

# DIASPORA NETWORKS AND IDENTITY: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

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## *Abstract*

*The countries in the Horn of Africa have a common history of endemic conflicts and poverty. Since the 1990s, the diaspora generated by these conflicts is believed to be actively participating in efforts toward conflict recovery and long-term development. By means of interviews and qualitative analysis, we examine the identity forming in the diaspora networks linked to the region. We evaluate whether the ideals emerging in these de-territorialised spaces could be promoted as an overarching regional identity in the places of origin to sustain peace and stability. Both the local and the transnational dimensions of such networks are taken into account in order to appreciate the social, cultural, political and economic relations they generate. Findings include evidence of new normative ideals of tolerance, peace, democracy and plurality that are slowly emerging in the young diaspora. While ethnic, clan, gender and religious affiliations continue influencing identity and hinder cohesion, the new ideas that diaspora might bring to the fore support cultural and political integration by problematizing and giving a vocabulary to the discourse of regional identity.*

## INTRODUCTION

This article explores the potential of African diasporic networks linked to the Horn of Africa to articulate a common identity on the basis of values shared in the spaces in which diaspora operates, and transmit these reshaped values in the territories of origin. A common identity would encompass and transcend the traditional ethnic lines and clan divisions that characterise Somalia, Ethiopia and the wider Horn, and could contribute to conflict resolution in the region.

Diaspora networks have been the object of study by social science, African and development studies. Scholars agree that African emigrants and intellectuals living abroad generate new forms of social relationships among themselves and involving their homeland. These relations are very real and can have economic, cultural and political repercussions on the diaspora itself and on the population back home. Africans worldwide want to be part of the political debate and make their voices heard in their countries of origin. They respond to the will of some Africans to promote long-term conflict resolution and peacekeeping within a regional framework. Diaspora networks, which flourish in the globalisation context, enshrine a common experience, a specific identity that has often been used to define them, even though such common attributes hide very different experiences and legacies.

We investigate how diasporic networks are developing their de-territorialised identities, which encompass the new world diaspora lives in, as well as a greater African identity. We have individuated the variables that are relevant to our analysis: the consequences of displacements; the opportunities aroused in the globalisation era such as increased communication possibilities and the facilitation of financial and human mobility; local circumstances, ethnic identity and new identities forming in the receiving countries; the formation of networks stretching traditional boundaries (transnational networks); and the articulation of new issues

and agendas and their role in governance (towards a regional framework for conflict resolution). Some Africans are trying to generate the impetus for the creation of a new narrative of an imagined community in the Horn of Africa. Whether this is mere utopia or the beginning of the construction of a peaceful Horn of Africa, we would like to give an infinitesimal contribution to its understanding.

Our investigation starts with the situation in Somalia. Although focusing on the Somali case, we also aim at assessing the region of the Horn of Africa as a whole, since conflicts are interlinked. A collapsed state caught in a deep crisis since 1991, Somalia is viewed by other countries in the Horn as a deviant society, which is disrupting the whole region. This is because of the territorial claims it has made since independence over the neighbouring territories inhabited by the Somali people (Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti). Moreover, Somali people are often identified with an old world of tribalism and clans, synonymous with continuous conflicts. On the ground in Somalia, clans and political power clashes make the emergence of a common identity appear as a remote occurrence (Toggia et al. 2000:127).

We analyse the value of a regional approach based on a common identity. Our investigation is based on a case study of three “displaced” people based in Aalborg and Århus, Denmark. One is a Somali, one is an Ethiopian and one is “an African,” by her own definition, and a woman. They are representative of different diaspora networks. The Ethiopian professor and the Somali PhD candidate, John and Idris - belong to what we would like to define as a ‘cultural diaspora,’ insofar as their agency as participants in cultural and political debates, as well as their participation in transnational networks, is ‘intellectual’ in nature. They want to bring to the fore and to research ideas and issues related to the conflicts back home, and possibly to diffuse values and norms to support peace and stability. They mainly do so through networks that primarily group intellectuals and university teachers but also within the Somali community in Denmark. Mary Jane

the third informant, is a Tanzanian woman, settled in Denmark for over 15 years, and asserting a strong African identity. A master student of political science, she is the president of a non-governmental organization based in Aalborg, in the north of Denmark. Her 'African Network' draws together African immigrants from different countries, including the Horn of Africa. The organisation seeks to promote integration into Danish society, and to give humanitarian support to Africans in society and, to a lesser extent, in Africa. We would like to call this organisation an 'issue network' as people have come together to tackle specific issues.<sup>1</sup> These informants, and the data gathered by means of open-ended interviews, will allow us to explore both the transnational dimension of the diaspora and its anchorage in the local community, two aspects that we believe are crucial for the articulation and promotion of new values and identity.

The main questions we would like to answer are: to what extent can diaspora networks contribute to the creation of a regional identity which would constitute an alternative to antagonist identities that have been fuelling the conflicts in the region? What values do such networks endorse? Do they depart from the traditional divisions on the ground? Is the notion of identity a viable way to address conflict resolution? Are these networks empowered by globalisation?

## CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Our research has two main focuses: diaspora networks and identity. We present the variables that are relevant to evaluate the ability of networks to consolidate an overarching identity able to constitute an alternative to identity clashes in the Horn of Africa. Because the subject of our investigation is 'diaspora networks,' all concepts are presented as functional to our understanding of the interplay of diaspora networks and identity.

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<sup>1</sup> The names of the informants here are fictitious

## Defining Diaspora

No clear consensus exists on the definition and conceptualisation of the diaspora. Diaspora exists in a tangible reality, but also possesses a symbolic substance: “*Diasporas are an imagined community*” (Mohan 2002:5).

The understanding of the ‘Victim Diaspora,’ which strongly stresses the “*search for an authentic homeland*” (Mohan 2002:5), is placing the home identity and idealised homeland at the core of the diasporic aspirations. Their idea of homeland is linked to its “*physical location, history, and achievements*” (Safran in Matsuoka & Sorenson, 2001: 7). Since the process of extradition from the original homeland is a forced one, these diasporic waves experience a certain nostalgia connected to their desire to return to their ‘authentic’ land. Members of the ‘Victim Diaspora’ are characterised by a lost sense of belonging, and they situate their nation of origin within a certain framework where home is romanticised and understood as a vision.

Diaspora in a contemporary sense could mean “*the voluntary and proactive movements of people and the connections between them*” (Mohan 2005:5). This understanding of diaspora “*challenges the conceptual limits imposed by national and ethnic/racial boundaries*” (Mohan 2005:6). Diaspora’s conceptualisation is no longer a limited, negative, one-sided notion. It is more than the mere description of exiles looking to return ‘home’, there is a “*need to think about multiple sites of exiles and, crucially, the connections between them*” (ibid). It has acquired a richer and more complex dimension, and cannot be analysed in binary terms of exile and return.

Another preoccupation of diaspora members and their interlocutors is to negotiate decisional power. The question is about who can legitimately expect to influence the political agenda of the homeland. Some argue that diaspora members should first succeed in integrating in their new home country, develop some sort of economic activity (John’s interview) and lead their communities into sharing a common memory and identity. These communities should be shaped by the

political situation in the original home country, and their actions should be driven by their deep interest in influencing its state affairs (Matsuoka & Sorenson 2001:8).

Diaspora might appear as relatively unified compared to their homeland, at least in theory. Most of diaspora leaders preach a unity of action, and as such might advocate in favour of a more comprehensive identity through the creation of inclusive networks transcending ethnic or regional divisions, as well as promoting collaboration between networks. However in practice, such bridging does not occur as often as it is claimed (Kent 2005:7).

### **Globalisation and Displacement**

The dramatic transformations in information and communication technology, in transport, financial and people mobility, and the economic restructuring reducing the significance of state borders, are some of the core aspects that are generally referred to as globalisation. The cumulative effect of these changes has been to *de-territorialise* some of the activities and processes that influence our life in contemporary states.

Robinson (2002) uses the term “displacement” as the point of departure for new opportunities of development in the global context. While forced displacement of people is viewed as disruptive and traumatic in a world system organized in nation-states, Robinson proposes a positive connotation to the term. Flows of people, information and resources can disrupt the current forms of social organisation and *therefore* create innovation. ‘Dis-placed,’ in the common discourse, implies that a person is closely linked to a place but is no longer there. This concept of place is not neutral of political meaning: it hints at the sense of belonging, the place where one is settled. The lack of it is therefore pictured as problematic, especially when it comes to refugees, who, according to the dominant worldview, are ‘out of place.’ Her argument is that the experience of displacement

offers an opportunity to redefine an alternative foundation for belonging beyond the nation-state, beyond ethnic and national identity (Robinson 2002). As she suggests, politically there still exists little basis for opposing the nation-state system, but the experiences of displaced people are increasingly becoming new normative forms of belonging. This is particularly evident in diasporic communities.

Globalisation has allowed diaspora communities to flourish, partly due to the increased ease of communication brought about by new technologies, the facilitation of financial flows, which allow the resources of diaspora to be efficiently channelled, but also because of the reconfiguration of the world geographical space with a change of values and the emergence of a heterogeneous social fabric in most countries. In this global context, it becomes reasonable to expect actors who are not located within the national frontiers to act upon home issues.

### **Diaspora Networks and Transnationalisation**

We have underlined a fundamental feature of diaspora: their link with the homeland. On this line, diaspora networks are defined by Kent (2005) as “*national or transnational civil society groupings whose role is autonomous but carries considerable potential to assist reconstruction of the war-torn homeland*”. His approach is based on social network analysis, which, in the specific case of diaspora networks, focuses on the dynamics that underlie the functioning of networks and the impact of their political and economic activities upon contemporary social processes. Remittances play a major role.<sup>2</sup> These are both individual transfers of money to assist households, and collective ones. In several cases, we need to add, money has gone to finance and thereby prolong the

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<sup>2</sup> World Bank studies have evidenced the fact that remittances are mainly used to assist the individual household and as such they are instrumental to alleviate poverty in the community, in fact, in times of conflict or post-conflict, remittances increase. However it is becoming a great concern of policy-makers to design policies that will encourage the use of remittances towards macro-economic development for long term development.

conflicts back home (Mohamoud 2006). In general, positive contributions to homeland reconstruction are empirically tangible. For instance, in the case of Somalia, remittances exceed the total development and humanitarian aid (Gundel 2002 in Kent 2005). It is their community-building capability, coupled with the diaspora's influence in the territories of origin, that enshrine the possibility of creating these common values, which are crucial for forging the common identity. Solidarity is needed to move towards a peaceful resolution of conflicts on the ground.

Diaspora networks are more than just diaspora groups. Their existence is not always proved empirically; rather it becomes evident because of crosscutting memberships of individual diasporic members in multiple social circles entwining to knit social systems. These systems are structured social relationships, whose values and potentials are far greater than those of single members. The structured social relations that underlie diaspora networks constitute both opportunities and constraints for members to take on several activities and operate towards specific goals (Kent 2005). Network analysis distinguishes between organised and social networks, but we agree with Kent (2005) in arguing that this distinction is somewhat inappropriate, as social relations often overlap with, or develop into more structured diasporic organisations. However, "*consciously motivated organisation can be more effective*" in influencing conflict resolution and stability in the territories of origin (Kent 2005).

Transnational networks are defined by Robinson (2002:207) as non-state actors, focused on a specific issue and articulated around shared values and shared political objectives. Their level of cohesion and organisational structure varies. They operate in a transnational environment in more than one country; members are not restricted by location, allowing them to have a flexible political approach, which could possibly help them to influence political matters.

Diaspora networks, "*weaving together social system*" (Wellman in Kent 2005:3), are a specific kind of transnational network.



Cohen (2002) points to the community-building effect of the transnationalised diaspora activity. Diaspora networks are, in his view, transnational communities that display the same political activism of transnational social movements. In our view, their shared experience, political participation, shared information and a forged common outlook create a sense of community possibly more cohesive than social movements as members often also share cultural traits.

Empowered by technology and by connecting forces, diaspora networks are crucial in internationalising and in giving a transnational dimension to conflicts in their homelands. Their political activities have often been evident: they can lobby in the host country against the government in the homeland of which they disapprove. They can also lobby for specific interests or for collective ends on a regional level (for instance for debt cancellation or trade concessions) (Mohamoud 2006).<sup>3</sup> The abstract space created by diaspora transnational networks, unbounded from a particular geographical area, is a new political space where networks assert their political identity through a process of translocality,<sup>4</sup> which gives birth to a form of de-territorialised governance.<sup>5</sup>

The state of displacement and the appropriation of transnational space by diaspora networks promote alternative forms of governance. We should bear in mind that in this work we are not looking specifically at the political agency of diaspora, rather we are interested in the ideological contribution of diaspora networks that, through the forging of a common identity, could provide an alternative to political solutions to conflict resolution and peace building. Diaspora networks are renewing and recreating their own identity through the transnational relations they sustain with their homelands and to one another.

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<sup>3</sup> Whether these demands will be met depend on their economic and political status and strength.

<sup>4</sup> Translocality represents this abstract political space that emerges between individuals and groups: a space characterised by a multitude of non-linear connections, which are occurring simultaneously in space and time (Robinson 2002: 209). Translocal activity takes place across borders. Individuals and networks assert a political identity, which is not defined on the basis of geographic location and that transcends borders.

<sup>5</sup> Governance refers to the process by which institutions and networks shape political agendas, by which issues are defined (Rosenau in Robinson 2002:215).

## Identity

The role of diaspora groupings in conflict resolution, as evidenced, becomes relevant because of the political, economic and cultural interconnections they generate. In this work, identity is the primary dimension that we take into consideration and identity explains the way in which we look at diaspora. The focus is not only on the theoretical articulation of a different, inclusive ‘African identity’ informed by post-modern conceptions of identity, but also on the social spaces which enable the articulations of such identity - or not: diaspora networks. An attempt is made to evaluate the post-modern view of identity as articulated by scholars of social studies such as Stuart Hall and Homi K. Bhabha and to see to what extent the post-modern conceptions of identity fit the networks that we are analyzing.

The very term ‘identity’ is a complex and multifaceted one that we intend here to use to include a number of allegiances that do not correspond to contemporary state or nation-states, to collapsed states in Somalia, Ethiopia, in the wider Horn or in diaspora populations. Such allegiances find origin in much more complex historical and spatial dimensions. ‘Identity’ here includes ethnicity, clan identity, cultural affiliations, language and religion, loyalties to the host countries and the incorporation of new norms and values. All this is entangled, overlapping and reshaping away from those territories of origin, emerging into a new local context and projected across borders.

The common identity is important because it affects the level of group cohesion, the ability to trust co-members and to get together to support the well-being of a real or imagined home. In our case, *home* could be the nation-state of origin or a wider conception of *home* that could correspond to the Horn of Africa (Robinson 2000). Several factors influence the “*in-between*” status that produces complex identities of diaspora groupings (Robinson 2000). One factor includes the local circumstances, such as the inability to feel at home in the host country and the hostility of the locals; another factor is diaspora’s common past, the forced

dispersal, the common destiny and history of forced migration fleeing from a war-torn country; a third aspect is the sense of solidarity among groups' members, which include strong feelings for the conflict-torn homeland, the need to help next of kin back home, but also a strong common desire to have peace and stability in the territories of origin (Cohen 2002). Particularly important is their ongoing relations with their homeland - being economic, through remittances or business - or social, through advocacy and political debates. These may all be factors that forge diasporic identity and support cohesion of a very pluralistic, distinctive community, taking form in the diaspora networks.

The local community is where such networks emerge; it is where friends, relatives, intellectuals and political activists interact with one another and articulate issues and preoccupations that motivate them to form networks. How they get together and possibly produce social change - whether it is according to ethnic lines or beyond that - is the interest of this work. Summarising, whilst 'identity' includes strong affiliations that emigrants carry from their place of origin, most specifically the term will be used to define that "*hybrid*" or salient identity that characterises African diaspora.

'Hybrid identity' is the term used by one of our informants, John, to define his own identity. He advocates for an inclusive African identity while asserting a strong Ethiopian identity. Stuart Hall and other post-modernists use the term hybridity to refer to the evolution of new, dynamic, mixed cultures (Hall in Cohen 2002: 131 and Bhabha in Ahluwalia, Zegeye 2002 ). Hybridity challenges the essentialisation of identity and has become a powerful metaphor to express the fluidity of the post-modern world. Hall, though, highlights another aspect of such hybridity, that being the two opposing characters of globalisation: the push towards homogenisation and, in contrast to it, the emergence of the reassertion of localism in the form of ethnicity, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism (Cohen 2002:131). Hall (Cohen, op cit.) defines such processes as "*cultures of*

*hybridity*” and associates them with the most recent diaspora populations.<sup>6</sup> Cohen (2002) explains the post-modern views of diaspora as emphasising the fluidities of the contemporary world. Citing Bhabha, he refers to the need to depart from nation-state’s divisions, but also to be aware of the multiple subject positions, that is, the multiple identities that form “*the building blocks of identity in the post-modern world*” (Cohen 2002:129).

Cohen (2002) uses the term “cultural diaspora” to describe the distinct characteristics of diaspora in the post-modern world. Such a term is well suited to this work as our interest lies in the articulation of malleable identities that take shape in the social and cultural relations embedded in the diaspora networks. Such identities emerge as they become relevant; they emerge not only around issues - political, cultural or humanitarian – but, as a result of local circumstances, hereunder the African diaspora in Aalborg and Århus, more specifically. Likewise they emerge because of the increased tempo of modern communications. Networks through the Internet can communicate transnationally and mobilise knowledge and produce information. Basically they are able to use diaspora’s intellectual resources or social capital<sup>7</sup> most efficiently. They create bonds with other dispersed groups and with the homeland.

The social spaces occupied by diaspora include therefore both the transnational areas, with the proliferation of political, social and economic activities empowered by globalisation, and also the local community. Their solidarity and integration becomes evident in relation to the local population - both natives and other immigrants - in the host country in which they live.

Our understanding of diaspora is of a community of people originating from a single space and scattered over several locations. Members of this community are

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<sup>6</sup> The new diasporas include the Africans that have fled their countries in the 1990s, rather than the African Americans or the Jews.

<sup>7</sup> Social capital is the human capital embodied in human beings, their knowledge and skills. Part of this is their ability to associate, which in turn comes from shared values. (See Robinson 2000:16)

willingly part of it and retain a strong connection to their homeland on various levels, from emotional to economic. This community might possess what could be called a specific diasporic identity that could allow them to be conscious of their status as diaspora and of their possible power when defined within this group identity. This identity could be more than the sum of the parts, and hence the construction of such identity encompasses the home identity - *"I am a Somali"*, as our informant Idris uttered - and the values acquired through the contact to the host country: *"but I do have Danish values even though I don't like to admit it"*. Diasporic identity refers to a common identity, although all aspects of this identity vary to different degrees, depending on the individual: *"some sense of common identity defines a diaspora yet much of what some groups deem to be diasporic actually lacks such commonality"* (Mohan 2002:2).

## **CONFLICTS IN HISTORY**

In order to understand the conflicts in Somalia and the wider region, we give here a short overview of historical conflicts and their causes.

### **History of Conflicts in Somalia**

Somalia has been involved for many decades in continuous conflicts, either civil war or regional wars with other states. Although in Somalia, unlike most other states of the Horn, the population is vastly homogenous in terms of ethnicity, language and religion, a civil war is currently destroying the country (2007)<sup>8</sup> and there has been no functioning state since 1991. *"In the case of Somalia, the problem has historically been one of building a homogeneous nation into a viable state"* (Keller 2004:19).

In 1991, the twenty-year dictatorship of Siad Barre came to an end, the Somali state collapsed and no centralised authority has since been able to govern the country (Toggia et al. 2000: 127). As a consequence of the lack of a state-centric

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<sup>8</sup> "Christmas War" opposing the UIC to the TFG and Ethiopian troops, since November 2006.

political system, political decisions have been reclaimed by the most powerful traditional Somali clans. Since the state's collapse, Somalis have emigrated en masse (Kusow 2007:3), forming worldwide diaspora networks.

The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), supported by a large part of the Somali diaspora, emerged as a possible peace-leading actor, aiming at rebuilding the state through *“a combination of religion, grass roots mobilisation and business support”* (Farah et al. 2007: viii). In the context of the global War on Terror, an Islamic-based actor was strongly disapproved and consequently, the UIC was fought by the Transitional Government of Somalia, assisted by Ethiopian troops. The Ethiopian involvement was not well-received by the majority, who remembered the Ethiopian desire for expansion, as witnessed in the Ogaden War, for instance.

Keller argues that social conflicts in Somalia are *“based upon clan interests and clan identities... Somalia's descent into chaos can largely be attributed (...) to conflicts which range from the sub-clan level up to the clan family level”* (Keller 2004:30). Somali family clans are fighting over power and resources; the main clans are in opposition to each other, but contestation also exists within the clans themselves, as they are further divided into rivalling sub-clans. So far, there has been no viable way to govern Somalia that takes into account the clan system, and all efforts to overcome tribalism (notably by president Barre) in creating a political system have failed. After the Somali state collapsed as a result of a civil war involving the different clan factions, the current situation as of 2007 is still of a non-functioning Somali state, along with two self-established, but not internationally recognised Somali states: Puntland and Somaliland.

### **Clan Identity and Conflicts**

Since ethnicity or religious-conflicting elements cannot explain the existing tension in Somalia, clan divisions and interests have been pointed out as one of the causes. At this stage it is relevant to investigate to what extent such conflicts are identity-based (clan identities) or are externally caused. Some analysts, for

instance Osman Farah, point to the external factors. There has been competition between countries within the region of the Horn and also between external actors to gain power over resources and control over the Red Sea coast, an essential strategic area, due to the importance of the Suez Canal (Lata 2004:87).

It could be argued that, although initiated by external causes, the identity aspect is paramount. Farah et al. discuss that the unique situation of the Somali stems from “*clan-related political fragmentation, armed conflicts, lawlessness and statelessness, and the impact of the worldwide dispersal of Somali who fled*” (2007: xi). During colonial times in the Horn of Africa, it was not deemed necessary to establish a cultural or political identity or loyalty to connect the state to its citizens. After the Second World War, this created problems when attempting to articulate a needed common idea for the community (Lata 2004:104). When fighting for independence from colonial rule, some leaders, including the Somali Youth League, understood the necessity to negotiate the formation of a Somali identity, beyond the clan divisions (Aweis 2007). In practise, the ideal of a united Somali identity embraced by all Somalis was never implemented.

Saggiomo argues that the Somali clan identity has for a long time been understood as a fixed concept, with rigid divisions, and that other social transformations, particularly colonialism, that have affected this Somali clan identity have not been taken into account (Saggiomo 2007:264). The clan identities at first appear static and impenetrable, and they have been accused of being largely responsible for Somalia disunion, either by themselves or associated with the “*negative impact of foreign aid*” (Mansur in Saggiomo 2007:265).

Yet the examples of the two self-proclaimed independent territories of Puntland and Somaliland can lead us to rethink the role of the clan and how it can use its specific identity for the general development of a country. Saggiomo contests the idea of a rigid clan identity; she claims that “*the fluidity that characterises Somali*

*identity (...) is a changing phenomenon where alliances and divisions are determined by a number of factors and where economic considerations are often stronger than blood relationships” (Saggiomo, Op.cit :265).*

Although the clans have proved in these two cases their ability to implement peace, although in a specifically delimited geographical space, the future of Somali’s peace should possibly not be devised within the patriarchal clan system, as it is exclusive and fragmented, rejecting women’s rights to political representation and not working towards the greater good of the Somali nation as a whole, as it concentrates power in multiples sources. The issue with the clan system is that “*the political allegiances are not based on ideology but on group identity,*” which devaluates ideas in themselves to emphasize the power sharing process (ibid).

There is, however, no easy way to categorise clans; they are as much part of the problem as part of the solution; their very existence seems an anachronistic occurrence, yet the methods of the traditional power structure are endogenous and to a certain extent legitimate: they have brought stability to some parts of the country and have constituted an alternative security net where the state has failed. It could be argued that Somalis, through the process of identification, need not only conceptualize themselves into discrete clan segments, but also into a united Somalia, which would include an overarching Somali identity encompassing the clan’s divisions, in order to induce peace and stability in the whole country. If Somalia is united and at peace, it could possibly impact on the whole region of the Horn of Africa, where conflicts would be less likely to occur between stable local nations. This possibility leads to the consideration of different political options for a solution. One of them is nation-state building, the other is the exploration of a regional solution.

### **A Regional Solution**

Political changes in one country influence all other countries in the Horn. In an interconnected region, stable countries will also be negatively affected by conflicts



and political struggles (Lata 2004:2). Neighbouring countries are disturbed by Somalia's state of disruption. It could be argued that it is in the interest of all regional actors to maintain peace and stability in Somalia. The question may be asked "*is there a regional interest that is more than the sum of the countries constituting what is known as the Horn of Africa?*" (Farah & Muchie 2007:326). Such a regional interest will need to be based on common values, whether it is religion, democracy or nationalism. Farah and Muchie believe that for a regional project to be implemented, it needs to be inclusive; state issues need to be addressed and common values established (ibid.:328). By acknowledging that identity issues are one of the defining characteristics of the type of conflict currently taking place in Somalia, it can be argued that prevention should include a profound identity rethinking as part of the solution for long-term peace.

Keller explores a different angle for a regional solution: "*Regional and Subregional organisations have a significant role to play in conflict prevention*" (Keller 2004:3). Keller argues that the future success of peace talks for the Horn of Africa requires implementation through regional organisations (e.g. AU), and subregional ones (e.g. IGAD) (Keller 2004:49). So far there has been no political or economic union created in the Horn of Africa. Regional institutions can address the issues associated with conflicts at different levels, including the political and economic ones. John introduces the concept of 'security community.' To bring about peace and stability, conflicts have to be stopped; the establishment of a regional security community might be one of the ways to bring peace: "*The concept of a security community implies stability of expectations by the region's actors of being willing and capable of engaging in a non-war settlement of conflicts, regardless of how difficult the conflict. It suggests the willingness to bring about sufficient collective identity to make peaceful adjustments to conflicts*".<sup>9</sup> Muchie and Farah emphasize the role of the diaspora in this respect. The diaspora is believed to be able to intervene in such a regional process: it "*can*

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<sup>9</sup> Mammo Muchie's lecture, 1st October 2007. Round table: "Millennium Hopes for Creating a Security Community from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea".

*play a catalytic role and can engage constructively or destructively*” (Muchie & Farah 2007b:328). A positive contribution from the diaspora needs to involve sharing its expertise and knowledge. This will be further explained in later pages.

### **Somali Diaspora Networks and the Peace Process**

The Somali diaspora, not bound to the state, appears as a flexible political actor, which can influence the conflicts in many forms, either by prolonging them or by promoting solutions. This boundlessness is interesting in the Somali case where no state is functioning and it raises some issue about the very necessity of a central Somali state. *“Diaspora groups assert major influence in improving the socio-political and economic situation of the Somalis”* (Farah et al. 2007: xi). The Somali diaspora is functioning in a transnational framework, bypassing the missing Somali state. If the diaspora can exert a positive influence in the absence of the state, this could possibly mean that the state is not a necessity. The *“potentials of the Somali stateless society”* (Farah et al. 2007: xv) are also highlighted, as well as the possibility to create a regional economic network in the Horn of Africa as an alternative to political failures.

The Somali conflict has never remained local, for instance, with the 2006 involvement of Ethiopia in the ‘Christmas War.’<sup>10</sup> The conflict is regionalised, even internationalised due to the *“economic, political, social and security interdependencies of the contemporary world”* (Farah 2007:174). Since the conflicts in one part of the region of the Horn rarely remain within the country’s borders and very often become regional, solving one country’s conflict will only be a temporary victory if that peace is threatened by greater regional instability.

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<sup>10</sup> In July 2006 the Government of Ethiopia initiated the armed invasion of Somalia. The ongoing conflict involves Ethiopian and Somali Transitional Federal Governments versus the Somali Islamic Union Courts (IUCs). The conflict takes the name of Christmas War because on December 24<sup>th</sup> 2006 Ethiopia officially stated that it would actively combat the IUCs, on the grounds that Ethiopia was facing threats to its own border and was therefore defending sovereignty.

Therefore, it could be argued that peace has to be conceptualised and devised in a regional structure, not merely state by state.

Some scholars assert the importance of creating a regional framework in the Horn of Africa and to “*approach the issues of state formation from a regional perspective (and) investigate the processes that may result from the formation of political authorities or states, even if they are regional*” (Farah et al. 2007: xii). To accompany this political/regional framework, a regional identity could be formed, similar to the European identity for instance. And while the international community is largely uninterested in the Somalia peace-building effort (Farah 2007:173), it may be that only regional actors can make a difference, as it is primarily them having deep interests in the region. Most seem to believe that the diaspora can contribute to state-building in Somalia (Farah, Muchie, Robinson). This leads to the question whether this state could be constructed on a Somali unified identity beyond clan divisions to bring peace and stability, not only in Somalia but also in the wider Horn.

## **TOWARDS A COMMON IDENTITY: ISSUES AND VALUES**

In the previous pages we have looked closely at the several conflicts taking place in the region of the Horn of Africa. We have touched upon the different factors that cause the permanent status of crisis in the Horn and have emphasized the identity dimension, both as one of the causes but also as a possible solution; a strong regional identity would enable the population in the region to stand up to external causes and actors and, theoretically, to find a regional solution, sensitive to cultural, traditional and customary concerns. We have also looked into African diaspora, an actor whose agency has gained momentum, especially since the 1990s, as a distinct community with a distinct identity, whose voice and action can be transnational.

As mentioned, the theoretical framework we have used for interpreting our data includes notions of identity, networks, globalisation and transnationalisation.

We have interviewed the informants about the situation in Somalia, but we also have tried to illuminate how Somalis and Africans negotiate their identity in Denmark. We have looked at the three interviewees' ability to articulate a post-modern fluid identity - or not - through their involvement in diasporic networks. Specifically we have looked at their understanding of 'identity' as being the key - or not - to influence stability in the Horn through the narratives of their experiences.

Our data have been considered in relation to the variables we have identified. Qualitative analysis is chosen here as opposed to social observation and critique, and its relation to pre-existing theoretical frameworks, for several reasons. First, identity is here appreciated as an alternative avenue for conflict resolution, which the mainstream development approaches have yet, we believe, to consider as a viable option. Second, identity is contextual, local, multiple and historically relevant and therefore needs to be investigated qualitatively, incorporating the views and the meaning of the people involved. Our hope is to disclose patterns and trends that we believe could illuminate dynamics in several African diasporic networks linked to the Horn of Africa.

The three interviewees tackle different issues, which all shed light onto our original problem: the potential of diasporic networks to propose shared values that could transcend the ethnic and clan identities that have been fuelling the conflict in the wider Horn before and after colonization. We have tried to cluster them into themes, as we are going to discuss in the following.

The formation of an overarching identity for the Horn of Africa to share common values is a very complex process in itself. Making these values exceed any other factor involved in the several conflicts in the region is an even greater enterprise. Through our theoretical framework, we understand diaspora as a potentially

powerful actor. Our literature states that diaspora is able to form new values and relate them to their homeland. Our ambition, as mentioned in our introduction, is to give an infinitesimal understanding to such a *process* and look at what the factors are that could make the formation of a common identity a reality.

The word ‘process’ suggests several dimensions: a phenomenon marked by gradual changes that lead toward a particular result, but also actions conducting toward an end. We have defined such a process as social transformation.

Through our literature and our interviews, we look closely at diasporic networks as the actors behind social transformation and consider the different dimensions where this is unfolding. It is not created in a vacuum but is the result of a dialectic process, which juxtaposes spatial and temporal dimensions.

The spatial dimension includes the host country, where diaspora members confront themselves to the hostility of the locals and to new values. Here there is the necessity to create a space in a new society, an ethnic community in the host country, where culture is perpetuated or adapted, where social interaction takes place, where networks start forming. The spatial dimension includes the territories of origin where conflicts take place, where family has been left behind, and which represents ‘homeland,’ more so a place to restore than a place to go back to. Lastly it includes the de-territorialized space for debate inhabited by transnational networks where new ideas and issues are brought to the fore.

The temporal dimension includes the legacy of history in a region that has not experienced peace and stability in centuries, a history of conflict that seems very hard to overturn; it includes the current era of globalisation that has enabled the emergence of networks and that can enable the African social capital to be shared and put to the disposal of greater portions of African and diasporic population. This dimension includes the time that passes for the diaspora member in the host-land and her/his growth (as Idris mentions) in the host society, where she/he takes time to appropriate and negotiate new values. Lastly it includes the time needed

for actions and ideas to meet in the networks and new values to be projected into different dimensions.

Our interviewees strongly believe that diaspora networks can play a major role in establishing peace in the Horn of Africa. According to them, both the intellectual and economic aspects are essential features of the diaspora's ability to influence their homeland. During the interviews we asked whether the diaspora was empirically able to influence factors on the ground and to make their voice heard. Both John and Idris told us that this phenomenon was occurring to a certain extent; they take the example of the Somali and Ethiopian diaspora in the USA, and their ability to influence political matters. They confirm the gains diaspora networks have been able to secure for themselves and their home communities. They also speak of a very important communication networks with media, television and radio all playing a major role in showing the growing material means of the diaspora networks. The conceptual shift of 'diaspora as victim' to perceiving the diaspora as a multi-level, empowered actor is very important.

In this respect we realise that several studies point to the detrimental effect of long-established diaspora, like the Ethiopian and Somali in the USA, onto the places of origin. Paul Collier (2006:15), in a recent empirical study, states that if a country that has recently ended a conflict has a large diaspora, the risk that the conflict will resume is sharply increased. Diasporas sometimes harbour rather romanticized attachments to their group of origin, he states, and may nurture grievances as a form of asserting their belonging. He defines economically-strong diaspora as a ready market for rebel groups wanting revenge. Not living in the country, and therefore not having to face the awful consequences of a renewed conflict, diasporas are a source of finance for such conflicts. Stephanie Bjork studied the transmission and durability of the clan identity amongst Somali of the diaspora community in Finland. In her case study, she asserts that the emergence of the Somali diaspora's networks was organized along the lines of the clan divisions on the ground in Somalia; furthermore, these networks exist not only in

Finland but are connected to other networks through transnational links, and continue the clan divisions across multiple countries (Bjork 2007:102). Whilst trying to understand the importance of clan groupings for the Somali diaspora, she also found that the clan identity has become *stronger* once the subject has moved away from his or her region of origin (ibid:104). Yet, quite paradoxically, the prominence of the clan identity is often downplayed or denied by the respondents to her survey (ibid:112). Somehow, the memory of the clan identity and the imagined representation of it have become more salient away from the clan system. “*The signs Somalis use to tell clan are based on stereotypes, a mixture of myth and reality*” (Bjork 2007:106). This would suggest that the clan identity is somehow artificially constructed, an idea rather than a reality. Regarding our original problem, if we accept the fact that identity can be recreated and modified - in this case, towards an intensification of the clan identity amongst Somali diaspora - we could also assume that such a process could be reversed. If clan identity is one of the main inhibitors to the peace process, the diaspora could very well intervene in this issue, either to further compartmentalize their community with the application of exclusive clan identities, or to articulate a more inclusive and fluid identity.

With these premises, we develop our discussion on the basis of the data gathered from our informants (wary of the possible contradiction between their aspirations and the empirical evidence they provide to us), who belong to a diaspora established in a nordic country in a relatively recent period, the 1990s, and benefiting from a welfare system which makes the clan safety-net redundant. With their complex personalities and life experience, the informants articulate issues that converge upon the conceptualisation of a democratic and peaceful reality imagined for their places of origin. We understand that such principles are part of diaspora’s set of values, which have been shaped by the unique position they inhabit between traditional home values and the influence of their host community. Tolerance and dialogue beyond clan and ethnic divisions is actively sought with the belief that it is possible to have a political conflict without fighting

and that regional interests, like the implementation of common economic goals, could be the key to peace. The interviewees point out that those diaspora networks are influenced by such values. A transformation of diasporic identity seems to be taking place, but we would like to discuss whether such changes are relayed to the individuals in the region of origin by exploring the interplay of spatial and temporal dimensions.

The diaspora in the host society seems willing to concentrate on its own diasporic needs and aspirations, also concerning its visions about its specific territories of origin. One urgent matter that diaspora seems to prioritise in the host society is integration, intended as mutual acceptance and understanding of both the receiving host and the African culture. This has become apparent in at least two of our interviews (Idris and Mary Jane). There is talk of an ‘African identity’ that becomes salient as it stands in contrast to the identity of the host-country locals and manages to unify all ethnic groups coming from the African continent: “...*Most of us Africans have this attitude to say that we are Africans*” (Mary Jane).

Mary Jane clearly points to some values that determine what can or cannot be incorporated in diaspora networks’ dialogue in terms of diversity. These include respect for cultural difference, the rejection of ethnic divisions, and respect for women. The confrontation with the host society emerges as one of the strongest common traits that can bring about cohesion within a diaspora; it makes individuals conscious of their status and it can be the common thread in an otherwise very heterogeneous grouping.

Conversely, we still see a struggle when it comes to merging local interests of the several communities forming the diaspora to the larger interests of restoration of the homeland, be it Somalia or the greater Horn. Ethnicity, gender and religion are part of the identity of individual belonging to the networks, and these can negatively affect group cohesion as in the case of the African Network bringing together several nationalities.



At the transnational level of networks, the conflicts on the ground still manage to create divisions. John reveals how the ‘Christmas War’ has made Somali and Ethiopian intellectuals display hostile attitudes even in those forums they created for discussing issues of peace based on shared values of dialogue and understanding. John qualifies the meetings with members from Ethiopian and Somali Diaspora networks working on general issues of Africa, as having suffered a “*step backwards*” in the cooperation, since the Somalis “*are upset because of the war*” and are “*hostile to Ethiopians,*” even intellectuals from the United States. From this experience he concludes that “*in a way it is hard to say that we have achieved a unifying idea, to come together.*”

Diaspora members’ building-blocks of identity seems to be the clan or ethnic identity and individuals are reluctant to renounce these. This does not mean that their identity is not renegotiated and the values of the Western host society are not being incorporated. What we notice, however, is that the division of diaspora along clan, nationality and educational lines is taking place and is a disrupting element for the cohesion of the diaspora members.

On the other hand, the relations between networks based on the clan system also demonstrated some positive achievements. The collaboration between clans in the Diaspora seems possible and in some cases, peace-building through this collaboration seems to be successful. Idris refers to a peace agreement signed in London between two major rivalling clans in Somalia to support this theory. Idris adds that in some instances, members of the Diaspora community can build and demonstrate a heavy influence, partly due to their economic power, and in this respect they can positively influence the actions between clans at home.

The Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean Diaspora face difficulties collaborating because of the conflicts at home, yet they still agree on the importance of the economic factor and of open borders for economic cooperation, which would in turn help to implement cultural harmony across borders. According to Idris, an

economic partnership would be a relatively neutral factor upon which to build unity and it would respect local cultural, ethnic, clan and religious affiliations. From an increased economic cooperation, a regional identity borne on the premises of peace and not on the seeds of destruction could slowly emerge, following the model of the European identity for instance.

While anchorage in the host country is crucial for the articulation of innovative concepts of identity, it is in these territorialised communities that clan and ethnic divisions are reproduced, constrained by the need to negotiate a position within the host society. But, as Cohen (2002) suggests, situations of personal crisis such as the that of being in-between two identities, bear potential for change and innovation. Being distant from home can possibly alienate diaspora members and exacerbate group interests. On the other hand, individuals exposed to the new environment can benefit from stable conditions, gather new experiences and rethink the values of the host country in a way that might be crucial to find stability at home.

From the analysis of our interviews, it appears that strong bonds to the homeland are still prominent and that the will to participate in its development is present to a great extent. One example would be providing information and participating in the political discourse. In their interviews, Idris and John both referred to the vital role of globalisation in reinforcing the power of African diaspora networks operating in a global context. The greater possibilities arising from advances in technology and communication have expanded the means by which diasporic communities can voice their concerns and opinions, particularly in their homelands. Although formed in a local geographical reality, a number of these networks have developed an increasingly global economic activity.

The liberalisation of markets in the global context has made the transfer of capital and financial flows easier, and money transactions can occur rapidly. Compared with their homeland brethren, diaspora networks are more powerful in the Western

countries, and they can effectively mobilise financial resources for providing humanitarian aid to the refugees fleeing from their war-torn nations. This economic power, in turn, has allowed them to develop a more influential political approach regarding issues of crucial importance for their countries of origin.

In our study, it emerged that diaspora has a strong economical and political influence and members of the diaspora enjoy the respect of their clans at home. It seems probable that this trend will continue and, owing to globalisation, society will open up and identity will not remain static but be unbolted for change. The diasporic individual thus becomes a mediator between two worlds, the home identity and the diasporic identity. However, this generally positive framework offered by the globalisation process is not without ambiguities. Although they are offered the possibility to organise and structure their transnational relations, the diasporic networks somehow still fail to substantially influence the political agenda of their war-torn nations. Diaspora networks can fuel the conflicts or passively fail to actually turn their attention to the core of the problems that feed the present conflicts occurring in Somalia. It became clear to us through our discussion with Idris that clan divisions follow Somalis even when they settle in countries far away from Africa. Members who belong to the same clan and operate according to its interests then shape many diaspora networks. Even empowered by globalisation and influenced by other values, it remains questionable whether networks act favorably to the general interest of Somalia or if they amplify the already existing divisions. The power diaspora members have gained in the past few years could be employed to reinforce the hegemony of political groups that are responsible for the current political instability occurring now in the Horn of Africa. Support of this kind could lead to “*extreme nationalism and war*” (Blitz in Kent 2005: 13). When Idris talks about the dissemination of information, he mentions that in the South of Somalia this process only occurs “*from mouth to mouth*”. It is obvious that the ease of communication associated with globalisation is not benefiting all concerned actors.

From our interviews with John and Idris, we deduced that values such as dialogue and exchange of experiences and knowledge are crucial for the formation of a common strategy promoting peace and stability. Although globalisation could actually help diasporic networks to move towards this direction by bringing diaspora members together through advanced means of communication, distances cannot be completely annihilated. The use of media helps to spread the voices of diaspora members when speaking out against repressive regimes in Africa or supporting peace procedures. However, the geographical distance cannot be bridged completely and existing conditions in Somalia or Ethiopia cannot easily be changed. Diaspora networks build their influence from a distance, and they might be unable to convey their transformations to the grass root level in the home country, confronting, among other barriers, the obstruction of governments that do not encourage intellectual influence in political affairs from outside the country.

It should be questioned whether the diaspora networks, as a non-state actor, are able to exert influence in their country of origin. In the host country, it is often the case that economic and political stability predominates, including recognised democratic institutions. In this configuration the diaspora seems to be successful. One could argue that a stable environment is necessary to achieve a notable influence on social developments in the country. It seems that non-state actors need a functioning (and stable) state before being given the chance to exert a positive influence on the conflict situation at home.

Notwithstanding the several divisions and contrasting elements we have highlighted, new narratives are being articulated in those transnational spaces occupied by political activists and especially by intellectuals. John and Idris reveal fascinating visions: the project of a Regional Security Community or a Regional Economic Partnership stressing the values of a unifying cause under which to gather.

Such projects and the process of peace-building seem to be generated externally; yet it could be argued that the process of peace-building needs to start in the homeland and take the local customs into consideration, e.g. the customary Somali laws. There are success stories of good governance, as is the case of Somaliland and Puntland, as well as Ethiopia. Such success stories could be amplified and create an impetus for pressure and opposition from within the nation-states and the region.

While in the spatial dimension divisions are still strong, there is a real potential for diaspora networks to develop de-territorialised spaces for debate based on common values of inclusiveness to strengthen the role of ideas and complete the process of social transformation in a temporal dimension that offers the opportunities for changing the historical legacy of wars and instability.

## **CONCLUSION**

The potential of diaspora networks to contribute to conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa by articulating a regional unifying identity is a difficult factor to measure. We highlighted that such a process is highly ambiguous and dependent on several aspects. We also established that the local dimension was paramount, as it is the place where changes in ideas originate and mature before being conveyed through transnational channels of information.

The advances brought by globalisation cannot yet be capitalised upon, as it seems difficult to link de-territorialised ideas to the homeland. The articulation of a common identity is a process that has first to be initiated amongst the diaspora communities, before it can be transmitted to the grass roots in the home country. The Horn of Africa diaspora settled in the north of Europe is a young phenomenon; their organisation into networks and their contribution in political, economic and social terms has started only recently. As we have highlighted, although they do possess an interesting potential, it is not yet possible to

accurately and fairly assess their involvement in the development and peace process in the Horn. It remains a question whether they are incorporating an inclusive identity supported by local circumstances in the host land, or whether they are mimicking cooperation but are bound to maintain divisions in the long run.

Diaspora networks as Mohan (2002) defines them, are an imagined community, a community based on ideas and issues, but also acting towards specific goals. The analysis at a micro-level of society, through the interview of Mary Jane is quite revealing. She is struggling to find common values to create cohesion under an imagined African identity. We say it is imagined, because it is not quite emergent; the values underlining it need to be constructed and supported. The conscious will to forge a unifying identity, we believe, is crucial to its success. Likewise, diaspora networks, thanks to their deliberate search for common grounds to promote peace and stability, enshrine the possibility to succeed, but their actions and the dissemination of those innovative common values have to be continued in a collective and united effort. Once again, it is a process that is still unfolding and that will require time and targeted actions to become pervasive.

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