensions within the Progressive Coalition

Progressive coalitions do not work in any automatic sense. Even in coalitions whose partners share similar ideologies and assessments, agreement on courses of action must be carefully forged to ensure unity. In our case, with varying perspectives among the officeholders, unity proved elusive. Yet in order to pursue redistributive policies that in all probability would generate controversy, unity would have been required among the officeholders. The difficulties were endemic from the start: the basis for the 1991 Democratic primary slate and later the People for Change campaign was an anti-incumbent sentiment with different actors and groups signing on for very different reasons and with very distinct assumptions and purposes. All the major forces in the coalition wanted a more inclusive and responsive local government: the African-American community, the Puerto Rican community, the South End group composed mainly of Italian

small-business people, and progressives from the fields of labor, human services, and education.

Although the campaign generated immense energy and hopefulness, there was only a thin degree of unity among the nine council candidates, a weakness that was to be easily exploited by the effort's detractors. Each candidate came to the effort with different personal constituencies and agendas that could be synchronized for purposes of the campaign: the various ethnic and racial leaders who all felt shut out of City Hall could coalesce around particular candidates, while the progressive activists from labor and other organizations could focus on PFC. When the *Hartford Courant* gave its endorsements in the primary race only to several members and not the entire slate, individual rivalries and divisiveness began.

The unity of the coalition was broken essentially by three factors: individual agendas and quests for power; ideological differences; tensions between African-American and Puerto Rican political leaders and how they perceived their community's aspirations. Depending on where one sat, one or another of these factors was more salient. Even within PFC there were different perspectives over whether this was primarily an issue of ethnic succession among communities of color or a progressive/pro-corporate split. Some viewed it as the former, while I viewed it as the latter, with the business interests able to take advantage of ethnic and racial tensions in order to defeat a regime they perceived as too radical.

Individual Quests for Power and Ideological Differences. For roughly eight months, Mayor Perry was able to assert leadership in the coalition. A progressive agenda was being melded in fits and starts. During this time, however, the business community began to court several council members, rifts began to simmer among African-American and Puerto Rican political leadership, and critical issues were coming before the council. A search for a city manager was started.

Eventually, as the title of Chinua Achebe's novel states, things fell apart.¹⁴ The mayor and council had implemented a system of rotating the position of deputy mayor in the beginning of the term in order to avoid a divisive internal election early in our tenure. As July 1992 neared, and the necessity to choose a permanent deputy mayor loomed, jockeying for the position had intensified and one council member, an upwardly mobile African-American woman, was pressuring several colleagues vigorously for their support. She had begun to clash with Mayor Perry and became aligned with the Chamber of Commerce. The key point at which the coalition fell apart occurred when she was able to coalesce a majority of five members — she herself and four others — to elect her deputy mayor.

The ideological differences among the officeholders were not initially a serious basis of division, but they became more salient over time as the personal animosities deepened and ideological divergences could be used by members of the council to justify particular positions on issues. Moreover, the downtown business interests could exploit ideological differences in their efforts to develop loyalty among several council members.

This division produced a situation in which Howard Stanback, the city manager, was a Perry ally, affording her and her council allies access to the city administration, while the corporation counsel became allied with and helped to buttress the five-person majority. Council meetings became long, drawn-out debates — characterized by the local media as bickering — thereby trivializing some of the major ideological or program-

matic disparities between the two factions. On occasion the manager might offer a proposal, only to be blocked by the corporation counsel.

Another key factor in the coalition's not holding together was its lack of programmatic preparation for taking over the reigns of government and its inability to move swiftly to implement policies. Since all six Democratic council members and I were novices, and there was more consensus between the Democratic challengers and People for Change about ousting the prior regime than about what a new approach to governance would resemble, a great deal of time had to be spent after the election and on assuming office acclimating new officeholders. Moreover, there was no prior agreement on specific projects to be undertaken once everyone was sworn into office. Many initiatives had to await the arrival of Howard Stanback, whose experience and philosophy fit with the coalition. He was unable to relocate until June of 1992, a difficult time frame for a fragile coalition to endure. The council first asked an incumbent, more conservative city manager, Raymond Eugene Shipman, to leave, then appointed as interim city manager a veteran attorney in the corporation counsel's office who was close to retirement. During the time the search was conducted for the permanent manager — although it is truly an oxymoron to describe the Hartford city manager's position as permanent — political divisions began to fester. When Stanback arrived, controversy was already simmering despite his competence and experience.

Tensions Under the Rainbow: What I label tensions under the rainbow cannot be underestimated in terms of how they may serve to detract from more redistributive efforts. During the term, these tensions manifested as a contest between the generation of African-American political leaders who had finally achieved a measure of political success in Hartford with certain limited opportunities to create patronage and the newly emerging Puerto Rican political leadership who were anxious to "deliver" to their community. This type of contest over remaining opportunities for patronage, however limited, can easily intensify and poses a most significant obstacle to overcome in multiracial electoral endeavors, despite the similar needs and conditions in the respective communities.

African-Americans and Puerto Ricans defy the conventional ethnic succession model in which political incorporation eventually affords an ethnic community the ability to assimilate and move out of a central city to an ethnically diffused, suburban existence.¹⁵ Few such opportunities are available to Hartford's African-Americans and especially to its Puerto Rican residents, although several suburbs now have growing numbers of those two ethnic groups. Indeed, at the core of the debate surrounding the notion of the underclass is the issue of the persistent lack of opportunity for African-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and other communities of color. Therefore, even as constrained as the patronage opportunities might be, any openings created through political participation and organization are coveted and can become the object of rivalry between the two communities. Although the greatest beneficiaries of such political patronage are the middle class and professional segments of the communities of color, these plums can become symbolically important to the communities.

In our term, one such dispute arose soon after Howard Stanback took office, when he attempted to hire an African-American consultant to do a study of the management information capacity and requirements of city departments. The effort was thwarted when one of the Puerto Rican city council members who had previously endorsed the project changed his position to one of open opposition and eventually garnered suffi-

cient votes to halt the entire project. Economic development loan funds available to small businesses in the city likewise generated similar controversies and broke the coalition's unity.

Redistributive Efforts

There are extremely limited means available for redistributive efforts at the local level. Moreover, any measures an urban regime attempts with respect to redistribution elicit reactions from a variety of constituencies, thereby provoking another key component of a battle over a city hall. Given the context of urban crisis and decay in the United States, this redistributive role of local government and the controversies inherent in such a role deserve attention and analysis. In our case, the relative emphasis within the Hartford coalition on redistributive policies became a focal point of opposition, illustrating a dimension of urban politics that is more than a battle over land use and the terms of fostering of a growth machine,¹⁶ as urban politics are typically described. For urban populists, for a black urban regime, for progressive activists, and for affected impoverished communities, alleviating poverty and providing support to those in need are fundamental motivations for even participating in the electoral arena.¹⁷ Despite all the constraining factors in the attempt to foster social change through a city hall, there are vastly different approaches to local governance, especially in this area.

Controversies over redistributive goals might be characterized as an inevitable consequence of the clash of competing imperatives facing officeholders suggested by Martin Shefter.¹⁸ Alternatively, they may be viewed in a manner suggested by David Harvey as one facet of the experimentation involved in flexible accumulation strategies of capital — a contingent local response to structural change — in which the relative strength of social movements has great influence over the outcome.¹⁹ Regardless, the choices available at city hall have significance in how everyday life is experienced. Hartford's pressing social needs, particularly in the two key areas of education and welfare, and the reaction of the business community to redistributive efforts, exemplified in the case of a local debate on health care reform, depict some of these controversies.

Social Needs Among the Population. A consistent issue for mayors of color, especially a city's first mayor of color, and for urban populists or progressives, is the problem of raised expectations among constituents that everyday life will improve. In Hartford, a small city with the extensive poverty noted earlier, this was certainly the case. The resources at the disposal of City Hall to deal with such poverty are largely inadequate, although it is clear that local government has a role to play in addressing inequality. Two important areas illustrate this dilemma.

Education: Hartford's heavy reliance on property taxes to raise local revenue juxtaposed against a school system overburdened by attempts to educate the poorest children in the region has produced a crisis-ridden education system. During the first year of the council term, a protracted set of negotiations between the teachers union and the board of education produced a contract settlement that the council had to ratify. The contract, which came under heavy criticism by the media, various political leaders, and a parent group, was characterized as too generous to the teachers in light of the city's dire budgetary straits. The majority of council members approved the contract, given that through the terms of the agreement certain costly arbitration awards were dropped by the teachers and incentives for early retirement were created. Leaders in the teachers union had been a vital part of the winning coalition, a fact that was seized on by the forces opposing the settlement.

As budget deliberations unfolded during each of the term's two years, huge deficits were faced: \$17 million in the first year and \$30 million in the second within an overall budget of between \$430 million and \$440 million. In Hartford's system, the city council adopts a budget that includes the board of education's allocation, an amount generally less than that requested by the board in an often highly publicized request. The funds appropriated to the board account for close to half the operating budget outright and there are additional costs associated with education that are absorbed in other portions of the city's budget. Yet there is generally a great deal of tension over how much the city allocates to the board, and the two bodies often engage in a public rhetorical slugfest over how much the city can afford, what with all the other services it must fund, versus what it should devote to education. For a progressive on the council side of the dilemma, it ranks as a worst nightmare.

A highly vocal parent group that emerged from a South End neo-Alinsky organization pressured the council for more education funds.²⁰ It was especially tenacious during the second year of the term in lobbying for several million more dollars than the council had adopted. The group demanded the attendance of the mayor and council members at many meetings, hounded the city manager, and continued coercion until they received a commitment of allocation funds as they could be identified during the course of the fiscal year. When the regime changed, the new incumbents reneged on that pledge.

Many of the parents in this group were also active in Peters's 1993 campaign, supported the Republicans and their conservative thrust for the council — it was the Republican leadership that decided not to fulfill the promised funds for education during the portion of fiscal year 1995 when they assumed office — and became ardent supporters of a plan to privatize the management of the schools, the first time such an extensive privatization plan has been attempted.

Welfare: Hartford's population includes a large number of families and individuals on public assistance. As noted earlier, over 27 percent of the city's population lives below the poverty line, and large numbers of working residents constitute the working poor. Hartford has the largest general assistance (GA) caseload in Connecticut, usually some one-third of the state's entire GA population. Social services available in Hartford generally are not replicated in suburban towns in the region so that people in need of those services leave their towns of origin and find refuge in Hartford's network of shelters and services.

We attempted to deal with the issue of welfare by asserting ourselves in the debate at the state legislature over changes and reforms to the welfare system and by attempting certain innovations in mental health services and job training for clients. When the legislature enacted a law that allowed cities to limit the receipt of general assistance to nine months, Hartford opted not to institute the provision because such a move would create huge disruption in the lives of the recipients as well as certain unrest. Moreover, in 1992, when the legislature considered ending general assistance for so-called employables, the elected officials testified at the legislature against the proposal. In addition, the council voted to approve a tent city overnight demonstration by GA recipients in a major downtown park as a protest, despite the opposition of downtown businesses to the event. By its vote, the city council agreed to waive requirements for insurance coverage for the demonstration and assume liability, along with other fees that are routinely assessed — but often waived wholly or in part — for organizations that plan events in city facilities and parks. Council members who were disposed to vote against such measures were informed by the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union that it would

seek an injunction against the city if it attempted to bar the demonstration.

Elements of the local media criticized these actions as too permissive and not strict enough with welfare recipients. They are in stark contrast to the actions of the majority of the succeeding council and mayor, who came out against a move and expansion of a soup kitchen operated by Catholic nuns from a building just north of the major business district into a downtown church basement across the street from the Civic Center. That leadership also supported a controversial position of the archbishop of the Hartford archdiocese, who blocked the proposed move. Later, the same officials opposed the use of several floors of a financially failing downtown hotel as housing for independently functioning recovering substance abusers. The hotel later closed after a good deal of controversy over the stance of the city officials, who also enacted a moratorium on any local social service expansion.

Reaction from the Business Community and Health Care Reform. The members of the 1989–1991 city council and their 1991 mayoral candidate received a great deal of backing from the business community. However, with an entirely new group of Democrats and a greater role for People for Change in that term, business interests had to readjust. One important episode involved the debate on health care reform in early 1992, a clear illustration of a redistributational controversy.

Health care reform had been a priority in the platforms of both the Perry slate and the PFC and became part of the council agenda in an effort to begin to implement the platform. This issue was included before the nomination of Bill Clinton for president, before the concept of managed competition emerged, and before any serious prospect of action by Congress was contemplated. It was being considered while the major debate on the issue was between advocates of the single payer Canadian-style plan and the pay or play alternative. Moreover, it was taking place in the city known as the insurance capital of the world, nicknamed the insurance city, where Aetna and Travelers Insurance companies are the largest taxpayers and active in many facets of community life. So as the council considered a resolution that in its original form essentially endorsed the single payer plan, the insurance companies, to coin a phrase, went ballistic.

I chaired the council committee before which the resolution was debated and was told by an Aetna government relations official that passage of the resolution would be considered a hostile act by the city council. Even though the resolution was primarily symbolic, the insurance companies took it very seriously. Insurance company employees were mobilized to testify at council hearings, a most atypical occurrence. One of them stated that the Hartford city council's endorsement of health care reform would be like Detroit's city council endorsing the relaxation of car import restrictions. Congresswoman Barbara Kennelly of Connecticut's first congressional district was enlisted to call me at my home to discuss the issue. In the end, by a vote of 6 to 2 with one abstention, the council passed a modified resolution that did not endorse a specific plan for reform but enumerated the principles we felt should be addressed through reform — of access, cost, universality, and quality among others. However, with the business community smarting from this action, it reverberated over time and was often used to illustrate our insensitivity to business.

The business community, notably through the Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce, tended to deal with only a few of the council members who were most disposed to concur with business's positions. An offshoot of the chamber, the Downtown Council, developed its agenda of issues for the city and enlisted two members to participate in

the body and take its agenda back to the city council. Moreover, despite the fact that city manager Howard Stanback was extremely skilled in the field of economic development and had extensive experience in working with the private sector — for example, overseeing a multimillion-dollar expansion of O’Hare Airport while serving as Chicago’s commissioner of aviation — the impression of a regime unfriendly to business persisted. This issue culminated in a speech delivered by Ronald Compton, CEO of Aetna, to the Chamber of Commerce during the 1993 primary campaign season in which he lambasted City Hall leadership for its unfriendly attitude toward the corporate sector. This speech was referred to continuously by our opponents in the campaigns. On the election of Michael Peters, Compton convened a round table of elected officials — the newly elected mayor, several incumbent state legislators, and reelected and newly elected council members — business leaders, and several community leaders to begin a new type of dialogue. In a similar forum held during the fall of 1994, Compton declared that City Hall was now a hospitable place for business.

Mistrust by the business community was based on council specific actions and individual council members’ support of agendas viewed as antagonistic to business goals. I, having extensive ties to the labor movement, was often approached by unions for assistance on their issues. During several local strikes, the council took actions such as ensuring that the conduct of police on picket lines was fair to strikers; allowing warming trailers within the city’s right-of-way near strike sites; pressuring companies through council resolutions and appeals by the mayor’s office; assessing companies for the cost of police overtime at strikes in which companies’ unfair labor practices were documented; and three council members participating in a strike-related civil disobedience action on one Martin Luther King birthday. I also worked with labor activists to craft an ordinance that established a workplace rights commission whose role was to be as a monitor of city economic development activity vis-à-vis the nature of the job creation and labor relations fostered by city economic development. These actions made the business community uncomfortable with the actions of the council and with me in particular when fairness to workers emerged as a theme. We maintained that workplace fairness did not have to be construed as antibusiness.

Public Perceptions of and Participation in the Coalition’s Efforts

The 1991–1993 Hartford city government was a highly public and highly publicly scrutinized one. We attempted to involve a wide variety of constituencies in city issues, develop new means of hearing the public and new methods of participation. The results of our efforts were sometimes characterized as creating an unruly atmosphere in meetings that went on too long. It seemed to some of us that we could rely on the *Hartford Courant* to construe anything it could as either a scandal or evidence of our incompetence or hostility to business. Yet we were able to fashion some very innovative approaches to governance.

Hostility of the Local Media. It is extremely difficult to convey the magnitude of the local media’s influence over the popular perception of our tenure in office. The city’s one daily newspaper, the *Hartford Courant*, functions as a key ideological outlet and source of information for the entire state of Connecticut. Its executive officers play an important role in many organizations throughout the state and in Hartford — for example, the Downtown Council — and the tenor of the editorials and news reporting has a far-reaching effect on the public’s perceptions of officeholders. The *Courant* was unen-

thusiastic about the election results — it had often endorsed Perry's opponents in previous primaries and general elections. During the two years, it carried many critical editorials on issues ranging from the health care resolution to the enactment of an anti-apartheid selective purchasing ordinance to the handling of city projects, council appointments, and more. The City Hall reporters were particularly adept at orchestrating issues that portrayed the mayor and her council supporters as radical, inept, corrupt, antibusiness, and so forth, negatively. Yet they downplayed or minimized her opponents' comparable issues. Two columnists hammered the mayor continually and often gratuitously, inserting a jibe about her in a topic unrelated to City Hall or her actions. The council was characterized as beset by bickering. Quotations attributed to council members were often construed for sensationalist touches in the stories.

There were few outlets for countering the *Courant* or offering a different perspective. Three English-language weekly community papers, one Spanish-language semimonthly community paper, and one so-called alternative weekly, an arts-oriented paper, commented on city events with more varied perspectives, but they also exhibited the divisions of the community in some of their coverage. Two African-American-oriented newspapers provided coverage generally less hostile to Perry and Stanback's efforts and those of their supporters. One paper, distributed citywide, but primarily oriented toward the prevailing politics in the South End, provided mixed coverage, but often was critical of either Mayor Perry or her council supporters. The Spanish-language paper alternated between supporting the coalition's efforts and offering stories more critical of the Perry group after the council split occurred.

The broadcast media, notably the local affiliates of major television networks, did not devote as much time in their newscasts to details of City Hall activities, but frequently portrayed their most circuslike aspects on the nightly local news. The local radio talk show hosts had a field day with the events. One former such host had previously been a police officer in Pennsylvania, and when the local police union clashed with the mayor over the issue of establishing a police civilian review board, he presided over a daily, constant barrage on his show. For reasons never fully disclosed to the public, he was eventually dismissed from his position, then hired briefly as a lobbyist by the Hartford Police Union.

Participatory Opportunities and Mechanisms. From 1991 to 1993, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people came in and out of the building: lobbying, demonstrating, working with council members, the mayor, or city manager on various projects. Since the format of the twice-monthly council meetings is fairly rigid and offers no opportunity for public participation during the discussions, we decided to precede the meetings with open forums in which the public could comment on issues before the body. Council meetings formally begin at 8:00 P.M., so we scheduled the public session at 7:30 before the meeting. That portion sometimes lasted until after 9:00 P.M. as many individuals and organizations raised their concerns. It was the first time such a practice had been instituted; previously, only ad hoc demonstrations to defy conventional processes provided such opportunities.

The *Hartford Courant* was critical of this innovation, complaining that too much of a circus atmosphere was created at the meetings. Some council members were also disdainful of the sessions, particularly when they were publicly disparaged. All of us took our share of disapproval during the two years of these forums. Yet for Perry and her supporters this new avenue for public input became a symbol of an important direction

for government, and we felt that the press's opposition to these sessions represented an undemocratic impulse.

We attempted other, more substantive methods of increasing participation to address needs. The city manager's office developed the concept of targeted neighborhoods for city services.²¹ Initially four neighborhoods, each with pressing but distinct needs, were selected. Local community organizations were brought together in these neighborhoods and either the city manager or a deputy city manager worked with each of the groups to identify municipal service needs and public-private partnerships that could be developed for each area. Community-based organizations had to agree to put aside their own differences and work together. The plan was for a coordinated set of services to be delivered in each neighborhood: combined intake procedures for city social service, employment, and health programs; collaboration between the local schools, the city, and the community-based organizations. Community policing was to augment the collaboration. Some services were to be subcontracted to the community groups. Local hospitals, colleges, and other institutions were to be brought into the mix in new ways.

Many of these efforts were beginning to take more concrete form toward the end of our term of office. Some initiatives proceeded more quickly than others, and some of the collaboration lives on after the departure of Howard Stanback.

New forms of citizen participation included better utilization of city commissions. We created several new bodies during our tenure — the Workplace Rights Commission noted above, commissions on gay, lesbian, and bisexual issues and on ethnic diversity — and envisioned their role as providing input to city government on their respective issues. We also relied on advisory groups and existing commissions. As chairperson of the Affirmative Action, Employment, Health, and Social Services Committee, I met with and sought input from more than half a dozen commissions and advisory bodies in devising city policy. It was both energizing and very useful to have these groups available because I felt that I had simply been thrust into the middle of a number of issues, so the guidance of interested parties was important.

Incorporation of Newly Emerging Constituencies and New Methods of Incorporating Constituencies. The establishment of the Commissions on Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Issues and the Commission on Workplace Rights, as well as other activities undertaken to address the needs of various populations, represent not only new mechanisms for participation, but the political development and incorporation of constituencies in new and different ways. Constituencies considered either peripheral or on the wane in influence were able to insert themselves into municipal political processes with high degrees of success.

Intensive political organization on the part of the Hartford gay and lesbian community over the recent past, and especially as a key component within People for Change, meant that their political presence had to be taken seriously and their needs and demands met by City Hall. During our tenure, we passed the Domestic Partnership Ordinance, establishing a process for registration and recognition of domestic partnerships, both same-sex and opposite-sex unions, but not extending health benefits to domestic partners of city employees. The latter provision was agreed to by commission members as a compromise in answer to criticism that a financially stressed city could not afford to provide this benefit, a key argument offered by opponents of the entire plan. The domestic partnership issue evoked the wrath of conservative religious forces in the city.

Within People for Change, labor was not regarded simply as an interest group to approach during elections for endorsements, money, and poll workers, but as a key constituency whose needs government should attempt to facilitate. This would be at least one way to balance the general access and power that corporate interests exert in influencing government policy and decisions. It goes beyond the conventional views about construction unions and their involvement in the growth machine²² — often the beginning and end of a discussion of labor in urban politics — leading to a more fundamental view of labor as a force for industrial democracy and social change.²³ Labor's needs in strikes, organizing, and other activities were taken seriously as issues in which government could be called upon to intervene with positive results for unions.

Activism and Advocacy: One key feature of local government during these years was active involvement in a variety of equity-oriented issues and advocacy on behalf of community residents. Whether in the arena of welfare, employment training, housing, recreation, health services or other municipal goods and services, the orientation was that government could and should be called upon to play an advocacy role. Moreover, the role should be strongly redistributive and accrue benefits to local constituencies. These include the utilization of local businesses, contractors, and firms, the protection of benefit levels for recipients of public assistance, housing initiatives that emphasize urban homesteading and home ownership opportunities, and recreational activities geared toward equalizing provision of services across different neighborhoods.

I devoted considerable effort to the city health department's AIDS programs and the facilitation of a local needle exchange program in collaboration with several community organizations. When problems developed in obtaining required insurance for the community organizations, we decided that the city should extend its own insurance to provide the necessary coverage, a controversial move to the career city bureaucrats. Later, when bureaucratic bungling by the health department resulted in the loss of state funding for certain AIDS activities, we developed a community advisory committee of AIDS organizations both to advise the health department and to hold it accountable. The committee, which still meets, was successful in leading a campaign to restore AIDS programs slated for elimination to the budget during the 1994–1995 deliberations of the succeeding council.

In these matters, our orientation was that government could and should play an active role in social advocacy: several officeholders who succeeded us have vastly different orientations that would perhaps allow such projects to falter or die without city intervention. Not unexpectedly, they believe city intervention should foster business development as opposed to fostering social services.²⁴

Preservation of Municipal Services. One additional area involves our approach to budget decisions and our desire to preserve the level and scope of services provided by the local government to the greatest extent possible. As mentioned previously, the operating budgets we considered ranged between \$430 million and \$440 million; and Hartford has faced budget crises for several years. During the first year of our term, the city faced a \$17 million budget deficit; the second year it was \$30 million. Property taxes were already extremely high, and there was no serious consideration to raising them. Layoffs, union concessions, and other measures whose burden fell heavily on municipal employees were abhorrent to me, to most of the council members, and to the mayor.

In 1992 layoffs were avoided by a number of the bargaining units agreeing to copayment plans in their insurance combined with hiring freezes and other cost containment measures. In 1993 we looked under every rock and at every possible method of saving. Besides additional hiring freezes, reorganization, reduced contractual recreation services, we considered a host of other cost containment strategies. We adopted an early retirement plan for city employees, which came under intense criticism by the press and by Nicholas Carbone — by then director of a legislative think tank on municipal issues — but allowed for minimal layoffs.

One strategy we resisted, which has been the hallmark of the succeeding city government, is a move toward privatization, a strategy eagerly embraced by the current board of education — the first such entity in the country to privatize the management of the entire school system — but also championed by the succeeding mayor and city council majority. Several members of the 1991–1993 city council on both sides of the five-four divide had ties to organized labor and were philosophically inclined against privatization, so such measures were not considered seriously. There was general consensus that cheaper, privatized services were not adequate answers to Hartford's problems as compared to regionalization and state-level solutions to the fiscal problems of central cities.

Other Positive Accomplishments

Despite the formidable obstacles and disappointments suffered by those of us who wanted a progressive coalition to succeed, several more accomplishments consistent with progressive orientations were achieved. Both affirmative action and economic development efforts can be mentioned. Some have withstood the transition to the next regime, while others have been erased since December 1993.

Affirmative Action. As in other cities that elect African-American mayors, one of the key improvements during our administration was gains in affirmative action among the leadership of the city workforce. First, the composition of the city council itself was for the first time more balanced and reflected the city's population: three African-Americans, three Puerto Ricans, and three whites; five women and four men. Three of us were full-time public-sector employees and public-sector union members. Hartford had an African-American female mayor, an African-American city manager, a Puerto Rican corporation counsel. Moreover, during his tenure, Stanback appointed a number of people of color as key department heads, including the city's first African-American police chief and first African-American fire chief. He named Puerto Ricans and African-Americans as heads of a number of departments, as well as deputy city manager and other important administrative posts. Many of Stanback's appointees have since been replaced.

Reorganization for Economic Development. Within city government, reorganization was accomplished to combine and unify the various economic development functions. Work was done to create more collaboration across departments and a greater preference for customer service among the staff.²⁵ Housing, planning, redevelopment, and business retention departments were placed in one new division, Community and Economic Development, to maximize collaboration. Efforts were undertaken to develop closer ties to area higher education institutions for consultation on business development. Some of this has been unassembled since our leaving office, but many of the initiatives will certainly benefit our successors.

Construction Projects as Economic Development. A vital thrust in economic development was to ensure that opportunities were being created for local and minority businesses. A model used with partial success on a school renovation project in Hartford offers an interesting method for maximizing minority business participation in municipal projects served as a pilot program for a larger school construction project. The millions of new construction dollars in the pipeline generated demands for inclusion of minority contractors and minority construction trade entrepreneurs in the project. Stanback had employed a similar model in the O'Hare Airport expansion projects in which the construction was broken down into small jobs for which minority contractors could bid and more easily obtain the financial guarantees necessary to participate in such endeavors. Instead of using a general contractor, the city would retain the services of a construction manager, a private firm that would act as the city's agent and attempt to carry out social goals such as affirmative action and minority business participation in the selection of companies to be involved in the project. Larger contracting firms had the capacity to bid on jobs either as general contractor or construction manager. The construction manager would be responsible for working with the city and devising bid packages that would lend themselves to the inclusion of small, minority businesses.

The project became embroiled in the incessant political maneuvering that takes place within the council. A selection panel that included four council members — serendipitously three from the minority caucus — and several city and school board employees initially selected a firm for construction manager whose proposal included a partnership with another firm experienced in the development of financial assistance to minority businesses in the areas of bonding and finance. This plan would be useful in achieving the goal of maximum participation of minority businesses that would be urged to employ and train local residents in need of employment. In an unusual insertion of itself into the affairs of the city manager's office, the council majority rejected the city manager's formal resolution to the council to hire the selection panel's choice and another company, approved by the majority, was selected. That company faltered badly in attempting to manage the project and was finally released. Stanback, whose expertise would have been required to make the effort work, left the city manager's office in December 1993; the building trades had put up obstacles to the minority firm goals; and the renovation fell more than a year behind schedule.

A Clash of Priorities

Adolph Reed urges an examination of whether a "black regime maximizes the options open to it, within its limited sphere, to press the interests of the rank-and-file black constituency" rather than capitulate to the progrowth corporate agenda that has generated a marginalized urban poor.²⁶ Experiences in Hartford reveal the response on the part of a highly organized corporate sector to attempts at progressive governance to pursue these goals. Utilizing Paul Peterson's categories of the policies undertaken by municipal government — developmental, allocational, and redistributive — the critical dimension of the fight over city hall in a city such as Hartford in this period is the conflict between the redistributive needs of those who remain in central cities and the developmental needs of those who amass profits in cities.²⁷ At times, public officials who seek to address these two sets of needs can coexist in local legislative and administrative bodies. But when redistributive issues are seen as too costly or a perception develops that officeholders are going too far, as I believe was the case with

Hartford's corporate sector during 1991–1993, and with buttressing by traditional political rivals, there is hardly space for a progressive regime to succeed or even to attempt to succeed. In Hartford, government capacity is so severely strained that even allocational issues — public safety, sanitation service, parks, and so forth — took on a redistributive dimension.

Using Martin Shefter's imperatives of local officeholders, even the successes of generating sufficient votes in 1991 and preserving Hartford's credit rating, which was AA in 1993, did not overcome the problem of regulating and containing conflict among city residents.²⁸ As we attempted to open up government, greater expectations developed, more conflict ensued, and more disappointments followed. How conflict was fueled, orchestrated, and taken advantage of contributed to our most severe problems, lack of unity and unfulfilled expectations.

The urban regime literature primarily considers questions of development as the defining element of urban politics, but issues of race, redistribution, social consumption, and other areas may need to figure more prominently in the discussion, notably in older cities such as Hartford, with political leadership of color, at least insofar as they constitute a compelling agenda for urban policymakers. Particularly when the urban government undergoes dramatic shifts, vacillating between progressive regimes and urban conservatism, the embodied frustrations require deeper analysis. New urban-based social movements, identity politics, other embodiments of popular grievance, and a backlash to these developments also factor into the urban political terrain and assert their presence in the electoral arena.

The Continuing Significance of Race and Its Manipulation

The shift in character from the 1991–1993 City Hall leadership to the 1993–1995 council majority and mayor could be construed as a rejection of progressive or redistributive initiatives by the local electorate. However, one could argue that there were additional dynamics at play, that the shift was more centrally concerned with race and the opportunity for whites to reassert political control. White voters easily grasped this possibility, and South End politicians, fortifying the urban political trenches, could exploit it.²⁹ Impressions of incumbent officeholders were orchestrated by downtown business interests which felt threatened by the thrust of the Perry coalition, aided by the *Hartford Courant's* editorial policy, in a manner that played upon the anxiety of the electorate. The racial dimensions of the 1993 election would be paramount, but they would not be publicly acknowledged as the issue within the election. Furthermore, a split in the Puerto Rican political community produced sufficient support for mayoral candidate Michael Peters to garner an important cushion in his margin of victory and also for the Republicans against People for Change.

The fusion slate gained the support of downtown interests not necessarily because of a preference for Republican social welfare policies, although certain members of that group may have held such beliefs, as much as fear that People for Change and the more liberal Democrats would go too far in the redistributive direction, too far in their support of labor, and create obstacles for or minimize the corporate agenda. Also, the patronage network that existed and fed off of contracts and arrangements with City Hall and various other city agencies rightly feared that new arrangements could and would be fashioned. We were perceived as a threat by this combination of forces, for whom our defeat was important.

Possibilities for Redistribution

Although some of us were clearly interested in using the electoral arena and local government to pursue a redistributive agenda focusing on impoverished communities of color, we were not sufficiently powerful to obstruct the developmental needs of the corporate sector if community benefits and fairness to the local workforce could accrue, no matter how leftist our personal ideologies. Still, I believe, the corporate interests disproportionately feared our agenda and did not fully understand the inherent limits that people like me perceived we faced. Even when we tried to accommodate the concerns of business interests on issues of downtown development, job training programs, public safety, and other concerns, or when we concurred with the Chamber of Commerce on such issues as opposing a proposal for a casino, they were sufficiently discomfited to warrant their intense mobilization in opposition to our reelection.

A personal example drove this point home to me. During the spring of 1993 there was a possibility of moving the New England Patriots from Boston to Hartford. As an alternative to a widely heralded proposal to build a casino in Hartford, the Patriots move seemed much more desirable and could defuse casino support. Several of us participated in booster campaign activities to bring the football team to Hartford. Having grown up in Wisconsin during the Green Bay Packers' glory years, I appreciated the game and thought that professional football was much better for Hartford than casino gambling. When I appeared with Mayor Perry at a downtown rally to support the effort, the president of the Chamber of Commerce, an important actor in the electoral campaign against us, astonished to see me at such an event, said to me, "Who would have thunk [*sic*] it!" Perhaps his patronizing comment was his attempt to overcome the social tension of sharing the platform with me. After all, I was not hostile to such grand economic development schemes in and of themselves, but they had to provide tangible benefits to the people of the impoverished neighborhoods, who were my first concern.

The Battle over What?

Since leaving office, I have watched a new governing philosophy emerge in Hartford, one of privatization, minimization of local government's role in solving social problems, and true hostility toward the poor and the programs that service their needs. The difference is stark and, for many of us, frightening. The new regime, particularly its mayor, has a brilliant public relations apparatus and overwhelming support from the *Hartford Courant* that downplays the severity of the impact of its policies. Their intent is to depopulate the city of its poor by dismantling public housing, razing abandoned housing that could be rehabilitated in new configurations, and dismantling supportive social services. Whether such strategies are peculiar to Hartford or replicated elsewhere, they seem to represent an extreme approach to urban governance, which has been bolstered by political shifts in Congress.

Despite all the constraints and contention, there are possibilities, limited to be sure, for reform and redistribution at City Hall. Progressive movements, particularly those with roots and ties in the communities of color, offer some hope that life in American cities can be a little easier, a little less harsh, with a greater degree of popular participation. Furthermore, the adoption of an advocacy posture by local government, both in and of itself and in combination with progressive forces, is another dimension of the battle, another political choice for urban officeholders. Serious questions remain as to

how to ensure that politicians who emanate from these urban social movements remain connected to their popular base and how to link these localized movements to a larger, more national whole, subjects for much more future speculation. ♣

Notes

1. See Norman Krumholz and Pierre Clavel, eds., *Reinventing Cities: Equity Planners Tell Their Stories* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); *Harold Washington and the Neighborhoods: Progressive City Government in Chicago, 1983–1987*, edited by Pierre Clavel and Wim Wiewel (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991); Pierre Clavel, *The Progressive City* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1986); Clarence Stone, "Summing Up: Urban Regimes, Development Policy, and Political Arrangements," in *The Politics of Urban Development*, edited by Clarence Stone and Heywood Sanders (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987); Clarence Stone, Marion Orr, and David Imbroscio, "The Reshaping of Urban Leadership in U.S. Cities: A Regime Analysis," in *Urban Life in Transition*, edited by M. Gottdiener and Chris Pickvance (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1991).
2. Krumholz and Clavel, *Reinventing Cities*.
3. Wanda Katz-Fishman, Jerome Scott, Ralph C. Gomes, and Robert Newby, "Politics of Race and Class in City Hall," in *Research in Urban Sociology: Race, Class and Urban Change*, edited by Jerry Lembcke (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1989).
4. See David Rusk, *Cities Without Suburbs* (Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
5. Eric Lipton, "Hartford Still among 10 Poorest Cities in Census Report," *Hartford Courant*, December 10, 1992, sec. C, 1, 11.
6. Peggy McCarthy, "In Hartford, the Best and Worst of Times," *New York Times*, February 7, 1988, sec. 11, 1, 14.
7. Hartford Planning Department, "Census Data Release." Mimeographed, 1991.
8. Larry Williams, "A Society Far Apart," *Hartford Courant*, September 25, 1988, sec. A, 1, 15.
9. Ira Katznelson, *City Trenches* (New York: Pantheon, 1981).
10. Clavel, *The Progressive City*.
11. See Joan Fitzgerald and Louise Simmons, "From Consumption to Production: Labor Participation in Grass-Roots Movements in Pittsburgh and Hartford," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 26, no. 4 (1991): 512–531; David Gillespie, *Politics at the Periphery: Third Parties in Two-Party America* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), 230–231; Louise Simmons, *Organizing in Hard Times: Labor and Neighborhoods in Hartford* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).
12. Bruce Shapiro, "Democratic Gadfly in Connecticut," *The Nation*, August 30, 1988, 104–144; Jonathan Rabinovitz, "Proudly Liberal, and Newly Powerful," *New York Times*, September 20, 1994, sec. B, 1, 5.
13. Krumholz and Clavel, *Reinventing Cities*.
14. Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart* (New York: Facade Crest, 1959).
15. Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
16. Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine," *American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 2 (1976): 309–332; see also Stephen Elkin, *City and Regime in the American Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Stephen Elkin, "State and Market in City Politics: Or, The 'Real' Dallas," in Stone and Sanders, *The Politics of Urban Development*.
17. Adolph Reed, "The Black Urban Regime: Structural Origins and Constraints," in *Power, Community, and the City*, edited by M. P. Smith (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988); Larry Bennett, "Harold Washington and the Black Urban Regime," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 28, no. 3 (1993): 423–440; see also Manning Marable, "Harold Washington's Chicago: Race, Class Conflict, and Political Change," in Lembcke, *Research in Urban Sociology: Race, Class, and Urban Change*.
18. Martin Shefter, *Political Crisis, Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of New York City* (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

19. David Harvey, "Flexible Accumulation through Urbanization," *Antipode* 19, no. 3 (1987): 260-286; see also Susan Clarke and Andrew Kirby, "In Search of the Corpse: The Mysterious Case of Local Politics," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (1990): 389-412.
20. See the discussion of neo-Alinsky organizations in Robert Fisher, *Let the People Decide* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984); see also Simmons, *Organizing in Hard Times*.
21. See interview with Howard Stanback in Krumholz and Clavel, *Reinventing Cities*.
22. Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine."
23. Robert Kuttner, "Will Unions Organize Again?" *Dissent* 34 (Winter 1987): 52-62; Robert Kuttner, "Unions, Economic Power, and the State," *Dissent* 33 (Winter 1986): 33-44; Simmons, *Organizing in Hard Times*.
24. As an example of how councilman Michael McGary justifies the priorities of the Community Development Block Program being shifted away from social services into development areas, he wrote in the community paper *Hartford News*, June 1-8, 1994, edition, "Every new social ill, true or exaggerated, immediately becomes a reason for a state [*sic*] of studies (by paid consultants), followed by committees (usually made up of potential directors) who agree on a program. Soon, the tweed [*sic*] ring of social activists find funding from a well meaning church, corporation, or foundation. After a year or two, so much progress is made that it is time for an application for CDBG funds. . . . Each and every program sounds laudatory at the outset. Social goals to be met, 'clients' to be served, staff well trained, and funding in place. However . . . several years later, goals have undergone a metamorphosis of some type, 'clients' usually slip down the social-economic scale, staff has changed (never for the better), and cash is always a problem."
25. See interview with Howard Stanback in Krumholz and Clavel, *Reinventing Cities*.
26. Reed, "The Black Urban Regime," 168.
27. Paul Peterson, *City Limits* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
28. Shefter, *Political Crisis, Fiscal Crisis*.
29. Katznelson, *City Trenches*.