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WHY THE DFL SLEPT:
AN HISTORICAL APPROACH TO THE 1966 ROLVAAG-KEITH FIGHT IN MINNESOTA

BY
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HONORS PROGRAM
SAINT JOHN'S UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
1967

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP OF INTELLECTUALS TO ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES	6
Organized Labor and the Intellectuals Before 1932 Labor and the New Deal Intellectual Disillusionment Conclusion	
III. LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS AND ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE MINNESOTA DEMOCRATIC-FARMER-LABOR PARTY, 1944-1962	55
IV. ROLVAAG VS. KEITH, 1966: SURFACING OF THE LABOR-INTELLECTUAL TENSIONS ON A STATEWIDE LEVEL	79
Karl Rolvaag's Relationship to Labor and the Intellectuals Labor and Rolvaag's 1961 Endorsement for Governor Intellectuals and Rolvaag's 1965 Sugar Hills Repudiation Sequel to Sugar Hills: the 1966 DFL State Convention Labor and a Massive Public Repudiation of the Party's Endorsement	
V. EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION	186
APPENDIX	190
BIBLIOGRAPHY	213

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is the intention of this thesis to demonstrate that Karl Rolvaag and the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor party were the 1966 victims of the inner contradictions inherent in an organized labor-liberal intellectual political alliance.¹

In 1966 the Minnesota DFL lost the governorship and a substantial number of state legislative seats. To some political observers this DFL loss was simply a reflection of a trend that carried nationwide, the result of a general discontent with Democratic Administration policy, and a pervasive anxiety over Vietnam and the inflation and contemplated tax increase that came with it.

To some extent this is true. The circumstances surrounding the 1966 break-up of the DFL were not entirely peculiar to Minnesota. They were in part the reflection of a larger, more dramatic story unfolding across the nation's political scene. That story has to deal with the

¹It is necessary at the outset to define in a footnote what I mean by DFL "intellectuals" and "labor people." I define "intellectual" as Maurice Nuefeld has in his article "The Historical Relationship of Liberals and Intellectuals to Organized Labor in the United States" (Annals of the American Academy, CCCL (November, 1963), 115-128): "one who has the capacity to develop ideas, the will to spend considerable time in the cultivation and exercise of that faculty, and the skill to express themselves with energy and conviction either in print or on a platform." DFL intellectuals I would define as those in the party who have generally advocated democratic and gradual reform, through the intervention of the state, for the benefit of the entire community. The orientation of "labor people" in the DFL has traditionally

forces and circumstances which made the country Democratic under Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932, and the remarkable coalition Roosevelt welded together for victory in 1936. Most importantly, the story of the 1966 decline of the DFL has to do with the gradual historical break-up of two components of that coalition, organized labor and the intellectuals.

During the 1950's there existed basic disagreement on DFL policy between the Hennepin County DFL organization and the Minneapolis Central Labor Union; DFL intellectuals, never keenly partisan to Minneapolis labor, began to voice acute criticism of CLU endorsement policy. This mutual antagonism was aggravated in 1959 when labor discovered that Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, the father of the DFL merger (and considered an intellectual by organized labor by virtue of his professorship background) had voted for passage of the Landrum-Griffin Bill.

In 1961 labor's basic antagonism for the Hennepin County DFL organization spread to the state leadership. Tension surfaced in

been less general; labor leaders have participated more as a special interest group, not rising as often above the sphere of their own interests. Their posture was succinctly summarized by Minnesota labor leader Robert Hess, who stressed in an interview that he was "first a labor man, secondly a DFLer." Solomon Barkin pointed out in his article "An Analytical Look at Labor" (Labor and Nation, VII, no. 4; Fall, 1951) that it must be remembered that there is a basic order of primacy in the labor movement:

The membership and the local unions tend to concentrate frequently to the exclusion of all else upon the immediate economic occupational interests. . . . It is only after these have been satisfied or met that the trade union, primarily through its leadership action rather than rank and file participation, undertakes to represent and battle for the other interests. They are first the interest of all workers as a class; second, they are the interest of workers as members of the lower income groups; third, they are the interests of workers as citizens of the community; and finally they are the interests of workers as citizens of the nation. (pp. 43-44)

3

a disagreement over the DFL endorsement for governor. In September, 1961, fully one year before the DFL state convention, the Minnesota A.F.L.-C.I.O. pulled a surprise endorsement of the then-Lieutenant Governor Karl F. Rolvaag for governor. The advantage to Rolvaag of this early endorsement by the 175,000 member A.F.L.-C.I.O. was enormous: its effect was to dispossess some of the leading party intellectuals of a voice in the selection of a DFL candidate. Rolvaag was not their idea of the right candidate. Disconsolate, these party leaders settled for getting their choice for Lieutenant Governor, A. M. (Sandy) Keith, endorsed. Both Rolvaag and Keith won election.

The three-and-one-half years of the Rolvaag governorship were marked by DFL internal dissension, perpetuated mainly by those dissidents who from the first opposed Rolvaag's candidacy. In 1966 this same group was involved in a drastic power play to unseat Rolvaag. Keith, with the advice and encouragement of a substantial segment of the party's "university crowd" successfully engineered the dumping of the incumbent Governor Rolvaag in a fight for party endorsement at the 1966 state DFL convention.

When Rolvaag decided to challenge Keith in a primary, his candidacy was overwhelmingly endorsed by rank-and-file statewide labor. In the September primary, Rolvaag scored a smashing victory over Keith. However, the victory had its price, for as a result of the intra-party feud, the DFL went into the November election badly split. Rolvaag succumbed to the Republicans and a rank novice in public office-seeking, Harold LeVander.

Thus, our analysis starts with four very obvious manifestations of labor-party discontent inside the DFL:

1. Labor's 1961 pre-convention endorsement of Rolvaag, in effect pre-empting intellectual party leaders from a voice in the choice of a candidate.

2. A small, hard-core group of party people, notoriously unenthusiastic over the Rolvaag candidacy; while not publicly opposing the Rolvaag candidacy, neither did they actively participate in the campaign to elect Rolvaag. In fact, some few opposed the recount which gave the DFL a Rolvaag victory.

3. In 1965 and 1966, many of these same dissident party leaders showed up advising and encouraging Keith to thwart the Rolvaag request for the party's re-endorsement, and engineered with Keith the dumping of Rolvaag.

4. Summer of 1966, Labor publicly conducted a massive repudiation of the DFL party's endorsement of Keith.

The goal which has been set for the first part of this paper is to penetrate beyond the Minnesota candidates and campaigning of any particular year to a discussion of how labor and the intellectual community joined forces in the Roosevelt coalition, and what their inner conflicts were. After 1935, the study of the historical relationship of organized labor and the intellectual community is inseparable from a study of the relationship of organized labor and the Democratic party in general, for, unquestionably, the latter at several points decisively affected the evolution of the former. Owing largely to the efforts of many intellectuals, labor experienced a political coming of age under the New Deal; owing largely to the manner in which labor wielded its new-found political power, intellectuals sought, in the 1940's and 1950's, to re-examine their relationship.

The second part of the paper intends to trace briefly the manifest tensions of these forces through a decade of Minneapolis politics.

In the third section of this paper I will attempt to explain the Rolvaag-Keith split in terms of the surfacing of these tensions on a statewide level.

Too often it happens that, when a historical event such as the Rolvaag-Keith struggle is studied, it is studied as an occurrence of independent development, independent in itself, rather than as the product of an organic historical continuity. Thus, it could not be said that the Rolvaag-Keith fight was an important phenomenon except that the circumstances which produced it had become, from the late 1940's, persistent facts. Usually the rivalries of pre-convention candidates pass away with the wind. The candidacies of Keith and Rolvaag, however, are of historic significance in that they dramatize so well the two conflicting elements which the DFL has had to reconcile for so long. Their rivalry sums up nicely the inner conflict which will continue to divide the DFL party even after both men are out of the picture.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP OF INTELLECTUALS TO ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES

There is a favorite story which Democratic party standard-bearers tell around election time. "Republicans always criticize us," the Democratic candidates tell their Democratic audiences, "because we fight like cats and dogs. But when election time comes around, there are always more cats and dogs."

The major voting elements of the Democratic party do indeed make up a fascinating, bewildering coalition -- a coalition which Franklin Delano Roosevelt fused in 1936 from among the resentful, the disinherited, and the old Democrats. "A sprawling mixture of groups," Life magazine depicted it at the time, "groups who have little sympathy with each other; and some of them hate each other more than they hate Republicans. . . . A gathering place for all the irrelevant prejudices in American life, a place where every contradictory attitude could hope to find a new home."²

V. O. Key, in an article entitled "The Future of the Democratic Party" has an interesting theory about what first brought so many disparate elements into the Roosevelt Coalition in 1932. Key suggests that there is a relationship between disaster and party alignment, and that for over a hundred years, catastrophe has fixed the grand outlines

² _____ . "Democrats and C.I.O.-P.A.C.," Life, XVII (July 31, 1944), 20.

of the partisan division among American voters.³ Because this theory contains substantial relevance as to the past and present status of the Democratic party, it is a point of departure for the first part of this thesis.

According to Key's theory, it was a catastrophe -- the Civil War -- which "burned into the American electorate a pattern of partisan faith, a system of loyalties that maintained themselves generation after generation,"⁴ and which were manifested in the sectional coalitions of Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats. The political aftermath of the war was to find the Republicans in control of the country for sixty-some odd years,⁵ and the Democrats split wide open. For over thirty years the Democratic party was to consist of an uneasy alliance of "the Solid South and whoever in the North had reasons to go along."⁶ Usually it was the big city bosses that went along with the Solid South. But for a long time after the Civil War the alliance of the South and the big-city machines was not enough to make up a national majority. The result was that, during the last half of the nineteenth century, the Democratic party had spotty success in its electoral efforts. Unless

³V. O. Key, "The Future of the Democratic Party," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXVIII (Spring, 1952), 161.

⁴Ibid.

⁵It is true of course that from 1876 a twenty year period did ensue in which Democrats and Republicans tugged almost evenly (and indecisively) with neither party winning the Presidency twice in succession and no President gaining a clear majority of the popular vote. Just the same, it was Republican leadership which succeeded in settling the decisive conflicts of the era: all the issues of westward expansion, of nationalizing of business and the growth of manufacturing interests under the production of the tariff, of the struggle to bring the trusts under some measure of public control which would balance the older ideals of agrarian democracy against the new interests of a rising industrialism. Cf. Vernon Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (Rahway, 1930).

⁶_____. "Democrats and C.I.O.-P.A.C.," Life, XVII (July 31, 1944), 20.

the industrial states and midwestern farmers joined the dependable Southern vote in going strongly Democratic, the Republicans would win. The political problems of bringing these elements into victorious Democratic coalition were difficult because industrial workers and dissatisfied farmers had little in common with Southern Bourbons or big-city bosses.⁷

Owing to this fact, that there were so many inner contradictions among the Democratic voters, the Democratic party was unable to provide the country with decisive leadership. After the election of 1896, when the Republicans were able to fight off the threat of Western silver and agrarian radicals, Republican dominance became unquestioned.

According to Key's thesis, it remained for a second catastrophe, the Great Depression, to produce a major alteration in the pattern of partisan division within the voting population.⁸ Key writes that the Democrats did not simply win a routine victory in 1932: "They weakened mightily, if they did not destroy, the coalition that had ruled the country."⁹

What is significant for our purposes, however, is not noting the re-alignment of political forces which the Depression triggered into 1932 victory for Roosevelt. The voting of that year represented a

⁷ _____ . "The Meaning of P.A.C.," New Republic, CXI (August 14, 1944), 174.

⁸ Interesting points: Charles Beard contended that the Civil War was the "Second American Revolution"; Samuel Lubell contends that the Depression was the "Third American Revolution." CF comments on both, Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York, 1952), p. 3.

⁹Key, op. cit., p. 163.

more-or-less normal electoral response to the existing adversity. People of all sorts and classes -- bankers and barbers, tycoons and unemployed, farmers and factory hands -- were bound to repudiate the Hoover regime, a regime they felt was responsible for the economic disaster which had engulfed the nation. Roosevelt's re-election of 1936 is significant, however, in that it represented the American approval of Roosevelt reforms, and thus signalized the effective welding of a new majority combination among American voters.

Roosevelt's new Democratic majority was a strange amalgam of inner contradictions, and the way FDR constructed it was to set the government to fulfilling the aspirations and needs of almost every discontented group. Immediately after the 1933 inauguration Roosevelt blitzed through Congress a legislative program of unprecedented scope. It is readily apparent why the actions of the New Deal had concrete effects on millions of citizens. The property of many farmers was saved from foreclosure; urban and rural workingmen survived because of a relief check or a WPA job; bank depositors salvaged some of their savings because of federal assistance from the banking system, and industrial workers for the first time were free to organize without having to fear the blacklist.¹⁰

The election of 1936 showed that Roosevelt's New Deal policies did not go unappreciated; in fact, never, until 1964, had so great a percentage of voters endorsed a party's program. Roosevelt drew 60 per cent of the votes.¹¹ So convincing was the country's demand for his return that his Republican opponent, Alf Landon, won but two states, Maine and

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 164-165.

¹¹President Lyndon Johnson's election on November 3, 1964, gave him 61 per cent of the popular vote, a bit over the percentage for Roosevelt in his 1936 re-election. Johnson's margin of victory, fifteen million votes, was the first to top Roosevelt's eleven million of 1936.

Vermont. The spectrum of Roosevelt's appeal showed up sharply in the statistics: the people of the metropolitan centers, industrial workers, Northern Negroes, Western farmers and lower income groups generally supported Roosevelt.

This, then, is where our study begins: with an introduction of two of the major voting elements -- labor and liberal intellectuals -- which Roosevelt brought together into victorious coalition.

ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE INTELLECTUALS BEFORE 1932

Before a meaningful discussion of the long and turbulent alliance of liberals and intellectuals with the labor movement in the early days of the first Roosevelt Administration can begin, their earlier historical relationship must be examined.

In the United States the labor movement was actually the creation of intellectuals. But, Richard Hofstadter points out in his Anti-Intellectualism in American Life, "it (the labor movement) was a child that turned upon its own father in order to forge its distinctive character."¹² Historically, Hofstadter suggests, the American labor movement did not begin with a narrow concentration on the job, the wage bargain, and the strike which eventually became the essence of its character:

It was always heavily infiltrated with bourgeois leadership, affected by the aims of reform theorists, and colored by the interest of its members in achieving a solid place in bourgeois society or in entirely reforming that society. Its early history consists of association with one sweeping reform panacea or another. ¹³

¹²R. Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York, 1962), p. 282.

¹³Ibid., p. 283.

It was not long after the formation of the American Federation of Labor in 1886 that Samuel Gompers became aware of the incompatibility of the philosophy of socialism with the American capitalistic type of government in which he believed. In a speech before the 1903 A.F. of L. convention, Gompers made his view clear:

I want to tell you Socialists that I have studied your philosophy, read your works upon economics . . . I have heard your orators and watched the work of your movement the world over . . . I have kept close watch upon your doctrines for thirty years; have been closely associated with many of you and know what you think and what you propose . . . I know too, what you have up your sleeve. And I want to say that I am entirely at variance with your philosophy. . . . Economically you are unsound, socially you are wrong, and industrially you are an impossibility. ¹⁴

Herbert Harris has written that, when the American Federation of Labor was formed, it soon discarded all utopianism, and "instead plumped for a bread and butter unionism."¹⁵ "Labor had to learn," Selig Perlman writes, "how to avoid such enthusiasms and 'sure paths' to victory and to concentrate on the job interest as the only hard reality in the wage earner's life."¹⁶

The earliest contacts labor leaders had had with intellectuals were of the sort to arouse the laborers' suspicions. At first there were the battles with the socialist doctrinaires within the labor movement itself, "the professoriate," as Gompers labeled them, "the open and covert enemies of the workers."¹⁷ Also, the movement for "scientific management," backed by the academic community at the turn of the century, was regarded by labor as a grave menace. It was points of difference

¹⁴Quoted by George F. Hinkle, "Union Bosses and Political Action," Vital Speeches, XXII (May 14, 1956), 474.

¹⁵Herbert Harris, "Why Labor Lost the Intellectuals," Harpers, CCXXVIII (June, 1964), 80.

¹⁶Selig Perlman, "The Basic Philosophy of the American Labor Movement," American Economic History, S. Coben and F. Hill, ed. (New York, 1966), 358.

¹⁷Hofstadter, op. cit., p. 285.

such as these which convinced Gompers and other leaders that leadership could be entrusted

only to those into whose hearts and minds had been woven the experiences of earning their bread by daily labor. I saw the danger of entangling alliances with intellectuals who did not understand that to experiment with the labor movement was to experiment with human life. ¹⁸

Labor's distrust of the intellectual community came to be matched by intellectual criticism of organized labor. In 1917, Robert F. Hoxie, commenting in his book Trade Unionism in the United States, pointed out that while unionism in its ultimate effect on industrial organization was democratic, in the sense of putting a share of the control and conduct into the hands of the workers, unionism in its own organization was undemocratic:

Power . . . centers in the hands of officers and leaders. They determine immediate policies and tactics to a very large extent. . . . While unionism as a whole is the spontaneous outcome of the conditions, needs, and problems of the workers, the rank and file in general are not in a condition to formulate methods for meeting needs or solving problems and, apart from the direction of competent leaders, have not the intelligence to combat employers successfully. ¹⁹

This criticism of the nature of democracy in labor unions was joined in 1924 by a remarkably perceptive volume by Sylvia Kopald.²⁰ Miss Kopald perceived that with the union attendance at union meetings

¹⁸ Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (New York, 1925), vol. 1, p. 55.

¹⁹ Robert Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United States (2d ed.; New York, 1924), p. 177.

²⁰ I call Miss Kopald's book perceptive because she identified the elements of the union leadership problem in the very terms which were popularized by Minneapolis liberal intellectuals vis a vis the Central Labor Union leaders early in the 1950's. It is a discussion to which we will return in the second section of the paper.

as poor as it was, "the management of organizational affairs passed almost inevitably into the hands of the active few and the professional politicians." Thus, leadership in unions had a tendency to become "remarkably stable and permanent." She pointed out further that men who retained office over long periods of time found it easy to create a machine, and that soon the steam roller appeared "at conventions and meetings, flattening out opposition, balking protest." The worst result was the effect the possession of power had on the labor leader:

In the first place, power affects the personal character of most men who acquire it. . . . The leader, separated from the mass, is urged by his own belief in himself to move still further from their control. In the second place, the appearance of long terms of office creates a real vested interest at the very heart of unionism Finally, the position of leadership in a union almost inevitably places the leaders in a totally different environment from that in which the rank and file move.²¹

The source of this early friction between labor and the intellectuals was the nature of their respective expectations from the labor movement, expectations which were altogether different. The intellectuals tended to look upon the labor movement as a means to a larger end -- to socialism or some other kind of social reconstruction. James Schlesinger summarizes the intellectual orientation by saying that it was intensely telescopic -- individual events were studied to reveal the direction in which history was moving. The direct consequences of a particular act were secondary; fundamentally events had to be considered in terms of their bearing on social progress. Thus, unions became vehicles for social advance; the changes they brought about in shop conditions were of lesser importance.²²

²¹Sylvia Kopald, Rebellion in Labor Unions (New York, 1924), pp. 1-49.

²²James Schlesinger, "Organized Labor and the Intellectuals," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXXVI (Winter, 1960), 40.

Put in another way, liberals and intellectuals were intent upon broad reforms, and thus championed the narrower cause of unionism because they thought that such action would serve to accomplish their wider aims, their grand vision of the national welfare and the good society.²³

This concept of the intellectual found scant support from the factory workman. Maurice Neufeld succinctly summarizes the position of the workman when he says that "unions have normally viewed their function in American life as less exalted and more limited than the destiny envisaged for them by liberals and intellectuals."²⁴ The workingman of necessity had to see the immediate impact of changes; unlike the intellectual, his perspective was short-run and microscopic. His notions of justice were job-oriented. His first concern was with better working conditions, better pay, shorter hours. In contrast to the intellectual, whose notion of social progress was movement toward some distant good society, the workingman's notion of social progress referred to concrete improvement of working conditions.²⁵

Granted these two disparate orientations, one is faced with a perplexing question: how is it that the two became so strongly allied under the Roosevelt Administration? Why, with the insights and compelling observations of some intellectuals into the labor movement, did liberals and intellectuals during the 1930's respond with such fervor to the cause of unions? How is it that labor allowed and encouraged intellectuals to work on its behalf? Did one adjust its views to accommodate the other?

²³Maurice Neufeld, "The Historical Relationship of Liberals and Intellectuals to Organized Labor in the United States," The Annals of the American Academy, COCL (November, 1963), 125.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵James Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 41.

To answer these questions, it must be understood that, for labor, the Twenties were trying times, a decade during which organizational movement had been in a steady decline. From its top point in 1920, when it included twelve per cent of the labor force, it shrank in strength, year by year, until in 1933 it had barely two million members -- less than six per cent of the American workers.²⁶ In the face of such bad fortune, the labor movement struggled to clarify its purposes.

Samuel Gompers, on his death in 1924, left his successors a clear-cut theory of labor organization. Implicit in his organizational theory were two doctrines: voluntarism and craft unionism.²⁷ Voluntarism was the doctrine that labor had nothing to gain from the intervention of the state. The belief by the A.F.of L.'s founder in voluntarism resulted in A.F.of L.'s avoiding politics, or engaging at most in a very minimal involvement in politics, with a determination toward achieving its gains through the economic strength of strike and boycott.²⁸ Because of the ethos in which it was formed, the A.F.of L. equated socialism with intellectuals, and both with governmentalism, and classified all three as subversive of labor's best interests. As late as 1930 the A.F.of L. was so fearful of becoming a "ward of the state" that it opposed unemployment insurance.²⁹

By 1933 the Depression had caused inroads on the old faith. Facing the need to survive, many union leaders began to take a second look at their long-held aversion to governmental aid. John L. Lewis was a

²⁶Harris, op. cit., p. 83.

²⁷Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1959), p. 405

²⁸Harris, op. cit., p. 80.

²⁹Ibid., p. 83.

typical victim of the felt necessities of the time. As head of the United Mine Workers, Lewis had watched his union drop from a peak membership of 500,000 in the early Twenties to 89,000 in 1932. Lewis had been a faithful Republican, and had even backed Hoover in 1932. In 1925 he had written and published a book, The Miners' Fight for American Standards, in which he insisted on the free play of natural economic laws. But the Depression eroded even his laissez-faire rejection of the state. Gradually he came to accept government, first as a regulator of the economy, then as a possible patron of labor.³⁰ When asked how he could justify his support of NRA, in light of the views he had expressed in his 1925 book, Lewis shrewdly parried with the statement that:

When natural economic law doesn't operate in hard times for the best interests of industry and the public, then perhaps the time comes for a bit of regulation. 31

As for the intellectuals, they had not learned their lessons from the early labor critics Hoxie and Kopald. Or perhaps it was, as Maurice Nuefeld suggests, that they had learned their lesson and the truths of the unions' defects, but "conveniently forgot them during the heady days of the first Roosevelt Administration."³² Thus, even if they had remembered their lesson, "the social and political climate of the period would have compelled them to reject clear-minded judgments."³³ To work on behalf of labor, James Schlesinger remarks of the early New Deal

³⁰ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., op. cit., p. 138.

³¹ Ibid., p. 418.

³² Nuefeld, op. cit., p. 122.

³³ Ibid.

period, was simply "the logic of the period."³⁴ "New ideas and new hopes were set free in America," writes Roosevelt historian Arthur Schlesinger, "these were years of awakening."³⁵ Thus, to the intellectual in the New Deal period, the old order seemed to be tottering, and to help in advancing labor organizations was proof in itself of social progress; he still thought in telescopic terms, still saw the labor movement as a means to a larger end. As was said about Woodrow Wilson, the intellectual community saw the laboring man, not as grubby, flesh-and-blood, corporeal man, but as Humanity.³⁶

Under such pretenses intellectuals joined hands with organized labor during the first part of the New Deal. It cannot be emphasized too much that this new alliance rested on a misreading of labor's goals by liberal intellectuals. The intellectual community during this period remained blind to the nature and purposes of those with whom they were allied. Intellectuals still viewed labor as an abstract force, whose destiny it was to serve some historical purpose. Labor organizations, on the other hand, were still militating for a bread and butter unionism, working from day to day, with no concern for "ultimate values," living up to Adolf Strasser's terse summary of the union's raison d'etre: "We are all practical men."³⁷

³⁴ James Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 38.

³⁵ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., op. cit., p. 385.

³⁶ William Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity (New York, 1964), p. 54. Herbert Harris depicted the stereotype which mesmerized many intellectuals as the "Adoration of the Worker":

It was visually based on drawings in the New Masses, which showed a larger-than-life-size wage earner, his eyes fixed on the far horizon. His martial jaw proclaimed a proletarian toughness armoring a heart that bled for all humanity. His muscular neck and bulging biceps suggested a spectacular virility. He was portrayed, in effect, as a combination of St. Augustine, Paul Bunyan, and a stud bull. (Harris, op. cit.,

³⁷ Hofstadter, op. cit., p. 284.

Two periods of the New Deal intellectual-labor alliance must be distinguished here. The first involved the struggle for the legal recognition of the right to organize, and dealt with the time period from 1933 to 1935. Important legislation for which labor agitated and solicited intellectual support included section 7a of the National Recovery Act, the National Labor Board, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Wagner Act.³⁸ The American Federation of Labor's leadership actively supported such legislation because it firmly established the legal right of labor to organize and to represent employees in collective bargaining.

The second period of the labor-intellectual relationship began in 1935 and involved the extension of union organization to the mass industries, and further extensions of recovery and relief policies. This period precipitated an ideological split within the labor movement itself. Under the leadership of Lewis, David Dubinsky, Sidney Hillman and others, a dissident faction, the Committee (later Congress) of Industrial Organization broke away from the A.F.of L.. This split centered around the issue of industrial (plant-wide and vertical) vs. craft (skill-narrow and horizontal) union structure.³⁹ The extension of union status to millions of workers in the mass industries was, of course, a proposal which struck directly at the most powerful A.F.of L. union heads, and ran contrary to the sacrosanct Gompers doctrine of craft-unionism as being basic to labor's organizational theory. Craft union leaders still subscribed to the creed Samuel Gompers and other founders of the Federation had given their present generation: "Upon the rock of trades autonomy, craft trades, you

³⁸For a discussion of the Wagner Act, see Appendix I.

³⁹For a well-rounded account of this dispute, see James MacGregor Burns, The Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956), pp. 209-226; Wm. E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York, 1963), pp. 109-111; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Coming of the New Deal (Boston, 1959), pp. 407-419.

shall build the church of the labor movement, and the gates of hell nor trade industrialism shall not prevail against it."⁴⁰ The stalwarts of the Federation sought to protect the sacred rights of the crafts. Many of the Federation's leaders were skilled workers and business unionists of northern European stock, concerned "only with the interests of their own membership, indifferent to ideology, contemptuous as good Irishmen of the late-coming Italians, Slavs, Negroes, and poor whites."⁴¹ Dan Tobin, head of the Teamsters, dismissed the factory workers as "rubbish." William Collins, the A.F.of L. representative in New York once confided that "My wife can always tell from the smell of my clothes what breed of foreigners I've been hanging out with."⁴²

But the cleavage also reflected profound differences about labor's role in politics, and government's role in labor affairs. Many A.F.of L. leaders, also reared in the voluntaristic tradition of Gompers, still looked on government with mistrust. John L. Lewis, however, was one labor leader who was quick to see the opportunity which was being extended to labor.⁴³ "With the guarantee of the 'right to organize' such industries may be unionized," Lewis wrote in regard to mass-production enterprises.

⁴⁰Leuchtenburg, FDR and the New Deal, p. 110.

⁴¹Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., op. cit., p. 411.

⁴²Leuchtenburg, op. cit., p. 109.

⁴³It is significant to note here, in regard to the different expectations which labor leaders and the intellectuals had of the labor movement, the orientation of John L. Lewis, the most influential labor leader of the time. Foster Rhea Dulles, in his book Labor in America writes of Lewis that:

he had no long range program or ultimate ideal, and from that point of view his policy conformed to the traditional opportunism of Samuel Gompers and the A.F.of L. rather than the reformist zeal of Terence V. Powderly and the Knights of Labor.

Labor in America (3d ed.; Binghamton, 1945), p. 291.

"The labor movement must organize and exert itself not only in the economic field but also in the political arena."⁴⁴

Three years earlier, before the ink was dry on the National Recovery Act, organizers for Lewis's United Mine Workers were storming through every coal camp proclaiming that President Roosevelt wanted unionization of the industry. Before the Roosevelt Administration was four months old, Lewis had run his lodge membership up to 500,000.⁴⁵ And just as he had used the name of Roosevelt to revive the dying UMW, Lewis now saw the President as his best bet to achieve CIO unionizing victories in mass-production fields.

Thus, in the first New Deal mentioned above, labor found many willing allies from the intellectual community. Indeed, in 1932, Roosevelt solicited intellectual advice and help for labor by tapping Raymond Moley to head a Brain Trust of college professors that would grapple with economic issues -- including the role of labor -- that had stumped the Hoover Administration and left it vulnerable in the midst of a depression. Young, intelligent lawyer-economist Leon Keyserling drafted provisions of the Wagner Act, labor's Magna Carta. But the real influx of liberal intellectuals came in the second period, as a result of the A.F. of L.-C.I.O. split. It was the new unionism of the C.I.O. which attracted the intellectuals, who pictured the members of the mass industries as possible agencies of reform. Indeed, industrial unionism, the issue upon which John Lewis rode to overlordship, had for some forty years been the slogan and cry of intellectual Socialists and Syndicalists.⁴⁶ The

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 313.

⁴⁵ _____, "John L. Lewis: His Labor Record," The American Mercury, XLI (June, 1937), 143.

⁴⁶Ibid.

A.F.of L., on the other hand, was seen by the intellectual community as representative of business unionism, devoid of idealistic vibrancy, unconcerned with ultimate goals, oligarchical in its tendencies.

From this point (1935) on, intellectual fervor for the labor movement rarely extended beyond their own exalted notions of the new unionism of the C.I.O. (almost to the exclusion, Maurice Nuefeld notes, of the A.F.of L.). Until this distinction is realized, it will be impossible to understand the disillusionment of the intellectual community in the later 1940's and 1950's, when it began to recognize how the two organizations, A.F.of L. and C.I.O. were coming to resemble each other in their institutional lives. It points up again the central fact of the entire labor-intellectual alliance: that these two components had expectations from the labor movement that were altogether different.

So it was that the C.I.O. determined to go beyond A.F.of L. "business unionism" and extend the social and economic reforms of President Roosevelt's first term,⁴⁷ and the intellectual community determined to aid in every way they could such a social advance. The C.I.O. had need for intellectuals to do many things: to write, speak, proselytize, plead in the courts, organize and administer as it worked to channel into orderly unionism hundreds of thousands of workers in automobiles, steel, meat-packing, and other mass-production industries.

The intellectuals responded with religious intensity. Either as paid C.I.O. staff members or as volunteers, they prepared pamphlets, composed songs, collected funds, and ran the mimeograph machines which turned out bulletins, instructions, and notices.⁴⁸ Volunteering for the picket

⁴⁷Dulles, p. 312: "It was natural that in this burst of political activity the C.I.O. should be far more aggressive than the A.F.of L.. The liberal and insurgent spirit characterizing its advocacy of industrial unionism was carried over to the promotion of social reform."

⁴⁸Harris, op. cit., p. 83.

lines, they would brave police, sheriff, and the mobsters hired by employers to smash strikes. And they talked -- "everywhere they talked," notes Herbert Harris, "at faculty teas and radio forums, at dinner parties and from loading platforms."⁴⁹

It is enough to summarize at this time by saying that the advancement of organized labor owed much to the intellectual community. Thanks to the efforts of many intellectuals labor found itself in 1936 on the threshold of a new era. Ironically, the estrangement which was to come was owing largely to the success which the intellectual community had put labor in a position to enjoy.

LABOR AND POLITICS IN THE NEW DEAL

Just as important as the support of the intellectual community was the indication in early 1936 that the C.I.O. was going to have the active support of the President. Raymond Moley, in his recently published book, The First New Deal, reveals that, with the illness and death of Louis Howe (Roosevelt's closest political confidant) in April, 1936, Roosevelt looked to Edward J. Flynn, the New York City Democratic party leader, for advice on political matters. According to Moley, Flynn told Roosevelt that voters were moving to the cities and that "We must attract them by radical programs of social and economic reform."⁵⁰ In addition, the rise of the Huey Long-type extremists

⁴⁹
Ibid.

⁵⁰ Donald Young, "Reminiscence of a Braintruster," Saturday Review (December 24, 1966), p. 58.

convinced Roosevelt that he would have to move left to blunt their appeal. As a result, FDR began attacking businessmen and pressing for legislation which was appealing to labor and other urban elements.⁵¹

Hence, to the politically sensitive Roosevelt, further labor legislation would have for its object the control of labor for a political purpose.⁵² If this mass of voting power could be made to coalesce and become group conscious, Roosevelt's 1936 re-election would be assured. In 1934 about two million workers were represented by craft unions and approximately another million by industrial unions. But, about thirty million wage and salary workers in the basic manufacturing and mining enterprises were available for and sorely needed the benefits of unionization.⁵³ If one could promote solidarity among this group, perhaps an enormous block of voters would become deliverable. It is small wonder, then, that Lewis and Hillman had the "wordless blessing" of the White House.⁵⁴ The Wagner Act obviously had not been enough to

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Roosevelt, of course, would have denied this. In a letter to one John Smith, Roosevelt laid down his thoughts on the rights of labor and the rights of management in labor disputes. Roosevelt concluded his letter with the following firm statement:

When this happened, it was, needless to say, impossible for me to remain silent. I could not lay myself open to the charge of playing politics or of cowardice in order to gain a political advantage.

Howard Zinn, New Deal Thought (New York, 1966), p. 220.

⁵³John L. Lewis, "The Next Four Years For Labor," New Republic, LXXXIX (December 23, 1936), 234.

⁵⁴Walter Davenport, "Mr. Roosevelt's Friend Sidney," Colliers, CXIV (July 29, 1944), 30.

win the unqualified support of labor leaders: one of the Act's principle beneficiaries, the A.F.of L., had been openly disavowing many aspects of New Deal legislation. President William Green of the A.F.of L. was publicly rapping the New Deal's recovery and relief policies.⁵⁵ The C.I.O., on the other hand, actually went to the left of the New Deal when it demanded heavier relief expenditures and larger recovery outlays than those Roosevelt had approved.

In discussing the later historical implications of the labor-Roosevelt Administration, one is confronted with the difficult question of who was using whom. It is often said that a coalition of labor and farm groups created the New Deal. But this thinking could be reversed, as James MacGregor Burns points out in his political biography of Roosevelt, The Lion and the Fox. It is no less true, Burns contends, that the New Deal helped create a new labor movement and a new farm movement in America, along with a dozen other immensely strengthened groups.⁵⁶

Magazine editorials at this time debated theories as to who was using whom. A 1937 editorial in the American Mercury indicted Roosevelt for playing mercenary politics by stimulating "group-consciousness." Labor's gains, the editorial suggested, were shrewdly calculated moves by the Administration for the intent of making labor beholden to it.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Although at this point (1936) Green still supported Roosevelt for re-election, his support was not as vocal as Roosevelt would have liked. By 1939 Green was publicly taking broadsides at Roosevelt measures: at a 1939 meeting of the A.F.of L. Executive Council, Green issued a statement which "sounded as if it might have been written by the National Association of Manufacturers." It deprecated "fear, lack of confidence, and distrust in business", deplored "various forms of public spending" and recoiled from the idea of maintaining "an army of unemployed as wards of the government." Kenneth Crawford, "A.F.of L. into G.O.P.," Nation, CXLVIII (March 11, 1939), 148.

⁵⁶ Burns, The Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956), p. 350.

⁵⁷ "The Rights of Labor," American Mercury, XL (April, 1937), 475.

A later article in that same magazine, however, suggested the opposite theory -- that Lewis had devised a strategy by which he planned to use Roosevelt in the struggle to gain supremacy over the A.F.of L.. The article mentioned the "singular influence over the President" which Lewis had, and his "experience with the early New Deal that the President could be bullied."⁵⁸

It would be most realistic to assume, of course, that both participants -- Lewis and Roosevelt -- were attracted to each other by self-interest: FDR by his concern for 1936 votes⁵⁹ and John L. Lewis by a giddy vision of sovereignty over the A.F.of L. There was no element of chance in Lewis's involvement, however.

⁵⁸ _____, "John L. Lewis: His Labor Record," The American Mercury, XLI (June, 1937), 144.

⁵⁹ Burns, however, would probably deny this; speaking of Roosevelt's earlier involvement in the handling of the Wagner Act, Burns contended that "the political implications of a vastly expanded labor movement solidly grounded in the millions of workers in the great mass-production industries seemed to have escaped him." (Burns, op. cit., p. 217) Such a naive apolitism by Franklin Roosevelt, one of America's most consummate politicians, seems a bit unbelievable.

There was one highly-respected member of the academic community who spotted almost immediately the rationale for such a paternalistic government policy. Walter Lippmann, writing in his July 1, 1937 Today and Tomorrow column of the New York Herald Tribune, commented:

The essential misconception of the New Deal labor policy lies in a failure to distinguish between agitation and government. The President and Senator Wagner have taken the wholly mistaken view that the power of government can be used to promote the organization and the solidarity of labor. They have, therefore, sponsored laws which invite the union organizer to proceed after promising him that the government will paralyze the employers who oppose him. The ostensible philosophy of the Wagner Act is an attempt to promote a forced growth of unionism in the hothouse of Federal power.

Reflecting further into the future to clarify some of the political implications of the labor policy of the New Deal, Lippmann noted that:

The social philosophy of the dominant New Dealers envisages a transformation of the Democratic party in which voting strength and political influence will lie in a combination of subsidized

John L. Lewis up to 1936 had been a faithful Republican. In 1932 he voted for Hoover, and in 1940 he would vote for Willkie. In 1936, however, he was faced with a crucial decision that was to alter his political allegiance. After walking out on the A.F. of L. and launching the C.I.O., Lewis confronted the crucial test of building another union to oppose the hundred or more internationals which still remained in the A.F. of L. Lewis realized how previous movements to establish dual unionism had dismally failed -- the Socialist Trades and Labor Alliance, the American Labor Union, the IWW, the Trade Union Unity League.⁶⁰ Obviously, if he was to have any hope of achieving any

farmers and organized industrial workers. They think of themselves as the leaders of a radical farmer-labor party. But in this country there is no labor for them to lead. And so, having sublime confidence in the power of government to do anything, they have set out to create a labor movement by the use of the power of government.

In order to do this they have had to sacrifice even the appearance of even-handed enforcement of the law. As a result, in the troubled communities particularly, but also throughout the land, they are producing the conviction that public authority is neither impartial nor strong. For when government repudiates its obligations to be impartial and abdicates its authority in the midst of lawlessness there is no legitimate standard to which the sober citizen of the community can repair. They are left to choose between the devil and the deep blue sea. . . . The remedy for this condition is to have the government affirm its obligation. . . . If there is a statesman-like instinct in this government the administration will promptly take decisive steps to stop the moral rot which is degenerating into class war. It will not only have to speak more plainly and fully, but it will have to recognize that the Wagner Act must be supplemented so that it ceases to be an instrument of one faction and becomes in truth what it professes to be, a charter of industrial peace in which all the rights of all concerned are safeguarded.

New York Herald Tribune, July 1, 1937.

⁶⁰American Mercury, XL, op. cit., p. 46.

permanent success, he would have to take a different approach than his rebel predecessors had, and it is a tribute to Lewis's realism that he realized the key to be the use of Roosevelt's name. But how could he bind Roosevelt by a tie of self-interest?

The opportunity was presented by the approaching 1936 campaign. If Lewis could show in the 1936 election that his support was of greater value to the President than that of the old A.F.of L., he could call on Roosevelt for backing in the post-election period. Lewis set about the delicate job of convincing the President that the C.I.O. was his most reliable labor backer. Early in May of 1936, Lewis, Sidney Hillman (head of the Amalgamated Clothiers Union) and Major George Berry (President of the powerful International Printing Pressmen and Assistants' Union since 1907) called on the President to tell him that they would back him to the limit in the 1936 campaign. They had formed a Non-Partisan League to work on his behalf, with a flat declaration that it was determined "to contribute to the complete unmasking of the offensives of the . . . organizations formed to defeat the President."⁶¹ "Labor had gained more under President Roosevelt," Lewis declared, "than under any president in memory. Obviously, it is the duty of labor to support Roosevelt 100 per cent in the next election."⁶²

Lewis went on to make it clear, however, that his support was not for past favors. When he produced \$770,000.00 for the Roosevelt campaign chest, he made no efforts to conceal the fact that he expected this huge offering to have a measurable return.⁶³ "Is anyone fool enough

⁶¹ _____, "Election Bloc," Literary Digest, CXXI (May 23, 1936), 35.

⁶² Dulles, op. cit., p. 314.

⁶³ At this point we face one of the most crucial developments in the evolution of the Democratic party; for these contributions from the C.I.O. marked a historic shift in the financial base of the Democratic

to think," he asked, "that we gave this money to Roosevelt because we were spellbound by his voice?"⁶⁴

As a matter of fact, Lewis' Non-Partisan League did give Roosevelt very effective support. According to the C.I.O. leaders, labor forces were directly responsible for turning old-time Republican strongholds Pennsylvania and Michigan into the Roosevelt fold, and were also responsible for swinging Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana for Roosevelt.

However, Roosevelt's mathematicians figured differently. They conceded that labor might have turned the tables in Ohio, Indiana, and Wyoming, but claimed that in the others -- including New York, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, the President would have won anyway. In any case, the election was not close, and the returns made Roosevelt feel independent of Lewis and labor. Still, shadowy rumors, founded upon the assumption that Roosevelt was in debt to organized labor, flitted around Washington.⁶⁵

The country was to wait a while before being assured that labor would not "run" the second Roosevelt Administration. At the turn of 1937 the C.I.O. launched its first major offensive -- a sit-down strike in the General Motors plant at Flint, Michigan. Lewis held a press conference at the opening of the strike and flatly declared that he expected the Administration to lend its aid now to labor.⁶⁶

Lewis's demands were not in good style. They were to Roosevelt arrogant insults, and the President resented them. Lewis's remarks

party; as business sources dried up the C.I.O.'s donation made the union the party's largest single benefactor. The ultimate result of this was to give labor the impression that the Democratic party was beholden to it. It is a problem to which we will return when we discuss the relationship of the Minneapolis Central Labor Union to the Hennepin County D.F.L. organization.

⁶⁴ Leuchtenburg, FDR and the New Deal, op. cit., p. 189.

⁶⁵ _____, "Labor," Newsweek, VIII (November 21, 1936), 9.

⁶⁶ _____, "Labor's Fight," Literary Digest, CXXIII (January, 1937), 9.

suggested that the C.I.O. and the Non-Partisan League had saved the New Deal and consequently that Roosevelt was under a direct obligation to pay off his political debt by subscribing fully to C.I.O. policy. Success had gone so much to Lewis's head that he appeared to think that the President should be at his beck and call.⁶⁷ It was the sort of statement that would later lead many intellectuals to second thoughts and disillusionment about the cause they were supporting. Many of the nation's press, never favorably disposed to labor anyway, turned a poison pen to Lewis's attitude. "The words of the head of the C.I.O.," wrote the Detroit Free Press, "have a grave significance, and they invite attention to a statement by the Senate Committee Investigating Campaign Expenditures that it is thinking of recommending a law to stop all political contributions."⁶⁸ "Such a crude appeal must be regarded as reflecting a mind either indifferent to or ignorant of the basic principles of democratic government," commented the Washington Post.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, the White House maintained a silence, which obviously was sympathetic to the strikers. Business interests were livid with anger at Roosevelt's hands-off policy, and the great majority of Democratic Senators and Congressmen "began to wonder whether John Lewis was about to foreclose the mortgage he held on the Democratic party."⁷⁰ Roosevelt, for his part, hoped that Lewis would recognize thenceforth

⁶⁷Dulles, op. cit., p. 320.

⁶⁸Literary Digest, CXXIII, op. cit., p. 9.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Raymond Moley, "Labor's Retreat from Politics," Newsweek, XI (April 18, 1938), 44.

the limits to labor's access to administrative influence. But Lewis pushed on with insatiable spirit, and in the important C.I.O. strike (the Little Steel strike) for recognition later that year, the President denied Lewis with the famous "a plague on both your houses" statement. Lewis was furious. "It ill behooves one who has supped at labor's table," he cryptically intoned, "to curse with equal fervor and fine impartiality both labor and its adversaries when they become locked in a deadly embrace."⁷¹

From that point on, there was bad blood between the two men.⁷² Although the alliance was restored in the 1938 elections, Lewis again felt let down when Roosevelt, after the election, refused to issue an executive order barring from government work contractors who had violated the Wagner Act.⁷² Roosevelt's attitude suggested Lewis remember that as President he was responsible to a whole people; Lewis suggested that Roosevelt had "sold out" the workers. Lewis further accused Roosevelt of hesitancy in enforcing the rights of unions to collective bargaining under the NRA, of lax administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act fixing minimum wages and maximum hours, and of failure to eliminate unemployment.⁷³

⁷¹Leuchtenburg, FDR and the New Deal, op. cit., p. 243.

⁷²I. F. Stone, "The Lewis-Willkie Pact," Nation, CLI (November 2, 1940), 413.

⁷³_____, "Mr. Lewis Shows His Spleen," New Republic, CIII (November 4, 1940), 615. Dulles suggests that there was another aspect to the growing rift between Roosevelt and Lewis. With the continuing triumphs of the C.I.O., and his own mounting fame,

John L. Lewis began to have political ambitions. Some time after the third term possibilities for Roosevelt had become a matter of widespread discussion, in late 1939 or early 1940, he went to the President with a proposal. "Mr. President, I have thought of all that and I have a suggestion for you to consider," Mrs. Perkins quotes Roosevelt, who in turn was quoting Lewis. "If the vice-presidential

In the meantime, there were more sit-down strikes, more violent tie-ups in steel, and the C.I.O. split with its parent A.F.of L. was widening. The A.F.of L. had made it known earlier, in 1937, that they were willing to talk peace with the C.I.O.. Charles Howard, head of the typographical union, and one of the most progressive, forceful labor leaders of the day, had then suggested to C.I.O. officials that the time had come for it to return to the A.F.of L. and to gain acceptance by the Federation of the industrial unions principle. But the C.I.O. was riding high in 1937 and so rejected Howard's advice.⁷⁴ Ironically, from late 1937 on, the C.I.O. began receding from its high-water mark, while the A.F.of L. began gaining immensely: by late 1939 it had passed its 1920 peak of 4,000,000 dues-paying members, and had enrolled twice as many as the C.I.O.'s book enrollment of 3,790,000.⁷⁵ The prospering A.F.of L. would not seek to appease C.I.O. leadership again.

candidate on your ticket should happen to be John L. Lewis, those objections would disappear. A strong labor man would insure the full support, not only of all the labor people, but of all the liberals who worry about such things as third terms."

It was a suggestion that did not appeal to the President. He let it slide. But there is another account of this incident, probably apocryphal. It has Lewis proposing to Roosevelt that as the "two most prominent men in the nation" they would make an invincible ticket, and the President blandly asking, "Which place will you take, John?"

Dulles, op. cit., pp. 320-321.

⁷⁴Herbert Harris, "Politics and the C.I.O.," Nation, CXLIX (November 18, 1939), 545.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 543. Cf. Dulles, op. cit., p. 297:

In the opinion of many observers, it was at this point that Lewis first dangerously overplayed his hand and lost what might have been the chance to control a united labor movement. For the C.I.O. membership had actually outstripped that of the AFL. At the close of 1937 it totaled some 3,700,000 as against

Under the circumstances, the Roosevelt Administration became acutely anxious to bring Lewis into the fold and achieve a semblance of unity between the A.F.of L. and the C.I.O.. As founder of the C.I.O. and as its indisputed head, Lewis was conceded to be the country's most important mass spokesman. Furthermore, since Roosevelt was looking toward a third-term candidacy in 1940, "any popular movement (for a third term) would have a distinctly papier-mache look until it was joined by Lewis."⁷⁶ And as the A.F.of L.-C.I.O. dispute was a most unpopular spectacle throughout the country, the Administration feared that the feelings of antagonism it aroused would be carried to the New Deal itself.⁷⁷

Most political observers felt at the time that the exigencies of the political situation would force a reconciliation upon Lewis and Roosevelt. It was not to be, however. At a United Mine Workers convention in January, he dramatically broke all former ties with the President. "Should the Democratic National Committee," he told his startled audience, "be coerced or dragooned into renominating him, I am convinced . . . that his candidacy would result in ignominious defeat."⁷⁸

its rival's 3,400,000, and whatever the terms of merger, the industrial unions would have dominated a reconstituted A.F.of L. But the growing power of the C.I.O. apparently convinced Lewis that he could win even greater victories without sharing responsibility, and he was stubbornly determined to go his own way. Not again would such a favorable opportunity present itself for restoring labor unity.

⁷⁶ _____, "Frankie and Johnny," New Republic, CII (February 5, 1940), 181.

⁷⁷Harris, "Politics and the C.I.O.," op. cit., p. 544.

⁷⁸Dulles, op. cit., p. 321.

The threat had its object, of course: to bring Roosevelt and the party around to a more militant, pro-labor stand.⁷⁹ Unfortunately the threat did not produce the desired results. Late in October, Lewis endorsed the Republican candidate for president, Wendell Willkie. To put teeth in this action, Lewis promised, if Roosevelt were elected, to accept the result as a vote of no confidence in himself and quit as C.I.O. president. His challenge to his C.I.O. members: "Sustain me now, or repudiate me." Before the election Lewis had his organizers storming through mining locations and plant factories passing out flyers which carried adjoining pictures of both he and Roosevelt, captioned in large letters with: WHO ARE YOU FOR?⁸⁰ The men and women of labor were not to have their political opinions made up for them by Lewis. It came out that, when it came to politics, the unionists were for Roosevelt. At election time the C.I.O. members deserted Lewis in droves.

The significance of this 1940 Roosevelt victory was that it indicated that Roosevelt had succeeded in consolidating his labor gains, and in burning a partisan Democratic faith into American labor. After the election Lewis did indeed resign as C.I.O. head, and three years later the C.I.O. organized a Political Action Committee, the declared purpose of which was to support President Roosevelt in a bid for a fourth term if he so chose to run.⁸¹ Time magazine commented at the time of the C.I.O.'s formation that "with \$5,000,000 and enough energy, the

⁷⁹ _____, "Lewis in a China Shop," Nation, CL (February 3, 1940), 116.

⁸⁰ Sam Stavisky, "Labor's Political Plans for 1954," Nation's Business, XLII (April, 1954), 25.

⁸¹ Sidney Hillman, "The Truth About the P.A.C.," New Republic, CXI (August 21, 1944) 209. Cf. Appendix II for summary of Hillman's statement.

C.I.O. hopes to rescue Franklin Roosevelt from his present necessary policy of appeasing conservative Southern Democrats and a balky Congress."⁸²

Hence it was that labor came to be normally Democratic, and that the Democratic party came to be regarded as "the friend of the workingman." Labor had indeed done well under the political leadership of Roosevelt. The Democratic party, on the other hand, had appealed for labor's backing, and had every reason to expect it. Roosevelt's Administration made a deliberate decision to grapple directly with the issues created by the Depression. It had shown a primary concern with getting people back to work, raising wages, and promoting union organization. "We will continue to protect the worker," the Democratic platform pledged, "and we will guard his rights, both as wage earner and consumer."⁸³ The working people everywhere knew that their really tough days had ended under the Wagner Act, the Anti-Injunction Act, the H.I.R.A. and other labor laws. They knew that they had won these gains under President Roosevelt and his New Deal.

Labor seemed willing to demonstrate its appreciation. In 1944, political observers agreed that most credit for returning Roosevelt and the Democrats to power was the C.I.O.'s Political Action Committee.⁸⁴ Against all the predictions of experts, the campaign provoked a phenomenal and unexpected increase in registration and voting. As late as October

⁸² _____, "\$5,000,000 for Term IV," Time, XLII (November 15, 1943), 18.

⁸³ Dulles, op. cit., p. 314.

⁸⁴ _____, "The Election," Time, XLIV (November 20, 1944), 20.

lth of that year the Gallup Poll had predicted that but 39,500,000 Americans would go to the polls.⁸⁵ The final total was almost 9,000,000 more.⁸⁶ In this huge increase P.A.C. activities had a definite and major share. The committees concentrated first on getting war workers and migrants in industrial centers registered, then on hauling them to the polls on election day while P.A.C.'s women minded the voters' babies at home.⁸⁷ Using the rationale that the chances of Roosevelt and other liberal candidates depended almost entirely on the size of the vote (assuming that if the masses of people got to the polls they would favor FDR and liberal candidates), I. F. Stone wrote that:

It is well to be honest with ourselves about the election just past. The P.A.C. is given credit for electing a President, and the credit is deserved. F.D.R. could have won in 1936 without labor but not in 1944. . . . The margin was not too comfortable, despite the Electoral College landslide. 88

"Without the new zeal and enthusiasm which the P.A.C. brought to this campaign," wrote Helen Fuller in the New Republic, "the Republican prayer for a small vote may well have been granted."⁸⁹ 1944 was the first sophisticated, thoroughly professional entry of labor into politics.⁹⁰

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Dan Golenpaul (ed.), Information, Please Almanac, 1964 (New York, 1963), p. 259.

⁸⁷ _____, "The Election," Time, XLIV (November 20, 1944), 20.

⁸⁸I. F. Stone, "The Future of the P.A.C.," Nation, CLIX (November 18, 1944), 607.

⁸⁹Helen Fuller, "The P.A.C. and the Future," New Republic, CXL (November 27, 1944), 690.

⁹⁰ _____, "Labor," Newsweek, XXIII (June 12, 1944), 30.

As Time magazine so aptly put it, labor's astounding success in the 1944 elections indeed marked the appearance on the American political scene of "a new force."⁹¹ The important question was: how much did labor learn from its debut into national politics?

INTELLECTUAL DISILLUSIONMENT

When Franklin Roosevelt died in 1945, labor was still busy counting the blessings which FDR's administration had put it in a position to enjoy. The defense program had increased the volume of employment and enhanced labor's bargaining power. Organized labor had come a long way from the bleak times of the Twenties and early Thirties, when its main struggle was for survival. After the war it continued to prosper and enjoy further growth.

But union heads credited all this success to themselves, and conveniently forgot how much the unions owed to the intellectuals in general, and in particular to the great wartime innovators in management-labor affairs. The union chieftains forgot that

it took a staff economist to prepare a presentation to justify a wage increase; a lawyer to argue the union cause before the labor relations boards and commissions and in the courts; the industrial engineer to figure out how the union could benefit from a new time study for production norms; the publicist to put together a speech or congressional testimony; the actuary to be familiar with the intricacies of pension funds. 92

Moreover, as the economic problems of the Depression and of postwar reconversion gave way to the national security problem as a result of

⁹¹ _____, "The New Force," Time, XLIV (July 24, 1944) 18.

⁹² Herbert Harris, "Why Labor Lost the Intellectuals," Harpers, CCXXVIII (June, 1964), 84. Among some of the great wartime innovators in management-labor affairs were the lawyer J. Warren Madden, chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, and its chief economist David J. Saposs; patent attorney William H. Davis, chairman of the War Labor Board, and his colleague Senator Wayne Morse, then dean of the Law School

the Soviet menace, the perspective of the intellectuals changed. The intellectuals became acutely aware that the trade unionists and trade union leaders "in many cases appeared indifferent to the problem of civil liberties."⁹³ The intellectual community also noted that the C.I.O. was coming more and more to resemble the A.F. of L. in its institutional life, and was concentrating on "business" or "market" unionism, intent on taking care of its own, and downgrading social or national interest unionism.⁹⁴ Furthermore, critical reports and articles began to appear as labor's intellectual friends "found that union 'democracy' was not always of the New England town meeting variety," and that the corruptions of commercialism were infecting unions.⁹⁵

Under such circumstances, intellectuals began examining with care the nature and purposes of organized labor. Under close examination, the mystique of the worker began to evaporate. The intellectuals discovered, Harris writes,

that the worker was pretty much like everybody else; that, indeed, the son of toil they had romanticized at a distance could be an anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, a white supremacist, a rancorous xenophobe; that his favorite reading was the sports page, comic books, and detective magazines, and that this diet did not endow him with a profound grasp of national and international issues. 96

Perhaps worst of all, notes James Schlesinger, was the intellectual community's discovery that, if anything, the workman was distinctly

at the University of Oregon; Professor George W. Taylor, the Edison of modern collective bargaining, who went on to become chairman of the Department of Industry at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania; and Clark Kerr, the West Coast director of the War Labor Board, who later became president of the University of California. (Ibid)

⁹³James Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 39.

⁹⁴Harris, op. cit., p. 83.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid.

anti-intellectual.⁹⁷ "Plainly," writes Schlesinger, "a new social order was unlikely to be introduced by those who spent their money on cars and television sets, who refused to buy books or to pay taxes for schools and libraries."⁹⁸

This process of intellectual disillusionment with organized labor was preceded by a public weariness over the growing militancy of labor. Signs of strain began to appear as early as 1937, when the massive General Motors sit-down strike had greatly aroused public opinion, and awoke fears and alarms that were not easily stilled. Gallup Poll reports at the time showed that an overwhelming majority of persons interviewed opposed the use of labor's new striking weapon (the sit-down), while seventy per cent of those questioned were convinced that new regulatory laws were needed to curb the unions.⁹⁹

After the election of 1940 the country in general swung more strongly behind the program of national defense. The greater production all along the economic front necessarily placed the activities of labor front and center before a nation nervous over the possibilities of American involvement in another world war. Under such conditions labor chose

⁹⁷Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 40.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Dulles, op. cit., p. 308. Cf. also earlier Lippmann quote:

In order to do this (create a labor movement) they (the Roosevelt Administration) have had to sacrifice even the appearance of even-handed enforcement of the law. . . . It (the Roosevelt Administration) will not only have to speak more plainly and fully, but it will have to recognize that the Wagner Act must be supplemented so that it ceases to be an instrument of one faction and becomes in truth which it professes to be, a charter of industrial peace in which all the rights of all concerned are safeguarded.

Mr. Justice Brandeis, in viewing the labor-management turmoil, had commented that the irresponsibility of labor unions "tended to make

to demand further extension of labor recognition and collective bargaining.

The growing needs of national defense, however, made the public impatient of labor's demands. Dulles writes that "an almost hysterical fear of the growing strength of the unions led a few companies not only to refuse wage demands but to try in every possible way to clip labor's wings."¹⁰⁰

Furthermore, labor's cause was not helped by its widespread internal squabbling of which the public was aware. Public confidence in the responsibility of organized labor was weakened by the many jurisdictional strikes and highly-publicized exposures of union racketeering and graft.

Then came 1941, a year which was to prove one of the most tumultuous in labor history. The number of labor disputes in 1941 was higher than in any other year except 1937. There was hardly an industry that escaped work stoppage. In all, there were 4,288 strikes involving over 2,000,000 workers -- almost twice the number of disputes and four times the number of workers as in the previous year, 1940.¹⁰¹

Late in 1941 labor became embroiled in a coal strike that so seriously interrupted production as to threaten the whole defense program. The major issue at stake was establishment of the union shop in the so-called "captive" coal mines operated by the steel industry.¹⁰² When

officers reckless, and thereby to alienate public sympathy and bring failure on their efforts."

It creates on the part of employers, also, a bitter antagonism, not so much on account of lawless acts as from a deep-rooted sense of injustice arising from the feeling that while the employer is subject to law, the union holds a position of legal irresponsibility.

Brandeis quoted in "The Rights of Labor," American Mercury, XL (April, 1937), 476.

¹⁰⁰Dulles, op. cit., p. 326.

¹⁰¹Ibid., p. 327.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 328.

the dispute came before the Defense Mediation Board, the Board refused to accept the union shop as the basis for a contract. In retaliation, Lewis ignored the board and called a strike in the captive coal mines that threatened to close down almost the entire steel industry.¹⁰³

The impression that the public received from Lewis's action was that he had selfishly decided to go his own way, in complete opposition to the needs of the country. The strike was called off shortly thereafter (Roosevelt gave in) but governmental authority had been brazenly flouted by labor. Lewis had arrogantly defied the authority of the President, and the country was angry. Dulles writes that the public's reaction to the coal strike was "a growing intensification of the anti-labor feeling that had been sweeping the country ever since the early strikes had broken out in defense industries."¹⁰⁴ Even the New Republic, long considered a friend of labor, showed a pronounced stiffening of its attitude toward A.F. of L. and C.I.O. leaders. "The union movement in this country is no longer an infant requiring protection," the magazine editorialized, pointing out that as a responsible adult labor had to be controlled "by the same social discipline which governs the rest of the community."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 330.

¹⁰⁵ _____, "Labor's Crisis," New Republic, CV (November 24, 1941), 685. The editorial had commented earlier that:

We are aware that employers often fail to grant justified demands, and that pressure must be brought on them to do so. . . . But we also firmly believe that in the present emergency, after all the resources of collective bargaining and mediation have been exhausted in any dispute, we must in our own interest refrain from exercising the right to strike . . . (p. 683)

Striking a prophetic note, the editorial went on to predict that:

. . . if they (labor) succeed, they will convict themselves in the eyes of all other American citizens of having exploited

From this point on, relations between labor and the intellectuals cooled noticeably. Late in 1941 John P. Troxell spoke before the American Economic Association on "Protecting Members' Rights Within the Union." In 1943, Joel Seidman's Union Rights and Union Duties appeared. In the book Seidman had documented evidence of dishonesty among unions, and this led him to accuse leaders in many unions of autocratic abuses of membership rights.¹⁰⁶

Later that year, a committee made up of distinguished liberals and intellectuals, the American Civil Liberties Union, published a study entitled Democracy in Trade Unions. The report expressed opposition to

legal restraints on unions beyond two measures guaranteeing, 1) that unions be open to all qualified workers without discrimination, and 2) that the democratic rights of members under union constitutions shall be protected.¹⁰⁷

These suggestions by the American Civil Liberties Union were paralleled by an experiment of leading liberals and intellectuals within

the national peril for their own advantage. Labor will not soon live down such a judgment; the memory will breed a bitterness too dangerous to be courted. (p. 684)

¹⁰⁶ Maurice Nuefeld, op. cit., p. 118.

¹⁰⁷ American Civil Liberties Union, Democracy in Trade Unions, (New York, 1943), p. 4. Members of the committee included such liberal intellectuals as Alfred M. Bingham, Paul Brissenden, Dorthy Dunbar Bromley, George S. Counts, Osmond K. Vraenkel, Walter Frank, Nathan Green, Arthur Garfield Hays, Karl L. Llewellyn, and Norman Thomas. Among those who supported the general aims of the recommendations were Mary R. Beard, Carl Becker, Jacob Billikopi, Morris Llewellyn Cooke, John A. Fitch, William G. Haber, Herbert Harris, Freda Kirchwey, William Draper Lewis, James Myers, Max Otto, Selig Perlman, Edward A. Ross, Monsignor John A. Ryan, Joel Seidman, I. L. Scharfman, Philip Taft, Ordway Tead, and William Allen White.

the labor movement. In 1945, J. B. S. Hardman launched the Inter-Union Institute for Labor and Democracy. In the first issue of its publication Labor and Nation the Institute explained its purpose as the encouragement of responsible self-criticism, "the fostering of candid and independent examination of the labor movement and its missions."¹⁰⁸ Six years later, Kermit Eby, who from 1943 to 1949 served in an important national office of the C.I.O., published "A Critical Look at Labor" in Labor and Nation. Eby opened his criticisms by noting that while unions in America stressed their democratic aspirations, no men more than union leaders lived so consistently in contradiction to those aspirations.¹⁰⁹ Eby had four criticisms of the American labor movement. His first concern was that its most obvious characteristics, i.e. its monolithic power struggles, its emphasis on loyalty, and its concept of the indispensable leader, were "antithetical to the best in democratic practices and procedures."¹¹⁰ In the second place, Eby noted, union leadership and bureaucracy were "often corrupted by the mores of the society it would reform . . . as time passes they (leaders) are seduced by the mode of life which is so seductive in the circle they copy."¹¹⁰ His third concern was with labor's lack of historical criticism, its "failure to tolerate self-criticism, defined as the ability and willingness to engage in critical analysis of its historical role."¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Harris, op. cit., p. 84.

¹⁰⁹ Kermit Eby, "A Critical Look at Labor," Labor and Nation, VII (Fall, 1941), 39.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

His final concern with the contemporary labor movement was that it had "lost the opportunity of giving leadership to the American people."¹¹²

In the same issue, Solomon Barkin, a former research director of C.I.O. Textile Workers, replied with an astonishing mixture of censure, directed at Eby's criticisms, and despair, at the lack of criticisms concerning the labor movement which Labor and Nation had received. The following comment is included because it is self-indicting testimony of labor's inability to tolerate self-criticism. "I cannot endure your disdain and use of strong moralistic words," wrote Barkin:

I doubt whether you could list even one handful of so-called national "monolithic" organizations by which I presume you mean a union controlled entirely by its central principal officer. . . . Where in the history of representative democracy can you find a more adequate system of relating the desires of the rank and file and the actions of leadership? 113

Outside these efforts of the Inter-Union Institute for Labor and Democracy, Wellington Roe published in 1948 a study of labor leaders

¹¹² Ibid., p. 41.

¹¹³ Solomon Barkin, "An Analytical Look at Labor," Labor and Nation, VII (Fall, 1941), 42. Despite Barkin's impatience with Eby's indictment, Eby repeated his charges the next year in an article called "Why Labor Leaders Are Lonely." (Antioch Review, XII, no. 2, Summer, 1952, 146-154) "Intellectually stultifying" is the way Eby described the environment surrounding the labor leader: "For there is nothing more seductive in all of life than the capture of a man by the power symbol he has become." (p. 147) "Lonely in the presence of their past, lonely as the symbol triumphs over the man (are labor leaders); in order to climb to the heights in union organization, men must have few doubts, and dare not to be introspective." (p. 148) "Perhaps the day will come when books and music and ideas for their own sake will be a part of the conversation of the men in power in the labor movement, but that time is far away." (p. 152) "Today the power structure of big unionism resembles that of the corporation. Orders in both worlds usually pass from the top down. Senior executives and top leaders support those below them more for their loyalty than for their competence." (p. 153)

entitled Juggernaut: American Labor in Action. Roe's book ended with this note of warning:

a first step toward a solution of the "labor problem" will be to free the union member from the dominance of his union leader. . . . This is in fact necessary if union leaders' control of the labor market is to be avoided. It is also imperative unless the Juggernaut which organized labor has become is permitted to crush the life not only from the trade unions themselves, but also from the democratic system whence they have come. ¹¹⁴

Two landmark studies of American labor leaders further widened the growing split between the intellectual community and organized labor. C. Wright Mills, in The New Men of Power noted in 1948 the limitations on the power of the labor intellectual. In a chapter titled "The Power and the Intellect" Mills pointed out that ever since Samuel Gompers "broke with his own socialist past and began the business-like trek from ideas to pure and simple unionism" labor leaders have shied away from the word "intellectual."¹¹⁵ That the intellectual had succeeded only in rare instances to raise the level of political awareness, Mills contended, was revealing of the character of labor leaders and of the unions and their membership.

Further studies indicated that the intellectual's role in the decision-making processes of labor organizations was declining. In 1956 Harold Wilensky made an effort systematically and comprehensively to explore the actual status of intellectual influence in labor organizations. Intellectuals in Labor Unions was identified by the author as a study of the relation of the "man of knowledge" to the "man of power." One of Wilensky's most significant findings was that the degree of influence exerted by the expert on trade union policies increased as

¹¹⁴ Wellington Roe, Juggernaut: American Labor in Action (New York, 1948), p. 362.

¹¹⁵ C. Wright Mills, The New Men of Power (New York, 1948), p. 281.

the question under consideration approached the periphery of trade-union interests.¹¹⁶ Wilensky included throughout the work actual responses he received in interviewing both labor leaders and intellectuals working for the unions. Typical of the labor leader's disenchantment with his college-bred colleague is this remark:

Here with these goddam statisticians and lawyers you can't say a goddam word that isn't proven. "You can't say that," the lawyer will tell you. Or (the economist) will say, "I can't support that." . . . Always wanting evidence. 117

The expert regarded his union boss with the same sort of contempt:

They (labor leaders) don't give a damn. They're philosophical relativists with no real belief in truth or in scientific objectivity; or at least they think the search for truth is too difficult, so they abandon it and excuse themselves from it by saying "Who's interested in the truth anyway --- management?" . . . Everything becomes a matter of partisan advantage. . . . All they want to do is build up the prejudices of the leader. . . .118

In the literal sense of the phrase, labor had begun to lose its minds.

The intellectual-labor alliance had not ended, however; it was simply entering a new phase.

When John L. Lewis gave \$500,000 of C.I.O. funds to Roosevelt's campaign in 1936, it was publicized as "the biggest slush-fund offering in history."¹¹⁹ Actually, it was a small contribution compared with the 1944 C.I.O. program which spent over \$3,000,000 for Roosevelt's

¹¹⁶ Harold Wilensky, Intellectuals in Labor Unions (Glencoe, 1956), p. 58.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 132.

¹¹⁹ _____, "Democrats and CIO-PAC," Life, XVII (July 31, 1944), 20.

re-election. It was that year, 1944, that labor assumed an indispensable role in Democratic politics. From a coattail-riding start with the 1933 Democratic party of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's it had gained party influence to a point where, eleven years later in 1944, it could help set party platform policy and express a preference in nominees for national offices. In the 1944 Democratic convention, labor's candidate for vice-president was Henry Wallace (and it had, in the words of the new C.I.O. boss Philip Murray, "no second choice.") But the C.I.O.-P.A.C.'s show of strength behind Wallace was so strong that the two established king-making elements of the party -- the Southern Bourbons¹²⁰ and the big-city bosses-- panicked and rallied behind the colorless Senator Truman.¹²¹ This struggle to re-nominate Wallace showed that the Political Action Committee was not well-enough established or skillful enough in politics to dominate the Democratic party when it was opposed by the other two forces (Southern conservatives and big-city machines) of the Democratic party. The traditional power structure was already beginning to change, however. With the increasing sophistication of labor's political involvement, the big-city bosses realized that their future as political leaders depended on their ability to win the favor of labor. In the

¹²⁰ _____, "C.I.O. Program in 1946 Elections: Localized Drives by C.I.O. Units," U. S. News And World Report, XX (April 26, 1946), 23:

. . . one reason why some Southern Democrats are so bitter. They see a growing industrialization of the South. And, with new industries, the union labor strength expands. Often this is CIO strength. And the PAC organizers are working hand in hand with the CIO organizers in the South. Slowly and gradually the hard crust of the old-line Southern Democrats is beginning to crumble. Several withdrew in 1940 in the face of changed conditions. A few more are withdrawing this time.

¹²¹ _____, Life, XVII (July 31, 1944), 20.

North, for example, the Political Action Committee became the organized expression of the opinions of rank-and-file voters upon whom the party machine depended for its victories.¹²²

The emergence of organized labor as a factor to be reckoned with in the future workings of the Democratic party was widely acknowledged. The full import of that development had hardly begun to be appreciated, however. Republicans and Southern conservatives were quickest to sense the awesome potential that lay in labor's participation in politics. In 1943, over President Roosevelt's veto, a coalition of anti-labor forces rammed through Congress the Smith-Connally Act, which barred union contributions to candidates for federal office during election campaigns. Four years later, the restrictions were tightened by the passage, over President Truman's veto, of the Taft-Hartley Act, which barred unions and management from making any "contribution or expenditure" in connection with federal elections or primaries to nominate candidates for federal offices.¹²³

After passage of Taft-Hartley, labor realized it had to get into politics to stay. Jack Kroll, who had succeeded Sidney Hillman as director of the C.I.O.'s Political Action Committee, testified in 1951 that:

It was the Taft-Hartley Act, against the background of previous legislative assaults on labor organizations, that made the trade union member, the secondary leadership of the trade union movement, and the more conservative old-line union officials conscious of the necessity for political action. 124

¹²² _____, "The Meaning of P.A.C.," New Republic, CXI (August 14, 1944), 174.

¹²³ _____, "A Test for Labor's Power," Business Week (March 3, 1956), 128.

¹²⁴ Jack Kroll, "Labor's Political Role," Annals of the American Academy, CCLXXIV (March, 1951), 118.

A New Republic editorial commented that the Taft-Hartley Act "was labor's final awakening. Because of its obvious evils, it produced among labor's factions a political unity never before attained."¹²⁵

From 1947 on, serious attempts to organize labor politically on a year-round, active basis began in earnest. Political observers of the time, who had been more than casually impressed by labor's formal entry into politics in 1944, marvelled at labor's new singleness of purpose. Claire Neikind, political reporter of the New Republic, observed of labor's increased political sophistication: "In 1944 the work was sporadic, superficial, resting on Roosevelt. The work now (1948) is mature, self-reliant; labor is digging in for a long seige."¹²⁶

With labor's increasing involvement in politics, the question that naturally arose was: to what extent could labor leaders influence their members? Thoughtful political observers were quick to point out that, like any other voter, the labor union member made up his mind on any number of grounds:

With children in school, they may have their vote swayed by a public education issue. As homeowners they may be interested primarily in taxes and mortgage rates. With relatives behind the Iron Curtain they may be most concerned about foreign policy. That they are union members with a stake in wages, hours and labor organization strength is only one of many interests to be taken into account. ¹²⁷

¹²⁵ _____, "Labor Begins to Roll," New Republic, CXIX (October 25, 1948), 10.

¹²⁶ Claire Neikind, "Ringling Doorbells with P.A.C.," New Republic, CXIX (October 25, 1948), 14.

¹²⁷ _____, "Less Talk, More Work," New Republic, CXIX (August 30, 1948), 12.

Labor leaders of the early Fifties conceded this restriction on their influence. But they were quick to point out that, for the most part, individual members of labor unions were generally agreed on the Democratic party as being the right party, and that labor leaders could therefore make an effective contribution to the Democratic party by seeing to it that union members registered and voted. Towards that end, the union's political techniques were not designed so much to change votes or sway votes as to raise the number of voters. Labor leaders realistically understood that it would require more than just recommendations to get people to vote for their candidates; it would take political education. Labor's political education program (more especially for the C.I.O. than the A.F.of L., but the same after the A.F.of L.-C.I.O. merger of 1955) consisted of five phases. The first stage was registration, an undertaking which labor's political activists took very seriously.¹²⁸ Jack Kroll, for many years the director of C.I.O.'s Political Action Committee, stressed the importance of registration: "An unregistered member anywhere is a political scab. He is as much of a danger to our organization as the man who crosses a picket line."¹²⁹

¹²⁸A good example of why labor expected registration to be its first and primary objective was this 1960 situation cited by A.F.of L.-C.I.O. president George Meaney:

In a group of high income precincts, 17,000 out of 18,400 adult citizens were registered and almost 16,000 of them voted in the 1960 elections.

In another group of precincts in the same city (Houston), populated mostly by trade-union families, there were twice as many adult citizens, but only about 11,000 were registered and a mere 8,622 went to the polls.

So 18,000 citizens outvoted 43,000 citizens, almost two-to-one. (_____, "Unions' Goal: Election Upset," Nation's Business, L (July, 1962), 67.

¹²⁹Sam Stavisky, "Labor's Political Plans for 1954," Nation's Business, XLIII (April, 1954), 26.

In order to encourage registration the union would do a number of things. It reminded members of the registration time and place, got their work schedule adjusted so that they could get time off to register, and would often transport them to the registration place. Some unions would even exempt their members from a month's dues if they would register; others would give prizes, or make registration a condition of union membership. Others would help members make out their income taxes so long as they would register to vote. A four-hour paid leave of absence from the job was used by some unions to encourage registration.¹³⁰

The second and third phases were really two aspects of one operation -- namely, collecting of information on issues, through a constant watch on legislative bills and procedures (both in the state and national legislatures), and a translation of them into simple terms that would have meaning to union members.¹³¹ The next step involved dissemination of this information, and of the voting records of congressmen and senators (on "scorecards" of "right" and "wrong" votes). This sort of political education was carried on the year round in union newspapers, in special union legislative conferences, in special classes of one and two-week summer courses conducted by unions on college campuses, and in the use of films.¹³²

The fourth stage in the increased political program of labor was the raising of finances. Labor's political money came from two sources: from voluntary contributions by union members for outright political

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² _____, "Is There A Labor Vote?" Christian Century, LXXIII (October 31, 1963), 1263.

action, and from union dues. The voluntary contributions could be used for direct political assistance (in the way of paying for radio and TV time, paid advertising, election literature, etc.) without violating the Taft-Hartley restrictions. The second source of labor political money, which was used mostly to finance the political activities of unions (registration costs, costs of distributing political issues, etc.) was from union dues.¹³³

The fifth, and culminating point in labor's political program was, naturally, getting out the vote. Labor's efforts in this respect were sometimes nothing short of spectacular. For instance, in 1956 in Milwaukee County alone a brigade of union volunteers went from house to house to distribute political information leaflets. On election day, in 27 cities, some 600 volunteers manned 360 telephones while another 2600 workers went from house to house.¹³⁴

The results of such dogged work by union-affiliated people resulted in thousands upon thousands of new registrations and potential Democratic voters. The labor vote came to be recognized as the vital mass in the Democratic party's efforts to achieve electoral success. Democratic party leaders suddenly were startled to realize that unions had something money could not buy -- statewide organization of manpower, precinct by precinct, and block by block, to get out the Democratic vote. Labor leaders realistically assayed their importance in the Democratic party's electoral efforts and began presenting Democratic leaders and congressmen with a price tag for their efforts.

¹³³ _____, "Labor's Political Machine Goes to Work," Nation's Business, XLIV (February, 1956), 72.

¹³⁴ _____, "Labor in the 1956 Campaign," Fortune, LIV (June, 1957), 231.

CONCLUSION

In this first section of the thesis three points have been emphasized: a) how the labor-intellectual alliance arose as a result of a misreading by intellectuals of the nature and purposes of labor unions; b) how, owing largely to part a), labor came to assume a place of prominence in the Democratic party; c) how, owing largely to part b), intellectuals became disillusioned upon learning the true nature and purposes of organized labor.

Intellectuals joined ranks with organized labor because they saw unions as a vehicle for social advance, as a first step toward accomplishing their grand vision of the national welfare and the good society. The workingman welcomed the aid of the intellectual because it helped effect concrete improvement of working conditions, which is all the workingman cared about. Due to the irreconcilable difference between these respective orientations, estrangement was inevitable.

It is also important to note in the first part of this thesis how the alliance limited itself almost entirely to C.I.O. unions as agencies of reform, and nearly excluded all unions of the A.F.of L..¹³⁵

There is a curious dialectic explaining the subsequent organized political activities of labor after the 1944 re-election of Roosevelt. The rub of the problem goes back to a question raised earlier. Just

¹³⁵There was one among the intellectual community who spotted very early the vain hope of expecting C.I.O. unionism to be any different than A.F.of L. unionism. In Labor Czars: A History of Labor Racketeering Harold Seidman (in 1938) prophesied:

Industrial unionism will not result in the immediate creation of the New Jerusalem. To overcome a tradition of half a century of labor racketeering in a few years is too much to demand from the C.I.O..

Quoted in Maurice Nuefeld, op. cit., p. 117.

as in the early New Deal people split over whether a coalition of labor and farm groups created the New Deal or whether the New Deal created a new labor movement and a new farm movement, so after the 1944 elections there must have lurked beneath the surface of every C.I.O.-P.A.C. official's mind the question: "Are we beholden to F.D.R. and the Democratic party for giving us our birthright, the franchise to organize and survive, or is FDR and the Democratic party beholden to us for saving their necks in the last election?"

There was solid logic to the question raised by labor. The \$770,000.00 C.I.O. contribution to Roosevelt's campaign chest in 1936 marked a historic shift in the financial base of the Democratic party. As business sources dried up the C.I.O.'s donation made the union the party's largest single benefactor.¹³⁶ The ultimate result of this was to give labor the impression that the Democratic party was 'beholden to it.

While organized labor was growing into a powerful political force, liberal intellectuals were recognizing that the C.I.O. was coming to resemble the A.F. of L. in its institutional life, by concentrating more

¹³⁶Louise Overacker writes of the defection of the business world as sources of political finances from the Democratic party:

In 1936 the Democratic National Committee lost much of the "big business" support which it had had in 1928, and even in 1932. Mr. Farley's statements that the New Deal had dried up many of the usual sources of the party's contributions cannot be dismissed as campaign "baloney" when one looks at the record. Bankers and brokers, whose donations made up twenty-four per cent of all that the Democratic party received in contributions of \$1,000 or more in 1932, contributed less than four per cent in 1936.

"Labor's Political Contributions," Political Science Quarterly, LIV (March, 1939), 56.

on business unionism and less on social reform for the good of all. The intellectual community began to re-examine its position in the labor-intellectual alliance. Not liking what they saw, many intellectuals decided to desert labor. Thus, with the defection of the intellectual community from the labor-intellectual alliance, a permanent tension between the two elements was established. The significant fact is that despite the disaffection each felt for the other, neither element, labor nor the intellectuals, decided to desert the Democratic party. Henceforth, any tensions that sprang up between the two would be resolved within the structure of the Democratic party. Hence, the statement: the labor-intellectual alliance had not ended; it was simply entering a new phase.

CHAPTER III

LIBERAL INTELLECTUALS AND ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE MINNESOTA DEMOCRATIC-FARMER-LABOR PARTY, 1944 -- 1962

In the first section of this paper it was pointed out that, despite their radically different orientations, liberal intellectuals and organized labor remained together in the Democratic party. The reason for the mutual forbearance lay in the exchange of help between intellectual candidates and party officers and the labor organizations, which had grown into powerful political forces in the late Forties.

This truth of the labor-intellectual political alliance bears substantial relevance to a discussion of the 1944-1962 development of the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor party. In regard to this fact, that organized labor and liberal intellectuals stayed together in the Democratic party because it was politically expedient for each to do so, it is important to point out that there probably could be no better description of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party in Minnesota than "union of expediency." That organized labor and liberal intellectuals in Minnesota were possessed of different political orientations is apparent in an historical review of their relationship. The years 1944-1962 in Minnesota are checkered with overt instances of how DFL labor and intellectual elements clashed over issues which manifest their different orientations. DFL forces twice joined forces with diverse elements from the entire Minneapolis community to urge charter reform, and DFL labor, in an attempt to preserve its own special interests, bitterly

opposed such a move. Labor also acted more as a special interest group than as representative of the entire community by consistent narrow consideration of the candidates it endorsed for local office.

After 1938 neither the Democratic party nor the Farmer-Labor party was able to make any political gain in Minnesota. After having enjoyed brief success as the state's majority party from 1931-1938, the Farmer-Labor party, riddled by incompetent leadership and weakened by Communist infiltration, succumbed to the Republicans and young, 31-year old Harold Stassen, in 1938. Stassen in that year amassed the largest majority ever received by a Minnesota Governor up to that time; he received equally impressive majorities in his successful bids for re-election in 1940 and 1942.¹ Then, in 1944, political necessity finally effected a fusion between the two political minorities in the state -- the Democratic party and the Farmer-Labor party.

Within ten years, the DFL was a phenomenal success. In the election of 1954, the party was successful in re-electing its founding father, Hubert H. Humphrey, to the U. S. Senate seat he had won in 1948, and in capturing five of the state's nine congressional seats. It also gained control of the state House of Representatives, and elected seven of its eight candidates for state office, including the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, and Secretary of State.² Yet, evident within this spectacularly successful coalition of Democratic-Farmer-Labor forces were many of the internal strains between labor and intellectuals exemplified earlier.

¹G. Theodore Mitau, Politics in Minnesota (Minneapolis, 1960), pp. 18-19.

²Laura Aurebach, A Short History of Minnesota's Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (Minneapolis, 1966), p. 54.

The party surely had more than its share of intellectuals. "It is, perhaps, no exaggeration," John Fenton wrote in his analysis of Minnesota politics, "to say that the professors ran the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party."³ Fenton's analysis is indeed an exaggeration, but it does successfully draw attention to the unusual professional backgrounds of many of the earliest and most influential DFL leaders. Many of the party leaders in the burgeoning DFL party of the 1940's were former college professors, such as Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (Macalaster College), Representative John Blatnik (Winona), Representative Eugene McCarthy (St. John's University, St. Thomas College), later Mayor of Minneapolis Arthur Naftalin (University of Minnesota). Indeed, even the state DFL administration which Orville Freeman (graduate, University of Minnesota Law School) brought in when elected governor in 1954 had a scholarly look. A 1955 Minneapolis Tribune article waggishly suggested that the new DFL regime be renamed the "Halls of Ivy."⁴ The Tribune gave the following summary on the advisors Freeman had surrounding him: Naftalin, who was appointed commissioner of administration; Mrs. Dorothy Jacobson, the governor's administrative assistant, had been an associate professor of political science at Macalaster College; George Selke, the governor's executive secretary, had been president of St. Cloud State Teacher's College, and a University of Minnesota faculty member; Walter Heller, Freeman's tax advisor, was a professor of economics at the University of Minnesota; Dr. Arthur Borak and Dr. Francis M. Boddy, who prepared the 1955-1957 budget, were both University of Minnesota professors. High on the list of campaign and political advisors were Dr.

³John Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York, 1966), p. 88.

⁴Minneapolis Tribune, January 3, 1955.

William Kubicek, professor of physical medicine at the University of Minnesota; Lloyd Short, chairman of the University of Minnesota's political science department, and William Andersen, another professor of political science at the University.

But if the intellectuals put up the candidates and the advisors, the labor movement insured electoral success by providing money and workers to the DFL causes. Testimony to that fact was in a letter from Democratic national committeeman Gerald W. Heaney (who was labelled the "quarterback" of the Freeman Administration brain trust⁵), to Mr. Charles Bannister, who at the time was president of the Duluth A.F. of L.-C.I.O.. Heaney's letter explained how the 8th Congressional District of Minnesota was able to maintain its position as the most Democratic district in the state of Minnesota. Labor's role (as outlined by Heaney) may be taken as a good indication of the extent to which the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party owed much of its electoral success to the efforts of organized labor. Heaney cited four reasons as causes for the party's success:

- 1) A high degree of cooperation between the AFL, the CIO, and the Railroad Brotherhood.
- 2) Activity on a year-round basis (e.g. policy of keeping the union membership informed of legislative activity during the session of the legislature).
- 3) Well-developed union activity (most importantly the work that the women did).
- 4) The effective work of the Duluth Labor World in educating the membership on a year-round basis.⁶

The union of expediency which Minnesota labor and intellectuals contracted between themselves was, therefore, eminently successful.

⁵Minneapolis Star, January 2, 1956.

⁶Correspondence of Gerald W. Heaney, National Democratic Committeeman from Minnesota, December 3, 1958. Cf. Appendix III for copy of letter.

Political success did not mean that the two were happy with each other. From the earliest time of the DFL merger there was dissension and a certain amount of bitterness between the two groups. The source of friction was, as noted earlier for the national Democratic party, the different attitudes and expectations which each element brought into politics.

Organized labor and the University of Minnesota-oriented DFLers found themselves at odds with each other from the time of their very first political success. When Hubert Humphrey was first elected mayor of Minneapolis, it was acknowledged that organized labor was a vital ingredient in his successful campaign.⁷ The former Macalaster professor immediately ran into a conflict with labor over the exercise of the one important authority he had as mayor, the appointment of the Minneapolis police chief.⁸ Even more significantly, the two elements of the young party opposed each other on the issue of city charter reform. As leader of the intellectual wing of the party, Humphrey campaigned hard for charter reform which would increase the power of the mayor.⁹ The reform plan was bitterly opposed by the city's labor leaders, who were happy working with the disorganized sort of government which the city charter allowed. The Central Labor Union of Minneapolis (an A.F. of L. affiliate) especially favored the old charter. The CLU's opposition to charter reform is easily understandable. The CLU was organized by crafts and had long been dominated by the building-trades unions; it thus cared little about national or state politics, but kept its political

⁷Michael Armine, This Is Humphrey (Garden City, 1960), p. 96.

⁸Ibid., p. 100.

⁹For Humphrey's argument on the need for charter reform, cf. Appendix IV.

attention on the city hall. As Samuel Lubell notes, the trade unions have always had a paramount interest in local politics:

(it is in) the city halls and party clubhouses of the land where building codes originate and deals can be made. Mayors and sheriffs and local machines have . . . been more important to its welfare than presidents, governors and national parties. The emphasis is not so much on policy as on what this man or that machine could do for a particular local in a particular town. ¹⁰

The Minneapolis Tribune editorialized about the CLU's long opposition to charter reform:

(The CLU) knows its way around the ancient maze of boards, commissions, divided responsibilities and diffused powers. It knows how and where to apply effective pressures and it has been particularly successful in applying them to the city council, where individual aldermen have found it more discreet to yield than to resist. ¹¹

Owing largely to the active opposition of labor, the intellectual-backed charter reform proposal was defeated when it came before the voters in 1948.

When Humphrey moved on to win the election to the United States Senate in 1948, his exit from the Minneapolis political scene was the occasion for another labor-intellectual fight. Humphrey resigned as mayor on December 1, 1948, to go to Washington. When he did so, the president of the Minneapolis city council, DFLer Eric Hoyer, moved up to serve as acting mayor until the next mayoralty election which would be held in June, 1949.

Eric Hoyer had come to the United States from Sweden at the age of seventeen. His formal schooling had ended with his completion of

¹⁰Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York, 1952), p. 198.

¹¹Minneapolis Tribune, April 22, 1960.

high school. In 1936 Hoyer, who had been a campaign worker for DFL Governor Floyd Olson, was appointed to the city council to fill the vacancy created by the retirement of the first-ward alderman.¹² By 1948 he had been elected president of the city council three successive terms, and as president at the time of Humphrey's resignation, stepped up to serve as acting mayor in December, 1948. As acting mayor of Minneapolis, and as a good DFLer who had served on the city council for thirteen years, Hoyer decided to file for a mayoralty term of his own that following spring. Though his candidacy received the endorsement of the Hennepin County C.I.O. and the Building Trades Council of the A.F.of L., DFLer Hoyer was opposed by his intellectual predecessor Humphrey, who chose instead to endorse the college-educated pastor of St. Mark's Lutheran Church in Minneapolis, John Simmons.¹³ Because he had the blessing of Humphrey, Simmons was able to push an endorsement for himself through the Hennepin County DFL organization, an endorsement to run against the incumbent DFL mayor. The young pastor also managed to get the endorsement of the Minneapolis CLU, largely through the efforts of those forces generally identified with Humphrey and the A.D.A.. However, a number of A.F.of L. unions broke from the CLU endorsement and endorsed Hoyer.

The outcome of this mayoralty race created a far-reaching political balance of power within the Minneapolis labor movement and the Minneapolis DFL. Because Hoyer won and Simmons lost the labor faction identified with Humphrey was weakened. During the campaign the Hoyer supporters claimed that the "Humphrey-ADA machine" was behind Simmons and was trying to "take over the labor movement as a political tool."¹⁴

¹² Minneapolis Tribune, June 12, 1949.

¹³ Minneapolis Tribune, June 1, 1949.

¹⁴ Minneapolis Tribune, June 9, 1949.

As an intra-party showdown, the 1949 Hoyer-Simons fight was significant as early establishing labor's dominance of Minneapolis DFL politics. Recognizing that fact, Humphrey met with Minneapolis labor leaders after the election and mapped out a program under which the state DFL organization would endorse candidates for statewide office and the Minneapolis Central Labor Union would be granted the prerogative of endorsing liberal candidates for Minneapolis mayor, school board, and city council positions, and Hennepin county legislative posts.¹⁵

The situation worked tolerably well the first year or two. In 1951, however, the style with which labor exercised its endorsement prerogative was sharply criticized and challenged by one of the leading DFL intellectual spokesman, Donald Fraser, prominent member of the Second Ward (in which the University of Minnesota is located) DFL Club. Fraser, acting as the spokesman for a committee which called itself the Citizens Slate for an Independent School Board, charged that the candidacies of the labor-backed Better School Board Committee represented an attempt by a "small group of school employees to hang onto labor's coattails and gain control of the school board."¹⁶ In the school board primary campaign the four members of the Citizens Slate for an Independent School Board issued this joint statement:

The main issue in this school board election campaign is whether Minneapolis or the leadership of the teachers' federations and janitors' unions through their hand-picked candidates will control the Minneapolis public schools.

It is well known that these two unions have openly boasted that they would gain control of the school board. ¹⁷

¹⁵Minneapolis Tribune, December 12, 1958.

¹⁶Minneapolis Star, May 31, 1951.

¹⁷Minneapolis Tribune, May 11, 1951.

This 1951 intellectual criticism of labor's use of endorsements was matched the next year by labor charges of "palace guard" directed at the small group of "intellectual" DFL leaders that had virtually dictated the party's statewide course for six years. This group included Freeman, University of Minnesota political science professor Arthur Naftalin, Macalaster College professor Mrs. Dorothy Jacobson, Donald Fraser (University of Minnesota Law School graduate), Gerald W. Heaney (University of Minnesota Law School graduate), who at the time was serving as party treasurer, and Karl Rolvaag, state party chairman and an honors graduate of St. Olaf College. The Minneapolis Star reported that "mutiny" was brewing in the DFL ranks because "this leadership was running the party without regard for the rank and filers who supply the sinews of the organization."¹⁸ The same criticisms of Freeman's political entourage as resembling a "classroom administration" were made following his election as governor in 1954.¹⁹

In 1955 another young second ward liberal intellectual, Kent Youngdahl, blew the top off Minneapolis labor's political teapot. For over forty years, since 1912, the Minneapolis Central Labor Union had required all those receiving labor's endorsement to sign a generally worded pledge to "support the program and platform formulated by the labor movement on city, county, state, and national issues."²⁰ The candidate receiving labor endorsement agreed to forfeit that endorsement if he failed to meet the state obligations. In 1955 the eight-man liberal

¹⁸Minneapolis Star, December 6, 1952.

¹⁹Minneapolis Tribune, January 3, 1955.

²⁰Minneapolis Tribune, January 6, 1956.

majority of the thirteen-man Minneapolis city council split 5-3 over the appointment of W. Glen Wallace as the CLU's recommendation for executive secretary of a long-range capital improvements committee. It was then that Walter Cramond, CLU president, devised a way to "re-unite the majority."²¹ He drew up a more binding pledge which candidates hoping for labor support were required to sign. Not only did the signers have to agree to support labor-formulated programs and platforms, but they pledged themselves "to abide by unit rule on all matters of organization or on basic labor issues."²² They also had to promise to let the screening committee censor all their campaign literature.

The new "unit rule" forced all liberal signers of the pledge to vote as a unit. Of the eight liberal aldermen on the 1955 Minneapolis City Council seven signed the pledge. If a majority of four decided to vote one way, the other three would have to follow suit. The four, in short, could control the seven, and the seven, because they constituted a majority of the council, could control final council policy.²³ Four liberal aldermen could thus conceivably dictate to the other nine.

This CLU "loyalty pledge" was brought to the eight liberal aldermen. Seven of the eight signed it; the eighth, Kent B. Youngdahl, DFLer from the University of Minnesota-oriented 2nd Ward, refused to sign it. He was thrown out of the liberal caucus for his independent thinking.

Public notice of the pledge and of Youngdahl's position as "a man without a caucus" conjured up a cloud of problems for DFL labor leaders.

²¹Ibid.

²²Minneapolis Tribune, December 31, 1955.

²³Minneapolis Star, December 31, 1955.

Youngdahl became swamped with letters and phone calls which praised his independence.²⁴ The CLU was bitterly castigated in the metropolitan press and in public and private discussions. Within two days the Central Labor Union made a quick retreat from that section of the pledge which forced liberals on the council to vote as a unit on "basic labor issues." The revised pledge still required its signers to vote as a unit on matters of organization.²⁵

Though the pledge was modified, the ambition of CLU labor bosses to control Minneapolis local government remained the same. Six months later, while still in control of the city council, the CLU dangerously overplayed its hand by dictating appointive policy to the council. In June of 1956 a vacancy was created on the Minneapolis school board, a vacancy which had to be filled by the city council. Two candidates emerged to fill the vacancy -- Dr. Reuben K. Youngdahl and a linoleum tile layer named Frank Persons. The qualifications of the two candidates contrasted so strongly as to make comparison ludicrous. Dr. Youngdahl, who at the time was pastor of Mount Olivet Lutheran Church in Minneapolis, was the holder of three degrees of higher education: a B. A. and D. D. from Gustavus Adolphus College and a B. D. from Augustana Theological Seminary. He had served as chairman on the Mayor's Council of Human Relations from 1946-1949; was vice-chairman of the Count Bernadotte Foundation; had received the Distinguished Service Award for the outstanding young man in Minneapolis in 1945; was chosen as one of the 100 Living Great in Minnesota in 1959; was one of eleven nationally elected

²⁴Minneapolis Tribune, January 16, 1956.

²⁵Minneapolis Tribune, December 31, 1955.

for a study tour of Israel in 1949; and was President of the Minnesota Citizens Mental Health Committee.²⁶ As a Minneapolis labor leader was to admit later of Youngdahl: "His name was synonymous with good things in our community."²⁷

By contrast, Dr. Youngdahl's opposition for the appointment, Frank Persons, had an educational background which totaled a two-year course in telegraphy at Minneapolis Vocational High School. He had worked for an upholstery firm, had switched to linoleum laying, and spent two years as a carpenter in Alaska. His civic leadership experience was comprised of membership in the Linoleum and Tile Layers Union, and membership in the Central Labor Union.²⁸

Yet, because he enjoyed the support of Walter Cramond, CLU president, Persons was appointed to fill the vacancy. Not only did the CLU-controlled liberal members of the council rebuke the highly-respected Reverend Youngdahl, but it was careless about the means it used to appoint Persons. At a special meeting called for the purpose of filling the vacancy, the liberals moved for a five-minute recess, and at that time caucused with three Central Labor Union representatives (Cramond, David Roe of the Minneapolis Building Trades Council, and Clyde Peterson, business agent for the School Board Janitor-Engineers, Local 63). Coming out of the caucus, Cramond walked over to Persons and said: "Don't worry, Frank; you'll get seven votes on the first ballot."²⁹ No qualifications of the candidates were discussed at any time. Ballots were simply cast and counted, and Persons was elected.

²⁶Minneapolis Tribune, July 27, 1956.

²⁷Minneapolis Tribune, June 19, 1957.

²⁸Minneapolis Tribune, July 27, 1956.

²⁹Ibid.

The rejection of Youngdahl and election of Cramond's henchman Persons was a grave error which would rise to haunt the CLU leadership one year later. The election of Persons brought to five the number of CLU-endorsed candidates on the seven-member school board. CLU endorsed officials also included eight of the thirteen city council members, and the mayor, Eric Hoyer.

The Central Labor Union by 1956 did indeed have an airtight control over Minneapolis city government. But the blatant, rule-or-ruin attitude it brazenly displayed by refusing to recognize Dr. Youngdahl's competence and qualifications alienated many people, including many members of organized labor in Minneapolis. The bad publicity following the Persons appointment³⁰ pointed up the fact that the CLU was not willing to put forward outstanding candidates but instead wanted people it could control.³¹ Intellectuals especially were incensed by the Persons appointment. Of the eight liberal aldermen, only one, Kent Youngdahl from the University of Minnesota-oriented 2nd Ward, voted against Persons.

But if labor was abusing its endorsement prerogative as it was granted under the 1949 Humphrey-CLU agreement, the intellectuals in 1956 were also guilty of pushing too far their privilege under that agreement. Late in 1955 an experienced political team of Governor Freeman's -- comprised of national committeeman Gerald Heaney, former

³⁰From the intellectuals' point of view, Persons did not make an auspicious start on his new job when he said, after his appointment, that he would try to incorporate some of his knowledge of the building trades field into his work on the school board. Some intellectuals had hoped at least for a broad statement in support of education. Minneapolis Star, June 12, 1956.

³¹Minneapolis Tribune, June 19, 1957.

Macalaster College professor Mrs. Dorothy Jacobson, Dr. William Kubicek of the University of Minnesota Physical Rehabilitation department, St. Olaf graduate Karl Rolvaag and Macalaster College graduate Thomas Hughes -- mapped out and managed a full-blown endorsement by the state DFL central committee of Adlai Stevenson for the 1956 presidential nomination. Stevenson was, of course, for many years the darling of intellectuals throughout the United States. After this endorsement was masterminded by the Freeman team of intellectuals a chorus of complaints arose from rank and filers, including many labor people, throughout the state that they were being "bossed."³²

In the March 20, 1956, presidential primary election, rank and filers overturned this intellectual endorsement of Stevenson by giving Estes Kefauver majorities in seven of the state's nine congressional districts.

Minneapolis voters effectively demonstrated their suspicion of the CLU's political activities in the 1957 city elections. Sensing the groundswell that had mushroomed following the bad publicity on the Youngdahl school board rejection one year earlier, the CLU put pressure on Mayor Eric Hoyer, who had received the CLU endorsement since 1951. Because Hoyer enjoyed a broad base of popular support in city elections, the CLU pressured him into endorsing the CLU-sponsored school candidates in political advertisements. It surprised many people that Hoyer, who had with justifiable pride always pointed out that his strength in city elections extended beyond the labor wards, would throw the weight of his office and personal endorsement behind the CLU-sponsored school candidates and against the three independent candidates who were supported by a wide cross-section of the city's liberals, independents, and conservatives. Confusion was compounded when word got to the metropolitan

³²Minneapolis Star, January 2, 1956.

press that the mayor said he had not authorized the advertisements.³³
 Upon being questioned by a Minneapolis Tribune reporter on whether or not he had authorized the advertisement, the mayor replied that while he had not "personally authorized" the advertisement, he was endorsing the CLU-sponsored slate in the election. He said that "someone" in his group might well have authorized the placing of the advertisements.³⁴

It was quite a spectacle -- the mayor of Minneapolis admitting that he did not personally authorize an advertisement in which he personally endorsed the CLU-supported slate. Minneapolis Tribune editors mused on the unusual circumstances thusly:

The question might properly be raised as to whether the mayor is making his own decisions on other matters or whether "someone" in his group is making the decisions for him, too. ³⁵

The CLU had grown mighty indeed -- so much so that it could take the mayor's name, without his personal authorization, and attach it as an endorsement for its school board candidates. But in growing into a politically powerful force, it had been careless about its style. As was once said about the CIO-PAC in the early Forties, it made too much noise, issued too many threats about what it was going to do to its enemies, and stirred up too much opposition from other groups of voters.³⁶ The CLU had too often overlooked the basic character and ability of the people it had endorsed for local office. Between the

³³ Minneapolis Tribune, June 8, 1957.

³⁴ Minneapolis Tribune, June 4, 1957.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ _____, U.S. News and World Report, XL (February 24, 1956), 124.

city elections of 1955 and 1957, it had brazenly demonstrated its domination of the Minneapolis City Council by forcing it to fill three successive school board vacancies with hand-picked CLU candidates.³⁷

The overall effect of this long-apparent CLU bossism was a crushing defeat in the 1957 Minneapolis city elections: veteran ten-year incumbent (and CLU-endorsed) mayor Eric Hoyer was put into political retirement by P. Kenneth Peterson. The entire CLU school board slate was swept out of office, and three CLU-endorsed candidates for the city council were soundly defeated. By contrast, Kent Yourgdahl, the second ward liberal who had refused to sign the "unit rule" pledge of the CLU in 1955 and who had rebelled against Cramond's dictation of Frank Persons as the man to be appointed to the 1956 school board vacancy, was elected by the largest majority that any alderman had received in the previous quarter century in his ward.³⁸

The CLU had, needless to say, lost a good deal of political support in the community. Mrs. Margaret Thornburgh, director of women's activity in the western part of the United States for the A.F. of L.-C.I.O.'s COPE (Committee on Political Education) called the 1957 Minneapolis city elections "the first major defeat for COPE west of the Mississippi River in a long, long time."³⁹

More significantly, murmurings of discontent came from the ranks of DFL intellectuals. From Duluth, national committeeman Gerald Heaney studied the implications of the disastrous DFL-labor defeat in the Minneapolis elections and began talking of "spreading around responsibility for Minneapolis municipal elections, rather than leaving it in

³⁷ Minneapolis Star, June 2, 1960.

³⁸ Minneapolis Tribune, June 19, 1957.

³⁹ Minneapolis Tribune, June 13, 1957.

the hands of labor alone" as had been agreed in the 1949 Humphrey-CLU peace talk.⁴⁰ The feeling became popular among DFL leaders that it was the heavy hand of the CLU that cost liberals mayoralty and school board seats in the June elections, and that the time had arrived to shake off CLU domination of DFL political affairs in Minneapolis.

By November of 1957 the dilemma had become public knowledge. Minneapolis Tribune political reporter John McDonald briefly summarized the problem as this:

How can the DFL regain party influence over "liberal" affairs in the county, and particularly in Minneapolis, which it has abdicated to the Central Labor Union? 41

By April of 1958 the long-smoldering DFL party discontent with the Central Labor Union's monopoly on the candidate-endorsing function in Minneapolis came to a head. It was then that efforts were made to realize Heaney's June, 1957 suggestion -- allowing the DFL Hennepin County committee, rather than the CLU, to set up a procedure of interviewing and endorsing candidates for public office prior to municipal elections.⁴² In an obvious movement to curb CLU political power, the Hennepin County DFL leadership voted to take the candidate-interviewing and endorsing into its hands.⁴³ The Hennepin County DFL leaders further asserted their independence of the CLU by defeating a Cramond-created slate of candidates for county officers and delegates at large to the state DFL convention.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Minneapolis Tribune, June 30, 1957.

⁴¹ Minneapolis Tribune, November 17, 1957.

⁴² Minneapolis Tribune, April 6, 1958.

⁴³ Minneapolis Tribune, April 20, 1958.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

That summer, for the first time in a decade, the Hennepin County DFL endorsed a slate of candidates for legislative and county offices. The result of this DFL decision was that both the DFL and the CLU went about the endorsing business separately.

The DFL decision to bypass the 1949 agreement by endorsing its own slate of legislative candidates and issuing its own sample ballot was debated later that December by Donald Fraser (by then a state senator, and long an intellectual thorn in the CLU's side) and Walter Cramond. (The debate took place, appropriately enough, before the 2nd Ward DFL Club) Cramond recalled the arrangement as it had been mapped out in 1949: the state DFL would endorse statewide candidates and the CLU would endorse for the various posts in Hennepin county and the city of Minneapolis. Fraser contended that the DFL had a responsibility to act as it did in the 1958 elections by endorsing candidates in Hennepin county. The state senator argued that the DFL had been running downhill in Hennepin county because of the endorsement tactics of labor, until the party reversed that trend by accepting the responsibility to endorse.⁴⁵ Fraser further indicated that the DFL was considering endorsing candidates in the 1959 municipal elections.

So it was that in 1959 the DFL encroached further on the CLU endorsement prerogative, and usurped that body's right to endorse candidates for Minneapolis municipal elections. The CLU in 1959 endorsed Frank Adams for mayor. Adams was a CLU-endorsed Minneapolis school board member, a county veterans service officer, and a delegate to the CLU from the City and County Employees Union.⁴⁶ DFL intellectual leaders

⁴⁵ Minneapolis Tribune, December 12, 1958.

⁴⁶ Minneapolis Tribune, February 12, 1959.

dismissed Adams as a candidate and split between Gerald Dillon and Kent Youngdahl as their preferences. The CLU and the DFL eventually agreed upon Dillon as a compromise between Youngdahl and Adams. Dillon lost to incumbent P. Kenneth Peterson in the general election.⁴⁷

One year later, the CLU's antagonism to the DFL, which to this point had been expressed mainly in relationship to the Hennepin County DFL organization, spread to the state leadership when it was discovered that Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy had voted for passage of the strict-labor-control Landrum Griffin Bill. The CLU was especially bitter in its criticism of Humphrey. A CLU assembly voted 72-2 to "commend" a Cramond statement which ordered Senator Humphrey to come out and say that he was sorry he had voted for the law.⁴⁸ When Humphrey came home after voting on the bill, the CLU boycotted a Hennepin County DFL fund-raising party for Humphrey and a DFL fund-raising dinner in St. Paul.⁴⁹ When the A.F. of L.-C.I.O. Minnesota Federation of Labor issued a favorable report on the two Minnesota senators after listening to their explanations as to why they had voted for the labor laws, the CLU refused to accept the statement. Feelings ran so strongly that the CLU held a meeting of its COPE political arm and listened to University of Minnesota political science professor Mulford Q. Sibley explain

⁴⁷Also interesting was the proposed contest between University of Minnesota professor Arnold Rose (who was the 2nd Ward chairman, and had won the endorsement from a steering committee headed by Donald Fraser) and Gene Larson, favorite of the Minneapolis Central Labor Union, who had been pushed into the race by Cramond "in order to give Rose and the intellectuals a race in the April 1st primary." Minneapolis Star, February 12, 1959.

⁴⁸Minneapolis Tribune, October 9, 1959.

⁴⁹Minneapolis Tribune, November 3, 1959.

how a third party functioned. The third party concept was exciting to COPE delegates; they voted unanimously to hold another meeting to explore the possibilities of political action outside the DFL.⁵⁰

The year 1960 was to find the leaders of the Minneapolis Central Labor Union at last on the winning side of an issue, for charter reform once again came before the Minneapolis voters in that year. The ideas of the 1960 charter amendment were almost identical to those which Hubert Humphrey proposed (and the CLU helped defeat) in 1948: more concentration of administrative power in the mayor and legislative power in the council; more centralization of responsibility and the ending of wide diffusion of authority. Once again, owing largely to the efforts of the CLU, the charter reform plan fell far short of receiving the necessary 55% majority to make it law. The consequence of the deeply bitter fight served to renew the division between the labor DFLers and the intellectual elements of the party. On the side of charter reform were such highly-respected intellectual DFLers as Governor Orville Freeman, Donald Fraser, State Senator Jack Davies (University of Minnesota Law School graduate), State Representative Mrs. Sally Luther, and Kent Youngdahl, who helped to draft the amendment.⁵¹

The reaction of the CLU to the intellectual element's support was a typically strong one. It drafted a resolution which accused "certain DFL leaders" of showing "poor judgment" in supporting the amendment. The resolution went on to warn that in the future it would deny endorsement to any political office seeker who supported the charter-reform type of amendment. It further requested the municipal building commission

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Minneapolis Tribune, June 11, 1960.

to deny the Minneapolis Star and Tribune the office space ordinarily reserved for reporters covering city and county affairs.⁵²

Hopes of mending the widening DFL-labor schism in Minneapolis were dealt a severe blow early in 1961 when a new contest broke out between the Minneapolis labor leaders and the intellectuals in the DFL party. The new fight arose over the 1961 DFL endorsement for mayor. Cramond and other CLU labor leaders supported David Roe for the nomination. There was no question that Roe's major interest and affiliation was with the labor movement, which he served as the business representative of the Building and Construction Trades Council.⁵³ Naftalin, a political native of the intellectually-oriented 2nd Ward DFL Club, had served as secretary to Mayor Hubert Humphrey in 1945, had been a political science professor at the University of Minnesota, and had served as state commissioner of administration under Freeman during the years of the latter's governorship, 1955-1960.⁵⁴

The old forces began to re-align themselves in the new struggle. Cramond vociferously supported and spearheaded the Roe campaign. Naftalin was supported by Senator Humphrey.⁵⁵ CLU officials complained that a "self-appointed hierarchy of the DFL believes that labor is unfit to hold high political office."⁵⁶ DFL intellectuals argued that, as usual, labor had revealed itself to be not so much interested in electing a uniquely qualified candidate as in simply controlling a candidate of its own.⁵⁷

⁵² Minneapolis Tribune, June 11, 1961. Cf. Appendix V for pledge.

⁵³ Minneapolis Tribune, February 22, 1961.

⁵⁴ Minneapolis Tribune, January 26, 1961.

⁵⁵ Minneapolis Star, August 14, 1961.

⁵⁶ Minneapolis Tribune, February 26, 1961.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

The spring DFL city convention ended in stalemate, with neither Naftalin or Roe able to win convention endorsement before the primary.

Then, a little over one month before the May primary, a political bombshell was dropped on the Minneapolis political scene. A hearing was ordered by the national A.F. of L.-C.I.O. on charges against the Minneapolis Central Labor Union of improper accounting practices and "failure to maintain high standards."⁵⁸ The orders from George Meany were viewed by labor leaders in Minneapolis as a move to oust Walter Cramond as CLU president. In the background of the hearing later that week (but not brought up in testimony) were charges and counter charges that the proceedings has been inspired by Cramond foes in the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party -- most obviously Humphrey. It was well known that Humphrey exerted an influence over Meany that few senators did. The Minnesota senator's enmity toward Cramond had also long been a matter of common knowledge. For well over a decade Cramond had been one of the most vocal opponents of the DFL party hierarchy. Under his controversial leadership the CLU had maintained a separate political organization which functioned independently of and in competition with the DFL. Cramond had led the personal attack against Humphrey after the senator had voted for the Landrum-Griffin Act, had led labor opposition to the 1960 charter reform amendment, and at the time of the hearing was directing the campaign for David Roe against Humphrey's personal choice for the office, Naftalin.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Minneapolis Star, March 16, 1961.

⁵⁹ In a sworn disposition later filed in Hennepin County District Court, Cramond said he was told by a national labor leader to "get Senator Humphrey off your back and your troubles are over. . . ." In a February 11, 1962 Minneapolis Tribune article Cramond told of a conversation he had in Miami, Florida with Maurice Hutcheson, president of the International Brotherhood of Carpenters of which Cramond was a member. Hutcheson had ordered an investigation of the charges against Cramond and had concluded that "there was nothing in the record

AFL-CIO spokesmen denied that there was a political reason for removing Cramond. The formal charges were that the CLU used "dedicated" funds for payment of current expenses, and that the CLU had lost effectiveness under Cramond.⁶⁰ But AFL-CIO unhappiness with the CLU's political record could be implicated in this "lost effectiveness" charge. An article in the Minneapolis Tribune almost one year later reported that "the inability of the CLU to elect more than three endorsed candidates to the 13-man Minneapolis city council last spring was the final burr in the AFL-CIO saddle."⁶¹

While Cramond and the CLU awaited judgment from the AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington, Naftalin defeated Roe in the early May primary. CLU partisans were so bitter after the primary that a CLU committee was formed to ruin Naftalin's chances for victory, with either a write-in vote for Roe or a shift of votes to Republican Mayor P. Kenneth Peterson in the general election. Perceptive Minneapolis Tribune reporters wrote that the "anti-Naftalin move was seen by some observers as a major struggle between labor and the so-called intellectual elements for party control."⁶²

Naftalin eventually won the mayoralty race and Cramond was ousted as CLU president; the DFL labor-intellectual struggle was about to enter a new phase.

to indicate that there was any reason for my removal." "He said aside from that," Cramond went on, " 'Walter, get Senator Humphrey off your back and your troubles are over.' "

Concerning Humphrey's role -- interestingly enough, the man put in to run the CLU under trusteeship -- P. G. McCartney, from Detroit, Michigan -- had been assigned to a Minnesota role once before; in 1947 and 1948, to assist in the running of Hubert Humphrey's campaign for the U.S. Senate.

⁶⁰ Minneapolis Star, August 14, 1961.

⁶¹ Minneapolis Tribune, February 11, 1962.

⁶² Minneapolis Tribune, May 5, 1961.

By 1962 the split in Minneapolis DFL politics had become an old one, and had crystallized into two rather clearly outlined geographical sectors. On the one side was much of organized labor and much of the party organization in the north and northeast sector. On the other side were the party leaders from the south-southeast areas, the intellectuals and University of Minnesota-oriented activists.

It is significant to note that all the intra-party feuds to this point have involved the party's endorsement procedure in the Minneapolis-Hennepin County area.

After 1959 and more especially after 1961 the Minnesota DFL labor-intellectual alliance entered a new phase. Whereas to this point the CLU antagonism had been expressed mainly in relation to the Hennepin county DFL organization, after 1959 and again more intensely after 1961 this antagonism spread to the state leadership.

The issue in dispute will still be that of party endorsement; but after 1961 it will be labor which usurps the endorsement prerogative of the "intellectuals," just as the intellectuals had encroached on labor's endorsement prerogative after the 1957 Minneapolis city elections.

CHAPTER IV

ROLVAAG VS. KEITH, 1966: SURFACING OF THE LABOR-INTELLECTUAL TENSIONS ON A STATEWIDE LEVEL

KARL ROLVAAG'S RELATIONSHIP TO LABOR AND THE INTELLECTUALS¹

A discussion of Karl Rolvaag's background will be instructive to figuring out his place in the DFL party structure.

Rolvaag is, first of all, steeped in Scandinavian background, a positive political point in Minnesota regardless of political party affiliation. As Abe Altowitz wrote in the Minneapolis Star on March 23, 1963:

Rolvaag's roots are deep in the history of Minnesota and his Norwegian ancestry. His middle name, Fritjof, is drawn from a Norwegian saga of that title. The meaning of the word itself is "peacemaker." The vaag in Rolvaag is Norwegian for bay or inlet. ²

Labor would find it easy to identify with Karl Rolvaag, who had to leave college in 1931 when the Depression came and death took his father. At that time, Rolvaag packed a sack and travelled West, and spent the next six years earning a hand-to-mouth existence as a logger, a miner, and a rancher in Idaho and Washington. He knew the tough and sweaty school of hard physical labor. He knew what it was like to be

¹"Intellectuals" as the term has been used throughout the first two sections of this thesis frequently happen also to be officers in the DFL party hierarchy, and hence will be referred to, alternatively, as either "intellectuals" or "party people."

²Minneapolis Star, March 23, 1963.

dog-tired from physical labor. He knew, too, the firsthand personal hardship of war, just as many of the labor movement did, for he served in World War II as a Captain and commander of a light tank platoon in Patton's Third Army. For his courage and gallantry in action, he was awarded a Silver Star. For wounds received in combat he was awarded the Purple Heart.

He had, furthermore, none of the glitter and superficiality which labor people have come to associate with intellectuals. He was blunt and straightforward in his approach, and labor people liked that. Abe Altowitz mentioned in the article cited above that

He couldn't qualify as an "overwhelming extrovert."
The directness of his reactions have more than once worked to his disadvantage.

Some admirers feel he speaks out harshly too often in situations where tactfulness and a "soft answer" might better have served. ³

Although Rolvaag never did make an especially good appearance on the mass media, notes Ronald Stinnet in his book Recount, Rolvaag excelled in personal meetings and conversations with individuals.⁴ And, as David Roe, president of the Minnesota A.F.L.-C.I.O. testified in a personal interview, Rolvaag

talked our (labor's) language. . . he was a plain guy. He was just our kind of guy. It's hard to explain. . . . you gotta have somebody who appeals to the common people, and Rolvaag does. ⁵

Robert Forsythe, Republican state chairman, had a telling description of Rolvaag:

³Ibid.

⁴ Ronald Stinnet and Charles Backstrom, Recount (Washington D.C., 1964) p. 8.

⁵ Interview with David Roe, president of the Minnesota A.F.L.-C.I.O., November 16, 1966.

I'd say Karl Rolvaag is a dogged and ploddy type. He came up through party ranks. He hasn't become known as a leader or one who commands cross-section loyalties from citizen groups. ⁶

What Forsythe criticizes to be dogged and ploddy are cherished in the labor movement as perseverance and ruggedness.

On the other hand, Rolvaag had a rather distinguished educational background. His father was the late Ole E. Rolvaag, professor of Norwegian Literature at St. Olaf College, who wrote the classic novel about the Midwest rugged pioneers, Giants in the Earth. Rolvaag himself returned to St. Olaf after his wanders in the West, and graduated from there in 1941 with honors. After the war, Rolvaag, always an avid advocate of education, spent a year doing graduate study in Oslo, Norway.

He did not give the appearance that some would like, however. He had neither the eloquence of a Hubert Humphrey nor the force of an Orville Freeman, two figures whom DFL intellectuals revered. He was never glib or sophisticated or "smart."

Thus, in such a polarized party structure described in the past two sections, Karl Rolvaag represented a real anomaly. The impression received through interviews of different sources on the question of which camp Rolvaag started out from — labor's or the intellectuals' — was that Rolvaag for a long time did not clearly bear the label of belonging to either the labor or the intellectual wing, but shared some of the advantages and disadvantages of being identified with each. Hence, with regard to the two elements of the party, Karl Rolvaag for all intents and purposed may be classified up to 1961 as neither fish

⁶ Minneapolis Star, March 23, 1963. Interestingly enough, Rolvaag and Forsythe were roommates and close friends at St. Olaf; Forsythe is also rumored to have been Rolvaag's campaign manager when the latter ran for Congress in 1946.

nor fowl, mainly because labor and the intellectuals never really had any occasion to cross swords over Karl Rolvaag and his position and future in the party.

In 1946, the DFL party asked Rolvaag to run for Congress in the First Congressional District, normally a strong Republican area. Rolvaag did, and lost. Two years later he tried it again, and lost again. In 1950 he became chairman of the state DFL party.

Early in the 1950's, therefore (Rolvaag was state chairman from 1950 to 1954), Rolvaag, by virtue of his college background and by virtue of his chair in the decision-making councils of the party, was suspect by the labor union leaders. Owing to his very taciturn nature, however, Rolvaag was never entirely accepted by the select, sophisticated "palace guard." Rolvaag's early position in the jungle of the DFL coalition, therefore, was reminiscent of the quip about the successful politician: in Washington, everyone thought he was a big man in New York; in New York, everyone assumed that he was a big man in Washington.

It is a fact of political life, that just as a candidate for high elective office must have a wide public appeal and acceptance, so he can afford to offend as few people as possible. In discussing Rolvaag's place in the DFL of the 1950's, this second quality -- offending as few party people as possible -- seemed to be his outstanding advantage. Indeed, Rolvaag's 1954 nomination for Lieutenant Governor involved no consideration of a "unity gesture," no response to a demand to round out the state ticket with equal labor and intellectual representation. At the time of the nomination no one considered either the Lieutenant Governor nomination or Karl Rolvaag very significant. Rolvaag was given

the nod for the spot mainly because the ballot had to be filled out. The man who chaired the 1954 DFL Endorsements Committee which recommended Rolvaag's name to the state convention delegates gave this account of the situation:

We had to fill the ticket with the party chairman --- Rolvaag --- just like Forsythe (Republican state chairman in 1966) had to run against Mondale in 1966. As party chairman, Rolvaag just kind of fell into it. He was the only candidate we could get. 7

In fact, positive proof exists that Rolvaag had the support of both elements of the DFL --- the labor people and the palace guard. Later, after the convention, when the endorsed DFL slate was threatened by primary competition, both elements of the DFL rallied to Rolvaag's support. A month after the DFL convention, State Representative Leonard A. Johnson, the administrative assistant to the Minneapolis City Council, filed for Lieutenant Governor as a DFler. Later that week in July, in a letter to Walter Mondale, then campaign manager for Orville Freeman, Gerald W. Heaney, one of the closest political confidants of Freeman, suggested that Mondale approach the CLU about endorsing Rolvaag:

. . . with respect to the Lieutenant-Governorship position, I think it would be a good idea if a request were made to the Minneapolis Central Labor Union to review the questions as to whether or not they were going to endorse Rolvaag. It would be an extremely good thing, if on Tuesday . . . Steve Nehotte as Hennepin County chairman could make public the fact that he was going to make this request. 8

Rolvaag later received the endorsement of the CLU and went on to win the Lieutenant-Governorship position by 54,000 votes.

In 1956 Rolvaag was able to emerge unscathed from the Stevenson-Kefauver party split, in which the DFL state central committee unanimously

⁷ Interviews with confidential sources.

⁸ Correspondence of Gerald W. Heaney, 1954 DFL finance director, July 19, 1954. Steve Nehotte was a prominent Minneapolis labor leader.

endorsed Stevenson, but found their endorsement overturned in the spring presidential primary. The rank and file voters that year preferred Kefauver in seven of the nine Congressional Districts.

In 1958 Rolvaag made some gains on each side of the DFL fence because of his role in the DFL disagreement about the endorsement for United States Senator. Thinking that the DFL and Freeman were reaching a peak of popularity in 1958, party leaders considered the question of opposition for Republican Senator Edward Thye a crucial one. The farmer's bitterness toward the national administration's farm policy had become plain in Minnesota. Just across the border in Wisconsin rural bitterness was dramatized when Democrat William Proxmire swept rural Wisconsin counties which had never before gone Democratic, en route to an upset victory for the U.S. Senate.⁹ The implication to Minnesota DFLers were clear: if they could tie the Benson Albatross around Thye's neck they could snatch the second Minnesota senate seat from the Republicans. Ranking DFLers began running furiously for the DFL nomination.

By informal understanding among the top leaders of the party, it was felt that John Blatnik, Eugene McCarthy, Rolvaag, and Mrs. Eugenie Andersen¹⁰ should have the opportunity to run, in that order.

⁹Minneapolis Star, October 29, 1957.

¹⁰Blatnik was dean of the Minnesota DFL congressional delegation, first elected to Congress from N.E. Minnesota's 8th District in 1946, two years before Humphrey's successful senatorial campaign; McCarthy had been the DFL 4th District Congressman since 1948; Mrs. Andersen, from Red Wing, Minnesota, was America's first woman ambassador, appointed by President Harry Truman to Denmark in 1949.

Blatnik's withdrawal from the race had interesting historical repercussions. In 1964, when Hubert Humphrey was elected vice-president, Minnesota had a United States Senate job available, a job that Rolvaag, as Governor, had to fill. Rolvaag chose Walter F. Mondale for the appointment, and so incurred the bitter wrath of Blatnik who, as dean of the

After giving considerable thought to the senate candidacy, Blatnik chose to withdraw from consideration. Although McCarthy was next in line, Rolvaag was very strong with party members throughout the state, and the consensus seemed to be that, if he, Rolvaag, so chose to fight it out for the endorsement on the convention floor, he could win.

Rolvaag even earlier than 1958 was seen as the strongest potential DFL candidate to run against Thye. Andrew Henjurn of the Winsted Journal reported on the political gossip at the June, 1957, Jefferson-Jackson dinner which indicated that Rolvaag was "the top favorite to run against Senator Edward Thye next year."¹¹ In September of 1957 Rolvaag was written up in the Minneapolis Tribune as:

The two-term lieutenant-governor, a loyal party man . . . Rolvaag is the favorite of many party leaders. They feel he has grown immensely as the No. 2 man in state officialdom, has become a top-grade speaker and would be a formidable candidate. ¹²

Early in 1958, when McCarthy had made up his mind to be a candidate for the DFL endorsement, Minneapolis Tribune political reporter John McDonald observed that McCarthy's candidacy did not mean that "all loyalist aspirants will roll over and play dead." McDonald elaborated that:

Minnesota Congressional delegation, thought he was entitled to the appointment. There was some consensus in the party, however, that Blatnik had had his shot at a Senate seat in 1958, and as he chose to withdraw, removed himself from further consideration as a Senate candidate.

Orville Freeman, as the in-residence titular head of the party, was not considered available for the senatorial nomination through his own choosing. Freeman cited three reasons why he would not be a candidate: 1) because he had "an extremely high regard" for the other DFL potential candidates, and felt that any of them could defeat Thye. 2) Because he felt that the conservative group in the GOP had taken over the party and planned an attack at the next session of the state legislature against some of his education and welfare programs. 3) Because he felt that the GOP would make an effort at the next legislature to put through a sales tax. Duluth Herald Tribune, Monday May 19, 1958.

¹¹Minneapolis Tribune, June 19, 1957.

¹²Minneapolis Tribune, September 29, 1957.

Supporters of Lt. Gov. Karl Rolvaag will tell you, and with considerable validity, we suspect, that their man has a sounder base of delegate strength than McCarthy has.

DFL party workers haven't forgotten that the quiet, hard-working Lieutenant Governor has a record of having hewed wood and carried water in the party interest over many years. 13

In the interests of party harmony, though, Rolvaag gallantly deferred to seniority and left the field to McCarthy and Mrs. Andersen. His withdrawal from the race was a definite boost for McCarthy. As outlined by then-National Committeeman Gerald Heaney in a 1958 letter to Hubert Humphrey, Rolvaag's withdrawal from the race helped McCarthy's candidacy in the following respects:

- a) the labor movement solidified almost unanimously behind McCarthy. Before Rolvaag withdrew, many of the labor leaders were strongly supporting him. Those leaders swung almost all over to McCarthy.
 - b) Roy Weir (labor leader and DFL Congressman from the 3rd District from 1948-1960) began doing a considerable amount of work for McCarthy after Rolvaag withdrew, "with obvious effects."
 - c) Coya Knutson (the first DFL Congresswoman elected, in 1954 from the 9th District), after Rolvaag's withdrawal, alerted her people in the 9th District to support McCarthy, "with the result that Gene didn't stand to receive only a small percentage of the vote in the 9th and now he will receive approximately 50% of it or probably more."
 - d) Most of Rolvaag's strength in the 6th and 7th Districts went over to McCarthy.
- 3) Because of Rolvaag's withdrawal, Bill Kubicek and Walter Mondale (important party figures who had influence on many DFL people, and who were supporting Rolvaag) switched to McCarthy. 14

Rolvaag won many more friendships within the party through his mature, responsible and selfless action of 1958. The general feeling

¹³Minneapolis Tribune, January 26, 1958.

¹⁴Correspondence of Gerald W. Heaney, 1958 Democratic National Committeeman from Minnesota, May 7, 1958.

at that time was that, of all the persons in the party, he was the best qualified to be the DFL candidate for governor when Freeman decided to step down. Heaney remarked to Rolvaag in an historic letter:

I do not know of anyone else in the party who has the same wide-spread support that you have and who is as well acquainted with state issues and problems as you are. . . if you decide to stay in the race (for the DFL senatorial nomination), and whether you win or lose in the convention, you can be assured that it will make absolutely no difference in my feelings for you, and that if you want my support for Governor in the future, you will have it. 15

Thus, the upshot of Rolvaag's 1958 political decision was that it consolidated strong party admiration for him from both wings of the party. Because his action was dictated out of respect for seniority and loyalty, he retained the respect of organized labor, which values the principles of seniority and loyalty; because he deferred to McCarthy, the beau ideal of many of the DFL intellectuals, he won the admiration of the liberal intellectual segment of the party.¹⁶

Rolvaag won re-election as Lieutenant Governor in 1958 by 179,870 votes, and by 151,441 votes in 1960. In the latter year Orville Freeman lost the governorship by 22,879 votes. A crucial factor in his defeat was his inability to pull down the normal heavy-DFL majority from the heavily-unionized Iron Range. Rolvaag's labor support from the Range approached that which he had pulled down in the 1958 election.

When shortly after the 1960 presidential elections Freeman accepted President-elect Kennedy's invitation to be Secretary of Agriculture,

¹⁵Correspondence of Gerald W. Heaney, 1958 Democratic National Committeeman from Minnesota, April 24, 1958.

¹⁶Significant in terms of 1966 was the support that Rolvaag earned from McCarthy and Heaney.

Rolvaag quite naturally saw himself as heir apparent to the DFL gubernatorial nomination, and dutifully began soliciting support throughout the state for the nomination that would be made in 1962. It would seem that up through autumn of 1961 Rolvaag continued to enjoy the support of both DFL elements, organized labor and the intellectuals. In September, 1961, the occasion for labor and intellectuals to cross swords over Karl Rolvaag finally came.

Meanwhile, a second personality, Walter F. Mondale, had entered the intra-party drama. By this time, at the age of 33, Walter "Fritz" Mondale was a veteran of 13 years of managing important DFL campaigns. In 1948, as a sophomore at Macalaster College, Mondale was the 2nd Congressional District campaign manager for the DFL's first senate aspirant, Hubert H. Humphrey. One year later, as a junior at Macalaster, Mondale was chosen to be the national executive secretary of the Students for Democratic Action. He had spent the previous year as state chairman of the SFDA, and in his newly appointed job left school and went to Washington to assist in coordinating a national student's organization.¹⁷ In 1950, Mondale was the state campaign chairman for Orville Freeman, who had been endorsed by the DFL for attorney-general. Freeman lost that election, but in 1952 was nominated by the DFL for governor. Mondale handled that campaign also, and Freeman was again defeated. In 1954 Mondale repeated his state management of Freeman's gubernatorial campaign, and was finally rewarded with electoral success.

By 1956 Mondale had graduated from the University of Minnesota Law School. While he was a senior in the Law School, he served as a clerk to Associate Justice Thomas F. Gallagher of the State Supreme Court.¹⁸

¹⁷Minneapolis Tribune, January 23, 1949.

¹⁸Minneapolis Star, May 4, 1960.

Upon leaving the University, Mondale joined the firm of Loevinger, Lindquist, Freeman and Fraser in Minneapolis. Later that same year he served as a DFL field man, to seek out and encourage liberal legislative candidates in the conservative-dominated first and second congressional districts.¹⁹ He also served as Freeman's 1956 campaign manager in the latter's bid for re-election. Two years later State DFL Chairman Ray Hemenway named Mondale state finance director. Once more, Mondale was manager of Freeman's re-election campaign.²⁰

By 1959, Mondale had won the statewide respect of both party officials and rank and file for his deft ability at running political campaigns. He had become a real "pro" -- not so much in the sense of a paid, career politician but as an attractive young man with administrative and executive talent, and a willingness to work in the background. Many in the party urged "Fritz" to try his own hand at public office. That his activities were being closely watched is attested to by an article in the Minneapolis Tribune, which read into Mondale's decision to move from St. Paul to Minneapolis in 1959 an intention on Mondale's part to enter the 1962 legislative races. The Tribune dutifully pointed out that Mondale had moved smack into an area that would legally be designated as a new legislative district in 1962, under the re-apportionment act of 1959.²¹

But it was not until 1960 that Mondale was to ascend to state public office. In early May of that year, the five-year incumbent Attorney-General, DFLer Miles Lord, resigned, ostensibly because of a desire to resume the private practice of law. Freeman called an unusual DFL state executive meeting in his Capital office, asked advice on who to appoint

¹⁹Minneapolis Tribune, August 3, 1956.

²⁰Minneapolis Tribune, December 21, 1958.

²¹Minneapolis Tribune, November 27, 1959.

to the suddenly-vacated spot, and learned that a majority favored Mondale over the next ranking candidate, Hennepin County Attorney George Scott. Mondale was appointed shortly thereafter. As Attorney-General, Mondale was extremely effective, and in 1961 had already completed several successful investigations and prosecutions of those found defrauding the public.²² By September of 1961 Mondale had become, quite logically and deservedly, the fair-haired boy of the Minnesota DFL, and many in the party were anxious to put him up against incumbent governor Elmer Andersen in the 1962 elections. The feeling among party people, in short, was that Andersen could be defeated in 1962 -- but by Mondale and not Rolvaag.²³

Rolvaag, a seasoned politician, sensed the Mondale groundswell that threatened to smash his long-held aspiration to the governorship. He realized that if he were to stand a chance of winning the gubernatorial nomination for which he had patiently waited so long, the Mondale candidacy would have to be squashed ruthlessly -- and squashed early so as to prevent ripping the party asunder with a long, bloody nomination fight.

The stage was dramatically set for Rolvaag's necessary alignment with one or the other element of the DFL party. It was a choice Rolvaag

²²Notable among these was the Sister Kenney Foundation case involving improper handling of charitable funds.

²³But where, one might well ask, did Rolvaag's strong party support of 1958 disappear to? Why did ranking party people who supported him in 1958 desert him in 1961 and 1962? There is, first the most obvious reason, the political rule of thumb which says that the longer a man holds office the more enemies he makes and the weaker he gets as a candidate for re-election. The second reason necessitates an examination of Rolvaag's 1958 deferral to McCarthy and Mrs. Andersen, and demands the cold acknowledgement that the image such a selfless act, however laudatory, produces is an unprofitable one, and one which develops in two stages: the first stage is one in which respect and gratitude prevail, a period in which everyone acknowledges the fine and noble deed. The second stage finds people naturally presuming upon such dedication, and becoming indignant when the old party wheelhorse asserts claim to what rightfully should be his. Politicians seldom survive long on gratitude; such was the lesson Rolvaag was to learn in 1961 and again in 1966.

had been able to avoid for eight years, by virtue of the ineffectual position which he held. There would be no such easy road to the governorship. In the summer of 1961, accordingly, Rolvaag decided with which side he would join forces. It was then that he asked Charles Bannister, AFL-CIO vice-president from Duluth, to be his campaign manager. The die was cast for one of the most important developments in Minnesota politics for the 1960's.

LABOR AND ROLVAAG'S 1961 ENDORSEMENT FOR GOVERNOR

By September of 1961 Walter Gramond had been ousted as CLU president and Arthur Naftalin had been elected mayor of Minneapolis, two developments which placed the intellectual wing of the party one-up on DFL labor. In the middle of that month the Minnesota AFL-CIO held its state convention in Duluth. Lieutenant Governor Rolvaag and Attorney General Mondale were both present to address the convention. In his speech, Rolvaag brought the delegates to their feet with an old-fashion political oration. He made a slashing attack on Governor Andersen as being a "pillar of weakness" and criticized the GOP state administration as being marked by "double talk, vacillation, and confusion." He recalled that Andersen had campaigned on the Iron Range with a "vote for jobs" slogan, and denounced it as a "phony appeal."²⁴

What followed Rolvaag's speech was a shrewdly pre-arranged political tactic. Before Mondale could get up to speak, John Curtis, president of the Minnesota State Culinary Workers, and a close associate of both Rolvaag's and Bannister's, grabbed the microphone and made a motion to urge Rolvaag to "actively seek the office of governor."²⁵ The motion,

²⁴Minneapolis Tribune, September 10, 1961.

²⁵Ibid.

made as it was in the blur of applause and enthusiasm following Rolvaag's speech, caught the delegates and officials completely unprepared, and was passed unanimously. If the circumstances surrounding the hurried endorsement were confusing, however, its implications were crystal clear: 800 delegates representing 175,000 Minnesota union members had formally urged Rolvaag to make the race for governor. There was no way that any of them could gracefully withdraw or reverse what had been done. Mondale, visibly shaken by the whole action, turned to AFL-CIO vice president Robert Hess, a Mondale supporter who was not taken into confidence on the endorsement plan, smiled weakly and commented: "I've just seen the train go by."²⁶

The ironic thing about this staged endorsement, which stood up as official, was that it was entirely out of order. The AFL-CIO had a Committee on Political Education which had the exclusive right and responsibility to endorse candidates. However, there could be no doubt about the endorsement's effect, which was to dispossess some of the leading party intellectuals of a voice in the selection of a DFL candidate. The advantage to Rolvaag of this early endorsement by the 175,000 member AFL-CIO was indeed enormous. No DFL candidate could easily contemplate contending for statewide office without it.

This endorsement thus represented a new wrinkle on the old feud. For the first time labor's antagonism to the DFL, long expressed in terms of Minneapolis CLU vs. Hennepin County DFL, spread to the state leadership, and pre-empted DFL party leaders of their prerogative, i.e. endorsing first for statewide office much as the Hennepin County DFL infringed on the CLU's right to local endorsement in the 1958-59 city and legislative contests. In a perpetuation of the rivalry, it is

²⁶Interviews with confidential sources.

significant that labor endorsed Rolvaag first. Had labor not thus forced the hand of the party people, the spectre of Rolvaag being the DFL gubernatorial nominee would not have been so difficult for the party people to accept, in spite of their disappointment at having to make Mondale wait in line. They could have rationalized their acquiescence in Rolvaag's candidacy by remembering that in the oligarchical order of things Rolvaag did deserve first chance. They could have convinced themselves that by allowing Rolvaag the nomination they had avoided a divisive, bloody nomination fight, and hence conducted themselves as "good party people."

Labor's endorsing Rolvaag first, however, precluded such a rationalization. The controlling consideration after labor's endorsement could no longer be "what is best for the party" but now became "who will control the party." If the party people acquiesced in Rolvaag's endorsement now, they would be looked upon as late-arrivers, as bandwagon-jumpers. Labor and not the small clique of party leaders, it was clear, would henceforth share Rolvaag's favor. The old pressures inside the DFL began to re-assert themselves. Rolvaag had strayed from his long-held position of neutrality to labor's camp. He would never be welcome to the other side of the party. After September, 1961, Rolvaag became a mere incidental expression of this larger signification. He became a pawn with which the old conflicting forces of the DFL would resume their contest.

The party people had not thrown in the towel so easily. There remained a small, hard-core group of Mondale dissidents who determined in every way they could to obstruct Rolvaag's path to the DFL nomination. Between winter of 1961 and May of 1962 (the time of the DFL state convention) there were two "Mondale movements," two desperate attempts to

salvage the DFL endorsement for Mondale. The first Mondale movement was prompted by several party leaders' natural inclination to Mondale and by the Minnesota Polls published in the first few months of 1962. On January 28, a poll was published which ostensibly showed the relative strength of Mondale, Rolvaag, and D. D. Wozniak. The latter at the time was assistant majority leader in the state house of representatives, and was being considered as a possible DFL candidate. Mondale outpolled both Rolvaag and Wozniak as being the strongest candidate among DFLers, Republicans, and Independents.²⁷

On March 11, 1962, the Minnesota Poll published its first comparisons of the relative strength of Mondale vs. Andersen and Rolvaag vs. Andersen. As reported in the Tribune, the poll showed:

1. "Andersen with a small edge over State Rep. D. D. Wozniak.
2. "Andersen in a neck and neck race with Lt. Gov. Karl Rolvaag.
3. "Andersen trailing Attorney General Walter Mondale by a small margin."²⁸

That same day, Sunday, March 11, 1962, Mondale made an unexpected announcement to some 150 members of the DFL State Central Committee which was meeting in the Radisson Hotel in Minneapolis. He started his remarks by saying that he wanted to "clarify some confusion" surrounding his 1962 political plans:

In the next campaign and the coming convention I'm going to support Karl Rolvaag, and I'm going to be standing to his left as attorney general when he's sworn in as governor.²⁹

Rolvaag was obviously moved by Mondale's forthright declaration. He

²⁷Minneapolis Tribune, January 28, 1962. Cf. Appendix VI for poll.

²⁸Minneapolis Tribune, March 11, 1962. Cf. Appendix VII for poll.

²⁹Minneapolis Tribune, March 12, 1962.

stood up and told the meeting that "this was not an easy statement for the attorney general to make,"

Indeed, it was not. Political rumor has it that some in the Minnesota Washington delegation urged Mondale to withdraw. It was felt that Orville Freeman, particularly, was in a position to influence Mondale, since it was Freeman who first appointed Mondale as Attorney-General. "Orville made it clear to Mondale," it was revealed in an interview, "that he had not appointed him so that he could run against Karl."³⁰

But Mondale's heart was not in his disavowal to the state central committee. The last day of March, Mondale introduced State Senator A. M. (Sandy) Keith as keynoter of a Hennepin County DFL convention. He praised Keith as having a bright future in politics.³¹ Less than two weeks later, on April 11, Keith told a suburban Hennepin County DFL meeting that he was still supporting Mondale for governor. Keith was quoted as having said of Rolvaag's potential candidacy for governor:

This is a loser — a person who cannot win. Why take a chance on losing what looks like a good election with a loser? 32

One week later, it was common knowledge around the metropolitan area that another "Draft Mondale" movement was on. It was known who sponsored the movement: Forrest Harris, University of Minnesota professor and 5th District chairman, and A. M. (Sandy) Keith, State Senator from Rochester. It was also known that other segments of the Minneapolis

³⁰ Interviews with confidential sources.

³¹ St. Paul Pioneer Press, April 22, 1962.

³² St. Paul Pioneer Press, May 26, 1962.

"university crowd" were encouraging the draft movement. It was not known whether Mondale had solicited the second draft. He was out of town the week-end that the news of the draft broke, and declined to return newsmen's phone calls most of the week. Thursday of the third week of April, Mondale called Harris and made it clear that he would not be a candidate for governor. Harris relented in his efforts.

Significantly, too, on the day preceding Mondale's second withdrawal, the 8000 member Twin City Machinists Nonpartisan League announced its endorsement of Rolvaag for governor. Other labor resolutions favoring Rolvaag's candidacy had already been passed by the St. Paul Trades and Labor assembly, the Minneapolis Central Labor Union, the Minnesota Federation of Labor, and scores of local unions throughout the state.³³

Rolvaag had worked long and hard to earn the support of the convention delegates. When it became apparent that the convention would be comprised of mostly Rolvaag delegates, most party people fell into line, and supported Rolvaag, but their unenthusiastic attitude was painfully apparent. These, combined with those hard-core dissidents who opposed the Rolvaag candidacy to the end, would emerge much better prepared at the next DFL convention which would meet to endorse a candidate for governor, four years later.

Ironically, too, the man who heretofore had been condemning Rolvaag's electability from one end of the state to the other -- A. M. (Sandy) Keith -- wound up as Rolvaag's running mate on the statewide ticket. Keith was not, however, selected in deference to those people who had opposed Rolvaag's candidacy. Opposition to Keith at the convention was

³³St. Paul Pioneer Press, April 20, 1962.

strong. It was recalled to the delegates that Keith had been going to different conventions just a few weeks earlier arguing that Rolvaag could not possibly win.

That situation was remedied easily enough. Keith was called before the endorsements committee after Rolvaag had received the endorsement for governor, and asked whether he believed Rolvaag could win the governorship. "Yes, sir," Keith replied.³⁴ Keith, meanwhile, received some major support from those who had opposed Rolvaag's candidacy. At the endorsements committee meeting, speeches for Keith were made by William Kubicek, state party secretary; Ray Hemenway, Albert Lea, Democratic national committeeman from Minnesota; Attorney General Walter F. Mondale, and Warren Eustis, Rochester, 1st Congressional District DFL chairman.

Of these four, probably Kubicek is the most significant, for he is widely reputed to be one of the most effective and influential men in the DFL. As a professor of physical medicine at the University of Minnesota, he certainly fits the classification of DFL intellectual. He is widely known as a distinguished medical researcher, and in 1950 was recommended for appointment to the National Science Foundation Board.³⁵

³⁴St. Paul Pioneer Press, May 26, 1962.

³⁵Among other distinguishing credentials, Kubicek has: invented a paraplegic chair device which was patented, manufactured, and distributed by a modern hospital equipment company (Minneapolis Star, November 10, 1956); published medical research on heart therapy (Minneapolis Tribune, February 22, 1959); served as a consultant to a medical instrument engineering company (Minneapolis Tribune, August 2, 1959); served as chairman of the medical school committee for the car and standards of the Minnesota animal hospital (Minneapolis Star, November 25, 1960).

Kubicek's influence within the DFL dates back to 1944, when he was in the first Humphrey brain trust that succeeded in electing Humphrey Minneapolis mayor. He served closely with the party in the years 1944-1948, when it drove out the communists and elected Humphrey senator.³⁶ In 1952 he headed a "Buck a Month" club for Freeman which financed the 1952 gubernatorial campaign.³⁷ It was later decided by DFL officials to carry over its buck-a-month club into everyday operations.

A special insight which might give a good idea of Dr. Kubicek's orientation to political candidates is this quote from a July, 1952 issue of the Minneapolis Tribune. In reference to Adlai Stevenson, who had recently spoken in Minnesota at a DFL rally, the paper noted that "Dr. Kubicek's admiration for Adlai Stevenson was so great as to make him awestruck: 'I have never witnessed any personality the equal of Stevenson since Franklin Roosevelt.'"³⁸

Kubicek's speech on behalf of Keith before the 1962 endorsements committee was indeed an ominous sign. It was not sufficient, however, to get Keith the endorsement. Rolvaag had first tendered the nomination to several people: Fred Cina and Larry Yetka, State Representatives from the heavily-DFL 8th District; Wozniak, Harold Schultz, then minority leader of the State Senate. All had rejected it. It was then, according to Rolvaag, that a Rochester delegation came and spoke to him, and arranged a meeting between Keith and Rolvaag. At the meeting, Keith testified that he was convinced that he had been wrong about Rolvaag's electability. The two agreed that each would complement the other in

³⁶Minneapolis Tribune, November 8, 1954.

³⁷Minneapolis Tribune, February 6, 1956.

³⁸Minneapolis Tribune, July 27, 1952.

winning election. On Sunday morning, Rolvaag made an appearance in the endorsements committee. After an hour's closed door session with the committee, a report came out indicating "complete confidence in Keith as a running mate" to Rolvaag.³⁹

It is particularly interesting to note how Rolvaag insisted on keeping the record straight about Keith's 1962 Lieutenant-Governorship candidacy. Rolvaag's exact quote in a personal interview was: "I picked Sandy -- nobody else."⁴⁰

Both Rolvaag and Keith won election. Rolvaag's victory, however, would not be known for five months, because the closeness of his returns as against those of Elmer Andersen necessitated a recount. When it became apparent that a recount would be necessary, Rolvaag went to the party leaders with a request for financial aid. Some party officers were not at all sympathetic to the idea of pouring thousands of dollars into nothing better than a bet that their man would come out the winner. Some few, in fact, opposed a recount, preferred to see Rolvaag and his recount and chances for DFL victory dropped and dismissed. Among these latter the most vociferous was Dr. William Kubicek.

Rolvaag did not wait for them to decide, but went to labor with his request for financial aid. Labor agreed to help -- with literally thousands of dollars. Then, with all the doggedness, the perseverance, and the blind-mule stubbornness that so characterized the man's temperament, Karl Rolvaag held on for five months until he was adjudged victor -- by 91 votes out of 1,276,502 votes cast -- Governor by .007 per cent.⁴¹

³⁹St. Paul Pioneer Press, May 28, 1962.

⁴⁰Interviews with confidential sources. In 1966 it seemed so ironic. "Whoever is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined himself." (Machiavelli, The Prince, Modern Library Edition, p. 13).

⁴¹Stinnet, op. cit., p. 1.

The following analysis of Karl Rolvaag as politician agrees with Ronald Stinnet's analysis (in his book, Recount) that Karl Rolvaag faced two problems as the 1962 DFL candidate for governor. His first problem was his inability to identify himself positively with the public. The second was his failure ever to enjoy the strong support of DFL party leaders. This analysis differs with Stinnet's at the point where he states of Rolvaag's lack of support from the DFL party that it "was erased" as a problem subsequent to the 1962 DFL state convention.⁴² Indeed, it was the 1962 DFL state convention, coupled with the November election and five-month recount, that reinforced this second major problem of Rolvaag's. Moreover, owing in part to this second problem's persistence, the first problem was perpetuated.

Thus, an analysis of these two problems burdening Rolvaag must be made, to show how they relate to the paper's overarching thesis, that Karl Rolvaag was the victim of a long, debilitating intra-party feud. This concluding section should in no way, however, be construed as intending to whitewash Rolvaag and his administration, or to deny that the three-and-one-half years Rolvaag was in office contributed to an aggravation of the dissent.

It will always be a mystery of Minnesota politics how Karl Rolvaag was able to defeat Elmer Andersen in the latter's bid for re-election as governor in 1962. Andersen enjoyed the odds of Minnesota electoral history, which had seen a first-term governor's bid for re-election rebuked only once. Then, in 1938, circumstances had been totally dissimilar to those facing Andersen in the peaceful and relatively prosperous

⁴² I am speaking, of course, of events that Stinnet's account -- which treats of the period up to March, 1963 -- could not have considered. Thus, mine is not a criticism of his evaluation but simply a further extension of it.

year of 1962. Andersen was a native resident of a geographically favorable area of Minnesota, St. Paul, an area which could provide extra votes; he was of Norwegian-Swedish stock, an asset in Minnesota because of the state's extremely high percentage of people with Scandinavian heritage; he enjoyed the backing of the state's mass media; he had appeal to Republican party leaders and workers, by virtue of their support of his candidacy two years earlier and his loyalty to the party's platform and program in his two years as governor. Despite these advantages Andersen was defeated in a bid for re-election by four-time DFL Lieutenant Governor Karl F. Rolvaag.

Ronald Stinnet in his analysis of the 1962 election acknowledges all these advantages of Andersen's; however, he points out, along with these positive qualities, there was:

a negative feeling that neither candidate merited the governorship. This feeling was expressed through polls, letters to the editor, public and private discussions, and an epidemic of "Vote No for Governor" bumper stickers which sprouted late in the campaign. ⁴³

As evidence of this, Stinnet cites the Minnesota Poll of October 30, 1962, in which an "image" study of Rolvaag and Andersen was published. A card with sixteen words or phrases was presented to the sample of voters, and they were asked to select those terms best describing the two men. The results show very definitely the similarities of qualities of the two candidates, as viewed by their supporters. Such evidence, according to Stinnet, contributed to the thesis that "neither candidate excelled the other very much in the public eye . . . the major mood throughout the campaign was one of impassivity, rather than one of ebullience or despondency."⁴⁴

⁴³Stinnet, op. cit., p. 9.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 27. Cf. Appendix VIII for poll.

Stinnet cites an editorial in the St. Paul Pioneer Press on the morning of the final day of the recount trial, March 21, 1963, as expressing the results of the similarities of the two candidates in electability, and in the even, compensating degrees of such characteristics:

. . . at the moment, however, the only thing that can be said with certainty and without presumption, is that whichever claimant turns out to be the authentic governor of Minnesota, he will hold office by the most trifling advantage in the vote that could be well nigh imagined in a total poll the size of Minnesota's.

No one stands to have a glorious great mandate from the people and no one stands to have suffered ignominious repudiation, or any other kind for that matter. It will have been for most practical purposes a dead heat.

Clearly, on the question of the governorship, the people of Minnesota are divided about equally. ⁴⁵

Indeed, during the recount, the Minnesota Poll published a release which revealed that 41 per cent of state residents did not believe that it would make a great deal of difference who emerged as governor. More significant for our purposes, however, is an analysis of the poll's findings which indicate early evidence of Rolvaag's inability to identify himself positively with the Minnesota voting public.

In this poll, the people who thought a lot depended on the election recount included more men and women who voted for Andersen (60 per cent of that group expressed that view) than backed Rolvaag (53 per cent of them had a similar opinion of the result). When those interviewed were asked why they voted for Andersen or Rolvaag, those who supported Rolvaag said their decisions were based chiefly on a "dislike for Andersen and his do-nothing record" (31 per cent), DFL party preference (23 per cent) and general preferences for Rolvaag as the better man

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 10.

(7 per cent).⁴⁶ These statistics point out the unfortunate fact that a strong anti-Andersen feeling existed in the public rather than a strong pro-Rolvaag attitude.

If ever a man entered a high public office with two strikes against him, it was Rolvaag. First off, of course, a degree of "inevitable confusion" occurred when Andersen walked out of his office, announcing that he would not press the recount further, and Rolvaag walked into that office the next day, with no briefing.⁴⁷ People had been in doubt about the outcome of the election for five long months -- from early November, 1962, through to the end of March, 1963. Any winner would find it difficult to form a favorable public image under such circumstances. Adding to the pressure of public diffidence was the fact that when Rolvaag came to assume the powers of the Governor's office, the legislature was in mid-session and Andersen had made dozens of appointments which the new governor found unfavorable. Thus, Rolvaag headed into a legislative session which was half completed. He was unable to present any program of his own, and was forced to work with people who were not of his choosing. In addition, members of his own party lay back in the wings and emphasized his early mistakes. Under such conditions Karl Rolvaag took office; all this under the gaze of a public that provided him with a 91-vote mandate. No doubt public image would be a problem.

A Minnesota Poll published on April 14, 1963 showed that, even as he took office as governor, Rolvaag's popularity was relatively low. As reported by the Minneapolis Tribune, there were indications "that

⁴⁶ Minneapolis Tribune, December 16, 1962. Cf. Appendix IX for poll.

⁴⁷ Minneapolis Star, March 23, 1963.

many people have a 'wait-and-see' attitude concerning the state's new chief executive, Democratic-Farmer-Labor victor of the long recount." "48% DISAPPROVE, 34% APPROVE OF ROLVAAG AT START OF TERM" blared the poll's headline:

More than three out of every four Republicans (77%) disapproved of Rolvaag, with 49% expressing strong disapproval. A majority of independent voters (56%) disapprove; these include 31 per cent who do so "strongly."

Only 55 per cent of Rolvaag's own party, the DFL, indicated approval.⁴⁸

Further study of the poll provides more evidence that Rolvaag failed to produce a positive image of himself during and after the 1962 campaign. When asked what changes or differences the interviewees might expect with Rolvaag as governor compared with Andersen's administration, a majority said that they foresaw no changes or that they did not know what would happen. Of those who did mention specific changes that they expected, the largest percentage said that Rolvaag would be friendly to labor; that he would veto a sales tax; that there would be more jobs and employment; and that he would spend more money. The one expectation which Republicans and DFLers held uppermost in common was that Rolvaag would be friendly to labor.⁴⁹

Shortly after the recount, the Rolvaag administration perhaps tipped its hand on the direction its relations with the Minneapolis intellectual community were going to take when Rolvaag appointed as his executive secretary James Rice, heir to the anti-Naftalin DFLers of the north and northeast sectors of Minneapolis. Rice the year before led the faction which sought to wrest control of the DFL city machinery from

⁴⁸ The Minneapolis Tribune, April 14, 1963.

⁴⁹ Ibid. Cf. Appendix X for poll.

5th District chairman Forrest Harris, the University of Minnesota professor who had instigated the "Draft Mondale" movement. For the next three years Rice would be the leading figure in the anti-Harris-Naftalin faction.

Thus did the split in Minneapolis DFL politics carry into the governor's office. Very probably, from the time of Rice's appointment the chances for Rolvaag achieving rapport with the Minneapolis intellectuals were doomed.

The DFL state convention was held in May of that year, about seven weeks after Rolvaag assumed the office of governor. From all accounts, newspaper reports and personal interviews, the convention was a singularly dull gathering. The only newsworthy occurrence was what was supposed to be a showdown between some of the governor's people and some of the still-powerful "party people," people who still were having difficulty accepting Rolvaag as governor. The showdown was planned in the form of a floor fight to unseat Dr. William Kubicek, the man who had so strongly opposed Rolvaag's candidacy and the recount which gave Rolvaag the governorship, as secretary of the State Executive Committee, the party's ruling body. The DFL Nominating Committee voted 10 to 5 to support Kubicek.⁵⁰

By June, 1963, after having served as governor for two and one-half months, Rolvaag's public image had improved rather well. In a statewide survey by the Minnesota Poll, 44 per cent of the people interviewed expressed approval of the way Rolvaag had handled his duties. Another 38 per cent had not formed an opinion by that time. Eighteen per cent of those interviewed disapproved of Rolvaag's performance. They offered a variety of criticisms:

⁵⁰Minneapolis Tribune, May 12, 1963.

1. "The first thing Rolvaag did was to order a limousine."
2. "He vetoed the Sunday-closing bill."
3. "He is a politician with no leadership, just not qualified."
4. "He got into office using a phony highway scandal."
5. "I disapproved of his 1962 election campaign." ⁵¹

Yet, after seven months in office, Rolvaag was unable to improve upon his best showing of 44 per cent approval by the Minnesota public. For DFLers, this was a grave omen. Compared to Orville Freeman's rate of approval during his six years as DFL governor, the gravity was strikingly clear. Freeman had started office with a 59 per cent popular approval in 1955, reached a peak of 72 per cent in December of 1958, and plunged to his lowest approval point of 49 per cent in his last term.⁵² Thus far, in seven months in office, Rolvaag at no time reached as high as the lowest point of approval in Freeman's six years as governor. A Minnesota Poll published on October 13, 1963, indicated that about 7 out of every 10 men and women (69 per cent) had not yet formed any definite opinions about "the kind of leader" Rolvaag was. Those Minnesotans who had a favorable regard for Rolvaag as a leader based it 1) on a general feeling that "Rolvaag is doing a good job," or "as well as might be expected," or "hasn't done anything I would criticize"; 2) on his personality -- being sincere, intelligent, and fair; and 3) on the fact that Rolvaag was a Democratic-Farmer-Labor party member. Unfavorable reactions toward Rolvaag as a leader came from 1) a feeling that "he doesn't do anything, just talks"; 2) a belief that Rolvaag lacked leadership ability; and 3) dissatisfaction with Rolvaag's 1962 campaign for governor.⁵³

⁵¹Minneapolis Tribune, June 2, 1963. Cf. Appendix XI for poll.

⁵²Stinnet, op. cit., p. 13.

⁵³Minneapolis Tribune, October 13, 1963. Cf. Appendix XII for poll.

It was at this point that some DFL leaders began publicly to express concern over the lackluster image Rolvaag was presenting to the public. An executive member of the DFL State Central Committee acknowledged, however, that those people making the most noise were the same old faces:

These dissidents were mainly those who had always opposed Rolvaag's candidacy. Others in the party dismissed the polls because Rolvaag had never had a chance to establish himself or develop a program during the 1963 legislative session, with the recount having delayed his entry into office and provided Andersen with an opportunity to make any appointments that otherwise wouldn't have been made. It was decided to wait and see how Rolvaag would perform in 1964. . . .⁵⁴

At the same time that party leaders were concerned about Rolvaag's problems, others in the state were wondering at the ambitions of his young running mate, A. M. (Sandy) Keith. Keith was an impressive person. In 1958 he had entered Minnesota state DFL politics as the youngest member of the state senate -- 29 -- and the pride and joy of Olmstead County. Tall, thick-shouldered and good-looking, he was a magna cum laude graduate of an Eastern college (Amherst), and held a Phi Beta Kappa key for his undergraduate excellence. He had gone on to Yale Law School, graduated, and joined the Marine Corps for a two-year tour of duty. He returned to Rochester in 1955 and became an attorney for the Mayo Clinic. He indicated an interest to enter DFL politics at that time.

It appeared, though, that DFLer Keith would have to put his political roots down elsewhere. Olmstead County had been Republican for so long that man could not remember to the contrary. Keith's first

⁵⁴ Interviews with confidential sources.

labor in the DFL vineyard came in 1956, when as Olmstead County Chairman of the Volunteers for Stevenson, he delivered 30 per cent of the county's vote to the Democratic candidate for president.⁵⁵

Undaunted by the 1956 defeat, Keith in 1958 threw his battered DFL hat into the ring and ran for the state senate. To the astonishment of nearly everyone, he defeated veteran Walter Burdick by 170 votes -- out of 17,000 cast.⁵⁶

Keith made a quick step up the line by getting endorsed for Lieutenant Governor at the 1962 state DFL convention. He won his election by some 5,000 votes. As Lieutenant Governor he started making the speaking circuit at a furious pace.

By 1963, quite naturally, some state editors were wondering where Keith was headed. Wrote Frank Miles in the Austin Daily Herald:

When an officeholder makes almost daily speeches around the state, there is usually the assumption that he has new political aspirations.

Lt. Gov. Keith has been playing the luncheon route heavily. 57

Harold Schoelkopf, editor of the St. Cloud Times, observed of Keith that:

Sandy Keith is a likeable, personable young man who has proved his vote-getting ability. It is unlikely he will be satisfied to remain in the more or less obscure office of lieutenant governor four years with the almost certain prospect Karl Rolvaag will seek a second term. . . . Sandy Keith is not a person to be put on the political shelf for eight years. 58

⁵⁵Minneapolis Star, November 9, 1962.

⁵⁶Editorial reprinted in the Minneapolis Tribune, November 4, 1963.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid.

Philip Duff, Jr., publisher of the Red Wing Republican Eagle, had probably the most apposite observation:

As for Sandy Keith, he is turning down few, if any, invitations as a dinner guest.

Seems that a smart fellow like Keith must have some fairly immediate goal in mind. Otherwise his present dizzy pace . . . makes no sense whatever. 59

The closest anyone had come to defining that "fairly immediate goal" was in an obscure Minneapolis Tribune article dated back to 1961.

In discussing possible successors to Adrian Winkel as DFL state party chairman, the article ruled out Keith as a candidate with this observation:

Keith, who aspires to be governor some day, knows that a state chairman must be the party hatchet man, and this sometimes pins a tag on him that dims his attractiveness as a vote-getter. 60

The period from October, 1963 to August, 1964, was an uneventful one. The DFL state convention of 1964 proved to be almost duller than the previous year's. With McCarthy's endorsement a foregone conclusion, the convention had no business, except to plan for state legislative races to be held in November, 1964.

There occurred one point of friction, however, an issue which the party dissidents were able to nurse on for a full year, until another point of difference arose on the horizon. In October of 1963 Rolvaag, acting on the advice of his Commissioner of Administration Stephen Quigley, declared that the state faced a financial crisis, and would therefore cut back on its 1964 foundation aid to Minnesota school districts

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Minneapolis Tribune, February 26, 1961.

by 5%. Rolvaag suffered severe criticism by members of his own party for ordering such a measure. The intellectual DFLers felt that, for Rolvaag to maintain the party's liberal tradition, the aids should have been paid, educational needs met, and money found later to make up the deficit. As one of the leading representatives of the "university crowd" testified in a personal interview: "For Rolvaag to order the cutback as a matter of fiscal responsibility was courageous but it was not being a good liberal."⁶¹

By August, 1964, Rolvaag had eased the school aid holdback from his original estimate of 5 per cent to 4.5 per cent, but still ordered it into effect "because of a mounting deficit in the state's income tax school fund."⁶² For that statement, Rolvaag was criticized both by members of his own party and legislative conservatives. The Standing House Education Committee which was headed by Conservative John Hartle, voted without dissent to voice "opposition to the governor's . . . decision," and urged the governor to "reconsider and permit school aid to be paid in full by the 1963 legislature and signed into law."⁶³ Veteran Republican State Auditor Stafford King declared that Minnesota had adequate funds to pay state school aids "in full."⁶⁴

Earlier that year in May, a group of DFL dissidents seized control of the precinct caucuses in Olmstead County, Keith's home county. According to an Associated Press story in the Minneapolis Tribune, the

⁶¹ Interviews with confidential sources.

⁶² Minneapolis Tribune, August 25, 1964.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Minneapolis Star, August 13, 1964.

rebels said they had previously received the backing of Lieutenant Governor A. M. (Sandy) Keith "for anything, anytime, against anyone."⁶⁵ They took control over the county DFL organization from a group that included several backers of Rolvaag. The rumor was that Keith was establishing a base for a 1966 run at the governorship.

Keith went to Rolvaag later that same month and assured the governor that the Olmstead battle was strictly a local affair and no one involved was interested in "knocking off an incumbent governor."⁶⁶

The chances of electing liberal candidates to the state legislature indeed did seem bright. According to a poll published in the Minneapolis Tribune of August 9, 1964, Minnesota appeared to be among those states overwhelmingly favoring Johnson and the Democratic party. According to this poll, Democratic tickets headed by President Johnson with either of Minnesota's senators (Hubert H. Humphrey or Eugene McCarthy) as running mates were preferred over Republicans Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William Miller by nearly 7 out of every 10 Minnesotans.⁶⁷

A poll taken later that fall, in October, one and one half weeks before the election, reinforced this expectation that the DFL would elect liberal legislators on election day. The poll showed that the DFL had gained strength in terms of the rank and file membership since October of 1960. Fifty-one per cent of the voters interviewed considered themselves DFLers, while only 24 per cent identified themselves with the Republican party.⁶⁸

Election returns bore out substantially the prophecy of the August poll, indicating that state residents would vote overwhelmingly Democratic

⁶⁵Minneapolis Tribune, June 16, 1964.

⁶⁶Minneapolis Tribune, September 15, 1965.

⁶⁷Minneapolis Tribune, August 9, 1964. Cf. Appendix XIII for poll.

⁶⁸Minneapolis Tribune, October 25, 1965. Cf. Appendix XIV for poll.

on the national ticket. The October poll, however, was discredited as an accurate barometer of DFL strength: even with the Johnson landslide, the DFL was able to elect only three new legislative candidates.⁶⁹

Dissident party leaders in the DFL found Rolvaag a convenient scapegoat for the unspectacular results. Rolvaag was quick to note that the DFL party organizers had not exactly been balls of fire in their efforts. The party leaders claimed that Rolvaag was not welcome as a campaigner for liberal legislative candidates, who considered him a political liability.⁷⁰ Rolvaag retorted that he and Mondale had "pressed and pressed and pressed Farr, the DFL state chairman, to get to work on the matter of liberal legislative candidates" but met with little cooperation.⁷¹ He pointed out further that it was not reasonable to expect the state legislative races to parallel the voting on the national ticket, because with the Minnesota non-partisan legislative designation, the Minnesota Republican party was not identified as a pro-Goldwater party.⁷²

The upshot of the bitter exchanges was that Rolvaag gained little in the way of support and the dissidents redoubled their efforts to discredit Rolvaag.

A little more than a week after the November elections, Rolvaag once more found himself in a situation from which he was to profit little. As a result of the 1964 elections Hubert Humphrey was vice-president and Minnesota was minus a senator. It fell to Rolvaag as

⁶⁹ Interviews with confidential sources.

⁷⁰ Minneapolis Tribune, January 3, 1965.

⁷¹ Interviews with confidential sources.

⁷² Interviews with confidential sources.

governor to appoint someone to fill the senate vacancy. Although the metropolitan press listed some sixteen prospective DFLers who were being considered for the appointment, it appeared that only three were seriously taken into consideration by the governor: Rolvaag himself, who could resign and allow Keith to assume the governorship, with the prior agreement that Keith would then appoint Rolvaag senator; Attorney General Walter F. Mondale; and Congressman John Blatnik. Of these three, it is most important to consider the case of John Blatnik.

Up to this time, Blatnik had served as dean of the Minnesota Congressional delegation for eighteen years. Year after year he was returned to Congress by massive majorities from his Eighth Congressional District, which includes the DFL stronghold of the Iron Range. For statewide election after statewide election Blatnik headed an 8th District DFL organization which poured literally thousands upon thousands of DFL votes into crucial gubernatorial, senatorial, and presidential elections. The Iron Range and the 8th District were fiercely proud of their DFL affiliation, and fiercely loyal to John Blatnik.

In 1958, DFL top party leaders, in considering who should get first shot at the DFL senatorial endorsement to run against Republican Edward Thye, deferred to Blatnik as their first choice. Blatnik, at the time, had not felt ready to run for the Senate. He passed it up.

In 1964, however, he was ready to collect what he quite naturally felt the DFL owed him. He said so publicly, that he expected he should get the appointment, and that he was willing and eager to accept.

Somehow, shortly after the election, Blatnik got the idea that he was being bypassed. He called Rolvaag and arranged a luncheon date, at which time he took three hours to make crystal clear to Rolvaag why he deserved the appointment. Rolvaag's only assurance to him at that

time was that no one had been eliminated from consideration up to that point. It was not the sort of assurance that John Blatnik thought he deserved. He decided to take his case to a DFL higher-up. On November 14, 1964, the Minneapolis Tribune informed people throughout the state what Blatnik had done. It did not cut a very flattering picture of the Congressman. "BLATNIK FLIES TO VIRGIN ISLES, APPARENTLY TO SEE HUBERT," read the headline:

Rep. John Blatnik has flown to the Virgin Islands in an apparent last-minute effort to see the vacationing Hubert H. Humphrey about filling the Minnesota senator's seat when he resigns to become vice-president.

Blatnik flew from Mpls. Thursday, evidently to see if Senator Humphrey would recommend the 18-year veteran of Congress from the Iron Range to DFL Governor Karl Rolvaag, who will make the appointment.

Whether Blatnik reached Senator Humphrey Friday was not learned.

It was determined that the congressman, who has been campaigning openly for the soon-to-be-vacant U. S. Senate seat, flew from the Twin Cities to New York, N. Y., and from there to San Juan, Puerto Rico, where he missed a connecting flight to the Virgin Islands.

Blatnik then reportedly took a private plane to St. John Island, where Senator Humphrey has been soaking up the sun ever since the Democratic victory. 73

The picture that the public got must have been deeply offensive to Blatnik, a man of great sensitivity and enormous pride. The newspapers had written up his last-ditch effort to salvage the appointment for what it plainly and painfully was: an act of desperation. Most humiliating, though, was Humphrey's thinly-veiled attempt to make a public excuse for Blatnik's understandable action. Reached the next day on St. John's Island, Humphrey clumsily assured the press that Blatnik "didn't come down here to put any pressure on me;"

⁷³Minneapolis Tribune, November 14, 1964.

I was a bit curious why he was coming and I asked him. He has a little flu and wants a rest, and I guess maybe he thought he'd like to see what we're doing here. ⁷⁴

Two days later Rolvaag appointed Walter F. Mondale as U. S. Senator from Minnesota. The merit of his decision was irrelevant; he had incurred the wrath of John Blatnik.

In December of 1964 the Minneapolis Tribune published another Minnesota Poll which indicated that the governor had not made much popular headway since the 1962 gubernatorial election. The poll showed that, in terms of over-all popularity, more residents disapproved of Rolvaag than approved. Most favorable impressions came from feelings that Rolvaag was doing a good job or "doing all right." Other favorable comments regarded Rolvaag as intelligent, sincere, dedicated, honest, and hard-working. On the unfavorable side were comments declaring that Rolvaag was a "do nothing" governor, that he was unfair in the 1962 election campaign, and that he was not qualified for governor, or that he was just not likeable.⁷⁵ As the Tribune pointed out, to this point Rolvaag's popularity curve roughly matched that of former Governor Elmer Andersen, whom Rolvaag defeated, but fell considerably under the level of Orville Freeman.⁷⁶

Later in spring, 1965, Keith made a trip to the governor's office. He came to volunteer the information to the governor that, despite the rumors that were flitting about the Capitol, he, Sandy Keith, would not be a candidate for governor against Karl Rolvaag in 1966. He even

⁷⁴Minneapolis Tribune, November 15, 1964.

⁷⁵Minneapolis Tribune, December 6, 1964. Cf. Appendix XV for poll.

⁷⁶Ibid.

offered to put this pledge in writing. Rolvaag replied to Keith that it would not be necessary -- that if his word was not good, neither would be the paper he put it on.⁷⁷

Just as Rolvaag closed out his first full-time session as governor a poll was taken which indicated that the electorate's over-all impression of Rolvaag was more positive than negative. About half of the people were favorably impressed with the governor, while roughly a third of the men and women regarded him in an unfavorable light.⁷⁸ As regarded re-election in 1966, forty per cent of the people questioned were in favor of re-electing Rolvaag and forty per cent were against it.⁷⁹

Late in the 1965 session, Rolvaag appointed a new highway commissioner, John Jamieson. On the surface, it would appear that such a maneuver was planned to appease certain intellectual segments of the party. Jamieson had no highway engineering experience, could not even make a comment of general policy upon accepting the post. He was, in his own words, a "novice" to the new job.⁸⁰ He did, however, happen to be a member of Minneapolis' 2nd Ward DFL Club, the home base of the "university crowd" of the DFL since the late 1940's. He had also served as campaign chairman for "longhair" alderman Robert MacGregor (graduate, Macalaster College, President of the University District Improvement Association).

Unfortunately, many legislators and union groups did not think that Jamieson was the right person to appoint. Bob Weber of the Minneapolis

⁷⁷Interview with confidential sources.

⁷⁸Minneapolis Tribune, June 13, 1965. Cf. Appendix XVI for poll.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Minneapolis Tribune, April 27, 1961.

Star wrote of the seemingly overwhelming statewide support that another man, Frank Marzitelli, enjoyed. The DFL minority leaders in the legislature, Rep. Fred Cina and Senator Paul Thuet, made their support of Marzitelli known. From the Conservative side, Rep. August Mueller, chairman of the House Highway Committee, put in a good word for Marzitelli. From the union ranks came representatives of seven St. Paul locals, including Teamsters, cement finishers, and carpenters. The Minneapolis Building Trades Council sent Rolvaag a letter signed by its president, urging Marzitelli's appointment, as did the Carpenters' District Council, which represented all the carpenters in the state. The 8th District DFL convention went on record favoring Marzitelli, as did the Steelworkers Union from the Duluth-Iron Range area. In addition, support for Marzitelli came from the business world, from such competitors for highway paving contracts as the blacktop and cement industry.⁸¹

Marzetelli had been a frequent visitor to the Capitol in the closing days of the 1963 legislative session. He had been the deputy highway commissioner three years before. A top legislative leader testified that;

He helped get Marshall's (former commissioner of highways James Marshall) highway through the legislature. ⁸²

Rolvaag had made a serious tactical mistake, and for it won the support of almost nobody; but the resiliency with which labor would rally to Rolvaag's side would later be testimony to the intensity of the labor-intellectual split.

By mid-July a poll was published in the Tribune which showed that public reaction to Rolvaag had once more turned cool. In a survey

⁸¹Minneapolis Star, April 13, 1965.

⁸²Ibid.

evaluating the performance of both the governor and the lawmakers, the electorate declared that the governor and the legislature worked poorly together in the regular session. Rolvaag was seen by most of those interviewed to be responsible for the situation and hence deserving of the blame.⁸³

One final poll must be cited, since it was published the day after a group of DFL party leaders met at a ski resort near Grand Rapids, Minnesota and decided that Rolvaag's public image was so bad that he should not be a candidate for re-election. Neither incident -- the DFL party meeting or the poll cited below -- influenced the other. This poll is cited as the concluding one in this section because after this point Rolvaag's electability problems (as indicated by the public opinion polls) enter a new phase.

In the poll, which was published on August 1, 1965, Rolvaag's veto of bounties on bears and foxes was disapproved of by 50% of the 600 people interviewed. A plurality of the rank-and-file of Rolvaag's own Democratic-Farmer-Labor party opposed him on the issue.⁸⁴

Rolvaag's first problem as outlined in this section -- an inability to identify himself positively with the Minnesota electorate -- had not ended, however; it was just to be joined by another decisive event whose effect would be to double the governor's trouble.

INTELLECTUALS AND ROLVAAG'S 1965 SUGAR HILLS REPUDIATION

The attention of Minnesotans on July 31, 1965, was diffused over a variety of matters. On the statewide scene, the Minnesota Twins

⁸³Minneapolis Tribune, July 11, 1965. Cf. Appendix XVII for poll.

⁸⁴Minneapolis Tribune, August 1, 1965. Cf. Appendix XVIII for poll.

had the day before slipped by its chief American League rival, the Baltimore Orioles, by a 3-2 score, and had assumed a commanding 5-game league lead en route to what Minnesotans hoped would be their first World Series. Dennis Linehan had signed a statement telling how, eight weeks earlier, he had lured 14-year-old Barbara Iversen from a Shoreview home where she had been babysitting, pulled her into his car and killed her when she struggled and screamed. Attorney General Robert Mattson had asked state insurance commissioner Cyrus Magnusson for details on a reported transaction involving the shifting of \$200,000 in assets of United States Mutual Insurance Co., a subsidiary firm of American Allied Insurance Company, to a Pennsylvania company.

On the national scene, President Johnson was pictured on the front page of morning newspapers signing the medicare bill in Independence, Missouri, while Harry Truman, the first American president who proposed a federal program of health insurance under Social Security, sat witnessing the ceremony. The United States had just modified its Viet Nam peace terms in a major effort to negotiate its way out of the war.⁸⁵

These were headline stories. But behind the headline stories that day there occurred an event which was ultimately to turn Minnesota politics upside down. At a small northeastern ski resort a group of DFL party leaders were gathering to discuss plans for the next year's elections. As Minneapolis Tribune political columnist Frank Wright was to later describe it:

The moment was one of grimness and emotion as well as one of possibly great significance in the party's history -- political organizations seldom decide that incumbent governors are through. ⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Taken from headlines of Minneapolis Star and Minneapolis Tribune, July 31, 1965.

⁸⁶ Minneapolis Tribune, September 4, 1965.

Ironically, it was Karl Rolvaag who first suggested the Sugar Hills meeting. Several months earlier the governor met with some party leaders and suggested a meeting away from the city, in order that they might discuss where a liberal political party such as the DFL was to go in 1965. The party leaders, accordingly, arranged to have a meeting of the DFL state central committee on July 23, 24, and 25 at Sugar Hills. But Rolvaag could not come that weekend, because it was the weekend he was to be host to the U. S. Governor's Conference being held in Minneapolis. He asked the party leaders to change the date and they complied by agreeing to meet one week later, when Rolvaag still had the Governor's Conference.

Sugar Hills, in itself, is a good example of political overkill. The stigma which the Minnesota public was to later place on Sugar Hills was sufficiently exaggerated so as to be almost farcical. As actually planned and as it actually occurred, Sugar Hills was a carefully thought out, strategically structured meeting of the DFL minds, of the Executive Committee plus several DFL state legislators, party staff members, and resource people, to discuss affairs of legitimate concern to all DFLers and of special concern to the Executive Committee. These problems included such matters as party organizations, party finances, and, most important of all, winning control of the state legislature.

Labelled the "DFL Sugar Hills Retreat," the gathering intended to mix humor with serious business. Contrary to the popular conception which would later crystalize and haunt party officials, the retreat was not a shady meeting of humorless, sinister politicians. Indeed, reading the jaunty agenda flyer which each participant was given, one could label the group which gathered at Sugar Hills as not Machiavellian but madcap. "The Retreat Staff is at your disposal," read the flyer:

Gordon Spielman is in charge of the silent meditation periods.
John Dablow is in charge of arranging late hour press conferences and criminal investigations.
Spot Reierson: women's activities.
Katherine Muff: Honorary Lifeguard.
Betty Kane: Honorary Bartender-in-chief.
George Farr: Chief weatherman in charge of wind direction and velocity.
Morris Sheppard: Sporting events chairman.

Anybody familiar with these personalities can appreciate the preposterous incongruities of the respective assignments.

Later, however, DFL officials and Keith campaign workers were to spend what seemed like endless hours trying to explain to an outraged Minnesota electorate "what really happened" at Sugar Hills. It was to no avail. The Minnesota voting public had made up its mind that a clique of political bosses had cut Rolvaag's heart out in the back rooms up at that meeting, and nothing was going to change it.

In reality, what happened was that the topic of Karl Rolvaag was never even scheduled for discussion. For any one of the DFL officials to believe, on the other hand, that it was not going to be taken up was either completely irresponsible or unbelievably naive. The people gathered there were aware that Rolvaag was in trouble politically. The point to be made is simply that the question of the governorship was not on the agenda, nor was it the purpose of the conference. It arose, ostensibly, because it seemed to have relevance to the future of the party, especially to the election of a liberal-controlled legislature.

The night of July 30 and most of the next day were devoted to discussion of party organization, finances and internal liason. At the end of the second day of continuous discussion, the members gathered for the final meeting of the day in their L-shaped conference cottage, the "Meetin' House." The "fourth session," as the later-famous meeting was then scheduled, carried this agenda:

8:30 -- 11 p.m. Free wheeling discussion; Moderator: Graven. Initial topics; "What Are We Going To Do?" "What Commitments Are the Party Leaders Going to Make on the Legislative Races and How Are We Going to Do It?" 87

Early in the discussion a DFL official -- at the time an acknowledged Rolvaag sympathizer -- raised the question: "Are our communications with the Governor's office adequate as far as the legislative races go?" At mention of this long-time sore spot, a cathedral hush fell over the crowded cottage. The chairman, a strong Keith sympathizer, encouraged discussion by going around the room and soliciting opinions. One by one, the party leaders rose and spoke. No notes were kept or taken.

The conclusion reached without dissent was that the governor was in real trouble and that unless there was a substantial change that he could not be re-elected. It was agreed that the Governor had failed to make a favorable impact on the voting public, as indicated in the polls; that he had not provided the party with the dynamic leadership which the times demanded; and that, for a variety of reasons, he had lost the confidence, if not the support, of many within his own party.

Two formal actions were taken: George Farr would have to call the governor that night, after which time a five-member committee, composed of Farr, Geri Joseph, Betty Kane, Spot Reiersen and Bob Hess, would go to see him early the next week. Secondly, all those present swore themselves to secrecy until the governor was contacted. This second decision was to prove disastrous; the secrecy with which the discussion was clothed in deference to the governor would later lend to the public image of Sugar Hills as shady, secretive political bossism.

⁸⁷Chairman Graven was a University of Minnesota Law School professor and an unsuccessful 1962 1st District candidate for Congress.

Having made these two decisions, the forty duly elected members of the state executive committee adjourned. According to those who were present at the meeting, there was a heavy pall hanging over the whole affair: "Everyone felt drained, emotionally exhausted by the time it came to adjourn."⁸⁸

It was too bad that everyone felt so low, because it meant that nobody felt like taking part in the concluding section of the "fourth session":

12:00 -- Midnight Swim followed by a Novel Tableau featuring George Farr in swimming trunks standing on one leg in a speed boat singing Italian arias while accompanied on a mandolin played by Betty Kane. This ridiculous sight ought to loosen everyone up and convince everyone that even our leaders are "just plain folks" and human like everyone else . . .

But the public would never be able to appreciate the leaders of Sugar Hills as "just plain folks." "The public just never understood Sugar Hills," one DFL higher-up bemoaned in September of 1966.⁸⁹ Neither would they understand the Sugar Hills sequel which was to come eleven months later.

Two days later the five-member delegation met with Rolvaag personally at the Capp Towers Motel in St. Paul. The group discussed the Sugar Hills consensus with the governor, and he challenged the accuracy of their assessment. He suggested that the party leaders' judgment might be good in August of 1965, but that even if they were right they could not make a judgment of his electability fifteen months before the election.⁹⁰ The implication seemed clear at the time that

⁸⁸Interviews with confidential sources.

⁸⁹Interviews with confidential sources.

⁹⁰Interviews with confidential sources.

many of the executive committee members were prepared to oppose him if he decided to seek party endorsement for a second term. Rolvaag told them that he would like time to make his own assessment of the situation, and requested they maintain a silence on the meeting.

One week later, on August 6, 1965, Rolvaag sent letters to all county chairman and precinct leaders, together with material spelling out DFL accomplishments in that year's legislative session. "I look forward to working closely with you in achieving our common objectives," the Governor's letter said.⁹¹ The race was on.

After the decisions of Sugar Hills became public, the polls and their significance entered a new phase.

The effect of Sugar Hills was to put a governor who was trailing in the polls in an impossible dilemma. After September, 1965, complaints about the governor had a vested interest. There was a shift of emphasis, away from DFLers criticizing their governor to challenging him. All the free-floating charges which quite naturally accumulate around an incumbent governor were now allowed to crystallize. Grudge-nursers and soreheads could now give their whining a rationale and a cause. The possibilities of the governor ameliorating complaints about his administration through traditional safety valves, whether that be a personal appearance or a matter of patronage, were greatly diminished. Whereas before this time DFLers could have tolerated and even encouraged criticism of their governor, after July 31, they could not, because they were no longer all on the same team.

From Rolvaag's standpoint, the most unfortunate development was that his enemies had chosen the field of battle. Rolvaag was forced

⁹¹Minneapolis Tribune, August 6, 1965.

into a situation that no incumbent governor ought to be put in publicly -- a show-cause demand by his own party. And the evidence that he was later called upon to produce -- his personal attractiveness vis-a-vis Sandy Keith -- was of a kind that Rolvaag could not reasonably be expected to produce. From Sandy Keith's standpoint, given the new conditions for loyalty -- personal attractiveness -- the Lieutenant Governor's stature could not help but increase.

The problem in such a comparison is that the fine but very significant distinction between personality and the issue of electability is too easily blurred and confused. If the rivalry is intense enough -- as it would be between Rolvaag and Keith -- the two distinct elements are thought to be interchangeable. This is always an unfortunate political development, for from such a confused frame of reference it is but a short step to a rule-or-ruin attitude. Such would be the fate of the DFL.

It is of course true that many people in the labor movement had, by July, 1965, been thinking the same thoughts about Karl Rolvaag as those expressed at the late-July discussions. The significant fact of Sugar Hills is not that the intellectual party leaders acted contrary to labor's wishes on the Rolvaag question, but that they acted first. By being the first to initiate serious questions about Rolvaag's electability, the party people in effect insured that labor would do the opposite. In line with this future development, two things are significant. First, Sugar Hills struck a sensitive chord in organized labor. It demonstrated an appalling lack of loyalty, a signal virtue to labor. Secondly, as had been demonstrated subsequent to labor's 1961 endorsement of Rolvaag, the important premise of the labor-intellectual relationship never to be forgotten is that, inside the DFL coalition

the blinding (and sometimes unconscious) consideration is to control . . . sometimes at the expense of all else.

From this point on, the polls seemed to have a decidedly different twist. It is a generally acknowledged fact in Minnesota political circles that the Minneapolis Star and Tribune are strongly Republican-oriented. The newspapers' conduct from August 15, 1965, two weeks after some news had leaked out about the Sugar Hills gathering, all the way through to November, 1966 was shameful. In retrospect, it seems a case could be made to say that the Minneapolis Tribune did everything humanly possible to feed the growing split between the two elements of the DFL. The great majority of polls from August, 1965 made no pretense of being objective, nonpartisan surveys; indeed, six polls in that time were deliberate, unabashed attempts to goad DFLers into intra-party bloodletting. The disgusting power which the Minneapolis press so irresponsibly wielded achieved its results; by late 1966 its carefully selected words and poll releases had become self-confirming: the DFL was shattered to the core. In retrospect, the Tribune's staging seems almost diabolical.

On the other hand, there is the newsman's eternal defense that the Star and Tribune was "just reporting the news."

The first of these subtly-worded reportings was on August 15, 1965, before public announcement of the Sugar Hills conclave was made, but a time by which knowledgeable politicians in each of the parties knew what had occurred. "46% OF DFL WANT ROLVAAG TO STEP ASIDE" the poll's headline screamed. Three questions were asked of DFL supporters: whether they thought that Rolvaag would be re-nominated by the DFL in 1966; whether they, personally, would like to see Rolvaag get the DFL

nomination; whether, if Rolvaag did get the nomination, they thought he was likely to lose. The results as reported by the Tribune showed that 45 per cent of all adults believed Rolvaag would be re-nominated as against 38 per cent who did not. But only 28 per cent of all adults at this time would have liked to see Rolvaag re-nominated, as against 53 per cent who would prefer someone else to Rolvaag; of that total 36 per cent of DFLers would have liked to see Rolvaag get the nomination, as against 46 per cent of DFLers who would have preferred someone else. Finally, without even mentioning a specific Republican opponent, the poll reported that 40 per cent of all adults felt that Rolvaag, if re-nominated, would lose, as against 29 per cent who thought he would win.⁹²

By September of 1965, it had become pretty apparent that DFL leaders were considering a candidate other than Rolvaag for the 1966 gubernatorial nomination. As indicated previously, most political observers thought the most likely candidate to be Lieutenant Governor A. M. (Sandy) Keith. Keith had pledged to Rolvaag in early 1964 and again in 1965 that he would not be a candidate for governor in 1966. When the Governor refreshed memories around the Capital about Keith's earlier pledges, a reporter went to Keith and asked him for comment on the matter. Keith refused to discuss the subject. "It has always been my firm belief," Keith intoned, "that political conversations between elected officials are privileged, and I never discuss them in the press."⁹³

Keith's friends denied it for him.

⁹²Minneapolis Tribune, August 15, 1965. Cf. Appendix XIX for poll.

⁹³Minneapolis Tribune, September 15, 1965.

That same month of September, the Tribune published its findings in another poll which reminded the public that a) "Rolvaag's standing with the public, never robust as chief executive, has been dropping slowly in 1965," and b) "more than two decades experience of measuring public opinion has demonstrated that the responses of a small but representative sampling of voting-age Minnesotans are accurate estimates for the total group."⁹⁴ The poll went on to report that half of the people questioned expressed disapproval of Rolvaag, while a third indicated approval. Then, with what appeared to be a sideways glance at the 1966 elections, the survey reported that former Governor Elmer Andersen got more approval (45 per cent) than disapproval (35 per cent) on the same poll. The poll also included a table showing Rolvaag's popularity at different times of his term.⁹⁵

During the same month the story of Sugar Hills was leaked to the press. In a hasty attempt to publicly amend the news leakage the Minnesota DFL Executive Committee met in Minneapolis and passed a resolution expressing its pride "in every DFL office holder."⁹⁶ But once it had made headlines, Sugar Hills opened the split in party ranks. The first DFL Congressional District chairman to volunteer his opposition to Rolvaag was, quite appropriately, Forrest Harris of the Fifth District, a veteran of the abortive stop-Rolvaag movement in 1962.

An associate professor of American History and Government at the University of Minnesota, Harris had been 5th District chairman since 1960. In 1961 he served as co-chairman of the Naftalin-for-Mayor Volunteer Committee. Naftalin, the former professor of political science at the

⁹⁴ Minneapolis Tribune, September 19, 1965. Cf. Appendix XX for poll.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Minneapolis Star, September 11, 1966.

University of Minnesota, has been described by some labor DFLers as "king of the longhairs,"⁹⁷ and has been a long-standing leader of the University-dominated 2nd Ward DFL Club in Minneapolis. Harris' co-chairman in the Naftalin campaign was Mrs. Arvonne Fraser, wife of Congressman Don Fraser. Congressman Fraser was one of the first and most persistent DFL thorns in labor's side, starting in the early 1950's. He, too, is a political native of the 2nd Ward DFL Club. In September of 1961 Harris became the private secretary to Minneapolis Mayor Art Naftalin.⁹⁸ In August of 1962 he left Naftalin's office to head the social science division at the University of Minnesota General College,⁹⁹ and, presumably, to carry on the battle.

On September 9, 1965, less than a week after the news of Sugar Hills was made public, Harris told the press:

If the governor chooses to seek the nomination, I presume he would have opposition . . . in which case I would oppose the governor's nomination. 100

Harris said that Keith was the "only candidate he saw on the horizon."¹⁰¹

Fourth Congressional District DFL chairman, lawyer Larry Cohen, made a similar statement on September 9, and indicated his opposition to Rolvaag's nomination. The reaction to his disavowal of Rolvaag was swift in the heavily-unionized 4th District,¹⁰² and on that same day a move was made by Rolvaag sympathizers to undercut Cohen for his public

⁹⁷Interviews with confidential sources.

⁹⁸Minneapolis Tribune, September 1, 1961.

⁹⁹Minneapolis Star, August 8, 1962.

¹⁰⁰Minneapolis Star, September 9, 1965.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²The 4th Congressional District consists of Ramsey and Washington Counties and has been a major source of DFL strength for over twenty years. It is a heavily unionized district; its present congressional representative is former labor leader Joseph Karth.

declaration and his role in the Sugar Hills discussions. Two of the DFL legislative districts in the 4th District passed resolutions endorsing Rolvaag. One of the endorsements carried this resolution:

Our committee asks by what right and by whose authority did these so-called leaders convey their conclusions to the governor? We condemn the effrontery of this attempt to usurp the prerogative of the state convention.

The 44th North Executive Committee requests the Ramsey County members of the state Executive Committee (several of whom were at Sugar Hills) to disavow this action or to resign their positions.

Finally, the 44th North DFL Executive Committee asserts its pride in the governor's accomplishments, its confidence in the people re-electing Karl Rolvaag and its pledge to support his decision to run again. 103

At the same time, a petition was circulating around the 4th District which aimed at forcing Cohen to call a meeting of the 4th District DFL Central Committee, with the avowed intent of publicly censuring Cohen.

That same week in September, a majority of the 3rd Congressional District DFL admitted to the press that they did not think Rolvaag could win again.¹⁰⁴ At a meeting of about fifteen top 3rd District DFL officials, about eight supported the view that Rolvaag was a lost cause. Five members felt that Rolvaag could still win and expressed extreme criticism of the Sugar Hills meeting.¹⁰⁵

The Tribune fanned the fire again one month later. On October 24 it reported that 48 per cent said they would favor Andersen in 1966,

¹⁰³ Minneapolis Tribune, September 10, 1965.

¹⁰⁴ The 3rd District consists of Anoka and suburban Hennepin Counties. It does not have the heavily unionized membership of the 4th or 5th Districts, and is generally considered to be Republican.

¹⁰⁵ Minneapolis Tribune, September 9, 1965.

and 40 per cent said they would support Rolvaag.¹⁰⁶ One week later the Tribune carried yet another poll which proclaimed in headlines that "DFL SUPPORTERS SPLIT IN BACKING ROLVAAG." The results were prefaced with the editorial comment that "DFL party supporters are sharply divided in their reactions to the Minnesota DFL executive committee for suggesting that Governor Karl Rolvaag not run for re-election next year." According to the Tribune, 36 per cent of the DFLers polled believed that the executive committee acted in the party's best interests, and 37 per cent believed it did not. The DFL rank-and-file was accordingly split over whether to nominate Rolvaag for governor, 46 per cent for it, or to switch to another candidate, 43 per cent for this action.¹⁰⁷

Early in November one of the last remaining influential members of the original "palace guard" from the Humphrey-Freeman era, one who was still supporting Rolvaag, received a letter from one of the other last remaining influential members of the original "palace guard," from one who was supporting Keith in the burgeoning DFL split:

Dear _____:

I believe that you and I should get together in the near future. The liberal movement, as we know it, may be nearing the end. Perhaps it could be salvaged if we would all get together.

Sincerely,

_____.¹⁰⁸

And again -- but one month later -- the Tribune published a reminder that Karl Rolvaag continued to be rated with more disapproval than

¹⁰⁶ Minneapolis Tribune, October 24, 1965.

¹⁰⁷ Minneapolis Tribune, October 31, 1965. Cf. Appendix XXI for poll.

¹⁰⁸ Interviews with confidential sources.

approval. It once again reassured the public that the "popularity standings serve as a broad-gauge measure of political strength with the general election less than a year away." Significantly, this November poll marked the first appearance of a possible DFL rival gubernatorial candidate to Rolvaag -- Lieutenant Governor A. M. (Sandy) Keith: "widely looked upon as a likely contender for the DFL nomination for governor if Rolvaag is not named."¹⁰⁹ The poll also included ratings on Senator Mondale and former Governor Elmer Andersen. The upshot was to portray Rolvaag as scoring the highest degree of disapproval.¹¹⁰

Earlier that month Rolvaag was the victim of his own office's clumsy political maneuvering. On the last day in October, A. O. (Spot) Reierson, DFL chairman of the 7th Congressional District, died of a heart attack. Reierson was widely respected as the most influential district chairman in the state DFL organization, a real power in the party, and beloved among 7th District DFL rank-and-filers. On the day after Reierson's death, the governor's office staff began making phone calls to the district's different county chairmen to arrange for a political rally for Rolvaag. It was generally felt that to be working on a Rolvaag party affair between Reierson's death and his funeral was in bad taste. As Mrs. Kay Peterson, the 7th Congressional District DFL chairwoman, said, there was something "indescribably wrong" with the situation. She said she "couldn't understand how any Democrat could possibly arrange something like this until we become adjusted here" to Reierson's death.¹¹¹

Rolvaag cancelled the rally. DFLers in the 7th District were to have long memories over the faux pas.

¹⁰⁹Minneapolis Tribune, November 28, 1965. Cf. Appendix XXII for poll.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Minneapolis Tribune, November 7, 1965.

On December 2 Lieutenant Governor A. M. (Sandy) Keith told a press conference that he was "available" as the DFL governor if the party wanted him. "No one would turn down an endorsement if the vast majority of a party wants you," he reasoned to those present.¹¹²

On January 7, the Minneapolis Tribune noted that Sandy Keith had quietly opened a political office in Minneapolis. The office was necessary "to arrange the Lieutenant Governor's active schedule of appearances." The Tribune noted that the Lieutenant Governor had made almost 300 speeches the year before, "a near-campaign pace."¹¹³

On January 28, a statewide DFL throng of 750 braved 35-degree below zero weather to applaud and cheer Keith's availability as governor (and to fatten his campaign funds by \$11,000). Ed Warren, Olmstead County DFL chairman, praised Keith as an "honest, handsome, articulate, highly intelligent lawyer with a Kennedyesque image." However, the next day's newspaper account reported, Keith himself continued to walk the political tight-rope.¹¹⁴

In early February the Minneapolis press edged forward in its three-cornered play-off of Rolvaag, Keith, and Andersen. A February 6 poll release indicated that, although the governor had a one-percentage point lead over Keith in terms of approval (32 per cent to 31 per cent) he also ran way ahead of his challenger-to-be in the disapproval column, by a better than 2-to-1 margin (51 per cent to 25 per cent). Most notable, the Tribune pointed out, was the change in the rating of independent voters, always a crucial factor in Minnesota statewide elections, who shifted to a seven percentage point increase in strong disapproval

¹¹²Minneapolis Tribune, December 3, 1965.

¹¹³Minneapolis Tribune, January 7, 1966.

¹¹⁴Rochester Post-Bulletin, January 29, 1966.

for Rolvaag and a ten-point gain in neutral readings for Keith with a corresponding reduction of ten points in mild disapproval. Furthermore, the poll noted, former Governor Elmer Andersen was rated in the same poll as having a 45 per cent approval rating with Minnesotans. "Andersen has gained popularity with Republican and Independent voters . . . since November," the poll pointed out.¹¹⁵

On February 26 Karl Rolvaag announced that he would be a candidate for the 1966 DFL gubernatorial endorsement.¹¹⁶ In that same month of February, Rolvaag was matched against three prospective Republican candidates for governor, with Republicans winning in two test pairings and trailing behind in a third. Against First District Republican Congressman Al Quie, Rolvaag lagged behind, 48 per cent to 42 per cent. Against Ramsey County Attorney William Randall,¹¹⁷ Rolvaag trailed 47 per cent to 40 per cent. It was only against unknown South St. Paul attorney Harold LeVander, a man who had never before run for public office, that Rolvaag managed to hold a lead, 46 per cent to 34 per cent.¹¹⁸

On February 28, 1966, Alexander MacDonald Keith announced, to the surprise of no one, that he, too, would be a candidate for the DFL gubernatorial nomination. Political theorists will tell you, denials notwithstanding, that the office seeks the man.

In the first week of March, the DFL held its precinct caucuses throughout the state to select convention delegates. Ward and legis-

¹¹⁵Minneapolis Tribune, February 6, 1966. Cf. Appendix XXIII for poll.

¹¹⁶Minneapolis Tribune, February 27, 1966.

¹¹⁷Randall had enjoyed statewide public exposure through his prosecution of Eugene Thompson in 1964, in the famous bludgeon wife-slaying case.

¹¹⁸Minneapolis Tribune, February 27, 1966. Cf. Appendix XXIV for poll.

lative district conventions in Minneapolis found Minneapolis' 2nd Ward with 8 committed delegates, all for Keith. The heavily-unionized 5th Ward had 11 delegates, all for Rolvaag.¹¹⁹

Later that week, the Tribune published a poll which showed that, although Rolvaag had the support of more DFLers than Keith, Keith ran a stronger second among DFLers than Rolvaag did among Independents.¹²⁰

By the second week of March, the 1st Congressional District DFL chairman, Duane Peterson, had publicly joined those opposing Rolvaag's candidacy. Furthermore, he had devised a resolution that would bar Rolvaag from even being considered for the endorsement at the state DFL convention which was to be held in June. It suggested that no consideration be given to a candidate who planned to run without party endorsement.¹²¹ This referred to Rolvaag's statement in February, that he would have no hesitancy about contesting the gubernatorial nomination in a primary election if the DFL endorsement went to Keith.

Peterson's resolution was later supported by the 6th Congressional District DFL chairman, James Davis, a professor of political science at St. Cloud State College. The resolution was abandoned after long debate in the DFL Executive Committee.

By May, the Minnesota Poll was suggesting that things looked so bad for the DFL that DFLers did not want either Rolvaag or Keith. The poll did point out, however, that although Rolvaag and Keith were rated about equally in over-all appeal by DFLers, Rolvaag was given more unfavorable mentions than was Keith. The release closed with an innocent editorial lesson for those not wise in the way of politics:

¹¹⁹ Minneapolis Tribune, March 3, 1966.

¹²⁰ Minneapolis Tribune, March 6, 1966. Cf. Appendix XXV for poll.

¹²¹ Minneapolis Tribune, March 13, 1966.

Party support or lack of it is a particularly important factor now with the DFL state convention little more than a month away. Party endorsement of a gubernatorial candidate could be given during the convention. . . . While public opinion is subject to change, little movement has taken place over a five-month period. ¹²²

Two weeks later, test measures taken by the Minnesota Poll indicated that both Rolvaag and Keith had lost public support to a quartet of Republican prospects for governor. Republican candidates rated were former Governor Andersen, Randall, LeVander, and John Pillsbury, Jr., president of the Northwestern Life Insurance Company. Still, the poll showed that while Rolvaag trailed all four prospective Republican candidates in the polling, Keith ran ahead of Pillsbury, Randall, and LeVander, and did not trail Andersen by as much as Rolvaag did. ¹²³

The days from March 1, the day of the DFL precinct caucuses throughout the state, and June 17, the opening day of the DFL convention, were taken up by a furious scramble for delegates at the legislative district, county, and congressional district levels. ¹²⁴

The pre-state conventions are interesting case studies of how the issue of personality came to be confused with the issue of electability. This is not to deny, of course, the importance of personality as a vital consideration of electability. It is merely to emphasize that,

¹²² Minneapolis Tribune, May 1, 1966. Cf. Appendix XXVI for poll.

¹²³ Minneapolis Tribune, May 15, 1966. Cf. Appendix XXVII for poll.

¹²⁴ This writer had neither the time nor the inclination to trace the different delegate shifts that went on throughout the state over the three-and-one-half month period. It was felt, however, that an account of the Rolvaag-Keith feud which omitted mention or treatment of the conventions would be representing the story in an incomplete manner.

while personality is a necessary element of electability, it is not the only criteria. It is also important to record the colorful and anecdotal milieu of the DFL conventions in order that one might appreciate their effect in shaping the public temper.

By late May the DFL gubernatorial endorsement was still very much undecided. The results of long and hard campaigning found Lieutenant Governor Keith holding an acknowledged narrow advantage over Governor Rolvaag, after seven of the state's eight congressional districts had held their DFL conventions. Although Rolvaag had secured the endorsement of the Second District DFL, Keith had been endorsed by the larger Third and Seventh Districts. Both sides shied away from endorsement attempts in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Districts. But because at each of these district conventions Keith backers had won convention fights for positions in key committees for the state convention, it was acknowledged that Keith held a delegate edge, however small, in each. Depending on whom you talked to, at the end of May, Keith was felt to be controlling between 50-60 per cent of the delegates officially elected at the seven congressional conventions. Two thirds, or $66 \frac{2}{3}$, of the elected state delegates would be needed for endorsement at the state convention.

The convening of the DFL's last district convention, the Eighth, came on June 4 in Cloquet. In terms of delegate strength, the Eighth District, with 150 delegate votes, was one of the largest DFL districts in the state.

Convening last as it did, with the remaining district delegations so evenly split, the Eighth District was of crucial significance for the two contenders. If Rolvaag could pull down a substantial majority

there, the chances of his blocking Keith's endorsement would be good, and the Lieutenant Governor had already pledged himself not to fight it out in a primary. If he could not get the party's endorsement at the state convention, he had promised repeatedly, he would not be a candidate for governor. If, on the other hand, Keith could earn a substantial majority of the 8th District delegates he would be close to having $66 \frac{2}{3}$ per cent of the state delegates, or at least enough of them so that it would prove difficult to deny him the endorsement.

There are ten counties which make up the Eighth District: Koochiching, Itasca, Aitken, Isanti, Kanabec, Carleton, Lake, Cook, St. Louis, and Pine. Of these ten, St. Louis County deserves our attention. Comprised largely of Duluth and the Iron Range, St. Louis County accounts for 90 of the district's 150 delegates.

At the St. Louis County convention in early April, no endorsement for governor was made. This was done largely for two reasons. Firstly, John Blatnik, Congressman from the Eighth District, at the time preferred not to endorse, and usually the district defers to him. It was felt at the time that Blatnik was for a third candidate. His enmity toward Rolvaag over the 1964 senatorial appointment was long a matter of common knowledge, while his dissatisfaction with Keith was for reasons lesser known. In 1963 Keith had engineered a floor fight to deny Blatnik the national committeeman post he wanted, and had managed the floor campaign for Ronald Stinnet, Blatnik's rival for the post, and a University of Minnesota professor. Blatnik won the fight but did not forget Keith's opposition to him. Secondly, Fred Cina, a longtime DFL State Representative from Aurora, who had served in DFL top posts of minority and majority leader for many legislative sessions, was a declared candidate for governor. Cina at the time of the St. Louis County convention

still was thinking that Blatnik might support him for the Eighth District endorsement. Leading supporters of both Rolvaag and Keith deferred to Cina in not pressing for an endorsement at the time.

In the interim between the St. Louis County convention in early April and the Eighth District convention in early June, there occurred two developments which would have later repercussions at the convention. After the St. Louis County convention, Keith went back to the Twin Cities and claimed to the metropolitan press that he had overwhelming support in the Eighth District. Then one week before the convention was to convene, John Blatnik told a metropolitan political writer that the "grass roots" in St. Louis County favored Keith.¹²⁵ This statement was immediately met with a response from Gerald Heaney, former national committeeman from Duluth, a Rolvaag sympathizer and widely regarded as one of the shrewdest and most effective politicians in the state, that Karl Rolvaag had the support of "at least" 90 of his district's 150 delegates.¹²⁶

The controversy climaxed early the morning of June 4 at the district convention in the Cloquet Labor Temple. At the door to the convention floor there started to be a sharp exchange of words between Heaney and Larry Yetka, the Eighth District chairman. Heaney was badgering Yetka to force a call for a vote for an endorsement from the convention. Yetka tried to walk away and Heaney blocked his path. Yetka pulled back his fist and gave Heaney a stiff push, which the Duluth lawyer obligingly returned. Yetka cursed Heaney and stalked away. Jim Oberstar, administrative assistant to Congressman Blatnik, had come over to clear up matters. Heaney began browbeating Oberstar for an explanation of Blatnik's mysterious role the previous week in claiming rank-and-file

¹²⁵Minneapolis Tribune, May 15, 1966.

¹²⁶Ibid.

support for Keith and not for Rolvaag. Their exchange is significant for setting the stage for the struggle which was to follow:

Heaney: Blatnik asked St. Louis County not to take a vote, so St. Louis County doesn't and Keith goes back to the Twin Cities and claims victory. Then Blatnik comes out and says that the grass roots in St. Louis County favor Keith. Why don't we just have John Blatnik go down to the state convention and represent the 8th District?

Oberstar: That's a ridiculous statement to make, Gerry; don't say that. You can just as well say, why not let Gerald Heaney go down state and represent the 8th District.

Heaney: I don't like the threats Yetka makes. If I want to insist on a vote, I have that right . . . I don't care, Oberstar, the delegates here have a right to express their preference. If we don't have an endorsement, Keith will go out of here claiming victory. You know that the Twin Cities newspapers will construe this as a victory for Keith.

Oberstar: Your (very sarcastically) governor doesn't even want to have a ballot for endorsement here today.

Heaney: That's not true.

Oberstar: Not at 2 a.m. this morning he didn't.

Heaney: I don't know what he was supposed to say to Blatnik at 2 a.m. this morning, but I don't believe he said that and I will check this out myself.

Oberstar: Gerry, if you push this thing you will ruin the one chance the 8th District ever had to control a state convention.

Heaney: We must take a vote. It is the only way to tell how we feel before the convention. . . it will be significant. Keith in the convention can claim 55%, which he doesn't have, and start a break toward his bandwagon. I don't want anyone speaking on behalf of the 8th District without a vote. Blatnik said earlier that if no endorsement were made he would be in favor of a secret ballot. Now he pulls out. Keith long ago came to me and said that he had 2/3 of Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, and that if he didn't he would withdraw. He didn't get them and he didn't withdraw.

Oberstar: We don't want to bring this up to a vote.

Heaney: I can't understand Blatnik's reason for this.

Oberstar: It's to prevent a split.

Heaney: You don't think we're split now?

Oberstar: If you push this today, Gerry, you will ruin the 8th District's chance to run the state convention for the first time.

Heaney: Unless we have a vote today the papers will construe the non-vote to be in favor of Keith. I will bet my \$100 to your \$5. 127

The central struggle of the day, clearly, would be over the matter of endorsement. But it would not be settled on the convention floor. After 10:30 the delegates were to sit on the convention floor for some nine hours before being consulted on their preferences in the matter.

Just before 10:00 Yetka announced that there would be a St. Louis County caucus downstairs. When everyone was assembled, Heaney was recognized and rose to speak:

I can understand objections to having an endorsement. The alternative I used was to send out a secret ballot to all of the delegates. I thought that this would be acceptable, but the endorsements committee turned this down. So I feel that this now is the only way to get the feeling of our own delegates. For two reasons: first off, there will be any number of actions today that will be construed as an endorsement, committee appointments, etc. Secondly, this will prevent politicians like myself from leaving here and claiming a majority of delegates for any particular candidate. Therefore, in all directness and candor we should allow everybody in secret to state their preferences. We would not count the votes by each legislative district, but all together, so that there will be no heat and revelations about how each district and each person in the district is voting. Let us now take a vote on whether or not we want to take a ballot for our preferences for governor. This is the only way to make our maximum effectiveness felt.

There were no objections to taking the straw vote. The caucus voted to submit this decision to the endorsement committee for their approval.

Meanwhile, up on the floor, Keith was campaigning for votes, and as a campaigner he was impressive. Up on the floor of the Eighth District

¹²⁷The entire following account of the Eighth District convention was pieced together from many confidential interviews and from my eye-witness account.

convention he was the fighter in the field, and the feeling one got from watching him was exhilarating . . . not primarily because of his personality but because of the drama of the situation. It would be difficult to describe the look on people's faces when they shook his confidently-thrust out hand. Nearly everywhere in the hall that day one saw the "old-timers" confused. . . half resigned to passing the torch, half fiercely indignant and determined to uphold their traditional positions. Some of the real sacred cows of the respective communities were attending the convention as alternates, having been replaced by the younger, more aggressive Keith forces. There were looks of half-bewilderment, half resentment on some people's faces, unsure to acknowledge the hand of this man they so vigorously opposed, but finding it difficult not to surrender to his vigorous "How are you, good to see you." Indeed, the impression one got from the hall's atmosphere was that a new generation was in command, and that Sandy Keith was the representative of the youthful force which was trying to replace the older people, representative of the times which were bypassing and humiliating the older party stalwarts. Keith that day got inestimable strength from his always being around, shaking hands and smiling, going out of his way to grab a delegate and start a friendly chat with him. For nine solid hours he worked, and at the end of the gruelling, trying, taxing day, he was at the foot of the steps to shake every delegate's hand with a sincere "I hope you can help me" comment for each.

Meanwhile, shortly after 10:00, one could spot Minnesota's governor, very drawn because he was just recovering from a flu attack, leaning against a table at the back of the hall, all by himself, puffing pensively on a cigarette. He was waiting to see John Blatnik. Shortly

after the dinner break he was to get the call and move into an ante-room to Blatnik's conference room, beyond the view of the convention delegates. As Rolvaag disappeared behind the closing door, a State Senator mused:

That's a very important door. The last time Blatnik and Rolvaag went through a door together Rolvaag told Blatnik: "This is the way it is." Now it is Blatnik who is saying: "This is the way it is."

Mrs. Rolvaag sat across the room and frequently cast anxious glances to the door which now was blocked and guarded by Rolvaag's administrative assistant. A Steelworkers Union official gained admittance, and as he passed through the open door, one caught a glimpse of Rolvaag pacing, smoking a cigarette. It seemed so incongruous; the governor of the state of Minnesota was waiting to see John Blatnik about his future as a candidate for governor.

After speeches from Senator Mondale, Bob Short, John Blatnik, and any number of minor candidates, the resolutions dragged on. It was not until almost 5:00 p.m. that Heaney interrupted the resolution recital and demanded that Rolvaag and Keith speak to the delegation. The chairman put it up to a motion, and it was passed overwhelmingly. Sandy Keith strode to the rostrum. His talk was an excellent one asking Eighth District DFLers for their support, "not for past favors or future promises. You don't owe me anything, not a thing." He went on to the theme that had shaped his entire campaign; that there was no ideological difference separating Rolvaag and himself, but that the question was one of electability, a question of which of the two candidates could win a majority of votes. Keith's speech was met with loud enthusiasm; Rolvaag rose immediately as Keith left the speaking stand.

I come to you today as a governor and as a candidate for governor. I am full of confidence . . . but I am bewildered. What has happened to our party? It's a long road from Sugar Hills to Cloquet, and that road is strewn with promises broken. Let's look at Sugar Hills. There were 30 or 40 party leaders there. Were you there?

From that opening Rolvaag went on through the same outline that he had been using at the different conventions: a discrediting of the polls and a review of his record ("the record is there and it is a record to be proud of . . . a humane and compassionate record."). Rolvaag's speech was met with much the same applause as Keith's.

Rolvaag had hardly left the stand before the chairman of the endorsements committee stepped to the microphone: "The endorsement committee recommends that this convention make no endorsement for governor." Heaney was immediately recognized and given the microphone:

I went to the St. Louis County Convention hoping that the rank and file would have an opportunity to express their preference and opinion for Karl Rolvaag or another candidate. St. Louis County voted to do this here at the district convention. But today Yetka and Congressman Blatnik came to me and told me that it wasn't a good idea. I defer to the Congressman in this regard. We for Rolvaag will stay firm for two weeks and we will show who the Eighth District is for.

With that, the day's first real floor fight was on. It started on a belligerent note. While the outraged delegates were shouting for an endorsement, Chairman Yetka literally pleaded with them:

Let's not make an endorsement here that will leave a lot of scars which we will carry into the legislative district election struggles. That's as plain and simple as I can make it.

Reply from the floor: That's pretty simple.

Former Eighth District chairman and Steelworker Union official Earl Bester argued to the delegates that for the first time the 8th District could go down to the state and control the state convention.

He was shouted down. Someone finally made a motion to take a vote on whether or not to make the endorsement. The motion passed overwhelmingly. Heaney called for recognition and demanded that the floor be cleared so that none but delegates be in the hall. There was chaos for about twenty minutes as the floor was cleared. Then a roll call vote was taken and, after what seemed like total vocal support for endorsement before the hall was cleared, the delegates voted 105-39 not to make an endorsement!

Weeks later, after piecing together different testimonies, a possible explanation of the enigmatic floor fight could be made. On the Friday before the convention Blatnik agreed to let Heaney and Bester draw up a ballot that the delegates would mark the next day. Later that evening Rolvaag arrived in Duluth with his wife and drove to the Hotel Duluth, at which time a Rolvaag administrative assistant arranged a late evening meeting with Blatnik, who was also staying in the Hotel Duluth. Blatnik told Rolvaag at that time that he was not adverse to having a referendum the next day, but that there would be no endorsement. Saturday morning at the convention, however, Yetka and Blatnik said there would be no ballot. The commotion at the door to the convention floor between Yetka and Heaney was over this issue. Yetka and Oberstar told Heaney that at 2 a.m. Blatnik and Rolvaag had agreed to no ballot. Heaney went to see Rolvaag and Rolvaag denied having consented to no ballot. It was then that Heaney requested the St. Louis County caucus and received the favorable vote from the delegates on taking a secret ballot.

Blatnik called in Heaney after the St. Louis County caucus and asked him if he was going to push the ballot, arguing that to do so would be divisive and defeating. Heaney disagreed, but told the Congressman

he would consult with some Rolvaag supporters on the question. All of them were reportedly for having the ballot. By this time, Blatnik was unhappily involved in a situation from which he knew he was to gain little. He knew that a ballot would be a personal defeat for him. He called in Rolvaag, and told him that he would split the representatives on the endorsements committee if no ballot were pushed. Rolvaag indicated that under that condition he would withdraw his opposition to no ballot. Heaney went further and argued that no vote be taken that day at the convention only on the condition that one be planned for a specific time on Saturday June 19, the opening day of the state convention at the Leamington Hotel in Minneapolis. Bester was in favor of such a straw vote because he knew that many delegates had promised Rolvaag their vote on the first ballot. After the straw vote the morning of the convention they would presumably be released.

All sides agreed to these conditions. It remained to clear up the question of who would step aside from the endorsements committee. An understanding of the politics of that problem, however, involves a prior knowledge of the battle to elect a new Eighth District chairman.

Originally there were three declared candidates for the position of Eighth District DFL chairman: Nick Krmpotich of Coleraine, Harry Munger of Duluth, and Clint Wyant of Aitken. On the first ballot in the endorsements committee, Wyant received seven votes, Munger received five votes, and Krmpotich received four votes. Krmpotich was dropped because he was low man on the ballot, but on the second ballot he received one vote anyway, while Wyant received eight and Munger seven. The chair ruled that Wyant was not yet the chairman because nine votes of the sixteen were needed to elect. The third

ballot resulted in an eight-eight tie between Munger and Wyant. The committee recessed after the third ballot, at which time Blatnik asked that Bob Nickloff, Hibbing, be selected the district chairman as a compromise candidate. The three original candidates, however, were reluctant to withdraw. After considerable discussion, Krmpotich agreed to withdraw peacefully if he could be first vice chairman. Wyant agreed to withdraw only if his wife was made district chairwoman, and Munger agreed to do so only if he could be named to one of the two slots on the endorsements committee.

Keith had enjoyed a 9-7 advantage on the district endorsements committee which was to select two delegates from the Eighth District to sit on the important state endorsements committee. Thus, when Nickloff was agreed upon as the compromise choice for district chairman, Munger's name was put into consideration for one of the two endorsements committee positions. His two rivals for the post were split, one apiece for Rolvaag and Keith: John Dablow from Cambridge was a Keith sympathizer, and Mitch DuBow from Virginia was a Rolvaag delegate. Munger was a Keith man, and received the top vote on the second ballot, thus assuring himself of a spot on the endorsements committee. In the run-off between Dablow and DuBow, Dablow won, with the result that both men from the Eighth District on the endorsements committee were Keith men.

Rolvaag, naturally, was upset about this development, and so was pleased when Blatnik offered to split the representatives on the committee at one for Rolvaag and one for Keith. Earlier that week a Duluth News-Tribune story claimed that Munger was a strong Keith supporter, and for that reason Rolvaag decided that he would like to have Munger taken off the committee and DuBow put on. He

expressed this desire to Yetka, who went to find Munger and give him the news. Munger went to see Rolvaag who informed him that if he withdrew from the committee there would be no floor fight. Munger then went to Keith and asked him what he should do. Keith told Munger that "it would sure help" if he would withdraw. Munger agreed to withdraw, then changed his mind and told Yetka that he would fight it in the committee. Yetka, accordingly, went to Rolvaag and asked him if it would be all right if Dablow would withdraw instead of Munger. Rolvaag said no, it had to be Munger. Yetka refused to deal with Rolvaag any longer, sent a delegate to Rolvaag with the ultimatum: Dablow would withdraw for DuBow and Munger would stay on the committee, take it or leave it. It was further amended in committee that subject to no floor fight, DuBow would be seated on the endorsements committee.

This having been done, Heaney made his speech to the convention, and when a roll call was finally called for, he insisted that the house be cleared of all but delegates so that he could use the recess to contact all the Rolvaag legislative district leaders and tell them of the changed circumstances, that a deal had been made in which it was agreed that no vote would be taken.

Thus is explained the mysterious reversal in which, although it appeared that there was overwhelming support for an endorsement, it was nonetheless voted down after the recess. Heaney's faction had not wanted a vote in any case, because by the time it had come time to vote, past 6:00, many of the delegates had gone home and their alternates could thus have voted, which would have made an accurate appraisal of Rolvaag's strength difficult and unpredictable. The difference over making an endorsement had been settled in an appropriate smoke-filled-room manner.

By June the hard-fought battle between the forces of Rolvaag and Keith had been drawn out for nearly twelve months. As the state DFL convention was to convene on June 17, the Minneapolis Tribune published two polls: the first indicated that 43 per cent of all adults and 38 per cent of all DFLers wanted a third candidate for DFL governor (besides Keith and Rolvaag).¹²⁸ The second poll indicated that, although neither Keith nor Rolvaag bore the stamp of a sure winner in November, Keith rated stronger against each prospective Republican candidate.¹²⁹ With this last published poll, Minnesota DFLers gathered in Minneapolis to select their candidate for governor.

Shortly before the convention convened in Minneapolis, however, all DFL delegates to the state convention received a twelve-page brochure in the mail which was ostensibly prepared, printed, and distributed by the "Political Action League of Anoka County." The brochure carried a picture of a Gallup Poll on its front page which proclaimed: "PRESIDENT'S POPULARITY DIPS TO 46 PER CENT." Below the poll was written, in heavy, block-style ink letters, "What will the DFL do about that? DUMP THEM? (of course not)" Inside the cover page was an effective gimmick: a "do-it-yourself" box score sheet by which to rate Rolvaag, President Johnson, and Vice-President Humphrey:

ARGUMENT	ROLVAAG	JOHNSON	HUMPHREY
1. He's "down" in the popularity polls.			
2. He doesn't look slick on TV (like Kennedy).			
3. Some people don't like his style.			
4. I don't like his appointments			

The point was made with good logic that the same arguments that were

¹²⁸ Minneapolis Tribune, June 12, 1966.

¹²⁹ Ibid. Cf. Appendix XXVIII for poll.

being made against the endorsement of Karl Rolvaag for a second term were equally true of Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey. Unfortunately, the piece of campaign literature soon diverted attention from the issue of electability and made a personal attack on Sandy Keith, calling him the "assassinator of a friend" and "the man you wouldn't want to be caught in a dark alley with."¹³⁰ The sound logic of the original argument was thus lost because of a dastardly attempted smear.

SEQUEL TO SUGAR HILLS: THE 1966 DFL STATE CONVENTION

If the secret Sugar Hills meeting of a year earlier had aroused resentment among the Minnesota voters, the DFL state convention as a logical extension of the Sugar Hills decision outraged them. The difference between Sugar Hills and the convention was that the DFL's repudiation of their governor at the convention was conducted over a statewide broadcast of radio and Twin Cities coverage by TV. While few people had seemed to be particularly fond of Rolvaag before this time, the spectacle of the leaders of his own party trying to take the loyal governor's job away and give it to a younger, more aggressive man who did not seem content to await the rewards of seniority, alienated many Minnesotans. State campaign chairman George Farr ruefully observed later in the primary campaign:

It was as though most of the television audience tuned in late on a championship fight, watched the 15th round, and then called for the referee's job because they didn't like his decision. ¹³¹

Minnesotans, it was apparent, did not understand the political machinery of the convention. Of significance then is the political machinery of the 1966 DFL state convention, along with some of the convention's anecdotal incidents.

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹New York Times, September 4, 1966.

State convention delegates began arriving at the Leamington Hotel in Minneapolis on Friday, June 17, and began registering at 4 p.m. that day. Business of the convention was to be the election of party officers; endorsement of candidates for state offices and United States senator; and the drafting of a party platform and the voting on constitutional changes. On the eve of balloting for the endorsement of a gubernatorial candidate, DFLers were given copies of the State DFL Newsletter, in which was written this optimistic observation of the burgeoning party split:

The conflict within the DFL party today may, in fact, discourage some. But most DFLers will be looking ahead to November. The vast accumulation of energy, determination and enthusiasm which has been building for months will be available and will be directed at the GOP. 132

The important endorsements committee of the state convention convened at 4:15 Friday, the day before the actual balloting was to begin. Besides the sixteen members of the actual committee there were about twenty newsmen, TV men, and radio men crowded into one of the Presidential rooms on the mezzanine of the Leamington Hotel. The endorsements committee was significant because it would make a recommendation to the convention for the endorsement of governor. Made up of two members of each of the state's eight congressional districts, the 1966 endorsements committee was controlled by Keith delegates, 11 votes to 5. Suffice it to say that control of all the state convention committees by pro-Keith men would bear heavily on the control of the convention and its ultimate decision on the gubernatorial endorsement.

Duane Peterson, chairman of the 1st District from Winona, brought the meeting to order by asking for nominations for a chairman. Somebody moved that the name of Duane Peterson be considered for

¹³² State DFL Newsletter, XV, no. 9. June, 1966.

chairman. Peterson's sonorous drawl seemed almost cryptic, a foreshadowing of Keith's control of the convention machinery and the futility of the Rolvaag forces in trying to fight it; "Are there any other nominations? Are there any other nominations? . . ." There was no response until someone spoke up: "I move that we cast a white ballot for Duane Peterson." No discussion followed; the Keith forces had won the first encounter.

William Kubicek moved that each candidate limit himself to fifteen minutes in his speech before the committee, and that seconding speeches be limited to five minutes each. The motion passed without objection. Gordon Speilman, 2nd District chairman, made a motion that a two-thirds vote of the committee be required for the committee's endorsement. He reasoned that a simple majority carried most things at the convention except the delegates' endorsement, which required two-thirds. Since it was an endorsements committee, Speilman argued, it would be good logic to require a two-thirds committee vote for endorsement. Kubicek cut Speilman off curtly by branding his proposal "monkey business," and decreeing that a simple majority would rule.

Speilman, the strongest vocal supporter of Rolvaag on the committee, requested that another rule of procedure be followed: that the committee first hear the unchallenged candidates, incumbent Secretary of State Joseph Donovan and incumbent Senator Walter F. Mondale, then search out candidates for those offices for which few were running. His recommendation was obviously proposed as a delaying tactic, as the Rolvaag strategy would be to block Keith's drive for the two-thirds endorsement, and carry the endorsement struggle over to a primary. Speilman's second proposal was also curtly and arrogantly dismissed,

this time by Chairman Peterson, who ruled that the committee would first take the candidates that were available. As Speilman started to voice a rebuttal, he was cut off by Kubicek, who had received a signal from the door, and, ignoring Speilman, declared: "I move that we now hear Sandy Keith." No vote was taken. Keith somehow had gotten into the room unnoticed and now stood at the head of the table, ready to begin his speech. His talk was a short one — four minutes — and it again followed the theme that all Minnesotans had been hearing for months:

I ask your nomination for the office of governor. I have been available since December . . . I want to make it clear that this is not a personality contest. The most important question of electability is the question of the future . . . We have to answer the question of where do we go from here. Just as important to me as the office of governor is the question of getting a liberal legislature elected. 133

Keith finished his speech, sat down, and was questioned by members of the committee. Kubicek asked the first question:

Do you intend to abide by the convention's endorsement?
(Keith: Yes. It is the only way we can have a responsible party.)

Norman Beck, St. James, 2nd District: "If the legislature passed a sales tax what would you do?" (Keith: "I can't conceive of a sales tax being passed while I am governor.")

Harry Munger, Duluth, 8th District: "Have you anything particular in mind for northeastern Minnesota?" (Keith: "Yes, to further the economic development; relieve the transportation problems; further the development of ports; adequately finance UMD and the Junior Colleges as important sources of talent.")

Jim Davis, St. Cloud, 6th District: "How about candidate recruitment for the state legislature? What will you be doing?" (Keith: "This is one of my highest priorities. Sometimes you have to literally talk people into running. This will be my first order of business after the convention.")

¹³³The entire section on the 1966 state DFL convention is constructed entirely from my eyewitness notes.

Louis Filippi, Little Falls, 6th District: "What will you do for rural Minnesota?" (Keith: "We have to get adequate state aids for rural schools; good transportation is needed; a rural development agency should be set up; tourist industry is very important and must be further developed.")

Frank Olson, Mahtomedi, 4th District: "What is your education platform?" (Keith: "As you know the Junior Colleges are now controlled by the state; the problems of our state colleges are critical; we must struggle to provide them with adequate facilities. This is a very critical area, as most education today is controlled by the state. The vocation schools are just as critical. These must be organized by the state.")

Gordon Speilman, Trimont, 2nd District: "You've emphasized that this isn't a personality fight. Don't you think that Rolvaag has done a good job?" (Keith: "I've never been critical in any way about this. There is no argument. The question is one of electability. There are two responsibilities to consider here: to yourself and to the party. You have to ask yourself where does the party go. You came to me yourself and expressed concern over this. Not just once, but several times . . . three or four times.")

Speilman: "The question is: has this been a good three years under the Rolvaag administration?" (Keith: "I would carry on. The governor and I are both DFLers. I want to see that this is continued.")

Mitch DuBow, Virginia, 8th District: "You say that you can conceive of no sales tax that you would pass. Don't you think that there is a need for tax reform?" (Keith: "Yes. But we can't do this all in one crack. I feel that the best system is the income tax, because it protects the unemployed and those with a fixed income. There are types of sales taxes which can be condoned.")

DuBow: "Do these differ from Rolvaag's ideas?" (Keith: "No, they do not.")

Dr. John Salchert, Minneapolis, 5th District: "I'm perplexed. If the present administration is doing a good job, why do you think you can step in and continue?" (Keith: "The problem we have is clear. A substantial number of people in the state don't think that things are going well. Look at the polls.")

Salchert: "Would you run if there was no endorsement at this convention?" (Keith: "I don't like the idea. Primaries are destructive, in terms of finances, etd. Doing this in the summer would ruin us for the fall. I think it is very important that we endorse. I hate to

cross that hurdle until I get to it. I would have to think long and hard.")

Salchert: "You talk about party responsibility. Do you think that if you have a guy elected governor it is a responsible thing to dump him?" (Keith: "When a party has doubts about winning elections, it has to ask some questions.")

Salchert: "Then if you don't have an endorsement from this convention you have no mandate to run?" (Keith: "This is the problem.")

Harry Lindahl, St. Paul, 4th District: "Literature the past couple of days has been predicting irreparable cleavage. What do you have to say about this?" (Keith: "This fight is helpful . . . we have had the biggest caucuses in the history of the DFL. It is amazing how fast these things heal.")

Mrs. Helen Duncan, Faribault, 1st District: "I'm from Faribault where we have three state schools. What will you do to help our situation?" (Keith: "This is one of our most complex problems. \$280. wages a month is not enough compensation to support a family. I was part of this when I was a senator from Rochester, and am acquainted with the problems.")

Greg Powers, Wheaton, 7th District: "Do I understand you right? You talk about putting across programs. The reasoning of yours is that first you must have the legislators before you can govern effectively?" (Keith: "This is right. It makes a difference to the governor. Historically we have put our emphasis on the national legislature. We have to put our highest priority on the state legislature. Especially now, when most of the new seats are in the conservative areas.")

Powers: "You think you can do this, get and restore a liberal legislature?" (Keith: "Yes, I do. I think that most of the candidates support me if you ask them in private.")

On the second round of questioning, the Rolvaag delegates tried to pin Keith down with these questions:

Speilman: "You cited some Minnesota history. Do you know of any instance in American history where a party repudiated its governor and won an election?" (Keith: "I wouldn't call this a repudiation. A change is necessary. I think it is clear that I am the strongest candidate. Yes, we have this problem of putting in a new generation. Yes, this is something new and unique. Tradition is important

but you can't live always with tradition.")

DuBow: "You said you've heard expressions that things aren't going well. Can you specify?" (Keith: "It's a hard thing to pinpoint. But some think that there will be a problem electing the governor.")

DuBow: "In other words, there is nothing specific you can put your finger on?" (Keith: "There are reasons. Some are good and fundamental. Others are just because some didn't get their letters answered.")

Salchert: "You talk about electability. The overriding sentiment of the people I talk to and what I hear from all my colleagues is the question about American Allied. I am a physician and always have to answer for being a Democrat. How would you answer this? What can I tell the people who ask me about your involvement in American Allied?" (Keith: "You do a number of things. I had nothing to do with American Allied, no legal work, etc. I worked for an organization that to my knowledge never did anything wrong. They just happened to be owned by the same people. But most important, we must see that it never happens again.")

Salchert: "But the thing that concerns me . . ." (Keith: "Let me tell you; nobody wins an election in Minnesota by slandering. You win by being for not against something.")

The question session with Keith ended at about 5:42, almost an hour from the time he entered the room. As he left, Mondale entered, was given a standing ovation by the committee, and was honored with endorsement by acclamation. Before he could leave Speilman asked him the question: "May I ask you here who you are supporting in this convention?" Mondale glanced down at his hands which were clasped in front of him on the table and replied very simply, "Governor Rolvaag." But he had said it too quick; he had said it as if he had to say it, and that is just how it was received throughout the room. It was as if everyone expected him to say it, and the question's intended effect rather backfired.

Rolvaag entered at just before six o'clock, and began his remarks by informing the committee members that;

This is not my first appearance at a DFL endorsements committee. Back in 1954 I appeared as a candidate for the Lieutenant Governorship nomination. Also in 1956, 1958, and 1960 I appeared as a candidate for the Lieutenant Governorship nomination. In 1962 I was accorded the honor of carrying the banner for the DFL for governor.

Rolvaag went on to point out that the 91 vote margin that gave him his victory in 1962 could have gone as high as 2,500 votes if the DFL had wanted to spend \$150,000 and go into July with the recount. He then began a review of his record:

Under my administration the junior college bill was passed, by which the state of Minnesota assumed responsibility for the control of junior colleges. We have expanded the junior college program from eleven to eighteen member institutions. The Minnesota Outdoors Resources Recreation Act was enacted under my leadership. A former governor wanted to do the same thing but could devise no way to finance the program. I financed it with a penny a pack tax on cigarettes. Minnesota has become known as a national and international leader in the field of mental health and retardation. I received the Rosemary Kennedy Foundation award for my work in the field of mental retardation. Under my administration a new state college was established at Marshall, Minnesota, and contributions to the facilities at UMD and Morris were substantially increased. I could cite other accomplishments, but would rather conclude by suggesting that we might do well in 1966 by looking at 1958 when the endorsements committee made no recommendations to the floor in the struggle between Eugenie Andersen and Gene McCarthy. This committee might discharge both names to the convention for the governorship. I appreciate the consideration of this committee and am confident -- not rather but very -- that I have a substantial majority of the delegates assembling here today.

Having finished his introductory remarks, Rolvaag sat down and awaited questions from members of the committee. First man to the chairman's left, Dr. William Kubicek, the man who had opposed Rolvaag so long and bitterly, motioned that he had no questions to ask the governor. Norman Beck, from St. James of the 2nd District, opened the questioning:

"Are you satisfied with your mental health program?"
 (Rolvaag, very tersely: "No, I am not satisfied. I have been to all the state hospitals and anyone with any compassion can't be. \$280 a month base pay is simply not enough . . . It is not going as well as it should be going.")

Davis, St. Cloud, 6th District: "About your electability; can you tell me why we won the governorship in 1962 and lost a legislative majority?" (Rolvaag: "Mr. Davis, I might point out that I have won more statewide elections than any other present DFL state officer except Joe Donovan. In 1962 we lost legislative candidates in districts that I won by 70%.")

Filippi, Little Falls, 6th District: "Why was the bounty vetoed?" (Rolvaag: "It was vetoed because it was not a satisfactory means of predatory control.")

Olson, Mahtomedi, 4th District: "Would you respect the wishes of this convention in its endorsement of another candidate?" (Rolvaag: "Yes, I will. I have always heartily endorsed endorsements' decisions.")

Speilman, Trimont, 2nd District: "Governor, what about your electability?" (Rolvaag: "About the polls: they may give an indication as of now, but I believe that I am electable. The party not supporting me has been conducive to bad polls.")

DuBow, Virginia, 8th District: "You've been around the state. How do you think the people feel about you?" (Rolvaag: "I obviously am not running for re-election for my exercise, Mitch.")

Salchert, Minneapolis, 5th District: "How about re-apportionment. Can you bring in a liberal legislature?" (Rolvaag: "With the record we can. If the candidates get out there is no reason we can't win the legislative seats.")

Salchert: "How will re-apportionment benefit us?" (Rolvaag: "The conservative legislators cried great copious tears over this because it looks bad for them. We have to organize the legislative campaign now.")

Lindall, St. Paul, 4th District: "Why are we in this position of dumping an incumbent governor?" (Rolvaag: "There are so many factors that we won't go into. I am a very perplexed man. I've worked with all of you. When you say like you do that the record is good; when you consider that I've never been defeated in a statewide election, it is very confusing to explain why we are in this position.")

Jim Davis of the 6th District came back at Rolvaag with questions relating to the recruiting of legislative candidates:

"What have you done about recruiting legislative candidates?" (Rolvaag: "I have been busy keeping state and running for re-election. It is not the responsibility of the governor to go out and recruit legislative candidates. This is the responsibility of the legislative caucuses.")

Davis: "How can you get your program through without a legislature?" (Rolvaag: "By darn hard work.")

The question session with Rolvaag ended at 6:30, approximately half an hour after Rolvaag had first entered the room. Outside the endorsements committee-room door, Rolvaag was being interviewed by newspapermen; they asked Rolvaag who would be making his nominating speech. "Walter Mondale." Who would be giving the seconding speeches? "I don't know." Is McCarthy? "No." Why not? "I thought Mondale would give a better nominating speech. Besides, I haven't decided, gentlemen. I told you today who would be giving the nominating speech. Tomorrow I will tell you who is going to give the seconding speeches."

Shortly after 7:00, the Rules Committee had issued a report that no motion to adjourn shall be in order until an endorsement shall be made for every office presented by the nominating committee. That, evidently, was supposed to squelch Rolvaag's thoughts about carrying a stymied convention to a primary for endorsement.

At about 1:40 Saturday morning Sandy Keith went up to see John Blatnik about getting an elected official to give his nominating speech the next day, as it had been ascertained that Mondale would rise to nominate Rolvaag. McCarthy, Blatnik and Wozniak were not available at the time, however. Ironically, they were discussing prospective third term candidates for governor. Keith conferred instead with Maurice Tobin, Blatnik's aide, and Earl Bester, the

Steelworkers Union boss, and conveyed his desire to them.

Inside room 1151, State Representative Fred Cina sat musing on the Saturday morning balloting situation:

Two candidates, neither of whom are able to win.
The way it is the DFL is not going to win any election.
Rolvaag will run whether he gets the nomination or
not. . . I found out how dispensable I was today . . .
right here in this room.

Cina had been a declared candidate for the DFL gubernatorial nomination, and had hoped that in the event of a deadlock between Rolvaag and Keith the kingmakers would decide upon him as a compromise candidate. Now, indeed, it appeared that there would be a convention deadlock over Rolvaag and Keith, but the kingmakers had already given him the word that he was not being considered as the compromise candidate. For Cina, a longtime legislative leader of the state house of representatives, such a rejection was a bitter pill.

At 11:00 Saturday morning, the entire 8th District delegation stood up in the hotel ballroom and filed out to hold its straw vote caucus. Reporters eagerly crowded outside the doors of the presidential room on the mezzanine where the caucus was held. The district was split up by counties and balloting was taken. The ballots had hardly been distributed and collected before a strong murmuring went through the district delegation that the balloting had been rigged. The delegates were allowed only one choice on the straw ballot, but were allowed to choose from five listed candidates instead of just Rolvaag and Keith. Cina was lecturing some people who had gathered about him, telling them that the ballot was rigged because with the five listed candidates, Rolvaag's strength would be diluted. Heaney stood outside the room after the balloting, and was approached by a rather jovial Blatnik, who kiddingly told him not to "look so serious,

you always look so serious." Heaney returned Blatnik's pleasantries with the observation that "not having the voters express a preference for either Rolvaag or Keith is shenanigans." Keith won the straw ballot, 76 to 68.

The importance of confidence became very apparent at this early stage in the convention. With the brief exception of Rolvaag's interview on TV following his endorsements committee appearance, there did not seem to be a bright, confident soul among the supporters of the governor. The Keith people, however, were easy to identify: smiling, friendly, very sure of themselves, and usually looking very young and bright. This Keith image was enhanced enormously by the group of about fifteen to twenty young girls, all very attractive, who wore look-alike "Keith outfits," all white dresses with red pinstriping and smart looking red and white hats. Most importantly, these young, attractive campaigners seemed to be everywhere: in the lobby, in the elevators, in the dining areas, in the mezzanine.

Gerald Heaney had taken time at about 1:30 to tell a TV interviewer and a Twin Cities audience how Clint Wyant, Aitkin County Chairman, had approached Rolvaag and tried to offer him six delegate votes if Rolvaag would appoint him to a district judgeship that had recently been vacated up in northeastern Minnesota. Rolvaag had reportedly told Wyant that "judicial appointments are not for sale for DFL convention votes," and that even if they "were the last six delegates needed to endorse" he, Karl Rolvaag, would not trade a judicial appointment for them. That, according to Heaney, was the whole difference between Rolvaag and Keith.

Wyant, of course, was considerably vexed to hear that the entire Twin Cities television audience had been told of his derring-do.

At exactly 2:10, Duane Peterson approached the speaker's rostrum with a report from the endorsements committee; Joseph Donovan, DFL incumbent Secretary of State had been endorsed by the committee. The chair moved that the endorsements committee's endorsement be accepted by acclamation.

The convention chairman then gave instructions for the approaching nomination speeches: one nominating speech, and two seconding speeches not totaling more than ten minutes.

At 2:25 Peterson again was given the chairman's microphone;

The endorsements committee recommends for the office of governor A. M. Sandy Keith.

Upon hearing the committee's report, the convention broke into brief bedlam, until gavelled back to order by the chairman. The call then rang out from the chair: "Are there any other nominations? Are there any other nominations? . . ." Joseph Donovan was recognized on the floor and deferred to Senator Walter Mondale. As he did so there was a commotion behind the chairman's stand, as 5th District Congressman Donald Fraser approached the speaker's rostrum and nominated Keith.

I rise in support of one of the delegates for governor. It has been a hard choice . . . this is a critical time in the history of our party. The decision we reach today will affect every citizen of the state of Minnesota. I am proud of this party . . . it is a progressive citizens party. We have an obligation to renew and strengthen the strength of the Minnesota DFL party.

Both candidates are my personal friends. But we cannot make our decision on the basis of friendship and loyalty because we have to do public business. Our decision must be based on the welfare of the people. We should not be looking at the past, but must look to the future.

A. M. Sandy Keith was the first DFL senator from Olmstead County in 32 years. This man was a first-rate member of the liberal group in the Minnesota Senate. He demonstrated courage to vote on things on which he would lose votes. In the 1962 Lieutenant Governor election, he showed the same energetic application. He has been around the state sounding out the feeling. . .

I am not unaware of the loyalty a party owes its officeholders. But I am also not unwareful of the party's obligation to the public interest. Can a party renew itself? I don't like the decision but it must be done. I second for the nomination of governor Lieutenant Governor Sandy Keith.

When Fraser concluded, the floor erupted. From the back doors poured the demonstrators, snake-dancing, chanting, wriggling, yelling. "WE WANT KEITH" shouts started up. A band entered and started marching through the crowded delegates. The WE WANT KEITH chant became like an enormous drumbeat, and the convention floor became so congested that it was impossible to move. The Keith advantage of young people became clearly apparent. After ten minutes of pleading for order, the chairman was finally rewarded by the demonstration's cessation.

Delegates had not yet found their seats when the young Senator Walter F. Mondale reached the speaker's podium. His opening line was dramatic, and brought the Rolvaag supporters cheering to their feet:

I rise to ask this convention to re-endorse Karl F. Rolvaag. I do so with the authority of the senior senator, Eugene McCarthy, who urges the same endorsement.

The rest of Mondale's speech did not seem to reach the delegates, however. There was a distracting shuffling and buzzing going on throughout the entire delivery, and the only reaction Mondale brought out from the delegates after his opening lines were disrespectful guffaws at his mention that, "Some believe I am supporting the governor because I owe him something."

Rolvaag's demonstration lasted twice as long as Keith's, and persisted despite the chairman's insistent gaveling. The governor's vocal support, though not as great as Keith's, seemed to be more emotional. At 3:30 the convention was ready to settle down to the business of endorsing its candidate for governor. Voting was held up,

however, by the seating of alternate delegates and the difficulty in getting the credentials committee to pass on the respective credentials of alternate delegates.

At 4:12 Rolvaag, an elected delegate from the 4th District, entered the floor, and his appearance touched off another demonstration with a band playing the Minnesota Rouser and his supporters taking up a WE WANT ROLVAAG chant. The WE WANT ROLVAAG yells soon became drowned by the more indignant WE WANT KEITH shouts. The chair pounded for order. Dr. Kubicek bulled his way to the speaker's rostrum, seized the microphone and yelled: "Mr. Chairman, the delegates resent this rude intrusion." It was plain that from that point on there would be no holds barred.

The chair had earlier announced that traditional convention rules regarding the counting of ballots had been altered: instead of being announced by county, the ballots would be taken and totaled and announced by congressional district. The chair explained that to do otherwise would violate the secret ballot.

Before 6:00 the results of the first ballot were announced, and they were: Keith 612.43; Rolvaag 491.56. Seven hundred thirty-six votes were needed to endorse.

After 6:00 a rumor was out that John Blatnik was going to make a public declaration of his support for Keith. In the period between 6:00 and 8:00 the second ballot was taken and announced, and Keith gained 41 more votes. The Keith-Rolvaag tally was Keith, 653, Rolvaag, 452. After this second ballot was announced, Kubicek, Oberstar (Blatnik's administrative assistant), Dick Moe (Keith's floor manager) and Bob Nickloff (8th District chairman) were seen huddling on the floor in front of the speaker's platform. Kubicek informed the group that state

Senator Rudy Perpich had told him that Blatnik would address a joint meeting of the 7th and 8th Districts. The problem was that nobody knew where Blatnik was and the third ballot was coming up, and was felt to be the crucial ballot in breaking the Rolvaag strength. Kubicek ordered a recess so that Blatnik could be found to address the 7th and 8th districts. This order was relayed to the convention chairman¹³⁴ who immediately called a recess. Word was gotten to the 7th and 8th district delegations that they were to assemble upstairs.

At 8:40 the 8th district chairman Bob Nickloff was requesting all those who were not delegates from the 7th or 8th districts to leave, as Congressman Blatnik wanted to explain his position. Conspicuous as not being a member of the 7th or 8th districts was hanger-on Bill Kubicek, who stood out of the view of the delegates and privately called the gathering to order by clicking a couple of glasses and softly grunting "Hear ye, Hear ye."

Blatnik entered the room, and as he moved to the microphone, his long legs pumping, he slipped in an ironic "My apologies for keeping you waiting." He was referring to the five-minute delay in his getting to that caucus; others saw it as being more representative of his long silence as to which of the two gubernatorial candidates he would like endorsed.

I was asked to make a statement at this crucial point of the convention. The first statement is that as an individual I have no personal interest in this deal. I am totally disinterested. Number two, then why am I here? I am here because of the party, because I want to keep the party together. I have always believed in the party, all of my life. I have always supported for the past 25 years the party's slate. The essential

¹³⁴State Senator Paul Thuet was the convention chairman and a strong Keith supporter. Actually, Thuet was only the co-chairman, but because he presided over virtually the entire convention, and because the other co-chairman was also a Keith supporter, he will be referred to henceforth as the convention chairman.

interest is that we come out of here with a two-thirds endorsement. Now I have asked Sandy Keith to throw open the nominations of the convention. He has complied with this very difficult request. He has thrown open the convention and the nominations. This is a very difficult thing for him to do. As far as I am concerned, get on that floor and stick with the person who has the best chance to win. I believe that person is Sandy Keith. I do not think that Governor Rolvaag can win the nomination or the election.

As Blatnik concluded his talk, an announcement came from the back of the room that unless the 7th and 8th district delegations got back to the convention floor they would forfeit the right to vote, as balloting for the third ballot was about to begin. People started streaming out as Gerald Heaney followed Blatnik to the microphone. Heaney burst over the mike that "this is typical of the running of this convention." Somebody yelled as the people kept stampeding out "What a railroad job!" For those that remained behind and for those delegates who were still within earshot Heaney spoke:

Governor Rolvaag asks you to hold firm. Bob Short has asked me to say that he holds my position. (someone moaned audibly at the mention of Short's name: "Short got only one lousy vote.") I make the same request that John Blatnik makes, except that I feel mine is 100 per cent pure and John's is 99 per cent pure.

Coming down the stairs from the caucus, 7th and 8th district delegates were greeted by the whole cadre of smiling Keith girls, who lined each aisle, and looked demure and innocent and alert at the delegates as if to say "in your heart you know we're right."

As expected, Blatnik's talk had a measurable effect on the voting pattern of 7th and 8th district delegates. On the ballot taken immediately after the caucus, the third ballot, Keith pushed his lead over Rolvaag to 675-439, a net gain of twenty-two delegate votes. Of these twenty two, eighteen came from the 7th and 8th districts (eleven from the 7th, seven from the 8th). But Keith's

gain over the second ballot in which he gained 41 votes over the first was nearly halved on the third ballot. Just the same, the Keith people on the floor acted smug and confident, predicting that it would be all over in a matter of one or two ballots.

The fourth ballot was taken shortly before 10:00, and while it was being tallied, Dick Moe, Keith's floor manager, was seen talking to chairman Thuet. The Rolvaag forces were going to request a recess, and Moe did not want Thuet to grant it to them. He told Thuet to tell the Rolvaag representative that Keith would not go along with a motion to recess or to adjourn, "because this must be a test of endurance." Thuet accordingly called up Michael McLaughlin and told him that there would be no recess or motion to adjourn.

At 10:35 the results from the fourth ballot were in: Keith 680, Rolvaag 418. Keith's gains on the fourth ballot over the third were severely reduced, and in three successive ballots his gains had plummeted from 41-22-5.

Still the Keith leaders maintained their countenance of complete confidence. In an interview over TV, kingmaker Kubicek was asked the strategy of the Keith forces in the opening and upcoming ballots. His reply was simple: Keith was going to get the endorsement tonight if it meant staying in the convention hall all night. They would keep balloting until he won.

At 10:45 there was a motion from the floor for a 30 minute recess. It was shouted down. The delegate making the request demanded to know "why the 7th and 8th districts were able to recess and now we can't." Thuet's reply was an insolent one: "They didn't recess. They just didn't show up." The person making the request was not one to be put

down; he kept the microphone in his hand and retorted: "Then I would like to suggest that the Rolvaag people just not show up." Another delegate was recognized and said: "I want to ask the Rolvaag people to hang in all night if necessary so we can hang up this convention and take it into a primary." He was met with an avalanche of boos.

After the fifth ballot was taken the Rolvaag delegates upped and left the floor to move upstairs into district caucuses. Rolvaag appeared at the 8th district's caucus and spoke off a chair:

. . . something happened to me on the way to the convention (laughter) . . . I'm not sure what it was. This is typical of the indignities we have suffered at this convention. We requested a recess. the chair refused. The chairman of the convention had earlier condoned a recess of the 7th and 8th districts. We have been told that a county vote announcement would violate the secret ballot . . . How do you like that? The Democratic-Farmer-Labor party has come to a fine pass (shouts: "Steamroller!" "Sugar Hills!") I was being interviewed by a TV man and a man came up to me and handed me a \$100 bill and said "Here's your filing fee." (applause) As long as you have the inclination keep casting those ballots. (shouts: "We will") There has been dissension because I appointed a U. S. Senator. I have been threatened by legislators that if I don't do thus and so I would lose their county. I was earlier confronted by a man who told me that he had some credentials to present for a judgeship, and that he had six delegate votes to offer. I have too high an opinion of justice in Minnesota to trade a judicial position for any number of delegate votes . . .

There was a man from Independence once (shout: "Give 'em hell, Karl"). On the desk in his office he had a little placard on which was written one of his favorite sayings: the buck stops here. And it does. . . You have a decision to make. If this convention doesn't mend its ways as far as justice and equity goes there will be a primary in September.

As the delegates cheered Rolvaag's pep talk, Heaney interrupted with the message: "I would like to interrupt to say that on the last

ballot Governor Rolvaag gained and Keith lost." The delegates headed back to the convention floor like storm troopers.

On the fifth ballot, Keith had lost 14 votes, falling to 666, and Rolvaag had gained 16 votes, moving up to 434. It was the occasion for a tremendous psychological uplift for the Rolvaag forces. Especially dramatic was the reading of the district-by-district vote. It had earlier been announced by the chair that all of the Hennepin County votes would be announced together with the 5th District's total, rather than having suburban Hennepin County's votes announced with the 3rd District, where it is technically located. Thus, Anoka County, which makes up the other half of the 3rd District, was, for all intents and purposes, the total that was announced for the 3rd District. Through the first four ballots the chairman had announced the 3rd District totals as "Anoka County -- Keith 32 votes, Rolvaag 0." On the fifth ballot the announcement came out, completely unexpected, as "Anoka County -- Keith 31 votes, Rolvaag 1 vote." The reaction of the convention was indescribable: a wild, spontaneous surge that was frightening in its strength. Keith's stronghold had been broken. The psychology of the convention was suddenly reversed; it was the turn for the Rolvaag delegates to slap backs, the Keith supporters to sit stunned and subdued. The sixth ballot was taken at 12:15 a.m.

John Blatnik had for his headquarters three adjoining rooms: #1153, 1151, and 1159. Gathered all in room #1153 were Keith, Eugene Foley, Eugene McCarthy, John Blatnik, Bill Kubicek, Maurice Tobin (Blatnik's aide), Bob Hess (AFL-CIO Minnesota vice-president), George Farr (DFL state chairman) Neil Peterson (an aide from Vice-President Humphrey's office), Earl Bester (Steelworkers Union boss), and Larry Yetka, former chairman of the 8th district.

In the adjoining room people came and went, not realizing what was happening in the room next door. Bob Hess came out of 1153 to get some ice cubes and muttered through the cigar clenched in his teeth that "We're going to take a recess." Shortly after he returned to the conference room, Bill Kubicek hurried out and left the eleventh floor rooms. All those in room #1151 were watching the TV broadcast of the convention which was still being held downstairs. Blatnik came out of room #1149 and paused long enough to listen to the TV announcer give the results of the sixth ballot: Keith 659, Rolvaag 440. Keith had lost one more, Rolvaag had picked up six more. Just as the announcer finished giving these results, who should pop up at his side on the TV screen but Bill Kubicek, who but a few minutes earlier had been hurrying out of the room (since the elevators were not serviceable, Kubicek must have had access to one of the freight elevators, which is a political convention's status symbol of sorts). Kubicek had just relayed the bosses' message to the chairman that it was time to adjourn, and the TV interviewer was curious about this reversal in Kubicek's attitude.

TV announcer: "Dr. Kubicek, you came in here tonight and told our viewers that the Keith forces would stay here all night if necessary. Now the change of mind. How do you account for this?"

Dr. Kubicek: "It's simple. We changed our mind."

Back on the eleventh floor, Gene McCarthy moved from room #1149, paused for a second in #1151, and quietly inquired of a bystander: "We're looking for a third candidate. Is there anyone here who wants to run?" Then he moved behind the closed door of #1153.

It was 1:20, and down on the mezzanine Rolvaag was bidding his delegates good night:

I'd like to take just a moment of your time. From Florence and me and the people of Minnesota I would like to say "Our thanks to you." The switchboard is jammed with people calling long distance from all over the state saying "HANG TOUGH!" (applause) Of course we recessed when they wanted to. It was done for a purpose. It's to get time before 10:00 tomorrow morning. Let's be just as firm . . . as firm as Minnesotans are . . .

At 8:30 the next morning in the Leamington lobby Eugene Foley, who party leaders had reached a consensus over as a compromise candidate in the probable convention deadlock, confided to Gerald Heaney that, "We have to take two ballots and then break." Heaney shortly after explained that his feeling was that if Rolvaag gained on the morning's first ballot, he should go to the convention and explain thusly: it is apparent that a deadlock has developed. The delegates ought to be given an opportunity with a limited number of ballots to choose another candidate, with both he (Rolvaag) and Keith withdrawing. If Keith refused to do this he, Rolvaag, would be a candidate in a primary. Heaney expressed a concern that the chance to beat Keith on the certain early deadlock would slip by unless immediate action was taken. He noted the fact that the Keith supporters were putting pressure on Minneapolis Mayor Arthur Naftalin, who throughout the first six ballots had fluctuated between zero and twelve votes for governor, to withdraw and pledge his support to Sandy Keith.

The seventh ballot was taken at approximately 10:40 that Sunday morning. Before its results were announced, Dick Moe conferred on the floor with chairman Thuet thusly: "The Rolvaag people want to have another ballot and then recess, but if Sandy's going down we don't want that. Let's recess now. Aren't there some committee reports or

platform reports that we can throw at them?" Moe then walked over to Kubicek, who indicated that he thought it was too early for a recess. The seventh ballot was announced: Keith 659, Rolvaag 436. Naftalin had received 10 votes. Keith had gained no ground and Rolvaag had picked up six votes. Again Kubicek ruled that "We can't recess. It's too early for a recess." The eighth ballot was taken and announced around dinner time: Keith 658, Rolvaag 431, Naftalin 12. No progress for either Rolvaag or Keith. Clearly, it was a hung convention.

But the Keith people held on and arranged so that Keith could make an unannounced appearance on the floor early after the dinner hour. His talk to the convention was an intensely dramatic one:

Let me just say a few words . . . We are not only dealing with the future of Sandy Keith or Governor Rolvaag . . . we are dealing with the whole future of the DFL party. There is only one way -- the endorsement procedure. Let me tell you something: we will be destroyed in a primary. I don't have to tell you great people of the 7th district about a party fight . . . there is no one who has played it as straight as I have, and I still maintain that it has to be two-thirds endorsement. Some people are still saying that I did something wrong with American Allied. I did absolutely nothing wrong. Anybody who can get 60 per cent of the votes without offering anybody anything ought to be given serious consideration . . . I want to tell the Rolvaag supporters that I am not a vindictive person. I'll go out and get those legislative candidates . . . All I can say is that I've made the case clear and it is time for a decision.

One could not help but be moved by Keith's plea; it was met with a thundering ovation.

Moments later the governor appeared up on the dais. He came up to the speaker's platform smiling:

My fellow delegates; this is a precedent shattering convention. Yesterday as I came on the floor as a

unanimously elected delegate somebody suggested that my action was improper. I came to cast my vote (yell from the crowd: "and you brought a brass band.") I just came from my headquarters, where I was made two propositions. I rejected both of them. . . . Those who say there has been no arm twisting know better. Congressmen and members of the legislature have come to me and said that unless I do thus and so I shall not receive their county delegations My decision as governor won't be based on those friends. Suggestions have been made in other branches of government, but I don't need another job.

You represent between 600 - 700,000 voters. You don't represent a special interest or a labor union; or an education official; or a mentally retarded person; not the onrushing students of our junior colleges; the downtrodden or misrepresented; the farmer, or businessman. You as elected representatives represent all of the segments. Your decisions must be soberly arrived at. Nobody is going to work them out for you. I don't expect that the Lieutenant Governor or I are going to drop out. There is a court of last resort and that is the primary. (Boos) Just a minute please. I am sure neither of us would like to go that way.

I have taken issue with a great deal of decision here, but so be it . . . so be it. But I have never lost a statewide election. Never. And I don't intend to begin in 1966.

The appearance of the two candidates before the convention was to prove to be the turning point of the battle. On the ninth ballot taken just after Rolvaag finished his talk, Keith finally broke Rolvaag's stranglehold over his progress, by moving from 658 to 665 votes. Just before the tenth ballot was taken, a remark was overheard near the dais that "Naftalin's votes are all ours (Keith's)." The tenth ballot was taken, after which the 8th District delegates moved upstairs for another caucus. The feeling before the tenth ballot was announced was that Keith had been effectively stopped, and upstairs the congressional delegation was really going to work in finding an acceptable third candidate. Chairman Nickloff tempered the tone of his message to the 8th District delegates accordingly. Instead

of a re-affirmation of Congressman Blatnik's earlier endorsement of Keith, Nickloff recommended that "we all re-examine our situations. We must endorse." Blatnik's talk had been just as non-committal;

I want to tell you that I had no pre-knowledge of this caucus. We fight like this once in a while in Congress. This is democracy. . . trial by ordeal . . . There have been no deal arrangements. I have nothing further to report. Please do as you think you should.

The ostensible rationale behind Blatnik's action was that he believed at this point that Keith had been stopped, and as his primary consideration all along had been to avoid a primary, it was now necessary to search out another candidate who could win endorsement. Just at that time the congressional delegation had Congressman Donald Fraser reluctantly considering to bail the party out of its jam by offering himself as the compromise candidate.

While Blatnik was being interviewed after the caucus by Robert O'Keefe of the St. Paul Pioneer Press, he was asked who was being considered as the third candidate. Blatnik demurred, but when O'Keefe point-blank asked him if Fraser was considering making the race, Blatnik replied: "Very reluctantly. Only very reluctantly would Don accept it." Just at that point, Dick Moe, Keith's floor manager, came rushing into the room to tell Blatnik that Keith had picked up and broke 680 on the just-announced tenth ballot, and that he thought he (Keith) could break 700 on the next two ballots. At news of this, Blatnik perked up and said that, all right, he would give Keith two more ballots to crack 700 before the 8th district caucused again. Blatnik had obviously sensed a break toward Keith and wanted to wait it out before asking Fraser to make any kind of decision.

Downstairs the eleventh ballot was hurriedly taken, and after it, the Rolvaag delegates gathered for another caucus in the basement

of the hotel. Rolvaag had abandoned the jaunty demeanor which he had presented at the previous caucuses, and he spoke very grimly now:

You've heard the results of the last ballot. We were at this position yesterday. Hopefully you can go out and advance persuasive arguments on why you want to remain a group. There is a cause much bigger than an individual here . . . that is strengthening the liberal movement in Minnesota. I am just the vehicle. As long as we have the spine and the backbone of that man Harry S. Truman our party is destined for success . . . you know one or two persons who can respond to reason and justice at this moment of truth.

Shouts of feigned enthusiasm, WE WANT KARL!, started, but quickly died out. Things looked bad for Rolvaag and his loyalists.

Keith continued to gain as the eleventh ballot was announced: Keith 689, Rolvaag 423. Also, with the announcement of the eleventh ballot the chairman read for the first time the corresponding percentages: Keith 61.69%, Rolvaag 37.86%; another convention-controlled tactic, and extremely effective.

The twelfth ballot was taken and announced at 5:30. Keith had broken 700 on the second ballot after the 8th district caucus, just as he said he would: Keith 705, Rolvaag 408. The hall was gripped with a bandwagon psychology. Somebody from the 3rd District was recognized on the floor and declared: "I have voted 12 times for Governor Rolvaag. I cannot so vote again. I do not wish to deny the endorsement to Keith because of a handful of votes."

The chair gavelled for order: "Your attention please. We are balloting now, hoping that this will be the last ballot." His flagrantly partisan conduct of the convention was met with applause. Through the 8th District delegation Keith supporters were moving from

chair to chair, grabbing delegates by the shoulder, pounding them on the backs, urging their Rolvaag friends: "Come on -- let's make it solid."

Within twenty minutes after having taken the ballot, the results were announced; the thirteenth ballot pushed Keith up to 716, or 63%; Rolvaag for the first time had dipped below the 400 vote mark, with 398, or 37%.

Recognized in the center of the convention floor was Bob Short, owner of the Leamington Hotel, long declared to be a candidate for governor if Rolvaag chose not to run. He spoke for Rolvaag: "The governor urges us to take this important ballot, right away, to show that we will stick with Rolvaag." The Keith management was glad to oblige, and rammed through another ballot and had the results within the hour: Keith 709, Rolvaag 405. Keith had lost ground on the fourteenth ballot. The Keith forces didn't pause to ask why, but steamrolled through the fifteenth ballot at 7:40. By 7:50 the results were tallied; Keith had lost ground again, had dipped to 702, while Rolvaag had picked up to 407. It was then that the Keith floor managers caught the drift of what had happened.

As mentioned earlier, before the tenth ballot was announced, Don Fraser was considering offering himself to the convention as a compromise candidate. Keith's having broken 680 on the tenth ballot precluded that possibility.

But the possibility had not been precluded in the mind of Gerry Heaney. Heaney has been rightfully referred to as one of the shrewdest political operators in Minnesota. When he learned, up at the congressional delegation's meeting, that Fraser would possibly

accept the role of compromise candidate, he started to work on the floor, informing various delegates throughout the hall that if a deadlock developed, Don Fraser would be the candidate for governor. In a political convention, such rumors have the force of fact. When Keith began suddenly and mysteriously to lose votes on the fourteenth ballot, someone went up and told Fraser what Heaney was doing.

Heaney and Fraser had long been political allies. Heaney and Freeman were close friends from the early forties and law school, and Fraser had joined Freeman's law firm when he graduated from the University of Minnesota Law School. Fraser had watched Heaney work in various capacities for Governor Freeman and realized the skill and effectiveness with which the Duluth lawyer worked at DFL conventions. When he heard what was happening, he rushed down to the floor, fought his way through the crowd of delegates that Heaney was working on, and said: "Gerry, I am not a candidate for governor. I had agreed that if the convention were deadlocked I would consider being a compromise candidate for governor." Heaney stared first at Fraser, then turned to the small group that he had been informing of the good news and blithely said: "In that case all we have to do is deadlock the convention."

When Keith took yet another dip on the fifteenth ballot, Fraser knew of no way to stop Heaney than to go right to the speaker's stand and tell the delegates of his status. Just before 8:00 Fraser looked out at the convention and said:

There is talk in this convention that I am available for the endorsement if a deadlock develops. I know of no such agreement . . . I will continue as fervently as ever my support for the person I gave the nominating speech for . . .

From that point on, it was all downhill for the Rolvaag forces. After the sixteenth ballot was taken at 8:05, it was agreed by both sides that there would be a meeting downstairs for all the Rolvaag people and upstairs for the Keith people. In an emotion-laden finale, Rolvaag thanked his supporters:

I want to bring you up to date on some recent developments. . . . Since the eleventh or twelfth ballot I've been meeting on the 14th floor in the interests of party unity I suggested two alternatives: 1) an open primary; 2) both Keith and I withdraw, remove ourselves as candidates (shouts: "No! No!"). Many of you signed a statement saying you are bound to me. I know the situation. Many of you have to work tonight or drive two to three-hundred miles home. Therefore, I want to release you so that you might vote your conscience. (Shouts: "We have." An old man with a heavy accent burst out from the back: "Where in hell we ever going to get a good man like you?") I will never lead you in surrender. You are the conscience of the party I feel rather like Adlai Stevenson did on the night of his 1952 defeat, when he said: "I'm too old to cry, but it hurts too much to laugh." words begin to fade I cannot now make an announcement about a primary in September.

Rolvaag's friends held on for four more hours, gallant and tight-lipped to the end.

It must be emphasized that those who surrounded Keith in an advisory capacity up to and through the convention, notably Dr. Kubicek and Forrest Harris, were, with few significant exceptions, those same hard-core intellectual few who had reacted so strongly against labor's 1961 endorsement of Rolvaag, and who had scuttled Rolvaag's administration virtually from the first day he entered the governor's office. It is important also that Keith was able to use the Lieutenant Governorship as a springboard to his gubernatorial crusade owing partly to the efforts of Kubicek, who had nominated him for the Lieutenant Governorship's position at the 1962 DFL state convention. As Keith

once remarked: "Dr. Kubicek . . (was) one of my earliest political fathers."¹³⁵

The dissidents had indeed excelled at their job of fomenting dissension; their singleness of purpose throughout the three and one-half years of the Rolvaag administration was almost fanatical, obsessive. Gerald Heaney wrote to the governor in December, 1964:

. . . I am constantly appalled at the fact that so many of our key people in the party . . . in the Twin Cities area are repeating publicly time and time again that your chances of being re-elected in 1966 are very poor . . . Somehow we must get the leaders in the Twin Cities area thinking and acting a good deal more positively than they are at the present time. 136

There was an old saying that used to go: "Tell me the price of hogs and I'll tell you who's gonna win." As regards the DFL that saying could be altered to read: "Tell me the degree of dissension in the Minneapolis DFL and I'll figure out the statewide DFL consensus."

The 1966 DFL state convention was truly the creation of the small group of Minneapolis DFL intellectual dissidents. This is not to deny that the delegates were elected in a most democratic way or that they duly and democratically elected Keith as their gubernatorial candidate.

In the beginning, however, there was the labor-intellectual split over Rolvaag. Nothing else is explainable apart from that most fundamental fact.

For nearly three weeks -- the period from June 20 to July 9 -- the attention of the state was riveted on the balding party wheelhorse who had been ignominiously dumped by his own party. DFL party leadership from Vice-President Humphrey on down publicly urged Rolvaag to avoid further dissension in the DFL by not filing in the primary. The

¹³⁵ Informal talk with Sandy Keith, June 4, 1966, Cloquet, Minnesota.

¹³⁶ Correspondence of Gerald W. Heaney, December 17, 1964.

vice-president made a postconvention plea for all DFLers to unite behind Keith, and made public the fact that he had advised Rolvaag not to challenge the endorsee. Congressmen John Blatnik and Donald Fraser, who had actively supported Keith during the convention, issued the same plea. Congressman Alec Olson, who had stayed by Rolvaag at the convention, joined his congressional brethren in requesting Rolvaag's acceptance of the convention's decision, as did Congressman Joe Karth, who had maintained a discreet neutrality throughout the feud. Even Walter Mondale, the man Rolvaag appointed to the senate position, and the man who had given the nominating speech for Rolvaag, urged acquiescence upon the governor. Only senior senator Eugene McCarthy stood apart and refused to endorse Keith.

But Rolvaag, with the virtue of a Missouri mule, was to make clear, in his own curiously endearing way, that he did not take his marching orders from Washington. After returning from the Midwestern Governor's Conference the week following the convention, the governor maintained a cryptic silence about his political plans. He and his wife left the Capitol for three days of vacation. Upon returning to St. Paul he said he was "gratified" by the encouragement he had been getting, but said he was still undecided about whether he would challenge Keith in a primary. He acknowledged that his office had been receiving thousands of letters, telegrams, and other communications since the convention, all in favor of his running in the primary.¹³⁷

Then, on Saturday, July 2, Rolvaag went to the streets to sound out the sentiment of the rank and file. He chose Hibbing for his sounding board, the heartland of the DFL stronghold in the 8th District.

¹³⁷Minneapolis Tribune, July 2, 1966.

Accompanied by Representative Jack Fena, Municipal Judge Arvid Nasi, and St. Louis County DFL chairman Joe Chamernick, Rolvaag strode out to the Hibbing sidewalks, unannounced, and waited to see the reaction.

It is a distance of one and one-quarter blocks from Jack Fena's law office, in downtown Hibbing, to the Androy Hotel, a walk of less than five minutes. Rolvaag started to measure this distance at 11:40. He did not get five steps before a middle-aged miner recognized him, forcibly arrested his progress, and burst out about what "a railroad job" the convention had given him. Rolvaag had barely finished thanking his first unsolicited supporter when the same thing happened with another passer-by, and another, and yet another. By the time Rolvaag had reached the Androy, it was 12:35; it had taken the governor fifty-five minutes to walk a little over a block. That short walk went a long way in making up Rolvaag's mind about what he should do. Why not let the people decide?

Two days later Rolvaag left the state to attend the National Governor's Conference in Los Angeles, California. He was not scheduled to return until the following Friday. Accompanying the governor to Los Angeles was David Roe, business representative of the Minneapolis Building and Construction Trades Council, and president of the Minnesota Building and Construction Trades Council, and I. J. (Slim) Oakes, president of the Minneapolis Building Trades Council.¹³⁸

On the Friday he returned from the Governor's Conference, Rolvaag called a press conference for 8:30 the next morning, in the governor's office. The next morning he told the jammed roomful of reporters, cameramen, and photographers that he would be a candidate for the DFL

¹³⁸ Minneapolis Star, July 12, 1966.

endorsement for governor in the September primary. "The people have a right to decide," the governor declared.

With Rolvaag's announcement of his candidacy, it was labor's turn to assume the center stage of DFL politics, just as the intellectual elements of the party, with Sugar Hills and the 1966 state convention as their creations, had shared the limelight up to July, 1966. The events immediately following Rolvaag's announcement bring us full-circle in our discussion of Rolvaag's relationship to labor and the intellectuals.

LABOR AND A MASSIVE PUBLIC REPUDIATION OF THE PARTY'S ENDORSEMENT

Once Rolvaag had decided to challenge Keith in a primary the reaction of labor to the convention's endorsement of Keith was swift and unequivocal. On the Monday evening following Rolvaag's Saturday announcement, the legislative committee of the St. Paul Trades and Labor Assembly met. The session had been called to review recommendations of the Trades and Labor executive committee relative to supporting legislative candidates in the St. Paul area. A vote on the gubernatorial endorsements was not scheduled, because a screening of the candidates normally preceded any endorsement action, and neither Rolvaag nor Keith had appeared before the screening committee. A motion was made from the floor to support Rolvaag, and when some Keith backers tried to table it, they were outvoted. The oral vote which followed for Rolvaag practically "tore the roof off" according to John O'Hara, representative of the bartenders union, who sat on the legislative committee.¹³⁹ Interestingly enough, the same John

¹³⁹Minneapolis Star, July 12, 1966.

O'Hara had been one of the small group who in 1961 engineered the surprise endorsement of Rolvaag at the state AFL-CIO convention.

Although the legislative committee's vote for Rolvaag would simply serve as a recommendation to the full assembly of the St. Paul Building and Trades union which would meet later in the week to consider formal endorsements, it triggered action by other labor groups.

The next day, Tuesday, July 12, two leaders of the Minneapolis Building Trades Council said they were recommending the endorsement of Rolvaag for governor to the board of the Building Trades Council which planned to meet at 10:00 the next morning. Dave Roe, the council's business representative, and I. J. Oakes, the council's president, the two men who had accompanied Rolvaag to Los Angeles, said that they expected their recommendations to be approved, in which case the endorsement would go before the full Trades and Labor group the next evening.¹⁴⁰ The executive board of the Minneapolis Building Trades Council voted the next day to recommend to its council members that they support Rolvaag. It also directed that a communication be sent to the Minneapolis Central Labor Union and the United Labor Committee, recommending similar support for Rolvaag.¹⁴¹

Meeting the next day, a delegate assembly of the Minneapolis Central Labor Union accepted the recommendation of the Building Trades Council and endorsed Rolvaag. The CLU's endorsement of Rolvaag was especially significant because the head of its executive committee was Robert Gomsrud, who had long been a Keith supporter. When the delegates assembled in the Minneapolis Labor Temple, the Executive

¹⁴⁰Minneapolis Tribune, July 13, 1966.

¹⁴¹Minneapolis Star, July 13, 1966.

Committee, through Gomsrud, made a recommendation to the delegates suggesting postponement of a gubernatorial endorsement for two weeks. The purpose of recommending the postponement was to honor written requests by Rolvaag and Keith to present their cases personally at a special meeting July 27.¹⁴² When put to a vote, however, the motion was overwhelmingly defeated. The Central Labor Union, representing some 41,000 members, officially went on record as supporting Rolvaag's attempt at re-election in the September primary.

That same evening, the St. Paul Trades and Labor Assembly, which represents some 50,000 union members, also accepted the recommendation of its legislative committee, despite the wishes of its ranking leaders. Adolph Tobler, executive secretary of the assembly and a strong Keith supporter, and Richard Radman, assembly secretary and Keith's chief lieutenant in the St. Paul labor movement, made a recommendation that the assembly reject the report of the legislative committee and postpone endorsement for governor until after the primary. The delegates rode roughshod over the motion, and on a standing vote, over 200 of the 250 delegates voted against delay of endorsement.¹⁴³ "I've never seen such a reaction in all my life," said the startled Radman, referring to the pro-Rolvaag reaction among the workers. "Everybody is for Rolvaag."¹⁴⁴

One week later Rolvaag completed a clean sweep of endorsements from the major labor organizations in the Twin Cities, when he won, without dissent, the backing of the 60,000 member United Labor Committee and the 33,000 member Political Education Committee of Teamster Joint Council 32.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴²Minneapolis Tribune, July 14, 1966.

¹⁴³Ibid.

¹⁴⁴Minneapolis Star, July 14, 1966.

¹⁴⁵Minneapolis Tribune, July 21, 1966.

No more of the story need be told. The overwhelming support of Rolvaag by organized labor put Keith at such a decisive disadvantage that he was never able to get his campaign moving successfully. What was expressed so well by labor's support of Rolvaag was their resentment of the party's disregard for the virtue of loyalty -- of the men beneath to the man above.

Rolvaag easily won the September primary -- by a better than 2 1/2 to 1 margin. But it was at the expense of party unity. By September 14 the DFL was shattered to the core. It was not important what the Republicans were presenting as a challenge; for if it be true, as Samuel Lubell writes in his Future of American Politics, that the political warfare of any particular period is to be found in the conflict among the clashing elements of the majority party¹⁴⁶, the key to the Republican victory in November was that the two basic elements of the DFL -- labor and the intellectuals -- had clubbed each other insensible and were unfit for November competition.

Karl Rolvaag was the victim.

¹⁴⁶Samuel Lubell, Future of American Politics (Garden City, 1951) p. 217.

CHAPTER V

EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION

In November a meeting of 18 rank-and-file labor representatives from throughout Minnesota was called to discuss a possible change in the labor movement's historical political alliance with the DFL party. AFL-CIO federation secretary-treasurer Neil Sherburne said the meeting was called because "there is a feeling on the part of some labor people that we're too closely allied with one party."¹ "What the rank and file is saying is that they're tired of having the DFL party tell them what to do," Sherburne went on to say.

Later in December DFL party leaders held a meeting and conferred on party reconstruction. At the meeting, the leaders authorized the appointment of a legislative advisory committee to assist DFL lawmakers during the 1967 legislative session and to help build a record on which the party's candidates could run in the 1968 elections. William Wright, associate professor in the University of Minnesota history department, was named chairman.

The leaders also authorized the formation of a policy advisory committee to update the broad philosophical goals of liberalism, "now that many of the old ones had been enacted into law under the Johnson administration."² Chairman of the committee would be Eugene Eidenberg, assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota.

¹Minneapolis Star, November 20, 1966.

²Minneapolis Tribune, December 18, 1966.

According to the newspaper report on the meeting, the new committee would be expected

to include additional representatives of the academic committee and . . . to warm party relationships with intellectuals, relationships which some leaders feel have been neglected. 3

The leaders also created a committee to set up a series of issues conferences during the next two years. Two of the five-member committee were William Kubicek, Bloomington, party secretary, and Forrest Harris, Minneapolis, party 1st vice chairman.

The old forces were starting to reassert themselves.

It cannot be emphasized too much that the labor-intellectual alliance arose in the 1930's as a result of a misreading by intellectuals of the nature and purposes of labor unions. Intellectuals joined ranks with organized labor because they saw unions as a vehicle for social advance, as a first step toward accomplishing their grand vision of the national welfare and the good society. The workingman welcomed the aid of the intellectual because it helped effect concrete improvement of working conditions, which is all the workingman cared about.

Inside a political coalition dominated by such disparate orientations it was perhaps an inevitable step to a rule-or-ruin competition between the rival elements. Such a psychology began forming in the Minneapolis Democratic-Farmer-Labor party organization during the 1950's.

³ Ibid.

Inside the labor-intellectual DFL alliance the dominant question for each element gradually became not what could be done with the power of Minneapolis city government but how could power be seized by one element of the party to the exclusion of the other.

This mentality spread to the statewide level in 1961 with labor's endorsement of Rolvaag for governor. A perpetuation of the problem on a statewide level was assured when Rolvaag appointed as his executive secretary a man who was a veteran partisan in the city split, the representative of the anti-intellectual forces in the long-smoldering Minneapolis feud. This appointment as much as anything doomed Rolvaag's chances of achieving rapprochement with the Twin Cities intellectual community.

As for Sandy Keith -- there is an axiom in politics that a candidate for any office is not simply the expression of individual ambition but is the gathering place of many men's ambitions.⁴ So Keith was a gathering place for the out-of-power dissidents. Such was the role history chose for him to play and lose.

But the DFL in 1967 faces the more serious problem of the future. The New Deal-type coalition which has been described and which paid off so handsomely for the party in the 1950's is not likely to be restored in its original form. The reason is that the aspirations of liberal intellectuals, which were largely social and economic in the 1930's and 1940's, have become cultural and moral in the 1950's and 1960's, and so no longer coincide with those of organized labor, which remain social and economic today.⁵

⁴Theodore White, The Making of the President, 1960 (New York, 1961), p. 57.

⁵Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. writes thusly about the new liberal coalition:

If the DFL party is to once again become a strong and united liberal coalition, it faces three problems. It is first necessary that the differences between its members and the Republican party become greater than their internal differences. The election of 1966, which took on the proportions of a political catastrophe for the DFL, should go far toward fulfilling this basic condition.

The second problem demands a more responsible attitude by both elements of the party. The intellectuals must define the issues of the day and must somehow bring labor back into the fold by proposing common purposes and common objectives. Minnesota labor, for its part, will have to expand its sense and concern of the public interest.

Third, it is necessary that a strong leader emerge to lead the party, someone who can command the respect of the intellectual community but still speak labor's language, one who has the charismatic qualities to conciliate and win the approval of both the Keith and Rolvaag segments of the party.

But if there is lurking in the ranks such a DFL leader, one somehow feels that he must be a lonely man.

The New Deal program tackled the elemental needs of the American people -- a job, a suit of clothing, three meals a day, a roof over one's head, and a measure of security for old age. Because the New Deal secured the basis of life for so many, contemporary liberalism has been able to move on to qualitative tasks -- to measures, in other words, designed to improve the quality of life in an industrial society. These are the issues of civil rights, of education, of urban planning, of the state of the arts and the beauty of the environment.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Liberal Coalition," Progressive, XXXI (April, 1967), 15.

APPENDIX I

Arthur Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal: "While labor's right to organize had been recognized under law for nearly a century, so too had been management's right to resist labor organization. Section 7a of the National Industrial Recovery Act, passed by Congress in 1933, greatly circumscribed the legal right of business to exterminate trade unionism . . . On the other hand the nature of the guarantees extended to labor remained enigmatic." (p. 136) "The meaning of 7a, in short, would be determined in large part not by the words of the act but by the pressure management and labor could bring to bear on the process of interpretation." (p. 137) "For labor, 7a thus meant protection of the right to organize independent unions; for management (or, at least for a vocal and powerful part of it), it meant the right to install company unions. When the two interpretations clashed, the result was very often a strike." (p. 145) "Obviously, this could not be enough; before the law could be executed, it had to be interpreted. Early in August, Johnson set up a new body, the National Labor Board, to handle labor disputes arising under the NRA." (p. 146) "There was spreading business discontent. Throughout the process the employer was denied the pleasure of discharging the union men in his plant or of exercising the other forms of economic coercion he had used to such advantage in the past. As the sense of crisis receded during the fall, employers began to defy the Board." (p. 148) "By this time, Senator Wagner, long since despairing of progress through the NLB, had begun work on a bill designed to establish by statute a new labor board with enforcement powers. Drafted under the direction of Leon Keyserling of Wagner's office, the bill was introduced in the Senate in March, 1934. Its provisions authorized the new board to hold elections, to prohibit acts of coercion and restraint by the employer, and to require management to do business with the designated representatives of a majority of the workers." (p. 150) "On June 29 Roosevelt established the National Labor Relations Board . . . The new Board had more status and power than the National Labor Board which it superseded." (p. 397) "By March, 1935, however, the NLRB seemed to have come to the end of its tether. Enforcement through NRA was not only increasingly problematic but increasingly ineffective; and, of the thirty-three cases the NLRB had referred to the Department of Justice, practically nothing was heard of most of them again." (p. 400) "A year before Senator Wagner had perceived the difficulty and proposed a remedy. In 1934 Roosevelt had been able to sidetrack the Wagner bill." (Ibid.) "On February 21, 1935, Wagner introduced the new bill into the Senate . . . His bill proposed to give the NLRB new power . . . power to order elections; power to define and prohibit unfair labor practices (such as the employer-dominated company union, the discriminatory discharge of union members, or the refusal to bargain in good faith); power to enforce decision through machinery modeled on that of the Federal Trade Commission. The aspirations of Section 7a at last had the promise of becoming enforceable realities." (p. 401) "On May 24 he (FDR) convened a White House conference where Wagner and Richberg debated the measure. In the course of the discussion it at last became clear that he wanted the Wagner bill in some form. (p. 405)

APPENDIX II

Sidney Hillman's statement upon formation of C.I.O.-P.A.C. in 1943:

The C.I.O.P.A.C. was organized in July, 1943, by the Congress of Industrial Organizations for the primary purpose of arousing the working men and women of America to a sense of their own responsibility as citizens of this nation, and, in a broader sense, as citizens of a free world. What really started the C.I.O.P.A.C. happened the year before the organization came into being. The Congressional elections held in November, 1942, gave clear evidence that a powerful reactionary trend had set in, which, if it continued through 1944, might well reverse all the progress of recent years, and render this nation incapable of making its indispensable contribution toward the eventual establishment of lasting peace. One could not help but recall the congressional elections of 1918, in which Woodrow Wilson lost control of both Houses of Congress, and with it a large measure of his prestige. One could not help but remember the dire consequences both at home and abroad . . . The 1942 elections left President Roosevelt with a reduced but still substantial Democratic majority in the Senate and a bare majority in the House. But this distinction was illusory. Actually, through the Unholy Alliance of obstructionist Republicans and reactionary Democrats, a coalition had come into power which was determined not merely to block any further progressive legislation, but to undermine where possible the whole structure of the New Deal Reform . . . Did this mean the American people had changed its mind? We thought not. We thought not, because an analysis of the vote cast in the 1942 election clearly showed what had happened. Only a little more than 28,000,000 American citizens had cast their ballots in these elections, as against 49,800,000 in 1940. Almost 22,000,000 Americans who had voted in the presidential year had failed to go to the polls two years later. The percentage of those who failed to vote was highest among the normally progressive groups of the population and lowest among those population groups which are normally conservative. The inference was clear: the forces of reaction were organized for political action; the progressive forces were not organized . . . That is why the C.I.O.P.A.C. was born one year later.

Sidney Hillman, "The Truth About the P.C.C.," New Republic, CXI (August 21, 1944), 209-211.

APPENDIX III

Mr. Charles Bannister, Chairman
Duluth A.F.L.-C.I.O.
Providence Building
Duluth, Minnesota

Dear Mr. Bannister:

I read in the Labor World where Steve Larson stated that Washington wanted a full report on why the 8th District was able to maintain its position in the last election as being the most liberal district in the State of Minnesota and why we did so well in that election. In view of the fact that I was rather close to that election I would like to express my views and to have them transmitted along with whatever report you may be sending in. You will note that I speak rather frankly so I assume that this letter is to be used in a confidential manner.

1. A high degree of cooperation between the A.F.L., the C.I.O., and the Railroad Brotherhood.
2. Activity on a year around basis, not only a month or two before election. I believe that we are the only Congressional District in the State of Minnesota that maintains a full time office of the Democratic Party, that has regular meetings at all levels within the party, that sponsors fund raising and other events over the period of years. Examples of activities that I think were important are these:
 - (a) Our policy of keeping our membership informed of legislative activity during the last session of the Legislature. Thus, Nick Krmpotich was representing the Steelworkers and I was representing the A.F.L. and we both made frequent reports.
 - (b) Our policy of bringing Governor Freeman into the 8th District on frequent occasions to make reports.
 - (c) The big fund raising dinner we had a year ago in Duluth at which we raised approximately \$16,000.
 - (d) The many meetings and conferences that we held with various department heads and other constitutional officers of the state during the year.
3. Well developed union activity. I suspect that if we were to be honest that we would say that the most important part of our victory was the tremendous job that our women did. You will recall that our women's organization made a complete check of the registration of both the A.F.L. and C.I.O. That they called all members of organized labor who were not registered at least once and in many cases two or three times. That on election day they again called all of the registered voters who live in the 58th or 59th Legislative District at least once and many of the women volunteered on election day for house to house work in the same area. Not only did they vigorously participate

APPENDIX III (CONTINUED)

in these election and pre-election day activities, but they sponsored a series of coffee parties in all sections of the City of Duluth which were tremendously important in acquainting our working wives with the issues. As a result of the activities of the women in the City of Duluth it is my very, very strong feeling that we just didn't lose the votes of the working wives in the City of Duluth and on the Range that they lost in many other areas of the country.

4. The effective work of the Duluth Labor World in educating our membership on a year-round basis.

5. The fact that by and large all of our State Legislators campaigned in support of the entire D.F.L. ticket. In other words, they just weren't out for themselves, but they were campaigning for everybody from Stevenson on down to the lowest Democratic office holder.

6. The fact that Governor Freeman and Congressman Blatnik have done a good job for the 8th District in terms of roads, schools, and other area development projects, and the fact that whenever anything has been done for the district by either of these men that we make positive that the public knows about it and knows why we received the project.

There are many other reasons why we did as well as we did, but I think that the ones that I mentioned above are probably the most important.

Sincerely yours,

Gerald W. Heaney
Democratic National Committeeman

December 3, 1956

APPENDIX IV

Summary of Hubert Humphrey's testimony before the city charter commission in which he argued the need for city charter reform; November 1, 1945.

As it now functions, the city government suffers from the lack of centralized administrative responsibility. Administrative functions today are being performed by the mayor's office, by the city council, the park board, the welfare board, the library board, the board of estimate and taxation, the city comptroller, the city treasurer, the building commission and the four independent retirement fund agencies . . .

The position of the mayor in our system is most unusual. He is the chief executive of the city, and the public, not understanding the real nature of its government, holds him responsible for the administration of all city functions. In fact, the mayor has authority to administer only the police department . . .

The city council, unlike most representative assemblies, has both legislative and administrative authority. In addition to exerting its ordinance power, the city council selects the city attorney, city clerk, city assessor, building inspector, city engineer, superintendant of licenses, weights, and measures, chief engineer of the fire department, city purchasing agent, and the supervisor of the waterworks department. As a result, these heads of departments come under the direct control of the city council. Thus, we have a situation in which the same branch of government which determines policy is also responsible for the execution of that policy . . .

The city council ought to have all the legislative authority and it ought to be divested of its administrative function, which should be placed where it rightfully belongs, and that is in a separate branch of the city government.

APPENDIX V

Text of a resolution adapted by Central Labor Union in 1960 which found "grievous fault" with DFL backers of city charter reform:

Whereas, certain DFL leaders broke rank with the liberal Jeffersonian tradition of keeping the government in the hands of the people, and

Whereas, they chose sides against the Minneapolis labor movement, and

Whereas, they consorted with the monopoly press to deprive the rank and file voter of certain voting rights, and

Whereas, we in the Minneapolis Central Labor Union council feel that certain DFL leaders showed poor judgment in dividing the liberal forces just prior to the state and national elections, and

Whereas, the Minneapolis labor movement is a large segment of liberal voting public and should have its fair representation so that their views may be represented for proper consideration for the public's good,

Now, therefore, be it resolved that in the future we deny endorsement to any person seeking political office who is in league with the monopoly press in denying the right of the people to vote for their representatives in public office.

Be it further resolved that we in the Minneapolis labor movement find grievous fault with any DFL officeholder or legislator who endeavored to take away representation from the people . . .

Whereas the Minneapolis Star acted totally irresponsible in its conduct and campaign for so-called charter reform,

Whereas the Minneapolis Star violated every principle and concept of honest, factual reporting with its vicious and prejudiced attack on the citizens of Minneapolis who have provided the Minneapolis Star with office space rent-free,

Whereas the Minneapolis Star showed its disrespect for the citizens of Minneapolis by initiating a special election on citizens of Minneapolis that cost the citizens of Minneapolis \$40,000,

Now therefore it be resolved that this organization, the CLUC, ask the municipal building commission to deny the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. any office space in the courthouse.

Minneapolis Tribune, June 11, 1960.

APPENDIX VI

The Minnesota Poll
January 28, 1962

Relative Strength of the Three Top DFL Contenders for
the Gubernatorial Nomination

		<u>DFL BACKERS</u>		
"Strongest" would be:		July	January	
		1961	1962	
	<hr/>			
		Mondale	24%	35%
		Rolvaag	28	32
		Wozniak	20	14
	Other	1		
	No opinion	27	19	
"Strongest" would be:		<u>INDEPENDENT VOTERS</u>		
		Mondale	31%	34%
		Rolvaag	20	24
		Other	1	1
		No opinion	31	24
"Strongest" would be		<u>NIXON VOTERS</u>		
		Mondale	32%	29%
		Rolvaag	23	28
		Wozniak	18	16
		No opinion	27	27
"Strongest" would be:		<u>KENNEDY VOTERS</u>		
		Mondale	24%	33%
		Rolvaag	27	30
		Wozniak	23	16
		No opinion	26	21

APPENDIX VII

The Minnesota Poll
March 11, 1962

Comparison of Rolvaag vs. Andersen, Mondale vs. Andersen, and
 Wozniak vs. Andersen, "if people were voting today."

	And.	Rol.	No op.	And.	Mond.	No op.	And.	Wcz.	No op.
TOTAL	39	41	50	35	43	22	42	35	23
Men	38	47	15	34	47	19	43	39	18
Women	40	36	24	36	38	26	42	31	27
DFL	15	72	13	13	69	18	20	59	21
Repub.	76	9	15	71	10	19	79	7	14
Indep.	44	25	31	36	34	30	44	23	33

APPENDIX VIII

The Minnesota Poll
October 30, 1962

Qualities or Characteristics of Andersen and Rolvaag
Described by Their Supporters

And. Qualities	Viewed by Andersen Supporters	Viewed by Rolvaag Supporters	Rol. Qualities	Viewed by Andersen Supporters	Viewed by Rolvaag Supporters
Capable	72%	18%	Capable	14%	56%
Sincere	68	16	Sincere	9	38
Intelligent	59	23	Intelligent	14	36
Experienced	55	22	Experienced	11	31
Thoughtful	37	8	Thoughtful	6	16
Conservative	33	19	Conservative	4	9
A Leader	31	9	A Leader	7	29
Decisive	21	4	Decisive	5	17
Dull	2	13	Dull	9	2
Not Sincere	1	2?	Not Sincere	16	1
Liberal	6	5	Liberal	23	22
Rash	1	5	Rash	23	2
Not Experienced	2	10	Not Experienced	14	3
Not Competent	1	23	Not Competent	21	0
Indecisive	8	29	Indecisive	13	2
No Opinion	2	10	No Opinion	29	12
Other	2	2	Other	2	1

APPENDIX IX

The Minnesota Poll
December 16, 1962

"It is still not known whether Elmer Andersen or Karl Rolvaag will become the governor of Minnesota for the four year term which starts in January. Do you think it will make a great deal of difference to Minnesota, or not too much difference, as to which man is elected?"

	Total Sample	Andersen Voters	Rolvaag Voters
Will make a great deal of difference	52%	60%	53%
Not too much difference	41	35	42
Qualified replies	1	1	..
No opinion	6	4	5

APPENDIX X

The Minnesota Poll
April 14, 1963

	All Adults	DFLers
Strong approval of Rolvaag	8%	18%
Mild approval	26	37
Neutral	18	21
Mild disapproval	20	12
Strong disapproval	28	12

APPENDIX XI

The Minnesota Poll
June 2, 1963

"Karl Rolvaag has been governor of Minnesota since March 25, and will serve until 1967. On the whole, do you approve or disapprove of the way Rolvaag is handling his duties as governor?"

	Approve of Rolvaag	Disapprove of Rolvaag	No. opinion
All adults	44%	18%	38%
Men	48	20	32
Women	40	16	44
DFLers	59	6	35
Republicans	26	36	38
Independents	43	14	43
Southern Minnesota	38	24	38
Twin Cities and Metro Area	45	18	37
Northern Minnesota	37	12	41

APPENDIX XII

The Minnesota Poll
October 13, 1963

"Karl Rolvaag has been governor of Minnesota for about six months. Have you formed any definite impressions yet about the kind of leader Rolvaag is proving to be? (If 'yes') Are your impressions of Rolvaag generally favorable or generally unfavorable?"

	Have favorable impression	Have unfavorable impression	No definite impression as yet
All adults	18%	13%	69%
Men	18	16	66
Women	18	11	71
Mpls., St. Paul and Duluth residents	19	12	68
Smaller cities	21	14	65
Town	13	8	79
Farm	18	21	61
DFLers	30	4	66
Republicans	7	28	65
Independents	11	12	66

APPENDIX XIII

The Minnesota Poll
August 9, 1964

	Votes for Johnson-Humphrey	Votes for Goldwater-Miller	Non-committal
All adults	68%	25%	7%
Men	71	24	5
Women	65	25	10
DFLers	93	3	4
Republicans	20	72	8
Independents	61	31	8
Catholics	85	9	6
Protestants	61	31	8

APPENDIX XIII (CONTINUED)

The Minnesota Poll
August 9, 1964

	Votes for Johnson- McCarthy	Votes for Goldwater- Miller	Non- committal
All Adults	69%	24%	7%
Men	71	23	6
Women	66	25	9
DFLers	95	1	4
Republicans	22	72	6
Independents	68	19	13
Protestants	61	31	8
Catholics	87	7	6

APPENDIX XIV

The Minnesota Poll
October 25, 1964

	Democratic party	Republican party
More favorable opinion of party	9%	6%
No change in opinion	71	56
Less favorable opinion	17	34
No opinion	3	4

"In politics do you consider yourself
a Democratic-Farmer-Laborite, or a Repub-
lican, or a member of some other party?"

	Late October 1960	Early October 1964
Consider self to be		
Democratic-Farmer-Laborite	44%	51%
Republican	33	24
Independent	20	21
Other answers, undecided	3	4

Appendix XV

The Minnesota Poll
December 6, 1964

Strong approval of Rolvaag	15%
Mild approval	22
Neutral	22
Mild disapproval	23
Strong disapproval	18
	100%

Approval of Rolvaag

	Strong	Mild	Total
December 1962	10%	26%	36%
March 63	8	26	34
June 63	15	25	40
Aug. 63	11	34	45
Dec. 63	12	29	41
March 64	11	32	43
May 64	11	30	41
Sept. 64	14	22	36
Nov. 64	15	22	37

APPENDIX XVI

The Minnesota Poll
June 13, 1965

"Karl Rolvaag has been governor of Minnesota for two years. Are your impressions of Rolvaag generally favorable or unfavorable?"

	Favorable	Unfavorable	Other and no opinion
All adults	49%	34%	17%
Men	49	38	13
Women	50	30	20
DFLers	68	18	14
Republicans	26	60	14
Independents	38	38	24

APPENDIX XVI (CONTINUED)

"Rolvaag has indicated he will run for re-election next year as governor. Right now, are you in favor of electing Rolvaag to a four-year term or not?"

	In favor of re-election	Not in favor	"Depends on who runs"	No opinion
All adults	40%	40%	9%	11%
Men	40	41	10	9
Women	40	38	9	13
DFLers	59	23	10	8
Republicans	19	70	4	7
Independents	27	42	13	18
Residents of southern Minnesota	42	40	8	10
Twin Cities Area	36	43	10	11
Northern Minnesota	45	34	8	13

APPENDIX XVII
The Minnesota Poll
July 11, 1965

	Gov. Karl Rolvaag	The 1965 legislature as a whole
Strong approval	9%	4%
Mild approval	25	22
Neutral, no opinion	18	30
Mild disapproval	26	28
Strong disapproval	22	16

"Do you think Gov. Rolvaag and the legislature did well or poorly in working together this year?"

	All adults	Men	Women
Worked well together	32%	30%	33%
Worked poorly together	45	52	40
"Fair, average"	4	4	4
Other answers	2	2	1
No opinion	17	12	22

"Who do you think is to blame for that, Governor Rolvaag or the legislature?"

Rolvaag is to blame	13%
Legislature to blame	9
Both to blame	20
Other answers	1
No opinion	2

APPENDIX XVIII

The Minnesota Poll
August 1, 1965

"For many years sportsmen were paid bounties for killing bears and foxes in Minnesota. Governor Rolvaag turned down a bill for continuing these payments. Do you approve or disapprove of the veto?"

	Approve of bounty veto	Disapprove of veto	Other and no opinion
All adults	37%	50%	13%
Men	41	51	8
Women	34	48	18
DFLers	39	46	15
Republicans	32	54	14
Independents	39	50	11

APPENDIX XIX

The Minnesota Poll
August 15, 1965

"Do you think Gov. Karl Rolvaag will or will not be nominated by the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party to run for governor next year?"

	Rolvaag will be re-nominated	Will not	Other and no opinion
All adults	45%	38%	17%
Men	51	37	12
Women	39	39	22
DFLers	51	34	15
Republicans	40	44	16
Independents	42	41	17

APPENDIX XIX (CONTINUED)

"Would you like to see Rolvaag get the DFL nomination for governor or would you prefer that it go to someone else?"

	Prefer Rolvaag	Prefer someone else	Other and no opinion
All adults	28%	53%	19%
Men	28	54	18
Women	27	51	22
DFLers	36	46	18
Republicans	17	68	15
Independents	24	52	24
Think Rolvaag will be re-nominated	49	37	14
Will not	10	80	10

"If Rolvaag is nominated, do you think he is likely to win re-election against his Republican opponent or lose?"

	Rolvaag will win	Will lose	Depends on candidate	Others and no opinion
All adults	29%	40%	21%	10%
Men	28	46	18	8
Women	30	34	24	12
DFLers	38	30	23	9
Republicans	17	61	16	6
Independents	26	39	24	11

APPENDIX XX

The Minnesota Poll
September 19, 1965

Rolvaag:	Strong approval	Mild approval	Neutral, no opinion	Mild disapproval	Strong disapproval
All adults	17%	28%	20%	21%	14%
DFLers	13	32	17	23	15
Republicans	3	15	15	24	43
Independents	2	19	19	31	29

Former Governor Andersen:	Strong approval	Mild approval	Neutral, no opinion	Mild disapproval	Strong disapproval
All adults	17%	28%	20%	21%	14%
DFLers	8	25	16	29	22
Republicans	33	34	21	9	3
Independents	19	28	23	18	12

APPENDIX XXI

The Minnesota Poll
October 31, 1965

"The Minnesota DFL executive committee has recommended that Karl F. Rolvaag not run for governor in 1966 because it feels he could not be re-elected. Do you think the Democratic-Farmer-Labor party would be better off staying with Rolvaag or better off switching to another candidate?"

	All adults	DFLers
Better for DFL to stay with Rolvaag	36%	46%
Better to switch	50	43
Other answers	2	1
No opinion	12	10

"Do you think the executive committee did nor did not act in the best interests of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party?"

	All adults	DFLers
Did act in party's best interests	37%	36%
Did not	35	37
Other	1	1
No opinion	27	26

APPENDIX XXII

The Minnesota Poll
November 28, 1965

	Strong and mild approval	Neutral or no opinion	Strong and mild disapproval
Mondale (DFL)	54%	32%	14%
Andersen (GOP)	41	23	36
Keith (DFL)	34	42	24
Rolvaag (DFL)	36	19	45

	All adults	DFLers	Republicans	Independents
Strong approval of ROLVAAG	9%	12%	4%	7%
Mild approval	27	40	15	19
Neutral	19	17	13	25
Strong disapproval	16	8	31	16
Strong approval of MONDALE	22%	31%	11%	17%
Mild approval	32	35	29	35
Neutral	32	27	33	35
Strong disapproval	3	1	6	3
Strong approval of ANDERSEN	14%	9%	27%	9%
Mild approval	27	19	42	28
Neutral	23	21	19	28
Mild disapproval	26	34	10	29
Strong disapproval	10	17	2	6
Strong approval of KEITH	8%	11%	4%	6%
Mild approval	26	31	28	19
Neutral	42	42	34	45
Mild disapproval	18	13	24	23
Strong disapproval	6	3	10	7

APPENDIX XXIII

The Minnesota Poll
February 6, 1966

	November 1965	Latest survey
ROLVAAG		
Strong approval	9%	9%
Mild approval	27	23
Neutral	19	17
Mild disapproval	29	28
Strong disapproval	16	23
KEITH		
Strong approval	8%	9%
Mild approval	26	22
Neutral	42	44
Mild disapproval	18	19
Strong disapproval	6	6

	All adults	DFLers	Repub- licans	Independ- ents
ROLVAAG				
Strong approval	9%	14%	2%	4%
Mild approval	23	34	5	22
Neutral	17	15	14	21
Mild disapproval	28	24	36	30
Strong disapproval	23	13	43	23
KEITH				
Strong approval	9%	14%	3%	5%
Mild approval	22	28	14	19
Neutral	44	41	40	55
Mild disapproval	6	2	13	8

APPENDIX XXIV

The Minnesota Poll
February 27, 1966

"Suppose that Karl Rolvaag runs for governor again on the Democratic-Farmer-Labor ticket and (Quie, Randall, LeVander) is the Republican nominee. If you were voting today, would you favor Rolvaag or (Quie, Randall, LeVander) for governor?"

GOVERNOR OF MINNESOTA

Quie (GOP)	48%
Rolvaag (DFL)	42
"Neither"	1
No opinion	9
Randall (GOP)	47%
Rolvaag (DFL)	40
"Neither"	1
No opinion	12
Rolvaag (DFL)	46%
LeVander (GOP)	34
"Neither"	1
No opinion	19

APPENDIX XXV

The Minnesota Poll
March 6, 1966

"Here is a list of men who have been mentioned as possible candidates for governor of Minnesota on the Democratic-Farmer-Labor ticket. Which man do you think would run the strongest race against the Republicans this year?"

	DFLers	Independents
Rolvaag	35%	21%
Keith	29	38
Fraser	10	11
Short	6	5
Cina	5	4
No opinion	15	21

APPENDIX XXVI

The Minnesota Poll
May 1, 1966

Democratic-Farmer-Laborites

	Ratings of Rolvaag	Ratings of Keith
Strong approval	20%	17%
Mild approval	27	28
Neutral	19	36
Mild disapproval	24	15
Strong disapproval	10	4

	All adults	DFLers	GOP	Indep- endents
ROLVAAG				
Strong approval	11%	20%	2%	6%
Mild approval	20	27	7	24
Neutral	19	19	14	25
Mild disapproval	27	24	30	26
Strong disapproval	23	10	47	19

APPENDIX XXVII

The Minnesota Poll
May 15, 1966

	GOP vs. Rolvaag	GOP vs. Keith
Andersen	51%	45%
Rolvaag	38	. .
Keith	. .	39
No opinion	16	16
Randall	46%	35%
Rolvaag	35	. .
Keith	. .	17
No opinion	19	24
LeVander	39%	30%
Rolvaag	36	. .
Keith	. .	42
No opinion	25	28
Pillsbury	45%	39%
Rolvaag	34	. .
Keith	. .	40
No opinion	21	21

APPENDIX XXIX

The Minnesota Poll
June 12, 1966

GOP VS. ROLVAAG		GOP VS. KEITH	
Andersen	49%	Andersen	45%
Rolvaag	39	Keith	43
No opinion	12	No opinion	12
LeVander	38%	LeVander	30%
Rolvaag	43	Keith	46
No opinion	19	No opinion	24
Pillsbury	43%	Pillsbury	37%
Rolvaag	39	Keith	42
No opinion	18	No opinion	21
Randall	42%	Randall	34%
Rolvaag	50	Keith	44
No opinion	18	No opinion	22

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